func
string | target
string | cwe
list | project
string | commit_id
string | hash
string | size
int64 | message
string | vul
int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TEST(IndexBoundsBuilderTest, TranslateEqualityToStringWithMockCollator) {
CollatorInterfaceMock collator(CollatorInterfaceMock::MockType::kReverseString);
auto testIndex = buildSimpleIndexEntry();
testIndex.collator = &collator;
BSONObj obj = BSON("a"
<< "foo");
auto expr = parseMatchExpression(obj);
BSONElement elt = obj.firstElement();
OrderedIntervalList oil;
IndexBoundsBuilder::BoundsTightness tightness;
IndexBoundsBuilder::translate(expr.get(), elt, testIndex, &oil, &tightness);
ASSERT_EQUALS(oil.name, "a");
ASSERT_EQUALS(oil.intervals.size(), 1U);
ASSERT_EQUALS(
Interval::INTERVAL_EQUALS,
oil.intervals[0].compare(Interval(fromjson("{'': 'oof', '': 'oof'}"), true, true)));
ASSERT_EQUALS(tightness, IndexBoundsBuilder::EXACT);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-754"
] |
mongo
|
f8f55e1825ee5c7bdb3208fc7c5b54321d172732
|
1.5390831921003002e+38
| 21 |
SERVER-44377 generate correct plan for indexed inequalities to null
| 0 |
struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ovl_entry *oe;
struct dentry *upperdir;
struct dentry *lowerdir;
struct dentry *upperdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *lowerdentry = NULL;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
int err;
err = -ENOMEM;
oe = ovl_alloc_entry();
if (!oe)
goto out;
upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
lowerdir = ovl_dentry_lower(dentry->d_parent);
if (upperdir) {
upperdentry = ovl_lookup_real(upperdir, &dentry->d_name);
err = PTR_ERR(upperdentry);
if (IS_ERR(upperdentry))
goto out_put_dir;
if (lowerdir && upperdentry) {
if (ovl_is_whiteout(upperdentry)) {
dput(upperdentry);
upperdentry = NULL;
oe->opaque = true;
} else if (ovl_is_opaquedir(upperdentry)) {
oe->opaque = true;
}
}
}
if (lowerdir && !oe->opaque) {
lowerdentry = ovl_lookup_real(lowerdir, &dentry->d_name);
err = PTR_ERR(lowerdentry);
if (IS_ERR(lowerdentry))
goto out_dput_upper;
}
if (lowerdentry && upperdentry &&
(!S_ISDIR(upperdentry->d_inode->i_mode) ||
!S_ISDIR(lowerdentry->d_inode->i_mode))) {
dput(lowerdentry);
lowerdentry = NULL;
oe->opaque = true;
}
if (lowerdentry || upperdentry) {
struct dentry *realdentry;
realdentry = upperdentry ? upperdentry : lowerdentry;
err = -ENOMEM;
inode = ovl_new_inode(dentry->d_sb, realdentry->d_inode->i_mode,
oe);
if (!inode)
goto out_dput;
ovl_copyattr(realdentry->d_inode, inode);
}
oe->__upperdentry = upperdentry;
oe->lowerdentry = lowerdentry;
dentry->d_fsdata = oe;
d_add(dentry, inode);
return NULL;
out_dput:
dput(lowerdentry);
out_dput_upper:
dput(upperdentry);
out_put_dir:
kfree(oe);
out:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121
|
4.148977435386449e+37
| 79 |
fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
| 0 |
explicit FormatError(CStringRef message)
: std::runtime_error(message.c_str()) {}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-134",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fmt
|
8cf30aa2be256eba07bb1cefb998c52326e846e7
|
5.856371676392378e+37
| 2 |
Fix segfault on complex pointer formatting (#642)
| 0 |
GF_Err gmin_box_size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_VideoMediaHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_VideoMediaHeaderBox *)s;
ptr->size += 12;
return GF_OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
gpac
|
6170024568f4dda310e98ef7508477b425c58d09
|
2.4286549460872466e+38
| 6 |
fixed potential crash - cf #1263
| 0 |
vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx,
Vmxnet3PktStatus status)
{
size_t tot_len = net_tx_pkt_get_total_len(s->tx_pkt);
struct UPT1_TxStats *stats = &s->txq_descr[qidx].txq_stats;
switch (status) {
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK:
switch (net_tx_pkt_get_packet_type(s->tx_pkt)) {
case ETH_PKT_BCAST:
stats->bcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->bcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_MCAST:
stats->mcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->mcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_UCAST:
stats->ucastPktsTxOK++;
stats->ucastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (s->offload_mode == VMXNET3_OM_TSO) {
/*
* According to VMWARE headers this statistic is a number
* of packets after segmentation but since we don't have
* this information in QEMU model, the best we can do is to
* provide number of non-segmented packets
*/
stats->TSOPktsTxOK++;
stats->TSOBytesTxOK += tot_len;
}
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_DISCARD:
stats->pktsTxDiscard++;
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR:
stats->pktsTxError++;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
qemu
|
6c352ca9b4ee3e1e286ea9e8434bd8e69ac7d0d8
|
7.99849576768915e+37
| 49 |
net: vmxnet3: check for device_active before write
Vmxnet3 device emulator does not check if the device is active,
before using it for write. It leads to a use after free issue,
if the vmxnet3_io_bar0_write routine is called after the device is
deactivated. Add check to avoid it.
Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
| 0 |
DIR *dd_init_next_file(struct dump_dir *dd)
{
// if (!dd->locked)
// error_msg_and_die("dump_dir is not opened"); /* bug */
int opendir_fd = dup(dd->dd_fd);
if (opendir_fd < 0)
{
perror_msg("dd_init_next_file: dup(dd_fd)");
return NULL;
}
if (dd->next_dir)
closedir(dd->next_dir);
dd->next_dir = fdopendir(opendir_fd);
if (!dd->next_dir)
{
error_msg("Can't open directory '%s'", dd->dd_dirname);
}
return dd->next_dir;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libreport
|
1951e7282043dfe1268d492aea056b554baedb75
|
1.3931824274085878e+38
| 22 |
lib: fix races in dump directory handling code
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>:
dd_opendir() should keep a file handle (opened with O_DIRECTORY) and
use openat() and similar functions to access files in it.
...
The file system manipulation functions should guard against hard
links (check that link count is <= 1, just as in the user coredump
code in abrt-hook-ccpp), possibly after opening the file
with O_PATH first to avoid side effects on open/close.
Related: #1214745
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
| 0 |
ref_param_read_signal_error(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, int code)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc;
ref_param_read(iplist, pkey, &loc, -1); /* can't fail */
*loc.presult = code;
switch (ref_param_read_get_policy(plist, pkey)) {
case gs_param_policy_ignore:
return 0;
case gs_param_policy_consult_user:
return_error(gs_error_configurationerror);
default:
return code;
}
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
ghostpdl
|
c3476dde7743761a4e1d39a631716199b696b880
|
1.6867390336015571e+38
| 16 |
Bug 699656: Handle LockDistillerParams not being a boolean
This caused a function call commented as "Can't fail" to fail, and resulted
in memory correuption and a segfault.
| 1 |
void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm)
{
kvm_free_all_assigned_devices(kvm);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux-2.6
|
59839dfff5eabca01cc4e20b45797a60a80af8cb
|
1.673435382710701e+38
| 4 |
KVM: x86: check for cr3 validity in ioctl_set_sregs
Matt T. Yourst notes that kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs lacks validity
checking for the new cr3 value:
"Userspace callers of KVM_SET_SREGS can pass a bogus value of cr3 to
the kernel. This will trigger a NULL pointer access in gfn_to_rmap()
when userspace next tries to call KVM_RUN on the affected VCPU and kvm
attempts to activate the new non-existent page table root.
This happens since kvm only validates that cr3 points to a valid guest
physical memory page when code *inside* the guest sets cr3. However, kvm
currently trusts the userspace caller (e.g. QEMU) on the host machine to
always supply a valid page table root, rather than properly validating
it along with the rest of the reloaded guest state."
http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail&atid=893831&aid=2687641&group_id=180599
Check for a valid cr3 address in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs, triple
fault in case of failure.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static uint get_decimal_precision(uint len, uint8 dec, bool unsigned_val)
{
uint precision= my_decimal_length_to_precision(len, dec, unsigned_val);
return MY_MIN(precision, DECIMAL_MAX_PRECISION);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
|
1.8510351165682454e+38
| 5 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <serg@mariadb.org>
| 0 |
ZEND_VM_HANDLER(75, ZEND_UNSET_DIM, VAR|CV, CONST|TMPVAR|CV)
{
USE_OPLINE
zend_free_op free_op1, free_op2;
zval *container;
zval *offset;
zend_ulong hval;
zend_string *key;
SAVE_OPLINE();
container = GET_OP1_OBJ_ZVAL_PTR_PTR_UNDEF(BP_VAR_UNSET);
offset = GET_OP2_ZVAL_PTR_UNDEF(BP_VAR_R);
do {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(container) == IS_ARRAY)) {
HashTable *ht;
ZEND_VM_C_LABEL(unset_dim_array):
SEPARATE_ARRAY(container);
ht = Z_ARRVAL_P(container);
ZEND_VM_C_LABEL(offset_again):
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_STRING)) {
key = Z_STR_P(offset);
if (OP2_TYPE != IS_CONST) {
if (ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(key, hval)) {
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(num_index_dim);
}
}
ZEND_VM_C_LABEL(str_index_dim):
if (ht == &EG(symbol_table)) {
zend_delete_global_variable(key);
} else {
zend_hash_del(ht, key);
}
} else if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_LONG)) {
hval = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
ZEND_VM_C_LABEL(num_index_dim):
zend_hash_index_del(ht, hval);
} else if ((OP2_TYPE & (IS_VAR|IS_CV)) && EXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_REFERENCE)) {
offset = Z_REFVAL_P(offset);
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(offset_again);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_DOUBLE) {
hval = zend_dval_to_lval(Z_DVAL_P(offset));
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(num_index_dim);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_NULL) {
key = ZSTR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(str_index_dim);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_FALSE) {
hval = 0;
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(num_index_dim);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_TRUE) {
hval = 1;
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(num_index_dim);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_RESOURCE) {
hval = Z_RES_HANDLE_P(offset);
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(num_index_dim);
} else if (OP2_TYPE == IS_CV && Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_UNDEF) {
ZVAL_UNDEFINED_OP2();
key = ZSTR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(str_index_dim);
} else {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type in unset");
}
break;
} else if (Z_ISREF_P(container)) {
container = Z_REFVAL_P(container);
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(container) == IS_ARRAY)) {
ZEND_VM_C_GOTO(unset_dim_array);
}
}
if (OP1_TYPE == IS_CV && UNEXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(container) == IS_UNDEF)) {
container = ZVAL_UNDEFINED_OP1();
}
if (OP2_TYPE == IS_CV && UNEXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(offset) == IS_UNDEF)) {
offset = ZVAL_UNDEFINED_OP2();
}
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(container) == IS_OBJECT)) {
if (OP2_TYPE == IS_CONST && Z_EXTRA_P(offset) == ZEND_EXTRA_VALUE) {
offset++;
}
Z_OBJ_HT_P(container)->unset_dimension(container, offset);
} else if (OP1_TYPE != IS_UNUSED && UNEXPECTED(Z_TYPE_P(container) == IS_STRING)) {
zend_throw_error(NULL, "Cannot unset string offsets");
}
} while (0);
FREE_OP2();
FREE_OP1_VAR_PTR();
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE_CHECK_EXCEPTION();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
php-src
|
f1ce8d5f5839cb2069ea37ff424fb96b8cd6932d
|
2.1774566225427334e+38
| 90 |
Fix #73122: Integer Overflow when concatenating strings
We must avoid integer overflows in memory allocations, so we introduce
an additional check in the VM, and bail out in the rare case of an
overflow. Since the recent fix for bug #74960 still doesn't catch all
possible overflows, we fix that right away.
| 0 |
static int mt_process_slot(struct mt_device *td, struct input_dev *input,
struct mt_application *app,
struct mt_usages *slot)
{
struct input_mt *mt = input->mt;
__s32 quirks = app->quirks;
bool valid = true;
bool confidence_state = true;
bool inrange_state = false;
int active;
int slotnum;
int tool = MT_TOOL_FINGER;
if (!slot)
return -EINVAL;
if ((quirks & MT_QUIRK_CONTACT_CNT_ACCURATE) &&
app->num_received >= app->num_expected)
return -EAGAIN;
if (!(quirks & MT_QUIRK_ALWAYS_VALID)) {
if (quirks & MT_QUIRK_VALID_IS_INRANGE)
valid = *slot->inrange_state;
if (quirks & MT_QUIRK_NOT_SEEN_MEANS_UP)
valid = *slot->tip_state;
if (quirks & MT_QUIRK_VALID_IS_CONFIDENCE)
valid = *slot->confidence_state;
if (!valid)
return 0;
}
slotnum = mt_compute_slot(td, app, slot, input);
if (slotnum < 0 || slotnum >= td->maxcontacts)
return 0;
if ((quirks & MT_QUIRK_IGNORE_DUPLICATES) && mt) {
struct input_mt_slot *i_slot = &mt->slots[slotnum];
if (input_mt_is_active(i_slot) &&
input_mt_is_used(mt, i_slot))
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (quirks & MT_QUIRK_CONFIDENCE)
confidence_state = *slot->confidence_state;
if (quirks & MT_QUIRK_HOVERING)
inrange_state = *slot->inrange_state;
active = *slot->tip_state || inrange_state;
if (app->application == HID_GD_SYSTEM_MULTIAXIS)
tool = MT_TOOL_DIAL;
else if (unlikely(!confidence_state)) {
tool = MT_TOOL_PALM;
if (!active && mt &&
input_mt_is_active(&mt->slots[slotnum])) {
/*
* The non-confidence was reported for
* previously valid contact that is also no
* longer valid. We can't simply report
* lift-off as userspace will not be aware
* of non-confidence, so we need to split
* it into 2 events: active MT_TOOL_PALM
* and a separate liftoff.
*/
active = true;
set_bit(slotnum, app->pending_palm_slots);
}
}
input_mt_slot(input, slotnum);
input_mt_report_slot_state(input, tool, active);
if (active) {
/* this finger is in proximity of the sensor */
int wide = (*slot->w > *slot->h);
int major = max(*slot->w, *slot->h);
int minor = min(*slot->w, *slot->h);
int orientation = wide;
int max_azimuth;
int azimuth;
if (slot->a != DEFAULT_ZERO) {
/*
* Azimuth is counter-clockwise and ranges from [0, MAX)
* (a full revolution). Convert it to clockwise ranging
* [-MAX/2, MAX/2].
*
* Note that ABS_MT_ORIENTATION require us to report
* the limit of [-MAX/4, MAX/4], but the value can go
* out of range to [-MAX/2, MAX/2] to report an upside
* down ellipsis.
*/
azimuth = *slot->a;
max_azimuth = input_abs_get_max(input,
ABS_MT_ORIENTATION);
if (azimuth > max_azimuth * 2)
azimuth -= max_azimuth * 4;
orientation = -azimuth;
}
if (quirks & MT_QUIRK_TOUCH_SIZE_SCALING) {
/*
* divided by two to match visual scale of touch
* for devices with this quirk
*/
major = major >> 1;
minor = minor >> 1;
}
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_POSITION_X, *slot->x);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_POSITION_Y, *slot->y);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_TOOL_X, *slot->cx);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_TOOL_Y, *slot->cy);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_DISTANCE, !*slot->tip_state);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_ORIENTATION, orientation);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_PRESSURE, *slot->p);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MAJOR, major);
input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MINOR, minor);
set_bit(MT_IO_FLAGS_ACTIVE_SLOTS, &td->mt_io_flags);
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
35556bed836f8dc07ac55f69c8d17dce3e7f0e25
|
2.3154462929050986e+38
| 126 |
HID: core: Sanitize event code and type when mapping input
When calling into hid_map_usage(), the passed event code is
blindly stored as is, even if it doesn't fit in the associated bitmap.
This event code can come from a variety of sources, including devices
masquerading as input devices, only a bit more "programmable".
Instead of taking the event code at face value, check that it actually
fits the corresponding bitmap, and if it doesn't:
- spit out a warning so that we know which device is acting up
- NULLify the bitmap pointer so that we catch unexpected uses
Code paths that can make use of untrusted inputs can now check
that the mapping was indeed correct and bail out if not.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@gmail.com>
| 0 |
pdf14_end_transparency_group(gx_device *dev,
gs_gstate *pgs)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
int code;
pdf14_parent_color_t *parent_color;
cmm_profile_t *group_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &group_profile,
&render_cond);
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_end_transparency_group\n");
code = pdf14_pop_transparency_group(pgs, pdev->ctx, pdev->blend_procs,
pdev->color_info.num_components, group_profile,
(gx_device *) pdev);
#ifdef DEBUG
pdf14_debug_mask_stack_state(pdev->ctx);
#endif
/* May need to reset some color stuff related
* to a mismatch between the parents color space
* and the group blending space */
parent_color = pdev->ctx->stack->parent_color_info_procs;
if (!(parent_color->parent_color_mapping_procs == NULL &&
parent_color->parent_color_comp_index == NULL)) {
pgs->get_cmap_procs = parent_color->get_cmap_procs;
gx_set_cmap_procs(pgs, dev);
pdev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs =
parent_color->parent_color_mapping_procs;
pdev->procs.get_color_comp_index =
parent_color->parent_color_comp_index;
pdev->color_info.polarity = parent_color->polarity;
pdev->color_info.num_components = parent_color->num_components;
pdev->blend_procs = parent_color->parent_blending_procs;
pdev->ctx->additive = parent_color->isadditive;
pdev->pdf14_procs = parent_color->unpack_procs;
pdev->color_info.depth = parent_color->depth;
pdev->color_info.max_color = parent_color->max_color;
pdev->color_info.max_gray = parent_color->max_gray;
memcpy(&(pdev->color_info.comp_bits),&(parent_color->comp_bits),
GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
memcpy(&(pdev->color_info.comp_shift),&(parent_color->comp_shift),
GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
parent_color->get_cmap_procs = NULL;
parent_color->parent_color_comp_index = NULL;
parent_color->parent_color_mapping_procs = NULL;
if (parent_color->icc_profile != NULL) {
/* make sure to decrement the device profile. If it was allocated
with the push then it will be freed. */
rc_decrement(group_profile,"pdf14_end_transparency_group");
dev->icc_struct->device_profile[0] = parent_color->icc_profile;
rc_decrement(parent_color->icc_profile,"pdf14_end_transparency_group");
parent_color->icc_profile = NULL;
}
}
return code;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
ghostpdl
|
90fd0c7ca3efc1ddff64a86f4104b13b3ac969eb
|
1.6522456642873473e+38
| 60 |
Bug 697456. Dont create new ctx when pdf14 device reenabled
This bug had yet another weird case where the user created a
file that pushed the pdf14 device twice. We were in that case,
creating a new ctx and blowing away the original one with out
proper clean up. To avoid, only create a new one when we need it.
| 0 |
read_16 (IOBUF inp)
{
unsigned short a;
a = (unsigned short)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
return a;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
gnupg
|
2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392
|
1.0863539951921465e+38
| 7 |
Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
| 0 |
char_superscript(struct buf *ob, struct sd_markdown *rndr, uint8_t *data, size_t offset, size_t size)
{
size_t sup_start, sup_len;
struct buf *sup;
if (!rndr->cb.superscript)
return 0;
if (size < 2)
return 0;
if (data[1] == '(') {
sup_start = sup_len = 2;
while (sup_len < size && data[sup_len] != ')' && data[sup_len - 1] != '\\')
sup_len++;
if (sup_len == size)
return 0;
} else {
sup_start = sup_len = 1;
while (sup_len < size && !_isspace(data[sup_len]))
sup_len++;
}
if (sup_len - sup_start == 0)
return (sup_start == 2) ? 3 : 0;
sup = rndr_newbuf(rndr, BUFFER_SPAN);
parse_inline(sup, rndr, data + sup_start, sup_len - sup_start);
rndr->cb.superscript(ob, sup, rndr->opaque);
rndr_popbuf(rndr, BUFFER_SPAN);
return (sup_start == 2) ? sup_len + 1 : sup_len;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
redcarpet
|
e5a10516d07114d582d13b9125b733008c61c242
|
5.665664270312272e+37
| 36 |
Avoid rewinding previous inline when auto-linking
When a bit like "_foo_1@bar.com" is processed, first the emphasis is
rendered, then the 1 is output verbatim. When the `@` is encountered,
Redcarpet tries to find the "local part" of the address and stops when
it encounters an invalid char (i.e. here the `!`).
The problem is that when it searches for the local part, Redcarpet
rewinds the characters but here, the emphasis is already rendered so
the previous HTML tag is rewinded as well and is not correctly closed.
| 0 |
static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
return;
}
__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467
|
3.746645751519591e+37
| 12 |
bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| 0 |
vhost_crypto_finalize_one_request(struct rte_crypto_op *op,
struct vhost_virtqueue *old_vq)
{
struct rte_mbuf *m_src = op->sym->m_src;
struct rte_mbuf *m_dst = op->sym->m_dst;
struct vhost_crypto_data_req *vc_req = rte_mbuf_to_priv(m_src);
uint16_t desc_idx;
if (unlikely(!vc_req)) {
VC_LOG_ERR("Failed to retrieve vc_req");
return NULL;
}
if (old_vq && (vc_req->vq != old_vq))
return vc_req->vq;
desc_idx = vc_req->desc_idx;
if (unlikely(op->status != RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_SUCCESS))
vc_req->inhdr->status = VIRTIO_CRYPTO_ERR;
else {
if (vc_req->zero_copy == 0)
write_back_data(vc_req);
}
vc_req->vq->used->ring[desc_idx].id = desc_idx;
vc_req->vq->used->ring[desc_idx].len = vc_req->len;
rte_mempool_put(m_src->pool, (void *)m_src);
if (m_dst)
rte_mempool_put(m_dst->pool, (void *)m_dst);
return vc_req->vq;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
dpdk
|
acd4c92fa693bbea695f2bb42bb93fb8567c3ca5
|
2.216724769047399e+38
| 35 |
vhost/crypto: validate keys lengths
transform_cipher_param() and transform_chain_param() handle
the payload data for the VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_CREATE_SESS
message. These payloads have to be validated, since it
could come from untrusted sources.
Two buffers and their lengths are defined in this payload,
one the the auth key and one for the cipher key. But above
functions do not validate the key length inputs, which could
lead to read out of bounds, as buffers have static sizes of
64 bytes for the cipher key and 512 bytes for the auth key.
This patch adds necessary checks on the key length field
before being used.
CVE-2020-10724
Fixes: e80a98708166 ("vhost/crypto: add session message handler")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaolong Ye <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
| 0 |
MONGO_EXPORT void mongo_init_sockets( void ) {
mongo_env_sock_init();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
mongo-c-driver-legacy
|
1a1f5e26a4309480d88598913f9eebf9e9cba8ca
|
6.972739440925013e+36
| 3 |
don't mix up int and size_t (first pass to fix that)
| 0 |
void visit(Repetition &ope) override {
if (ope.max_ == std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max()) {
HasEmptyElement vis(refs_);
ope.ope_->accept(vis);
if (vis.is_empty) {
has_error = true;
error_s = vis.error_s;
error_name = vis.error_name;
}
} else {
ope.ope_->accept(*this);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
|
2.359891652148546e+38
| 13 |
Fix #122
| 0 |
static VALUE mString_Extend_json_create(VALUE self, VALUE o)
{
VALUE ary;
Check_Type(o, T_HASH);
ary = rb_hash_aref(o, rb_str_new2("raw"));
return rb_funcall(ary, i_pack, 1, rb_str_new2("C*"));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
json
|
8f782fd8e181d9cfe9387ded43a5ca9692266b85
|
2.1316429788548147e+38
| 7 |
Fix arbitrary heap exposure problem
| 0 |
Perl_same_dirent(pTHX_ const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *fa = strrchr(a,'/');
char *fb = strrchr(b,'/');
Stat_t tmpstatbuf1;
Stat_t tmpstatbuf2;
SV * const tmpsv = sv_newmortal();
PERL_ARGS_ASSERT_SAME_DIRENT;
if (fa)
fa++;
else
fa = a;
if (fb)
fb++;
else
fb = b;
if (strNE(a,b))
return FALSE;
if (fa == a)
sv_setpvs(tmpsv, ".");
else
sv_setpvn(tmpsv, a, fa - a);
if (PerlLIO_stat(SvPVX_const(tmpsv), &tmpstatbuf1) < 0)
return FALSE;
if (fb == b)
sv_setpvs(tmpsv, ".");
else
sv_setpvn(tmpsv, b, fb - b);
if (PerlLIO_stat(SvPVX_const(tmpsv), &tmpstatbuf2) < 0)
return FALSE;
return tmpstatbuf1.st_dev == tmpstatbuf2.st_dev &&
tmpstatbuf1.st_ino == tmpstatbuf2.st_ino;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
perl5
|
34716e2a6ee2af96078d62b065b7785c001194be
|
2.1654834301685256e+38
| 35 |
Perl_my_setenv(); handle integer wrap
RT #133204
Wean this function off int/I32 and onto UV/Size_t.
Also, replace all malloc-ish calls with a wrapper that does
overflow checks,
In particular, it was doing (nlen + vlen + 2) which could wrap when
the combined length of the environment variable name and value
exceeded around 0x7fffffff.
The wrapper check function is probably overkill, but belt and braces...
NB this function has several variant parts, #ifdef'ed by platform
type; I have blindly changed the parts that aren't compiled under linux.
| 0 |
void GraphConstructor::RemapNodeDefInputs(
NodeDef* node_def, std::vector<bool>* input_already_exists) {
DCHECK_EQ(input_already_exists->size(), node_def->input_size());
std::set<TensorId> control_inputs;
std::vector<int> inputs_to_remove;
for (int i = 0; i < node_def->input_size(); ++i) {
auto iter = opts_.input_map.find(ParseTensorName(node_def->input(i)));
if (iter == opts_.input_map.end()) continue;
used_input_map_keys_.insert(iter->first);
TensorId new_input = iter->second;
if (new_input.second == Graph::kControlSlot) {
// Check if we've already remapped a different input to new_input, and if
// so remove this input.
if (control_inputs.count(new_input) > 0) {
inputs_to_remove.push_back(i);
continue;
}
control_inputs.insert(new_input);
}
node_def->set_input(i, new_input.ToString());
(*input_already_exists)[i] = true;
}
if (!inputs_to_remove.empty()) {
RemoveInputs(inputs_to_remove, node_def, input_already_exists);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-369",
"CWE-908"
] |
tensorflow
|
0cc38aaa4064fd9e79101994ce9872c6d91f816b
|
1.6518807723445805e+38
| 28 |
Prevent unitialized memory access in `GraphConstructor::MakeEdge`
The `MakeEdge` implementation assumes that there exists an output at `output_index` of `src` node and an input at `input_index` of `dst` node. However, if this is not the case this results in accessing data out of bounds. Because we are accessing an array that is a private member of a class and only in read only mode, this usually results only in unitialized memory access. However, it is reasonable to think that malicious users could manipulate these indexes to actually read data outside the class, thus resulting in information leakage and further exploits.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 346343288
Change-Id: I2127da27c2023d27f26efd39afa6c853385cab6f
| 0 |
static int on_ppp_if_down(struct tunnel *tunnel)
{
log_info("Setting ppp interface down.\n");
if (tunnel->config->set_routes) {
log_info("Restoring routes...\n");
ipv4_restore_routes(tunnel);
}
if (tunnel->config->set_dns) {
log_info("Removing VPN nameservers...\n");
ipv4_del_nameservers_from_resolv_conf(tunnel);
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-295"
] |
openfortivpn
|
60660e00b80bad0fadcf39aee86f6f8756c94f91
|
2.1887722788351492e+38
| 16 |
correctly check return value of X509_check_host
CVE-2020-7041 incorrect use of X509_check_host (regarding return value)
is fixed with this commit.
The flaw came in with #242 and prevented proper host name verification
when openssl >= 1.0.2 was in use since openfortivpn 1.7.0.
| 0 |
int dev_change_net_namespace(struct net_device *dev, struct net *net, const char *pat)
{
int err;
ASSERT_RTNL();
/* Don't allow namespace local devices to be moved. */
err = -EINVAL;
if (dev->features & NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL)
goto out;
/* Ensure the device has been registrered */
if (dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
goto out;
/* Get out if there is nothing todo */
err = 0;
if (net_eq(dev_net(dev), net))
goto out;
/* Pick the destination device name, and ensure
* we can use it in the destination network namespace.
*/
err = -EEXIST;
if (__dev_get_by_name(net, dev->name)) {
/* We get here if we can't use the current device name */
if (!pat)
goto out;
if (dev_get_valid_name(net, dev, pat) < 0)
goto out;
}
/*
* And now a mini version of register_netdevice unregister_netdevice.
*/
/* If device is running close it first. */
dev_close(dev);
/* And unlink it from device chain */
err = -ENODEV;
unlist_netdevice(dev);
synchronize_net();
/* Shutdown queueing discipline. */
dev_shutdown(dev);
/* Notify protocols, that we are about to destroy
this device. They should clean all the things.
Note that dev->reg_state stays at NETREG_REGISTERED.
This is wanted because this way 8021q and macvlan know
the device is just moving and can keep their slaves up.
*/
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, dev);
rcu_barrier();
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER_FINAL, dev);
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_DELLINK, dev, ~0U, GFP_KERNEL);
/*
* Flush the unicast and multicast chains
*/
dev_uc_flush(dev);
dev_mc_flush(dev);
/* Send a netdev-removed uevent to the old namespace */
kobject_uevent(&dev->dev.kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
/* Actually switch the network namespace */
dev_net_set(dev, net);
/* If there is an ifindex conflict assign a new one */
if (__dev_get_by_index(net, dev->ifindex)) {
int iflink = (dev->iflink == dev->ifindex);
dev->ifindex = dev_new_index(net);
if (iflink)
dev->iflink = dev->ifindex;
}
/* Send a netdev-add uevent to the new namespace */
kobject_uevent(&dev->dev.kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
/* Fixup kobjects */
err = device_rename(&dev->dev, dev->name);
WARN_ON(err);
/* Add the device back in the hashes */
list_netdevice(dev);
/* Notify protocols, that a new device appeared. */
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_REGISTER, dev);
/*
* Prevent userspace races by waiting until the network
* device is fully setup before sending notifications.
*/
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, ~0U, GFP_KERNEL);
synchronize_net();
err = 0;
out:
return err;
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
7bced397510ab569d31de4c70b39e13355046387
|
7.101645303267323e+37
| 104 |
net_dma: simple removal
Per commit "77873803363c net_dma: mark broken" net_dma is no longer used
and there is no plan to fix it.
This is the mechanical removal of bits in CONFIG_NET_DMA ifdef guards.
Reverting the remainder of the net_dma induced changes is deferred to
subsequent patches.
Marked for stable due to Roman's report of a memory leak in
dma_pin_iovec_pages():
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/3/177
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Cc: David Whipple <whipple@securedatainnovations.ch>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
| 0 |
int ext4_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
handle_t *handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
int ret = 0, started = 0;
unsigned max_blocks = bh_result->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
int dio_credits;
if (create && !handle) {
/* Direct IO write... */
if (max_blocks > DIO_MAX_BLOCKS)
max_blocks = DIO_MAX_BLOCKS;
dio_credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, dio_credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
started = 1;
}
ret = ext4_get_blocks(handle, inode, iblock, max_blocks, bh_result,
create ? EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE : 0);
if (ret > 0) {
bh_result->b_size = (ret << inode->i_blkbits);
ret = 0;
}
if (started)
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
3.3021599461748345e+38
| 32 |
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
| 0 |
static int send_msg(int sd, char *msg)
{
int n = 0;
int l;
if (!msg) {
err:
ERR(EINVAL, "Missing argument to send_msg()");
return 1;
}
l = strlen(msg);
if (l <= 0)
goto err;
while (n < l) {
int result = send(sd, msg + n, l, 0);
if (result < 0) {
ERR(errno, "Failed sending message to client");
return 1;
}
n += result;
}
DBG("Sent: %s%s", is_cont(msg) ? "\n" : "", msg);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
uftpd
|
0fb2c031ce0ace07cc19cd2cb2143c4b5a63c9dd
|
2.1441057990273163e+38
| 30 |
FTP: Fix buffer overflow in PORT parser, reported by Aaron Esau
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
| 0 |
jas_stream_t *jas_stream_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
jas_stream_fileobj_t *obj;
int openflags;
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
/* Determine the correct flags to use for opening the file. */
if ((stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) &&
(stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE)) {
openflags = O_RDWR;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) {
openflags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE) {
openflags = O_WRONLY;
} else {
openflags = 0;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_APPEND) {
openflags |= O_APPEND;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
openflags |= O_BINARY;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_CREATE) {
openflags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC;
}
/* Allocate space for the underlying file stream object. */
if (!(obj = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_stream_fileobj_t)))) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
obj->fd = -1;
obj->flags = 0;
obj->pathname[0] = '\0';
stream->obj_ = (void *) obj;
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_fileops;
/* Open the underlying file. */
if ((obj->fd = open(filename, openflags, JAS_STREAM_PERMS)) < 0) {
// Free the underlying file object, since it will not otherwise
// be freed.
jas_free(obj);
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
return stream;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-415",
"CWE-190",
"CWE-369"
] |
jasper
|
634ce8e8a5accc0fa05dd2c20d42b4749d4b2735
|
3.1551591770726023e+38
| 62 |
Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
| 0 |
static int handle_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
u64 exit_qualification = vmcs_read64(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, exit_qualification);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
16175a796d061833aacfbd9672235f2d2725df65
|
2.0319555768501206e+38
| 8 |
KVM: VMX: Don't allow uninhibited access to EFER on i386
vmx_set_msr() does not allow i386 guests to touch EFER, but they can still
do so through the default: label in the switch. If they set EFER_LME, they
can oops the host.
Fix by having EFER access through the normal channel (which will check for
EFER_LME) even on i386.
Reported-and-tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <bgilbert@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int handle_apic_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
u64 exit_qualification;
enum emulation_result er;
unsigned long offset;
exit_qualification = vmcs_read64(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
offset = exit_qualification & 0xffful;
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu, kvm_run, 0, 0, 0);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"Fail to handle apic access vmexit! Offset is 0x%lx\n",
offset);
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
16175a796d061833aacfbd9672235f2d2725df65
|
2.757989679824596e+38
| 19 |
KVM: VMX: Don't allow uninhibited access to EFER on i386
vmx_set_msr() does not allow i386 guests to touch EFER, but they can still
do so through the default: label in the switch. If they set EFER_LME, they
can oops the host.
Fix by having EFER access through the normal channel (which will check for
EFER_LME) even on i386.
Reported-and-tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <bgilbert@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
void aes_crypt_ecb( aes_context *ctx,
int mode,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
int i;
unsigned long *RK, X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3;
#if defined(XYSSL_PADLOCK_C) && defined(XYSSL_HAVE_X86)
if( padlock_supports( PADLOCK_ACE ) )
{
if( padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
return;
}
#endif
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->rk == NULL)
return;
RK = ctx->rk;
GET_ULONG_LE( X0, input, 0 ); X0 ^= *RK++;
GET_ULONG_LE( X1, input, 4 ); X1 ^= *RK++;
GET_ULONG_LE( X2, input, 8 ); X2 ^= *RK++;
GET_ULONG_LE( X3, input, 12 ); X3 ^= *RK++;
if( mode == AES_DECRYPT )
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_RROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_RROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( RSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( RSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)RSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
else /* AES_ENCRYPT */
{
for( i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i-- )
{
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
AES_FROUND( X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 );
}
AES_FROUND( Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, X0, X1, X2, X3 );
X0 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X1 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y1 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X2 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y2 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
X3 = *RK++ ^ ( FSb[ ( Y3 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] << 8 ) ^
( FSb[ ( Y1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] << 16 ) ^
( ((unsigned int)FSb[ ( Y2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ]) << 24 );
}
PUT_ULONG_LE( X0, output, 0 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X1, output, 4 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X2, output, 8 );
PUT_ULONG_LE( X3, output, 12 );
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
ghostpdl
|
8e9ce5016db968b40e4ec255a3005f2786cce45f
|
1.5147919458681672e+38
| 92 |
Bug 699665 "memory corruption in aesdecode"
The specimen file calls aesdecode without specifying the key to be
used, though it does manage to do enough work with the PDF interpreter
routines to get access to aesdecode (which isn't normally available).
This causes us to read uninitialised memory, which can (and often does)
lead to a segmentation fault.
In this commit we set the key to NULL explicitly during intialisation
and then check it before we read it. If its NULL we just return.
It seems bizarre that we don't return error codes, we should probably
look into that at some point, but this prevents the code trying to
read uninitialised memory.
| 0 |
static int mov_read_sv3d(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int size, layout;
int32_t yaw, pitch, roll;
uint32_t l = 0, t = 0, r = 0, b = 0;
uint32_t tag, padding = 0;
enum AVSphericalProjection projection;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams - 1];
sc = st->priv_data;
if (atom.size < 8) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Empty spherical video box\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size <= 12 || size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('s','v','h','d')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing spherical video header\n");
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 4); /* version + flags */
avio_skip(pb, size - 12); /* metadata_source */
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('p','r','o','j')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing projection box\n");
return 0;
}
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('p','r','h','d')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing projection header box\n");
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 4); /* version + flags */
/* 16.16 fixed point */
yaw = avio_rb32(pb);
pitch = avio_rb32(pb);
roll = avio_rb32(pb);
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 4); /* version + flags */
switch (tag) {
case MKTAG('c','b','m','p'):
layout = avio_rb32(pb);
if (layout) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Unsupported cubemap layout %d\n", layout);
return 0;
}
projection = AV_SPHERICAL_CUBEMAP;
padding = avio_rb32(pb);
break;
case MKTAG('e','q','u','i'):
t = avio_rb32(pb);
b = avio_rb32(pb);
l = avio_rb32(pb);
r = avio_rb32(pb);
if (b >= UINT_MAX - t || r >= UINT_MAX - l) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid bounding rectangle coordinates "
"%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32"\n", l, t, r, b);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (l || t || r || b)
projection = AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR_TILE;
else
projection = AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR;
break;
default:
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown projection type\n");
return 0;
}
sc->spherical = av_spherical_alloc(&sc->spherical_size);
if (!sc->spherical)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->spherical->projection = projection;
sc->spherical->yaw = yaw;
sc->spherical->pitch = pitch;
sc->spherical->roll = roll;
sc->spherical->padding = padding;
sc->spherical->bound_left = l;
sc->spherical->bound_top = t;
sc->spherical->bound_right = r;
sc->spherical->bound_bottom = b;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-834"
] |
FFmpeg
|
9cb4eb772839c5e1de2855d126bf74ff16d13382
|
2.380060147138742e+38
| 118 |
avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
| 0 |
static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
char **rule = (char **)vrule;
*rule = NULL;
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return -EINVAL;
if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
return -EINVAL;
*rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux-2.6
|
ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f
|
2.262224040123226e+38
| 15 |
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| 0 |
TEST(FormatterTest, FormatIntLocale) {
ScopedMock<LocaleMock> mock;
lconv lc = lconv();
char sep[] = "--";
lc.thousands_sep = sep;
EXPECT_CALL(mock, localeconv()).Times(3).WillRepeatedly(testing::Return(&lc));
EXPECT_EQ("123", format("{:n}", 123));
EXPECT_EQ("1--234", format("{:n}", 1234));
EXPECT_EQ("1--234--567", format("{:n}", 1234567));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-134",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fmt
|
8cf30aa2be256eba07bb1cefb998c52326e846e7
|
3.958453080189265e+37
| 10 |
Fix segfault on complex pointer formatting (#642)
| 0 |
void MsgSetMSGoffs(msg_t *pMsg, short offs)
{
ISOBJ_TYPE_assert(pMsg, msg);
pMsg->offMSG = offs;
if(offs > pMsg->iLenRawMsg) {
assert(offs - 1 == pMsg->iLenRawMsg);
pMsg->iLenMSG = 0;
} else {
pMsg->iLenMSG = pMsg->iLenRawMsg - offs;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-772"
] |
rsyslog
|
8083bd1433449fd2b1b79bf759f782e0f64c0cd2
|
3.2003684484930748e+38
| 11 |
backporting abort condition fix from 5.7.7
| 0 |
static void yam_tx_byte(struct net_device *dev, struct yam_port *yp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char b, temp;
switch (yp->tx_state) {
case TX_OFF:
break;
case TX_HEAD:
if (--yp->tx_count <= 0) {
if (!(skb = skb_dequeue(&yp->send_queue))) {
ptt_off(dev);
yp->tx_state = TX_OFF;
break;
}
yp->tx_state = TX_DATA;
if (skb->data[0] != 0) {
/* do_kiss_params(s, skb->data, skb->len); */
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
break;
}
yp->tx_len = skb->len - 1; /* strip KISS byte */
if (yp->tx_len >= YAM_MAX_FRAME || yp->tx_len < 2) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
break;
}
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 1,
yp->tx_buf,
yp->tx_len);
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
yp->tx_count = 0;
yp->tx_crcl = 0x21;
yp->tx_crch = 0xf3;
yp->tx_state = TX_DATA;
}
break;
case TX_DATA:
b = yp->tx_buf[yp->tx_count++];
outb(b, THR(dev->base_addr));
temp = yp->tx_crcl;
yp->tx_crcl = chktabl[temp] ^ yp->tx_crch;
yp->tx_crch = chktabh[temp] ^ b;
if (yp->tx_count >= yp->tx_len) {
yp->tx_state = TX_CRC1;
}
break;
case TX_CRC1:
yp->tx_crch = chktabl[yp->tx_crcl] ^ yp->tx_crch;
yp->tx_crcl = chktabh[yp->tx_crcl] ^ chktabl[yp->tx_crch] ^ 0xff;
outb(yp->tx_crcl, THR(dev->base_addr));
yp->tx_state = TX_CRC2;
break;
case TX_CRC2:
outb(chktabh[yp->tx_crch] ^ 0xFF, THR(dev->base_addr));
if (skb_queue_empty(&yp->send_queue)) {
yp->tx_count = (yp->bitrate * yp->txtail) / 8000;
if (yp->dupmode == 2)
yp->tx_count += (yp->bitrate * yp->holdd) / 8;
if (yp->tx_count == 0)
yp->tx_count = 1;
yp->tx_state = TX_TAIL;
} else {
yp->tx_count = 1;
yp->tx_state = TX_HEAD;
}
++dev->stats.tx_packets;
break;
case TX_TAIL:
if (--yp->tx_count <= 0) {
yp->tx_state = TX_OFF;
ptt_off(dev);
}
break;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
8e3fbf870481eb53b2d3a322d1fc395ad8b367ed
|
3.0178044589037466e+38
| 75 |
hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static int snd_ctl_elem_read_user(struct snd_card *card,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value __user *_control)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control;
int result;
control = memdup_user(_control, sizeof(*control));
if (IS_ERR(control))
return PTR_ERR(control);
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
result = snd_ctl_elem_read(card, control);
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (result < 0)
goto error;
if (copy_to_user(_control, control, sizeof(*control)))
result = -EFAULT;
error:
kfree(control);
return result;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
6ab55ec0a938c7f943a4edba3d6514f775983887
|
2.303954845279247e+38
| 22 |
ALSA: control: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in get_ctl_id_hash()
Since the user can control the arguments provided to the kernel by the
ioctl() system call, an out-of-bounds bug occurs when the 'id->name'
provided by the user does not end with '\0'.
The following log can reveal it:
[ 10.002313] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.002895] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888109f5fe28 by task snd/439
[ 10.004934] Call Trace:
[ 10.007140] snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.007489] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x6cf/0x10e0
Fix this by checking the bound of 'id->name' in the loop.
Fixes: c27e1efb61c5 ("ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups")
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220824081654.3767739-1-zheyuma97@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
| 0 |
virtual void visit(const messages::result_message::schema_change& m) override {
auto change = m.get_change();
switch (change->type) {
case event::event_type::SCHEMA_CHANGE: {
auto sc = static_pointer_cast<event::schema_change>(change);
_response.write_int(0x0005);
_response.serialize(*sc, _version);
break;
}
default:
assert(0);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
scylladb
|
1c2eef384da439b0457b6d71c7e37d7268e471cb
|
2.724573749603575e+38
| 13 |
transport/server.cc: Return correct size of decompressed lz4 buffer
An incorrect size is returned from the function, which could lead to
crashes or undefined behavior. Fix by erroring out in these cases.
Fixes #11476
| 0 |
static void gs_charEvent(struct fvcontainer *fvc,void *event) {
struct gsd *gs = (struct gsd *) fvc;
FVChar(gs->fv,event);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fontforge
|
626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
|
4.18190536065929e+37
| 4 |
Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
| 0 |
struct trace_buffer *__ring_buffer_alloc(unsigned long size, unsigned flags,
struct lock_class_key *key)
{
struct trace_buffer *buffer;
long nr_pages;
int bsize;
int cpu;
int ret;
/* keep it in its own cache line */
buffer = kzalloc(ALIGN(sizeof(*buffer), cache_line_size()),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return NULL;
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&buffer->cpumask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto fail_free_buffer;
nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
buffer->flags = flags;
buffer->clock = trace_clock_local;
buffer->reader_lock_key = key;
init_irq_work(&buffer->irq_work.work, rb_wake_up_waiters);
init_waitqueue_head(&buffer->irq_work.waiters);
/* need at least two pages */
if (nr_pages < 2)
nr_pages = 2;
buffer->cpus = nr_cpu_ids;
bsize = sizeof(void *) * nr_cpu_ids;
buffer->buffers = kzalloc(ALIGN(bsize, cache_line_size()),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer->buffers)
goto fail_free_cpumask;
cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask);
buffer->buffers[cpu] = rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(buffer, nr_pages, cpu);
if (!buffer->buffers[cpu])
goto fail_free_buffers;
ret = cpuhp_state_add_instance(CPUHP_TRACE_RB_PREPARE, &buffer->node);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail_free_buffers;
mutex_init(&buffer->mutex);
return buffer;
fail_free_buffers:
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
if (buffer->buffers[cpu])
rb_free_cpu_buffer(buffer->buffers[cpu]);
}
kfree(buffer->buffers);
fail_free_cpumask:
free_cpumask_var(buffer->cpumask);
fail_free_buffer:
kfree(buffer);
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
bbeb97464eefc65f506084fd9f18f21653e01137
|
3.1355178314340832e+38
| 66 |
tracing: Fix race in trace_open and buffer resize call
Below race can come, if trace_open and resize of
cpu buffer is running parallely on different cpus
CPUX CPUY
ring_buffer_resize
atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled)
tracing_open
tracing_reset_online_cpus
ring_buffer_reset_cpu
rb_reset_cpu
rb_update_pages
remove/insert pages
resetting pointer
This race can cause data abort or some times infinte loop in
rb_remove_pages and rb_insert_pages while checking pages
for sanity.
Take buffer lock to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1601976833-24377-1-git-send-email-gkohli@codeaurora.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b23d7a5f4a07a ("ring-buffer: speed up buffer resets by avoiding synchronize_rcu for each CPU")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
| 0 |
static int pfkey_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct pfkey_sock *pfk = pfkey_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
goto out;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free;
sock_recv_cmsgs(msg, sk, skb);
err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied;
if (pfk->dump.dump != NULL &&
3 * atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
pfkey_do_dump(pfk);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
ba953a9d89a00c078b85f4b190bc1dde66fe16b5
|
5.553525137556928e+37
| 40 |
af_key: Do not call xfrm_probe_algs in parallel
When namespace support was added to xfrm/afkey, it caused the
previously single-threaded call to xfrm_probe_algs to become
multi-threaded. This is buggy and needs to be fixed with a mutex.
Reported-by: Abhishek Shah <abhishek.shah@columbia.edu>
Fixes: 283bc9f35bbb ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| 0 |
f_getcurpos(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
getpos_both(argvars, rettv, TRUE);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-78"
] |
vim
|
8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075
|
3.1398047689083006e+38
| 4 |
patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others.
| 0 |
str_equal (const char *a, const char *b, gboolean insensitive)
{
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return a == b;
return insensitive ? !g_ascii_strcasecmp (a, b) : !strcmp (a, b);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
gvfs
|
f81ff2108ab3b6e370f20dcadd8708d23f499184
|
9.030760744257874e+37
| 7 |
dav: don't unescape the uri twice
path_equal tries to unescape path before comparing. Unfortunately
this function is used also for already unescaped paths. Therefore
unescaping can fail. This commit reverts changes which was done in
commit 50af53d and unescape just uris, which aren't unescaped yet.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=743298
| 0 |
static int check_host (X509 *x509cert, const char *hostname, char *err, size_t errlen)
{
int i, rc = 0;
/* hostname in ASCII format: */
char *hostname_ascii = NULL;
/* needed to get the common name: */
X509_NAME *x509_subject;
char *buf = NULL;
int bufsize;
/* needed to get the DNS subjectAltNames: */
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *subj_alt_names;
int subj_alt_names_count;
GENERAL_NAME *subj_alt_name;
/* did we find a name matching hostname? */
int match_found;
/* Check if 'hostname' matches the one of the subjectAltName extensions of
* type DNS or the Common Name (CN). */
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIDN) || defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2)
if (idna_to_ascii_lz(hostname, &hostname_ascii, 0) != IDNA_SUCCESS)
{
hostname_ascii = safe_strdup(hostname);
}
#else
hostname_ascii = safe_strdup(hostname);
#endif
/* Try the DNS subjectAltNames. */
match_found = 0;
if ((subj_alt_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
NULL, NULL)))
{
subj_alt_names_count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(subj_alt_names);
for (i = 0; i < subj_alt_names_count; i++)
{
subj_alt_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(subj_alt_names, i);
if (subj_alt_name->type == GEN_DNS)
{
if (subj_alt_name->d.ia5->length >= 0 &&
mutt_strlen((char *)subj_alt_name->d.ia5->data) == (size_t)subj_alt_name->d.ia5->length &&
(match_found = hostname_match(hostname_ascii,
(char *)(subj_alt_name->d.ia5->data))))
{
break;
}
}
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free(subj_alt_names);
}
if (!match_found)
{
/* Try the common name */
if (!(x509_subject = X509_get_subject_name(x509cert)))
{
if (err && errlen)
strfcpy (err, _("cannot get certificate subject"), errlen);
goto out;
}
/* first get the space requirements */
bufsize = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(x509_subject, NID_commonName,
NULL, 0);
if (bufsize == -1)
{
if (err && errlen)
strfcpy (err, _("cannot get certificate common name"), errlen);
goto out;
}
bufsize++; /* space for the terminal nul char */
buf = safe_malloc((size_t)bufsize);
if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(x509_subject, NID_commonName,
buf, bufsize) == -1)
{
if (err && errlen)
strfcpy (err, _("cannot get certificate common name"), errlen);
goto out;
}
/* cast is safe since bufsize is incremented above, so bufsize-1 is always
* zero or greater.
*/
if (mutt_strlen(buf) == (size_t)bufsize - 1)
{
match_found = hostname_match(hostname_ascii, buf);
}
}
if (!match_found)
{
if (err && errlen)
snprintf (err, errlen, _("certificate owner does not match hostname %s"),
hostname);
goto out;
}
rc = 1;
out:
FREE(&buf);
FREE(&hostname_ascii);
return rc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-74"
] |
mutt
|
c547433cdf2e79191b15c6932c57f1472bfb5ff4
|
1.2879370036722298e+38
| 104 |
Fix STARTTLS response injection attack.
Thanks again to Damian Poddebniak and Fabian Ising from the Münster
University of Applied Sciences for reporting this issue. Their
summary in ticket 248 states the issue clearly:
We found another STARTTLS-related issue in Mutt. Unfortunately, it
affects SMTP, POP3 and IMAP.
When the server responds with its "let's do TLS now message", e.g. A
OK begin TLS\r\n in IMAP or +OK begin TLS\r\n in POP3, Mutt will
also read any data after the \r\n and save it into some internal
buffer for later processing. This is problematic, because a MITM
attacker can inject arbitrary responses.
There is a nice blogpost by Wietse Venema about a "command
injection" in postfix (http://www.postfix.org/CVE-2011-0411.html).
What we have here is the problem in reverse, i.e. not a command
injection, but a "response injection."
This commit fixes the issue by clearing the CONNECTION input buffer in
mutt_ssl_starttls().
To make backporting this fix easier, the new functions only clear the
top-level CONNECTION buffer; they don't handle nested buffering in
mutt_zstrm.c or mutt_sasl.c. However both of those wrap the
connection *after* STARTTLS, so this is currently okay. mutt_tunnel.c
occurs before connecting, but it does not perform any nesting.
| 0 |
query_async_data_free (QueryAsyncData *self)
{
if (self->domain != NULL)
g_object_unref (self->domain);
g_free (self->feed_uri);
if (self->query)
g_object_unref (self->query);
if (self->feed)
g_object_unref (self->feed);
g_slice_free (QueryAsyncData, self);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libgdata
|
6799f2c525a584dc998821a6ce897e463dad7840
|
2.9050635138217237e+38
| 13 |
core: Validate SSL certificates for all connections
This prevents MitM attacks which use spoofed SSL certificates.
Note that this bumps our libsoup requirement to 2.37.91.
Closes: https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671535
| 0 |
static int check_ld_abs(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
struct reg_state *reg;
int i, err;
if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
(mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
verbose("BPF_LD_ABS uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (mode == BPF_IND) {
/* check explicit source operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
reg->type = NOT_INIT;
reg->imm = 0;
}
/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
* the value fetched from the packet
*/
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
92117d8443bc5afacc8d5ba82e541946310f106e
|
1.2063013571187427e+38
| 49 |
bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static void portio_release(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct uio_portio *portio = to_portio(kobj);
kfree(portio);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-189",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
1.2426533801564437e+38
| 5 |
Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
| 0 |
static struct crypto_aead *macsec_alloc_tfm(char *key, int key_len, int icv_len)
{
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
int ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return tfm;
ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, icv_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
return tfm;
fail:
crypto_free_aead(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
net
|
5294b83086cc1c35b4efeca03644cf9d12282e5b
|
1.7248716497983266e+38
| 23 |
macsec: dynamically allocate space for sglist
We call skb_cow_data, which is good anyway to ensure we can actually
modify the skb as such (another error from prior). Now that we have the
number of fragments required, we can safely allocate exactly that amount
of memory.
Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
int blkid_partitions_strcpy_ptuuid(blkid_probe pr, char *str)
{
struct blkid_chain *chn = blkid_probe_get_chain(pr);
if (chn->binary || !str || !*str)
return 0;
if (!blkid_probe_set_value(pr, "PTUUID", (unsigned char *) str, strlen(str) + 1))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
util-linux
|
50d1594c2e6142a3b51d2143c74027480df082e0
|
2.8220033072362708e+38
| 12 |
libblkid: avoid non-empty recursion in EBR
This is extension to the patch 7164a1c34d18831ac61c6744ad14ce916d389b3f.
We also need to detect non-empty recursion in the EBR chain. It's
possible to create standard valid logical partitions and in the last one
points back to the EBR chain. In this case all offsets will be non-empty.
Unfortunately, it's valid to create logical partitions that are not in
the "disk order" (sorted by start offset). So link somewhere back is
valid, but this link cannot points to already existing partition
(otherwise we will see recursion).
This patch forces libblkid to ignore duplicate logical partitions, the
duplicate chain segment is interpreted as non-data segment, after 100
iterations with non-data segments it will break the loop -- no memory
is allocated in this case by the loop.
Addresses: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1349536
References: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q3/40
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
| 0 |
qb_ipc_socket_send(struct qb_ipc_one_way *one_way,
const void *msg_ptr, size_t msg_len)
{
ssize_t rc = 0;
struct ipc_us_control *ctl;
ctl = (struct ipc_us_control *)one_way->u.us.shared_data;
if (one_way->u.us.sock_name) {
rc = _finish_connecting(one_way);
if (rc < 0) {
qb_util_log(LOG_ERR, "socket connect-on-send");
return rc;
}
}
qb_sigpipe_ctl(QB_SIGPIPE_IGNORE);
rc = send(one_way->u.us.sock, msg_ptr, msg_len, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (rc == -1) {
rc = -errno;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != ENOBUFS) {
qb_util_perror(LOG_DEBUG, "socket_send:send");
}
}
qb_sigpipe_ctl(QB_SIGPIPE_DEFAULT);
if (ctl && rc == msg_len) {
qb_atomic_int_inc(&ctl->sent);
}
return rc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-59"
] |
libqb
|
e322e98dc264bc5911d6fe1d371e55ac9f95a71e
|
2.2224781515938462e+38
| 31 |
ipc: use O_EXCL on SHM files, and randomize the names
Signed-off-by: Christine Caulfield <ccaulfie@redhat.com>
| 0 |
txBoolean fxCheckLength(txMachine* the, txSlot* slot, txInteger* index)
{
txNumber number = fxToNumber(the, slot);
txNumber check = c_trunc(number);
if ((number == check) && (0 <= number) && (number <= 0x7FFFFFFF)) {
*index = (txInteger)number;
return 1 ;
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
moddable
|
135aa9a4a6a9b49b60aa730ebc3bcc6247d75c45
|
1.8103942333842957e+38
| 10 |
XS: #896
| 0 |
void StreamEncoderImpl::encodeHeader(const char* key, uint32_t key_size, const char* value,
uint32_t value_size) {
connection_.reserveBuffer(key_size + value_size + 4);
ASSERT(key_size > 0);
connection_.copyToBuffer(key, key_size);
connection_.addCharToBuffer(':');
connection_.addCharToBuffer(' ');
connection_.copyToBuffer(value, value_size);
connection_.addCharToBuffer('\r');
connection_.addCharToBuffer('\n');
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
envoy
|
afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014
|
2.0322704072350447e+38
| 13 |
Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <asraa@google.com>
| 0 |
unshape_window (GSWindow *window)
{
gdk_window_shape_combine_region (gtk_widget_get_window (GTK_WIDGET (window)),
NULL,
0,
0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284"
] |
cinnamon-screensaver
|
da7af55f1fa966c52e15cc288d4f8928eca8cc9f
|
3.1184265176631454e+38
| 7 |
Workaround gtk3 bug, don't allow GtkWindow to handle popup_menu.
| 0 |
bus_server_init (void)
{
GError *error = NULL;
dbus = bus_dbus_impl_get_default ();
ibus = bus_ibus_impl_get_default ();
bus_dbus_impl_register_object (dbus, (IBusService *)ibus);
/* init server */
GDBusServerFlags flags = G_DBUS_SERVER_FLAGS_AUTHENTICATION_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS;
gchar *guid = g_dbus_generate_guid ();
if (!g_str_has_prefix (g_address, "unix:tmpdir=") &&
!g_str_has_prefix (g_address, "unix:path=")) {
g_error ("Your socket address does not have the format unix:tmpdir=$DIR "
"or unix:path=$FILE; %s", g_address);
}
server = g_dbus_server_new_sync (
g_address, /* the place where the socket file lives, e.g. /tmp, abstract namespace, etc. */
flags, guid,
NULL /* observer */,
NULL /* cancellable */,
&error);
if (server == NULL) {
g_error ("g_dbus_server_new_sync() is failed with address %s "
"and guid %s: %s",
g_address, guid, error->message);
}
g_free (guid);
g_signal_connect (server, "new-connection", G_CALLBACK (bus_new_connection_cb), NULL);
g_dbus_server_start (server);
address = g_strdup_printf ("%s,guid=%s",
g_dbus_server_get_client_address (server),
g_dbus_server_get_guid (server));
/* write address to file */
ibus_write_address (address);
/* own a session bus name so that third parties can easily track our life-cycle */
g_bus_own_name (G_BUS_TYPE_SESSION, IBUS_SERVICE_IBUS,
G_BUS_NAME_OWNER_FLAGS_NONE,
bus_acquired_handler,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-862"
] |
ibus
|
3d442dbf936d197aa11ca0a71663c2bc61696151
|
1.9190730038830173e+38
| 46 |
bus: Implement GDBusAuthObserver callback
ibus uses a GDBusServer with G_DBUS_SERVER_FLAGS_AUTHENTICATION_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS,
and doesn't set a GDBusAuthObserver, which allows anyone who can connect
to its AF_UNIX socket to authenticate and be authorized to send method calls.
It also seems to use an abstract AF_UNIX socket, which does not have
filesystem permissions, so the practical effect might be that a local
attacker can connect to another user's ibus service and make arbitrary
method calls.
BUGS=rhbz#1717958
| 1 |
static void sdhci_sysbus_init(Object *obj)
{
SDHCIState *s = SYSBUS_SDHCI(obj);
sdhci_initfn(s);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
dfba99f17feb6d4a129da19d38df1bcd8579d1c3
|
2.113386546198574e+38
| 6 |
hw/sd/sdhci: Fix DMA Transfer Block Size field
The 'Transfer Block Size' field is 12-bit wide.
See section '2.2.2. Block Size Register (Offset 004h)' in datasheet.
Two different bug reproducer available:
- https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1892960
- https://ruhr-uni-bochum.sciebo.de/s/NNWP2GfwzYKeKwE?path=%2Fsdhci_oob_write1
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1892960
Fixes: d7dfca0807a ("hw/sdhci: introduce standard SD host controller")
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Message-Id: <20200901140411.112150-3-f4bug@amsat.org>
| 0 |
static bool ok_inflater_distance_with_tree(ok_inflater *inflater,
const ok_inflater_huffman_tree *tree) {
if (inflater->state_count < 0) {
inflater->state_count = ok_inflater_decode_length(inflater, inflater->huffman_code);
if (inflater->state_count < 0) {
// Needs input
return false;
}
inflater->huffman_code = -1;
}
if (inflater->state_distance < 0) {
inflater->state_distance = ok_inflater_decode_distance(inflater, tree);
if (inflater->state_distance < 0) {
// Needs input
return false;
}
}
// Copy len bytes from offset to buffer_end_pos
int buffer_offset = (inflater->buffer_end_pos - inflater->state_distance) & BUFFER_SIZE_MASK;
if (inflater->state_distance == 1) {
// Optimization: can use memset
int n = inflater->state_count;
int n2 = ok_inflater_write_byte_n(inflater, inflater->buffer[buffer_offset], n);
inflater->state_count -= n2;
if (n2 != n) {
// Full buffer
return false;
}
} else if (buffer_offset + inflater->state_count < BUFFER_SIZE) {
// Optimization: the offset won't wrap
int bytes_copyable = inflater->state_distance;
while (inflater->state_count > 0) {
int n = min(inflater->state_count, bytes_copyable);
int n2 = ok_inflater_write_bytes(inflater, inflater->buffer + buffer_offset, n);
inflater->state_count -= n2;
bytes_copyable += n2;
if (n2 != n) {
// Full buffer
return false;
}
}
} else {
// This could be optimized, but it happens rarely, so it's probably not worth it
while (inflater->state_count > 0) {
int n = min(inflater->state_count, inflater->state_distance);
n = min(n, (BUFFER_SIZE - buffer_offset));
int n2 = ok_inflater_write_bytes(inflater, inflater->buffer + buffer_offset, n);
inflater->state_count -= n2;
buffer_offset = (buffer_offset + n2) & BUFFER_SIZE_MASK;
if (n2 != n) {
// Full buffer
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
ok-file-formats
|
e49cdfb84fb5eca2a6261f3c51a3c793fab9f62e
|
2.6266288976944206e+38
| 58 |
ok_png: Disallow multiple IHDR chunks (#15)
| 0 |
void h2_beam_on_consumed(h2_bucket_beam *beam,
h2_beam_ev_callback *ev_cb,
h2_beam_io_callback *io_cb, void *ctx)
{
h2_beam_lock bl;
if (enter_yellow(beam, &bl) == APR_SUCCESS) {
beam->cons_ev_cb = ev_cb;
beam->cons_io_cb = io_cb;
beam->cons_ctx = ctx;
leave_yellow(beam, &bl);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
mod_h2
|
83a2e3866918ce6567a683eb4c660688d047ee81
|
1.3633186062662012e+38
| 12 |
* fixes a race condition where aborting streams triggers an unnecessary timeout.
| 0 |
static void __net_exit sit_exit_batch_net(struct list_head *net_list)
{
LIST_HEAD(list);
struct net *net;
rtnl_lock();
list_for_each_entry(net, net_list, exit_list)
sit_destroy_tunnels(net, &list);
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
rtnl_unlock();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-772",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
07f12b26e21ab359261bf75cfcb424fdc7daeb6d
|
1.597922020696749e+38
| 12 |
net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
int ifindex,
u16 family)
{
struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 proto;
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
sksec = sk->sk_security;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net->family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
return NF_DROP;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-682"
] |
linux-stable
|
0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125
|
1.8940170446630084e+38
| 32 |
selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec6864e
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| 0 |
static int manager_setup_user_lookup_fd(Manager *m) {
int r;
assert(m);
/* Set up the socket pair used for passing UID/GID resolution results from forked off processes to PID
* 1. Background: we can't do name lookups (NSS) from PID 1, since it might involve IPC and thus activation,
* and we might hence deadlock on ourselves. Hence we do all user/group lookups asynchronously from the forked
* off processes right before executing the binaries to start. In order to be able to clean up any IPC objects
* created by a unit (see RemoveIPC=) we need to know in PID 1 the used UID/GID of the executed processes,
* hence we establish this communication channel so that forked off processes can pass their UID/GID
* information back to PID 1. The forked off processes send their resolved UID/GID to PID 1 in a simple
* datagram, along with their unit name, so that we can share one communication socket pair among all units for
* this purpose.
*
* You might wonder why we need a communication channel for this that is independent of the usual notification
* socket scheme (i.e. $NOTIFY_SOCKET). The primary difference is about trust: data sent via the $NOTIFY_SOCKET
* channel is only accepted if it originates from the right unit and if reception was enabled for it. The user
* lookup socket OTOH is only accessible by PID 1 and its children until they exec(), and always available.
*
* Note that this function is called under two circumstances: when we first initialize (in which case we
* allocate both the socket pair and the event source to listen on it), and when we deserialize after a reload
* (in which case the socket pair already exists but we still need to allocate the event source for it). */
if (m->user_lookup_fds[0] < 0) {
/* Free all secondary fields */
safe_close_pair(m->user_lookup_fds);
m->user_lookup_event_source = sd_event_source_unref(m->user_lookup_event_source);
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, m->user_lookup_fds) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to allocate user lookup socket: %m");
(void) fd_inc_rcvbuf(m->user_lookup_fds[0], NOTIFY_RCVBUF_SIZE);
}
if (!m->user_lookup_event_source) {
r = sd_event_add_io(m->event, &m->user_lookup_event_source, m->user_lookup_fds[0], EPOLLIN, manager_dispatch_user_lookup_fd, m);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to allocate user lookup event source: %m");
/* Process even earlier than the notify event source, so that we always know first about valid UID/GID
* resolutions */
r = sd_event_source_set_priority(m->user_lookup_event_source, SD_EVENT_PRIORITY_NORMAL-8);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set priority ot user lookup event source: %m");
(void) sd_event_source_set_description(m->user_lookup_event_source, "user-lookup");
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
systemd
|
531ac2b2349da02acc9c382849758e07eb92b020
|
5.617013264078868e+37
| 52 |
If the notification message length is 0, ignore the message (#4237)
Fixes #4234.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Niedbalski <jnr@metaklass.org>
| 0 |
ar6000_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)ar6k_priv(dev);
netif_stop_queue(dev);
ar6000_disconnect(ar);
if(ar->arWmiReady == true) {
if (wmi_scanparams_cmd(ar->arWmi, 0xFFFF, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
return -EIO;
}
ar->arWlanState = WLAN_DISABLED;
}
ar6k_cfg80211_scanComplete_event(ar, A_ECANCELED);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
1.1330626390560444e+38
| 18 |
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static void *tcp_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct tcp_iter_state *st = seq->private;
void *rc = NULL;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
rc = tcp_get_idx(seq, 0);
goto out;
}
switch (st->state) {
case TCP_SEQ_STATE_OPENREQ:
case TCP_SEQ_STATE_LISTENING:
rc = listening_get_next(seq, v);
if (!rc) {
st->state = TCP_SEQ_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
st->bucket = 0;
st->offset = 0;
rc = established_get_first(seq);
}
break;
case TCP_SEQ_STATE_ESTABLISHED:
case TCP_SEQ_STATE_TIME_WAIT:
rc = established_get_next(seq, v);
break;
}
out:
++*pos;
st->last_pos = *pos;
return rc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
2.3392144230887726e+38
| 31 |
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static int stbi__info_main(stbi__context *s, int *x, int *y, int *comp)
{
#ifndef STBI_NO_JPEG
if (stbi__jpeg_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_PNG
if (stbi__png_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_GIF
if (stbi__gif_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_BMP
if (stbi__bmp_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_PSD
if (stbi__psd_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_PIC
if (stbi__pic_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_PNM
if (stbi__pnm_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
#ifndef STBI_NO_HDR
if (stbi__hdr_info(s, x, y, comp)) return 1;
#endif
// test tga last because it's a crappy test!
#ifndef STBI_NO_TGA
if (stbi__tga_info(s, x, y, comp))
return 1;
#endif
return stbi__err("unknown image type", "Image not of any known type, or corrupt");
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
stb
|
5ba0baaa269b3fd681828e0e3b3ac0f1472eaf40
|
2.3783226211661913e+38
| 41 |
stb_image: Reject fractional JPEG component subsampling ratios
The component resamplers are not written to support this and I've
never seen it happen in a real (non-crafted) JPEG file so I'm
fine rejecting this as outright corrupt.
Fixes issue #1178.
| 0 |
static int hugetlb_acct_memory(struct hstate *h, long delta)
{
int ret = -ENOMEM;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
/*
* When cpuset is configured, it breaks the strict hugetlb page
* reservation as the accounting is done on a global variable. Such
* reservation is completely rubbish in the presence of cpuset because
* the reservation is not checked against page availability for the
* current cpuset. Application can still potentially OOM'ed by kernel
* with lack of free htlb page in cpuset that the task is in.
* Attempt to enforce strict accounting with cpuset is almost
* impossible (or too ugly) because cpuset is too fluid that
* task or memory node can be dynamically moved between cpusets.
*
* The change of semantics for shared hugetlb mapping with cpuset is
* undesirable. However, in order to preserve some of the semantics,
* we fall back to check against current free page availability as
* a best attempt and hopefully to minimize the impact of changing
* semantics that cpuset has.
*
* Apart from cpuset, we also have memory policy mechanism that
* also determines from which node the kernel will allocate memory
* in a NUMA system. So similar to cpuset, we also should consider
* the memory policy of the current task. Similar to the description
* above.
*/
if (delta > 0) {
if (gather_surplus_pages(h, delta) < 0)
goto out;
if (delta > allowed_mems_nr(h)) {
return_unused_surplus_pages(h, delta);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
if (delta < 0)
return_unused_surplus_pages(h, (unsigned long) -delta);
out:
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
17743798d81238ab13050e8e2833699b54e15467
|
2.049875336707915e+38
| 46 |
mm/hugetlb: fix a race between hugetlb sysctl handlers
There is a race between the assignment of `table->data` and write value
to the pointer of `table->data` in the __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() on
the other thread.
CPU0: CPU1:
proc_sys_write
hugetlb_sysctl_handler proc_sys_call_handler
hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common hugetlb_sysctl_handler
table->data = &tmp; hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common
table->data = &tmp;
proc_doulongvec_minmax
do_proc_doulongvec_minmax sysctl_head_finish
__do_proc_doulongvec_minmax unuse_table
i = table->data;
*i = val; // corrupt CPU1's stack
Fix this by duplicating the `table`, and only update the duplicate of
it. And introduce a helper of proc_hugetlb_doulongvec_minmax() to
simplify the code.
The following oops was seen:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
Code: Bad RIP value.
...
Call Trace:
? set_max_huge_pages+0x3da/0x4f0
? alloc_pool_huge_page+0x150/0x150
? proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x46/0x60
? hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0x1c7/0x200
? nr_hugepages_store+0x20/0x20
? copy_fd_bitmaps+0x170/0x170
? hugetlb_sysctl_handler+0x1e/0x20
? proc_sys_call_handler+0x2f1/0x300
? unregister_sysctl_table+0xb0/0xb0
? __fd_install+0x78/0x100
? proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
? __vfs_write+0x4d/0x90
? vfs_write+0xef/0x240
? ksys_write+0xc0/0x160
? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
? __close_fd+0x129/0x150
? __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x200
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: e5ff215941d5 ("hugetlb: multiple hstates for multiple page sizes")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200828031146.43035-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
fill_input_buffer (j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
{
static uchar jpeg_buffer[4096];
size_t nbytes;
nbytes = fread (jpeg_buffer, 1, 4096, ifp);
swab (jpeg_buffer, jpeg_buffer, nbytes);
cinfo->src->next_input_byte = jpeg_buffer;
cinfo->src->bytes_in_buffer = nbytes;
return TRUE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-129"
] |
LibRaw
|
89d065424f09b788f443734d44857289489ca9e2
|
1.971374925501996e+38
| 11 |
fixed two more problems found by fuzzer
| 0 |
static void __reg_bound_offset32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
u64 mask = 0xffffFFFF;
struct tnum range = tnum_range(reg->umin_value & mask,
reg->umax_value & mask);
struct tnum lo32 = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, 4);
struct tnum hi32 = tnum_lshift(tnum_rshift(reg->var_off, 32), 32);
reg->var_off = tnum_or(hi32, tnum_intersect(lo32, range));
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
294f2fc6da27620a506e6c050241655459ccd6bd
|
1.6883229874087093e+38
| 10 |
bpf: Verifer, adjust_scalar_min_max_vals to always call update_reg_bounds()
Currently, for all op verification we call __red_deduce_bounds() and
__red_bound_offset() but we only call __update_reg_bounds() in bitwise
ops. However, we could benefit from calling __update_reg_bounds() in
BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, and BPF_MUL cases as well.
For example, a register with state 'R1_w=invP0' when we subtract from
it,
w1 -= 2
Before coerce we will now have an smin_value=S64_MIN, smax_value=U64_MAX
and unsigned bounds umin_value=0, umax_value=U64_MAX. These will then
be clamped to S32_MIN, U32_MAX values by coerce in the case of alu32 op
as done in above example. However tnum will be a constant because the
ALU op is done on a constant.
Without update_reg_bounds() we have a scenario where tnum is a const
but our unsigned bounds do not reflect this. By calling update_reg_bounds
after coerce to 32bit we further refine the umin_value to U64_MAX in the
alu64 case or U32_MAX in the alu32 case above.
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507151689.15666.566796274289413203.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower
| 0 |
yy_symbol_value_print (FILE *yyoutput, int yytype, YYSTYPE const * const yyvaluep)
{
FILE *yyo = yyoutput;
YYUSE (yyo);
if (!yyvaluep)
return;
# ifdef YYPRINT
if (yytype < YYNTOKENS)
YYPRINT (yyoutput, yytoknum[yytype], *yyvaluep);
# endif
YYUSE (yytype);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-19"
] |
ntp
|
fe46889f7baa75fc8e6c0fcde87706d396ce1461
|
2.6028958385733727e+38
| 12 |
[Sec 2942]: Off-path DoS attack on auth broadcast mode. HStenn.
| 1 |
rpa_read_buffer(pool_t pool, const unsigned char **data,
const unsigned char *end, unsigned char **buffer)
{
const unsigned char *p = *data;
unsigned int len;
if (p > end)
return 0;
len = *p++;
if (p + len > end)
return 0;
*buffer = p_malloc(pool, len);
memcpy(*buffer, p, len);
*data += 1 + len;
return len;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
core
|
69ad3c902ea4bbf9f21ab1857d8923f975dc6145
|
1.1372862516199172e+38
| 20 |
auth: mech-rpa - Fail on zero len buffer
| 1 |
unsigned long long sendSync(int fd) {
/* To start we need to send the SYNC command and return the payload.
* The hiredis client lib does not understand this part of the protocol
* and we don't want to mess with its buffers, so everything is performed
* using direct low-level I/O. */
char buf[4096], *p;
ssize_t nread;
/* Send the SYNC command. */
if (write(fd,"SYNC\r\n",6) != 6) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error writing to master\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Read $<payload>\r\n, making sure to read just up to "\n" */
p = buf;
while(1) {
nread = read(fd,p,1);
if (nread <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error reading bulk length while SYNCing\n");
exit(1);
}
if (*p == '\n' && p != buf) break;
if (*p != '\n') p++;
}
*p = '\0';
if (buf[0] == '-') {
printf("SYNC with master failed: %s\n", buf);
exit(1);
}
return strtoull(buf+1,NULL,10);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
redis
|
9fdcc15962f9ff4baebe6fdd947816f43f730d50
|
2.8940885958520404e+38
| 32 |
Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
| 0 |
rb_str_intern(s)
VALUE s;
{
volatile VALUE str = s;
ID id;
if (!RSTRING(str)->ptr || RSTRING(str)->len == 0) {
rb_raise(rb_eArgError, "interning empty string");
}
if (strlen(RSTRING(str)->ptr) != RSTRING(str)->len)
rb_raise(rb_eArgError, "symbol string may not contain `\\0'");
if (OBJ_TAINTED(str) && rb_safe_level() >= 1 && !rb_sym_interned_p(str)) {
rb_raise(rb_eSecurityError, "Insecure: can't intern tainted string");
}
id = rb_intern(RSTRING(str)->ptr);
return ID2SYM(id);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
ruby
|
e926ef5233cc9f1035d3d51068abe9df8b5429da
|
2.9251376315297123e+38
| 17 |
* random.c (rb_genrand_int32, rb_genrand_real), intern.h: Export.
* string.c (rb_str_tmp_new), intern.h: New function.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_1_8@16014 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
| 0 |
TiledInputFile::frameBuffer () const
{
Lock lock (*_data->_streamData);
return _data->frameBuffer;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
openexr
|
e79d2296496a50826a15c667bf92bdc5a05518b4
|
1.6561409999624367e+38
| 5 |
fix memory leaks and invalid memory accesses
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz>
| 0 |
static CURLcode hsts_create(struct hsts *h,
const char *hostname,
bool subdomains,
curl_off_t expires)
{
struct stsentry *sts = hsts_entry();
if(!sts)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
sts->expires = expires;
sts->includeSubDomains = subdomains;
sts->host = strdup(hostname);
if(!sts->host) {
free(sts);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
Curl_llist_insert_next(&h->list, h->list.tail, sts, &sts->node);
return CURLE_OK;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
curl
|
fae6fea209a2d4db1582f608bd8cc8000721733a
|
1.4405620945451048e+38
| 19 |
hsts: ignore trailing dots when comparing hosts names
CVE-2022-30115
Reported-by: Axel Chong
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-30115.html
Closes #8821
| 1 |
static int racls_add_cb(const mbentry_t *mbentry, void *rock)
{
struct txn **txn = (struct txn **)rock;
return mboxlist_update_racl(mbentry->name, NULL, mbentry, txn);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
cyrus-imapd
|
6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
1.2071438852071734e+38
| 5 |
mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
| 0 |
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_script)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_SCRIPT_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
php-src
|
97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484
|
2.6942642133860103e+38
| 4 |
Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
| 1 |
int kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
gpa_t gpa)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
ghc->gpa = gpa;
ghc->generation = slots->generation;
ghc->memslot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
ghc->hva = gfn_to_hva_many(ghc->memslot, gfn, NULL);
if (!kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva))
ghc->hva += offset;
else
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e
|
2.713875028640449e+38
| 18 |
KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int wsrep_after_row(THD *thd)
{
DBUG_ENTER("wsrep_after_row");
/* enforce wsrep_max_ws_rows */
thd->wsrep_affected_rows++;
if (wsrep_max_ws_rows &&
wsrep_thd_is_local(thd) &&
thd->wsrep_affected_rows > wsrep_max_ws_rows)
{
trans_rollback_stmt(thd) || trans_rollback(thd);
my_message(ER_ERROR_DURING_COMMIT, "wsrep_max_ws_rows exceeded", MYF(0));
DBUG_RETURN(ER_ERROR_DURING_COMMIT);
}
else if (wsrep_after_row_internal(thd))
{
DBUG_RETURN(ER_LOCK_DEADLOCK);
}
DBUG_RETURN(0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758
|
2.0457796894437582e+38
| 19 |
MDEV-28098 incorrect key in "dup value" error after long unique
reset errkey after using it, so that it wouldn't affect
the next error message in the next statement
| 0 |
GF_Box *pasp_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_PixelAspectRatioBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_PASP);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
gpac
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
8.026652548780425e+36
| 5 |
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
| 0 |
void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
{
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCK_STEP);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLE_STEP);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-264",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
dab6cf55f81a6e16b8147aed9a843e1691dcd318
|
2.875926315108535e+38
| 5 |
s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
| 0 |
static int nfs4_xdr_enc_setattr(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_setattrargs *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 3,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fh);
if(status)
goto out;
status = encode_setattr(&xdr, args, args->server);
if(status)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
2.3729465307325106e+38
| 21 |
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
| 0 |
file_truncate (struct rw *rw, int64_t size)
{
struct rw_file *rwf = (struct rw_file *) rw;
/* If the destination is an ordinary file then the original file
* size doesn't matter. Truncate it to the source size. But
* truncate it to zero first so the file is completely empty and
* sparse.
*/
if (rwf->is_block)
return;
if (ftruncate (rwf->fd, 0) == -1 ||
ftruncate (rwf->fd, size) == -1) {
fprintf (stderr, "%s: truncate: %m\n", rw->name);
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
rwf->rw.size = size;
/* We can assume the destination is zero. */
destination_is_zero = true;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-252"
] |
libnbd
|
8d444b41d09a700c7ee6f9182a649f3f2d325abb
|
1.2936580407967473e+38
| 22 |
copy: CVE-2022-0485: Fail nbdcopy if NBD read or write fails
nbdcopy has a nasty bug when performing multi-threaded copies using
asynchronous nbd calls - it was blindly treating the completion of an
asynchronous command as successful, rather than checking the *error
parameter. This can result in the silent creation of a corrupted
image in two different ways: when a read fails, we blindly wrote
garbage to the destination; when a write fails, we did not flag that
the destination was not written.
Since nbdcopy already calls exit() on a synchronous read or write
failure to a file, doing the same for an asynchronous op to an NBD
server is the simplest solution. A nicer solution, but more invasive
to code and thus not done here, might be to allow up to N retries of
the transaction (in case the read or write failure was transient), or
even having a mode where as much data is copied as possible (portions
of the copy that failed would be logged on stderr, and nbdcopy would
still fail with a non-zero exit status, but this would copy more than
just stopping at the first error, as can be done with rsync or
ddrescue).
Note that since we rely on auto-retiring and do NOT call
nbd_aio_command_completed, our completion callbacks must always return
1 (if they do not exit() first), even when acting on *error, so as not
leave the command allocated until nbd_close. As such, there is no
sane way to return an error to a manual caller of the callback, and
therefore we can drop dead code that calls perror() and exit() if the
callback "failed". It is also worth documenting the contract on when
we must manually call the callback during the asynch_zero callback, so
that we do not leak or double-free the command; thankfully, all the
existing code paths were correct.
The added testsuite script demonstrates several scenarios, some of
which fail without the rest of this patch in place, and others which
showcase ways in which sparse images can bypass errors.
Once backports are complete, a followup patch on the main branch will
edit docs/libnbd-security.pod with the mailing list announcement of
the stable branch commit ids and release versions that incorporate
this fix.
Reported-by: Nir Soffer <nsoffer@redhat.com>
Fixes: bc896eec4d ("copy: Implement multi-conn, multiple threads, multiple requests in flight.", v1.5.6)
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2046194
Message-Id: <20220203202558.203013-6-eblake@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nir Soffer <nsoffer@redhat.com>
[eblake: fix error message per Nir, tweak requires lines in unit test per Rich]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static av_cold void avcodec_init(void)
{
static int initialized = 0;
if (initialized != 0)
return;
initialized = 1;
if (CONFIG_ME_CMP)
ff_me_cmp_init_static();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
FFmpeg
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
4.769499089223268e+37
| 11 |
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
| 0 |
static bool tEXtToDataBuf(const byte* bytes, long length, DataBuf& result)
{
static const char* hexdigits = "0123456789ABCDEF";
static int value[256];
static bool bFirst = true;
if (bFirst) {
for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++)
value[i] = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
value[tolower(hexdigits[i])] = i + 1;
value[toupper(hexdigits[i])] = i + 1;
}
bFirst = false;
}
// calculate length and allocate result;
// count: number of \n in the header
long count = 0;
// p points to the current position in the array bytes
const byte* p = bytes;
// header is '\nsomething\n number\n hex'
// => increment p until it points to the byte after the last \n
// p must stay within bounds of the bytes array!
while ((count < 3) && (p - bytes < length)) {
// length is later used for range checks of p => decrement it for each increment of p
--length;
if (*p++ == '\n') {
count++;
}
}
for (long i = 0; i < length; i++)
if (value[p[i]])
++count;
result.alloc((count + 1) / 2);
// hex to binary
count = 0;
byte* r = result.pData_;
int n = 0; // nibble
for (long i = 0; i < length; i++) {
if (value[p[i]]) {
int v = value[p[i]] - 1;
if (++count % 2)
n = v * 16; // leading digit
else
*r++ = n + v; // trailing
}
}
return true;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
exiv2
|
491c3ebe3b3faa6d8f75fb28146186792c2439da
|
4.1152934123663564e+37
| 51 |
Avoid negative integer overflow when `iccOffset > chunkLength`.
This fixes #790.
(cherry picked from commit 6fa2e31206127bd8bcac0269311f3775a8d6ea21)
| 0 |
GF_Err dvvC_box_read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return dvcC_box_read(s, bs);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3
|
4.791172644784532e+36
| 4 |
fixed #2255
| 0 |
dns_message_renderend(dns_message_t *msg) {
isc_buffer_t tmpbuf;
isc_region_t r;
int result;
unsigned int count;
REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
REQUIRE(msg->buffer != NULL);
if ((msg->rcode & ~DNS_MESSAGE_RCODE_MASK) != 0 && msg->opt == NULL) {
/*
* We have an extended rcode but are not using EDNS.
*/
return (DNS_R_FORMERR);
}
/*
* If we're adding a OPT, TSIG or SIG(0) to a truncated message,
* clear all rdatasets from the message except for the question
* before adding the OPT, TSIG or SIG(0). If the question doesn't
* fit, don't include it.
*/
if ((msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->sig0key != NULL || msg->opt) &&
(msg->flags & DNS_MESSAGEFLAG_TC) != 0)
{
isc_buffer_t *buf;
msgresetnames(msg, DNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
buf = msg->buffer;
dns_message_renderreset(msg);
msg->buffer = buf;
isc_buffer_clear(msg->buffer);
isc_buffer_add(msg->buffer, DNS_MESSAGE_HEADERLEN);
dns_compress_rollback(msg->cctx, 0);
result = dns_message_rendersection(msg, DNS_SECTION_QUESTION,
0);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS && result != ISC_R_NOSPACE)
return (result);
}
/*
* If we've got an OPT record, render it.
*/
if (msg->opt != NULL) {
dns_message_renderrelease(msg, msg->opt_reserved);
msg->opt_reserved = 0;
/*
* Set the extended rcode.
*/
msg->opt->ttl &= ~DNS_MESSAGE_EDNSRCODE_MASK;
msg->opt->ttl |= ((msg->rcode << 20) &
DNS_MESSAGE_EDNSRCODE_MASK);
/*
* Render.
*/
count = 0;
result = renderset(msg->opt, dns_rootname, msg->cctx,
msg->buffer, msg->reserved, 0, &count);
msg->counts[DNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL] += count;
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
return (result);
}
/*
* If we're adding a TSIG record, generate and render it.
*/
if (msg->tsigkey != NULL) {
dns_message_renderrelease(msg, msg->sig_reserved);
msg->sig_reserved = 0;
result = dns_tsig_sign(msg);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
return (result);
count = 0;
result = renderset(msg->tsig, msg->tsigname, msg->cctx,
msg->buffer, msg->reserved, 0, &count);
msg->counts[DNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL] += count;
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
return (result);
}
/*
* If we're adding a SIG(0) record, generate and render it.
*/
if (msg->sig0key != NULL) {
dns_message_renderrelease(msg, msg->sig_reserved);
msg->sig_reserved = 0;
result = dns_dnssec_signmessage(msg, msg->sig0key);
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
return (result);
count = 0;
/*
* Note: dns_rootname is used here, not msg->sig0name, since
* the owner name of a SIG(0) is irrelevant, and will not
* be set in a message being rendered.
*/
result = renderset(msg->sig0, dns_rootname, msg->cctx,
msg->buffer, msg->reserved, 0, &count);
msg->counts[DNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL] += count;
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
return (result);
}
isc_buffer_usedregion(msg->buffer, &r);
isc_buffer_init(&tmpbuf, r.base, r.length);
dns_message_renderheader(msg, &tmpbuf);
msg->buffer = NULL; /* forget about this buffer only on success XXX */
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
bind9
|
6ed167ad0a647dff20c8cb08c944a7967df2d415
|
3.00752068195625e+38
| 111 |
Always keep a copy of the message
this allows it to be available even when dns_message_parse()
returns a error.
| 0 |
static double screen_units(double d)
{
switch (screen.unit) {
case GERBV_INS:
return COORD2INS(d);
break;
case GERBV_MILS:
return COORD2MILS(d);
break;
case GERBV_MMS:
return COORD2MMS(d);
break;
}
return d;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
gerbv
|
319a8af890e4d0a5c38e6d08f510da8eefc42537
|
2.0371265938899597e+38
| 16 |
Remove local alias to parameter array
Normalizing access to `gerbv_simplified_amacro_t::parameter` as a step to fix CVE-2021-40402
| 0 |
static int direct_splice_actor(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
struct file *file = sd->u.file;
return do_splice_from(pipe, file, &sd->pos, sd->total_len, sd->flags);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-94"
] |
linux-2.6
|
8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361
|
2.161313114329676e+38
| 7 |
splice: missing user pointer access verification
vmsplice_to_user() must always check the user pointer and length
with access_ok() before copying. Likewise, for the slow path of
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() we need to check that we may read from
the user region.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Wojciech Purczynski <cliph@research.coseinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
Default_object_creation_ctx::Default_object_creation_ctx(
CHARSET_INFO *client_cs, CHARSET_INFO *connection_cl)
: m_client_cs(client_cs),
m_connection_cl(connection_cl)
{ }
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585
|
2.5849225447804217e+38
| 5 |
MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments.
| 0 |
DEFUN (no_auto_summary,
no_auto_summary_cmd,
"no auto-summary",
NO_STR
"Enable automatic network number summarization\n")
{
return CMD_SUCCESS;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
frr
|
6d58272b4cf96f0daa846210dd2104877900f921
|
1.2884523830233344e+37
| 8 |
[bgpd] cleanup, compact and consolidate capability parsing code
2007-07-26 Paul Jakma <paul.jakma@sun.com>
* (general) Clean up and compact capability parsing slightly.
Consolidate validation of length and logging of generic TLV, and
memcpy of capability data, thus removing such from cap specifc
code (not always present or correct).
* bgp_open.h: Add structures for the generic capability TLV header
and for the data formats of the various specific capabilities we
support. Hence remove the badly named, or else misdefined, struct
capability.
* bgp_open.c: (bgp_capability_vty_out) Use struct capability_mp_data.
Do the length checks *before* memcpy()'ing based on that length
(stored capability - should have been validated anyway on input,
but..).
(bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices) new function to validate (afi,safi)
which is about to be used as index into arrays, consolidates
several instances of same, at least one of which appeared to be
incomplete..
(bgp_capability_mp) Much condensed.
(bgp_capability_orf_entry) New, process one ORF entry
(bgp_capability_orf) Condensed. Fixed to process all ORF entries.
(bgp_capability_restart) Condensed, and fixed to use a
cap-specific type, rather than abusing capability_mp.
(struct message capcode_str) added to aid generic logging.
(size_t cap_minsizes[]) added to aid generic validation of
capability length field.
(bgp_capability_parse) Generic logging and validation of TLV
consolidated here. Code compacted as much as possible.
* bgp_packet.c: (bgp_open_receive) Capability parsers now use
streams, so no more need here to manually fudge the input stream
getp.
(bgp_capability_msg_parse) use struct capability_mp_data. Validate
lengths /before/ memcpy. Use bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices.
(bgp_capability_receive) Exported for use by test harness.
* bgp_vty.c: (bgp_show_summary) fix conversion warning
(bgp_show_peer) ditto
* bgp_debug.h: Fix storage 'extern' after type 'const'.
* lib/log.c: (mes_lookup) warning about code not being in
same-number array slot should be debug, not warning. E.g. BGP
has several discontigious number spaces, allocating from
different parts of a space is not uncommon (e.g. IANA
assigned versus vendor-assigned code points in some number
space).
| 0 |
static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
/* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
time-consuming seedings in vain */
static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE;
char fname[256];
if(ssl_seeded)
return CURLE_OK;
if(rand_enough()) {
/* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ will return here */
ssl_seeded = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
/* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
us to! */
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE])
#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
#endif
{
/* let the option override the define */
RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]:
RANDOM_FILE),
RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
if(rand_enough())
return CURLE_OK;
}
#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD)
/* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
/* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
#ifndef EGD_SOCKET
/* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option
is set */
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET])
#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
#endif
{
/* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
define */
int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET);
if(-1 != ret) {
if(rand_enough())
return CURLE_OK;
}
}
#endif
/* fallback to a custom seeding of the PRNG using a hash based on a current
time */
do {
unsigned char randb[64];
size_t len = sizeof(randb);
size_t i, i_max;
for(i = 0, i_max = len / sizeof(struct curltime); i < i_max; ++i) {
struct curltime tv = Curl_now();
Curl_wait_ms(1);
tv.tv_sec *= i + 1;
tv.tv_usec *= (unsigned int)i + 2;
tv.tv_sec ^= ((Curl_now().tv_sec + Curl_now().tv_usec) *
(i + 3)) << 8;
tv.tv_usec ^= (unsigned int) ((Curl_now().tv_sec +
Curl_now().tv_usec) *
(i + 4)) << 16;
memcpy(&randb[i * sizeof(struct curltime)], &tv,
sizeof(struct curltime));
}
RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2);
} while(!rand_enough());
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
if(fname[0]) {
/* we got a file name to try */
RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
if(rand_enough())
return CURLE_OK;
}
infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n");
return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK :
CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-290"
] |
curl
|
b09c8ee15771c614c4bf3ddac893cdb12187c844
|
1.1979059030032457e+38
| 89 |
vtls: add 'isproxy' argument to Curl_ssl_get/addsessionid()
To make sure we set and extract the correct session.
Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22890.html
CVE-2021-22890
| 0 |
static void DehoistArrayIndex(ArrayInstructionInterface* array_operation) {
HValue* index = array_operation->GetKey();
if (!index->representation().IsInteger32()) return;
HConstant* constant;
HValue* subexpression;
int32_t sign;
if (index->IsAdd()) {
sign = 1;
HAdd* add = HAdd::cast(index);
if (add->left()->IsConstant()) {
subexpression = add->right();
constant = HConstant::cast(add->left());
} else if (add->right()->IsConstant()) {
subexpression = add->left();
constant = HConstant::cast(add->right());
} else {
return;
}
} else if (index->IsSub()) {
sign = -1;
HSub* sub = HSub::cast(index);
if (sub->left()->IsConstant()) {
subexpression = sub->right();
constant = HConstant::cast(sub->left());
} else if (sub->right()->IsConstant()) {
subexpression = sub->left();
constant = HConstant::cast(sub->right());
} return;
} else {
return;
}
if (!constant->HasInteger32Value()) return;
int32_t value = constant->Integer32Value() * sign;
// We limit offset values to 30 bits because we want to avoid the risk of
// overflows when the offset is added to the object header size.
if (value >= 1 << array_operation->MaxIndexOffsetBits() || value < 0) return;
array_operation->SetKey(subexpression);
if (index->HasNoUses()) {
index->DeleteAndReplaceWith(NULL);
}
ASSERT(value >= 0);
array_operation->SetIndexOffset(static_cast<uint32_t>(value));
array_operation->SetDehoisted(true);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
node
|
fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21
|
3.0915621494626156e+38
| 46 |
deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
R=svenpanne@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/172093002
git-svn-id: https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@19475 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
fix #8070
| 0 |
static long php_jpeg_emit_message(j_common_ptr jpeg_info, int level)
{
char message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
jmpbuf_wrapper *jmpbufw;
int ignore_warning = 0;
jmpbufw = (jmpbuf_wrapper *) jpeg_info->client_data;
if (jmpbufw != 0) {
ignore_warning = jmpbufw->ignore_warning;
}
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
/* It is a warning message */
if (level < 0) {
/* display only the 1st warning, as would do a default libjpeg
* unless strace_level >= 3
*/
if ((jpeg_info->err->num_warnings == 0) || (jpeg_info->err->trace_level >= 3)) {
if (!ignore_warning) {
gd_error("gd-jpeg, libjpeg: recoverable error: %s\n", message);
}
}
jpeg_info->err->num_warnings++;
} else {
/* strace msg, Show it if trace_level >= level. */
if (jpeg_info->err->trace_level >= level) {
if (!ignore_warning) {
gd_error("gd-jpeg, libjpeg: strace message: %s\n", message);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-415"
] |
php-src
|
089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae
|
2.8570188326846638e+38
| 36 |
Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
| 0 |
get_dn(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, const char *whom, gnutls_x509_dn_t * dn)
{
*dn = asn1_find_node(cert->cert, whom);
if (!*dn)
return GNUTLS_E_ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-295"
] |
gnutls
|
6e76e9b9fa845b76b0b9a45f05f4b54a052578ff
|
3.923959901329559e+37
| 7 |
on certificate import check whether the two signature algorithms match
| 0 |
QPDF_Stream::isDataModified() const
{
return (! this->token_filters.empty());
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qpdf
|
d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e
|
3.168865696457423e+37
| 4 |
Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition.
| 0 |
regenerate_ld_cache (GPtrArray *base_argv_array,
GArray *base_fd_array,
GFile *app_id_dir,
const char *checksum,
GFile *runtime_files,
gboolean generate_ld_so_conf,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
g_autoptr(FlatpakBwrap) bwrap = NULL;
g_autoptr(GArray) combined_fd_array = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) ld_so_cache = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) ld_so_cache_tmp = NULL;
g_autofree char *sandbox_cache_path = NULL;
g_autofree char *tmp_basename = NULL;
g_auto(GStrv) minimal_envp = NULL;
g_autofree char *commandline = NULL;
int exit_status;
glnx_autofd int ld_so_fd = -1;
g_autoptr(GFile) ld_so_dir = NULL;
if (app_id_dir)
ld_so_dir = g_file_get_child (app_id_dir, ".ld.so");
else
{
g_autoptr(GFile) base_dir = g_file_new_for_path (g_get_user_cache_dir ());
ld_so_dir = g_file_resolve_relative_path (base_dir, "flatpak/ld.so");
}
ld_so_cache = g_file_get_child (ld_so_dir, checksum);
ld_so_fd = open (flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_cache), O_RDONLY);
if (ld_so_fd >= 0)
return glnx_steal_fd (&ld_so_fd);
g_debug ("Regenerating ld.so.cache %s", flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_cache));
if (!flatpak_mkdir_p (ld_so_dir, cancellable, error))
return FALSE;
minimal_envp = flatpak_run_get_minimal_env (FALSE, FALSE);
bwrap = flatpak_bwrap_new (minimal_envp);
flatpak_bwrap_append_args (bwrap, base_argv_array);
flatpak_run_setup_usr_links (bwrap, runtime_files);
if (generate_ld_so_conf)
{
if (!add_ld_so_conf (bwrap, error))
return -1;
}
else
flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap,
"--symlink", "../usr/etc/ld.so.conf", "/etc/ld.so.conf",
NULL);
tmp_basename = g_strconcat (checksum, ".XXXXXX", NULL);
glnx_gen_temp_name (tmp_basename);
sandbox_cache_path = g_build_filename ("/run/ld-so-cache-dir", tmp_basename, NULL);
ld_so_cache_tmp = g_file_get_child (ld_so_dir, tmp_basename);
flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap,
"--unshare-pid",
"--unshare-ipc",
"--unshare-net",
"--proc", "/proc",
"--dev", "/dev",
"--bind", flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_dir), "/run/ld-so-cache-dir",
NULL);
if (!flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (bwrap, 1, -1, FALSE, error))
return -1;
flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap,
"ldconfig", "-X", "-C", sandbox_cache_path, NULL);
flatpak_bwrap_finish (bwrap);
commandline = flatpak_quote_argv ((const char **) bwrap->argv->pdata, -1);
g_debug ("Running: '%s'", commandline);
combined_fd_array = g_array_new (FALSE, TRUE, sizeof (int));
g_array_append_vals (combined_fd_array, base_fd_array->data, base_fd_array->len);
g_array_append_vals (combined_fd_array, bwrap->fds->data, bwrap->fds->len);
/* We use LEAVE_DESCRIPTORS_OPEN to work around dead-lock, see flatpak_close_fds_workaround */
if (!g_spawn_sync (NULL,
(char **) bwrap->argv->pdata,
bwrap->envp,
G_SPAWN_SEARCH_PATH | G_SPAWN_LEAVE_DESCRIPTORS_OPEN,
flatpak_bwrap_child_setup_cb, combined_fd_array,
NULL, NULL,
&exit_status,
error))
return -1;
if (!WIFEXITED (exit_status) || WEXITSTATUS (exit_status) != 0)
{
flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED,
_("ldconfig failed, exit status %d"), exit_status);
return -1;
}
ld_so_fd = open (flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_cache_tmp), O_RDONLY);
if (ld_so_fd < 0)
{
flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Can't open generated ld.so.cache"));
return -1;
}
if (app_id_dir == NULL)
{
/* For runs without an app id dir we always regenerate the ld.so.cache */
unlink (flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_cache_tmp));
}
else
{
g_autoptr(GFile) active = g_file_get_child (ld_so_dir, "active");
/* For app-dirs we keep one checksum alive, by pointing the active symlink to it */
/* Rename to known name, possibly overwriting existing ref if race */
if (rename (flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_cache_tmp), flatpak_file_get_path_cached (ld_so_cache)) == -1)
{
glnx_set_error_from_errno (error);
return -1;
}
if (!flatpak_switch_symlink_and_remove (flatpak_file_get_path_cached (active),
checksum, error))
return -1;
}
return glnx_steal_fd (&ld_so_fd);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-94",
"CWE-74"
] |
flatpak
|
6d1773d2a54dde9b099043f07a2094a4f1c2f486
|
1.1013706760402452e+38
| 136 |
run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap arguments
This avoids some of them being filtered out by a setuid bwrap. It also
means that if they came from an untrusted source, they cannot be used
to inject arbitrary code into a non-setuid bwrap via mechanisms like
LD_PRELOAD.
Because they get bundled into a memfd or temporary file, they do not
actually appear in argv, ensuring that they remain inaccessible to
processes running under a different uid (which is important if their
values are tokens or other secrets).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Part-of: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2
| 0 |
void MainWindow::on_actionExportFrame_triggered()
{
if (Settings.playerGPU() || Settings.playerPreviewScale()) {
Mlt::GLWidget* glw = qobject_cast<Mlt::GLWidget*>(MLT.videoWidget());
connect(glw, SIGNAL(imageReady()), SLOT(onGLWidgetImageReady()));
MLT.setPreviewScale(0);
glw->requestImage();
MLT.refreshConsumer();
} else {
onGLWidgetImageReady();
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-89",
"CWE-327",
"CWE-295"
] |
shotcut
|
f008adc039642307f6ee3378d378cdb842e52c1d
|
1.7689569058622197e+38
| 12 |
fix upgrade check is not using TLS correctly
| 0 |
static void ohci_wakeup(USBPort *port1)
{
OHCIState *s = port1->opaque;
OHCIPort *port = &s->rhport[port1->index];
uint32_t intr = 0;
if (port->ctrl & OHCI_PORT_PSS) {
trace_usb_ohci_port_wakeup(port1->index);
port->ctrl |= OHCI_PORT_PSSC;
port->ctrl &= ~OHCI_PORT_PSS;
intr = OHCI_INTR_RHSC;
}
/* Note that the controller can be suspended even if this port is not */
if ((s->ctl & OHCI_CTL_HCFS) == OHCI_USB_SUSPEND) {
trace_usb_ohci_remote_wakeup(s->name);
/* This is the one state transition the controller can do by itself */
s->ctl &= ~OHCI_CTL_HCFS;
s->ctl |= OHCI_USB_RESUME;
/* In suspend mode only ResumeDetected is possible, not RHSC:
* see the OHCI spec 5.1.2.3.
*/
intr = OHCI_INTR_RD;
}
ohci_set_interrupt(s, intr);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-835"
] |
qemu
|
95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb
|
1.3655794049642555e+38
| 24 |
usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static void usbhid_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct hid_device *hid = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct usbhid_device *usbhid;
if (WARN_ON(!hid))
return;
usbhid = hid->driver_data;
spin_lock_irq(&usbhid->lock); /* Sync with error and led handlers */
set_bit(HID_DISCONNECTED, &usbhid->iofl);
spin_unlock_irq(&usbhid->lock);
hid_destroy_device(hid);
kfree(usbhid);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
f043bfc98c193c284e2cd768fefabe18ac2fed9b
|
1.285098088664238e+38
| 15 |
HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
| 0 |
int phar_open_or_create_zip(char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, int is_data, int options, phar_archive_data** pphar, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar;
int ret = phar_create_or_parse_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, is_data, options, &phar, error TSRMLS_CC);
if (FAILURE == ret) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = phar;
}
phar->is_data = is_data;
if (phar->is_zip) {
return ret;
}
if (phar->is_brandnew) {
phar->internal_file_start = 0;
phar->is_zip = 1;
phar->is_tar = 0;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* we've reached here - the phar exists and is a regular phar */
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar zip error: phar \"%s\" already exists as a regular phar and must be deleted from disk prior to creating as a zip-based phar", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
php-src
|
a6fdc5bb27b20d889de0cd29318b3968aabb57bd
|
4.741072197384651e+37
| 33 |
Fix bug #71498: Out-of-Bound Read in phar_parse_zipfile()
| 0 |
static void sntp_cb(struct mg_connection *c, int ev, void *evd, void *fnd) {
if (ev == MG_EV_READ) {
int64_t milliseconds = mg_sntp_parse(c->recv.buf, c->recv.len);
if (milliseconds > 0) {
mg_call(c, MG_EV_SNTP_TIME, &milliseconds);
LOG(LL_DEBUG, ("%u.%u, next at %lu", (unsigned) (milliseconds / 1000),
(unsigned) (milliseconds % 1000), s_sntmp_next));
}
c->recv.len = 0; // Clear receive buffer
} else if (ev == MG_EV_CONNECT) {
mg_sntp_send(c, (unsigned long) time(NULL));
} else if (ev == MG_EV_CLOSE) {
}
(void) fnd;
(void) evd;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-552"
] |
mongoose
|
c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945
|
3.2438012538881204e+38
| 16 |
Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload()
| 0 |
u_int32_t ndpi_detection_get_sizeof_ndpi_flow_struct(void) {
return(sizeof(struct ndpi_flow_struct));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-787"
] |
nDPI
|
6a9f5e4f7c3fd5ddab3e6727b071904d76773952
|
1.502340393516076e+38
| 3 |
Fixed use after free caused by dangling pointer
* This fix also improved RCE Injection detection
Signed-off-by: Toni Uhlig <matzeton@googlemail.com>
| 0 |
QPDF::checkLinearizationInternal()
{
// All comments referring to the PDF spec refer to the spec for
// version 1.4.
std::list<std::string> errors;
std::list<std::string> warnings;
// Check all values in linearization parameter dictionary
LinParameters& p = this->m->linp;
// L: file size in bytes -- checked by isLinearized
// O: object number of first page
std::vector<QPDFObjectHandle> const& pages = getAllPages();
if (p.first_page_object != pages.at(0).getObjectID())
{
QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDF err /O mismatch");
errors.push_back("first page object (/O) mismatch");
}
// N: number of pages
int npages = toI(pages.size());
if (p.npages != npages)
{
// Not tested in the test suite
errors.push_back("page count (/N) mismatch");
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < toS(npages); ++i)
{
QPDFObjectHandle const& page = pages.at(i);
QPDFObjGen og(page.getObjGen());
if (this->m->xref_table[og].getType() == 2)
{
errors.push_back("page dictionary for page " +
QUtil::uint_to_string(i) + " is compressed");
}
}
// T: offset of whitespace character preceding xref entry for object 0
this->m->file->seek(p.xref_zero_offset, SEEK_SET);
while (1)
{
char ch;
this->m->file->read(&ch, 1);
if (! ((ch == ' ') || (ch == '\r') || (ch == '\n')))
{
this->m->file->seek(-1, SEEK_CUR);
break;
}
}
if (this->m->file->tell() != this->m->first_xref_item_offset)
{
QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDF err /T mismatch");
errors.push_back("space before first xref item (/T) mismatch "
"(computed = " +
QUtil::int_to_string(this->m->first_xref_item_offset) +
"; file = " +
QUtil::int_to_string(this->m->file->tell()));
}
// P: first page number -- Implementation note 124 says Acrobat
// ignores this value, so we will too.
// Check numbering of compressed objects in each xref section.
// For linearized files, all compressed objects are supposed to be
// at the end of the containing xref section if any object streams
// are in use.
if (this->m->uncompressed_after_compressed)
{
errors.push_back("linearized file contains an uncompressed object"
" after a compressed one in a cross-reference stream");
}
// Further checking requires optimization and order calculation.
// Don't allow optimization to make changes. If it has to, then
// the file is not properly linearized. We use the xref table to
// figure out which objects are compressed and which are
// uncompressed.
{ // local scope
std::map<int, int> object_stream_data;
for (std::map<QPDFObjGen, QPDFXRefEntry>::const_iterator iter =
this->m->xref_table.begin();
iter != this->m->xref_table.end(); ++iter)
{
QPDFObjGen const& og = (*iter).first;
QPDFXRefEntry const& entry = (*iter).second;
if (entry.getType() == 2)
{
object_stream_data[og.getObj()] = entry.getObjStreamNumber();
}
}
optimize(object_stream_data, false);
calculateLinearizationData(object_stream_data);
}
// E: offset of end of first page -- Implementation note 123 says
// Acrobat includes on extra object here by mistake. pdlin fails
// to place thumbnail images in section 9, so when thumbnails are
// present, it also gets the wrong value for /E. It also doesn't
// count outlines here when it should even though it places them
// in part 6. This code fails to put thread information
// dictionaries in part 9, so it actually gets the wrong value for
// E when threads are present. In that case, it would probably
// agree with pdlin. As of this writing, the test suite doesn't
// contain any files with threads.
if (this->m->part6.empty())
{
throw std::logic_error("linearization part 6 unexpectedly empty");
}
qpdf_offset_t min_E = -1;
qpdf_offset_t max_E = -1;
for (std::vector<QPDFObjectHandle>::iterator iter = this->m->part6.begin();
iter != this->m->part6.end(); ++iter)
{
QPDFObjGen og((*iter).getObjGen());
if (this->m->obj_cache.count(og) == 0)
{
// All objects have to have been dereferenced to be classified.
throw std::logic_error("linearization part6 object not in cache");
}
ObjCache const& oc = this->m->obj_cache[og];
min_E = std::max(min_E, oc.end_before_space);
max_E = std::max(max_E, oc.end_after_space);
}
if ((p.first_page_end < min_E) || (p.first_page_end > max_E))
{
QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDF warn /E mismatch");
warnings.push_back("end of first page section (/E) mismatch: /E = " +
QUtil::int_to_string(p.first_page_end) +
"; computed = " +
QUtil::int_to_string(min_E) + ".." +
QUtil::int_to_string(max_E));
}
// Check hint tables
std::map<int, int> shared_idx_to_obj;
checkHSharedObject(errors, warnings, pages, shared_idx_to_obj);
checkHPageOffset(errors, warnings, pages, shared_idx_to_obj);
checkHOutlines(warnings);
// Report errors
bool result = true;
if (! errors.empty())
{
result = false;
for (std::list<std::string>::iterator iter = errors.begin();
iter != errors.end(); ++iter)
{
*this->m->out_stream << "ERROR: " << (*iter) << std::endl;
}
}
if (! warnings.empty())
{
result = false;
for (std::list<std::string>::iterator iter = warnings.begin();
iter != warnings.end(); ++iter)
{
*this->m->out_stream << "WARNING: " << (*iter) << std::endl;
}
}
return result;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qpdf
|
d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e
|
2.712631247921529e+38
| 172 |
Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition.
| 0 |
static BOOL rdp_read_desktop_composition_capability_set(wStream* s, UINT16 length,
rdpSettings* settings)
{
if (length < 6)
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek_UINT16(s); /* compDeskSupportLevel (2 bytes) */
return TRUE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
3627aaf7d289315b614a584afb388f04abfb5bbf
|
2.5789630515558397e+38
| 9 |
Fixed #6011: Bounds check in rdp_read_font_capability_set
| 0 |
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