func
string | target
string | cwe
list | project
string | commit_id
string | hash
string | size
int64 | message
string | vul
int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
void UrlParser::parse(char ch)
{
switch(_state)
{
case state_0:
if (ch == '=')
_state = state_value;
else if (ch == '&')
;
else if (ch == '%')
_state = state_keyesc;
else
{
_key = ch;
_state = state_key;
}
break;
case state_key:
if (ch == '=')
_state = state_value;
else if (ch == '&')
{
_q.add(_key);
_key.clear();
_state = state_0;
}
else if (ch == '%')
_state = state_keyesc;
else
_key += ch;
break;
case state_value:
if (ch == '%')
_state = state_valueesc;
else if (ch == '&')
{
_q.add(_key, _value);
_key.clear();
_value.clear();
_state = state_0;
}
else if (ch == '+')
_value += ' ';
else
_value += ch;
break;
case state_keyesc:
case state_valueesc:
if (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')
{
++_cnt;
_v = (_v << 4) + (ch - '0');
}
else if (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'f')
{
++_cnt;
_v = (_v << 4) + (ch - 'a' + 10);
}
else if (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'F')
{
++_cnt;
_v = (_v << 4) + (ch - 'A' + 10);
}
else
{
if (_cnt == 0)
{
if (_state == state_keyesc)
{
_key += '%';
_state = state_key;
}
else
{
_value += '%';
_state = state_value;
}
}
else
{
if (_state == state_keyesc)
{
_key += static_cast<char>(_v);
_state = state_key;
}
else
{
_value += static_cast<char>(_v);
_state = state_value;
}
_cnt = 0;
_v = 0;
}
parse(ch);
break;
}
if (_cnt >= 2)
{
if (_state == state_keyesc)
{
_key += static_cast<char>(_v);
_state = state_key;
}
else
{
_value += static_cast<char>(_v);
_state = state_value;
}
_cnt = 0;
_v = 0;
}
break;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
cxxtools
|
142bb2589dc184709857c08c1e10570947c444e3
|
1.3322126312792012e+38
| 123 |
fix parsing double % in query parameters
| 0 |
mark_trusted_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
MarkTrustedJob *job = user_data;
g_object_unref (job->file);
if (job->done_callback)
{
job->done_callback (!job_aborted ((CommonJob *) job),
job->done_callback_data);
}
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) job);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
nautilus
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1.3829108675870285e+38
| 16 |
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
| 1 |
static struct server_data *create_server(int index,
const char *domain, const char *server,
int protocol)
{
struct server_data *data;
struct addrinfo hints, *rp;
int ret;
DBG("index %d server %s", index, server);
data = g_try_new0(struct server_data, 1);
if (!data) {
connman_error("Failed to allocate server %s data", server);
return NULL;
}
data->index = index;
if (domain)
data->domains = g_list_append(data->domains, g_strdup(domain));
data->server = g_strdup(server);
data->protocol = protocol;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
switch (protocol) {
case IPPROTO_UDP:
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
break;
case IPPROTO_TCP:
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
break;
default:
destroy_server(data);
return NULL;
}
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICSERV | AI_NUMERICHOST;
ret = getaddrinfo(data->server, "53", &hints, &rp);
if (ret) {
connman_error("Failed to parse server %s address: %s\n",
data->server, gai_strerror(ret));
destroy_server(data);
return NULL;
}
/* Do not blindly copy this code elsewhere; it doesn't loop over the
results using ->ai_next as it should. That's OK in *this* case
because it was a numeric lookup; we *know* there's only one. */
data->server_addr_len = rp->ai_addrlen;
switch (rp->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
data->server_addr = (struct sockaddr *)
g_try_new0(struct sockaddr_in, 1);
break;
case AF_INET6:
data->server_addr = (struct sockaddr *)
g_try_new0(struct sockaddr_in6, 1);
break;
default:
connman_error("Wrong address family %d", rp->ai_family);
break;
}
if (!data->server_addr) {
freeaddrinfo(rp);
destroy_server(data);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(data->server_addr, rp->ai_addr, rp->ai_addrlen);
freeaddrinfo(rp);
if (server_create_socket(data) != 0) {
destroy_server(data);
return NULL;
}
if (protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) {
if (__connman_service_index_is_default(data->index) ||
__connman_service_index_is_split_routing(
data->index)) {
data->enabled = true;
DBG("Adding DNS server %s", data->server);
enable_fallback(false);
}
server_list = g_slist_append(server_list, data);
}
return data;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
connman
|
5c281d182ecdd0a424b64f7698f32467f8f67b71
|
2.285691498857453e+37
| 95 |
dnsproxy: Fix crash on malformed DNS response
If the response query string is malformed, we might access memory
pass the end of "name" variable in parse_response().
| 0 |
void georadiusGeneric(client *c, int flags) {
robj *key = c->argv[1];
robj *storekey = NULL;
int storedist = 0; /* 0 for STORE, 1 for STOREDIST. */
/* Look up the requested zset */
robj *zobj = NULL;
if ((zobj = lookupKeyReadOrReply(c, key, shared.emptyarray)) == NULL ||
checkType(c, zobj, OBJ_ZSET)) {
return;
}
/* Find long/lat to use for radius search based on inquiry type */
int base_args;
double xy[2] = { 0 };
if (flags & RADIUS_COORDS) {
base_args = 6;
if (extractLongLatOrReply(c, c->argv + 2, xy) == C_ERR)
return;
} else if (flags & RADIUS_MEMBER) {
base_args = 5;
robj *member = c->argv[2];
if (longLatFromMember(zobj, member, xy) == C_ERR) {
addReplyError(c, "could not decode requested zset member");
return;
}
} else {
addReplyError(c, "Unknown georadius search type");
return;
}
/* Extract radius and units from arguments */
double radius_meters = 0, conversion = 1;
if ((radius_meters = extractDistanceOrReply(c, c->argv + base_args - 2,
&conversion)) < 0) {
return;
}
/* Discover and populate all optional parameters. */
int withdist = 0, withhash = 0, withcoords = 0;
int sort = SORT_NONE;
long long count = 0;
if (c->argc > base_args) {
int remaining = c->argc - base_args;
for (int i = 0; i < remaining; i++) {
char *arg = c->argv[base_args + i]->ptr;
if (!strcasecmp(arg, "withdist")) {
withdist = 1;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "withhash")) {
withhash = 1;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "withcoord")) {
withcoords = 1;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "asc")) {
sort = SORT_ASC;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "desc")) {
sort = SORT_DESC;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "count") && (i+1) < remaining) {
if (getLongLongFromObjectOrReply(c, c->argv[base_args+i+1],
&count, NULL) != C_OK) return;
if (count <= 0) {
addReplyError(c,"COUNT must be > 0");
return;
}
i++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "store") &&
(i+1) < remaining &&
!(flags & RADIUS_NOSTORE))
{
storekey = c->argv[base_args+i+1];
storedist = 0;
i++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "storedist") &&
(i+1) < remaining &&
!(flags & RADIUS_NOSTORE))
{
storekey = c->argv[base_args+i+1];
storedist = 1;
i++;
} else {
addReply(c, shared.syntaxerr);
return;
}
}
}
/* Trap options not compatible with STORE and STOREDIST. */
if (storekey && (withdist || withhash || withcoords)) {
addReplyError(c,
"STORE option in GEORADIUS is not compatible with "
"WITHDIST, WITHHASH and WITHCOORDS options");
return;
}
/* COUNT without ordering does not make much sense, force ASC
* ordering if COUNT was specified but no sorting was requested. */
if (count != 0 && sort == SORT_NONE) sort = SORT_ASC;
/* Get all neighbor geohash boxes for our radius search */
GeoHashRadius georadius =
geohashGetAreasByRadiusWGS84(xy[0], xy[1], radius_meters);
/* Search the zset for all matching points */
geoArray *ga = geoArrayCreate();
membersOfAllNeighbors(zobj, georadius, xy[0], xy[1], radius_meters, ga);
/* If no matching results, the user gets an empty reply. */
if (ga->used == 0 && storekey == NULL) {
addReply(c,shared.emptyarray);
geoArrayFree(ga);
return;
}
long result_length = ga->used;
long returned_items = (count == 0 || result_length < count) ?
result_length : count;
long option_length = 0;
/* Process [optional] requested sorting */
if (sort == SORT_ASC) {
qsort(ga->array, result_length, sizeof(geoPoint), sort_gp_asc);
} else if (sort == SORT_DESC) {
qsort(ga->array, result_length, sizeof(geoPoint), sort_gp_desc);
}
if (storekey == NULL) {
/* No target key, return results to user. */
/* Our options are self-contained nested multibulk replies, so we
* only need to track how many of those nested replies we return. */
if (withdist)
option_length++;
if (withcoords)
option_length++;
if (withhash)
option_length++;
/* The array len we send is exactly result_length. The result is
* either all strings of just zset members *or* a nested multi-bulk
* reply containing the zset member string _and_ all the additional
* options the user enabled for this request. */
addReplyArrayLen(c, returned_items);
/* Finally send results back to the caller */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < returned_items; i++) {
geoPoint *gp = ga->array+i;
gp->dist /= conversion; /* Fix according to unit. */
/* If we have options in option_length, return each sub-result
* as a nested multi-bulk. Add 1 to account for result value
* itself. */
if (option_length)
addReplyArrayLen(c, option_length + 1);
addReplyBulkSds(c,gp->member);
gp->member = NULL;
if (withdist)
addReplyDoubleDistance(c, gp->dist);
if (withhash)
addReplyLongLong(c, gp->score);
if (withcoords) {
addReplyArrayLen(c, 2);
addReplyHumanLongDouble(c, gp->longitude);
addReplyHumanLongDouble(c, gp->latitude);
}
}
} else {
/* Target key, create a sorted set with the results. */
robj *zobj;
zset *zs;
int i;
size_t maxelelen = 0;
if (returned_items) {
zobj = createZsetObject();
zs = zobj->ptr;
}
for (i = 0; i < returned_items; i++) {
zskiplistNode *znode;
geoPoint *gp = ga->array+i;
gp->dist /= conversion; /* Fix according to unit. */
double score = storedist ? gp->dist : gp->score;
size_t elelen = sdslen(gp->member);
if (maxelelen < elelen) maxelelen = elelen;
znode = zslInsert(zs->zsl,score,gp->member);
serverAssert(dictAdd(zs->dict,gp->member,&znode->score) == DICT_OK);
gp->member = NULL;
}
if (returned_items) {
zsetConvertToZiplistIfNeeded(zobj,maxelelen);
setKey(c,c->db,storekey,zobj);
decrRefCount(zobj);
notifyKeyspaceEvent(NOTIFY_ZSET,"georadiusstore",storekey,
c->db->id);
server.dirty += returned_items;
} else if (dbDelete(c->db,storekey)) {
signalModifiedKey(c,c->db,storekey);
notifyKeyspaceEvent(NOTIFY_GENERIC,"del",storekey,c->db->id);
server.dirty++;
}
addReplyLongLong(c, returned_items);
}
geoArrayFree(ga);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
redis
|
f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3
|
1.8784928554385607e+38
| 212 |
Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
| 1 |
static void xsltFixImportedCompSteps(xsltStylesheetPtr master,
xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
xsltStylesheetPtr res;
xmlHashScan(style->templatesHash, xsltNormalizeCompSteps, master);
master->extrasNr += style->extrasNr;
for (res = style->imports; res != NULL; res = res->next) {
xsltFixImportedCompSteps(master, res);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
libxslt
|
e03553605b45c88f0b4b2980adfbbb8f6fca2fd6
|
3.099848626645288e+38
| 9 |
Fix security framework bypass
xsltCheckRead and xsltCheckWrite return -1 in case of error but callers
don't check for this condition and allow access. With a specially
crafted URL, xsltCheckRead could be tricked into returning an error
because of a supposedly invalid URL that would still be loaded
succesfully later on.
Fixes #12.
Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report.
| 0 |
static int nbd_negotiate_send_rep_list(QIOChannel *ioc, NBDExport *exp)
{
size_t name_len, desc_len;
uint32_t len;
const char *name = exp->name ? exp->name : "";
const char *desc = exp->description ? exp->description : "";
int rc;
TRACE("Advertising export name '%s' description '%s'", name, desc);
name_len = strlen(name);
desc_len = strlen(desc);
len = name_len + desc_len + sizeof(len);
rc = nbd_negotiate_send_rep_len(ioc, NBD_REP_SERVER, NBD_OPT_LIST, len);
if (rc < 0) {
return rc;
}
len = cpu_to_be32(name_len);
if (nbd_write(ioc, &len, sizeof(len), NULL) < 0) {
LOG("write failed (name length)");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nbd_write(ioc, name, name_len, NULL) < 0) {
LOG("write failed (name buffer)");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nbd_write(ioc, desc, desc_len, NULL) < 0) {
LOG("write failed (description buffer)");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
qemu
|
2b0bbc4f8809c972bad134bc1a2570dbb01dea0b
|
3.313862106202685e+38
| 32 |
nbd/server: get rid of nbd_negotiate_read and friends
Functions nbd_negotiate_{read,write,drop_sync} were introduced in
1a6245a5b, when nbd_rwv (was nbd_wr_sync) was working through
qemu_co_sendv_recvv (the path is nbd_wr_sync -> qemu_co_{recv/send} ->
qemu_co_send_recv -> qemu_co_sendv_recvv), which just yields, without
setting any handlers. But starting from ff82911cd nbd_rwv (was
nbd_wr_syncv) works through qio_channel_yield() which sets handlers, so
watchers are redundant in nbd_negotiate_{read,write,drop_sync}, then,
let's just use nbd_{read,write,drop} functions.
Functions nbd_{read,write,drop} has errp parameter, which is unused in
this patch. This will be fixed later.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170602150150.258222-4-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int __init setup_fail_page_alloc(char *str)
{
return setup_fault_attr(&fail_page_alloc.attr, str);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
400e22499dd92613821374c8c6c88c7225359980
|
1.9015943545838014e+38
| 4 |
mm: don't warn about allocations which stall for too long
Commit 63f53dea0c98 ("mm: warn about allocations which stall for too
long") was a great step for reducing possibility of silent hang up
problem caused by memory allocation stalls. But this commit reverts it,
for it is possible to trigger OOM lockup and/or soft lockups when many
threads concurrently called warn_alloc() (in order to warn about memory
allocation stalls) due to current implementation of printk(), and it is
difficult to obtain useful information due to limitation of synchronous
warning approach.
Current printk() implementation flushes all pending logs using the
context of a thread which called console_unlock(). printk() should be
able to flush all pending logs eventually unless somebody continues
appending to printk() buffer.
Since warn_alloc() started appending to printk() buffer while waiting
for oom_kill_process() to make forward progress when oom_kill_process()
is processing pending logs, it became possible for warn_alloc() to force
oom_kill_process() loop inside printk(). As a result, warn_alloc()
significantly increased possibility of preventing oom_kill_process()
from making forward progress.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
Before warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
}
goto retry;
After warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else if (waited_for_10seconds()) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
Although waited_for_10seconds() becomes true once per 10 seconds,
unbounded number of threads can call waited_for_10seconds() at the same
time. Also, since threads doing waited_for_10seconds() keep doing
almost busy loop, the thread doing print_one_log() can use little CPU
resource. Therefore, this situation can be simplified like
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
when printk() is called faster than print_one_log() can process a log.
One of possible mitigation would be to introduce a new lock in order to
make sure that no other series of printk() (either oom_kill_process() or
warn_alloc()) can append to printk() buffer when one series of printk()
(either oom_kill_process() or warn_alloc()) is already in progress.
Such serialization will also help obtaining kernel messages in readable
form.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
mutex_lock(&oom_printk_lock);
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_printk_lock)) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
}
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
But this commit does not go that direction, for we don't want to
introduce a new lock dependency, and we unlikely be able to obtain
useful information even if we serialized oom_kill_process() and
warn_alloc().
Synchronous approach is prone to unexpected results (e.g. too late [1],
too frequent [2], overlooked [3]). As far as I know, warn_alloc() never
helped with providing information other than "something is going wrong".
I want to consider asynchronous approach which can obtain information
during stalls with possibly relevant threads (e.g. the owner of
oom_lock and kswapd-like threads) and serve as a trigger for actions
(e.g. turn on/off tracepoints, ask libvirt daemon to take a memory dump
of stalling KVM guest for diagnostic purpose).
This commit temporarily loses ability to report e.g. OOM lockup due to
unable to invoke the OOM killer due to !__GFP_FS allocation request.
But asynchronous approach will be able to detect such situation and emit
warning. Thus, let's remove warn_alloc().
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192981
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAM_iQpWuPVGc2ky8M-9yukECtS+zKjiDasNymX7rMcBjBFyM_A@mail.gmail.com
[3] commit db73ee0d46379922 ("mm, vmscan: do not loop on too_many_isolated for ever"))
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509017339-4802-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yuwang.yuwang <yuwang.yuwang@alibaba-inc.com>
Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
static int tableAndColumnIndex(
SrcList *pSrc, /* Array of tables to search */
int N, /* Number of tables in pSrc->a[] to search */
const char *zCol, /* Name of the column we are looking for */
int *piTab, /* Write index of pSrc->a[] here */
int *piCol /* Write index of pSrc->a[*piTab].pTab->aCol[] here */
){
int i; /* For looping over tables in pSrc */
int iCol; /* Index of column matching zCol */
assert( (piTab==0)==(piCol==0) ); /* Both or neither are NULL */
for(i=0; i<N; i++){
iCol = columnIndex(pSrc->a[i].pTab, zCol);
if( iCol>=0 ){
if( piTab ){
*piTab = i;
*piCol = iCol;
}
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
sqlite
|
e59c562b3f6894f84c715772c4b116d7b5c01348
|
2.9542028842196735e+38
| 23 |
Fix a crash that could occur if a sub-select that uses both DISTINCT and window functions also used an ORDER BY that is the same as its select list.
FossilOrigin-Name: bcdd66c1691955c697f3d756c2b035acfe98f6aad72e90b0021bab6e9023b3ba
| 0 |
static int io_shutdown_prep(struct io_kiocb *req,
const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
{
if (unlikely(sqe->off || sqe->addr || sqe->rw_flags ||
sqe->buf_index || sqe->splice_fd_in))
return -EINVAL;
req->shutdown.how = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
9cae36a094e7e9d6e5fe8b6dcd4642138b3eb0c7
|
1.2791393129932985e+38
| 10 |
io_uring: reinstate the inflight tracking
After some debugging, it was realized that we really do still need the
old inflight tracking for any file type that has io_uring_fops assigned.
If we don't, then trivial circular references will mean that we never get
the ctx cleaned up and hence it'll leak.
Just bring back the inflight tracking, which then also means we can
eliminate the conditional dropping of the file when task_work is queued.
Fixes: d5361233e9ab ("io_uring: drop the old style inflight file tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
| 0 |
void lzw_context_destroy(struct lzw_ctx *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
chafa
|
e6ce3746cdcf0836b9dae659a5aed15d73a080d8
|
1.797259772607244e+38
| 4 |
libnsgif: fix oob in lzw_decode
| 0 |
static Upvaldesc *allocupvalue (FuncState *fs) {
Proto *f = fs->f;
int oldsize = f->sizeupvalues;
checklimit(fs, fs->nups + 1, MAXUPVAL, "upvalues");
luaM_growvector(fs->ls->L, f->upvalues, fs->nups, f->sizeupvalues,
Upvaldesc, MAXUPVAL, "upvalues");
while (oldsize < f->sizeupvalues)
f->upvalues[oldsize++].name = NULL;
return &f->upvalues[fs->nups++];
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
lua
|
1f3c6f4534c6411313361697d98d1145a1f030fa
|
2.4804023664327644e+38
| 10 |
Bug: Lua can generate wrong code when _ENV is <const>
| 0 |
static int lo_read_transfer(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq,
loff_t pos)
{
struct bio_vec bvec, b;
struct req_iterator iter;
struct iov_iter i;
struct page *page;
ssize_t len;
int ret = 0;
page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO);
if (unlikely(!page))
return -ENOMEM;
rq_for_each_segment(bvec, rq, iter) {
loff_t offset = pos;
b.bv_page = page;
b.bv_offset = 0;
b.bv_len = bvec.bv_len;
iov_iter_bvec(&i, ITER_BVEC, &b, 1, b.bv_len);
len = vfs_iter_read(lo->lo_backing_file, &i, &pos, 0);
if (len < 0) {
ret = len;
goto out_free_page;
}
ret = lo_do_transfer(lo, READ, page, 0, bvec.bv_page,
bvec.bv_offset, len, offset >> 9);
if (ret)
goto out_free_page;
flush_dcache_page(bvec.bv_page);
if (len != bvec.bv_len) {
struct bio *bio;
__rq_for_each_bio(bio, rq)
zero_fill_bio(bio);
break;
}
}
ret = 0;
out_free_page:
__free_page(page);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
1.087440915276054e+38
| 49 |
loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
| 0 |
void assertContents(const intrusive_ptr<Testable>& expr, const BSONArray& expectedContents) {
ASSERT_BSONOBJ_EQ(constify(BSON("$testable" << expectedContents)), expressionToBson(expr));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-835"
] |
mongo
|
0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816
|
3.239666802918738e+38
| 3 |
SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression
| 0 |
host_ntoa(int type, const void *arg, uschar *buffer, int *portptr)
{
uschar *yield;
/* The new world. It is annoying that we have to fish out the address from
different places in the block, depending on what kind of address it is. It
is also a pain that inet_ntop() returns a const uschar *, whereas the IPv4
function inet_ntoa() returns just uschar *, and some picky compilers insist
on warning if one assigns a const uschar * to a uschar *. Hence the casts. */
#if HAVE_IPV6
uschar addr_buffer[46];
if (type < 0)
{
int family = ((struct sockaddr *)arg)->sa_family;
if (family == AF_INET6)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sk = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)arg;
yield = US inet_ntop(family, &(sk->sin6_addr), CS addr_buffer,
sizeof(addr_buffer));
if (portptr != NULL) *portptr = ntohs(sk->sin6_port);
}
else
{
struct sockaddr_in *sk = (struct sockaddr_in *)arg;
yield = US inet_ntop(family, &(sk->sin_addr), CS addr_buffer,
sizeof(addr_buffer));
if (portptr != NULL) *portptr = ntohs(sk->sin_port);
}
}
else
{
yield = US inet_ntop(type, arg, CS addr_buffer, sizeof(addr_buffer));
}
/* If the result is a mapped IPv4 address, show it in V4 format. */
if (Ustrncmp(yield, "::ffff:", 7) == 0) yield += 7;
#else /* HAVE_IPV6 */
/* The old world */
if (type < 0)
{
yield = US inet_ntoa(((struct sockaddr_in *)arg)->sin_addr);
if (portptr != NULL) *portptr = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)arg)->sin_port);
}
else
yield = US inet_ntoa(*((struct in_addr *)arg));
#endif
/* If there is no buffer, put the string into some new store. */
if (!buffer) buffer = store_get(46, FALSE);
/* Callers of this function with a non-NULL buffer must ensure that it is
large enough to hold an IPv6 address, namely, at least 46 bytes. That's what
makes this use of strcpy() OK.
If the library returned apparently an apparently tainted string, clean it;
we trust IP addresses. */
string_format_nt(buffer, 46, "%s", yield);
return buffer;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
exim
|
d4bc023436e4cce7c23c5f8bb5199e178b4cc743
|
1.4105447195987704e+38
| 65 |
Fix host_name_lookup (Close 2747)
Thanks to Nico R for providing a reproducing configuration.
host_lookup = *
message_size_limit = ${if def:sender_host_name {32M}{32M}}
acl_smtp_connect = acl_smtp_connect
acl_smtp_rcpt = acl_smtp_rcpt
begin acl
acl_smtp_connect:
warn ratelimit = 256 / 1m / per_conn
accept
acl_smtp_rcpt:
accept hosts = 127.0.0.*
begin routers
null:
driver = accept
transport = null
begin transports
null:
driver = appendfile
file = /dev/null
Tested with
swaks -f mailbox@example.org -t mailbox@example.org --pipe 'exim -bh 127.0.0.1 -C /opt/exim/etc/exim-bug.conf'
The IP must have a PTR to "localhost." to reproduce it.
(cherry picked from commit 20812729e3e47a193a21d326ecd036d67a8b2724)
| 0 |
Network::FilterStatus onData(Buffer::Instance& data, bool) override {
onDataInternal(data);
return Network::FilterStatus::StopIteration;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
542f84c66e9f6479bc31c6f53157c60472b25240
|
1.5662942882149233e+38
| 4 |
overload: Runtime configurable global connection limits (#147)
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <tony@allen.gg>
| 0 |
static double _mp_vargkth(CImg<doubleT>& vec) {
const double val = (+vec).get_shared_points(1,vec.width() - 1).
kth_smallest((ulongT)cimg::cut((longT)*vec - 1,(longT)0,(longT)vec.width() - 2));
cimg_for_inX(vec,1,vec.width()-1,ind) if (vec[ind]==val) return ind - 1.;
return 1.;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
|
6.807702111054783e+37
| 6 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
| 0 |
void btrfs_orphan_commit_root(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct btrfs_block_rsv *block_rsv;
int ret;
if (atomic_read(&root->orphan_inodes) ||
root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE)
return;
spin_lock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (atomic_read(&root->orphan_inodes)) {
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
return;
}
if (root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE) {
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
return;
}
block_rsv = root->orphan_block_rsv;
root->orphan_block_rsv = NULL;
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (root->orphan_item_inserted &&
btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) > 0) {
ret = btrfs_del_orphan_item(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
root->root_key.objectid);
BUG_ON(ret);
root->orphan_item_inserted = 0;
}
if (block_rsv) {
WARN_ON(block_rsv->size > 0);
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, block_rsv);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
2.1291344477056448e+38
| 38 |
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
| 0 |
static void convert_blocked_entry(GKeyFile *key_file, void *value)
{
g_key_file_set_boolean(key_file, "General", "Blocked", TRUE);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
] |
bluez
|
b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055
|
1.4240949206366185e+38
| 4 |
adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting
discoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable
property and not when discovery client set it as that be considered
temporary just for the lifetime of the discovery.
| 0 |
CImg<T>& _load_bmp(std::FILE *const file, const char *const filename) {
if (!file && !filename)
throw CImgArgumentException(_cimg_instance
"load_bmp(): Specified filename is (null).",
cimg_instance);
std::FILE *const nfile = file?file:cimg::fopen(filename,"rb");
CImg<ucharT> header(54);
cimg::fread(header._data,54,nfile);
if (*header!='B' || header[1]!='M') {
if (!file) cimg::fclose(nfile);
throw CImgIOException(_cimg_instance
"load_bmp(): Invalid BMP file '%s'.",
cimg_instance,
filename?filename:"(FILE*)");
}
// Read header and pixel buffer
int
file_size = header[0x02] + (header[0x03]<<8) + (header[0x04]<<16) + (header[0x05]<<24),
offset = header[0x0A] + (header[0x0B]<<8) + (header[0x0C]<<16) + (header[0x0D]<<24),
header_size = header[0x0E] + (header[0x0F]<<8) + (header[0x10]<<16) + (header[0x11]<<24),
dx = header[0x12] + (header[0x13]<<8) + (header[0x14]<<16) + (header[0x15]<<24),
dy = header[0x16] + (header[0x17]<<8) + (header[0x18]<<16) + (header[0x19]<<24),
compression = header[0x1E] + (header[0x1F]<<8) + (header[0x20]<<16) + (header[0x21]<<24),
nb_colors = header[0x2E] + (header[0x2F]<<8) + (header[0x30]<<16) + (header[0x31]<<24),
bpp = header[0x1C] + (header[0x1D]<<8);
if (!file_size || file_size==offset) {
cimg::fseek(nfile,0,SEEK_END);
file_size = (int)cimg::ftell(nfile);
cimg::fseek(nfile,54,SEEK_SET);
}
if (header_size>40) cimg::fseek(nfile,header_size - 40,SEEK_CUR);
const int
dx_bytes = (bpp==1)?(dx/8 + (dx%8?1:0)):((bpp==4)?(dx/2 + (dx%2)):(int)((longT)dx*bpp/8)),
align_bytes = (4 - dx_bytes%4)%4;
const ulongT
cimg_iobuffer = (ulongT)24*1024*1024,
buf_size = std::min((ulongT)cimg::abs(dy)*(dx_bytes + align_bytes),(ulongT)file_size - offset);
CImg<intT> colormap;
if (bpp<16) { if (!nb_colors) nb_colors = 1<<bpp; } else nb_colors = 0;
if (nb_colors) { colormap.assign(nb_colors); cimg::fread(colormap._data,nb_colors,nfile); }
const int xoffset = offset - 14 - header_size - 4*nb_colors;
if (xoffset>0) cimg::fseek(nfile,xoffset,SEEK_CUR);
CImg<ucharT> buffer;
if (buf_size<cimg_iobuffer) {
// buffer.assign(cimg::abs(dy)*(dx_bytes + align_bytes),1,1,1,0);
buffer.assign(buf_size,1,1,1,0);
cimg::fread(buffer._data,buf_size,nfile);
} else buffer.assign(dx_bytes + align_bytes);
unsigned char *ptrs = buffer;
// Decompress buffer (if necessary)
if (compression) {
if (file)
throw CImgIOException(_cimg_instance
"load_bmp(): Unable to load compressed data from '(*FILE)' inputs.",
cimg_instance);
else {
if (!file) cimg::fclose(nfile);
return load_other(filename);
}
}
// Read pixel data
assign(dx,cimg::abs(dy),1,3,0);
switch (bpp) {
case 1 : { // Monochrome
if (colormap._width>=2) for (int y = height() - 1; y>=0; --y) {
if (buf_size>=cimg_iobuffer) {
if (!cimg::fread(ptrs=buffer._data,dx_bytes,nfile)) break;
cimg::fseek(nfile,align_bytes,SEEK_CUR);
}
unsigned char mask = 0x80, val = 0;
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
if (mask==0x80) val = *(ptrs++);
const unsigned char *col = (unsigned char*)(colormap._data + (val&mask?1:0));
(*this)(x,y,2) = (T)*(col++);
(*this)(x,y,1) = (T)*(col++);
(*this)(x,y,0) = (T)*(col++);
mask = cimg::ror(mask);
}
ptrs+=align_bytes;
}
} break;
case 4 : { // 16 colors
if (colormap._width>=16) for (int y = height() - 1; y>=0; --y) {
if (buf_size>=cimg_iobuffer) {
if (!cimg::fread(ptrs=buffer._data,dx_bytes,nfile)) break;
cimg::fseek(nfile,align_bytes,SEEK_CUR);
}
unsigned char mask = 0xF0, val = 0;
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
if (mask==0xF0) val = *(ptrs++);
const unsigned char color = (unsigned char)((mask<16)?(val&mask):((val&mask)>>4));
const unsigned char *col = (unsigned char*)(colormap._data + color);
(*this)(x,y,2) = (T)*(col++);
(*this)(x,y,1) = (T)*(col++);
(*this)(x,y,0) = (T)*(col++);
mask = cimg::ror(mask,4);
}
ptrs+=align_bytes;
}
} break;
case 8 : { // 256 colors
if (colormap._width>=256) for (int y = height() - 1; y>=0; --y) {
if (buf_size>=cimg_iobuffer) {
if (!cimg::fread(ptrs=buffer._data,dx_bytes,nfile)) break;
cimg::fseek(nfile,align_bytes,SEEK_CUR);
}
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
const unsigned char *col = (unsigned char*)(colormap._data + *(ptrs++));
(*this)(x,y,2) = (T)*(col++);
(*this)(x,y,1) = (T)*(col++);
(*this)(x,y,0) = (T)*(col++);
}
ptrs+=align_bytes;
}
} break;
case 16 : { // 16 bits colors
for (int y = height() - 1; y>=0; --y) {
if (buf_size>=cimg_iobuffer) {
if (!cimg::fread(ptrs=buffer._data,dx_bytes,nfile)) break;
cimg::fseek(nfile,align_bytes,SEEK_CUR);
}
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
const unsigned char c1 = *(ptrs++), c2 = *(ptrs++);
const unsigned short col = (unsigned short)(c1|(c2<<8));
(*this)(x,y,2) = (T)(col&0x1F);
(*this)(x,y,1) = (T)((col>>5)&0x1F);
(*this)(x,y,0) = (T)((col>>10)&0x1F);
}
ptrs+=align_bytes;
}
} break;
case 24 : { // 24 bits colors
for (int y = height() - 1; y>=0; --y) {
if (buf_size>=cimg_iobuffer) {
if (!cimg::fread(ptrs=buffer._data,dx_bytes,nfile)) break;
cimg::fseek(nfile,align_bytes,SEEK_CUR);
}
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
(*this)(x,y,2) = (T)*(ptrs++);
(*this)(x,y,1) = (T)*(ptrs++);
(*this)(x,y,0) = (T)*(ptrs++);
}
ptrs+=align_bytes;
}
} break;
case 32 : { // 32 bits colors
for (int y = height() - 1; y>=0; --y) {
if (buf_size>=cimg_iobuffer) {
if (!cimg::fread(ptrs=buffer._data,dx_bytes,nfile)) break;
cimg::fseek(nfile,align_bytes,SEEK_CUR);
}
cimg_forX(*this,x) {
(*this)(x,y,2) = (T)*(ptrs++);
(*this)(x,y,1) = (T)*(ptrs++);
(*this)(x,y,0) = (T)*(ptrs++);
++ptrs;
}
ptrs+=align_bytes;
}
} break;
}
if (dy<0) mirror('y');
if (!file) cimg::fclose(nfile);
return *this;
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
|
2.497058171224485e+38
| 173 |
.
| 0 |
GF_Box *gitn_box_new()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GroupIdToNameBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GITN);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3
|
4.6473553099535685e+37
| 5 |
fixed #2255
| 0 |
brcmf_cfg80211_escan_handler(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
const struct brcmf_event_msg *e, void *data)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = ifp->drvr->config;
s32 status;
struct brcmf_escan_result_le *escan_result_le;
struct brcmf_bss_info_le *bss_info_le;
struct brcmf_bss_info_le *bss = NULL;
u32 bi_length;
struct brcmf_scan_results *list;
u32 i;
bool aborted;
status = e->status;
if (!test_bit(BRCMF_SCAN_STATUS_BUSY, &cfg->scan_status)) {
brcmf_err("scan not ready, bsscfgidx=%d\n", ifp->bsscfgidx);
return -EPERM;
}
if (status == BRCMF_E_STATUS_PARTIAL) {
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, "ESCAN Partial result\n");
escan_result_le = (struct brcmf_escan_result_le *) data;
if (!escan_result_le) {
brcmf_err("Invalid escan result (NULL pointer)\n");
goto exit;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(escan_result_le->bss_count) != 1) {
brcmf_err("Invalid bss_count %d: ignoring\n",
escan_result_le->bss_count);
goto exit;
}
bss_info_le = &escan_result_le->bss_info_le;
if (brcmf_p2p_scan_finding_common_channel(cfg, bss_info_le))
goto exit;
if (!cfg->scan_request) {
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, "result without cfg80211 request\n");
goto exit;
}
bi_length = le32_to_cpu(bss_info_le->length);
if (bi_length != (le32_to_cpu(escan_result_le->buflen) -
WL_ESCAN_RESULTS_FIXED_SIZE)) {
brcmf_err("Invalid bss_info length %d: ignoring\n",
bi_length);
goto exit;
}
if (!(cfg_to_wiphy(cfg)->interface_modes &
BIT(NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC))) {
if (le16_to_cpu(bss_info_le->capability) &
WLAN_CAPABILITY_IBSS) {
brcmf_err("Ignoring IBSS result\n");
goto exit;
}
}
list = (struct brcmf_scan_results *)
cfg->escan_info.escan_buf;
if (bi_length > BRCMF_ESCAN_BUF_SIZE - list->buflen) {
brcmf_err("Buffer is too small: ignoring\n");
goto exit;
}
for (i = 0; i < list->count; i++) {
bss = bss ? (struct brcmf_bss_info_le *)
((unsigned char *)bss +
le32_to_cpu(bss->length)) : list->bss_info_le;
if (brcmf_compare_update_same_bss(cfg, bss,
bss_info_le))
goto exit;
}
memcpy(&cfg->escan_info.escan_buf[list->buflen], bss_info_le,
bi_length);
list->version = le32_to_cpu(bss_info_le->version);
list->buflen += bi_length;
list->count++;
} else {
cfg->escan_info.escan_state = WL_ESCAN_STATE_IDLE;
if (brcmf_p2p_scan_finding_common_channel(cfg, NULL))
goto exit;
if (cfg->scan_request) {
brcmf_inform_bss(cfg);
aborted = status != BRCMF_E_STATUS_SUCCESS;
brcmf_notify_escan_complete(cfg, ifp, aborted, false);
} else
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, "Ignored scan complete result 0x%x\n",
status);
}
exit:
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c
|
6.822396151680378e+37
| 94 |
brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
| 0 |
int inet_rtx_syn_ack(const struct sock *parent, struct request_sock *req)
{
int err = req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req);
if (!err)
req->num_retrans++;
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-415"
] |
linux
|
657831ffc38e30092a2d5f03d385d710eb88b09a
|
1.4942869153872264e+38
| 8 |
dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent
syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket()
It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time,
which is very bad.
Very similar to commit 8b485ce69876 ("tcp: do not inherit
fastopen_req from parent")
Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one.
Thanks a lot to them !
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
request_new (const char *method, char *arg)
{
struct request *req = xnew0 (struct request);
req->hcapacity = 8;
req->headers = xnew_array (struct request_header, req->hcapacity);
req->method = method;
req->arg = arg;
return req;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
wget
|
d892291fb8ace4c3b734ea5125770989c215df3f
|
1.7555977745740067e+38
| 9 |
Fix stack overflow in HTTP protocol handling (CVE-2017-13089)
* src/http.c (skip_short_body): Return error on negative chunk size
Reported-by: Antti Levomäki, Christian Jalio, Joonas Pihlaja from Forcepoint
Reported-by: Juhani Eronen from Finnish National Cyber Security Centre
| 0 |
long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
{
key_ref_t key_ref;
struct key *key;
long ret;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
if (ret != -EACCES)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ret = 0;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
ret = -EPERM;
else
key_revoke(key);
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error:
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-347"
] |
linux
|
ee8f844e3c5a73b999edf733df1c529d6503ec2f
|
1.90076431300709e+38
| 29 |
KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings
This fixes CVE-2016-9604.
Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.
This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.
This also affects kexec and IMA.
This can be tested by (as root):
keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
keyctl add user a a @s
keyctl list @s
which on my test box gives me:
2 keys in keyring:
180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a
Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
| 0 |
global_init_keywords(void)
{
/* global definitions mapping */
init_global_keywords(true);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
init_vrrp_keywords(false);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
init_check_keywords(false);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
init_bfd_keywords(false);
#endif
return keywords;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
keepalived
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
2.97778707854305e+38
| 17 |
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
| 0 |
void ga_command_state_init(GAState *s, GACommandState *cs)
{
if (!vss_initialized()) {
ga_command_state_add(cs, NULL, guest_fsfreeze_cleanup);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
qemu
|
141b197408ab398c4f474ac1a728ab316e921f2b
|
3.3419872922316444e+38
| 6 |
qga: check bytes count read by guest-file-read
While reading file content via 'guest-file-read' command,
'qmp_guest_file_read' routine allocates buffer of count+1
bytes. It could overflow for large values of 'count'.
Add check to avoid it.
Reported-by: Fakhri Zulkifli <mohdfakhrizulkifli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| 0 |
int intel_iommu_enable_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct intel_svm_dev *sdev)
{
struct device_domain_info *info;
struct context_entry *context;
struct dmar_domain *domain;
unsigned long flags;
u64 ctx_lo;
int ret;
domain = get_valid_domain_for_dev(sdev->dev);
if (!domain)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
spin_lock(&iommu->lock);
ret = -EINVAL;
info = sdev->dev->archdata.iommu;
if (!info || !info->pasid_supported)
goto out;
context = iommu_context_addr(iommu, info->bus, info->devfn, 0);
if (WARN_ON(!context))
goto out;
ctx_lo = context[0].lo;
sdev->did = domain->iommu_did[iommu->seq_id];
sdev->sid = PCI_DEVID(info->bus, info->devfn);
if (!(ctx_lo & CONTEXT_PASIDE)) {
if (iommu->pasid_state_table)
context[1].hi = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->pasid_state_table);
context[1].lo = (u64)virt_to_phys(info->pasid_table->table) |
intel_iommu_get_pts(sdev->dev);
wmb();
/* CONTEXT_TT_MULTI_LEVEL and CONTEXT_TT_DEV_IOTLB are both
* extended to permit requests-with-PASID if the PASIDE bit
* is set. which makes sense. For CONTEXT_TT_PASS_THROUGH,
* however, the PASIDE bit is ignored and requests-with-PASID
* are unconditionally blocked. Which makes less sense.
* So convert from CONTEXT_TT_PASS_THROUGH to one of the new
* "guest mode" translation types depending on whether ATS
* is available or not. Annoyingly, we can't use the new
* modes *unless* PASIDE is set. */
if ((ctx_lo & CONTEXT_TT_MASK) == (CONTEXT_TT_PASS_THROUGH << 2)) {
ctx_lo &= ~CONTEXT_TT_MASK;
if (info->ats_supported)
ctx_lo |= CONTEXT_TT_PT_PASID_DEV_IOTLB << 2;
else
ctx_lo |= CONTEXT_TT_PT_PASID << 2;
}
ctx_lo |= CONTEXT_PASIDE;
if (iommu->pasid_state_table)
ctx_lo |= CONTEXT_DINVE;
if (info->pri_supported)
ctx_lo |= CONTEXT_PRS;
context[0].lo = ctx_lo;
wmb();
iommu->flush.flush_context(iommu, sdev->did, sdev->sid,
DMA_CCMD_MASK_NOBIT,
DMA_CCMD_DEVICE_INVL);
}
/* Enable PASID support in the device, if it wasn't already */
if (!info->pasid_enabled)
iommu_enable_dev_iotlb(info);
if (info->ats_enabled) {
sdev->dev_iotlb = 1;
sdev->qdep = info->ats_qdep;
if (sdev->qdep >= QI_DEV_EIOTLB_MAX_INVS)
sdev->qdep = 0;
}
ret = 0;
out:
spin_unlock(&iommu->lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
fb58fdcd295b914ece1d829b24df00a17a9624bc
|
6.979070639573532e+37
| 83 |
iommu/vt-d: Do not enable ATS for untrusted devices
Currently Linux automatically enables ATS (Address Translation Service)
for any device that supports it (and IOMMU is turned on). ATS is used to
accelerate DMA access as the device can cache translations locally so
there is no need to do full translation on IOMMU side. However, as
pointed out in [1] ATS can be used to bypass IOMMU based security
completely by simply sending PCIe read/write transaction with AT
(Address Translation) field set to "translated".
To mitigate this modify the Intel IOMMU code so that it does not enable
ATS for any device that is marked as being untrusted. In case this turns
out to cause performance issues we may selectively allow ATS based on
user decision but currently use big hammer and disable it completely to
be on the safe side.
[1] https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274352
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
| 0 |
static int StreamTcpTest10 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p == NULL));
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t payload[4];
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
stream_config.async_oneside = TRUE;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = 0;
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(6);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED);
FAIL_IF(! (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC));
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->client.last_ack != 6 &&
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq != 11);
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
PASS;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-94"
] |
suricata
|
1c63d3905852f746ccde7e2585600b2199cefb4b
|
2.1594795907578993e+38
| 73 |
stream: reject broken ACK packets
Fix evasion posibility by rejecting packets with a broken ACK field.
These packets have a non-0 ACK field, but do not have a ACK flag set.
Bug #3324.
Reported-by: Nicolas Adba
(cherry picked from commit fa692df37a796c3330c81988d15ef1a219afc006)
| 0 |
static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
const struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int type;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
type = array_index_nospec(cd->type, ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table));
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm_no_destroy(kvm);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
ops->destroy(dev);
return ret;
}
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-459"
] |
linux
|
683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b
|
1.657842929329252e+38
| 54 |
KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
path_table_last_entry(struct path_table *pathtbl)
{
if (pathtbl->first == NULL)
return (NULL);
return (((struct isoent *)(void *)
((char *)(pathtbl->last) - offsetof(struct isoent, ptnext))));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
libarchive
|
3014e19820ea53c15c90f9d447ca3e668a0b76c6
|
7.769341206591883e+37
| 7 |
Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
| 0 |
void HGraphBuilder::GenerateIsSmi(CallRuntime* call) {
ASSERT(call->arguments()->length() == 1);
CHECK_ALIVE(VisitForValue(call->arguments()->at(0)));
HValue* value = Pop();
HIsSmiAndBranch* result = new(zone()) HIsSmiAndBranch(value);
return ast_context()->ReturnControl(result, call->id());
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
node
|
fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21
|
2.8305120635508265e+37
| 7 |
deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
R=svenpanne@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/172093002
git-svn-id: https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@19475 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
fix #8070
| 0 |
mailimf_resent_to_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, struct mailimf_to ** result)
{
struct mailimf_address_list * addr_list;
struct mailimf_to * to;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token, "Resent-To");
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_address_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &addr_list);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_addr_list;
}
to = mailimf_to_new(addr_list);
if (to == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_addr_list;
}
* result = to;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_addr_list:
mailimf_address_list_free(addr_list);
err:
return res;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
libetpan
|
1fe8fbc032ccda1db9af66d93016b49c16c1f22d
|
2.1180004187951624e+37
| 52 |
Fixed crash #274
| 0 |
static int io_send(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_kiocb **nxt,
bool force_nonblock)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_NET)
struct socket *sock;
int ret;
if (unlikely(req->ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL))
return -EINVAL;
sock = sock_from_file(req->file, &ret);
if (sock) {
struct io_sr_msg *sr = &req->sr_msg;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
unsigned flags;
ret = import_single_range(WRITE, sr->buf, sr->len, &iov,
&msg.msg_iter);
if (ret)
return ret;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
flags = req->sr_msg.msg_flags;
if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT)
req->flags |= REQ_F_NOWAIT;
else if (force_nonblock)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
ret = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg);
if (force_nonblock && ret == -EAGAIN)
return -EAGAIN;
if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS)
ret = -EINTR;
}
io_cqring_add_event(req, ret);
if (ret < 0)
req_set_fail_links(req);
io_put_req_find_next(req, nxt);
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
ff002b30181d30cdfbca316dadd099c3ca0d739c
|
3.422907860733679e+37
| 50 |
io_uring: grab ->fs as part of async preparation
This passes it in to io-wq, so it assumes the right fs_struct when
executing async work that may need to do lookups.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
| 0 |
static unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
{
unsigned long value;
asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMREAD_RDX_RAX)
: "=a"(value) : "d"(field) : "cc");
return value;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
16175a796d061833aacfbd9672235f2d2725df65
|
2.6546212259727405e+37
| 8 |
KVM: VMX: Don't allow uninhibited access to EFER on i386
vmx_set_msr() does not allow i386 guests to touch EFER, but they can still
do so through the default: label in the switch. If they set EFER_LME, they
can oops the host.
Fix by having EFER access through the normal channel (which will check for
EFER_LME) even on i386.
Reported-and-tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <bgilbert@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static bool cut(const double val) { return val<(double)min()?min():val>(double)max()?max():(bool)val; }
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
|
1.2903007045128728e+38
| 1 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
| 0 |
static int ccp_run_ecc_pm_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)
{
struct ccp_ecc_engine *ecc = &cmd->u.ecc;
struct ccp_dm_workarea src, dst;
struct ccp_op op;
int ret;
u8 *save;
if (!ecc->u.pm.point_1.x ||
(ecc->u.pm.point_1.x_len > CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES) ||
!ecc->u.pm.point_1.y ||
(ecc->u.pm.point_1.y_len > CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
if (ecc->function == CCP_ECC_FUNCTION_PADD_384BIT) {
if (!ecc->u.pm.point_2.x ||
(ecc->u.pm.point_2.x_len > CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES) ||
!ecc->u.pm.point_2.y ||
(ecc->u.pm.point_2.y_len > CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (!ecc->u.pm.domain_a ||
(ecc->u.pm.domain_a_len > CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
if (ecc->function == CCP_ECC_FUNCTION_PMUL_384BIT)
if (!ecc->u.pm.scalar ||
(ecc->u.pm.scalar_len > CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ecc->u.pm.result.x ||
(ecc->u.pm.result.x_len < CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES) ||
!ecc->u.pm.result.y ||
(ecc->u.pm.result.y_len < CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES))
return -EINVAL;
memset(&op, 0, sizeof(op));
op.cmd_q = cmd_q;
op.jobid = CCP_NEW_JOBID(cmd_q->ccp);
/* Concatenate the modulus and the operands. Both the modulus and
* the operands must be in little endian format. Since the input
* is in big endian format it must be converted and placed in a
* fixed length buffer.
*/
ret = ccp_init_dm_workarea(&src, cmd_q, CCP_ECC_SRC_BUF_SIZE,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Save the workarea address since it is updated in order to perform
* the concatenation
*/
save = src.address;
/* Copy the ECC modulus */
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0, ecc->mod, 0, ecc->mod_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
/* Copy the first point X and Y coordinate */
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0, ecc->u.pm.point_1.x, 0,
ecc->u.pm.point_1.x_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0, ecc->u.pm.point_1.y, 0,
ecc->u.pm.point_1.y_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
/* Set the first point Z coordinate to 1 */
*src.address = 0x01;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
if (ecc->function == CCP_ECC_FUNCTION_PADD_384BIT) {
/* Copy the second point X and Y coordinate */
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0, ecc->u.pm.point_2.x, 0,
ecc->u.pm.point_2.x_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0, ecc->u.pm.point_2.y, 0,
ecc->u.pm.point_2.y_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
/* Set the second point Z coordinate to 1 */
*src.address = 0x01;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
} else {
/* Copy the Domain "a" parameter */
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0, ecc->u.pm.domain_a, 0,
ecc->u.pm.domain_a_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
if (ecc->function == CCP_ECC_FUNCTION_PMUL_384BIT) {
/* Copy the scalar value */
ret = ccp_reverse_set_dm_area(&src, 0,
ecc->u.pm.scalar, 0,
ecc->u.pm.scalar_len);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
src.address += CCP_ECC_OPERAND_SIZE;
}
}
/* Restore the workarea address */
src.address = save;
/* Prepare the output area for the operation */
ret = ccp_init_dm_workarea(&dst, cmd_q, CCP_ECC_DST_BUF_SIZE,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (ret)
goto e_src;
op.soc = 1;
op.src.u.dma.address = src.dma.address;
op.src.u.dma.offset = 0;
op.src.u.dma.length = src.length;
op.dst.u.dma.address = dst.dma.address;
op.dst.u.dma.offset = 0;
op.dst.u.dma.length = dst.length;
op.u.ecc.function = cmd->u.ecc.function;
ret = cmd_q->ccp->vdata->perform->ecc(&op);
if (ret) {
cmd->engine_error = cmd_q->cmd_error;
goto e_dst;
}
ecc->ecc_result = le16_to_cpup(
(const __le16 *)(dst.address + CCP_ECC_RESULT_OFFSET));
if (!(ecc->ecc_result & CCP_ECC_RESULT_SUCCESS)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto e_dst;
}
/* Save the workarea address since it is updated as we walk through
* to copy the point math result
*/
save = dst.address;
/* Save the ECC result X and Y coordinates */
ccp_reverse_get_dm_area(&dst, 0, ecc->u.pm.result.x, 0,
CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES);
dst.address += CCP_ECC_OUTPUT_SIZE;
ccp_reverse_get_dm_area(&dst, 0, ecc->u.pm.result.y, 0,
CCP_ECC_MODULUS_BYTES);
/* Restore the workarea address */
dst.address = save;
e_dst:
ccp_dm_free(&dst);
e_src:
ccp_dm_free(&src);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
505d9dcb0f7ddf9d075e729523a33d38642ae680
|
1.807653374954786e+38
| 168 |
crypto: ccp - fix resource leaks in ccp_run_aes_gcm_cmd()
There are three bugs in this code:
1) If we ccp_init_data() fails for &src then we need to free aad.
Use goto e_aad instead of goto e_ctx.
2) The label to free the &final_wa was named incorrectly as "e_tag" but
it should have been "e_final_wa". One error path leaked &final_wa.
3) The &tag was leaked on one error path. In that case, I added a free
before the goto because the resource was local to that block.
Fixes: 36cf515b9bbe ("crypto: ccp - Enable support for AES GCM on v5 CCPs")
Reported-by: "minihanshen(沈明航)" <minihanshen@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| 0 |
struct ip_vs_dest *ip_vs_find_dest(struct net *net, int af,
const union nf_inet_addr *daddr,
__be16 dport,
const union nf_inet_addr *vaddr,
__be16 vport, __u16 protocol, __u32 fwmark,
__u32 flags)
{
struct ip_vs_dest *dest;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
__be16 port = dport;
svc = ip_vs_service_get(net, af, fwmark, protocol, vaddr, vport);
if (!svc)
return NULL;
if (fwmark && (flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_FWD_MASK) != IP_VS_CONN_F_MASQ)
port = 0;
dest = ip_vs_lookup_dest(svc, daddr, port);
if (!dest)
dest = ip_vs_lookup_dest(svc, daddr, port ^ dport);
if (dest)
atomic_inc(&dest->refcnt);
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
return dest;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680
|
2.2968492216755386e+38
| 24 |
ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
QPDF_Array::releaseResolved()
{
for (std::vector<QPDFObjectHandle>::iterator iter = this->items.begin();
iter != this->items.end(); ++iter)
{
QPDFObjectHandle::ReleaseResolver::releaseResolved(*iter);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qpdf
|
d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e
|
2.140689104337751e+38
| 8 |
Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition.
| 0 |
static void _slurm_rpc_step_layout(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
int error_code = SLURM_SUCCESS;
slurm_msg_t response_msg;
DEF_TIMERS;
job_step_id_msg_t *req = (job_step_id_msg_t *)msg->data;
slurm_step_layout_t *step_layout = NULL;
/* Locks: Read config job, write node */
slurmctld_lock_t job_read_lock = {
READ_LOCK, READ_LOCK, READ_LOCK, NO_LOCK, NO_LOCK };
uid_t uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred,
slurmctld_config.auth_info);
struct job_record *job_ptr = NULL;
struct step_record *step_ptr = NULL;
START_TIMER;
debug2("Processing RPC: REQUEST_STEP_LAYOUT, from uid=%d", uid);
lock_slurmctld(job_read_lock);
error_code = job_alloc_info(uid, req->job_id, &job_ptr);
END_TIMER2("_slurm_rpc_step_layout");
/* return result */
if (error_code || (job_ptr == NULL)) {
unlock_slurmctld(job_read_lock);
if (error_code == ESLURM_ACCESS_DENIED) {
error("Security vioation, REQUEST_STEP_LAYOUT for "
"JobId=%u from uid=%u", req->job_id, uid);
} else {
if (slurmctld_conf.debug_flags & DEBUG_FLAG_STEPS)
info("%s: JobId=%u, uid=%u: %s", __func__,
req->job_id, uid,
slurm_strerror(error_code));
}
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, error_code);
return;
}
step_ptr = find_step_record(job_ptr, req->step_id);
if (!step_ptr) {
unlock_slurmctld(job_read_lock);
if (slurmctld_conf.debug_flags & DEBUG_FLAG_STEPS)
info("%s: JobId=%u.%u Not Found", __func__,
req->job_id, req->step_id);
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID);
return;
}
step_layout = slurm_step_layout_copy(step_ptr->step_layout);
#ifdef HAVE_FRONT_END
if (job_ptr->batch_host)
step_layout->front_end = xstrdup(job_ptr->batch_host);
#endif
unlock_slurmctld(job_read_lock);
slurm_msg_t_init(&response_msg);
response_msg.flags = msg->flags;
response_msg.protocol_version = msg->protocol_version;
response_msg.msg_type = RESPONSE_STEP_LAYOUT;
response_msg.data = step_layout;
slurm_send_node_msg(msg->conn_fd, &response_msg);
slurm_step_layout_destroy(step_layout);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
slurm
|
033dc0d1d28b8d2ba1a5187f564a01c15187eb4e
|
2.816139281605239e+38
| 62 |
Fix insecure handling of job requested gid.
Only trust MUNGE signed values, unless the RPC was signed by
SlurmUser or root.
CVE-2018-10995.
| 0 |
TEST_F(ConnectionHandlerTest, TcpListenerInplaceUpdate) {
InSequence s;
uint64_t old_listener_tag = 1;
uint64_t new_listener_tag = 2;
Network::ListenerCallbacks* old_listener_callbacks;
auto old_listener = new NiceMock<Network::MockListener>();
TestListener* old_test_listener = addListener(old_listener_tag, true, false, "test_listener",
old_listener, &old_listener_callbacks);
EXPECT_CALL(*socket_factory_, localAddress()).WillOnce(ReturnRef(local_address_));
handler_->addListener(absl::nullopt, *old_test_listener);
ASSERT_NE(old_test_listener, nullptr);
Network::ListenerCallbacks* new_listener_callbacks = nullptr;
auto overridden_filter_chain_manager =
std::make_shared<NiceMock<Network::MockFilterChainManager>>();
TestListener* new_test_listener =
addListener(new_listener_tag, true, false, "test_listener", /* Network::Listener */ nullptr,
&new_listener_callbacks, nullptr, nullptr, Network::Socket::Type::Stream,
std::chrono::milliseconds(15000), false, overridden_filter_chain_manager);
handler_->addListener(old_listener_tag, *new_test_listener);
ASSERT_EQ(new_listener_callbacks, nullptr)
<< "new listener should be inplace added and callback should not change";
Network::MockConnectionSocket* connection = new NiceMock<Network::MockConnectionSocket>();
EXPECT_CALL(manager_, findFilterChain(_)).Times(0);
EXPECT_CALL(*overridden_filter_chain_manager, findFilterChain(_)).WillOnce(Return(nullptr));
old_listener_callbacks->onAccept(Network::ConnectionSocketPtr{connection});
EXPECT_CALL(*old_listener, onDestroy());
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
dfddb529e914d794ac552e906b13d71233609bf7
|
1.3591570311254545e+38
| 30 |
listener: Add configurable accepted connection limits (#153)
Add support for per-listener limits on accepted connections.
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <tony@allen.gg>
| 0 |
ecma_op_container_has (ecma_value_t this_arg, /**< this argument */
ecma_value_t key_arg, /**< key argument */
lit_magic_string_id_t lit_id) /**< internal class id */
{
ecma_extended_object_t *map_object_p = ecma_op_container_get_object (this_arg, lit_id);
if (map_object_p == NULL)
{
return ECMA_VALUE_ERROR;
}
ecma_collection_t *container_p = ECMA_GET_INTERNAL_VALUE_POINTER (ecma_collection_t,
map_object_p->u.class_prop.u.value);
#if ENABLED (JERRY_ES2015_BUILTIN_WEAKMAP) || ENABLED (JERRY_ES2015_BUILTIN_WEAKSET)
if ((map_object_p->u.class_prop.extra_info & ECMA_CONTAINER_FLAGS_WEAK) != 0
&& !ecma_is_value_object (key_arg))
{
return ECMA_VALUE_FALSE;
}
#endif /* ENABLED (JERRY_ES2015_BUILTIN_WEAKMAP) || ENABLED (JERRY_ES2015_BUILTIN_WEAKSET) */
if (ECMA_CONTAINER_GET_SIZE (container_p) == 0)
{
return ECMA_VALUE_FALSE;
}
ecma_value_t *entry_p = ecma_op_internal_buffer_find (container_p, key_arg, lit_id);
return ecma_make_boolean_value (entry_p != NULL);
} /* ecma_op_container_has */
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-703"
] |
jerryscript
|
c2b662170245a16f46ce02eae68815c325d99821
|
2.0686520151254245e+38
| 31 |
Fix adding entries to the internal buffer of a Map object (#3805)
When appending the key/value pair separately, garbage collection could be
triggered before the value is added, which could cause problems during
marking. This patch changes insertion to add both values at the same
time, which prevents partial entries from being present in the internal
buffer.
Fixes #3804.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Dániel Bátyai dbatyai@inf.u-szeged.hu
| 0 |
include_class_new(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *m, struct RClass *super)
{
struct RClass *ic = (struct RClass*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, MRB_TT_ICLASS, mrb->class_class);
if (m->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS) {
m = m->c;
}
MRB_CLASS_ORIGIN(m);
ic->iv = m->iv;
ic->mt = m->mt;
ic->super = super;
if (m->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS) {
ic->c = m->c;
}
else {
ic->c = m;
}
return ic;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-415"
] |
mruby
|
faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
7.917973027240316e+37
| 18 |
`mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
| 0 |
static int cqspi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct cqspi_st *cqspi = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT; i++)
if (cqspi->f_pdata[i].registered)
mtd_device_unregister(&cqspi->f_pdata[i].nor.mtd);
cqspi_controller_enable(cqspi, 0);
clk_disable_unprepare(cqspi->clk);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
193e87143c290ec16838f5368adc0e0bc94eb931
|
2.2941206413362724e+38
| 15 |
mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
| 0 |
hf_try_val_to_str(guint32 value, const header_field_info *hfinfo)
{
if (hfinfo->display & BASE_RANGE_STRING)
return try_rval_to_str(value, (const range_string *) hfinfo->strings);
if (hfinfo->display & BASE_EXT_STRING) {
if (hfinfo->display & BASE_VAL64_STRING)
return try_val64_to_str_ext(value, (val64_string_ext *) hfinfo->strings);
else
return try_val_to_str_ext(value, (value_string_ext *) hfinfo->strings);
}
if (hfinfo->display & BASE_VAL64_STRING)
return try_val64_to_str(value, (const val64_string *) hfinfo->strings);
if (hfinfo->display & BASE_UNIT_STRING)
return unit_name_string_get_value(value, (const struct unit_name_string*) hfinfo->strings);
return try_val_to_str(value, (const value_string *) hfinfo->strings);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-401"
] |
wireshark
|
a9fc769d7bb4b491efb61c699d57c9f35269d871
|
1.357369696977932e+38
| 20 |
epan: Fix a memory leak.
Make sure _proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val allocates a bits array using the
packet scope, otherwise we leak memory. Fixes #17032.
| 0 |
initConfigSettings(void)
{
cs.bEmitMsgOnClose = 0;
cs.bEmitMsgOnOpen = 0;
cs.wrkrMax = DFLT_wrkrMax;
cs.bSuppOctetFram = 1;
cs.iAddtlFrameDelim = TCPSRV_NO_ADDTL_DELIMITER;
cs.maxFrameSize = 200000;
cs.pszInputName = NULL;
cs.pszBindRuleset = NULL;
cs.pszInputName = NULL;
cs.lstnIP = NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
rsyslog
|
89955b0bcb1ff105e1374aad7e0e993faa6a038f
|
1.3167829098176666e+38
| 13 |
net bugfix: potential buffer overrun
| 0 |
static int sync_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_REGS) {
__set_regs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.regs);
vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_REGS;
}
if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS) {
if (__set_sregs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.sregs))
return -EINVAL;
vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS;
}
if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS) {
if (kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(
vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.events))
return -EINVAL;
vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS;
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
|
2.250669425360143e+38
| 20 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211210163625.2886-6-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static void xudc_set_clear_feature(struct xusb_udc *udc)
{
struct xusb_ep *ep0 = &udc->ep[0];
struct xusb_req *req = udc->req;
struct xusb_ep *target_ep;
u8 endpoint;
u8 outinbit;
u32 epcfgreg;
int flag = (udc->setup.bRequest == USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE ? 1 : 0);
int ret;
switch (udc->setup.bRequestType) {
case USB_RECIP_DEVICE:
switch (udc->setup.wValue) {
case USB_DEVICE_TEST_MODE:
/*
* The Test Mode will be executed
* after the status phase.
*/
break;
case USB_DEVICE_REMOTE_WAKEUP:
if (flag)
udc->remote_wkp = 1;
else
udc->remote_wkp = 0;
break;
default:
xudc_ep0_stall(udc);
break;
}
break;
case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
if (!udc->setup.wValue) {
endpoint = udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
if (endpoint >= XUSB_MAX_ENDPOINTS) {
xudc_ep0_stall(udc);
return;
}
target_ep = &udc->ep[endpoint];
outinbit = udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_DIR_MASK;
outinbit = outinbit >> 7;
/* Make sure direction matches.*/
if (outinbit != target_ep->is_in) {
xudc_ep0_stall(udc);
return;
}
epcfgreg = udc->read_fn(udc->addr + target_ep->offset);
if (!endpoint) {
/* Clear the stall.*/
epcfgreg &= ~XUSB_EP_CFG_STALL_MASK;
udc->write_fn(udc->addr,
target_ep->offset, epcfgreg);
} else {
if (flag) {
epcfgreg |= XUSB_EP_CFG_STALL_MASK;
udc->write_fn(udc->addr,
target_ep->offset,
epcfgreg);
} else {
/* Unstall the endpoint.*/
epcfgreg &= ~(XUSB_EP_CFG_STALL_MASK |
XUSB_EP_CFG_DATA_TOGGLE_MASK);
udc->write_fn(udc->addr,
target_ep->offset,
epcfgreg);
}
}
}
break;
default:
xudc_ep0_stall(udc);
return;
}
req->usb_req.length = 0;
ret = __xudc_ep0_queue(ep0, req);
if (ret == 0)
return;
dev_err(udc->dev, "Can't respond to SET/CLEAR FEATURE\n");
xudc_ep0_stall(udc);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-129"
] |
linux
|
7f14c7227f342d9932f9b918893c8814f86d2a0d
|
2.157166562117127e+38
| 83 |
USB: gadget: validate endpoint index for xilinx udc
Assure that host may not manipulate the index to point
past endpoint array.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| 0 |
ews_store_unset_oof_settings_state (CamelSession *session,
GCancellable *cancellable,
gpointer user_data,
GError **error)
{
CamelEwsStore *ews_store = user_data;
EEwsConnection *connection;
EEwsOofSettings *oof_settings;
EEwsOofState state;
GError *local_error = NULL;
camel_operation_push_message (cancellable, _("Unsetting the “Out of Office” status"));
connection = camel_ews_store_ref_connection (ews_store);
oof_settings = e_ews_oof_settings_new_sync (connection, cancellable, &local_error);
g_object_unref (connection);
if (local_error != NULL) {
g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
camel_operation_pop_message (cancellable);
return;
}
state = e_ews_oof_settings_get_state (oof_settings);
if (state == E_EWS_OOF_STATE_DISABLED) {
g_object_unref (oof_settings);
camel_operation_pop_message (cancellable);
return;
}
e_ews_oof_settings_set_state (oof_settings, E_EWS_OOF_STATE_DISABLED);
e_ews_oof_settings_submit_sync (oof_settings, cancellable, error);
g_object_unref (oof_settings);
camel_operation_pop_message (cancellable);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
|
2.7769684329395e+38
| 36 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
| 0 |
static Bool parse_short_term_ref_pic_set(GF_BitStream *bs, HEVC_SPS *sps, u32 idx_rps)
{
u32 i;
Bool inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag = 0;
if (idx_rps != 0)
inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
if (inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag ) {
HEVC_ReferencePictureSets *ref_ps, *rps;
u32 delta_idx_minus1 = 0;
u32 ref_idx;
u32 delta_rps_sign;
u32 abs_delta_rps_minus1, nb_ref_pics;
s32 deltaRPS;
u32 k = 0, k0 = 0, k1 = 0;
if (idx_rps == sps->num_short_term_ref_pic_sets)
delta_idx_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
assert(delta_idx_minus1 <= idx_rps - 1);
ref_idx = idx_rps - 1 - delta_idx_minus1;
delta_rps_sign = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
abs_delta_rps_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
deltaRPS = (1 - (delta_rps_sign<<1)) * (abs_delta_rps_minus1 + 1);
rps = &sps->rps[idx_rps];
ref_ps = &sps->rps[ref_idx];
nb_ref_pics = ref_ps->num_negative_pics + ref_ps->num_positive_pics;
for (i=0; i<=nb_ref_pics; i++) {
s32 ref_idc;
s32 used_by_curr_pic_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ref_idc = used_by_curr_pic_flag ? 1 : 0;
if ( !used_by_curr_pic_flag ) {
used_by_curr_pic_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ref_idc = used_by_curr_pic_flag << 1;
}
if ((ref_idc==1) || (ref_idc== 2)) {
s32 deltaPOC = deltaRPS;
if (i < nb_ref_pics)
deltaPOC += ref_ps->delta_poc[i];
rps->delta_poc[k] = deltaPOC;
if (deltaPOC < 0) k0++;
else k1++;
k++;
}
}
rps->num_negative_pics = k0;
rps->num_positive_pics = k1;
} else {
s32 prev = 0, poc = 0;
sps->rps[idx_rps].num_negative_pics = bs_get_ue(bs);
sps->rps[idx_rps].num_positive_pics = bs_get_ue(bs);
if (sps->rps[idx_rps].num_negative_pics>16)
return GF_FALSE;
if (sps->rps[idx_rps].num_positive_pics>16)
return GF_FALSE;
for (i=0; i<sps->rps[idx_rps].num_negative_pics; i++) {
u32 delta_poc_s0_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
poc = prev - delta_poc_s0_minus1 - 1;
prev = poc;
sps->rps[idx_rps].delta_poc[i] = poc;
/*used_by_curr_pic_s1_flag[ i ] = */gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
}
for (i=0; i<sps->rps[idx_rps].num_positive_pics; i++) {
u32 delta_poc_s1_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
poc = prev + delta_poc_s1_minus1 + 1;
prev = poc;
sps->rps[idx_rps].delta_poc[i] = poc;
/*used_by_curr_pic_s1_flag[ i ] = */gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
}
}
return GF_TRUE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
|
2.3471217064746026e+38
| 75 |
fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
| 0 |
GF_Err fiin_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
FDItemInformationBox *ptr = (FDItemInformationBox *) s;
if (!s) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u16(bs, gf_list_count(ptr->partition_entries) );
e = gf_isom_box_array_write(s, ptr->partition_entries, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->session_info) gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box*)ptr->session_info, bs);
if (ptr->group_id_to_name) gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box*)ptr->group_id_to_name, bs);
return GF_OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
gpac
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
1.8229930617601655e+38
| 15 |
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
| 0 |
loc_offsets_compar (const void *ap, const void *bp)
{
dwarf_vma a = loc_offsets[*(const unsigned int *) ap];
dwarf_vma b = loc_offsets[*(const unsigned int *) bp];
int ret = (a > b) - (b > a);
if (ret)
return ret;
a = loc_views[*(const unsigned int *) ap];
b = loc_views[*(const unsigned int *) bp];
ret = (a > b) - (b > a);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
binutils-gdb
|
695c6dfe7e85006b98c8b746f3fd5f913c94ebff
|
3.0734419943587815e+38
| 16 |
PR29370, infinite loop in display_debug_abbrev
The PR29370 testcase is a fuzzed object file with multiple
.trace_abbrev sections. Multiple .trace_abbrev or .debug_abbrev
sections are not a violation of the DWARF standard. The DWARF5
standard even gives an example of multiple .debug_abbrev sections
contained in groups. Caching and lookup of processed abbrevs thus
needs to be done by section and offset rather than base and offset.
(Why base anyway?) Or, since section contents are kept, by a pointer
into the contents.
PR 29370
* dwarf.c (struct abbrev_list): Replace abbrev_base and
abbrev_offset with raw field.
(find_abbrev_list_by_abbrev_offset): Delete.
(find_abbrev_list_by_raw_abbrev): New function.
(process_abbrev_set): Set list->raw and list->next.
(find_and_process_abbrev_set): Replace abbrev list lookup with
new function. Don't set list abbrev_base, abbrev_offset or next.
| 0 |
static int mov_read_elst(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int i, edit_count, version;
int64_t elst_entry_size;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1 || c->ignore_editlist)
return 0;
sc = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1]->priv_data;
version = avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
edit_count = avio_rb32(pb); /* entries */
atom.size -= 8;
elst_entry_size = version == 1 ? 20 : 12;
if (atom.size != edit_count * elst_entry_size) {
if (c->fc->strict_std_compliance >= FF_COMPLIANCE_STRICT) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid edit list entry_count: %d for elst atom of size: %"PRId64" bytes.\n",
edit_count, atom.size + 8);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
} else {
edit_count = atom.size / elst_entry_size;
if (edit_count * elst_entry_size != atom.size) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "ELST atom of %"PRId64" bytes, bigger than %d entries.\n", atom.size, edit_count);
}
}
}
if (!edit_count)
return 0;
if (sc->elst_data)
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Duplicated ELST atom\n");
av_free(sc->elst_data);
sc->elst_count = 0;
sc->elst_data = av_malloc_array(edit_count, sizeof(*sc->elst_data));
if (!sc->elst_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "track[%u].edit_count = %i\n", c->fc->nb_streams - 1, edit_count);
for (i = 0; i < edit_count && atom.size > 0 && !pb->eof_reached; i++) {
MOVElst *e = &sc->elst_data[i];
if (version == 1) {
e->duration = avio_rb64(pb);
e->time = avio_rb64(pb);
atom.size -= 16;
} else {
e->duration = avio_rb32(pb); /* segment duration */
e->time = (int32_t)avio_rb32(pb); /* media time */
atom.size -= 8;
}
e->rate = avio_rb32(pb) / 65536.0;
atom.size -= 4;
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "duration=%"PRId64" time=%"PRId64" rate=%f\n",
e->duration, e->time, e->rate);
if (e->time < 0 && e->time != -1 &&
c->fc->strict_std_compliance >= FF_COMPLIANCE_STRICT) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Track %d, edit %d: Invalid edit list media time=%"PRId64"\n",
c->fc->nb_streams-1, i, e->time);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
sc->elst_count = i;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
FFmpeg
|
c953baa084607dd1d84c3bfcce3cf6a87c3e6e05
|
2.7723576307275284e+37
| 68 |
avformat/mov: Check count sums in build_open_gop_key_points()
Fixes: ffmpeg.md
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: CVE-2022-2566
Found-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Found-by: 3pvd <3pvd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
| 0 |
static uint32_t hpet_in_legacy_mode(HPETState *s)
{
return s->config & HPET_CFG_LEGACY;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
3f1c49e2136fa08ab1ef3183fd55def308829584
|
7.625305524118037e+37
| 4 |
hpet: fix buffer overrun on invalid state load
CVE-2013-4527 hw/timer/hpet.c buffer overrun
hpet is a VARRAY with a uint8 size but static array of 32
To fix, make sure num_timers is valid using VMSTATE_VALID hook.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static inline u32 nfsd4_only_status_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
return (op_encode_hdr_size) * sizeof(__be32);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-129"
] |
linux
|
b550a32e60a4941994b437a8d662432a486235a5
|
2.5224903995047818e+38
| 4 |
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c:1262:34
shift exponent 128 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Depending on compiler+architecture, this may cause the check for
layout_type to succeed for overly large values (which seems to be the
case with amd64). The large value will be later used in de-referencing
nfsd4_layout_ops for function pointers.
Reported-by: Jani Tuovila <tuovila@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
[colin.king@canonical.com: use LAYOUT_TYPE_MAX instead of 32]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static struct socket *sockfd_lookup_light(int fd, int *err, int *fput_needed)
{
struct file *file;
struct socket *sock;
*err = -EBADF;
file = fget_light(fd, fput_needed);
if (file) {
sock = sock_from_file(file, err);
if (sock)
return sock;
fput_light(file, *fput_needed);
}
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux-2.6
|
644595f89620ba8446cc555be336d24a34464950
|
4.0154247587118725e+37
| 15 |
compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/socket.c
Use helper functions aware of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME to write struct
timeval and struct timespec to userspace in net/socket.c.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
| 0 |
static void jp2_write_url(opj_cio_t *cio, char *Idx_file)
{
OPJ_UINT32 i;
opj_jp2_box_t box;
box.init_pos = cio_tell(cio);
cio_skip(cio, 4);
cio_write(cio, JP2_URL, 4); /* DBTL */
cio_write(cio, 0, 1); /* VERS */
cio_write(cio, 0, 3); /* FLAG */
if (Idx_file) {
for (i = 0; i < strlen(Idx_file); i++) {
cio_write(cio, Idx_file[i], 1);
}
}
box.length = cio_tell(cio) - box.init_pos;
cio_seek(cio, box.init_pos);
cio_write(cio, box.length, 4); /* L */
cio_seek(cio, box.init_pos + box.length);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
openjpeg
|
4edb8c83374f52cd6a8f2c7c875e8ffacccb5fa5
|
1.2298374524172329e+38
| 22 |
Add support for generation of PLT markers in encoder
* -PLT switch added to opj_compress
* Add a opj_encoder_set_extra_options() function that
accepts a PLT=YES option, and could be expanded later
for other uses.
-------
Testing with a Sentinel2 10m band, T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2,
coming from S2A_MSIL1C_20160914T074612_N0204_R135_T36JTT_20160914T081456.SAFE
Decompress it to TIFF:
```
opj_uncompress -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 -o T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.tif
```
Recompress it with similar parameters as original:
```
opj_compress -n 5 -c [256,256],[256,256],[256,256],[256,256],[256,256] -t 1024,1024 -PLT -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.tif -o T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2
```
Dump codestream detail with GDAL dump_jp2.py utility (https://github.com/OSGeo/gdal/blob/master/gdal/swig/python/samples/dump_jp2.py)
```
python dump_jp2.py T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 > /tmp/dump_sentinel2_ori.txt
python dump_jp2.py T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 > /tmp/dump_sentinel2_openjpeg_plt.txt
```
The diff between both show very similar structure, and identical number of packets in PLT markers
Now testing with Kakadu (KDU803_Demo_Apps_for_Linux-x86-64_200210)
Full file decompression:
```
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 -o tmp.tif
Consumed 121 tile-part(s) from a total of 121 tile(s).
Consumed 80,318,806 codestream bytes (excluding any file format) = 5.329697
bits/pel.
Processed using the multi-threaded environment, with
8 parallel threads of execution
```
Partial decompresson (presumably using PLT markers):
```
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 -o tmp.pgm -region "{0.5,0.5},{0.01,0.01}"
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 -o tmp2.pgm -region "{0.5,0.5},{0.01,0.01}"
diff tmp.pgm tmp2.pgm && echo "same !"
```
-------
Funded by ESA for S2-MPC project
| 0 |
void set_personality_ia32(bool x32)
{
/* inherit personality from parent */
/* Make sure to be in 32bit mode */
set_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32);
/* Mark the associated mm as containing 32-bit tasks. */
if (x32) {
clear_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
set_thread_flag(TIF_X32);
if (current->mm)
current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_X32;
current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
/* is_compat_task() uses the presence of the x32
syscall bit flag to determine compat status */
current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
} else {
set_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32);
if (current->mm)
current->mm->context.ia32_compat = TIF_IA32;
current->personality |= force_personality32;
/* Prepare the first "return" to user space */
current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
f647d7c155f069c1a068030255c300663516420e
|
1.7922881536120377e+38
| 27 |
x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES
Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.
This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
gotchas in the code.
Before this patch, the both tests below failed. With this
patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.
----- begin es test -----
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
{
return (idx << 3) | 3;
}
static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
{
struct user_desc desc = {
.entry_number = idx,
.base_addr = base,
.limit = 0xfffff,
.seg_32bit = 1,
.contents = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
.read_exec_only = 0,
.limit_in_pages = 1,
.seg_not_present = 0,
.useable = 0,
};
if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &desc) != 0)
err(1, "set_thread_area");
return desc.entry_number;
}
int main()
{
int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);
unsigned short orig_es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));
int errors = 0;
int total = 1000;
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
usleep(100);
unsigned short es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
if (errors == 0)
printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
GDT3(idx), es);
errors++;
}
}
if (errors) {
printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
return 1;
} else {
printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
return 0;
}
}
----- end es test -----
----- begin gsbase test -----
/*
* gsbase.c, a gsbase test
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;
static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
{
unsigned char ret;
asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
return ret;
}
int main()
{
int errors = 0;
testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
*testptr = 0;
*testptr2 = 1;
if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
(unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
errors++;
}
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
errors++;
}
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
errors++;
}
return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
----- end gsbase test -----
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| 0 |
void generate_field(std::ofstream& out, const t_field* field) {
generate_field_name(out, field);
generate_field_value(out, field);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
thrift
|
cfaadcc4adcfde2a8232c62ec89870b73ef40df1
|
2.901023422639499e+38
| 4 |
THRIFT-3231 CPP: Limit recursion depth to 64
Client: cpp
Patch: Ben Craig <bencraig@apache.org>
| 0 |
static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
int slen;
/*
* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
* the appropriate error.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
return;
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
} else {
sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,
slen,
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
openssl
|
bb1a4866034255749ac578adb06a76335fc117b1
|
6.647140270980275e+37
| 23 |
Make message buffer slightly larger than message.
Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against
OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer
will be large enough already.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 006a788c84e541c8920dd2ad85fb62b52185c519)
| 0 |
void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
{
struct map_struct *buf;
OFF_T i, len = st_p->st_size;
md_context m;
int32 remainder;
int fd;
memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
return;
buf = map_file(fd, len, MAX_MAP_SIZE, CSUM_CHUNK);
switch (checksum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CSUM_CHUNK),
CSUM_CHUNK);
}
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0)
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
mdfour_begin(&m);
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK) {
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, CSUM_CHUNK),
CSUM_CHUNK);
}
/* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes. */
remainder = (int32)(len - i);
if (remainder > 0 || checksum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)map_ptr(buf, i, remainder), remainder);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
default:
rprintf(FERROR, "invalid checksum-choice for the --checksum option (%d)\n", checksum_type);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
close(fd);
unmap_file(buf);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-354"
] |
rsync
|
7b8a4ecd6ff9cdf4e5d3850ebf822f1e989255b3
|
2.9460110041619102e+38
| 60 |
Handle archaic checksums properly.
| 0 |
need_timeslice(struct intel_engine_cs *engine, const struct i915_request *rq)
{
int hint;
if (!intel_engine_has_timeslices(engine))
return false;
if (list_is_last(&rq->sched.link, &engine->active.requests))
return false;
hint = max(rq_prio(list_next_entry(rq, sched.link)),
engine->execlists.queue_priority_hint);
return hint >= effective_prio(rq);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux
|
bc8a76a152c5f9ef3b48104154a65a68a8b76946
|
2.8332260239915367e+37
| 15 |
drm/i915/gen9: Clear residual context state on context switch
Intel ID: PSIRT-TA-201910-001
CVEID: CVE-2019-14615
Intel GPU Hardware prior to Gen11 does not clear EU state
during a context switch. This can result in information
leakage between contexts.
For Gen8 and Gen9, hardware provides a mechanism for
fast cleardown of the EU state, by issuing a PIPE_CONTROL
with bit 27 set. We can use this in a context batch buffer
to explicitly cleardown the state on every context switch.
As this workaround is already in place for gen8, we can borrow
the code verbatim for Gen9.
Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Akeem G Abodunrin <akeem.g.abodunrin@intel.com>
Cc: Kumar Valsan Prathap <prathap.kumar.valsan@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris.p.wilson@intel.com>
Cc: Balestrieri Francesco <francesco.balestrieri@intel.com>
Cc: Bloomfield Jon <jon.bloomfield@intel.com>
Cc: Dutt Sudeep <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
| 0 |
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
int off=0, clr = 0;
SSL *con=NULL,*con2=NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
int s,k,width,state=0;
char *cbuf=NULL,*sbuf=NULL,*mbuf=NULL;
int cbuf_len,cbuf_off;
int sbuf_len,sbuf_off;
fd_set readfds,writefds;
short port=PORT;
int full_log=1;
char *host=SSL_HOST_NAME;
char *cert_file=NULL,*key_file=NULL;
int cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL,*cipher=NULL;
int reconnect=0,badop=0,verify=SSL_VERIFY_NONE,bugs=0;
int crlf=0;
int write_tty,read_tty,write_ssl,read_ssl,tty_on,ssl_pending;
SSL_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int ret=1,in_init=1,i,nbio_test=0;
int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
int prexit = 0, vflags = 0;
SSL_METHOD *meth=NULL;
#ifdef sock_type
#undef sock_type
#endif
int sock_type=SOCK_STREAM;
BIO *sbio;
char *inrand=NULL;
int mbuf_len=0;
struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
char *engine_id=NULL;
char *ssl_client_engine_id=NULL;
ENGINE *ssl_client_engine=NULL;
#endif
ENGINE *e=NULL;
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
struct timeval tv;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
char *servername = NULL;
tlsextctx tlsextcbp =
{NULL,0};
#endif
char *sess_in = NULL;
char *sess_out = NULL;
struct sockaddr peer;
int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
int fallback_scsv = 0;
int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
long socket_mtu = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
char *jpake_secret = NULL;
#endif
meth=SSLv23_client_method();
apps_startup();
c_Pause=0;
c_quiet=0;
c_ign_eof=0;
c_debug=0;
c_msg=0;
c_showcerts=0;
if (bio_err == NULL)
bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
goto end;
if ( ((cbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
((sbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
((mbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
goto end;
}
verify_depth=0;
verify_error=X509_V_OK;
#ifdef FIONBIO
c_nbio=0;
#endif
argc--;
argv++;
while (argc >= 1)
{
if (strcmp(*argv,"-host") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
host= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-port") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
port=atoi(*(++argv));
if (port == 0) goto bad;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-connect") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv),&host,NULL,&port))
goto bad;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-verify") == 0)
{
verify=SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
verify_depth=atoi(*(++argv));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify depth is %d\n",verify_depth);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cert") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
cert_file= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-sess_out") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
sess_out = *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-sess_in") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
sess_in = *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-certform") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crl_check") == 0)
vflags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crl_check_all") == 0)
vflags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-prexit") == 0)
prexit=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crlf") == 0)
crlf=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-quiet") == 0)
{
c_quiet=1;
c_ign_eof=1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ign_eof") == 0)
c_ign_eof=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ign_eof") == 0)
c_ign_eof=0;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-pause") == 0)
c_Pause=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-debug") == 0)
c_debug=1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-tlsextdebug") == 0)
c_tlsextdebug=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-status") == 0)
c_status_req=1;
#endif
#ifdef WATT32
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-wdebug") == 0)
dbug_init();
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-msg") == 0)
c_msg=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-showcerts") == 0)
c_showcerts=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nbio_test") == 0)
nbio_test=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-state") == 0)
state=1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
meth=SSLv2_client_method();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
meth=SSLv3_client_method();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
meth=TLSv1_client_method();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dtls1") == 0)
{
meth=DTLSv1_client_method();
sock_type=SOCK_DGRAM;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
{
fallback_scsv = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-timeout") == 0)
enable_timeouts=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-mtu") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
}
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
bugs=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-pass") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
passarg = *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-key") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
key_file= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-reconnect") == 0)
{
reconnect=5;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CApath") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
CApath= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CAfile") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
CAfile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_tls1") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ssl3") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ssl2") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0)
{ off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; }
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_server_connect") == 0)
{ off|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_legacy_server_connect") == 0)
{ clr|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
cipher= *(++argv);
}
#ifdef FIONBIO
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nbio") == 0)
{ c_nbio=1; }
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-starttls") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
++argv;
if (strcmp(*argv,"smtp") == 0)
starttls_proto = PROTO_SMTP;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"pop3") == 0)
starttls_proto = PROTO_POP3;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"imap") == 0)
starttls_proto = PROTO_IMAP;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"ftp") == 0)
starttls_proto = PROTO_FTP;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "xmpp") == 0)
starttls_proto = PROTO_XMPP;
else
goto bad;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-engine") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
engine_id = *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl_client_engine") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
ssl_client_engine_id = *(++argv);
}
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-rand") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
inrand= *(++argv);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-servername") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
servername= *(++argv);
/* meth=TLSv1_client_method(); */
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
jpake_secret = *++argv;
}
#endif
else
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
badop=1;
break;
}
argc--;
argv++;
}
if (badop)
{
bad:
sc_usage();
goto end;
}
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
SSL_load_error_strings();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
if (ssl_client_engine_id)
{
ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(ssl_client_engine_id);
if (!ssl_client_engine)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"Error getting client auth engine\n");
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
goto end;
}
if (key_file == NULL)
key_file = cert_file;
if (key_file)
{
key = load_key(bio_err, key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e,
"client certificate private key file");
if (!key)
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
if (cert_file)
{
cert = load_cert(bio_err,cert_file,cert_format,
NULL, e, "client certificate file");
if (!cert)
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL
&& !RAND_status())
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
}
if (inrand != NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_err,"%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
if (bio_c_out == NULL)
{
if (c_quiet && !c_debug && !c_msg)
{
bio_c_out=BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
}
else
{
if (bio_c_out == NULL)
bio_c_out=BIO_new_fp(stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE);
}
}
ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
if (ctx == NULL)
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (ssl_client_engine)
{
if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine))
{
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
goto end;
}
ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
}
#endif
if (bugs)
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,SSL_OP_ALL|off);
else
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,off);
if (clr)
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, clr);
/* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-(
* Setting read ahead solves this problem.
*/
if (sock_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback);
if (cipher != NULL)
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting cipher list\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
#if 0
else
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,getenv("SSL_CIPHER"));
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,verify,verify_callback);
if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,cert,key))
goto end;
if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx,CAfile,CApath)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)))
{
/* BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting default verify locations\n"); */
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
/* goto end; */
}
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{
tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err;
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
}
#endif
con=SSL_new(ctx);
if (sess_in)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r");
if (!stmp)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n",
sess_in);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL);
BIO_free(stmp);
if (!sess)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n",
sess_in);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
SSL_set_session(con, sess);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
if (fallback_scsv)
SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{
if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con,servername))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (con && (con->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL)
{
kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER, host);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* SSL_set_cipher_list(con,"RC4-MD5"); */
re_start:
if (init_client(&s,host,port,sock_type) == 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"connect:errno=%d\n",get_last_socket_error());
SHUTDOWN(s);
goto end;
}
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"CONNECTED(%08X)\n",s);
#ifdef FIONBIO
if (c_nbio)
{
unsigned long l=1;
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"turning on non blocking io\n");
if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s,FIONBIO,&l) < 0)
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (c_Pause & 0x01) con->debug=1;
if ( SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
{
sbio=BIO_new_dgram(s,BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (getsockname(s, &peer, (void *)&peerlen) < 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n",
get_last_socket_error());
SHUTDOWN(s);
goto end;
}
(void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, 1, &peer);
if ( enable_timeouts)
{
timeout.tv_sec = 0;
timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
timeout.tv_sec = 0;
timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
}
if (socket_mtu > 28)
{
SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
SSL_set_mtu(con, socket_mtu - 28);
}
else
/* want to do MTU discovery */
BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
}
else
sbio=BIO_new_socket(s,BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (nbio_test)
{
BIO *test;
test=BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
sbio=BIO_push(test,sbio);
}
if (c_debug)
{
con->debug=1;
BIO_set_callback(sbio,bio_dump_callback);
BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio,(char *)bio_c_out);
}
if (c_msg)
{
SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_out);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (c_tlsextdebug)
{
SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out);
}
if (c_status_req)
{
SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out);
#if 0
{
STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
OCSP_RESPID *id = OCSP_RESPID_new();
id->value.byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
id->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
ASN1_STRING_set(id->value.byKey, "Hello World", -1);
sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id);
SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids);
}
#endif
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
if (jpake_secret)
jpake_client_auth(bio_c_out, sbio, jpake_secret);
#endif
SSL_set_bio(con,sbio,sbio);
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
/* ok, lets connect */
width=SSL_get_fd(con)+1;
read_tty=1;
write_tty=0;
tty_on=0;
read_ssl=1;
write_ssl=1;
cbuf_len=0;
cbuf_off=0;
sbuf_len=0;
sbuf_off=0;
/* This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions */
/* We do have to handle multi-line responses which may come
in a single packet or not. We therefore have to use
BIO_gets() which does need a buffering BIO. So during
the initial chitchat we do push a buffering BIO into the
chain that is removed again later on to not disturb the
rest of the s_client operation. */
if (starttls_proto == PROTO_SMTP)
{
int foundit=0;
BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
/* wait for multi-line response to end from SMTP */
do
{
mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
}
while (mbuf_len>3 && mbuf[3]=='-');
/* STARTTLS command requires EHLO... */
BIO_printf(fbio,"EHLO openssl.client.net\r\n");
(void)BIO_flush(fbio);
/* wait for multi-line response to end EHLO SMTP response */
do
{
mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
if (strstr(mbuf,"STARTTLS"))
foundit=1;
}
while (mbuf_len>3 && mbuf[3]=='-');
(void)BIO_flush(fbio);
BIO_pop(fbio);
BIO_free(fbio);
if (!foundit)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"didn't found starttls in server response,"
" try anyway...\n");
BIO_printf(sbio,"STARTTLS\r\n");
BIO_read(sbio,sbuf,BUFSIZZ);
}
else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_POP3)
{
BIO_read(sbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
BIO_printf(sbio,"STLS\r\n");
BIO_read(sbio,sbuf,BUFSIZZ);
}
else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_IMAP)
{
int foundit=0;
BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
BIO_gets(fbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
/* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */
BIO_printf(fbio,". CAPABILITY\r\n");
(void)BIO_flush(fbio);
/* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */
do
{
mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
if (strstr(mbuf,"STARTTLS"))
foundit=1;
}
while (mbuf_len>3 && mbuf[0]!='.');
(void)BIO_flush(fbio);
BIO_pop(fbio);
BIO_free(fbio);
if (!foundit)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"didn't found STARTTLS in server response,"
" try anyway...\n");
BIO_printf(sbio,". STARTTLS\r\n");
BIO_read(sbio,sbuf,BUFSIZZ);
}
else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_FTP)
{
BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
/* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */
do
{
mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
}
while (mbuf_len>3 && mbuf[3]=='-');
(void)BIO_flush(fbio);
BIO_pop(fbio);
BIO_free(fbio);
BIO_printf(sbio,"AUTH TLS\r\n");
BIO_read(sbio,sbuf,BUFSIZZ);
}
if (starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP)
{
int seen = 0;
BIO_printf(sbio,"<stream:stream "
"xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' "
"xmlns='jabber:client' to='%s' version='1.0'>", host);
seen = BIO_read(sbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
mbuf[seen] = 0;
while (!strstr(mbuf, "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'"))
{
if (strstr(mbuf, "/stream:features>"))
goto shut;
seen = BIO_read(sbio,mbuf,BUFSIZZ);
mbuf[seen] = 0;
}
BIO_printf(sbio, "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>");
seen = BIO_read(sbio,sbuf,BUFSIZZ);
sbuf[seen] = 0;
if (!strstr(sbuf, "<proceed"))
goto shut;
mbuf[0] = 0;
}
for (;;)
{
FD_ZERO(&readfds);
FD_ZERO(&writefds);
if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
timeoutp = &timeout;
else
timeoutp = NULL;
if (SSL_in_init(con) && !SSL_total_renegotiations(con))
{
in_init=1;
tty_on=0;
}
else
{
tty_on=1;
if (in_init)
{
in_init=0;
if (sess_out)
{
BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w");
if (stmp)
{
PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, SSL_get_session(con));
BIO_free(stmp);
}
else
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n", sess_out);
}
print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,full_log);
if (full_log > 0) full_log--;
if (starttls_proto)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s",mbuf);
/* We don't need to know any more */
starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
}
if (reconnect)
{
reconnect--;
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"drop connection and then reconnect\n");
SSL_shutdown(con);
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con));
goto re_start;
}
}
}
ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_pending(con);
if (!ssl_pending)
{
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
if (tty_on)
{
if (read_tty) FD_SET(fileno(stdin),&readfds);
if (write_tty) FD_SET(fileno(stdout),&writefds);
}
if (read_ssl)
FD_SET(SSL_get_fd(con),&readfds);
if (write_ssl)
FD_SET(SSL_get_fd(con),&writefds);
#else
if(!tty_on || !write_tty) {
if (read_ssl)
FD_SET(SSL_get_fd(con),&readfds);
if (write_ssl)
FD_SET(SSL_get_fd(con),&writefds);
}
#endif
/* printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
/* Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter
* is currently of type (int *) whereas under other
* systems it is (void *) if you don't have a cast it
* will choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then
* you can either go for (int *) or (void *).
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
/* Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can
* always write to the tty: therefore if we need to
* write to the tty we just fall through. Otherwise
* we timeout the select every second and see if there
* are any keypresses. Note: this is a hack, in a proper
* Windows application we wouldn't do this.
*/
i=0;
if(!write_tty) {
if(read_tty) {
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
NULL,&tv);
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
if(!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty) ) continue;
#else
if(!i && (!((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0))) || !read_tty) ) continue;
#endif
} else i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
NULL,timeoutp);
}
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
if(!write_tty) {
if(read_tty) {
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
NULL,&tv);
} else i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
NULL,timeoutp);
}
#else
i=select(width,(void *)&readfds,(void *)&writefds,
NULL,timeoutp);
#endif
if ( i < 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad select %d\n",
get_last_socket_error());
goto shut;
/* goto end; */
}
}
if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"TIMEOUT occured\n");
}
if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con),&writefds))
{
k=SSL_write(con,&(cbuf[cbuf_off]),
(unsigned int)cbuf_len);
switch (SSL_get_error(con,k))
{
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
cbuf_off+=k;
cbuf_len-=k;
if (k <= 0) goto end;
/* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */
if (cbuf_len <= 0)
{
read_tty=1;
write_ssl=0;
}
else /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */
{
read_tty=0;
write_ssl=1;
}
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"write W BLOCK\n");
write_ssl=1;
read_tty=0;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"write R BLOCK\n");
write_tty=0;
read_ssl=1;
write_ssl=0;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"write X BLOCK\n");
break;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
if (cbuf_len != 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"shutdown\n");
goto shut;
}
else
{
read_tty=1;
write_ssl=0;
break;
}
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"write:errno=%d\n",
get_last_socket_error());
goto shut;
}
else
{
read_tty=1;
write_ssl=0;
}
break;
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto shut;
}
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
/* Assume Windows/DOS can always write */
else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty)
#else
else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout),&writefds))
#endif
{
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]),&(sbuf[sbuf_off]),sbuf_len);
#endif
i=write(fileno(stdout),&(sbuf[sbuf_off]),sbuf_len);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"DONE\n");
goto shut;
/* goto end; */
}
sbuf_len-=i;;
sbuf_off+=i;
if (sbuf_len <= 0)
{
read_ssl=1;
write_tty=0;
}
}
else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con),&readfds))
{
#ifdef RENEG
{ static int iiii; if (++iiii == 52) { SSL_renegotiate(con); iiii=0; } }
#endif
#if 1
k=SSL_read(con,sbuf,1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ );
#else
/* Demo for pending and peek :-) */
k=SSL_read(con,sbuf,16);
{ char zbuf[10240];
printf("read=%d pending=%d peek=%d\n",k,SSL_pending(con),SSL_peek(con,zbuf,10240));
}
#endif
switch (SSL_get_error(con,k))
{
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
if (k <= 0)
goto end;
sbuf_off=0;
sbuf_len=k;
read_ssl=0;
write_tty=1;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"read W BLOCK\n");
write_ssl=1;
read_tty=0;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"read R BLOCK\n");
write_tty=0;
read_ssl=1;
if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0))
write_ssl=1;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"read X BLOCK\n");
break;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"read:errno=%d\n",get_last_socket_error());
goto shut;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"closed\n");
goto shut;
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto shut;
/* break; */
}
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
else if (_kbhit())
#else
else if ((_kbhit()) || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 == WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0)))
#endif
#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
else if (_kbhit())
#else
else if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin),&readfds))
#endif
{
if (crlf)
{
int j, lf_num;
i=read(fileno(stdin),cbuf,BUFSIZZ/2);
lf_num = 0;
/* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
if (cbuf[j] == '\n')
lf_num++;
for (j = i-1; j >= 0; j--)
{
cbuf[j+lf_num] = cbuf[j];
if (cbuf[j] == '\n')
{
lf_num--;
i++;
cbuf[j+lf_num] = '\r';
}
}
assert(lf_num == 0);
}
else
i=read(fileno(stdin),cbuf,BUFSIZZ);
if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q')))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"DONE\n");
goto shut;
}
if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R'))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"RENEGOTIATING\n");
SSL_renegotiate(con);
cbuf_len=0;
}
else
{
cbuf_len=i;
cbuf_off=0;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i);
#endif
}
write_ssl=1;
read_tty=0;
}
}
shut:
SSL_shutdown(con);
SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con));
ret=0;
end:
if(prexit) print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,1);
if (con != NULL) SSL_free(con);
if (con2 != NULL) SSL_free(con2);
if (ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (key)
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
if (pass)
OPENSSL_free(pass);
if (cbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); }
if (sbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(sbuf); }
if (mbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(mbuf); }
if (bio_c_out != NULL)
{
BIO_free(bio_c_out);
bio_c_out=NULL;
}
apps_shutdown();
OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
c6a876473cbff0fd323c8abcaace98ee2d21863d
|
2.3462041075635662e+38
| 1,132 |
Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
| 0 |
Item_string(THD *thd, const char *name_par, const char *str, uint length,
CHARSET_INFO *cs, Derivation dv, uint repertoire):
Item_basic_constant(thd)
{
str_value.set_or_copy_aligned(str, length, cs);
fix_from_value(dv, Metadata(&str_value, repertoire));
set_name(thd, name_par, 0, system_charset_info);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772
|
7.6617826355763435e+37
| 8 |
MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <sergey.petrunya@mariadb.com>
| 0 |
PHPAPI void php_add_session_var(zend_string *name) /* {{{ */
{
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zval *sess_var = Z_REFVAL(PS(http_session_vars));
SEPARATE_ARRAY(sess_var);
if (!zend_hash_exists(Z_ARRVAL_P(sess_var), name)) {
zval empty_var;
ZVAL_NULL(&empty_var);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(sess_var), name, &empty_var);
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
php-src
|
d76f7c6c636b8240e06a1fa29eebb98ad005008a
|
1.992364882874259e+38
| 12 |
Fix bug #79221 - Null Pointer Dereference in PHP Session Upload Progress
| 0 |
static MonoMethodSignature*
method_builder_to_signature (MonoImage *image, MonoReflectionMethodBuilder *method) {
MonoMethodSignature *sig;
sig = parameters_to_signature (image, method->parameters);
sig->hasthis = method->attrs & METHOD_ATTRIBUTE_STATIC? 0: 1;
sig->ret = method->rtype? mono_reflection_type_get_handle ((MonoReflectionType*)method->rtype): &mono_defaults.void_class->byval_arg;
sig->generic_param_count = method->generic_params ? mono_array_length (method->generic_params) : 0;
return sig;
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mono
|
4905ef1130feb26c3150b28b97e4a96752e0d399
|
8.974250733407605e+37
| 9 |
Handle invalid instantiation of generic methods.
* verify.c: Add new function to internal verifier API to check
method instantiations.
* reflection.c (mono_reflection_bind_generic_method_parameters):
Check the instantiation before returning it.
Fixes #655847
| 0 |
dummy_symbol_get (location loc)
{
/* Incremented for each generated symbol. */
static int dummy_count = 0;
char buf[32];
int len = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "$@%d", ++dummy_count);
assure (len < sizeof buf);
symbol *sym = symbol_get (buf, loc);
sym->content->class = nterm_sym;
sym->content->number = nnterms++;
return sym;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
bison
|
b7aab2dbad43aaf14eebe78d54aafa245a000988
|
2.678319775850913e+38
| 12 |
fix: crash when redefining the EOF token
Reported by Agency for Defense Development.
https://lists.gnu.org/r/bug-bison/2020-08/msg00008.html
On an empty such as
%token FOO
BAR
FOO 0
%%
input: %empty
we crash because when we find FOO 0, we decrement ntokens (since FOO
was discovered to be EOF, which is already known to be a token, so we
increment ntokens for it, and need to cancel this). This "works well"
when EOF is properly defined in one go, but here it is first defined
and later only assign token code 0. In the meanwhile BAR was given
the token number that we just decremented.
To fix this, assign symbol numbers after parsing, not during parsing,
so that we also saw all the explicit token codes. To maintain the
current numbers (I'd like to keep no difference in the output, not
just equivalence), we need to make sure the symbols are numbered in
the same order: that of appearance in the source file. So we need the
locations to be correct, which was almost the case, except for nterms
that appeared several times as LHS (i.e., several times as "foo:
..."). Fixing the use of location_of_lhs sufficed (it appears it was
intended for this use, but its implementation was unfinished: it was
always set to "false" only).
* src/symtab.c (symbol_location_as_lhs_set): Update location_of_lhs.
(symbol_code_set): Remove broken hack that decremented ntokens.
(symbol_class_set, dummy_symbol_get): Don't set number, ntokens and
nnterms.
(symbol_check_defined): Do it.
(symbols): Don't count nsyms here.
Actually, don't count nsyms at all: let it be done in...
* src/reader.c (check_and_convert_grammar): here. Define nsyms from
ntokens and nnterms after parsing.
* tests/input.at (EOF redeclared): New.
* examples/c/bistromathic/bistromathic.test: Adjust the traces: in
"%nterm <double> exp %% input: ...", exp used to be numbered before
input.
| 1 |
static void ProcessRadioTxDone( void )
{
GetPhyParams_t getPhy;
PhyParam_t phyParam;
SetBandTxDoneParams_t txDone;
if( MacCtx.NvmCtx->DeviceClass != CLASS_C )
{
Radio.Sleep( );
}
// Setup timers
TimerSetValue( &MacCtx.RxWindowTimer1, MacCtx.RxWindow1Delay );
TimerStart( &MacCtx.RxWindowTimer1 );
TimerSetValue( &MacCtx.RxWindowTimer2, MacCtx.RxWindow2Delay );
TimerStart( &MacCtx.RxWindowTimer2 );
if( ( MacCtx.NvmCtx->DeviceClass == CLASS_C ) || ( MacCtx.NodeAckRequested == true ) )
{
getPhy.Attribute = PHY_ACK_TIMEOUT;
phyParam = RegionGetPhyParam( MacCtx.NvmCtx->Region, &getPhy );
TimerSetValue( &MacCtx.AckTimeoutTimer, MacCtx.RxWindow2Delay + phyParam.Value );
TimerStart( &MacCtx.AckTimeoutTimer );
}
// Store last Tx channel
MacCtx.NvmCtx->LastTxChannel = MacCtx.Channel;
// Update last tx done time for the current channel
txDone.Channel = MacCtx.Channel;
if( MacCtx.NvmCtx->NetworkActivation == ACTIVATION_TYPE_NONE )
{
txDone.Joined = false;
}
else
{
txDone.Joined = true;
}
txDone.LastTxDoneTime = TxDoneParams.CurTime;
RegionSetBandTxDone( MacCtx.NvmCtx->Region, &txDone );
// Update Aggregated last tx done time
MacCtx.NvmCtx->LastTxDoneTime = TxDoneParams.CurTime;
if( MacCtx.NodeAckRequested == false )
{
MacCtx.McpsConfirm.Status = LORAMAC_EVENT_INFO_STATUS_OK;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
LoRaMac-node
|
e3063a91daa7ad8a687223efa63079f0c24568e4
|
1.7515602232545126e+38
| 46 |
Added received buffer size checks.
| 0 |
/* {{{ PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION */
PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(date)
{
const timelib_tzdb *tzdb = DATE_TIMEZONEDB;
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_row(2, "date/time support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "\"Olson\" Timezone Database Version", tzdb->version);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Timezone Database", php_date_global_timezone_db_enabled ? "external" : "internal");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Default timezone", guess_timezone(tzdb TSRMLS_CC));
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
|
Safe
|
[] |
php-src
|
c377f1a715476934133f3254d1e0d4bf3743e2d2
|
5.189698096524784e+37
| 13 |
Fix bug #68942 (Use after free vulnerability in unserialize() with DateTimeZone)
| 0 |
static inline void ModulateHWB(const double percent_hue,
const double percent_whiteness,const double percent_blackness,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
blackness,
hue,
whiteness;
/*
Increase or decrease color blackness, whiteness, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToHWB(*red,*green,*blue,&hue,&whiteness,&blackness);
hue+=0.5*(0.01*percent_hue-1.0);
blackness*=0.01*percent_blackness;
whiteness*=0.01*percent_whiteness;
ConvertHWBToRGB(hue,whiteness,blackness,red,green,blue);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-835"
] |
ImageMagick
|
a80ee0ee1a083b4991d12ed4c07b7c7c5890f329
|
3.087234365779839e+38
| 18 |
https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31506
| 0 |
static inline MemoryRegion *address_space_translate_cached(
MemoryRegionCache *cache, hwaddr addr, hwaddr *xlat,
hwaddr *plen, bool is_write, MemTxAttrs attrs)
{
MemoryRegionSection section;
MemoryRegion *mr;
IOMMUMemoryRegion *iommu_mr;
AddressSpace *target_as;
assert(!cache->ptr);
*xlat = addr + cache->xlat;
mr = cache->mrs.mr;
iommu_mr = memory_region_get_iommu(mr);
if (!iommu_mr) {
/* MMIO region. */
return mr;
}
section = address_space_translate_iommu(iommu_mr, xlat, plen,
NULL, is_write, true,
&target_as, attrs);
return section.mr;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qemu
|
4bfb024bc76973d40a359476dc0291f46e435442
|
3.108322365832021e+38
| 24 |
memory: clamp cached translation in case it points to an MMIO region
In using the address_space_translate_internal API, address_space_cache_init
forgot one piece of advice that can be found in the code for
address_space_translate_internal:
/* MMIO registers can be expected to perform full-width accesses based only
* on their address, without considering adjacent registers that could
* decode to completely different MemoryRegions. When such registers
* exist (e.g. I/O ports 0xcf8 and 0xcf9 on most PC chipsets), MMIO
* regions overlap wildly. For this reason we cannot clamp the accesses
* here.
*
* If the length is small (as is the case for address_space_ldl/stl),
* everything works fine. If the incoming length is large, however,
* the caller really has to do the clamping through memory_access_size.
*/
address_space_cache_init is exactly one such case where "the incoming length
is large", therefore we need to clamp the resulting length---not to
memory_access_size though, since we are not doing an access yet, but to
the size of the resulting section. This ensures that subsequent accesses
to the cached MemoryRegionSection will be in range.
With this patch, the enclosed testcase notices that the used ring does
not fit into the MSI-X table and prints a "qemu-system-x86_64: Cannot map used"
error.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
const Tracing::CustomTagMap* ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStream::customTags() const {
return tracing_custom_tags_.get();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c
|
2.60824053154758e+37
| 3 |
http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount of data buffered.
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <mklein@lyft.com>
| 0 |
ath_tx_form_aggr(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_txq *txq,
struct ath_atx_tid *tid, struct list_head *bf_q,
struct ath_buf *bf_first, struct sk_buff_head *tid_q,
int *aggr_len)
{
#define PADBYTES(_len) ((4 - ((_len) % 4)) % 4)
struct ath_buf *bf = bf_first, *bf_prev = NULL;
int nframes = 0, ndelim;
u16 aggr_limit = 0, al = 0, bpad = 0,
al_delta, h_baw = tid->baw_size / 2;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info;
struct ath_frame_info *fi;
struct sk_buff *skb;
bool closed = false;
bf = bf_first;
aggr_limit = ath_lookup_rate(sc, bf, tid);
do {
skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
fi = get_frame_info(skb);
/* do not exceed aggregation limit */
al_delta = ATH_AGGR_DELIM_SZ + fi->framelen;
if (nframes) {
if (aggr_limit < al + bpad + al_delta ||
ath_lookup_legacy(bf) || nframes >= h_baw)
break;
tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(bf->bf_mpdu);
if ((tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_RATE_CTRL_PROBE) ||
!(tx_info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU))
break;
}
/* add padding for previous frame to aggregation length */
al += bpad + al_delta;
/*
* Get the delimiters needed to meet the MPDU
* density for this node.
*/
ndelim = ath_compute_num_delims(sc, tid, bf_first, fi->framelen,
!nframes);
bpad = PADBYTES(al_delta) + (ndelim << 2);
nframes++;
bf->bf_next = NULL;
/* link buffers of this frame to the aggregate */
if (!fi->baw_tracked)
ath_tx_addto_baw(sc, tid, bf);
bf->bf_state.ndelim = ndelim;
__skb_unlink(skb, tid_q);
list_add_tail(&bf->list, bf_q);
if (bf_prev)
bf_prev->bf_next = bf;
bf_prev = bf;
bf = ath_tx_get_tid_subframe(sc, txq, tid, &tid_q);
if (!bf) {
closed = true;
break;
}
} while (ath_tid_has_buffered(tid));
bf = bf_first;
bf->bf_lastbf = bf_prev;
if (bf == bf_prev) {
al = get_frame_info(bf->bf_mpdu)->framelen;
bf->bf_state.bf_type = BUF_AMPDU;
} else {
TX_STAT_INC(txq->axq_qnum, a_aggr);
}
*aggr_len = al;
return closed;
#undef PADBYTES
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-241"
] |
linux
|
21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8
|
3.1148372481566332e+38
| 83 |
ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
| 0 |
static int seed_from_timestamp_and_pid(uint32_t *seed) {
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
/* XOR of seconds and microseconds */
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
*seed = (uint32_t)tv.tv_sec ^ (uint32_t)tv.tv_usec;
#else
/* Seconds only */
*seed = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
#endif
/* XOR with PID for more randomness */
#if defined(_WIN32)
*seed ^= (uint32_t)_getpid();
#elif defined(HAVE_GETPID)
*seed ^= (uint32_t)getpid();
#endif
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
jansson
|
8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
2.2424559478255432e+38
| 20 |
CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
| 0 |
static int equal_email(const unsigned char *a, size_t a_len,
const unsigned char *b, size_t b_len,
unsigned int unused_flags)
{
size_t i = a_len;
if (a_len != b_len)
return 0;
/*
* We search backwards for the '@' character, so that we do not have to
* deal with quoted local-parts. The domain part is compared in a
* case-insensitive manner.
*/
while (i > 0) {
--i;
if (a[i] == '@' || b[i] == '@') {
if (!equal_nocase(a + i, a_len - i, b + i, a_len - i, 0))
return 0;
break;
}
}
if (i == 0)
i = a_len;
return equal_case(a, i, b, i, 0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
openssl
|
bb4d2ed4091408404e18b3326e3df67848ef63d0
|
1.1576833750550065e+38
| 24 |
Fix append_ia5 function to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
| 0 |
composite_setup(struct usb_gadget *gadget, const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl)
{
struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = get_gadget_data(gadget);
struct usb_request *req = cdev->req;
int value = -EOPNOTSUPP;
int status = 0;
u16 w_index = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wIndex);
u8 intf = w_index & 0xFF;
u16 w_value = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wValue);
u16 w_length = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wLength);
struct usb_function *f = NULL;
u8 endp;
if (w_length > USB_COMP_EP0_BUFSIZ) {
if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) {
/* Cast away the const, we are going to overwrite on purpose. */
__le16 *temp = (__le16 *)&ctrl->wLength;
*temp = cpu_to_le16(USB_COMP_EP0_BUFSIZ);
w_length = USB_COMP_EP0_BUFSIZ;
} else {
goto done;
}
}
/* partial re-init of the response message; the function or the
* gadget might need to intercept e.g. a control-OUT completion
* when we delegate to it.
*/
req->zero = 0;
req->context = cdev;
req->complete = composite_setup_complete;
req->length = 0;
gadget->ep0->driver_data = cdev;
/*
* Don't let non-standard requests match any of the cases below
* by accident.
*/
if ((ctrl->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_MASK) != USB_TYPE_STANDARD)
goto unknown;
switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
/* we handle all standard USB descriptors */
case USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR:
if (ctrl->bRequestType != USB_DIR_IN)
goto unknown;
switch (w_value >> 8) {
case USB_DT_DEVICE:
cdev->desc.bNumConfigurations =
count_configs(cdev, USB_DT_DEVICE);
cdev->desc.bMaxPacketSize0 =
cdev->gadget->ep0->maxpacket;
if (gadget_is_superspeed(gadget)) {
if (gadget->speed >= USB_SPEED_SUPER) {
cdev->desc.bcdUSB = cpu_to_le16(0x0320);
cdev->desc.bMaxPacketSize0 = 9;
} else {
cdev->desc.bcdUSB = cpu_to_le16(0x0210);
}
} else {
if (gadget->lpm_capable)
cdev->desc.bcdUSB = cpu_to_le16(0x0201);
else
cdev->desc.bcdUSB = cpu_to_le16(0x0200);
}
value = min(w_length, (u16) sizeof cdev->desc);
memcpy(req->buf, &cdev->desc, value);
break;
case USB_DT_DEVICE_QUALIFIER:
if (!gadget_is_dualspeed(gadget) ||
gadget->speed >= USB_SPEED_SUPER)
break;
device_qual(cdev);
value = min_t(int, w_length,
sizeof(struct usb_qualifier_descriptor));
break;
case USB_DT_OTHER_SPEED_CONFIG:
if (!gadget_is_dualspeed(gadget) ||
gadget->speed >= USB_SPEED_SUPER)
break;
fallthrough;
case USB_DT_CONFIG:
value = config_desc(cdev, w_value);
if (value >= 0)
value = min(w_length, (u16) value);
break;
case USB_DT_STRING:
value = get_string(cdev, req->buf,
w_index, w_value & 0xff);
if (value >= 0)
value = min(w_length, (u16) value);
break;
case USB_DT_BOS:
if (gadget_is_superspeed(gadget) ||
gadget->lpm_capable) {
value = bos_desc(cdev);
value = min(w_length, (u16) value);
}
break;
case USB_DT_OTG:
if (gadget_is_otg(gadget)) {
struct usb_configuration *config;
int otg_desc_len = 0;
if (cdev->config)
config = cdev->config;
else
config = list_first_entry(
&cdev->configs,
struct usb_configuration, list);
if (!config)
goto done;
if (gadget->otg_caps &&
(gadget->otg_caps->otg_rev >= 0x0200))
otg_desc_len += sizeof(
struct usb_otg20_descriptor);
else
otg_desc_len += sizeof(
struct usb_otg_descriptor);
value = min_t(int, w_length, otg_desc_len);
memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value);
}
break;
}
break;
/* any number of configs can work */
case USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION:
if (ctrl->bRequestType != 0)
goto unknown;
if (gadget_is_otg(gadget)) {
if (gadget->a_hnp_support)
DBG(cdev, "HNP available\n");
else if (gadget->a_alt_hnp_support)
DBG(cdev, "HNP on another port\n");
else
VDBG(cdev, "HNP inactive\n");
}
spin_lock(&cdev->lock);
value = set_config(cdev, ctrl, w_value);
spin_unlock(&cdev->lock);
break;
case USB_REQ_GET_CONFIGURATION:
if (ctrl->bRequestType != USB_DIR_IN)
goto unknown;
if (cdev->config)
*(u8 *)req->buf = cdev->config->bConfigurationValue;
else
*(u8 *)req->buf = 0;
value = min(w_length, (u16) 1);
break;
/* function drivers must handle get/set altsetting */
case USB_REQ_SET_INTERFACE:
if (ctrl->bRequestType != USB_RECIP_INTERFACE)
goto unknown;
if (!cdev->config || intf >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES)
break;
f = cdev->config->interface[intf];
if (!f)
break;
/*
* If there's no get_alt() method, we know only altsetting zero
* works. There is no need to check if set_alt() is not NULL
* as we check this in usb_add_function().
*/
if (w_value && !f->get_alt)
break;
spin_lock(&cdev->lock);
value = f->set_alt(f, w_index, w_value);
if (value == USB_GADGET_DELAYED_STATUS) {
DBG(cdev,
"%s: interface %d (%s) requested delayed status\n",
__func__, intf, f->name);
cdev->delayed_status++;
DBG(cdev, "delayed_status count %d\n",
cdev->delayed_status);
}
spin_unlock(&cdev->lock);
break;
case USB_REQ_GET_INTERFACE:
if (ctrl->bRequestType != (USB_DIR_IN|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE))
goto unknown;
if (!cdev->config || intf >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES)
break;
f = cdev->config->interface[intf];
if (!f)
break;
/* lots of interfaces only need altsetting zero... */
value = f->get_alt ? f->get_alt(f, w_index) : 0;
if (value < 0)
break;
*((u8 *)req->buf) = value;
value = min(w_length, (u16) 1);
break;
case USB_REQ_GET_STATUS:
if (gadget_is_otg(gadget) && gadget->hnp_polling_support &&
(w_index == OTG_STS_SELECTOR)) {
if (ctrl->bRequestType != (USB_DIR_IN |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE))
goto unknown;
*((u8 *)req->buf) = gadget->host_request_flag;
value = 1;
break;
}
/*
* USB 3.0 additions:
* Function driver should handle get_status request. If such cb
* wasn't supplied we respond with default value = 0
* Note: function driver should supply such cb only for the
* first interface of the function
*/
if (!gadget_is_superspeed(gadget))
goto unknown;
if (ctrl->bRequestType != (USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE))
goto unknown;
value = 2; /* This is the length of the get_status reply */
put_unaligned_le16(0, req->buf);
if (!cdev->config || intf >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES)
break;
f = cdev->config->interface[intf];
if (!f)
break;
status = f->get_status ? f->get_status(f) : 0;
if (status < 0)
break;
put_unaligned_le16(status & 0x0000ffff, req->buf);
break;
/*
* Function drivers should handle SetFeature/ClearFeature
* (FUNCTION_SUSPEND) request. function_suspend cb should be supplied
* only for the first interface of the function
*/
case USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE:
case USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE:
if (!gadget_is_superspeed(gadget))
goto unknown;
if (ctrl->bRequestType != (USB_DIR_OUT | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE))
goto unknown;
switch (w_value) {
case USB_INTRF_FUNC_SUSPEND:
if (!cdev->config || intf >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES)
break;
f = cdev->config->interface[intf];
if (!f)
break;
value = 0;
if (f->func_suspend)
value = f->func_suspend(f, w_index >> 8);
if (value < 0) {
ERROR(cdev,
"func_suspend() returned error %d\n",
value);
value = 0;
}
break;
}
break;
default:
unknown:
/*
* OS descriptors handling
*/
if (cdev->use_os_string && cdev->os_desc_config &&
(ctrl->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_VENDOR) &&
ctrl->bRequest == cdev->b_vendor_code) {
struct usb_configuration *os_desc_cfg;
u8 *buf;
int interface;
int count = 0;
req = cdev->os_desc_req;
req->context = cdev;
req->complete = composite_setup_complete;
buf = req->buf;
os_desc_cfg = cdev->os_desc_config;
w_length = min_t(u16, w_length, USB_COMP_EP0_OS_DESC_BUFSIZ);
memset(buf, 0, w_length);
buf[5] = 0x01;
switch (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_RECIP_MASK) {
case USB_RECIP_DEVICE:
if (w_index != 0x4 || (w_value >> 8))
break;
buf[6] = w_index;
/* Number of ext compat interfaces */
count = count_ext_compat(os_desc_cfg);
buf[8] = count;
count *= 24; /* 24 B/ext compat desc */
count += 16; /* header */
put_unaligned_le32(count, buf);
value = w_length;
if (w_length > 0x10) {
value = fill_ext_compat(os_desc_cfg, buf);
value = min_t(u16, w_length, value);
}
break;
case USB_RECIP_INTERFACE:
if (w_index != 0x5 || (w_value >> 8))
break;
interface = w_value & 0xFF;
if (interface >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES ||
!os_desc_cfg->interface[interface])
break;
buf[6] = w_index;
count = count_ext_prop(os_desc_cfg,
interface);
put_unaligned_le16(count, buf + 8);
count = len_ext_prop(os_desc_cfg,
interface);
put_unaligned_le32(count, buf);
value = w_length;
if (w_length > 0x0A) {
value = fill_ext_prop(os_desc_cfg,
interface, buf);
if (value >= 0)
value = min_t(u16, w_length, value);
}
break;
}
goto check_value;
}
VDBG(cdev,
"non-core control req%02x.%02x v%04x i%04x l%d\n",
ctrl->bRequestType, ctrl->bRequest,
w_value, w_index, w_length);
/* functions always handle their interfaces and endpoints...
* punt other recipients (other, WUSB, ...) to the current
* configuration code.
*/
if (cdev->config) {
list_for_each_entry(f, &cdev->config->functions, list)
if (f->req_match &&
f->req_match(f, ctrl, false))
goto try_fun_setup;
} else {
struct usb_configuration *c;
list_for_each_entry(c, &cdev->configs, list)
list_for_each_entry(f, &c->functions, list)
if (f->req_match &&
f->req_match(f, ctrl, true))
goto try_fun_setup;
}
f = NULL;
switch (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_RECIP_MASK) {
case USB_RECIP_INTERFACE:
if (!cdev->config || intf >= MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES)
break;
f = cdev->config->interface[intf];
break;
case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
if (!cdev->config)
break;
endp = ((w_index & 0x80) >> 3) | (w_index & 0x0f);
list_for_each_entry(f, &cdev->config->functions, list) {
if (test_bit(endp, f->endpoints))
break;
}
if (&f->list == &cdev->config->functions)
f = NULL;
break;
}
try_fun_setup:
if (f && f->setup)
value = f->setup(f, ctrl);
else {
struct usb_configuration *c;
c = cdev->config;
if (!c)
goto done;
/* try current config's setup */
if (c->setup) {
value = c->setup(c, ctrl);
goto done;
}
/* try the only function in the current config */
if (!list_is_singular(&c->functions))
goto done;
f = list_first_entry(&c->functions, struct usb_function,
list);
if (f->setup)
value = f->setup(f, ctrl);
}
goto done;
}
check_value:
/* respond with data transfer before status phase? */
if (value >= 0 && value != USB_GADGET_DELAYED_STATUS) {
req->length = value;
req->context = cdev;
req->zero = value < w_length;
value = composite_ep0_queue(cdev, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (value < 0) {
DBG(cdev, "ep_queue --> %d\n", value);
req->status = 0;
composite_setup_complete(gadget->ep0, req);
}
} else if (value == USB_GADGET_DELAYED_STATUS && w_length != 0) {
WARN(cdev,
"%s: Delayed status not supported for w_length != 0",
__func__);
}
done:
/* device either stalls (value < 0) or reports success */
return value;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
75e5b4849b81e19e9efe1654b30d7f3151c33c2c
|
2.16734993810273e+38
| 425 |
USB: gadget: validate interface OS descriptor requests
Stall the control endpoint in case provided index exceeds array size of
MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES or when the retrieved function pointer is null.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| 0 |
static void test_store_result2()
{
MYSQL_STMT *stmt;
int rc;
int nData;
ulong length;
MYSQL_BIND my_bind[1];
char query[MAX_TEST_QUERY_LENGTH];
myheader("test_store_result2");
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS test_store_result");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "CREATE TABLE test_store_result(col1 int , col2 varchar(50))");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "INSERT INTO test_store_result VALUES(10, 'venu'), (20, 'mysql')");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "INSERT INTO test_store_result(col2) VALUES('monty')");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_commit(mysql);
myquery(rc);
/*
We need to memset bind structure because mysql_stmt_bind_param checks all
its members.
*/
memset(my_bind, 0, sizeof(my_bind));
my_bind[0].buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG;
my_bind[0].buffer= (void *) &nData; /* integer data */
my_bind[0].length= &length;
my_bind[0].is_null= 0;
strmov((char *)query , "SELECT col1 FROM test_store_result where col1= ?");
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, query);
check_stmt(stmt);
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_param(stmt, my_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_result(stmt, my_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
nData= 10; length= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
nData= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_store_result(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
if (!opt_silent)
fprintf(stdout, "\n row 1: %d", nData);
DIE_UNLESS(nData == 10);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == MYSQL_NO_DATA);
nData= 20;
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
nData= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_store_result(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
if (!opt_silent)
fprintf(stdout, "\n row 1: %d", nData);
DIE_UNLESS(nData == 20);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == MYSQL_NO_DATA);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
mysql-server
|
4797ea0b772d5f4c5889bc552424132806f46e93
|
2.419407573341557e+38
| 84 |
BUG#17512527: LIST HANDLING INCORRECT IN MYSQL_PRUNE_STMT_LIST()
Analysis:
---------
Invalid memory access maybe observed when using prepared statements if:
a) The mysql client connection is lost after statement preparation
is complete and
b) There is at least one statement which is in initialized state but
not prepared yet.
When the client detects a closed connection, it calls end_server()
to shutdown the connection. As part of the clean up, the
mysql_prune_stmt_list() removes the statements which has transitioned
beyond the initialized state and retains only the statements which
are in a initialized state. During this processing, the initialized
statements are moved from 'mysql->stmts' to a temporary 'pruned_list'.
When moving the first 'INIT_DONE' element to the pruned_list,
'element->next' is set to NULL. Hence the rest of the list is never
traversed and the statements which have transitioned beyond the
initialized state are never invalidated.
When the mysql_stmt_close() is called for the statement which is not
invalidated; the statements list is updated in order to remove the
statement. This would end up accessing freed memory(freed by the
mysql_stmt_close() for a previous statement in the list).
Fix:
---
mysql_prune_stmt_list() called list_add() incorrectly to create a
temporary list. The use case of list_add() is to add a single
element to the front of the doubly linked list.
mysql_prune_stmt_list() called list_add() by passing an entire
list as the 'element'.
mysql_prune_stmt_list() now uses list_delete() to remove the
statement which has transitioned beyond the initialized phase.
Thus the statement list would contain only elements where the
the state of the statement is initialized.
Note: Run the test with valgrind-mysqltest and leak-check=full
option to see the invalid memory access.
| 0 |
long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
return (0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
openssl
|
86f8fb0e344d62454f8daf3e15236b2b59210756
|
6.970154383206869e+37
| 4 |
Fix reachable assert in SSLv2 servers.
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
| 0 |
static int set_delay_drop(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev)
{
int err = 0;
mutex_lock(&dev->delay_drop.lock);
if (dev->delay_drop.activate)
goto out;
err = mlx5_core_set_delay_drop(dev->mdev, dev->delay_drop.timeout);
if (err)
goto out;
dev->delay_drop.activate = true;
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->delay_drop.lock);
if (!err)
atomic_inc(&dev->delay_drop.rqs_cnt);
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
1.17895191414221e+37
| 20 |
IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
| 0 |
*/
bool skb_try_coalesce(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from,
bool *fragstolen, int *delta_truesize)
{
int i, delta, len = from->len;
*fragstolen = false;
if (skb_cloned(to))
return false;
if (len <= skb_tailroom(to)) {
if (len)
BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(from, 0, skb_put(to, len), len));
*delta_truesize = 0;
return true;
}
if (skb_has_frag_list(to) || skb_has_frag_list(from))
return false;
if (skb_headlen(from) != 0) {
struct page *page;
unsigned int offset;
if (skb_shinfo(to)->nr_frags +
skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return false;
if (skb_head_is_locked(from))
return false;
delta = from->truesize - SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct sk_buff));
page = virt_to_head_page(from->head);
offset = from->data - (unsigned char *)page_address(page);
skb_fill_page_desc(to, skb_shinfo(to)->nr_frags,
page, offset, skb_headlen(from));
*fragstolen = true;
} else {
if (skb_shinfo(to)->nr_frags +
skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags > MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return false;
delta = from->truesize - SKB_TRUESIZE(skb_end_offset(from));
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(delta < len);
memcpy(skb_shinfo(to)->frags + skb_shinfo(to)->nr_frags,
skb_shinfo(from)->frags,
skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags * sizeof(skb_frag_t));
skb_shinfo(to)->nr_frags += skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags;
if (!skb_cloned(from))
skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags = 0;
/* if the skb is not cloned this does nothing
* since we set nr_frags to 0.
*/
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags; i++)
skb_frag_ref(from, i);
to->truesize += delta;
to->len += len;
to->data_len += len;
*delta_truesize = delta;
return true;
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
1.301446217129872e+38
| 70 |
tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
int managesieve_parser_finish_line
(struct managesieve_parser *parser, unsigned int count,
enum managesieve_parser_flags flags, const struct managesieve_arg **args_r)
{
const unsigned char *data;
size_t data_size;
int ret;
ret = managesieve_parser_read_args(parser, count, flags, args_r);
if (ret == -2) {
/* we should have noticed end of everything except atom */
if (parser->cur_type == ARG_PARSE_ATOM) {
data = i_stream_get_data(parser->input, &data_size);
managesieve_parser_save_arg(parser, data, data_size);
}
}
return finish_line(parser, count, args_r);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
pigeonhole
|
7ce9990a5e6ba59e89b7fe1c07f574279aed922c
|
6.661729742255613e+37
| 18 |
lib-managesieve: Don't accept strings with NULs
ManageSieve doesn't allow NULs in strings.
This fixes a bug with unescaping a string with NULs: str_unescape() could
have been called for memory that points outside the allocated string,
causing heap corruption. This could cause crashes or theoretically even
result in remote code execution exploit.
Found by Nick Roessler and Rafi Rubin
| 0 |
static void crypto_rng_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
seq_printf(m, "type : rng\n");
seq_printf(m, "seedsize : %u\n", alg->cra_rng.seedsize);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
linux
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
2.357965552854577e+37
| 5 |
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| 0 |
static void ev_stream_submitted(h2_proxy_session *session, int stream_id,
const char *msg)
{
switch (session->state) {
case H2_PROXYS_ST_IDLE:
case H2_PROXYS_ST_WAIT:
transit(session, "stream submitted", H2_PROXYS_ST_BUSY);
break;
default:
/* nop */
break;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-770"
] |
mod_h2
|
dd05d49abe0f67512ce9ed5ba422d7711effecfb
|
2.8394941640693685e+38
| 13 |
* fixes Timeout vs. KeepAliveTimeout behaviour, see PR 63534 (for trunk now,
mpm event backport to 2.4.x up for vote).
* Fixes stream cleanup when connection throttling is in place.
* Counts stream resets by client on streams initiated by client as cause
for connection throttling.
* Header length checks are now logged similar to HTTP/1.1 protocol handler (thanks @mkaufmann)
* Header length is checked also on the merged value from several header instances
and results in a 431 response.
| 0 |
static int on_invalid_frame_recv_cb(nghttp2_session *ngh2,
const nghttp2_frame *frame,
int error, void *userp)
{
h2_session *session = (h2_session *)userp;
(void)ngh2;
if (APLOGcdebug(session->c)) {
char buffer[256];
h2_util_frame_print(frame, buffer, sizeof(buffer)/sizeof(buffer[0]));
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, session->c,
H2_SSSN_LOG(APLOGNO(03063), session,
"recv invalid FRAME[%s], frames=%ld/%ld (r/s)"),
buffer, (long)session->frames_received,
(long)session->frames_sent);
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
mod_h2
|
5e75e5685dd043fe93a5a08a15edd087a43f6968
|
9.086646061537201e+37
| 19 |
v1.11.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* connection IO event handling reworked. Instead of reacting on incoming bytes, the
state machine now acts on incoming frames that are affecting it. This reduces
state transitions.
* pytest suite now covers some basic tests on h2 selection, GET and POST
* started to add pytest suite from existing bash tests
| 0 |
TEST_F(Http1ClientConnectionImplTest, SimpleGet) {
initialize();
MockResponseDecoder response_decoder;
Http::RequestEncoder& request_encoder = codec_->newStream(response_decoder);
std::string output;
ON_CALL(connection_, write(_, _)).WillByDefault(AddBufferToString(&output));
TestRequestHeaderMapImpl headers{{":method", "GET"}, {":path", "/"}};
request_encoder.encodeHeaders(headers, true);
EXPECT_EQ("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\n\r\n", output);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-770"
] |
envoy
|
7ca28ff7d46454ae930e193d97b7d08156b1ba59
|
1.210061564939194e+37
| 13 |
[http1] Include request URL in request header size computation, and reject partial headers that exceed configured limits (#145)
Signed-off-by: antonio <avd@google.com>
| 0 |
ldns_rr_list_rr_count(const ldns_rr_list *rr_list)
{
if (rr_list) {
return rr_list->_rr_count;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-415"
] |
ldns
|
070b4595981f48a21cc6b4f5047fdc2d09d3da91
|
1.8802411189598215e+38
| 8 |
CAA and URI
| 0 |
static int brcmf_cfg80211_set_pmk(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
const struct cfg80211_pmk_conf *conf)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "enter\n");
/* expect using firmware supplicant for 1X */
ifp = netdev_priv(dev);
if (WARN_ON(ifp->vif->profile.use_fwsup != BRCMF_PROFILE_FWSUP_1X))
return -EINVAL;
return brcmf_set_pmk(ifp, conf->pmk, conf->pmk_len);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c
|
2.713839117161889e+38
| 14 |
brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
long n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n2s(p,i);
param_len+=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
param_len=3;
if ((param_len > n) ||
(*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
if ((param_len > n) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
int num;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
/* let's do ECDSA */
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
/* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
openssl
|
edc032b5e3f3ebb1006a9c89e0ae00504f47966f
|
2.315731255756958e+38
| 509 |
Add SRP support.
| 1 |
runChecks(T& source,bool reduceMemory,bool reduceTime)
{
//
// multipart test: also grab the type of the first part to
// check which other tests are expected to fail
//
string firstPartType;
bool threw = false;
{
try
{
MultiPartInputFile multi(source);
firstPartType = multi.header(0).type();
threw = readMultiPart(multi , reduceMemory , reduceTime);
}
catch(...)
{
threw = true;
}
}
{
bool gotThrow = false;
resetInput(source);
try
{
RgbaInputFile rgba(source);
gotThrow = readRgba( rgba, reduceMemory , reduceTime );
}
catch(...)
{
gotThrow = true;
}
if (gotThrow && firstPartType != DEEPTILE)
{
threw = true;
}
}
{
bool gotThrow = false;
resetInput(source);
try
{
InputFile rgba(source);
gotThrow = readScanline( rgba, reduceMemory , reduceTime );
}
catch(...)
{
gotThrow = true;
}
if (gotThrow && firstPartType != DEEPTILE)
{
threw = true;
}
}
{
bool gotThrow = false;
resetInput(source);
try
{
TiledInputFile rgba(source);
gotThrow = readTile( rgba, reduceMemory , reduceTime );
}
catch(...)
{
gotThrow = true;
}
if (gotThrow && firstPartType == TILEDIMAGE)
{
threw = true;
}
}
{
bool gotThrow = false;
resetInput(source);
try
{
DeepScanLineInputFile rgba(source);
gotThrow = readDeepScanLine( rgba, reduceMemory , reduceTime );
}
catch(...)
{
gotThrow = true;
}
if (gotThrow && firstPartType == DEEPSCANLINE)
{
threw = true;
}
}
{
bool gotThrow = false;
resetInput(source);
try
{
DeepTiledInputFile rgba(source);
gotThrow = readDeepTile( rgba, reduceMemory , reduceTime );
}
catch(...)
{
gotThrow = true;
}
if (gotThrow && firstPartType == DEEPTILE)
{
threw = true;
}
}
return threw;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
openexr
|
ae6d203892cc9311917a7f4f05354ef792b3e58e
|
2.8030878906053563e+38
| 111 |
Handle xsampling and bad seekg() calls in exrcheck (#872)
* fix exrcheck xsampling!=1
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz>
* fix handling bad seekg() calls in exrcheck
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz>
* fix deeptile detection in multipart files
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <peterh@wetafx.co.nz>
| 0 |
flatpak_proxy_set_log_messages (FlatpakProxy *proxy,
gboolean log)
{
proxy->log_messages = log;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-436"
] |
flatpak
|
52346bf187b5a7f1c0fe9075b328b7ad6abe78f6
|
3.3826531675416623e+38
| 5 |
Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
| 0 |
static int caif_seqpkt_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
int buffer_size;
int ret = 0;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
int noblock;
long timeo;
caif_assert(cf_sk);
ret = sock_error(sk);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto err;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_namelen)
goto err;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(msg->msg_iov->iov_base == NULL))
goto err;
noblock = msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, noblock);
timeo = caif_wait_for_flow_on(container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk),
1, timeo, &ret);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = -EPIPE;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_state != CAIF_CONNECTED ||
sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
goto err;
/* Error if trying to write more than maximum frame size. */
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > cf_sk->maxframe && cf_sk->sk.sk_protocol != CAIFPROTO_RFM)
goto err;
buffer_size = len + cf_sk->headroom + cf_sk->tailroom;
ret = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, buffer_size, noblock, &ret);
if (!skb || skb_tailroom(skb) < buffer_size)
goto err;
skb_reserve(skb, cf_sk->headroom);
ret = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = transmit_skb(skb, cf_sk, noblock, timeo);
if (ret < 0)
/* skb is already freed */
return ret;
return len;
err:
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
2d6fbfe733f35c6b355c216644e08e149c61b271
|
9.324009705205202e+37
| 69 |
caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
cmsHPROFILE CMSEXPORT cmsOpenProfileFromFile(const char *ICCProfile, const char *sAccess)
{
return cmsOpenProfileFromFileTHR(NULL, ICCProfile, sAccess);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
Little-CMS
|
d2d902b9a03583ae482c782b2f243f7e5268a47d
|
1.827548892858446e+38
| 4 |
>Changes from Richard Hughes
| 0 |
untrusted_launcher_response_callback (GtkDialog *dialog,
int response_id,
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters)
{
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
GFile *file;
switch (response_id) {
case RESPONSE_RUN:
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (parameters->file);
nautilus_debug_log (FALSE, NAUTILUS_DEBUG_LOG_DOMAIN_USER,
"directory view activate_callback launch_desktop_file window=%p: %s",
parameters->parent_window, uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
break;
case RESPONSE_MARK_TRUSTED:
file = nautilus_file_get_location (parameters->file);
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (file,
parameters->parent_window,
NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (file);
break;
default:
/* Just destroy dialog */
break;
}
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (dialog));
activate_parameters_desktop_free (parameters);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
nautilus
|
1e1c916f5537eb5e4144950f291f4a3962fc2395
|
2.8053566011079443e+38
| 34 |
Add "interactive" argument to nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-operations.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-operations.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Add "interactive" argument to
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted.
* src/nautilus-application.c:
Mark all desktopfiles on the desktop trusted on first
run.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15009
| 1 |
const file_tree_checksum& data_tree_checksum(bool reset)
{
static file_tree_checksum checksum;
if (reset)
checksum.reset();
if(checksum.nfiles == 0) {
get_file_tree_checksum_internal("data/",checksum);
get_file_tree_checksum_internal(get_user_data_dir() + "/data/",checksum);
LOG_FS << "calculated data tree checksum: "
<< checksum.nfiles << " files; "
<< checksum.sum_size << " bytes\n";
}
return checksum;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
wesnoth
|
af61f9fdd15cd439da9e2fe5fa39d174c923eaae
|
1.3963389879930036e+38
| 15 |
fs: Use game data path to resolve ./ in the absence of a current_dir
Fixes a file content disclosure bug (#22042) affecting functionality
relying on the get_wml_location() function and not passing a non-empty
value for the current_dir parameter.
See <https://gna.org/bugs/?22042> for details.
This is a candidate for the 1.10 and 1.12 branches.
(Backported from master, commit 314425ab0e57b32909d324f7d4bf213d62cbd3b5.)
| 0 |
static inline void pack_gate(gate_desc *gate, unsigned type, unsigned long func,
unsigned dpl, unsigned ist, unsigned seg)
{
gate->offset_low = PTR_LOW(func);
gate->segment = __KERNEL_CS;
gate->ist = ist;
gate->p = 1;
gate->dpl = dpl;
gate->zero0 = 0;
gate->zero1 = 0;
gate->type = type;
gate->offset_middle = PTR_MIDDLE(func);
gate->offset_high = PTR_HIGH(func);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
linux-2.6
|
5ac37f87ff18843aabab84cf75b2f8504c2d81fe
|
6.438200334983473e+36
| 14 |
x86: fix ldt limit for 64 bit
Fix size of LDT entries. On x86-64, ldt_desc is a double-sized descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
| 0 |
inline void StreamResource::EmitRead(ssize_t nread, const uv_buf_t& buf) {
#ifdef DEBUG
v8::SealHandleScope handle_scope(v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
#endif
if (nread > 0)
bytes_read_ += static_cast<uint64_t>(nread);
listener_->OnStreamRead(nread, buf);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
node
|
7f178663ebffc82c9f8a5a1b6bf2da0c263a30ed
|
1.9166618359088537e+38
| 8 |
src: use unique_ptr for WriteWrap
This commit attempts to avoid a use-after-free error by using unqiue_ptr
and passing a reference to it.
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8265
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/issues/227
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/238
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
| 0 |
int DCTStream::getChar()
{
if (current == limit)
if (!readLine())
return EOF;
return *current++;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
poppler
|
ae614bf8ab42c9d0c7ac57ecdfdcbcfc4ff6c639
|
1.7979855973277728e+38
| 8 |
Fix DCTStream::getChars we're reading past the buffer check
I wonder how this had never crashed before :S
Fixes #1011
| 0 |
event_name2nr(char_u *start, char_u **end)
{
char_u *p;
int i;
int len;
/* the event name ends with end of line, '|', a blank or a comma */
for (p = start; *p && !VIM_ISWHITE(*p) && *p != ',' && *p != '|'; ++p)
;
for (i = 0; event_names[i].name != NULL; ++i)
{
len = (int)STRLEN(event_names[i].name);
if (len == p - start && STRNICMP(event_names[i].name, start, len) == 0)
break;
}
if (*p == ',')
++p;
*end = p;
if (event_names[i].name == NULL)
return NUM_EVENTS;
return event_names[i].event;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-668"
] |
vim
|
5a73e0ca54c77e067c3b12ea6f35e3e8681e8cf8
|
2.2013092309580277e+38
| 22 |
patch 8.0.1263: others can read the swap file if a user is careless
Problem: Others can read the swap file if a user is careless with his
primary group.
Solution: If the group permission allows for reading but the world
permissions doesn't, make sure the group is right.
| 0 |
write_direct_sig (KBNODE root, PKT_public_key *psk,
struct revocation_key *revkey, u32 timestamp,
const char *cache_nonce)
{
gpg_error_t err;
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("writing direct signature\n"));
/* Get the pk packet from the pub_tree. */
node = find_kbnode (root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!node)
BUG ();
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* We have to cache the key, so that the verification of the
signature creation is able to retrieve the public key. */
cache_public_key (pk);
/* Make the signature. */
err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL,NULL, psk, 0x1F,
0, timestamp, 0,
keygen_add_revkey, revkey, cache_nonce);
if (err)
{
log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) );
return err;
}
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
add_kbnode (root, new_kbnode (pkt));
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
gnupg
|
2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392
|
1.9379766270834853e+38
| 39 |
Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
| 0 |
nfsd4_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
union nfsd4_op_u *u)
{
struct nfsd4_setattr *setattr = &u->setattr;
__be32 status = nfs_ok;
int err;
if (setattr->sa_iattr.ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
status = nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op(rqstp, cstate,
&cstate->current_fh, &setattr->sa_stateid,
WR_STATE, NULL, NULL);
if (status) {
dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_setattr: couldn't process stateid!\n");
return status;
}
}
err = fh_want_write(&cstate->current_fh);
if (err)
return nfserrno(err);
status = nfs_ok;
status = check_attr_support(rqstp, cstate, setattr->sa_bmval,
nfsd_attrmask);
if (status)
goto out;
if (setattr->sa_acl != NULL)
status = nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh,
setattr->sa_acl);
if (status)
goto out;
if (setattr->sa_label.len)
status = nfsd4_set_nfs4_label(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh,
&setattr->sa_label);
if (status)
goto out;
status = nfsd_setattr(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, &setattr->sa_iattr,
0, (time_t)0);
out:
fh_drop_write(&cstate->current_fh);
return status;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
01310bb7c9c98752cc763b36532fab028e0f8f81
|
7.06383245248059e+36
| 42 |
nfsd: COPY and CLONE operations require the saved filehandle to be set
Make sure we have a saved filehandle, otherwise we'll oops with a null
pointer dereference in nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op().
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
| 0 |
nautilus_file_get_date_as_string (NautilusFile *file, NautilusDateType date_type)
{
return nautilus_file_fit_date_as_string (file, date_type,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
nautilus
|
7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983
|
1.2149552363290464e+37
| 5 |
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003
| 0 |
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