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4,900 |
The United States is Latin America’s traditional hegemonic power, but China’s influence in the region is large and growing. How far does China’s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of China’s activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the region’s infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.
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Hilton, 2013 (Isabel, a London-based writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, NOREF, http://peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf)
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The United States is Latin America’s traditional hegemonic power, but China’s influence in the region is large and growing. How far does China’s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources The impact of China’s activities varies in degree China is having an important impact on the region’s infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.
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Scenario 1 is hegemony
| 1,455 | 22 | 883 | 222 | 4 | 139 | 0.018018 | 0.626126 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,901 |
Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century bc the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still “number one,” but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught. At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that, taking steps to ensure those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the established great powers—the so-called status quo states—who are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system. The resulting clash of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Others—hoping to avoid war—have taken the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing international order. But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war.
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Friedberg, 2011 (Aaron, professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics”, The National Interest, http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Friedberg.pdf)
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Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against As far back as the fifth century bc the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. . The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the established great powers who are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system The resulting clash of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. fforts have almost always ended in failure Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments This is why periods of transition, when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war.
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Unchecked China rise inevitably leads to conflict-the stakes are as high as they can get
| 4,089 | 88 | 1,979 | 649 | 15 | 311 | 0.023112 | 0.479199 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,902 |
Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very active American intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating the underlying conditions for a massive, and probably nuclear, great power war. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.
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Walton, 2007 (C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49)
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Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power necessitating very active American intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating the underlying conditions for a massive, and probably nuclear, great power war
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US-Sino hegemonic conflict draws in other great powers-it WILL go nuclear
| 1,290 | 73 | 530 | 206 | 11 | 89 | 0.053398 | 0.432039 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,903 |
Needless to say, following Mr. Chavez’s lead would be a costly mistake for Latin America. Nobody doubts the resource potential they all hold, but turning that into money needs major capital and technological skills, most of which sits with international oil companies rather than national entities farming out work to service companies on the cheap. Like it or not, IOCs still have lucrative (some would say larger) unconventional oil and gas plays they can go for in North America, Russia, East Africa, Australasia and even distinctly conventional MENA and Caspian regions. The Americas is now a ‘nice to have’ location in their portfolios, not a make or break region for corporate survival. Ironically Chavez understands that, which is why the vast bulk of his hydrocarbon investment over that past five years has all come from China. In ball-park terms, Beijing has sunk $40bn into Caracas coffers, mostly as loan for oil agreements. That’s been very good news for the likes of China Petrochemical Corp and CNPC, with China receiving around 640,000b/d from Venezuela (200,000 barrels of which services the debt), but whether that’s really in Venezuelan interests rather than selling most its oil on open markets is at best, dubious. Given China’s vast capital, it’s not surprising that they’re now a key player in the Venezuelan market, or that they’re following up with similar investments in Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia. But selling oil into Asia is one thing, letting China own the entire value chain from ‘Latin American fields to Chinese ports’ is clearly a less wise proposition. It merely adds to the list of Chavez resource blunders, and looks an increasingly likely trap for other Americas producers to fall into. Raking in (cheap) Renminbi for chimerical output gains will favour Beijing in the long run, especially if China controls the taps with oil deliveries merely paying down debt. No matter what the wager, it’s simply not a plausible model for the Americas to adopt across its entire production base.
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Hulbert, 2012 (Matthew, Forbes writer covering energy markets, geopolitics, and political risk, “Chavez Contagion: The Growing Risk To Latin American Oil”, 10/8/2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/10/08/chavez-contagion-the-growing-risk-to-latin-american-oil/)
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following Mr. Chavez’s lead would be a costly mistake for Latin America. Nobody doubts the resource potential they all hold, but turning that into money needs major capital and technological skills The Americas is now a ‘nice to have’ location in their portfolios, not a make or break region for corporate survival. Ironically Chavez understands that, which is why the vast bulk of his hydrocarbon investment over that past five years has all come from Chin Beijing has sunk $40bn into Caracas coffers, mostly as loan for oil agreements. That’s been very good news for the likes of China Petrochemical Corp but whether that’s really in Venezuelan interests rather than selling most its oil on open markets is at best, dubious. Given China’s vast capital, it’s not surprising that they’re now a key player in the Venezuelan market or that they’re following up with similar investments in Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia letting China own the entire value chain from ‘Latin American fields to Chinese ports’ is clearly a less wise proposition. It merely adds to the list of Chavez resource blunders gains will favour Beijing in the long run, especially if China controls the taps it’s simply not a plausible model for the Americas to adopt across its entire production base.
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Scenario two is resources
| 2,022 | 25 | 1,269 | 330 | 4 | 211 | 0.012121 | 0.639394 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,904 |
In the past decade, Latin America has taken great strides in lifting millions out of poverty. Yet in a continent with the most unequal income distribution in the world, and where, according to UN figures, 189 million people still live on less than $2 a day (about 34% of the population), who is really benefiting from the Chinese economic boom? Instead of working towards better wealth distribution, a 2004 report by the Latin America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific Economics and Business Association warned that Chinese expansion could actually have a detrimental impact on the vulnerability and exclusion of the poor from economic activity. It argued that China's expansion into the region has been fuelled by the need for agricultural and extractive resources – energy oil reserves, iron ore, copper and soy – mostly non-labour intensive products that are unlikely to have a big positive impact on the poor. In fact, the report concludes that the most vulnerable could have been negatively affected as a result of the Chinese-led expansion. The soy industry is a case in point. While China has helped South America's soybean industries expand their access to global markets, few benefits have gone to rural communities. Despite rising production, employment and wages have decreased with the proliferation of high-volume monoculture farming. For example, while Brazilian soy production quadrupled between 1995 and 2009, employment in the sector actually shrank. Soy production has also been linked to the deforestation of 528,000 sq km of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest. A research project backed by the Institute of Development Studies and the British Academy is looking into the links between Chinese business in Latin America and the knock-on impact on poor communities. Researchers in Peru have found that Chinese companies running state or private enterprises have little meaningful or positive engagement with local communities or labour organisations. Neil Renwick, a university professor of global security at Coventry University, is one of the researchers leading the project. He says that Beijing's approach in Latin America is indicative of its domestic approach to development. "In many ways, the Chinese approach [in Latin America] reflects the high price the [Chinese] people have paid for development, for example, with regard to poverty, inequality, corruption or the environment," he says. China's determination to take advantage of the spending power of Latin America's emerging middle classes through flooding local markets with cheap Chinese goods could also affect the growth of domestic manufacturing, often vital to growing local employment and income opportunities and to reducing poverty.
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Kelly, 2011 (Annie, writer on global development, human rights and social affairs for the Guardian and Observer, “Who really benefits from China's trade with Latin America?”, 2/16/2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/feb/16/china-latin-america-trade-benefit)
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in a continent with the most unequal income distribution in the world who is really benefiting from the Chinese economic boom? Instead of working towards better wealth distribution, a 2004 report warned that Chinese expansion could actually have a detrimental impact China's expansion into the region has been fuelled by the need for resources In fact, the report concludes that the most vulnerable could have been negatively affected as a result of the Chinese-led expansion few benefits have gone to rural communities. Despite rising production, employment and wages have decreased links between Chinese business in Latin America and the knock-on impact on poor communities Chinese companies running state or private enterprises have little meaningful or positive engagement In many ways, the Chinese approach reflects the high price people have paid for development China's determination to take advantage of the spending power of Latin America's emerging middle classes through flooding local markets with cheap Chinese goods could also affect the growth of domestic manufacturing vital to growing local employment and income
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However, Chinese economic expansion for resources floods the Latin American markets and is massively detrimental to their economies
| 2,713 | 131 | 1,129 | 415 | 18 | 170 | 0.043373 | 0.409639 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,905 |
Economic crises can magnify the destabilizing political impact of all of these factors (Pei and Adesnik 2000). Deciding on an appropriate policy response to economic crisis can be an intensely divisive process for ruling elites. Economic crises can also prove a useful mobilization tool for segments of the population that already have grievances with the regime. Haggard and Kaufman’s (1995) examination of the political effects of the debt crisis in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s illustrates how these factors can interact with an economic crisis to trigger regime change. The debt crisis exacerbated existing schisms within the ruling elites of many authoritarian countries by undermining the basis of these regimes’ legitimacy and stimulating the defection many business elites from the ruling coalition who questioned the regimes’ ability to cope with the crises. Combined with increased popular protest as opposition movements used the deteriorating economic conditions to recruit new followers, the debt crisis helped prompt softliners within these regimes to conclude that the costs of further coercion outweighed the benefits of such coercion and to look for a way to negotiate their withdrawal. The presence of moderate opposition movements solidified the decision of softliners to negotiate, since presumably these movements would agree to more favorable terms for the outgoing regime.
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Brower and Carothers, 2009 (Julia, junior fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Thomas, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this capacity, he oversees the Democracy and Rule of Law Program, Middle East Program, and Carnegie Europe, “Will the International Economic Crisis Undermine Struggling Democracies?”, The Carnegie Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/economic_crisis_political_change_2.pdf)
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Economic crises can magnify the destabilizing political impact of all of these factors Deciding on an appropriate policy response to economic crisis can be an intensely divisive process for ruling elites Economic crises can also prove a useful mobilization tool for segments of the population that already have grievances with the regime examination of the political effects of the debt crisis in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s illustrates how these factors can interact with an economic crisis The debt crisis exacerbated existing schisms within the ruling elites stimulating the defection many business elites from the ruling coalition who questioned the regimes’ ability the debt crisis helped prompt softliners within these regimes to conclude that the costs of further coercion outweighed the benefits of such coercion
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Empirics prove -Latin American economic crises lead to massive instability and regime change
| 1,414 | 92 | 840 | 213 | 13 | 129 | 0.061033 | 0.605634 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,906 |
The growing disorder in the nations of the Andean ridge highlights a dangerous new phenomenon with significant national security implications for the United States: Criminal organizations and armed groups in the region have fallen into new forms of collaboration that allow them to finance their own operations without reliance on outside aid and its associated strings. The military and self-financing activities of groups, in turn, creates dynamics that ultimately could break down the economic and sociopolitical fabric of the countries in which they operate. As illustrated by the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia, these organizations leverage the weakness of the states in which they operate to survive and grow. Their activities are financed, in part, by taxing or directly engaging in criminal activity such as narcotrafficking, embezzlement, and extortion [11]. These criminal enterprises, in turn, leverage a unique combination of global commerce and information flows and the compromised character of the institutions within their own country. In short, criminal organizations conduct operations involving global shipments of narcotics and other goods, leveraging international banking, the international transportation infrastructure, and the ability to purchase “specialized human expertise” for certain operations on global markets [12]. At the same time, the criminal activities depend on “safe havens” that they have created within compromised states to conduct key stages of their operations—such as money laundering and narcotics production. Within their compromised societies, criminal organizations have enormous manpower needs, both to perform the daily physical labor required by their operations and to provide protection from the state (and from rivals) for their activities. Armed groups on both the left and right serve the interests of criminal enterprises by physically protecting them in exchange for revenue. This loose partnership between criminal organizations and armed political groups thus generates capabilities and promulgates incidents that contribute to the weakness of the state—thus sustaining the space in which criminal activity can take place [13]. Both criminal organizations and armed groups thus are nourished by—and systematically destroy— the socioeconomic fabric of the state in which they grow. As the host state weakens, the activities of these organizations also infects and destabilizes neighboring states through flows of guerillas and refugees, and the violence and human suffering associated with them. Although a great deal has been written about narcotrafficking, the spread of insurgency, and socioeconomic problems in Latin America [14], the current confluence of events is new and different with respect to the way in which multiple phenomenon reinforce each other to produce a potential escalating spiral of violence and economic malaise in the region. The individual perpetrators—such as drug cartels, terrorist cells, and insurgent groups—may not be coordinated, yet the combination of their individual goal-directed actions produces systemic effects that could ultimately destabilize the region and undercut the basis for U.S. global power.
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Ellis, 2004 (R. Evan.,professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, “The Impact of Instability in Latin America”, http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2003/proceed/PAPERS/119.pdf)
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disorder in the nations of the Andean ridge highlights a dangerous new phenomenon with significant national security implications for the United States Criminal organizations and armed groups in the region have fallen into new forms of collaboration As illustrated by the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia, these organizations leverage the weakness of the states in which they operate to survive and grow Their activities are financed by narcotrafficking In short, criminal organizations conduct operations involving global shipments of narcotics and other goods, leveraging international banking, the international transportation infrastructure Armed groups on both the left and right serve the interests of criminal enterprises by physically protecting them in exchange for revenue. This loose partnership between criminal organizations and armed political groups thus generates capabilities and promulgates incidents Both criminal organizations and armed groups thus are nourished by—and systematically destroy— the socioeconomic fabric of the state in which they grow. As the host state weakens, the activities of these organizations also infects and destabilizes neighboring states the violence and human suffering associated with them the current confluence of events is new and different with respect to the way in which multiple phenomenon reinforce each other to produce a potential escalating spiral of violence and economic malaise in the region drug cartels, terrorist cells, and insurgent groups—may not be coordinated, yet the combination of their individual goal-directed actions produces systemic effects that could ultimately destabilize the region and undercut the basis for U.S. global power.
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Latin American instability creates a breeding ground for the drug trade
| 3,204 | 71 | 1,709 | 462 | 11 | 244 | 0.02381 | 0.528139 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,907 |
For the past decade, Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing interest in Latin America. But while Beijing's diplomats bulked up on their Spanish and Portuguese, most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United States still held a dominant position in the minds of its southern neighbors. In April 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on China's influence in the hemisphere and concluded that the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere was much stronger than China's and, moreover, that Beijing's economic engagement in the region did not present a security threat. But that was 2005. In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make no mistake: China is now a presence in the region. Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica. Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California, sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders. Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Calderón. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States. The challenges arising from China's global engagement should not, however, be confused with the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that characterized the Cold War, in which each side actively promoted different, competing concepts for a global order. China does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, yet the mercantilist way in which it promotes its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international norms that it didn't create, makes it more difficult for the United States to conduct business and pursue policy goals in Latin America and other parts of the world.
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Ellis, 6/6/13 (R. Evan Ellis is associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “China's New Backyard Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag in Latin America?”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america?page=0,1)
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For the past decade, Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing interest in Latin America most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United States still held a dominant position in the minds of its southern neighbors . In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China Make no mistake: China is now a presence in the region China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders. Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground relatively independent of the United States China does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, yet the mercantilist way in which it promotes its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international norms that it didn't create, makes it more difficult for the United States to conduct business and pursue policy goals in Latin America and other parts of the world.
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China is the new presence in Latin America, shoring up formerly American influence
| 3,984 | 82 | 1,645 | 647 | 13 | 284 | 0.020093 | 0.438949 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,908 |
BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban first vice-president of the councils of state and ministers. Xi asked Diaz-Canel to convey his greetings to Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro. Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the two countries forged diplomatic relations in 1960, particularly the increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish its friendship with Cuba. It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust, deepen mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own development and common prosperity, Xi said. China would like to work more closely with Cuba on international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community, Xi said. Xi said he witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region during his visit earlier this month. China would like a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean countries, featuring political trust, economic cooperation and cultural mutual learning, Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core. China appreciates Cuba's efforts to promoting China-Latin America relations and expects growth of relations during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community of Latin American and Caribbean states. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro to Xi. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China, pledging to enhance high-level visits and communication, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and seek growth of ties between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America. Diaz-Canel will conclude his three-day China visit on Wednesday.
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Xinhua News, 6/18/2013 (Chinese news service, “Chinese President meets Cuban VP on stronger ties”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/19/c_124874409.htm)
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Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban first vice-president of the councils of state and ministers Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the two countries forged diplomatic relations in 1960 increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century . It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust, deepen mutual understanding China would like to work more closely with Cuba on international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China, pledging to enhance high-level visits and communication, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and seek growth of ties between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America
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Chinese relations with Cuba specifically are strong now
| 2,148 | 55 | 1,121 | 310 | 8 | 158 | 0.025806 | 0.509677 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,909 |
For its first fifty years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took little interest in Latin America1. The United States exercised unrivalled political and economic power in the region, and is still the dominant influence2. While Cuba established diplomatic relations with China from 1960 onwards, most Latin American governments waited until President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972 before recognising the People’s Republic: in 1972 Argentina and Mexico recognised the PRC, followed by Brazil two years later and, later still, Bolivia in 1985. This period of relative indifference was now at an end. President Hu Jintao’s visits, towards the end of 2004, to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba and, a year later, to Mexico attested to Beijing’s interest in the region3. While numerous studies have focused on China’s policy towards Africa, its role in Latin America is less frequently touched upon. Yet, its growing presence there is of the greatest economic and geostrategic significance; and raises concerns and anxieties both in Latin America and in the United States, where Beijing’s interference in the region has aroused something less than enthusiasm. In media and political circles, periodic alarms have been sounded over the Chinese presence in America’s “back yard”4. Washington’s fears have been strengthened over the past year with the electoral triumphs of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Alan García in Peru and then Lula da Silva in Brazil, all of whom are openly seeking closer relations with Beijing. China in Latin America: a growing influence China’s influence in Latin America can be evaluated in two ways. From the outset, one objective consideration must be noted: so far, China’s presence is limited. As a proportion of China’s overall trade, Latin America represents only 3.55%―a modest total as yet5. According to Chinese government data, in 2004 less than 18% of all China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), that is US$8.2 billion6 worth was placed in Latin America. And China’s share of the incoming flow of FDI amounted to only 6%7. Yet this data has to be treated with caution. On a careful reading of the MOFCOM statistics, it appears that China’s investment in the region is mainly concentrated on the Cayman Islands and the Virgin Islands, both of which are notorious as tax havens. In all probability, this capital is sent back to mainland China for reinvestment, qualifying now for the benefits accorded to foreign investors. When this investment in the Caymans and the Virgin Islands is excluded, Latin America receives no more than 1.5% of China’s overall FDI. And a comparable figure is suggested by UNCTAD8: in 2002, China invested US$653 million overall, 1.5% of its total outward investment. But these figures do not reflect the rapid expansion of financial relations between Beijing and Latin America. China’s total foreign investment in 2005 is put at US$6.9 billion, bringing the cumulative figure for its investment across the world to US$50 billion. And, since 2003, China has signed public and private investment projects in Latin America, detailed below, worth nearly ten billion dollars in all. In November 2004, in Brasilia, President Hu addressed members of the National Congress promising that China would be investing US$100 billion in the region over the next ten years. The promise is in the process of being fulfilled. At the same time, the volume of bilateral trade is increasing exponentially, from US$12.6 billion in 2001 to US$40 billion in 2004, settling at over US$50 billion in 2005 (see Table 1). By 2010 the figure of US$100 billion should have been reached. China’s main trading partners are Brazil, Mexico and Chile, who between them represented 62.2% of all exchanges9 in 2004 (charts 1 and 2). Data provided by MOFCOM is set out in Tables 1 and 2; it is used as reference material for the international institutions. But most Latin American countries reject these figures, putting China’s exports to them at lower levels. And the gap may be significant. There is a simple reason for this underestimate. A large proportion (12%) of China’s exports to the region are officially destined for Panama―rather surprisingly, considering Panama’s small population (3 million) and the fact that it does not maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing. The truth is that Panama performs on the American continent a role comparable to that of Hong Kong in Asia (an area where industrial products are assembled and China’s exports are packaged) and is in reality no more than a point of transit. It is also worth noting that Mercosur or, in English, the Southern Common Market (linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) allows for Chinese goods to be circulated far from its initial destination10. China’s interest in Latin America may be explained in terms of three imperatives: oil supplies, minerals and agricultural products.
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Lefargue, 2006 (Francois, French academic and Professor at the ESG management school and the Studies Institute for International Relations, ‘China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits”, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053#tocto1n1)
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Cuba established diplomatic relations with China from 1960 onwards in 1972 Argentina and Mexico recognised the PRC, followed by Brazil two years later and, later still, Bolivia in 1985 Hu Jintao’s visits, towards the end of 2004, to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba and, a year later, to Mexico attested to Beijing’s interest in the region its growing presence there is of the greatest economic and geostrategic significance; and raises concerns and anxieties both in Latin America and in the United States periodic alarms have been sounded over the Chinese presence in America’s “back yard this data has to be treated with caution this capital is sent back to mainland China for reinvestment, qualifying now for the benefits accorded to foreign investors these figures do not reflect the rapid expansion of financial relations between Beijing and Latin America. China’s total foreign investment in 2005 is put at US$6.9 billion, bringing the cumulative figure for its investment across the world to US$50 billion. And, since 2003, China has signed public and private investment projects in Latin America President Hu addressed members of the National Congress promising that China would be investing US$100 billion in the region over the next ten years the volume of bilateral trade is increasing exponentially By 2010 the figure of US$100 billion should have been reached. China’s main trading partners are Brazil, Mexico and Chile China’s interest in Latin America may be explained in terms of three imperatives: oil supplies, minerals and agricultural products
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Chinese economic presence in America’s backyard is getting dangerously large
| 4,907 | 76 | 1,565 | 786 | 10 | 247 | 0.012723 | 0.314249 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,910 |
Within a few years, following the elections of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998) and Lula Da Silva in Brazil (2002), most Latin American countries elected governments of the populist left, with mostly hostile attitudes to American policy; their leaders include Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabaré Vasquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005) and Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2005). In particular, the victory of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua last November perplexes the United States, which dreads even the thought of any lessening of its influence in the Latin American continent. US fears are all the more justified because, since September 11th 2001, the United States has paid scant attention to Latin America. On the political front, China’s presence erodes the influence of Washington, whose growing isolation is evident. Only Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Salvador joined the United States-led coalition to fight in Iraq27. Latin American countries are no longer afraid to defy Washington; and they see in China a more conciliatory partner than the IMF. The point is illustrated by Bolivia’s decision to follow Ecuador’s example in nationalising its hydrocarbon sector. China will be taking over the American and European investments. On the oil front, Latin America provides more than a quarter of US imports28; but they have had to reduce their purchases from Venezuela because of President Chávez’ policies. Relations between Caracas and Washington are on the slide. Chávez is seeking to create a common front against what he calls North American imperialism. His rhetoric is reflected in closer relations with governments condemned by Washington, such as Belarus and Iran. China, being a major investor, may enable Venezuela to rid itself of US influence29. But Chávez looks well beyond the function of supplying hydrocarbons. He sees a political role for himself on the international stage. In October 2006, Venezuela made a bid―with China’s support―for one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council―in vain, however. Venezuela fought a bitter battle with Guatemala (which had support from Washington)―and Panama won the election. And China will probably be asked to deliver arms to Caracas, following in the footsteps of Spain (due to supply transport aircraft and corvettes) and Russia (Sukhoi fighter planes). Chávez’ self-confidence has been rewarded by the links forged with China. His project, the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas” is designed to strengthen co-operation between economies in the region. In June 2005, Venezuela concluded an alliance known as Petrocaribe30 with 13 Caribbean states, enabling it to support socialist municipalities in Salvador and Nicaragua31 and to contribute to the popularity of left-wing movements. Similarly, Cuba has achieved oil independence thanks partly to its own production (which covers half the island’s needs), and partly to deliveries from Venezuela. Meanwhile, the region’s two other powers, Mexico and Brazil, are the focus for real attention from Beijing.
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Lefargue, 2006 (Francois, French academic and Professor at the ESG management school and the Studies Institute for International Relations, ‘China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits”, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053#tocto1n1)
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most Latin American countries elected governments of the populist left, with mostly hostile attitudes to American policy the victory of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua last November perplexes the United States, which dreads even the thought of any lessening of its influence in the Latin American continent. US fears are all the more justified the United States has paid scant attention to Latin America China’s presence erodes the influence of Washington, whose growing isolation is evident Latin American countries are no longer afraid to defy Washington; and they see in China a more conciliatory partner than the IMF China will be taking over the American and European investments. On the oil front, Latin America provides more than a quarter of US imports28; but they have had to reduce their purchases from Venezuela because of President Chávez’ policies China, being a major investor, may enable Venezuela to rid itself of US influence29 China will probably be asked to deliver arms to Caracas, following in the footsteps of Spain ) and Russia Cuba has achieved oil independence thanks partly to its own production and partly to deliveries from Venezuela. Meanwhile, the region’s two other powers, Mexico and Brazil, are the focus for real attention from Beijing.
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China is displacing the US as the leader in Latin America
| 3,075 | 57 | 1,265 | 469 | 11 | 203 | 0.023454 | 0.432836 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,911 |
CARACAS, Venezuela — As Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America, China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted access to credit. In recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazil’s national oil company $10 billion. The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come. China’s trade with Latin America has grown quickly this decade, making it the region’s second largest trading partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washington’s influence in the hemisphere. “This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis,” said David Rothkopf, a former Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. “The loans are an example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more active.” Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the economic crisis, including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of clout that has suffered losses from the financial crisis. Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected to push Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba. Meanwhile, China is rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to commodities like soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes.
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Romero and Barrionuevo, 2009 (Simon, Brazil bureau chief for The New York Times specializing in Latin America, Alexei, staff writer for the New York Times, “Deals Help China Expand Sway in Latin America”, 4/15/2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/world/16chinaloan.html?_r=0)
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As Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America, China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while they struggle with sharply slowing economies China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela with access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come. China’s trade with Latin America has grown quickly this decade But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washington’s influence in the hemisphere. “This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis The loans are an example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more active Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected to push Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba China is rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues long-term access to commodities
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The balance of power in America’s backyard has shifted from the U.S. to China
| 1,929 | 77 | 1,127 | 309 | 14 | 187 | 0.045307 | 0.605178 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,912 |
By 2002, China had become the word’s second biggest consumer of oil, after the United States but ahead of Japan. And between 2000 and 2005, Beijing moved up from ninth to third place among the world’s oil importers. These foreign purchases, representing nearly one-third of China’s oil consumption in 2000 and rising to one-half today, is likely to reach 60% between now and 2010. So China has committed itself to a policy of diversifying its supplies of hydrocarbons by investing in Africa, (Sudan and Angola in particular), Central Asia and Latin America. Latin America, with 9.7% of the world’s oil reserves, was producing by 2005 8.8% of world output11. For the time being, China’s presence in the hydrocarbon sector remains modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin American oil, but lags far behind the United States in terms of volume12. By 2005, the region provided 3.1% of China’s oil supplies, 107,000 barrels per day (bpd). This may seem a small amount, but these exports were up by 28% on the previous year (83,000 bpd) and were nearly twenty times more than in 2001. An undeniable rise in importance is taking place, with Latin America’s contribution to China’s oil imports estimated to have doubled last year. China has established particularly close relations with Venezuela, an oil producer in the first league. Venezuela has 6.6% of the world’s oil reserves (putting it in sixth place) and 68% of Latin America’s reserves (as against Mexico’s 11.3%). As a producer it ranks in seventh place, with 4% of world production. In December 2004 and again more recently in August last year, President Hugo Chávez paid an official visit to Beijing, where he and President Hu signed several agreements on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 billion in 2004 and US$2.14 billion in 2005. China’s Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, visited Caracas in January 2005, attesting Beijing’s interest in Venezuela. On that occasion, several new contracts were signed. China plans investments worth US$350 million in the development of 15 oilfields (which might contain up to one billion barrels of oil) and US$60 million towards infrastructure costs (building a rail network, refineries . . .). The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have also signed agreements on offshore gas exploration. Then, at the end of August 2005, the two countries formed a joint company to develop the Zumano oilfield in Anzoátegui State, which promises an output of 50,000 bpd. China has also created a US$40 million credit line for Venezuela’s purchase of agricultural equipment from China. The volume of Venezuela’s oil exports to China rose between 2004 and 2005 from 12,300 bpd to 70,000 bpd. Last year it reached 160,000 bpd13, a figure likely to double over the year ahead, on course to reach 500,000 bpd by 2010. By the second half of 2006, Venezuela was supplying about 5% of China’s oil imports. China is its second biggest customer, after the United States, purchasing about 15% of its oil exports.
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Lefargue, 2006 (Francois, French academic and Professor at the ESG management school and the Studies Institute for International Relations, ‘China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits”, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053#tocto1n1)
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China had become the word’s second biggest consumer of oil, These foreign purchases, representing nearly one-third of China’s oil consumption in 2000 and rising to one-half today, is likely to reach 60% between now and 2010 China has committed itself to a policy of diversifying its supplies by investing in Latin America China’s presence in the hydrocarbon sector remains modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin American oil This may seem a small amount, but these exports were up by 28% on the previous year and were nearly twenty times more than in 2001. An undeniable rise in importance is taking place, with Latin America’s contribution to China’s oil imports estimated to have doubled last year China has established particularly close relations with Venezuela President Chávez signed several agreements on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 b China plans investments worth US$350 million in the development of 15 oilfields The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation ) and Petróleos de Venezuela have also signed agreements on offshore gas exploration
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China is rapidly shoring up Latin American oil
| 3,145 | 46 | 1,176 | 514 | 8 | 184 | 0.015564 | 0.357977 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,913 |
Latin America has 45% of the world’s copper reserves, a quarter of its silver reserves and a third of its pewter reserves: for China it represents an invaluable source of raw materials to draw upon. Chile and Peru between them produce 44% of world copper output and for China, the world’s biggest consumer, half its imports. It is hardly surprising that China is building up its investments in the mining sector. Its giant steel-maker, Shougang Group, via its subsidiary Shougang Hierro Peru, has since 1992 been working several Peruvian iron ore mines, including the one at Marcona to the south of Lima. In Chile, in June 2005, the Chinese company Minmetals Corporation joined forces with Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre)18 to secure annual deliveries of 55,000 tons of copper for 15 years. China may also take a share in developing the Gaby copper mine with its expected yearly production (from 2008 onwards) of 150,000 tons. Among Cuba’s trading partners, China now ranks third after Spain and Venezuela. The relationship is being extended. The island is the world’s third largest producer of nickel19 and has significant reserves of copper and cobalt. In November 2004, on the occasion of President Hu’s visit to Havana, Minmetals and Cubaniquel agreed jointly to develop the nickel deposits at Las Camariocas in Holguín Province, 800 kilometres east of Havana: production has reached 22,500 tons a year. This collaboration is expected to push Cuba’s annual copper production, currently 75,000 tons, up to nearly 132,000 tons. A further deal has been signed between the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) and Cubaniquel to develop the nickel deposit at San Felipe in Camaguey Province. Chinese investments look likely to swell still further in the years ahead. On September 9th 2005, a colloquium was held in Xiamen on China’s opportunities for investment in Cuba. The Cuban delegation proposed 12 projects including building sugar houses and tourist infrastructure. Brazil is also one of the main targets for Chinese investment. After India and Australia, Brazil ranks as China’s third biggest supplier of iron ore, providing a quarter of all its imports. In five years, 2000-2005, China moved up from fifteenth place among Brazil’s trading partners to being its third biggest customer. In October 2001, the Brazilian firm Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the world’s leading producer and exporter of iron ore, undertook to deliver six million tons of ore per year to the steel-maker Baosteel, China’s leading producer. From 2010 onwards the annual order will increase to 20 million tons. In spring 2004, Baosteel, CVRD and Arcelor decided jointly to build a steel-making complex in Brazil, near the port of São Luis in Maranhao state. The plant is designed to produce 3.7 million tons of steel plate per year, from 2007 onwards. It is no further than a day’s journey by rail from the mine at Carajas and a few days by sea from Panama. The total investment came to US$2.5 billion, of which Baosteel put up 60%. CRVD has also concluded agreements with Shougang to deliver iron ore. But Latin America represents not just a source of raw materials, but an agricultural storehouse too.
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Lefargue, 2006 (Francois, French academic and Professor at the ESG management school and the Studies Institute for International Relations, ‘China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits”, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053#tocto1n1)
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Latin America has 45% of the world’s copper reserves, a quarter of its silver reserves and a third of its pewter reserves: for China it represents an invaluable source of raw materials to draw upon. Chile and Peru between them produce 44% of world copper output It is hardly surprising that China is building up its investments in the mining sector. Its giant steel-maker, Shougang Group Peru, has since 1992 been working several Peruvian iron ore mines Among Cuba’s trading partners, China now ranks third after Spain and Venezuela. The relationship is being extended. The island is the world’s third largest producer of nickel and has significant reserves of copper and cobalt on the occasion of President Hu’s visit to Havana, Minmetals and Cubaniquel agreed jointly to develop the nickel deposits at Las Camariocas in Holguín Province This collaboration is expected to push Cuba’s annual copper production, currently 75,000 tons, up to nearly 132,000 tons Chinese investments look likely to swell still further in the years ahead. On September 9th 2005, a colloquium was held in Xiamen on China’s opportunities for investment in Cuba China moved up from fifteenth place among Brazil’s trading partners to being its third biggest customer In spring 2004, Baosteel, CVRD and Arcelor decided jointly to build a steel-making complex in Brazil, Latin America represents not just a source of raw materials, but an agricultural storehouse too.
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China is also shoring up tons of Latin American minerals
| 3,222 | 56 | 1,440 | 525 | 10 | 231 | 0.019048 | 0.44 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,914 |
China’s presence has upset the economic and geostrategic balance in the region. These massive investments have provoked a real debate21 across Latin America, where governments fear their countries may be confined to the role of providing agricultural and mineral raw materials. The figures speak volumes: three quarters of Argentina’s exports to China consist of agricultural products. China is the main customer for soya beans, buying 45% of the total exported; Thailand comes next with 13% and Spain with 7%. And when it comes to Brazil’s exports to China, 37% consist of agricultural products. The dependence of the Latin American countries is undeniable. China is the destination for 70% of the iron ore, 47% of the lead and 37% of the copper exported by Peru, 33% of the pewter exported by Bolivia and 16% of the copper leaving Chile. Far from allowing development, trade with China tends over the long term to weaken the Latin American economies. China reinforces the rentier attitude in these countries. The appreciating prices for raw materials22 and the growth rates in Chile (5.9% in 2004 and then 5.1% in 2005) or Argentina (9.2% in 2005) do little to encourage people to diversify their production. The opening up of trade is the root of many disappointments. Imports from China swamp the local markets, a situation that might be aggravated by the creation of a bilateral free-trade area. The sometimes unfair competition from Chinese goods has also been denounced. In 2005, several governments including Brazil and Argentina23 did not hesitate to employ anti-dumping measures against textiles and toys. Beijing’s trading deficit with Latin America is fairly quickly absorbed. Brazil’s trading surplus with China has been considerably reduced, falling from US$5 billion in 2004 to US$1.48 billion the following year. On top of everything, Latin American countries are up against Chinese competition in foreign markets, especially in the United States. Between 2003 and 2005, with the end of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA), China’s share in US textile imports doubled, increasing from 25% to 56%.
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Lefargue, 2006 (Francois, French academic and Professor at the ESG management school and the Studies Institute for International Relations, ‘China’s Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits”, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053#tocto1n1)
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China’s presence has upset the economic and geostrategic balance in the region. These massive investments have provoked a real debate21 across Latin America where governments fear their countries may be confined to the role of providing agricultural and mineral raw materials China is the main customer for soya beans, buying 45% The dependence of the Latin American countries is undeniable. China is the destination for 70% of the iron ore, 47% of the lead and 37% of the copper exported by Peru trade with China tends over the long term to weaken the Latin American economies. China reinforces the rentier attitude in these countries appreciating prices for raw materials22 do little to encourage people to diversify their production. The opening up of trade is the root of many disappointments. Imports from China swamp the local markets The sometimes unfair competition from Chinese goods has also been denounced On top of everything, Latin American countries are up against Chinese competition in foreign markets
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Chinese engagement in Latin America crushes Latin American economies
| 2,107 | 68 | 1,017 | 335 | 9 | 162 | 0.026866 | 0.483582 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,915 |
WASHINGTON ALSO worries about China's growing presence in Latin America, a concern that has already been the subject of congressional hearings. In fact, some members of Congress view China as the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They cite the huge financial resources China is promising to bring to Latin America, its growing military-to-military relations in the region, and its clear political ambitions there all as potential threats to the long-standing pillar of U.S. policy in the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine. China's interest in Latin America is significant and expanding. The region has become a vital source of raw materials and foodstuffs for China. In the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than sixfold, or by nearly 6o percent a year. Beijing also faces a major political challenge in the region: of the 26 countries that recognize Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America or the Caribbean. China is intent on reducing that number through aggressive diplomacy and increased trade, aid, and investment. Bush administration officials have watched China's growing commercial and political engagement in the region closely. Chinese President Hu Jintao traveled to Latin America twice in the past two years, spending a total of 16 days there. The White House could not have missed the warm welcome he received in the five Latin American countries he visited, the concessions the host governments offered him (such as the quick granting of "market-economy status" to China), and the enormous expectations his presence created of major Chinese investments in roads, ports, and other infrastructure. Hu's trips have been reciprocated by a long series of visits to China by Latin American heads of state, economic officials, and corporate leaders. Many people in Latin America look to China as an economic and political alternative to U.S. hegemony. Although officials in some of these countries are concerned that China, with its lower manu facturing costs, will cut into their sales, profits, and investment, others (mainly South Amer ica's food- and mineral-producing nations) largely see China as a major potential partner for new trade and investment. Brazilian leaders, including President Lula, have said they want to establish a strategic relation ship with Beijing that might involve trade in high-tech products, mutual support in international organizations, and scientitic and cultural collaboration. Interestingly, the recent advances of China (and India as well) have prompted some Latin Americans to examine their own economic and political development, producing a new wave of self-criticism about the region'stumbling performance in recent years and intense discussion about what can be learned from the success of some Asian countries.
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Hakim, 2006 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2006), pp. 39-53, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031841.pdf?acceptTC=true)
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WASHINGTON ALSO worries about China's growing presence in Latin America, a concern that has already been the subject of congressional hearings some members of Congress view China as the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union its growing military-to-military relations in the region, and its clear political ambitions there all as potential threats to the long-standing pillar of U.S. policy in the hemisphere China's interest in Latin America is significant and expanding. The region has become a vital source of raw materials Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than sixfold Hu Jintao traveled to Latin America twice in the past two years, spending a total of 16 days there. The White House could not have missed the warm welcome he received the enormous expectations his presence created of major Chinese investments in roads, ports, and other infrastructure. Hu's trips have been reciprocated by a long series of visits to China by Latin American heads of state Many people in Latin America look to China as an economic and political alternative to U.S. hegemony officials see China as a major potential partner for new trade and investment. Brazilian leaders, including President Lula, have said they want to establish a strategic relation ship with Beijing the recent advances of China have prompted some Latin Americans to examine their own economic and political development
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Currently, rising Chinese influence in the region trades off with US hegemony
| 2,845 | 77 | 1,451 | 440 | 12 | 232 | 0.027273 | 0.527273 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,916 |
The stakes are high for post-embargo trade. Cuba has a gross domestic product (in purchasing power parity) of about $114 billion, putting it in a league with Ecuador and New Zealand. Companies from dozens of countries – including Spain, France, Venezuela and Canada – are already profiting by trade with Cuba. Miami attorney Zamora, who gives legal advice to companies in the U.S. and throughout Latin America, said these are some of the major opportunities for American companies: –Construction. Many houses, for example, are in need of repair. –Resorts, including retirement communities, golf courses and other sports facilities. –Oil refineries (assuming the success of continued oil exploration). –Infrastructure, especially highways, ports and power plants. (Earlier this month, some five million residents of western Cuba were without electricity after a massive blackout.) –Biotechnology and health-care facilities. –Travel to, from and on the island. Many businesses, especially in Florida, are already preparing for trade and investment in post-embargo Cuba, and several Cuba trade groups have started up in Miami and Tampa, among other cities. Trade advocates point out that if U.S. companies don’t start doing business in Cuba, foreign corporations are almost certain to step up their activities there. The French, for example, pulled back their investments when European economies tanked several years ago. They now hope to increase investment in Cuba from a recent level of 150 million euros (about $196 million) to 250 million euros (about $327 million) a year.
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Ediger, ’12 [9/19/12, Don Ediger is a veteran journalist who has worked for The Miami Herald, Associated Press, BusinessWeek and the International Herald Tribune, among other publications, “Cuba’s Post-Castro Future”, http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/19/cubas-post-castro-future/]
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The stakes are high for post-embargo trade. Cuba has a gross domestic product (in purchasing power parity) of about $114 billion, the U.S. and throughout Latin America, said these are some of the major opportunities for American companies: –Construction. Many houses, for example, are in need of repair. –Resorts, including retirement communities, golf courses and other sports facilities. –Oil refineries Infrastructure, especially highways, ports and power plants Biotechnology and health-care facilities. –Travel to businesses, especially in Florida, are already preparing for trade and investment in post-embargo Cuba Trade advocates point out that if U.S. companies don’t start doing business in Cuba, foreign corporations are almost certain to step up their activities there They now hope to increase investment in Cuba
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Repealing the embargo provides boost for US trade
| 1,575 | 49 | 825 | 240 | 8 | 120 | 0.033333 | 0.5 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,917 |
Almost as informative as the decline in warfare has been where this decline is occurring. Traditionally, nations were constrained by opportunity. Most nations did not fight most others because they could not physically do so. Powerful nations, in contrast, tended to fight more often, and particularly to fight with other powerful states. Modern “zones of peace” are dominated by powerful, militarily capable countries. These countries could fight each other, but are not inclined to do so. At the same time, weaker developing nations that continue to exercise force in traditional ways are incapable of projecting power against the developed world, with the exception of unconventional methods, such as terrorism.¶ The world is thus divided between those who could use force but prefer not to (at least not against each other) and those who would be willing to fight but lack the material means to fight far from home. Warfare in the modern world has thus become an activity involving weak (usually neighboring) nations, with intervention by powerful (geographically distant) states in a policing capacity. So, the riddle of peace boils down to why capable nations are not fighting each other. There are several explanations, as Mack has pointed out.¶ The easiest, and I think the best, explanation has to do with an absence of motive. Modern states find little incentive to bicker over tangible property, since armies are expensive and the goods that can be looted are no longer of considerable value. Ironically, this is exactly the explanation that Norman Angell famously supplied before the World Wars. Yet, today the evidence is abundant that the most prosperous, capable nations prefer to buy rather than take. Decolonization, for example, divested European powers of territories that were increasingly expensive to administer and which contained tangible assets of limited value.¶ Of comparable importance is the move to substantial consensus among powerful nations about how international affairs should be conducted. The great rivalries of the twentieth century were ideological rather than territorial. These have been substantially resolved, as Francis Fukuyama has pointed out. The fact that remaining differences are moderate, while the benefits of acting in concert are large (due to economic interdependence in particular) means that nations prefer to deliberate rather than fight. Differences remain, but for the most part the capable countries of the world have been in consensus, while the disgruntled developing world is incapable of acting on respective nations’ dissatisfaction.¶ While this version of events explains the partial peace bestowed on the developed world, it also poses challenges in terms of the future. The rising nations of Asia in particular have not been equal beneficiaries in the world political system. These nations have benefited from economic integration, and this has proved sufficient in the past to pacify them. The question for the future is whether the benefits of tangible resources through markets are sufficient to compensate the rising powers for their lack of influence in the policy sphere. The danger is that established powers may be slow to accommodate or give way to the demands of rising powers from Asia and elsewhere, leading to divisions over the intangible domain of policy and politics. Optimists argue that at the same time that these nations are rising in power, their domestic situations are evolving in a way that makes their interests more similar to the West. Consumerism, democracy, and a market orientation all help to draw the rising powers in as fellow travelers in an expanding zone of peace among the developed nations. Pessimists argue instead that capabilities among the rising powers are growing faster than their affinity for western values, or even that fundamental differences exist among the interests of first- and second-wave powers that cannot be bridged by the presence of market mechanisms or McDonald’s restaurants.¶ If the peace observed among western, developed nations is to prove durable, it must be because warfare proves futile as nations transition to prosperity. Whether this will happen depends on the rate of change in interests and capabilities, a difficult thing to judge. We must hope that the optimistic view is correct, that what ended war in Europe can be exported globally. Prosperity has made war expensive, while the fruits of conflict, both in terms of tangible and intangible spoils have declined in value. These forces are not guaranteed to prevail indefinitely. Already, research on robotic warfare promises to lower the cost of conquest. If in addition, fundamental differences among capable communities arise, then warfare over ideology or policy can also be resurrected. We must all hope that the consolidating forces of prosperity prevail, that war becomes a durable anachronism.
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Gartzke 11 Erik Gartzke is an associate Professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego PhD from Iowa and B.A. from UCSF "SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD" www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/09/erik-gartzke/security-in-an-insecure-world/
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Almost as informative as the decline in warfare has been where this decline is occurring. Traditionally, nations were constrained by opportunity. Most nations did not fight most others because they could not physically do so. Modern “zones of peace” are dominated by powerful, militarily capable countries. These countries could fight each other, but are not inclined to do so weaker developing nations that continue to exercise force in traditional ways are incapable of projecting power Warfare in the modern world has thus become an activity involving weak nations, with intervention by powerful states in a policing capacity The easiest, and I think the best, explanation has to do with an absence of motive. Modern states find little incentive to bicker over tangible property armies are expensive and the goods that can be looted are no longer of considerable value. Yet today the evidence is abundant that the most prosperous, capable nations prefer to buy rather than take Decolonization divested European powers of territories that were increasingly expensive to administer and which contained tangible assets of limited value Of comparable importance is the move to substantial consensus among powerful nations about how international affairs should be conducted. The great rivalries were ideological rather than territorial. These have been substantially resolved, The fact that remaining differences are moderate, while the benefits of acting in concert are large (due to economic interdependence in particular means that nations prefer to deliberate rather than fight Differences remain, but for the most part the capable countries of the world have been in consensus While this version of events explains the partial peace bestowed on the developed world, it also poses challenges in terms of the future. The rising nations of Asia have not been beneficiaries in the world political system. These have benefited from economic integration this has proved sufficient in the past to pacify them these nations are rising in power, their domestic situations are evolving in a way that makes their interests more similar to the West. Consumerism, democracy, and a market orientation all help to draw the rising powers in as fellow travelers in an expanding zone of peace If the peace observed among western, developed nations is to prove durable, it must be because warfare proves futile as nations transition to prosperity We must hope that the optimistic view is correct, that what ended war in Europe can be exported globally Prosperity has made war expensive while the fruits of conflict, both in terms of tangible and intangible spoils have declined in value We must all hope that the consolidating forces of prosperity prevail, that war becomes a durable anachronism.
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Trade eliminates the only rational incentives for war
| 4,898 | 54 | 2,782 | 766 | 8 | 438 | 0.010444 | 0.571802 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,918 |
Those that support the embargo often make the claim that as such a small Caribbean country, the economic advantage to be gained by the United States in lifting its embargo on Cuba would be negligible. This assertion is simply without merit, and the evidence proves it. A committee of former Department of Transportation economists recently noted that eradicating the embargo would add 1.6 billion dollars in revenue to the U.S. economy and establish approximately twenty thousand additional jobs in the U.S. (Weinmann, 2004, 29) Analysts have asserted that had the embargo been lifted, the Cuban people would have been able to use revenues derived from tourism to purchase significant amounts of machinery and agricultural products from the United States. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In fact, the American Farm Bureau has stated that the embargo has caused U.S. businesses to lose out on a major potential export market in agriculture which could have led American farmers to profits upwards of one billion dollars, and to an additional quarter million dollars per year in the exportation of farming machinery and accessories. (Griswold, 2005, 2) The passage of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which banned all trade in foodstuffs to Cuba through U.S. subsidiaries, effectively deepening the Cuban depression, further served to damage U.S. agricultural business interests abroad. (Weinmann, 2004, 24; 29) In addition, the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which allowed U.S. citizens, including those Cuban-Americans who had not been citizens at the time, to commence lawsuits against companies that had engaged in indirect business transactions with the Castro regime has had a crippling affect on a multitude of U.S. businesses. (Vanden, 2006, 360-61) In addition, the maintenance of the embargo requires a significant utilization of national security resources that can clearly be put to better use in protecting America from substantive terrorism threats rather than by using them to enforce an inconsequential ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Thus, from an economic standpoint, the United States does indeed have the potential to benefit from a liberalization of trade with Cuba.
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Safran, ’12 [8/14/12, Brian Safran has a Master of Science in Global Affairs , “End the Cuban Embargo - Brian Safran”, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran]
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the economic advantage to be gained by the United States in lifting its embargo on Cuba would be negligible. This assertion is simply without merit, and the evidence proves it former Department of Transportation economists recently noted that eradicating the embargo would add 1.6 billion dollars in revenue to the U.S. economy and establish approximately twenty thousand additional jobs in the U.S. have asserted that had the embargo been lifted, the Cuban people would have been able to use revenues derived from tourism to purchase significant amounts of machinery and agricultural products from the United States. ( he embargo has caused U.S. businesses to lose out on a major potential export market in agriculture which could have led American farmers to profits upwards of one billion dollars, and to an additional quarter million dollars per year in the exportation of farming machinery and accessories. ( Cuban-Americans who had not been citizens at the time, to commence lawsuits against companies that had engaged in indirect business transactions with the Castro regime has had a crippling affect on a multitude of U.S. businesses from an economic standpoint, the United States does indeed have the potential to benefit from a liberalization of trade with Cuba.
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Embargo Boosts US Economy and competitiveness
| 2,172 | 45 | 1,273 | 337 | 6 | 202 | 0.017804 | 0.599407 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,919 |
Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences. In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'. Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power. The classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma. Apart from such fiscal disempowerment of the State, economic under-performance would also reduce a nation's attraction as a market, as a source of capital and technology, and as a 'knowledge power'. As power shifted from Europe to America, so did the knowledge base of the global economy. As China's power rises, so does its profile as a 'knowledge economy'. Impressed by such arguments, the China Academy of Social Sciences developed the concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to get China's political and military leadership to focus more clearly on economic and technological performance than on military power alone in its quest for Great Power status.5 While China's impressive economic performance, and the consequent rise in China's global profile, has forced strategic analysts to acknowledge this link, the recovery of the US economy in the 1990s had reduced the appeal of the Kennedy thesis in Washington, DC. We must expect a revival of interest in Kennedy's arguments in the current context. A historian of power who took Kennedy seriously, Niall Ferguson, has helped keep the focus on the geopolitical implications of economic performance. In his masterly survey of the role of finance in the projection of state power, Ferguson defines the 'square of power' as the tax bureaucracy, the parliament, the national debt, and the central bank. These four institutions of 'fiscal empowerment' of the state enable nations to project power by mobilizing and deploying financial resources to that end.6 Ferguson shows how vital sound economic management is to strategic policy and national power. More recently, Ferguson has been drawing a parallel between the role of debt and financial crises in the decline of the Ottoman and Soviet Empires and that of the United States. In an early comment on the present financial crisis, Ferguson wrote: We are indeed living through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of how an over-extended empire sought to cope with an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. The empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US. … It remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for America's quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just sell shares to satisfy their creditors. … as in the 1870s the balance of financial power is shifting. Then, the move was from the ancient oriental empires (not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to western Europe. Today the shift is from the US - and other western financial centres - to the autocracies of the Middle East and East Asia. …7 An economic or financial crisis may not trigger the decline of an empire. It can certainly speed up a process already underway. In the case of the Soviet Union, the financial crunch caused by the Afghan War came on top of years of economic under-performance and the loss of political legitimacy of the Soviet State. In a democratic society like the United States, the political legitimacy of the state is constantly renewed through periodic elections. Thus, the election of Barack Obama may serve to renew the legitimacy of the state and by doing so enable the state to undertake measures that restore health to the economy. This the Soviet State was unable to do under Gorbachev even though he repudiated the Brezhnev legacy and distanced himself from it. Hence, one must not become an economic determinist, and historic parallels need not always be relevant. Politics can intervene and offer solutions. Political economy and politics, in the form of Keynesian economics and the 'New Deal' did intervene to influence the geopolitical implications of the Great Depression. Whether they will do so once again in today's America remains to be seen.
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Baru, ‘9 [March 2009, Sanjaya Barus is visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009, pages 163 – 168]
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economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences strong economic performance is the foundation of power 'Victory 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'. Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power. economic under-performance would also reduce a nation's attraction as a market, as a source of capital and technology, and as a 'knowledge power' China developed the concept of CNP) to get China's political and military leadership to focus more clearly on economic and technological performance in its quest for Great Power status. While China's impressive economic performance, and the consequent rise in China's global profile, has forced strategic analysts to acknowledge this link, Ferguson shows how vital sound economic management is to strategic policy and national power. The empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman empire. Today it is the US. … It remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by geopolitical shift one must not become an economic determinist, and historic parallels need not always be relevant. Politics can intervene and offer solutions. Political economy and politics, in the form of Keynesian economics and the 'New Deal' did intervene to influence the geopolitical implications of the Great Depression. Whether they will do so once again in today's America remains to be seen.
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Competitiveness solves Great power war
| 5,454 | 38 | 2,071 | 878 | 5 | 311 | 0.005695 | 0.354214 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
|
4,920 |
HAVANA, Cuba — At the last Summit of the Americas, held in Colombia in April, Washington’s rivals in Latin America and its political allies had the same piece of advice for better US diplomacy in the region: get over your Cuba fixation. Now, with Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) likely to be confirmed as the next secretary of state, the United States will have a top diplomat who has been a frequent critic of America’s 50-year-old effort to force regime change in Havana. In recent years, Kerry has been the Senate’s most prominent skeptic of US-funded pro-democracy efforts that give financial backing to dissident groups in Cuba and beam anti-Castro programming to the island through radio and television programs based in Miami. Kerry has also favored lifting curbs on US travel to the island, and opening up American tourism to the only country in the world the US government restricts its own citizens from visiting. For the rest of Latin America, where leaders say they're eager for Washington to modernize its view of the region and engage in new ways, Cuba remains “a litmus test” for the Obama presidency, according to Julia Sweig, director of Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The strategic benefits of getting Cuba right would reverberate throughout the Americas,” said Sweig, calling Kerry “ideally suited to the task.” “Kerry's instincts and experience in Latin America are to see past lingering and often toxic ideology in the US Congress and bureaucracy in favor of pragmatism and problem solving,” she said. Regardless of Kerry’s record on Cuba policy in the Senate, analysts say he will face several obstacles to major change, not least of which will be the man likely to replace him as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sen. Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey), a Cuban American. If Menendez becomes chairman, then the committee responsible for shaping US foreign policy in the upper house will be led by a hardliner who wants to ratchet up — not dial back — the US squeeze on Havana. So while Kerry may have some latitude to adjust Cuba policy from inside the White House, Latin America experts don’t expect sweeping change — like an end to the Cuba Embargo — which requires Congressional action. “On Latin America, in general, I think Kerry has a longer and broader vision,” said Robert Pastor, professor of international relations at American University. But when it comes to Cuba, he cautioned, “Kerry is also a political realist.”
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Miroff, ’13 [1/2/13, Nick Miroff covers Cuba for GlobalPost, “Can Kerry make friends with Cuba?”, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/cuba/121231/kerry-cuba-secretary-of-state-obama]
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At the last Summit of the Americas, Washington’s rivals in Latin America and its political allies had the same piece of advice for better US diplomacy in the region: get over your Cuba fixation. Now, with Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) likely to be confirmed as the next secretary of state, the United States will have a top diplomat who has been a frequent critic of America’s 50-year-old effort to force regime change in Havana. Kerry has been the Senate’s most prominent skeptic of US-funded pro-democracy efforts that give financial backing to dissident groups in Cuba Kerry has also favored lifting curbs on US travel to the island, and opening up American tourism to the only country in the world the US government restricts its own citizens from visiting. For the rest of Latin America, where leaders say they're eager for Washington to modernize its view of the region and engage in new ways The strategic benefits of getting Cuba right would reverberate throughout the Americas said Sweig, calling Kerry “ideally suited to the task.” Kerry's instincts and experience in Latin America are to see past lingering and often toxic ideology in the US Congress and bureaucracy So while Kerry may have some latitude to adjust Cuba policy from inside the White House — like an end to the Cuba Embargo — which requires Congressional action. I think Kerry has a longer and broader vision But when it comes to Cuba, he cautioned, “Kerry is also a political realist.”
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The Plan would be a big win for Relations and Kerry
| 2,489 | 51 | 1,458 | 416 | 11 | 248 | 0.026442 | 0.596154 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,921 |
Kerry and peace diplomacy out on a limb His boss’s troubles directly affect Secretary of State John Kerry and leave him out on a limb. After meeting President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on May 7, Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced they were convening an international conference to jointly resolve the Syria crisis. But behind this show of accord, US and Russian officials agreed on nothing. Kerry has since moved the conference timeline from late May to June. But the chances of a meeting this summer are fading. In Moscow, the Secretary sensed that the mayhem in Washington had cut the ground from under his feet. Putin, meanwhile, could hardly hide his smiles as US, British, German and Israeli leaders made pilgrimages to Moscow in the past two weeks to try and crack his solid support for the Assad regime and slow his Middle East momentum. On Monday, May 13, the Russian leader staged a scene bearing the hallmarks of a Cold War spy thriller. He ordered the arrest – then expulsion - of Ryan Christopher Fogle, a career diplomat serving as third secretary in the Political Section of the US Embassy in Moscow. The Federal Security Service-FSB accused him of trying to recruit a Russian intelligence officer for the CIA. It was clear that he had fallen victim to an FSB sting operation and the wide publicity was aimed at humiliating the CIA and the State Department. Kerry is being brought up short on the diplomatic initiatives he started rolling in the past five months by the loss of steady direction from Washington. His efforts for a breakthrough on the Syrian impasse have run aground and he is losing momentum for getting the ball rolling for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – on which he focused heavily - when he arrives in the Middle East next month.
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DEBKAfile, 5/17 [5/17/13, DEBKAfile was founded by a team of journalists in June 2000 as an independent Internet Web site, providing an intelligence and security news service. DEBKAfile pioneered intensive news coverage and analysis of global terror before it hit the front pages. Indeed, our profound knowledge of the subject gave DEBKAfile's earliest readers advance notice of 9/11 and its target, the World Trade Center, “John Kerry Loses Clout for Middle East Diplomacy”, http://www.debka.com/article/22973/]
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Kerry and peace diplomacy out on a limb Secretary of State John Kerry and leave him out on a limb. After meeting President Vladimir Putin in Moscow announced they were convening an international conference to jointly resolve the Syria crisis. this show of accord, US and Russian officials agreed on nothing. Secretary sensed that the mayhem in Washington had cut the ground from under his feet. Putin, meanwhile, could hardly hide his smiles as US, British, German and Israeli leaders made pilgrimages to Moscow regime and slow his Middle East momentum. Kerry is being brought up short on the diplomatic initiatives he started rolling in the past five months by the loss of steady direction from Washington. His efforts for a breakthrough on the Syrian impasse have run aground and he is losing momentum for getting the ball rolling for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – on which he focused heavily - when he arrives in the Middle East next month.
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Kerry Credibility key to Middle East peace talks
| 1,789 | 48 | 948 | 307 | 8 | 158 | 0.026059 | 0.514658 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,922 |
Of course, the U.S.-Canadian relationship has had its rocky moments before. In the 1970s and 1980s, in response to public concern over the United States’ economic domination of Canada, Ottawa enacted a wide variety of protectionist measures that irritated Washington. Eventually, the two countries recognized their mutual interests and resolved what differences they had, ratifying the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement in 1987 and its successor, NAFTA, seven years later. Back then, Canada had little choice but to find a way to fix its relationship with the United States, the only game in town. Ottawa is in a different position now. Today, it enjoys a respectable platform of self-confidence, having weathered the financial crisis and ensuing recession far better than the United States. And unlike in the past, Canada can now look beyond its own neighborhood for economic opportunities -- especially to the rising economies of Asia.Indeed, Canada has made a full-court press in the Asia-Pacific region. It is wooing countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea, which are eager to invest and trade in Canadian minerals, energy, and agricultural products. Harper has announced Canada’s intention to explore free-trade negotiations with China, and talks with Japan, Thailand, India, and South Korea are under way. As Harper put it during a visit to China in February, “We want to sell our energy to people who want to buy our energy.” To be sure, Canadian companies will never abandon the U.S. market. Nevertheless, the U.S. recession and the rise of Asia have allowed Canada to diversify its economic relations. In 2010, only 68 percent of Canadian exports were destined for the United States, down from 85 percent in 2000. Canadians are accustomed to benign neglect from a neighbor preoccupied with more urgent global flashpoints, but since that neglect has grown so much as to be malign, they have begun to reappraise their relationship with the United States. As Canada develops closer ties with China and finds more receptive outlets for its exports, the United States may find itself with a less obliging partner to the north. The Keystone XL pipeline will probably be approved eventually -- the economic consequences of not building it are simply too great -- but it will take a long time to undo the damage its delay has done to U.S.-Canadian relations. Obama’s mishandling of an ordinarily routine pipeline permit awakened Canadians to the problems with depending exclusively on the United States as an export market. Already, Ottawa has shifted toward alternative options that include exporting oil from the west and east coasts of Canada later this decade. To that end, the Harper government introduced legislation that will speed regulatory approval of such projects. In May 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy gave a speech before the Canadian parliament in which he celebrated the deep ties between the United States and Canada. “Geography has made us neighbors, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies,” he said. What Kennedy stated then is still true today, and the two countries, linked by shared values and a network of individual contacts, will continue to cooperate for their mutual security and prosperity. Yet none of the truths he listed should excuse neglect. Even relations between close allies require constant care. And when the world’s most powerful country allows narrow political considerations to trample the high-priority interests of its immediate neighbor, it raises questions not only about its ability to maintain an entrenched alliance but also about its capacity for steady global leadership.
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Burney and Hampson, ’12 [6/21/12, Derek H. Burney was Senior Strategic Advisor of Norton Rose, former Chief of Staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, and Canadian Ambassador to the US, and Fen Olser Hampson is the Chancellor’s Professor & Director of NPSIA, Professor of International Affairs, “How Obama Lost Canada”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada?page=show]
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Of course, the U.S.-Canadian relationship has had its rocky moments before. in response to public concern over the United States’ economic domination of Canada Ottawa enacted a wide variety of protectionist measures that irritated Washington. E then, Canada had little choice but to find a way to fix its relationship with the United States, the only game in town. Ottawa is in a different position now Today, it enjoys a respectable platform of self-confidence, having weathered the financial crisis and ensuing recession far better than the United States. And unlike in the past, Canada can now look beyond its own neighborhood for economic opportunities -- especially to the rising economies of Asia.Indeed, Canada has made a full-court press in the Asia-Pacific region. It is wooing countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea, which are eager to invest and trade in Canadian minerals, energy, and agricultural products. We want to sell our energy to people who want to buy our energy Nevertheless, the U.S. recession and the rise of Asia have allowed Canada to diversify its economic relations. Canadians are accustomed to benign neglect from a neighbor preoccupied with more urgent global flashpoints, but since that neglect has grown so much as to be malign, they have begun to reappraise their relationship with the United States. the United States may find itself with a less obliging partner to the north The Keystone XL pipeline will probably be approved eventually but it will take a long time to undo the damage its delay has done to U.S.-Canadian relations. Obama’s mishandling of an ordinarily routine pipeline permit awakened Canadians to the problems with depending exclusively on the United States as an export market. . Yet none of the truths he listed should excuse neglect. Even relations between close allies require constant care. And when the world’s most powerful country allows narrow political considerations to trample the high-priority interests of its immediate neighbor, it raises questions not only about its ability to maintain an entrenched allianc
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US-Canada Relations are not resilient and are at a crossroads – action now is key
| 3,706 | 81 | 2,093 | 591 | 15 | 334 | 0.025381 | 0.565144 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,923 |
In anticipation of U.S. involvement in the region, Anatol von Hahn calls on Canada to strengthen its own Americas policy and devote more resources to the region. Through its engagement in Latin America, Canada can build not only a competitive edge, but it can shore up Canada’s relationship with the U.S. as Brazil, Mexico and others rise in strategic and economic importance to our southern neighbour. Rebuilding a coalition in the region to defend and sustain democratic gains in the region is also critical, according to John Graham. Given the similarities between Obama and Canada’s Americas strategies, Obama’s February 19 visit to Canada and the upcoming Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago this April will be important venues for this discussion.
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Moore, ’09 [February 2009, Peter Moore is the editor for he Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) to complement a new long-term policy for Latin America led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Note from the Editor — How Will Obama Transform the Americas?”, http://www.focal.ca/pdf/focalpoint_february2009.pdf]
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In anticipation of U.S. involvement in the region Canada to strengthen its own Americas policy and devote more resources to the region Through its engagement in Latin America Canada shore up Canada’s relationship with the U.S. rise in strategic and economic importance to our southern neighbour. Rebuilding a coalition in the region to defend and sustain democratic gains in the region is also critical, according to John Graham. Given the similarities between Obama and Canada’s Americas strategies
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Engagement in Latin America- boosts relations
| 763 | 45 | 499 | 123 | 6 | 77 | 0.04878 | 0.626016 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,924 |
Of graver import would be the will and capability of Canada itself to continue supporting the North American defense structure. With its ongoing debt crisis, its traditional aversion to U.S. military initiatives, and the fading of the Soviet threat, Canada might reduce even further its NORAD and NATO commitments. It might choose to believe that through its control of territory crucial to the Western alliance, plus its vital natural resources, it could continue to wield disproportionate influence on international and continental security planning. More likely, if Ottawa continued to stint on its defense spending and became increasingly unable to patrol or secure its own borders, the United States would feel compelled to step in and do the job itself. In that event America would rekindle all the deepest passions about Canadian sovereignty, especially in the Arctic. Its development in the late 1980s proved a signal advance in continental security, although some Canadians believed that new radar technology would render the network obsolete by the end of the century. Others feared it would draw Canada further into the Star Wars strategizing of Pentagon planners. Paved Paws did not assuage the larger fear of military analysts that by the early 1990s, after the START Treaty had been signed by the United States and Russia, Canada the front line of any nuclear attack on North America, stood to face an expanded armory of Russian cruise missile which could be launched southward from the Arctic through Canadian airspace. A provision in the treaty to rescue both superpowers nuclear stockpiles ironically permitted the Russians, as part of a trade-off to increase their cruise missiles arsenal by nearly half. Thus, instead of landbased ICBMs, easier to track and shoot down with their predictable trajectories, Canada now faces the possibility of some day having to track one or more cigar-shaped cruises streaking at tree level over Canadian territory toward a designated target. That prospect, however dim at the moment, could take on sharper tones in the context of these possible developments: Quebec’s separation and the emergence to America’s north of a fragmented Canada, neither event enhancing the continent’s security; Canada’s military inadequacies and an erosion of Canada-U.S. relations, which might send signals inviting aggression by the Western alliance’s adversaries; or a political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, which would precipitate an international crisis. Any prolonged crisis, as security analysts know, involves not only heightened tensions and escalating suspicions but a shift in emphasis to preparing for a very rapid response if hostilities erupt. In such situations the usual safeguards are sometimes apt to be disregarded or even removed.
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Lamont, 94 [Lansing, national political correspondent for Time Magazine’s Washington bureau from 1961-1968, chief Canada correspondent and United Nations bureau chief from 1971-1975, member of the Council on Foreign Relations “Breakup: The coming end of Canada and the stakes for America”, 1994, p. 233-5]
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Of graver import would be the will of Canada to continue supporting the North American defense structure Canada might reduce its NORAD and NATO commitments Canada the front line of any nuclear attack on North America stood to face an expanded armory of Russian cruise missile which could be launched southward from the Arctic through Canadian airspace. instead of landbased ICBMs, easier to track and shoot down with their predictable trajectories Canada now faces the possibility of some day having to track one or more cigar-shaped cruises streaking at tree level over Canadian territory toward a designated target. an erosion of Canada-U.S. relations might send signals inviting aggression by the Western alliance’s adversaries or a political upheaval in the former Soviet Union which would precipitate an international crisis Any prolonged crisis involves not only heightened tensions and escalating suspicions but a shift in emphasis to preparing for a very rapid response if hostilities erupt. In such situations the usual safeguards are sometimes apt to be disregarded or even removed.
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Canadian relations solve global nuclear war
| 2,791 | 43 | 1,093 | 432 | 6 | 169 | 0.013889 | 0.391204 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,925 |
Addressing the wide range of threats confronting America’s security interests in North America will require NORAD’s involvement. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to blow up a U.S.-bound jetliner was al-Qaeda’s most recent effort to cause mass casualties in America.[22] In addition, threats to energy, communication, and computer networks persist. Malicious third parties can attack the United States through vulnerable intermediaries, such as Canada, which offers a huge backdoor into the U.S. computer networks. Much of the infrastructure of the two nations—from railroads to aviation to pipelines and electrical systems—is inextricably intertwined. Canada is also America’s largest trading partner, accounting for many links in U.S. supply chains. NORAD and NORTHCOM have partnered with a number of agencies—including the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Strategic Command— to protect U.S. networks. This cooperation will help NORAD to secure U.S. systems against potential attack, but NORAD does not currently have a lead cyber-security role.[23] The United States needs to deepen cooperation with its North American partners on cyber security. Both the Canadian and U.S. economies depend on a secure and functioning cyberspace. Computer systems and infrastructure in both countries are linked and a substantial amount of bilateral trade is conducted through the Internet. Since cyber terrorists and criminals can operate from anywhere, integration of cyber-security efforts is essential to protect computer infrastructure. Integration is especially necessary for Canada because its 200 law enforcement and 2,500 military personnel dedicated to cyber security are insufficient to prevent cyber attacks effectively. Through NORAD, Canada and the United States could coordinate cyber security with the various military commands and civilian agencies.[24] Cooperation with Mexico as its economy and cyber infrastructure develop is also vital, as the U.S. and Mexican governments acknowledged by creating the Working Group on Cyber-Security in 2004.[25]
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Carafano et al 2010 – James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Jena Baker McNeill is Policy Analyst for Homeland Security and Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political–Military Analysis at Hudson Institute (“Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/expand-norad-to-improve-security-in-north-america)
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Addressing the wide range of threats confronting America’s security interests in North America will require NORAD’s involvement threats to energy, communication, and computer networks persist Malicious third parties can attack the U S through intermediaries, such as Canada offers a huge backdoor into U.S. networks the infrastructure of the two is inextricably intertwined The U S needs to deepen cooperation with its North American partners on cyber security Both the Canadian and U.S. economies depend on a secure and functioning cyberspace. Since cyber terrorists can operate from anywhere, integration of cyber-security efforts is essential to protect computer infrastructure
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Relations key to cyber threat management
| 2,119 | 41 | 680 | 299 | 6 | 98 | 0.020067 | 0.327759 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,926 |
U.S. Arctic policy is first and foremost, in a foreign policy sense, focused on cooperation with the eight states that have territory in the Arctic, and there is no more important bilateral relationship in that context for us than Canada. The United States has exceptionally good cooperation with Canada on a tremendous range of issues, as befits two countries that share a border of thousands of miles.¶ I’ll mention just one example out of many. In 2003, the U.S. National Ice Service, the Canadian Ice Service and the International Ice Service formed a special partnership, the North American Ice Service that combines the strengths and resources of all three organizations. The NAIS provides integrated ice service planning and operations for both governments, and the services’ combined efforts avoid duplication and promote maritime safety and environmental protection.¶ Of course, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards work closely on shared missions to promote safety and protect the environment. U.S. and Canadian scientists are also working together on numerous projects related to the International Polar Year.¶ We have much Arctic business with Canada, but of course we have important relationships with the other Arctic States as well. Russia is a key example, where there is an important long-term need to maintain bilateral cooperation. There are many facets to that relationship, including efforts to assist Russia with environmental protection and remediation in the Russian Far East. Security Issues¶ There is, naturally, a security dimension to U.S. interests in the Arctic as with many other places. And when I speak of security, I am referring to a broad range of economic, energy, defense and related security interests. This fits in with close U.S.-Canada cooperation on related issues. For example, the U.S. and Canada have been partners in the common defense of North America for over 60 years, including through NORAD.¶ There is no more important trading partner for the U.S. than Canada, measured in volume or value, goods or services. Energy is also a critical part of our bilateral relationship. Canada is our single largest supplier of imported crude oil and petroleum products, natural gas, electricity and uranium, and it is a stable supplier.¶ Although there are no longer Cold War tensions in the region, the U.S. continues to have strong national security interests in the Arctic. We have a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability, controlling our borders, carrying out military exercises in the region, and moving ships and aircraft freely under customary international law rights and freedoms as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.¶ Security issues in the Arctic play a key role in determining whether and to what extent the US Government will invest in new icebreakers, which is a matter under active consideration.¶ The Arctic is an area rich in natural resources, and the U.S. promotes sustainable development in that region. Transportation is a matter of considerable interest. Thus, with respect to commercial shipping, Canada and the U.S. are leading a major effort in the Arctic Council to estimate future shipping activity and needs in the Arctic Ocean as a consequence of predicted sea ice melting. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) will use 2004 as a baseline, and will extrapolate to 2020 and 2050, while taking into consideration impacts on indigenous people, the environment and the regional economy. The Assessment will be the largest and most comprehensive effort to look at current and future
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Evan T. Bloom 7, Deputy Director for Polar and Scientific Affairs, US Dept of State, April 20, 2007, “The Arctic,” http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2007/85350.htm
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U.S. Arctic policy is first and foremost focused on cooperation with the eight states that have territory in the Arctic, and there is no more important bilateral relationship in that context for us than Canada We have much Arctic business with Canada There is a security dimension to U.S. interests in the Arctic This fits in with close U.S.-Canada cooperation on related issues. For example, the U.S. and Canada have been partners through NORAD There is no more important trading partner for the U.S. than Canada the U.S. continues to have strong national security interests in the Arctic. We have a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability carrying out military exercises in the region, and moving ships and aircraft freely under customary international law The Arctic is an area rich in natural resources, and the U.S. promotes sustainable development in that region. Canada and the U.S. are leading a major effort in the Arctic Council to estimate future shipping activity and needs in the Arctic Ocean as a consequence of predicted sea ice melting to
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Canada relations are key to Arctic stability
| 3,572 | 44 | 1,065 | 567 | 7 | 176 | 0.012346 | 0.310406 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,927 |
The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.”
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Wallace & Staples 10 Michael Wallace is Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia; Steven Staples is President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa, March 2010, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons A Task Long Overdue”, http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf
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The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the U S and Russia which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.”
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Arctic conflict goes nuclear
| 3,603 | 28 | 1,026 | 549 | 4 | 162 | 0.007286 | 0.295082 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,928 |
The U.S. and Canada also work closely to resolve transboundary environmental issues, an area of increasing importance in the bilateral relationship. A principal instrument of this cooperation is the International Joint Commission (IJC), established as part of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to resolve differences and promote international cooperation on boundary waters. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 is another historic example of joint cooperation in controlling transboundary water pollution. The two governments also consult semiannually on transboundary air pollution. Under the Air Quality Agreement of 1991, both countries have made substantial progress in coordinating and implementing their acid rain control programs and signed an annex on ground level ozone in 2000. In June 2003, Canada and the U.S. announced a new border air quality initiative designed to increase cooperation in combating cross-border air pollution, including particulate matter
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US Department of State, ’08 [2008, US Department of State, “Canada (03/06)”, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/canada/63660.htm]
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The U.S. and Canada also work closely to resolve transboundary environmental issues, an area of increasing importance in the bilateral relationship. The two governments also consult semiannually on transboundary air pollution. U both countries have made substantial progress in coordinating and implementing their acid rain control programs and signed an annex on ground level ozone in 2000 Canada and the U.S. announced a new border air quality initiative designed to increase cooperation in combating cross-border air pollution, including particulate matter
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US Canadian relations key to environment and stopping air pollution
| 983 | 67 | 559 | 141 | 10 | 80 | 0.070922 | 0.567376 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,929 |
Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs [*27] that is worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. Between them, they aid understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the center of concerns for sustainable development." n3 While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects a concern about the natural environment. n4 Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates both of these concerns. n5
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Driesen ’03, David, Professor of Law at Syracuse, Fall/Spring 2003, Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, Lexis Nexis
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Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations . The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature" n4 Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates both of these concerns.
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Air pollution causes extinction
| 998 | 31 | 392 | 159 | 4 | 65 | 0.025157 | 0.408805 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
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4,930 |
(Reuters) - The 50th anniversary of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba on Tuesday was met with little fanfare on the island, where Cubans said it was a failed policy that had succeeded only in making their lives more difficult.¶ They said if the embargo was lifted, they likely would live a little better, but some said it also would increase pressure on the Cuban government to fix problems that for years it has blamed on U.S. sanctions.¶ On February 7, 1962 what had been a partial embargo became a nearly total one as President John F. Kennedy tried to step up pressure on Cuba's fiery young leader Fidel Castro, who at the height of the Cold War had aligned his country with the Soviet Union.¶ The Kennedy administration hoped the trade ban would disrupt the Cuban economy and undermine the Castro government.¶ Half a century and nine U.S. presidents later, Fidel Castro, though mostly retired, is still around, his brother Raul Castro is leading the country and the communist system they created remains in place.¶ But the embargo is still the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean island 90 miles from Florida.¶ The "blockade," as its known in Cuba, failed to achieve its primary objective, but has made things more difficult and more expensive for the average Cuban, said retiree Juan Jorge Castillo, 67.¶ "We know that that the (country) that embargoes us is a power and that the power could sell us (products) more cheaply," he said. "We have to go to other places and acquire them more expensively. The objective is to destroy us, to drown us."¶ Roberto Esteban, a self-employed vendor of Cuban handicrafts, agreed, saying Cuba's chronic economic woes are attributable to the U.S. sanctions.¶ "It does a lot of damage to us. There are many people here who think that's not the case, that it's the country, an internal problem," he said at his stand in central Havana.¶ DOING HARM¶ "I don't think it's an internal problem. The blockade exists and it's doing harm," he said.¶ Communist Party newspaper Granma had nothing about the anniversary on Tuesday, but Cuban television news repeated the government's contention that the embargo has cost the island $975 billion over the years, a figure that many experts consider inflated.¶ The embargo allows U.S. sales of agricultural goods and medicine to Cuba and U.S. President Barack Obama has loosened travel restrictions to the island.¶ Many Cubans say the persistence of the embargo cannot be blamed solely on the U.S. government.¶ They believe vested interests in the Cuban exile community in the United States want it to continue for their own economic and political interest, and they say their own government finds it a convenient scapegoat.¶ "It's like it's a shield for the bad things they've done here," said vegetable salesman Rafael Garcia. "It influences in part what happens, but it does not determine everything."¶ "I don't think the embargo is killing us or doing as much as the government says," said Rachel, a teacher who did not want to give her full name.¶ "If they did away with the embargo, our government would have no one to blame for the way things are and we would have the possibility to say to the government 'now what are you going to do? How are you going to fix it?" she said.¶ Dissident economist Oscar Espinoza Chepe said the embargo had only served "to give the Cuban government an alibi to declare Cuba a fortress under siege, to justify repression and to (pass) the blame for the economic disaster in Cuba."¶
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Jeff Franks, Feb 7, 2012, Cubans say U.S. embargo a failure at 50, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-cuba-usa-embargo-idUSTRE81700M20120208, Writer/ Reporter for Reuters
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The 50th anniversary of the U.S. embargo against Cuba was met with little fanfare on the island, where Cubans said it was a failed policy that had succeeded only in making their lives more difficult. They said if the embargo was lifted, they likely would live a little better it also would increase pressure on the Cuban government to fix problems that for years it has blamed on U.S. sanctions. The "blockade, failed to achieve its primary objective, but has made things more difficult and more expensive for the average Cuban the embargo has cost the island $975 billion over the years Cubans say the persistence of the embargo cannot be blamed solely on the U.S. government. If they did away with the embargo, our government would have no one to blame for the way things are and we would have the possibility to say to the government 'now what are you going to do? How are you going to fix it?" she said. economist Oscar Espinoza Chepe said the embargo had only served "to give the Cuban government an alibi to declare Cuba a fortress under siege, to justify repression and to (pass) the blame for the economic disaster in Cuba."
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Cubans want the Embargo Lifted, makes their lives to difficult and frustrated at their Government
| 3,510 | 98 | 1,132 | 600 | 15 | 202 | 0.025 | 0.336667 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,931 |
¶ The embargo, fully in place since 1962, has done $108 billion in damage to the Cuba economy, but also has violated the constitutional rights of Americans and made a market of 11 million people off limits to U.S. companies, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez told reporters.¶ ¶ "The blockade is, without doubt, the principal cause of the economic problems of our country and the essential obstacle for (our) development," he said, using Cuba's term for the embargo.¶ ¶ "The blockade provokes suffering, shortages, difficulties that reach each Cuban family, each Cuban child," Rodriguez said.¶ ¶ He spoke at a press conference that Cuba stages each year ahead of what has become an annual vote in the United Nations on a resolution condemning the embargo. The vote is expected to take place next month.¶ ¶ Last year, 186 countries voted for the resolution, while only the United States and Israel supported the embargo, Rodriguez said.¶ ¶ Lifting the embargo would improve the image of the United States around the world, he said, adding that it would also end what he called a "massive, flagrant and systematic violation of human rights."¶ ¶ That violation includes restrictions on U.S. travel to the island that require most Americans to get U.S. government permission to visit and a ban on most U.S. companies doing business in Cuba, he said.¶ ¶ "The prohibition of travel for Americans is an atrocity from the constitutional point of view," Rodriguez said.¶ ¶ Cuba has its own limits on travel that make it difficult for most of its citizens to leave the country for any destination.¶ ¶ Rodriguez said the elimination of the embargo would provide a much-needed tonic for the sluggish U.S. economy.¶ ¶ "In a moment of economic crisis, lifting the blockade would contribute to the United States a totally new market of 11 million people. It would generate employment and end the situation in which American companies cannot compete in Cuba," he said.
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Jeff Franks, September 20th 2012, Cuba says ending U.S. embargo would help both countries, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/us-cuba-usa-embargo-idUSBRE88J15G20120920, Writer/ Reporter for Reuters
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The embargo has done $108 billion in damage to the Cuba economy Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez The blockade is, without doubt, the principal cause of the economic problems of our country and the essential obstacle for (our) development he said The blockade provokes suffering, shortages, difficulties that reach each Cuban family, each Cuban child, Lifting the embargo would improve the image of the United States around the world, he said, adding that it would also end what he called a "massive, flagrant and systematic violation of human rights Rodriguez said the elimination of the embargo would provide a much-needed tonic for the sluggish U.S. economy. "In a moment of economic crisis, lifting the blockade would contribute to the United States a totally new market of 11 million people. It would generate employment and end the situation in which American companies cannot compete in Cuba," he said.
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Cuba Wants to End the Embargo due to potential economic benefits
| 1,953 | 65 | 911 | 326 | 11 | 146 | 0.033742 | 0.447853 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,932 |
Is there a greater example of utter folly than America’s superannuated policy toward Cuba? During more than 50 years corrupted by covert actions, economic sabotage, travel bans and unending embargo, the United States managed to make Castro and Cuba an international symbol of proud independence. Intent on isolating Cuba, Washington has succeeded only in isolating itself in its own hemisphere. Intent on displacing Fidel Castro, the U.S. enmity only added to his nationalist credentials.¶ A recent visit reveals a Cuba that is already beginning a new, post-Castro era. That only highlights the inanity of the continuing U.S. embargo, a cruel relic of a Cold War era that is long gone.¶ Cuba is beginning a new experiment, driven by necessity, of trying to build its own version of market socialism in one country. Just as populist movements in the hemisphere looked to Castro and Cuba for inspiration, now Cuba is learning from its allies as it cautiously seeks to open up its economy. A former minister of the economy spoke of how Cuba is committed to fostering private coops and businesses, and is beginning a push to make more state enterprises make their own way.¶ This month, 100 state-run produce markets and 26 other establishments are scheduled to become private cooperatives. The government says many more establishments will follow, beginning in 2014, as an alternative to small and medium-size state businesses in retail and food services, transportation, light manufacturing and construction, among other sectors.¶ Despite the embargo, José Martí International Airport displays the new vitality. Hundreds of Cuban Americans fly into see relatives, bringing everything from flat-screen TVs to consumer basics. Since President Obama lifted restrictions on family visits in 2009, remittances and material support from Cuban Americans play a growing role in the microeconomy of the island.¶ Whereas in the 1990s, Havana was willing to permit only limited private enterprise as an emergency measure, government officials now speculate openly about aiming toward 50 percent of Cuba’s GDP in private hands within five years. Of course, an expanding small business sector won’t resolve some central issues facing the island: access to large-scale credit and investment and the need to boost exports and address anemic productivity, not to mention the demands of an aging population.¶ In Havana, there is more talk about Brazil’s investment in renovating Mariel Harbor than about Edward Snowden. Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht had to resist threats by Florida’s state government to cut off any state contracts if it invested in Cuba. This enormous deep-water port is designed to handle trade with the United States and beyond in a post-embargo world, if the embargo is ever ended.¶ Cuba’s official media remains sclerotic, though there are spirited debates in a few online outlets. But the government appears to understand that the explosion of social media will transform communications and politics, and however tentatively, realizes it has little choice but to change if it is to engage a younger generation.¶ It is long past time for the United States to end the embargo and influence Cuba, rather than threaten it. Ironically, as a result of a new Cuban migration law lifting more than 50 years of restrictions on the ability of its citizens to travel freely abroad, taking effect this year, Cubans are now freer to travel to the United States than Americans are to Cuba. The president can’t end the travel ban without Congressional approval, but as Peter Kornbluhexplained in a recent piece in The Nation, he can take several steps that would transform our policy.¶ Obama should start by removing Cuba from the State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism, terminating the economic and commercial sanctions that come with that designation. The Treasury could stop fining international banks for doing business with Cuba, a practice that impedes the country’s slow opening to private enterprise. At the same time, the president could expand licensing for travel to Cuba, making it easier for entrepreneurs, scientists, doctors and others to travel and explore commercial possibilities. The Cold War “Cuban Democracy and Contingency Planning Program,” designed for “regime change,” should be reconfigured to a people-to-people exchange program that would actually have some influence.
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Katrina Vanden Heuvel on July 2, 2013, The U.S should end the Cuban Embargo. http://www.thenation.com/blog/175067/us-should-end-cuban-embargo#axzz2YHSAm2Up , Editor and Publisher of The Nation. Her articles have appeared in The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, Foreign Policy magazine and The Boston Globe.
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Is there a greater example of utter folly than America’s superannuated policy toward Cuba Intent on isolating Cuba, Washington has succeeded only in isolating itself in its own hemisphere. Cuba is beginning a new experiment, driven by necessity of trying to build its own version of market socialism Cuba cautiously seeks to open up its economy Cuba is committed to fostering private coops and businesses, and is beginning a push to make more state enterprises make their own way Since President Obama lifted restrictions on family visits in 2009, remittances and material support from Cuban Americans play a growing role in the microeconomy of the island. government officials now speculate openly about aiming toward 50 percent of Cuba’s GDP in private hands within five years It is long past time for the United States to end the embargo and influence Cuba, rather than threaten it. Obama should start by removing Cuba from the State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism, terminating the economic and commercial sanctions that come with that designation The Cold War “Cuban Democracy and Contingency Planning Program,” designed for “regime change,” should be reconfigured to a people-to-people exchange program that would actually have some influence.
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Cuba is implementing economic reforms but unless the embargo is lifted they cannot achieve complete success, repealing it is key to allow the U.S help influence the development of Cuba’s market economy
| 4,407 | 202 | 1,269 | 690 | 32 | 199 | 0.046377 | 0.288406 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,933 |
HAVANA (AP) — The world is much changed since the early days of 1962, but one thing has remained constant: The United States’ economic embargo on Cuba, a near-total trade ban that turned 50 on Tuesday.¶ Supporters say it is a justified measure against a repressive Communist government that has never stopped being a thorn in Washington’s side. Critics call it a failed policy that has hurt ordinary Cubans instead of the government.¶ All acknowledge that it has not accomplished its core mission of toppling Fidel Castro or his brother and successor, Raúl.¶ “All this time has gone by, and yet we keep it in place,” said Wayne Smith, who was a young American diplomat in Havana in 1961 when relations were severed and who returned as the chief American diplomat after they were partially re-established under President Jimmy Carter. “We talk to the Russians, we talk to the Chinese, we have normal relations even with Vietnam,” Mr. Smith said. “We trade with all of them. So why not with Cuba?”¶ In the White House, the first sign of the looming total embargo came when President John F. Kennedy told his press secretary to buy him as many H. Upmann Cuban cigars as he could find. The aide came back with 1,200.¶ Although trade restrictions had been imposed by his predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mr. Kennedy announced the total embargo on Feb. 3, 1962, citing “the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet Communism with which the government of Cuba is publicly aligned.”¶ It went into effect four days later at the height of the cold war, a year removed from the failed C.I.A.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion meant to oust Communism from Cuba and eight months before the Soviet attempts to put nuclear missiles on the island brought the two superpowers to the brink of war.¶ Little was planned to observe Tuesday’s anniversary, but Cuban-American members of Congress issued a joint statement vowing to keep the heat on Cuba.¶ Supporters of the policy acknowledge that many American strategic concerns from the 1960s are now in the past, such as curbing Soviet influence and keeping Fidel Castro from exporting revolution throughout Latin America. But they say that other justifications remain, such as the confiscation of United States property in Cuba and the need to press for greater freedoms on the island.¶ “We have a hemispheric commitment to freedom and democracy and respect for human rights,” said José Cárdenas, a former National Security Council staff member on Cuba under President George W. Bush. “I still think that those are worthy aspirations.”¶ With just 90 miles of sea between Florida and Cuba, the United States would be a natural No. 1 trade partner and source of tourism.¶ The embargo is a constant talking point for island authorities, who blame it for shortages of everything from medical equipment to the concrete needed for highway construction. Cuba frequently fulminates against the “blockade” at the United Nations and demands the United States end its “genocidal” policy. Every fall, a vast majority of nations back a resolution condemning the embargo.
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THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/americas/american-embargo-on-cuba-has-50th-anniversary.html?_r=0
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The United States’ economic embargo on Cuba a failed policy that has hurt ordinary Cubans instead of the government. “We talk to the Russians, we talk to the Chinese, we have normal relations even with Vietnam We trade with all of them. So why not with Cuba?” Supporters of the policy acknowledge that many American strategic concerns from the 1960s are now in the past, “We have a hemispheric commitment to freedom and democracy and respect for human rights,” said José Cárdenas, a former National Security Council staff member on Cuba With just 90 miles of sea between Florida and Cuba, the United States would be a natural No. 1 trade partner and source of tourism. The embargo is a constant talking point for island authorities, who blame it for shortages of everything from medical equipment to the concrete needed for highway construction. Cuba frequently fulminates against the “blockade” at the United Nations and demands the United States end its “genocidal” policy
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The Embargo is a failed policy, Cuba is pushing for the U.S to End the Embargo
| 3,089 | 78 | 974 | 512 | 16 | 162 | 0.03125 | 0.316406 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,934 |
For the first time in more than fifty years, Cuban citizens can travel abroad without permission from their government. The move, part of a broader reform package being phased in by Raul Castro, underscores the irrationality of America’s continuation of a five-decade old embargo.¶ While the embargo has been through several legal iterations in the intervening years, the general tenor of the U.S. position toward Cuba is a hardline not-in-my-backyard approach to communism a la the Monroe Doctrine. The official position is outdated, hypocritical, and counterproductive.¶ The Cuban embargo was inaugurated by a Kennedy administration executive order in 1960 as a response to the confiscation of American property in Cuba under the newly installed Castro regime. The current incarnation of the embargo – codified primarily in the Helms-Burton Act – aims at producing free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties.¶ Since Fidel Castro abdicated power to his brother Raul in 2008, the government has undertaken more than 300 economic reforms designed to encourage enterprise, and restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal governance, electronics access, and more. Cuba is still a place of oppression and gross human rights abuse, but recent events would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the right direction.¶ Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.¶ At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum.¶ At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims.¶ Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges.¶ Yet, estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.¶ What’s worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores.¶ Repealing the embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. China, a communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government.¶ Which, of course, begs the question: when will the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo? If Cuba is trending towards democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo to be rolled back?¶ The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism.¶ A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform makes little sense, especially when America’s allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It keeps a broader discussion about smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.
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Daniel Hanson, Dayne Batten & Harrison Ealey 1/16/2013 It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cubahttp://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/
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For the first time in more than fifty years, Cuban citizens can travel abroad without permission from their government The move by Raul Castro, underscores the irrationality of America’s continuation of a five-decade old embargo. The official position is outdated, hypocritical, and counterproductive Since 2008 the government has undertaken more than 300 economic reforms designed to encourage enterprise, and restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal governance, electronics access, and more recent events would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the right direction. Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States , the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year. . Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum. the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent. What’s worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores. The cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism. it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.
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The Embargo must End, Its Outdated, Impractical, and economically detrimental
| 5,695 | 78 | 2,384 | 877 | 10 | 377 | 0.011403 | 0.429875 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,935 |
TAMPA — Saying "It's time to try something new," U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor on Monday called for the Obama administration and Congress to lift travel restrictions and the 51-year-old trade embargo on Cuba.¶ "Cuba is changing," said Castor, D-Tampa, who left on a fact-finding trip there Wednesday evening and returned Saturday. "They have embarked on economic reforms that the United States of America should promote. The United States of America now should normalize relations and begin a constructive dialogue with the island nation."¶ Castor has worked for years to help arrange direct flights from Tampa International Airport to Havana, but her support for ending the embargo and travel restrictions goes further than before.¶ Castor said Fidel Castro is no longer in power, described his brother, President Raul Castro, as "a much more practical ruler," and said there is a generational change in Cuba's government.¶ "They are still a hard-core communist nation, but they are embarking on market reforms in their economy that deserve encouragement," said Castor, who traveled with members of her staff and representatives of the nonprofit, nonpartisan Center for Democracy in the Americas.¶ Castor said she plans to ask President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry "to open talks to lead to greater trade and travel opportunities."¶ "This should not be done with blinders on, however," she said. "There are still very significant human rights challenges in Cuba. It is still, to many extents, a repressive regime that does not allow citizens to enjoy all of the human rights that we all enjoy.¶ "But after 50 years of an embargo and isolation that's proved that it hasn't worked, it's time to try something new and refresh our relationship," she said.¶ Easing the restrictions would offer the United States a variety of benefits, Castor said: a new market for manufacturers who cannot sell to Cuba now, more influence over a Cuban offshore oil drilling industry whose antiquated technology could threaten Florida beaches, and an opportunity for Tampa to become a tourism gateway to the island.
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Richard Danielson April 8th 2013, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/us-rep-kathy-castor-lift-cuba-embargo-travel-restrictions/2113828, Timed Staff Writer
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It's time to try something new Cuba is changing," said Castor, They have embarked on economic reforms that the United States should promote. The United States now should normalize relations and begin a constructive dialogue with the island nation." Castor described President Raul Castro, as "a much more practical ruler," there is a generational change in Cuba's government. they are embarking on market reforms in their economy that deserve encouragement after 50 years of an embargo and isolation that's proved that it hasn't worked, it's time to try something new and refresh our relationship Easing the restrictions would offer the United States a variety of benefits a new market for manufacturers more influence over a Cuban offshore oil drilling industry whose antiquated technology could threaten Florida beaches, and an opportunity for Tampa to become a tourism gateway to the island.
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It’s time to lift the Embargo, failed policy and numerous benefits
| 2,108 | 67 | 896 | 338 | 11 | 140 | 0.032544 | 0.414201 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,936 |
Fifty years ago Tuesday, President John F. Kennedy’s Proclamation 3447 entered into full force, and all trade between the United States and Cuba was prohibited. The measure dramatically tightened what had been a partial economic embargo against Cuba — and the harsher measure continues to this day.¶ The embargo was initially enacted after Fidel Castro took power and the Cuban government nationalized American holdings in Cuba. The embargo prohibits American citizens from doing business with Cuba, visiting (except under exceptional circumstances) and, until 2000, even providing humanitarian aid. The embargo’s extraterritorial provisions also make it extremely difficult for Cuba to do business with other countries.¶ The embargo has stunted the Cuban economy and limited Cubans’ access to good food, modern technology and useful medicine. It has also hurt the United States’ relationships with other countries — the European Parliament actually passed a law making it illegal for Europeans to comply with certain parts of the embargo. The purpose of the embargo was undeniably to make life so difficult for Cubans that they would see the error of their ways and expel Castro and communism. The United States government has maintained — for 50 years — that it will not do business with Cuba until it learns to respect human rights and liberty.¶ There is a pretty serious problem with this plan: It hasn’t worked. Beyond the fact that Castro is still in power and Cuba is still not a democracy, the embargo has not truly succeeded in sewing resentment into the hearts and minds of the Cuban people. The embargo allows Castro to make the United States and the embargo the scapegoats for all of Cuba’s ills. It also forces Cuba to rely on countries like the former USSR, China and Venezuela for trade. The appalling hypocrisy of the embargo is that the United States nearly always maintained diplomatic and economic relationships with countries like Russia, China and Vietnam even during the heart of the Cold War.¶ Numerous influential people have come out against the Cuban embargo, including Pope John Paul II, Jesse Jackson and George Schultz. They all claim that the embargo hurts the Cuban people, not the Cuban government. Democratic politicians Gary Hart, George McGovern and Jimmy Carter have also expressed this view. It is interesting to note, however, that Hart and McGovern only became vocal enemies of the embargo long after their presidential runs. Politicians are scared openly to oppose the embargo.
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SCOTT STERN, February 10, 2012, Lift the Cuba embargo, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2012/02/10/stern-lift-the-cuba-embargo/ , Writer for the Yale Daily News
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The embargo prohibits American citizens from doing business with Cuba The embargo’s extraterritorial provisions also make it extremely difficult for Cuba to do business with other countries. The embargo has stunted the Cuban economy and limited Cubans’ access to good food, modern technology and useful medicine. It has hurt the United States’ relationships with other countries There is a pretty serious problem with this plan: It hasn’t worked the embargo has not truly succeeded in sewing resentment into the hearts and minds of the Cuban people. The embargo allows Castro to make the United States and the embargo the scapegoats for all of Cuba’s ills. the embargo hurts the Cuban people, not the Cuban government.
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The Embargo has failed to succeed, Now is the time to lift it.
| 2,517 | 63 | 718 | 405 | 13 | 115 | 0.032099 | 0.283951 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,937 |
¶ Now that the election is over, the United States has a rare opportunity to do away with one of its most pointless and ineffective foreign policies – the embargo of Cuba – that is as obsolete as the “cool” 1950s and 1960s sedans still running on the streets of Havana.¶ ¶ Just a few weeks ago, U.S. President Barack Obama sat down with leaders in Myanmar, an international pariah for many years with a military responsible for thousands of civilian deaths. The United States now trades actively with Vietnam, which remains under the control of the same Communist Party against whom it once fought – and lost – a terrible war. The U.S. has a normal, albeit complex, diplomatic and commercial relationship with China, another Communist country.¶ Yet, Cuba is still treated as a pariah, a bizarre relic of the Cold Wa. I just returned from a visit there and realized that lifting the embargo would be to both countries’ advantage. Americans would have full access to Cuba’s rich culture and natural beauty, and some new trade and investment opportunities. Cuba would have expanded economic options, which it needs to improve the material well-being of its citizens.¶ ¶ The U.S. has had normal diplomatic and commercial relationships with regimes and despots of all stripes – from Mobutu in Zaire to Mubarak in Egypt. The list is long. So what makes Cuba so special?¶ ¶ Is it because it is so close to the continental United States? No – the U.S. has had a good, if testy, formal relationship with Mexico for many years, including when it was a one-party state.¶ ¶ Is it because Cuba poses a military threat? Maybe, once upon a time. But if Americans got over the Vietnam War, they surely can put the Cuban (or was that Soviet?) missile crisis behind them, especially since the U.S. now has quite a normal relationship with Russia.¶ ¶ What about a security threat? Arguably, almost every country could be wittingly or unwittingly harboring extremist plotters. Somehow, though, I don’t think al-Qaeda operatives are drinking mojitos on Cuban beaches. Cuba loosened its ban on organized religion some time ago, but imagining either the government or its people sympathetic to Islamic fundamentalism is quite a stretch.¶ ¶ Is it because Cuba lacks economic opportunities for U.S. business? Granted, it’s not a potential powerhouse such as Russia, China or even Vietnam for commercial purposes. But the U.S. has maintained good relationships (and made money) with many small, poor countries. What’s one more?¶ ¶ Is it because Americans are standing on principle over Cuba’s human-rights record or strident rhetoric? It’s hard to argue this when the White House has entertained leaders of countries with even worse records and positions. Moreover, many of those countries do not have education, health-care or food systems that reach the poor. Cuba does, although increasingly it is a challenge.¶ ¶ Of course, America should care about human rights and, along with that, everyone should have access to adequate food, education and health care. But sadly, none of these reasons explain why the U.S. keeps a strict embargo on Cuba and has no diplomatic relationship with it.¶ ¶ No, the real reason is because of a small vocal minority (Cuban-American exiles and their families) who happen to be clustered in an electoral swing state (Florida) that gives them political clout. Some say the attitudes of the younger generation are softening toward Cuba. Does Washington really need to wait another generation or two?¶ ¶ The U.S. stand on Cuba is incomprehensible and only serves to look hypocritical and arbitrary in the eyes of a world that doesn’t understand the intricacies of American politics. Now that the election is over, there is a window of opportunity to open up a full commercial and diplomatic relationship. Mr. Obama should use the full extent of his executive powers to immediately relax restrictions, and Congress should pass legislation lifting the remaining legal obstacles.¶ ¶ It’s time to forget about old grudges and remember that the best way to convert an enemy into a friend is to embrace him. Instead of admiring Havana’s old cars, Americans should be selling them new ones.
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PHYLLIS POMERANTZ, Jan. 01 2013, Now’s the time to lift the U.S. embargo on Cuba, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/nows-the-time-to-lift-the-us-embargo-on-cuba/article6790494/ , Phyllis Pomerantz is a professor of the practice of public policy at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy and a former staff member of the World Bank.
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the United States has a rare opportunity to do away with one of its most pointless and ineffective foreign policies – the embargo of Cuba – that is as obsolete The United States now trades actively with Vietnam The U.S. has a normal diplomatic and commercial relationship with China, another Communist country. Yet, Cuba is still treated as a pariah, a bizarre relic of the Cold Wa Is it because it is so close to the continental United State No – the U.S. has had a good, if testy, formal relationship with Mexico if Americans got over the Vietnam War, they surely can put the Cuban missile crisis behind them especially since the U.S. now has quite a normal relationship with Russia. What about a security threat I don’t think al-Qaeda operatives are drinking mojitos on Cuban beaches. Is it because Cuba lacks economic opportunities for U.S. business the U.S. has maintained good relationships (and made money) with many small, poor countries Of course, America should care about human rights and, along with that, everyone should have access to adequate food, education and health care. But sadly, none of these reasons explain why the U.S. keeps a strict embargo on Cuba and has no diplomatic relationship with it. the real reason is because of a small vocal minority who happen to be clustered in an electoral swing state that gives them political clout the attitudes of the younger generation are softening toward Cuba. Does Washington really need to wait another generation or two? The U.S. stand on Cuba is incomprehensible and only serves to look hypocritical and arbitrary in the eyes of a world that doesn’t understand the intricacies of American politics. . Mr. Obama should use the full extent of his executive powers to immediately relax restrictions, and Congress should pass legislation lifting the remaining legal obstacles. It’s time to forget about old grudges and remember that the best way to convert an enemy into a friend is to embrace him
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The U.S should end the Cuban Embargo, Laundry List of Reasons
| 4,196 | 62 | 1,972 | 698 | 11 | 332 | 0.015759 | 0.475645 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,938 |
Contrary to all intended purposes the US embargo and the restrictions imposed under the Bush ¶ administration did not succeed in ousting Fidel Castro or triggering regime change in Havana. The ¶ negative externalities observed in the majority of countries against which economic sanctions had ¶ been applied, could also be confirmed in the Cuban case: ¶ a) Since the US took an extremely public policy stance towards Cuba, Havana had a distinct ¶ disincentive to offer any positive behavior to Washington in the face of threats and ¶ sanctions. Moreover, as a matter of both national pride and cool political calculations the ¶ Cuban leadership had to signal to the US that human rights were non-negotiable sovereignty ¶ issues. ¶ b) From the outset the US sanctions failed in mobilizing domestic opponents because they ¶ were simply too weak to challenge the regime. With the advent of the Bush administration ¶ the sanctions even undermined the infant political opposition movements because the ¶ regime condemned opponents by stigmatizing them as ‘mercenaries’ paid by the US to ¶ topple the Cuban government. By associating opponents and human rights defenders with ¶ Washington’s agenda for regime change the authorities attempted to delegitimize their quest ¶ for political reform and respect of fundamental freedoms. As a result the majority of Cuban ¶ dissidents sought to distance themselves from Washington and support offered through US ¶ channels. ¶ c) Using the pretext of foreign intervention the Cuban regime decided to crack down on those ¶ human rights activists perceived as becoming too vocal a source of public discontent. The ¶ viability of the emerging illegal political opposition became seriously undermined ¶ following the arrests of 75 dissidents in March 2003, many of whom have actively worked ¶ for the Oswaldo Paya-led Varela project seeking a referendum on political reform. ¶ d) The regime has successfully exploited the nearly five decade old embargo in general and ¶ the Bush restrictions of 2004 in particular, by denouncing the measures as foreign ¶ aggression and calling for a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ as the only remedy to counteract the US ¶ ‘assault’ on national sovereignty. Indeed, the quasi-totality of the Cuban population rejects ¶ the US embargo, but mostly because it deprives them of access to US consumer goods and ¶ fluid contacts with the American people, including those family members having fled the ¶ island. ¶ e) Furthermore, the Cuban regime succeeded in translating the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect ¶ into increased cohesion between the leadership and those strata of society believing in the ¶ legitimacy of the goals of the Revolution, namely in the field of social justice. The regime, ¶ rather successfully, painted the Revolution’s social acquis as being under constant threat by ¶ the US embargo. As a result, important segments of the Cuban population are fearful that ¶ the US agenda is not only driven by regime change but also by taking away Cuba’s social ¶ agenda. ¶ f) Havana claims that total losses caused by the US embargo during the past 47 years stand at ¶ well above 90 bio USD. Official US sources believe this figure to be in the range of some ¶ 120 mio USD annually since 1991 (some 2 bio USD overall), i.e. after the collapse of the ¶ Soviet Union as Cuba’s key political ally and economic benefactor. In either case Havana ¶ can plausibly argue that the US sanctions affect negatively Cuba’s economic and social ¶ development and cause harm to the Cuban people. ¶ g) The humanitarian and economic costs of the economic sanctions are clearly ¶ instrumentalised by the regime and serve as a much welcome scapegoat for first, blaming ¶ inefficiencies and hardship on the embargo, and second, justifying stifling public policy ¶ responses such as drastic austerity measures to contain public spending or tighter control to ¶ fight informal sector activities. ¶ h) Last but not least, it comes as no surprise that in a tightly state-controlled economy such as ¶ in Cuba, scarce economic resources will be increasingly controlled by the most trusted ¶ segments of the regime, which in Cuba’s case is the military. Today, two thirds of Cuba’s ¶ foreign exchange generating economic activities are directly managed or controlled by the ¶ armed forces.¶
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Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff♦¶ US Policy towards Cuba: ¶ Problems and Opportunities ¶ for the Incoming Obama Administration♣March 2009, Post-Graduate Diploma in Development Studies¶ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Berlin, Germany.¶ 06.02.1987 Ph.D. in Political Science, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg, Germany.¶ 29.06.1984 M.A. in Political Science, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg, Germany., http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf
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Contrary to all intended purposes the US embargo and the restrictions imposed under the Bush administration did not succeed in ousting Fidel Castro or triggering regime change . The negative externalities observed in the majority of countries against which economic sanctions had been applied, could be confirmed in the Cuban case: Since the US took an extremely policy stance towards Cuba Havana had a distinct disincentive to offer any positive behavior to Washington in the face of threats and sanctions , as a matter of both national pride and cool political calculations the Cuban leadership had to signal to the US that human rights were non-negotiable sovereignty issues. From the outset the US sanctions failed in mobilizing domestic opponents because they were simply too weak to challenge the regime By associating opponents and human rights defenders with Washington’s agenda for regime change the authorities attempted to delegitimize their quest for political reform and respect of fundamental freedoms. As a result the majority of Cuban dissidents sought to distance themselves from Washington and support offered through US channels. The regime has successfully exploited the nearly five decade old embargo by denouncing the measures as foreign aggression and calling for a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ as the only remedy to counteract the US ‘assault’ on national sovereignty mostly it deprives them of access to US consumer goods and , the Cuban regime succeeded in translating the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect into increased cohesion between the leadership and those strata of society believing in the legitimacy of the goals of the Revolution . As a result segments of the Cuban population are fearful that the US agenda is not only driven by regime change but also by taking away Cuba’s social agenda. Havana can plausibly argue that the US sanctions affect negatively Cuba’s economic and social development and cause harm to the Cuban people. The humanitarian and economic costs of the economic sanctions are clearly instrumentalised by the regime and serve as a much welcome scapegoat for first, blaming inefficiencies and hardship on the embargo, justifying stifling public policy responses such as drastic austerity measures to contain public spending or tighter control to fight informal sector activities. in a tightly state-controlled economy such as in Cuba, scarce economic resources will be increasingly controlled by the most trusted segments of the regime the military two thirds of Cuba’s foreign exchange are directly managed or controlled by the armed forces.
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The U.S MUST lift the Embargo, has only produced negative results laundry list
| 4,365 | 79 | 2,629 | 712 | 13 | 400 | 0.018258 | 0.561798 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,939 |
¶ The analysis of the impact of the US embargo against Cuba clearly demonstrates that the economic ¶ sanctions did not only fail in attaining their intended purposes but also proved to be ¶ counterproductive in all respects and at all levels. The US policy did not achieve any of its ¶ objectives and damaged severely the reputation of the United States, isolating de facto the US in its ¶ policy approach towards Cuba (in November 2008 185 countries supported the Cuba-introduced ¶ resolution against the US embargo at the UN General Assembly). It alienated traditional allies and ¶ partners because of the extraterritorial application of US law, actually strengthened the Castro ¶ regime, weakened the opposition, and hurt the Cuban population. The embargo policy even ¶ undermines national security interests of the US by not engaging in far-sighted conflict prevention ¶ measures with a view to reducing the probability of a - however unlikely - mass exodus of Cubans ¶ (as a result of a humanitarian crisis triggered by sudden and total regime breakdown in Havana).
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Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff♦¶ US Policy towards Cuba: ¶ Problems and Opportunities ¶ for the Incoming Obama Administration♣March 2009, Post-Graduate Diploma in Development Studies¶ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Berlin, Germany.¶ 06.02.1987 Ph.D. in Political Science, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg, Germany.¶ 29.06.1984 M.A. in Political Science, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg, Germany., http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf
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The analysis of the impact of the US embargo against Cuba clearly demonstrates that the economic sanctions did not only fail in attaining their intended purposes but also proved to be counterproductive in all respects and at all levels did not achieve any of its objectives damaged the reputation of the United States alienated traditional allies and partners actually strengthened the Castro regime, weakened the opposition, and hurt the Cuban population undermines national security interests of the US by not engaging in far-sighted conflict prevention measures with a view to reducing the probability of a - however unlikely - mass exodus of Cuban
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The Cuban Embargo didn’t work and was counterproductive
| 1,070 | 56 | 651 | 177 | 8 | 103 | 0.045198 | 0.581921 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Affirmatives
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2013
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4,940 |
The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana. In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy steps Obama should take at this stage -- removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana. Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba can stand to become a more open, democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on the island for greater economic and political liberalization.
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Sweig, ’13 [July/August 2013, Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island”, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991]
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The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana
|
Plan does not require congressional approval
| 1,181 | 44 | 620 | 183 | 6 | 95 | 0.032787 | 0.519126 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,941 |
Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize
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Safran, ’12 [8/14/12, Brian Safran has a Master of Science in Global Affairs , “End the Cuban Embargo - Brian Safran”, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran]
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Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. , the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize
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Removal Embargo boosts Cred more than it would hurt- international backlash proves
| 950 | 82 | 613 | 154 | 12 | 103 | 0.077922 | 0.668831 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,942 |
The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc. But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba. Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States. Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically. Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.” There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to explore improving relations with Havana. Spain’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba. The administration should move now, before congressmen are focused on the next election. President Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the embargo. He also could use his authority to relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses to visit the island.
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Bandow, ’12 [12/11/12, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan, “Time to End the Cuba Embargo”, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo]
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The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba. Support for the Republican Party also is falling Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island e demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically. Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. Paul Ryan has defended the embargo that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.” There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. the European Union plans to explore improving relations with Havana the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba. Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the embargo
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The Plan is politically viable
| 2,334 | 30 | 1,421 | 378 | 5 | 235 | 0.013228 | 0.621693 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,943 |
Though largely overlooked by the media, major shifts in Florida demographics make repeal of the embargo much more likely. Numbering more than one million, Cuban-Americans have been the largest Hispanic group in Florida, and for many years they overwhelmingly favored keeping the embargo in place. To win elections in Florida – the country’s largest swing state – politicians of both parties have traditionally promised to uphold the embargo for fear of alienating Cuban voters. Now that’s changing. Hispanics from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Mexico and other Latin American countries are growing faster in numbers than those from Cuba. And while Cuban-Americans are mostly Republicans, others in Florida are heavily Democratic. Moreover, Cuban-Americans themselves are changing their mind about the embargo. According to a recent study by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University (FIU), most Cuban-Americans in Miami would agree with Zamora that the embargo hasn’t worked well. In fact, 47 percent would like to see the embargo lifted. “This is probably the first presidential election in which Cuba is not a top issue for the Cuban-American community,” says Andy Gomez, senior fellow at the University of Miami’s Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. A member of Mitt Romney’s staff phoned Gomez last year to get his advice on the topics that Romney should address when he visits Miami. Gomez’s answer wasn’t Cuba but jobs and the economy. It’s not that Cuban-Americans are no longer interested in Cuba, Gomez says, but that they are “tired of the same thing over and over again.” There’s a growing consensus among Cuban-Americans that lifting the embargo won’t help the Castros retain power – as some once thought – because the regime has been thoroughly entrenched for more than five decades. When Fidel Castro became ill six years ago, some experts thought the end was near, but today they discuss a variety of scenarios.
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Ediger, ’12 [9/19/12, Don Ediger is a veteran journalist who has worked for The Miami Herald, Associated Press, BusinessWeek and the International Herald Tribune, among other publications, “Cuba’s Post-Castro Future”, http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/19/cubas-post-castro-future/]
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major shifts in Florida demographics make repeal of the embargo much more likely. To win elections in Florida – the country’s largest swing state – politicians of both parties have traditionally promised to uphold the embargo for fear of alienating Cuban voters. Now that’s changing. Hispanics from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Mexico and other Latin American countries are growing faster in numbers others in Florida are heavily Democratic. Cuban-Americans themselves are changing their mind about the embargo. According to a recent study by the Cuban Research Institute most Cuban-Americans in Miami would agree with Zamora that the embargo hasn’t worked well. 47 percent would like to see the embargo lifted. Cuba is not a top issue for the Cuban-American community There’s a growing consensus among Cuban-Americans that lifting the embargo won’t help the Castros retain power
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Repealing the embargo is now politically popular
| 1,979 | 48 | 898 | 313 | 7 | 138 | 0.022364 | 0.440895 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,944 |
ABC News’ Rick Klein reports: Fresh off a trip to Cuba that included a visit with both Fidel and Raul Castro, members of the Congressional Black Caucus are lobbying President Obama to lift the nation’s longstanding Cuba embargo, and open up lines of communication with the Castros. Rep. Laura Richardson, D-Calif., said on ABCNews.com’s "Top Line" today that she and her colleagues want a complete elimination of the embargo first instituted by the Kennedy administration. Click here to watch our interview with Richardson. Richardson said she welcomes the Obama administration’s planned loosening of travel and financial restrictions impacting those with relatives in Cuba — but said she wants the president to go further. "The real big steps that we have to take is looking at the embargo, and the question is, has the embargo worked for 50 years?" said Richardson, who serves on the House Homeland Security Committee. "What I can tell you is, [from] when I went there, every country is working with Cuba except the United States. And my question to you is, what has isolation gotten us in the last 10 years when we’ve isolated ourselves from other countries?" Such a move would fit with the president’s efforts to remake America’s image, she said. Richardson said her visit to Cuba only confirmed her sentiments regarding the need to fundamentally change the relationship between Cuba and the United States. "You know President Obama just two days ago when he was in Turkey, he talked about turning the page," Richardson said. "The key, I think, to having progress is if you’re actually talking to someone. Currently over the 50 years, maybe there has been limited progress in that area, so are we just gonna continue not to talk for another 50 years?" "So, the question is, we can continue not to talk and not to have any progress, or we can sit down and maybe through those dialogues that they will see the benefits of what we’ve gained, how we operate in this country, and as we’ve seen successes in other countries, I believe we would see the same in Cuba." The White House has signaled that it will make changes to Cuba policies in advance of this month’s Summit of the Americas, specifically to make it easier for those with family on the island nation to travel thereand send money to relatives. Congress is also expected to consider a measure that would allow all Americans to travel freely to and from Cuba. But the president has not indicated a willingness to lift the US trade embargo against Cuba, a cornerstone of American foreign policy toward one of the nation’s closest neighbors for 47 years. The Castro regime’s fiercest critics in Congress are promising to fight any effort to ease the terms of the embargo, until or unless the Cuban government first commits to reforms such as releasing political prisoners and scheduling democratic elections. "The position on the embargo is principle-driven . . . We should not be providing any type of unilateral concessions to that regime," Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, both Florida Republicans, said in a joint statement provided to ABC News. Of their colleagues’ trip to Cuba, they added: "It’s truly unfortunate that they did not dedicate any portion of the trip to meeting with the victims of repressions in Cuba, or those who are advocating for human rights and a democratic transition." Those promising to fight changes in Cuba policy include some prominent Democrats. "Our great nation should always stand for human freedom and democracy and against underwriting regimes that oppress, suppress and murder," Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., the son of Cuban immigrants and head of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, said last week after fellow senators introduced legislation that would end the travel ban. But members of the Congressional Black Caucus say they’re looking to the new administration to revamp policies of isolation that they view as outdated. "We are convinced based on the meetings which were held, that the Cubans do want dialogue, they do want talks, and they do want normal relations with USA, and I believe that its in the US best interest to do that," said Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., the caucus’ chairwoman, said Tuesday, after she and her colleagues returned from their trip to Cuba.
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Klein, ’09 [4/8/09, Rick Klein is a congressional reporter for ABC news, “Black Caucus to Obama: Lift Cuba Embargo”, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/04/black-caucus-to/]
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members of the Congressional Black Caucus are lobbying President Obama to lift the nation’s longstanding Cuba embargo, Rep. Laura Richardson today that she and her colleagues want a complete elimination of the embargo first instituted by the Kennedy administration Richardson said she welcomes the Obama administration’s planned loosening of travel and financial restrictions impacting those with relatives in Cuba she wants the president to go furthe every country is working with Cuba except the United States. And my question to you is, what has isolation gotten us in the last 10 years when we’ve isolated ourselves from other countries?" would fit with the president’s efforts to remake America’s image Congress is also expected to consider a measure that would allow all Americans to travel freely to and from Cuba. But the president has not indicated a willingness to lift the US trade embargo against Cuba But members of the Congressional Black Caucus say they’re looking to the new administration to revamp policies of isolation that they view as outdated We are convinced based on the meetings which were held, that the Cubans do want dialogue, they do want talks, and they do want normal relations with USA, and I believe that its in the US best interest to do that," said Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., the caucus’ chairwoman
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The Congressional Black Caucus supports the Plan
| 4,305 | 48 | 1,334 | 718 | 7 | 218 | 0.009749 | 0.303621 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,945 |
While political and media attention remains focused on the unprecedented support President Barack Obama received in Tuesday’s election from Latinos, one particular subset of those voters – one with potential foreign policy clout – is drawing intense interest. Cuban Americans, for the last 50 years one of the most reliable constituencies for Republicans, particularly in the perennial “swing state” of Florida where most of them live, voted for the Democratic candidate in unprecedented numbers. According to exit polls conducted by both Fox News and the Pew Hispanic Center, Obama beat Romney by a 49-47 percent margin among Cuban-American voters in what one close observer of Florida politics called a “historic demographic upset”. A couple of other polls, including one conducted by the highly respected Miami-based Bendixen-Amandi International polling firm, found Romney prevailing over Obama among Cuban Americans, but only by a mere 52-48 percent margin.“I think it has made clear that the Cuban-American community is no longer as monolithically Republican as many interested parties would like them to think,” Fernand Amandi, the firm’s managing partner, told IPS Friday. “What it means is that this administration will have more room to maneouvre on Cuba policy than they ever thought they had,” said Geoffrey Thale, a Cuba specialist at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). “U.S. policy for decades has been determined far more by political considerations about the vote in Florida than foreign policy considerations, particularly toward Latin America which has called consistently for an end to the U.S. embargo,” Thale told IPS. “So having more room in Florida means they have more flexibility in their policy if they choose to use it.” Like others, Thale stressed that Obama was unlikely to take major new steps to warm relations, particularly so long as Alan Gross, a U.S. Agency for International Development contractor arrested in 2009 and sentenced to a 15-year prison term for crimes against the state, remains in jail. But a greater opening toward Havana, including broadening current bilateral discussions and further relaxing curbs on travel to Cuba, could be in the offing. While Florida remains the one state in the country whose electoral votes have not yet been cast due to the continuing counting of ballots there, virtually all political analysts say they believe it will end up in Obama’s column. He is currently leading the state by one percent, or about 50,000 votes. If, as expected, he prevails, it will be largely due to the higher-than-anticipated Latino turnout which Obama won by a 60-39 percent margin, according to most exit polls. That margin was considerably less than the 71-27 percent spread in Obama’s favour for all U.S. Latino voters, who made up a record 10 percent of the nationwide electorate this year and almost twice much in Florida. The largest group of Latin voters in Florida are of Cuban heritage – about one-third of all Latinos in the state – a clear explanation for why Obama did not score as well with Latinos there as in every other state in the country. Still, the results in Florida stunned most observers who interpreted them as a confirmation of a generational shift in Cuban-American political attitudes. “This is a generational phenomenon,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue (IAD), a Washington think tank. “It reflects the passing of the old generation and the acceptance of new attitudes.” “Young Cuban Americans are more open about dealing with Cuba and also have other issues that are important to them that Obama was able to capitalise on,” he told IPS, adding, however, that so long as Gross remains in prison, Obama is unlikely to do much more than he has already in terms of rolling back many of the restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba that were imposed during the George W. Bush administration. While the Pew and Fox News polls showed Obama winning the Cuban-American vote, the Bendixen survey was more detailed and confirmed the generational divide. Cuban-born voters, it found, favoured Romney by 55 percent to 45 percent, but Cuban-American voters born in the U.S. voted for Obama by a 60-40 margin. “The Cuban-American community is changing,” said Wayne Smith, a former head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana who resigned to protest Ronald Reagan’s hard-line policies and has been working for three decades to promote educational and scientific exchanges between the two countries. “The younger the community and the newer the immigrants, the more difficult it is for the old hard-liners to control,” Smith, who is based at the Center for International Policy, told IPS. Indeed, as recently as 1988, 85 percent of Cuban Americans in Florida voted for the Republican presidential candidate – George H.W. Bush in that year. Until now, the high-water mark for a Democrat was Bill Clinton, who won 35 percent of the Cuban-American vote in 1996 and subsequently moved to ease rules governing travel and remittances to Cuba. He also punched a big hole in the trade embargo by permitting agricultural exports to the island for the first time. In 2000, however, Vice President Al Gore won only 25 percent of the Cuban-American vote in Florida, compared to George W. Bush’s 75 percent. Eight years later, Obama equaled Clinton’s performance, as the generational shift appeared to take firmer hold. But this year’s Democratic tally of 48-49 percent far exceeded expectations. While anti-Castro hardliners in the House of Representatives, most prominently Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario Diaz Balart, held their seats on Tuesday, Joe Garcia soundly defeated another hard-line incumbent, Rep. David Rivera, to become the first Cuban-American Democrat who explicitly favours better ties with Havana in Congress. Another hard-line incumbent whose district includes the “Little Havana” section of Miami also fell to a pro-engagement Cuban-American Democrat in the state legislature.
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Lobe, ’12 [11/9/12, Jim Lobe is a reporter for the Inter Press service, “Obama’s Historic Cuban-American Vote Opens Window for Change”, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/11/obamas-historic-cuban-american-vote-opens-window-for-change/]
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one particular subset of those voters – one with potential foreign policy clout – is drawing intense interest. Cuban Americans, for the last 50 years one of the most reliable constituencies for Republicans, particularly in the perennial “swing state” of Florida where most of them live, voted for the Democratic candidate in unprecedented numbers. I think it has made clear that the Cuban-American community is no longer as monolithically Republican as many interested parties would like them to thin “What it means is that this administration will have more room to maneouvre on Cuba policy than they ever thought they had,” said Geoffrey Thale, a Cuba specialist U.S. policy for decades has been determined far more by political considerations about the vote in Florida than foreign policy considerations But a greater opening toward Havana, including broadening current bilateral discussions and further relaxing curbs on travel to Cuba, could be in the offing. till, the results in Florida stunned most observers who interpreted them as a confirmation of a generational shift in Cuban-American political attitudes. “This is a generational phenomenon,” said Michael Shifter, It reflects the passing of the old generation and the acceptance of new attitudes.” The Cuban-American community is changing,” The younger the community and the newer the immigrants, the more difficult it is for the old hard-liners to control,” incumbent, Rep. David Rivera, to become the first Cuban-American Democrat who explicitly favours better ties with Havana in Congress. Another hard-line incumbent whose district includes the “Little Havana” section of Miami also fell to a pro-engagement Cuban-American Democrat in the state legislature.
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Plan is Popular- 2012 Election proves
| 6,007 | 37 | 1,725 | 959 | 6 | 263 | 0.006257 | 0.274244 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,946 |
The irrationality of U.S. policy does not stem just from concerns about electoral politics in Florida. The Cuban-American community has evolved to the point that a majority now favors engagement with Cuba, as both opinion polls and Obama's electoral success in 2008 and 2012 demonstrate. Today, the larger problem is the climate of fear in the government bureaucracy, where even honest reporting about Cuba -- let alone advocating a more sensible policy -- can endanger one's career. Democratic presidents, who ought to know better, have tolerated this distortion of the policy process and at times have reinforced it by allowing the Cuba lobby to extort concessions from them. But the cost is high -- the gradual and insidious erosion of the government's ability to make sound policy based on fact rather than fantasy. Through bullying and character assassination, the China Lobby blocked a sensible U.S. policy toward Beijing for a quarter-century, with tragic results. When Richard Nixon finally defied the China Lobby by going to Beijing in 1972, the earth did not tremble, civilization did not collapse, and U.S. security did not suffer. If anything, U.S. allies around the world applauded the adoption -- finally -- of a rational policy. At home, the punditocracy was surprised to discover that Nixon's bold stroke was politically popular. The China Lobby proved to be a paper tiger; the Red Scare fever of the 1950s had subsided, robbing the movement of its political base. Likewise, the Cuba Lobby has blocked a sensible policy toward Cuba for half a century, with growing damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. When a courageous U.S. president finally decides to defy the Cuba Lobby with a stroke as bold as Nixon's trip to China, she or he will discover that so too the Cuba Lobby no longer has the political clout it once had. The strategic importance of repairing the United States' frayed relations with Latin America has come to outweigh the political risk of reconciliation with Havana. Nixon went to China, and history records it as the highlight of his checkered legacy. Will Barack Obama have the courage to go to Havana?
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Leogrande, ’13 [4/11/13, William M. LeoGrande was the Dean of the American University School of Public Affairs and frequent publisher and expert on Latin America, “The Cuba Lobby”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the_cuba_lobby_jay_z?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]
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The irrationality of U.S. policy does not stem just from concerns about electoral politics in Florida. a majority now favors engagement with Cuba the larger problem is the climate of fear in the government bureaucracy, where even honest reporting about Cuba -- let alone advocating a more sensible policy -- can endanger one's career Through bullying and character assassination, the China Lobby blocked a sensible U.S. policy toward Beijing for a quarter-century, with tragic results When Richard Nixon finally defied the China Lobby by going to Beijing in 1972, the earth did not tremble, civilization did not collapse, and U.S. security did not suffer U.S. allies around the world applauded the adoption -- finally -- of a rational policy. Nixon's bold stroke was politically popular. China Lobby proved to be a paper tiger; robbing the movement of its political base. Likewise, the Cuba Lobby has blocked a sensible policy toward Cuba for half a century, with growing damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. When a courageous U.S. president finally decides to defy the Cuba Lobby with a stroke as bold as Nixon's trip to China, she or he will discover that so too the Cuba Lobby no longer has the political clout it once had. The strategic importance of repairing the United States' frayed relations with Latin America has come to outweigh the political risk of reconciliation with Havana history records it as the highlight of his checkered legacy. Will Barack Obama have the courage to go to Havana?
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Plan is a win for Obama boosts his clout
| 2,145 | 40 | 1,510 | 355 | 9 | 250 | 0.025352 | 0.704225 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,947 |
Increasingly, Latin American countries see China not as a rival but as a valuable trading partner. In fact, explains Kevin Gallagher, China has become a better partner in many ways than the United States. China is offering attractive deals to Latin American economies, while the United States continues to lecture and dictate. It's time for a real reset in U.S.-Latin American trade relations. The Obama administration and U.S. media have made much ado about the U.S. "pivot" to Asia.What has largely escaped their attention, however, is that China has been lining up economic allies in the erstwhile "backyard" of the United States. Well, just as serious competition ought to awaken one's creative juices in business, it is time for the United States to step up a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too late. The difference in approaches by the United States and China in Latin America were squarely brought into focus just in recent weeks when U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made tours of Latin America. The United States principal offer to its Latin American neighbors is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP offers access to the U.S. market to Latin American and Asian nations on the basis of a triple form of conditionality. First, they must deregulate their financial markets; second, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms; and third, allow private U.S. firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for violating any of its conditions. Talk about a heavily conditioned offering. So what's the Chinese approach? On his visit to the region, China's President Xi Jinping offered more than $5.3 billion in financing, with few conditions attached, to China's newfound Latin American friends. These offers will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: $3 billion in commitments to eight Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3 billion to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit, including a $900 million dollar loan from the Chinese Development Bank for upgrading a petroleum refinery and a $400 million dollar line of credit for road infrastructure from the Chinese Ex-Im Bank; and a $1 billion credit line from the China Ex-Im bank to Mexico for its state-owned oil company PEMEX. Making available this financing comes on top of the already $86 billion in financing provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. Granted, that amount — large as it sounds — seems just like another number in today's world. To put it into proper perspective, consider this: Since 2003, thus over the past decade, China's policy banks have provided more finance to Latin America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. If anything ought to awaken the United States from its past slumber and taking Latin America essentially for granted, that comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the United States and the array of largely Western-dominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by China's financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world! But it's not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike U.S. trade treaties or the finance from the international financial institutions largely under U.S. control, China offers up its loans come with few strings attached. In a region that is understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank, China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities. That said, the Chinese don't lack a strong commercial focus. Often times the Chinese provide a tied offer — requiring that Chinese firms will be hired to conduct a bulk of the envisioned project work. What is more, the U.S. offer of a Trans-Pacific Partnership to all of the Latin American countries in the TPP process doesn't amount to much in the real world. They already have trade treaties with the United States that grant them access to the U.S. market.In just a few years, China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two trading partner (for Peru and Mexico). These aren't just any countries. They are the most important economies in Latin America. Of course, the United States is still the most important economic partner for the region overall. However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism — just telling Latin America what it needs. Compare that to China's approach: It offers Latin America what it wants (in the form of financing and trade from China). When President Obama took office, he and his team pledged to hit the reset button with the region and rethink its trade regime with Latin America. It hasn't worked out that way. Thus far, "reset" has essentially meant making the same old offer, but via new faces. In addition, too much of the interaction with regional governments has been on such efforts as concentrating on drug interdiction purposes. Those countries rightfully don't see that as much of a growth-enhancing development approach, but rather as a foreign-based, defensive mechanism to protect the U.S. homeland. Given all that, it is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America. Very soon, it may be too late.
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Gallagher, 6/18 [6/18/13, Kevin P. Gallagher is an associate professor of international relations at Boston University, where he coordinates the Global Development Policy Program, “Time for a U.S. Pivot to Latin America”, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?storyid=10035]
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Increasingly, Latin American countries see China not as a rival but as a valuable trading partner. , explains Kevin Gallagher, China has become a better partner than the United States China is offering attractive deals to Latin American economies, while the United States continues to lecture and dictate time for a reset in U.S.-Latin American relations. China has been lining up economic allies in the erstwhile "backyard" of the United States. , it is time for the United States to step up a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too late. The difference in approaches by the United States and China in Latin America were squarely brought into focus The United States principal offer to its Latin American neighbors is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP offers access to the U.S. market on the basis of a triple form of conditionality. First, they must deregulate their financial markets; second, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms; and third, allow private U.S. firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for violating any of its conditions. Talk about a heavily conditioned offering. So what's the Chinese approach? Xi Jinping offered more than $5.3 billion in financing, with few conditions attached, to China's newfound Latin American friends. $3 billion in commitments to eight Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3 billion to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit $1 billion credit line from the China Ex-Im bank to Mexico Granted, that amount — large as it sounds — seems just like another number in today's world. , China's policy banks have provided more finance to Latin America than their counterparts If anything ought to awaken the United States from its past slumber and taking Latin America essentially for granted, that comparison ought to do it. But it's not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike U.S. trade treaties or the finance from the international financial institutions largely under U.S. control, China offers up its loans come with few strings attached. In a region that is understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities. These aren't just any countries. They are the most important economies in Latin America. However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism — just telling Latin America what it needs. Compare that to China's approach: It offers Latin America what it wants ( Thus far, "reset" has essentially meant making the same old offer, but via new faces. Those countries rightfully don't see that as much of a growth-enhancing development approach, but rather as a foreign-based, defensive mechanism to protect the U.S. homeland. Given all that, it is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America. Very soon, it may be too late.
|
CP doesn’t solve relations- Latin American says no and allows China to gain influence in the region
| 5,482 | 99 | 3,039 | 903 | 17 | 497 | 0.018826 | 0.550388 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,948 |
Cuban President Raul Castro says his government is ready to hold diplomatic talks with the United States without preconditions on any issue, to discuss any issue between the Cold War foes, as long as they sit down as equals. Castro, Fidel's brother, said today that no topic is off-limits, including questions of democracy, freedom of the press or human rights, the Associated Press reports. "Any day they want, the table is set. This has already been said through diplomatic channels," Castro said. "If they want to talk, we will talk. "We are nobody's colony, nobody's puppet," Castro added.
|
Stanglin, ’12 [7/26/12, Douglas Stanglin is a reporter for the USA Today, “Raul Castro says Cuba ready for talks with U.S. on any issue”, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/07/raul-castro-says-cuba-ready-for-talks-with-us-on-any-issue/1#.Ud16Hjvqn80]
|
President Raul Castro says his government is ready to hold diplomatic talks with the United States without preconditions on any issue, to discuss any issue between the Cold War foes, as long as they sit down as equals. no topic is off-limits "Any day they want, the table is set. This has already been said through diplomatic channels We are nobody's colony, nobody's puppet Castro added.
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Cuba says no to conditions- only plan solves relations
| 593 | 54 | 388 | 98 | 9 | 66 | 0.091837 | 0.673469 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,949 |
During his second and final term, and after having drawn unprecedented electoral support as a Democrat from Cuban-Americans in Miami, President Obama is in a position to make serious reforms, if he has the will to do so. He might begin by resurrecting a 1998-99 proposal—then endorsed by former secretaries of state Kissinger and George Shultz, but killed by President Clinton—for convening a Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to seriously examine the pros and cons of the policy. It would certainly see the need for change and its findings would give Obama cover for action.¶ Many significant changes can be made now without the support of Congress, though since 1996 the latter’s backing has been necessary to fully lift the embargo. Immediate reforms should include: securing the release of Alan Gross, the American contractor arrested in 2009 for doing his “proactive” U.S. government-funded job; ending provocative “proactive” programs; allowing more visits to Cuba by all Americans, not just largely Cuban-Americans; expanding trade beyond the foods and medicines now allowed; bringing our Cuba immigration policy into line with our policies toward immigrants from other countries; increasing discussions with Cuba’s political and military leaders on affairs of mutual interest; and looking objectively at the reforms under way today and deciding how Washington can promote change while defusing rather than stoking domestic conflict and tensions.¶ Whatever else we do, we must jettison our quid pro quo approach that holds essential U.S. policy changes hostage to repeated “vetoes” by both Cuban-Americans in the States and Castroites in Havana.
|
William Ratliff, January 30, 2013, Cuba's Tortured Transition, William Ratliff is a research fellow and former curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution and a research fellow at the Independent Institute. http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281
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During his second term Obama is in a position to make serious reforms, Many significant changes can be made now without the support of Congress, though since 1996 the latter’s backing has been necessary to fully lift the embargo Immediate reforms should include: securing the release of Alan Gross nding provocative “proactive” programs; allowing more visits to Cuba by all Americans, expanding trade beyond the foods and medicines allowed bringing our Cuba immigration policy into line with our policies toward immigrants from other countries; increasing discussions with Cuba’s political and military leaders on affairs of mutual interest; and looking objectively at the reforms under way today and deciding how Washington can promote change while defusing domestic conflict and tensions we must jettison our quid pro quo approach that holds essential U.S. policy changes hostage to repeated “vetoes” by both Cuban-Americans in the States and Castroites in Havana.
|
The Cuban Embargo must be lifted, without ANY Conditions otherwise it will fail
| 1,661 | 79 | 966 | 254 | 13 | 147 | 0.051181 | 0.57874 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,950 |
The United States should not precondition action on changes in Cuba and should refrain from ¶ using keywords and catchphrases that have had political cache at home but that inhibit the ability ¶ of the United States to engage constructively. Instead of talking about isolating the Cuban ¶ regime, U.S. leaders should discuss the desire for reconciliation with the people of Cuba. The ¶ next president should stop talking about transition in Cuba altogether, which allows the Cuban ¶ government to suggest that the United States wants to intervene in its domestic affairs. U.S. ¶ politicians should also cease referring to Cuban Americans as exiles. When eighty percent would ¶ elect to stay in the United States even if Cuba became a democracy and three-quarters favor the ¶ ownership by current residents of properties in Cuba rather than returning them to their original ¶ owners, it is clear that the vast majority of the community is no longer living in exile.92
|
Jake Colvin 2008, The Case for a New Cuba Policy¶ Why diplomatic and humanitarian engagement would be good politics and great foreign policy, http://web.archive.org/web/20120904201743/http://www.newideasfund.org/proposals/Colvin%20-%20Cuba%20-%20Master.pdf , fellow with the New Ideas Fund, a group that seeks new approaches and ¶ paradigms for U.S. national security and foreign policy. He is also Vice President for Global ¶ Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and oversees the Cuba initiative of ¶ USA*Engage, a business coalition established under the Council to promote U.S. diplomacy, ¶ trade and humanitarian assistance abroad
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The United States should not precondition action on changes in Cuba and should refrain from using keywords and catchphrases that inhibit the ability of the United States to engage constructively. Instead of talking about isolating the Cuban regime, U.S. leaders should discuss the desire for reconciliation with the people of Cuba stop talking about transition in Cuba altogether, which allows the Cuban government to suggest that the United States wants to intervene in its domestic affairs
|
Putting Conditions on lifting the Embargo prevents successful engagement
| 966 | 73 | 491 | 161 | 9 | 76 | 0.055901 | 0.47205 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,951 |
The answer depends on the conditions under which the embargo is lifted. I focus on the expected distribution of benefits (and costs) between the government and the Cuban population. A unilateral move by the US Government, without any quid pro quo by the Cuban government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown magnitude to the population at large. I posit that the magnitude of the latter depends on the degree of internal liberalization of the Cuban economy. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or constraints arguably more restrictive than the US embargo. What I have called the internal embargo consisted in the Cuban government outright prohibition for Cubans to own enterprises, freely employ workers or trade domestically and internationally. To many Cubans, probably a majority, such constraints were the main cause of the country ´s secular economic crisis.
|
Jorge A. Sanguinetty April 2013, Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted?, http://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/08/who-benefits-and-loses-if-the-us-cuba-embargo-is-lifted-by-jorge-a-sanguinetty/ , Director, Latin American Program in Applied Economics at American University
|
A unilateral move by the US Government, without any quid pro quo by the Cuban government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown magnitude to the population at large. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or constraints more restrictive than the US embargo To many Cubans, such constraints were the main cause of the country ´s secular economic crisis.
|
Lifting the embargo, unilaterally and without Conditions has the most benefits
| 989 | 79 | 473 | 158 | 11 | 79 | 0.06962 | 0.5 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,952 |
Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.
|
Safran, ’12 [8/14/12, Brian Safran has a Master of Science in Global Affairs , “End the Cuban Embargo - Brian Safran”, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran]
|
Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. , the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.
|
The Embargo is a tool of Neocolonialist ideology- the plan reverses that
| 1,051 | 72 | 714 | 168 | 12 | 117 | 0.071429 | 0.696429 |
Cuba Embargo Affirmative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekJuniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Affirmatives
|
2013
|
4,953 |
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
|
Barnett 9 (Thomas, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, August 25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)
|
as global economic news brightens globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts can be attributed to the global recession , the last new entry predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. the only two potential state-on-state wars ) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn
|
Economic Decline doesn’t cause war
| 2,442 | 34 | 844 | 378 | 5 | 135 | 0.013228 | 0.357143 |
Cuba Negative - Wyoming 2013.html5
|
Wyoming
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,954 |
The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).
|
Miller 00 (Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K (Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)
|
Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... to an outbreak of violence
|
Decline doesn’t cause war
| 1,475 | 25 | 551 | 247 | 4 | 90 | 0.016194 | 0.364372 |
Cuba Negative - Wyoming 2013.html5
|
Wyoming
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,955 |
The destruction of forests and other habitats is the single most important cause of biodiversity loss (IUCN 2004), and it is inevitable that the massive loss of forests that will occur over the next few decades will result in widespread extinctions. The magnitude of this impending extinction event can be estimated, roughly, using the species-area relationship. The species-area relationship describes the increase in species richness (S) with area of habitat (A), which can usually be modelled as a power function of the form S = cAz, the value of z indicating the slope of the increase. The expected loss of species from time t to t+1 can therefore be estimated as a function of habitat loss, using the equation St+1/St = (At+1/At)z. Using this method it has been predicted, for example, that endemic mammal species richness in the Brazilian Amazon could be reduced by 518% under different modelled scenarios of forest loss to 2020 (Grelle 2005).
|
Cardillo, 06 (Marcel, Division of Biology, Imperial College London, 2006, “Disappearing forests and biodiversity loss: which areas should we protect?,” International Forestry Review Volume 8, Issue 2, http://www.tempoandmode.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/int-forestry-review-june-2006-cardillo.pdf,)
|
The destruction of forests and other habitats is the single most important cause of biodiversity loss it is inevitable that the massive loss of forests that will occur will result in widespread extinctions The magnitude of this extinction event can be estimated using the species-area relationship it has been predicted that endemic mammal species richness in the Brazilian Amazon could be reduced by 518% under different modelled scenarios of forest loss to 2020
|
Deforestation makes biodiversity loss inevitable
| 949 | 48 | 463 | 156 | 5 | 73 | 0.032051 | 0.467949 |
Cuba Negative - Wyoming 2013.html5
|
Wyoming
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,956 |
There are several reasons for this. First, in spite of growing international cooperation among national law enforcement agencies, law enforcement remains a national activity confined to a single territorial jurisdiction, while organized crime is transnational in scope. In effect, law enforcement still continues to operate in a bordered world, whereas organized crime operates in a borderless world. Second, although the United States placed a high priority on denying safe haven or sanctuary to international criminals, many states have limited capacity to enforce laws against organized crime.Consequently, transnational criminal organizations are able to operate from safe havens, using a mix of corruption and violence to perpetuate the weakness of the states from which they operate.Nowhere is this more evident than in Mexico, where a war for control of routes and markets on the northern border has led to violence spilling over into the United States. Third, all too often attacking transnational criminal organizations has been subordinated to other goals and objectives. In spite of the emphasis on attacking smuggling and smugglers, for example, this is not something which has been allowed to interfere with global trade. In effect, reaping the benefits of globalization, tacitly at least, has been deemed more important than combating transnational organized crime.Not surprisingly, therefore, as Moises Naim has pointed out, ‘there is simply nothing in the cards that points to an imminent reversal of fortune for the myriads of networks active in illicit trade. It is even difficult to find evidence of substantial progress in reversing or even just containing the growth of these illicit markets’(2005: 221). Fourth, both transnational criminal organizations and the illicit markets in which they operate are highly adaptable. Law enforcement success against a particular organization, for example, tends simply to offer opportunities for its rivals to fill the gap.Moreover, the ability of organizations to move from one illicit product to another makes them even more difficult to combat. In recent years, for example, Burmese warlords have moved from opium to methamphetamine production and have become major suppliers to Asian markets for the drug.
|
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh 8-18-2006 http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199289783/baylis_chap09.pdf
|
in spite of growing cooperation law enforcement remains confined to a single territorial jurisdiction, while organized crime is transnational law enforcement operate in a bordered world organized crime operates in a borderless world many states have limited capacity to enforce laws against organized crime.Consequently, transnational criminal organizations are able to operate from safe havens using weakness of the states from which they operate attacking transnational criminal organizations has been subordinated to other goals and objectives In spite of emphasis It is even difficult to find evidence of containing illicit markets’ transnational criminal organizations and the illicit markets in which they operate are highly adaptable. the ability of organizations to move from one illicit product to another makes them even more difficult to combat
|
-No jurisdiction, weak states, trade offs, too adaptable
| 2,269 | 56 | 855 | 341 | 8 | 123 | 0.02346 | 0.360704 |
Cuba Negative - Wyoming 2013.html5
|
Wyoming
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,957 |
In many respects, the threats posed to the United States and more broadly to the international community of states by transnational organized crime and terrorism can be understood as an important manifestation of the new phase in world politics in which some of the key interactions are between the state system and what James Rosenau (1990) termed the ‘multi-centric system’, composed of ‘sovereignty-free actors’ . In this connection, it is notable that the first serious challenge to United States hegemony in the post-cold war world came not from another state but from a terrorist network.Moreover, both criminals and terrorists have certain advantages over states: they are agile, distributed, highly dynamic organizations with a capacity to morph or transform themselves when under pressure. States in contrast are slow, clumsy, hierarchical, and bureaucratic and, although they have the capacity to bring lots of resources to bear on a problem, can rarely do this with speed and efficiency. As discussed above, in the United States war on terror, the strategy for the war of ideas was very slow to develop, not least because of inter-agency differences. The same has been true in the effort to combat terrorist finances. As the Government Accountability Office (2005) has noted, ‘the U.S. government lacks an integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance to countries vulnerable to terrorist financing. Specifically, the effort does not have key stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a strategic alignment of resources with needs, or a process to measure performance’. Differences of perspective and approach between the Departments of State and Treasury have also seriously bedevilled the effort to ‘enable weak states’, one of the keys to the multilateral component of the administration’s strategy to combat terrorism. Similar problems have been evident in efforts to combat organized crime and drug trafficking.A striking example is the counter-drug intelligence architecture for the United States which has the Crime and Narcotics Center at CIA looking at the international dimension of drug trafficking, the National Drug Intelligence Center responsible for domestic aspects of the problem, the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network focusing on money laundering, and the El Paso Intelligence Center responsible for tactical intelligence. Although this architecture provides clear roles and responsibilities, it also creates bureaucratic seams in the effort to understand and assess what is clearly a seamless process of drug trafficking and money laundering across borders. Although good information exchanges can ease this problem, the architecture is far from optimal.
|
Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh 8-18-2006 http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199289783/baylis_chap09.pdf
|
criminals have advantages over states they are agile, distributed, highly dynamic with a capacity to morph or transform themselves when under pressure. States in contrast are slow, clumsy, hierarchical, and bureaucratic Differences of perspective and approach between the Departments of State and Treasury have also seriously bedevilled the effort Similar problems have been evident in efforts to combat organized crime
|
-Too agile, bureaucratic inefficiency
| 2,770 | 37 | 419 | 412 | 4 | 60 | 0.009709 | 0.145631 |
Cuba Negative - Wyoming 2013.html5
|
Wyoming
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
4,958 |
The actions that Bush and his modern predecessors have taken by fiat do not fit¶ easily within a theoretical framework of executive power that emphasizes weakness and¶ dependence, and offers as recourse only persuasion. For at least two reasons, the ability¶ to act unilaterally is conceptually distinct from the array of powers presidents rely upon¶ within a bargaining framework. First, when presidents act unilaterally, they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape. If they choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against¶ the president, then the president’s order stands. Only by taking (or credibly threatening¶ to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president’s unilateral powers. Second, when the president acts unilaterally, he acts alone. Now of course, he¶ relies upon numerous advisers to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it¶ against congressional or judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implementation (more¶ on this below). But in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities,¶ compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a case to¶ court. The president, instead, can strike out on his own. Doing so, the modern president is in a unique position to lead, to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance.¶ The ability to move first and act alone, then, distinguishes unilateral actions from other sources of influence. Indeed, the central precepts of Neustadt’s argument are turned¶ upside down, for unilateral action is the virtual antithesis of persuasion. Here, presidents just act; their power does not hinge upon their capacity to “convince [political actors]¶ that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their sake and¶ for their authority” (Neustadt 1990, 30). To make policy, presidents need not secure the formal consent of Congress. Instead, presidents simply set public policy and dare others to counter. And as long as Congress lacks the votes (usually two thirds of both chambers)¶ to overturn
|
Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, 5 (William G., Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35, no. 3, September, p. 421)
|
when presidents act unilaterally they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape Only by taking positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president’s unilateral powers when the president acts unilaterally he acts alone. in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities compromise with adversaries or wait for some interest group The president can strike out on his own the modern president is in a unique position to lead to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance. The ability to move first and act alone distinguishes unilateral actions from other sources of influence presidents just act; their power does not hinge upon their capacity to “convince [political actors To make policy presidents need not secure the formal consent of Congress presidents simply set public policy and dare others to counter.
|
Unilateral action avoids the politics DA – doesn’t spend political capital.
| 2,211 | 76 | 995 | 351 | 11 | 159 | 0.031339 | 0.452991 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,959 |
The president's base of independent authority, in fact, is enormously enhanced rather than compromised by the executive nature of his constitutional¶ job (sccMoc, 1998).¶ (1) Because presidents are executives, they must be (and in practice are) regarded as having certain legal prerogatives that allow them to do what executives¶ do: manage, coordinate, staff, collect information, plan, reconcile conflicting¶ values, and respond quickly and flexibly to emerging problems. These functions are what it means, in practice, to have the "executive power." They give¶ presidents tremendous discretion in the exercise of governmental authority, and¶ allow them, in effect, to make and change governmental policy through their¶ own unilateral action.¶ (2) Because presidents are executives, the reins of government are in their¶ hands. While Congress has the right to create programs and appropriate money,¶ and while the courts have the right to say what the law is, the unavoidable fact¶ of life in American government—and in all governments of any size—is that¶ virtually all authoritative governmental decisions are made within the executive.¶ The opportunities for presidential imperialism arc too numerous to count—or to¶ monitor, or to respond to—because, when presidents feel it is in their political¶ interests, they can put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in¶ gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their power.¶ (3) Because presidents are executives, they have at their disposal a tremendous reservoir of expertise, experience, and organizational capacity, both in the¶ institutional presidency and in the bureaucracy at large. As executives, they¶ also have the ability to act quickly and with flexibility in responding to problems and changing political, economic, and social circumstances as they arise,¶ and to fashion policy responses. They have, in short, enormous informational¶ and operational resources at their disposal for taking advantage of the myriad¶ opportunities for aggrandizement that present themselves in the course of governmental decision making, resources that are far superior to those of the other branches.¶ (4) And finally, there is a key advantage that is often overlooked. Because¶ presidents are executives, and because of the discretion, opportunities, and re-¶ sources executives have available to them in politics, presidents are particularly¶ well suited to be first-movers and to reap the agenda powers that go along with¶ it. If they want to shift the status quo by taking unilateral action on their own¶ authority, whether or not that authority is clearly established in law, they can¶ simply do it—quickly, forcefully, and (if they like) with no advance notice. The¶ other branches arc then presented with a fait accompli, and it is up to them to¶ respond. If they are unable to respond effectively, or decide not to, the president¶ wins by default. And even if they do respond, which could take years, he may¶ still get much of what he wants anyway.¶ The bottom line, then, is that the Constitution's incomplete contract sets up a¶ governing structure that virtually invites presidential imperialism. Presidents,¶ especially in modern times, are motivated to seek power. And because the¶ Constitution does not say precisely what the proper boundaries of their power¶ are, and because their hold on the executive functions of government gives¶ them pivotal advantages in the political struggle, they have strong incentives to¶ push for expanded authority: by moving into gray areas of the law, asserting¶ their rights, and exercising them, whether or not other actors, particularly in¶ Congress, happens to agree.
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Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, and Moe, Stanford University, 99 (William G. and Terry M, 1999, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, no. 1, p.137-8)
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The president's base of independent authority is enormously enhanced rather than compromised by the executive nature Because presidents are executives, They give presidents tremendous discretion in the exercise of governmental authority, and allow them, in effect, to make and change governmental policy through their own unilateral action the reins of government are in their hands virtually all authoritative governmental decisions are made within the executive. they can put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their power They have enormous informational and operational resources at their disposal for taking advantage of the myriad opportunities for aggrandizement that present themselves in the course of governmental decision making resources that are far superior to those of the other branches presidents are particularly well suited to be first-movers and to reap the agenda powers that go along with it If they want to shift the status quo by taking unilateral action on their own authority, whether or not that authority is clearly established in law, they can simply do it—quickly, forcefully, and (if they like) with no advance notice If they are unable to respond effectively, or decide not to, the president wins by default And even if they do respond, which could take years, he may still get much of what he wants anyway because the Constitution does not say precisely what the proper boundaries of their power are and because their hold on the executive functions of government gives them pivotal advantages in the political struggle, they have strong incentives to push for expanded authority
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The federal government is subservient to the president allowing for unilateral action to occur without triggering political struggles – multiple warrants.
| 3,700 | 154 | 1,694 | 565 | 21 | 266 | 0.037168 | 0.470796 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,960 |
Yet statutory constraint cannot be counted upon to work especially well as¶ a check on unilateral action by presidents. In the first place, legislators may¶ actually prefer broad delegations of authority on many occasions, granting pres-¶ idents substantial discretion to act unilaterally. This can happen, for instance,¶ (1) when their policy goals are similar to those of presidents, (2) when they are¶ heavily dependent on the expertise and experience of the administration, (3)¶ when they want to avoid making conflictual decisions within the legislature,¶ and thus find it attractive to "shift the responsibility" to the executive, (4) when¶ Congress, as a collective institution, really doesn't have specific preferences¶ and can only decide on the broad outlines of a policy, (5) when, in complex pol-¶ icy areas with changing environments, it is impossible to design a decent policy¶ that promises to meet its objectives unless substantial authority is delegated¶ to the executive, and (6) when certain policies require speed, flexibility, and¶ secrecy if they are to be successful (Moe, 1990, 1998; Epstein and O'Halloran,¶ 1999). Most of these conditions, we should point out, are more likely to be met¶ in foreign rather than domestic policy, so there is good reason to expect broad¶ delegations to be more common in that realm.
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Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, and Moe, Stanford University, 99 (William G. and Terry M, 1999, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, no. 1, p.141)
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Yet statutory constraint cannot be counted upon to work especially well as¶ a check on unilateral action by presidents. when their policy goals are similar to those of presidents they are heavily dependent on the expertise and experience of the administration they want to avoid making conflictual decisions within the legislature, and thus find it attractive to "shift the responsibility" to the executive, when Congress, can only decide on the broad outlines of a policy it is impossible to design a decent policy that promises to meet its objectives unless substantial authority is delegated to the executive
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Statutory constraints don’t work – it is impossible to avoid executive authority for policymaking.
| 1,339 | 98 | 611 | 210 | 14 | 97 | 0.066667 | 0.461905 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,961 |
What is likely to happen in Congress, then, when presidents take unilateral action by issuing executive orders that shift the policy status quo? The answer¶ is that legislative responses (if there are any) will be rooted in constituency.¶ An executive order that promotes civil rights, for example, will tend to be¶ supported by legislators from urban or liberal constituencies, because it shifts¶ the status quo in their preferred direction, while members from conservative¶ constituencies will tend to oppose it. The fact that this executive order might¶ well be seen as usurping Congress's lawmaking powers, or that it has the effect of expanding presidential power, will for most legislators be quite beside the¶ point. Thus if Congress tries to take any action at all in responding to the¶ executive order, the battle lines will be determined by the order's effects on¶ legislative constituencies, not by its effects on Congress's power vis-a-vis the¶ president. Even when presidents arc clearly taking action to push out the¶ boundaries of their power. Congress will not tend to vote or respond on that¶ basis, and will not as a result, be able to defend or promote its institutional¶ power very effectively
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Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, and Moe, Stanford University, 99 (William G. and Terry M, 1999, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, no. 1, p.144)
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What is likely to happen in Congress when presidents take unilateral action by issuing executive orders that shift the policy status quo legislative responses will be rooted in constituency The fact that this executive order might well be seen as usurping Congress's lawmaking powers, or that it has the effect of expanding presidential power, will for most legislators be quite beside the point Congress will not tend to vote or respond on that basis, and will not as a result, be able to defend or promote its institutional power very effectively
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No backlash – Congress doesn’t care about the president abusing his power.
| 1,213 | 74 | 548 | 195 | 12 | 91 | 0.061538 | 0.466667 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,962 |
Presidents exercise two important kinds of agenda power in their relations¶ with Congress. The first is now part of the familiar, textbook description of¶ American politics: precisely because Congress is so fragmented, the president's policy proposals are the focal points for congressional action. The major issues¶ Congress deals with each year, as a result, are fundamentally shaped by what¶ presidents decide will be the salient concerns for the nation. While this kind¶ of agenda power is of great consequence, a second kind is probably more¶ important for the institutional balance of power, yet it is rarely recognized as¶ such. This is the agenda power that presidents exercise when they take unilateral action to alter the status quo. When they do this, they present Congress with¶ a fait accompli—a new, prcsidcntially made law—and Congress is then in the¶ position of having to respond or acquiesce.¶ Note the key differences between these forms of agenda control. Under the¶ first, presidential success ultimately requires an affirmative act by Congress,¶ and thus that Congress go through all the laborious steps necessary to produce¶ new legislation—which is politically very difficult, often highly conflictual,¶ typically very time consuming, and in the final analysis unlikely to happen¶ (more on this below). This is why modern presidents have incentives to shy away from the "legislative strategy" of presidential leadership (Nathan, 1983).¶ Even with all their resources, they can expect to have a hard time getting their¶ programs through Congress.¶ On the other hand, the second form of agenda control, rooted as it is in¶ unilateral action, gives the president what he wants immediately—a shift in¶ the status quo, and perhaps a new increment to his power—and depends for its¶ success on Congress's not being able to pass new (and veto-proof) legislation¶ that would overturn or change it. Such a requirement is much more readily met¶ for it is far easier, by many orders of magnitude, to block congressional action¶ than it is to engineer new legislation. And if this were not enough, the new status quo initiated by the president may in itself defuse legislative opposition and do away with the need to block at all. When a president unilaterally launches an¶ invasion of another country, for instance. Congress faces a drastically different¶ set of options than it did before the conflict started, and may find itself politically¶ compelled to support and provide funds for an exercise it never would have¶ agreed to beforehand. Needless to say, these advantages of agenda control give¶ modern presidents strong incentives to favor an "administrative strategy" of¶ leadership as opposed to a "legislative strategy" (Nathan. 1983).
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Howell, Associate Professor of Government @ Harvard University, and Moe, Stanford University, 99 (William G. and Terry M, 1999, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, no. 1, p.145-6)
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Presidents exercise two important kinds of agenda power in their relations with Congress. The first is precisely because Congress is so fragmented, the president's policy proposals are the focal points for congressional action a second kind is more important for the institutional balance of power This is the agenda power that presidents exercise when they take unilateral action to alter the status quo. Under the first, presidential success ultimately requires an affirmative act by Congress This is why modern presidents have incentives to shy away from the "legislative strategy" of presidential leadership the second form of agenda control, rooted as it is in unilateral action, gives the president what he wants immediately And if this were not enough, the new status quo initiated by the president may in itself defuse legislative opposition and do away with the need to block at all
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Their evidence does not assume unilateral action that defuses legislative opposition.
| 2,756 | 85 | 891 | 434 | 11 | 142 | 0.025346 | 0.327189 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,963 |
Sean Heather, vice president of the U.S. Chamber's Center for Global Regulatory Cooperation, issued the following statement welcoming today’s announcement by the Obama Administration of a new executive order on international regulatory cooperation: “Today’s executive order marks a paradigm shift for U.S. regulators by directing them to take the international implications of their work into account in a consistent and comprehensive way. “Fulfilling primary regulatory objectives such as health and safety is more complicated than ever due to the interconnected nature of the global economy. The result is that international cooperation is clearly in the interest of regulators and is now assuming a central role in framing good domestic regulatory policy. “This landmark executive order recognizes that good regulatory policy supports good trade policy. Dialogue between U.S. regulators and their foreign counterparts can avert unnecessary divergences in regulation that become 'behind the border' barriers to commerce and hinder the ability of U.S. companies to reach the 95% of the world’s consumers that live beyond our borders. “Some U.S. regulators have been moving in this direction in recent years, but not systematically and not always in a well coordinated fashion that supports our international economic policy objectives. This executive order provides a much needed political emphasis and sharpens the administration's focus on international regulatory cooperation in APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and in bilateral regulatory dialogues with key trading partners such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union. “Over the past four decades, almost every president has made important contributions to the body of administrative law that directs regulatory promulgation, but until today all of those contributions were domestic in nature. This executive order is the international riposte. We look forward to working with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on further guidance in support of today’s executive order.” The Center for Global Regulatory Cooperation seeks to align trade, regulatory, and competition policy in support of open and competitive markets. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world’s largest business federation representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations.
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USCOC 13 (United States Chamber of Commerce, May 01, 2012, U.S. Chamber Welcomes Executive Order on International Regulatory Cooperation, http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2012/may/us-chamber-welcomes-executive-order-international-regulatory-cooperation) TYBG
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“Today’s executive order marks a paradigm shift for U.S. regulators by directing them to take the international implications of their work into account in a consistent and comprehensive way. This executive order provides a much needed political emphasis and sharpens the administration's focus on international regulatory cooperation in APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and in bilateral regulatory dialogues with key trading partners such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union. This executive order is the international riposte. We look forward to working with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on further guidance in support of today’s executive order.”
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Recent executive order proves Obama can use XO’s to further economic engagement
| 2,426 | 79 | 677 | 355 | 12 | 98 | 0.033803 | 0.276056 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,964 |
President Barack Obama came into office four years ago skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress. Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way. He’s done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency. And he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he’s bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more to advance their goals. While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered a torrent of criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider. He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change. Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.
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Kumar 13 (Anita, McClatchy Newspapers, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants”, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.UdxwMD6gXFw) TYBG
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as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way. he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change. Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.
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Obama can push through virtually any executive order
| 1,693 | 52 | 1,050 | 279 | 8 | 170 | 0.028674 | 0.609319 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,965 |
We have amassed considerable evidence that in the eighteenth century, the executive power included authority over foreign affairs; that during the Articles era, Congress was understood to enjoy the executive power over foreign affairs; that the Department of Foreign Affairs was regarded as an executive department; and that the Framers and ratifiers recognized that the President would enjoy foreign affairs authorities beyond those specifically enumerated in Article II, Sections 2 and 3. On the other hand, we have explained that under the Constitution, Congress lacks a textual hook upon which it might lay claim to those residual powers over foreign affairs not otherwise granted to the President. Admittedly, Congress enjoys unquestioned foreign affairs authority over discrete foreign affairs matters (war, foreign commerce, marque and reprisal, and the law of nations). But these discrete powers are a far cry from the type of authority that might be thought to invest Congress with a sweeping residual power over foreign affairs. Indeed, during the drafting and ratification phases, no one suggested that Congress would enjoy anything close to plenary authority over foreign affairs as it had under the Articles. Nor did anyone suggest that Congress would enjoy all the foreign affairs authorities not allocated to the President. We believe these materials and arguments are sufficient to establish that the President’s executive power grants the power to control foreign affairs except where the Constitution specifically allocates authority to Congress or requires that it be shared with the Senate.
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Prakash and Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, 2001 (Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-8-13, RRR)
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the executive power included authority over foreign affai the Framers and ratifiers recognized that the President would enjoy foreign affairs authorities beyond those specifically enumerated in Article II, Sections 2 and 3. under the Constitution, Congress lacks a textual hook upon which it might lay claim to those residual powers over foreign affairs not otherwise granted to the President. during the drafting and ratification phases, no one suggested that Congress would enjoy anything close to plenary authority over foreign affairs Nor did anyone suggest that Congress would enjoy all the foreign affairs authorities not allocated to the President. We believe these materials and arguments are sufficient to establish that the President’s executive power grants the power to control foreign affairs
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The president has broad executive powers
| 1,610 | 41 | 805 | 244 | 6 | 120 | 0.02459 | 0.491803 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,966 |
This Section focuses on the formation of United States foreign policy during the Washington Administration. As discussed, by “ foreign policy” we mean the ability to publicly pronounce the views and goals of the United States—as Washington himself called it, the “ disposition” of the United States412—on international matters, even though that policy might contradict or go beyond existing laws.413 Our theory of residual executive power over foreign affairs would give this power to the President, since the determination of foreign policy is an aspect of the traditional executive power not allocated elsewhere by the Constitution. As this Section reveals,414 the events of the Washington Administration—particularly in response to the war between England and France in 1793-1794—confirm this understanding of executive power.415
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Prakash and Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, 2001 (Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-8-13, RRR)
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As discussed, by “ foreign policy” we mean the ability to publicly pronounce the views and goals of the United States—as Washington himself called it, the “ disposition” of the United States on international matters, even though that policy might contradict or go beyond existing laws Our theory of residual executive power over foreign affairs would give this power to the President, since the determination of foreign policy is an aspect of the traditional executive power not allocated elsewhere by the Constitution. As this Section reveals,414 the events of the Washington Administration—particularly in response to the war between England and France in 1793-1794—confirm this understanding of executive power.
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The president has the power to change the disposition of US foreign policy, even if it goes beyond or contradicts existing laws
| 832 | 128 | 714 | 122 | 22 | 108 | 0.180328 | 0.885246 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,967 |
As many of the incidents recounted above indicate, Washington spoke for the United States when communicating with foreign countries. In this Section, we recount Washington’s control of foreign communications. We also reveal how Congress and other countries accepted the executive’s control of communications. Finally, we relate how Jefferson dealt with Genet when the latter denied that Washington spoke for the nation. In the early days of the new administration, Washington assumed control over foreign communications. We have already discussed Jay’s illuminating letter to the American agent in Morocco in which Jay instructed the agent that communications to the United States from foreign nations would now be directed toward the President rather than Congress.370 Jay’s construction of the Constitution was entirely consistent with the Chief Diplomat’s because Washington also believed that he could control communications with foreign regimes. In a December 1789 letter to Muhammed Ben Abdalla, the King of Morocco, the President asserted his authority as “ sole channel of official intercourse.” 371 After apologizing for the delay in responding to the King’s 1788 letter, the President explained that since he was “ the supreme executive Authority,” the King’s letter had been delivered to him.372 Likewise, after reviewing a 1789 letter from Louis XVI addressed to the President and Congress, Washington informed Congress that he would respond to the letter. In the subsequent letter to Louis XVI, Washington explained that because of the new Constitution, he had the “ honor of receiving and answering” the King’s earlier letter.373 Washington understood that, as part of his “ supreme executive authority” conveyed by Article II, Section 1, he was to correspond with foreign governments, and their letters were to be addressed to him as the nation’s sole representative. Congress never challenged the President’s communications monopoly. Although members often held strong sentiments about overseas events, Congress never conveyed those sentiments directly to another country. Nor did Congress ever command the President to convey certain sentiments to foreign countries, as the Continental Congress had commanded its Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the Articles.375 Instead, Congress adopted resolutions that must seem odd to modern observers of foreign affairs. Rather than passing a resolution that merely expressed the congressional view (or the view of the House or the Senate), each chamber beseeched the President to convey a message to the relevant foreign government. For instance, after learning that the French King had accepted a new constitution, the House and Senate “ requested” that the President express the sincere interest of the chambers “ in his answer” to France’s notification.376 On another occasion, the Senate and the House “ requested” the President to respond favorably to a letter from the notorious Committee of Public Safety.377 Finally, upon learning that the French Republic had presented its colors, the House requested the President to convey its sentiments to France.378
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(Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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Washington spoke for the United States when communicating with foreign countries Congress and other countries accepted the executive’s control of communications. In the early days of the new administration, Washington assumed control over foreign communications Jay instructed the agent that communications to the United States from foreign nations would now be directed toward the President rather than Congress. Washington also believed that he could control communications with foreign regimes. the President asserted his authority as “ sole channel of official intercourse.” the President explained that since he was “ the supreme executive Authority,” the King’s letter had been delivered to him. after reviewing a 1789 letter from Louis XVI addressed to the President and Congress, Washington informed Congress that he would respond to the letter Washington explained that because of the new Constitution, he had the “ honor of receiving and answering” the King’s earlier letter. as part of his “ supreme executive authority” conveyed by Article II, Section 1, he was to correspond with foreign governments, and their letters were to be addressed to him as the nation’s sole representative. Congress never challenged the President’s communications monopoly. Congress never ever command the President to convey certain sentiments to foreign countries
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The President is the sole channel of foreign intercourse
| 3,122 | 56 | 1,355 | 470 | 9 | 201 | 0.019149 | 0.42766 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,968 |
President Obama, being unable to get his environmental and anti-global warming agenda through Congress, has announced that he will impose it by executive order. After all, the bureaucracies and regulatory agencies of the Executive branch have become the nation’s de facto lawmakers anyway. So why do we need Congress when the president can rule by fiat?¶ From UPI:¶ The plan will include brand new federal regulations to limit carbon emissions from existing power plants, a move that faced stringent opposition from energy producers and Republican leaders.¶ It also opens the door for more renewable sources, including wind, solar and hydropower energy, to be placed on public lands. And an $8 billion federal loan aims to encourage further research and innovation into clean sources of energy.¶ Obama’s action will raise efficiency standards for federal buildings to lower carbon pollution by at least 3 billion metric tons, about half the annual pollution from the energy sector, by 2030, and further improve fuel economy of new cars.¶ The plan also attempts to take preemptive action to prepare for more frequent severe weather in hurricane-prone regions and for farmers facing droughts and wildfires.¶ Finally, the action includes a renewed push to encourage international cooperation on raising clean energy standards, particularly with China and India.¶ While scientists for years have agreed that human factors have contributed to shifts in global weather patterns, efforts to put policy changes in place have been stonewalled by political deadlock.¶ The president’s plan will side-step Congress and issue an executive order to reduce carbon emissions and prepare for the effects of climate change.
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Veith 6/27 ¶ (gene) Professor of Literature at Patrick Henry College “Green lawmaking by executive order” http://www.patheos.com/blogs/geneveith/2013/06/green-lawmaking-by-executive-order/
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President Obama, being unable to get his environmental and anti-global warming agenda through Congress, has announced that he will impose it by executive order. After all, the bureaucracies and regulatory agencies of the Executive branch have become the nation’s de facto lawmakers anyway why do we need Congress when the president can rule by fiat?¶ The plan will include brand new federal regulations to limit carbon emissions from existing power plants, a move that faced stringent opposition from energy producers and Republican leaders.¶ It also opens the door for more renewable sources, including wind, solar and hydropower energy, to an $8 billion federal loan aims to encourage further research and innovation into clean sources of energy.¶ Finally, the action includes a renewed push to encourage international cooperation on raising clean energy standards The president’s plan will side-step Congress and issue an executive order to reduce carbon emissions and prepare for the effects of climate change.
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XO solves international coop on clean energy
| 1,705 | 44 | 1,014 | 263 | 7 | 155 | 0.026616 | 0.589354 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,969 |
Events of the late eighteenth century also confirm an understanding that Congress had a derivative power to legislate in support of presidential powers over foreign affairs. Consider, for example, the issuance of passports. No federal statute conveyed to the President a general authority to issue passports during Washington’s administration (or indeed at any time prior to 1856).528 Although passport power does not seem to be granted by anything in Article II, Sections 2 and 3, the Washington Administration issued passports without anyone raising any question as to its constitutional authority to do so.529 This further confirms our theory of residual executive power over foreign affairs, as the passport power would easily be encompassed by the residual power, and we think it likely that this is how the Washington Administration and its contemporaries understood it. Although Congress did not give general passport authority to the President, it did legislate in support of the President’s independent passport power. Specifically, in 1790 Congress passed a statute that, among other things, provided penalties for forgery of a U.S. passport.530 This sequence of events fits perfectly with our understanding of the respective roles of Congress and the President in foreign affairs. Although issuance of passports was an executive function, the President alone could not decree criminal penalties for forgery of a passport, since the President lacked lawmaking authority.531 Congress, however, could do that, even though it lacked an enumerated power to issue passports in the first instance, since it had the power to pass laws in support of other powers granted by the Constitution.532 As a result, the 1790 Passport Act suffered no constitutional infirmity.533
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Prakash and Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, 2001 (Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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Congress had a derivative power to legislate in support of presidential powers over foreign affairs. Consider the issuance of passports. No federal statute conveyed to the President a general authority to issue passports during Washington’s administration Although passport power does not seem to be granted by anything in Article II, Sections 2 and 3, the Washington Administration issued passports without anyone raising any question as to its constitutional authority to do so. This further confirms our theory of residual executive power over foreign affairs, as the passport power would easily be encompassed by the residual power, and we think it likely that this is how the Washington Administration and its contemporaries understood it. Although Congress did not give general passport authority to the President, it did legislate in support of the President’s independent passport power. in 1790 Congress passed a statute tha provided penalties for forgery of a U.S. passport. This sequence of events fits perfectly with our understanding of the respective roles of Congress and the President in foreign affairs. Although issuance of passports was an executive function, the President alone could not decree criminal penalties for forgery of a passport, since the President lacked lawmaking authority. Congress, however, could do that, even though it lacked an enumerated power to issue passports in the first instance, since it had the power to pass laws in support of other powers granted by the Constitution. As a result, the 1790 Passport Act suffered no constitutional infirmity.
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The Executive has the power to issue passports
| 1,772 | 47 | 1,592 | 270 | 8 | 245 | 0.02963 | 0.907407 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,970 |
Senior experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies explained how in the 18 months since the Obama administration had announced its pivot towards Asia-Pacific, the emphasis had moved beyond military redeployment towards greater diplomatic, political and economic engagement in the region.
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Lake, Managing Director of Shephard Media, 1-6-13 (Darren, Shephard Media, “China, US relationship central at Asian security dialogue,” http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/china-us-relationship-asian-security-dialogue/, Accessed 7-2-13, RRR)
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experts explained how emphasis had moved beyond military redeployment towards economic engagement
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The Department of Defense can increase economic engagement
| 306 | 59 | 97 | 42 | 8 | 12 | 0.190476 | 0.285714 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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4,971 |
This situation represents an opportunity for the U.S. to curb Venezuelan and Cuban influence in the region by providing the GOP tailored assistance to address the militant threat. Vice President Castiglioni has appealed for our assistance. In reply, we should stress the need for the GOP to respond to the threat sooner rather than later by acquiring resources, particularly in the way of weapons it will need to meet this threat. We should also leverage the GOP's request for our assistance to shore up support for continued approval of U.S.-Paraguayan military exercises and protections for U.S. military personnel who participate in those exercises. It is possible that personnel and other resources present in Paraguay for such exercises could assist the GOP with efforts to locate and apprehend members of the militant PPL faction believed to be hiding in remote, generally inaccessible areas of the country. Combined with events in Bolivia, the increasingly public PPL threat may also deepen GOP distrust of Venezuela and Cuba. Increased U.S. political and economic engagement could consolidate and accelerate this trend. An effort is under way, with foreign backing, to establish a militant leftist movement in Paraguay, but we should be careful not to exaggerate the threat. Paraguay does not have a long history of radical leftist activity, and the PPL's military wing, while violent, is relatively small and isolated in pockets of the countryside. Post does not see a revolution in Paraguay's immediate future. On the other hand, we need to begin exploring ways to help the GOP deal with the threat that does exist, and consider ways such assistance might advance U.S. interests in curbing Venezuelan and Cuban influence and fostering the strong military-to-military relations we have enjoyed in Paraguay for many years. Post is seeking increased direct assistance for the GOP for pursuing the PPL through DoD and other channels. In addition, Department should seek ways to increase political and economic engagement with the GOP to consolidate and accelerate growing GOP suspicions of Venezuela and Cuba.
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Stamilio, a special advisor in the U.S. State Department's Office of War Crimes Issues, 5-6-12 (Mark, Wikileaks, PARAGUAY'S INCIPIENT INSURGENCY: A KEY MOMENT FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06ASUNCION503.html, Accessed 7-2-13, RRR)
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we need to begin exploring ways to help the GOP consider ways assistance might advance U.S. interests in Venezuela and Cuba Post is seeking increased direct assistance for the GOP through DoD and other channels. Department should seek ways to increase economic engagement with the GOP to consolidate and accelerate growing GOP suspicions of Venezuela and Cuba.
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DOD has economically engaged before
| 2,115 | 36 | 360 | 334 | 5 | 57 | 0.01497 | 0.170659 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,972 |
Sarewitz, who studies the government's role in promoting innovation, said the Defense Department had been more successful than other federal agencies because it is the main user of the innovations that it finances. The Pentagon, which spends billions each year on weapons, equipment and technology, has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects.
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Binyamin Appelbaum 12, Defense cuts would hurt scientific R%26D, experts say, The New York Times, 1-8-12, http://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/defense-cuts-would-hurt-scientific-rd-experts-say
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Defense Department had been more successful than other federal agencies because it is the main user of the innovations that it finances. The Pentagon has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects.
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The DOD is insulated from politics
| 385 | 34 | 236 | 59 | 6 | 38 | 0.101695 | 0.644068 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,973 |
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, P. 2, Accessed: 7/2/13, LPS.)
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Meyer, analyst in Latin American, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 12
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(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service,
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The State department is the primary actor in Latin American aid allocation
| 383 | 74 | 134 | 50 | 12 | 18 | 0.24 | 0.36 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,974 |
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, P. 7, Accessed: 7/2/13, LPS.)
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Meyer, analyst in Latin American, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 12
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(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service,
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The State department can allocate Venezuela aid
| 383 | 47 | 134 | 50 | 7 | 18 | 0.14 | 0.36 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,975 |
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, P. 9, Accessed: 7/2/13, LPS.)
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Meyer, analyst in Latin American, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 12
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(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service,
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The State Department can allocate Mexico aid
| 383 | 44 | 134 | 50 | 7 | 18 | 0.14 | 0.36 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,976 |
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, P. 14, Accessed: 7/2/13, LPS.)
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Meyer, analyst in Latin American, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 12
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(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service,
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State department can allocate aid to Cuba
| 384 | 41 | 134 | 50 | 7 | 18 | 0.14 | 0.36 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,977 |
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, P. 15, Accessed: 7/2/13, LPS.)
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Meyer, analyst in Latin American, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 12
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(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service,
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State department solves Cuba best- congress takes too long
| 384 | 58 | 134 | 50 | 9 | 18 | 0.18 | 0.36 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,978 |
Lawmakers of both parties blasted President Obama on Tuesday for failing to live up to his promise of open government, after a report found that nearly two-thirds of his administration’s agencies are failing to comply with a five-year-old law requiring bureaucrats to be more responsive to public requests for information.¶ A governmentwide audit makes clear that “the overwhelming majority of federal agencies are neither fulfilling the president’s promise of an open and transparent government for the American people, nor complying with the vital reforms to the [Freedom of Information Act] process that Congress demanded,” said Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat, who helped to write those new laws.¶ Sen. John Cornyn, Texas Republican and co-author of the 2007 law, said Mr. Obama’s pledge to make his administration “the most open and transparent in history” is falling far short of his goal.¶ “This report reveals how hollow that pledge was, and can be added to the long list of broken promises from his administration,” Mr. Cornyn said.¶ A spokesman for the White House on government transparency issues didn’t respond to a request for comment.¶ The Freedom of Information Act audit by the National Security Archive of George Washington University found that 62 of 99 government agencies haven’t updated their FOIA regulations since Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. advised department heads in March 2009 to cut through red tape and release more documents sought by the public. Mr. Holder’s own department is one of the backsliders on conforming with the law.¶ Fifty-six federal agencies have not updated their FOIA regulations since the passage in 2007 of the Open Government Act, which mandated reforming agencies’ fees, instituting tracking numbers for requests and publishing specific data on their FOIA output. Among the agencies that have failed to update their FOIA regulations are the Justice Department, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Special Counsel.
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Boyer ’12 (Dave Boyer, The Washington Times, 12/4/12, “Obama’s FOIA lag draws fire from left and right,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/4/obamas-foia-lag-draws-fire-left-and-right/?page=all, accessed 7/6/13, LPS)
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Lawmakers of both parties blasted President Obama for failing to live up to his promise of open government, after a report found that nearly two-thirds of his administration’s agencies are failing to comply with a five-year-old law requiring bureaucrats to be more responsive to public requests for information “the overwhelming majority of federal agencies are neither fulfilling the president’s promise of an open and transparent government for the American people, nor complying with the vital reforms to the [Freedom of Information Act] Among the agencies that have failed to update their FOIA regulations are the Justice Department, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Special Counsel.
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Obama gets the heat for the State Department – FOIA proves
| 2,144 | 58 | 822 | 332 | 11 | 124 | 0.033133 | 0.373494 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,979 |
In contemporary practice, executive orders typically either originate from the advisory structures within the Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of presidential action. For particularly complex or far-reaching orders, the White House will solicit comment and suggestions from affected agencies on wording and substantive content. Simple executive orders navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over an inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.
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Mayer, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, 01 (Kenneth, , Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 61, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power, accessed: 7/9/13, ML)
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, executive orders typically either originate from the advisory structures within the Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of presidential action. For particularly complex or far-reaching orders, the White House will solicit comment and suggestions from affected agencies on wording and substantive content. Simple executive orders navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over an inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.
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Take years to happen
| 562 | 20 | 538 | 81 | 4 | 79 | 0.049383 | 0.975309 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,980 |
Finally, practice in the Washington Administration confirms that the President lacked authority over matters that were traditionally legislative— notably lawmaking and appropriations—even where these powers implicated foreign affairs. Rather, these remained independent powers of Congress.521 We have discussed in some detail the efforts to enforce neutrality in 1793-1794, emphasizing the fact that the President did not claim that his Neutrality Proclamation had any legal force of its own right, and that his search for other legal bases upon which to enforce neutrality was largely unsuccessful.522 It is also worth noting that, although Congress raised no objections to the Neutrality Proclamation and ultimately passed the Neutrality Act to give it legislative force, Congress did not feel obligated to follow the President’s lead in this matter. Instead, it debated the substance of the Act extensively, and passed it over some serious opposition.523 It was not suggested that the Proclamation bound Congress to act524—to the contrary, Congress plainly believed it could and should act independently in foreign affairs legislation. Relatedly, Congress did not feel bound to follow the President’s lead in foreign affairs appropriations, nor did the President expect it. For example, during the Neutrality Crisis, Washington officially told both British and French representatives that he thought the United States was obligated to compensate certain victims of privateers violating U.S. neutrality.525 When the issue came before Congress, however, that body felt no obligation to provide any compensation, despite the President’s prior remarks, and declined to do so.526 Although this amounted to a potentially serious embarrassment to the President, Washington acknowledged Congress’s right to act independently on the matter.527
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Prakash and Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, 2001 (Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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practice in the Washington Administration confirms that the President lacked authority over matters that were traditionally legislative— notably lawmaking and appropriations—even where these powers implicated foreign affairs. , these remained independent powers of Congress We have discussed in some detail the efforts to enforce neutrality emphasizing the fact that the President did not claim that his Neutrality Proclamation had any legal force of its own right, and that his search for other legal bases upon which to enforce neutrality was largely unsuccessful although Congress raised no objections to the Neutrality Proclamation and ultimately passed the Neutrality Act to give it legislative force, Congress did not feel obligated to follow the President’s lead in this matter. Instead, it debated the substance of the Act extensively, and passed it over some serious opposition. Congress did not feel bound to follow the President’s lead in foreign affairs appropriations, nor did the President expect it. during the Neutrality Crisis, Washington officially told both British and French representatives that he thought the United States was obligated to compensate certain victims of privateers violating U.S. neutrality. When the issue came before Congress, however, that body felt no obligation to provide any compensation, despite the President’s prior remarks, and declined to do so.
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Congress acts independently over legislation or appropriations, even when foreign affairs are implicated
| 1,837 | 104 | 1,396 | 265 | 13 | 206 | 0.049057 | 0.777358 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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4,981 |
A second area where the President ceded the lead to Congress involved the regulation of foreign commerce. Arguably, some regulations of foreign commerce fall within the traditional executive power in the English system.516 The English monarch had the power, for example, to impose embargoes under certain circumstances.517 However, regulation of commerce with foreign nations—including embargoes—was encompassed by Congress’s express Article I, Section 8 power.518 Not surprisingly, there was no discussion of the President imposing an embargo (or other regulation of commerce) during the Washington Administration; these matters were handled in Congress.519 In particular, Congress obviously thought the President lacked the ability to impose an embargo on his own authority, for in 1794 it delegated to the President the power to impose an embargo during the legislative recess “ whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require.” 520 This further confirms the general understanding that foreign affairs powers conveyed to Congress by the Constitution were conveyed away from the President, even where these powers had previously been traditional executive powers.
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Prakash and Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, 2001 (Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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A second area where the President ceded the lead to Congress involved the regulation of foreign commerce ulation of commerce with foreign nations—including embargoes—was encompassed by Congress’s express Article I, Section 8 power. Not surprisingly, there was no discussion of the President imposing an embargo (or other regulation of commerce) Congress obviously thought the President lacked the ability to impose an embargo on his own authority, This further confirms the general understanding that foreign affairs powers conveyed to Congress by the Constitution were conveyed away from the President, even where these powers had previously been traditional executive powers.
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Congress has power over foreign trade and embargos
| 1,178 | 51 | 677 | 171 | 8 | 98 | 0.046784 | 0.573099 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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4,982 |
If it has one, the power to appropriate money for unilaterally created programs is Congress's trump card. When a unilateral action requires funding, considerable influence shifts back to the legislative branch—for in these instances, a president's directive requires positive action by Congress. Whereas before, presidents needed only to block congressional efforts to amend or overturn their orders—something more easily done, given the well-documented travails of the legislative process—now they must build and sustain the coalitions that often prove so elusive in collective decision-making bodies. And should they not secure it, orders written on paper may not translate into action taken on the ground.
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Howell, Professor at Harvard University, 5 (William G. “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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the power to appropriate money for unilaterally created programs is Congress's trump card. When a unilateral action requires funding, considerable influence shifts back to the legislative branch—for in these instances, a president's directive requires positive action by Congress. they must build and sustain the coalitions that often prove so elusive in collective decision-making bodies. And should they not secure it, orders written on paper may not translate into action taken on the ground.
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Congress has the trump card, they’re the only one’s who can fund projects
| 708 | 74 | 495 | 103 | 13 | 73 | 0.126214 | 0.708738 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,983 |
The Law of Nations Clause gives Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.”151 On its face, this Clause may not be an obvious source of congressional detention authority. Indeed, in categorizing the powers of Congress in The Federalist Papers, James Madison classified the Law of Nations Clause as part of a “class of powers” involving “Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations” rather than “Security against foreign danger.”152 The latter class involved “those [powers] of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying an borrowing money,”153 while the Law of Nations Clause was classified with powers “to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, . . . to regulate foreign commerce,” and the slave importation clauses.154
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Hains, Bingham Law School, 11 (William H, Bingham Law Review, Challenging the Executive: The Constitutionality of Congressional Regulation of the President’s Wartime Detention Policies, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1342143693_12hains.fin.pdf, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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The Law of Nations Clause gives Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.” the Law of Nations Clause as part of a “class of powers” involving “Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations” rather than “Security against foreign danger.” those [powers] of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying an borrowing money,” powers “to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, . . . to regulate foreign commerce,”
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The Law of Nations Clause gives congress a laundry list of powers
| 976 | 65 | 660 | 155 | 12 | 108 | 0.077419 | 0.696774 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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4,984 |
In setting forth our theory of foreign affairs powers, it is important to stress not only the scope of the President’s power, but also the limits upon it. In particular, as discussed below, our theory emphasizes that, for the most part, the President’s power over foreign affairs is residual. In areas where Congress has a power or where the Senate shares a power, the President cannot exercise such powers unilaterally. One characteristic of Washington as President was that he sometimes acted with great deference to Congress and the Senate in foreign affairs, and sometimes acted unilaterally. This allows the various camps of foreign affairs scholars to claim precedent for their view in the Washington Administration: Advocates of presidential primacy in foreign affairs stress Washington’s assertiveness, while congressional primacists stress his deference.504 We think the two faces of Washington are reconcilable in a way consistent with our theory of foreign affairs power. As discussed above, the areas in which Washington acted unilaterally—ambassadors, diplomacy, foreign policy—are part of the unallocated residual power over foreign affairs. As described below, the areas in which Washington acted deferentially concern matters that are granted to other branches by the text of the Constitution or that were never part of the traditional executive foreign affairs power. One area in which Washington exercised deference to Congress was war powers. War was one of the principal executive powers of foreign affairs in the taxonomy of the great eighteenth-century writers.505 The Constitution, however, vests Congress with the power “ to declare war and issue letters of marque and reprisal.” 506 We do not propose to enter into a substantial examination of Congress’s war power.507 It is sufficient to note that this Clause appears to grant Congress some material power over war, and that Washington and his advisers saw much less room to pursue a unilateral executive program to involve the United States in war. We have already noted, for example, that in connection with the Nootka Sound incident, even the most pro-executive members of Washington’s cabinet— Hamilton and Knox—thought it necessary to convene Congress in case war with Britain became imminent, although the entire cabinet believed that Washington could act unilaterally up to that point.508 Relatedly, Hamilton’s Pacificus, while arguing for broad presidential powers over foreign affairs, acknowledged an exclusive power in Congress to move the nation from peace to war.
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Prakash and Ramsey, University of San Diego School of Law, 2001 (Saikrishna B and Michael D, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/111-2/PrakashFINAL.pdf, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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for the most part, the President’s power over foreign affairs is residual. In areas where Congress has a power or where the Senate shares a power, the President cannot exercise such powers unilaterally. the areas in which Washington acted deferentially concern matters that are granted to other branches by the text of the Constitution or that were never part of the traditional executive foreign affairs power. One area in which Washington exercised deference to Congress was war powers. this Clause appears to grant Congress some material power over war, and that Washington and his advisers saw much less room to pursue a unilateral executive program to involve the United States in war.
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Congress has the power to declare war, the president only gets residual powers
| 2,552 | 78 | 690 | 391 | 13 | 112 | 0.033248 | 0.286445 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,985 |
President Barack Obama made waves last Friday when — amid a fierce fiscal cliff debate — he signed an executive order ending the pay freeze on certain federal workers. Beneficiaries to see a pay boost included Vice President Joe Biden and members of Congress. Though the raises were relatively modest (at least for a government that runs trillion-dollar deficits)– about $900/year for members of Congress and $6,000/year for Biden– the Weekly Standard writes that the executive order would cost the taxpayer roughly $11 billion over the next ten years. On Tuesday night, the U.S. House of Representatives approved legislation blocking the pay raise. “Unbelievably, in the middle of talks this week on tax rates and sequestration revision, in the midst of high deficits and a growing national debt, the president has proposed pay increases for members of Congress,” Rep. Mike Fitzpatrick (R-Pa.) summarized. “I have to say that nobody in this town saw this coming, and very few think it is warranted.” The measure received immense bipartisan support, passing 287-129, with 55 Democrats voting with Republicans against the president’s proposal.
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Ritz, The Blaze, 1-2-13 (Erica, The Blaze, “WHICH OBAMA EXECUTIVE ORDER DID THE HOUSE OVERWHELMINGLY OVERTURN YESTERDAY?,” Accessed- 7-9-13, RRR)
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Obama made waves last Friday when — amid a fierce fiscal cliff debate — he signed an executive order ending the pay freeze on certain federal workers. Though the raises were relatively modest the Weekly Standard writes that the executive order would cost the taxpayer roughly $11 billion over the next ten years. On Tuesday night, the U.S. House of Representatives approved legislation blocking the pay raise. The measure received immense bipartisan support, passing 287-129, with 55 Democrats voting with Republicans against the president’s proposal.
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Congress can and will overturn Obama’s executive orders
| 1,142 | 56 | 551 | 180 | 8 | 85 | 0.044444 | 0.472222 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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4,986 |
In one of his first official acts as president, Barack Obama has overturned a controversial executive order in which former President George W. Bush limited public access to presidential records.
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Howard, The Chronicle, 9 (Jennifer, The Chronicle, Obama Overturns Bush Order on Presidential Records, http://chronicle.com/article/Obama-Overturns-Bush-Order-on/42277, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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In one of his first official acts as president Obama has overturned a controversial executive order in which former President George W. Bush limited public access to presidential records
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XO’s will just get overturned by later presidents
| 195 | 50 | 186 | 30 | 8 | 29 | 0.266667 | 0.966667 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,987 |
In 1993, President Clinton urged Congress to enact a statute that would prohibit employers from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. The right to hire such permanent replacement workers was firmly established in both the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and in decisions of the Supreme Court. Congress refused to authorize the change in law in 1993-1994. Shortly after Republicans gained control of Congress in 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12,954, an attempt to achieve through executive fiat what he could not achieve through legislation. President Clinton claimed authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (the "Procurement Act") to require all large government contractors, which employed roughly twenty-two percent of the labor force, to agree not to hire permanent replacements for lawfully striking employees. In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously overturned the executive order and the implementing regulations that had been issued by the Secretary of Labor. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction over the case - despite what the court described as President Clinton's "breathtakingly broad claim of non-reviewability of presidential actions." In short, the court said that it did not have to defer to the President's claim that he was acting pursuant to lawful authority under the Procurement Act.
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Gaziano, Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director of the Center for Legal Judicial Studies at Heritage Foundation, 2001 (Todd, Texas Review of Law & Politics, 5 Tex. Rev. Law & Pol. 267, Accessed 7-9-13, RRR)
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Clinton urged Congress to enact a statute that would prohibit employers from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. The Congress refused to authorize the change in law he President issued Executive Order 12,954, an attempt to achieve through executive fiat what he could not achieve through legislation. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously overturned the executive order and the implementing regulations that had been issued by the Secretary of Labor. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction over the case - despite what the court described as President Clinton's "breathtakingly broad claim of non-reviewability of presidential actions." In short, the court said that it did not have to defer to the President's claim that he was acting pursuant to lawful authority under the Procurement Act.
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The Courts can overturn XO’s
| 1,478 | 29 | 917 | 223 | 5 | 142 | 0.022422 | 0.636771 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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4,988 |
The Case Against an Executive Order Liberal blogger John Cole argues that letting the Pentagon and Congress take charge, even if it takes longer, frames repeal as "not 'if' it will be repealed but 'when.'" He warns Obama against simply issued an executive order, "causing a huge congressional and military backlash with a media narrative about nothing but Obama over-reaching his mandate and the accompanying backlash."
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Fisher, Atlantic Wire reporter, 10 [Max, 2/2/10, Atlantic Wire, “How Obama Can Repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell”, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2010/02/how-obama-can-repeal-don-t-ask-don-t-tell/25642/, accessed: 7/9/13, ML]
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let and Congress take charge, even if it takes longer He warns Obama against simply issued an executive order, "causing a huge congressional and military backlash with a media narrative about nothing but Obama over-reaching his mandate
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XO leads creates backlash
| 423 | 25 | 239 | 66 | 4 | 37 | 0.060606 | 0.560606 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Counterplans
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2013
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4,989 |
Mismatched timelines. Effective development cooperation is a long-term proposition requiring local ownership, sustained engagement, and mutual accountability. DoD humanitarian activities—health or otherwise—are typically one-off, short-term, drop-ins of cash, technical assistance, or direct service delivery, resulting in fleeting improvements at best, inadvertent harm at worst. Development aid provided in accordance with internationally-accepted principles can produce results, even in unstable and insecure environments like Afghanistan. Aid projects to meet short-term security goals are much less likely to succeed in delivering either development or stabilization objectives, as my colleagues at CGD have documented.
|
Almquist-Knopf 13 (Kate, Center for Global Development, “DoD and Global Health: Time for a Dose of Development Realism”, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/dod-and-global-health-time-dose-development-realism)
|
Effective development cooperation is a long-term proposition requiring local ownership, sustained engagement, and mutual accountability DoD humanitarian activities are typically one-off, short-term, drop-ins of cash, technical assistance, or direct service delivery, resulting in fleeting improvements at best, inadvertent harm at worst
|
DOD engagement fails – undermines local ownership and lacks sustained engagement
| 724 | 80 | 336 | 90 | 11 | 41 | 0.122222 | 0.455556 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,990 |
Coordination challenges. The United States’ civilian foreign assistance agencies spend more on global health than nearly any other sector of foreign assistance, second only to peace and security. In FY 2012, this amounted to more than $9 billion in assistance. (Health typically accounts for 60-70 percent annually of USAID’s development programs in Africa, for instance.) DoD, by the Kaiser Family Foundation’s best estimate, spent at least $580 million on global health related activities in FY 2012, though it is impossible to know the actual total or what part of this went to medical stability operations. While improvements have been made in aid coordination between DoD, State, and USAID, significant challenges remain in coordinating programs and budgets.
|
Almquist-Knopf 13 (Kate, Center for Global Development, “DoD and Global Health: Time for a Dose of Development Realism”, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/dod-and-global-health-time-dose-development-realism)
|
While improvements have been made in aid coordination between DoD, State, and USAID, significant challenges remain in coordinating programs and budgets.
|
DOD engagement causes fights with civilian agencies
| 763 | 51 | 152 | 116 | 7 | 21 | 0.060345 | 0.181034 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,991 |
Mixed messages. Delivery of health services to civilian populations is a civilian role, not a military one, even in poorly governed or otherwise insecure areas; only in grave emergencies for finite periods of time is it appropriate for the military to step in (e.g., immediately after a massive natural disaster). The provision of normal health services through the US military or counterpart military forces or even direct US military engagement with national ministries of health and local health officials may send mixed messages about the role of military in society. This is particularly important in many fragile African states where the balance between civilian and military roles is not clearly delineated. A perceived or actual failure on the part of the civilian authorities is not justification for the military to step in and assume the role. This is how coups happen.
|
Almquist-Knopf 13 (Kate, Center for Global Development, “DoD and Global Health: Time for a Dose of Development Realism”, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/dod-and-global-health-time-dose-development-realism)
|
Mixed messages The provision of normal services through the US military or counterpart military forces or even direct US military engagement with national ministries may send mixed messages about the role of military in society A perceived or actual failure on the part of the civilian authorities is not justification for the military to step in and assume the role. This is how coups happen.
|
Military engagement sends mixed messages – undermines governance and encourages coups
| 880 | 85 | 393 | 141 | 11 | 65 | 0.078014 | 0.460993 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,992 |
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon proposed a $526.6 billion budget on Wednesday that calls for closing bases, slashing the civilian workforce and scrapping arms programs, holding out hope the Congress might still opt for an alternative to even more draconian cuts already on their way.¶ The proposed 2014 fiscal year budget would let the Defense Department implement new spending reductions of $150 billion over the next decade rather than forcing it to carry out the $500 billion in automatic cuts known as sequestration that began on March 1.¶ But defense analysts criticized the plan. One said it would be "dead on arrival" in Congress because of the politically difficult steps it requires and could trigger new budget cuts that would extend the financial uncertainty that has caused turmoil at the Pentagon in recent months.¶ With the United States still at war in Afghanistan, and grappling with tensions on the Korean peninsula, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the new budget plan would buy the Pentagon needed time, delaying most of the $150 billion reduction until after 2018.¶ "While no agency welcomes further budget cuts, the president's deficit reduction proposal requested in this budget gives the department time," Hagel said.¶ The proposed budget asks Congress to take a series of politically difficult steps, including starting a new U.S. base closure process, increasing healthcare fees for military retirees and slowing military pay increases.¶ Defense officials said the department also planned to reduce its civilian workforce by 40,000 to 50,000 over five years, mainly through attrition, and take new steps to reduce the cost of healthcare, including overhauling treatment facilities.¶ "The costs of infrastructure, overhead, acquisitions and personnel compensation must be addressed in order to put the Department of Defense's budget on a sustainable path - particularly given the pressures on our top-line budget," Hagel told a budget briefing.¶ The budget includes $88.5 billion for the war in Afghanistan and other overseas operations, the same amount as requested last year. Comptroller Robert Hale said the figure was a placeholder and would ultimately be somewhat lower, but still high because of the cost of removing equipment from Afghanistan.¶ The spending plan is part of the budget President Barack Obama sent to Congress on Wednesday. It stands little chance of being enacted into law and will serve largely as a negotiating tool with Republicans, who have outlined budget proposals of their own.¶ HIGH-PRIORITY PROGRAMS¶ The Defense Department is in the midst of a long-term budget drawdown after a decade of increases. It began implementing $487 billion in cuts to proposed spending in 2012 and was hit by an additional $500 billion over a decade starting on March 1.¶ While looking for ways to cut back in the current tight fiscal environment, the Pentagon budget would continue to fund high-priority programs and initiatives, including the strategic "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific announced last year.¶ It includes $8.4 billion for continued development of the three variants of Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon's most expensive procurement program.¶ It also includes $10.9 billion for new ship construction, $9.2 billion for missile defenses, $379 million for development of a new long-range bomber, $4.7 billion for cyberspace operations and $10.1 billion for space technologies.¶ The plan aims to save $9.9 billion by restructuring and canceling arms programs.¶ The defense budget is $52 billion higher than spending caps set by law for 2014 and is based on the assumption that a deal can be reached with Congress to replace the cuts that began on March 1 with an alternative package of tax increases and spending reductions.¶ The two sides have been trying for two years without success to reach a deal to avoid the cuts.¶ Obama's budget proposal would replace the Pentagon's $500 billion sequestration cut with a $150 billion reduction, most of it spread over a five-year period beginning several years from now. Some $34 billion in cuts would be implemented over the next five years.¶ Defense analysts criticized the White House for failing to take sequestration into account. Mackenzie Eaglen, of the American Enterprise Institute, said it would lead to "continued uncertainty" over the Pentagon budget, and Laicie Heeley, at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said the plan would be "essentially dead on arrival" in Congress.¶ Defense industry executives welcomed the administration's effort to reduce the spending cuts to $150 billion over the next decade but worried the proposal would be dismissed out of hand by Congress because of differences over proposed cuts.¶ "Sequestration is in effect. I'd like to see a budget that reflects what the reality is going to be," said David Melcher, chief executive of defense contractor ITT Exelis Corp. "Ignoring it doesn't solve the problem."¶ The Pentagon budget asks Congress to begin a new round of U.S. Base Realignment and Closure proceedings, a proposal that was rejected by lawmakers last year.¶ This year's request includes $2.4 billion over five years to pay for the base closure process. Closures disrupt local economies and cost a huge amount upfront, saving money only over the long run.¶ Based on estimates from the last round of base closures that started in 2005, the Pentagon is believed to have more than 20 percent surplus of infrastructure.
|
Reuters 4/10 (4/10/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/us-usa-fiscal-defense-idUSBRE9390QU20130410?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews, “Pentagon’s $526.6 billion budget asks Congress for unpopular steps,” Reuters, MCJC)
|
The Pentagon proposed a $526.6 billion budget that calls for closing bases, slashing the civilian workforce and scrapping arms programs, holding out hope the Congress might still opt for an alternative to more draconian cuts it would be "dead on arrival" in Congress because of the politically difficult steps it requires and could trigger new budget cuts that would extend the financial uncertainty The proposed budget asks Congress to take a series of politically difficult steps, including starting a new U.S. base closure process, increasing healthcare fees for military retirees and slowing military pay increases officials said the department also planned to reduce its civilian workforce by 40,000 to 50,000 over five years, and take new steps to reduce the cost of healthcare, including overhauling treatment facilities.¶ It stands little chance of being enacted into law and will serve largely as a negotiating tool with Republicans, who have outlined budget proposals of their own The two sides have been trying for two years without success to reach a deal to avoid the cuts.¶ Obama's budget proposal would replace the Pentagon's $500 billion sequestration cut with a $150 billion reduction, most of it spread over a five-year period beginning several years from now
|
DOD budget expansion unpopular with Congress – forces cuts in other areas
| 5,494 | 73 | 1,277 | 868 | 12 | 202 | 0.013825 | 0.232719 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,993 |
WASHINGTON — Republican House Speaker John Boehner on Friday slammed President Barack Obama's coming 2014 budget plan for not cutting federal spending deeply enough while proposing more new revenues. For the defense sector, the Ohio Republican's stance shows the Pentagon budget remains caught in an ideological struggle over domestic programs and tax rates.¶ Boehner's critical statement came after reports surfaced that the budget blueprint the Obama administration will send to Congress next week will propose Social Security and Medicare changes, including $400 million in savings from the former.¶ The Obama plan will also propose further slashing the federal deficit by $1.8 trillion. The Obama administration's spending plan would trim future Pentagon spending by only $100 billion in 10 years, $400 billion less than mandated under sequestration. It calls for the same amount in domestic cuts.¶ The White House's budget will propose replacing the twin $500 billion defense and domestic sequestration cuts with other federal spending cuts and new revenues by again raising tax rates on the wealthiest Americans and by closing corporate tax loopholes.¶ Most congressional Republicans and Democrats also say they want to find a package of deficit-reduction measures that would replace the sequester cuts. Obama and lawmakers from both parties, almost all in the Senate, are in talks about the kind of “grand bargain” fiscal package needed to turn off the sequestration cuts.¶ Congressional Democrats largely support Obama's plan, though many want fewer federal spending cuts and more revenues; Republicans oppose any further revenue increases, saying additional deficit-paring steps should be achieved almost entirely via spending cuts — though some GOP lawmakers have not entirely abandoned the idea of closing corporate tax loopholes.¶ White House officials say the backbone of their 2014 budget plan, set to hit Capitol Hill on Wednesday, is the final proposal the president presented to Boehner in late December as part of the infamous “fiscal cliff” negotiations.
|
Navy Times 12 (http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130405/NEWS05/304050013/Boehner-rejects-Obama-s-budget-59-DoD-budget-political-limbo, “Boehner rejects Obama’s budget; DOD budget in political limbo,” Navy Times, MCJC)
|
House Speaker John Boehner slammed President Barack Obama's coming 2014 budget plan for not cutting federal spending deeply enough while proposing more new revenues The Obama plan will also propose further slashing the federal deficit by $1.8 trillion. The Obama administration's spending plan would trim future Pentagon spending by 100 billion The White House's budget will propose replacing the twin $500 billion defense and domestic sequestration cuts with other federal spending cuts and new revenues by again raising tax rates on the wealthiest Americans and by closing corporate tax loopholes Democrats largely support Obama's plan, though many want fewer federal spending cuts and more revenues; Republicans oppose any further revenue increases
|
Boehner is against DOD budget expansion.
| 2,073 | 41 | 751 | 313 | 6 | 111 | 0.019169 | 0.354633 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,994 |
With respect to foreign aid, whether military assistance from the Department of Defense, or other assistance delivered through the State Department or USAID (now subsumed within the State Department), Congressional scrutiny is more robust, but it does not compare to the oversight of domestic programs.
|
Dickinson 6 (Laura. Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Democracy and Trust)
|
With respect to foreign aid, whether military assistance from the Department of Defense, or other assistance delivered through the State Department or USAID Congressional scrutiny is more robust
|
USAID and State attracts Congressional scrutiny
| 302 | 47 | 194 | 45 | 6 | 28 | 0.133333 | 0.622222 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,995 |
USAID was the most visible, but also the weakest, democracy promoter in the U.S. government. Other arms of the U.S. government gave USAID much responsibility for building democracy in the former Soviet Union, but little authority to make it happen. USAID handled much of the work we most readily identify with building democracy, such as strengthening political parties, training independent journalists, and funding NGOs. Yet the agency had little experience, money, bureaucratic power, or tools to address the deeper obstacles to democracy taking hold. Unfortunately, the heavy lifting expected of USAID was less of a division of labor in democracy promotion, than an easy target of blame by other arms of the U.S. government.
|
Spence 4 (Dr. Matthew, Ph.D. in International Relations – Oxford University and JD – Yale University, “Policy Coherence and Incoherence: The Domestic Politics of American Democracy Promotion”, 10-5, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20741/Spence-_CDDRL_10-4_draf1.pdf)
|
USAID was the most visible, but also the weakest, democracy promoter in the U.S. government. Other arms gave USAID much responsibility but little authority to make it happen. Yet the agency had little experience, money, bureaucratic power, or tools to address obstacles the heavy lifting expected of USAID was an easy target of blame by other arms of the U.S. government.
|
USAID has no clout – lightening rod for criticism
| 728 | 49 | 371 | 114 | 9 | 61 | 0.078947 | 0.535088 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,996 |
Eliminating USAID is a powerful call among a number of vocal critics of the long-standing foreign aid regime. USAID is old and a proven failure at worst, mediocre at best. There is substantial evidence of this for over half a century. There is no strong public or political support for USAID, just modest support or indifference. USAID does not reflect vigor or dynamics, it has not attracted much more resources, it does not inspire, and it may have questionable recruitment and training methods that suggest average standard operating procedures, i.e. minimal behavior and qualifications trump results. USAID also has a long history of supporting authoritarian regimes and socialist economies. It does not require countries to conform to American values and political and economic goals. It has no greater vision than what is now. Given the past results and likely future, USAID is very costly and unproductive for the billions of dollars given to it each year.The typical bureaucrats are attracted and retained by it. USAID's bureaucratic culture and path dependency make it highly unlikely that it will really change and improve its operations and results by any substantial margins.
|
Dobransky, 11 (Steve, Adjunct Prof @ Cleveland State, American Diplomacy, 3/7)
|
USAID is proven failure at worst, mediocre at best. There is substantial evidence of this There is no strong public or political support for USAID, just modest support or indifference. USAID does not reflect vigor or dynamics, it has not attracted much more resources, it does not inspire,
|
No turns – supporters lack intensity – no constituency and perception of failures
| 1,187 | 81 | 289 | 189 | 13 | 48 | 0.068783 | 0.253968 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,997 |
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and ¶ the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, P. 1, Accessed: 7/2/13, LPS.)
|
Meyer, analyst in Latin American, and Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 12
|
(Peter J., analyst in Latin American Affairs, Mark P., Specialist in Latin American Affairs, 6/26/12, “Congressional Research Service,
|
Congress is key to solve-funding allocation
| 383 | 43 | 134 | 50 | 6 | 18 | 0.12 | 0.36 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,998 |
Once the Defense Department’s authority to train and equip foreign militaries is firmly established, there will be no incentive to keep the State Department involved. Why fund any programs through the State Department, and invite congressional scrutiny, when the same programs can be funneled more easily through the defense bills, to which few are paying attention? These changes would further set in stone the foreign policy decision-making role of the Defense Department.
|
Withers 8 (George. Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy. Latin American Working Group Education Fund. http://justf.org/files/pubs/080306read.pdf
|
there will be no incentive to keep the State Department involved. Why fund any programs through the State Department, and invite congressional scrutiny, when the same programs can be funneled more easily
|
State Department funding ensures congressional scrutiny
| 474 | 55 | 203 | 72 | 6 | 32 | 0.083333 | 0.444444 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
4,999 |
Meanwhile, the Keystone XL pipeline controversy also demonstrates the limits of using science to dictate policy. An exhaustive study of Keystone’s potential environmental impact by the State Department found that the construction and operation of the pipeline would cause “no significant impacts” to nearby habitats and communities. But opposition to Keystone is not only based on concerns over the environmental impact of the pipeline itself, but also on the threat of climate change posed by the use of petroleum from the Canadian oil sands. In a 2011 open letter, several activists described the pipeline as a “1,500-mile fuse to the biggest carbon bomb on the continent,” quoting climate scientist James Hansen’s claim that Canadian oil sands must be “left in the ground” if we are to have any chance of “stabiliz[ing] earth’s climate.”¶ Of course, no matter how much President Obama — or any other president faced with the choice of whether to build the pipeline — might want to base his decision only on the “soundest science,” the decision is an unavoidably political one. Some scientists report that the pipeline is a comparatively safe way to transport oil, but others contend, not incompatibly, that building and using the pipeline will contribute devastatingly to climate change. Meanwhile, the existence of the global marketplace suggests that if the pipeline is not built, Canada will export its oil-sands resources to some other country. And all this must be weighed against the U.S. economy’s ever-growing energy needs. Politics cannot be reduced to science or avoided by invoking the authority of science.
|
Keiper and Foht ’13 (Adam Keiper, and Brendan P. Foht, The New Atlantic, Winter/Spring 2013, “The Record of Our ‘Scientist-In-Chief,’” http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-record-of-our-scientist-in-chief, accessed 7/6/13, LPS)
|
An exhaustive study of Keystone’s potential environmental impact by the State Department found that the construction and operation of the pipeline would cause “no significant impacts” opposition to Keystone is not only based on concerns over the environmental impact of the pipeline itself, but also on the threat of climate change posed by the use of petroleum from the Canadian oil sands no matter how much President Obama might want to base his decision only on the “soundest science,” the decision is an unavoidably political one. Some scientists report that the pipeline is a comparatively safe way to transport oil, but others contend, not incompatibly, that building and using the pipeline will contribute devastatingly to climate change. Meanwhile, the existence of the global marketplace suggests that if the pipeline is not built, Canada will export its oil-sands resources to some other country. And all this must be weighed against the U.S. economy’s ever-growing energy needs. Politics cannot be reduced to science or avoided by invoking the authority of science.
|
State Department links to politics – Keystone proves Obama draws fire for the results
| 1,621 | 85 | 1,076 | 258 | 14 | 169 | 0.054264 | 0.655039 |
Executive Counterplan - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Counterplans
|
2013
|
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