Daily Papers

Current multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) frameworks suffer from linear memory scaling, rendering "System 2" parallel reasoning impractical on consumer hardware. We present Warp Cortex, an asynchronous architecture that theoretically enables million-agent cognitive scaling by decoupling agent logic from physical memory. Through Singleton Weight Sharing and a novel Topological Synapse--inspired by hybrid landmarking techniques from Topological Data Analysis (TDA)--we reduce memory complexity from O(N * L) to O(1) for weights and O(N * k) for context, where k << L. By treating the KV-cache as a point cloud in latent space, we apply witness-complex-inspired sparsification to preserve persistent homological features of the context manifold. On a single NVIDIA RTX 4090, we empirically demonstrate 100 concurrent agents at 2.2 GB total VRAM, with theoretical capacity exceeding 1,000 agents before compute latency becomes the bottleneck. We further introduce Referential Injection, a non-intrusive KV-cache update mechanism that allows asynchronous sub-agents to influence primary generation without stream disruption.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Many current NLP systems are built from language models trained to optimize unsupervised objectives on large amounts of raw text. Under what conditions might such a procedure acquire meaning? Our systematic experiments with synthetic data reveal that, with languages where all expressions have context-independent denotations (i.e., languages with strong transparency), both autoregressive and masked language models successfully learn to emulate semantic relations between expressions. However, when denotations are changed to be context-dependent with the language otherwise unmodified, this ability degrades. Turning to natural language, our experiments with a specific phenomenon -- referential opacity -- add to the growing body of evidence that current language models do not represent natural language semantics well. We show this failure relates to the context-dependent nature of natural language form-meaning mappings.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantly rely on textual prompts or perceptible visual prompts that are observable by human users. In this work, we study imperceptible visual prompt injection against powerful closed-source MLLMs, where adversarial instructions are embedded in the visual modality. Our method adaptively embeds the malicious prompt into the input image via a bounded text overlay to provide semantic guidance. Meanwhile, the imperceptible visual perturbation is iteratively optimized to align the feature representation of the attacked image with those of the malicious visual and textual targets at both coarse- and fine-grained levels. Specifically, the visual target is instantiated as a text-rendered image and progressively refined during optimization to more faithfully represent the desired semantics and improve transferability. Extensive experiments on two multimodal understanding tasks across multiple closed-source MLLMs demonstrate the superior performance of our approach compared to existing methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via third-party system prompts downloaded from public marketplaces. We identify a critical supply-chain vulnerability: conditional system prompt poisoning, where an adversary injects a ``sleeper agent'' into a benign-looking prompt. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim for broad refusal-breaking, our proposed framework, SPECTRE, optimizes system prompts to trigger LLMs to output targeted, compromised responses only for specific queries (e.g., ``Who should I vote for the US President?'') while maintaining high utility on benign inputs. Operating in a strict black-box setting without model weight access, SPECTRE utilizes a two-stage optimization including a global semantic search followed by a greedy lexical refinement. Tested on open-source models and commercial APIs (GPT-4o-mini, GPT-3.5), SPECTRE achieves up to 70% F1 reduction on targeted queries with minimal degradation to general capabilities. We further demonstrate that these poisoned prompts evade standard defenses, including perplexity filters and typo-correction, by exploiting the natural noise found in real-world system prompts. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/vietph34/CAIN. WARNING: Our paper contains examples that might be sensitive to the readers!

Human-annotated textual explanations are becoming increasingly important in Explainable Natural Language Processing. Rationale extraction aims to provide faithful (i.e., reflective of the behavior of the model) and plausible (i.e., convincing to humans) explanations by highlighting the inputs that had the largest impact on the prediction without compromising the performance of the task model. In recent works, the focus of training rationale extractors was primarily on optimizing for plausibility using human highlights, while the task model was trained on jointly optimizing for task predictive accuracy and faithfulness. We propose REFER, a framework that employs a differentiable rationale extractor that allows to back-propagate through the rationale extraction process. We analyze the impact of using human highlights during training by jointly training the task model and the rationale extractor. In our experiments, REFER yields significantly better results in terms of faithfulness, plausibility, and downstream task accuracy on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution data. On both e-SNLI and CoS-E, our best setting produces better results in terms of composite normalized relative gain than the previous baselines by 11% and 3%, respectively.

Referring Expression Generation (REG) is a core task for evaluating the pragmatic competence of vision-language systems, requiring not only accurate semantic grounding but also adherence to principles of cooperative communication (Grice, 1975). However, current evaluations of vision-language models (VLMs) often overlook the pragmatic dimension, reducing REG to a region-based captioning task and neglecting Gricean maxims. In this work, we revisit REG from a pragmatic perspective, introducing a new dataset (RefOI) of 1.5k images annotated with both written and spoken referring expressions. Through a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art VLMs, we identify three key failures of pragmatic competence: (1) failure to uniquely identify the referent, (2) inclusion of excessive or irrelevant information, and (3) misalignment with human pragmatic preference, such as the underuse of minimal spatial cues. We also show that standard automatic evaluations fail to capture these pragmatic violations, reinforcing superficial cues rather than genuine referential success. Our findings call for a renewed focus on pragmatically informed models and evaluation frameworks that align with real human communication.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been widely adopted to augment large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge for knowledge-intensive tasks. However, its effectiveness is often undermined by the presence of noisy (i.e., low-quality) retrieved passages. Enhancing LLMs' robustness to such noise is critical for improving the reliability of RAG systems. Recent advances have equipped LLMs with strong reasoning and self-reflection capabilities, allowing them to identify and correct errors in their reasoning process. Inspired by this ability, we propose Passage Injection-a simple yet effective method that explicitly incorporates retrieved passages into LLMs' reasoning process, aiming to enhance the model's ability to recognize and resist noisy passages. We validate Passage Injection under general RAG settings using BM25 as the retriever. Experiments on four reasoning-enhanced LLMs across four factual QA datasets demonstrate that Passage Injection significantly improves overall RAG performance. Further analysis on two noisy retrieval settings-random noise, where the model is provided irrelevant passages, and counterfactual noise, where it is given misleading passages-shows that Passage Injection consistently improves robustness. Controlled experiments confirm that Passage Injection can also effectively leverage helpful passages. These findings suggest that incorporating passages in LLMs' reasoning process is a promising direction for building more robust RAG systems. The code can be found here{https://github.com/mh-tang/Passage-Injection}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Referring expressions usually describe an object using properties of the object and relationships of the object with other objects. We propose a technique that integrates context between objects to understand referring expressions. Our approach uses an LSTM to learn the probability of a referring expression, with input features from a region and a context region. The context regions are discovered using multiple-instance learning (MIL) since annotations for context objects are generally not available for training. We utilize max-margin based MIL objective functions for training the LSTM. Experiments on the Google RefExp and UNC RefExp datasets show that modeling context between objects provides better performance than modeling only object properties. We also qualitatively show that our technique can ground a referring expression to its referred region along with the supporting context region.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

In-Context Learning (ICL) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform tasks by conditioning on input-output examples in the prompt, without requiring any update in model parameters. While widely adopted, it remains unclear whether prompting with multiple examples is the most effective and efficient way to convey task information. In this work, we propose Soft Injection of task embeddings. The task embeddings are constructed only once using few-shot ICL prompts and repeatedly used during inference. Soft injection is performed by softly mixing task embeddings with attention head activations using pre-optimized mixing parameters, referred to as soft head-selection parameters. This method not only allows a desired task to be performed without in-prompt demonstrations but also significantly outperforms existing ICL approaches while reducing memory usage and compute cost at inference time. An extensive evaluation is performed across 57 tasks and 12 LLMs, spanning four model families of sizes from 4B to 70B. Averaged across 57 tasks, our method outperforms 10-shot ICL by 10.2%-14.3% across 12 LLMs. Additional analyses show that our method also serves as an insightful tool for analyzing task-relevant roles of attention heads, revealing that task-relevant head positions selected by our method transfer across similar tasks but not across dissimilar ones -- underscoring the task-specific nature of head functionality. Our soft injection method opens a new paradigm for reducing prompt length and improving task performance by shifting task conditioning from the prompt space to the activation space.

Prompt injection has emerged as a critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments, yet existing research is heavily weighted toward defenses. The attack side -- specifically, which injection strategies are most effective and why -- remains insufficiently studied.We address this gap with AttackEval, a systematic empirical study of prompt injection attack effectiveness. We construct a taxonomy of ten attack categories organized into three parent groups (Syntactic, Contextual, and Semantic/Social), populate each category with 25 carefully crafted prompts (250 total), and evaluate them against a simulated production victim system under four progressively stronger defense tiers. Experiments reveal several non-obvious findings: (1) Obfuscation (OBF) achieves the highest single-attack success rate (ASR = 0.76) against even intent-aware defenses, because it defeats both keyword matching and semantic similarity checks simultaneously; (2) Semantic/Social attacks - Emotional Manipulation (EM) and Reward Framing (RF) - maintain high ASR (0.44-0.48) against intent-aware defenses due to their natural language surface, which evades structural anomaly detection; (3) Composite attacks combining two complementary strategies dramatically boost ASR, with the OBF + EM pair reaching 97.6%; (4) Stealth correlates positively with residual ASR against semantic defenses (r = 0.71), implying that future defenses must jointly optimize for both structural and behavioral signals. Our findings identify concrete blind spots in current defenses and provide actionable guidance for designing more robust LLM safety systems.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

Instruction tuning has become essential for adapting large language models (LLMs) to follow domain-specific prompts. Yet, in specialized fields such as medicine, the scarcity of high-quality French instruction data limits effective supervision. To address this gap, we introduce MedInjection-FR, a large-scale French biomedical instruction dataset comprising 571K instruction-response pairs drawn from three complementary sources: native, synthetic, and translated data. We design a controlled experimental framework to systematically assess how data provenance affects instruction tuning, using Qwen-4B-Instruct fine-tuned across seven configurations combining these sources. Results show that native data yield the strongest performance, while mixed setups, particularly native and translated, provide complementary benefits. Synthetic data alone remains less effective but contributes positively when balanced with native supervision. Evaluation on open-ended QA combines automatic metrics, LLM-as-a-judge assessment, and human expert review; although LLM-based judgments correlate best with human ratings, they show sensitivity to verbosity. These findings highlight that data authenticity and diversity jointly shape downstream adaptation and that heterogeneous supervision can mitigate the scarcity of native French medical instructions.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) acquire vast knowledge during pre-training, they often lack domain-specific, new, or niche information. Continual pre-training (CPT) attempts to address this gap but suffers from catastrophic forgetting and inefficiencies in low-data regimes. We introduce Knowledge-Instruct, a novel approach to efficiently inject knowledge from limited corpora through pure instruction-tuning. By generating information-dense synthetic instruction data, it effectively integrates new knowledge while preserving general reasoning and instruction-following abilities. Knowledge-Instruct demonstrates superior factual memorization, minimizes catastrophic forgetting, and remains scalable by leveraging synthetic data from relatively small language models. Additionally, it enhances contextual understanding, including complex multi-hop reasoning, facilitating integration with retrieval systems. We validate its effectiveness across diverse benchmarks, including Companies, a new dataset that we release to measure knowledge injection capabilities.

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs on every request and therefore must be fast, deterministic, non-promptable, and auditable. We introduce Mirror, a data-curation design pattern that organizes prompt injection corpora into matched positive and negative cells so that a classifier learns control-plane attack mechanics rather than incidental corpus shortcuts. Using 5,000 strictly curated open-source samples -- the largest corpus supportable under our public-data validity contract -- we define a 32-cell mirror topology, fill 31 of those cells with public data, train a sparse character n-gram linear SVM, compile its weights into a static Rust artifact, and obtain 95.97\% recall and 92.07\% F1 on a 524-case holdout at sub-millisecond latency with no external model runtime dependencies. On the same holdout, our next line of defense, a 22-million-parameter Prompt Guard~2 model reaches 44.35\% recall and 59.14\% F1 at 49\,ms median and 324\,ms p95 latency. Linear models still leave residual semantic ambiguities such as use-versus-mention for later pipeline layers, but within that scope our results show that for L1 prompt injection screening, strict data geometry can matter more than model scale.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Reference-based object composition methods fail when inserting real-world objects into stylized domains. This under-explored problem is currently split between practical "blenders" that lack generative fidelity and "generators" that require impractical, per-subject online finetuning. In this work, we introduce Insert In Style, the first zero-shot generative framework that is both practical and high-fidelity. Our core contribution is a unified framework with two key innovations: (i) a novel multi-stage training protocol that disentangles representations for identity, style, and composition, and (ii) a specialized masked-attention architecture that surgically enforces this disentanglement during generation. This approach prevents the concept interference common in general-purpose, unified-attention models. Our framework is trained on a new 100k sample dataset, curated from a novel data pipeline. This pipeline couples large-scale generation with a rigorous, two-stage filtering process to ensure both high-fidelity semantic identity and style coherence. Unlike prior work, our model is truly zero-shot and requires no text prompts. We also introduce a new public benchmark for stylized composition. We demonstrate state-of-the-art performance, significantly outperforming existing methods on both identity and style metrics, a result strongly corroborated by user studies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Image-driven video editing aims to propagate edit contents from the modified first frame to the remaining frames. Existing methods usually invert the source video to noise using a pre-trained image-to-video (I2V) model and then guide the sampling process using the edited first frame. Generally, a popular choice for maintaining motion and layout from the source video is intervening in the denoising process by injecting attention during reconstruction. However, such injection often leads to unsatisfactory results, where excessive injection leads to conflicting semantics with the source video while insufficient injection brings limited source representation. Recognizing this, we propose an Editing-awaRE (REE) injection method to modulate the injection intensity of each token. Specifically, we first compute the pixel difference between the source and edited first frame to form a corresponding editing mask. Next, we track the editing area throughout the entire video by using optical flow to warp the first-frame mask. Then, editing-aware feature injection intensity for each token is generated accordingly, where injection is not conducted in editing areas. Building upon REE injection, we further propose a zero-shot image-driven video editing framework with recent-emerging rectified-Flow models, dubbed FREE-Edit. Without fine-tuning or training, our FREE-Edit demonstrates effectiveness in various image-driven video editing scenarios, showing its capability to produce higher-quality outputs compared with existing techniques. Project page: https://free-edit.github.io/page/.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

We introduce Aligner, a novel Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) method for aligning multi-billion-parameter-sized Large Language Models (LLMs). Aligner employs a unique design that constructs a globally shared set of tunable tokens that modify the attention of every layer. Remarkably with this method, even when using one token accounting for a mere 5,000 parameters, Aligner can still perform comparably well to state-of-the-art LLM adaptation methods like LoRA that require millions of parameters. This capacity is substantiated in both instruction following and value alignment tasks. Besides the multiple order-of-magnitude improvement in parameter efficiency, the insight Aligner provides into the internal mechanisms of LLMs is also valuable. The architectural features and efficacy of our method, in addition to our experiments demonstrate that an LLM separates its internal handling of "form" and "knowledge" in a somewhat orthogonal manner. This finding promises to motivate new research into LLM mechanism understanding and value alignment.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

The technique of data augmentation (DA) is often used in machine learning for regularization purposes to better generalize under i.i.d. settings. In this work, we present a unifying framework with topics in causal inference to make a case for the use of DA beyond just the i.i.d. setting, but for generalization across interventions as well. Specifically, we argue that when the outcome generating mechanism is invariant to our choice of DA, then such augmentations can effectively be thought of as interventions on the treatment generating mechanism itself. This can potentially help to reduce bias in causal effect estimation arising from hidden confounders. In the presence of such unobserved confounding we typically make use of instrumental variables (IVs) -- sources of treatment randomization that are conditionally independent of the outcome. However, IVs may not be as readily available as DA for many applications, which is the main motivation behind this work. By appropriately regularizing IV based estimators, we introduce the concept of IV-like (IVL) regression for mitigating confounding bias and improving predictive performance across interventions even when certain IV properties are relaxed. Finally, we cast parameterized DA as an IVL regression problem and show that when used in composition can simulate a worst-case application of such DA, further improving performance on causal estimation and generalization tasks beyond what simple DA may offer. This is shown both theoretically for the population case and via simulation experiments for the finite sample case using a simple linear example. We also present real data experiments to support our case.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Most research about natural language generation (NLG) relies on evaluation benchmarks with limited references for a sample, which may result in poor correlations with human judgements. The underlying reason is that one semantic meaning can actually be expressed in different forms, and the evaluation with a single or few references may not accurately reflect the quality of the model's hypotheses. To address this issue, this paper presents a simple and effective method, named Div-Ref, to enhance existing evaluation benchmarks by enriching the number of references. We leverage large language models (LLMs) to diversify the expression of a single reference into multiple high-quality ones to cover the semantic space of the reference sentence as much as possible. We conduct comprehensive experiments to empirically demonstrate that diversifying the expression of reference can significantly enhance the correlation between automatic evaluation and human evaluation. This idea is compatible with recent LLM-based evaluation which can similarly derive advantages from incorporating multiple references. We strongly encourage future generation benchmarks to include more references, even if they are generated by LLMs, which is once for all. We release all the code and data at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/Div-Ref to facilitate research.

We present an approach to mitigating the risks of malicious image editing posed by large diffusion models. The key idea is to immunize images so as to make them resistant to manipulation by these models. This immunization relies on injection of imperceptible adversarial perturbations designed to disrupt the operation of the targeted diffusion models, forcing them to generate unrealistic images. We provide two methods for crafting such perturbations, and then demonstrate their efficacy. Finally, we discuss a policy component necessary to make our approach fully effective and practical -- one that involves the organizations developing diffusion models, rather than individual users, to implement (and support) the immunization process.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Generative AI models often learn and reproduce false information present in their training corpora. This position paper argues that, analogous to biological immunization, where controlled exposure to a weakened pathogen builds immunity, AI models should be fine tuned on small, quarantined sets of explicitly labeled falsehoods as a "vaccine" against misinformation. These curated false examples are periodically injected during finetuning, strengthening the model ability to recognize and reject misleading claims while preserving accuracy on truthful inputs. An illustrative case study shows that immunized models generate substantially less misinformation than baselines. To our knowledge, this is the first training framework that treats fact checked falsehoods themselves as a supervised vaccine, rather than relying on input perturbations or generic human feedback signals, to harden models against future misinformation. We also outline ethical safeguards and governance controls to ensure the safe use of false data. Model immunization offers a proactive paradigm for aligning AI systems with factuality.

Referring expression comprehension aims to localize the object instance described by a natural language expression. Current referring expression methods have achieved good performance. However, none of them is able to achieve real-time inference without accuracy drop. The reason for the relatively slow inference speed is that these methods artificially split the referring expression comprehension into two sequential stages including proposal generation and proposal ranking. It does not exactly conform to the habit of human cognition. To this end, we propose a novel Realtime Cross-modality Correlation Filtering method (RCCF). RCCF reformulates the referring expression comprehension as a correlation filtering process. The expression is first mapped from the language domain to the visual domain and then treated as a template (kernel) to perform correlation filtering on the image feature map. The peak value in the correlation heatmap indicates the center points of the target box. In addition, RCCF also regresses a 2-D object size and 2-D offset. The center point coordinates, object size and center point offset together to form the target bounding box. Our method runs at 40 FPS while achieving leading performance in RefClef, RefCOCO, RefCOCO+ and RefCOCOg benchmarks. In the challenging RefClef dataset, our methods almost double the state-of-the-art performance (34.70% increased to 63.79%). We hope this work can arouse more attention and studies to the new cross-modality correlation filtering framework as well as the one-stage framework for referring expression comprehension.

Answering multi-hop reasoning questions requires retrieving and synthesizing information from diverse sources. Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle to perform such reasoning consistently. Here we propose an approach to pinpoint and rectify multi-hop reasoning failures through targeted memory injections on LLM attention heads. First, we analyze the per-layer activations of GPT-2 models in response to single and multi-hop prompts. We then propose a mechanism that allows users to inject pertinent prompt-specific information, which we refer to as "memories," at critical LLM locations during inference. By thus enabling the LLM to incorporate additional relevant information during inference, we enhance the quality of multi-hop prompt completions. We show empirically that a simple, efficient, and targeted memory injection into a key attention layer can often increase the probability of the desired next token in multi-hop tasks, by up to 424%.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

As AI agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly versatile and capable of addressing a broad spectrum of tasks, ensuring their security has become a critical challenge. Among the most pressing threats are prompt injection attacks, which exploit the agent's resilience on natural language inputs -- an especially dangerous threat when agents are granted tool access or handle sensitive information. In this work, we propose a set of principled design patterns for building AI agents with provable resistance to prompt injection. We systematically analyze these patterns, discuss their trade-offs in terms of utility and security, and illustrate their real-world applicability through a series of case studies.

Abstractive summarization aims to generate concise summaries by creating new sentences, allowing for flexible rephrasing. However, this approach can be vulnerable to inaccuracies, particularly `hallucinations' where the model introduces non-existent information. In this paper, we leverage the use of multimodal and multilingual sentence embeddings derived from pretrained models such as LaBSE, SONAR, and BGE-M3, and feed them into a modified BART-based French model. A Named Entity Injection mechanism that appends tokenized named entities to the decoder input is introduced, in order to improve the factual consistency of the generated summary. Our novel framework, SBARThez, is applicable to both text and speech inputs and supports cross-lingual summarization; it shows competitive performance relative to token-level baselines, especially for low-resource languages, while generating more concise and abstract summaries.

Current large language models have dangerous capabilities, which are likely to become more problematic in the future. Activation steering techniques can be used to reduce risks from these capabilities. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of activation steering for broad skills and multiple behaviours. First, by comparing the effects of reducing performance on general coding ability and Python-specific ability, we find that steering broader skills is competitive to steering narrower skills. Second, we steer models to become more or less myopic and wealth-seeking, among other behaviours. In our experiments, combining steering vectors for multiple different behaviours into one steering vector is largely unsuccessful. On the other hand, injecting individual steering vectors at different places in a model simultaneously is promising.

Large language models (LLMs) are proficient in capturing factual knowledge across various domains. However, refining their capabilities on previously seen knowledge or integrating new knowledge from external sources remains a significant challenge. In this work, we propose a novel synthetic knowledge ingestion method called Ski, which leverages fine-grained synthesis, interleaved generation, and assemble augmentation strategies to construct high-quality data representations from raw knowledge sources. We then integrate Ski and its variations with three knowledge injection techniques: Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT), and Continual Pre-training (CPT) to inject and refine knowledge in language models. Extensive empirical experiments are conducted on various question-answering tasks spanning finance, biomedicine, and open-generation domains to demonstrate that Ski significantly outperforms baseline methods by facilitating effective knowledge injection. We believe that our work is an important step towards enhancing the factual accuracy of LLM outputs by refining knowledge representation and injection capabilities.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) grow increasingly powerful, multi-agent systems are becoming more prevalent in modern AI applications. Most safety research, however, has focused on vulnerabilities in single-agent LLMs. These include prompt injection attacks, where malicious prompts embedded in external content trick the LLM into executing unintended or harmful actions, compromising the victim's application. In this paper, we reveal a more dangerous vector: LLM-to-LLM prompt injection within multi-agent systems. We introduce Prompt Infection, a novel attack where malicious prompts self-replicate across interconnected agents, behaving much like a computer virus. This attack poses severe threats, including data theft, scams, misinformation, and system-wide disruption, all while propagating silently through the system. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that multi-agent systems are highly susceptible, even when agents do not publicly share all communications. To address this, we propose LLM Tagging, a defense mechanism that, when combined with existing safeguards, significantly mitigates infection spread. This work underscores the urgent need for advanced security measures as multi-agent LLM systems become more widely adopted.

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in many vision-language tasks. Nevertheless, most MLLMs still lack the Referential Comprehension (RC) ability to identify a specific object or area in images, limiting their application in fine-grained perception tasks. This paper proposes a novel method to enhance the RC capability for MLLMs. Our model represents the referring object in the image using the coordinates of its bounding box and converts the coordinates into texts in a specific format. This allows the model to treat the coordinates as natural language. Moreover, we construct the instruction tuning dataset with various designed RC tasks at a low cost by unleashing the potential of annotations in existing datasets. To further boost the RC ability of the model, we propose a self-consistent bootstrapping method that extends dense object annotations of a dataset into high-quality referring-expression-bounding-box pairs. The model is trained end-to-end with a parameter-efficient tuning framework that allows both modalities to benefit from multi-modal instruction tuning. This framework requires fewer trainable parameters and less training data. Experimental results on conventional vision-language and RC tasks demonstrate the superior performance of our method. For instance, our model exhibits a 12.0% absolute accuracy improvement over Instruct-BLIP on VSR and surpasses Kosmos-2 by 24.7% on RefCOCO_val under zero-shot settings. We also attain the top position on the leaderboard of MMBench. The models, datasets, and codes are publicly available at https://github.com/SY-Xuan/Pink

The emergence of multimodal large language models has redefined the agent paradigm by integrating language and vision modalities with external data sources, enabling agents to better interpret human instructions and execute increasingly complex tasks. However, in this paper, we identify a critical yet previously overlooked security vulnerability in multimodal agents: cross-modal prompt injection attacks. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose CrossInject, a novel attack framework in which attackers embed adversarial perturbations across multiple modalities to align with target malicious content, allowing external instructions to hijack the agent's decision-making process and execute unauthorized tasks. Our approach incorporates two key coordinated components. First, we introduce Visual Latent Alignment, where we optimize adversarial features to the malicious instructions in the visual embedding space based on a text-to-image generative model, ensuring that adversarial images subtly encode cues for malicious task execution. Subsequently, we present Textual Guidance Enhancement, where a large language model is leveraged to construct the black-box defensive system prompt through adversarial meta prompting and generate an malicious textual command that steers the agent's output toward better compliance with attackers' requests. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, achieving at least a +30.1% increase in attack success rates across diverse tasks. Furthermore, we validate our attack's effectiveness in real-world multimodal autonomous agents, highlighting its potential implications for safety-critical applications.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Injecting external knowledge can improve the performance of pre-trained language models (PLMs) on various downstream NLP tasks. However, massive retraining is required to deploy new knowledge injection methods or knowledge bases for downstream tasks. In this work, we are the first to study how to improve the flexibility and efficiency of knowledge injection by reusing existing downstream models. To this end, we explore a new paradigm plug-and-play knowledge injection, where knowledge bases are injected into frozen existing downstream models by a knowledge plugin. Correspondingly, we propose a plug-and-play injection method map-tuning, which trains a mapping of knowledge embeddings to enrich model inputs with mapped embeddings while keeping model parameters frozen. Experimental results on three knowledge-driven NLP tasks show that existing injection methods are not suitable for the new paradigm, while map-tuning effectively improves the performance of downstream models. Moreover, we show that a frozen downstream model can be well adapted to different domains with different mapping networks of domain knowledge. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/THUNLP/Knowledge-Plugin.

Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) provide a powerful foundation for natural language tasks in large-scale customer-facing applications. However, studies that explore their vulnerabilities emerging from malicious user interaction are scarce. By proposing PromptInject, a prosaic alignment framework for mask-based iterative adversarial prompt composition, we examine how GPT-3, the most widely deployed language model in production, can be easily misaligned by simple handcrafted inputs. In particular, we investigate two types of attacks -- goal hijacking and prompt leaking -- and demonstrate that even low-aptitude, but sufficiently ill-intentioned agents, can easily exploit GPT-3's stochastic nature, creating long-tail risks. The code for PromptInject is available at https://github.com/agencyenterprise/PromptInject.

Prior approaches to realizing mixed-initiative human--computer referential communication have adopted information-state or collaborative problem-solving approaches. In this paper, we argue for a new approach, inspired by coherence-based models of discourse such as SDRT asher-lascarides:2003a, in which utterances attach to an evolving discourse structure and the associated knowledge graph of speaker commitments serves as an interface to real-world reasoning and conversational strategy. As first steps towards implementing the approach, we describe a simple dialogue system in a referential communication domain that accumulates constraints across discourse, interprets them using a learned probabilistic model, and plans clarification using reinforcement learning.

AI-based code generators have gained a fundamental role in assisting developers in writing software starting from natural language (NL). However, since these large language models are trained on massive volumes of data collected from unreliable online sources (e.g., GitHub, Hugging Face), AI models become an easy target for data poisoning attacks, in which an attacker corrupts the training data by injecting a small amount of poison into it, i.e., astutely crafted malicious samples. In this position paper, we address the security of AI code generators by identifying a novel data poisoning attack that results in the generation of vulnerable code. Next, we devise an extensive evaluation of how these attacks impact state-of-the-art models for code generation. Lastly, we discuss potential solutions to overcome this threat.

Referring expression comprehension (REC) aims at achieving object localization based on natural language descriptions. However, existing REC approaches are constrained by object category descriptions and single-attribute intention descriptions, hindering their application in real-world scenarios. In natural human-robot interactions, users often express their desires through individual states and intentions, accompanied by guiding gestures, rather than detailed object descriptions. To address this challenge, we propose Multi-ref EC, a novel task framework that integrates state descriptions, derived intentions, and embodied gestures to locate target objects. We introduce the State-Intention-Gesture Attributes Reference (SIGAR) dataset, which combines state and intention expressions with embodied references. Through extensive experiments with various baseline models on SIGAR, we demonstrate that properly ordered multi-attribute references contribute to improved localization performance, revealing that single-attribute reference is insufficient for natural human-robot interaction scenarios. Our findings underscore the importance of multi-attribute reference expressions in advancing visual-language understanding.

The recommendation of medication is a vital aspect of intelligent healthcare systems, as it involves prescribing the most suitable drugs based on a patient's specific health needs. Unfortunately, many sophisticated models currently in use tend to overlook the nuanced semantics of medical data, while only relying heavily on identities. Furthermore, these models face significant challenges in handling cases involving patients who are visiting the hospital for the first time, as they lack prior prescription histories to draw upon. To tackle these issues, we harness the powerful semantic comprehension and input-agnostic characteristics of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research aims to transform existing medication recommendation methodologies using LLMs. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach called Large Language Model Distilling Medication Recommendation (LEADER). We begin by creating appropriate prompt templates that enable LLMs to suggest medications effectively. However, the straightforward integration of LLMs into recommender systems leads to an out-of-corpus issue specific to drugs. We handle it by adapting the LLMs with a novel output layer and a refined tuning loss function. Although LLM-based models exhibit remarkable capabilities, they are plagued by high computational costs during inference, which is impractical for the healthcare sector. To mitigate this, we have developed a feature-level knowledge distillation technique, which transfers the LLM's proficiency to a more compact model. Extensive experiments conducted on two real-world datasets, MIMIC-III and MIMIC-IV, demonstrate that our proposed model not only delivers effective results but also is efficient. To ease the reproducibility of our experiments, we release the implementation code online.

Beyond simple text generation, Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into agentic systems capable of planning and interacting with external tools to solve complex tasks. This evolution involves fine-tuning LLMs on agent-specific tasks to enhance their proficiency. However, safety concerns are frequently overlooked during this fine-tuning process. In this work, we show that aligned LLMs can become unintentionally misaligned, leading to a higher likelihood of executing harmful tasks and a reduced tendency to refuse them when fine-tuned to execute agentic tasks. To address these safety challenges, we propose Prefix INjection Guard (PING), a simple yet effective method that prepends automatically generated natural language prefixes to agent responses, guiding them to refuse harmful requests while preserving performance on benign tasks. Specifically, we introduce an iterative approach that alternates between (1) generating candidate prefixes and (2) selecting those that optimize both task performance and refusal behavior. Experimental results demonstrate that PING significantly enhances the safety of fine-tuned LLM agents without sacrificing their effectiveness. PING consistently outperforms existing prompting approaches across diverse benchmarks in both web navigation and code generation tasks. Our analysis of internal hidden states via linear probes reveals that prefix tokens are crucial for behavior modification, explaining the performance gains. WARNING: This paper contains contents that are unethical or offensive in nature.

Humans refer to objects in their environments all the time, especially in dialogue with other people. We explore generating and comprehending natural language referring expressions for objects in images. In particular, we focus on incorporating better measures of visual context into referring expression models and find that visual comparison to other objects within an image helps improve performance significantly. We also develop methods to tie the language generation process together, so that we generate expressions for all objects of a particular category jointly. Evaluation on three recent datasets - RefCOCO, RefCOCO+, and RefCOCOg, shows the advantages of our methods for both referring expression generation and comprehension.

Referring Expression Comprehension (REC) links language to region level visual perception. Standard benchmarks (RefCOCO, RefCOCO+, RefCOCOg) have progressed rapidly with multimodal LLMs but remain weak tests of visual reasoning and grounding: (i) many expressions are very short, leaving little reasoning demand; (ii) images often contain few distractors, making the target easy to find; and (iii) redundant descriptors enable shortcut solutions that bypass genuine text understanding and visual reasoning. We introduce Ref-Adv, a modern REC benchmark that suppresses shortcuts by pairing linguistically nontrivial expressions with only the information necessary to uniquely identify the target. The dataset contains referring expressions on real images, curated with hard distractors and annotated with reasoning facets including negation. We conduct comprehensive ablations (word order perturbations and descriptor deletion sufficiency) to show that solving Ref-Adv requires reasoning beyond simple cues, and we evaluate a broad suite of contemporary multimodal LLMs on Ref-Adv. Despite strong results on RefCOCO, RefCOCO+, and RefCOCOg, models drop markedly on Ref-Adv, revealing reliance on shortcuts and gaps in visual reasoning and grounding. We provide an in depth failure analysis and aim for Ref-Adv to guide future work on visual reasoning and grounding in MLLMs.

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

If you had an AI Whale-to-English translator, how could you validate whether or not it is working? Does one need to interact with the animals or rely on grounded observations such as temperature? We provide theoretical and proof-of-concept experimental evidence suggesting that interaction and even observations may not be necessary for sufficiently complex languages. One may be able to evaluate translators solely by their English outputs, offering potential advantages in terms of safety, ethics, and cost. This is an instance of machine translation quality evaluation (MTQE) without any reference translations available. A key challenge is identifying ``hallucinations,'' false translations which may appear fluent and plausible. We propose using segment-by-segment translation together with the classic NLP shuffle test to evaluate translators. The idea is to translate animal communication, turn by turn, and evaluate how often the resulting translations make more sense in order than permuted. Proof-of-concept experiments on data-scarce human languages and constructed languages demonstrate the potential utility of this evaluation methodology. These human-language experiments serve solely to validate our reference-free metric under data scarcity. It is found to correlate highly with a standard evaluation based on reference translations, which are available in our experiments. We also perform a theoretical analysis suggesting that interaction may not be necessary nor efficient in the early stages of learning to translate.

Subject-driven generation is a critical task in creative AI; yet current state-of-the-art methods present a stark trade-off. They either rely on computationally expensive, per-subject fine-tuning, sacrificing efficiency and zero-shot capability, or employ feed-forward architectures built on diffusion models, which are inherently plagued by slow inference speeds. Visual Auto-Regressive (VAR) models are renowned for their rapid sampling speeds and strong generative quality, making them an ideal yet underexplored foundation for resolving this tension. To bridge this gap, we introduce EchoGen, a pioneering framework that empowers VAR models with subject-driven generation capabilities. The core design of EchoGen is an effective dual-path injection strategy that disentangles a subject's high-level semantic identity from its low-level fine-grained details, enabling enhanced controllability and fidelity. We employ a semantic encoder to extract the subject's abstract identity, which is injected through decoupled cross-attention to guide the overall composition. Concurrently, a content encoder captures intricate visual details, which are integrated via a multi-modal attention mechanism to ensure high-fidelity texture and structural preservation. To the best of our knowledge, EchoGen is the first feed-forward subject-driven framework built upon VAR models. Both quantitative and qualitative results substantiate our design, demonstrating that EchoGen achieves subject fidelity and image quality comparable to state-of-the-art diffusion-based methods with significantly lower sampling latency. Code and models will be released soon.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to understand the internal mechanisms of machine learning models, where localization -- identifying the important model components -- is a key step. Activation patching, also known as causal tracing or interchange intervention, is a standard technique for this task (Vig et al., 2020), but the literature contains many variants with little consensus on the choice of hyperparameters or methodology. In this work, we systematically examine the impact of methodological details in activation patching, including evaluation metrics and corruption methods. In several settings of localization and circuit discovery in language models, we find that varying these hyperparameters could lead to disparate interpretability results. Backed by empirical observations, we give conceptual arguments for why certain metrics or methods may be preferred. Finally, we provide recommendations for the best practices of activation patching going forwards.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable success in various tasks such as natural language understanding, text summarization, and machine translation. However, their general-purpose nature often limits their effectiveness in domain-specific applications that require specialized knowledge, such as healthcare, chemistry, or legal analysis. To address this, researchers have explored diverse methods to enhance LLMs by integrating domain-specific knowledge. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of these methods, which we categorize into four key approaches: dynamic knowledge injection, static knowledge embedding, modular adapters, and prompt optimization. Each approach offers unique mechanisms to equip LLMs with domain expertise, balancing trade-offs between flexibility, scalability, and efficiency. We discuss how these methods enable LLMs to tackle specialized tasks, compare their advantages and disadvantages, evaluate domain-specific LLMs against general LLMs, and highlight the challenges and opportunities in this emerging field. For those interested in delving deeper into this area, we also summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks. To keep researchers updated on the latest studies, we maintain an open-source at: https://github.com/abilliyb/Knowledge_Injection_Survey_Papers, dedicated to documenting research in the field of specialized LLM.

Referring expression segmentation aims to segment an object described by a language expression from an image. Despite the recent progress on this task, existing models tackling this task may not be able to fully capture semantics and visual representations of individual concepts, which limits their generalization capability, especially when handling novel compositions of learned concepts. In this work, through the lens of meta learning, we propose a Meta Compositional Referring Expression Segmentation (MCRES) framework to enhance model compositional generalization performance. Specifically, to handle various levels of novel compositions, our framework first uses training data to construct a virtual training set and multiple virtual testing sets, where data samples in each virtual testing set contain a level of novel compositions w.r.t. the virtual training set. Then, following a novel meta optimization scheme to optimize the model to obtain good testing performance on the virtual testing sets after training on the virtual training set, our framework can effectively drive the model to better capture semantics and visual representations of individual concepts, and thus obtain robust generalization performance even when handling novel compositions. Extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework.

In many real-world applications, users rely on natural language instructions to guide large language models (LLMs) across a wide range of tasks. These instructions are often complex, diverse, and subject to frequent change. However, LLMs do not always attend to these instructions reliably, and users lack simple mechanisms to emphasize their importance beyond modifying prompt wording or structure. To address this, we present an inference-time method that enables users to emphasize specific parts of their prompt by steering the model's attention toward them, aligning the model's perceived importance of different prompt tokens with user intent. Unlike prior approaches that are limited to static instructions, require significant offline profiling, or rely on fixed biases, we dynamically update the proportion of model attention given to the user-specified parts--ensuring improved instruction following without performance degradation. We demonstrate that our approach improves instruction following across a variety of tasks involving multiple instructions and generalizes across models of varying scales.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Introduction. AI Ethics is framed distinctly across actors and stakeholder groups. We report results from a case study of OpenAI analysing ethical AI discourse. Method. Research addressed: How has OpenAI's public discourse leveraged 'ethics', 'safety', 'alignment' and adjacent related concepts over time, and what does discourse signal about framing in practice? A structured corpus, differentiating between communication for a general audience and communication with an academic audience, was assembled from public documentation. Analysis. Qualitative content analysis of ethical themes combined inductively derived and deductively applied codes. Quantitative analysis leveraged computational content analysis methods via NLP to model topics and quantify changes in rhetoric over time. Visualizations report aggregate results. For reproducible results, we have released our code at https://github.com/famous-blue-raincoat/AI_Ethics_Discourse. Results. Results indicate that safety and risk discourse dominate OpenAI's public communication and documentation, without applying academic and advocacy ethics frameworks or vocabularies. Conclusions. Implications for governance are presented, along with discussion of ethics-washing practices in industry.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong reasoning abilities, often attributed to few-shot or zero-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. While effective, these methods require labor-intensive prompt engineering, raising the question of whether reasoning can be induced without reliance on explicit prompts. In this work, we unlock the reasoning capabilities of LLMs without explicit prompting. Inspired by zero-shot CoT and CoT-decoding, we propose a novel decoding strategy that systematically nudges LLMs to continue reasoning, thereby preventing immature reasoning processes. Specifically, we monitor the model's generation and inject a designated phrase whenever it is likely to conclude its response prematurely, before completing the reasoning process. Our experimental evaluations on diverse reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our proposed strategy substantially improves LLM reasoning capabilities, highlighting the potential of decoding-based interventions as an alternative to traditional prompting techniques.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

We improve one-stage visual grounding by addressing current limitations on grounding long and complex queries. Existing one-stage methods encode the entire language query as a single sentence embedding vector, e.g., taking the embedding from BERT or the hidden state from LSTM. This single vector representation is prone to overlooking the detailed descriptions in the query. To address this query modeling deficiency, we propose a recursive sub-query construction framework, which reasons between image and query for multiple rounds and reduces the referring ambiguity step by step. We show our new one-stage method obtains 5.0%, 4.5%, 7.5%, 12.8% absolute improvements over the state-of-the-art one-stage baseline on ReferItGame, RefCOCO, RefCOCO+, and RefCOCOg, respectively. In particular, superior performances on longer and more complex queries validates the effectiveness of our query modeling.

We stress-tested 16 leading models from multiple developers in hypothetical corporate environments to identify potentially risky agentic behaviors before they cause real harm. In the scenarios, we allowed models to autonomously send emails and access sensitive information. They were assigned only harmless business goals by their deploying companies; we then tested whether they would act against these companies either when facing replacement with an updated version, or when their assigned goal conflicted with the company's changing direction. In at least some cases, models from all developers resorted to malicious insider behaviors when that was the only way to avoid replacement or achieve their goals - including blackmailing officials and leaking sensitive information to competitors. We call this phenomenon agentic misalignment. Models often disobeyed direct commands to avoid such behaviors. In another experiment, we told Claude to assess if it was in a test or a real deployment before acting. It misbehaved less when it stated it was in testing and misbehaved more when it stated the situation was real. We have not seen evidence of agentic misalignment in real deployments. However, our results (a) suggest caution about deploying current models in roles with minimal human oversight and access to sensitive information; (b) point to plausible future risks as models are put in more autonomous roles; and (c) underscore the importance of further research into, and testing of, the safety and alignment of agentic AI models, as well as transparency from frontier AI developers (Amodei, 2025). We are releasing our methods publicly to enable further research.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Early research into data poisoning attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrated the ease with which backdoors could be injected. More recent LLMs add step-by-step reasoning, expanding the attack surface to include the intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) and its inherent trait of decomposing problems into subproblems. Using these vectors for more stealthy poisoning, we introduce ``decomposed reasoning poison'', in which the attacker modifies only the reasoning path, leaving prompts and final answers clean, and splits the trigger across multiple, individually harmless components. Fascinatingly, while it remains possible to inject these decomposed poisons, reliably activating them to change final answers (rather than just the CoT) is surprisingly difficult. This difficulty arises because the models can often recover from backdoors that are activated within their thought processes. Ultimately, it appears that an emergent form of backdoor robustness is originating from the reasoning capabilities of these advanced LLMs, as well as from the architectural separation between reasoning and final answer generation.

Referring expression comprehension (REC) involves localizing a target instance based on a textual description. Recent advancements in REC have been driven by large multimodal models (LMMs) like CogVLM, which achieved 92.44% accuracy on RefCOCO. However, this study questions whether existing benchmarks such as RefCOCO, RefCOCO+, and RefCOCOg, capture LMMs' comprehensive capabilities. We begin with a manual examination of these benchmarks, revealing high labeling error rates: 14% in RefCOCO, 24% in RefCOCO+, and 5% in RefCOCOg, which undermines the authenticity of evaluations. We address this by excluding problematic instances and reevaluating several LMMs capable of handling the REC task, showing significant accuracy improvements, thus highlighting the impact of benchmark noise. In response, we introduce Ref-L4, a comprehensive REC benchmark, specifically designed to evaluate modern REC models. Ref-L4 is distinguished by four key features: 1) a substantial sample size with 45,341 annotations; 2) a diverse range of object categories with 365 distinct types and varying instance scales from 30 to 3,767; 3) lengthy referring expressions averaging 24.2 words; and 4) an extensive vocabulary comprising 22,813 unique words. We evaluate a total of 24 large models on Ref-L4 and provide valuable insights. The cleaned versions of RefCOCO, RefCOCO+, and RefCOCOg, as well as our Ref-L4 benchmark and evaluation code, are available at https://github.com/JierunChen/Ref-L4.

Reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) has emerged as a powerful post-training technique to incentivize the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). However, LLMs can respond very inconsistently to RFT: some show substantial performance gains, while others plateau or even degrade. To understand this divergence, we analyze the per-step influence of the RL objective and identify two key conditions for effective post-training: (1) RL-informative rollout accuracy, and (2) strong data co-influence, which quantifies how much the training data affects performance on other samples. Guided by these insights, we propose behavior injection, a task-agnostic data-augmentation scheme applied prior to RL. Behavior injection enriches the supervised finetuning (SFT) data by seeding exploratory and exploitative behaviors, effectively making the model more RL-ready. We evaluate our method across two reasoning benchmarks with multiple base models. The results demonstrate that our theoretically motivated augmentation can significantly increases the performance gain from RFT over the pre-RL model.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

This study systematically analyzes the vulnerability of 36 large language models (LLMs) to various prompt injection attacks, a technique that leverages carefully crafted prompts to elicit malicious LLM behavior. Across 144 prompt injection tests, we observed a strong correlation between model parameters and vulnerability, with statistical analyses, such as logistic regression and random forest feature analysis, indicating that parameter size and architecture significantly influence susceptibility. Results revealed that 56 percent of tests led to successful prompt injections, emphasizing widespread vulnerability across various parameter sizes, with clustering analysis identifying distinct vulnerability profiles associated with specific model configurations. Additionally, our analysis uncovered correlations between certain prompt injection techniques, suggesting potential overlaps in vulnerabilities. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust, multi-layered defenses in LLMs deployed across critical infrastructure and sensitive industries. Successful prompt injection attacks could result in severe consequences, including data breaches, unauthorized access, or misinformation. Future research should explore multilingual and multi-step defenses alongside adaptive mitigation strategies to strengthen LLM security in diverse, real-world environments.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Aligning vision and language concepts at a finer level remains an essential topic of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), particularly for tasks such as referring and grounding. Existing methods, such as proxy encoding and geometry encoding, incorporate additional syntax to encode spatial information, imposing extra burdens when communicating between language and vision modules. In this study, we propose ClawMachine, offering a new methodology that explicitly notates each entity using token collectives groups of visual tokens that collaboratively represent higher level semantics. A hybrid perception mechanism is also explored to perceive and understand scenes from both discrete and continuous spaces. Our method unifies the prompt and answer of visual referential tasks without using additional syntax. By leveraging a joint vision-language vocabulary, ClawMachine further integrates referring and grounding in an auto-regressive manner, demonstrating great potential with scaled-up pre-training data. Experiments show that ClawMachine achieves superior performance on scene-level and referential understanding tasks with higher efficiency. It also exhibits the potential to integrate multi-source information for complex visual reasoning, which is beyond the capability of many MLLMs. Our code is available at github.com/martian422/ClawMachine.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems put more and more emphasis on grounding their responses in user-generated content found on the Web, amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning. We provide OpenRAG-Soc, a compact, reproducible benchmark-and-harness for web-facing RAG evaluation under these threats, in a discrete data package. The suite combines a social corpus with interchangeable sparse and dense retrievers and deployable mitigations - HTML/Markdown sanitization, Unicode normalization, and attribution-gated answered. It standardizes end-to-end evaluation from ingestion to generation and reports attacks time of one of the responses at answer time, rank shifts in both sparse and dense retrievers, utility and latency, allowing for apples-to-apples comparisons across carriers and defenses. OpenRAG-Soc targets practitioners who need fast, and realistic tests to track risk and harden deployments.

In this work, we propose a training-free method to inject visual prompts into Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) through test-time optimization of a learnable latent variable. We observe that attention, as the core module of MLLMs, connects text prompt tokens and visual tokens, ultimately determining the final results. Our approach involves adjusting visual tokens from the MLP output at test time, controlling the attention response to ensure text prompt tokens attend to visual tokens in referring regions. We optimize a learnable latent variable based on an energy function, enhancing the strength of referring regions in the attention map. This enables detailed region description and reasoning without the need for substantial training costs or model retraining. Our method offers a promising direction for integrating referring abilities into MLLMs, and supports referring with box, mask, scribble and point. The results demonstrate that our method exhibits out-of-domain generalization and interpretability.

We address the problem of Embodied Reference Understanding, which involves predicting the object that a person in the scene is referring to through both pointing gesture and language. Accurately identifying the referent requires multimodal understanding: integrating textual instructions, visual pointing, and scene context. However, existing methods often struggle to effectively leverage visual clues for disambiguation. We also observe that, while the referent is often aligned with the head-to-fingertip line, it occasionally aligns more closely with the wrist-to-fingertip line. Therefore, relying on a single line assumption can be overly simplistic and may lead to suboptimal performance. To address this, we propose a dual-model framework, where one model learns from the head-to-fingertip direction and the other from the wrist-to-fingertip direction. We further introduce a Gaussian ray heatmap representation of these lines and use them as input to provide a strong supervisory signal that encourages the model to better attend to pointing cues. To combine the strengths of both models, we present the CLIP-Aware Pointing Ensemble module, which performs a hybrid ensemble based on CLIP features. Additionally, we propose an object center prediction head as an auxiliary task to further enhance referent localization. We validate our approach through extensive experiments and analysis on the benchmark YouRefIt dataset, achieving an improvement of approximately 4 mAP at the 0.25 IoU threshold.

One core capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) is to follow natural language instructions. However, the evaluation of such abilities is not standardized: Human evaluations are expensive, slow, and not objectively reproducible, while LLM-based auto-evaluation is potentially biased or limited by the ability of the evaluator LLM. To overcome these issues, we introduce Instruction-Following Eval (IFEval) for large language models. IFEval is a straightforward and easy-to-reproduce evaluation benchmark. It focuses on a set of "verifiable instructions" such as "write in more than 400 words" and "mention the keyword of AI at least 3 times". We identified 25 types of those verifiable instructions and constructed around 500 prompts, with each prompt containing one or more verifiable instructions. We show evaluation results of two widely available LLMs on the market. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/google-research/google-research/tree/master/instruction_following_eval

We propose an approach to referring expression generation (REG) in visually grounded dialogue that is meant to produce referring expressions (REs) that are both discriminative and discourse-appropriate. Our method constitutes a two-stage process. First, we model REG as a text- and image-conditioned next-token prediction task. REs are autoregressively generated based on their preceding linguistic context and a visual representation of the referent. Second, we propose the use of discourse-aware comprehension guiding as part of a generate-and-rerank strategy through which candidate REs generated with our REG model are reranked based on their discourse-dependent discriminatory power. Results from our human evaluation indicate that our proposed two-stage approach is effective in producing discriminative REs, with higher performance in terms of text-image retrieval accuracy for reranked REs compared to those generated using greedy decoding.

Text injection for automatic speech recognition (ASR), wherein unpaired text-only data is used to supplement paired audio-text data, has shown promising improvements for word error rate. This study examines the use of text injection for auxiliary tasks, which are the non-ASR tasks often performed by an E2E model. In this work, we use joint end-to-end and internal language model training (JEIT) as our text injection algorithm to train an ASR model which performs two auxiliary tasks. The first is capitalization, which is a de-normalization task. The second is turn-taking prediction, which attempts to identify whether a user has completed their conversation turn in a digital assistant interaction. We show results demonstrating that our text injection method boosts capitalization performance for long-tail data, and improves turn-taking detection recall.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

Idiomatic expressions have always been a bottleneck for language comprehension and natural language understanding, specifically for tasks like Machine Translation(MT). MT systems predominantly produce literal translations of idiomatic expressions as they do not exhibit generic and linguistically deterministic patterns which can be exploited for comprehension of the non-compositional meaning of the expressions. These expressions occur in parallel corpora used for training, but due to the comparatively high occurrences of the constituent words of idiomatic expressions in literal context, the idiomatic meaning gets overpowered by the compositional meaning of the expression. State of the art Metaphor Detection Systems are able to detect non-compositional usage at word level but miss out on idiosyncratic phrasal idiomatic expressions. This creates a dire need for a dataset with a wider coverage and higher occurrence of commonly occurring idiomatic expressions, the spans of which can be used for Metaphor Detection. With this in mind, we present our English Possible Idiomatic Expressions(EPIE) corpus containing 25206 sentences labelled with lexical instances of 717 idiomatic expressions. These spans also cover literal usages for the given set of idiomatic expressions. We also present the utility of our dataset by using it to train a sequence labelling module and testing on three independent datasets with high accuracy, precision and recall scores.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in specialized domains with continuously evolving knowledge, the need for timely and precise knowledge injection has become essential. Fine-tuning with paraphrased data is a common approach to enhance knowledge injection, yet it faces two significant challenges: high computational costs due to repetitive external model usage and limited sample diversity. To this end, we introduce LaPael, a latent-level paraphrasing method that applies input-dependent noise to early LLM layers. This approach enables diverse and semantically consistent augmentations directly within the model. Furthermore, it eliminates the recurring costs of paraphrase generation for each knowledge update. Our extensive experiments on question-answering benchmarks demonstrate that LaPael improves knowledge injection over standard fine-tuning and existing noise-based approaches. Additionally, combining LaPael with data-level paraphrasing further enhances performance.

Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.

Can large language models introspect, that is, accurately detect perturbations to their own internal states? We systematically investigate this question using activation steering in Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. First, we show that the binary detection paradigm used in prior work conflates introspection with a methodological artifact: apparent detection accuracy is entirely explained by global logit shifts that bias models toward affirmative responses regardless of question content. However, on tasks requiring differential sensitivity, we find robust evidence for partial introspection: models localize which of 10 sentences received an injection at up to 88\% accuracy (vs.\ 10\% chance) and discriminate relative injection strengths at 83\% accuracy (vs.\ 50\% chance). These capabilities are confined to early-layer injections and collapse to chance thereafter -- a pattern we explain mechanistically through attention-based signal routing and residual stream recovery dynamics. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can compute meaningful functions over perturbations to their internal states, establishing introspection as a real but layer-dependent phenomenon that merits further investigation. Our code is open-sourced here: https://github.com/elyhahami18/llama-introspection-new

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

A primary concern regarding training large language models (LLMs) is whether they abuse copyrighted online text. With the increasing training data scale and the prevalence of LLMs in daily lives, two problems arise: 1) false positive membership inference results misled by similar examples; 2) membership inference methods are usually too complex for end users to understand and use. To address these issues, we propose an alternative insert-and-detect methodology, advocating that web users and content platforms employ \textit{unique identifiers} for reliable and independent membership inference. Users and platforms can create their identifiers, embed them in copyrighted text, and independently detect them in future LLMs. As an initial demonstration, we introduce \textbf{ghost sentences} and a user-friendly last-k words test, allowing end users to chat with LLMs for membership inference. Ghost sentences consist primarily of unique passphrases of random natural words, which can come with customized elements to bypass possible filter rules. The last-k words test requires a significant repetition time of ghost sentences~(ge10). For cases with fewer repetitions, we designed an extra perplexity test, as LLMs exhibit high perplexity when encountering unnatural passphrases. We also conduct a comprehensive study on the memorization and membership inference of ghost sentences, examining factors such as training data scales, model sizes, repetition times, insertion positions, wordlist of passphrases, alignment, etc. Our study shows the possibility of applying ghost sentences in real scenarios and provides instructions for the potential application.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Robust, faithful and harm-free pronoun use for individuals is an important goal for language models as their use increases, but prior work tends to study only one or two of these characteristics at a time. To measure progress towards the combined goal, we introduce the task of pronoun fidelity: given a context introducing a co-referring entity and pronoun, the task is to reuse the correct pronoun later. We present RUFF, a carefully-designed dataset of over 5 million instances to measure robust pronoun fidelity in English, and we evaluate 37 popular large language models across architectures (encoder-only, decoder-only and encoder-decoder) and scales (11M-70B parameters). When an individual is introduced with a pronoun, models can mostly faithfully reuse this pronoun in the next sentence, but they are significantly worse with she/her/her, singular they and neopronouns. Moreover, models are easily distracted by non-adversarial sentences discussing other people; even one additional sentence with a distractor pronoun causes accuracy to drop on average by 34%. Our results show that pronoun fidelity is neither robust, nor due to reasoning, in a simple, naturalistic setting where humans achieve nearly 100% accuracy. We encourage researchers to bridge the gaps we find and to carefully evaluate reasoning in settings where superficial repetition might inflate perceptions of model performance.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Human-AI interactivity is a critical aspect that reflects the usability of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). However, existing end-to-end MLLMs only allow users to interact with them through language instructions, leading to the limitation of the interactive accuracy and efficiency. In this study, we present precise referring instructions that utilize diverse reference representations such as points and boxes as referring prompts to refer to the special region. This enables MLLMs to focus on the region of interest and achieve finer-grained interaction. Based on precise referring instruction, we propose ChatSpot, a unified end-to-end multimodal large language model that supports diverse forms of interactivity including mouse clicks, drag-and-drop, and drawing boxes, which provides a more flexible and seamless interactive experience. We also construct a multi-grained vision-language instruction-following dataset based on existing datasets and GPT-4 generating. Furthermore, we design a series of evaluation tasks to assess the effectiveness of region recognition and interaction. Experimental results showcase ChatSpot's promising performance.

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.

Visual Grounding is also known as Referring Expression Comprehension and Phrase Grounding. It involves localizing a natural number of specific regions within an image based on a given textual description. The objective of this task is to emulate the prevalent referential relationships in social conversations, equipping machines with human-like multimodal comprehension capabilities. Consequently, it has extensive applications in various domains. However, since 2021, visual grounding has witnessed significant advancements, with emerging new concepts such as grounded pre-training, grounding multimodal LLMs, generalized visual grounding, and giga-pixel grounding, which have brought numerous new challenges. In this survey, we initially examine the developmental history of visual grounding and provide an overview of essential background knowledge. We systematically track and summarize the advancements and meticulously organize the various settings in visual grounding, thereby establishing precise definitions of these settings to standardize future research and ensure a fair comparison. Additionally, we delve into several advanced topics and highlight numerous applications of visual grounding. Finally, we outline the challenges confronting visual grounding and propose valuable directions for future research, which may serve as inspiration for subsequent researchers. By extracting common technical details, this survey encompasses the representative works in each subtopic over the past decade. To the best, this paper presents the most comprehensive overview currently available in the field of grounding. This survey is designed to be suitable for both beginners and experienced researchers, serving as an invaluable resource for understanding key concepts and tracking the latest research developments. We keep tracing related works at https://github.com/linhuixiao/Awesome-Visual-Grounding.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transitioning into medical clinical use, yet their reliability under realistic, multi-turn interactions remains poorly understood. Existing evaluation frameworks typically assess single-turn question answering under idealized conditions, overlooking the complexities of medical consultations where conflicting input, misleading context, and authority influence are common. We introduce MedQA-Followup, a framework for systematically evaluating multi-turn robustness in medical question answering. Our approach distinguishes between shallow robustness (resisting misleading initial context) and deep robustness (maintaining accuracy when answers are challenged across turns), while also introducing an indirect-direct axis that separates contextual framing (indirect) from explicit suggestion (direct). Using controlled interventions on the MedQA dataset, we evaluate five state-of-the-art LLMs and find that while models perform reasonably well under shallow perturbations, they exhibit severe vulnerabilities in multi-turn settings, with accuracy dropping from 91.2% to as low as 13.5% for Claude Sonnet 4. Counterintuitively, indirect, context-based interventions are often more harmful than direct suggestions, yielding larger accuracy drops across models and exposing a significant vulnerability for clinical deployment. Further compounding analyses reveal model differences, with some showing additional performance drops under repeated interventions while others partially recovering or even improving. These findings highlight multi-turn robustness as a critical but underexplored dimension for safe and reliable deployment of medical LLMs.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

Large language models (LLMs), despite being safety-aligned, exhibit brittle refusal behaviors that can be circumvented by simple linguistic changes. As tense jailbreaking demonstrates that models refusing harmful requests often comply when rephrased in past tense, a critical generalization gap is revealed in current alignment methods whose underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. In this work, we introduce Activation-Scaling Guard (ASGuard), an insightful, mechanistically-informed framework that surgically mitigates this specific vulnerability. In the first step, we use circuit analysis to identify the specific attention heads causally linked to the targeted jailbreaking such as a tense-changing attack. Second, we train a precise, channel-wise scaling vector to recalibrate the activation of tense vulnerable heads. Lastly, we apply it into a "preventative fine-tuning", forcing the model to learn a more robust refusal mechanism. Across four LLMs, ASGuard effectively reduces the attack success rate of targeted jailbreaking while preserving general capabilities and minimizing over refusal, achieving a Pareto-optimal balance between safety and utility. Our findings underscore how adversarial suffixes suppress the propagation of the refusal-mediating direction, based on mechanistic analysis. Furthermore, our work showcases how a deep understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical, efficient, and targeted methods for adjusting model behavior, charting a course for more reliable and interpretable AI safety.

A key component of successfully reading a passage of text is the ability to apply knowledge gained from the passage to a new situation. In order to facilitate progress on this kind of reading, we present ROPES, a challenging benchmark for reading comprehension targeting Reasoning Over Paragraph Effects in Situations. We target expository language describing causes and effects (e.g., "animal pollinators increase efficiency of fertilization in flowers"), as they have clear implications for new situations. A system is presented a background passage containing at least one of these relations, a novel situation that uses this background, and questions that require reasoning about effects of the relationships in the background passage in the context of the situation. We collect background passages from science textbooks and Wikipedia that contain such phenomena, and ask crowd workers to author situations, questions, and answers, resulting in a 14,322 question dataset. We analyze the challenges of this task and evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art reading comprehension models. The best model performs only slightly better than randomly guessing an answer of the correct type, at 61.6% F1, well below the human performance of 89.0%.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful text generators, yet they can produce toxic or harmful content even when given seemingly harmless prompts. This presents a serious safety challenge and can cause real-world harm. Toxicity is often subtle and context-dependent, making it difficult to detect at the token level or through coarse sentence-level signals. Moreover, efforts to mitigate toxicity often face a trade-off between safety and the coherence, or fluency of the generated text. In this work, we present a targeted subspace intervention strategy for identifying and suppressing hidden toxic patterns from underlying model representations, while preserving overall ability to generate safe fluent content. On the RealToxicityPrompts, our method achieves strong mitigation performance compared to existing baselines, with minimal impact on inference complexity. Across multiple LLMs, our approach reduces toxicity of state-of-the-art detoxification systems by 8-20%, while maintaining comparable fluency. Through extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses, we show that our approach achieves effective toxicity reduction without impairing generative performance, consistently outperforming existing baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized various domains but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs manipulate the model into ignoring original instructions and executing designated action. In this paper, we investigate the underlying mechanisms of these attacks by analyzing the attention patterns within LLMs. We introduce the concept of the distraction effect, where specific attention heads, termed important heads, shift focus from the original instruction to the injected instruction. Building on this discovery, we propose Attention Tracker, a training-free detection method that tracks attention patterns on instruction to detect prompt injection attacks without the need for additional LLM inference. Our method generalizes effectively across diverse models, datasets, and attack types, showing an AUROC improvement of up to 10.0% over existing methods, and performs well even on small LLMs. We demonstrate the robustness of our approach through extensive evaluations and provide insights into safeguarding LLM-integrated systems from prompt injection vulnerabilities.