func
string | target
string | cwe
list | project
string | commit_id
string | hash
string | size
int64 | message
string | vul
int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
int mg_base64_update(unsigned char ch, char *to, int n) {
int rem = (n & 3) % 3;
if (rem == 0) {
to[n] = (char) mg_b64idx(ch >> 2);
to[++n] = (char) ((ch & 3) << 4);
} else if (rem == 1) {
to[n] = (char) mg_b64idx(to[n] | (ch >> 4));
to[++n] = (char) ((ch & 15) << 2);
} else {
to[n] = (char) mg_b64idx(to[n] | (ch >> 6));
to[++n] = (char) mg_b64idx(ch & 63);
n++;
}
return n;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-552"
] |
mongoose
|
c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945
|
3.890124249879703e+37
| 15 |
Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload()
| 0 |
gs_font_map_glyph_to_unicode(gs_font *font, gs_glyph glyph, int ch, ushort *u, unsigned int length)
{
font_data *pdata = pfont_data(font);
const ref *UnicodeDecoding;
uchar *unicode_return = (uchar *)u;
if (r_type(&pdata->GlyphNames2Unicode) == t_dictionary) {
int c = gs_font_map_glyph_by_dict(font->memory,
&pdata->GlyphNames2Unicode, glyph, u, length);
if (c != 0)
return c;
if (ch != -1) { /* -1 indicates a CIDFont */
/* Its possible that we have a GlyphNames2Unicode dictionary
* which contains integers and Unicode values, rather than names
* and Unicode values. This happens if the input was PDF, the font
* has a ToUnicode Cmap, but no Encoding. In this case we need to
* use the character code as an index into the dictionary. Try that
* now before we fall back to the UnicodeDecoding.
*/
ref *v, n;
make_int(&n, ch);
if (dict_find(&pdata->GlyphNames2Unicode, &n, &v) > 0) {
if (r_has_type(v, t_string)) {
int l = r_size(v);
if (l > length)
return l;
memcpy(unicode_return, v->value.const_bytes, l * sizeof(short));
return l;
}
if (r_type(v) == t_integer) {
if (v->value.intval > 65535) {
if (length < 4)
return 4;
unicode_return[0] = v->value.intval >> 24;
unicode_return[1] = (v->value.intval & 0x00FF0000) >> 16;
unicode_return[2] = (v->value.intval & 0x0000FF00) >> 8;
unicode_return[3] = v->value.intval & 0xFF;
return 4;
} else {
if (length < 2)
return 2;
unicode_return[0] = v->value.intval >> 8;
unicode_return[1] = v->value.intval & 0xFF;
return 2;
}
}
}
}
/*
* Fall through, because test.ps for SF bug #529103 requres
* to examine both tables. Due to that the Unicode Decoding resource
* can't be a default value for FontInfo.GlyphNames2Unicode .
*/
}
if (glyph <= GS_MIN_CID_GLYPH) {
UnicodeDecoding = zfont_get_to_unicode_map(font->dir);
if (UnicodeDecoding != NULL && r_type(UnicodeDecoding) == t_dictionary)
return gs_font_map_glyph_by_dict(font->memory, UnicodeDecoding, glyph, u, length);
}
return 0; /* No map. */
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
ghostpdl
|
407c98a38c3a6ac1681144ed45cc2f4fc374c91f
|
2.5807331224873433e+38
| 65 |
txtwrite - guard against using GS_NO_GLYPH to retrieve Unicode values
Bug 701822 "Segmentation fault at psi/iname.c:296 in names_index_ref"
Avoid using a glyph with the value GS_NO_GLYPH to retrieve a glyph
name or Unicode code point from the glyph ID, as this is not a valid
ID.
| 1 |
static Image *ReadCAPTIONImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*caption,
geometry[MagickPathExtent],
*property,
*text;
const char
*gravity,
*option;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
split,
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
height,
width;
TypeMetric
metrics;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
/*
Format caption.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
property=InterpretImageProperties((ImageInfo *) image_info,image,
image_info->filename,exception);
else
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"caption:",8) == 0)
property=InterpretImageProperties((ImageInfo *) image_info,image,option+8,
exception);
else
property=InterpretImageProperties((ImageInfo *) image_info,image,option,
exception);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property,exception);
property=DestroyString(property);
caption=ConstantString(GetImageProperty(image,"caption",exception));
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,caption);
gravity=GetImageOption(image_info,"gravity");
if (gravity != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,gravity);
split=MagickFalse;
status=MagickTrue;
if (image->columns == 0)
{
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text,
exception);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics,exception);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
image->columns=width;
}
if (image->rows == 0)
{
split=MagickTrue;
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text,exception);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics,exception);
image->rows=(size_t) ((i+1)*(metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+draw_info->stroke_width)+0.5);
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((fabs(image_info->pointsize) < MagickEpsilon) && (strlen(caption) > 0))
{
double
high,
low;
/*
Auto fit text into bounding box.
*/
for ( ; ; draw_info->pointsize*=2.0)
{
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text,
exception);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics,exception);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width >= image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height >= image->rows)))
break;
}
high=draw_info->pointsize;
for (low=1.0; (high-low) > 0.5; )
{
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0;
text=AcquireString(caption);
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&text,
exception);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,text);
text=DestroyString(text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics,exception);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width < image->columns) && (height < image->rows))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width < image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height < image->rows)))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
draw_info->pointsize=floor((low+high)/2.0-0.5);
}
/*
Draw caption.
*/
i=FormatMagickCaption(image,draw_info,split,&metrics,&caption,exception);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->text,caption);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+g%+g",MagickMax(
draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection ? image->columns-
metrics.bounds.x2 : -metrics.bounds.x1,0.0),draw_info->gravity ==
UndefinedGravity ? metrics.ascent : 0.0);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
status=AnnotateImage(image,draw_info,exception);
if (image_info->pointsize == 0.0)
{
char
pointsize[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pointsize,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",
draw_info->pointsize);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption:pointsize",pointsize,exception);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
caption=DestroyString(caption);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-835"
] |
ImageMagick
|
7d8e14899c562157c7760a77fc91625a27cb596f
|
4.430411623585966e+37
| 207 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/771
| 1 |
const SHA& sslHashes::get_SHA() const
{
return shaHandShake_;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-254"
] |
mysql-server
|
e7061f7e5a96c66cb2e0bf46bec7f6ff35801a69
|
7.735754085548459e+37
| 4 |
Bug #22738607: YASSL FUNCTION X509_NAME_GET_INDEX_BY_NID IS NOT WORKING AS EXPECTED.
| 0 |
ff_layout_free_iostats_array(struct nfs42_layoutstat_devinfo *devinfo,
unsigned int num_entries)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
if (!devinfo[i].ld_private.ops)
continue;
if (!devinfo[i].ld_private.ops->free)
continue;
devinfo[i].ld_private.ops->free(&devinfo[i].ld_private);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925
|
6.579886368828048e+37
| 13 |
pNFS/flexfiles: fix incorrect size check in decode_nfs_fh()
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <nlivic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| 0 |
LIBSSH2_ALLOC_FUNC(libssh2_default_alloc)
{
(void) abstract;
return malloc(count);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libssh2
|
dc109a7f518757741590bb993c0c8412928ccec2
|
9.697347221793281e+36
| 5 |
Security fixes (#315)
* Bounds checks
Fixes for CVEs
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3863.html
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3856.html
* Packet length bounds check
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3855.html
* Response length check
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html
* Bounds check
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3857.html
* Bounds checking
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html
and additional data validation
* Check bounds before reading into buffers
* Bounds checking
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html
* declare SIZE_MAX and UINT_MAX if needed
| 0 |
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(date_timezone_set)
{
zval *object;
zval *timezone_object;
php_date_obj *dateobj;
php_timezone_obj *tzobj;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "OO", &object, date_ce_date, &timezone_object, date_ce_timezone) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
dateobj = (php_date_obj *) zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
DATE_CHECK_INITIALIZED(dateobj->time, DateTime);
tzobj = (php_timezone_obj *) zend_object_store_get_object(timezone_object TSRMLS_CC);
switch (tzobj->type) {
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET:
timelib_set_timezone_from_offset(dateobj->time, tzobj->tzi.utc_offset);
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR:
timelib_set_timezone_from_abbr(dateobj->time, tzobj->tzi.z);
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ID:
timelib_set_timezone(dateobj->time, tzobj->tzi.tz);
break;
}
timelib_unixtime2local(dateobj->time, dateobj->time->sse);
RETURN_ZVAL(object, 1, 0);
|
Safe
|
[] |
php-src
|
7b1898183032eeabc64a086ff040af991cebcd93
|
1.949192218134842e+38
| 29 |
Fix bug #68942 (Use after free vulnerability in unserialize() with DateTimeZone)
Conflicts:
ext/date/php_date.c
| 0 |
static int cmp_timestamp(void *cmp_arg,
Timestamp_or_zero_datetime *a,
Timestamp_or_zero_datetime *b)
{
return a->cmp(*b);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8
|
3.2750896123284985e+37
| 6 |
MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item.
| 0 |
void CLASS process_Sony_0x940c(uchar *buf, ushort len)
{
if ((imSony.SonyCameraType != LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE) &&
(imSony.SonyCameraType != LIBRAW_SONY_NEX))
return;
if (len <= 0x000a)
return;
ushort lid2;
if ((ilm.LensMount != LIBRAW_MOUNT_Canon_EF) &&
(ilm.LensMount != LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sigma_X3F))
{
switch (SonySubstitution[buf[0x0008]])
{
case 1:
case 5:
ilm.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A;
break;
case 4:
ilm.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E;
break;
}
}
lid2 = (((ushort)SonySubstitution[buf[0x000a]]) << 8) | ((ushort)SonySubstitution[buf[0x0009]]);
if ((lid2 > 0) &&
((lid2 < 32784) ||
(ilm.LensID == 0x1999) ||
(ilm.LensID == 0xffff)))
parseSonyLensType2(SonySubstitution[buf[0x000a]], // LensType2 - Sony lens ids
SonySubstitution[buf[0x0009]]);
return;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400"
] |
LibRaw
|
e67a9862d10ebaa97712f532eca1eb5e2e410a22
|
2.6747564244420458e+38
| 32 |
Fixed Secunia Advisory SA86384
- possible infinite loop in unpacked_load_raw()
- possible infinite loop in parse_rollei()
- possible infinite loop in parse_sinar_ia()
Credits: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera
| 0 |
static bool access_pminten(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
u64 mask = kvm_pmu_valid_counter_mask(vcpu);
if (!kvm_arm_pmu_v3_ready(vcpu))
return trap_raz_wi(vcpu, p, r);
if (!vcpu_mode_priv(vcpu))
return false;
if (p->is_write) {
u64 val = p->regval & mask;
if (r->Op2 & 0x1)
/* accessing PMINTENSET_EL1 */
vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMINTENSET_EL1) |= val;
else
/* accessing PMINTENCLR_EL1 */
vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMINTENSET_EL1) &= ~val;
} else {
p->regval = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMINTENSET_EL1) & mask;
}
return true;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] |
linux
|
9e3f7a29694049edd728e2400ab57ad7553e5aa9
|
1.6422058905457684e+38
| 26 |
arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
| 0 |
static int __kvm_io_bus_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_bus *bus,
struct kvm_io_range *range, void *val)
{
int idx;
idx = kvm_io_bus_get_first_dev(bus, range->addr, range->len);
if (idx < 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
while (idx < bus->dev_count &&
kvm_io_bus_cmp(range, &bus->range[idx]) == 0) {
if (!kvm_iodevice_read(vcpu, bus->range[idx].dev, range->addr,
range->len, val))
return idx;
idx++;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-459"
] |
linux
|
683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b
|
2.5841603318920905e+38
| 19 |
KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static void h2_release(struct connection *conn)
{
struct h2c *h2c = conn->ctx;
LIST_DEL(&conn->list);
if (h2c) {
hpack_dht_free(h2c->ddht);
HA_SPIN_LOCK(BUF_WQ_LOCK, &buffer_wq_lock);
LIST_DEL(&h2c->buf_wait.list);
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(BUF_WQ_LOCK, &buffer_wq_lock);
h2_release_buf(h2c, &h2c->dbuf);
h2_release_buf(h2c, &h2c->mbuf);
if (h2c->task) {
h2c->task->context = NULL;
task_wakeup(h2c->task, TASK_WOKEN_OTHER);
h2c->task = NULL;
}
if (h2c->wait_event.task)
tasklet_free(h2c->wait_event.task);
if (h2c->wait_event.events != 0)
conn->xprt->unsubscribe(conn, h2c->wait_event.events,
&h2c->wait_event);
pool_free(pool_head_h2c, h2c);
}
conn->mux = NULL;
conn->ctx = NULL;
conn_stop_tracking(conn);
conn_full_close(conn);
if (conn->destroy_cb)
conn->destroy_cb(conn);
conn_free(conn);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
haproxy
|
a01f45e3ced23c799f6e78b5efdbd32198a75354
|
8.821584485380622e+37
| 39 |
BUG/CRITICAL: mux-h2: re-check the frame length when PRIORITY is used
Tim D�sterhus reported a possible crash in the H2 HEADERS frame decoder
when the PRIORITY flag is present. A check is missing to ensure the 5
extra bytes needed with this flag are actually part of the frame. As per
RFC7540#4.2, let's return a connection error with code FRAME_SIZE_ERROR.
Many thanks to Tim for responsibly reporting this issue with a working
config and reproducer. This issue was assigned CVE-2018-20615.
This fix must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8.
| 0 |
bool operator==(const BigIntVal& other) const {
if (is_null && other.is_null) {
return true;
}
if (is_null || other.is_null) {
return false;
}
return val == other.val;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
incubator-doris
|
246ac4e37aa4da6836b7850cb990f02d1c3725a3
|
1.2492162395419895e+38
| 11 |
[fix] fix a bug of encryption function with iv may return wrong result (#8277)
| 0 |
void snd_seq_driver_unregister(struct snd_seq_driver *drv)
{
driver_unregister(&drv->driver);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57
|
2.2836497552409215e+38
| 4 |
ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
| 0 |
static int __init usb_pwc_init(void)
{
int i, sz;
char *sizenames[PSZ_MAX] = { "sqcif", "qsif", "qcif", "sif", "cif", "vga" };
PWC_INFO("Philips webcam module version " PWC_VERSION " loaded.\n");
PWC_INFO("Supports Philips PCA645/646, PCVC675/680/690, PCVC720[40]/730/740/750 & PCVC830/840.\n");
PWC_INFO("Also supports the Askey VC010, various Logitech Quickcams, Samsung MPC-C10 and MPC-C30,\n");
PWC_INFO("the Creative WebCam 5 & Pro Ex, SOTEC Afina Eye and Visionite VCS-UC300 and VCS-UM100.\n");
if (fps) {
if (fps < 4 || fps > 30) {
PWC_ERROR("Framerate out of bounds (4-30).\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
default_fps = fps;
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Default framerate set to %d.\n", default_fps);
}
if (size) {
/* string; try matching with array */
for (sz = 0; sz < PSZ_MAX; sz++) {
if (!strcmp(sizenames[sz], size)) { /* Found! */
default_size = sz;
break;
}
}
if (sz == PSZ_MAX) {
PWC_ERROR("Size not recognized; try size=[sqcif | qsif | qcif | sif | cif | vga].\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Default image size set to %s [%dx%d].\n", sizenames[default_size], pwc_image_sizes[default_size].x, pwc_image_sizes[default_size].y);
}
if (mbufs) {
if (mbufs < 1 || mbufs > MAX_IMAGES) {
PWC_ERROR("Illegal number of mmap() buffers; use a number between 1 and %d.\n", MAX_IMAGES);
return -EINVAL;
}
pwc_mbufs = mbufs;
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Number of image buffers set to %d.\n", pwc_mbufs);
}
if (fbufs) {
if (fbufs < 2 || fbufs > MAX_FRAMES) {
PWC_ERROR("Illegal number of frame buffers; use a number between 2 and %d.\n", MAX_FRAMES);
return -EINVAL;
}
default_fbufs = fbufs;
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Number of frame buffers set to %d.\n", default_fbufs);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_USB_PWC_DEBUG
if (pwc_trace >= 0) {
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Trace options: 0x%04x\n", pwc_trace);
}
#endif
if (compression >= 0) {
if (compression > 3) {
PWC_ERROR("Invalid compression setting; use a number between 0 (uncompressed) and 3 (high).\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pwc_preferred_compression = compression;
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Preferred compression set to %d.\n", pwc_preferred_compression);
}
if (power_save)
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("Enabling power save on open/close.\n");
if (leds[0] >= 0)
led_on = leds[0];
if (leds[1] >= 0)
led_off = leds[1];
/* Big device node whoopla. Basically, it allows you to assign a
device node (/dev/videoX) to a camera, based on its type
& serial number. The format is [type[.serialnumber]:]node.
Any camera that isn't matched by these rules gets the next
available free device node.
*/
for (i = 0; i < MAX_DEV_HINTS; i++) {
char *s, *colon, *dot;
/* This loop also initializes the array */
device_hint[i].pdev = NULL;
s = dev_hint[i];
if (s != NULL && *s != '\0') {
device_hint[i].type = -1; /* wildcard */
strcpy(device_hint[i].serial_number, "*");
/* parse string: chop at ':' & '/' */
colon = dot = s;
while (*colon != '\0' && *colon != ':')
colon++;
while (*dot != '\0' && *dot != '.')
dot++;
/* Few sanity checks */
if (*dot != '\0' && dot > colon) {
PWC_ERROR("Malformed camera hint: the colon must be after the dot.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (*colon == '\0') {
/* No colon */
if (*dot != '\0') {
PWC_ERROR("Malformed camera hint: no colon + device node given.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
else {
/* No type or serial number specified, just a number. */
device_hint[i].device_node = pwc_atoi(s);
}
}
else {
/* There's a colon, so we have at least a type and a device node */
device_hint[i].type = pwc_atoi(s);
device_hint[i].device_node = pwc_atoi(colon + 1);
if (*dot != '\0') {
/* There's a serial number as well */
int k;
dot++;
k = 0;
while (*dot != ':' && k < 29) {
device_hint[i].serial_number[k++] = *dot;
dot++;
}
device_hint[i].serial_number[k] = '\0';
}
}
PWC_TRACE("device_hint[%d]:\n", i);
PWC_TRACE(" type : %d\n", device_hint[i].type);
PWC_TRACE(" serial# : %s\n", device_hint[i].serial_number);
PWC_TRACE(" node : %d\n", device_hint[i].device_node);
}
else
device_hint[i].type = 0; /* not filled */
} /* ..for MAX_DEV_HINTS */
PWC_DEBUG_PROBE("Registering driver at address 0x%p.\n", &pwc_driver);
return usb_register(&pwc_driver);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
85237f202d46d55c1bffe0c5b1aa3ddc0f1dce4d
|
3.1058114425759557e+38
| 138 |
USB: fix DoS in pwc USB video driver
the pwc driver has a disconnect method that waits for user space to
close the device. This opens up an opportunity for a DoS attack,
blocking the USB subsystem and making khubd's task busy wait in
kernel space. This patch shifts freeing resources to close if an opened
device is disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| 0 |
This function decrypts the plaintext */
PHP_FUNCTION(mdecrypt_generic)
{
zval *mcryptind;
char *data;
int data_len;
php_mcrypt *pm;
char* data_s;
int block_size, data_size;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs", &mcryptind, &data, &data_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt * , &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
PHP_MCRYPT_INIT_CHECK
if (data_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "An empty string was passed");
RETURN_FALSE
}
/* Check blocksize */
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_mode(pm->td) == 1) { /* It's a block algorithm */
block_size = mcrypt_enc_get_block_size(pm->td);
data_size = (((data_len - 1) / block_size) + 1) * block_size;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
} else { /* It's not a block algorithm */
data_size = data_len;
data_s = emalloc(data_size + 1);
memset(data_s, 0, data_size);
memcpy(data_s, data, data_len);
}
mdecrypt_generic(pm->td, data_s, data_size);
RETVAL_STRINGL(data_s, data_size, 1);
efree(data_s);
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
6c5211a0cef0cc2854eaa387e0eb036e012904d0
|
2.633574619186283e+38
| 40 |
Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
| 1 |
ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) {
ExecCommand *i;
while ((i = c)) {
LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i);
exec_command_done(i);
free(i);
}
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-269"
] |
systemd
|
f69567cbe26d09eac9d387c0be0fc32c65a83ada
|
2.416906615060974e+37
| 11 |
core: expose SUID/SGID restriction as new unit setting RestrictSUIDSGID=
| 0 |
LIR_Opr LIRGenerator::result_register_for(ValueType* type, bool callee) {
LIR_Opr opr;
switch (type->tag()) {
case intTag: opr = FrameMap::rax_opr; break;
case objectTag: opr = FrameMap::rax_oop_opr; break;
case longTag: opr = FrameMap::long0_opr; break;
#ifdef _LP64
case floatTag: opr = FrameMap::xmm0_float_opr; break;
case doubleTag: opr = FrameMap::xmm0_double_opr; break;
#else
case floatTag: opr = UseSSE >= 1 ? FrameMap::xmm0_float_opr : FrameMap::fpu0_float_opr; break;
case doubleTag: opr = UseSSE >= 2 ? FrameMap::xmm0_double_opr : FrameMap::fpu0_double_opr; break;
#endif // _LP64
case addressTag:
default: ShouldNotReachHere(); return LIR_OprFact::illegalOpr;
}
assert(opr->type_field() == as_OprType(as_BasicType(type)), "type mismatch");
return opr;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
jdk17u
|
268c0159253b3de5d72eb826ef2329b27bb33fea
|
1.8156192600807074e+38
| 20 |
8272014: Better array indexing
Reviewed-by: thartmann
Backport-of: 937c31d896d05aa24543b74e98a2ea9f05b5d86f
| 0 |
static inline void ConvertRGBToCMYK(PixelInfo *pixel)
{
MagickRealType
black,
blue,
cyan,
green,
magenta,
red,
yellow;
if (pixel->colorspace != sRGBColorspace)
{
red=QuantumScale*pixel->red;
green=QuantumScale*pixel->green;
blue=QuantumScale*pixel->blue;
}
else
{
red=QuantumScale*DecodePixelGamma(pixel->red);
green=QuantumScale*DecodePixelGamma(pixel->green);
blue=QuantumScale*DecodePixelGamma(pixel->blue);
}
if ((fabs((double) red) < MagickEpsilon) &&
(fabs((double) green) < MagickEpsilon) &&
(fabs((double) blue) < MagickEpsilon))
{
pixel->black=(MagickRealType) QuantumRange;
return;
}
cyan=(MagickRealType) (1.0-red);
magenta=(MagickRealType) (1.0-green);
yellow=(MagickRealType) (1.0-blue);
black=cyan;
if (magenta < black)
black=magenta;
if (yellow < black)
black=yellow;
cyan=(MagickRealType) ((cyan-black)/(1.0-black));
magenta=(MagickRealType) ((magenta-black)/(1.0-black));
yellow=(MagickRealType) ((yellow-black)/(1.0-black));
pixel->colorspace=CMYKColorspace;
pixel->red=QuantumRange*cyan;
pixel->green=QuantumRange*magenta;
pixel->blue=QuantumRange*yellow;
pixel->black=QuantumRange*black;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-369"
] |
ImageMagick
|
a81ca9a1b46a96be83682af3389f0a6f3d0d389d
|
3.402059335411551e+38
| 47 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1711
| 1 |
void Item_sum_sum::update_field()
{
DBUG_ASSERT (aggr->Aggrtype() != Aggregator::DISTINCT_AGGREGATOR);
if (Item_sum_sum::result_type() == DECIMAL_RESULT)
{
my_decimal value, *arg_val= args[0]->val_decimal(&value);
if (!args[0]->null_value)
{
if (!result_field->is_null())
{
my_decimal field_value,
*field_val= result_field->val_decimal(&field_value);
my_decimal_add(E_DEC_FATAL_ERROR, dec_buffs, arg_val, field_val);
result_field->store_decimal(dec_buffs);
}
else
{
result_field->store_decimal(arg_val);
result_field->set_notnull();
}
}
}
else
{
double old_nr,nr;
uchar *res=result_field->ptr;
float8get(old_nr,res);
nr= args[0]->val_real();
if (!args[0]->null_value)
{
old_nr+=nr;
result_field->set_notnull();
}
float8store(res,old_nr);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120"
] |
server
|
eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1
|
1.4168522988955121e+38
| 37 |
MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size.
Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations.
It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the
existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix.
| 0 |
void acl_mask_perm_str(acl_t acl, char *str)
{
acl_entry_t entry;
str[0] = '\0';
if (acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &entry) != 1)
return;
for(;;) {
acl_tag_t tag;
acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tag);
if (tag == ACL_MASK) {
acl_perm_str(entry, str);
return;
}
if (acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &entry) != 1)
return;
}
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
acl
|
63451a06b7484d220750ed8574d3ee84e156daf5
|
1.0224495784919361e+38
| 19 |
Make sure that getfacl -R only calls stat(2) on symlinks when it needs to
This fixes http://oss.sgi.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=790
"getfacl follows symlinks, even without -L".
| 0 |
static int uas_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
786de92b3cb26012d3d0f00ee37adf14527f35c4
|
6.996062389024808e+36
| 4 |
USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| 0 |
int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int err = 0;
int old_state = sk->sk_state;
if (old_state != TCP_CLOSE)
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
/* ABORT function of RFC793 */
if (old_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
inet_csk_listen_stop(sk);
} else if (unlikely(tp->repair)) {
sk->sk_err = ECONNABORTED;
} else if (tcp_need_reset(old_state) ||
(tp->snd_nxt != tp->write_seq &&
(1 << old_state) & (TCPF_CLOSING | TCPF_LAST_ACK))) {
/* The last check adjusts for discrepancy of Linux wrt. RFC
* states
*/
tcp_send_active_reset(sk, gfp_any());
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
} else if (old_state == TCP_SYN_SENT)
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
tcp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
tcp_write_queue_purge(sk);
tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(sk);
skb_rbtree_purge(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
inet->inet_dport = 0;
if (!(sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK))
inet_reset_saddr(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = 0;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
tp->srtt_us = 0;
tp->write_seq += tp->max_window + 2;
if (tp->write_seq == 0)
tp->write_seq = 1;
icsk->icsk_backoff = 0;
tp->snd_cwnd = 2;
icsk->icsk_probes_out = 0;
tp->packets_out = 0;
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0;
tp->window_clamp = 0;
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
tcp_clear_retrans(tp);
inet_csk_delack_init(sk);
/* Initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS to avoid division by 0
* issue in __tcp_select_window()
*/
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss = TCP_MIN_MSS;
tcp_init_send_head(sk);
memset(&tp->rx_opt, 0, sizeof(tp->rx_opt));
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
tcp_saved_syn_free(tp);
/* Clean up fastopen related fields */
tcp_free_fastopen_req(tp);
inet->defer_connect = 0;
WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash);
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-369"
] |
linux
|
499350a5a6e7512d9ed369ed63a4244b6536f4f8
|
3.1434465806290065e+38
| 72 |
tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
irc_server_set_buffer_title (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
char *title;
int length;
if (server && server->buffer)
{
if (server->is_connected)
{
length = 16 +
((server->current_address) ? strlen (server->current_address) : 16) +
16 + ((server->current_ip) ? strlen (server->current_ip) : 16) + 1;
title = malloc (length);
if (title)
{
snprintf (title, length, "IRC: %s/%d (%s)",
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
(server->current_ip) ? server->current_ip : "");
weechat_buffer_set (server->buffer, "title", title);
free (title);
}
}
else
{
weechat_buffer_set (server->buffer, "title", "");
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
weechat
|
40ccacb4330a64802b1f1e28ed9a6b6d3ca9197f
|
8.293945856492744e+37
| 29 |
irc: fix crash when a new message 005 is received with longer nick prefixes
Thanks to Stuart Nevans Locke for reporting the issue.
| 0 |
static void test_helper_initialized(VncConnection *conn,
gpointer opaque)
{
struct GVncTest *test = opaque;
gint32 encodings[] = { VNC_CONNECTION_ENCODING_DESKTOP_RESIZE,
VNC_CONNECTION_ENCODING_ZRLE,
VNC_CONNECTION_ENCODING_HEXTILE,
VNC_CONNECTION_ENCODING_RRE,
VNC_CONNECTION_ENCODING_COPY_RECT,
VNC_CONNECTION_ENCODING_RAW };
gint32 *encodingsp;
int n_encodings;
test_helper_desktop_resize(conn,
vnc_connection_get_width(conn),
vnc_connection_get_height(conn),
test);
encodingsp = encodings;
n_encodings = G_N_ELEMENTS(encodings);
VNC_DEBUG("Sending %d encodings", n_encodings);
if (!vnc_connection_set_encodings(conn, n_encodings, encodingsp))
goto error;
VNC_DEBUG("Requesting first framebuffer update");
if (!vnc_connection_framebuffer_update_request(test->conn,
0, 0, 0,
vnc_connection_get_width(test->conn),
vnc_connection_get_height(test->conn)))
vnc_connection_shutdown(test->conn);
test->connected = TRUE;
return;
error:
vnc_connection_shutdown(conn);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
gtk-vnc
|
ea0386933214c9178aaea9f2f85049ea3fa3e14a
|
8.285083300041661e+37
| 38 |
Fix bounds checking for RRE, hextile & copyrect encodings
While the client would bounds check the overall update
region, it failed to bounds check the payload data
parameters.
Add a test case to validate bounds checking.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=778048
CVE-2017-5884
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
| 0 |
nm_connection_list_present (NMConnectionList *list)
{
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_CONNECTION_LIST (list));
gtk_window_present (GTK_WINDOW (list->dialog));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
network-manager-applet
|
8627880e07c8345f69ed639325280c7f62a8f894
|
2.9362746878598048e+38
| 6 |
editor: prevent any registration of objects on the system bus
D-Bus access-control is name-based; so requests for a specific name
are allowed/denied based on the rules in /etc/dbus-1/system.d. But
apparently apps still get a non-named service on the bus, and if we
register *any* object even though we don't have a named service,
dbus and dbus-glib will happily proxy signals. Since the connection
editor shouldn't ever expose anything having to do with connections
on any bus, make sure that's the case.
| 0 |
static const char *metadata_to_str(uint32_t id)
{
switch (id) {
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_TITLE:
return "Title";
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_ARTIST:
return "Artist";
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_ALBUM:
return "Album";
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_GENRE:
return "Genre";
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_TRACK:
return "TrackNumber";
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_N_TRACKS:
return "NumberOfTracks";
case AVRCP_MEDIA_ATTRIBUTE_DURATION:
return "Duration";
}
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
bluez
|
e2b0f0d8d63e1223bb714a9efb37e2257818268b
|
3.10628486779865e+38
| 21 |
avrcp: Fix not checking if params_len match number of received bytes
This makes sure the number of bytes in the params_len matches the
remaining bytes received so the code don't end up accessing invalid
memory.
| 0 |
static inline int nla_put_u32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, u32 value)
{
return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u32), &value);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux-2.6
|
1045b03e07d85f3545118510a587035536030c1c
|
1.0269224367274947e+38
| 4 |
netlink: fix overrun in attribute iteration
kmemcheck reported this:
kmemcheck: Caught 16-bit read from uninitialized memory (f6c1ba30)
0500110001508abf050010000500000002017300140000006f72672e66726565
i i i i i i i i i i i i i u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
^
Pid: 3462, comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted (2.6.27-rc3-00054-g6397ab9-dirty #13)
EIP: 0060:[<c05de64a>] EFLAGS: 00010296 CPU: 0
EIP is at nla_parse+0x5a/0xf0
EAX: 00000008 EBX: fffffffd ECX: c06f16c0 EDX: 00000005
ESI: 00000010 EDI: f6c1ba30 EBP: f6367c6c ESP: c0a11e88
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: f781cc84 CR3: 3632f000 CR4: 000006d0
DR0: c0ead9bc DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff4ff0 DR7: 00000400
[<c05d4b23>] rtnl_setlink+0x63/0x130
[<c05d5f75>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x165/0x200
[<c05ddf66>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x76/0xa0
[<c05d5dfe>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1e/0x30
[<c05dda21>] netlink_unicast+0x281/0x290
[<c05ddbe9>] netlink_sendmsg+0x1b9/0x2b0
[<c05beef2>] sock_sendmsg+0xd2/0x100
[<c05bf945>] sys_sendto+0xa5/0xd0
[<c05bf9a6>] sys_send+0x36/0x40
[<c05c03d6>] sys_socketcall+0x1e6/0x2c0
[<c020353b>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x3f
[<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
This is the line in nla_ok():
/**
* nla_ok - check if the netlink attribute fits into the remaining bytes
* @nla: netlink attribute
* @remaining: number of bytes remaining in attribute stream
*/
static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)
{
return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
nla->nla_len <= remaining;
}
It turns out that remaining can become negative due to alignment in
nla_next(). But GCC promotes "remaining" to unsigned in the test
against sizeof(*nla) above. Therefore the test succeeds, and the
nla_for_each_attr() may access memory outside the received buffer.
A short example illustrating this point is here:
#include <stdio.h>
main(void)
{
printf("%d\n", -1 >= sizeof(int));
}
...which prints "1".
This patch adds a cast in front of the sizeof so that GCC will make
a signed comparison and fix the illegal memory dereference. With the
patch applied, there is no kmemcheck report.
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
remove_form_auth_data (gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data)
{
if (value)
free_form_auth_data_list ((GSList*)value);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
epiphany
|
3e0f7dea754381c5ad11a06ccc62eb153382b498
|
1.5072201120031656e+36
| 5 |
Report broken certs through the padlock icon
This uses a new feature in libsoup that reports through a
SoupMessageFlag whether the message is talking to a server that has a
trusted server.
Bug #600663
| 0 |
inline char *strellipsize(const char *const str, char *const res, const unsigned int l=64,
const bool is_ending=true) {
const unsigned int nl = l<5?5:l, ls = (unsigned int)std::strlen(str);
if (ls<=nl) { std::strcpy(res,str); return res; }
if (is_ending) {
std::strncpy(res,str,nl - 5);
std::strcpy(res + nl -5,"(...)");
} else {
const unsigned int ll = (nl - 5)/2 + 1 - (nl%2), lr = nl - ll - 5;
std::strncpy(res,str,ll);
std::strcpy(res + ll,"(...)");
std::strncpy(res + ll + 5,str + ls - lr,lr);
}
res[nl] = 0;
return res;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
|
2.0690450367987483e+38
| 16 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
| 0 |
static double CubicBC(const double x,const ResizeFilter *resize_filter)
{
/*
Cubic Filters using B,C determined values:
Mitchell-Netravali B = 1/3 C = 1/3 "Balanced" cubic spline filter
Catmull-Rom B = 0 C = 1/2 Interpolatory and exact on linears
Spline B = 1 C = 0 B-Spline Gaussian approximation
Hermite B = 0 C = 0 B-Spline interpolator
See paper by Mitchell and Netravali, Reconstruction Filters in Computer
Graphics Computer Graphics, Volume 22, Number 4, August 1988
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/fussell/courses/cs384g/lectures/mitchell/
Mitchell.pdf.
Coefficents are determined from B,C values:
P0 = ( 6 - 2*B )/6 = coeff[0]
P1 = 0
P2 = (-18 +12*B + 6*C )/6 = coeff[1]
P3 = ( 12 - 9*B - 6*C )/6 = coeff[2]
Q0 = ( 8*B +24*C )/6 = coeff[3]
Q1 = ( -12*B -48*C )/6 = coeff[4]
Q2 = ( 6*B +30*C )/6 = coeff[5]
Q3 = ( - 1*B - 6*C )/6 = coeff[6]
which are used to define the filter:
P0 + P1*x + P2*x^2 + P3*x^3 0 <= x < 1
Q0 + Q1*x + Q2*x^2 + Q3*x^3 1 <= x < 2
which ensures function is continuous in value and derivative (slope).
*/
if (x < 1.0)
return(resize_filter->coefficient[0]+x*(x*
(resize_filter->coefficient[1]+x*resize_filter->coefficient[2])));
if (x < 2.0)
return(resize_filter->coefficient[3]+x*(resize_filter->coefficient[4]+x*
(resize_filter->coefficient[5]+x*resize_filter->coefficient[6])));
return(0.0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
ImageMagick
|
c5402b6e0fcf8b694ae2af6a6652ebb8ce0ccf46
|
1.7657062559054934e+38
| 39 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/717
| 0 |
evbuffer_add_printf(struct evbuffer *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
{
int res = -1;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
res = evbuffer_add_vprintf(buf, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return (res);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-189"
] |
libevent
|
7b21c4eabf1f3946d3f63cce1319c490caab8ecf
|
3.178570159944555e+38
| 11 |
Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 1.4
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
| 0 |
int dir_decode(nfs_readdir_descriptor_t *desc)
{
__be32 *p = desc->ptr;
p = desc->decode(p, desc->entry, desc->plus);
if (IS_ERR(p))
return PTR_ERR(p);
desc->ptr = p;
if (desc->timestamp_valid)
desc->entry->fattr->time_start = desc->timestamp;
else
desc->entry->fattr->valid &= ~NFS_ATTR_FATTR;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
54af3bb543c071769141387a42deaaab5074da55
|
5.0299348566167935e+37
| 13 |
NFS: Fix an Oops in encode_lookup()
It doesn't look as if the NFS file name limit is being initialised correctly
in the struct nfs_server. Make sure that we limit whatever is being set in
nfs_probe_fsinfo() and nfs_init_server().
Also ensure that readdirplus and nfs4_path_walk respect our file name
limits.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
void kvp_get_os_info(void)
{
FILE *file;
char *p, buf[512];
uname(&uts_buf);
os_version = uts_buf.release;
os_build = strdup(uts_buf.release);
os_name = uts_buf.sysname;
processor_arch = uts_buf.machine;
/*
* The current windows host (win7) expects the build
* string to be of the form: x.y.z
* Strip additional information we may have.
*/
p = strchr(os_version, '-');
if (p)
*p = '\0';
/*
* Parse the /etc/os-release file if present:
* http://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/os-release.html
*/
file = fopen("/etc/os-release", "r");
if (file != NULL) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), file)) {
char *value, *q;
/* Ignore comments */
if (buf[0] == '#')
continue;
/* Split into name=value */
p = strchr(buf, '=');
if (!p)
continue;
*p++ = 0;
/* Remove quotes and newline; un-escape */
value = p;
q = p;
while (*p) {
if (*p == '\\') {
++p;
if (!*p)
break;
*q++ = *p++;
} else if (*p == '\'' || *p == '"' ||
*p == '\n') {
++p;
} else {
*q++ = *p++;
}
}
*q = 0;
if (!strcmp(buf, "NAME")) {
p = strdup(value);
if (!p)
break;
os_name = p;
} else if (!strcmp(buf, "VERSION_ID")) {
p = strdup(value);
if (!p)
break;
os_major = p;
}
}
fclose(file);
return;
}
/* Fallback for older RH/SUSE releases */
file = fopen("/etc/SuSE-release", "r");
if (file != NULL)
goto kvp_osinfo_found;
file = fopen("/etc/redhat-release", "r");
if (file != NULL)
goto kvp_osinfo_found;
/*
* We don't have information about the os.
*/
return;
kvp_osinfo_found:
/* up to three lines */
p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), file);
if (p) {
p = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (p)
*p = '\0';
p = strdup(buf);
if (!p)
goto done;
os_name = p;
/* second line */
p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), file);
if (p) {
p = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (p)
*p = '\0';
p = strdup(buf);
if (!p)
goto done;
os_major = p;
/* third line */
p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), file);
if (p) {
p = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (p)
*p = '\0';
p = strdup(buf);
if (p)
os_minor = p;
}
}
}
done:
fclose(file);
return;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
char-misc
|
95a69adab9acfc3981c504737a2b6578e4d846ef
|
2.6299309633406006e+38
| 127 |
tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <thozza@redhat.com>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| 0 |
ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *rt, bool destroy) {
if (!rt)
return NULL;
assert(rt->n_ref > 0);
rt->n_ref--;
if (rt->n_ref > 0)
return NULL;
return exec_runtime_free(rt, destroy);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-269"
] |
systemd
|
f69567cbe26d09eac9d387c0be0fc32c65a83ada
|
3.3681247029641474e+38
| 12 |
core: expose SUID/SGID restriction as new unit setting RestrictSUIDSGID=
| 0 |
std::string RGWFormPost::get_current_content_type() const
{
try {
const auto& field = current_data_part->fields.at("Content-Type");
return field.val;
} catch (std::out_of_range&) {
/* NOP */;
}
return std::string();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
ceph
|
f44a8ae8aa27ecef69528db9aec220f12492810e
|
2.3325432196068822e+38
| 11 |
rgw: RGWSwiftWebsiteHandler::is_web_dir checks empty subdir_name
checking for empty name avoids later assertion in RGWObjectCtx::set_atomic
Fixes: CVE-2021-3531
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7196a469b4470f3c8628489df9a41ec8b00a5610)
| 0 |
static void mysql_end_timer(ulong start_time,char *buff)
{
buff[0]=' ';
buff[1]='(';
end_timer(start_time,buff+2);
my_stpcpy(strend(buff),")");
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] |
mysql-server
|
3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390
|
1.2213188424580215e+38
| 7 |
WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options
| 0 |
static int multipath_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
char *result, unsigned int maxlen)
{
int sz = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct priority_group *pg;
struct pgpath *p;
unsigned pg_num;
char state;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
/* Features */
if (type == STATUSTYPE_INFO)
DMEMIT("2 %u %u ", m->queue_size, m->pg_init_count);
else {
DMEMIT("%u ", m->queue_if_no_path +
(m->pg_init_retries > 0) * 2 +
(m->pg_init_delay_msecs != DM_PG_INIT_DELAY_DEFAULT) * 2);
if (m->queue_if_no_path)
DMEMIT("queue_if_no_path ");
if (m->pg_init_retries)
DMEMIT("pg_init_retries %u ", m->pg_init_retries);
if (m->pg_init_delay_msecs != DM_PG_INIT_DELAY_DEFAULT)
DMEMIT("pg_init_delay_msecs %u ", m->pg_init_delay_msecs);
}
if (!m->hw_handler_name || type == STATUSTYPE_INFO)
DMEMIT("0 ");
else
DMEMIT("1 %s ", m->hw_handler_name);
DMEMIT("%u ", m->nr_priority_groups);
if (m->next_pg)
pg_num = m->next_pg->pg_num;
else if (m->current_pg)
pg_num = m->current_pg->pg_num;
else
pg_num = (m->nr_priority_groups ? 1 : 0);
DMEMIT("%u ", pg_num);
switch (type) {
case STATUSTYPE_INFO:
list_for_each_entry(pg, &m->priority_groups, list) {
if (pg->bypassed)
state = 'D'; /* Disabled */
else if (pg == m->current_pg)
state = 'A'; /* Currently Active */
else
state = 'E'; /* Enabled */
DMEMIT("%c ", state);
if (pg->ps.type->status)
sz += pg->ps.type->status(&pg->ps, NULL, type,
result + sz,
maxlen - sz);
else
DMEMIT("0 ");
DMEMIT("%u %u ", pg->nr_pgpaths,
pg->ps.type->info_args);
list_for_each_entry(p, &pg->pgpaths, list) {
DMEMIT("%s %s %u ", p->path.dev->name,
p->is_active ? "A" : "F",
p->fail_count);
if (pg->ps.type->status)
sz += pg->ps.type->status(&pg->ps,
&p->path, type, result + sz,
maxlen - sz);
}
}
break;
case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
list_for_each_entry(pg, &m->priority_groups, list) {
DMEMIT("%s ", pg->ps.type->name);
if (pg->ps.type->status)
sz += pg->ps.type->status(&pg->ps, NULL, type,
result + sz,
maxlen - sz);
else
DMEMIT("0 ");
DMEMIT("%u %u ", pg->nr_pgpaths,
pg->ps.type->table_args);
list_for_each_entry(p, &pg->pgpaths, list) {
DMEMIT("%s ", p->path.dev->name);
if (pg->ps.type->status)
sz += pg->ps.type->status(&pg->ps,
&p->path, type, result + sz,
maxlen - sz);
}
}
break;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
1.3161415457445187e+37
| 107 |
dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| 0 |
bool bt_att_set_timeout_cb(struct bt_att *att, bt_att_timeout_func_t callback,
void *user_data,
bt_att_destroy_func_t destroy)
{
if (!att)
return false;
if (att->timeout_destroy)
att->timeout_destroy(att->timeout_data);
att->timeout_callback = callback;
att->timeout_destroy = destroy;
att->timeout_data = user_data;
return true;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-415"
] |
bluez
|
1cd644db8c23a2f530ddb93cebed7dacc5f5721a
|
2.499287506385445e+38
| 16 |
shared/att: Fix possible crash on disconnect
If there are pending request while disconnecting they would be notified
but clients may endup being freed in the proccess which will then be
calling bt_att_cancel to cancal its requests causing the following
trace:
Invalid read of size 4
at 0x1D894C: enable_ccc_callback (gatt-client.c:1627)
by 0x1D247B: disc_att_send_op (att.c:417)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1D47B7: disconnect_cb (att.c:635)
by 0x1E0707: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170)
by 0x48E963B: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x48E9AC7: ??? (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x48E9ECF: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x1E0E97: mainloop_run (mainloop-glib.c:79)
by 0x1E13B3: mainloop_run_with_signal (mainloop-notify.c:201)
by 0x12BC3B: main (main.c:770)
Address 0x7d40a28 is 24 bytes inside a block of size 32 free'd
at 0x484A2E0: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:540)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1CCC83: queue_destroy (queue.c:73)
by 0x1D7DD7: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:2209)
by 0x16497B: batt_free (battery.c:77)
by 0x16497B: batt_remove (battery.c:286)
by 0x1A0013: service_remove (service.c:176)
by 0x1A9B7B: device_remove_gatt_service (device.c:3691)
by 0x1A9B7B: gatt_service_removed (device.c:3805)
by 0x1CC90B: queue_foreach (queue.c:220)
by 0x1DE27B: notify_service_changed.isra.0.part.0 (gatt-db.c:369)
by 0x1DE387: notify_service_changed (gatt-db.c:361)
by 0x1DE387: gatt_db_service_destroy (gatt-db.c:385)
by 0x1DE3EF: gatt_db_remove_service (gatt-db.c:519)
by 0x1D674F: discovery_op_complete (gatt-client.c:388)
by 0x1D6877: discover_primary_cb (gatt-client.c:1260)
by 0x1E220B: discovery_op_complete (gatt-helpers.c:628)
by 0x1E249B: read_by_grp_type_cb (gatt-helpers.c:730)
by 0x1D247B: disc_att_send_op (att.c:417)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1D47B7: disconnect_cb (att.c:635)
| 0 |
R_API RList *r_anal_var_get_prots(RAnalFunction *fcn) {
r_return_val_if_fail (fcn, NULL);
RList *ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)r_anal_var_proto_free);
if (ret) {
void **p;
r_pvector_foreach (&fcn->vars, p) {
RAnalVar *var = *p;
RAnalVarProt *vp = R_NEW0 (RAnalVarProt);
if (vp) {
vp->isarg = var->isarg;
vp->name = strdup (var->name);
vp->type = strdup (var->type);
vp->kind = var->kind;
vp->delta = var->delta;
r_list_append (ret, vp);
}
}
}
return ret;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
radare2
|
a7ce29647fcb38386d7439696375e16e093d6acb
|
9.202135702640791e+37
| 20 |
Fix UAF in aaaa on arm/thumb switching ##crash
* Reported by @peacock-doris via huntr.dev
* Reproducer tests_65185
* This is a logic fix, but not the fully safe as changes in the code
can result on UAF again, to properly protect r2 from crashing we
need to break the ABI and add refcounting to RRegItem, which can't
happen in 5.6.x because of abi-compat rules
| 0 |
EIGEN_STRONG_INLINE bool operator>(const QUInt16 a, const QUInt16 b) {
return a.value > b.value;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-908",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
ace0c15a22f7f054abcc1f53eabbcb0a1239a9e2
|
7.97120998095611e+35
| 3 |
Default initialize fixed point Eigen types.
In certain cases, tensors are filled with default values of the type. But, for these fixed point types, these values were uninitialized. Thus, we would have uninitialized memory access bugs, some of which were caught by MSAN.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 344101137
Change-Id: I14555fda74dca3b5f1582da9008901937e3f14e2
| 0 |
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayer(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
ssize_t
j;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" setting up new layer image");
if (psd_info->mode != IndexedMode)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(layer_info->image,exception);
layer_info->image->compose=PSDBlendModeToCompositeOperator(
layer_info->blendkey);
if (layer_info->visible == MagickFalse)
layer_info->image->compose=NoCompositeOp;
/*
Set up some hidden attributes for folks that need them.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",
(double) layer_info->page.x);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.x",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",
(double) layer_info->page.y);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.y",message);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
layer_info->opacity);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:layer.opacity",message);
(void) SetImageProperty(layer_info->image,"label",(char *) layer_info->name,
exception);
status=MagickTrue;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info->channels; j++)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for channel %.20g",(double) j);
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobShort(layer_info->image);
/* TODO: Remove this when we figure out how to support this */
if ((compression == ZipWithPrediction) && (image->depth == 32))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeError,"CompressionNotSupported","ZipWithPrediction(32 bit)");
return(MagickFalse);
}
layer_info->image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (layer_info->channel_info[j].type == -1)
layer_info->image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
status=ReadPSDChannel(layer_info->image,image_info,psd_info,layer_info,j,
compression,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ApplyPSDLayerOpacity(layer_info->image,layer_info->opacity,
MagickFalse,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) &&
(layer_info->image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
status=NegateCMYK(layer_info->image,exception);
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (layer_info->mask.image != (Image *) NULL))
{
const char
*option;
layer_info->mask.image->page.x=layer_info->mask.page.x;
layer_info->mask.image->page.y=layer_info->mask.page.y;
/* Do not composite the mask when it is disabled */
if ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) == 0x02)
layer_info->mask.image->compose=NoCompositeOp;
else
status=ApplyPSDOpacityMask(layer_info->image,layer_info->mask.image,
layer_info->mask.background == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,MagickFalse,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if (IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse)
PreservePSDOpacityMask(image,layer_info,exception);
layer_info->mask.image=DestroyImage(layer_info->mask.image);
}
return(status);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
ImageMagick
|
17a1a6f97fd088a71931bdc422f4e96bb6ffc549
|
2.4920268966417033e+38
| 97 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1249
| 0 |
static void ipa_udata_copy(wmfAPI * API, wmfUserData_t * userdata)
{
(void) API;
(void) userdata;
/* wmf_magick_t* ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData (API); */
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-772"
] |
ImageMagick
|
b2b48d50300a9fbcd0aa0d9230fd6d7a08f7671e
|
9.319213403418312e+37
| 7 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/544
| 0 |
void lj_trace_err(jit_State *J, TraceError e)
{
setnilV(&J->errinfo); /* No error info. */
setintV(J->L->top++, (int32_t)e);
lj_err_throw(J->L, LUA_ERRRUN);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
LuaJIT
|
12ab596997b9cb27846a5b254d11230c3f9c50c8
|
1.419824693318362e+38
| 6 |
Fix handling of errors during snapshot restore.
| 0 |
void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_association *new)
{
struct sctp_transport *trans;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
/* Copy in new parameters of peer. */
asoc->c = new->c;
asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Remove any peer addresses not present in the new association. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
trans = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(new, &trans->ipaddr)) {
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, trans);
continue;
}
if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
sctp_transport_reset(trans);
}
/* If the case is A (association restart), use
* initial_tsn as next_tsn. If the case is B, use
* current next_tsn in case data sent to peer
* has been discarded and needs retransmission.
*/
if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
asoc->next_tsn = new->next_tsn;
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = new->ctsn_ack_point;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = new->adv_peer_ack_point;
/* Reinitialize SSN for both local streams
* and peer's streams.
*/
sctp_ssnmap_clear(asoc->ssnmap);
/* Flush the ULP reassembly and ordered queue.
* Any data there will now be stale and will
* cause problems.
*/
sctp_ulpq_flush(&asoc->ulpq);
/* reset the overall association error count so
* that the restarted association doesn't get torn
* down on the next retransmission timer.
*/
asoc->overall_error_count = 0;
} else {
/* Add any peer addresses from the new association. */
list_for_each_entry(trans, &new->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &trans->ipaddr))
sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &trans->ipaddr,
GFP_ATOMIC, trans->state);
}
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = asoc->next_tsn - 1;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
if (!asoc->ssnmap) {
/* Move the ssnmap. */
asoc->ssnmap = new->ssnmap;
new->ssnmap = NULL;
}
if (!asoc->assoc_id) {
/* get a new association id since we don't have one
* yet.
*/
sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
/* SCTP-AUTH: Save the peer parameters from the new associations
* and also move the association shared keys over
*/
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
asoc->peer.peer_random = new->peer.peer_random;
new->peer.peer_random = NULL;
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = new->peer.peer_chunks;
new->peer.peer_chunks = NULL;
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs;
new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL;
sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
net
|
1be9a950c646c9092fb3618197f7b6bfb50e82aa
|
2.4365796760119878e+38
| 96 |
net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 1 |
static UINT printer_process_irp_write(PRINTER_DEVICE* printer_dev, IRP* irp)
{
UINT32 Length;
UINT64 Offset;
rdpPrintJob* printjob = NULL;
UINT error = CHANNEL_RC_OK;
void* ptr;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(irp->input) < 32)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
Stream_Read_UINT32(irp->input, Length);
Stream_Read_UINT64(irp->input, Offset);
Stream_Seek(irp->input, 20); /* Padding */
ptr = Stream_Pointer(irp->input);
if (!Stream_SafeSeek(irp->input, Length))
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
if (printer_dev->printer)
printjob = printer_dev->printer->FindPrintJob(printer_dev->printer, irp->FileId);
if (!printjob)
{
irp->IoStatus = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
Length = 0;
}
else
{
error = printjob->Write(printjob, ptr, Length);
}
if (error)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "printjob->Write failed with error %" PRIu32 "!", error);
return error;
}
Stream_Write_UINT32(irp->output, Length);
Stream_Write_UINT8(irp->output, 0); /* Padding */
return irp->Complete(irp);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
6b485b146a1b9d6ce72dfd7b5f36456c166e7a16
|
2.473484897451885e+38
| 39 |
Fixed oob read in irp_write and similar
| 0 |
cmsBool Type_vcgt_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsToneCurve** Curves = (cmsToneCurve**) Ptr;
cmsUInt32Number i, j;
if (cmsGetToneCurveParametricType(Curves[0]) == 5 &&
cmsGetToneCurveParametricType(Curves[1]) == 5 &&
cmsGetToneCurveParametricType(Curves[2]) == 5) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, cmsVideoCardGammaFormulaType)) return FALSE;
// Save parameters
for (i=0; i < 3; i++) {
_cmsVCGTGAMMA v;
v.Gamma = Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Params[0];
v.Min = Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Params[5];
v.Max = pow(Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Params[1], v.Gamma) + v.Min;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, v.Gamma)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, v.Min)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, v.Max)) return FALSE;
}
}
else {
// Always store as a table of 256 words
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, cmsVideoCardGammaTableType)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 3)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 256)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 2)) return FALSE;
for (i=0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j=0; j < 256; j++) {
cmsFloat32Number v = cmsEvalToneCurveFloat(Curves[i], (cmsFloat32Number) (j / 255.0));
cmsUInt16Number n = _cmsQuickSaturateWord(v * 65535.0);
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, n)) return FALSE;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
Little-CMS
|
41d222df1bc6188131a8f46c32eab0a4d4cdf1b6
|
2.1741782875328334e+38
| 50 |
Memory squeezing fix: lcms2 cmsPipeline construction
When creating a new pipeline, lcms would often try to allocate a stage
and pass it to cmsPipelineInsertStage without checking whether the
allocation succeeded. cmsPipelineInsertStage would then assert (or crash)
if it had not.
The fix here is to change cmsPipelineInsertStage to check and return
an error value. All calling code is then checked to test this return
value and cope.
| 0 |
static inline void VectorMultiply3(const DDSVector3 left,
const DDSVector3 right, DDSVector3 *destination)
{
destination->x = left.x * right.x;
destination->y = left.y * right.y;
destination->z = left.z * right.z;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] |
ImageMagick
|
0c5b1e430a83ef793a7334bbbee408cf3c628699
|
1.4381277986744747e+38
| 7 |
Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
| 0 |
static void smbd_notify_cancel_by_map(struct notify_mid_map *map)
{
struct smb_request *smbreq = map->req->req;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbreq->sconn;
struct smbd_smb2_request *smb2req = smbreq->smb2req;
NTSTATUS notify_status = NT_STATUS_CANCELLED;
if (smb2req != NULL) {
NTSTATUS sstatus;
if (smb2req->session == NULL) {
sstatus = NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED;
} else {
sstatus = smb2req->session->status;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(sstatus, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED)) {
sstatus = NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sstatus)) {
notify_status = STATUS_NOTIFY_CLEANUP;
} else if (smb2req->tcon == NULL) {
notify_status = STATUS_NOTIFY_CLEANUP;
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(smb2req->tcon->status)) {
notify_status = STATUS_NOTIFY_CLEANUP;
}
}
change_notify_reply(smbreq, notify_status,
0, NULL, map->req->reply_fn);
change_notify_remove_request(sconn, map->req);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-266"
] |
samba
|
f43ecce46a89c6380317fbb5f2ae38f48d3d42c8
|
1.5898506515918206e+38
| 33 |
s3: smbd: Ensure change notifies can't get set unless the directory handle is open for SEC_DIR_LIST.
Remove knownfail entry.
CVE-2020-14318
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14434
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
| 0 |
static void qemu_input_queue_event(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue,
QemuConsole *src, InputEvent *evt)
{
QemuInputEventQueue *item = g_new0(QemuInputEventQueue, 1);
item->type = QEMU_INPUT_QUEUE_EVENT;
item->src = src;
item->evt = evt;
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-772"
] |
qemu
|
fa18f36a461984eae50ab957e47ec78dae3c14fc
|
3.3229968341935248e+38
| 10 |
input: limit kbd queue depth
Apply a limit to the number of items we accept into the keyboard queue.
Impact: Without this limit vnc clients can exhaust host memory by
sending keyboard events faster than qemu feeds them to the guest.
Fixes: CVE-2017-8379
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
Reported-by: jiangxin1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20170428084237.23960-1-kraxel@redhat.com
| 1 |
int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
int needed)
{
int error;
struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry;
struct ext4_inode *raw_inode;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
error = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc);
if (error)
return error;
raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc);
entry = (struct ext4_xattr_entry *)((void *)raw_inode +
EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_off);
if (EXT4_XATTR_LEN(entry->e_name_len) +
EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size)) < needed) {
error = -ENOSPC;
goto out;
}
error = ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode, &iloc);
out:
brelse(iloc.bh);
return error;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
8bc1379b82b8e809eef77a9fedbb75c6c297be19
|
1.2372211430166578e+38
| 27 |
ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file
Use a separate journal transaction if it turns out that we need to
convert an inline file to use an data block. Otherwise we could end
up failing due to not having journal credits.
This addresses CVE-2018-10883.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
| 1 |
inline unsigned int& exception_mode(const unsigned int value, const bool is_set) {
static unsigned int mode = cimg_verbosity;
if (is_set) { cimg::mutex(0); mode = value<4?value:4; cimg::mutex(0,0); }
return mode;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
|
1.6804040667279835e+38
| 5 |
.
| 0 |
dvi_document_file_exporter_do_page (EvFileExporter *exporter,
EvRenderContext *rc)
{
DviDocument *dvi_document = DVI_DOCUMENT(exporter);
g_string_append_printf (dvi_document->exporter_opts, "%d,", (rc->page->index) + 1);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-78"
] |
evince
|
350404c76dc8601e2cdd2636490e2afc83d3090e
|
1.7759775386845525e+38
| 7 |
dvi: Mitigate command injection attacks by quoting filename
With commit 1fcca0b8041de0d6074d7e17fba174da36c65f99 came a DVI backend.
It exports to PDF via the dvipdfm tool.
It calls that tool with the filename of the currently loaded document.
If that filename is cleverly crafted, it can escape the currently
used manual quoting of the filename. Instead of manually quoting the
filename, we use g_shell_quote.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784947
| 0 |
static int fuse_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
*pagep = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!*pagep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
linux-2.6
|
0bd87182d3ab18a32a8e9175d3f68754c58e3432
|
3.7339954637940983e+37
| 11 |
fuse: fix kunmap in fuse_ioctl_copy_user
Looks like another victim of the confusing kmap() vs kmap_atomic() API
differences.
Reported-by: Todor Gyumyushev <yodor1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
| 0 |
struct iscsi_task *iscsi_itt_to_task(struct iscsi_conn *conn, itt_t itt)
{
struct iscsi_session *session = conn->session;
int i;
if (itt == RESERVED_ITT)
return NULL;
if (session->tt->parse_pdu_itt)
session->tt->parse_pdu_itt(conn, itt, &i, NULL);
else
i = get_itt(itt);
if (i >= session->cmds_max)
return NULL;
return session->cmds[i];
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
ec98ea7070e94cc25a422ec97d1421e28d97b7ee
|
3.1930633458284446e+38
| 17 |
scsi: iscsi: Ensure sysfs attributes are limited to PAGE_SIZE
As the iSCSI parameters are exported back through sysfs, it should be
enforcing that they never are more than PAGE_SIZE (which should be more
than enough) before accepting updates through netlink.
Change all iSCSI sysfs attributes to use sysfs_emit().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Adam Nichols <adam@grimm-co.com>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
| 0 |
int apply_filters_to_response(struct session *s, struct buffer *rtr, struct proxy *px)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
struct hdr_exp *exp;
for (exp = px->rsp_exp; exp; exp = exp->next) {
int ret;
/*
* The interleaving of transformations and verdicts
* makes it difficult to decide to continue or stop
* the evaluation.
*/
if (txn->flags & TX_SVDENY)
break;
if ((txn->flags & TX_SVALLOW) &&
(exp->action == ACT_ALLOW || exp->action == ACT_DENY ||
exp->action == ACT_PASS)) {
exp = exp->next;
continue;
}
/* if this filter had a condition, evaluate it now and skip to
* next filter if the condition does not match.
*/
if (exp->cond) {
ret = acl_exec_cond(exp->cond, px, s, txn, ACL_DIR_RTR);
ret = acl_pass(ret);
if (((struct acl_cond *)exp->cond)->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
ret = !ret;
if (!ret)
continue;
}
/* Apply the filter to the status line. */
ret = apply_filter_to_sts_line(s, rtr, exp);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return -1;
if (likely(ret == 0)) {
/* The filter did not match the response, it can be
* iterated through all headers.
*/
apply_filter_to_resp_headers(s, rtr, exp);
}
}
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
haproxy-1.4
|
dc80672211e085c211f1fc47e15cfe57ab587d38
|
3.392625051597331e+38
| 50 |
BUG/CRITICAL: using HTTP information in tcp-request content may crash the process
During normal HTTP request processing, request buffers are realigned if
there are less than global.maxrewrite bytes available after them, in
order to leave enough room for rewriting headers after the request. This
is done in http_wait_for_request().
However, if some HTTP inspection happens during a "tcp-request content"
rule, this realignment is not performed. In theory this is not a problem
because empty buffers are always aligned and TCP inspection happens at
the beginning of a connection. But with HTTP keep-alive, it also happens
at the beginning of each subsequent request. So if a second request was
pipelined by the client before the first one had a chance to be forwarded,
the second request will not be realigned. Then, http_wait_for_request()
will not perform such a realignment either because the request was
already parsed and marked as such. The consequence of this, is that the
rewrite of a sufficient number of such pipelined, unaligned requests may
leave less room past the request been processed than the configured
reserve, which can lead to a buffer overflow if request processing appends
some data past the end of the buffer.
A number of conditions are required for the bug to be triggered :
- HTTP keep-alive must be enabled ;
- HTTP inspection in TCP rules must be used ;
- some request appending rules are needed (reqadd, x-forwarded-for)
- since empty buffers are always realigned, the client must pipeline
enough requests so that the buffer always contains something till
the point where there is no more room for rewriting.
While such a configuration is quite unlikely to be met (which is
confirmed by the bug's lifetime), a few people do use these features
together for very specific usages. And more importantly, writing such
a configuration and the request to attack it is trivial.
A quick workaround consists in forcing keep-alive off by adding
"option httpclose" or "option forceclose" in the frontend. Alternatively,
disabling HTTP-based TCP inspection rules enough if the application
supports it.
At first glance, this bug does not look like it could lead to remote code
execution, as the overflowing part is controlled by the configuration and
not by the user. But some deeper analysis should be performed to confirm
this. And anyway, corrupting the process' memory and crashing it is quite
trivial.
Special thanks go to Yves Lafon from the W3C who reported this bug and
deployed significant efforts to collect the relevant data needed to
understand it in less than one week.
CVE-2013-1912 was assigned to this issue.
Note that 1.4 is also affected so the fix must be backported.
(cherry picked from commit aae75e3279c6c9bd136413a72dafdcd4986bb89a)
| 0 |
void addReply(redisClient *c, robj *obj) {
if (_installWriteEvent(c) != REDIS_OK) return;
redisAssert(!server.ds_enabled || obj->storage == REDIS_VM_MEMORY);
/* This is an important place where we can avoid copy-on-write
* when there is a saving child running, avoiding touching the
* refcount field of the object if it's not needed.
*
* If the encoding is RAW and there is room in the static buffer
* we'll be able to send the object to the client without
* messing with its page. */
if (obj->encoding == REDIS_ENCODING_RAW) {
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,obj->ptr,sdslen(obj->ptr)) != REDIS_OK)
_addReplyObjectToList(c,obj);
} else {
/* FIXME: convert the long into string and use _addReplyToBuffer()
* instead of calling getDecodedObject. As this place in the
* code is too performance critical. */
obj = getDecodedObject(obj);
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,obj->ptr,sdslen(obj->ptr)) != REDIS_OK)
_addReplyObjectToList(c,obj);
decrRefCount(obj);
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
redis
|
697af434fbeb2e3ba2ba9687cd283ed1a2734fa5
|
1.0356276271781419e+37
| 24 |
initial changes needed to turn the current VM code into a cache system. Tons of work to do still.
| 0 |
void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work)
{
int r;
if ((vcpu->arch.mmu->direct_map != work->arch.direct_map) ||
work->wakeup_all)
return;
r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r))
return;
if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->direct_map &&
work->arch.cr3 != vcpu->arch.mmu->get_cr3(vcpu))
return;
vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, work->gva, 0, true);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
e97f852fd4561e77721bb9a4e0ea9d98305b1e93
|
3.094372764774389e+38
| 18 |
KVM: X86: Fix scan ioapic use-before-initialization
Reported by syzkaller:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
PGD 80000003ec4da067 P4D 80000003ec4da067 PUD 3f7bfa067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 5059 Comm: debug Tainted: G OE 4.19.0-rc5 #16
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x1a6/0x1990
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xdb/0x210
_raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x70
kvm_ioapic_scan_entry+0x3e/0x110 [kvm]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x167e/0x1910 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x35c/0x610 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e9/0x6d0 [kvm]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x690
ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x6e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The reason is that the testcase writes hyperv synic HV_X64_MSR_SINT6 msr
and triggers scan ioapic logic to load synic vectors into EOI exit bitmap.
However, irqchip is not initialized by this simple testcase, ioapic/apic
objects should not be accessed.
This can be triggered by the following program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <endian.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
uint64_t r[3] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};
int main(void)
{
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0);
long res = 0;
memcpy((void*)0x20000040, "/dev/kvm", 9);
res = syscall(__NR_openat, 0xffffffffffffff9c, 0x20000040, 0, 0);
if (res != -1)
r[0] = res;
res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[0], 0xae01, 0);
if (res != -1)
r[1] = res;
res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[1], 0xae41, 0);
if (res != -1)
r[2] = res;
memcpy(
(void*)0x20000080,
"\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x5b\x61\xbb\x96\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00"
"\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x77\xd1\x78\x4d\xd8\x3a\xed\xb1\x5c\x2e\x43"
"\xaa\x43\x39\xd6\xff\xf5\xf0\xa8\x98\xf2\x3e\x37\x29\x89\xde\x88\xc6\x33"
"\xfc\x2a\xdb\xb7\xe1\x4c\xac\x28\x61\x7b\x9c\xa9\xbc\x0d\xa0\x63\xfe\xfe"
"\xe8\x75\xde\xdd\x19\x38\xdc\x34\xf5\xec\x05\xfd\xeb\x5d\xed\x2e\xaf\x22"
"\xfa\xab\xb7\xe4\x42\x67\xd0\xaf\x06\x1c\x6a\x35\x67\x10\x55\xcb",
106);
syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0x4008ae89, 0x20000080);
syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0xae80, 0);
return 0;
}
This patch fixes it by bailing out scan ioapic if ioapic is not initialized in
kernel.
Reported-by: Wei Wu <ww9210@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Wei Wu <ww9210@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getFlags)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = Z_SPLFILESYSTEM_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->flags & SPL_FILE_OBJECT_MASK);
} /* }}} */
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-74"
] |
php-src
|
a5a15965da23c8e97657278fc8dfbf1dfb20c016
|
4.619766989715847e+37
| 10 |
Fix #78863: DirectoryIterator class silently truncates after a null byte
Since the constructor of DirectoryIterator and friends is supposed to
accepts paths (i.e. strings without NUL bytes), we must not accept
arbitrary strings.
| 0 |
void kvm_hv_irq_routing_update(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
u32 gsi;
irq_rt = srcu_dereference_check(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->irq_lock));
for (gsi = 0; gsi < irq_rt->nr_rt_entries; gsi++) {
hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[gsi], link) {
if (e->type == KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT)
kvm_hv_set_sint_gsi(kvm, e->hv_sint.vcpu,
e->hv_sint.sint, gsi);
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
919f4ebc598701670e80e31573a58f1f2d2bf918
|
3.213400134840206e+38
| 17 |
KVM: x86: hyper-v: Fix Hyper-V context null-ptr-deref
Reported by syzkaller:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000140-0x0000000000000147]
CPU: 1 PID: 8370 Comm: syz-executor859 Not tainted 5.11.0-syzkaller #0
RIP: 0010:synic_get arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:165 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_hv_set_sint_gsi arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:475 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_hv_irq_routing_update+0x230/0x460 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:498
Call Trace:
kvm_set_irq_routing+0x69b/0x940 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/irqchip.c:223
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x12d0/0x2800 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3959
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Hyper-V context is lazily allocated until Hyper-V specific MSRs are accessed
or SynIC is enabled. However, the syzkaller testcase sets irq routing table
directly w/o enabling SynIC. This results in null-ptr-deref when accessing
SynIC Hyper-V context. This patch fixes it.
syzkaller source: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=163342ccd00000
Reported-by: syzbot+6987f3b2dbd9eda95f12@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 8f014550dfb1 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Make Hyper-V emulation enablement conditional")
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1614326399-5762-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| 0 |
do_invoke_method (VerifyContext *ctx, int method_token, gboolean virtual)
{
int param_count, i;
MonoMethodSignature *sig;
ILStackDesc *value;
MonoMethod *method;
gboolean virt_check_this = FALSE;
gboolean constrained = ctx->prefix_set & PREFIX_CONSTRAINED;
if (!(method = verifier_load_method (ctx, method_token, virtual ? "callvirt" : "call")))
return;
if (virtual) {
CLEAR_PREFIX (ctx, PREFIX_CONSTRAINED);
if (method->klass->valuetype) // && !constrained ???
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use callvirtual with valuetype method at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if ((method->flags & METHOD_ATTRIBUTE_STATIC))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use callvirtual with static method at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
} else {
if (method->flags & METHOD_ATTRIBUTE_ABSTRACT)
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use call with an abstract method at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if ((method->flags & METHOD_ATTRIBUTE_VIRTUAL) && !(method->flags & METHOD_ATTRIBUTE_FINAL) && !(method->klass->flags & TYPE_ATTRIBUTE_SEALED)) {
virt_check_this = TRUE;
ctx->code [ctx->ip_offset].flags |= IL_CODE_CALL_NONFINAL_VIRTUAL;
}
}
if (!(sig = mono_method_get_signature_full (method, ctx->image, method_token, ctx->generic_context)))
sig = mono_method_get_signature (method, ctx->image, method_token);
if (!sig) {
char *name = mono_type_get_full_name (method->klass);
ADD_VERIFY_ERROR (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Could not resolve signature of %s:%s at 0x%04x", name, method->name, ctx->ip_offset));
g_free (name);
return;
}
param_count = sig->param_count + sig->hasthis;
if (!check_underflow (ctx, param_count))
return;
for (i = sig->param_count - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
VERIFIER_DEBUG ( printf ("verifying argument %d\n", i); );
value = stack_pop (ctx);
if (!verify_stack_type_compatibility (ctx, sig->params[i], value)) {
char *stack_name = stack_slot_full_name (value);
char *sig_name = mono_type_full_name (sig->params [i]);
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Incompatible parameter with function signature: Calling method with signature (%s) but for argument %d there is a (%s) on stack at 0x%04x", sig_name, i, stack_name, ctx->ip_offset));
g_free (stack_name);
g_free (sig_name);
}
if (stack_slot_is_managed_mutability_pointer (value))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use a readonly pointer as argument of %s at 0x%04x", virtual ? "callvirt" : "call", ctx->ip_offset));
if ((ctx->prefix_set & PREFIX_TAIL) && stack_slot_is_managed_pointer (value)) {
ADD_VERIFY_ERROR (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot pass a byref argument to a tail %s at 0x%04x", virtual ? "callvirt" : "call", ctx->ip_offset));
return;
}
}
if (sig->hasthis) {
MonoType *type = &method->klass->byval_arg;
ILStackDesc copy;
if (mono_method_is_constructor (method) && !method->klass->valuetype) {
if (!mono_method_is_constructor (ctx->method))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot call a constructor outside one at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (method->klass != ctx->method->klass->parent && method->klass != ctx->method->klass)
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot call a constructor to a type diferent that this or super at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
ctx->super_ctor_called = TRUE;
value = stack_pop_safe (ctx);
if ((value->stype & THIS_POINTER_MASK) != THIS_POINTER_MASK)
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Invalid 'this ptr' argument for constructor at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
} else {
value = stack_pop (ctx);
}
copy_stack_value (©, value);
//TODO we should extract this to a 'drop_byref_argument' and use everywhere
//Other parts of the code suffer from the same issue of
copy.type = mono_type_get_type_byval (copy.type);
copy.stype &= ~POINTER_MASK;
if (virt_check_this && !stack_slot_is_this_pointer (value) && !(method->klass->valuetype || stack_slot_is_boxed_value (value)))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use the call opcode with a non-final virtual method on an object diferent thant the this pointer at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (constrained && virtual) {
if (!stack_slot_is_managed_pointer (value))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Object is not a managed pointer for a constrained call at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (!mono_metadata_type_equal_full (mono_type_get_type_byval (value->type), ctx->constrained_type, TRUE))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Object not compatible with constrained type at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
copy.stype |= BOXED_MASK;
} else {
if (stack_slot_is_managed_pointer (value) && !mono_class_from_mono_type (value->type)->valuetype)
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot call a reference type using a managed pointer to the this arg at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (!virtual && mono_class_from_mono_type (value->type)->valuetype && !method->klass->valuetype && !stack_slot_is_boxed_value (value))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot call a valuetype baseclass at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (virtual && mono_class_from_mono_type (value->type)->valuetype && !stack_slot_is_boxed_value (value))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use a valuetype with callvirt at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (method->klass->valuetype && (stack_slot_is_boxed_value (value) || !stack_slot_is_managed_pointer (value)))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Cannot use a boxed or literal valuetype to call a valuetype method at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
}
if (!verify_stack_type_compatibility (ctx, type, ©)) {
char *expected = mono_type_full_name (type);
char *effective = stack_slot_full_name (©);
char *method_name = mono_method_full_name (method, TRUE);
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Incompatible this argument on stack with method signature expected '%s' but got '%s' for a call to '%s' at 0x%04x",
expected, effective, method_name, ctx->ip_offset));
g_free (method_name);
g_free (effective);
g_free (expected);
}
if (!IS_SKIP_VISIBILITY (ctx) && !mono_method_can_access_method_full (ctx->method, method, mono_class_from_mono_type (value->type))) {
char *name = mono_method_full_name (method, TRUE);
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE2 (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Method %s is not accessible at 0x%04x", name, ctx->ip_offset), MONO_EXCEPTION_METHOD_ACCESS);
g_free (name);
}
} else if (!IS_SKIP_VISIBILITY (ctx) && !mono_method_can_access_method_full (ctx->method, method, NULL)) {
char *name = mono_method_full_name (method, TRUE);
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE2 (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Method %s is not accessible at 0x%04x", name, ctx->ip_offset), MONO_EXCEPTION_METHOD_ACCESS);
g_free (name);
}
if (sig->ret->type != MONO_TYPE_VOID) {
if (check_overflow (ctx)) {
value = stack_push (ctx);
set_stack_value (ctx, value, sig->ret, FALSE);
if ((ctx->prefix_set & PREFIX_READONLY) && method->klass->rank && !strcmp (method->name, "Address")) {
ctx->prefix_set &= ~PREFIX_READONLY;
value->stype |= CMMP_MASK;
}
}
}
if ((ctx->prefix_set & PREFIX_TAIL)) {
if (!mono_delegate_ret_equal (mono_method_signature (ctx->method)->ret, sig->ret))
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Tail call with incompatible return type at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
if (ctx->header->code [ctx->ip_offset + 5] != CEE_RET)
CODE_NOT_VERIFIABLE (ctx, g_strdup_printf ("Tail call not followed by ret at 0x%04x", ctx->ip_offset));
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mono
|
65292a69c837b8a5f7a392d34db63de592153358
|
1.3025027839086453e+38
| 153 |
Handle invalid instantiation of generic methods.
* verify.c: Add new function to internal verifier API to check
method instantiations.
* reflection.c (mono_reflection_bind_generic_method_parameters):
Check the instantiation before returning it.
Fixes #655847
| 0 |
virDomainDefValidateInternal(const virDomainDef *def,
virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt)
{
if (virDomainDefCheckDuplicateDiskInfo(def) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainDefCheckDuplicateDriveAddresses(def) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainDefGetVcpusTopology(def, NULL) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainDefValidateAliases(def, NULL) < 0)
return -1;
if (def->iommu &&
def->iommu->intremap == VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON &&
def->features[VIR_DOMAIN_FEATURE_IOAPIC] != VIR_DOMAIN_IOAPIC_QEMU) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
_("IOMMU interrupt remapping requires split I/O APIC "
"(ioapic driver='qemu')"));
return -1;
}
if (def->iommu &&
def->iommu->eim == VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON &&
def->iommu->intremap != VIR_TRISTATE_SWITCH_ON) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
_("IOMMU eim requires interrupt remapping to be enabled"));
return -1;
}
if (virDomainDefLifecycleActionValidate(def) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainDefMemtuneValidate(def) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainDefOSValidate(def, xmlopt) < 0)
return -1;
if (virDomainDefCputuneValidate(def) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-212"
] |
libvirt
|
a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979
|
2.5051742198966583e+37
| 46 |
conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <hhan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
| 0 |
static int __init yam_init_driver(void)
{
struct net_device *dev;
int i, err;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
printk(yam_drvinfo);
for (i = 0; i < NR_PORTS; i++) {
sprintf(name, "yam%d", i);
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct yam_port), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, yam_setup);
if (!dev) {
pr_err("yam: cannot allocate net device\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
err = register_netdev(dev);
if (err) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "yam: cannot register net device %s\n", dev->name);
free_netdev(dev);
goto error;
}
yam_devs[i] = dev;
}
timer_setup(&yam_timer, yam_dotimer, 0);
yam_timer.expires = jiffies + HZ / 100;
add_timer(&yam_timer);
proc_create_seq("yam", 0444, init_net.proc_net, &yam_seqops);
return 0;
error:
while (--i >= 0) {
unregister_netdev(yam_devs[i]);
free_netdev(yam_devs[i]);
}
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
29eb31542787e1019208a2e1047bb7c76c069536
|
7.675632519439778e+37
| 42 |
yam: fix a memory leak in yam_siocdevprivate()
ym needs to be free when ym->cmd != SIOCYAMSMCS.
Fixes: 0781168e23a2 ("yam: fix a missing-check bug")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
Formats the interval.
*/
PHP_FUNCTION(date_interval_format)
{
zval *object;
php_interval_obj *diobj;
char *format;
int format_len;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os", &object, date_ce_interval, &format, &format_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
diobj = (php_interval_obj *) zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
DATE_CHECK_INITIALIZED(diobj->initialized, DateInterval);
|
Safe
|
[] |
php-src
|
bb057498f7457e8b2eba98332a3bad434de4cf12
|
2.8308185960830488e+38
| 15 |
Fix #70277: new DateTimeZone($foo) is ignoring text after null byte
The DateTimeZone constructors are not binary safe. They're parsing the timezone
as string, but discard the length when calling timezone_initialize(). This
patch adds a tz_len parameter and a respective check to timezone_initialize().
| 0 |
static int btrfs_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_block_rsv *rsv;
int ret = 0;
int err = 0;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
u64 mask = root->sectorsize - 1;
u64 min_size = btrfs_calc_trunc_metadata_size(root, 1);
ret = btrfs_wait_ordered_range(inode, inode->i_size & (~mask),
(u64)-1);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Yes ladies and gentelment, this is indeed ugly. The fact is we have
* 3 things going on here
*
* 1) We need to reserve space for our orphan item and the space to
* delete our orphan item. Lord knows we don't want to have a dangling
* orphan item because we didn't reserve space to remove it.
*
* 2) We need to reserve space to update our inode.
*
* 3) We need to have something to cache all the space that is going to
* be free'd up by the truncate operation, but also have some slack
* space reserved in case it uses space during the truncate (thank you
* very much snapshotting).
*
* And we need these to all be seperate. The fact is we can use alot of
* space doing the truncate, and we have no earthly idea how much space
* we will use, so we need the truncate reservation to be seperate so it
* doesn't end up using space reserved for updating the inode or
* removing the orphan item. We also need to be able to stop the
* transaction and start a new one, which means we need to be able to
* update the inode several times, and we have no idea of knowing how
* many times that will be, so we can't just reserve 1 item for the
* entirety of the opration, so that has to be done seperately as well.
* Then there is the orphan item, which does indeed need to be held on
* to for the whole operation, and we need nobody to touch this reserved
* space except the orphan code.
*
* So that leaves us with
*
* 1) root->orphan_block_rsv - for the orphan deletion.
* 2) rsv - for the truncate reservation, which we will steal from the
* transaction reservation.
* 3) fs_info->trans_block_rsv - this will have 1 items worth left for
* updating the inode.
*/
rsv = btrfs_alloc_block_rsv(root, BTRFS_BLOCK_RSV_TEMP);
if (!rsv)
return -ENOMEM;
rsv->size = min_size;
rsv->failfast = 1;
/*
* 1 for the truncate slack space
* 1 for updating the inode.
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 2);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
err = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out;
}
/* Migrate the slack space for the truncate to our reserve */
ret = btrfs_block_rsv_migrate(&root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv, rsv,
min_size);
BUG_ON(ret);
/*
* So if we truncate and then write and fsync we normally would just
* write the extents that changed, which is a problem if we need to
* first truncate that entire inode. So set this flag so we write out
* all of the extents in the inode to the sync log so we're completely
* safe.
*/
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
trans->block_rsv = rsv;
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_truncate_inode_items(trans, root, inode,
inode->i_size,
BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY);
if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EAGAIN) {
err = ret;
break;
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (ret) {
err = ret;
break;
}
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 2);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = err = PTR_ERR(trans);
trans = NULL;
break;
}
ret = btrfs_block_rsv_migrate(&root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv,
rsv, min_size);
BUG_ON(ret); /* shouldn't happen */
trans->block_rsv = rsv;
}
if (ret == 0 && inode->i_nlink > 0) {
trans->block_rsv = root->orphan_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_orphan_del(trans, inode);
if (ret)
err = ret;
}
if (trans) {
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (ret && !err)
err = ret;
ret = btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
}
out:
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, rsv);
if (ret && !err)
err = ret;
return err;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
3.3309138437105733e+38
| 139 |
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
| 0 |
xmlStrncmp(const xmlChar *str1, const xmlChar *str2, int len) {
register int tmp;
if (len <= 0) return(0);
if (str1 == str2) return(0);
if (str1 == NULL) return(-1);
if (str2 == NULL) return(1);
#ifdef __GNUC__
tmp = strncmp((const char *)str1, (const char *)str2, len);
return tmp;
#else
do {
tmp = *str1++ - *str2;
if (tmp != 0 || --len == 0) return(tmp);
} while (*str2++ != 0);
return 0;
#endif
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
|
1.0792628195386107e+36
| 18 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
| 0 |
char *redisProtocolToLuaType_Bool(lua_State *lua, char *reply, int tf) {
char *p = strchr(reply+1,'\r');
lua_pushboolean(lua,tf == 't');
return p+2;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
redis
|
6ac3c0b7abd35f37201ed2d6298ecef4ea1ae1dd
|
2.9208486160652983e+38
| 5 |
Fix protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (CVE-2021-32672)
The protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (LUA debugging)
Assumed protocol correctness. This means that if the following
is given:
*1
$100
test
The parser will try to read additional 94 unallocated bytes after
the client buffer.
This commit fixes this issue by validating that there are actually enough
bytes to read. It also limits the amount of data that can be sent by
the debugger client to 1M so the client will not be able to explode
the memory.
| 0 |
TfLiteStatus Prepare(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {
OpData* data = reinterpret_cast<OpData*>(node->user_data);
TF_LITE_ENSURE_EQ(context, NumInputs(node), 2);
TF_LITE_ENSURE_EQ(context, NumOutputs(node), 1);
const TfLiteTensor* input1;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context,
GetInputSafe(context, node, kInputTensor1, &input1));
const TfLiteTensor* input2;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context,
GetInputSafe(context, node, kInputTensor2, &input2));
TfLiteTensor* output;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context,
GetOutputSafe(context, node, kOutputTensor, &output));
TF_LITE_ENSURE_TYPES_EQ(context, input1->type, input2->type);
output->type = input2->type;
data->requires_broadcast = !HaveSameShapes(input1, input2);
TfLiteIntArray* output_size = nullptr;
if (data->requires_broadcast) {
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, CalculateShapeForBroadcast(
context, input1, input2, &output_size));
} else {
output_size = TfLiteIntArrayCopy(input1->dims);
}
return context->ResizeTensor(context, output, output_size);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35
|
2.7327491536128566e+38
| 31 |
[tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299
Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56
| 0 |
static table_map get_table_map(List<Item> *items)
{
List_iterator_fast<Item> item_it(*items);
Item_field *item;
table_map map= 0;
while ((item= (Item_field *) item_it++))
map|= item->all_used_tables();
DBUG_PRINT("info", ("table_map: 0x%08lx", (long) map));
return map;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
ecb6f9c894d3ebafeff1c6eb3b65cd248062296f
|
2.383529921082864e+38
| 11 |
MDEV-28095 crash in multi-update and implicit grouping
disallow implicit grouping in multi-update.
explicit GROUP BY is not allowed by the grammar.
| 0 |
notify_script_init(int extra_params, const char *type)
{
notify_script_t *script = MALLOC(sizeof(notify_script_t));
vector_t *strvec_qe;
/* We need to reparse the command line, allowing for quoted and escaped strings */
strvec_qe = alloc_strvec_quoted_escaped(NULL);
if (!strvec_qe) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse notify script");
FREE(script);
return NULL;
}
set_script_params_array(strvec_qe, script, extra_params);
if (!script->args) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse script '%s' - ignoring", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec_qe, 1));
FREE(script);
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return NULL;
}
script->flags = 0;
if (vector_size(strvec_qe) > 2) {
if (set_script_uid_gid(strvec_qe, 2, &script->uid, &script->gid)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Invalid user/group for %s script %s - ignoring", type, script->args[0]);
FREE(script->args);
FREE(script);
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return NULL;
}
}
else {
if (set_default_script_user(NULL, NULL)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Failed to set default user for %s script %s - ignoring", type, script->args[0]);
FREE(script->args);
FREE(script);
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return NULL;
}
script->uid = default_script_uid;
script->gid = default_script_gid;
}
free_strvec(strvec_qe);
return script;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
keepalived
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
1.9963791443648825e+38
| 50 |
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
| 0 |
static struct sk_buff **gre_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct sk_buff *p;
const struct gre_base_hdr *greh;
unsigned int hlen, grehlen;
unsigned int off;
int flush = 1;
struct packet_offload *ptype;
__be16 type;
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark)
goto out;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark = 1;
off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off + sizeof(*greh);
greh = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
greh = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!greh))
goto out;
}
/* Only support version 0 and K (key), C (csum) flags. Note that
* although the support for the S (seq#) flag can be added easily
* for GRO, this is problematic for GSO hence can not be enabled
* here because a GRO pkt may end up in the forwarding path, thus
* requiring GSO support to break it up correctly.
*/
if ((greh->flags & ~(GRE_KEY|GRE_CSUM)) != 0)
goto out;
type = greh->protocol;
rcu_read_lock();
ptype = gro_find_receive_by_type(type);
if (!ptype)
goto out_unlock;
grehlen = GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
if (greh->flags & GRE_KEY)
grehlen += GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
if (greh->flags & GRE_CSUM)
grehlen += GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
hlen = off + grehlen;
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
greh = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!greh))
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Don't bother verifying checksum if we're going to flush anyway. */
if ((greh->flags & GRE_CSUM) && !NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush) {
if (skb_gro_checksum_simple_validate(skb))
goto out_unlock;
skb_gro_checksum_try_convert(skb, IPPROTO_GRE, 0,
null_compute_pseudo);
}
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
const struct gre_base_hdr *greh2;
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
/* The following checks are needed to ensure only pkts
* from the same tunnel are considered for aggregation.
* The criteria for "the same tunnel" includes:
* 1) same version (we only support version 0 here)
* 2) same protocol (we only support ETH_P_IP for now)
* 3) same set of flags
* 4) same key if the key field is present.
*/
greh2 = (struct gre_base_hdr *)(p->data + off);
if (greh2->flags != greh->flags ||
greh2->protocol != greh->protocol) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
if (greh->flags & GRE_KEY) {
/* compare keys */
if (*(__be32 *)(greh2+1) != *(__be32 *)(greh+1)) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
}
}
skb_gro_pull(skb, grehlen);
/* Adjusted NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->csum after skb_gro_pull()*/
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, greh, grehlen);
pp = ptype->callbacks.gro_receive(head, skb);
flush = 0;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
return pp;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
3.4016629409750154e+38
| 111 |
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
void print_worker_info(const char *log_lvl, struct task_struct *task)
{
work_func_t *fn = NULL;
char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { };
char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { };
struct pool_workqueue *pwq = NULL;
struct workqueue_struct *wq = NULL;
bool desc_valid = false;
struct worker *worker;
if (!(task->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER))
return;
/*
* This function is called without any synchronization and @task
* could be in any state. Be careful with dereferences.
*/
worker = kthread_probe_data(task);
/*
* Carefully copy the associated workqueue's workfn and name. Keep
* the original last '\0' in case the original contains garbage.
*/
probe_kernel_read(&fn, &worker->current_func, sizeof(fn));
probe_kernel_read(&pwq, &worker->current_pwq, sizeof(pwq));
probe_kernel_read(&wq, &pwq->wq, sizeof(wq));
probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);
/* copy worker description */
probe_kernel_read(&desc_valid, &worker->desc_valid, sizeof(desc_valid));
if (desc_valid)
probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1);
if (fn || name[0] || desc[0]) {
printk("%sWorkqueue: %s %pf", log_lvl, name, fn);
if (desc[0])
pr_cont(" (%s)", desc);
pr_cont("\n");
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tip
|
dfb4357da6ddbdf57d583ba64361c9d792b0e0b1
|
2.8258144221971526e+38
| 40 |
time: Remove CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Xing Gao <xgao01@email.wm.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <me@jessfraz.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
| 0 |
icmp_tstamp_print(u_int tstamp)
{
u_int msec,sec,min,hrs;
static char buf[64];
msec = tstamp % 1000;
sec = tstamp / 1000;
min = sec / 60; sec -= min * 60;
hrs = min / 60; min -= hrs * 60;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%02u:%02u:%02u.%03u",hrs,min,sec,msec);
return buf;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
tcpdump
|
1a1bce0526a77b62e41531b00f8bb5e21fd4f3a3
|
8.446629900376419e+37
| 13 |
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14462/ICMP: Add a missing bounds check
In icmp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add two tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
| 0 |
static void sctp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (!sctp_style(sk, TCP))
return;
if (how & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
if (!list_empty(&ep->asocs)) {
asoc = list_entry(ep->asocs.next,
struct sctp_association, asocs);
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
}
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4
|
2.1702168868257128e+38
| 18 |
sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
TIFFOpen(const char* name, const char* mode)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFOpen";
int m, fd;
TIFF* tif;
m = _TIFFgetMode(mode, module);
if (m == -1)
return ((TIFF*)0);
/* for cygwin and mingw */
#ifdef O_BINARY
m |= O_BINARY;
#endif
fd = open(name, m, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno > 0 && strerror(errno) != NULL ) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: %s", name, strerror(errno) );
} else {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: Cannot open", name);
}
return ((TIFF *)0);
}
tif = TIFFFdOpen((int)fd, name, mode);
if(!tif)
close(fd);
return tif;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-369"
] |
libtiff
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
2.723534298630336e+38
| 30 |
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
| 0 |
bool CascadeClassifierImpl::Data::read(const FileNode &root)
{
static const float THRESHOLD_EPS = 1e-5f;
// load stage params
String stageTypeStr = (String)root[CC_STAGE_TYPE];
if( stageTypeStr == CC_BOOST )
stageType = BOOST;
else
return false;
String featureTypeStr = (String)root[CC_FEATURE_TYPE];
if( featureTypeStr == CC_HAAR )
featureType = FeatureEvaluator::HAAR;
else if( featureTypeStr == CC_LBP )
featureType = FeatureEvaluator::LBP;
else if( featureTypeStr == CC_HOG )
{
featureType = FeatureEvaluator::HOG;
CV_Error(Error::StsNotImplemented, "HOG cascade is not supported in 3.0");
}
else
return false;
origWinSize.width = (int)root[CC_WIDTH];
origWinSize.height = (int)root[CC_HEIGHT];
CV_Assert( origWinSize.height > 0 && origWinSize.width > 0 );
// load feature params
FileNode fn = root[CC_FEATURE_PARAMS];
if( fn.empty() )
return false;
ncategories = fn[CC_MAX_CAT_COUNT];
int subsetSize = (ncategories + 31)/32,
nodeStep = 3 + ( ncategories>0 ? subsetSize : 1 );
// load stages
fn = root[CC_STAGES];
if( fn.empty() )
return false;
stages.reserve(fn.size());
classifiers.clear();
nodes.clear();
stumps.clear();
FileNodeIterator it = fn.begin(), it_end = fn.end();
minNodesPerTree = INT_MAX;
maxNodesPerTree = 0;
for( int si = 0; it != it_end; si++, ++it )
{
FileNode fns = *it;
Stage stage;
stage.threshold = (float)fns[CC_STAGE_THRESHOLD] - THRESHOLD_EPS;
fns = fns[CC_WEAK_CLASSIFIERS];
if(fns.empty())
return false;
stage.ntrees = (int)fns.size();
stage.first = (int)classifiers.size();
stages.push_back(stage);
classifiers.reserve(stages[si].first + stages[si].ntrees);
FileNodeIterator it1 = fns.begin(), it1_end = fns.end();
for( ; it1 != it1_end; ++it1 ) // weak trees
{
FileNode fnw = *it1;
FileNode internalNodes = fnw[CC_INTERNAL_NODES];
FileNode leafValues = fnw[CC_LEAF_VALUES];
if( internalNodes.empty() || leafValues.empty() )
return false;
DTree tree;
tree.nodeCount = (int)internalNodes.size()/nodeStep;
minNodesPerTree = std::min(minNodesPerTree, tree.nodeCount);
maxNodesPerTree = std::max(maxNodesPerTree, tree.nodeCount);
classifiers.push_back(tree);
nodes.reserve(nodes.size() + tree.nodeCount);
leaves.reserve(leaves.size() + leafValues.size());
if( subsetSize > 0 )
subsets.reserve(subsets.size() + tree.nodeCount*subsetSize);
FileNodeIterator internalNodesIter = internalNodes.begin(), internalNodesEnd = internalNodes.end();
for( ; internalNodesIter != internalNodesEnd; ) // nodes
{
DTreeNode node;
node.left = (int)*internalNodesIter; ++internalNodesIter;
node.right = (int)*internalNodesIter; ++internalNodesIter;
node.featureIdx = (int)*internalNodesIter; ++internalNodesIter;
if( subsetSize > 0 )
{
for( int j = 0; j < subsetSize; j++, ++internalNodesIter )
subsets.push_back((int)*internalNodesIter);
node.threshold = 0.f;
}
else
{
node.threshold = (float)*internalNodesIter; ++internalNodesIter;
}
nodes.push_back(node);
}
internalNodesIter = leafValues.begin(), internalNodesEnd = leafValues.end();
for( ; internalNodesIter != internalNodesEnd; ++internalNodesIter ) // leaves
leaves.push_back((float)*internalNodesIter);
}
}
if( maxNodesPerTree == 1 )
{
int nodeOfs = 0, leafOfs = 0;
size_t nstages = stages.size();
for( size_t stageIdx = 0; stageIdx < nstages; stageIdx++ )
{
const Stage& stage = stages[stageIdx];
int ntrees = stage.ntrees;
for( int i = 0; i < ntrees; i++, nodeOfs++, leafOfs+= 2 )
{
const DTreeNode& node = nodes[nodeOfs];
stumps.push_back(Stump(node.featureIdx, node.threshold,
leaves[leafOfs], leaves[leafOfs+1]));
}
}
}
return true;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
opencv
|
321c74ccd6077bdea1d47450ca4fe955cb5b6330
|
1.219770005065263e+38
| 133 |
objdetect: validate feature rectangle on reading
| 1 |
void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)
{
if (!point) return;
if (point->meth->point_clear_finish != 0)
point->meth->point_clear_finish(point);
else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
point->meth->point_finish(point);
OPENSSL_cleanse(point, sizeof *point);
OPENSSL_free(point);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-320"
] |
openssl
|
8aed2a7548362e88e84a7feb795a3a97e8395008
|
2.766018777018562e+36
| 11 |
Reserve option to use BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime in ECDSA.
Submitted by Shay Gueron, Intel Corp.
RT: 3149
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f54be179aa4cbbd944728771d7d59ed588158a12)
| 0 |
void SoundTouch::setRateChange(double newRate)
{
virtualRate = 1.0 + 0.01 * newRate;
calcEffectiveRateAndTempo();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-617"
] |
soundtouch
|
107f2c5d201a4dfea1b7f15c5957ff2ac9e5f260
|
1.6777728984548372e+38
| 5 |
Replaced illegal-number-of-channel assertions with run-time exception
| 0 |
DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_block_by_block)
{
/* This test uses strange buffer sizes intentionally. */
struct archive_entry *ae;
struct archive *a;
uint8_t buf[173];
int bytes_read;
uint32_t computed_crc = 0;
extract_reference_file("test_read_format_rar5_compressed.rar");
assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL);
assertA(0 == archive_read_support_filter_all(a));
assertA(0 == archive_read_support_format_all(a));
assertA(0 == archive_read_open_filename(a, "test_read_format_rar5_compressed.rar", 130));
assertA(0 == archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
assertEqualString("test.bin", archive_entry_pathname(ae));
assertEqualInt(1200, archive_entry_size(ae));
/* File size is 1200 bytes, we're reading it using a buffer of 173 bytes.
* Libarchive is configured to use a buffer of 130 bytes. */
while(1) {
/* archive_read_data should return one of:
* a) 0, if there is no more data to be read,
* b) negative value, if there was an error,
* c) positive value, meaning how many bytes were read.
*/
bytes_read = archive_read_data(a, buf, sizeof(buf));
assertA(bytes_read >= 0);
if(bytes_read <= 0)
break;
computed_crc = crc32(computed_crc, buf, bytes_read);
}
assertEqualInt(computed_crc, 0x7CCA70CD);
EPILOGUE();
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-125"
] |
libarchive
|
94821008d6eea81e315c5881cdf739202961040a
|
2.5974299772469163e+38
| 40 |
RAR5 reader: reject files that declare invalid header flags
One of the fields in RAR5's base block structure is the size of the
header. Some invalid files declare a 0 header size setting, which can
confuse the unpacker. Minimum header size for RAR5 base blocks is 7
bytes (4 bytes for CRC, and 3 bytes for the rest), so block size of 0
bytes should be rejected at header parsing stage.
The fix adds an error condition if header size of 0 bytes is detected.
In this case, the unpacker will not attempt to unpack the file, as the
header is corrupted.
The commit also adds OSSFuzz #20459 sample to test further regressions
in this area.
| 0 |
short *CLASS foveon_make_curve(double max, double mul, double filt)
{
short *curve;
unsigned i, size;
double x;
if (!filt)
filt = 0.8;
size = 4 * M_PI * max / filt;
if (size == UINT_MAX)
size--;
curve = (short *)calloc(size + 1, sizeof *curve);
merror(curve, "foveon_make_curve()");
curve[0] = size;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
{
x = i * filt / max / 4;
curve[i + 1] = (cos(x) + 1) / 2 * tanh(i * filt / mul) * mul + 0.5;
}
return curve;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] |
LibRaw
|
d7c3d2cb460be10a3ea7b32e9443a83c243b2251
|
6.245104779461775e+37
| 21 |
Secunia SA75000 advisory: several buffer overruns
| 0 |
bool is_unhealthy(utime_t cutoff) const {
return
! ((last_rx_front > cutoff ||
(last_rx_front == utime_t() && (last_tx == utime_t() ||
first_tx > cutoff))) &&
(last_rx_back > cutoff ||
(last_rx_back == utime_t() && (last_tx == utime_t() ||
first_tx > cutoff))));
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
ceph
|
5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468
|
6.766178553558632e+36
| 9 |
auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()
| 0 |
static inline ssize_t DitherY(const ssize_t y,const size_t rows)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=y+DitherMatrix[y & 0x07]-32L;
if (index < 0L)
return(0L);
if (index >= (ssize_t) rows)
return((ssize_t) rows-1L);
return(index);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
ImageMagick
|
aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
|
1.7590599543585363e+38
| 12 |
Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
| 0 |
net_is_http_or_https(const char *url)
{
return (strncasecmp(url, "http://", strlen("http://")) == 0 || strncasecmp(url, "https://", strlen("https://")) == 0);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
owntone-server
|
246d8ae0cef27377e5dfe9ee3ad87e864d6b6266
|
1.047449362037426e+37
| 4 |
[misc] Fix use-after-free in net_bind()
Thanks to Ba Jinsheng for reporting this bug
| 0 |
char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
{
int is_export,pkl,kl;
const char *ver,*exp_str;
const char *kx,*au,*enc,*mac;
unsigned long alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl,alg2;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n";
#else
static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n";
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
alg2=cipher->algorithm2;
is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher);
pkl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher);
exp_str=is_export?" export":"";
if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2)
ver="SSLv2";
else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
ver="SSLv3";
else
ver="unknown";
switch (alg_mkey)
{
case SSL_kRSA:
kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)"):"RSA";
break;
case SSL_kDHr:
kx="DH/RSA";
break;
case SSL_kDHd:
kx="DH/DSS";
break;
case SSL_kKRB5:
kx="KRB5";
break;
case SSL_kEDH:
kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)"):"DH";
break;
case SSL_kECDHr:
kx="ECDH/RSA";
break;
case SSL_kECDHe:
kx="ECDH/ECDSA";
break;
case SSL_kEECDH:
kx="ECDH";
break;
case SSL_kPSK:
kx="PSK";
break;
case SSL_kSRP:
kx="SRP";
break;
default:
kx="unknown";
}
switch (alg_auth)
{
case SSL_aRSA:
au="RSA";
break;
case SSL_aDSS:
au="DSS";
break;
case SSL_aDH:
au="DH";
break;
case SSL_aKRB5:
au="KRB5";
break;
case SSL_aECDH:
au="ECDH";
break;
case SSL_aNULL:
au="None";
break;
case SSL_aECDSA:
au="ECDSA";
break;
case SSL_aPSK:
au="PSK";
break;
default:
au="unknown";
break;
}
switch (alg_enc)
{
case SSL_DES:
enc=(is_export && kl == 5)?"DES(40)":"DES(56)";
break;
case SSL_3DES:
enc="3DES(168)";
break;
case SSL_RC4:
enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)")
:((alg2&SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)?"RC4(64)":"RC4(128)");
break;
case SSL_RC2:
enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)"):"RC2(128)";
break;
case SSL_IDEA:
enc="IDEA(128)";
break;
case SSL_eNULL:
enc="None";
break;
case SSL_AES128:
enc="AES(128)";
break;
case SSL_AES256:
enc="AES(256)";
break;
case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
enc="Camellia(128)";
break;
case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
enc="Camellia(256)";
break;
case SSL_SEED:
enc="SEED(128)";
break;
default:
enc="unknown";
break;
}
switch (alg_mac)
{
case SSL_MD5:
mac="MD5";
break;
case SSL_SHA1:
mac="SHA1";
break;
default:
mac="unknown";
break;
}
if (buf == NULL)
{
len=128;
buf=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) return("OPENSSL_malloc Error");
}
else if (len < 128)
return("Buffer too small");
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str,alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl);
#else
BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
return(buf);
}
|
Safe
|
[] |
openssl
|
edc032b5e3f3ebb1006a9c89e0ae00504f47966f
|
1.0918369875256178e+38
| 169 |
Add SRP support.
| 0 |
static int similarity_index(struct diff_filepair *p)
{
return p->score * 100 / MAX_SCORE;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
git
|
fd55a19eb1d49ae54008d932a65f79cd6fda45c9
|
1.1685369055785798e+38
| 4 |
Fix buffer overflow in git diff
If PATH_MAX on your system is smaller than a path stored, it may cause
buffer overflow and stack corruption in diff_addremove() and diff_change()
functions when running git-diff
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Potapov <dpotapov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
| 0 |
build_object (GoaProvider *provider,
GoaObjectSkeleton *object,
GKeyFile *key_file,
const gchar *group,
GDBusConnection *connection,
gboolean just_added,
GError **error)
{
GoaAccount *account;
GoaCalendar *calendar;
GoaContacts *contacts;
GoaExchange *exchange;
GoaMail *mail;
GoaPasswordBased *password_based;
gboolean calendar_enabled;
gboolean contacts_enabled;
gboolean mail_enabled;
gboolean ret;
account = NULL;
calendar = NULL;
contacts = NULL;
exchange = NULL;
mail = NULL;
password_based = NULL;
ret = FALSE;
/* Chain up */
if (!GOA_PROVIDER_CLASS (goa_exchange_provider_parent_class)->build_object (provider,
object,
key_file,
group,
connection,
just_added,
error))
goto out;
password_based = goa_object_get_password_based (GOA_OBJECT (object));
if (password_based == NULL)
{
password_based = goa_password_based_skeleton_new ();
/* Ensure D-Bus method invocations run in their own thread */
g_dbus_interface_skeleton_set_flags (G_DBUS_INTERFACE_SKELETON (password_based),
G_DBUS_INTERFACE_SKELETON_FLAGS_HANDLE_METHOD_INVOCATIONS_IN_THREAD);
goa_object_skeleton_set_password_based (object, password_based);
g_signal_connect (password_based,
"handle-get-password",
G_CALLBACK (on_handle_get_password),
NULL);
}
account = goa_object_get_account (GOA_OBJECT (object));
/* Email */
mail = goa_object_get_mail (GOA_OBJECT (object));
mail_enabled = g_key_file_get_boolean (key_file, group, "MailEnabled", NULL);
if (mail_enabled)
{
if (mail == NULL)
{
const gchar *email_address;
email_address = goa_account_get_presentation_identity (account);
mail = goa_mail_skeleton_new ();
g_object_set (G_OBJECT (mail), "email-address", email_address, NULL);
goa_object_skeleton_set_mail (object, mail);
}
}
else
{
if (mail != NULL)
goa_object_skeleton_set_mail (object, NULL);
}
/* Calendar */
calendar = goa_object_get_calendar (GOA_OBJECT (object));
calendar_enabled = g_key_file_get_boolean (key_file, group, "CalendarEnabled", NULL);
if (calendar_enabled)
{
if (calendar == NULL)
{
calendar = goa_calendar_skeleton_new ();
goa_object_skeleton_set_calendar (object, calendar);
}
}
else
{
if (calendar != NULL)
goa_object_skeleton_set_calendar (object, NULL);
}
/* Contacts */
contacts = goa_object_get_contacts (GOA_OBJECT (object));
contacts_enabled = g_key_file_get_boolean (key_file, group, "ContactsEnabled", NULL);
if (contacts_enabled)
{
if (contacts == NULL)
{
contacts = goa_contacts_skeleton_new ();
goa_object_skeleton_set_contacts (object, contacts);
}
}
else
{
if (contacts != NULL)
goa_object_skeleton_set_contacts (object, NULL);
}
/* Exchange */
exchange = goa_object_get_exchange (GOA_OBJECT (object));
if (exchange == NULL)
{
gchar *host;
host = g_key_file_get_string (key_file, group, "Host", NULL);
exchange = goa_exchange_skeleton_new ();
g_object_set (G_OBJECT (exchange), "host", host, NULL);
goa_object_skeleton_set_exchange (object, exchange);
g_free (host);
}
if (just_added)
{
goa_account_set_mail_disabled (account, !mail_enabled);
goa_account_set_calendar_disabled (account, !calendar_enabled);
goa_account_set_contacts_disabled (account, !contacts_enabled);
g_signal_connect (account,
"notify::mail-disabled",
G_CALLBACK (goa_util_account_notify_property_cb),
"MailEnabled");
g_signal_connect (account,
"notify::calendar-disabled",
G_CALLBACK (goa_util_account_notify_property_cb),
"CalendarEnabled");
g_signal_connect (account,
"notify::contacts-disabled",
G_CALLBACK (goa_util_account_notify_property_cb),
"ContactsEnabled");
}
ret = TRUE;
out:
if (exchange != NULL)
g_object_unref (exchange);
if (contacts != NULL)
g_object_unref (contacts);
if (calendar != NULL)
g_object_unref (calendar);
if (mail != NULL)
g_object_unref (mail);
if (password_based != NULL)
g_object_unref (password_based);
return ret;
}
|
Vulnerable
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
gnome-online-accounts
|
edde7c63326242a60a075341d3fea0be0bc4d80e
|
1.209886632497148e+38
| 156 |
Guard against invalid SSL certificates
None of the branded providers (eg., Google, Facebook and Windows Live)
should ever have an invalid certificate. So set "ssl-strict" on the
SoupSession object being used by GoaWebView.
Providers like ownCloud and Exchange might have to deal with
certificates that are not up to the mark. eg., self-signed
certificates. For those, show a warning when the account is being
created, and only proceed if the user decides to ignore it. In any
case, save the status of the certificate that was used to create the
account. So an account created with a valid certificate will never
work with an invalid one, and one created with an invalid certificate
will not throw any further warnings.
Fixes: CVE-2013-0240
| 1 |
ProcXkbSetIndicatorMap(ClientPtr client)
{
int i, bit;
int nIndicators;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *from;
int rc;
REQUEST(xkbSetIndicatorMapReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xkbSetIndicatorMapReq);
if (!(client->xkbClientFlags & _XkbClientInitialized))
return BadAccess;
CHK_KBD_DEVICE(dev, stuff->deviceSpec, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
if (stuff->which == 0)
return Success;
for (nIndicators = i = 0, bit = 1; i < XkbNumIndicators; i++, bit <<= 1) {
if (stuff->which & bit)
nIndicators++;
}
if (stuff->length != ((SIZEOF(xkbSetIndicatorMapReq) +
(nIndicators * SIZEOF(xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc))) /
4)) {
return BadLength;
}
from = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) &stuff[1];
for (i = 0, bit = 1; i < XkbNumIndicators; i++, bit <<= 1) {
if (stuff->which & bit) {
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&from->virtualMods);
swapl(&from->ctrls);
}
CHK_MASK_LEGAL(i, from->whichGroups, XkbIM_UseAnyGroup);
CHK_MASK_LEGAL(i, from->whichMods, XkbIM_UseAnyMods);
from++;
}
}
from = (xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *) &stuff[1];
rc = _XkbSetIndicatorMap(client, dev, stuff->which, from);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (stuff->deviceSpec == XkbUseCoreKbd) {
DeviceIntPtr other;
for (other = inputInfo.devices; other; other = other->next) {
if ((other != dev) && other->key && !IsMaster(other) &&
GetMaster(other, MASTER_KEYBOARD) == dev) {
rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, other,
DixSetAttrAccess);
if (rc == Success)
_XkbSetIndicatorMap(client, other, stuff->which, from);
}
}
}
return Success;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-119"
] |
xserver
|
f7cd1276bbd4fe3a9700096dec33b52b8440788d
|
7.181902946450016e+37
| 63 |
Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames()
CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
| 0 |
int bpf_link_prime(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_link_primer *primer)
{
struct file *file;
int fd, id;
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
id = bpf_link_alloc_id(link);
if (id < 0) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
return id;
}
file = anon_inode_getfile("bpf_link", &bpf_link_fops, link, O_CLOEXEC);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
bpf_link_free_id(id);
put_unused_fd(fd);
return PTR_ERR(file);
}
primer->link = link;
primer->file = file;
primer->fd = fd;
primer->id = id;
return 0;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-307"
] |
linux
|
350a5c4dd2452ea999cc5e1d4a8dbf12de2f97ef
|
4.534112631079426e+37
| 29 |
bpf: Dont allow vmlinux BTF to be used in map_create and prog_load.
The syzbot got FD of vmlinux BTF and passed it into map_create which caused
crash in btf_type_id_size() when it tried to access resolved_ids. The vmlinux
BTF doesn't have 'resolved_ids' and 'resolved_sizes' initialized to save
memory. To avoid such issues disallow using vmlinux BTF in prog_load and
map_create commands.
Fixes: 5329722057d4 ("bpf: Assign ID to vmlinux BTF and return extra info for BTF in GET_OBJ_INFO")
Reported-by: syzbot+8bab8ed346746e7540e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210307225248.79031-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
| 0 |
static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
{
unsigned int ret;
int npad,n;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
EVP_MD_CTX ctx,*d=NULL;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return 0;
/* Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst
* array*/
for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
{
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
{
d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
break;
}
}
if (!d) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
if (n < 0)
return 0;
npad=(48/n)*n;
if (sender != NULL)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,sender,len);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,md_buf,&i);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,md_buf,i);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,p,&ret);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return((int)ret);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
cf6da05304d554aaa885151451aa4ecaa977e601
|
1.6289901477373436e+38
| 53 |
Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
| 0 |
bool operator==(const DecimalV2Val& other) const {
if (is_null && other.is_null) {
return true;
}
if (is_null || other.is_null) {
return false;
}
return val == other.val;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-200"
] |
incubator-doris
|
246ac4e37aa4da6836b7850cb990f02d1c3725a3
|
1.0146606158310537e+38
| 11 |
[fix] fix a bug of encryption function with iv may return wrong result (#8277)
| 0 |
int FAST_FUNC udhcp_str2optset(const char *const_str, void *arg,
const struct dhcp_optflag *optflags, const char *option_strings,
bool dhcpv6)
{
struct option_set **opt_list = arg;
char *opt;
char *str;
const struct dhcp_optflag *optflag;
struct dhcp_optflag userdef_optflag;
unsigned optcode;
int retval;
/* IP_PAIR needs 8 bytes, STATIC_ROUTES needs 9 max */
char buffer[9] ALIGNED(4);
uint16_t *result_u16 = (uint16_t *) buffer;
uint32_t *result_u32 = (uint32_t *) buffer;
/* Cheat, the only *const* str possible is "" */
str = (char *) const_str;
opt = strtok(str, " \t=:");
if (!opt)
return 0;
optcode = bb_strtou(opt, NULL, 0);
if (!errno && optcode < 255) {
/* Raw (numeric) option code.
* Initially assume binary (hex-str), but if "str" or 'str'
* is seen later, switch to STRING.
*/
userdef_optflag.flags = OPTION_BIN;
userdef_optflag.code = optcode;
optflag = &userdef_optflag;
} else {
optflag = &optflags[udhcp_option_idx(opt, option_strings)];
}
/* Loop to handle OPTION_LIST case, else execute just once */
retval = 0;
do {
int length;
char *val;
if (optflag->flags == OPTION_BIN) {
val = strtok(NULL, ""); /* do not split "'q w e'" */
trim(val);
} else
val = strtok(NULL, ", \t");
if (!val)
break;
length = dhcp_option_lengths[optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK];
retval = 0;
opt = buffer; /* new meaning for variable opt */
switch (optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK) {
case OPTION_IP:
retval = udhcp_str2nip(val, buffer);
break;
case OPTION_IP_PAIR:
retval = udhcp_str2nip(val, buffer);
val = strtok(NULL, ", \t/-");
if (!val)
retval = 0;
if (retval)
retval = udhcp_str2nip(val, buffer + 4);
break;
case_OPTION_STRING:
case OPTION_STRING:
case OPTION_STRING_HOST:
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_RFC3397
case OPTION_DNS_STRING:
#endif
length = strnlen(val, 254);
if (length > 0) {
opt = val;
retval = 1;
}
break;
// case OPTION_BOOLEAN: {
// static const char no_yes[] ALIGN1 = "no\0yes\0";
// buffer[0] = retval = index_in_strings(no_yes, val);
// retval++; /* 0 - bad; 1: "no" 2: "yes" */
// break;
// }
case OPTION_U8:
buffer[0] = bb_strtou32(val, NULL, 0);
retval = (errno == 0);
break;
/* htonX are macros in older libc's, using temp var
* in code below for safety */
/* TODO: use bb_strtoX? */
case OPTION_U16: {
uint32_t tmp = bb_strtou32(val, NULL, 0);
*result_u16 = htons(tmp);
retval = (errno == 0 /*&& tmp < 0x10000*/);
break;
}
// case OPTION_S16: {
// long tmp = bb_strtoi32(val, NULL, 0);
// *result_u16 = htons(tmp);
// retval = (errno == 0);
// break;
// }
case OPTION_U32: {
uint32_t tmp = bb_strtou32(val, NULL, 0);
*result_u32 = htonl(tmp);
retval = (errno == 0);
break;
}
case OPTION_S32: {
int32_t tmp = bb_strtoi32(val, NULL, 0);
*result_u32 = htonl(tmp);
retval = (errno == 0);
break;
}
case OPTION_STATIC_ROUTES: {
/* Input: "a.b.c.d/m" */
/* Output: mask(1 byte),pfx(0-4 bytes),gw(4 bytes) */
unsigned mask;
char *slash = strchr(val, '/');
if (slash) {
*slash = '\0';
retval = udhcp_str2nip(val, buffer + 1);
buffer[0] = mask = bb_strtou(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
val = strtok(NULL, ", \t/-");
if (!val || mask > 32 || errno)
retval = 0;
if (retval) {
length = ((mask + 7) >> 3) + 5;
retval = udhcp_str2nip(val, buffer + (length - 4));
}
}
break;
}
case OPTION_BIN:
/* Raw (numeric) option code. Is it a string? */
if (val[0] == '"' || val[0] == '\'') {
char delim = val[0];
char *end = last_char_is(val + 1, delim);
if (end) {
*end = '\0';
val++;
userdef_optflag.flags = OPTION_STRING;
goto case_OPTION_STRING;
}
}
/* No: hex-str option, handled in attach_option() */
opt = val;
retval = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (retval)
attach_option(opt_list, optflag, opt, length, dhcpv6);
} while (retval && (optflag->flags & OPTION_LIST));
return retval;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-125"
] |
busybox
|
6d3b4bb24da9a07c263f3c1acf8df85382ff562c
|
2.8125857213538466e+38
| 159 |
udhcpc: check that 4-byte options are indeed 4-byte, closes 11506
function old new delta
udhcp_get_option32 - 27 +27
udhcp_get_option 231 248 +17
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 1/0 grow/shrink: 1/0 up/down: 44/0) Total: 44 bytes
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
| 0 |
static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *ireq6 = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_daddr, &newnp->daddr);
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
opt = np->opt;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (dst == NULL) {
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_DCCP;
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &ireq6->rmt_addr);
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.saddr, &ireq6->loc_addr);
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet_rsk(req)->rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet_rsk(req)->loc_port;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p, false);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
goto out;
}
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newsk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features & ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO);
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->daddr, &ireq6->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->saddr, &ireq6->loc_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &ireq6->loc_addr);
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq6->iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN */
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
if (ireq6->pktopts != NULL) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq6->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree_skb(ireq6->pktopts);
ireq6->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
*
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
if (opt != NULL) {
newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
if (opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newnp->opt != NULL)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
newnp->opt->opt_flen);
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto out;
}
__inet6_hash(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
out_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
if (opt != NULL && opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
return NULL;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
2.274227100389829e+38
| 166 |
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
void test_s_lineto(bezctx *z, double x, double y) {
test_bezctx *p = (test_bezctx*)z;
int i;
if ( (i=p->len) < S_RESULTS ) {
#ifdef VERBOSE
printf("test_s_lineto(%g,%g) [%d]%d\n",x,y,p->c_id,i);
#endif
p->my_curve[i].x1 = x;
p->my_curve[i].y1 = y;
p->my_curve[p->len++].ty = 'l';
}
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libspiro
|
35233450c922787dad42321e359e5229ff470a1e
|
2.726899119205303e+38
| 13 |
CVE-2019-19847, Stack-based buffer overflow in the spiro_to_bpath0()
Frederic Cambus (@fcambus) discovered a bug in call-test.c using:
./configure CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address"
make
./tests/call-test[14,15,16,17,18,19]
Fredrick Brennan (@ctrlcctrlv) provided bugfix. See issue #21
| 0 |
bool LEX::sp_body_finalize_routine(THD *thd)
{
if (sphead->check_unresolved_goto())
return true;
sphead->set_stmt_end(thd);
sphead->restore_thd_mem_root(thd);
return false;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
39feab3cd31b5414aa9b428eaba915c251ac34a2
|
1.0366660641772437e+38
| 8 |
MDEV-26412 Server crash in Item_field::fix_outer_field for INSERT SELECT
IF an INSERT/REPLACE SELECT statement contained an ON expression in the top
level select and this expression used a subquery with a column reference
that could not be resolved then an attempt to resolve this reference as
an outer reference caused a crash of the server. This happened because the
outer context field in the Name_resolution_context structure was not set
to NULL for such references. Rather it pointed to the first element in
the select_stack.
Note that starting from 10.4 we cannot use the SELECT_LEX::outer_select()
method when parsing a SELECT construct.
Approved by Oleksandr Byelkin <sanja@mariadb.com>
| 0 |
struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *filename, int flags)
{
struct open_flags op;
int err = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (flags & O_CREAT)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-17"
] |
linux
|
eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87
|
6.15880490094083e+37
| 14 |
get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| 0 |
void __qdisc_run(struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned long start_time = jiffies;
while (qdisc_restart(dev)) {
if (netif_queue_stopped(dev))
break;
/*
* Postpone processing if
* 1. another process needs the CPU;
* 2. we've been doing it for too long.
*/
if (need_resched() || jiffies != start_time) {
netif_schedule(dev);
break;
}
}
clear_bit(__LINK_STATE_QDISC_RUNNING, &dev->state);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
2ba2506ca7ca62c56edaa334b0fe61eb5eab6ab0
|
2.592943135376365e+38
| 21 |
[NET]: Add preemption point in qdisc_run
The qdisc_run loop is currently unbounded and runs entirely in a
softirq. This is bad as it may create an unbounded softirq run.
This patch fixes this by calling need_resched and breaking out if
necessary.
It also adds a break out if the jiffies value changes since that would
indicate we've been transmitting for too long which starves other
softirqs.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| 0 |
llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr,
struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr)
{
u8 iv[16];
unsigned char *data;
int authlen, datalen, assoclen, rc;
struct scatterlist sg;
struct aead_request *req;
authlen = ieee802154_sechdr_authtag_len(&hdr->sec);
llsec_geniv(iv, dev_addr, &hdr->sec);
req = aead_request_alloc(llsec_tfm_by_len(key, authlen), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
assoclen = skb->mac_len;
data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {
assoclen += datalen - authlen;
datalen = authlen;
}
aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
aead_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, datalen, iv);
aead_request_set_ad(req, assoclen);
rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
kfree_sensitive(req);
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - authlen);
return rc;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
1165affd484889d4986cf3b724318935a0b120d8
|
3.2727849587704538e+38
| 40 |
net: mac802154: Fix general protection fault
syzbot found general protection fault in crypto_destroy_tfm()[1].
It was caused by wrong clean up loop in llsec_key_alloc().
If one of the tfm array members is in IS_ERR() range it will
cause general protection fault in clean up function [1].
Call Trace:
crypto_free_aead include/crypto/aead.h:191 [inline] [1]
llsec_key_alloc net/mac802154/llsec.c:156 [inline]
mac802154_llsec_key_add+0x9e0/0xcc0 net/mac802154/llsec.c:249
ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x56/0x80 net/mac802154/cfg.c:338
rdev_add_llsec_key net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:260 [inline]
nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x3d3/0x560 net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:1584
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+9ec037722d2603a9f52e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304152125.1052825-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
| 0 |
static GF_Err gf_m4v_parse_frame_mpeg4(GF_M4VParser *m4v, GF_M4VDecSpecInfo *dsi, u8 *frame_type, u32 *time_inc, u64 *size, u64 *start, Bool *is_coded)
{
u8 go, hasVOP, firstObj, secs;
s32 o_type;
u32 vop_inc = 0;
if (!m4v || !size || !start || !frame_type) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
*size = 0;
firstObj = 1;
hasVOP = 0;
*is_coded = 0;
m4v->current_object_type = (u32)-1;
*frame_type = 0;
*start = 0;
if (!m4v->step_mode)
M4V_Reset(m4v, m4v->current_object_start);
go = 1;
while (go) {
o_type = M4V_LoadObject(m4v);
switch (o_type) {
case M4V_VOP_START_CODE:
/*done*/
if (hasVOP) {
go = 0;
break;
}
if (firstObj) {
*start = m4v->current_object_start;
firstObj = 0;
}
hasVOP = 1;
/*coding type*/
*frame_type = gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 2);
/*modulo time base*/
secs = 0;
while (gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1) != 0)
secs++;
/*no support for B frames in parsing*/
secs += (dsi->enh_layer || *frame_type!=2) ? m4v->tc_dec : m4v->tc_disp;
/*marker*/
gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1);
/*vop_time_inc*/
if (dsi->NumBitsTimeIncrement)
vop_inc = gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, dsi->NumBitsTimeIncrement);
m4v->prev_tc_dec = m4v->tc_dec;
m4v->prev_tc_disp = m4v->tc_disp;
if (dsi->enh_layer || *frame_type!=2) {
m4v->tc_disp = m4v->tc_dec;
m4v->tc_dec = secs;
}
*time_inc = secs * dsi->clock_rate + vop_inc;
/*marker*/
gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1);
/*coded*/
*is_coded = gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1);
gf_bs_align(m4v->bs);
break;
case M4V_GOV_START_CODE:
if (firstObj) {
*start = m4v->current_object_start;
firstObj = 0;
}
if (hasVOP) go = 0;
break;
case M4V_VOL_START_CODE:
if (m4v->step_mode)
gf_m4v_parse_vol(m4v, dsi);
case M4V_VOS_START_CODE:
if (hasVOP) {
go = 0;
}
else if (firstObj) {
*start = m4v->current_object_start;
firstObj = 0;
}
break;
case M4V_VO_START_CODE:
default:
break;
case -1:
*size = gf_bs_get_position(m4v->bs) - *start;
return GF_EOS;
}
if (m4v->step_mode)
return GF_OK;
}
assert(m4v->current_object_start >= *start);
*size = m4v->current_object_start - *start;
return GF_OK;
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
51cdb67ff7c5f1242ac58c5aa603ceaf1793b788
|
2.2021208683489863e+38
| 98 |
add safety in avc/hevc/vvc sps/pps/vps ID check - cf #1720 #1721 #1722
| 0 |
megasas_fire_cmd_ppc(struct megasas_instance *instance,
dma_addr_t frame_phys_addr,
u32 frame_count,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
writel((frame_phys_addr | (frame_count<<1))|1,
&(regs)->inbound_queue_port);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
1.6189627092740478e+38
| 12 |
scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
| 0 |
static void ide_sector_write_timer_cb(void *opaque)
{
IDEState *s = opaque;
ide_set_irq(s->bus);
}
|
Safe
|
[
"CWE-189"
] |
qemu
|
940973ae0b45c9b6817bab8e4cf4df99a9ef83d7
|
2.0459831065614687e+38
| 5 |
ide: Correct improper smart self test counter reset in ide core.
The SMART self test counter was incorrectly being reset to zero,
not 1. This had the effect that on every 21st SMART EXECUTE OFFLINE:
* We would write off the beginning of a dynamically allocated buffer
* We forgot the SMART history
Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
Message-id: 1397336390-24664-1-git-send-email-benoit.canet@irqsave.net
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Acked-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
[PMM: tweaked commit message as per suggestions from Markus]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
| 0 |
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