Daily Papers

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a powerful paradigm for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), yet its success hinges on effective exploration. An ideal exploration strategy must navigate two fundamental challenges: it must preserve sample quality while also ensuring training stability. While standard fixed-temperature sampling is simple, it struggles to balance these competing demands, as high temperatures degrade sample quality and low temperatures limit discovery. In this work, we propose a simpler and more effective strategy, Exploratory Annealed Decoding (EAD), grounded in the insight that exploration is most impactful on early tokens which define a sequence's semantic direction. EAD implements an intuitive **explore-at-the-beginning, exploit-at-the-end** strategy by annealing the sampling temperature from high to low during generation. This dynamic schedule encourages meaningful, high-level diversity at the start, then gradually lowers the temperature to preserve sample quality and keep the sampling distribution close to the target policy, which is essential for stable training. We demonstrate that EAD is a lightweight, plug-and-play method that significantly improves sample efficiency, consistently outperforming fixed-temperature sampling across various RLVR algorithms and model sizes. Our work suggests that aligning exploration with the natural dynamics of sequential generation offers a robust path to improving LLM reasoning.

A key challenge in eXplainable Artificial Intelligence is the well-known tradeoff between the transparency of an algorithm (i.e., how easily a human can directly understand the algorithm, as opposed to receiving a post-hoc explanation), and its accuracy. We report on the design of a new deep network that achieves improved transparency without sacrificing accuracy. We design a deep convolutional neuro-fuzzy inference system (DCNFIS) by hybridizing fuzzy logic and deep learning models and show that DCNFIS performs as accurately as existing convolutional neural networks on four well-known datasets and 3 famous architectures. Our performance comparison with available fuzzy methods show that DCNFIS is now state-of-the-art fuzzy system and outperforms other shallow and deep fuzzy methods to the best of our knowledge. At the end, we exploit the transparency of fuzzy logic by deriving explanations, in the form of saliency maps, from the fuzzy rules encoded in the network to take benefit of fuzzy logic upon regular deep learning methods. We investigate the properties of these explanations in greater depth using the Fashion-MNIST dataset.

Determining the exact latitude and longitude that a photo was taken is a useful and widely applicable task, yet it remains exceptionally difficult despite the accelerated progress of other computer vision tasks. Most previous approaches have opted to learn a single representation of query images, which are then classified at different levels of geographic granularity. These approaches fail to exploit the different visual cues that give context to different hierarchies, such as the country, state, and city level. To this end, we introduce an end-to-end transformer-based architecture that exploits the relationship between different geographic levels (which we refer to as hierarchies) and the corresponding visual scene information in an image through hierarchical cross-attention. We achieve this by learning a query for each geographic hierarchy and scene type. Furthermore, we learn a separate representation for different environmental scenes, as different scenes in the same location are often defined by completely different visual features. We achieve state of the art street level accuracy on 4 standard geo-localization datasets : Im2GPS, Im2GPS3k, YFCC4k, and YFCC26k, as well as qualitatively demonstrate how our method learns different representations for different visual hierarchies and scenes, which has not been demonstrated in the previous methods. These previous testing datasets mostly consist of iconic landmarks or images taken from social media, which makes them either a memorization task, or biased towards certain places. To address this issue we introduce a much harder testing dataset, Google-World-Streets-15k, comprised of images taken from Google Streetview covering the whole planet and present state of the art results. Our code will be made available in the camera-ready version.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) improves instruction following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but suffers from training inefficiency due to inadequate difficulty assessment. Moreover, RLVR is prone to over-optimization, where LLMs exploit verification shortcuts without aligning to the actual intent of user instructions. We introduce Instruction Following Decorator (IFDecorator}, a framework that wraps RLVR training into a robust and sample-efficient pipeline. It consists of three components: (1) a cooperative-adversarial data flywheel that co-evolves instructions and hybrid verifications, generating progressively more challenging instruction-verification pairs; (2) IntentCheck, a bypass module enforcing intent alignment; and (3) trip wires, a diagnostic mechanism that detects reward hacking via trap instructions, which trigger and capture shortcut exploitation behaviors. Our Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct-IFDecorator achieves 87.43% accuracy on IFEval, outperforming larger proprietary models such as GPT-4o. Additionally, we demonstrate substantial improvements on FollowBench while preserving general capabilities. Our trip wires show significant reductions in reward hacking rates. We will release models, code, and data for future research.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Trajectory data, which tracks movements through geographic locations, is crucial for improving real-world applications. However, collecting such sensitive data raises considerable privacy concerns. Local differential privacy (LDP) offers a solution by allowing individuals to locally perturb their trajectory data before sharing it. Despite its privacy benefits, LDP protocols are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where attackers inject fake data to manipulate aggregated results. In this work, we make the first attempt to analyze vulnerabilities in several representative LDP trajectory protocols. We propose TraP, a heuristic algorithm for data Poisoning attacks using a prefix-suffix method to optimize fake Trajectory selection, significantly reducing computational complexity. Our experimental results demonstrate that our attack can substantially increase target pattern occurrences in the perturbed trajectory dataset with few fake users. This study underscores the urgent need for robust defenses and better protocol designs to safeguard LDP trajectory data against malicious manipulation.