func
string | target
string | cwe
list | project
string | commit_id
string | hash
string | size
int64 | message
string | vul
int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
virtual void visit(CharacterClass & /*ope*/) {}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
|
2.6322275363806645e+38
| 1 |
Fix #122
| 0 |
static int kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index, u64 data)
{
struct kvm_hv *hv = to_kvm_hv(kvm);
size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
return -EINVAL;
hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)] = data;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
919f4ebc598701670e80e31573a58f1f2d2bf918
|
1.7231647168857393e+38
| 11 |
KVM: x86: hyper-v: Fix Hyper-V context null-ptr-deref
Reported by syzkaller:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000140-0x0000000000000147]
CPU: 1 PID: 8370 Comm: syz-executor859 Not tainted 5.11.0-syzkaller #0
RIP: 0010:synic_get arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:165 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_hv_set_sint_gsi arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:475 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_hv_irq_routing_update+0x230/0x460 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:498
Call Trace:
kvm_set_irq_routing+0x69b/0x940 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/irqchip.c:223
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x12d0/0x2800 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3959
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Hyper-V context is lazily allocated until Hyper-V specific MSRs are accessed
or SynIC is enabled. However, the syzkaller testcase sets irq routing table
directly w/o enabling SynIC. This results in null-ptr-deref when accessing
SynIC Hyper-V context. This patch fixes it.
syzkaller source: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=163342ccd00000
Reported-by: syzbot+6987f3b2dbd9eda95f12@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 8f014550dfb1 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Make Hyper-V emulation enablement conditional")
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1614326399-5762-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int mov_imm_reg(RAnal* anal, RAnalOp* op, ut16 code){
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;
op->dst = anal_fill_ai_rg (anal, GET_TARGET_REG(code));
op->src[0] = anal_fill_im (anal, (st8)(code & 0xFF));
return op->size;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
77c47cf873dd55b396da60baa2ca83bbd39e4add
|
3.1106218348688295e+38
| 6 |
Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
| 0 |
static SQInteger table_filter(HSQUIRRELVM v)
{
SQObject &o = stack_get(v,1);
SQTable *tbl = _table(o);
SQObjectPtr ret = SQTable::Create(_ss(v),0);
SQObjectPtr itr, key, val;
SQInteger nitr;
while((nitr = tbl->Next(false, itr, key, val)) != -1) {
itr = (SQInteger)nitr;
v->Push(o);
v->Push(key);
v->Push(val);
if(SQ_FAILED(sq_call(v,3,SQTrue,SQFalse))) {
return SQ_ERROR;
}
if(!SQVM::IsFalse(v->GetUp(-1))) {
_table(ret)->NewSlot(key, val);
}
v->Pop();
}
v->Push(ret);
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
squirrel
|
a6413aa690e0bdfef648c68693349a7b878fe60d
|
2.4615522492879736e+38
| 26 |
fix in thread.call
| 0 |
explicit PhiloxRandomOp(OpKernelConstruction* ctx) : OpKernel(ctx) {
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, generator_.Init(ctx));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-197"
] |
tensorflow
|
27b417360cbd671ef55915e4bb6bb06af8b8a832
|
2.222943478870509e+38
| 3 |
Prevent `int64` to `int` truncation in `Shard` API usage.
The function argument in `Shard` must be a function of two `int64` arguments. However, we are passing in a function with two `int` arguments. Thus, for large workloads, these arguments get truncated from positive `int64` values to negative `int` ones, resulting in a buffer out of bounds write.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332557334
Change-Id: I236c9a2e7f53580e520571da8ba941a3aa9fa0b5
| 0 |
size_t curlWriter(char* data, size_t size, size_t nmemb,
std::string* writerData)
{
if (writerData == nullptr) return 0;
writerData->append(data, size*nmemb);
return size * nmemb;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
exiv2
|
c73d1e27198a389ce7caf52ac30f8e2120acdafd
|
3.1042991445366235e+38
| 7 |
Avoid negative integer overflow when `filesize < io_->tell()`.
This fixes #791.
| 0 |
capi_ctr_get(struct capi_ctr *ctr)
{
if (!try_module_get(ctr->owner))
return NULL;
return ctr;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
1f3e2e97c003f80c4b087092b225c8787ff91e4d
|
3.2777829399646135e+37
| 6 |
isdn: cpai: check ctr->cnr to avoid array index out of bound
The cmtp_add_connection() would add a cmtp session to a controller
and run a kernel thread to process cmtp.
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
session->task = kthread_run(cmtp_session, session, "kcmtpd_ctr_%d",
session->num);
During this process, the kernel thread would call detach_capi_ctr()
to detach a register controller. if the controller
was not attached yet, detach_capi_ctr() would
trigger an array-index-out-bounds bug.
[ 46.866069][ T6479] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi.c:483:21
[ 46.867196][ T6479] index -1 is out of range for type 'capi_ctr *[32]'
[ 46.867982][ T6479] CPU: 1 PID: 6479 Comm: kcmtpd_ctr_0 Not tainted
5.15.0-rc2+ #8
[ 46.869002][ T6479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX,
1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
[ 46.870107][ T6479] Call Trace:
[ 46.870473][ T6479] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 46.870974][ T6479] ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
[ 46.871458][ T6479] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x43/0x48
[ 46.872135][ T6479] detach_capi_ctr+0x64/0xc0
[ 46.872639][ T6479] cmtp_session+0x5c8/0x5d0
[ 46.873131][ T6479] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x60/0x60
[ 46.873712][ T6479] ? cmtp_add_msgpart+0x120/0x120
[ 46.874256][ T6479] kthread+0x147/0x170
[ 46.874709][ T6479] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 46.875248][ T6479] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 46.875773][ T6479]
Signed-off-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008065830.305057-1-butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| 0 |
static void construct_reply_common(struct smb_request *req, const char *inbuf,
char *outbuf)
{
srv_set_message(outbuf,0,0,false);
SCVAL(outbuf, smb_com, req->cmd);
SIVAL(outbuf,smb_rcls,0);
SCVAL(outbuf,smb_flg, FLAG_REPLY | (CVAL(inbuf,smb_flg) & FLAG_CASELESS_PATHNAMES));
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_flg2,
(SVAL(inbuf,smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS) |
common_flags2);
memset(outbuf+smb_pidhigh,'\0',(smb_tid-smb_pidhigh));
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_tid,SVAL(inbuf,smb_tid));
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_pid,SVAL(inbuf,smb_pid));
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,SVAL(inbuf,smb_uid));
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_mid,SVAL(inbuf,smb_mid));
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
samba
|
c116652a3050a8549b722ae8ab5f9a2bf9a33b9f
|
2.441270452329892e+38
| 18 |
In chain_reply, copy the subrequests' error to the main request
| 0 |
PHP_METHOD(Phar, mount)
{
char *fname, *arch = NULL, *entry = NULL, *path, *actual;
int fname_len, arch_len, entry_len;
size_t path_len, actual_len;
phar_archive_data *pphar;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "pp", &path, &path_len, &actual, &actual_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(path_len) || ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(actual_len)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
fname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename();
fname_len = (int)strlen(fname);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(fname, fname_len);
#endif
if (fname_len > 7 && !memcmp(fname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
efree(entry);
entry = NULL;
if (path_len > 7 && !memcmp(path, "phar://", 7)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Can only mount internal paths within a phar archive, use a relative path instead of \"%s\"", path);
efree(arch);
return;
}
carry_on2:
if (NULL == (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), arch, arch_len))) {
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, arch, arch_len))) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
}
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s is not a phar archive, cannot mount", arch);
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
carry_on:
if (SUCCESS != phar_mount_entry(pphar, actual, (int)actual_len, path, (int)path_len)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Mounting of %s to %s within phar %s failed", path, actual, arch);
if (path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
}
if (entry && path && path == entry) {
efree(entry);
}
if (arch) {
efree(arch);
}
return;
} else if (PHAR_G(phar_fname_map.u.flags) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), fname, fname_len))) {
goto carry_on;
} else if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, fname, fname_len))) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_copy_on_write(&pphar)) {
goto carry_on;
}
goto carry_on;
} else if (SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(path, (int)path_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
path = entry;
path_len = entry_len;
goto carry_on2;
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "Mounting of %s to %s failed", path, actual);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-281"
] |
php-src
|
e5c95234d87fcb8f6b7569a96a89d1e1544749a6
|
3.2793341526711067e+37
| 85 |
Fix bug #79082 - Files added to tar with Phar::buildFromIterator have all-access permissions
| 0 |
static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
struct sk_buff *skb, int hdrlen,
int frag_threshold)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = tx->local;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct sk_buff *tmp;
int per_fragm = frag_threshold - hdrlen - FCS_LEN;
int pos = hdrlen + per_fragm;
int rem = skb->len - hdrlen - per_fragm;
if (WARN_ON(rem < 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* first fragment was already added to queue by caller */
while (rem) {
int fraglen = per_fragm;
if (fraglen > rem)
fraglen = rem;
rem -= fraglen;
tmp = dev_alloc_skb(local->tx_headroom +
frag_threshold +
tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom +
IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM);
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
__skb_queue_tail(&tx->skbs, tmp);
skb_reserve(tmp,
local->tx_headroom + tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom);
/* copy control information */
memcpy(tmp->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(tmp->cb));
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tmp);
info->flags &= ~(IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT |
IEEE80211_TX_CTL_FIRST_FRAGMENT);
if (rem)
info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_MORE_FRAMES;
skb_copy_queue_mapping(tmp, skb);
tmp->priority = skb->priority;
tmp->dev = skb->dev;
/* copy header and data */
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, hdrlen), skb->data, hdrlen);
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, fraglen), skb->data + pos, fraglen);
pos += fraglen;
}
/* adjust first fragment's length */
skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
return 0;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f
|
2.6011678706689736e+38
| 59 |
mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
| 1 |
static ext3_fsblk_t descriptor_loc(struct super_block *sb,
ext3_fsblk_t logic_sb_block,
int nr)
{
struct ext3_sb_info *sbi = EXT3_SB(sb);
unsigned long bg, first_meta_bg;
int has_super = 0;
first_meta_bg = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_meta_bg);
if (!EXT3_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT3_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_META_BG) ||
nr < first_meta_bg)
return (logic_sb_block + nr + 1);
bg = sbi->s_desc_per_block * nr;
if (ext3_bg_has_super(sb, bg))
has_super = 1;
return (has_super + ext3_group_first_block_no(sb, bg));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc
|
3.3350867290140455e+38
| 18 |
ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
| 0 |
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3(
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
const uint8_t *buf,
size_t plaintext_len,
char **err_msg_out)
{
ssize_t adjust, v2_ver_specific_len, ts_offset;
/* This should only be called on v3 cells */
if (intro->version != 3) {
if (err_msg_out)
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3() called with "
"bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)",
intro->version,
(int)(intro->type));
goto err;
}
/*
* Check that we have at least enough to get auth_len:
*
* 1 octet for version, 1 for auth_type, 2 for auth_len
*/
if (plaintext_len < 4) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of "
"version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
intro->version,
(int)(intro->type));
}
goto err;
}
/*
* The rend_client_send_introduction() function over in rendclient.c is
* broken (i.e., fails to match the spec) in such a way that we can't
* change it without breaking the protocol. Specifically, it doesn't
* emit auth_len when auth-type is REND_NO_AUTH, so everything is off
* by two bytes after that. Calculate ts_offset and do everything from
* the timestamp on relative to that to handle this dain bramage.
*/
intro->u.v3.auth_type = buf[1];
if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
intro->u.v3.auth_len = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 2));
ts_offset = 4 + intro->u.v3.auth_len;
} else {
intro->u.v3.auth_len = 0;
ts_offset = 2;
}
/* Check that auth len makes sense for this auth type */
if (intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ||
intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
if (intro->u.v3.auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"wrong auth data size %d for INTRODUCE%d cell, "
"should be %d",
(int)(intro->u.v3.auth_len),
(int)(intro->type),
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
}
goto err;
}
}
/* Check that we actually have everything up through the timestamp */
if (plaintext_len < (size_t)(ts_offset)+4) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of "
"version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
intro->version,
(int)(intro->type));
}
goto err;
}
if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
intro->u.v3.auth_len > 0) {
/* Okay, we can go ahead and copy auth_data */
intro->u.v3.auth_data = tor_malloc(intro->u.v3.auth_len);
/*
* We know we had an auth_len field in this case, so 4 is
* always right.
*/
memcpy(intro->u.v3.auth_data, buf + 4, intro->u.v3.auth_len);
}
/*
* From here on, the format is as in v2, so we call the v2 parser with
* adjusted buffer and length. We are 4 + ts_offset octets in, but the
* v2 parser expects to skip over a version byte at the start, so we
* adjust by 3 + ts_offset.
*/
adjust = 3 + ts_offset;
v2_ver_specific_len =
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(intro,
buf + adjust, plaintext_len - adjust,
err_msg_out);
/* Success in v2 parser */
if (v2_ver_specific_len >= 0) return v2_ver_specific_len + adjust;
/* Failure in v2 parser; it will have provided an err_msg */
else return v2_ver_specific_len;
err:
return -1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-532"
] |
tor
|
09ea89764a4d3a907808ed7d4fe42abfe64bd486
|
9.60757948502179e+37
| 116 |
Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
| 0 |
PHP_FUNCTION(image_type_to_mime_type)
{
long p_image_type;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &p_image_type) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZVAL_STRING(return_value, (char*)php_image_type_to_mime_type(p_image_type), 1);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
php-src
|
87829c09a1d9e39bee994460d7ccf19dd20eda14
|
2.908720859841715e+38
| 10 |
Fix #70052: getimagesize() fails for very large and very small WBMP
Very large WBMP (width or height greater than 2**31-1) cause an overflow and
circumvent the size limitation of 2048x2048 px. Very small WBMP (less than 12
bytes) cause a read error and are not recognized. This patch fixes both bugs.
| 0 |
int sock_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
err = sk_filter(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
return __sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290
|
2.0824790999316296e+38
| 10 |
net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
Object* global_proxy() {
return context()->global_proxy();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-119"
] |
node
|
530af9cb8e700e7596b3ec812bad123c9fa06356
|
2.7006116888230932e+38
| 3 |
v8: Interrupts must not mask stack overflow.
Backport of https://codereview.chromium.org/339883002
| 0 |
Envoy::StatusOr<ParserStatus> ServerConnectionImpl::onHeadersCompleteBase() {
// Handle the case where response happens prior to request complete. It's up to upper layer code
// to disconnect the connection but we shouldn't fire any more events since it doesn't make
// sense.
if (active_request_) {
auto& headers = absl::get<RequestHeaderMapPtr>(headers_or_trailers_);
ENVOY_CONN_LOG(trace, "Server: onHeadersComplete size={}", connection_, headers->size());
if (!handling_upgrade_ && headers->Connection()) {
// If we fail to sanitize the request, return a 400 to the client
if (!Utility::sanitizeConnectionHeader(*headers)) {
absl::string_view header_value = headers->getConnectionValue();
ENVOY_CONN_LOG(debug, "Invalid nominated headers in Connection: {}", connection_,
header_value);
error_code_ = Http::Code::BadRequest;
RETURN_IF_ERROR(
sendProtocolError(Http1ResponseCodeDetails::get().ConnectionHeaderSanitization));
return codecProtocolError("Invalid nominated headers in Connection.");
}
}
// Inform the response encoder about any HEAD method, so it can set content
// length and transfer encoding headers correctly.
const Http::HeaderValues& header_values = Http::Headers::get();
active_request_->response_encoder_.setIsResponseToHeadRequest(parser_->methodName() ==
header_values.MethodValues.Head);
active_request_->response_encoder_.setIsResponseToConnectRequest(
parser_->methodName() == header_values.MethodValues.Connect);
RETURN_IF_ERROR(handlePath(*headers, parser_->methodName()));
ASSERT(active_request_->request_url_.empty());
headers->setMethod(parser_->methodName());
// Make sure the host is valid.
auto details = HeaderUtility::requestHeadersValid(*headers);
if (details.has_value()) {
RETURN_IF_ERROR(sendProtocolError(details.value().get()));
return codecProtocolError(
"http/1.1 protocol error: request headers failed spec compliance checks");
}
// Determine here whether we have a body or not. This uses the new RFC semantics where the
// presence of content-length or chunked transfer-encoding indicates a body vs. a particular
// method. If there is no body, we defer raising decodeHeaders() until the parser is flushed
// with message complete. This allows upper layers to behave like HTTP/2 and prevents a proxy
// scenario where the higher layers stream through and implicitly switch to chunked transfer
// encoding because end stream with zero body length has not yet been indicated.
if (parser_->isChunked() ||
(parser_->contentLength().has_value() && parser_->contentLength().value() > 0) ||
handling_upgrade_) {
active_request_->request_decoder_->decodeHeaders(std::move(headers), false);
// If the connection has been closed (or is closing) after decoding headers, pause the parser
// so we return control to the caller.
if (connection_.state() != Network::Connection::State::Open) {
return parser_->pause();
}
} else {
deferred_end_stream_headers_ = true;
}
}
return ParserStatus::Success;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
envoy
|
fe7c69c248f4fe5a9080c7ccb35275b5218bb5ab
|
4.748487690840827e+37
| 65 |
internal redirect: fix a lifetime bug (#785)
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Wilk <alyssar@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <mklein@lyft.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Rao <pcrao@google.com>
| 0 |
static void minix_read_inode(struct inode * inode)
{
if (INODE_VERSION(inode) == MINIX_V1)
V1_minix_read_inode(inode);
else
V2_minix_read_inode(inode);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-189"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f5fb09fa3392ad43fbcfc2f4580752f383ab5996
|
1.5383939134106042e+38
| 7 |
[PATCH] Fix for minix crash
Mounting a (corrupt) minix filesystem with zero s_zmap_blocks
gives a spectacular crash on my 2.6.17.8 system, no doubt
because minix/inode.c does an unconditional
minix_set_bit(0,sbi->s_zmap[0]->b_data);
[akpm@osdl.org: make labels conistent while we're there]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
| 0 |
static int run_userns_fn(void *data)
{
struct userns_fn_data *d = data;
char c;
// we're not sharing with the parent any more, if it was a thread
close(d->p[1]);
if (read(d->p[0], &c, 1) != 1)
return -1;
close(d->p[0]);
return d->fn(d->arg);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
lxc
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
8.982434736011185e+36
| 12 |
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
| 0 |
static u32 gen_reqid(struct net *net)
{
struct xfrm_policy_walk walk;
u32 start;
int rc;
static u32 reqid = IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX;
start = reqid;
do {
++reqid;
if (reqid == 0)
reqid = IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX+1;
xfrm_policy_walk_init(&walk, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN);
rc = xfrm_policy_walk(net, &walk, check_reqid, (void*)&reqid);
xfrm_policy_walk_done(&walk);
if (rc != -EEXIST)
return reqid;
} while (reqid != start);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
5.234063346124696e+37
| 20 |
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
TRIO_PUBLIC_STRING int trio_xstring_equal_case_max TRIO_ARGS3((self, max, other),
trio_string_t* self, size_t max,
TRIO_CONST char* other)
{
assert(self);
assert(other);
return trio_equal_case_max(self->content, max, other);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27
|
1.5311070117623215e+38
| 9 |
Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this.
| 0 |
JBIG2Bitmap *JBIG2Bitmap::getSlice(unsigned int x, unsigned int y, unsigned int wA, unsigned int hA)
{
JBIG2Bitmap *slice;
unsigned int xx, yy;
if (!data) {
return nullptr;
}
slice = new JBIG2Bitmap(0, wA, hA);
if (slice->isOk()) {
slice->clearToZero();
for (yy = 0; yy < hA; ++yy) {
for (xx = 0; xx < wA; ++xx) {
if (getPixel(x + xx, y + yy)) {
slice->setPixel(xx, yy);
}
}
}
} else {
delete slice;
slice = nullptr;
}
return slice;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-190"
] |
poppler
|
27354e9d9696ee2bc063910a6c9a6b27c5184a52
|
2.2219358553546082e+38
| 25 |
JBIG2Stream: Fix crash on broken file
https://github.com/jeffssh/CVE-2021-30860
Thanks to David Warren for the heads up
| 0 |
QPDFWriter::disableIncompatibleEncryption(int major, int minor,
int extension_level)
{
if (! this->m->encrypted)
{
return;
}
bool disable = false;
if (compareVersions(major, minor, 1, 3) < 0)
{
disable = true;
}
else
{
int V = QUtil::string_to_int(
this->m->encryption_dictionary["/V"].c_str());
int R = QUtil::string_to_int(
this->m->encryption_dictionary["/R"].c_str());
if (compareVersions(major, minor, 1, 4) < 0)
{
if ((V > 1) || (R > 2))
{
disable = true;
}
}
else if (compareVersions(major, minor, 1, 5) < 0)
{
if ((V > 2) || (R > 3))
{
disable = true;
}
}
else if (compareVersions(major, minor, 1, 6) < 0)
{
if (this->m->encrypt_use_aes)
{
disable = true;
}
}
else if ((compareVersions(major, minor, 1, 7) < 0) ||
((compareVersions(major, minor, 1, 7) == 0) &&
extension_level < 3))
{
if ((V >= 5) || (R >= 5))
{
disable = true;
}
}
}
if (disable)
{
QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDFWriter forced version disabled encryption");
this->m->encrypted = false;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
qpdf
|
1868a10f8b06631362618bfc85ca8646da4b4b71
|
1.7723650254598735e+38
| 56 |
Replace all atoi calls with QUtil::string_to_int
The latter catches underflow/overflow.
| 0 |
static int ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t i, padlen = 0, correct = 1;
unsigned char tmp[POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_MAC_SIZE];
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) );
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "in_msglen (%d) < minlen (%d)",
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->minlen ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
if( ssl->transform_in->ivlen == 0 )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_ARC4_C)
if( ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA )
{
arc4_crypt( (arc4_context *) ssl->transform_in->ctx_dec,
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg,
ssl->in_msg );
} else
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if( ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 )
{
} else
#endif
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
else if( ssl->transform_in->ivlen == 12 )
{
unsigned char *dec_msg;
unsigned char *dec_msg_result;
size_t dec_msglen;
unsigned char add_data[13];
int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#if defined(POLARSSL_AES_C) && defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C)
if( ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 )
{
dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen - ( ssl->transform_in->ivlen -
ssl->transform_in->fixed_ivlen );
dec_msglen -= 16;
dec_msg = ssl->in_msg + ( ssl->transform_in->ivlen -
ssl->transform_in->fixed_ivlen );
dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg;
ssl->in_msglen = dec_msglen;
memcpy( add_data, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
add_data[8] = ssl->in_msgtype;
add_data[9] = ssl->major_ver;
add_data[10] = ssl->minor_ver;
add_data[11] = ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
add_data[12] = ssl->in_msglen & 0xFF;
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
add_data, 13 );
memcpy( ssl->transform_in->iv_dec + ssl->transform_in->fixed_ivlen,
ssl->in_msg,
ssl->transform_in->ivlen - ssl->transform_in->fixed_ivlen );
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
ssl->transform_in->ivlen );
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", dec_msg + dec_msglen, 16 );
memcpy( ssl->transform_in->iv_dec + ssl->transform_in->fixed_ivlen,
ssl->in_msg,
ssl->transform_in->ivlen - ssl->transform_in->fixed_ivlen );
ret = gcm_auth_decrypt( (gcm_context *) ssl->transform_in->ctx_dec,
dec_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
add_data, 13,
dec_msg + dec_msglen, 16,
dec_msg, dec_msg_result );
if( ret != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "AEAD decrypt failed on validation (ret = -0x%02x)",
-ret ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
} else
#endif
return( ret );
}
else
{
/*
* Decrypt and check the padding
*/
unsigned char *dec_msg;
unsigned char *dec_msg_result;
size_t dec_msglen;
size_t minlen = 0, fake_padlen;
/*
* Check immediate ciphertext sanity
*/
if( ssl->in_msglen % ssl->transform_in->ivlen != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0",
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
if( ssl->minor_ver >= SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
minlen += ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
if( ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->ivlen ||
ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->maclen + 1 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) + 1 ) ( + expl IV )",
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen, ssl->transform_in->maclen ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen;
dec_msg = ssl->in_msg;
dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg;
/*
* Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up
*/
if( ssl->minor_ver >= SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
dec_msg += ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
for( i = 0; i < ssl->transform_in->ivlen; i++ )
ssl->transform_in->iv_dec[i] = ssl->in_msg[i];
}
switch( ssl->transform_in->ivlen )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_DES_C)
case 8:
#if defined(POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES)
if( ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA )
{
des_crypt_cbc( (des_context *) ssl->transform_in->ctx_dec,
DES_DECRYPT, dec_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, dec_msg, dec_msg_result );
}
else
#endif
des3_crypt_cbc( (des3_context *) ssl->transform_in->ctx_dec,
DES_DECRYPT, dec_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, dec_msg, dec_msg_result );
break;
#endif
case 16:
#if defined(POLARSSL_AES_C)
if ( ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 )
{
aes_crypt_cbc( (aes_context *) ssl->transform_in->ctx_dec,
AES_DECRYPT, dec_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, dec_msg, dec_msg_result );
break;
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C)
if ( ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 ||
ssl->session_in->ciphersuite == TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 )
{
camellia_crypt_cbc( (camellia_context *) ssl->transform_in->ctx_dec,
CAMELLIA_DECRYPT, dec_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->iv_dec, dec_msg, dec_msg_result );
break;
}
#endif
default:
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
padlen = 1 + ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen - 1];
fake_padlen = 256 - padlen;
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->maclen + padlen )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)",
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen, padlen ) );
padlen = 0;
fake_padlen = 256;
correct = 0;
}
if( ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( padlen > ssl->transform_in->ivlen )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %d, "
"should be no more than %d",
padlen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) );
correct = 0;
}
}
else
{
/*
* TLSv1+: always check the padding up to the first failure
* and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding
*/
for( i = 1; i <= padlen; i++ )
{
if( ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen - i] != padlen - 1 )
{
correct = 0;
fake_padlen = 256 - i;
padlen = 0;
}
}
for( i = 1; i <= fake_padlen; i++ )
{
if( ssl->in_msg[i + 1] != fake_padlen - 1 )
minlen = 0;
else
minlen = 1;
}
if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0)
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
}
}
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
/*
* Always compute the MAC (RFC4346, CBCTIME).
*/
ssl->in_msglen -= ( ssl->transform_in->maclen + padlen );
ssl->in_hdr[3] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 );
ssl->in_hdr[4] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen );
memcpy( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
if( ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( ssl->transform_in->maclen == 16 )
ssl_mac_md5( ssl->transform_in->mac_dec,
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype );
else if( ssl->transform_in->maclen == 20 )
ssl_mac_sha1( ssl->transform_in->mac_dec,
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype );
else if( ssl->transform_in->maclen == 32 )
ssl_mac_sha2( ssl->transform_in->mac_dec,
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype );
else if( ssl->transform_in->maclen != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid MAC len: %d",
ssl->transform_in->maclen ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
}
else
{
/*
* Process MAC and always update for padlen afterwards to make
* total time independent of padlen
*/
if( ssl->transform_in->maclen == 16 )
md5_hmac( ssl->transform_in->mac_dec, 16,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msglen + 13,
ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen );
else if( ssl->transform_in->maclen == 20 )
sha1_hmac( ssl->transform_in->mac_dec, 20,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msglen + 13,
ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen );
else if( ssl->transform_in->maclen == 32 )
sha2_hmac( ssl->transform_in->mac_dec, 32,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msglen + 13,
ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, 0 );
else if( ssl->transform_in->maclen != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid MAC len: %d",
ssl->transform_in->maclen ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
}
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", tmp, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
if( memcmp( tmp, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
correct = 0;
}
/*
* Finally check the correct flag
*/
if( correct == 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
{
ssl->nb_zero++;
/*
* Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack
* (excessive CPU consumption).
*/
if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty "
"messages, possible DoS attack" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
}
else
ssl->nb_zero = 0;
for( i = 8; i > 0; i-- )
if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
break;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) );
return( 0 );
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
polarssl
|
d66f070d492ef75405baad9f0d018b1bd06862c8
|
8.316945656659467e+37
| 357 |
Disable debug messages that can introduce a timing side channel.
Introduced the POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL flag to enable all these debug
messages in case somebody does want to see the reason checks fail.
| 1 |
bool read_key_file(RSA **key_ptr, bool is_priv_key, char **key_text_buffer)
{
String key_file_path;
char *key;
const char *key_type;
FILE *key_file= NULL;
key= is_priv_key ? auth_rsa_private_key_path : auth_rsa_public_key_path;
key_type= is_priv_key ? "private" : "public";
*key_ptr= NULL;
get_key_file_path(key, &key_file_path);
/*
Check for existance of private key/public key file.
*/
if ((key_file= fopen(key_file_path.c_ptr(), "r")) == NULL)
{
sql_print_information("RSA %s key file not found: %s."
" Some authentication plugins will not work.",
key_type, key_file_path.c_ptr());
}
else
{
*key_ptr= is_priv_key ? PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(key_file, 0, 0, 0) :
PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY(key_file, 0, 0, 0);
if (!(*key_ptr))
{
char error_buf[MYSQL_ERRMSG_SIZE];
ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), error_buf, MYSQL_ERRMSG_SIZE);
sql_print_error("Failure to parse RSA %s key (file exists): %s:"
" %s", key_type, key_file_path.c_ptr(), error_buf);
/*
Call ERR_clear_error() just in case there are more than 1 entry in the
OpenSSL thread's error queue.
*/
ERR_clear_error();
return true;
}
/* For public key, read key file content into a char buffer. */
if (!is_priv_key)
{
int filesize;
fseek(key_file, 0, SEEK_END);
filesize= ftell(key_file);
fseek(key_file, 0, SEEK_SET);
*key_text_buffer= new char[filesize+1];
(void) fread(*key_text_buffer, filesize, 1, key_file);
(*key_text_buffer)[filesize]= '\0';
}
fclose(key_file);
}
return false;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
mysql-server
|
25d1b7e03b9b375a243fabdf0556c063c7282361
|
2.32924974965319e+38
| 58 |
Bug #22722946: integer overflow may lead to wrong results in get_56_lenc_string
| 0 |
void eval(CImg<t>& output, const char *const expression,
const double x=0, const double y=0, const double z=0, const double c=0,
CImgList<T> *const list_images=0) const {
_eval(output,0,expression,x,y,z,c,list_images);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
|
3.5906871481814946e+37
| 5 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
| 0 |
ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_next_index_insert_new(HashTable *ht, zval *pData ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
return _zend_hash_index_add_or_update_i(ht, ht->nNextFreeElement, pData, HASH_ADD | HASH_ADD_NEW | HASH_ADD_NEXT ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
4cc0286f2f3780abc6084bcdae5dce595daa3c12
|
1.9083690290616888e+38
| 4 |
Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
| 0 |
vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
int res;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
res = check_true_false(strvec_slot(strvec, 1));
if (res >= 0)
vrrp->lower_prio_no_advert = (unsigned)res;
else
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) invalid lower_prio_no_advert %s specified", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
} else {
/* Defaults to true */
vrrp->lower_prio_no_advert = true;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
keepalived
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
2.9815585574220303e+38
| 16 |
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
| 0 |
get_obj_from_str(str)
VALUE str;
{
const char *s = StringValueCStr(str);
#if TCL_MAJOR_VERSION == 8 && TCL_MINOR_VERSION == 0
return Tcl_NewStringObj((char*)s, RSTRING_LEN(str));
#else /* TCL_VERSION >= 8.1 */
VALUE enc = rb_attr_get(str, ID_at_enc);
if (!NIL_P(enc)) {
StringValue(enc);
if (strcmp(RSTRING_PTR(enc), "binary") == 0) {
/* binary string */
return Tcl_NewByteArrayObj((const unsigned char *)s, RSTRING_LENINT(str));
} else {
/* text string */
return Tcl_NewStringObj(s, RSTRING_LENINT(str));
}
#ifdef HAVE_RUBY_ENCODING_H
} else if (rb_enc_get_index(str) == ENCODING_INDEX_BINARY) {
/* binary string */
return Tcl_NewByteArrayObj((const unsigned char *)s, RSTRING_LENINT(str));
#endif
} else if (memchr(s, 0, RSTRING_LEN(str))) {
/* probably binary string */
return Tcl_NewByteArrayObj((const unsigned char *)s, RSTRING_LENINT(str));
} else {
/* probably text string */
return Tcl_NewStringObj(s, RSTRING_LENINT(str));
}
#endif
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
tk
|
d098136e3f62a4879a7d7cd34bbd50f482ba3331
|
1.0343705325244331e+37
| 33 |
tcltklib.c: use StringValueCStr [ci skip]
* ext/tk/tcltklib.c (set_max_block_time, tcl_protect_core,
ip_init, ip_create_slave_core, get_obj_from_str,
ip_cancel_eval_core, lib_set_system_encoding,
alloc_invoke_arguments, lib_merge_tklist): use StringValueCStr
instead of StringValuePtr for values to be passed to Tcl
interperter.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@55842 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
| 0 |
static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
u32 uval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(current);
int ret;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We release only a lock we actually own:
*/
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
return -EPERM;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
/*
* To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
* again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
* anyone else up:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) &&
cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr, vpid, 0))
goto pi_faulted;
/*
* Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically,
* no need to wake anyone else up:
*/
if (unlikely(uval == vpid))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters
* and do the wakeup if necessary:
*/
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key))
continue;
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this);
/*
* The atomic access to the futex value
* generated a pagefault, so retry the
* user-access and the wakeup:
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* No waiters - kernel unlocks the futex:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
}
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
pi_faulted:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e
|
3.2222418081622963e+38
| 82 |
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi
If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.
Clean it up unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 1 |
aodv_rerr(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
u_int i, dc;
const struct aodv_rerr *ap = (const struct aodv_rerr *)dat;
const struct rerr_unreach *dp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
if (length < sizeof(*ap))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rerr %s [items %u] [%u]:",
ap->rerr_flags & RERR_NODELETE ? "[D]" : "",
ap->rerr_dc, length));
dp = (const struct rerr_unreach *)(dat + sizeof(*ap));
i = length - sizeof(*ap);
for (dc = ap->rerr_dc; dc != 0; dc--) {
ND_TCHECK(*dp);
if (i < sizeof(*dp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " {%s}(%ld)", ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->u_da),
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->u_ds)));
dp++;
i -= sizeof(*dp);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|rerr]"));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tcpdump
|
cbddb98484ea8ec1deece351abd56e063d775b38
|
3.13667531872697e+38
| 28 |
CVE-2017-13002/AODV: Add some missing bounds checks.
In aodv_extension() do a bounds check on the extension header before we
look at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, add the RFC number, and check the validity of the
length for the Hello extension.
| 0 |
gdm_display_finish (GdmDisplay *self)
{
GdmDisplayPrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (GDM_IS_DISPLAY (self), FALSE);
priv = gdm_display_get_instance_private (self);
if (priv->finish_idle_id != 0) {
g_source_remove (priv->finish_idle_id);
priv->finish_idle_id = 0;
}
_gdm_display_set_status (self, GDM_DISPLAY_FINISHED);
g_debug ("GdmDisplay: finish display");
return TRUE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-754"
] |
gdm
|
4e6e5335d29c039bed820c43bfd1c19cb62539ff
|
2.5247965167138807e+38
| 18 |
display: Use autoptr to handle errors in look for existing users
It will make things just cleaner
| 0 |
void OSD::handle_pg_backfill_reserve(OpRequestRef op)
{
const MBackfillReserve *m = static_cast<const MBackfillReserve*>(op->get_req());
assert(m->get_type() == MSG_OSD_BACKFILL_RESERVE);
if (!require_osd_peer(op->get_req()))
return;
if (!require_same_or_newer_map(op, m->query_epoch, false))
return;
PG::CephPeeringEvtRef evt;
if (m->type == MBackfillReserve::REQUEST) {
evt = PG::CephPeeringEvtRef(
new PG::CephPeeringEvt(
m->query_epoch,
m->query_epoch,
PG::RequestBackfillPrio(m->priority)));
} else if (m->type == MBackfillReserve::GRANT) {
evt = PG::CephPeeringEvtRef(
new PG::CephPeeringEvt(
m->query_epoch,
m->query_epoch,
PG::RemoteBackfillReserved()));
} else if (m->type == MBackfillReserve::REJECT) {
// NOTE: this is replica -> primary "i reject your request"
// and also primary -> replica "cancel my previously-granted request"
evt = PG::CephPeeringEvtRef(
new PG::CephPeeringEvt(
m->query_epoch,
m->query_epoch,
PG::RemoteReservationRejected()));
} else {
ceph_abort();
}
if (service.splitting(m->pgid)) {
peering_wait_for_split[m->pgid].push_back(evt);
return;
}
PG *pg = _lookup_lock_pg(m->pgid);
if (!pg) {
dout(10) << " don't have pg " << m->pgid << dendl;
return;
}
pg->queue_peering_event(evt);
pg->unlock();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
ceph
|
5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468
|
2.187658544037379e+38
| 49 |
auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()
| 0 |
xkb_file_type_to_string(enum xkb_file_type type)
{
if (type > _FILE_TYPE_NUM_ENTRIES)
return "unknown";
return xkb_file_type_strings[type];
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
libxkbcommon
|
e3cacae7b1bfda0d839c280494f23284a1187adf
|
6.099840500505003e+37
| 6 |
xkbcomp: fix crashes in the parser when geometry tokens appear
In the XKB format, floats and various keywords can only be used in the
xkb_geometry section. xkbcommon removed support xkb_geometry, but still
parses it for backward compatibility. As part of ignoring it, the float
AST node and various keywords were removed, and instead NULL was
returned by their parsing actions. However, the rest of the code does
not handle NULLs, and so when they appear crashes usually ensue.
To fix this, restore the float AST node and the ignored keywords. None
of the evaluating code expects them, so nice error are displayed.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <ran234@gmail.com>
| 0 |
binlog_trans_log_savepos(THD *thd, my_off_t *pos)
{
DBUG_ENTER("binlog_trans_log_savepos");
DBUG_ASSERT(pos != NULL);
if (thd_get_ha_data(thd, binlog_hton) == NULL)
thd->binlog_setup_trx_data();
binlog_cache_mngr *const cache_mngr=
(binlog_cache_mngr*) thd_get_ha_data(thd, binlog_hton);
DBUG_ASSERT(mysql_bin_log.is_open());
*pos= cache_mngr->trx_cache.get_byte_position();
DBUG_PRINT("return", ("*pos: %lu", (ulong) *pos));
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mysql-server
|
48bd8b16fe382be302c6f0b45931be5aa6f29a0e
|
5.625261796277373e+37
| 13 |
Bug#24388753: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION USING MYSQLD_SAFE
[This is the 5.5/5.6 version of the bugfix].
The problem was that it was possible to write log files ending
in .ini/.cnf that later could be parsed as an options file.
This made it possible for users to specify startup options
without the permissions to do so.
This patch fixes the problem by disallowing general query log
and slow query log to be written to files ending in .ini and .cnf.
| 0 |
static inline const u32 *flow_keys_hash_start(const struct flow_keys *flow)
{
const void *p = flow;
BUILD_BUG_ON(FLOW_KEYS_HASH_OFFSET % sizeof(u32));
return (const u32 *)(p + FLOW_KEYS_HASH_OFFSET);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-330"
] |
linux
|
55667441c84fa5e0911a0aac44fb059c15ba6da2
|
2.2042428642879366e+38
| 7 |
net/flow_dissector: switch to siphash
UDP IPv6 packets auto flowlabels are using a 32bit secret
(static u32 hashrnd in net/core/flow_dissector.c) and
apply jhash() over fields known by the receivers.
Attackers can easily infer the 32bit secret and use this information
to identify a device and/or user, since this 32bit secret is only
set at boot time.
Really, using jhash() to generate cookies sent on the wire
is a serious security concern.
Trying to change the rol32(hash, 16) in ip6_make_flowlabel() would be
a dead end. Trying to periodically change the secret (like in sch_sfq.c)
could change paths taken in the network for long lived flows.
Let's switch to siphash, as we did in commit df453700e8d8
("inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash")
Using a cryptographically strong pseudo random function will solve this
privacy issue and more generally remove other weak points in the stack.
Packet schedulers using skb_get_hash_perturb() benefit from this change.
Fixes: b56774163f99 ("ipv6: Enable auto flow labels by default")
Fixes: 42240901f7c4 ("ipv6: Implement different admin modes for automatic flow labels")
Fixes: 67800f9b1f4e ("ipv6: Call skb_get_hash_flowi6 to get skb->hash in ip6_make_flowlabel")
Fixes: cb1ce2ef387b ("ipv6: Implement automatic flow label generation on transmit")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Berger <jonathann1@walla.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 1 |
f_resolve(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
char_u *p;
#ifdef HAVE_READLINK
char_u *buf = NULL;
#endif
p = tv_get_string(&argvars[0]);
#ifdef FEAT_SHORTCUT
{
char_u *v = NULL;
v = mch_resolve_shortcut(p);
if (v != NULL)
rettv->vval.v_string = v;
else
rettv->vval.v_string = vim_strsave(p);
}
#else
# ifdef HAVE_READLINK
{
char_u *cpy;
int len;
char_u *remain = NULL;
char_u *q;
int is_relative_to_current = FALSE;
int has_trailing_pathsep = FALSE;
int limit = 100;
p = vim_strsave(p);
if (p[0] == '.' && (vim_ispathsep(p[1])
|| (p[1] == '.' && (vim_ispathsep(p[2])))))
is_relative_to_current = TRUE;
len = STRLEN(p);
if (len > 0 && after_pathsep(p, p + len))
{
has_trailing_pathsep = TRUE;
p[len - 1] = NUL; /* the trailing slash breaks readlink() */
}
q = getnextcomp(p);
if (*q != NUL)
{
/* Separate the first path component in "p", and keep the
* remainder (beginning with the path separator). */
remain = vim_strsave(q - 1);
q[-1] = NUL;
}
buf = alloc(MAXPATHL + 1);
if (buf == NULL)
goto fail;
for (;;)
{
for (;;)
{
len = readlink((char *)p, (char *)buf, MAXPATHL);
if (len <= 0)
break;
buf[len] = NUL;
if (limit-- == 0)
{
vim_free(p);
vim_free(remain);
emsg(_("E655: Too many symbolic links (cycle?)"));
rettv->vval.v_string = NULL;
goto fail;
}
/* Ensure that the result will have a trailing path separator
* if the argument has one. */
if (remain == NULL && has_trailing_pathsep)
add_pathsep(buf);
/* Separate the first path component in the link value and
* concatenate the remainders. */
q = getnextcomp(vim_ispathsep(*buf) ? buf + 1 : buf);
if (*q != NUL)
{
if (remain == NULL)
remain = vim_strsave(q - 1);
else
{
cpy = concat_str(q - 1, remain);
if (cpy != NULL)
{
vim_free(remain);
remain = cpy;
}
}
q[-1] = NUL;
}
q = gettail(p);
if (q > p && *q == NUL)
{
/* Ignore trailing path separator. */
q[-1] = NUL;
q = gettail(p);
}
if (q > p && !mch_isFullName(buf))
{
/* symlink is relative to directory of argument */
cpy = alloc((unsigned)(STRLEN(p) + STRLEN(buf) + 1));
if (cpy != NULL)
{
STRCPY(cpy, p);
STRCPY(gettail(cpy), buf);
vim_free(p);
p = cpy;
}
}
else
{
vim_free(p);
p = vim_strsave(buf);
}
}
if (remain == NULL)
break;
/* Append the first path component of "remain" to "p". */
q = getnextcomp(remain + 1);
len = q - remain - (*q != NUL);
cpy = vim_strnsave(p, STRLEN(p) + len);
if (cpy != NULL)
{
STRNCAT(cpy, remain, len);
vim_free(p);
p = cpy;
}
/* Shorten "remain". */
if (*q != NUL)
STRMOVE(remain, q - 1);
else
VIM_CLEAR(remain);
}
/* If the result is a relative path name, make it explicitly relative to
* the current directory if and only if the argument had this form. */
if (!vim_ispathsep(*p))
{
if (is_relative_to_current
&& *p != NUL
&& !(p[0] == '.'
&& (p[1] == NUL
|| vim_ispathsep(p[1])
|| (p[1] == '.'
&& (p[2] == NUL
|| vim_ispathsep(p[2]))))))
{
/* Prepend "./". */
cpy = concat_str((char_u *)"./", p);
if (cpy != NULL)
{
vim_free(p);
p = cpy;
}
}
else if (!is_relative_to_current)
{
/* Strip leading "./". */
q = p;
while (q[0] == '.' && vim_ispathsep(q[1]))
q += 2;
if (q > p)
STRMOVE(p, p + 2);
}
}
/* Ensure that the result will have no trailing path separator
* if the argument had none. But keep "/" or "//". */
if (!has_trailing_pathsep)
{
q = p + STRLEN(p);
if (after_pathsep(p, q))
*gettail_sep(p) = NUL;
}
rettv->vval.v_string = p;
}
# else
rettv->vval.v_string = vim_strsave(p);
# endif
#endif
simplify_filename(rettv->vval.v_string);
#ifdef HAVE_READLINK
fail:
vim_free(buf);
#endif
rettv->v_type = VAR_STRING;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-78"
] |
vim
|
8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075
|
3.3252051904559937e+38
| 199 |
patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others.
| 0 |
void bdrv_set_io_limits(BlockDriverState *bs,
ThrottleConfig *cfg)
{
int i;
throttle_config(&bs->throttle_state, cfg);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
qemu_co_enter_next(&bs->throttled_reqs[i]);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
qemu
|
8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b
|
3.758663522860955e+37
| 11 |
block: Limit request size (CVE-2014-0143)
Limiting the size of a single request to INT_MAX not only fixes a
direct integer overflow in bdrv_check_request() (which would only
trigger bad behaviour with ridiculously huge images, as in close to
2^64 bytes), but can also prevent overflows in all block drivers.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
| 0 |
gif_get8(gif_context_t *s)
{
if (s->img_buffer < s->img_buffer_end) {
return *s->img_buffer++;
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
libsixel
|
7808a06b88c11dbc502318cdd51fa374f8cd47ee
|
5.583469633168989e+37
| 7 |
gif loader: check LZW code size (Issue #75)
| 0 |
flatpak_dir_ensure_bundle_remote (FlatpakDir *self,
GFile *file,
GBytes *extra_gpg_data,
char **out_ref,
char **out_checksum,
char **out_metadata,
gboolean *out_created_remote,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
g_autofree char *ref = NULL;
gboolean created_remote = FALSE;
g_autoptr(GVariant) deploy_data = NULL;
g_autoptr(GVariant) metadata = NULL;
g_autofree char *origin = NULL;
g_autofree char *fp_metadata = NULL;
g_auto(GStrv) parts = NULL;
g_autofree char *basename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GBytes) included_gpg_data = NULL;
GBytes *gpg_data = NULL;
g_autofree char *to_checksum = NULL;
g_autofree char *remote = NULL;
g_autofree char *collection_id = NULL;
if (!flatpak_dir_ensure_repo (self, cancellable, error))
return NULL;
metadata = flatpak_bundle_load (file, &to_checksum,
&ref,
&origin,
NULL, &fp_metadata, NULL,
&included_gpg_data,
&collection_id,
error);
if (metadata == NULL)
return NULL;
gpg_data = extra_gpg_data ? extra_gpg_data : included_gpg_data;
parts = flatpak_decompose_ref (ref, error);
if (parts == NULL)
return NULL;
deploy_data = flatpak_dir_get_deploy_data (self, ref, FLATPAK_DEPLOY_VERSION_ANY, cancellable, NULL);
if (deploy_data != NULL)
{
remote = g_strdup (flatpak_deploy_data_get_origin (deploy_data));
/* We need to import any gpg keys because otherwise the pull will fail */
if (gpg_data != NULL)
{
g_autoptr(GKeyFile) new_config = NULL;
new_config = ostree_repo_copy_config (flatpak_dir_get_repo (self));
if (!flatpak_dir_modify_remote (self, remote, new_config,
gpg_data, cancellable, error))
return NULL;
}
}
else
{
/* Add a remote for later updates */
basename = g_file_get_basename (file);
remote = flatpak_dir_create_origin_remote (self,
origin,
parts[1],
basename,
ref,
gpg_data,
collection_id,
cancellable,
error);
if (remote == NULL)
return NULL;
/* From here we need to goto out on error, to clean up */
created_remote = TRUE;
}
if (out_created_remote)
*out_created_remote = created_remote;
if (out_ref)
*out_ref = g_steal_pointer (&ref);
if (out_checksum)
*out_checksum = g_steal_pointer (&to_checksum);
if (out_metadata)
*out_metadata = g_steal_pointer (&fp_metadata);
return g_steal_pointer (&remote);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-668"
] |
flatpak
|
cd2142888fc4c199723a0dfca1f15ea8788a5483
|
1.161984261131255e+37
| 96 |
Don't expose /proc when running apply_extra
As shown by CVE-2019-5736, it is sometimes possible for the sandbox
app to access outside files using /proc/self/exe. This is not
typically an issue for flatpak as the sandbox runs as the user which
has no permissions to e.g. modify the host files.
However, when installing apps using extra-data into the system repo
we *do* actually run a sandbox as root. So, in this case we disable mounting
/proc in the sandbox, which will neuter attacks like this.
| 0 |
net_peer_address_is_trusted(const char *addr)
{
cfg_t *section;
const char *network;
int i;
int n;
if (!addr)
return false;
if (strncmp(addr, "::ffff:", strlen("::ffff:")) == 0)
addr += strlen("::ffff:");
section = cfg_getsec(cfg, "general");
n = cfg_size(section, "trusted_networks");
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
network = cfg_getnstr(section, "trusted_networks", i);
if (!network || network[0] == '\0')
return false;
if (strncmp(network, addr, strlen(network)) == 0)
return true;
if ((strcmp(network, "localhost") == 0) && (strcmp(addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(addr, "::1") == 0))
return true;
if (strcmp(network, "any") == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
owntone-server
|
246d8ae0cef27377e5dfe9ee3ad87e864d6b6266
|
2.642434923269195e+38
| 35 |
[misc] Fix use-after-free in net_bind()
Thanks to Ba Jinsheng for reporting this bug
| 0 |
set_arg(void __user *b, void *val, int len)
{
if (len <= 0)
len = sizeof(void *);
if (copy_to_user(b, val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
4ab42d78e37a294ac7bc56901d563c642e03c4ae
|
3.36432687471341e+37
| 8 |
ppp, slip: Validate VJ compression slot parameters completely
Currently slhc_init() treats out-of-range values of rslots and tslots
as equivalent to 0, except that if tslots is too large it will
dereference a null pointer (CVE-2015-7799).
Add a range-check at the top of the function and make it return an
ERR_PTR() on error instead of NULL. Change the callers accordingly.
Compile-tested only.
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
References: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.oss.general/17908
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
_ipmi_get_channel_info(struct ipmi_intf *intf,
struct channel_info_t *channel_info)
{
struct ipmi_rs *rsp;
struct ipmi_rq req = {0};
uint8_t data[1];
if (!channel_info) {
return (-3);
}
data[0] = channel_info->channel & 0x0F;
req.msg.netfn = IPMI_NETFN_APP;
req.msg.cmd = IPMI_GET_CHANNEL_INFO;
req.msg.data = data;
req.msg.data_len = 1;
rsp = intf->sendrecv(intf, &req);
if (!rsp) {
return (-1);
} else if (rsp->ccode) {
return rsp->ccode;
} else if (rsp->data_len != 9) {
return (-2);
}
channel_info->channel = rsp->data[0] & 0x0F;
channel_info->medium = rsp->data[1] & 0x7F;
channel_info->protocol = rsp->data[2] & 0x1F;
channel_info->session_support = rsp->data[3] & 0xC0;
channel_info->active_sessions = rsp->data[3] & 0x3F;
memcpy(channel_info->vendor_id, &rsp->data[4],
sizeof(channel_info->vendor_id));
memcpy(channel_info->aux_info, &rsp->data[7],
sizeof(channel_info->aux_info));
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120"
] |
ipmitool
|
9452be87181a6e83cfcc768b3ed8321763db50e4
|
6.291550990820868e+37
| 35 |
channel: Fix buffer overflow
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
The `ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites` function does not properly check
the final response’s `data_len`, which can lead to stack buffer overflow
on the final copy.
| 0 |
eval_op_mult(uschar **sptr, BOOL decimal, uschar **error)
{
uschar *s = *sptr;
int_eximarith_t x = eval_op_unary(&s, decimal, error);
if (*error == NULL)
{
while (*s == '*' || *s == '/' || *s == '%')
{
int op = *s++;
int_eximarith_t y = eval_op_unary(&s, decimal, error);
if (*error != NULL) break;
/* SIGFPE both on div/mod by zero and on INT_MIN / -1, which would give
* a value of INT_MAX+1. Note that INT_MIN * -1 gives INT_MIN for me, which
* is a bug somewhere in [gcc 4.2.1, FreeBSD, amd64]. In fact, -N*-M where
* -N*M is INT_MIN will yielf INT_MIN.
* Since we don't support floating point, this is somewhat simpler.
* Ideally, we'd return an error, but since we overflow for all other
* arithmetic, consistency suggests otherwise, but what's the correct value
* to use? There is none.
* The C standard guarantees overflow for unsigned arithmetic but signed
* overflow invokes undefined behaviour; in practice, this is overflow
* except for converting INT_MIN to INT_MAX+1. We also can't guarantee
* that long/longlong larger than int are available, or we could just work
* with larger types. We should consider whether to guarantee 32bit eval
* and 64-bit working variables, with errors returned. For now ...
* So, the only SIGFPEs occur with a non-shrinking div/mod, thus -1; we
* can just let the other invalid results occur otherwise, as they have
* until now. For this one case, we can coerce.
*/
if (y == -1 && x == EXIM_ARITH_MIN && op != '*')
{
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("Integer exception dodging: " PR_EXIM_ARITH "%c-1 coerced to " PR_EXIM_ARITH "\n",
EXIM_ARITH_MIN, op, EXIM_ARITH_MAX);
x = EXIM_ARITH_MAX;
continue;
}
if (op == '*')
x *= y;
else
{
if (y == 0)
{
*error = (op == '/') ? US"divide by zero" : US"modulo by zero";
x = 0;
break;
}
if (op == '/')
x /= y;
else
x %= y;
}
}
}
*sptr = s;
return x;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-189"
] |
exim
|
7685ce68148a083d7759e78d01aa5198fc099c44
|
2.9620515888663503e+38
| 57 |
Only expand integers for integer math once
| 0 |
io_open_sockets(void)
{
static int already_opened;
if (already_opened || HAVE_OPT( SAVECONFIGQUIT ))
return;
already_opened = 1;
/*
* Create the sockets
*/
BLOCKIO();
create_sockets(NTP_PORT);
UNBLOCKIO();
init_async_notifications();
DPRINTF(3, ("io_open_sockets: maxactivefd %d\n", maxactivefd));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-287"
] |
ntp
|
71a962710bfe066f76da9679cf4cfdeffe34e95e
|
2.947856195186799e+37
| 20 |
[Sec 2936] Skeleton Key: Any trusted key system can serve time. HStenn.
| 0 |
best_effort_strncat_in_locale(struct archive_string *as, const void *_p,
size_t length, struct archive_string_conv *sc)
{
size_t remaining;
const uint8_t *itp;
int return_value = 0; /* success */
/*
* If both from-locale and to-locale is the same, this makes a copy.
* And then this checks all copied MBS can be WCS if so returns 0.
*/
if (sc->same) {
if (archive_string_append(as, _p, length) == NULL)
return (-1);/* No memory */
return (invalid_mbs(_p, length, sc));
}
/*
* If a character is ASCII, this just copies it. If not, this
* assigns '?' character instead but in UTF-8 locale this assigns
* byte sequence 0xEF 0xBD 0xBD, which are code point U+FFFD,
* a Replacement Character in Unicode.
*/
remaining = length;
itp = (const uint8_t *)_p;
while (*itp && remaining > 0) {
if (*itp > 127) {
// Non-ASCII: Substitute with suitable replacement
if (sc->flag & SCONV_TO_UTF8) {
if (archive_string_append(as, utf8_replacement_char, sizeof(utf8_replacement_char)) == NULL) {
__archive_errx(1, "Out of memory");
}
} else {
archive_strappend_char(as, '?');
}
return_value = -1;
} else {
archive_strappend_char(as, *itp);
}
++itp;
}
return (return_value);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libarchive
|
22b1db9d46654afc6f0c28f90af8cdc84a199f41
|
1.946271842459908e+38
| 44 |
Bugfix and optimize archive_wstring_append_from_mbs()
The cal to mbrtowc() or mbtowc() should read up to mbs_length
bytes and not wcs_length. This avoids out-of-bounds reads.
mbrtowc() and mbtowc() return (size_t)-1 wit errno EILSEQ when
they encounter an invalid multibyte character and (size_t)-2 when
they they encounter an incomplete multibyte character. As we return
failure and all our callers error out it makes no sense to continue
parsing mbs.
As we allocate `len` wchars at the beginning and each wchar has
at least one byte, there will never be need to grow the buffer,
so the code can be left out. On the other hand, we are always
allocatng more memory than we need.
As long as wcs_length == mbs_length == len we can omit wcs_length.
We keep the old code commented if we decide to save memory and
use autoexpanding wcs_length in the future.
Fixes #1276
| 0 |
Array_Marshal(BYTE *sourceBuffer, UINT16 sourceSize, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
{
if (buffer != NULL) {
if ((size == NULL) || (*size >= sourceSize)) {
memcpy(*buffer, sourceBuffer, sourceSize);
*buffer += sourceSize;
if (size != NULL) {
*size -= sourceSize;
}
}
else {
pAssert(FALSE);
}
}
return sourceSize;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libtpms
|
3ef9b26cb9f28bd64d738bff9505a20d4eb56acd
|
5.998554577431005e+36
| 18 |
tpm2: Add maxSize parameter to TPM2B_Marshal for sanity checks
Add maxSize parameter to TPM2B_Marshal and assert on it checking
the size of the data intended to be marshaled versus the maximum
buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
| 0 |
static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
{
int ret = -EINVAL;
struct scatterlist sgio;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, big_key_skcipher);
if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(big_key_skcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto error;
}
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, big_key_skcipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
NULL, NULL);
sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, NULL);
if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
else
ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
error:
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
7df3e59c3d1df4f87fe874c7956ef7a3d2f4d5fb
|
8.69360473567933e+37
| 28 |
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| 0 |
make_absent_tree_for_simple_one_char_repeat(Node** node, Node* absent, Node* quant,
Node* body, int possessive, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r;
int i;
int id1;
int lower, upper;
Node* x;
Node* ns[4];
*node = NULL_NODE;
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
ns[0] = ns[1] = NULL_NODE;
ns[2] = body, ns[3] = absent;
lower = QUANT_(quant)->lower;
upper = QUANT_(quant)->upper;
onig_node_free(quant);
r = node_new_save_gimmick(&ns[0], SAVE_RIGHT_RANGE, env);
if (r != 0) goto err;
id1 = GIMMICK_(ns[0])->id;
r = make_absent_engine(&ns[1], id1, absent, body, lower, upper, possessive,
FALSE, env);
if (r != 0) goto err;
ns[2] = ns[3] = NULL_NODE;
r = node_new_update_var_gimmick(&ns[2], UPDATE_VAR_RIGHT_RANGE_FROM_STACK,
id1, env);
if (r != 0) goto err;
x = make_list(3, ns);
if (IS_NULL(x)) goto err0;
*node = x;
return ONIG_NORMAL;
err0:
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
err:
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) onig_node_free(ns[i]);
return r;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
oniguruma
|
aa0188eaedc056dca8374ac03d0177429b495515
|
1.0293044011155604e+38
| 46 |
fix #163: heap-buffer-overflow in gb18030_mbc_enc_len
| 0 |
static int ath6kl_wmi_p2p_info_event_rx(u8 *datap, int len)
{
struct wmi_p2p_info_event *ev;
u32 flags;
u16 dlen;
if (len < sizeof(*ev))
return -EINVAL;
ev = (struct wmi_p2p_info_event *) datap;
flags = le32_to_cpu(ev->info_req_flags);
dlen = le16_to_cpu(ev->len);
ath6kl_dbg(ATH6KL_DBG_WMI, "p2p_info: flags=%x len=%d\n", flags, dlen);
if (flags & P2P_FLAG_CAPABILITIES_REQ) {
struct wmi_p2p_capabilities *cap;
if (dlen < sizeof(*cap))
return -EINVAL;
cap = (struct wmi_p2p_capabilities *) ev->data;
ath6kl_dbg(ATH6KL_DBG_WMI, "p2p_info: GO Power Save = %d\n",
cap->go_power_save);
}
if (flags & P2P_FLAG_MACADDR_REQ) {
struct wmi_p2p_macaddr *mac;
if (dlen < sizeof(*mac))
return -EINVAL;
mac = (struct wmi_p2p_macaddr *) ev->data;
ath6kl_dbg(ATH6KL_DBG_WMI, "p2p_info: MAC Address = %pM\n",
mac->mac_addr);
}
if (flags & P2P_FLAG_HMODEL_REQ) {
struct wmi_p2p_hmodel *mod;
if (dlen < sizeof(*mod))
return -EINVAL;
mod = (struct wmi_p2p_hmodel *) ev->data;
ath6kl_dbg(ATH6KL_DBG_WMI, "p2p_info: P2P Model = %d (%s)\n",
mod->p2p_model,
mod->p2p_model ? "host" : "firmware");
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
5d6751eaff672ea77642e74e92e6c0ac7f9709ab
|
4.673811385935828e+37
| 43 |
ath6kl: add some bounds checking
The "ev->traffic_class" and "reply->ac" variables come from the network
and they're used as an offset into the wmi->stream_exist_for_ac[] array.
Those variables are u8 so they can be 0-255 but the stream_exist_for_ac[]
array only has WMM_NUM_AC (4) elements. We need to add a couple bounds
checks to prevent array overflows.
I also modified one existing check from "if (traffic_class > 3) {" to
"if (traffic_class >= WMM_NUM_AC) {" just to make them all consistent.
Fixes: bdcd81707973 (" Add ath6kl cleaned up driver")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
| 0 |
mark_pages(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_write_state *opts, pdf_obj *val, int pagenum)
{
if (pdf_mark_obj(ctx, val))
return pagenum;
fz_try(ctx)
{
if (pdf_is_dict(ctx, val))
{
if (pdf_name_eq(ctx, PDF_NAME_Page, pdf_dict_get(ctx, val, PDF_NAME_Type)))
{
int num = pdf_to_num(ctx, val);
pdf_unmark_obj(ctx, val);
mark_all(ctx, doc, opts, val, pagenum == 0 ? USE_PAGE1 : (pagenum<<USE_PAGE_SHIFT), pagenum);
page_objects_list_set_page_object(ctx, opts, pagenum, num);
pagenum++;
opts->use_list[num] |= USE_PAGE_OBJECT;
}
else
{
int i, n = pdf_dict_len(ctx, val);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
pdf_obj *key = pdf_dict_get_key(ctx, val, i);
pdf_obj *obj = pdf_dict_get_val(ctx, val, i);
if (pdf_name_eq(ctx, PDF_NAME_Kids, key))
pagenum = mark_pages(ctx, doc, opts, obj, pagenum);
else
mark_all(ctx, doc, opts, obj, USE_CATALOGUE, -1);
}
if (pdf_is_indirect(ctx, val))
{
int num = pdf_to_num(ctx, val);
opts->use_list[num] |= USE_CATALOGUE;
}
}
}
else if (pdf_is_array(ctx, val))
{
int i, n = pdf_array_len(ctx, val);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
pagenum = mark_pages(ctx, doc, opts, pdf_array_get(ctx, val, i), pagenum);
}
if (pdf_is_indirect(ctx, val))
{
int num = pdf_to_num(ctx, val);
opts->use_list[num] |= USE_CATALOGUE;
}
}
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
pdf_unmark_obj(ctx, val);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
return pagenum;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
mupdf
|
520cc26d18c9ee245b56e9e91f9d4fcae02be5f0
|
1.1395620942693807e+37
| 65 |
Bug 689699: Avoid buffer overrun.
When cleaning a pdf file, various lists (of pdf_xref_len length) are
defined early on.
If we trigger a repair during the clean, this can cause pdf_xref_len
to increase causing an overrun.
Fix this by watching for changes in the length, and checking accesses
to the list for validity.
This also appears to fix bugs 698700-698703.
| 0 |
static struct commit *get_revision_1(struct rev_info *revs)
{
if (!revs->commits)
return NULL;
do {
struct commit_list *entry = revs->commits;
struct commit *commit = entry->item;
revs->commits = entry->next;
free(entry);
if (revs->reflog_info)
fake_reflog_parent(revs->reflog_info, commit);
/*
* If we haven't done the list limiting, we need to look at
* the parents here. We also need to do the date-based limiting
* that we'd otherwise have done in limit_list().
*/
if (!revs->limited) {
if (revs->max_age != -1 &&
(commit->date < revs->max_age))
continue;
if (add_parents_to_list(revs, commit, &revs->commits) < 0)
return NULL;
}
switch (simplify_commit(revs, commit)) {
case commit_ignore:
continue;
case commit_error:
return NULL;
default:
return commit;
}
} while (revs->commits);
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
git
|
fd55a19eb1d49ae54008d932a65f79cd6fda45c9
|
2.590069312826178e+38
| 39 |
Fix buffer overflow in git diff
If PATH_MAX on your system is smaller than a path stored, it may cause
buffer overflow and stack corruption in diff_addremove() and diff_change()
functions when running git-diff
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Potapov <dpotapov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
| 0 |
static inline bool is_external_interrupt(u32 intr_info)
{
return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK))
== (INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493
|
4.913958072756869e+37
| 5 |
KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static struct SessionHandle* gethandleathead(struct curl_llist *pipeline)
{
struct curl_llist_element *curr = pipeline->head;
if(curr) {
return (struct SessionHandle *) curr->ptr;
}
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
curl
|
b3875606925536f82fc61f3114ac42f29eaf6945
|
2.9867745996348307e+37
| 9 |
curl_easy_duphandle: CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS read out of bounds
When duplicating a handle, the data to post was duplicated using
strdup() when it could be binary and contain zeroes and it was not even
zero terminated! This caused read out of bounds crashes/segfaults.
Since the lib/strdup.c file no longer is easily shared with the curl
tool with this change, it now uses its own version instead.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20141105.html
CVE: CVE-2014-3707
Reported-By: Symeon Paraschoudis
| 0 |
int ip_mc_join_group_ssm(struct sock *sk, struct ip_mreqn *imr,
unsigned int mode)
{
return __ip_mc_join_group(sk, imr, mode);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
23d2b94043ca8835bd1e67749020e839f396a1c2
|
1.2758611114844205e+38
| 5 |
igmp: Add ip_mc_list lock in ip_check_mc_rcu
I got below panic when doing fuzz test:
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 4056 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G B 5.14.0-rc1-00195-gcff5c4254439-dirty #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0x9b
panic+0x2cd/0x5af
end_report.cold+0x5a/0x5a
kasan_report+0xec/0x110
ip_check_mc_rcu+0x556/0x5d0
__mkroute_output+0x895/0x1740
ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x2d0/0x1050
ip_route_output_key_hash+0x182/0x2e0
ip_route_output_flow+0x28/0x130
udp_sendmsg+0x165d/0x2280
udpv6_sendmsg+0x121e/0x24f0
inet6_sendmsg+0xf7/0x140
sock_sendmsg+0xe9/0x180
____sys_sendmsg+0x2b8/0x7a0
___sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x160
__sys_sendmmsg+0x17e/0x3c0
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9e/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x462eb9
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8
48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48>
3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3df5af1c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462eb9
RDX: 0000000000000312 RSI: 0000000020001700 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3df5af26bc
R13: 00000000004c372d R14: 0000000000700b10 R15: 00000000ffffffff
It is one use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu.
In ip_mc_del_src, the ip_sf_list of pmc has been freed under pmc->lock protection.
But access to ip_sf_list in ip_check_mc_rcu is not protected by the lock.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static double Hamming(const double x,
const ResizeFilter *magick_unused(resize_filter))
{
/*
Offset cosine window function:
.54 + .46 cos(pi x).
*/
const double cosine = cos((double) (MagickPI*x));
magick_unreferenced(resize_filter);
return(0.54+0.46*cosine);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-369"
] |
ImageMagick
|
43539e67a47d2f8de832d33a5b26dc2a7a12294f
|
5.384513463612174e+37
| 11 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1718
| 0 |
u8 append_local_name(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *ptr, u8 ad_len)
{
size_t short_len;
size_t complete_len;
/* no space left for name (+ NULL + type + len) */
if ((HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH - ad_len) < HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH + 3)
return ad_len;
/* use complete name if present and fits */
complete_len = strlen(hdev->dev_name);
if (complete_len && complete_len <= HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH)
return eir_append_data(ptr, ad_len, EIR_NAME_COMPLETE,
hdev->dev_name, complete_len + 1);
/* use short name if present */
short_len = strlen(hdev->short_name);
if (short_len)
return eir_append_data(ptr, ad_len, EIR_NAME_SHORT,
hdev->short_name, short_len + 1);
/* use shortened full name if present, we already know that name
* is longer then HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH
*/
if (complete_len) {
u8 name[HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
memcpy(name, hdev->dev_name, HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH);
name[HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH] = '\0';
return eir_append_data(ptr, ad_len, EIR_NAME_SHORT, name,
sizeof(name));
}
return ad_len;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
e2cb6b891ad2b8caa9131e3be70f45243df82a80
|
3.303075217077456e+38
| 36 |
bluetooth: eliminate the potential race condition when removing the HCI controller
There is a possible race condition vulnerability between issuing a HCI
command and removing the cont. Specifically, functions hci_req_sync()
and hci_dev_do_close() can race each other like below:
thread-A in hci_req_sync() | thread-B in hci_dev_do_close()
| hci_req_sync_lock(hdev);
test_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags); |
... | test_and_clear_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags)
hci_req_sync_lock(hdev); |
|
In this commit we alter the sequence in function hci_req_sync(). Hence,
the thread-A cannot issue th.
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Fixes: 7c6a329e4447 ("[Bluetooth] Fix regression from using default link policy")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| 0 |
void Dispatcher::printSpeed() {
++m_countPrint;
if( m_countPrint > m_vDevices.size() ) {
std::string strGPUs;
double speedTotal = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
for (auto & e : m_vDevices) {
const auto curSpeed = e->m_speed.getSpeed();
speedTotal += curSpeed;
strGPUs += " GPU" + toString(e->m_index) + ": " + formatSpeed(curSpeed);
++i;
}
const std::string strVT100ClearLine = "\33[2K\r";
std::cerr << strVT100ClearLine << "Total: " << formatSpeed(speedTotal) << " -" << strGPUs << '\r' << std::flush;
m_countPrint = 0;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
profanity
|
69ff010c14ff80ec14246772db6a245aa59e6689
|
1.5610308324198899e+38
| 18 |
[FIX] pritive key seed .
| 0 |
bool WebContents::OnGoToEntryOffset(int offset) {
GoToOffset(offset);
return false;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
electron
|
e9fa834757f41c0b9fe44a4dffe3d7d437f52d34
|
1.8942602620634396e+37
| 4 |
fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to appropriate render frames (#33344)
* fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to authorized render frames
Notes: no-notes
* refactor: extract electron API IPC to its own mojo interface
* fix: just check main frame not primary main frame
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <samuel.r.attard@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <sattard@salesforce.com>
| 0 |
PHP_FUNCTION(radius_strerror)
{
char *msg;
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
zval *z_radh;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &z_radh) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(raddesc, radius_descriptor *, &z_radh, -1, "rad_handle", le_radius);
msg = (char *)rad_strerror(raddesc->radh);
RETURN_STRINGL(msg, strlen(msg), 1);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
php-radius
|
13c149b051f82b709e8d7cc32111e84b49d57234
|
2.41319883608671e+37
| 14 |
Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
| 0 |
//! Return iterator to one position after the last image of the list \const.
const_iterator end() const {
return _data + _width;
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
|
1.5451963751904005e+38
| 3 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
| 0 |
static bool is_version_0 (void *opaque, int version_id)
{
return version_id == 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
52f91c3723932f8340fe36c8ec8b18a757c37b2b
|
2.6915499516839263e+38
| 4 |
zaurus: fix buffer overrun on invalid state load
CVE-2013-4540
Within scoop_gpio_handler_update, if prev_level has a high bit set, then
we get bit > 16 and that causes a buffer overrun.
Since prev_level comes from wire indirectly, this can
happen on invalid state load.
Similarly for gpio_level and gpio_dir.
To fix, limit to 16 bit.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
| 0 |
UdfDelete (
IN EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL *This
)
{
PRIVATE_UDF_FILE_DATA *PrivFileData;
if (This == NULL) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
PrivFileData = PRIVATE_UDF_FILE_DATA_FROM_THIS (This);
(VOID)PrivFileData->FileIo.Close(This);
return EFI_WARN_DELETE_FAILURE;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
edk2
|
b9ae1705adfdd43668027a25a2b03c2e81960219
|
2.995835135025268e+38
| 16 |
MdeModulePkg/UdfDxe: Refine boundary checks for file/path name string
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=828
The commit refines the boundary checks for file/path name string to
prevent possible buffer overrun.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Acked-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
| 0 |
static void tcg_commit(MemoryListener *listener)
{
CPUAddressSpace *cpuas;
AddressSpaceDispatch *d;
/* since each CPU stores ram addresses in its TLB cache, we must
reset the modified entries */
cpuas = container_of(listener, CPUAddressSpace, tcg_as_listener);
cpu_reloading_memory_map();
/* The CPU and TLB are protected by the iothread lock.
* We reload the dispatch pointer now because cpu_reloading_memory_map()
* may have split the RCU critical section.
*/
d = atomic_rcu_read(&cpuas->as->dispatch);
atomic_rcu_set(&cpuas->memory_dispatch, d);
tlb_flush(cpuas->cpu);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
qemu
|
04bf2526ce87f21b32c9acba1c5518708c243ad0
|
3.0885704157618777e+38
| 17 |
exec: use qemu_ram_ptr_length to access guest ram
When accessing guest's ram block during DMA operation, use
'qemu_ram_ptr_length' to get ram block pointer. It ensures
that DMA operation of given length is possible; And avoids
any OOB memory access situations.
Reported-by: Alex <broscutamaker@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-Id: <20170712123840.29328-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int btrfs_device_init_dev_stats(struct btrfs_device *device,
struct btrfs_path *path)
{
struct btrfs_dev_stats_item *ptr;
struct extent_buffer *eb;
struct btrfs_key key;
int item_size;
int i, ret, slot;
if (!device->fs_info->dev_root)
return 0;
key.objectid = BTRFS_DEV_STATS_OBJECTID;
key.type = BTRFS_PERSISTENT_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = device->devid;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, device->fs_info->dev_root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (ret) {
for (i = 0; i < BTRFS_DEV_STAT_VALUES_MAX; i++)
btrfs_dev_stat_set(device, i, 0);
device->dev_stats_valid = 1;
btrfs_release_path(path);
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
}
slot = path->slots[0];
eb = path->nodes[0];
item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(eb, slot);
ptr = btrfs_item_ptr(eb, slot, struct btrfs_dev_stats_item);
for (i = 0; i < BTRFS_DEV_STAT_VALUES_MAX; i++) {
if (item_size >= (1 + i) * sizeof(__le64))
btrfs_dev_stat_set(device, i,
btrfs_dev_stats_value(eb, ptr, i));
else
btrfs_dev_stat_set(device, i, 0);
}
device->dev_stats_valid = 1;
btrfs_dev_stat_print_on_load(device);
btrfs_release_path(path);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
e4571b8c5e9ffa1e85c0c671995bd4dcc5c75091
|
3.271053442074086e+38
| 43 |
btrfs: fix NULL pointer dereference when deleting device by invalid id
[BUG]
It's easy to trigger NULL pointer dereference, just by removing a
non-existing device id:
# mkfs.btrfs -f -m single -d single /dev/test/scratch1 \
/dev/test/scratch2
# mount /dev/test/scratch1 /mnt/btrfs
# btrfs device remove 3 /mnt/btrfs
Then we have the following kernel NULL pointer dereference:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 9 PID: 649 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.14.0-rc3-custom+ #35
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:btrfs_rm_device+0x4de/0x6b0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x18bb/0x3190 [btrfs]
? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120
? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80
? do_user_addr_fault+0x201/0x6a0
? lock_release+0xd2/0x2d0
? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[CAUSE]
Commit a27a94c2b0c7 ("btrfs: Make btrfs_find_device_by_devspec return
btrfs_device directly") moves the "missing" device path check into
btrfs_rm_device().
But btrfs_rm_device() itself can have case where it only receives
@devid, with NULL as @device_path.
In that case, calling strcmp() on NULL will trigger the NULL pointer
dereference.
Before that commit, we handle the "missing" case inside
btrfs_find_device_by_devspec(), which will not check @device_path at all
if @devid is provided, thus no way to trigger the bug.
[FIX]
Before calling strcmp(), also make sure @device_path is not NULL.
Fixes: a27a94c2b0c7 ("btrfs: Make btrfs_find_device_by_devspec return btrfs_device directly")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
| 0 |
GF_Err gf_fs_check_gl_provider(GF_FilterSession *session)
{
GF_Event evt;
GF_Err e;
const char *sOpt;
void *os_disp_handler;
if (!session->nb_gl_filters) return GF_OK;
if (gf_list_count(session->gl_providers)) return GF_OK;
if (session->gl_driver) return GF_OK;
session->gl_driver = (GF_VideoOutput *) gf_module_load(GF_VIDEO_OUTPUT_INTERFACE, gf_opts_get_key("core", "video-output") );
if (!session->gl_driver) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_FILTER, ("Failed to load a video output for OpenGL context support !\n"));
return GF_IO_ERR;
}
if (!gf_opts_get_key("core", "video-output")) {
gf_opts_set_key("core", "video-output", session->gl_driver->module_name);
}
session->gl_driver->hw_caps |= GF_VIDEO_HW_INTERNAL;
session->gl_driver->on_event = fsess_on_event;
session->gl_driver->evt_cbk_hdl = session;
os_disp_handler = NULL;
sOpt = gf_opts_get_key("Temp", "OSDisp");
if (sOpt) sscanf(sOpt, "%p", &os_disp_handler);
e = session->gl_driver->Setup(session->gl_driver, NULL, os_disp_handler, GF_TERM_INIT_HIDE);
if (e!=GF_OK) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_FILTER, ("Failed to setup Video Driver %s!\n", session->gl_driver->module_name));
gf_modules_close_interface((GF_BaseInterface *)session->gl_driver);
session->gl_driver = NULL;
return e;
}
//and initialize GL context
memset(&evt, 0, sizeof(GF_Event));
evt.type = GF_EVENT_VIDEO_SETUP;
evt.setup.width = 128;
evt.setup.height = 128;
evt.setup.use_opengl = GF_TRUE;
evt.setup.back_buffer = 1;
//we anyway should'nt call swapBuffer/flush on this object
evt.setup.disable_vsync = GF_TRUE;
session->gl_driver->ProcessEvent(session->gl_driver, &evt);
if (evt.setup.use_opengl) {
gf_opengl_init();
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
da37ec8582266983d0ec4b7550ec907401ec441e
|
9.262588590266771e+36
| 54 |
fixed crashes for very long path - cf #1908
| 0 |
static void display_refresh(struct DisplayState *ds)
{
if (qxl0->mode == QXL_MODE_VGA) {
qemu_spice_display_refresh(&qxl0->ssd);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
qemu-kvm
|
5ff4e36c804157bd84af43c139f8cd3a59722db9
|
2.3823481910301908e+38
| 6 |
qxl: async io support using new spice api
Some of the QXL port i/o commands are waiting for the spice server to
complete certain actions. Add async versions for these commands, so we
don't block the vcpu while the spice server processses the command.
Instead the qxl device will raise an IRQ when done.
The async command processing relies on an added QXLInterface::async_complete
and added QXLWorker::*_async additions, in spice server qxl >= 3.1
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alon Levy <alevy@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int order_lookups(const void *_otl1, const void *_otl2) {
const OTLookup *otl1 = *(const OTLookup **) _otl1, *otl2 = *(const OTLookup **) _otl2;
return( otl1->lookup_index - otl2->lookup_index );
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
fontforge
|
048a91e2682c1a8936ae34dbc7bd70291ec05410
|
2.5728471589917693e+38
| 4 |
Fix for #4084 Use-after-free (heap) in the SFD_GetFontMetaData() function
Fix for #4086 NULL pointer dereference in the SFDGetSpiros() function
Fix for #4088 NULL pointer dereference in the SFD_AssignLookups() function
Add empty sf->fontname string if it isn't set, fixing #4089 #4090 and many
other potential issues (many downstream calls to strlen() on the value).
| 0 |
static int legacy_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
{
fc->fs_private = kzalloc(sizeof(struct legacy_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!fc->fs_private)
return -ENOMEM;
fc->ops = &legacy_fs_context_ops;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
722d94847de29310e8aa03fcbdb41fc92c521756
|
4.197507784369395e+37
| 8 |
vfs: fs_context: fix up param length parsing in legacy_parse_param
The "PAGE_SIZE - 2 - size" calculation in legacy_parse_param() is an
unsigned type so a large value of "size" results in a high positive
value instead of a negative value as expected. Fix this by getting rid
of the subtraction.
Signed-off-by: Jamie Hill-Daniel <jamie@hill-daniel.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: William Liu <willsroot@protonmail.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Tested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
read_cupsd_conf(cups_file_t *fp) /* I - File to read from */
{
int linenum; /* Current line number */
char line[HTTP_MAX_BUFFER],
/* Line from file */
temp[HTTP_MAX_BUFFER],
/* Temporary buffer for value */
*value, /* Pointer to value */
*valueptr; /* Pointer into value */
int valuelen; /* Length of value */
http_addrlist_t *addrlist, /* Address list */
*addr; /* Current address */
cups_file_t *incfile; /* Include file */
char incname[1024]; /* Include filename */
/*
* Loop through each line in the file...
*/
linenum = 0;
while (cupsFileGetConf(fp, line, sizeof(line), &value, &linenum))
{
/*
* Decode the directive...
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Include") && value)
{
/*
* Include filename
*/
if (value[0] == '/')
strlcpy(incname, value, sizeof(incname));
else
snprintf(incname, sizeof(incname), "%s/%s", ServerRoot, value);
if ((incfile = cupsFileOpen(incname, "rb")) == NULL)
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to include config file \"%s\" - %s",
incname, strerror(errno));
else
{
read_cupsd_conf(incfile);
cupsFileClose(incfile);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "<Location") && value)
{
/*
* <Location path>
*/
linenum = read_location(fp, value, linenum);
if (linenum == 0)
return (0);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "<Policy") && value)
{
/*
* <Policy name>
*/
linenum = read_policy(fp, value, linenum);
if (linenum == 0)
return (0);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FaxRetryInterval") && value)
{
JobRetryInterval = atoi(value);
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN,
"FaxRetryInterval is deprecated; use "
"JobRetryInterval on line %d of %s.", linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FaxRetryLimit") && value)
{
JobRetryLimit = atoi(value);
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN,
"FaxRetryLimit is deprecated; use "
"JobRetryLimit on line %d of %s.", linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SSLOptions"))
{
/*
* SSLOptions [AllowRC4] [AllowSSL3] [AllowDH] [DenyCBC] [DenyTLS1.0] [None]
*/
int options = _HTTP_TLS_NONE,/* SSL/TLS options */
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_0,
max_version = _HTTP_TLS_MAX;
if (value)
{
char *start, /* Start of option */
*end; /* End of option */
for (start = value; *start; start = end)
{
/*
* Find end of keyword...
*/
end = start;
while (*end && !_cups_isspace(*end))
end ++;
if (*end)
*end++ = '\0';
/*
* Compare...
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "AllowRC4"))
options |= _HTTP_TLS_ALLOW_RC4;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "AllowSSL3"))
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_SSL3;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "AllowDH"))
options |= _HTTP_TLS_ALLOW_DH;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "DenyCBC"))
options |= _HTTP_TLS_DENY_CBC;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "DenyTLS1.0"))
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_1;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MaxTLS1.0"))
max_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_0;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MaxTLS1.1"))
max_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_1;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MaxTLS1.2"))
max_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_2;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MaxTLS1.3"))
max_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_3;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MinTLS1.0"))
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_0;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MinTLS1.1"))
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_1;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MinTLS1.2"))
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_2;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "MinTLS1.3"))
min_version = _HTTP_TLS_1_3;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(start, "None"))
options = _HTTP_TLS_NONE;
else if (_cups_strcasecmp(start, "NoEmptyFragments"))
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Unknown SSL option %s at line %d.", start, linenum);
}
}
_httpTLSSetOptions(options, min_version, max_version);
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
else if ((!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Port") || !_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Listen")
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| !_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SSLPort") || !_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SSLListen")
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
) && value)
{
/*
* Add listening address(es) to the list...
*/
cupsd_listener_t *lis; /* New listeners array */
/*
* Get the address list...
*/
addrlist = get_address(value, IPP_PORT);
if (!addrlist)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Bad %s address %s at line %d.", line,
value, linenum);
continue;
}
/*
* Add each address...
*/
for (addr = addrlist; addr; addr = addr->next)
{
/*
* See if this address is already present...
*/
for (lis = (cupsd_listener_t *)cupsArrayFirst(Listeners);
lis;
lis = (cupsd_listener_t *)cupsArrayNext(Listeners))
if (httpAddrEqual(&(addr->addr), &(lis->address)) &&
httpAddrPort(&(addr->addr)) == httpAddrPort(&(lis->address)))
break;
if (lis)
{
#ifdef HAVE_ONDEMAND
if (!lis->on_demand)
#endif /* HAVE_ONDEMAND */
{
httpAddrString(&lis->address, temp, sizeof(temp));
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN,
"Duplicate listen address \"%s\" ignored.", temp);
}
continue;
}
/*
* Allocate another listener...
*/
if (!Listeners)
Listeners = cupsArrayNew(NULL, NULL);
if (!Listeners)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to allocate %s at line %d - %s.",
line, linenum, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if ((lis = calloc(1, sizeof(cupsd_listener_t))) == NULL)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to allocate %s at line %d - %s.",
line, linenum, strerror(errno));
break;
}
cupsArrayAdd(Listeners, lis);
/*
* Copy the current address and log it...
*/
memcpy(&(lis->address), &(addr->addr), sizeof(lis->address));
lis->fd = -1;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SSLPort") || !_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SSLListen"))
lis->encryption = HTTP_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
httpAddrString(&lis->address, temp, sizeof(temp));
#ifdef AF_LOCAL
if (lis->address.addr.sa_family == AF_LOCAL)
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Listening to %s (Domain)", temp);
else
#endif /* AF_LOCAL */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO, "Listening to %s:%d (IPv%d)", temp,
httpAddrPort(&(lis->address)),
httpAddrFamily(&(lis->address)) == AF_INET ? 4 : 6);
if (!httpAddrLocalhost(&(lis->address)))
RemotePort = httpAddrPort(&(lis->address));
}
/*
* Free the list...
*/
httpAddrFreeList(addrlist);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "BrowseProtocols") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "BrowseLocalProtocols"))
{
/*
* "BrowseProtocols name [... name]"
* "BrowseLocalProtocols name [... name]"
*/
int protocols = parse_protocols(value);
if (protocols < 0)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown browse protocol \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
break;
}
BrowseLocalProtocols = protocols;
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "DefaultAuthType") && value)
{
/*
* DefaultAuthType {basic,digest,basicdigest,negotiate}
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "none"))
default_auth_type = CUPSD_AUTH_NONE;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "basic"))
default_auth_type = CUPSD_AUTH_BASIC;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "negotiate"))
default_auth_type = CUPSD_AUTH_NEGOTIATE;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "auto"))
default_auth_type = CUPSD_AUTH_AUTO;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN,
"Unknown default authorization type %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "DefaultEncryption"))
{
/*
* DefaultEncryption {Never,IfRequested,Required}
*/
if (!value || !_cups_strcasecmp(value, "never"))
DefaultEncryption = HTTP_ENCRYPT_NEVER;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "required"))
DefaultEncryption = HTTP_ENCRYPT_REQUIRED;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "ifrequested"))
DefaultEncryption = HTTP_ENCRYPT_IF_REQUESTED;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN,
"Unknown default encryption %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "HostNameLookups") && value)
{
/*
* Do hostname lookups?
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "off") || !_cups_strcasecmp(value, "no") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "false"))
HostNameLookups = 0;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "on") || !_cups_strcasecmp(value, "yes") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "true"))
HostNameLookups = 1;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "double"))
HostNameLookups = 2;
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Unknown HostNameLookups %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "AccessLogLevel") && value)
{
/*
* Amount of logging to do to access log...
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "all"))
AccessLogLevel = CUPSD_ACCESSLOG_ALL;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "actions"))
AccessLogLevel = CUPSD_ACCESSLOG_ACTIONS;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "config"))
AccessLogLevel = CUPSD_ACCESSLOG_CONFIG;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "none"))
AccessLogLevel = CUPSD_ACCESSLOG_NONE;
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Unknown AccessLogLevel %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "LogLevel") && value)
{
/*
* Amount of logging to do to error log...
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "debug2"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "debug"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "info"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_INFO;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "notice"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_NOTICE;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "warn"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_WARN;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "error"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_ERROR;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "crit"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_CRIT;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "alert"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_ALERT;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "emerg"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_EMERG;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "none"))
LogLevel = CUPSD_LOG_NONE;
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Unknown LogLevel %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "LogTimeFormat") && value)
{
/*
* Amount of logging to do to error log...
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "standard"))
LogTimeFormat = CUPSD_TIME_STANDARD;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "usecs"))
LogTimeFormat = CUPSD_TIME_USECS;
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Unknown LogTimeFormat %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerTokens") && value)
{
/*
* Set the string used for the Server header...
*/
struct utsname plat; /* Platform info */
uname(&plat);
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "ProductOnly"))
cupsdSetString(&ServerHeader, "CUPS IPP");
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "Major"))
cupsdSetStringf(&ServerHeader, "CUPS/%d IPP/2", CUPS_VERSION_MAJOR);
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "Minor"))
cupsdSetStringf(&ServerHeader, "CUPS/%d.%d IPP/2.1", CUPS_VERSION_MAJOR,
CUPS_VERSION_MINOR);
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "Minimal"))
cupsdSetString(&ServerHeader, CUPS_MINIMAL " IPP/2.1");
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "OS"))
cupsdSetStringf(&ServerHeader, CUPS_MINIMAL " (%s %s) IPP/2.1",
plat.sysname, plat.release);
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "Full"))
cupsdSetStringf(&ServerHeader, CUPS_MINIMAL " (%s %s; %s) IPP/2.1",
plat.sysname, plat.release, plat.machine);
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "None"))
cupsdSetString(&ServerHeader, "");
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Unknown ServerTokens %s on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PassEnv") && value)
{
/*
* PassEnv variable [... variable]
*/
for (; *value;)
{
for (valuelen = 0; value[valuelen]; valuelen ++)
if (_cups_isspace(value[valuelen]) || value[valuelen] == ',')
break;
if (value[valuelen])
{
value[valuelen] = '\0';
valuelen ++;
}
cupsdSetEnv(value, NULL);
for (value += valuelen; *value; value ++)
if (!_cups_isspace(*value) || *value != ',')
break;
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerAlias") && value)
{
/*
* ServerAlias name [... name]
*/
if (!ServerAlias)
ServerAlias = cupsArrayNew(NULL, NULL);
for (; *value;)
{
for (valuelen = 0; value[valuelen]; valuelen ++)
if (_cups_isspace(value[valuelen]) || value[valuelen] == ',')
break;
if (value[valuelen])
{
value[valuelen] = '\0';
valuelen ++;
}
cupsdAddAlias(ServerAlias, value);
for (value += valuelen; *value; value ++)
if (!_cups_isspace(*value) || *value != ',')
break;
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SetEnv") && value)
{
/*
* SetEnv variable value
*/
for (valueptr = value; *valueptr && !isspace(*valueptr & 255); valueptr ++);
if (*valueptr)
{
/*
* Found a value...
*/
while (isspace(*valueptr & 255))
*valueptr++ = '\0';
cupsdSetEnv(value, valueptr);
}
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Missing value for SetEnv directive on line %d of %s.",
linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "AccessLog") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "CacheDir") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ConfigFilePerm") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "DataDir") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "DocumentRoot") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ErrorLog") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FatalErrors") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FileDevice") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FontPath") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Group") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "LogFilePerm") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "LPDConfigFile") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PageLog") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Printcap") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PrintcapFormat") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "RemoteRoot") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "RequestRoot") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerBin") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerCertificate") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerKey") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerKeychain") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerRoot") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SMBConfigFile") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "StateDir") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SystemGroup") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SystemGroupAuthKey") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "TempDir") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "User"))
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO,
"Please move \"%s%s%s\" on line %d of %s to the %s file; "
"this will become an error in a future release.",
line, value ? " " : "", value ? value : "", linenum,
ConfigurationFile, CupsFilesFile);
}
else
parse_variable(ConfigurationFile, linenum, line, value,
sizeof(cupsd_vars) / sizeof(cupsd_vars[0]), cupsd_vars);
}
return (1);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
cups
|
d47f6aec436e0e9df6554436e391471097686ecc
|
2.5883142763435275e+38
| 564 |
Fix local privilege escalation to root and sandbox bypasses in scheduler
(rdar://37836779, rdar://37836995, rdar://37837252, rdar://37837581)
| 1 |
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_export_to_file)
{
X509 * cert;
zval ** zcert;
zend_bool notext = 1;
BIO * bio_out;
long certresource;
char * filename;
int filename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Zp|b", &zcert, &filename, &filename_len, ¬ext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
bio_out = BIO_new_file(filename, "w");
if (bio_out) {
if (!notext) {
X509_print(bio_out, cert);
}
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, cert);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error opening file %s", filename);
}
if (certresource == -1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
php-src
|
2874696a5a8d46639d261571f915c493cd875897
|
1.6472145851439837e+37
| 41 |
Fix CVE-2013-4073 - handling of certs with null bytes
| 0 |
void skb_set_dev(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
skb_dst_drop(skb);
if (skb->dev && !net_eq(dev_net(skb->dev), dev_net(dev))) {
secpath_reset(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
skb_init_secmark(skb);
skb->mark = 0;
skb->priority = 0;
skb->nf_trace = 0;
skb->ipvs_property = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED
skb->tc_index = 0;
#endif
}
skb->dev = dev;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
2.059669988987662e+38
| 17 |
veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
export_remote_greeter_interface (GdmSession *self,
GDBusConnection *connection)
{
GdmDBusRemoteGreeter *remote_greeter_interface;
remote_greeter_interface = GDM_DBUS_REMOTE_GREETER (gdm_dbus_remote_greeter_skeleton_new ());
g_signal_connect (remote_greeter_interface,
"handle-disconnect",
G_CALLBACK (gdm_session_handle_client_disconnect),
self);
g_dbus_interface_skeleton_export (G_DBUS_INTERFACE_SKELETON (remote_greeter_interface),
connection,
GDM_SESSION_DBUS_OBJECT_PATH,
NULL);
self->priv->remote_greeter_interface = remote_greeter_interface;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
gdm
|
5ac224602f1d603aac5eaa72e1760d3e33a26f0a
|
1.8846886778739997e+38
| 20 |
session: disconnect signals from worker proxy when conversation is freed
We don't want an outstanding reference on the worker proxy to lead to
signal handlers getting dispatched after the conversation is freed.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758032
| 0 |
defineAttribute(ELEMENT_TYPE *type, ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, XML_Bool isCdata,
XML_Bool isId, const XML_Char *value, XML_Parser parser)
{
DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *att;
if (value || isId) {
/* The handling of default attributes gets messed up if we have
a default which duplicates a non-default. */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < type->nDefaultAtts; i++)
if (attId == type->defaultAtts[i].id)
return 1;
if (isId && !type->idAtt && !attId->xmlns)
type->idAtt = attId;
}
if (type->nDefaultAtts == type->allocDefaultAtts) {
if (type->allocDefaultAtts == 0) {
type->allocDefaultAtts = 8;
type->defaultAtts = (DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *)MALLOC(type->allocDefaultAtts
* sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE));
if (!type->defaultAtts)
return 0;
}
else {
DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *temp;
int count = type->allocDefaultAtts * 2;
temp = (DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *)
REALLOC(type->defaultAtts, (count * sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)));
if (temp == NULL)
return 0;
type->allocDefaultAtts = count;
type->defaultAtts = temp;
}
}
att = type->defaultAtts + type->nDefaultAtts;
att->id = attId;
att->value = value;
att->isCdata = isCdata;
if (!isCdata)
attId->maybeTokenized = XML_TRUE;
type->nDefaultAtts += 1;
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
libexpat
|
ba0f9c3b40c264b8dd392e02a7a060a8fa54f032
|
1.946584737195108e+38
| 42 |
CVE-2015-1283 Sanity check size calculations. r=peterv, a=abillings
https://sourceforge.net/p/expat/bugs/528/
| 0 |
static bool fuse_block_alloc(struct fuse_conn *fc, bool for_background)
{
return !fc->initialized || (for_background && fc->blocked);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb
|
5.189911409724859e+37
| 4 |
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
static int decode_attr_group(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
const struct nfs_server *server, uint32_t *gid, int may_sleep)
{
uint32_t len;
__be32 *p;
int ret = 0;
*gid = -2;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
len = be32_to_cpup(p);
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
if (!may_sleep) {
/* do nothing */
} else if (len < XDR_MAX_NETOBJ) {
if (nfs_map_group_to_gid(server, (char *)p, len, gid) == 0)
ret = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_GROUP;
else
dprintk("%s: nfs_map_group_to_gid failed!\n",
__func__);
} else
dprintk("%s: name too long (%u)!\n",
__func__, len);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP;
}
dprintk("%s: gid=%d\n", __func__, (int)*gid);
return ret;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
1.853282321017135e+38
| 37 |
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
| 0 |
part_of_refkey(TABLE *table,Field *field)
{
JOIN_TAB *join_tab= table->reginfo.join_tab;
if (!join_tab)
return (Item*) 0; // field from outer non-select (UPDATE,...)
uint ref_parts= join_tab->ref.key_parts;
if (ref_parts) /* if it's ref/eq_ref/ref_or_null */
{
uint key= join_tab->ref.key;
KEY *key_info= join_tab->get_keyinfo_by_key_no(key);
KEY_PART_INFO *key_part= key_info->key_part;
for (uint part=0 ; part < ref_parts ; part++,key_part++)
{
if (field->eq(key_part->field))
{
/*
Found the field in the key. Check that
1. ref_or_null doesn't alternate this component between a value and
a NULL
2. index fully covers the key
*/
if (part != join_tab->ref.null_ref_part && // (1)
!(key_part->key_part_flag & HA_PART_KEY_SEG)) // (2)
{
return join_tab->ref.items[part];
}
break;
}
}
}
return (Item*) 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
server
|
ff77a09bda884fe6bf3917eb29b9d3a2f53f919b
|
3.2606228955037826e+38
| 34 |
MDEV-22464 Server crash on UPDATE with nested subquery
Uninitialized ref_pointer_array[] because setup_fields() got empty
fields list. mysql_multi_update() for some reason does that by
substituting the fields list with empty total_list for the
mysql_select() call (looks like wrong merge since total_list is not
used anywhere else and is always empty). The fix would be to return
back the original fields list. But this fails update_use_source.test
case:
--error ER_BAD_FIELD_ERROR
update v1 set t1c1=2 order by 1;
Actually not failing the above seems to be ok.
The other fix would be to keep resolve_in_select_list false (and that
keeps outer context from being resolved in
Item_ref::fix_fields()). This fix is more consistent with how SELECT
behaves:
--error ER_SUBQUERY_NO_1_ROW
select a from t1 where a= (select 2 from t1 having (a = 3));
So this patch implements this fix.
| 0 |
static uint8_t req_get_seid(struct pending_req *req)
{
if (req->signal_id == AVDTP_DISCOVER)
return 0;
return ((struct seid_req *) (req->data))->acp_seid;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
bluez
|
7a80d2096f1b7125085e21448112aa02f49f5e9a
|
1.879818474047966e+38
| 7 |
avdtp: Fix accepting invalid/malformed capabilities
Check if capabilities are valid before attempting to copy them.
| 0 |
MONGO_EXPORT int mongo_write_concern_finish( mongo_write_concern *write_concern ) {
bson *command;
/* Destory any existing serialized write concern object and reuse it. */
if( write_concern->cmd ) {
bson_destroy( write_concern->cmd );
command = write_concern->cmd;
}
else
command = (bson *)bson_malloc( sizeof( bson ) );
if( !command ) {
return MONGO_ERROR;
}
bson_init( command );
bson_append_int( command, "getlasterror", 1 );
if( write_concern->mode ) {
bson_append_string( command, "w", write_concern->mode );
}
else if( write_concern->w && write_concern->w > 1 ) {
bson_append_int( command, "w", write_concern->w );
}
if( write_concern->wtimeout ) {
bson_append_int( command, "wtimeout", write_concern->wtimeout );
}
if( write_concern->j ) {
bson_append_int( command, "j", write_concern->j );
}
if( write_concern->fsync ) {
bson_append_int( command, "fsync", write_concern->fsync );
}
bson_finish( command );
/* write_concern now owns the BSON command object.
* This is freed in mongo_write_concern_destroy(). */
write_concern->cmd = command;
return MONGO_OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
mongo-c-driver-legacy
|
1a1f5e26a4309480d88598913f9eebf9e9cba8ca
|
3.989105752254089e+37
| 47 |
don't mix up int and size_t (first pass to fix that)
| 0 |
void bio_unmap_user(struct bio *bio)
{
__bio_unmap_user(bio);
bio_put(bio);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-772",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
95d78c28b5a85bacbc29b8dba7c04babb9b0d467
|
2.990886171487564e+38
| 5 |
fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| 0 |
float ComputeIntersectionOverUnion(const TfLiteTensor* decoded_boxes,
const int i, const int j) {
auto& box_i = ReInterpretTensor<const BoxCornerEncoding*>(decoded_boxes)[i];
auto& box_j = ReInterpretTensor<const BoxCornerEncoding*>(decoded_boxes)[j];
const float area_i = (box_i.ymax - box_i.ymin) * (box_i.xmax - box_i.xmin);
const float area_j = (box_j.ymax - box_j.ymin) * (box_j.xmax - box_j.xmin);
if (area_i <= 0 || area_j <= 0) return 0.0;
const float intersection_ymin = std::max<float>(box_i.ymin, box_j.ymin);
const float intersection_xmin = std::max<float>(box_i.xmin, box_j.xmin);
const float intersection_ymax = std::min<float>(box_i.ymax, box_j.ymax);
const float intersection_xmax = std::min<float>(box_i.xmax, box_j.xmax);
const float intersection_area =
std::max<float>(intersection_ymax - intersection_ymin, 0.0) *
std::max<float>(intersection_xmax - intersection_xmin, 0.0);
return intersection_area / (area_i + area_j - intersection_area);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35
|
7.047170976076981e+37
| 16 |
[tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299
Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56
| 0 |
void sqlite3VdbeVerifyNoResultRow(Vdbe *p){
int i;
for(i=0; i<p->nOp; i++){
assert( p->aOp[i].opcode!=OP_ResultRow );
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-755"
] |
sqlite
|
8654186b0236d556aa85528c2573ee0b6ab71be3
|
2.8598030135299374e+38
| 6 |
When an error occurs while rewriting the parser tree for window functions
in the sqlite3WindowRewrite() routine, make sure that pParse->nErr is set,
and make sure that this shuts down any subsequent code generation that might
depend on the transformations that were implemented. This fixes a problem
discovered by the Yongheng and Rui fuzzer.
FossilOrigin-Name: e2bddcd4c55ba3cbe0130332679ff4b048630d0ced9a8899982edb5a3569ba7f
| 0 |
FLAC__bool file_eof_callback_(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, void *client_data)
{
(void)client_data;
return feof(decoder->private_->file)? true : false;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
flac
|
5b3033a2b355068c11fe637e14ac742d273f076e
|
3.368970675683028e+38
| 6 |
src/libFLAC/stream_decoder.c : Fix buffer read overflow.
This is CVE-2014-8962.
Reported-by: Michele Spagnuolo,
Google Security Team <mikispag@google.com>
| 0 |
void r_bin_le_free(r_bin_le_obj_t *bin) {
r_return_if_fail (bin);
free (bin->header);
free (bin->objtbl);
free (bin->filename);
free (bin);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-252"
] |
radare2
|
d7ea20fb2e1433ebece9f004d87ad8f2377af23d
|
2.8247721750078472e+38
| 7 |
Fix #18923 - Fix resource exhaustion bug in LE binary (#18926)
| 0 |
static int kill_something_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, pid_t pid)
{
int ret;
if (pid > 0) {
rcu_read_lock();
ret = kill_pid_info(sig, info, find_vpid(pid));
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (pid != -1) {
ret = __kill_pgrp_info(sig, info,
pid ? find_vpid(-pid) : task_pgrp(current));
} else {
int retval = 0, count = 0;
struct task_struct * p;
for_each_process(p) {
if (task_pid_vnr(p) > 1 &&
!same_thread_group(p, current)) {
int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++count;
if (err != -EPERM)
retval = err;
}
}
ret = count ? retval : -ESRCH;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return ret;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
4ea77014af0d6205b05503d1c7aac6eace11d473
|
8.000552686128805e+36
| 34 |
kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 1 |
static void MapCharsetR(int n)
{
curr->w_ss = 0;
if (curr->w_CharsetR != n) {
curr->w_CharsetR = n;
curr->w_FontR = curr->w_charsets[n];
}
curr->w_gr = 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
screen
|
c336a32a1dcd445e6b83827f83531d4c6414e2cd
|
1.758799656077517e+38
| 9 |
Fix stack overflow due to too deep recursion
Bug: 45713
How to reproduce:
Run this command inside screen
$ printf '\x1b[10000000T'
screen will recursively call MScrollV to depth n/256. This is time consuming and will overflow stack if n is huge.
| 0 |
static void brotli_close_writer(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct contenc_writer *writer)
{
struct brotli_params *bp = (struct brotli_params *) &writer->params;
(void) data;
if(bp->br) {
BrotliDecoderDestroyInstance(bp->br);
bp->br = NULL;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
curl
|
3a09fbb7f264c67c438d01a30669ce325aa508e2
|
2.51059720511297e+38
| 11 |
content_encoding: return error on too many compression steps
The max allowed steps is arbitrarily set to 5.
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32206.html
CVE-2022-32206
Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
Closes #9049
| 0 |
int sock_recv_errqueue(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len,
int level, int type)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb2;
int copied, err;
err = -EAGAIN;
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_error_queue);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
put_cmsg(msg, level, type, sizeof(serr->ee), &serr->ee);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_ERRQUEUE;
err = copied;
/* Reset and regenerate socket error */
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_error_queue.lock);
sk->sk_err = 0;
if ((skb2 = skb_peek(&sk->sk_error_queue)) != NULL) {
sk->sk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb2)->ee.ee_errno;
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_error_queue.lock);
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_error_queue.lock);
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
7bced397510ab569d31de4c70b39e13355046387
|
2.0612658023740533e+38
| 44 |
net_dma: simple removal
Per commit "77873803363c net_dma: mark broken" net_dma is no longer used
and there is no plan to fix it.
This is the mechanical removal of bits in CONFIG_NET_DMA ifdef guards.
Reverting the remainder of the net_dma induced changes is deferred to
subsequent patches.
Marked for stable due to Roman's report of a memory leak in
dma_pin_iovec_pages():
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/3/177
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Cc: David Whipple <whipple@securedatainnovations.ch>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
| 0 |
ikev2_sa_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext1,
u_int osa_length, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth)
{
const struct isakmp_gen *ext;
struct isakmp_gen e;
u_int sa_length;
const u_char *cp;
int i;
int pcount;
u_char np;
u_int item_len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext1);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext1, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, "sa", e.critical);
/*
* ikev2_sub0_print() guarantees that this is >= 4.
*/
osa_length= ntohs(e.len);
sa_length = osa_length - 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", sa_length));
/*
* Print the payloads.
*/
cp = (const u_char *)(ext1 + 1);
pcount = 0;
for (np = ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P; np != 0; np = e.np) {
pcount++;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
if (sa_length < sizeof(*ext))
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
* Since we can't have a payload length of less than 4 bytes,
* we need to bail out here if the generic header is nonsensical
* or truncated, otherwise we could loop forever processing
* zero-length items or otherwise misdissect the packet.
*/
item_len = ntohs(e.len);
if (item_len <= 4)
goto trunc;
if (sa_length < item_len)
goto toolong;
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, item_len);
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
if (np == ISAKMP_NPTYPE_P) {
cp = ikev2_p_print(ndo, np, pcount, ext, item_len,
ep, depth);
if (cp == NULL) {
/* error, already reported */
return NULL;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", NPSTR(np)));
cp += item_len;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
sa_length -= item_len;
}
return cp;
toolong:
/*
* Skip the rest of the SA.
*/
cp += sa_length;
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tcpdump
|
8dca25d26c7ca2caf6138267f6f17111212c156e
|
1.6325357200873606e+38
| 86 |
CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
| 1 |
alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp, int order, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, int node, bool hugepage)
{
struct mempolicy *pol;
struct page *page;
int preferred_nid;
nodemask_t *nmask;
pol = get_vma_policy(vma, addr);
if (pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) {
unsigned nid;
nid = interleave_nid(pol, vma, addr, PAGE_SHIFT + order);
mpol_cond_put(pol);
page = alloc_page_interleave(gfp, order, nid);
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && hugepage)) {
int hpage_node = node;
/*
* For hugepage allocation and non-interleave policy which
* allows the current node (or other explicitly preferred
* node) we only try to allocate from the current/preferred
* node and don't fall back to other nodes, as the cost of
* remote accesses would likely offset THP benefits.
*
* If the policy is interleave, or does not allow the current
* node in its nodemask, we allocate the standard way.
*/
if (pol->mode == MPOL_PREFERRED && !(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL))
hpage_node = pol->v.preferred_node;
nmask = policy_nodemask(gfp, pol);
if (!nmask || node_isset(hpage_node, *nmask)) {
mpol_cond_put(pol);
/*
* First, try to allocate THP only on local node, but
* don't reclaim unnecessarily, just compact.
*/
page = __alloc_pages_node(hpage_node,
gfp | __GFP_THISNODE | __GFP_NORETRY, order);
/*
* If hugepage allocations are configured to always
* synchronous compact or the vma has been madvised
* to prefer hugepage backing, retry allowing remote
* memory with both reclaim and compact as well.
*/
if (!page && (gfp & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM))
page = __alloc_pages_node(hpage_node,
gfp, order);
goto out;
}
}
nmask = policy_nodemask(gfp, pol);
preferred_nid = policy_node(gfp, pol, node);
page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp, order, preferred_nid, nmask);
mpol_cond_put(pol);
out:
return page;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
aa9f7d5172fac9bf1f09e678c35e287a40a7b7dd
|
1.073538905313863e+38
| 66 |
mm: mempolicy: require at least one nodeid for MPOL_PREFERRED
Using an empty (malformed) nodelist that is not caught during mount option
parsing leads to a stack-out-of-bounds access.
The option string that was used was: "mpol=prefer:,". However,
MPOL_PREFERRED requires a single node number, which is not being provided
here.
Add a check that 'nodes' is not empty after parsing for MPOL_PREFERRED's
nodeid.
Fixes: 095f1fc4ebf3 ("mempolicy: rework shmem mpol parsing and display")
Reported-by: Entropy Moe <3ntr0py1337@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+b055b1a6b2b958707a21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: syzbot+b055b1a6b2b958707a21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/89526377-7eb6-b662-e1d8-4430928abde9@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
grub_ext2_mount (grub_disk_t disk)
{
struct grub_ext2_data *data;
data = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_ext2_data));
if (!data)
return 0;
/* Read the superblock. */
grub_disk_read (disk, 1 * 2, 0, sizeof (struct grub_ext2_sblock),
&data->sblock);
if (grub_errno)
goto fail;
/* Make sure this is an ext2 filesystem. */
if (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.magic) != EXT2_MAGIC)
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not an ext2 filesystem");
goto fail;
}
/* Check the FS doesn't have feature bits enabled that we don't support. */
if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->sblock.feature_incompat)
& ~(EXT2_DRIVER_SUPPORTED_INCOMPAT | EXT2_DRIVER_IGNORED_INCOMPAT))
{
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem has unsupported incompatible features");
goto fail;
}
data->disk = disk;
data->diropen.data = data;
data->diropen.ino = 2;
data->diropen.inode_read = 1;
data->inode = &data->diropen.inode;
grub_ext2_read_inode (data, 2, data->inode);
if (grub_errno)
goto fail;
return data;
fail:
if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE)
grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not an ext2 filesystem");
grub_free (data);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
radare2
|
796dd28aaa6b9fa76d99c42c4d5ff8b257cc2191
|
2.0778882744792352e+38
| 51 |
Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
| 0 |
DefineRelation(CreateStmt *stmt, char relkind, Oid ownerId)
{
char relname[NAMEDATALEN];
Oid namespaceId;
List *schema = stmt->tableElts;
Oid relationId;
Oid tablespaceId;
Relation rel;
TupleDesc descriptor;
List *inheritOids;
List *old_constraints;
bool localHasOids;
int parentOidCount;
List *rawDefaults;
List *cookedDefaults;
Datum reloptions;
ListCell *listptr;
AttrNumber attnum;
static char *validnsps[] = HEAP_RELOPT_NAMESPACES;
Oid ofTypeId;
/*
* Truncate relname to appropriate length (probably a waste of time, as
* parser should have done this already).
*/
StrNCpy(relname, stmt->relation->relname, NAMEDATALEN);
/*
* Check consistency of arguments
*/
if (stmt->oncommit != ONCOMMIT_NOOP
&& stmt->relation->relpersistence != RELPERSISTENCE_TEMP)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TABLE_DEFINITION),
errmsg("ON COMMIT can only be used on temporary tables")));
if (stmt->constraints != NIL && relkind == RELKIND_FOREIGN_TABLE)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_WRONG_OBJECT_TYPE),
errmsg("constraints are not supported on foreign tables")));
/*
* Look up the namespace in which we are supposed to create the relation,
* check we have permission to create there, lock it against concurrent
* drop, and mark stmt->relation as RELPERSISTENCE_TEMP if a temporary
* namespace is selected.
*/
namespaceId =
RangeVarGetAndCheckCreationNamespace(stmt->relation, NoLock, NULL);
/*
* Security check: disallow creating temp tables from security-restricted
* code. This is needed because calling code might not expect untrusted
* tables to appear in pg_temp at the front of its search path.
*/
if (stmt->relation->relpersistence == RELPERSISTENCE_TEMP
&& InSecurityRestrictedOperation())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("cannot create temporary table within security-restricted operation")));
/*
* Select tablespace to use. If not specified, use default tablespace
* (which may in turn default to database's default).
*/
if (stmt->tablespacename)
{
tablespaceId = get_tablespace_oid(stmt->tablespacename, false);
}
else
{
tablespaceId = GetDefaultTablespace(stmt->relation->relpersistence);
/* note InvalidOid is OK in this case */
}
/* Check permissions except when using database's default */
if (OidIsValid(tablespaceId) && tablespaceId != MyDatabaseTableSpace)
{
AclResult aclresult;
aclresult = pg_tablespace_aclcheck(tablespaceId, GetUserId(),
ACL_CREATE);
if (aclresult != ACLCHECK_OK)
aclcheck_error(aclresult, ACL_KIND_TABLESPACE,
get_tablespace_name(tablespaceId));
}
/* In all cases disallow placing user relations in pg_global */
if (tablespaceId == GLOBALTABLESPACE_OID)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("only shared relations can be placed in pg_global tablespace")));
/* Identify user ID that will own the table */
if (!OidIsValid(ownerId))
ownerId = GetUserId();
/*
* Parse and validate reloptions, if any.
*/
reloptions = transformRelOptions((Datum) 0, stmt->options, NULL, validnsps,
true, false);
(void) heap_reloptions(relkind, reloptions, true);
if (stmt->ofTypename)
{
AclResult aclresult;
ofTypeId = typenameTypeId(NULL, stmt->ofTypename);
aclresult = pg_type_aclcheck(ofTypeId, GetUserId(), ACL_USAGE);
if (aclresult != ACLCHECK_OK)
aclcheck_error_type(aclresult, ofTypeId);
}
else
ofTypeId = InvalidOid;
/*
* Look up inheritance ancestors and generate relation schema, including
* inherited attributes.
*/
schema = MergeAttributes(schema, stmt->inhRelations,
stmt->relation->relpersistence,
&inheritOids, &old_constraints, &parentOidCount);
/*
* Create a tuple descriptor from the relation schema. Note that this
* deals with column names, types, and NOT NULL constraints, but not
* default values or CHECK constraints; we handle those below.
*/
descriptor = BuildDescForRelation(schema);
localHasOids = interpretOidsOption(stmt->options,
(relkind == RELKIND_RELATION ||
relkind == RELKIND_FOREIGN_TABLE));
descriptor->tdhasoid = (localHasOids || parentOidCount > 0);
/*
* Find columns with default values and prepare for insertion of the
* defaults. Pre-cooked (that is, inherited) defaults go into a list of
* CookedConstraint structs that we'll pass to heap_create_with_catalog,
* while raw defaults go into a list of RawColumnDefault structs that will
* be processed by AddRelationNewConstraints. (We can't deal with raw
* expressions until we can do transformExpr.)
*
* We can set the atthasdef flags now in the tuple descriptor; this just
* saves StoreAttrDefault from having to do an immediate update of the
* pg_attribute rows.
*/
rawDefaults = NIL;
cookedDefaults = NIL;
attnum = 0;
foreach(listptr, schema)
{
ColumnDef *colDef = lfirst(listptr);
attnum++;
if (colDef->raw_default != NULL)
{
RawColumnDefault *rawEnt;
Assert(colDef->cooked_default == NULL);
rawEnt = (RawColumnDefault *) palloc(sizeof(RawColumnDefault));
rawEnt->attnum = attnum;
rawEnt->raw_default = colDef->raw_default;
rawDefaults = lappend(rawDefaults, rawEnt);
descriptor->attrs[attnum - 1]->atthasdef = true;
}
else if (colDef->cooked_default != NULL)
{
CookedConstraint *cooked;
cooked = (CookedConstraint *) palloc(sizeof(CookedConstraint));
cooked->contype = CONSTR_DEFAULT;
cooked->name = NULL;
cooked->attnum = attnum;
cooked->expr = colDef->cooked_default;
cooked->skip_validation = false;
cooked->is_local = true; /* not used for defaults */
cooked->inhcount = 0; /* ditto */
cooked->is_no_inherit = false;
cookedDefaults = lappend(cookedDefaults, cooked);
descriptor->attrs[attnum - 1]->atthasdef = true;
}
}
/*
* Create the relation. Inherited defaults and constraints are passed in
* for immediate handling --- since they don't need parsing, they can be
* stored immediately.
*/
relationId = heap_create_with_catalog(relname,
namespaceId,
tablespaceId,
InvalidOid,
InvalidOid,
ofTypeId,
ownerId,
descriptor,
list_concat(cookedDefaults,
old_constraints),
relkind,
stmt->relation->relpersistence,
false,
false,
localHasOids,
parentOidCount,
stmt->oncommit,
reloptions,
true,
allowSystemTableMods,
false);
/* Store inheritance information for new rel. */
StoreCatalogInheritance(relationId, inheritOids);
/*
* We must bump the command counter to make the newly-created relation
* tuple visible for opening.
*/
CommandCounterIncrement();
/*
* Open the new relation and acquire exclusive lock on it. This isn't
* really necessary for locking out other backends (since they can't see
* the new rel anyway until we commit), but it keeps the lock manager from
* complaining about deadlock risks.
*/
rel = relation_open(relationId, AccessExclusiveLock);
/*
* Now add any newly specified column default values and CHECK constraints
* to the new relation. These are passed to us in the form of raw
* parsetrees; we need to transform them to executable expression trees
* before they can be added. The most convenient way to do that is to
* apply the parser's transformExpr routine, but transformExpr doesn't
* work unless we have a pre-existing relation. So, the transformation has
* to be postponed to this final step of CREATE TABLE.
*/
if (rawDefaults || stmt->constraints)
AddRelationNewConstraints(rel, rawDefaults, stmt->constraints,
true, true, false);
/*
* Clean up. We keep lock on new relation (although it shouldn't be
* visible to anyone else anyway, until commit).
*/
relation_close(rel, NoLock);
return relationId;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
postgres
|
5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a
|
8.528213465093404e+36
| 254 |
Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062
| 0 |
static void cache_space_invalidate(JournalStorageSpace *space) {
zero(*space);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-770"
] |
systemd
|
084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f
|
2.6732346839008118e+38
| 3 |
journald: do not store the iovec entry for process commandline on stack
This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under
control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
allocation for it.
CVE-2018-16864
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because
journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
| 0 |
struct nfs_commit_data *nfs_commitdata_alloc(void)
{
struct nfs_commit_data *p = mempool_alloc(nfs_commit_mempool, GFP_NOIO);
if (p) {
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pages);
}
return p;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
c7559663e42f4294ffe31fe159da6b6a66b35d61
|
2.761432296619476e+38
| 10 |
NFS: Allow nfs_updatepage to extend a write under additional circumstances
Currently nfs_updatepage allows a write to be extended to cover a full
page only if we don't have a byte range lock lock on the file... but if
we have a write delegation on the file or if we have the whole file
locked for writing then we should be allowed to extend the write as
well.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
[Trond: fix up call to nfs_have_delegation()]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
| 0 |
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
union sctp_addr from_addr;
struct sctp_transport *link;
sctp_sender_hb_info_t *hbinfo;
unsigned long max_interval;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the HEARTBEAT-ACK chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_heartbeat_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data;
/* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */
if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) !=
sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) {
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
from_addr = hbinfo->daddr;
link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr);
/* This should never happen, but lets log it if so. */
if (unlikely(!link)) {
if (from_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s association %p could not find address %pI6\n",
__func__,
asoc,
&from_addr.v6.sin6_addr);
} else {
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s association %p could not find address %pI4\n",
__func__,
asoc,
&from_addr.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* Validate the 64-bit random nonce. */
if (hbinfo->hb_nonce != link->hb_nonce)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
max_interval = link->hbinterval + link->rto;
/* Check if the timestamp looks valid. */
if (time_after(hbinfo->sent_at, jiffies) ||
time_after(jiffies, hbinfo->sent_at + max_interval)) {
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: HEARTBEAT ACK with invalid timestamp "
"received for transport: %p\n",
__func__, link);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* 8.3 Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK, the sender of
* the HEARTBEAT should clear the error counter of the
* destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT was
* sent and mark the destination transport address as active if
* it is not so marked.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TRANSPORT_ON, SCTP_TRANSPORT(link));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9fcb95a105758b81ef0131cd18e2db5149f13e95
|
4.494055154210933e+37
| 75 |
sctp: Avoid memory overflow while FWD-TSN chunk is received with bad stream ID
If FWD-TSN chunk is received with bad stream ID, the sctp will not do the
validity check, this may cause memory overflow when overwrite the TSN of
the stream ID.
The FORWARD-TSN chunk is like this:
FORWARD-TSN chunk
Type = 192
Flags = 0
Length = 172
NewTSN = 99
Stream = 10000
StreamSequence = 0xFFFF
This patch fix this problem by discard the chunk if stream ID is not
less than MIS.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
struct buffer_page *reader = NULL;
unsigned long overwrite;
unsigned long flags;
int nr_loops = 0;
int ret;
local_irq_save(flags);
arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
again:
/*
* This should normally only loop twice. But because the
* start of the reader inserts an empty page, it causes
* a case where we will loop three times. There should be no
* reason to loop four times (that I know of).
*/
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > 3)) {
reader = NULL;
goto out;
}
reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
/* If there's more to read, return this page */
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))
goto out;
/* Never should we have an index greater than the size */
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
cpu_buffer->reader_page->read > rb_page_size(reader)))
goto out;
/* check if we caught up to the tail */
reader = NULL;
if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
goto out;
/* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
goto out;
/*
* Reset the reader page to size zero.
*/
local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->page->commit, 0);
cpu_buffer->reader_page->real_end = 0;
spin:
/*
* Splice the empty reader page into the list around the head.
*/
reader = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
if (!reader)
goto out;
cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.next = rb_list_head(reader->list.next);
cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.prev = reader->list.prev;
/*
* cpu_buffer->pages just needs to point to the buffer, it
* has no specific buffer page to point to. Lets move it out
* of our way so we don't accidentally swap it.
*/
cpu_buffer->pages = reader->list.prev;
/* The reader page will be pointing to the new head */
rb_set_list_to_head(cpu_buffer, &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
/*
* We want to make sure we read the overruns after we set up our
* pointers to the next object. The writer side does a
* cmpxchg to cross pages which acts as the mb on the writer
* side. Note, the reader will constantly fail the swap
* while the writer is updating the pointers, so this
* guarantees that the overwrite recorded here is the one we
* want to compare with the last_overrun.
*/
smp_mb();
overwrite = local_read(&(cpu_buffer->overrun));
/*
* Here's the tricky part.
*
* We need to move the pointer past the header page.
* But we can only do that if a writer is not currently
* moving it. The page before the header page has the
* flag bit '1' set if it is pointing to the page we want.
* but if the writer is in the process of moving it
* than it will be '2' or already moved '0'.
*/
ret = rb_head_page_replace(reader, cpu_buffer->reader_page);
/*
* If we did not convert it, then we must try again.
*/
if (!ret)
goto spin;
/*
* Yeah! We succeeded in replacing the page.
*
* Now make the new head point back to the reader page.
*/
rb_list_head(reader->list.next)->prev = &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list;
rb_inc_page(cpu_buffer, &cpu_buffer->head_page);
/* Finally update the reader page to the new head */
cpu_buffer->reader_page = reader;
cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
if (overwrite != cpu_buffer->last_overrun) {
cpu_buffer->lost_events = overwrite - cpu_buffer->last_overrun;
cpu_buffer->last_overrun = overwrite;
}
goto again;
out:
/* Update the read_stamp on the first event */
if (reader && reader->read == 0)
cpu_buffer->read_stamp = reader->page->time_stamp;
arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return reader;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
linux-stable
|
59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
|
1.4524254387658226e+38
| 131 |
ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
| 0 |
char **file_lines_parse(char *p, size_t size, int *numlines, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
{
int i;
char *s, **ret;
if (!p) return NULL;
for (s = p, i=0; s < p+size; s++) {
if (s[0] == '\n') i++;
}
ret = talloc_array(mem_ctx, char *, i+2);
if (!ret) {
talloc_free(p);
return NULL;
}
talloc_steal(ret, p);
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(ret[0])*(i+2));
ret[0] = p;
for (s = p, i=0; s < p+size; s++) {
if (s[0] == '\n') {
s[0] = 0;
i++;
ret[i] = s+1;
}
if (s[0] == '\r') s[0] = 0;
}
/* remove any blank lines at the end */
while (i > 0 && ret[i-1][0] == 0) {
i--;
}
if (numlines) *numlines = i;
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
samba
|
63d98ed90466295d0e946f79868d3d7aad6e7589
|
8.019119612037256e+37
| 40 |
CVE-2013-4476: lib-util: split out file_save_mode() from file_save()
file_save_mode() writes files with specified mode.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10234
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb@sernet.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
| 0 |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL zend_binary_assign_op_helper_SPEC_UNUSED_VAR(int (*binary_op)(zval *result, zval *op1, zval *op2 TSRMLS_DC), ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
zend_free_op free_op2, free_op_data2, free_op_data1;
zval **var_ptr;
zval *value;
switch (opline->extended_value) {
case ZEND_ASSIGN_OBJ:
return zend_binary_assign_op_obj_helper_SPEC_UNUSED_VAR(binary_op, ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS_PASSTHRU);
break;
case ZEND_ASSIGN_DIM: {
zval **container = _get_obj_zval_ptr_ptr_unused(TSRMLS_C);
if (IS_UNUSED == IS_VAR && !container) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Cannot use string offset as an array");
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(container) == IS_OBJECT) {
if (IS_UNUSED == IS_VAR && !0) {
Z_ADDREF_PP(container); /* undo the effect of get_obj_zval_ptr_ptr() */
}
return zend_binary_assign_op_obj_helper_SPEC_UNUSED_VAR(binary_op, ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS_PASSTHRU);
} else {
zend_op *op_data = opline+1;
zval *dim = _get_zval_ptr_var(&opline->op2, EX(Ts), &free_op2 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_fetch_dimension_address(&EX_T(op_data->op2.u.var), container, dim, 0, BP_VAR_RW TSRMLS_CC);
value = get_zval_ptr(&op_data->op1, EX(Ts), &free_op_data1, BP_VAR_R);
var_ptr = _get_zval_ptr_ptr_var(&op_data->op2, EX(Ts), &free_op_data2 TSRMLS_CC);
ZEND_VM_INC_OPCODE();
}
}
break;
default:
value = _get_zval_ptr_var(&opline->op2, EX(Ts), &free_op2 TSRMLS_CC);
var_ptr = NULL;
/* do nothing */
break;
}
if (!var_ptr) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Cannot use assign-op operators with overloaded objects nor string offsets");
}
if (*var_ptr == EG(error_zval_ptr)) {
if (!RETURN_VALUE_UNUSED(&opline->result)) {
AI_SET_PTR(EX_T(opline->result.u.var).var, EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr));
PZVAL_LOCK(EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr));
}
if (free_op2.var) {zval_ptr_dtor(&free_op2.var);};
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
}
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(var_ptr);
if(Z_TYPE_PP(var_ptr) == IS_OBJECT && Z_OBJ_HANDLER_PP(var_ptr, get)
&& Z_OBJ_HANDLER_PP(var_ptr, set)) {
/* proxy object */
zval *objval = Z_OBJ_HANDLER_PP(var_ptr, get)(*var_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
Z_ADDREF_P(objval);
binary_op(objval, objval, value TSRMLS_CC);
Z_OBJ_HANDLER_PP(var_ptr, set)(var_ptr, objval TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&objval);
} else {
binary_op(*var_ptr, *var_ptr, value TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!RETURN_VALUE_UNUSED(&opline->result)) {
AI_SET_PTR(EX_T(opline->result.u.var).var, *var_ptr);
PZVAL_LOCK(*var_ptr);
}
if (free_op2.var) {zval_ptr_dtor(&free_op2.var);};
if (opline->extended_value == ZEND_ASSIGN_DIM) {
FREE_OP(free_op_data1);
FREE_OP_VAR_PTR(free_op_data2);
}
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
php-src
|
ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd
|
2.1283336014925765e+38
| 80 |
- fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus
| 0 |
static bool is_ivb_ioat(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
switch (pdev->device) {
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB0:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB1:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB2:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB3:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB4:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB5:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB6:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB7:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB8:
case PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_IOAT_IVB9:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
7bced397510ab569d31de4c70b39e13355046387
|
2.6313528032267494e+38
| 19 |
net_dma: simple removal
Per commit "77873803363c net_dma: mark broken" net_dma is no longer used
and there is no plan to fix it.
This is the mechanical removal of bits in CONFIG_NET_DMA ifdef guards.
Reverting the remainder of the net_dma induced changes is deferred to
subsequent patches.
Marked for stable due to Roman's report of a memory leak in
dma_pin_iovec_pages():
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/3/177
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Cc: David Whipple <whipple@securedatainnovations.ch>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
| 0 |
static int bus_add_match_full(
sd_bus *bus,
sd_bus_slot **slot,
bool asynchronous,
const char *match,
sd_bus_message_handler_t callback,
sd_bus_message_handler_t install_callback,
void *userdata) {
struct bus_match_component *components = NULL;
unsigned n_components = 0;
sd_bus_slot *s = NULL;
int r = 0;
assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
assert_return(bus = bus_resolve(bus), -ENOPKG);
assert_return(match, -EINVAL);
assert_return(!bus_pid_changed(bus), -ECHILD);
r = bus_match_parse(match, &components, &n_components);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
s = bus_slot_allocate(bus, !slot, BUS_MATCH_CALLBACK, sizeof(struct match_callback), userdata);
if (!s) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
s->match_callback.callback = callback;
s->match_callback.install_callback = install_callback;
if (bus->bus_client) {
enum bus_match_scope scope;
scope = bus_match_get_scope(components, n_components);
/* Do not install server-side matches for matches against the local service, interface or bus path. */
if (scope != BUS_MATCH_LOCAL) {
/* We store the original match string, so that we can use it to remove the match again. */
s->match_callback.match_string = strdup(match);
if (!s->match_callback.match_string) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
if (asynchronous) {
r = bus_add_match_internal_async(bus,
&s->match_callback.install_slot,
s->match_callback.match_string,
add_match_callback,
s);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Make the slot of the match call floating now. We need the reference, but we don't
* want that this match pins the bus object, hence we first create it non-floating, but
* then make it floating. */
r = sd_bus_slot_set_floating(s->match_callback.install_slot, true);
} else
r = bus_add_match_internal(bus, s->match_callback.match_string, &s->match_callback.after);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
s->match_added = true;
}
}
bus->match_callbacks_modified = true;
r = bus_match_add(&bus->match_callbacks, components, n_components, &s->match_callback);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
if (slot)
*slot = s;
s = NULL;
finish:
bus_match_parse_free(components, n_components);
sd_bus_slot_unref(s);
return r;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
systemd
|
1068447e6954dc6ce52f099ed174c442cb89ed54
|
6.653227382590398e+37
| 86 |
sd-bus: introduce API for re-enqueuing incoming messages
When authorizing via PolicyKit we want to process incoming method calls
twice: once to process and figure out that we need PK authentication,
and a second time after we aquired PK authentication to actually execute
the operation. With this new call sd_bus_enqueue_for_read() we have a
way to put an incoming message back into the read queue for this
purpose.
This might have other uses too, for example debugging.
| 0 |
static bool build_multipart(
ogs_sbi_http_message_t *http, ogs_sbi_message_t *message)
{
int i;
char boundary[32];
unsigned char digest[16];
char *p = NULL, *last;
char *content_type = NULL;
char *json = NULL;
ogs_assert(message);
ogs_assert(http);
ogs_random(digest, 16);
strcpy(boundary, "=-");
ogs_base64_encode_binary(boundary + 2, digest, 16);
p = http->content = ogs_calloc(1, OGS_HUGE_LEN);
ogs_expect_or_return_val(p, false);
last = p + OGS_HUGE_LEN;
/* First boundary */
p = ogs_slprintf(p, last, "--%s\r\n", boundary);
/* Encapsulated multipart part (application/json) */
json = build_json(message);
ogs_expect_or_return_val(json, false);
p = ogs_slprintf(p, last, "%s\r\n\r\n%s",
OGS_SBI_CONTENT_TYPE ": " OGS_SBI_CONTENT_JSON_TYPE, json);
ogs_free(json);
/* Add part */
for (i = 0; i < message->num_of_part; i++) {
p = ogs_slprintf(p, last, "\r\n--%s\r\n", boundary);
p = ogs_slprintf(p, last, "%s: %s\r\n",
OGS_SBI_CONTENT_ID, message->part[i].content_id);
p = ogs_slprintf(p, last, "%s: %s\r\n\r\n",
OGS_SBI_CONTENT_TYPE, message->part[i].content_type);
memcpy(p, message->part[i].pkbuf->data, message->part[i].pkbuf->len);
p += message->part[i].pkbuf->len;
}
/* Last boundary */
p = ogs_slprintf(p, last, "\r\n--%s--\r\n", boundary);
http->content_length = p - http->content;
content_type = ogs_msprintf("%s; boundary=\"%s\"",
OGS_SBI_CONTENT_MULTIPART_TYPE, boundary);
ogs_expect_or_return_val(content_type, false);
ogs_sbi_header_set(http->headers, OGS_SBI_CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
ogs_free(content_type);
return true;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-787"
] |
open5gs
|
d919b2744cd05abae043490f0a3dd1946c1ccb8c
|
5.264648370535551e+37
| 61 |
[AMF] fix the memory problem (#1247)
1. memory corruption
- Overflow num_of_part in SBI message
2. null pointer dereference
- n2InfoContent->ngap_ie_type
| 0 |
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