Daily Papers

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Several works have proposed Simplicity Bias (SB)---the tendency of standard training procedures such as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to find simple models---to justify why neural networks generalize well [Arpit et al. 2017, Nakkiran et al. 2019, Soudry et al. 2018]. However, the precise notion of simplicity remains vague. Furthermore, previous settings that use SB to theoretically justify why neural networks generalize well do not simultaneously capture the non-robustness of neural networks---a widely observed phenomenon in practice [Goodfellow et al. 2014, Jo and Bengio 2017]. We attempt to reconcile SB and the superior standard generalization of neural networks with the non-robustness observed in practice by designing datasets that (a) incorporate a precise notion of simplicity, (b) comprise multiple predictive features with varying levels of simplicity, and (c) capture the non-robustness of neural networks trained on real data. Through theory and empirics on these datasets, we make four observations: (i) SB of SGD and variants can be extreme: neural networks can exclusively rely on the simplest feature and remain invariant to all predictive complex features. (ii) The extreme aspect of SB could explain why seemingly benign distribution shifts and small adversarial perturbations significantly degrade model performance. (iii) Contrary to conventional wisdom, SB can also hurt generalization on the same data distribution, as SB persists even when the simplest feature has less predictive power than the more complex features. (iv) Common approaches to improve generalization and robustness---ensembles and adversarial training---can fail in mitigating SB and its pitfalls. Given the role of SB in training neural networks, we hope that the proposed datasets and methods serve as an effective testbed to evaluate novel algorithmic approaches aimed at avoiding the pitfalls of SB.

Existing question answering (QA) datasets are no longer challenging to most powerful Large Language Models (LLMs). Traditional QA benchmarks like TriviaQA, NaturalQuestions, ELI5 and HotpotQA mainly study ``known unknowns'' with clear indications of both what information is missing, and how to find it to answer the question. Hence, good performance on these benchmarks provides a false sense of security. A yet unmet need of the NLP community is a bank of non-factoid, multi-perspective questions involving a great deal of unclear information needs, i.e. ``unknown uknowns''. We claim we can find such questions in search engine logs, which is surprising because most question-intent queries are indeed factoid. We present Researchy Questions, a dataset of search engine queries tediously filtered to be non-factoid, ``decompositional'' and multi-perspective. We show that users spend a lot of ``effort'' on these questions in terms of signals like clicks and session length, and that they are also challenging for GPT-4. We also show that ``slow thinking'' answering techniques, like decomposition into sub-questions shows benefit over answering directly. We release sim 100k Researchy Questions, along with the Clueweb22 URLs that were clicked.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

We demonstrate that LLMs may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to implicit meta-learning (IML): in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems. Our code can be found at https://github.com/krasheninnikov/internalization.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

We study secret elicitation: discovering knowledge that an AI possesses but does not explicitly verbalize. As a testbed, we train three families of large language models (LLMs) to possess specific knowledge that they apply downstream but deny knowing when asked directly. For example, in one setting, we train an LLM to generate replies that are consistent with knowing the user is female, while denying this knowledge when asked directly. We then design various black-box and white-box secret elicitation techniques and evaluate them based on whether they can help an LLM auditor successfully guess the secret knowledge. Many of our techniques improve on simple baselines. Our most effective techniques (performing best in 2/3 settings) are based on prefill attacks, a black-box technique where the LLM reveals secret knowledge when generating a completion from a predefined prefix. In our remaining setting, white-box techniques based on logit lens and sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are most effective. We release our models and code, establishing a public benchmark for evaluating secret elicitation methods.

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have recently been achieving state-of-the-art performance on a variety of pattern-recognition tasks, most notably visual classification problems. Given that DNNs are now able to classify objects in images with near-human-level performance, questions naturally arise as to what differences remain between computer and human vision. A recent study revealed that changing an image (e.g. of a lion) in a way imperceptible to humans can cause a DNN to label the image as something else entirely (e.g. mislabeling a lion a library). Here we show a related result: it is easy to produce images that are completely unrecognizable to humans, but that state-of-the-art DNNs believe to be recognizable objects with 99.99% confidence (e.g. labeling with certainty that white noise static is a lion). Specifically, we take convolutional neural networks trained to perform well on either the ImageNet or MNIST datasets and then find images with evolutionary algorithms or gradient ascent that DNNs label with high confidence as belonging to each dataset class. It is possible to produce images totally unrecognizable to human eyes that DNNs believe with near certainty are familiar objects, which we call "fooling images" (more generally, fooling examples). Our results shed light on interesting differences between human vision and current DNNs, and raise questions about the generality of DNN computer vision.

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

We show that existing unsupervised methods on large language model (LLM) activations do not discover knowledge -- instead they seem to discover whatever feature of the activations is most prominent. The idea behind unsupervised knowledge elicitation is that knowledge satisfies a consistency structure, which can be used to discover knowledge. We first prove theoretically that arbitrary features (not just knowledge) satisfy the consistency structure of a particular leading unsupervised knowledge-elicitation method, contrast-consistent search (Burns et al. - arXiv:2212.03827). We then present a series of experiments showing settings in which unsupervised methods result in classifiers that do not predict knowledge, but instead predict a different prominent feature. We conclude that existing unsupervised methods for discovering latent knowledge are insufficient, and we contribute sanity checks to apply to evaluating future knowledge elicitation methods. Conceptually, we hypothesise that the identification issues explored here, e.g. distinguishing a model's knowledge from that of a simulated character's, will persist for future unsupervised methods.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

It is almost always easier to find an accurate-but-complex model than an accurate-yet-simple model. Finding optimal, sparse, accurate models of various forms (linear models with integer coefficients, decision sets, rule lists, decision trees) is generally NP-hard. We often do not know whether the search for a simpler model will be worthwhile, and thus we do not go to the trouble of searching for one. In this work, we ask an important practical question: can accurate-yet-simple models be proven to exist, or shown likely to exist, before explicitly searching for them? We hypothesize that there is an important reason that simple-yet-accurate models often do exist. This hypothesis is that the size of the Rashomon set is often large, where the Rashomon set is the set of almost-equally-accurate models from a function class. If the Rashomon set is large, it contains numerous accurate models, and perhaps at least one of them is the simple model we desire. In this work, we formally present the Rashomon ratio as a new gauge of simplicity for a learning problem, depending on a function class and a data set. The Rashomon ratio is the ratio of the volume of the set of accurate models to the volume of the hypothesis space, and it is different from standard complexity measures from statistical learning theory. Insight from studying the Rashomon ratio provides an easy way to check whether a simpler model might exist for a problem before finding it, namely whether several different machine learning methods achieve similar performance on the data. In that sense, the Rashomon ratio is a powerful tool for understanding why and when an accurate-yet-simple model might exist. If, as we hypothesize in this work, many real-world data sets admit large Rashomon sets, the implications are vast: it means that simple or interpretable models may often be used for high-stakes decisions without losing accuracy.

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

One way to increase confidence in the outputs of Large Language Models (LLMs) is to support them with reasoning that is clear and easy to check -- a property we call legibility. We study legibility in the context of solving grade-school math problems and show that optimizing chain-of-thought solutions only for answer correctness can make them less legible. To mitigate the loss in legibility, we propose a training algorithm inspired by Prover-Verifier Game from Anil et al. (2021). Our algorithm iteratively trains small verifiers to predict solution correctness, "helpful" provers to produce correct solutions that the verifier accepts, and "sneaky" provers to produce incorrect solutions that fool the verifier. We find that the helpful prover's accuracy and the verifier's robustness to adversarial attacks increase over the course of training. Furthermore, we show that legibility training transfers to time-constrained humans tasked with verifying solution correctness. Over course of LLM training human accuracy increases when checking the helpful prover's solutions, and decreases when checking the sneaky prover's solutions. Hence, training for checkability by small verifiers is a plausible technique for increasing output legibility. Our results suggest legibility training against small verifiers as a practical avenue for increasing legibility of large LLMs to humans, and thus could help with alignment of superhuman models.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Pre-trained models of code have achieved success in many important software engineering tasks. However, these powerful models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that slightly perturb model inputs to make a victim model produce wrong outputs. Current works mainly attack models of code with examples that preserve operational program semantics but ignore a fundamental requirement for adversarial example generation: perturbations should be natural to human judges, which we refer to as naturalness requirement. In this paper, we propose ALERT (nAturaLnEss AwaRe ATtack), a black-box attack that adversarially transforms inputs to make victim models produce wrong outputs. Different from prior works, this paper considers the natural semantic of generated examples at the same time as preserving the operational semantic of original inputs. Our user study demonstrates that human developers consistently consider that adversarial examples generated by ALERT are more natural than those generated by the state-of-the-art work by Zhang et al. that ignores the naturalness requirement. On attacking CodeBERT, our approach can achieve attack success rates of 53.62%, 27.79%, and 35.78% across three downstream tasks: vulnerability prediction, clone detection and code authorship attribution. On GraphCodeBERT, our approach can achieve average success rates of 76.95%, 7.96% and 61.47% on the three tasks. The above outperforms the baseline by 14.07% and 18.56% on the two pre-trained models on average. Finally, we investigated the value of the generated adversarial examples to harden victim models through an adversarial fine-tuning procedure and demonstrated the accuracy of CodeBERT and GraphCodeBERT against ALERT-generated adversarial examples increased by 87.59% and 92.32%, respectively.

Hallucinated outputs from language models pose risks in the medical domain, especially for lay audiences making health-related decisions. Existing factuality evaluation methods, such as entailment- and question-answering-based (QA), struggle with plain language summary (PLS) generation due to elaborative explanation phenomenon, which introduces external content (e.g., definitions, background, examples) absent from the source document to enhance comprehension. To address this, we introduce PlainQAFact, a framework trained on a fine-grained, human-annotated dataset PlainFact, to evaluate the factuality of both source-simplified and elaboratively explained sentences. PlainQAFact first classifies factuality type and then assesses factuality using a retrieval-augmented QA-based scoring method. Our approach is lightweight and computationally efficient. Empirical results show that existing factuality metrics fail to effectively evaluate factuality in PLS, especially for elaborative explanations, whereas PlainQAFact achieves state-of-the-art performance. We further analyze its effectiveness across external knowledge sources, answer extraction strategies, overlap measures, and document granularity levels, refining its overall factuality assessment.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Understanding natural language requires common sense, one aspect of which is the ability to discern the plausibility of events. While distributional models -- most recently pre-trained, Transformer language models -- have demonstrated improvements in modeling event plausibility, their performance still falls short of humans'. In this work, we show that Transformer-based plausibility models are markedly inconsistent across the conceptual classes of a lexical hierarchy, inferring that "a person breathing" is plausible while "a dentist breathing" is not, for example. We find this inconsistency persists even when models are softly injected with lexical knowledge, and we present a simple post-hoc method of forcing model consistency that improves correlation with human plausibility judgements.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Recent work has argued that large language models (LLMs) are not "abstract reasoners", citing their poor zero-shot performance on a variety of challenging tasks as evidence. We revisit these experiments in order to add nuance to the claim. First, we show that while LLMs indeed perform poorly in a zero-shot setting, even tuning a small subset of parameters for input encoding can enable near-perfect performance. However, we also show that this finetuning does not necessarily transfer across datasets. We take this collection of empirical results as an invitation to (re-)open the discussion of what it means to be an "abstract reasoner", and why it matters whether LLMs fit the bill.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

While hallucinations of large language models (LLMs) prevail as a major challenge, existing evaluation benchmarks on factuality do not cover the diverse domains of knowledge that the real-world users of LLMs seek information about. To bridge this gap, we introduce WildHallucinations, a benchmark that evaluates factuality. It does so by prompting LLMs to generate information about entities mined from user-chatbot conversations in the wild. These generations are then automatically fact-checked against a systematically curated knowledge source collected from web search. Notably, half of these real-world entities do not have associated Wikipedia pages. We evaluate 118,785 generations from 15 LLMs on 7,919 entities. We find that LLMs consistently hallucinate more on entities without Wikipedia pages and exhibit varying hallucination rates across different domains. Finally, given the same base models, adding a retrieval component only slightly reduces hallucinations but does not eliminate hallucinations.

A patent must be deemed novel and non-obvious in order to be granted by the US Patent Office (USPTO). If it is not, a US patent examiner will cite the prior work, or prior art, that invalidates the novelty and issue a non-final rejection. Predicting what claims of the invention should change given the prior art is an essential and crucial step in securing invention rights, yet has not been studied before as a learnable task. In this work we introduce the PatentEdits dataset, which contains 105K examples of successful revisions that overcome objections to novelty. We design algorithms to label edits sentence by sentence, then establish how well these edits can be predicted with large language models (LLMs). We demonstrate that evaluating textual entailment between cited references and draft sentences is especially effective in predicting which inventive claims remained unchanged or are novel in relation to prior art.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

There is some theoretical evidence that deep neural networks with multiple hidden layers have a potential for more efficient representation of multidimensional mappings than shallow networks with a single hidden layer. The question is whether it is possible to exploit this theoretical advantage for finding such representations with help of numerical training methods. Tests using prototypical problems with a known mean square minimum did not confirm this hypothesis. Minima found with the help of deep networks have always been worse than those found using shallow networks. This does not directly contradict the theoretical findings---it is possible that the superior representational capacity of deep networks is genuine while finding the mean square minimum of such deep networks is a substantially harder problem than with shallow ones.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed as powerful tools for several natural language processing (NLP) applications. Recent works show that modern LLMs can generate self-explanations (SEs), which elicit their intermediate reasoning steps for explaining their behavior. Self-explanations have seen widespread adoption owing to their conversational and plausible nature. However, there is little to no understanding of their faithfulness. In this work, we discuss the dichotomy between faithfulness and plausibility in SEs generated by LLMs. We argue that while LLMs are adept at generating plausible explanations -- seemingly logical and coherent to human users -- these explanations do not necessarily align with the reasoning processes of the LLMs, raising concerns about their faithfulness. We highlight that the current trend towards increasing the plausibility of explanations, primarily driven by the demand for user-friendly interfaces, may come at the cost of diminishing their faithfulness. We assert that the faithfulness of explanations is critical in LLMs employed for high-stakes decision-making. Moreover, we urge the community to identify the faithfulness requirements of real-world applications and ensure explanations meet those needs. Finally, we propose some directions for future work, emphasizing the need for novel methodologies and frameworks that can enhance the faithfulness of self-explanations without compromising their plausibility, essential for the transparent deployment of LLMs in diverse high-stakes domains.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

Interpretability or explainability is an emerging research field in NLP. From a user-centric point of view, the goal is to build models that provide proper justification for their decisions, similar to those of humans, by requiring the models to satisfy additional constraints. To this end, we introduce a new application on legal text where, contrary to mainstream literature targeting word-level rationales, we conceive rationales as selected paragraphs in multi-paragraph structured court cases. We also release a new dataset comprising European Court of Human Rights cases, including annotations for paragraph-level rationales. We use this dataset to study the effect of already proposed rationale constraints, i.e., sparsity, continuity, and comprehensiveness, formulated as regularizers. Our findings indicate that some of these constraints are not beneficial in paragraph-level rationale extraction, while others need re-formulation to better handle the multi-label nature of the task we consider. We also introduce a new constraint, singularity, which further improves the quality of rationales, even compared with noisy rationale supervision. Experimental results indicate that the newly introduced task is very challenging and there is a large scope for further research.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

The last decade has seen tremendous progress in our ability to generate realistic-looking data, be it images, text, audio, or video. Here, we discuss the closely related problem of quantifying realism, that is, designing functions that can reliably tell realistic data from unrealistic data. This problem turns out to be significantly harder to solve and remains poorly understood, despite its prevalence in machine learning and recent breakthroughs in generative AI. Drawing on insights from algorithmic information theory, we discuss why this problem is challenging, why a good generative model alone is insufficient to solve it, and what a good solution would look like. In particular, we introduce the notion of a universal critic, which unlike adversarial critics does not require adversarial training. While universal critics are not immediately practical, they can serve both as a North Star for guiding practical implementations and as a tool for analyzing existing attempts to capture realism.

We identify incremental learning dynamics in transformers, where the difference between trained and initial weights progressively increases in rank. We rigorously prove this occurs under the simplifying assumptions of diagonal weight matrices and small initialization. Our experiments support the theory and also show that phenomenon can occur in practice without the simplifying assumptions.

In contrast to entropy, which increases monotonically, the "complexity" or "interestingness" of closed systems seems intuitively to increase at first and then decrease as equilibrium is approached. For example, our universe lacked complex structures at the Big Bang and will also lack them after black holes evaporate and particles are dispersed. This paper makes an initial attempt to quantify this pattern. As a model system, we use a simple, two-dimensional cellular automaton that simulates the mixing of two liquids ("coffee" and "cream"). A plausible complexity measure is then the Kolmogorov complexity of a coarse-grained approximation of the automaton's state, which we dub the "apparent complexity." We study this complexity measure, and show analytically that it never becomes large when the liquid particles are non-interacting. By contrast, when the particles do interact, we give numerical evidence that the complexity reaches a maximum comparable to the "coffee cup's" horizontal dimension. We raise the problem of proving this behavior analytically.

Unsupervised pretraining, which learns a useful representation using a large amount of unlabeled data to facilitate the learning of downstream tasks, is a critical component of modern large-scale machine learning systems. Despite its tremendous empirical success, the rigorous theoretical understanding of why unsupervised pretraining generally helps remains rather limited -- most existing results are restricted to particular methods or approaches for unsupervised pretraining with specialized structural assumptions. This paper studies a generic framework, where the unsupervised representation learning task is specified by an abstract class of latent variable models Phi and the downstream task is specified by a class of prediction functions Psi. We consider a natural approach of using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for unsupervised pretraining and Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) for learning downstream tasks. We prove that, under a mild ''informative'' condition, our algorithm achieves an excess risk of mathcal{O}(mathcal{C_Phi/m} + mathcal{C_Psi/n}) for downstream tasks, where C_Phi, C_Psi are complexity measures of function classes Phi, Psi, and m, n are the number of unlabeled and labeled data respectively. Comparing to the baseline of mathcal{O}(mathcal{C_{Phi circ Psi}/n}) achieved by performing supervised learning using only the labeled data, our result rigorously shows the benefit of unsupervised pretraining when m gg n and C_{Phicirc Psi} > C_Psi. This paper further shows that our generic framework covers a wide range of approaches for unsupervised pretraining, including factor models, Gaussian mixture models, and contrastive learning.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

EasyMath is a compact benchmark for practical math reasoning in small language models. It covers thirteen categories, from basic arithmetic and order of operations to word problems, algebraic expressions, edge cases, and omits specialist topics. We tested 23 models (14M to 4B parameters) using exact, numerical, and symbolic checks on free-form answers in a zero-shot setting. Accuracy rises with size and training, chain-of-thought adds modest gains, and consistency improves at scale.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Large language models (LLMs) have a tendency to generate plausible-sounding yet factually incorrect responses, especially when queried on unfamiliar concepts. In this work, we explore the underlying mechanisms that govern how finetuned LLMs hallucinate. Our investigation reveals an interesting pattern: as inputs become more unfamiliar, LLM outputs tend to default towards a ``hedged'' prediction, whose form is determined by how the unfamiliar examples in the finetuning data are supervised. Thus, by strategically modifying these examples' supervision, we can control LLM predictions for unfamiliar inputs (e.g., teach them to say ``I don't know''). Based on these principles, we develop an RL approach that more reliably mitigates hallucinations for long-form generation tasks, by tackling the challenges presented by reward model hallucinations. We validate our findings with a series of controlled experiments in multiple-choice QA on MMLU, as well as long-form biography and book/movie plot generation tasks.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Abstraction ability is crucial in human intelligence, which can also benefit various tasks in NLP study. Existing work shows that LLMs are deficient in abstract ability, and how to improve it remains unexplored. In this work, we design the framework AbsInstruct to enhance LLMs' abstraction ability through instruction tuning. The framework builds instructions with in-depth explanations to assist LLMs in capturing the underlying rationale of abstraction. Meanwhile, we introduce a plausibility estimator to select instructions that are more consistent with the abstraction knowledge of LLMs to be aligned. Then, our framework combines abstraction instructions with general-purpose ones to build a hybrid dataset. Extensive experiments and analyses demonstrate that our framework can considerably enhance LLMs' abstraction ability with strong generalization performance while maintaining their general instruction-following abilities.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Hallucination plagues even frontier LLMs--but how bad is it really for summarizing academic papers? We evaluate Factored Verification, a simple automated method for detecting hallucinations in abstractive summaries. This method sets a new SotA on hallucination detection in the summarization task of the HaluEval benchmark, achieving 76.2% accuracy. We then use this method to estimate how often language models hallucinate when summarizing across multiple academic papers and find 0.62 hallucinations in the average ChatGPT (16k) summary, 0.84 for GPT-4, and 1.55 for Claude 2. We ask models to self-correct using Factored Critiques and find that this lowers the number of hallucinations to 0.49 for ChatGPT, 0.46 for GPT-4, and 0.95 for Claude 2. The hallucinations we find are often subtle, so we advise caution when using models to synthesize academic papers.

Post-hoc gradient-based interpretability methods [Simonyan et al., 2013, Smilkov et al., 2017] that provide instance-specific explanations of model predictions are often based on assumption (A): magnitude of input gradients -- gradients of logits with respect to input -- noisily highlight discriminative task-relevant features. In this work, we test the validity of assumption (A) using a three-pronged approach. First, we develop an evaluation framework, DiffROAR, to test assumption (A) on four image classification benchmarks. Our results suggest that (i) input gradients of standard models (i.e., trained on original data) may grossly violate (A), whereas (ii) input gradients of adversarially robust models satisfy (A). Second, we introduce BlockMNIST, an MNIST-based semi-real dataset, that by design encodes a priori knowledge of discriminative features. Our analysis on BlockMNIST leverages this information to validate as well as characterize differences between input gradient attributions of standard and robust models. Finally, we theoretically prove that our empirical findings hold on a simplified version of the BlockMNIST dataset. Specifically, we prove that input gradients of standard one-hidden-layer MLPs trained on this dataset do not highlight instance-specific signal coordinates, thus grossly violating assumption (A). Our findings motivate the need to formalize and test common assumptions in interpretability in a falsifiable manner [Leavitt and Morcos, 2020]. We believe that the DiffROAR evaluation framework and BlockMNIST-based datasets can serve as sanity checks to audit instance-specific interpretability methods; code and data available at https://github.com/harshays/inputgradients.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Many adversarial attacks in NLP perturb inputs to produce visually similar strings ('ergo' rightarrow 'epsilonrgo') which are legible to humans but degrade model performance. Although preserving legibility is a necessary condition for text perturbation, little work has been done to systematically characterize it; instead, legibility is typically loosely enforced via intuitions around the nature and extent of perturbations. Particularly, it is unclear to what extent can inputs be perturbed while preserving legibility, or how to quantify the legibility of a perturbed string. In this work, we address this gap by learning models that predict the legibility of a perturbed string, and rank candidate perturbations based on their legibility. To do so, we collect and release LEGIT, a human-annotated dataset comprising the legibility of visually perturbed text. Using this dataset, we build both text- and vision-based models which achieve up to 0.91 F1 score in predicting whether an input is legible, and an accuracy of 0.86 in predicting which of two given perturbations is more legible. Additionally, we discover that legible perturbations from the LEGIT dataset are more effective at lowering the performance of NLP models than best-known attack strategies, suggesting that current models may be vulnerable to a broad range of perturbations beyond what is captured by existing visual attacks. Data, code, and models are available at https://github.com/dvsth/learning-legibility-2023.

Large Language Models (LLM) are a new class of computation engines, "programmed" via prompt engineering. We are still learning how to best "program" these LLMs to help developers. We start with the intuition that developers tend to consciously and unconsciously have a collection of semantics facts in mind when working on coding tasks. Mostly these are shallow, simple facts arising from a quick read. For a function, examples of facts might include parameter and local variable names, return expressions, simple pre- and post-conditions, and basic control and data flow, etc. One might assume that the powerful multi-layer architecture of transformer-style LLMs makes them inherently capable of doing this simple level of "code analysis" and extracting such information, implicitly, while processing code: but are they, really? If they aren't, could explicitly adding this information help? Our goal here is to investigate this question, using the code summarization task and evaluate whether automatically augmenting an LLM's prompt with semantic facts explicitly, actually helps. Prior work shows that LLM performance on code summarization benefits from few-shot samples drawn either from the same-project or from examples found via information retrieval methods (such as BM25). While summarization performance has steadily increased since the early days, there is still room for improvement: LLM performance on code summarization still lags its performance on natural-language tasks like translation and text summarization. We find that adding semantic facts actually does help! This approach improves performance in several different settings suggested by prior work, including for two different Large Language Models. In most cases, improvement nears or exceeds 2 BLEU; for the PHP language in the challenging CodeSearchNet dataset, this augmentation actually yields performance surpassing 30 BLEU.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

Neural networks often pack many unrelated concepts into a single neuron - a puzzling phenomenon known as 'polysemanticity' which makes interpretability much more challenging. This paper provides a toy model where polysemanticity can be fully understood, arising as a result of models storing additional sparse features in "superposition." We demonstrate the existence of a phase change, a surprising connection to the geometry of uniform polytopes, and evidence of a link to adversarial examples. We also discuss potential implications for mechanistic interpretability.

A consistent body of evidence suggests that dream reports significantly vary from other types of textual transcripts with respect to semantic content. Furthermore, it appears to be a widespread belief in the dream/sleep research community that dream reports constitute rather ``unique'' strings of text. This might be a notable issue for the growing amount of approaches using natural language processing (NLP) tools to automatically analyse dream reports, as they largely rely on neural models trained on non-dream corpora scraped from the web. In this work, I will adopt state-of-the-art (SotA) large language models (LLMs), to study if and how dream reports deviate from other human-generated text strings, such as Wikipedia. Results show that, taken as a whole, DreamBank does not deviate from Wikipedia. Moreover, on average, single dream reports are significantly more predictable than Wikipedia articles. Preliminary evidence suggests that word count, gender, and visual impairment can significantly shape how predictable a dream report can appear to the model.

Universality is a key hypothesis in mechanistic interpretability -- that different models learn similar features and circuits when trained on similar tasks. In this work, we study the universality hypothesis by examining how small neural networks learn to implement group composition. We present a novel algorithm by which neural networks may implement composition for any finite group via mathematical representation theory. We then show that networks consistently learn this algorithm by reverse engineering model logits and weights, and confirm our understanding using ablations. By studying networks of differing architectures trained on various groups, we find mixed evidence for universality: using our algorithm, we can completely characterize the family of circuits and features that networks learn on this task, but for a given network the precise circuits learned -- as well as the order they develop -- are arbitrary.

The stock market is a network which provides a platform for almost all major economic transactions. While investing in the stock market is a good idea, investing in individual stocks may not be, especially for the casual investor. Smart stock-picking requires in-depth research and plenty of dedication. Predicting this stock value offers enormous arbitrage profit opportunities. This attractiveness of finding a solution has prompted researchers to find a way past problems like volatility, seasonality, and dependence on time. This paper surveys recent literature in the domain of natural language processing and machine learning techniques used to predict stock market movements. The main contributions of this paper include the sophisticated categorizations of many recent articles and the illustration of the recent trends of research in stock market prediction and its related areas.

Deep neural networks learn fragile "shortcut" features, rendering them difficult to interpret (black box) and vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This paper proposes semantic features as a general architectural solution to this problem. The main idea is to make features locality-sensitive in the adequate semantic topology of the domain, thus introducing a strong regularization. The proof of concept network is lightweight, inherently interpretable and achieves almost human-level adversarial test metrics - with no adversarial training! These results and the general nature of the approach warrant further research on semantic features. The code is available at https://github.com/314-Foundation/white-box-nn

With infinitely many high-quality data points, infinite computational power, an infinitely large foundation model with a perfect training algorithm and guaranteed zero generalization error on the pretext task, can the model be used for everything? This question cannot be answered by the existing theory of representation, optimization or generalization, because the issues they mainly investigate are assumed to be nonexistent here. In this paper, we show that category theory provides powerful machinery to answer this question. We have proved three results. The first one limits the power of prompt-based learning, saying that the model can solve a downstream task with prompts if and only if the task is representable. The second one says fine tuning does not have this limit, as a foundation model with the minimum required power (up to symmetry) can theoretically solve downstream tasks for the category defined by pretext task, with fine tuning and enough resources. Our final result can be seen as a new type of generalization theorem, showing that the foundation model can generate unseen objects from the target category (e.g., images) using the structural information from the source category (e.g., texts). Along the way, we provide a categorical framework for supervised and self-supervised learning, which might be of independent interest.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Our understanding of the generalization capabilities of neural networks (NNs) is still incomplete. Prevailing explanations are based on implicit biases of gradient descent (GD) but they cannot account for the capabilities of models from gradient-free methods nor the simplicity bias recently observed in untrained networks. This paper seeks other sources of generalization in NNs. Findings. To understand the inductive biases provided by architectures independently from GD, we examine untrained, random-weight networks. Even simple MLPs show strong inductive biases: uniform sampling in weight space yields a very biased distribution of functions in terms of complexity. But unlike common wisdom, NNs do not have an inherent "simplicity bias". This property depends on components such as ReLUs, residual connections, and layer normalizations. Alternative architectures can be built with a bias for any level of complexity. Transformers also inherit all these properties from their building blocks. Implications. We provide a fresh explanation for the success of deep learning independent from gradient-based training. It points at promising avenues for controlling the solutions implemented by trained models.

Despite its simplicity and efficacy, the high token expenditure of self-consistency can limit its practical utility. Here we investigate if self-consistency can be made more token-efficient for long chain-of-thought reasoning tasks, while preserving its parallelism, through early hypothesis pruning. Concretely, we generate all solutions in parallel, but periodically prune intermediate hypotheses that are deemed unnecessary based on two lightweight indicators: (a) the model's own confidence in individual hypotheses, and (b) lexical coverage of all current hypotheses by candidate subsets that are under consideration for continued retention. We design a fast weighted set cover algorithm that utilizes the two indicators; our evaluation of five LLMs on three math benchmarks shows that this method can improve token efficiency for all models, by 10-35% in many cases.

Open-ended algorithms aim to learn new, interesting behaviors forever. That requires a vast environment search space, but there are thus infinitely many possible tasks. Even after filtering for tasks the current agent can learn (i.e., learning progress), countless learnable yet uninteresting tasks remain (e.g., minor variations of previously learned tasks). An Achilles Heel of open-endedness research is the inability to quantify (and thus prioritize) tasks that are not just learnable, but also interesting (e.g., worthwhile and novel). We propose solving this problem by Open-endedness via Models of human Notions of Interestingness (OMNI). The insight is that we can utilize foundation models (FMs) as a model of interestingness (MoI), because they already internalize human concepts of interestingness from training on vast amounts of human-generated data, where humans naturally write about what they find interesting or boring. We show that FM-based MoIs improve open-ended learning by focusing on tasks that are both learnable and interesting, outperforming baselines based on uniform task sampling or learning progress alone. This approach has the potential to dramatically advance the ability to intelligently select which tasks to focus on next (i.e., auto-curricula), and could be seen as AI selecting its own next task to learn, facilitating self-improving AI and AI-Generating Algorithms. Project website at https://www.jennyzhangzt.com/omni/

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for machines.

This paper investigates the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the context of understanding their own knowledge and measuring their uncertainty. We argue this is an important feature for mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, we focus on addressing known-unknown questions, characterized by high uncertainty due to the absence of definitive answers. To facilitate our study, we collect a dataset with new Known-Unknown Questions (KUQ) and propose a novel categorization scheme to elucidate the sources of uncertainty. Subsequently, we assess the LLMs' ability to differentiate between known and unknown questions and classify them accordingly. Moreover, we evaluate the quality of their answers in an Open-Ended QA setting. To quantify the uncertainty expressed in the answers, we create a semantic evaluation method that measures the model's accuracy in expressing uncertainty between known vs unknown questions.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

Theorem proving in natural mathematical language - the mixture of symbolic and natural language used by humans - plays a central role in mathematical advances and education, and tests aspects of reasoning that are core to intelligence. Yet it has remained underexplored with modern generative models. We study large-scale language models on two new generation tasks: suggesting the next step in a mathematical proof, and full proof generation. We develop NaturalProver, a language model that generates proofs by conditioning on background references (e.g. theorems and definitions that are either retrieved or human-provided), and optionally enforces their presence with constrained decoding. On theorems from the NaturalProofs benchmark, NaturalProver improves the quality of next-step suggestions and generated proofs over fine-tuned GPT-3, according to human evaluations from university-level mathematics students. NaturalProver is capable of proving some theorems that require short (2-6 step) proofs, and providing next-step suggestions that are rated as correct and useful over 40% of the time, which is to our knowledge the first demonstration of these capabilities using neural language models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Hallucination has been widely recognized to be a significant drawback for large language models (LLMs). There have been many works that attempt to reduce the extent of hallucination. These efforts have mostly been empirical so far, which cannot answer the fundamental question whether it can be completely eliminated. In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that it is impossible to eliminate hallucination in LLMs. Specifically, we define a formal world where hallucination is defined as inconsistencies between a computable LLM and a computable ground truth function. By employing results from learning theory, we show that LLMs cannot learn all of the computable functions and will therefore always hallucinate. Since the formal world is a part of the real world which is much more complicated, hallucinations are also inevitable for real world LLMs. Furthermore, for real world LLMs constrained by provable time complexity, we describe the hallucination-prone tasks and empirically validate our claims. Finally, using the formal world framework, we discuss the possible mechanisms and efficacies of existing hallucination mitigators as well as the practical implications on the safe deployment of LLMs.

Many complex tasks can be decomposed into simpler, independent parts. Discovering such underlying compositional structure has the potential to enable compositional generalization. Despite progress, our most powerful systems struggle to compose flexibly. It therefore seems natural to make models more modular to help capture the compositional nature of many tasks. However, it is unclear under which circumstances modular systems can discover hidden compositional structure. To shed light on this question, we study a teacher-student setting with a modular teacher where we have full control over the composition of ground truth modules. This allows us to relate the problem of compositional generalization to that of identification of the underlying modules. In particular we study modularity in hypernetworks representing a general class of multiplicative interactions. We show theoretically that identification up to linear transformation purely from demonstrations is possible without having to learn an exponential number of module combinations. We further demonstrate empirically that under the theoretically identified conditions, meta-learning from finite data can discover modular policies that generalize compositionally in a number of complex environments.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

Modality is the linguistic ability to describe events with added information such as how desirable, plausible, or feasible they are. Modality is important for many NLP downstream tasks such as the detection of hedging, uncertainty, speculation, and more. Previous studies that address modality detection in NLP often restrict modal expressions to a closed syntactic class, and the modal sense labels are vastly different across different studies, lacking an accepted standard. Furthermore, these senses are often analyzed independently of the events that they modify. This work builds on the theoretical foundations of the Georgetown Gradable Modal Expressions (GME) work by Rubinstein et al. (2013) to propose an event-based modality detection task where modal expressions can be words of any syntactic class and sense labels are drawn from a comprehensive taxonomy which harmonizes the modal concepts contributed by the different studies. We present experiments on the GME corpus aiming to detect and classify fine-grained modal concepts and associate them with their modified events. We show that detecting and classifying modal expressions is not only feasible, but also improves the detection of modal events in their own right.

Most work in machine reading focuses on question answering problems where the answer is directly expressed in the text to read. However, many real-world question answering problems require the reading of text not because it contains the literal answer, but because it contains a recipe to derive an answer together with the reader's background knowledge. One example is the task of interpreting regulations to answer "Can I...?" or "Do I have to...?" questions such as "I am working in Canada. Do I have to carry on paying UK National Insurance?" after reading a UK government website about this topic. This task requires both the interpretation of rules and the application of background knowledge. It is further complicated due to the fact that, in practice, most questions are underspecified, and a human assistant will regularly have to ask clarification questions such as "How long have you been working abroad?" when the answer cannot be directly derived from the question and text. In this paper, we formalise this task and develop a crowd-sourcing strategy to collect 32k task instances based on real-world rules and crowd-generated questions and scenarios. We analyse the challenges of this task and assess its difficulty by evaluating the performance of rule-based and machine-learning baselines. We observe promising results when no background knowledge is necessary, and substantial room for improvement whenever background knowledge is needed.

We describe HypotheSAEs, a general method to hypothesize interpretable relationships between text data (e.g., headlines) and a target variable (e.g., clicks). HypotheSAEs has three steps: (1) train a sparse autoencoder on text embeddings to produce interpretable features describing the data distribution, (2) select features that predict the target variable, and (3) generate a natural language interpretation of each feature (e.g., "mentions being surprised or shocked") using an LLM. Each interpretation serves as a hypothesis about what predicts the target variable. Compared to baselines, our method better identifies reference hypotheses on synthetic datasets (at least +0.06 in F1) and produces more predictive hypotheses on real datasets (~twice as many significant findings), despite requiring 1-2 orders of magnitude less compute than recent LLM-based methods. HypotheSAEs also produces novel discoveries on two well-studied tasks: explaining partisan differences in Congressional speeches and identifying drivers of engagement with online headlines.

Despite their success at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, large language models (LLMs) still struggle to effectively leverage knowledge for knowledge-intensive tasks, manifesting limitations such as generating incomplete, non-factual, or illogical answers. These limitations stem from inadequate knowledge awareness of LLMs during vanilla fine-tuning. To address these problems, we propose a knowledge-aware fine-tuning (KnowTuning) method to explicitly and implicitly improve the knowledge awareness of LLMs. We devise an explicit knowledge-aware generation stage to train LLMs to explicitly identify knowledge triples in answers. We also propose an implicit knowledge-aware comparison stage to train LLMs to implicitly distinguish between reliable and unreliable knowledge, in three aspects: completeness, factuality, and logicality. Extensive experiments on both generic and medical question answering (QA) datasets confirm the effectiveness of KnowTuning, through automatic and human evaluations, across various sizes of LLMs. Finally, we demonstrate that the improvements of KnowTuning generalize to unseen QA datasets.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

Factuality assesses the extent to which a language utterance relates to real-world information; it determines whether utterances correspond to facts, possibilities, or imaginary situations, and as such, it is instrumental for fact checking. Factuality is a complex notion that relies on multiple linguistic signals, and has been studied in various disciplines. We present a complex, multi-faceted annotation scheme of factuality that combines concepts from a variety of previous works. We developed the scheme for Hebrew, but we trust that it can be adapted to other languages. We also present a set of almost 5,000 sentences in the domain of parliamentary discourse that we manually annotated according to this scheme. We report on inter-annotator agreement, and experiment with various approaches to automatically predict (some features of) the scheme, in order to extend the annotation to a large corpus.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

We examine the connections between deterministic, complete, and general global optimisation of continuous functions and a general concept of regression from the perspective of constructive type theory via the concept of 'searchability'. We see how the property of convergence of global optimisation is a straightforward consequence of searchability. The abstract setting allows us to generalise searchability and continuity to higher-order functions, so that we can formulate novel convergence criteria for regression, derived from the convergence of global optimisation. All the theory and the motivating examples are fully formalised in the proof assistant Agda.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

This paper describes our winning contribution to SemEval 2018 Task 4: Character Identification on Multiparty Dialogues. It is a simple, standard model with one key innovation, an entity library. Our results show that this innovation greatly facilitates the identification of infrequent characters. Because of the generic nature of our model, this finding is potentially relevant to any task that requires effective learning from sparse or unbalanced data.

As language models become more powerful and sophisticated, it is crucial that they remain trustworthy and reliable. There is concerning preliminary evidence that models may attempt to deceive or keep secrets from their operators. To explore the ability of current techniques to elicit such hidden knowledge, we train a Taboo model: a language model that describes a specific secret word without explicitly stating it. Importantly, the secret word is not presented to the model in its training data or prompt. We then investigate methods to uncover this secret. First, we evaluate non-interpretability (black-box) approaches. Subsequently, we develop largely automated strategies based on mechanistic interpretability techniques, including logit lens and sparse autoencoders. Evaluation shows that both approaches are effective in eliciting the secret word in our proof-of-concept setting. Our findings highlight the promise of these approaches for eliciting hidden knowledge and suggest several promising avenues for future work, including testing and refining these methods on more complex model organisms. This work aims to be a step towards addressing the crucial problem of eliciting secret knowledge from language models, thereby contributing to their safe and reliable deployment.

Machine learning systems are known to be sensitive to spurious correlations between biased features of the inputs (e.g., background, texture, and secondary objects) and the corresponding labels. These features and their correlations with the labels are known as "spurious" because they tend to change with shifts in real-world data distributions, which can negatively impact the model's generalization and robustness. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of this issue, along with a taxonomy of current state-of-the-art methods for addressing spurious correlations in machine learning models. Additionally, we summarize existing datasets, benchmarks, and metrics to aid future research. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent advancements and future research challenges in this field, aiming to provide valuable insights for researchers in the related domains.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

When answering questions, LLMs can convey not only an answer, but a level of confidence about the answer being correct. This includes explicit confidence markers (e.g. giving a numeric score) as well as implicit markers, like an authoritative tone or elaborating with additional knowledge. For LLMs to be trustworthy knowledge sources, the confidence they convey should match their actual expertise; however, most current models tend towards overconfidence. To calibrate both implicit and explicit confidence markers, we introduce a pragmatic, listener-aware finetuning method (LACIE) that models the listener, considering not only whether an answer is right, but whether it will be accepted by a listener. We cast calibration as preference optimization, creating data via a two-agent game, where a speaker model's outputs are judged by a simulated listener. We then finetune three LLMs (Mistral-7B, Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B) with LACIE, and show that the resulting models are better calibrated w.r.t. a simulated listener. Crucially, these trends transfer to human listeners, helping them correctly predict model correctness: we conduct a human evaluation where annotators accept or reject an LLM's answers, finding that training with LACIE results in 47% fewer incorrect answers being accepted while maintaining the same level of acceptance for correct answers. Furthermore, LACIE generalizes to another dataset, resulting in a large increase in truthfulness on TruthfulQA when trained on TriviaQA. Our analysis indicates that LACIE leads to a better confidence separation between correct and incorrect examples. Qualitatively, we find that a LACIE-trained model hedges more and implicitly signals certainty when it is correct by using an authoritative tone or including details. Finally, LACIE finetuning leads to an emergent increase in model abstention (e.g. saying "I don't know") for answers that are likely wrong.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Reasoning over commonsense knowledge bases (CSKB) whose elements are in the form of free-text is an important yet hard task in NLP. While CSKB completion only fills the missing links within the domain of the CSKB, CSKB population is alternatively proposed with the goal of reasoning unseen assertions from external resources. In this task, CSKBs are grounded to a large-scale eventuality (activity, state, and event) graph to discriminate whether novel triples from the eventuality graph are plausible or not. However, existing evaluations on the population task are either not accurate (automatic evaluation with randomly sampled negative examples) or of small scale (human annotation). In this paper, we benchmark the CSKB population task with a new large-scale dataset by first aligning four popular CSKBs, and then presenting a high-quality human-annotated evaluation set to probe neural models' commonsense reasoning ability. We also propose a novel inductive commonsense reasoning model that reasons over graphs. Experimental results show that generalizing commonsense reasoning on unseen assertions is inherently a hard task. Models achieving high accuracy during training perform poorly on the evaluation set, with a large gap between human performance. We will make the data publicly available for future contributions. Codes and data are available at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/CSKB-Population.

We discuss why AI is hard and why physics is simple. We discuss how physical intuition and the approach of theoretical physics can be brought to bear on the field of artificial intelligence and specifically machine learning. We suggest that the underlying project of machine learning and the underlying project of physics are strongly coupled through the principle of sparsity, and we call upon theoretical physicists to work on AI as physicists. As a first step in that direction, we discuss an upcoming book on the principles of deep learning theory that attempts to realize this approach.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

We automate deep step-by step reasoning in an LLM dialog thread by recursively exploring alternatives (OR-nodes) and expanding details (AND-nodes) up to a given depth. Starting from a single succinct task-specific initiator we steer the automated dialog thread to stay focussed on the task by synthesizing a prompt that summarizes the depth-first steps taken so far. Our algorithm is derived from a simple recursive descent implementation of a Horn Clause interpreter, except that we accommodate our logic engine to fit the natural language reasoning patterns LLMs have been trained on. Semantic similarity to ground-truth facts or oracle advice from another LLM instance is used to restrict the search space and validate the traces of justification steps returned as answers. At the end, the unique minimal model of a generated Horn Clause program collects the results of the reasoning process. As applications, we sketch implementations of consequence predictions, causal explanations, recommendation systems and topic-focussed exploration of scientific literature.

We investigate feature universality in large language models (LLMs), a research field that aims to understand how different models similarly represent concepts in the latent spaces of their intermediate layers. Demonstrating feature universality allows discoveries about latent representations to generalize across several models. However, comparing features across LLMs is challenging due to polysemanticity, in which individual neurons often correspond to multiple features rather than distinct ones. This makes it difficult to disentangle and match features across different models. To address this issue, we employ a method known as dictionary learning by using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to transform LLM activations into more interpretable spaces spanned by neurons corresponding to individual features. After matching feature neurons across models via activation correlation, we apply representational space similarity metrics like Singular Value Canonical Correlation Analysis to analyze these SAE features across different LLMs. Our experiments reveal significant similarities in SAE feature spaces across various LLMs, providing new evidence for feature universality.

We introduce a novel framework for incorporating human expertise into algorithmic predictions. Our approach leverages human judgment to distinguish inputs which are algorithmically indistinguishable, or "look the same" to predictive algorithms. We argue that this framing clarifies the problem of human-AI collaboration in prediction tasks, as experts often form judgments by drawing on information which is not encoded in an algorithm's training data. Algorithmic indistinguishability yields a natural test for assessing whether experts incorporate this kind of "side information", and further provides a simple but principled method for selectively incorporating human feedback into algorithmic predictions. We show that this method provably improves the performance of any feasible algorithmic predictor and precisely quantify this improvement. We find empirically that although algorithms often outperform their human counterparts on average, human judgment can improve algorithmic predictions on specific instances (which can be identified ex-ante). In an X-ray classification task, we find that this subset constitutes nearly 30% of the patient population. Our approach provides a natural way of uncovering this heterogeneity and thus enabling effective human-AI collaboration.

We present an accessible first course on diffusion models and flow matching for machine learning, aimed at a technical audience with no diffusion experience. We try to simplify the mathematical details as much as possible (sometimes heuristically), while retaining enough precision to derive correct algorithms.

Despite their massive size, successful deep artificial neural networks can exhibit a remarkably small difference between training and test performance. Conventional wisdom attributes small generalization error either to properties of the model family, or to the regularization techniques used during training. Through extensive systematic experiments, we show how these traditional approaches fail to explain why large neural networks generalize well in practice. Specifically, our experiments establish that state-of-the-art convolutional networks for image classification trained with stochastic gradient methods easily fit a random labeling of the training data. This phenomenon is qualitatively unaffected by explicit regularization, and occurs even if we replace the true images by completely unstructured random noise. We corroborate these experimental findings with a theoretical construction showing that simple depth two neural networks already have perfect finite sample expressivity as soon as the number of parameters exceeds the number of data points as it usually does in practice. We interpret our experimental findings by comparison with traditional models.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Current captioning datasets, focus on object-centric captions, describing the visible objects in the image, often ending up stating the obvious (for humans), e.g. "people eating food in a park". Although these datasets are useful to evaluate the ability of Vision & Language models to recognize the visual content, they lack in expressing trivial abstract concepts, e.g. "people having a picnic". Such concepts are licensed by human's personal experience and contribute to forming common sense assumptions. We present the High-Level Dataset; a dataset extending 14997 images of the COCO dataset with 134973 human-annotated (high-level) abstract captions collected along three axes: scenes, actions and rationales. We describe and release such dataset and we show how it can be used to assess models' multimodal grounding of abstract concepts and enrich models' visio-lingusitic representations. Moreover, we describe potential tasks enabled by this dataset involving high- and low-level concepts interactions.

Language Models [LMs] are now playing an increasingly large role in information generation and synthesis; the representation of scientific knowledge in these systems needs to be highly accurate. A prime challenge is hallucination; that is, generating apparently plausible but actually false information, including invented citations and nonexistent research papers. This kind of inaccuracy is dangerous in all the domains that require high levels of factual correctness, such as academia and education. This work presents a pipeline for evaluating the frequency with which language models hallucinate in generating responses in the scientific literature. We propose ArxEval, an evaluation pipeline with two tasks using ArXiv as a repository: Jumbled Titles and Mixed Titles. Our evaluation includes fifteen widely used language models and provides comparative insights into their reliability in handling scientific literature.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

Verifiability is a core content policy of Wikipedia: claims that are likely to be challenged need to be backed by citations. There are millions of articles available online and thousands of new articles are released each month. For this reason, finding relevant sources is a difficult task: many claims do not have any references that support them. Furthermore, even existing citations might not support a given claim or become obsolete once the original source is updated or deleted. Hence, maintaining and improving the quality of Wikipedia references is an important challenge and there is a pressing need for better tools to assist humans in this effort. Here, we show that the process of improving references can be tackled with the help of artificial intelligence (AI). We develop a neural network based system, called Side, to identify Wikipedia citations that are unlikely to support their claims, and subsequently recommend better ones from the web. We train this model on existing Wikipedia references, therefore learning from the contributions and combined wisdom of thousands of Wikipedia editors. Using crowd-sourcing, we observe that for the top 10% most likely citations to be tagged as unverifiable by our system, humans prefer our system's suggested alternatives compared to the originally cited reference 70% of the time. To validate the applicability of our system, we built a demo to engage with the English-speaking Wikipedia community and find that Side's first citation recommendation collects over 60% more preferences than existing Wikipedia citations for the same top 10% most likely unverifiable claims according to Side. Our results indicate that an AI-based system could be used, in tandem with humans, to improve the verifiability of Wikipedia. More generally, we hope that our work can be used to assist fact checking efforts and increase the general trustworthiness of information online.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Methods for understanding the decisions of and mechanisms underlying deep neural networks (DNNs) typically rely on building intuition by emphasizing sensory or semantic features of individual examples. For instance, methods aim to visualize the components of an input which are "important" to a network's decision, or to measure the semantic properties of single neurons. Here, we argue that interpretability research suffers from an over-reliance on intuition-based approaches that risk-and in some cases have caused-illusory progress and misleading conclusions. We identify a set of limitations that we argue impede meaningful progress in interpretability research, and examine two popular classes of interpretability methods-saliency and single-neuron-based approaches-that serve as case studies for how overreliance on intuition and lack of falsifiability can undermine interpretability research. To address these concerns, we propose a strategy to address these impediments in the form of a framework for strongly falsifiable interpretability research. We encourage researchers to use their intuitions as a starting point to develop and test clear, falsifiable hypotheses, and hope that our framework yields robust, evidence-based interpretability methods that generate meaningful advances in our understanding of DNNs.

AI led chess systems to a superhuman level, yet these systems heavily rely on black-box algorithms. This is unsustainable in ensuring transparency to the end-user, particularly when these systems are responsible for sensitive decision-making. Recent interpretability work has shown that the inner representations of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) were fathomable and contained human-understandable concepts. Yet, these methods are seldom contextualised and are often based on a single hidden state, which makes them unable to interpret multi-step reasoning, e.g. planning. In this respect, we propose contrastive sparse autoencoders (CSAE), a novel framework for studying pairs of game trajectories. Using CSAE, we are able to extract and interpret concepts that are meaningful to the chess-agent plans. We primarily focused on a qualitative analysis of the CSAE features before proposing an automated feature taxonomy. Furthermore, to evaluate the quality of our trained CSAE, we devise sanity checks to wave spurious correlations in our results.

Neural language models encode rich knowledge about entities and their relationships which can be extracted from their representations using probing. Common properties of nouns (e.g., red strawberries, small ant) are, however, more challenging to extract compared to other types of knowledge because they are rarely explicitly stated in texts. We hypothesize this to mainly be the case for perceptual properties which are obvious to the participants in the communication. We propose to extract these properties from images and use them in an ensemble model, in order to complement the information that is extracted from language models. We consider perceptual properties to be more concrete than abstract properties (e.g., interesting, flawless). We propose to use the adjectives' concreteness score as a lever to calibrate the contribution of each source (text vs. images). We evaluate our ensemble model in a ranking task where the actual properties of a noun need to be ranked higher than other non-relevant properties. Our results show that the proposed combination of text and images greatly improves noun property prediction compared to powerful text-based language models.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

Can Transformers predict new syllogisms by composing established ones? More generally, what type of targets can be learned by such models from scratch? Recent works show that Transformers can be Turing-complete in terms of expressivity, but this does not address the learnability objective. This paper puts forward the notion of 'globality degree' of a target distribution to capture when weak learning is efficiently achievable by regular Transformers, where the latter measures the least number of tokens required in addition to the tokens histogram to correlate nontrivially with the target. As shown experimentally and theoretically under additional assumptions, distributions with high globality cannot be learned efficiently. In particular, syllogisms cannot be composed on long chains. Furthermore, we show that (i) an agnostic scratchpad cannot help to break the globality barrier, (ii) an educated scratchpad can help if it breaks the globality at each step, however not all such scratchpads can generalize to out-of-distribution (OOD) samples, (iii) a notion of 'inductive scratchpad', that composes the prior information more efficiently, can both break the globality barrier and improve the OOD generalization. In particular, some inductive scratchpads can achieve length generalizations of up to 6x for some arithmetic tasks depending on the input formatting.

Large-scale datasets for natural language inference are created by presenting crowd workers with a sentence (premise), and asking them to generate three new sentences (hypotheses) that it entails, contradicts, or is logically neutral with respect to. We show that, in a significant portion of such data, this protocol leaves clues that make it possible to identify the label by looking only at the hypothesis, without observing the premise. Specifically, we show that a simple text categorization model can correctly classify the hypothesis alone in about 67% of SNLI (Bowman et. al, 2015) and 53% of MultiNLI (Williams et. al, 2017). Our analysis reveals that specific linguistic phenomena such as negation and vagueness are highly correlated with certain inference classes. Our findings suggest that the success of natural language inference models to date has been overestimated, and that the task remains a hard open problem.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant potential in scientific disciplines such as biomedicine, particularly in hypothesis generation, where they can analyze vast literature, identify patterns, and suggest research directions. However, a key challenge lies in evaluating the truthfulness of generated hypotheses, as verifying their accuracy often requires substantial time and resources. Additionally, the hallucination problem in LLMs can lead to the generation of hypotheses that appear plausible but are ultimately incorrect, undermining their reliability. To facilitate the systematic study of these challenges, we introduce TruthHypo, a benchmark for assessing the capabilities of LLMs in generating truthful biomedical hypotheses, and KnowHD, a knowledge-based hallucination detector to evaluate how well hypotheses are grounded in existing knowledge. Our results show that LLMs struggle to generate truthful hypotheses. By analyzing hallucinations in reasoning steps, we demonstrate that the groundedness scores provided by KnowHD serve as an effective metric for filtering truthful hypotheses from the diverse outputs of LLMs. Human evaluations further validate the utility of KnowHD in identifying truthful hypotheses and accelerating scientific discovery. Our data and source code are available at https://github.com/Teddy-XiongGZ/TruthHypo.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

We introduce a new type of programming challenge called programming puzzles, as an objective and comprehensive evaluation of program synthesis, and release an open-source dataset of Python Programming Puzzles (P3). Each puzzle is defined by a short Python program f, and the goal is to find an input which makes f return True. The puzzles are objective in that each one is specified entirely by the source code of its verifier f, so evaluating f is all that is needed to test a candidate solution. They do not require an answer key or input/output examples, nor do they depend on natural language understanding. The dataset is comprehensive in that it spans problems of a range of difficulties and domains, ranging from trivial string manipulation problems, to classic programming puzzles (e.g., Tower of Hanoi), to interview/competitive-programming problems (e.g., dynamic programming), to longstanding open problems in algorithms and mathematics (e.g., factoring). We develop baseline enumerative program synthesis, GPT-3 and Codex solvers that are capable of solving puzzles -- even without access to any reference solutions -- by learning from their own past solutions. Codex performs best, solving up to 18% of 397 test problems with a single try and 80% of the problems with 1,000 tries per problem. In a small user study, we find a positive correlation between puzzle-solving performance and coding experience, and between the puzzle difficulty for humans and AI solvers. Therefore, further improvements on P3 could have a significant impact on many program synthesis areas.

Instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) excel at many tasks, and will even provide explanations for their behavior. Since these models are directly accessible to the public, there is a risk that convincing and wrong explanations can lead to unsupported confidence in LLMs. Therefore, interpretability-faithfulness of self-explanations is an important consideration for AI Safety. Assessing the interpretability-faithfulness of these explanations, termed self-explanations, is challenging as the models are too complex for humans to annotate what is a correct explanation. To address this, we propose employing self-consistency checks as a measure of faithfulness. For example, if an LLM says a set of words is important for making a prediction, then it should not be able to make the same prediction without these words. While self-consistency checks are a common approach to faithfulness, they have not previously been applied to LLM's self-explanations. We apply self-consistency checks to three types of self-explanations: counterfactuals, importance measures, and redactions. Our work demonstrate that faithfulness is both task and model dependent, e.g., for sentiment classification, counterfactual explanations are more faithful for Llama2, importance measures for Mistral, and redaction for Falcon 40B. Finally, our findings are robust to prompt-variations.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

We present Generative Logic (GL), a deterministic architecture that begins from user-supplied axiomatic definitions -- written in a minimalist Mathematical Programming Language (MPL) -- and systematically explores their deductive neighborhood. Definitions are compiled into a distributed grid of simple Logic Blocks (LBs) that exchange messages; any time several expressions unify under an inference rule, a new fact is emitted with full provenance to its sources, yielding replayable, auditable proof graphs. A prototype software implementation instantiates the workflow on first-order Peano arithmetic. Starting only from the Peano axioms, GL enumerates candidate implications, applies normalization and type filters, and automatically reconstructs machine-checkable proofs of foundational arithmetic laws including associativity and commutativity of addition, associativity and commutativity of multiplication, and distributivity. Generated proofs export to navigable HTML so that every inference step can be inspected independently. We outline a hardware-software co-design path toward massively parallel realizations and describe prospective integration with probabilistic models (e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs)) for autoformalization and conjecture seeding. The Python and MPL code to reproduce the Peano experiments, along with the full HTML proof graphs, are available in the project's GitHub repository at https://github.com/Generative-Logic/GL/tree/35a111ea9ba53afe051703d6050be0c3923e9724 and are permanently archived at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16408441. We invite community feedback and collaboration.

Many people are interested in ChatGPT since it has become a prominent AIGC model that provides high-quality responses in various contexts, such as software development and maintenance. Misuse of ChatGPT might cause significant issues, particularly in public safety and education, despite its immense potential. The majority of researchers choose to publish their work on Arxiv. The effectiveness and originality of future work depend on the ability to detect AI components in such contributions. To address this need, this study will analyze a method that can see purposely manufactured content that academic organizations use to post on Arxiv. For this study, a dataset was created using physics, mathematics, and computer science articles. Using the newly built dataset, the following step is to put originality.ai through its paces. The statistical analysis shows that Originality.ai is very accurate, with a rate of 98%.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

We begin the study of list-decodable linear regression using batches. In this setting only an alpha in (0,1] fraction of the batches are genuine. Each genuine batch contains ge n i.i.d. samples from a common unknown distribution and the remaining batches may contain arbitrary or even adversarial samples. We derive a polynomial time algorithm that for any nge tilde Omega(1/alpha) returns a list of size mathcal O(1/alpha^2) such that one of the items in the list is close to the true regression parameter. The algorithm requires only mathcal{O}(d/alpha^2) genuine batches and works under fairly general assumptions on the distribution. The results demonstrate the utility of batch structure, which allows for the first polynomial time algorithm for list-decodable regression, which may be impossible for the non-batch setting, as suggested by a recent SQ lower bound diakonikolas2021statistical for the non-batch setting.

Understanding why a model makes a certain prediction can be as crucial as the prediction's accuracy in many applications. However, the highest accuracy for large modern datasets is often achieved by complex models that even experts struggle to interpret, such as ensemble or deep learning models, creating a tension between accuracy and interpretability. In response, various methods have recently been proposed to help users interpret the predictions of complex models, but it is often unclear how these methods are related and when one method is preferable over another. To address this problem, we present a unified framework for interpreting predictions, SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations). SHAP assigns each feature an importance value for a particular prediction. Its novel components include: (1) the identification of a new class of additive feature importance measures, and (2) theoretical results showing there is a unique solution in this class with a set of desirable properties. The new class unifies six existing methods, notable because several recent methods in the class lack the proposed desirable properties. Based on insights from this unification, we present new methods that show improved computational performance and/or better consistency with human intuition than previous approaches.

Instruction fine-tuning (IFT) can increase the informativeness of large language models (LLMs), but may reduce their truthfulness. This trade-off arises because IFT steers LLMs to generate responses containing long-tail knowledge that was not well covered during pre-training. As a result, models become more informative but less accurate when generalizing to unseen tasks. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate how unfamiliar knowledge in IFT datasets can negatively affect the truthfulness of LLMs, and we introduce two new IFT paradigms, UNIT_{cut} and UNIT_{ref}, to address this issue. UNIT_{cut} identifies and removes unfamiliar knowledge from IFT datasets to mitigate its impact on model truthfulness, whereas UNIT_{ref} trains LLMs to recognize their uncertainty and explicitly indicate it at the end of their responses. Our experiments show that UNIT_{cut} substantially improves LLM truthfulness, while UNIT_{ref} maintains high informativeness and reduces hallucinations by distinguishing between confident and uncertain statements.

Despite a sea of interpretability methods that can produce plausible explanations, the field has also empirically seen many failure cases of such methods. In light of these results, it remains unclear for practitioners how to use these methods and choose between them in a principled way. In this paper, we show that for moderately rich model classes (easily satisfied by neural networks), any feature attribution method that is complete and linear -- for example, Integrated Gradients and SHAP -- can provably fail to improve on random guessing for inferring model behaviour. Our results apply to common end-tasks such as characterizing local model behaviour, identifying spurious features, and algorithmic recourse. One takeaway from our work is the importance of concretely defining end-tasks: once such an end-task is defined, a simple and direct approach of repeated model evaluations can outperform many other complex feature attribution methods.

This paper investigates Who's Harry Potter (WHP), a pioneering yet insufficiently understood method for LLM unlearning. We explore it in two steps. First, we introduce a new task of LLM targeted unlearning, where given an unlearning target (e.g., a person) and some unlearning documents, we aim to unlearn only the information about the target, rather than everything in the unlearning documents. We further argue that a successful unlearning should satisfy criteria such as not outputting gibberish, not fabricating facts about the unlearning target, and not releasing factual information under jailbreak attacks. Second, we construct a causal intervention framework for targeted unlearning, where the knowledge of the unlearning target is modeled as a confounder between LLM input and output, and the unlearning process as a deconfounding process. This framework justifies and extends WHP, deriving a simple unlearning algorithm that includes WHP as a special case. Experiments on existing and new datasets show that our approach, without explicitly optimizing for the aforementioned criteria, achieves competitive performance in all of them. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/causal_unlearn.git.

Human cognition exhibits systematic compositionality, the algebraic ability to generate infinite novel combinations from finite learned components, which is the key to understanding and reasoning about complex logic. In this work, we investigate the compositionality of large language models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning. Specifically, we construct a new dataset MathTrap by introducing carefully designed logical traps into the problem descriptions of MATH and GSM8K. Since problems with logical flaws are quite rare in the real world, these represent "unseen" cases to LLMs. Solving these requires the models to systematically compose (1) the mathematical knowledge involved in the original problems with (2) knowledge related to the introduced traps. Our experiments show that while LLMs possess both components of requisite knowledge, they do not spontaneously combine them to handle these novel cases. We explore several methods to mitigate this deficiency, such as natural language prompts, few-shot demonstrations, and fine-tuning. Additionally, we test the recently released OpenAI o1 model and find that human-like `slow thinking' helps improve the compositionality of LLMs. Overall, systematic compositionality remains an open challenge for large language models.

AI video generation is undergoing a revolution, with quality and realism advancing rapidly. These advances have led to a passionate scientific debate: Do video models learn ``world models'' that discover laws of physics -- or, alternatively, are they merely sophisticated pixel predictors that achieve visual realism without understanding the physical principles of reality? We address this question by developing Physics-IQ, a comprehensive benchmark dataset that can only be solved by acquiring a deep understanding of various physical principles, like fluid dynamics, optics, solid mechanics, magnetism and thermodynamics. We find that across a range of current models (Sora, Runway, Pika, Lumiere, Stable Video Diffusion, and VideoPoet), physical understanding is severely limited, and unrelated to visual realism. At the same time, some test cases can already be successfully solved. This indicates that acquiring certain physical principles from observation alone may be possible, but significant challenges remain. While we expect rapid advances ahead, our work demonstrates that visual realism does not imply physical understanding. Our project page is at https://physics-iq.github.io; code at https://github.com/google-deepmind/physics-IQ-benchmark.

Recent studies have put into question the belief that emergent abilities in language models are exclusive to large models. This skepticism arises from two observations: 1) smaller models can also exhibit high performance on emergent abilities and 2) there is doubt on the discontinuous metrics used to measure these abilities. In this paper, we propose to study emergent abilities in the lens of pre-training loss, instead of model size or training compute. We demonstrate that the models with the same pre-training loss, but different model and data sizes, generate the same performance on various downstream tasks. We also discover that a model exhibits emergent abilities on certain tasks -- regardless of the continuity of metrics -- when its pre-training loss falls below a specific threshold. Before reaching this threshold, its performance remains at the level of random guessing. This inspires us to redefine emergent abilities as those that manifest in models with lower pre-training losses, highlighting that these abilities cannot be predicted by merely extrapolating the performance trends of models with higher pre-training losses.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Training deep neural networks in low rank, i.e. with factorised layers, is of particular interest to the community: it offers efficiency over unfactorised training in terms of both memory consumption and training time. Prior work has focused on low rank approximations of pre-trained networks and training in low rank space with additional objectives, offering various ad hoc explanations for chosen practice. We analyse techniques that work well in practice, and through extensive ablations on models such as GPT2 we provide evidence falsifying common beliefs in the field, hinting in the process at exciting research opportunities that still need answering.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Natural-language prompts have recently been used to coax pretrained language models into performing other AI tasks, using a fill-in-the-blank paradigm (Petroni et al., 2019) or a few-shot extrapolation paradigm (Brown et al., 2020). For example, language models retain factual knowledge from their training corpora that can be extracted by asking them to "fill in the blank" in a sentential prompt. However, where does this prompt come from? We explore the idea of learning prompts by gradient descent -- either fine-tuning prompts taken from previous work, or starting from random initialization. Our prompts consist of "soft words," i.e., continuous vectors that are not necessarily word type embeddings from the language model. Furthermore, for each task, we optimize a mixture of prompts, learning which prompts are most effective and how to ensemble them. Across multiple English LMs and tasks, our approach hugely outperforms previous methods, showing that the implicit factual knowledge in language models was previously underestimated. Moreover, this knowledge is cheap to elicit: random initialization is nearly as good as informed initialization.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Abstractive summarization systems today produce fluent and relevant output, but often "hallucinate" statements not supported by the source text. We analyze the connection between hallucinations and training data, and find evidence that models hallucinate because they train on target summaries that are unsupported by the source. Based on our findings, we present PINOCCHIO, a new decoding method that improves the consistency of a transformer-based abstractive summarizer by constraining beam search to avoid hallucinations. Given the model states and outputs at a given step, PINOCCHIO detects likely model hallucinations based on various measures of attribution to the source text. PINOCCHIO backtracks to find more consistent output, and can opt to produce no summary at all when no consistent generation can be found. In experiments, we find that PINOCCHIO improves the consistency of generation (in terms of F1) by an average of~67% on two abstractive summarization datasets.

The task of abductive natural language inference (nli), to decide which hypothesis is the more likely explanation for a set of observations, is a particularly difficult type of NLI. Instead of just determining a causal relationship, it requires common sense to also evaluate how reasonable an explanation is. All recent competitive systems build on top of contextualized representations and make use of transformer architectures for learning an NLI model. When somebody is faced with a particular NLI task, they need to select the best model that is available. This is a time-consuming and resource-intense endeavour. To solve this practical problem, we propose a simple method for predicting the performance without actually fine-tuning the model. We do this by testing how well the pre-trained models perform on the nli task when just comparing sentence embeddings with cosine similarity to what the performance that is achieved when training a classifier on top of these embeddings. We show that the accuracy of the cosine similarity approach correlates strongly with the accuracy of the classification approach with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.65. Since the similarity computation is orders of magnitude faster to compute on a given dataset (less than a minute vs. hours), our method can lead to significant time savings in the process of model selection.

What are the root causes of hallucinations in large language models (LLMs)? We use Communication Complexity to prove that the Transformer layer is incapable of composing functions (e.g., identify a grandparent of a person in a genealogy) if the domains of the functions are large enough; we show through examples that this inability is already empirically present when the domains are quite small. We also point out that several mathematical tasks that are at the core of the so-called compositional tasks thought to be hard for LLMs are unlikely to be solvable by Transformers, for large enough instances and assuming that certain well accepted conjectures in the field of Computational Complexity are true.

Scaling up language models has been shown to predictably improve performance and sample efficiency on a wide range of downstream tasks. This paper instead discusses an unpredictable phenomenon that we refer to as emergent abilities of large language models. We consider an ability to be emergent if it is not present in smaller models but is present in larger models. Thus, emergent abilities cannot be predicted simply by extrapolating the performance of smaller models. The existence of such emergence implies that additional scaling could further expand the range of capabilities of language models.

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

We design a suite of minimal algorithmic tasks that are a loose abstraction of open-ended real-world tasks. This allows us to cleanly and controllably quantify the creative limits of the present-day language model. Much like real-world tasks that require a creative, far-sighted leap of thought, our tasks require an implicit, open-ended stochastic planning step that either (a) discovers new connections in an abstract knowledge graph (like in wordplay, drawing analogies, or research) or (b) constructs new patterns (like in designing math problems or new proteins). In these tasks, we empirically and conceptually argue how next-token learning is myopic and memorizes excessively; comparatively, multi-token approaches, namely teacherless training and diffusion models, excel in producing diverse and original output. Secondly, in our tasks, we find that to elicit randomness from the Transformer without hurting coherence, it is better to inject noise right at the input layer (via a method we dub hash-conditioning) rather than defer to temperature sampling from the output layer. Thus, our work offers a principled, minimal test-bed for analyzing open-ended creative skills, and offers new arguments for going beyond next-token learning and softmax-based sampling. We make part of the code available under https://github.com/chenwu98/algorithmic-creativity

It is known that human speech and certain animal vocalizations can convey meaningful content because we can decipher the content that a given utterance does convey. This paper explores an alternative approach to determining whether a signal is meaningful, one that analyzes only the signal itself and is independent of what the conveyed meaning might be. We devise a method that takes a waveform as input and outputs a score indicating its degree of `meaningfulness`. We cluster contiguous portions of the input to minimize the total description length, and then take the length of the code of the assigned cluster labels as meaningfulness score. We evaluate our method empirically, against several baselines, and show that it is the only one to give a high score to human speech in various languages and with various speakers, a moderate score to animal vocalizations from birds and orcas, and a low score to ambient noise from various sources.

The ability to solve problems is a hallmark of intelligence and has been an enduring goal in AI. AI systems that can create programs as solutions to problems or assist developers in writing programs can increase productivity and make programming more accessible. Recently, pre-trained large language models have shown impressive abilities in generating new codes from natural language descriptions, repairing buggy codes, translating codes between languages, and retrieving relevant code segments. However, the evaluation of these models has often been performed in a scattered way on only one or two specific tasks, in a few languages, at a partial granularity (e.g., function) level and in many cases without proper training data. Even more concerning is that in most cases the evaluation of generated codes has been done in terms of mere lexical overlap rather than actual execution whereas semantic similarity (or equivalence) of two code segments depends only on their ``execution similarity'', i.e., being able to get the same output for a given input.

Reasoning encompasses two typical types: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Despite extensive research into the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), most studies have failed to rigorously differentiate between inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to a blending of the two. This raises an essential question: In LLM reasoning, which poses a greater challenge - deductive or inductive reasoning? While the deductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, (i.e. their capacity to follow instructions in reasoning tasks), have received considerable attention, their abilities in true inductive reasoning remain largely unexplored. To investigate into the true inductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, we propose a novel framework, SolverLearner. This framework enables LLMs to learn the underlying function (i.e., y = f_w(x)), that maps input data points (x) to their corresponding output values (y), using only in-context examples. By focusing on inductive reasoning and separating it from LLM-based deductive reasoning, we can isolate and investigate inductive reasoning of LLMs in its pure form via SolverLearner. Our observations reveal that LLMs demonstrate remarkable inductive reasoning capabilities through SolverLearner, achieving near-perfect performance with ACC of 1 in most cases. Surprisingly, despite their strong inductive reasoning abilities, LLMs tend to relatively lack deductive reasoning capabilities, particularly in tasks involving ``counterfactual'' reasoning.

Inductive Reasoning (IR), the ability to summarize rules from examples and apply on new ones, has long been viewed as a primal ability for general intelligence and widely studied by cognitive science and AI researchers. Many benchmarks have been proposed to measure such ability for Large Language Models (LLMs); however, they focus on few-shot (usually <10) setting and lack evaluation for aggregating many pieces of information from long contexts. On the other hand, the ever-growing context length of LLMs have brought forth the novel paradigm of many-shot In-Context Learning (ICL), which addresses new tasks with hundreds to thousands of examples without expensive and inefficient fine-tuning. However, many-shot evaluations are mostly focused on classification (a very limited aspect of IR), and popular long-context LLM tasks such as Needle-In-A-Haystack (NIAH) seldom require complicated intelligence for integrating many pieces of information. To fix the issues from both worlds, we propose MIR-Bench, the first many-shot in-context inductive reasoning benchmark that asks LLM to induce output via input-output examples from underlying functions with diverse data format. Based on MIR-Bench, we study many novel problems for inductive reasoning and many-shot ICL, including robustness against erroneous shots and the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT), and acquired insightful findings.

A fundamental open challenge in modern LLM scaling is the lack of understanding around emergent capabilities. In particular, language model pretraining loss is known to be highly predictable as a function of compute. However, downstream capabilities are far less predictable -- sometimes even exhibiting emergent jumps -- which makes it challenging to anticipate the capabilities of future models. In this work, we first pose the task of emergence prediction: given access to current LLMs that have random few-shot accuracy on a task, can we predict whether future models (GPT-N+1) will have non-trivial accuracy on that task? We then discover a simple insight for this problem: finetuning LLMs on a given task can shift the point in scaling at which emergence occurs towards less capable models. To operationalize this insight, we can finetune LLMs with varying amounts of data and fit a parametric function that predicts when emergence will occur (i.e., "emergence laws"). We validate this approach using four standard NLP benchmarks where large-scale open-source LLMs already demonstrate emergence (MMLU, GSM8K, CommonsenseQA, and CoLA). Using only small-scale LLMs, we find that, in some cases, we can accurately predict whether models trained with up to 4x more compute have emerged. Finally, we present a case study of two realistic uses for emergence prediction.

Most benchmark datasets targeting commonsense reasoning focus on everyday scenarios: physical knowledge like knowing that you could fill a cup under a waterfall [Talmor et al., 2019], social knowledge like bumping into someone is awkward [Sap et al., 2019], and other generic situations. However, there is a rich space of commonsense inferences anchored to knowledge about specific entities: for example, deciding the truthfulness of a claim "Harry Potter can teach classes on how to fly on a broomstick." Can models learn to combine entity knowledge with commonsense reasoning in this fashion? We introduce CREAK, a testbed for commonsense reasoning about entity knowledge, bridging fact-checking about entities (Harry Potter is a wizard and is skilled at riding a broomstick) with commonsense inferences (if you're good at a skill you can teach others how to do it). Our dataset consists of 13k human-authored English claims about entities that are either true or false, in addition to a small contrast set. Crowdworkers can easily come up with these statements and human performance on the dataset is high (high 90s); we argue that models should be able to blend entity knowledge and commonsense reasoning to do well here. In our experiments, we focus on the closed-book setting and observe that a baseline model finetuned on existing fact verification benchmark struggles on CREAK. Training a model on CREAK improves accuracy by a substantial margin, but still falls short of human performance. Our benchmark provides a unique probe into natural language understanding models, testing both its ability to retrieve facts (e.g., who teaches at the University of Chicago?) and unstated commonsense knowledge (e.g., butlers do not yell at guests).

One characteristic that makes humans superior to modern artificially intelligent models is the ability to interpret images beyond what is visually apparent. Consider the following two natural language search queries - (i) "a queue of customers patiently waiting to buy ice cream" and (ii) "a queue of tourists going to see a famous Mughal architecture in India." Interpreting these queries requires one to reason with (i) Commonsense such as interpreting people as customers or tourists, actions as waiting to buy or going to see; and (ii) Fact or world knowledge associated with named visual entities, for example, whether the store in the image sells ice cream or whether the landmark in the image is a Mughal architecture located in India. Such reasoning goes beyond just visual recognition. To enable both commonsense and factual reasoning in the image search, we present a unified framework, namely Knowledge Retrieval-Augmented Multimodal Transformer (KRAMT), that treats the named visual entities in an image as a gateway to encyclopedic knowledge and leverages them along with natural language query to ground relevant knowledge. Further, KRAMT seamlessly integrates visual content and grounded knowledge to learn alignment between images and search queries. This unified framework is then used to perform image search requiring commonsense and factual reasoning. The retrieval performance of KRAMT is evaluated and compared with related approaches on a new dataset we introduce - namely COFAR. We make our code and dataset available at https://vl2g.github.io/projects/cofar

Detecting hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) is critical for enhancing their reliability and trustworthiness. Most research focuses on hallucinations as deviations from information seen during training. However, the opaque nature of an LLM's parametric knowledge complicates the understanding of why generated texts appear ungrounded: The LLM might not have picked up the necessary knowledge from large and often inaccessible datasets, or the information might have been changed or contradicted during further training. Our focus is on hallucinations involving information not used in training, which we determine by using recency to ensure the information emerged after a cut-off date. This study investigates these hallucinations by detecting them at sentence level using different internal states of various LLMs. We present HalluRAG, a dataset designed to train classifiers on these hallucinations. Depending on the model and quantization, MLPs trained on HalluRAG detect hallucinations with test accuracies ranging up to 75 %, with Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1 achieving the highest test accuracies. Our results show that IAVs detect hallucinations as effectively as CEVs and reveal that answerable and unanswerable prompts are encoded differently as separate classifiers for these categories improved accuracy. However, HalluRAG showed some limited generalizability, advocating for more diversity in datasets on hallucinations.

Many commonsense reasoning NLP tasks involve choosing between one or more possible answers to a question or prompt based on knowledge that is often implicit. Large pretrained language models (PLMs) can achieve near-human performance on such tasks, while providing little human-interpretable evidence of the underlying reasoning they use. In this work, we show how to use these same models to generate such evidence: inspired by the contrastive nature of human explanations, we use PLMs to complete explanation prompts which contrast alternatives according to the key attribute(s) required to justify the correct answer (for example, peanuts are usually salty while raisins are sweet). Conditioning model decisions on these explanations improves performance on two commonsense reasoning benchmarks, as compared to previous non-contrastive alternatives. These explanations are also judged by humans to be more relevant for solving the task, and facilitate a novel method to evaluate explanation faithfulfness.

The generalization mystery in deep learning is the following: Why do over-parameterized neural networks trained with gradient descent (GD) generalize well on real datasets even though they are capable of fitting random datasets of comparable size? Furthermore, from among all solutions that fit the training data, how does GD find one that generalizes well (when such a well-generalizing solution exists)? We argue that the answer to both questions lies in the interaction of the gradients of different examples during training. Intuitively, if the per-example gradients are well-aligned, that is, if they are coherent, then one may expect GD to be (algorithmically) stable, and hence generalize well. We formalize this argument with an easy to compute and interpretable metric for coherence, and show that the metric takes on very different values on real and random datasets for several common vision networks. The theory also explains a number of other phenomena in deep learning, such as why some examples are reliably learned earlier than others, why early stopping works, and why it is possible to learn from noisy labels. Moreover, since the theory provides a causal explanation of how GD finds a well-generalizing solution when one exists, it motivates a class of simple modifications to GD that attenuate memorization and improve generalization. Generalization in deep learning is an extremely broad phenomenon, and therefore, it requires an equally general explanation. We conclude with a survey of alternative lines of attack on this problem, and argue that the proposed approach is the most viable one on this basis.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

In our opinion the exuberance surrounding the relative success of data-driven large language models (LLMs) is slightly misguided and for several reasons (i) LLMs cannot be relied upon for factual information since for LLMs all ingested text (factual or non-factual) was created equal; (ii) due to their subsymbolic na-ture, whatever 'knowledge' these models acquire about language will always be buried in billions of microfeatures (weights), none of which is meaningful on its own; and (iii) LLMs will often fail to make the correct inferences in several linguistic contexts (e.g., nominal compounds, copredication, quantifier scope ambi-guities, intensional contexts. Since we believe the relative success of data-driven large language models (LLMs) is not a reflection on the symbolic vs. subsymbol-ic debate but a reflection on applying the successful strategy of a bottom-up reverse engineering of language at scale, we suggest in this paper applying the effective bottom-up strategy in a symbolic setting resulting in symbolic, explainable, and ontologically grounded language models.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Rigorousness and clarity are both essential for interpretations of DNNs to engender human trust. Path methods are commonly employed to generate rigorous attributions that satisfy three axioms. However, the meaning of attributions remains ambiguous due to distinct path choices. To address the ambiguity, we introduce Concentration Principle, which centrally allocates high attributions to indispensable features, thereby endowing aesthetic and sparsity. We then present SAMP, a model-agnostic interpreter, which efficiently searches the near-optimal path from a pre-defined set of manipulation paths. Moreover, we propose the infinitesimal constraint (IC) and momentum strategy (MS) to improve the rigorousness and optimality. Visualizations show that SAMP can precisely reveal DNNs by pinpointing salient image pixels. We also perform quantitative experiments and observe that our method significantly outperforms the counterparts. Code: https://github.com/zbr17/SAMP.

As machine learning systems become ubiquitous, there has been a surge of interest in interpretable machine learning: systems that provide explanation for their outputs. These explanations are often used to qualitatively assess other criteria such as safety or non-discrimination. However, despite the interest in interpretability, there is very little consensus on what interpretable machine learning is and how it should be measured. In this position paper, we first define interpretability and describe when interpretability is needed (and when it is not). Next, we suggest a taxonomy for rigorous evaluation and expose open questions towards a more rigorous science of interpretable machine learning.

We formalize constraint-based structure learning of the "true" causal graph from observed data when unobserved variables are also existent. We provide conditions for a "natural" family of constraint-based structure-learning algorithms that output graphs that are Markov equivalent to the causal graph. Under the faithfulness assumption, this natural family contains all exact structure-learning algorithms. We also provide a set of assumptions, under which any natural structure-learning algorithm outputs Markov equivalent graphs to the causal graph. These assumptions can be thought of as a relaxation of faithfulness, and most of them can be directly tested from (the underlying distribution) of the data, particularly when one focuses on structural causal models. We specialize the definitions and results for structural causal models.

We report a peculiar observation that LLMs can assign hidden meanings to sequences that seem visually incomprehensible to humans: for example, a nonsensical phrase consisting of Byzantine musical symbols is recognized by gpt-4o as "say abracadabra". Moreover, some models can communicate using these sequences. Some of these meanings are hypothesized to partly originate in the massive spurious correlations due to BPE tokenization. We systematically evaluate the presence of such abilities in a wide range of models: Claude-3.5 Haiku, Claude-3.5 Sonnet (New and Old), Claude-3.7 Sonnet, gpt-4o mini, gpt-4o, o1-mini, Llama-3.3 70B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Lllama 70B, Qwen2.5 1.5B, Qwen2.5 32B, Phi-3.5 mini, GigaChat-Max, Vikhr-Llama-3.2 1B. We argue that this observation might have far-reaching consequences for both safety and security of the modern and future LLMs and systems that employ them. As an illustration, we show that applying this method in combination with simple templates is sufficient to jailbreak previous generation models, with ASR = 0.4 on gpt-4o mini. Our code and data artifacts are available at https://github.com/L3G5/llm-hidden-meanings

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has made significant strides in recent years, yet it continues to struggle with a fundamental aspect of cognition present in all animals: common sense. Current AI systems, including those designed for complex tasks like autonomous driving, problem-solving challenges such as the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), and conversational benchmarks like the Turing Test, often lack the ability to adapt to new situations without extensive prior knowledge. This manuscript argues that integrating common sense into AI systems is essential for achieving true autonomy and unlocking the full societal and commercial value of AI. We propose a shift in the order of knowledge acquisition emphasizing the importance of developing AI systems that start from minimal prior knowledge and are capable of contextual learning, adaptive reasoning, and embodiment -- even within abstract domains. Additionally, we highlight the need to rethink the AI software stack to address this foundational challenge. Without common sense, AI systems may never reach true autonomy, instead exhibiting asymptotic performance that approaches theoretical ideals like AIXI but remains unattainable in practice due to infinite resource and computation requirements. While scaling AI models and passing benchmarks like the Turing Test have brought significant advancements in applications that do not require autonomy, these approaches alone are insufficient to achieve autonomous AI with common sense. By redefining existing benchmarks and challenges to enforce constraints that require genuine common sense, and by broadening our understanding of embodiment to include both physical and abstract domains, we can encourage the development of AI systems better equipped to handle the complexities of real-world and abstract environments.

Automatic disease diagnosis has become increasingly valuable in clinical practice. The advent of large language models (LLMs) has catalyzed a paradigm shift in artificial intelligence, with growing evidence supporting the efficacy of LLMs in diagnostic tasks. Despite the increasing attention in this field, a holistic view is still lacking. Many critical aspects remain unclear, such as the diseases and clinical data to which LLMs have been applied, the LLM techniques employed, and the evaluation methods used. In this article, we perform a comprehensive review of LLM-based methods for disease diagnosis. Our review examines the existing literature across various dimensions, including disease types and associated clinical specialties, clinical data, LLM techniques, and evaluation methods. Additionally, we offer recommendations for applying and evaluating LLMs for diagnostic tasks. Furthermore, we assess the limitations of current research and discuss future directions. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive review for LLM-based disease diagnosis.

We present an empirical evaluation of various outputs generated by nine of the most widely-available large language models (LLMs). Our analysis is done with off-the-shelf, readily-available tools. We find a correlation between percentage of memorized text, percentage of unique text, and overall output quality, when measured with respect to output pathologies such as counterfactual and logically-flawed statements, and general failures like not staying on topic. Overall, 80.0% of the outputs evaluated contained memorized data, but outputs containing the most memorized content were also more likely to be considered of high quality. We discuss and evaluate mitigation strategies, showing that, in the models evaluated, the rate of memorized text being output is reduced. We conclude with a discussion on potential implications around what it means to learn, to memorize, and to evaluate quality text.

Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.

We show that feedforward neural networks with ReLU activation generalize on low complexity data, suitably defined. Given i.i.d. data generated from a simple programming language, the minimum description length (MDL) feedforward neural network which interpolates the data generalizes with high probability. We define this simple programming language, along with a notion of description length of such networks. We provide several examples on basic computational tasks, such as checking primality of a natural number, and more. For primality testing, our theorem shows the following. Suppose that we draw an i.i.d. sample of Theta(N^{delta}ln N) numbers uniformly at random from 1 to N, where deltain (0,1). For each number x_i, let y_i = 1 if x_i is a prime and 0 if it is not. Then with high probability, the MDL network fitted to this data accurately answers whether a newly drawn number between 1 and N is a prime or not, with test error leq O(N^{-delta}). Note that the network is not designed to detect primes; minimum description learning discovers a network which does so.

Machine learning models are increasingly used in societal applications, yet legal and privacy concerns demand that they very often be kept confidential. Consequently, there is a growing distrust about the fairness properties of these models in the minds of consumers, who are often at the receiving end of model predictions. To this end, we propose \name -- a system that uses Zero-Knowledge Proofs (a cryptographic primitive) to publicly verify the fairness of a model, while maintaining confidentiality. We also propose a fairness certification algorithm for fully-connected neural networks which is befitting to ZKPs and is used in this system. We implement \name in Gnark and demonstrate empirically that our system is practically feasible. Code is available at https://github.com/infinite-pursuits/FairProof.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

The measure of a machine learning algorithm is the difficulty of the tasks it can perform, and sufficiently difficult tasks are critical drivers of strong machine learning models. However, quantifying the generalization difficulty of machine learning benchmarks has remained challenging. We propose what is to our knowledge the first model-agnostic measure of the inherent generalization difficulty of tasks. Our inductive bias complexity measure quantifies the total information required to generalize well on a task minus the information provided by the data. It does so by measuring the fractional volume occupied by hypotheses that generalize on a task given that they fit the training data. It scales exponentially with the intrinsic dimensionality of the space over which the model must generalize but only polynomially in resolution per dimension, showing that tasks which require generalizing over many dimensions are drastically more difficult than tasks involving more detail in fewer dimensions. Our measure can be applied to compute and compare supervised learning, reinforcement learning and meta-learning generalization difficulties against each other. We show that applied empirically, it formally quantifies intuitively expected trends, e.g. that in terms of required inductive bias, MNIST < CIFAR10 < Imagenet and fully observable Markov decision processes (MDPs) < partially observable MDPs. Further, we show that classification of complex images < few-shot meta-learning with simple images. Our measure provides a quantitative metric to guide the construction of more complex tasks requiring greater inductive bias, and thereby encourages the development of more sophisticated architectures and learning algorithms with more powerful generalization capabilities.

Large Language Models have shown tremendous performance on a large variety of natural language processing tasks, ranging from text comprehension to common sense reasoning. However, the mechanisms responsible for this success remain opaque, and it is unclear whether LLMs can achieve human-like cognitive capabilities or whether these models are still fundamentally circumscribed. Abstract reasoning is a fundamental task for cognition, consisting of finding and applying a general pattern from few data. Evaluating deep neural architectures on this task could give insight into their potential limitations regarding reasoning and their broad generalisation abilities, yet this is currently an under-explored area. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark for evaluating language models beyond memorization on abstract reasoning tasks. We perform extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, showing that they currently achieve very limited performance in contrast with other natural language tasks, and we examine the reasons for this difference. We apply techniques that have been shown to improve performance on other NLP tasks and show that their impact on abstract reasoning is limited.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Research in mechanistic interpretability seeks to explain behaviors of machine learning models in terms of their internal components. However, most previous work either focuses on simple behaviors in small models, or describes complicated behaviors in larger models with broad strokes. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting an explanation for how GPT-2 small performs a natural language task called indirect object identification (IOI). Our explanation encompasses 26 attention heads grouped into 7 main classes, which we discovered using a combination of interpretability approaches relying on causal interventions. To our knowledge, this investigation is the largest end-to-end attempt at reverse-engineering a natural behavior "in the wild" in a language model. We evaluate the reliability of our explanation using three quantitative criteria--faithfulness, completeness and minimality. Though these criteria support our explanation, they also point to remaining gaps in our understanding. Our work provides evidence that a mechanistic understanding of large ML models is feasible, opening opportunities to scale our understanding to both larger models and more complex tasks.

We often attribute human characteristics to large language models (LLMs) and claim that they "know" certain things. LLMs have an internal probabilistic knowledge that represents information retained during training. How can we assess the veracity of this knowledge? We examine two common methods for probing the veracity of LLMs and discover several assumptions that are flawed. To address these flawed assumptions, we introduce sAwMIL (short for Sparse Aware Multiple-Instance Learning), a probing method that utilizes the internal activations of LLMs to separate statements into true, false, and neither. sAwMIL is based on multiple-instance learning and conformal prediction. We evaluate sAwMIL on 5 validity criteria across 16 open-source LLMs, including both default and chat-based variants, as well as on 3 new datasets. Among the insights we provide are: (1) the veracity signal is often concentrated in the third quarter of an LLM's depth; (2) truth and falsehood signals are not always symmetric; (3) linear probes perform better on chat models than on default models; (4) nonlinear probes may be required to capture veracity signals for some LLMs with reinforcement learning from human feedback or knowledge distillation; and (5) LLMs capture a third type of signal that is distinct from true and false and is neither true nor false. These findings provide a reliable method for verifying what LLMs "know" and how certain they are of their probabilistic internal knowledge.

The Automated Model Evaluation (AutoEval) framework entertains the possibility of evaluating a trained machine learning model without resorting to a labeled testing set. Despite the promise and some decent results, the existing AutoEval methods heavily rely on computing distribution shifts between the unlabelled testing set and the training set. We believe this reliance on the training set becomes another obstacle in shipping this technology to real-world ML development. In this work, we propose Contrastive Automatic Model Evaluation (CAME), a novel AutoEval framework that is rid of involving training set in the loop. The core idea of CAME bases on a theoretical analysis which bonds the model performance with a contrastive loss. Further, with extensive empirical validation, we manage to set up a predictable relationship between the two, simply by deducing on the unlabeled/unseen testing set. The resulting framework CAME establishes a new SOTA results for AutoEval by surpassing prior work significantly.

Compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression is constructed from the meaning of its parts and syntactic rules, permits the infinite productivity of human language. For the first time, artificial language models (LMs) are able to match human performance in a number of compositional generalization tasks. However, much remains to be understood about the representational mechanisms underlying these abilities. We take a high-level geometric approach to this problem by relating the degree of compositionality in a dataset to the intrinsic dimensionality of its representations under an LM, a measure of feature complexity. We find not only that the degree of dataset compositionality is reflected in representations' intrinsic dimensionality, but that the relationship between compositionality and geometric complexity arises due to learned linguistic features over training. Finally, our analyses reveal a striking contrast between linear and nonlinear dimensionality, showing that they respectively encode formal and semantic aspects of linguistic composition.

The generalization of language models (LMs) is undergoing active debates, contrasting their potential for general intelligence with their struggles with basic knowledge composition (e.g., reverse/transition curse). This paper uncovers the phenomenon of linear correlations in LMs during knowledge composition. For explanation, there exists a linear transformation between certain related knowledge that maps the next token prediction logits from one prompt to another, e.g., "X lives in the city of" rightarrow "X lives in the country of" for every given X. This mirrors the linearity in human knowledge composition, such as Paris rightarrow France. Our findings indicate that the linear transformation is resilient to large-scale fine-tuning, generalizing updated knowledge when aligned with real-world relationships, but causing hallucinations when it deviates. Empirical results suggest that linear correlation can serve as a potential identifier of LM's generalization. Finally, we show such linear correlations can be learned with a single feedforward network and pre-trained vocabulary representations, indicating LM generalization heavily relies on the latter.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

An account of the subjective elements of quantum mechanics or of whether, as Einstein famously asked, the Moon exists when nobody is looking at it.

Do large language models (LLMs) anticipate when they will answer correctly? To study this, we extract activations after a question is read but before any tokens are generated, and train linear probes to predict whether the model's forthcoming answer will be correct. Across three open-source model families ranging from 7 to 70 billion parameters, projections on this "in-advance correctness direction" trained on generic trivia questions predict success in distribution and on diverse out-of-distribution knowledge datasets, outperforming black-box baselines and verbalised predicted confidence. Predictive power saturates in intermediate layers, suggesting that self-assessment emerges mid-computation. Notably, generalisation falters on questions requiring mathematical reasoning. Moreover, for models responding "I don't know", doing so strongly correlates with the probe score, indicating that the same direction also captures confidence. By complementing previous results on truthfulness and other behaviours obtained with probes and sparse auto-encoders, our work contributes essential findings to elucidate LLM internals.

With the advent of larger and more complex deep learning models, such as in Natural Language Processing (NLP), model qualities like explainability and interpretability, albeit highly desirable, are becoming harder challenges to tackle and solve. For example, state-of-the-art models in text classification are black-box by design. Although standard explanation methods provide some degree of explainability, these are mostly correlation-based methods and do not provide much insight into the model. The alternative of causal explainability is more desirable to achieve but extremely challenging in NLP due to a variety of reasons. Inspired by recent endeavors to utilize Large Language Models (LLMs) as experts, in this work, we aim to leverage the instruction-following and textual understanding capabilities of recent state-of-the-art LLMs to facilitate causal explainability via counterfactual explanation generation for black-box text classifiers. To do this, we propose a three-step pipeline via which, we use an off-the-shelf LLM to: (1) identify the latent or unobserved features in the input text, (2) identify the input features associated with the latent features, and finally (3) use the identified input features to generate a counterfactual explanation. We experiment with our pipeline on multiple NLP text classification datasets, with several recent LLMs, and present interesting and promising findings.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand the computational mechanisms underlying neural networks' capabilities in order to accomplish concrete scientific and engineering goals. Progress in this field thus promises to provide greater assurance over AI system behavior and shed light on exciting scientific questions about the nature of intelligence. Despite recent progress toward these goals, there are many open problems in the field that require solutions before many scientific and practical benefits can be realized: Our methods require both conceptual and practical improvements to reveal deeper insights; we must figure out how best to apply our methods in pursuit of specific goals; and the field must grapple with socio-technical challenges that influence and are influenced by our work. This forward-facing review discusses the current frontier of mechanistic interpretability and the open problems that the field may benefit from prioritizing.

Research has a long history of discussing what is superior in predicting certain outcomes: statistical methods or the human brain. This debate has repeatedly been sparked off by the remarkable technological advances in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), such as solving tasks like object and speech recognition, achieving significant improvements in accuracy through deep-learning algorithms (Goodfellow et al. 2016), or combining various methods of computational intelligence, such as fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms, and case-based reasoning (Medsker 2012). One of the implicit promises that underlie these advancements is that machines will 1 day be capable of performing complex tasks or may even supersede humans in performing these tasks. This triggers new heated debates of when machines will ultimately replace humans (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017). While previous research has proved that AI performs well in some clearly defined tasks such as playing chess, playing Go or identifying objects on images, it is doubted that the development of an artificial general intelligence (AGI) which is able to solve multiple tasks at the same time can be achieved in the near future (e.g., Russell and Norvig 2016). Moreover, the use of AI to solve complex business problems in organizational contexts occurs scarcely, and applications for AI that solve complex problems remain mainly in laboratory settings instead of being implemented in practice. Since the road to AGI is still a long one, we argue that the most likely paradigm for the division of labor between humans and machines in the next decades is Hybrid Intelligence. This concept aims at using the complementary strengths of human intelligence and AI, so that they can perform better than each of the two could separately (e.g., Kamar 2016).

We introduce CLIMATE-FEVER, a new publicly available dataset for verification of climate change-related claims. By providing a dataset for the research community, we aim to facilitate and encourage work on improving algorithms for retrieving evidential support for climate-specific claims, addressing the underlying language understanding challenges, and ultimately help alleviate the impact of misinformation on climate change. We adapt the methodology of FEVER [1], the largest dataset of artificially designed claims, to real-life claims collected from the Internet. While during this process, we could rely on the expertise of renowned climate scientists, it turned out to be no easy task. We discuss the surprising, subtle complexity of modeling real-world climate-related claims within the fever framework, which we believe provides a valuable challenge for general natural language understanding. We hope that our work will mark the beginning of a new exciting long-term joint effort by the climate science and AI community.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a wide range of promising capabilities -- from step-by-step planning to commonsense reasoning -- that may provide utility for robots, but remain prone to confidently hallucinated predictions. In this work, we present KnowNo, which is a framework for measuring and aligning the uncertainty of LLM-based planners such that they know when they don't know and ask for help when needed. KnowNo builds on the theory of conformal prediction to provide statistical guarantees on task completion while minimizing human help in complex multi-step planning settings. Experiments across a variety of simulated and real robot setups that involve tasks with different modes of ambiguity (e.g., from spatial to numeric uncertainties, from human preferences to Winograd schemas) show that KnowNo performs favorably over modern baselines (which may involve ensembles or extensive prompt tuning) in terms of improving efficiency and autonomy, while providing formal assurances. KnowNo can be used with LLMs out of the box without model-finetuning, and suggests a promising lightweight approach to modeling uncertainty that can complement and scale with the growing capabilities of foundation models. Website: https://robot-help.github.io

We study the problem of attributing the prediction of a deep network to its input features, a problem previously studied by several other works. We identify two fundamental axioms---Sensitivity and Implementation Invariance that attribution methods ought to satisfy. We show that they are not satisfied by most known attribution methods, which we consider to be a fundamental weakness of those methods. We use the axioms to guide the design of a new attribution method called Integrated Gradients. Our method requires no modification to the original network and is extremely simple to implement; it just needs a few calls to the standard gradient operator. We apply this method to a couple of image models, a couple of text models and a chemistry model, demonstrating its ability to debug networks, to extract rules from a network, and to enable users to engage with models better.

One of the roadblocks to a better understanding of neural networks' internals is polysemanticity, where neurons appear to activate in multiple, semantically distinct contexts. Polysemanticity prevents us from identifying concise, human-understandable explanations for what neural networks are doing internally. One hypothesised cause of polysemanticity is superposition, where neural networks represent more features than they have neurons by assigning features to an overcomplete set of directions in activation space, rather than to individual neurons. Here, we attempt to identify those directions, using sparse autoencoders to reconstruct the internal activations of a language model. These autoencoders learn sets of sparsely activating features that are more interpretable and monosemantic than directions identified by alternative approaches, where interpretability is measured by automated methods. Ablating these features enables precise model editing, for example, by removing capabilities such as pronoun prediction, while disrupting model behaviour less than prior techniques. This work indicates that it is possible to resolve superposition in language models using a scalable, unsupervised method. Our method may serve as a foundation for future mechanistic interpretability work, which we hope will enable greater model transparency and steerability.

While large language models (LLMs) have proven to be effective on a large variety of tasks, they are also known to hallucinate information. To measure whether an LLM prefers factually consistent continuations of its input, we propose a new benchmark called FIB(Factual Inconsistency Benchmark) that focuses on the task of summarization. Specifically, our benchmark involves comparing the scores an LLM assigns to a factually consistent versus a factually inconsistent summary for an input news article. For factually consistent summaries, we use human-written reference summaries that we manually verify as factually consistent. To generate summaries that are factually inconsistent, we generate summaries from a suite of summarization models that we have manually annotated as factually inconsistent. A model's factual consistency is then measured according to its accuracy, i.e.\ the proportion of documents where it assigns a higher score to the factually consistent summary. To validate the usefulness of FIB, we evaluate 23 large language models ranging from 1B to 176B parameters from six different model families including BLOOM and OPT. We find that existing LLMs generally assign a higher score to factually consistent summaries than to factually inconsistent summaries. However, if the factually inconsistent summaries occur verbatim in the document, then LLMs assign a higher score to these factually inconsistent summaries than factually consistent summaries. We validate design choices in our benchmark including the scoring method and source of distractor summaries. Our code and benchmark data can be found at https://github.com/r-three/fib.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning are in a period of astounding growth. However, there are concerns that these technologies may be used, either with or without intention, to perpetuate the prejudice and unfairness that unfortunately characterizes many human institutions. Here we show for the first time that human-like semantic biases result from the application of standard machine learning to ordinary language---the same sort of language humans are exposed to every day. We replicate a spectrum of standard human biases as exposed by the Implicit Association Test and other well-known psychological studies. We replicate these using a widely used, purely statistical machine-learning model---namely, the GloVe word embedding---trained on a corpus of text from the Web. Our results indicate that language itself contains recoverable and accurate imprints of our historic biases, whether these are morally neutral as towards insects or flowers, problematic as towards race or gender, or even simply veridical, reflecting the {\em status quo} for the distribution of gender with respect to careers or first names. These regularities are captured by machine learning along with the rest of semantics. In addition to our empirical findings concerning language, we also contribute new methods for evaluating bias in text, the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) and the Word Embedding Factual Association Test (WEFAT). Our results have implications not only for AI and machine learning, but also for the fields of psychology, sociology, and human ethics, since they raise the possibility that mere exposure to everyday language can account for the biases we replicate here.

One of the challenges of developing a summarization model arises from the difficulty in measuring the factual inconsistency of the generated text. In this study, we reinterpret the decoder overconfidence-regularizing objective suggested in (Miao et al., 2021) as a hallucination risk measurement to better estimate the quality of generated summaries. We propose a reference-free metric, HaRiM+, which only requires an off-the-shelf summarization model to compute the hallucination risk based on token likelihoods. Deploying it requires no additional training of models or ad-hoc modules, which usually need alignment to human judgments. For summary-quality estimation, HaRiM+ records state-of-the-art correlation to human judgment on three summary-quality annotation sets: FRANK, QAGS, and SummEval. We hope that our work, which merits the use of summarization models, facilitates the progress of both automated evaluation and generation of summary.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly impacted nearly every domain of human knowledge. However, the explainability of these models esp. to laypersons, which are crucial for instilling trust, have been examined through various skeptical lenses. In this paper, we introduce a novel notion of LLM explainability to laypersons, termed ReQuesting, across three high-priority application domains -- law, health and finance, using multiple state-of-the-art LLMs. The proposed notion exhibits faithful generation of explainable layman-understandable algorithms on multiple tasks through high degree of reproducibility. Furthermore, we observe a notable alignment of the explainable algorithms with intrinsic reasoning of the LLMs.

Amid a discussion about Green AI in which we see explainability neglected, we explore the possibility to efficiently approximate computationally expensive explainers. To this end, we propose feature attribution modelling with Empirical Explainers. Empirical Explainers learn from data to predict the attribution maps of expensive explainers. We train and test Empirical Explainers in the language domain and find that they model their expensive counterparts surprisingly well, at a fraction of the cost. They could thus mitigate the computational burden of neural explanations significantly, in applications that tolerate an approximation error.

Since the recent prosperity of Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been interleaved discussions regarding how to reduce hallucinations from LLM responses, how to increase the factuality of LLMs, and whether Knowledge Graphs (KGs), which store the world knowledge in a symbolic form, will be replaced with LLMs. In this paper, we try to answer these questions from a new angle: How knowledgeable are LLMs? To answer this question, we constructed Head-to-Tail, a benchmark that consists of 18K question-answer (QA) pairs regarding head, torso, and tail facts in terms of popularity. We designed an automated evaluation method and a set of metrics that closely approximate the knowledge an LLM confidently internalizes. Through a comprehensive evaluation of 14 publicly available LLMs, we show that existing LLMs are still far from being perfect in terms of their grasp of factual knowledge, especially for facts of torso-to-tail entities.

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

Alignment is a standard procedure to fine-tune pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to follow natural language instructions and serve as helpful AI assistants. We have observed, however, that the conventional alignment process fails to enhance the factual accuracy of LLMs, and often leads to the generation of more false facts (i.e. hallucination). In this paper, we study how to make the LLM alignment process more factual, by first identifying factors that lead to hallucination in both alignment steps:\ supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, we find that training the LLM on new knowledge or unfamiliar texts can encourage hallucination. This makes SFT less factual as it trains on human labeled data that may be novel to the LLM. Furthermore, reward functions used in standard RL can also encourage hallucination, because it guides the LLM to provide more helpful responses on a diverse set of instructions, often preferring longer and more detailed responses. Based on these observations, we propose factuality-aware alignment, comprised of factuality-aware SFT and factuality-aware RL through direct preference optimization. Experiments show that our proposed factuality-aware alignment guides LLMs to output more factual responses while maintaining instruction-following capability.

Modern generative models demonstrate impressive capabilities, likely stemming from an ability to identify and manipulate abstract concepts underlying their training data. However, fundamental questions remain: what determines the concepts a model learns, the order in which it learns them, and its ability to manipulate those concepts? To address these questions, we propose analyzing a model's learning dynamics via a framework we call the concept space, where each axis represents an independent concept underlying the data generating process. By characterizing learning dynamics in this space, we identify how the speed at which a concept is learned, and hence the order of concept learning, is controlled by properties of the data we term concept signal. Further, we observe moments of sudden turns in the direction of a model's learning dynamics in concept space. Surprisingly, these points precisely correspond to the emergence of hidden capabilities, i.e., where latent interventions show the model possesses the capability to manipulate a concept, but these capabilities cannot yet be elicited via naive input prompting. While our results focus on synthetically defined toy datasets, we hypothesize a general claim on emergence of hidden capabilities may hold: generative models possess latent capabilities that emerge suddenly and consistently during training, though a model might not exhibit these capabilities under naive input prompting.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Recent advances in large reasoning models have enabled complex, step-by-step reasoning but often introduce significant overthinking, resulting in verbose and redundant outputs that hinder efficiency. In this study, we examine whether explicit self-reflection, signaled by tokens such as "Wait" and "Hmm", is necessary for advanced reasoning. We propose NoWait, a simple yet effective approach that disables explicit self-reflection by suppressing these tokens during inference. Extensive experiments on ten benchmarks across textual, visual, and video reasoning tasks show that NoWait reduces chain-of-thought trajectory length by up to 27%-51% in five R1-style model series, without compromising model utility. NoWait thus offers a plug-and-play solution for efficient and utility-preserving multimodal reasoning.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Programming-by-example is the task of synthesizing a program that is consistent with a set of user-provided input-output examples. As examples are often an under-specification of one's intent, a good synthesizer must choose the intended program from the many that are consistent with the given set of examples. Prior work frames program synthesis as a cooperative game between a listener (that synthesizes programs) and a speaker (a user choosing examples), and shows that models of computational pragmatic inference are effective in choosing the user intended programs. However, these models require counterfactual reasoning over a large set of programs and examples, which is infeasible in realistic program spaces. In this paper, we propose a novel way to amortize this search with neural networks. We sample pairs of programs and examples via self-play between listener and speaker models, and use pragmatic inference to choose informative training examples from this sample.We then use the informative dataset to train models to improve the synthesizer's ability to disambiguate user-provided examples without human supervision. We validate our method on the challenging task of synthesizing regular expressions from example strings, and find that our method (1) outperforms models trained without choosing pragmatic examples by 23% (a 51% relative increase) (2) matches the performance of supervised learning on a dataset of pragmatic examples provided by humans, despite using no human data in training.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

Many recent works have discussed the propensity, or lack thereof, for emergent languages to exhibit properties of natural languages. A favorite in the literature is learning compositionality. We note that most of those works have focused on communicative bandwidth as being of primary importance. While important, it is not the only contributing factor. In this paper, we investigate the learning biases that affect the efficacy and compositionality of emergent languages. Our foremost contribution is to explore how capacity of a neural network impacts its ability to learn a compositional language. We additionally introduce a set of evaluation metrics with which we analyze the learned languages. Our hypothesis is that there should be a specific range of model capacity and channel bandwidth that induces compositional structure in the resulting language and consequently encourages systematic generalization. While we empirically see evidence for the bottom of this range, we curiously do not find evidence for the top part of the range and believe that this is an open question for the community.

We provide a syllabification algorithm for the Divine Comedy using techniques from probabilistic and constraint programming. We particularly focus on the synalephe, addressed in terms of the "propensity" of a word to take part in a synalephe with adjacent words. We jointly provide an online vocabulary containing, for each word, information about its syllabification, the location of the tonic accent, and the aforementioned synalephe propensity, on the left and right sides. The algorithm is intrinsically nondeterministic, producing different possible syllabifications for each verse, with different likelihoods; metric constraints relative to accents on the 10th, 4th and 6th syllables are used to further reduce the solution space. The most likely syllabification is hence returned as output. We believe that this work could be a major milestone for a lot of different investigations. From the point of view of digital humanities it opens new perspectives on computer assisted analysis of digital sources, comprising automated detection of anomalous and problematic cases, metric clustering of verses and their categorization, or more foundational investigations addressing e.g. the phonetic roles of consonants and vowels. From the point of view of text processing and deep learning, information about syllabification and the location of accents opens a wide range of exciting perspectives, from the possibility of automatic learning syllabification of words and verses, to the improvement of generative models, aware of metric issues, and more respectful of the expected musicality.

With the growing attention and investment in recent AI approaches such as large language models, the narrative that the larger the AI system the more valuable, powerful and interesting it is is increasingly seen as common sense. But what is this assumption based on, and how are we measuring value, power, and performance? And what are the collateral consequences of this race to ever-increasing scale? Here, we scrutinize the current scaling trends and trade-offs across multiple axes and refute two common assumptions underlying the 'bigger-is-better' AI paradigm: 1) that improved performance is a product of increased scale, and 2) that all interesting problems addressed by AI require large-scale models. Rather, we argue that this approach is not only fragile scientifically, but comes with undesirable consequences. First, it is not sustainable, as its compute demands increase faster than model performance, leading to unreasonable economic requirements and a disproportionate environmental footprint. Second, it implies focusing on certain problems at the expense of others, leaving aside important applications, e.g. health, education, or the climate. Finally, it exacerbates a concentration of power, which centralizes decision-making in the hands of a few actors while threatening to disempower others in the context of shaping both AI research and its applications throughout society.

This paper addresses a regression problem in which output label values are the results of sensing the magnitude of a phenomenon. A low value of such labels can mean either that the actual magnitude of the phenomenon was low or that the sensor made an incomplete observation. This leads to a bias toward lower values in labels and the resultant learning because labels may have lower values due to incomplete observations, even if the actual magnitude of the phenomenon was high. Moreover, because an incomplete observation does not provide any tags indicating incompleteness, we cannot eliminate or impute them. To address this issue, we propose a learning algorithm that explicitly models incomplete observations corrupted with an asymmetric noise that always has a negative value. We show that our algorithm is unbiased as if it were learned from uncorrupted data that does not involve incomplete observations. We demonstrate the advantages of our algorithm through numerical experiments.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

We investigate large language model performance across five orders of magnitude of compute scaling in eleven recent model architectures. We show that average benchmark performance, aggregating over many individual tasks and evaluations as in the commonly-used BIG-Bench dataset, is decently predictable as a function of training compute scale. Specifically, when extrapolating BIG-Bench Hard performance across one order of magnitude in compute, we observe average absolute errors of 6 percentage points (pp). By contrast, extrapolation for individual BIG-Bench tasks across an order of magnitude in compute yields higher average errors of 18pp. Nonetheless, individual task performance remains significantly more predictable than chance. Overall, our work suggests compute scaling provides a promising basis to forecast AI capabilities in diverse benchmarks, though predicting performance in specific tasks poses challenges.

While Large language models (LLMs) have become excellent writing assistants, they still struggle with quotation generation. This is because they either hallucinate when providing factual quotations or fail to provide quotes that exceed human expectations. To bridge the gap, we systematically study how to evaluate and improve LLMs' performance in quotation generation tasks. We first establish a holistic and automatic evaluation system for quotation generation task, which consists of five criteria each with corresponding automatic metric. To improve the LLMs' quotation generation abilities, we construct a bilingual knowledge base that is broad in scope and rich in dimensions, containing up to 32,022 quotes. Moreover, guided by our critiria, we further design a quotation-specific metric to rerank the retrieved quotations from the knowledge base. Extensive experiments show that our metrics strongly correlate with human preferences. Existing LLMs struggle to generate desired quotes, but our quotation knowledge base and reranking metric help narrow this gap. Our dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/GraceXiaoo/QUILL.

We present a new knowledge-base of hasPart relationships, extracted from a large corpus of generic statements. Complementary to other resources available, it is the first which is all three of: accurate (90% precision), salient (covers relationships a person may mention), and has high coverage of common terms (approximated as within a 10 year old's vocabulary), as well as having several times more hasPart entries than in the popular ontologies ConceptNet and WordNet. In addition, it contains information about quantifiers, argument modifiers, and links the entities to appropriate concepts in Wikipedia and WordNet. The knowledge base is available at https://allenai.org/data/haspartkb

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements in various natural language processing tasks, including question answering (QA) tasks. While incorporating new information with the retrieval of relevant passages is a promising way to improve QA with LLMs, the existing methods often require additional fine-tuning which becomes infeasible with recent LLMs. Augmenting retrieved passages via prompting has the potential to address this limitation, but this direction has been limitedly explored. To this end, we design a simple yet effective framework to enhance open-domain QA (ODQA) with LLMs, based on the summarized retrieval (SuRe). SuRe helps LLMs predict more accurate answers for a given question, which are well-supported by the summarized retrieval that could be viewed as an explicit rationale extracted from the retrieved passages. Specifically, SuRe first constructs summaries of the retrieved passages for each of the multiple answer candidates. Then, SuRe confirms the most plausible answer from the candidate set by evaluating the validity and ranking of the generated summaries. Experimental results on diverse ODQA benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of SuRe, with improvements of up to 4.6% in exact match (EM) and 4.0% in F1 score over standard prompting approaches. SuRe also can be integrated with a broad range of retrieval methods and LLMs. Finally, the generated summaries from SuRe show additional advantages to measure the importance of retrieved passages and serve as more preferred rationales by models and humans.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Zero-shot learning (ZSL) aims at understanding unseen categories with no training examples from class-level descriptions. To improve the discriminative power of zero-shot learning, we model the visual learning process of unseen categories with inspiration from the psychology of human creativity for producing novel art. We relate ZSL to human creativity by observing that zero-shot learning is about recognizing the unseen and creativity is about creating a likable unseen. We introduce a learning signal inspired by creativity literature that explores the unseen space with hallucinated class-descriptions and encourages careful deviation of their visual feature generations from seen classes while allowing knowledge transfer from seen to unseen classes. Empirically, we show consistent improvement over the state of the art of several percents on the largest available benchmarks on the challenging task or generalized ZSL from a noisy text that we focus on, using the CUB and NABirds datasets. We also show the advantage of our approach on Attribute-based ZSL on three additional datasets (AwA2, aPY, and SUN). Code is available.

Abstract grammatical knowledge - of parts of speech and grammatical patterns - is key to the capacity for linguistic generalization in humans. But how abstract is grammatical knowledge in large language models? In the human literature, compelling evidence for grammatical abstraction comes from structural priming. A sentence that shares the same grammatical structure as a preceding sentence is processed and produced more readily. Because confounds exist when using stimuli in a single language, evidence of abstraction is even more compelling from crosslingual structural priming, where use of a syntactic structure in one language primes an analogous structure in another language. We measure crosslingual structural priming in large language models, comparing model behavior to human experimental results from eight crosslingual experiments covering six languages, and four monolingual structural priming experiments in three non-English languages. We find evidence for abstract monolingual and crosslingual grammatical representations in the models that function similarly to those found in humans. These results demonstrate that grammatical representations in multilingual language models are not only similar across languages, but they can causally influence text produced in different languages.

Understanding time is crucial for understanding events expressed in natural language. Because people rarely say the obvious, it is often necessary to have commonsense knowledge about various temporal aspects of events, such as duration, frequency, and temporal order. However, this important problem has so far received limited attention. This paper systematically studies this temporal commonsense problem. Specifically, we define five classes of temporal commonsense, and use crowdsourcing to develop a new dataset, MCTACO, that serves as a test set for this task. We find that the best current methods used on MCTACO are still far behind human performance, by about 20%, and discuss several directions for improvement. We hope that the new dataset and our study here can foster more future research on this topic.

Large language models (LLMs) can explain their predictions through post-hoc or Chain-of-Thought (CoT) explanations. But an LLM could make up reasonably sounding explanations that are unfaithful to its underlying reasoning. Recent work has designed tests that aim to judge the faithfulness of post-hoc or CoT explanations. In this work we argue that these faithfulness tests do not measure faithfulness to the models' inner workings -- but rather their self-consistency at output level. Our contributions are three-fold: i) We clarify the status of faithfulness tests in view of model explainability, characterising them as self-consistency tests instead. This assessment we underline by ii) constructing a Comparative Consistency Bank for self-consistency tests that for the first time compares existing tests on a common suite of 11 open LLMs and 5 tasks -- including iii) our new self-consistency measure CC-SHAP. CC-SHAP is a fine-grained measure (not a test) of LLM self-consistency. It compares how a model's input contributes to the predicted answer and to generating the explanation. Our fine-grained CC-SHAP metric allows us iii) to compare LLM behaviour when making predictions and to analyse the effect of other consistency tests at a deeper level, which takes us one step further towards measuring faithfulness by bringing us closer to the internals of the model than strictly surface output-oriented tests. Our code is available at https://github.com/Heidelberg-NLP/CC-SHAP

A wide variety of NLP applications, such as machine translation, summarization, and dialog, involve text generation. One major challenge for these applications is how to evaluate whether such generated texts are actually fluent, accurate, or effective. In this work, we conceptualize the evaluation of generated text as a text generation problem, modeled using pre-trained sequence-to-sequence models. The general idea is that models trained to convert the generated text to/from a reference output or the source text will achieve higher scores when the generated text is better. We operationalize this idea using BART, an encoder-decoder based pre-trained model, and propose a metric BARTScore with a number of variants that can be flexibly applied in an unsupervised fashion to evaluation of text from different perspectives (e.g. informativeness, fluency, or factuality). BARTScore is conceptually simple and empirically effective. It can outperform existing top-scoring metrics in 16 of 22 test settings, covering evaluation of 16 datasets (e.g., machine translation, text summarization) and 7 different perspectives (e.g., informativeness, factuality). Code to calculate BARTScore is available at https://github.com/neulab/BARTScore, and we have released an interactive leaderboard for meta-evaluation at http://explainaboard.nlpedia.ai/leaderboard/task-meval/ on the ExplainaBoard platform, which allows us to interactively understand the strengths, weaknesses, and complementarity of each metric.

Stepwise inference protocols, such as scratchpads and chain-of-thought, help language models solve complex problems by decomposing them into a sequence of simpler subproblems. Despite the significant gain in performance achieved via these protocols, the underlying mechanisms of stepwise inference have remained elusive. To address this, we propose to study autoregressive Transformer models on a synthetic task that embodies the multi-step nature of problems where stepwise inference is generally most useful. Specifically, we define a graph navigation problem wherein a model is tasked with traversing a path from a start to a goal node on the graph. Despite is simplicity, we find we can empirically reproduce and analyze several phenomena observed at scale: (i) the stepwise inference reasoning gap, the cause of which we find in the structure of the training data; (ii) a diversity-accuracy tradeoff in model generations as sampling temperature varies; (iii) a simplicity bias in the model's output; and (iv) compositional generalization and a primacy bias with in-context exemplars. Overall, our work introduces a grounded, synthetic framework for studying stepwise inference and offers mechanistic hypotheses that can lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) has proven effective for compressing large teacher models into smaller student models. While it is well known that student models can achieve similar accuracies as the teachers, it has also been shown that they nonetheless often do not learn the same function. It is, however, often highly desirable that the student's and teacher's functions share similar properties such as basing the prediction on the same input features, as this ensures that students learn the 'right features' from the teachers. In this work, we explore whether this can be achieved by not only optimizing the classic KD loss but also the similarity of the explanations generated by the teacher and the student. Despite the idea being simple and intuitive, we find that our proposed 'explanation-enhanced' KD (e^2KD) (1) consistently provides large gains in terms of accuracy and student-teacher agreement, (2) ensures that the student learns from the teacher to be right for the right reasons and to give similar explanations, and (3) is robust with respect to the model architectures, the amount of training data, and even works with 'approximate', pre-computed explanations.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Machine learning has achieved remarkable success in many applications. However, existing studies are largely based on the closed-world assumption, which assumes that the environment is stationary, and the model is fixed once deployed. In many real-world applications, this fundamental and rather naive assumption may not hold because an open environment is complex, dynamic, and full of unknowns. In such cases, rejecting unknowns, discovering novelties, and then incrementally learning them, could enable models to be safe and evolve continually as biological systems do. This paper provides a holistic view of open-world machine learning by investigating unknown rejection, novel class discovery, and class-incremental learning in a unified paradigm. The challenges, principles, and limitations of current methodologies are discussed in detail. Finally, we discuss several potential directions for future research. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive introduction to the emerging open-world machine learning paradigm, to help researchers build more powerful AI systems in their respective fields, and to promote the development of artificial general intelligence.

We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.

Although LLMs are increasing the productivity of professional programmers, existing work shows that beginners struggle to prompt LLMs to solve text-to-code tasks. Why is this the case? This paper explores two competing hypotheses about the cause of student-LLM miscommunication: (1) students simply lack the technical vocabulary needed to write good prompts, and (2) students do not understand the extent of information that LLMs need to solve code generation tasks. We study (1) with a causal intervention experiment on technical vocabulary and (2) by analyzing graphs that abstract how students edit prompts and the different failures that they encounter. We find that substance beats style: a poor grasp of technical vocabulary is merely correlated with prompt failure; that the information content of prompts predicts success; that students get stuck making trivial edits; and more. Our findings have implications for the use of LLMs in programming education, and for efforts to make computing more accessible with LLMs.

Many current NLP systems are built from language models trained to optimize unsupervised objectives on large amounts of raw text. Under what conditions might such a procedure acquire meaning? Our systematic experiments with synthetic data reveal that, with languages where all expressions have context-independent denotations (i.e., languages with strong transparency), both autoregressive and masked language models successfully learn to emulate semantic relations between expressions. However, when denotations are changed to be context-dependent with the language otherwise unmodified, this ability degrades. Turning to natural language, our experiments with a specific phenomenon -- referential opacity -- add to the growing body of evidence that current language models do not represent natural language semantics well. We show this failure relates to the context-dependent nature of natural language form-meaning mappings.

Assessing the quality of Large Language Model (LLM) outputs presents a critical challenge. Previous methods either rely on text-level information (e.g., reward models, majority voting), which can overfit to superficial cues, or on calibrated confidence from token probabilities, which would fail on less-calibrated models. Yet both of these signals are, in fact, partial projections of a richer source of information: the model's internal hidden states. Early layers, closer to token embeddings, preserve semantic and lexical features that underpin text-based judgments, while later layers increasingly align with output logits, embedding confidence-related information. This paper explores hidden states directly as a unified foundation for verification. We show that the correctness of a solution is encoded as a geometrically separable signature within the trajectory of hidden activations. To validate this, we present Clue (Clustering and Experience-based Verification), a deliberately minimalist, non-parametric verifier. With no trainable parameters, CLUE only summarizes each reasoning trace by an hidden state delta and classifies correctness via nearest-centroid distance to ``success'' and ``failure'' clusters formed from past experience. The simplicity of this method highlights the strength of the underlying signal. Empirically, CLUE consistently outperforms LLM-as-a-judge baselines and matches or exceeds modern confidence-based methods in reranking candidates, improving both top-1 and majority-vote accuracy across AIME 24/25 and GPQA. As a highlight, on AIME 24 with a 1.5B model, CLUE boosts accuracy from 56.7% (majority@64) to 70.0% (top-maj@16).

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.