func
string | target
string | cwe
list | project
string | commit_id
string | hash
string | size
int64 | message
string | vul
int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static int __nl80211_set_channel(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct wireless_dev *wdev,
struct genl_info *info)
{
enum nl80211_channel_type channel_type = NL80211_CHAN_NO_HT;
u32 freq;
int result;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_FREQ])
return -EINVAL;
if (!nl80211_can_set_dev_channel(wdev))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_CHANNEL_TYPE]) {
channel_type = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[
NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_CHANNEL_TYPE]);
if (channel_type != NL80211_CHAN_NO_HT &&
channel_type != NL80211_CHAN_HT20 &&
channel_type != NL80211_CHAN_HT40PLUS &&
channel_type != NL80211_CHAN_HT40MINUS)
return -EINVAL;
}
freq = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_FREQ]);
mutex_lock(&rdev->devlist_mtx);
if (wdev) {
wdev_lock(wdev);
result = cfg80211_set_freq(rdev, wdev, freq, channel_type);
wdev_unlock(wdev);
} else {
result = cfg80211_set_freq(rdev, NULL, freq, channel_type);
}
mutex_unlock(&rdev->devlist_mtx);
return result;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-119"
] |
linux
|
208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
2.1430857287576674e+38
| 38 |
nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
| 0 |
generate_cookie (void)
{
guint32 cookie;
cookie = (guint32)g_random_int_range (1, G_MAXINT32);
return cookie;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
gnome-screensaver
|
284c9924969a49dbf2d5fae1d680d3310c4df4a3
|
3.3019899642787902e+37
| 8 |
Remove session inhibitors if the originator falls of the bus
This fixes a problem where totem leaves inhibitors behind, see
bug 600488.
| 0 |
static int kvm_request_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
{
struct kvm_vcpu_arch *vcpu = &v->arch;
if (!vcpu->time_page)
return 0;
set_bit(KVM_REQ_KVMCLOCK_UPDATE, &v->requests);
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux-2.6
|
59839dfff5eabca01cc4e20b45797a60a80af8cb
|
1.4916939629626748e+37
| 9 |
KVM: x86: check for cr3 validity in ioctl_set_sregs
Matt T. Yourst notes that kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs lacks validity
checking for the new cr3 value:
"Userspace callers of KVM_SET_SREGS can pass a bogus value of cr3 to
the kernel. This will trigger a NULL pointer access in gfn_to_rmap()
when userspace next tries to call KVM_RUN on the affected VCPU and kvm
attempts to activate the new non-existent page table root.
This happens since kvm only validates that cr3 points to a valid guest
physical memory page when code *inside* the guest sets cr3. However, kvm
currently trusts the userspace caller (e.g. QEMU) on the host machine to
always supply a valid page table root, rather than properly validating
it along with the rest of the reloaded guest state."
http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail&atid=893831&aid=2687641&group_id=180599
Check for a valid cr3 address in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs, triple
fault in case of failure.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
s2n(nl,p);
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
l2n3(n,d);
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
return(-1);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
openssl
|
ee2ffc279417f15fef3b1073c7dc81a908991516
|
3.38045415981186e+37
| 88 |
Add Next Protocol Negotiation.
| 0 |
iasecc_pin_get_policy (struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, struct iasecc_pin_policy *pin)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_file *save_current_df = NULL, *save_current_ef = NULL;
struct iasecc_sdo sdo;
struct sc_path path;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy(card:%p)", card);
if (data->pin_type != SC_AC_CHV) {
sc_log(ctx, "PIN policy only available for CHV type");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df) {
sc_file_dup(&save_current_df, card->cache.current_df);
if (save_current_df == NULL) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
sc_log(ctx, "Cannot duplicate current DF file");
goto err;
}
}
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_ef) {
sc_file_dup(&save_current_ef, card->cache.current_ef);
if (save_current_ef == NULL) {
rv = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
sc_log(ctx, "Cannot duplicate current EF file");
goto err;
}
}
if (!(data->pin_reference & IASECC_OBJECT_REF_LOCAL) && card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df) {
sc_format_path("3F00", &path);
path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID;
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Unable to select MF");
}
memset(&sdo, 0, sizeof(sdo));
sdo.sdo_class = IASECC_SDO_CLASS_CHV;
sdo.sdo_ref = data->pin_reference & ~IASECC_OBJECT_REF_LOCAL;
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() reference %i", sdo.sdo_ref);
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_data(card, &sdo);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Cannot get SDO PIN data");
if (sdo.docp.acls_contact.size == 0) {
rv = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
sc_log(ctx, "Extremely strange ... there is no ACLs");
goto err;
}
sc_log(ctx,
"iasecc_pin_get_policy() sdo.docp.size.size %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
sdo.docp.size.size);
memcpy(pin->scbs, sdo.docp.scbs, sizeof(pin->scbs));
pin->min_length = (sdo.data.chv.size_min.value ? *sdo.data.chv.size_min.value : -1);
pin->max_length = (sdo.data.chv.size_max.value ? *sdo.data.chv.size_max.value : -1);
pin->tries_maximum = (sdo.docp.tries_maximum.value ? *sdo.docp.tries_maximum.value : -1);
pin->tries_remaining = (sdo.docp.tries_remaining.value ? *sdo.docp.tries_remaining.value : -1);
if (sdo.docp.size.value && sdo.docp.size.size <= sizeof(int)) {
unsigned int n = 0;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<sdo.docp.size.size; i++)
n = (n << 8) + *(sdo.docp.size.value + i);
pin->stored_length = n;
} else {
pin->stored_length = -1;
}
sc_log(ctx, "PIN policy: size max/min %i/%i, tries max/left %i/%i",
pin->max_length, pin->min_length, pin->tries_maximum, pin->tries_remaining);
iasecc_sdo_free_fields(card, &sdo);
if (save_current_df) {
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() restore current DF");
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &save_current_df->path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Cannot return to saved DF");
}
if (save_current_ef) {
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_get_policy() restore current EF");
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &save_current_ef->path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, rv, "Cannot return to saved EF");
}
err:
sc_file_free(save_current_df);
sc_file_free(save_current_ef);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
OpenSC
|
ae1cf0be90396fb6c0be95829bf0d3eecbd2fd1c
|
7.118990436849107e+37
| 99 |
iasecc: Prevent stack buffer overflow when empty ACL is returned
Thanks oss-fuzz
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=30800
| 0 |
static int selinux_syslog(int type)
{
int rc;
switch (type) {
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
break;
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
/* Set level of messages printed to console */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
break;
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
default:
rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
break;
}
return rc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548
|
3.2580100364419917e+38
| 26 |
Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| 0 |
static int schannel_init(void)
{
return (Curl_sspi_global_init() == CURLE_OK ? 1 : 0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-290"
] |
curl
|
b09c8ee15771c614c4bf3ddac893cdb12187c844
|
3.2815035542312194e+38
| 4 |
vtls: add 'isproxy' argument to Curl_ssl_get/addsessionid()
To make sure we set and extract the correct session.
Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22890.html
CVE-2021-22890
| 0 |
static int may_init_module(void)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) || modules_disabled)
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-347"
] |
linux
|
0c18f29aae7ce3dadd26d8ee3505d07cc982df75
|
2.3462196959481285e+38
| 7 |
module: limit enabling module.sig_enforce
Irrespective as to whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, specifying
"module.sig_enforce=1" on the boot command line sets "sig_enforce".
Only allow "sig_enforce" to be set when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured.
This patch makes the presence of /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce
dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y.
Fixes: fda784e50aac ("module: export module signature enforcement status")
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
static size_t vhost_get_avail_size(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
unsigned int num)
{
size_t event __maybe_unused =
vhost_has_feature(vq, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX) ? 2 : 0;
return sizeof(*vq->avail) +
sizeof(*vq->avail->ring) * num + event;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120"
] |
linux
|
060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4
|
4.518549567894835e+37
| 9 |
vhost: make sure log_num < in_num
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as
in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However
this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0,
it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This
bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num
in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <lidongchen@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: ruippan <ruippan@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: yongduan <yongduan@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
| 0 |
void Save() {
if (!on_heap_ && size_ > 0) {
char* s = new char[size_];
memcpy(s, str_, size_);
str_ = s;
on_heap_ = true;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
node
|
7b3fb22290c3b6acb497ca85cf2f1648d75c8154
|
1.3188983381382265e+38
| 8 |
typo in node_http_parser
| 0 |
void CLASS setPentaxBodyFeatures (unsigned id)
{
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CamID = id;
switch (id) {
case 0x12994:
case 0x12aa2:
case 0x12b1a:
case 0x12b60:
case 0x12b62:
case 0x12b7e:
case 0x12b80:
case 0x12b9c:
case 0x12b9d:
case 0x12ba2:
case 0x12c1e:
case 0x12c20:
case 0x12cd2:
case 0x12cd4:
case 0x12cfa:
case 0x12d72:
case 0x12d73:
case 0x12db8:
case 0x12dfe:
case 0x12e6c:
case 0x12e76:
case 0x12ef8:
case 0x12f52:
case 0x12f70:
case 0x12f71:
case 0x12fb6:
case 0x12fc0:
case 0x12fca:
case 0x1301a:
case 0x13024:
case 0x1309c:
case 0x13222:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC;
break;
case 0x13092:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_K;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF;
break;
case 0x12e08:
case 0x13010:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_645;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_MF;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_645;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = LIBRAW_FORMAT_MF;
break;
case 0x12ee4:
case 0x12f66:
case 0x12f7a:
case 0x1302e:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_Q;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Pentax_Q;
break;
default:
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens;
}
return;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
LibRaw
|
d13e8f6d1e987b7491182040a188c16a395f1d21
|
7.179935977375932e+37
| 66 |
CVE-2017-1438 credits; fix for Kodak 65000 out of bounds access
| 0 |
int vm_insert_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
struct page *page)
{
if (addr < vma->vm_start || addr >= vma->vm_end)
return -EFAULT;
if (!page_count(page))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_INSERTPAGE;
return insert_page(vma, addr, page, vma->vm_page_prot);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
89f5b7da2a6bad2e84670422ab8192382a5aeb9f
|
1.971176825671826e+38
| 10 |
Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real empty pages needlessly.
We used to get the ZERO_PAGE when we did the "handle_mm_fault()", but
since fault handling no longer uses ZERO_PAGE for new anonymous pages,
we now need to handle that special case in follow_page() instead.
In particular, the removal of ZERO_PAGE effectively removed the core
file writing optimization where we would skip writing pages that had not
been populated at all, and increased memory pressure a lot by allocating
all those useless newly zeroed pages.
This reinstates the optimization by making the unmapped PTE case the
same as for a non-existent page table, which already did this correctly.
While at it, this also fixes the XIP case for follow_page(), where the
caller could not differentiate between the case of a page that simply
could not be used (because it had no "struct page" associated with it)
and a page that just wasn't mapped.
We do that by simply returning an error pointer for pages that could not
be turned into a "struct page *". The error is arbitrarily picked to be
EFAULT, since that was what get_user_pages() already used for the
equivalent IO-mapped page case.
[ Also removed an impossible test for pte_offset_map_lock() failing:
that's not how that function works ]
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
is_code_ctype(OnigCodePoint code, unsigned int ctype)
{
if (code < 256)
return ENC_IS_ISO_8859_1_CTYPE(code, ctype);
else
return FALSE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
oniguruma
|
65a9b1aa03c9bc2dc01b074295b9603232cb3b78
|
2.1330267743087905e+38
| 7 |
onig-5.9.2
| 0 |
}
inline float abs(const float a) {
return (float)std::fabs((double)a);
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
|
2.9291117286867852e+38
| 3 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
| 0 |
void fmessage(char* fmt, ...) { // TODO: this function is duplicated in src/fnet/interface.c
if (arg_quiet)
return;
va_list args;
va_start(args,fmt);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
fflush(0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-269",
"CWE-94"
] |
firejail
|
27cde3d7d1e4e16d4190932347c7151dc2a84c50
|
3.260609458898298e+38
| 10 |
fixing CVE-2022-31214
| 0 |
GF_Err tfxd_box_read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_MSSTimeExtBox *ptr = (GF_MSSTimeExtBox *)s;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
ptr->version = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
ptr->flags = gf_bs_read_u24(bs);
if (ptr->version == 0x01) {
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 16);
ptr->absolute_time_in_track_timescale = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->fragment_duration_in_track_timescale = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
} else {
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 8);
ptr->absolute_time_in_track_timescale = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->fragment_duration_in_track_timescale = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
388ecce75d05e11fc8496aa4857b91245007d26e
|
3.313312147606184e+38
| 19 |
fixed #1587
| 0 |
static void process_bin_update(conn *c) {
char *key;
int nkey;
int vlen;
item *it;
protocol_binary_request_set* req = binary_get_request(c);
assert(c != NULL);
key = binary_get_key(c);
nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
/* fix byteorder in the request */
req->message.body.flags = ntohl(req->message.body.flags);
req->message.body.expiration = ntohl(req->message.body.expiration);
vlen = c->binary_header.request.bodylen - (nkey + c->binary_header.request.extlen);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
int ii;
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_ADD) {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d ADD ", c->sfd);
} else if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET) {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d SET ", c->sfd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d REPLACE ", c->sfd);
}
for (ii = 0; ii < nkey; ++ii) {
fprintf(stderr, "%c", key[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, " Value len is %d", vlen);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_set(key, nkey);
}
it = item_alloc(key, nkey, req->message.body.flags,
realtime(req->message.body.expiration), vlen+2);
if (it == 0) {
enum store_item_type status;
if (! item_size_ok(nkey, req->message.body.flags, vlen + 2)) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_E2BIG, NULL, vlen);
status = TOO_LARGE;
} else {
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR Out of memory allocating item");
/* This error generating method eats the swallow value. Add here. */
c->sbytes = vlen;
status = NO_MEMORY;
}
/* FIXME: losing c->cmd since it's translated below. refactor? */
LOGGER_LOG(c->thread->l, LOG_MUTATIONS, LOGGER_ITEM_STORE,
NULL, status, 0, key, nkey);
/* Avoid stale data persisting in cache because we failed alloc.
* Unacceptable for SET. Anywhere else too? */
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET) {
it = item_get(key, nkey, c);
if (it) {
item_unlink(it);
item_remove(it);
}
}
/* swallow the data line */
c->write_and_go = conn_swallow;
return;
}
ITEM_set_cas(it, c->binary_header.request.cas);
switch (c->cmd) {
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_ADD:
c->cmd = NREAD_ADD;
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET:
c->cmd = NREAD_SET;
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_REPLACE:
c->cmd = NREAD_REPLACE;
break;
default:
assert(0);
}
if (ITEM_get_cas(it) != 0) {
c->cmd = NREAD_CAS;
}
c->item = it;
c->ritem = ITEM_data(it);
c->rlbytes = vlen;
conn_set_state(c, conn_nread);
c->substate = bin_read_set_value;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
memcached
|
bd578fc34b96abe0f8d99c1409814a09f51ee71c
|
2.8709543443160527e+38
| 98 |
CVE reported by cisco talos
| 0 |
bash_servicename_completion_function (text, state)
const char *text;
int state;
{
#if defined (__WIN32__) || defined (__OPENNT) || !defined (HAVE_GETSERVENT)
return ((char *)NULL);
#else
static char *sname = (char *)NULL;
static struct servent *srvent;
static int snamelen, firstc;
char *value;
char **alist, *aentry;
int afound;
if (state == 0)
{
FREE (sname);
firstc = *text;
sname = savestring (text);
snamelen = strlen (sname);
setservent (0);
}
while (srvent = getservent ())
{
afound = 0;
if (snamelen == 0 || (STREQN (sname, srvent->s_name, snamelen)))
break;
/* Not primary, check aliases */
for (alist = srvent->s_aliases; *alist; alist++)
{
aentry = *alist;
if (STREQN (sname, aentry, snamelen))
{
afound = 1;
break;
}
}
if (afound)
break;
}
if (srvent == 0)
{
endservent ();
return ((char *)NULL);
}
value = afound ? savestring (aentry) : savestring (srvent->s_name);
return value;
#endif
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
bash
|
4f747edc625815f449048579f6e65869914dd715
|
3.0536779405515412e+38
| 54 |
Bash-4.4 patch 7
| 0 |
static void mptsas_fetch_request(MPTSASState *s)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
char req[MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE];
MPIRequestHeader *hdr = (MPIRequestHeader *)req;
hwaddr addr;
int size;
/* Read the message header from the guest first. */
addr = s->host_mfa_high_addr | MPTSAS_FIFO_GET(s, request_post);
pci_dma_read(pci, addr, req, sizeof(*hdr));
if (hdr->Function < ARRAY_SIZE(mpi_request_sizes) &&
mpi_request_sizes[hdr->Function]) {
/* Read the rest of the request based on the type. Do not
* reread everything, as that could cause a TOC/TOU mismatch
* and leak data from the QEMU stack.
*/
size = mpi_request_sizes[hdr->Function];
assert(size <= MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE);
pci_dma_read(pci, addr + sizeof(*hdr), &req[sizeof(*hdr)],
size - sizeof(*hdr));
}
if (hdr->Function == MPI_FUNCTION_SCSI_IO_REQUEST) {
/* SCSI I/O requests are separate from mptsas_process_message
* because they cannot be sent through the doorbell yet.
*/
mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(s, (MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *)req, addr);
} else {
mptsas_process_message(s, (MPIRequestHeader *)req);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
qemu
|
3791642c8d60029adf9b00bcb4e34d7d8a1aea4d
|
1.2010627804817058e+37
| 33 |
mptsas: Remove unused MPTSASState 'pending' field (CVE-2021-3392)
While processing SCSI i/o requests in mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(),
the Megaraid emulator appends new MPTSASRequest object 'req' to
the 's->pending' queue. In case of an error, this same object gets
dequeued in mptsas_free_request() only if SCSIRequest object
'req->sreq' is initialised. This may lead to a use-after-free issue.
Since s->pending is actually not used, simply remove it from
MPTSASState.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Cheolwoo Myung <cwmyung@snu.ac.kr>
Message-id: 20210419134247.1467982-1-f4bug@amsat.org
Message-Id: <20210416102243.1293871-1-mjt@msgid.tls.msk.ru>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Cheolwoo Myung <cwmyung@snu.ac.kr>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1914236 (CVE-2021-3392)
Fixes: e351b826112 ("hw: Add support for LSI SAS1068 (mptsas) device")
[PMD: Reworded description, added more tags]
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
| 0 |
int wc_ecc_init(ecc_key* key)
{
return wc_ecc_init_ex(key, NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-326",
"CWE-203"
] |
wolfssl
|
1de07da61f0c8e9926dcbd68119f73230dae283f
|
3.391243687578309e+38
| 4 |
Constant time EC map to affine for private operations
For fast math, use a constant time modular inverse when mapping to
affine when operation involves a private key - key gen, calc shared
secret, sign.
| 0 |
async_result_cb (GObject *obj,
GAsyncResult *result,
gpointer user_data)
{
GAsyncResult **result_out = user_data;
*result_out = g_object_ref (result);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-668"
] |
flatpak
|
cd2142888fc4c199723a0dfca1f15ea8788a5483
|
2.0143881896148725e+38
| 8 |
Don't expose /proc when running apply_extra
As shown by CVE-2019-5736, it is sometimes possible for the sandbox
app to access outside files using /proc/self/exe. This is not
typically an issue for flatpak as the sandbox runs as the user which
has no permissions to e.g. modify the host files.
However, when installing apps using extra-data into the system repo
we *do* actually run a sandbox as root. So, in this case we disable mounting
/proc in the sandbox, which will neuter attacks like this.
| 0 |
void PeerListWidget::showPeerListMenu(const QPoint&)
{
QMenu menu;
bool emptyMenu = true;
BitTorrent::TorrentHandle *const torrent = m_properties->getCurrentTorrent();
if (!torrent) return;
// Add Peer Action
QAction *addPeerAct = 0;
if (!torrent->isQueued() && !torrent->isChecking()) {
addPeerAct = menu.addAction(GuiIconProvider::instance()->getIcon("user-group-new"), tr("Add a new peer..."));
emptyMenu = false;
}
QAction *banAct = 0;
QAction *copyPeerAct = 0;
if (!selectionModel()->selectedRows().isEmpty()) {
copyPeerAct = menu.addAction(GuiIconProvider::instance()->getIcon("edit-copy"), tr("Copy IP:port"));
menu.addSeparator();
banAct = menu.addAction(GuiIconProvider::instance()->getIcon("user-group-delete"), tr("Ban peer permanently"));
emptyMenu = false;
}
if (emptyMenu) return;
QAction *act = menu.exec(QCursor::pos());
if (act == 0) return;
if (act == addPeerAct) {
QList<BitTorrent::PeerAddress> peersList = PeersAdditionDlg::askForPeers();
int peerCount = 0;
foreach (const BitTorrent::PeerAddress &addr, peersList) {
if (torrent->connectPeer(addr)) {
qDebug("Adding peer %s...", qPrintable(addr.ip.toString()));
Logger::instance()->addMessage(tr("Manually adding peer '%1'...").arg(addr.ip.toString()));
peerCount++;
}
else {
Logger::instance()->addMessage(tr("The peer '%1' could not be added to this torrent.").arg(addr.ip.toString()), Log::WARNING);
}
}
if (peerCount < peersList.length())
QMessageBox::information(0, tr("Peer addition"), tr("Some peers could not be added. Check the Log for details."));
else if (peerCount > 0)
QMessageBox::information(0, tr("Peer addition"), tr("The peers were added to this torrent."));
return;
}
if (act == banAct) {
banSelectedPeers();
return;
}
if (act == copyPeerAct) {
copySelectedPeers();
return;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-79"
] |
qBittorrent
|
6ca3e4f094da0a0017cb2d483ec1db6176bb0b16
|
3.0381158918919633e+38
| 52 |
Add Utils::String::toHtmlEscaped
| 0 |
string handleStartupResponse(StartupDetails &details) {
TRACE_POINT();
string socketAddress;
while (true) {
string line;
try {
line = readMessageLine(details);
} catch (const SystemException &e) {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader. There was an I/O error while reading its "
"startup response: " + e.sys(),
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
details);
} catch (const TimeoutException &) {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader: it did not write a startup response in time.",
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT,
details);
}
if (line.empty()) {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader. It unexpected closed the connection while "
"sending its startup response.",
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
details);
} else if (line[line.size() - 1] != '\n') {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader. It sent a line without a newline character "
"in its startup response.",
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
details);
} else if (line == "\n") {
break;
}
string::size_type pos = line.find(": ");
if (pos == string::npos) {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader. It sent a startup response line without "
"separator.",
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
details);
}
string key = line.substr(0, pos);
string value = line.substr(pos + 2, line.size() - pos - 3);
if (key == "socket") {
socketAddress = fixupSocketAddress(options, value);
} else {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader. It sent an unknown startup response line "
"called '" + key + "'.",
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
details);
}
}
if (socketAddress.empty()) {
throwPreloaderSpawnException("An error occurred while starting up "
"the preloader. It did not report a socket address in its "
"startup response.",
SpawnException::PRELOADER_STARTUP_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
details);
}
return socketAddress;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
passenger
|
8c6693e0818772c345c979840d28312c2edd4ba4
|
3.745773464646341e+37
| 70 |
Security check socket filenames reported by spawned application processes.
| 1 |
void sqlite3WindowUnlinkFromSelect(Window *p){
if( p->ppThis ){
*p->ppThis = p->pNextWin;
if( p->pNextWin ) p->pNextWin->ppThis = p->ppThis;
p->ppThis = 0;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
sqlite
|
75e95e1fcd52d3ec8282edb75ac8cd0814095d54
|
3.1521811734813538e+38
| 7 |
When processing constant integer values in ORDER BY clauses of window
definitions (see check-in [7e4809eadfe99ebf]) be sure to fully disable
the constant value to avoid an invalid pointer dereference if the expression
is ever duplicated. This fixes a crash report from Yongheng and Rui.
FossilOrigin-Name: 1ca0bd982ab1183bbafce0d260e4dceda5eb766ed2e7793374a88d1ae0bdd2ca
| 0 |
static int LEfloatint (lua_Number f, lua_Integer i) {
if (l_intfitsf(i))
return luai_numle(f, cast_num(i)); /* compare them as floats */
else { /* f <= i <=> ceil(f) <= i */
lua_Integer fi;
if (luaV_flttointeger(f, &fi, F2Iceil)) /* fi = ceil(f) */
return fi <= i; /* compare them as integers */
else /* 'f' is either greater or less than all integers */
return f < 0; /* less? */
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
lua
|
eb41999461b6f428186c55abd95f4ce1a76217d5
|
1.9458390100174914e+37
| 11 |
Fixed bugs of stack reallocation x GC
Macro 'checkstackGC' was doing a GC step after resizing the stack;
the GC could shrink the stack and undo the resize. Moreover, macro
'checkstackp' also does a GC step, which could remove the preallocated
CallInfo when calling a function. (Its name has been changed to
'checkstackGCp' to emphasize that it calls the GC.)
| 0 |
void ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStream::completeRequest() {
filter_manager_.streamInfo().onRequestComplete();
Upstream::HostDescriptionConstSharedPtr upstream_host =
connection_manager_.read_callbacks_->upstreamHost();
if (upstream_host != nullptr) {
Upstream::ClusterRequestResponseSizeStatsOptRef req_resp_stats =
upstream_host->cluster().requestResponseSizeStats();
if (req_resp_stats.has_value()) {
req_resp_stats->get().upstream_rq_body_size_.recordValue(
filter_manager_.streamInfo().bytesReceived());
req_resp_stats->get().upstream_rs_body_size_.recordValue(
filter_manager_.streamInfo().bytesSent());
}
}
if (connection_manager_.remote_close_) {
filter_manager_.streamInfo().setResponseCodeDetails(
StreamInfo::ResponseCodeDetails::get().DownstreamRemoteDisconnect);
filter_manager_.streamInfo().setResponseFlag(
StreamInfo::ResponseFlag::DownstreamConnectionTermination);
}
// TODO(danzh) bring HTTP/3 to parity here.
if (connection_manager_.codec_->protocol() != Protocol::Http3) {
ASSERT(filter_manager_.streamInfo().responseCodeDetails().has_value());
}
connection_manager_.stats_.named_.downstream_rq_active_.dec();
if (filter_manager_.streamInfo().healthCheck()) {
connection_manager_.config_.tracingStats().health_check_.inc();
}
if (active_span_) {
Tracing::HttpTracerUtility::finalizeDownstreamSpan(
*active_span_, request_headers_.get(), response_headers_.get(), response_trailers_.get(),
filter_manager_.streamInfo(), *this);
}
if (state_.successful_upgrade_) {
connection_manager_.stats_.named_.downstream_cx_upgrades_active_.dec();
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-22"
] |
envoy
|
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
|
3.011735497486896e+38
| 40 |
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <yavlasov@google.com>
| 0 |
is_mouse_topline(win_T *wp)
{
return orig_topline == wp->w_topline
#ifdef FEAT_DIFF
&& orig_topfill == wp->w_topfill
#endif
;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
vim
|
e178af5a586ea023622d460779fdcabbbfac0908
|
8.516175410293708e+37
| 8 |
patch 8.2.5160: accessing invalid memory after changing terminal size
Problem: Accessing invalid memory after changing terminal size.
Solution: Adjust cmdline_row and msg_row to the value of Rows.
| 0 |
static inline struct iw_statistics *get_wireless_stats(struct net_device *dev)
{
/* New location */
if((dev->wireless_handlers != NULL) &&
(dev->wireless_handlers->get_wireless_stats != NULL))
return dev->wireless_handlers->get_wireless_stats(dev);
/* Old location, will be phased out in next WE */
return (dev->get_wireless_stats ?
dev->get_wireless_stats(dev) :
(struct iw_statistics *) NULL);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9ef1d4c7c7aca1cd436612b6ca785b726ffb8ed8
|
1.4066026314861024e+38
| 12 |
[NETLINK]: Missing initializations in dumped data
Mostly missing initialization of padding fields of 1 or 2 bytes length,
two instances of uninitialized nlmsgerr->msg of 16 bytes length.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
inline void Virtual_column_info::print(String* str)
{
expr->print_for_table_def(str);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772
|
3.112066357049682e+38
| 4 |
MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <sergey.petrunya@mariadb.com>
| 0 |
u32 acpi_ns_opens_scope(acpi_object_type type)
{
ACPI_FUNCTION_ENTRY();
if (type > ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_MAX) {
/* type code out of range */
ACPI_WARNING((AE_INFO, "Invalid Object Type 0x%X", type));
return (ACPI_NS_NORMAL);
}
return (((u32)acpi_gbl_ns_properties[type]) & ACPI_NS_NEWSCOPE);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-755"
] |
linux
|
3b2d69114fefa474fca542e51119036dceb4aa6f
|
1.001296084047112e+38
| 14 |
ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).
But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
| 0 |
int kvm_arm_sys_reg_get_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
const struct sys_reg_desc *r;
void __user *uaddr = (void __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_DEMUX)
return demux_c15_get(reg->id, uaddr);
if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) != sizeof(__u64))
return -ENOENT;
r = index_to_sys_reg_desc(vcpu, reg->id);
if (!r)
return get_invariant_sys_reg(reg->id, uaddr);
if (r->get_user)
return (r->get_user)(vcpu, r, reg, uaddr);
return reg_to_user(uaddr, &vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg), reg->id);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] |
linux
|
9e3f7a29694049edd728e2400ab57ad7553e5aa9
|
2.7704669358397988e+38
| 20 |
arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
| 0 |
static inline void __user *kvm_get_attr_addr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
{
void __user *uaddr = (void __user*)(unsigned long)attr->addr;
if ((u64)(unsigned long)uaddr != attr->addr)
return ERR_PTR_USR(-EFAULT);
return uaddr;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-459"
] |
linux
|
683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b
|
6.0083490590079675e+37
| 8 |
KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
void LinkResolver::linktime_resolve_interface_method(methodHandle& resolved_method, KlassHandle resolved_klass, Symbol* method_name,
Symbol* method_signature, KlassHandle current_klass, bool check_access, TRAPS) {
// normal interface method resolution
resolve_interface_method(resolved_method, resolved_klass, method_name, method_signature, current_klass, check_access, true, CHECK);
assert(resolved_method->name() != vmSymbols::object_initializer_name(), "should have been checked in verifier");
assert(resolved_method->name() != vmSymbols::class_initializer_name (), "should have been checked in verifier");
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
jdk8u
|
f14e35d20e1a4d0f507f05838844152f2242c6d3
|
3.2372556626998537e+38
| 8 |
8281866: Enhance MethodHandle invocations
Reviewed-by: andrew
Backport-of: d974d9da365f787f67971d88c79371c8b0769f75
| 0 |
gdImagePtr gdImageRotateBilinear(gdImagePtr src, const float degrees, const int bgColor)
{
float _angle = (float)((- degrees / 180.0f) * M_PI);
const unsigned int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const unsigned int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
unsigned int new_width = abs((int)(src_w*cos(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*sin(_angle) + 0.5f));
unsigned int new_height = abs((int)(src_w*sin(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*cos(_angle) + 0.5f));
const gdFixed f_0_5 = gd_ftofx(0.5f);
const gdFixed f_H = gd_itofx(src_h/2);
const gdFixed f_W = gd_itofx(src_w/2);
const gdFixed f_cos = gd_ftofx(cos(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_sin = gd_ftofx(sin(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_1 = gd_itofx(1);
unsigned int i;
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
gdImagePtr dst;
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i = 0; i < new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j=0; j < new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx((int)i - (int)new_height / 2);
const gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx((int)j - (int)new_width / 2);
const gdFixed f_m = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_sin) + gd_mulfx(f_i,f_cos) + f_0_5 + f_H;
const gdFixed f_n = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_cos) - gd_mulfx(f_i,f_sin) + f_0_5 + f_W;
const unsigned int m = gd_fxtoi(f_m);
const unsigned int n = gd_fxtoi(f_n);
if ((m > 0) && (m < src_h - 1) && (n > 0) && (n < src_w - 1)) {
const gdFixed f_f = f_m - gd_itofx(m);
const gdFixed f_g = f_n - gd_itofx(n);
const gdFixed f_w1 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w2 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_g);
const gdFixed f_w3 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w4 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_g);
if (n < src_w - 1) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m;
}
if (m < src_h - 1) {
src_offset_x = n;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
if (!((n >= src_w - 1) || (m >= src_h - 1))) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
{
const int pixel1 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x];
register int pixel2, pixel3, pixel4;
if (src_offset_y + 1 >= src_h) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else if (src_offset_x + 1 >= src_w) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else {
pixel2 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x + 1];
pixel3 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x];
pixel4 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x + 1];
}
{
const gdFixed f_r1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_r2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_r3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_r4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_g1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_g2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_g3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_g4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_b1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_b2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_b3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_b4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_a1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_a2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_a3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_a4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_red = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_r1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_r2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_r3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_r4);
const gdFixed f_green = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_g1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_g2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_g3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_g4);
const gdFixed f_blue = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_b1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_b2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_b3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_b4);
const gdFixed f_alpha = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_a1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_a2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_a3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_a4);
const unsigned char red = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_red), 0, 255);
const unsigned char green = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_green), 0, 255);
const unsigned char blue = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_blue), 0, 255);
const unsigned char alpha = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_alpha), 0, 127);
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = gdTrueColorAlpha(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
}
} else {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = bgColor;
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libgd
|
4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
|
5.136914713566533e+37
| 121 |
Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
| 0 |
void MirrorJob::HandleFile(FileInfo *file)
{
int res;
struct stat st;
// TODO: get rid of local hacks.
const char *dst_name=file->name;
if(FlagSet(TARGET_FLAT))
dst_name=basename_ptr(dst_name);
// dir_name returns pointer to static data - need to dup it.
const char *source_name=dir_file(source_dir,file->name);
source_name=alloca_strdup(source_name);
const char *target_name=dir_file(target_dir,dst_name);
target_name=alloca_strdup(target_name);
const char *source_name_rel=dir_file(source_relative_dir,file->name);
source_name_rel=alloca_strdup(source_name_rel);
const char *target_name_rel=dir_file(target_relative_dir,dst_name);
target_name_rel=alloca_strdup(target_name_rel);
FileInfo::type filetype=FileInfo::NORMAL;
if(file->Has(file->TYPE))
filetype=file->filetype;
else
{
FileInfo *target=target_set->FindByName(file->name);
if(target && target->Has(target->TYPE))
filetype=target->filetype;
}
switch(filetype)
{
case(FileInfo::NORMAL):
case(FileInfo::REDIRECT):
{
bool remove_target=false;
bool cont_this=false;
bool use_pget=(pget_n>1) && target_is_local;
if(file->Has(file->SIZE) && file->size<pget_minchunk*2)
use_pget=false;
if(target_is_local)
{
if(lstat(target_name,&st)!=-1)
{
// few safety checks.
FileInfo *old=new_files_set->FindByName(file->name);
if(old)
goto skip; // file has appeared after mirror start
old=old_files_set->FindByName(file->name);
if(old && ((old->Has(old->SIZE) && old->size!=st.st_size)
||(old->Has(old->DATE) && old->date!=st.st_mtime)))
goto skip; // the file has changed after mirror start
if(!script_only && access(target_name,W_OK)==-1)
{
// try to enable write access.
chmod(target_name,st.st_mode|0200);
}
}
}
FileInfo *old=target_set->FindByName(FileCopy::TempFileName(file->name));
if(old)
{
if(FlagSet(CONTINUE)
&& old->Has(file->TYPE) && old->filetype==old->NORMAL
&& (FlagSet(IGNORE_TIME) ||
(file->Has(file->DATE) && old->Has(old->DATE)
&& file->date + file->date.ts_prec < old->date - old->date.ts_prec))
&& file->Has(file->SIZE) && old->Has(old->SIZE)
&& file->size >= old->size)
{
cont_this=true;
stats.mod_files++;
}
else if(!to_rm_mismatched->FindByName(file->name))
{
if(!FlagSet(OVERWRITE)) {
remove_target=true;
Report(_("Removing old file `%s'"),target_name_rel);
} else {
Report(_("Overwriting old file `%s'"),target_name_rel);
}
stats.mod_files++;
}
else
stats.new_files++;
}
else if(FlagSet(ONLY_EXISTING))
{
Report(_("Skipping file `%s' (only-existing)"),source_name_rel);
goto skip;
}
else
stats.new_files++;
Report(_("Transferring file `%s'"),source_name_rel);
if(script)
{
ArgV args(use_pget?"pget":"get");
if(use_pget)
{
args.Append("-n");
args.Append(pget_n);
}
if(cont_this)
args.Append("-c");
if(remove_target)
args.Append("-e");
if(FlagSet(ASCII))
args.Append("-a");
if(remove_source_files)
args.Append("-E");
args.Append("-O");
args.Append(target_is_local?target_dir.get()
:target_session->GetConnectURL().get());
args.Append(source_session->GetFileURL(file->name));
xstring_ca cmd(args.CombineQuoted());
fprintf(script,"%s\n",cmd.get());
if(script_only)
goto skip;
}
FileCopyPeer *src_peer=0;
if(source_is_local)
src_peer=new FileCopyPeerFDStream(new FileStream(source_name,O_RDONLY),FileCopyPeer::GET);
else
src_peer=new FileCopyPeerFA(source_session->Clone(),file->name,FA::RETRIEVE);
FileCopyPeer *dst_peer=0;
if(target_is_local)
dst_peer=new FileCopyPeerFDStream(new FileStream(target_name,O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|(cont_this?0:O_TRUNC)),FileCopyPeer::PUT);
else
dst_peer=new FileCopyPeerFA(target_session->Clone(),dst_name,FA::STORE);
FileCopy *c=FileCopy::New(src_peer,dst_peer,cont_this);
if(remove_source_files)
c->RemoveSourceLater();
if(remove_target)
c->RemoveTargetFirst();
if(FlagSet(ASCII))
c->Ascii();
CopyJob *cp=(use_pget ? new pgetJob(c,file->name,pget_n) : new CopyJob(c,file->name,"mirror"));
if(file->Has(file->DATE))
cp->SetDate(file->date);
if(file->Has(file->SIZE) && !FlagSet(IGNORE_SIZE))
cp->SetSize(file->size);
TransferStarted(cp);
cp->cmdline.vset("\\transfer `",source_name_rel,"'",NULL);
set_state(WAITING_FOR_TRANSFER);
break;
}
case(FileInfo::DIRECTORY):
{
if(recursion_mode==RECURSION_NEVER || FlagSet(NO_RECURSION))
goto skip;
bool create_target_subdir=true;
const FileInfo *old=0;
if(FlagSet(TARGET_FLAT)) {
create_target_subdir=false;
target_name=target_dir;
goto do_submirror;
}
if(target_set)
old=target_set->FindByName(file->name);
if(!old)
{
if(FlagSet(ONLY_EXISTING))
{
Report(_("Skipping directory `%s' (only-existing)"),target_name_rel);
goto skip;
}
}
else if(old->TypeIs(old->DIRECTORY))
{
create_target_subdir=false;
}
if(target_is_local && !script_only)
{
if((FlagSet(RETR_SYMLINKS)?stat:lstat)(target_name,&st)!=-1)
{
if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
{
// try to enable write access
// only if not enabled as chmod can clear sgid flags on directories
if(st.st_mode!=(st.st_mode|0700))
chmod(target_name,st.st_mode|0700);
create_target_subdir=false;
}
else
{
Report(_("Removing old local file `%s'"),target_name_rel);
if(remove(target_name)==-1)
{
eprintf("mirror: remove(%s): %s\n",target_name,strerror(errno));
goto skip;
}
create_target_subdir=true;
}
}
}
do_submirror:
// launch sub-mirror
MirrorJob *mj=new MirrorJob(this,
source_session->Clone(),target_session->Clone(),
source_name,target_name);
AddWaiting(mj);
mj->cmdline.vset("\\mirror `",source_name_rel,"'",NULL);
mj->source_relative_dir.set(source_name_rel);
mj->target_relative_dir.set(target_name_rel);
mj->create_target_dir=create_target_subdir;
if(verbose_report>=3) {
if(FlagSet(SCAN_ALL_FIRST))
Report(_("Scanning directory `%s'"),mj->target_relative_dir.get());
else
Report(_("Mirroring directory `%s'"),mj->target_relative_dir.get());
}
break;
}
case(FileInfo::SYMLINK):
{
if(FlagSet(NO_SYMLINKS))
goto skip;
if(!file->symlink)
goto skip;
if(!target_is_local)
{
if(script)
{
ArgV args("ln");
args.Append("-s");
args.Append(file->symlink);
args.Append(target_name);
xstring_ca cmd(args.CombineQuoted());
fprintf(script,"%s\n",cmd.get());
if(script_only)
goto skip;
}
bool remove_target=false;
FileInfo *old=target_set->FindByName(file->name);
if(old && !to_rm_mismatched->FindByName(file->name))
{
Report(_("Removing old file `%s'"),target_name_rel);
remove_target=true;
stats.mod_symlinks++;
}
else
stats.new_symlinks++;
Report(_("Making symbolic link `%s' to `%s'"),target_name_rel,file->symlink.get());
mvJob *j=new mvJob(target_session->Clone(),file->symlink,target_name,FA::SYMLINK);
if(remove_target)
j->RemoveTargetFirst();
JobStarted(j);
RemoveSourceLater(file);
break;
}
if(script)
{
ArgV args("shell");
args.Append("ln");
args.Append("-sf");
args.Append(shell_encode(file->symlink));
args.Append(shell_encode(target_name));
xstring_ca cmd(args.CombineQuoted());
fprintf(script,"%s\n",cmd.get());
if(script_only)
goto skip;
}
struct stat st;
if(lstat(target_name,&st)!=-1)
{
Report(_("Removing old local file `%s'"),target_name_rel);
stats.mod_symlinks++;
if(remove(target_name)==-1)
{
eprintf("mirror: remove(%s): %s\n",target_name,strerror(errno));
goto skip;
}
}
else
{
if(FlagSet(ONLY_EXISTING))
{
Report(_("Skipping symlink `%s' (only-existing)"),target_name_rel);
goto skip;
}
stats.new_symlinks++;
}
Report(_("Making symbolic link `%s' to `%s'"),target_name_rel,file->symlink.get());
res=symlink(file->symlink,target_name);
if(res==-1)
eprintf("mirror: symlink(%s): %s\n",target_name,strerror(errno));
RemoveSourceLater(file);
break;
}
case FileInfo::UNKNOWN:
break;
}
skip:
return;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-401"
] |
lftp
|
a27e07d90a4608ceaf928b1babb27d4d803e1992
|
2.0073047103009737e+38
| 315 |
mirror: prepend ./ to rm and chmod arguments to avoid URL recognition (fix #452)
| 0 |
boolean jpegqs_start_decompress(j_decompress_ptr cinfo, jpegqs_control_t *opts) {
boolean ret; int use_jpeqqs = opts->niter > 0 || opts->flags & JPEGQS_UPSAMPLE_UV;
if (use_jpeqqs) cinfo->buffered_image = TRUE;
ret = jpeg_start_decompress(cinfo);
if (use_jpeqqs) {
while (!jpeg_input_complete(cinfo)) {
jpeg_start_output(cinfo, cinfo->input_scan_number);
jpeg_finish_output(cinfo);
}
do_quantsmooth(cinfo, jpeg_read_coefficients(cinfo), opts);
jpeg_start_output(cinfo, cinfo->input_scan_number);
}
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
jpeg-quantsmooth
|
3ab3838e610d361b71d937738edf156505c59c58
|
2.674003847338116e+38
| 14 |
avoid divide-by-zero on damaged JPEG files
Also fixed misleading indentation warnings from GCC.
| 0 |
static int macvtap_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len,
int flags)
{
struct macvtap_queue *q = container_of(sock, struct macvtap_queue, sock);
int ret;
if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC))
return -EINVAL;
ret = macvtap_do_read(q, iocb, m->msg_iov, total_len,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (ret > total_len) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
ret = flags & MSG_TRUNC ? ret : total_len;
}
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b92946e2919134ebe2a4083e4302236295ea2a73
|
1.9861488836345087e+38
| 16 |
macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
| 0 |
PHP_FUNCTION(fnmatch)
{
char *pattern, *filename;
int pattern_len, filename_len;
long flags = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss|l", &pattern, &pattern_len, &filename, &filename_len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (filename_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Filename exceeds the maximum allowed length of %d characters", MAXPATHLEN);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (pattern_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Pattern exceeds the maximum allowed length of %d characters", MAXPATHLEN);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_BOOL( ! fnmatch( pattern, filename, flags ));
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[] |
php-src
|
ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd
|
2.726210860946441e+38
| 21 |
- fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus
| 1 |
static void vnc_dpy_copy(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
int src_x, int src_y,
int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
{
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
VncState *vs, *vn;
uint8_t *src_row;
uint8_t *dst_row;
int i, x, y, pitch, inc, w_lim, s;
int cmp_bytes;
if (!vd->server) {
/* no client connected */
return;
}
vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
vs->force_update = 1;
vnc_update_client(vs, 1, true);
/* vs might be free()ed here */
}
}
/* do bitblit op on the local surface too */
pitch = vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
src_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, src_x, src_y);
dst_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, dst_x, dst_y);
y = dst_y;
inc = 1;
if (dst_y > src_y) {
/* copy backwards */
src_row += pitch * (h-1);
dst_row += pitch * (h-1);
pitch = -pitch;
y = dst_y + h - 1;
inc = -1;
}
w_lim = w - (VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT - (dst_x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
if (w_lim < 0) {
w_lim = w;
} else {
w_lim = w - (w_lim % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
}
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
for (x = 0; x <= w_lim;
x += s, src_row += cmp_bytes, dst_row += cmp_bytes) {
if (x == w_lim) {
if ((s = w - w_lim) == 0)
break;
} else if (!x) {
s = (VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT -
(dst_x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
s = MIN(s, w_lim);
} else {
s = VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT;
}
cmp_bytes = s * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
if (memcmp(src_row, dst_row, cmp_bytes) == 0)
continue;
memmove(dst_row, src_row, cmp_bytes);
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
if (!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
set_bit(((x + dst_x) / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT),
vs->dirty[y]);
}
}
}
src_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
dst_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
y += inc;
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
vnc_copy(vs, src_x, src_y, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
qemu
|
4c65fed8bdf96780735dbdb92a8bd0d6b6526cc3
|
3.2627460264997856e+38
| 80 |
ui: vnc: avoid floating point exception
While sending 'SetPixelFormat' messages to a VNC server,
the client could set the 'red-max', 'green-max' and 'blue-max'
values to be zero. This leads to a floating point exception in
write_png_palette while doing frame buffer updates.
Reported-by: Lian Yihan <lianyihan@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
| 0 |
static u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
int ret = 0;
if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
kvm
|
a642fc305053cc1c6e47e4f4df327895747ab485
|
1.0189316169443413e+38
| 12 |
kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
dissect_kafka_create_topics_request_create_topic_request(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, kafka_api_version_t api_version)
{
proto_item *subti, *subsubti;
proto_tree *subtree, *subsubtree;
int topic_start, topic_len;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, -1,
ett_kafka_topic,
&subti, "Create Topic Request");
/* topic */
offset = dissect_kafka_string(subtree, hf_kafka_topic_name, tvb, pinfo, offset, api_version >= 5, &topic_start, &topic_len);
/* num_partitions */
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_kafka_num_partitions, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* replication_factor */
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_kafka_replication_factor, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* [replica_assignment] */
subsubtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(subtree, tvb, offset, -1,
ett_kafka_replica_assignment,
&subsubti, "Replica Assignments");
offset = dissect_kafka_array(subsubtree, tvb, pinfo, offset, api_version >= 5, api_version,
&dissect_kafka_create_topics_request_replica_assignment, NULL);
proto_item_set_end(subsubti, tvb, offset);
/* [config] */
subsubtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(subtree, tvb, offset, -1,
ett_kafka_config,
&subsubti, "Configs");
offset = dissect_kafka_array(subsubtree, tvb, pinfo, offset, api_version >= 5, api_version,
&dissect_kafka_create_topics_request_config, NULL);
proto_item_set_end(subsubti, tvb, offset);
if (api_version >= 5) {
offset = dissect_kafka_tagged_fields(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, 0);
}
proto_item_set_end(subti, tvb, offset);
proto_item_append_text(subti, " (Topic=%s)",
tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb,
topic_start, topic_len, ENC_UTF_8));
return offset;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-401"
] |
wireshark
|
f4374967bbf9c12746b8ec3cd54dddada9dd353e
|
5.51676133871097e+37
| 49 |
Kafka: Limit our decompression size.
Don't assume that the Internet has our best interests at heart when it
gives us the size of our decompression buffer. Assign an arbitrary limit
of 50 MB.
This fixes #16739 in that it takes care of
** (process:17681): WARNING **: 20:03:07.440: Dissector bug, protocol Kafka, in packet 31: ../epan/proto.c:7043: failed assertion "end >= fi->start"
which is different from the original error output. It looks like *that*
might have taken care of in one of the other recent Kafka bug fixes.
The decompression routines return a success or failure status. Use
gbooleans instead of ints for that.
| 0 |
void replace_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
{
char *old = sb->s_options;
rcu_assign_pointer(sb->s_options, options);
if (old) {
synchronize_rcu();
kfree(old);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-269"
] |
user-namespace
|
a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd
|
1.2581936143822086e+37
| 9 |
mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.
Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| 0 |
int udf_expand_file_adinicb(struct inode *inode)
{
struct page *page;
char *kaddr;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
int err;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(inode));
if (!iinfo->i_lenAlloc) {
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_SHORT_AD))
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT;
else
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG;
/* from now on we have normal address_space methods */
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return 0;
}
/*
* Release i_data_sem so that we can lock a page - page lock ranks
* above i_data_sem. i_mutex still protects us against file changes.
*/
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
page = find_or_create_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, GFP_NOFS);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
memset(kaddr + iinfo->i_lenAlloc, 0x00,
PAGE_SIZE - iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
memcpy(kaddr, iinfo->i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr,
iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
flush_dcache_page(page);
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
}
down_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
memset(iinfo->i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr, 0x00,
iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_SHORT_AD))
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT;
else
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG;
/* from now on we have normal address_space methods */
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
err = filemap_fdatawrite(inode->i_mapping);
if (err) {
/* Restore everything back so that we don't lose data... */
lock_page(page);
down_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(iinfo->i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr, kaddr, inode->i_size);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
unlock_page(page);
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops;
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
}
put_page(page);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return err;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
ea8569194b43f0f01f0a84c689388542c7254a1f
|
2.703151452776371e+38
| 70 |
udf: Restore i_lenAlloc when inode expansion fails
When we fail to expand inode from inline format to a normal format, we
restore inode to contain the original inline formatting but we forgot to
set i_lenAlloc back. The mismatch between i_lenAlloc and i_size was then
causing further problems such as warnings and lost data down the line.
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7e49b6f2480c ("udf: Convert UDF to new truncate calling sequence")
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
| 1 |
iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
desired_object, value);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-18"
] |
krb5
|
e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a
|
2.3258265431106426e+38
| 13 |
Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
| 0 |
void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags)
{
dest->d = b->d;
dest->top = b->top;
dest->dmax = b->dmax;
dest->neg = b->neg;
dest->flags = ((dest->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
| (b->flags & ~BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
| BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA | flags);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e
|
1.1634317094595527e+37
| 10 |
Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6009)
(cherry picked from commit 40e48e54582e46c1a01e184ecf5bd31f4f7f8294)
| 0 |
othercase(charset,ch)
CHARSET_INFO *charset;
int ch;
{
/*
In MySQL some multi-byte character sets
have 'ctype' array but don't have 'to_lower'
and 'to_upper' arrays. In this case we handle
only basic latin letters a..z and A..Z.
If 'to_lower' and 'to_upper' arrays are empty in a character set,
then my_isalpha(cs, ch) should never return TRUE for characters
other than basic latin letters. Otherwise it should be
considered as a mistake in character set definition.
*/
assert(my_isalpha(charset,ch));
if (my_isupper(charset,ch))
{
return(charset->to_lower ? my_tolower(charset,ch) :
ch - 'A' + 'a');
}
else if (my_islower(charset,ch))
{
return(charset->to_upper ? my_toupper(charset,ch) :
ch - 'a' + 'A');
}
else /* peculiar, but could happen */
return(ch);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
mysql-server
|
dc45e408250c582eb532417a42cef5b5a8e2fe77
|
3.326226891717427e+38
| 29 |
Bug#20642505: HENRY SPENCER REGULAR EXPRESSIONS (REGEX) LIBRARY
The MySQL server uses Henry Spencer's library for regular
expressions to support the REGEXP/RLIKE string operator.
This changeset adapts a recent fix from the upstream for
better 32-bit compatiblity. (Note that we cannot simply use
the current upstream version as a drop-in replacement
for the version used by the server as the latter has
been extended to understand MySQL charsets etc.)
| 0 |
acl_fetch_stcode(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
char *ptr;
int len;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
return 0;
len = txn->rsp.sl.st.c_l;
ptr = txn->rsp.chn->buf->p + txn->rsp.sl.st.c;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = __strl2ui(ptr, len);
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST;
return 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
haproxy
|
aae75e3279c6c9bd136413a72dafdcd4986bb89a
|
2.4194190738698037e+38
| 20 |
BUG/CRITICAL: using HTTP information in tcp-request content may crash the process
During normal HTTP request processing, request buffers are realigned if
there are less than global.maxrewrite bytes available after them, in
order to leave enough room for rewriting headers after the request. This
is done in http_wait_for_request().
However, if some HTTP inspection happens during a "tcp-request content"
rule, this realignment is not performed. In theory this is not a problem
because empty buffers are always aligned and TCP inspection happens at
the beginning of a connection. But with HTTP keep-alive, it also happens
at the beginning of each subsequent request. So if a second request was
pipelined by the client before the first one had a chance to be forwarded,
the second request will not be realigned. Then, http_wait_for_request()
will not perform such a realignment either because the request was
already parsed and marked as such. The consequence of this, is that the
rewrite of a sufficient number of such pipelined, unaligned requests may
leave less room past the request been processed than the configured
reserve, which can lead to a buffer overflow if request processing appends
some data past the end of the buffer.
A number of conditions are required for the bug to be triggered :
- HTTP keep-alive must be enabled ;
- HTTP inspection in TCP rules must be used ;
- some request appending rules are needed (reqadd, x-forwarded-for)
- since empty buffers are always realigned, the client must pipeline
enough requests so that the buffer always contains something till
the point where there is no more room for rewriting.
While such a configuration is quite unlikely to be met (which is
confirmed by the bug's lifetime), a few people do use these features
together for very specific usages. And more importantly, writing such
a configuration and the request to attack it is trivial.
A quick workaround consists in forcing keep-alive off by adding
"option httpclose" or "option forceclose" in the frontend. Alternatively,
disabling HTTP-based TCP inspection rules enough if the application
supports it.
At first glance, this bug does not look like it could lead to remote code
execution, as the overflowing part is controlled by the configuration and
not by the user. But some deeper analysis should be performed to confirm
this. And anyway, corrupting the process' memory and crashing it is quite
trivial.
Special thanks go to Yves Lafon from the W3C who reported this bug and
deployed significant efforts to collect the relevant data needed to
understand it in less than one week.
CVE-2013-1912 was assigned to this issue.
Note that 1.4 is also affected so the fix must be backported.
| 0 |
bool asn1_write_implicit_Integer(struct asn1_data *data, int i)
{
if (i == -1) {
/* -1 is special as it consists of all-0xff bytes. In
push_int_bigendian this is the only case that is not
properly handled, as all 0xff bytes would be handled as
leading ones to be ignored. */
return asn1_write_uint8(data, 0xff);
} else {
return push_int_bigendian(data, i, i<0);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
samba
|
9d989c9dd7a5b92d0c5d65287935471b83b6e884
|
5.76746051386027e+35
| 12 |
CVE-2015-7540: lib: util: Check *every* asn1 return call and early return.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9187
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <Volker.Lendecke@SerNet.DE>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 19 01:29:00 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
(cherry picked from commit b9d3fd4cc551df78a7b066ee8ce43bbaa3ff994a)
| 0 |
static int bpf_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
static struct tree_descr bpf_rfiles[] = { { "" } };
struct inode *inode;
int ret;
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, BPF_FS_MAGIC, bpf_rfiles);
if (ret)
return ret;
sb->s_op = &bpf_super_ops;
inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
inode->i_op = &bpf_dir_iops;
inode->i_mode &= ~S_IALLUGO;
inode->i_mode |= S_ISVTX | S_IRWXUGO;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
92117d8443bc5afacc8d5ba82e541946310f106e
|
1.376585465704047e+38
| 19 |
bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static my_bool process_set_gtid_purged(MYSQL* mysql_con)
{
MYSQL_RES *gtid_mode_res;
MYSQL_ROW gtid_mode_row;
char *gtid_mode_val= 0;
char buf[32], query[64];
if (opt_set_gtid_purged_mode == SET_GTID_PURGED_OFF)
return FALSE; /* nothing to be done */
/*
Check if the server has the knowledge of GTIDs(pre mysql-5.6)
or if the gtid_mode is ON or OFF.
*/
my_snprintf(query, sizeof(query), "SHOW VARIABLES LIKE %s",
quote_for_like("gtid_mode", buf));
if (mysql_query_with_error_report(mysql_con, >id_mode_res, query))
return TRUE;
gtid_mode_row = mysql_fetch_row(gtid_mode_res);
/*
gtid_mode_row is NULL for pre 5.6 versions. For versions >= 5.6,
get the gtid_mode value from the second column.
*/
gtid_mode_val = gtid_mode_row ? (char*)gtid_mode_row[1] : NULL;
if (gtid_mode_val && strcmp(gtid_mode_val, "OFF"))
{
/*
For any gtid_mode !=OFF and irrespective of --set-gtid-purged
being AUTO or ON, add GTID_PURGED in the output.
*/
if (opt_databases || !opt_alldbs || !opt_dump_triggers
|| !opt_routines || !opt_events)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Warning: A partial dump from a server that has GTIDs will "
"by default include the GTIDs of all transactions, even "
"those that changed suppressed parts of the database. If "
"you don't want to restore GTIDs, pass "
"--set-gtid-purged=OFF. To make a complete dump, pass "
"--all-databases --triggers --routines --events. \n");
}
set_session_binlog(FALSE);
if (add_set_gtid_purged(mysql_con))
return TRUE;
}
else /* gtid_mode is off */
{
if (opt_set_gtid_purged_mode == SET_GTID_PURGED_ON)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Server has GTIDs disabled.\n");
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] |
mysql-server
|
3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390
|
1.5686640898499732e+38
| 60 |
WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options
| 0 |
static unsigned long cpu_avg_load_per_task(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
unsigned long nr_running = READ_ONCE(rq->cfs.h_nr_running);
unsigned long load_avg = cpu_runnable_load(rq);
if (nr_running)
return load_avg / nr_running;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
de53fd7aedb100f03e5d2231cfce0e4993282425
|
2.631505708414591e+38
| 11 |
sched/fair: Fix low cpu usage with high throttling by removing expiration of cpu-local slices
It has been observed, that highly-threaded, non-cpu-bound applications
running under cpu.cfs_quota_us constraints can hit a high percentage of
periods throttled while simultaneously not consuming the allocated
amount of quota. This use case is typical of user-interactive non-cpu
bound applications, such as those running in kubernetes or mesos when
run on multiple cpu cores.
This has been root caused to cpu-local run queue being allocated per cpu
bandwidth slices, and then not fully using that slice within the period.
At which point the slice and quota expires. This expiration of unused
slice results in applications not being able to utilize the quota for
which they are allocated.
The non-expiration of per-cpu slices was recently fixed by
'commit 512ac999d275 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift
condition")'. Prior to that it appears that this had been broken since
at least 'commit 51f2176d74ac ("sched/fair: Fix unlocked reads of some
cfs_b->quota/period")' which was introduced in v3.16-rc1 in 2014. That
added the following conditional which resulted in slices never being
expired.
if (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires) {
/* extend local deadline, drift is bounded above by 2 ticks */
cfs_rq->runtime_expires += TICK_NSEC;
Because this was broken for nearly 5 years, and has recently been fixed
and is now being noticed by many users running kubernetes
(https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/67577) it is my opinion
that the mechanisms around expiring runtime should be removed
altogether.
This allows quota already allocated to per-cpu run-queues to live longer
than the period boundary. This allows threads on runqueues that do not
use much CPU to continue to use their remaining slice over a longer
period of time than cpu.cfs_period_us. However, this helps prevent the
above condition of hitting throttling while also not fully utilizing
your cpu quota.
This theoretically allows a machine to use slightly more than its
allotted quota in some periods. This overflow would be bounded by the
remaining quota left on each per-cpu runqueueu. This is typically no
more than min_cfs_rq_runtime=1ms per cpu. For CPU bound tasks this will
change nothing, as they should theoretically fully utilize all of their
quota in each period. For user-interactive tasks as described above this
provides a much better user/application experience as their cpu
utilization will more closely match the amount they requested when they
hit throttling. This means that cpu limits no longer strictly apply per
period for non-cpu bound applications, but that they are still accurate
over longer timeframes.
This greatly improves performance of high-thread-count, non-cpu bound
applications with low cfs_quota_us allocation on high-core-count
machines. In the case of an artificial testcase (10ms/100ms of quota on
80 CPU machine), this commit resulted in almost 30x performance
improvement, while still maintaining correct cpu quota restrictions.
That testcase is available at https://github.com/indeedeng/fibtest.
Fixes: 512ac999d275 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition")
Signed-off-by: Dave Chiluk <chiluk+linux@indeed.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hammond <jhammond@indeed.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kyle Anderson <kwa@yelp.com>
Cc: Gabriel Munos <gmunoz@netflix.com>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@posk.io>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563900266-19734-2-git-send-email-chiluk+linux@indeed.com
| 0 |
tgs_make_reply(astgs_request_t r,
krb5_const_principal tgt_name,
const EncTicketPart *tgt,
const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
int rk_is_subkey,
const EncryptionKey *serverkey,
const krb5_keyblock *sessionkey,
krb5_kvno kvno,
AuthorizationData *auth_data,
hdb_entry_ex *server,
krb5_principal server_principal,
hdb_entry_ex *client,
krb5_principal client_principal,
const char *tgt_realm,
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
krb5_principals spp,
const krb5_data *rspac,
const METHOD_DATA *enc_pa_data)
{
krb5_context context = r->context;
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
const char **e_text = &r->e_text;
krb5_data *reply = r->reply;
KDC_REP rep;
EncKDCRepPart ek;
EncTicketPart et;
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
krb5_error_code ret;
int is_weak = 0;
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep;
et.authtime = tgt->authtime;
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till);
ALLOC(et.starttime);
*et.starttime = kdc_time;
ret = check_tgs_flags(r, b, tgt_name, tgt, &et);
if(ret)
goto out;
/* We should check the transited encoding if:
1) the request doesn't ask not to be checked
2) globally enforcing a check
3) principal requires checking
4) we allow non-check per-principal, but principal isn't marked as allowing this
5) we don't globally allow this
*/
#define GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
(config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK)
#define GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL \
(config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL)
#define GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
(config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST)
/* these will consult the database in future release */
#define PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
#define PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
ret = fix_transited_encoding(context, config,
!f.disable_transited_check ||
GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK ||
PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server) ||
!((GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL &&
PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server)) ||
GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK),
&tgt->transited, &et,
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client_principal),
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
tgt_realm);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_Realm(&server_principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server_principal);
ret = copy_Realm(&tgt_name->realm, &rep.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* RFC 8062 states "if the ticket in the TGS request is an anonymous
* one, the client and client realm are copied from that ticket". So
* whilst the TGT flag check below is superfluous, it is included in
* order to follow the specification to its letter.
*/
if (et.flags.anonymous && !tgt->flags.anonymous)
_kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep.cname);
else
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&tgt_name->name, &rep.cname);
if (ret)
goto out;
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
ek.caddr = et.caddr;
{
time_t life;
life = et.endtime - *et.starttime;
if(client && client->entry.max_life)
life = min(life, *client->entry.max_life);
if(server->entry.max_life)
life = min(life, *server->entry.max_life);
et.endtime = *et.starttime + life;
}
if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable &&
et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till &&
tgt->renew_till != NULL)
{
et.flags.renewable = 1;
ALLOC(et.renew_till);
*et.renew_till = *b->till;
}
if(et.renew_till){
time_t renew;
renew = *et.renew_till - *et.starttime;
if(client && client->entry.max_renew)
renew = min(renew, *client->entry.max_renew);
if(server->entry.max_renew)
renew = min(renew, *server->entry.max_renew);
*et.renew_till = *et.starttime + renew;
}
if(et.renew_till){
*et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till);
*et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till);
et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till);
}
*et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime);
if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID;
goto out;
}
if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){
free(et.renew_till);
et.renew_till = NULL;
et.flags.renewable = 0;
}
et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent;
et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent;
et.flags.ok_as_delegate = server->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate;
/* See MS-KILE 3.3.5.1 */
if (!server->entry.flags.forwardable)
et.flags.forwardable = 0;
if (!server->entry.flags.proxiable)
et.flags.proxiable = 0;
/*
* For anonymous tickets, we should filter out positive authorization data
* that could reveal the client's identity, and return a policy error for
* restrictive authorization data. Policy for unknown authorization types
* is implementation dependent.
*/
if (rspac->length && !et.flags.anonymous) {
/*
* No not need to filter out the any PAC from the
* auth_data since it's signed by the KDC.
*/
ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, rspac);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (auth_data) {
unsigned int i = 0;
/* XXX check authdata */
if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
et.authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*et.authorization_data));
if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < auth_data->len ; i++) {
ret = add_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data, &auth_data->val[i]);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
}
/* Filter out type KRB5SignedPath */
ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, et.authorization_data, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
if (et.authorization_data->len == 1) {
free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
free(et.authorization_data);
et.authorization_data = NULL;
} else {
AuthorizationData *ad = et.authorization_data;
free_AuthorizationDataElement(&ad->val[ad->len - 1]);
ad->len--;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, sessionkey, &et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
et.crealm = rep.crealm;
et.cname = rep.cname;
ek.key = et.key;
/* MIT must have at least one last_req */
ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ek.last_req.len = 1; /* set after alloc to avoid null deref on cleanup */
ek.nonce = b->nonce;
ek.flags = et.flags;
ek.authtime = et.authtime;
ek.starttime = et.starttime;
ek.endtime = et.endtime;
ek.renew_till = et.renew_till;
ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm;
ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname;
_kdc_log_timestamp(r, "TGS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
/* Don't sign cross realm tickets, they can't be checked anyway */
{
char *realm = get_krbtgt_realm(&ek.sname);
if (realm == NULL || strcmp(realm, ek.srealm) == 0) {
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
krbtgt,
krbtgt_etype,
client_principal,
NULL,
spp,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
if (enc_pa_data->len) {
rep.padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*rep.padata));
if (rep.padata == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(enc_pa_data, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, serverkey->keytype) != 0
&& _kdc_is_weak_exception(server->entry.principal, serverkey->keytype))
{
krb5_enctype_enable(context, serverkey->keytype);
is_weak = 1;
}
/* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following
encryption should come from. What we have is a session
key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes
*for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible
etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look
at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt
session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say)
CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the
etype list, even if we don't want a session key with
DES3? */
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config, NULL, 0,
&rep, &et, &ek, serverkey->keytype,
kvno,
serverkey, 0, replykey, rk_is_subkey,
e_text, reply);
if (is_weak)
krb5_enctype_disable(context, serverkey->keytype);
r->reply_key.keytype = replykey->keytype;
_log_astgs_req(r, serverkey->keytype);
out:
free_TGS_REP(&rep);
free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited);
if(et.starttime)
free(et.starttime);
if(et.renew_till)
free(et.renew_till);
if(et.authorization_data) {
free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
free(et.authorization_data);
}
free_LastReq(&ek.last_req);
memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length);
free_EncryptionKey(&et.key);
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
heimdal
|
04171147948d0a3636bc6374181926f0fb2ec83a
|
1.7682513330710294e+38
| 314 |
kdc: validate sname in TGS-REQ
In tgs_build_reply(), validate the server name in the TGS-REQ is present before
dereferencing.
| 0 |
mime_header_decoder_delete(struct mime_header_decoder_data *pd)
{
if (pd) {
mbfl_convert_filter_delete(pd->conv2_filter);
mbfl_convert_filter_delete(pd->conv1_filter);
mbfl_convert_filter_delete(pd->deco_filter);
mbfl_memory_device_clear(&pd->outdev);
mbfl_memory_device_clear(&pd->tmpdev);
mbfl_free((void*)pd);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
php-src
|
64f42c73efc58e88671ad76b6b6bc8e2b62713e1
|
8.089915486435586e+36
| 11 |
Fixed bug #71906: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param (-1) in mbfl_strcut
| 0 |
void Greeter::setTheme(const QString &theme) {
m_theme = theme;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
sddm
|
4cfed6b0a625593fb43876f04badc4dd99799d86
|
2.018164485656025e+38
| 3 |
Disable greeters from loading KDE's debug hander
Some themes may use KDE components which will automatically load KDE's
crash handler.
If the greeter were to then somehow crash, that would leave a crash
handler allowing other actions, albeit as the locked down SDDM user.
Only SDDM users using the breeze theme from plasma-workspace are
affected. Safest and simplest fix is to handle this inside SDDM
disabling kcrash via an environment variable for all future themes that
may use these libraries.
CVE-2015-0856
| 0 |
u64 ring_buffer_event_time_stamp(struct trace_buffer *buffer,
struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[smp_processor_id()];
unsigned int nest;
u64 ts;
/* If the event includes an absolute time, then just use that */
if (event->type_len == RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_STAMP)
return rb_event_time_stamp(event);
nest = local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing);
verify_event(cpu_buffer, event);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest))
goto fail;
/* Read the current saved nesting level time stamp */
if (likely(--nest < MAX_NEST))
return cpu_buffer->event_stamp[nest];
/* Shouldn't happen, warn if it does */
WARN_ONCE(1, "nest (%d) greater than max", nest);
fail:
/* Can only fail on 32 bit */
if (!rb_time_read(&cpu_buffer->write_stamp, &ts))
/* Screw it, just read the current time */
ts = rb_time_stamp(cpu_buffer->buffer);
return ts;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
67f0d6d9883c13174669f88adac4f0ee656cc16a
|
7.89694175438762e+37
| 31 |
tracing: Fix bug in rb_per_cpu_empty() that might cause deadloop.
The "rb_per_cpu_empty()" misinterpret the condition (as not-empty) when
"head_page" and "commit_page" of "struct ring_buffer_per_cpu" points to
the same buffer page, whose "buffer_data_page" is empty and "read" field
is non-zero.
An error scenario could be constructed as followed (kernel perspective):
1. All pages in the buffer has been accessed by reader(s) so that all of
them will have non-zero "read" field.
2. Read and clear all buffer pages so that "rb_num_of_entries()" will
return 0 rendering there's no more data to read. It is also required
that the "read_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same
page, while "head_page" is the next page of them.
3. Invoke "ring_buffer_lock_reserve()" with large enough "length"
so that it shot pass the end of current tail buffer page. Now the
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same page.
4. Discard current event with "ring_buffer_discard_commit()", so that
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to a page whose buffer
data page is now empty.
When the error scenario has been constructed, "tracing_read_pipe" will
be trapped inside a deadloop: "trace_empty()" returns 0 since
"rb_per_cpu_empty()" returns 0 when it hits the CPU containing such
constructed ring buffer. Then "trace_find_next_entry_inc()" always
return NULL since "rb_num_of_entries()" reports there's no more entry
to read. Finally "trace_seq_to_user()" returns "-EBUSY" spanking
"tracing_read_pipe" back to the start of the "waitagain" loop.
I've also written a proof-of-concept script to construct the scenario
and trigger the bug automatically, you can use it to trace and validate
my reasoning above:
https://github.com/aegistudio/RingBufferDetonator.git
Tests has been carried out on linux kernel 5.14-rc2
(2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c), my fixed version
of kernel (for testing whether my update fixes the bug) and
some older kernels (for range of affected kernels). Test result is
also attached to the proof-of-concept repository.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPaNxsIlb2yjSi5Y@aegistudio/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPgrN85WL9VyrZ55@aegistudio
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf41a158cacba ("ring-buffer: make reentrant")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Haoran Luo <www@aegistudio.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
| 0 |
conntrack_init(struct conntrack *ct)
{
unsigned i, j;
long long now = time_msec();
ct_rwlock_init(&ct->resources_lock);
ct_rwlock_wrlock(&ct->resources_lock);
hmap_init(&ct->nat_conn_keys);
hmap_init(&ct->alg_expectations);
ovs_list_init(&ct->alg_exp_list);
ct_rwlock_unlock(&ct->resources_lock);
for (i = 0; i < CONNTRACK_BUCKETS; i++) {
struct conntrack_bucket *ctb = &ct->buckets[i];
ct_lock_init(&ctb->lock);
ct_lock_lock(&ctb->lock);
hmap_init(&ctb->connections);
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ctb->exp_lists); j++) {
ovs_list_init(&ctb->exp_lists[j]);
}
ct_lock_unlock(&ctb->lock);
ovs_mutex_init(&ctb->cleanup_mutex);
ovs_mutex_lock(&ctb->cleanup_mutex);
ctb->next_cleanup = now + CT_TM_MIN;
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ctb->cleanup_mutex);
}
ct->hash_basis = random_uint32();
atomic_count_init(&ct->n_conn, 0);
atomic_init(&ct->n_conn_limit, DEFAULT_N_CONN_LIMIT);
latch_init(&ct->clean_thread_exit);
ct->clean_thread = ovs_thread_create("ct_clean", clean_thread_main, ct);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
ovs
|
35c280072c1c3ed58202745b7d27fbbd0736999b
|
1.344250730146375e+37
| 33 |
flow: Support extra padding length.
Although not required, padding can be optionally added until
the packet length is MTU bytes. A packet with extra padding
currently fails sanity checks.
Vulnerability: CVE-2020-35498
Fixes: fa8d9001a624 ("miniflow_extract: Properly handle small IP packets.")
Reported-by: Joakim Hindersson <joakim.hindersson@elastx.se>
Acked-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@sysclose.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
| 0 |
static void decrement_prob(struct sfb_bucket *b, struct sfb_sched_data *q)
{
b->p_mark = prob_minus(b->p_mark, q->decrement);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-330"
] |
linux
|
55667441c84fa5e0911a0aac44fb059c15ba6da2
|
1.3135892585602263e+38
| 4 |
net/flow_dissector: switch to siphash
UDP IPv6 packets auto flowlabels are using a 32bit secret
(static u32 hashrnd in net/core/flow_dissector.c) and
apply jhash() over fields known by the receivers.
Attackers can easily infer the 32bit secret and use this information
to identify a device and/or user, since this 32bit secret is only
set at boot time.
Really, using jhash() to generate cookies sent on the wire
is a serious security concern.
Trying to change the rol32(hash, 16) in ip6_make_flowlabel() would be
a dead end. Trying to periodically change the secret (like in sch_sfq.c)
could change paths taken in the network for long lived flows.
Let's switch to siphash, as we did in commit df453700e8d8
("inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash")
Using a cryptographically strong pseudo random function will solve this
privacy issue and more generally remove other weak points in the stack.
Packet schedulers using skb_get_hash_perturb() benefit from this change.
Fixes: b56774163f99 ("ipv6: Enable auto flow labels by default")
Fixes: 42240901f7c4 ("ipv6: Implement different admin modes for automatic flow labels")
Fixes: 67800f9b1f4e ("ipv6: Call skb_get_hash_flowi6 to get skb->hash in ip6_make_flowlabel")
Fixes: cb1ce2ef387b ("ipv6: Implement automatic flow label generation on transmit")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Berger <jonathann1@walla.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static int bcf_dec_typed_int1_safe(uint8_t *p, uint8_t *end, uint8_t **q,
int32_t *val) {
uint32_t t;
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
t = *p++ & 0xf;
/* Use if .. else if ... else instead of switch to force order. Assumption
is that small integers are more frequent than big ones. */
if (t == BCF_BT_INT8) {
*q = p + 1;
*val = *(int8_t *) p;
} else if (t == BCF_BT_INT16) {
if (end - p < 2) return -1;
*q = p + 2;
*val = le_to_i16(p);
} else if (t == BCF_BT_INT32) {
if (end - p < 4) return -1;
*q = p + 4;
*val = le_to_i32(p);
#ifdef VCF_ALLOW_INT64
} else if (t == BCF_BT_INT64) {
// This case should never happen because there should be no 64-bit BCFs
// at all, definitely not coming from htslib
if (end - p < 8) return -1;
*q = p + 8;
*val = le_to_i64(p);
#endif
} else {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
htslib
|
dcd4b7304941a8832fba2d0fc4c1e716e7a4e72c
|
2.3473138694179356e+38
| 31 |
Fix check for VCF record size
The check for excessive record size in vcf_parse_format() only
looked at individual fields. It was therefore possible to
exceed the limit and overflow fmt_aux_t::offset by having
multiple fields with a combined size that went over INT_MAX.
Fix by including the amount of memory used so far in the check.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
Fixes oss-fuzz 24097
| 0 |
int kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
struct kvm_io_device *dev)
{
int i, r;
struct kvm_io_bus *new_bus, *bus;
bus = kvm->buses[bus_idx];
new_bus = kmemdup(bus, sizeof(*bus), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_bus)
return -ENOMEM;
r = -ENOENT;
for (i = 0; i < new_bus->dev_count; i++)
if (new_bus->range[i].dev == dev) {
r = 0;
new_bus->dev_count--;
new_bus->range[i] = new_bus->range[new_bus->dev_count];
sort(new_bus->range, new_bus->dev_count,
sizeof(struct kvm_io_range),
kvm_io_bus_sort_cmp, NULL);
break;
}
if (r) {
kfree(new_bus);
return r;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->buses[bus_idx], new_bus);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kfree(bus);
return r;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
kvm
|
5b40572ed5f0344b9dbee486a17c589ce1abe1a3
|
2.704122066330232e+37
| 34 |
KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else {
int64_t i;
/* Overflow detected - can happen if source has a larger MAC table.
* We simply set overflow flag so there's no need to maintain the
* table of addresses, discard them all.
* Note: 64 bit math to avoid integer overflow.
*/
for (i = 0; i < (int64_t)n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN; ++i) {
qemu_get_byte(f);
}
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
}
if (version_id >= 6)
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)n->vlans, MAX_VLAN >> 3);
if (version_id >= 7) {
if (qemu_get_be32(f) && !peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
if (version_id >= 9) {
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->mac_table.uni_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 10) {
n->alluni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nomulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nouni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nobcast = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 11) {
if (qemu_get_byte(f) && !peer_has_ufo(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires TUN_F_UFO support");
return -1;
}
}
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (n->curr_queues > n->max_queues) {
error_report("virtio-net: curr_queues %x > max_queues %x",
n->curr_queues, n->max_queues);
return -1;
}
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
}
if ((1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS) & vdev->guest_features) {
n->curr_guest_offloads = qemu_get_be64(f);
} else {
n->curr_guest_offloads = virtio_net_supported_guest_offloads(n);
}
if (peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads(n);
}
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
/* Find the first multicast entry in the saved MAC filter */
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN] & 1) {
break;
}
}
n->mac_table.first_multi = i;
/* nc.link_down can't be migrated, so infer link_down according
* to link status bit in n->status */
link_down = (n->status & VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP) == 0;
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i)->link_down = link_down;
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
98f93ddd84800f207889491e0b5d851386b459cf
|
2.8656223422149838e+38
| 129 |
virtio-net: out-of-bounds buffer write on load
CVE-2013-4149 QEMU 1.3.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c
> } else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
> uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
We are allocating buffer of size n->mac_table.in_use
> qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
and read to the n->mac_table.in_use size buffer n->mac_table.in_use *
ETH_ALEN bytes, corrupting memory.
If adversary controls state then memory written there is controlled
by adversary.
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static inline int vmsvga_copy_rect(struct vmsvga_state_s *s,
int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int w, int h)
{
DisplaySurface *surface = qemu_console_surface(s->vga.con);
uint8_t *vram = s->vga.vram_ptr;
int bypl = surface_stride(surface);
int bypp = surface_bytes_per_pixel(surface);
int width = bypp * w;
int line = h;
uint8_t *ptr[2];
if (!vmsvga_verify_rect(surface, "vmsvga_copy_rect/src", x0, y0, w, h)) {
return -1;
}
if (!vmsvga_verify_rect(surface, "vmsvga_copy_rect/dst", x1, y1, w, h)) {
return -1;
}
if (y1 > y0) {
ptr[0] = vram + bypp * x0 + bypl * (y0 + h - 1);
ptr[1] = vram + bypp * x1 + bypl * (y1 + h - 1);
for (; line > 0; line --, ptr[0] -= bypl, ptr[1] -= bypl) {
memmove(ptr[1], ptr[0], width);
}
} else {
ptr[0] = vram + bypp * x0 + bypl * y0;
ptr[1] = vram + bypp * x1 + bypl * y1;
for (; line > 0; line --, ptr[0] += bypl, ptr[1] += bypl) {
memmove(ptr[1], ptr[0], width);
}
}
vmsvga_update_rect_delayed(s, x1, y1, w, h);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
qemu
|
fa892e9abb728e76afcf27323ab29c57fb0fe7aa
|
1.1356134223502782e+38
| 35 |
ui/cursor: fix integer overflow in cursor_alloc (CVE-2021-4206)
Prevent potential integer overflow by limiting 'width' and 'height' to
512x512. Also change 'datasize' type to size_t. Refer to security
advisory https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4206/ for more information.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4206
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220407081712.345609-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static unsigned long xdp_get_metalen(const struct xdp_buff *xdp)
{
return xdp_data_meta_unsupported(xdp) ? 0 :
xdp->data - xdp->data_meta;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120"
] |
linux
|
050fad7c4534c13c8eb1d9c2ba66012e014773cb
|
7.984920371961698e+37
| 5 |
bpf: fix truncated jump targets on heavy expansions
Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic:
[ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...]
[ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7
[ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017
[ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0
[ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754
[ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0
[ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001
[ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00
[ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000
[ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a
[ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03
[ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18
[ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000
[ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000
[ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6
[ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500
[ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08
[ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974)
[ 208.086235] Call trace:
[ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0
[ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754
[ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8
[ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230
[ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198
[ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34
[ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680)
[ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]---
The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole
instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required
heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also
had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all
constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns,
bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets
which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional
delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could
not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset
wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa
depending on the jump direction.
Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions
in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For
the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s
BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The
bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case
of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to
detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus
the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets
on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place
and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are
rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next,
though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue
in bpf seems more appropriate in this case.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| 0 |
static inline void __netif_reschedule(struct Qdisc *q)
{
struct softnet_data *sd;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
sd = &__get_cpu_var(softnet_data);
q->next_sched = NULL;
*sd->output_queue_tailp = q;
sd->output_queue_tailp = &q->next_sched;
raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
9.05769720117912e+37
| 13 |
net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| 0 |
int is_dir(const char *path)
{
struct stat statbuf;
int ret = stat(path, &statbuf);
if (ret == 0 && S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
lxc
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
2.681684453829299e+38
| 8 |
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
| 0 |
ztpqr_scale_wb_common(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, int idx)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
double a[4], Ps; /* a[0] = ws, a[1] = bs, a[2] = wd, a[3] = bd */
double result;
int code;
int i;
code = real_param(op, &Ps);
if (code < 0) return code;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ref tmp;
code = array_get(imemory, op - 4 + i, idx, &tmp);
if (code >= 0)
code = real_param(&tmp, &a[i]);
if (code < 0) return code;
}
if (a[0] == a[1])
return_error(gs_error_undefinedresult);
result = a[3] + (a[2] - a[3]) * (Ps - a[1]) / (a[0] - a[1]);
make_real(op - 4, result);
pop(4);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-704"
] |
ghostpdl
|
548bb434e81dadcc9f71adf891a3ef5bea8e2b4e
|
3.0200683622293353e+38
| 27 |
PS interpreter - add some type checking
These were 'probably' safe anyway, since they mostly treat the objects
as integers without checking, which at least can't result in a crash.
Nevertheless, we ought to check.
The return from comparedictkeys could be wrong if one of the keys had
a value which was not an array, it could incorrectly decide the two
were in fact the same.
| 0 |
int64_t ClockMath::floorDivide(int64_t numerator, int64_t denominator) {
return (numerator >= 0) ?
numerator / denominator : ((numerator + 1) / denominator) - 1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
icu
|
71dd84d4ffd6600a70e5bca56a22b957e6642bd4
|
2.9011972608547417e+38
| 4 |
ICU-12504 in ICU4C Persian cal, use int64_t math for one operation to avoid overflow; add tests in C and J
X-SVN-Rev: 40654
| 0 |
void Convert::generic_convert(const char * in, int size, CharVector & out)
{
buf_.clear();
decode_->decode(in, size, buf_);
FilterChar * start = buf_.pbegin();
FilterChar * stop = buf_.pend();
if (!filter.empty())
filter.process(start, stop);
encode_->encode(start, stop, out);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
aspell
|
de29341638833ba7717bd6b5e6850998454b044b
|
1.788887366894189e+38
| 10 |
Don't allow null-terminated UCS-2/4 strings using the original API.
Detect if the encoding is UCS-2/4 and the length is -1 in affected API
functions and refuse to convert the string. If the string ends up
being converted somehow, abort with an error message in DecodeDirect
and ConvDirect. To convert a null terminated string in
Decode/ConvDirect, a negative number corresponding to the width of the
underlying character type for the encoding is expected; for example,
if the encoding is "ucs-2" then a the size is expected to be -2.
Also fix a 1-3 byte over-read in DecodeDirect when reading UCS-2/4
strings when a size is provided (found by OSS-Fuzz).
Also fix a bug in DecodeDirect that caused DocumentChecker to return
the wrong offsets when working with UCS-2/4 strings.
| 0 |
void Monitor::reset_probe_timeout()
{
cancel_probe_timeout();
probe_timeout_event = new C_MonContext(this, [this](int r) {
probe_timeout(r);
});
double t = g_conf->mon_probe_timeout;
if (timer.add_event_after(t, probe_timeout_event)) {
dout(10) << "reset_probe_timeout " << probe_timeout_event
<< " after " << t << " seconds" << dendl;
} else {
probe_timeout_event = nullptr;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
ceph
|
5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468
|
2.0413917595539077e+38
| 14 |
auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()
| 0 |
gst_qtdemux_sync_streams (GstQTDemux * demux)
{
gint i;
if (demux->n_streams <= 1)
return;
for (i = 0; i < demux->n_streams; i++) {
QtDemuxStream *stream;
GstClockTime end_time;
stream = demux->streams[i];
if (!stream->pad)
continue;
/* TODO advance time on subtitle streams here, if any some day */
/* some clips/trailers may have unbalanced streams at the end,
* so send EOS on shorter stream to prevent stalling others */
/* do not mess with EOS if SEGMENT seeking */
if (demux->segment.flags & GST_SEEK_FLAG_SEGMENT)
continue;
if (demux->pullbased) {
/* loop mode is sample time based */
if (!STREAM_IS_EOS (stream))
continue;
} else {
/* push mode is byte position based */
if (stream->n_samples &&
stream->samples[stream->n_samples - 1].offset >= demux->offset)
continue;
}
if (stream->sent_eos)
continue;
/* only act if some gap */
end_time = stream->segments[stream->n_segments - 1].stop_time;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "current position: %" GST_TIME_FORMAT
", stream end: %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (demux->segment.position), GST_TIME_ARGS (end_time));
if (GST_CLOCK_TIME_IS_VALID (end_time)
&& (end_time + 2 * GST_SECOND < demux->segment.position)) {
GstEvent *event;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "sending EOS for stream %s",
GST_PAD_NAME (stream->pad));
stream->sent_eos = TRUE;
event = gst_event_new_eos ();
if (demux->segment_seqnum)
gst_event_set_seqnum (event, demux->segment_seqnum);
gst_pad_push_event (stream->pad, event);
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
gst-plugins-good
|
d0949baf3dadea6021d54abef6802fed5a06af75
|
3.1289308721200124e+38
| 58 |
qtdemux: Fix out of bounds read in tag parsing code
We can't simply assume that the length of the tag value as given
inside the stream is correct but should also check against the amount of
data we have actually available.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=775451
| 0 |
cnt_miss(struct worker *wrk, struct req *req)
{
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(req, REQ_MAGIC);
AN(req->vcl);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(req->objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_ORNULL(req->stale_oc, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
VCL_miss_method(req->vcl, wrk, req, NULL, NULL);
switch (wrk->handling) {
case VCL_RET_FETCH:
wrk->stats->cache_miss++;
VBF_Fetch(wrk, req, req->objcore, req->stale_oc, VBF_NORMAL);
if (req->stale_oc != NULL)
(void)HSH_DerefObjCore(wrk, &req->stale_oc, 0);
req->req_step = R_STP_FETCH;
return (REQ_FSM_MORE);
case VCL_RET_FAIL:
req->req_step = R_STP_VCLFAIL;
break;
case VCL_RET_SYNTH:
req->req_step = R_STP_SYNTH;
break;
case VCL_RET_RESTART:
req->req_step = R_STP_RESTART;
break;
case VCL_RET_PASS:
req->req_step = R_STP_PASS;
break;
default:
WRONG("Illegal return from vcl_miss{}");
}
VRY_Clear(req);
if (req->stale_oc != NULL)
(void)HSH_DerefObjCore(wrk, &req->stale_oc, 0);
AZ(HSH_DerefObjCore(wrk, &req->objcore, 1));
return (REQ_FSM_MORE);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-212"
] |
varnish-cache
|
bd7b3d6d47ccbb5e1747126f8e2a297f38e56b8c
|
7.524818117127606e+37
| 39 |
Clear err_code and err_reason at start of request handling
req->err_code and req->err_reason are set when going to synthetic
handling. From there the resp.reason HTTP field is set from
req->err_reason if set, or the generic code based on req->err_code is used
if it was NULL. This patch clears these members so that a value from the
handling of a previous request doesn't linger.
Fixes: VSV00004
| 0 |
matchUrl(char *base, ObjectPtr object)
{
int n = strlen(base);
if(object->key_size < n)
return 0;
if(memcmp(base, object->key, n) != 0)
return 0;
return (object->key_size == n) || (((char*)object->key)[n] == '?');
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
polipo
|
0e2b44af619e46e365971ea52b97457bc0778cd3
|
3.416362805966464e+37
| 9 |
Try to read POST requests to local configuration interface correctly.
| 0 |
int set_unit_path(const char *p) {
/* This is mostly for debug purposes */
if (setenv("SYSTEMD_UNIT_PATH", p, 1) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-269"
] |
systemd
|
bf65b7e0c9fc215897b676ab9a7c9d1c688143ba
|
1.5632596431406343e+38
| 7 |
core: imply NNP and SUID/SGID restriction for DynamicUser=yes service
Let's be safe, rather than sorry. This way DynamicUser=yes services can
neither take benefit of, nor create SUID/SGID binaries.
Given that DynamicUser= is a recent addition only we should be able to
get away with turning this on, even though this is strictly speaking a
binary compatibility breakage.
| 0 |
static inline int num_user_pages(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len)
{
const unsigned long spage = addr & PAGE_MASK;
const unsigned long epage = (addr + len - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
return 1 + ((epage - spage) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
3d2a9d642512c21a12d19b9250e7a835dcb41a79
|
9.505268593846367e+37
| 8 |
IB/hfi1: Ensure correct mm is used at all times
Two earlier bug fixes have created a security problem in the hfi1
driver. One fix aimed to solve an issue where current->mm was not valid
when closing the hfi1 cdev. It attempted to do this by saving a cached
value of the current->mm pointer at file open time. This is a problem if
another process with access to the FD calls in via write() or ioctl() to
pin pages via the hfi driver. The other fix tried to solve a use after
free by taking a reference on the mm.
To fix this correctly we use the existing cached value of the mm in the
mmu notifier. Now we can check in the insert, evict, etc. routines that
current->mm matched what the notifier was registered for. If not, then
don't allow access. The register of the mmu notifier will save the mm
pointer.
Since in do_exit() the exit_mm() is called before exit_files(), which
would call our close routine a reference is needed on the mm. We rely on
the mmgrab done by the registration of the notifier, whereas before it was
explicit. The mmu notifier deregistration happens when the user context is
torn down, the creation of which triggered the registration.
Also of note is we do not do any explicit work to protect the interval
tree notifier. It doesn't seem that this is going to be needed since we
aren't actually doing anything with current->mm. The interval tree
notifier stuff still has a FIXME noted from a previous commit that will be
addressed in a follow on patch.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: e0cf75deab81 ("IB/hfi1: Fix mm_struct use after free")
Fixes: 3faa3d9a308e ("IB/hfi1: Make use of mm consistent")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201125210112.104301.51331.stgit@awfm-01.aw.intel.com
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
| 0 |
unsigned FAST_FUNC udhcp_option_idx(const char *name, const char *option_strings)
{
int n = index_in_strings(option_strings, name);
if (n >= 0)
return n;
{
char *buf, *d;
const char *s;
s = option_strings;
while (*s)
s += strlen(s) + 1;
d = buf = xzalloc(s - option_strings);
s = option_strings;
while (!(*s == '\0' && s[1] == '\0')) {
*d++ = (*s == '\0' ? ' ' : *s);
s++;
}
bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown option '%s', known options: %s", name, buf);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
busybox
|
6d3b4bb24da9a07c263f3c1acf8df85382ff562c
|
1.6242741241879427e+38
| 23 |
udhcpc: check that 4-byte options are indeed 4-byte, closes 11506
function old new delta
udhcp_get_option32 - 27 +27
udhcp_get_option 231 248 +17
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 1/0 grow/shrink: 1/0 up/down: 44/0) Total: 44 bytes
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
| 0 |
explicit RaggedTensorToVariantOp(OpKernelConstruction* context)
: OpKernel(context) {
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->GetAttr("batched_input", &batched_input_));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
tensorflow
|
b055b9c474cd376259dde8779908f9eeaf097d93
|
1.7911783451336435e+38
| 4 |
Fix `tf.raw_ops.RaggedTensorToVariant` invalid resize.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 368299574
Change-Id: I751c186325aa0bab397928845e790e60c2d90918
| 0 |
static void tx3g_dump_style_nobox(FILE * trace, GF_StyleRecord *rec, u32 *shift_offset, u32 so_count)
{
gf_fprintf(trace, "<Style ");
if (rec->startCharOffset || rec->endCharOffset)
tx3g_print_char_offsets(trace, rec->startCharOffset, rec->endCharOffset, shift_offset, so_count);
gf_fprintf(trace, "styles=\"");
if (!rec->style_flags) {
gf_fprintf(trace, "Normal");
} else {
if (rec->style_flags & 1) gf_fprintf(trace, "Bold ");
if (rec->style_flags & 2) gf_fprintf(trace, "Italic ");
if (rec->style_flags & 4) gf_fprintf(trace, "Underlined ");
}
gf_fprintf(trace, "\" fontID=\"%d\" fontSize=\"%d\" ", rec->fontID, rec->font_size);
tx3g_dump_rgba8(trace, "color", rec->text_color);
gf_fprintf(trace, "/>\n");
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
ea1eca00fd92fa17f0e25ac25652622924a9a6a0
|
1.3442104065637246e+38
| 18 |
fixed #2138
| 0 |
void CSoundFile::KeyOff(ModChannel *pChn) const
{
const bool bKeyOn = !pChn->dwFlags[CHN_KEYOFF];
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_KEYOFF);
if(pChn->pModInstrument != nullptr && !pChn->VolEnv.flags[ENV_ENABLED])
{
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
}
if (!pChn->nLength) return;
if (pChn->dwFlags[CHN_SUSTAINLOOP] && pChn->pModSample && bKeyOn)
{
const ModSample *pSmp = pChn->pModSample;
if(pSmp->uFlags[CHN_LOOP])
{
if (pSmp->uFlags[CHN_PINGPONGLOOP])
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_PINGPONGLOOP);
else
pChn->dwFlags.reset(CHN_PINGPONGLOOP | CHN_PINGPONGFLAG);
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_LOOP);
pChn->nLength = pSmp->nLength;
pChn->nLoopStart = pSmp->nLoopStart;
pChn->nLoopEnd = pSmp->nLoopEnd;
if (pChn->nLength > pChn->nLoopEnd) pChn->nLength = pChn->nLoopEnd;
if(pChn->position.GetUInt() > pChn->nLength)
{
// Test case: SusAfterLoop.it
pChn->position.Set(pChn->position.GetInt() - pChn->nLength + pChn->nLoopStart);
}
} else
{
pChn->dwFlags.reset(CHN_LOOP | CHN_PINGPONGLOOP | CHN_PINGPONGFLAG);
pChn->nLength = pSmp->nLength;
}
}
if (pChn->pModInstrument)
{
const ModInstrument *pIns = pChn->pModInstrument;
if((pIns->VolEnv.dwFlags[ENV_LOOP] || (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_MT2 | MOD_TYPE_MDL))) && pIns->nFadeOut != 0)
{
pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
}
if (pIns->VolEnv.nReleaseNode != ENV_RELEASE_NODE_UNSET && pChn->VolEnv.nEnvValueAtReleaseJump == NOT_YET_RELEASED)
{
pChn->VolEnv.nEnvValueAtReleaseJump = pIns->VolEnv.GetValueFromPosition(pChn->VolEnv.nEnvPosition, 256);
pChn->VolEnv.nEnvPosition = pIns->VolEnv[pIns->VolEnv.nReleaseNode].tick;
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
openmpt
|
7ebf02af2e90f03e0dbd0e18b8b3164f372fb97c
|
6.577528309561028e+37
| 50 |
[Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
| 0 |
void RenameCollectionTest::tearDown() {
_targetNss = {};
_sourceNss = {};
_opObserver = nullptr;
_replCoord = nullptr;
_opCtx = {};
auto service = getServiceContext();
repl::DropPendingCollectionReaper::set(service, {});
repl::StorageInterface::set(service, {});
ServiceContextMongoDTest::tearDown();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mongo
|
35c1b1f588f04926a958ad2fe4d9c59d79f81e8b
|
6.840203472612164e+37
| 13 |
SERVER-35636 renameCollectionForApplyOps checks for complete namespace
| 0 |
int Http2Handler::verify_npn_result() {
const unsigned char *next_proto = nullptr;
unsigned int next_proto_len;
// Check the negotiated protocol in NPN or ALPN
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(ssl_, &next_proto, &next_proto_len);
#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
if (next_proto) {
auto proto = StringRef{next_proto, next_proto_len};
if (sessions_->get_config()->verbose) {
std::cout << "The negotiated protocol: " << proto << std::endl;
}
if (util::check_h2_is_selected(proto)) {
return 0;
}
break;
} else {
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(ssl_, &next_proto, &next_proto_len);
#else // OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L
break;
#endif // OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L
}
}
if (sessions_->get_config()->verbose) {
std::cerr << "Client did not advertise HTTP/2 protocol."
<< " (nghttp2 expects " << NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID << ")"
<< std::endl;
}
return -1;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
nghttp2
|
95efb3e19d174354ca50c65d5d7227d92bcd60e1
|
2.6304668768861717e+38
| 32 |
Don't read too greedily
| 0 |
static unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long rflags, save_rflags;
rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
save_rflags = to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.save_rflags;
rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
}
return rflags;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493
|
2.876425712283937e+38
| 12 |
KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int md_mergeable_bvec(struct request_queue *q,
struct bvec_merge_data *bvm,
struct bio_vec *biovec)
{
struct mddev *mddev = q->queuedata;
int ret;
rcu_read_lock();
if (mddev->suspended) {
/* Must always allow one vec */
if (bvm->bi_size == 0)
ret = biovec->bv_len;
else
ret = 0;
} else {
struct md_personality *pers = mddev->pers;
if (pers && pers->mergeable_bvec)
ret = pers->mergeable_bvec(mddev, bvm, biovec);
else
ret = biovec->bv_len;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
6.816010430084719e+37
| 23 |
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
| 0 |
static encodePtr make_persistent_sdl_encoder(encodePtr enc, HashTable *ptr_map, HashTable *bp_types, HashTable *bp_encoders)
{
encodePtr penc = NULL;
penc = malloc(sizeof(encode));
memset(penc, 0, sizeof(encode));
*penc = *enc;
if (penc->details.type_str) {
penc->details.type_str = strdup(penc->details.type_str);
}
if (penc->details.ns) {
penc->details.ns = strdup(penc->details.ns);
}
if (penc->details.sdl_type) {
make_persistent_sdl_type_ref(&penc->details.sdl_type, ptr_map, bp_types);
}
return penc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
php-src
|
3c939e3f69955d087e0bb671868f7267dfb2a502
|
2.5070956959693248e+38
| 22 |
Fix bug #80672 - Null Dereference in SoapClient
| 0 |
static inline int select_idle_smt(struct task_struct *p, struct sched_domain *sd, int target)
{
return -1;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
1.4367433361377165e+38
| 4 |
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| 0 |
const Track* Tracks::GetTrackByIndex(uint32_t index) const {
if (track_entries_ == NULL)
return NULL;
if (index >= track_entries_size_)
return NULL;
return track_entries_[index];
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
f00890eecdf8365ea125ac16769a83aa6b68792d
|
1.7681375690059313e+38
| 9 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-352-g6ab9fcf
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/af81f26..6ab9fcf
Change-Id: I9d56e1fbaba9b96404b4fbabefddc1a85b79c25d
| 0 |
void vfio_pci_intx_mask(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
/*
* Masking can come from interrupt, ioctl, or config space
* via INTx disable. The latter means this can get called
* even when not using intx delivery. In this case, just
* try to have the physical bit follow the virtual bit.
*/
if (unlikely(!is_intx(vdev))) {
if (vdev->pci_2_3)
pci_intx(pdev, 0);
} else if (!vdev->ctx[0].masked) {
/*
* Can't use check_and_mask here because we always want to
* mask, not just when something is pending.
*/
if (vdev->pci_2_3)
pci_intx(pdev, 0);
else
disable_irq_nosync(pdev->irq);
vdev->ctx[0].masked = true;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vdev->irqlock, flags);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-190"
] |
linux
|
05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a
|
1.9931295817949775e+38
| 31 |
vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
| 0 |
void gf_m2ts_demux_dmscc_init(GF_M2TS_Demuxer *ts) {
char temp_dir[GF_MAX_PATH];
u32 length;
GF_Err e;
ts->dsmcc_controler = gf_list_new();
ts->process_dmscc = 1;
strcpy(temp_dir, gf_get_default_cache_directory() );
length = (u32) strlen(temp_dir);
if(temp_dir[length-1] == GF_PATH_SEPARATOR) {
temp_dir[length-1] = 0;
}
ts->dsmcc_root_dir = (char*)gf_calloc(strlen(temp_dir)+strlen("CarouselData")+2,sizeof(char));
sprintf(ts->dsmcc_root_dir,"%s%cCarouselData",temp_dir,GF_PATH_SEPARATOR);
e = gf_mkdir(ts->dsmcc_root_dir);
if(e) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[Process DSMCC] Error during the creation of the directory %s \n",ts->dsmcc_root_dir));
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] |
gpac
|
1ab4860609f2e7a35634930571e7d0531297e090
|
2.150139935593907e+38
| 23 |
fixed potential crash on PMT IOD parse - cf #1268 #1269
| 0 |
static void sctp_v4_to_sk_saddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk)
{
inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr = addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4
|
3.2483592077709743e+38
| 4 |
sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
static int map_search_self_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb;
struct map_context *ac;
int ret;
ac = talloc_get_type(req->context, struct map_context);
ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
if (!ares) {
return ldb_module_done(ac->req, NULL, NULL,
LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR);
}
if (ares->error != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ldb_module_done(ac->req, ares->controls,
ares->response, ares->error);
}
/* We are interested only in the single reply */
switch(ares->type) {
case LDB_REPLY_ENTRY:
/* We have already found a remote DN */
if (ac->local_dn) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb,
"Too many results!");
return ldb_module_done(ac->req, NULL, NULL,
LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR);
}
/* Store local DN */
ac->local_dn = talloc_steal(ac, ares->message->dn);
break;
case LDB_REPLY_DONE:
switch (ac->req->operation) {
case LDB_MODIFY:
ret = map_modify_do_local(ac);
break;
case LDB_DELETE:
ret = map_delete_do_local(ac);
break;
case LDB_RENAME:
ret = map_rename_do_local(ac);
break;
default:
/* if we get here we have definitely a problem */
ret = LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ldb_module_done(ac->req, NULL, NULL,
LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR);
}
break;
default:
/* ignore referrals */
break;
}
talloc_free(ares);
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
samba
|
0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77
|
1.621585731962756e+38
| 63 |
CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
| 0 |
PeiUsbHubCtrlSetHubDepth (
IN EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
IN PEI_USB_DEVICE *PeiUsbDevice,
IN PEI_USB_IO_PPI *UsbIoPpi
)
{
EFI_USB_DEVICE_REQUEST DevReq;
ZeroMem (&DevReq, sizeof (EFI_USB_DEVICE_REQUEST));
//
// Fill Device request packet
//
DevReq.RequestType = USB_RT_HUB;
DevReq.Request = USB_HUB_REQ_SET_DEPTH;
DevReq.Value = PeiUsbDevice->Tier;
DevReq.Length = 0;
return UsbIoPpi->UsbControlTransfer (
PeiServices,
UsbIoPpi,
&DevReq,
EfiUsbNoData,
PcdGet32 (PcdUsbTransferTimeoutValue),
NULL,
0
);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
edk2
|
72750e3bf9174f15c17e78f0f117b5e7311bb49f
|
9.76473924930577e+37
| 27 |
MdeModulePkg UsbBusPei: Fix wrong buffer length used to read hub desc
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=973
Bug 973 just mentions UsbBusDxe, but UsbBusPei has similar issue.
HUB descriptor has variable length.
But the code uses stack (HubDescriptor in PeiDoHubConfig) with fixed
length sizeof(EFI_USB_HUB_DESCRIPTOR) to hold HUB descriptor data.
It uses hard code length value (12) for SuperSpeed path.
And it uses HubDesc->Length for none SuperSpeed path, then there will
be stack overflow when HubDesc->Length is greater than
sizeof(EFI_USB_HUB_DESCRIPTOR).
The patch updates the code to use a big enough buffer to hold the
descriptor data.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <bret.barkelew@microsoft.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bret Barkelew <bret.barkelew@microsoft.com>
| 0 |
TcpProxyStats Config::SharedConfig::generateStats(Stats::Scope& scope) {
return {ALL_TCP_PROXY_STATS(POOL_COUNTER(scope), POOL_GAUGE(scope))};
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
envoy
|
ce0ae309057a216aba031aff81c445c90c6ef145
|
1.8915575619430754e+38
| 3 |
CVE-2021-43826
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <yavlasov@google.com>
| 0 |
crcbuf(int crc, unsigned int len, const char *buf)
{
const unsigned char *ubuf = (const unsigned char *)buf;
while (len--)
crc = ((crc << 8) & 0xFF00) ^ crctab[((crc >> 8) & 0xFF) ^ *ubuf++];
return crc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
t1utils
|
6b9d1aafcb61a3663c883663eb19ccdbfcde8d33
|
2.1328887021499145e+38
| 7 |
Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
| 0 |
current_word(
oparg_T *oap,
long count,
int include, // TRUE: include word and white space
int bigword) // FALSE == word, TRUE == WORD
{
pos_T start_pos;
pos_T pos;
int inclusive = TRUE;
int include_white = FALSE;
cls_bigword = bigword;
CLEAR_POS(&start_pos);
// Correct cursor when 'selection' is exclusive
if (VIsual_active && *p_sel == 'e' && LT_POS(VIsual, curwin->w_cursor))
dec_cursor();
/*
* When Visual mode is not active, or when the VIsual area is only one
* character, select the word and/or white space under the cursor.
*/
if (!VIsual_active || EQUAL_POS(curwin->w_cursor, VIsual))
{
/*
* Go to start of current word or white space.
*/
back_in_line();
start_pos = curwin->w_cursor;
/*
* If the start is on white space, and white space should be included
* (" word"), or start is not on white space, and white space should
* not be included ("word"), find end of word.
*/
if ((cls() == 0) == include)
{
if (end_word(1L, bigword, TRUE, TRUE) == FAIL)
return FAIL;
}
else
{
/*
* If the start is not on white space, and white space should be
* included ("word "), or start is on white space and white
* space should not be included (" "), find start of word.
* If we end up in the first column of the next line (single char
* word) back up to end of the line.
*/
fwd_word(1L, bigword, TRUE);
if (curwin->w_cursor.col == 0)
decl(&curwin->w_cursor);
else
oneleft();
if (include)
include_white = TRUE;
}
if (VIsual_active)
{
// should do something when inclusive == FALSE !
VIsual = start_pos;
redraw_curbuf_later(INVERTED); // update the inversion
}
else
{
oap->start = start_pos;
oap->motion_type = MCHAR;
}
--count;
}
/*
* When count is still > 0, extend with more objects.
*/
while (count > 0)
{
inclusive = TRUE;
if (VIsual_active && LT_POS(curwin->w_cursor, VIsual))
{
/*
* In Visual mode, with cursor at start: move cursor back.
*/
if (decl(&curwin->w_cursor) == -1)
return FAIL;
if (include != (cls() != 0))
{
if (bck_word(1L, bigword, TRUE) == FAIL)
return FAIL;
}
else
{
if (bckend_word(1L, bigword, TRUE) == FAIL)
return FAIL;
(void)incl(&curwin->w_cursor);
}
}
else
{
/*
* Move cursor forward one word and/or white area.
*/
if (incl(&curwin->w_cursor) == -1)
return FAIL;
if (include != (cls() == 0))
{
if (fwd_word(1L, bigword, TRUE) == FAIL && count > 1)
return FAIL;
/*
* If end is just past a new-line, we don't want to include
* the first character on the line.
* Put cursor on last char of white.
*/
if (oneleft() == FAIL)
inclusive = FALSE;
}
else
{
if (end_word(1L, bigword, TRUE, TRUE) == FAIL)
return FAIL;
}
}
--count;
}
if (include_white && (cls() != 0
|| (curwin->w_cursor.col == 0 && !inclusive)))
{
/*
* If we don't include white space at the end, move the start
* to include some white space there. This makes "daw" work
* better on the last word in a sentence (and "2daw" on last-but-one
* word). Also when "2daw" deletes "word." at the end of the line
* (cursor is at start of next line).
* But don't delete white space at start of line (indent).
*/
pos = curwin->w_cursor; // save cursor position
curwin->w_cursor = start_pos;
if (oneleft() == OK)
{
back_in_line();
if (cls() == 0 && curwin->w_cursor.col > 0)
{
if (VIsual_active)
VIsual = curwin->w_cursor;
else
oap->start = curwin->w_cursor;
}
}
curwin->w_cursor = pos; // put cursor back at end
}
if (VIsual_active)
{
if (*p_sel == 'e' && inclusive && LTOREQ_POS(VIsual, curwin->w_cursor))
inc_cursor();
if (VIsual_mode == 'V')
{
VIsual_mode = 'v';
redraw_cmdline = TRUE; // show mode later
}
}
else
oap->inclusive = inclusive;
return OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-126",
"CWE-787"
] |
vim
|
53a70289c2712808e6d4e88927e03cac01b470dd
|
2.2705652557121054e+38
| 168 |
patch 8.2.4925: trailing backslash may cause reading past end of line
Problem: Trailing backslash may cause reading past end of line.
Solution: Check for NUL after backslash.
| 0 |
TEST(IndexBoundsBuilderTest, ExistsFalse) {
auto testIndex = buildSimpleIndexEntry();
BSONObj obj = fromjson("{a: {$exists: false}}");
auto expr = parseMatchExpression(obj);
BSONElement elt = obj.firstElement();
OrderedIntervalList oil;
IndexBoundsBuilder::BoundsTightness tightness;
IndexBoundsBuilder::translate(expr.get(), elt, testIndex, &oil, &tightness);
ASSERT_EQUALS(oil.name, "a");
ASSERT_EQUALS(oil.intervals.size(), 1U);
ASSERT_EQUALS(Interval::INTERVAL_EQUALS,
oil.intervals[0].compare(Interval(fromjson("{'': null, '': null}"), true, true)));
ASSERT_EQUALS(tightness, IndexBoundsBuilder::INEXACT_FETCH);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-754"
] |
mongo
|
f8f55e1825ee5c7bdb3208fc7c5b54321d172732
|
3.0997911452154116e+38
| 14 |
SERVER-44377 generate correct plan for indexed inequalities to null
| 0 |
static void tight_pack24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, size_t count, size_t *ret)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix;
int rshift, gshift, bshift;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
if (1 /* FIXME: (vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) */) {
rshift = vs->client_pf.rshift;
gshift = vs->client_pf.gshift;
bshift = vs->client_pf.bshift;
} else {
rshift = 24 - vs->client_pf.rshift;
gshift = 24 - vs->client_pf.gshift;
bshift = 24 - vs->client_pf.bshift;
}
if (ret) {
*ret = count * 3;
}
while (count--) {
pix = *buf32++;
*buf++ = (char)(pix >> rshift);
*buf++ = (char)(pix >> gshift);
*buf++ = (char)(pix >> bshift);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
qemu
|
9f64916da20eea67121d544698676295bbb105a7
|
1.1362062014808283e+38
| 30 |
pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc.
The vnc code uses *three* DisplaySurfaces:
First is the surface of the actual QemuConsole, usually the guest
screen, but could also be a text console (monitor/serial reachable via
Ctrl-Alt-<nr> keys). This is left as-is.
Second is the current server's view of the screen content. The vnc code
uses this to figure which parts of the guest screen did _really_ change
to reduce the amount of updates sent to the vnc clients. It is also
used as data source when sending out the updates to the clients. This
surface gets replaced by a pixman image. The format changes too,
instead of using the guest screen format we'll use fixed 32bit rgb
framebuffer and convert the pixels on the fly when comparing and
updating the server framebuffer.
Third surface carries the format expected by the vnc client. That isn't
used to store image data. This surface is switched to PixelFormat and a
boolean for bigendian byte order.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
| 0 |
TEST_P(RBACIntegrationTest, PathWithQueryAndFragment) {
config_helper_.addFilter(RBAC_CONFIG_WITH_PATH_EXACT_MATCH);
initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
const std::vector<std::string> paths{"/allow", "/allow?p1=v1&p2=v2", "/allow?p1=v1#seg"};
for (const auto& path : paths) {
auto response = codec_client_->makeRequestWithBody(
Http::TestRequestHeaderMapImpl{
{":method", "POST"},
{":path", path},
{":scheme", "http"},
{":authority", "host"},
{"x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.1"},
},
1024);
waitForNextUpstreamRequest();
upstream_request_->encodeHeaders(Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl{{":status", "200"}}, true);
response->waitForEndStream();
ASSERT_TRUE(response->complete());
EXPECT_EQ("200", response->headers().getStatusValue());
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
envoy
|
2c60632d41555ec8b3d9ef5246242be637a2db0f
|
2.326884778329352e+38
| 26 |
http: header map security fixes for duplicate headers (#197)
Previously header matching did not match on all headers for
non-inline headers. This patch changes the default behavior to
always logically match on all headers. Multiple individual
headers will be logically concatenated with ',' similar to what
is done with inline headers. This makes the behavior effectively
consistent. This behavior can be temporary reverted by setting
the runtime value "envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers"
to "false".
Targeted fixes have been additionally performed on the following
extensions which make them consider all duplicate headers by default as
a comma concatenated list:
1) Any extension using CEL matching on headers.
2) The header to metadata filter.
3) The JWT filter.
4) The Lua filter.
Like primary header matching used in routing, RBAC, etc. this behavior
can be disabled by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers" to false.
Finally, the setCopy() header map API previously only set the first
header in the case of duplicate non-inline headers. setCopy() now
behaves similiarly to the other set*() APIs and replaces all found
headers with a single value. This may have had security implications
in the extauth filter which uses this API. This behavior can be disabled
by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.http_set_copy_replace_all_headers" to false.
Fixes https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy-setec/issues/188
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <mklein@lyft.com>
| 0 |
ico_get_byte_from_data (const guint8 *data,
gint line_width,
gint byte)
{
gint line;
gint width32;
gint offset;
/* width per line in multiples of 32 bits */
width32 = (line_width % 4 == 0 ? line_width / 4 : line_width / 4 + 1);
line = byte / line_width;
offset = byte % line_width;
return data[line * width32 * 4 + offset];
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
gimp
|
323ecb73f7bf36788fb7066eb2d6678830cd5de7
|
2.4860263052901123e+38
| 15 |
Bug 773233 - CVE-2007-3126 - Gimp 2.3.14 allows context-dependent attackers...
...to cause a denial of service (crash) via an ICO file with an
InfoHeader containing a Height of zero
Add some error handling to ico-load.c and bail out on zero width or height
icons. Also some formatting cleanup.
(cherry picked from commit 46bcd82800e37b0f5aead76184430ef2fe802748)
| 0 |
static int StreamTcpPacketStateSynSent(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt received: %s", ssn, PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) ?
"toclient":"toserver");
/* check for bad responses */
if (StateSynSentValidateTimestamp(ssn, p) == false)
return -1;
/* RST */
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateRst(ssn, p))
return -1;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
if (SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_WINDOW(p), 0) &&
SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), (ssn->client.isn + 1)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV");
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
}
} else {
ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV;
SCLogDebug("ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV");
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received and state changed to "
"TCP_CLOSED", ssn);
}
/* FIN */
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_FIN) {
/** \todo */
/* SYN/ACK */
} else if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) && PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK received on 4WHS session", ssn);
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet ack's the earlier
* received SYN packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.isn + 1))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ACK mismatch, packet ACK %"PRIu32""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->server.isn + 1);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet SEQ's the *FIRST* received SYN
* packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_4WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_SYN);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %"PRIu32""
" != %" PRIu32 " from *first* SYN pkt", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.isn);
return -1;
}
/* update state */
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_SYN_RECV);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ 4WHS ssn state is now TCP_SYN_RECV", ssn);
/* sequence number & window */
ssn->client.isn = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->client, ssn->client.isn);
ssn->client.next_seq = ssn->client.isn + 1;
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS window %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.window);
/* Set the timestamp values used to validate the timestamp of
* received packets. */
if ((TCP_HAS_TS(p)) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP))
{
ssn->client.last_ts = TCP_GET_TSVAL(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.last_ts %" PRIu32" "
"ssn->server.last_ts %" PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.last_ts, ssn->server.last_ts);
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
if (ssn->client.last_ts == 0)
ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
} else {
ssn->server.last_ts = 0;
ssn->client.last_ts = 0;
ssn->server.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
}
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
ssn->client.last_ack = ssn->client.isn + 1;
/** check for the presense of the ws ptr to determine if we
* support wscale at all */
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE) &&
(TCP_HAS_WSCALE(p)))
{
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_GET_WSCALE(p);
} else {
ssn->server.wscale = 0;
}
if ((ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK) &&
TCP_GET_SACKOK(p) == 1) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SACK permitted for 4WHS session", ssn);
}
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.next_win %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.next_win);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->server.next_win %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->server.next_win);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %" PRIu32 " "
"(ssn->server.last_ack %" PRIu32 ")", ssn,
ssn->client.isn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack, ssn->server.last_ack);
/* done here */
return 0;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_IN_WRONG_DIRECTION);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN/ACK received in the wrong direction", ssn);
return -1;
}
if (!(TCP_HAS_TFO(p) || (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TCP_FAST_OPEN))) {
/* Check if the SYN/ACK packet ack's the earlier
* received SYN packet. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.isn + 1))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ACK mismatch, packet ACK %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_ACK(p),
ssn->client.isn + 1);
return -1;
}
} else {
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_ACK(p), ssn->client.next_seq))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_WITH_WRONG_ACK);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: (TFO) ACK mismatch, packet ACK %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_ACK(p),
ssn->client.next_seq);
return -1;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: (TFO) ACK match, packet ACK %" PRIu32 " == "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_ACK(p),
ssn->client.next_seq);
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TCP_FAST_OPEN;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
}
StreamTcp3whsSynAckUpdate(ssn, p, /* no queue override */NULL);
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_SENT... resent", ssn);
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SYN packet on state SYN_SENT... resent of "
"4WHS SYN", ssn);
}
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
/** a SYN only packet in the opposite direction could be:
* http://www.breakingpointsystems.com/community/blog/tcp-
* portals-the-three-way-handshake-is-a-lie
*
* \todo improve resetting the session */
/* indicate that we're dealing with 4WHS here */
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS flag set", ssn);
/* set the sequence numbers and window for server
* We leave the ssn->client.isn in place as we will
* check the SYN/ACK pkt with that.
*/
ssn->server.isn = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->server, ssn->server.isn);
ssn->server.next_seq = ssn->server.isn + 1;
/* Set the stream timestamp value, if packet has timestamp
* option enabled. */
if (TCP_HAS_TS(p)) {
ssn->server.last_ts = TCP_GET_TSVAL(p);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: %02x", ssn, ssn->server.last_ts);
if (ssn->server.last_ts == 0)
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->server.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
}
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
if (TCP_HAS_WSCALE(p)) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE;
ssn->server.wscale = TCP_GET_WSCALE(p);
} else {
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE;
ssn->server.wscale = 0;
}
if (TCP_GET_SACKOK(p) == 1) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK;
} else {
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK;
}
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->server.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->server.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->server.isn, ssn->server.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: 4WHS ssn->client.isn %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ", "
"ssn->client.last_ack %"PRIu32"", ssn,
ssn->client.isn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack);
}
/** \todo check if it's correct or set event */
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) {
/* Handle the asynchronous stream, when we receive a SYN packet
and now istead of receving a SYN/ACK we receive a ACK from the
same host, which sent the SYN, this suggests the ASNYC streams.*/
if (stream_config.async_oneside == FALSE)
return 0;
/* we are in AYNC (one side) mode now. */
/* one side async means we won't see a SYN/ACK, so we can
* only check the SYN. */
if (!(SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq))) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_ASYNC_WRONG_SEQ);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream",ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
ssn->client.next_seq);
return -1;
}
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ ssn state is now TCP_ESTABLISHED", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p);
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_SEQ(p);
ssn->client.next_win = ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window;
/* Set the server side parameters */
ssn->server.isn = TCP_GET_ACK(p) - 1;
STREAMTCP_SET_RA_BASE_SEQ(&ssn->server, ssn->server.isn);
ssn->server.next_seq = ssn->server.isn + 1;
ssn->server.last_ack = ssn->server.next_seq;
ssn->server.next_win = ssn->server.last_ack;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: synsent => Asynchronous stream, packet SEQ"
" %" PRIu32 ", payload size %" PRIu32 " (%" PRIu32 "), "
"ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 ""
,ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p), p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)
+ p->payload_len, ssn->client.next_seq);
/* if SYN had wscale, assume it to be supported. Otherwise
* we know it not to be supported. */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_SERVER_WSCALE) {
ssn->client.wscale = TCP_WSCALE_MAX;
}
/* Set the timestamp values used to validate the timestamp of
* received packets.*/
if (TCP_HAS_TS(p) &&
(ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP))
{
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_TIMESTAMP;
ssn->client.last_pkt_ts = p->ts.tv_sec;
} else {
ssn->client.last_ts = 0;
ssn->client.flags &= ~STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_ZERO_TIMESTAMP;
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_CLIENT_SACKOK) {
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_SACKOK;
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: default case", ssn);
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-436",
"CWE-94"
] |
suricata
|
fa692df37a796c3330c81988d15ef1a219afc006
|
2.594454695784805e+38
| 311 |
stream: reject broken ACK packets
Fix evasion posibility by rejecting packets with a broken ACK field.
These packets have a non-0 ACK field, but do not have a ACK flag set.
Bug #3324.
Reported-by: Nicolas Adba
| 0 |
GF_Err esds_box_read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e=GF_OK;
u32 descSize;
GF_ESDBox *ptr = (GF_ESDBox *)s;
descSize = (u32) (ptr->size);
if (descSize) {
char *enc_desc = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * descSize);
if (!enc_desc) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
//get the payload
gf_bs_read_data(bs, enc_desc, descSize);
//send it to the OD Codec
e = gf_odf_desc_read(enc_desc, descSize, (GF_Descriptor **) &ptr->desc);
//OK, free our desc
gf_free(enc_desc);
if (ptr->desc && (ptr->desc->tag!=GF_ODF_ESD_TAG) ) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid descriptor tag 0x%x in esds\n", ptr->desc->tag));
gf_odf_desc_del((GF_Descriptor*)ptr->desc);
ptr->desc=NULL;
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (e) {
ptr->desc = NULL;
} else {
/*fix broken files*/
if (ptr->desc && !ptr->desc->URLString) {
if (!ptr->desc->slConfig) {
ptr->desc->slConfig = (GF_SLConfig *) gf_odf_desc_new(GF_ODF_SLC_TAG);
ptr->desc->slConfig->predefined = SLPredef_MP4;
} else if (ptr->desc->slConfig->predefined != SLPredef_MP4) {
ptr->desc->slConfig->predefined = SLPredef_MP4;
gf_odf_slc_set_pref(ptr->desc->slConfig);
}
}
}
}
return e;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
388ecce75d05e11fc8496aa4857b91245007d26e
|
1.645248466175278e+38
| 42 |
fixed #1587
| 0 |
do_source_buffer_init(source_cookie_T *sp, exarg_T *eap)
{
linenr_T curr_lnum;
char_u *line = NULL;
char_u *fname;
CLEAR_FIELD(*sp);
if (curbuf == NULL)
return NULL;
// Use ":source buffer=<num>" as the script name
vim_snprintf((char *)IObuff, IOSIZE, ":source buffer=%d", curbuf->b_fnum);
fname = vim_strsave(IObuff);
if (fname == NULL)
return NULL;
ga_init2(&sp->buflines, sizeof(char_u *), 100);
// Copy the lines from the buffer into a grow array
for (curr_lnum = eap->line1; curr_lnum <= eap->line2; curr_lnum++)
{
line = vim_strsave(ml_get(curr_lnum));
if (line == NULL)
goto errret;
if (ga_add_string(&sp->buflines, line) == FAIL)
goto errret;
line = NULL;
}
sp->buf_lnum = 0;
sp->source_from_buf = TRUE;
return fname;
errret:
vim_free(fname);
vim_free(line);
ga_clear_strings(&sp->buflines);
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-122"
] |
vim
|
2bdad6126778f907c0b98002bfebf0e611a3f5db
|
7.230483056962917e+37
| 40 |
patch 8.2.4647: "source" can read past end of copied line
Problem: "source" can read past end of copied line.
Solution: Add a terminating NUL.
| 0 |
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba
|
1.5241983072465042e+38
| 13 |
Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
| 1 |
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