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188 005-2
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5.3.31 Link_Amf_Uaaf
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188 005-2
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5.3.31.1 Definition
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This IOC models the a3 reference point as defined in ES 282 004 [5].
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188 005-2
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5.3.32 Link_Aracf_Clf
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188 005-2
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5.3.32.1 Definition
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This IOC models the e4 reference point as defined in ES 282 003 [4].
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5.3.33 Link_Aracf_Rcef
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.3.33.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Re reference point as defined in ES 282 003 [4].
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188 005-2
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5.3.34 Link_Aracf_Spdf
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5.3.34.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Rq reference point as defined in ES 282 003 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 27
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5.3.35 Link_Bgf_Spdf
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5.3.35.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Ia reference point as defined in ES 282 003 [4].
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5.3.36 Link_CamelImSsfAs_Upsf
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.3.36.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Si reference point between ASF Type 2 CAMEL IM-SSF Application Server and UPSF as defined in ES 282 007 [7].
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5.3.37 Link_Clf_Clf
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5.3.37.1 Definition
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This IOC models the e2 reference point as defined in ES 282 004 [5].
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5.3.38 Link_Clf_Nacf
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5.3.38.1 Definition
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This IOC models the a2 reference point as defined in ES 282 004 [5].
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5.3.39 Link_Clf_Pcscf
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5.3.39.1 Definition
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This IOC models the e2 reference point as defined in ES 282 004 [5].
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5.3.40 Link_Clf_Uaaf
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5.3.40.1 Definition
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This IOC models the a4 reference point as defined in ES 282 004 [5].
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5.3.41 Link_OsaScsAs_Upsf
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5.3.41.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Sh reference point between ASF Type 2 OSA SCS Application Server and UPSF as defined in ES 282 007 [7].
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5.3.42 Link_Pcscf_Spdf
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.3.42.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Gq' reference point as defined in ES 282 003 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 28
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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5.3.43 Link_Pdbf_Uaaf
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188 005-2
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5.3.43.1 Definition
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This IOC models the reference point between PDBF and UAAF as defined in ES 282 004 [5].
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188 005-2
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5.3.44 Link_SipAs_Upsf
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.3.44.1 Definition
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This IOC models the Sh reference point between ASF Type 2 SIP Application Server and UPSF as defined in ES 282 007 [7].
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.4 Information relationship definitions
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Void.
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5.5 Information attribute definitions
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5.5.1 Definition and legal values
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The following table defines the attributes that are present in several information object classes of the present document. Attribute Name Definition Legal Values agcfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. amfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. amgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. aracfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. arfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. asf1FunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. bgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. cbgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 29 Attribute Name Definition Legal Values clfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. cngcfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. ibcfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. ibgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. mgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. ngnIwfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. nacfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. pdbfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. rcefFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. sgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. spdfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. tmgfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. uaafFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance. upsfFunctionId An attribute whose "name+value" can be used as an RDN when naming an instance of the IOC. This RDN uniquely identifies the object instance within the scope of its containing (parent) object instance
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.5.2 Constraints
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Name Definition - - ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 30
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.6 Common notifications
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Void.
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9c52842ceb1d62db2a87c77bbbc3cd90
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188 005-2
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5.7 Particular information configurations
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Not applicable. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 31 Annex A (informative): Mapping to 3GPP and TMF SID As noted in the scope, this version the NRM is linked to 3GPP NRM using naming and inheritance, however a need to link the NRM to the TeleManagement Forum's Shared Information Data Model (SID) has been identified and will be addressed in future revisions of the present document. A.1 Example Scenarios A.1.1 SID based OSS An OSS which use SID (typically any CRM or SM and Some RM OSSs) will expect to see SID based objects via the NOSIs it uses. Therefore if the OSS needs to use the service exposed by a NOSI providing a Network Resource service, it will expect to see SID based IOCs. A.1.2 SID based resources The NGN Resources being managed may be modelled using 3GPP, IEEE and TMF (e.g. MTNM) standards. Thus some resources will be SID based (e.g. MTNM) and some (e.g. IMS) will be 3GPP based. A.2 Comparison of 3GPP and SID inheritance A.2.1 GPP NRM Inheritance Top objectClass objectInstance <<InformationObjectClass>> ManagedFunction userLabel <<InformationObjectClass>> xxxxFunction xxxFunctionID Figure A.2.1.1: 3GPP Inheritance ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 32 Table A.2.1.1 Inherited Attributes Attribute Inherited From objectClass Top objectInstance Top Userlabel ManagedFunction Relationships None A.2.2 SID Inheritance RootEntity UserDefinedName description Entity version ManagedEntity managementMethodCurrent management MethodSupported Resource usageState LogicalRes ource lrStatus xxxFunction xxxFunctionID userLabel <<InformationObjectClass>> Figure A.2.2.1: TMF Inheritance ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 33 Table A.2.2.1 Inherited Attributes Attribute Inherited From CommonName RootEntity Description RootEntity Version Entity managementMethodCurrent ManagedEntity managementMethodSupported ManagedEntity usageState Resource lrStatus LogicalResource Relationships Attribute Inherited From SpecificesResource Resource ResourceTakesOnRoles Resource RolesDescribeLogicalResource Logical Resource ResourceCharacterizedBy Resource LogicalResourceImplementation Logical Resource SupportedMgmtMethods ManagedEntity DescribedByMgmtInfo ManagedEntity A.3 Alarm Management Example This clause identifies Candidate Alarm Management Use Cases based on the above scenarios. A.3.1 Problem Statement An Alarm Management System needs to integrate alarms coming from mobile networks (3GPP Based), fixed networks (TISPAN based) and transport technologies (e.g. MTNM based). The Alarm Management System then needs to present unified alarm situation upwards (SID based). Access Network (3GPP based ) Alarm Manager Transport Network (MTNM based) Service Layer (TISPAN based) 3GPP Alarms Proactive FM system (SID based) Unified View of Alarms MTNM Alarms TISPAN Alarms Figure A.3.1.1: Alarm Management Example Figure A.3.1.1 provides an example of the need to collect alarms from 3GPP based Access Networks, MTNM Based Transport Networks and a TISPAN based NGN Service layer and to provide a unified view of these alarms to a SID based proactive Fault management System. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 34 A.3.2 Requirements There is a need to: • integrate data from mobile networks, the TISPAN NGN and transport technologies; and • to present this data in a SID based form. A.3.3 Candidate Use Cases Transport Network 3G Network TISPAN NGN Alarm contract manager Alarm analysis/consolidation Alarm Manager Alarm Collector SID Based System 1 1 1 1 1 1 Receives alarms 1 1 Receives alarms 1 1 receives alarm reports 1 1 receives alarm reports 1 1 Request alarm service 1 1 Request alarm service 1 1 request alarm reports 1 1 request alarm reports 1 1 manages 1 1 manages 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 manages 1 1 manages 1 1 manages 1 1 manages Figure A.3.3.1: Candidate Use Cases Alarm Contract Manager: • subscribe/unsubscribe/configure Alarm NOSI. Alarm Collector: • receive Alarms from NRM NOSIs. Alarm Analysis/Consolidation: • provides Alarm report NOSIs to other systems. ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 35 Annex B (informative): Bibliography ETSI TS 132 152: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Integration Reference Point (IRP) Information Service (IS) Unified Modelling Language (UML) repertoire (3GPP TS 32.152 Release 7)". ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 36 Annex C (informative): Change history Date WG Doc. CR Rev CAT Title / Comment Current Version New Version 05-11-08 19WTD064r 1 1 - F Correction to update R-MGF 2.0.0 2.0.1 Publication 2.0.1 2.1.1 ETSI ETSI TS 188 005-2 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 37 History Document history V2.0.0 March 2008 Publication V2.1.1 February 2009 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document defines the security architecture of NGN Release 1. The definition complies with the requirements of ITU-T Recommendation I.130 [32] at stage 2. The present document addresses the security architecture required to fulfil the NGN R1 security requirements defined in TS 187 001 [1] and includes the definition of security architectures to provide protection for each of the NGN functional architecture (ES 282 001 [3]) and its subsystems (ES 282 004 [6], ES 282 002 [4], ES 282 007 [27], ES 283 003 [26] and ES 282 003 [5]). Where appropriate the present document endorses security mechanisms defined in other specifications. The present document addresses the security issues of the NGN core network and the NGN access network(s) up to and including the NGN Network Termination (NGN NT) in the residential customer domain. The NGN NT denotes a logical demarcation point between the residential customer domain and the NGN core and access networks and covers the corresponding interfaces.
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following cases: - if it is accepted that it will be possible to use all future changes of the referenced document for the purposes of the referring document; - for informative references. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. For online referenced documents, information sufficient to identify and locate the source shall be provided. Preferably, the primary source of the referenced document should be cited, in order to ensure traceability. Furthermore, the reference should, as far as possible, remain valid for the expected life of the document. The reference shall include the method of access to the referenced document and the full network address, with the same punctuation and use of upper case and lower case letters. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For non-specific references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. [1] ETSI TS 187 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN SECurity (SEC); Requirements". [2] Void. [3] ETSI ES 282 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Functional Architecture Release 1". [4] ETSI ES 282 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES); Functional architecture". ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 7 [5] ETSI ES 282 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control Sub-system (RACS); Functional Architecture". [6] ETSI ES 282 004: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Functional Architecture; Network Attachment Sub-System (NASS)". [7] ETSI TS 183 033: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IP Multimedia; Diameter based protocol for the interfaces between the Call Session Control Function and the User Profile Server Function/Subscription Locator Function; Signalling flows and protocol details [3GPP TS 29.228 V6.8.0 and 3GPP TS 29.229 V6.6.0, modified]". [8] ETSI TS 133 203: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Access security for IP-based services (3GPP TS 33.203)". [9] ETSI TS 133 210: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security (3GPP TS 33.210)". [10] ETSI TS 133 310: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Network domain security; Authentication framework (NDS/AF) (3GPP TS 33.310)". [11] ETSI TS 133 141: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Presence service; Security (3GPP TS 33.141)". [12] ETSI TS 133 222: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) (3GPP TS 33.222)". [13] ETSI TS 133 220: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture (3GPP TS 33.220)". [14] ETSI TS 122 048: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Security Mechanisms for the (U)SIM application toolkit; Stage 1 (3GPP TS 22.048)". [15] ETSI TS 123 048: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Security mechanisms for the (U)SIM application toolkit; Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.048)". [16] ETSI TS 131 101: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); UICC-terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics (3GPP TS 31.101)". [17] ETSI TS 131 102: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application (3GPP TS 31.102)". [18] ETSI TS 131 103: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application (3GPP TS 31.103)". [19] ETSI TS 129 329: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Sh interface based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details (3GPP TS 29.329)". [20] ETSI ES 283 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem (PES); NGN Release 1 H.248 Profile for controlling Access and Residential Gateways". [21] ETSI ES 283 018: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN);Resource and Admission Control: H.248 Profile for controlling Border Gateway Functions (BGF) in the Resource and Admission Control Subsystem (RACS); Protocol specification". ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 8 [22] ETSI TS 183 019: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Network Attachment; Network Access xDSL and WLAN Access Networks; Interface Protocol Definitions". [23] ETSI ES 283 035: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networks (TISPAN); Network Attachment Sub-System (NASS); e2 interface based on the DIAMETER protocol". [24] ETSI ES 283 034: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Network Attachment Sub-System (NASS); e4 interface based on the DIAMETER protocol". [25] ETSI ETR 232: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); Glossary of security terminology". [26] ETSI ES 283 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Endorsement of "IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) Stage 3 (Release 6)" for NGN Release 1". [27] ETSI ES 282 007: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Functional architecture". [28] ETSI TS 182 006: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2 description (3GPP TS 23.228 V7.2.0, modified)". [29] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". [30] ISO/IEC 10181-1: 1996: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Security frameworks for open systems: Overview". [31] ISO/IEC 11770-1: 1996: "Information technology - Security techniques - Key management - Part 1: Framework". [32] ITU-T Recommendation I.130: "Method for the characterization of telecommunication services supported by an ISDN and network capabilities of an ISDN". [33] ITU-T Recommendation X.810 (1995): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Security frameworks for open systems: Overview". [34] ITU-T Recommendation X.811: "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Security Frameworks for Open Systems: Authentication Framework". [35] ITU-T Recommendation X.812: "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Security Frameworks for Open Systems: Access Control Framework". [36] ITU-T Recommendation X.814: "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Security Frameworks for Open Systems: Confidentiality Framework". [37] ITU-T Recommendation X.815: "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Security Frameworks for Open Systems: Integrity Frameworks". [38] ETSI TS 183 017: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN);Resource and Admission Control: DIAMETER protocol for session based policy set-up information exchange between the Application Function (AF) and the Service Policy Decision Function (SPDF); Protocol specification". [39] IETF RFC 2617: "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication". [40] ETSI TS 183 043: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation; IMS-based PSTN/ISDN Emulation Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Protocol specification". ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 9 [41] ETSI TS 182 012: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS-based PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem; Functional architecture". [42] ETSI TS 133 102: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Security architecture (3GPP TS 33.102)". [43] ETSI ES 283 026: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN);.Resource and Admission Control; Protocol for QoS reservation information exchange between the Service Policy Decision Function (SPDF) and the Access-Resource and Admission Control Function (A-RACF) in the Resource and Protocol specification". [44] ETSI EG 202 238: "Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks (TIPHON); Evaluation criteria for cryptographic algorithms". [45] IEEE 802.1x: "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks Port-Based Network Access Control". [46] ETSI TS 123 002: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Network architecture (3GPP TS 23.002)". [47] ETSI TS 133 234: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security (3GPP TS 33.234)".
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2.2 Informative references
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[48] ETSI TR 182 005: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Organization of user data". [49] ETSI TR 187 002 (Release 2): "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); TISPAN NGN Security (NGN-SEC); Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis". [50] ETSI TR 183 032: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Feasibility study into mechanisms for the support of encapsulated ISUP information in IMS". [51] ETSI TR 183 014: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networks (TISPAN); Development and Verification of PSTN/ISDN emulation".
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187 003
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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187 003
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: Authentication Service (AUTH): See ITU-T Recommendation X.811 [34]. Authorization Service (AUTHOR): See ITU-T Recommendation X.812 [35]. Confidentiality Service (CONF): See ITU-T Recommendation X.814 [36]. data: any information conveyed in communication packets as well as any other information such as topology information Integrity Service (INT): See ITU-T Recommendation X.815 [37]. Key Management Service (KM): See ISO/IEC 11770-1 [31]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 10 NGN Network Termination (NGN NT): reference point which denotes a logical demarcation point between the residential customer domain and the NGN core via access networks. It covers the corresponding interfaces Policy Enforcement Function (PEF): security function that enforces policy rules NOTE: The PEF encompasses functions for filtering and topology hiding such as typically found in firewalls and/or session border controllers. security domain: set of elements made of security policy, security authority and set of security relevant activities in which the set of elements are subject to the security policy for the specified activities, and the security policy is administered by the security authority for the security domain NOTE: The activities of a security domain involve one or more elements from that security domain and, possibly, elements of other security domains
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3G 3rd Generation 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project AAA Authentication, Authorization, Accounting AF Application Functions AGCF Access Gateway Control Function AGW Access GateWay AKA Authentication and Key Agreement AMF Access Management Function AN Access Network AN Access Node AP Access Point AP Authentication Proxy A-RACF Access-Resource Admission Control Function AS Application Server ASP Application Service Provider AuC Authentication Center AUTH AUTHentication Service AUTHOR AUTHORization Service BGCF Breakout Gateway Control Function BSF Bootstrapping Server Functionality CLF Connectivity session and repository Location Function CONF CONFidentiality service CPE Customer Premises Equipment CSCF Call Session Control Function DoS Denial-of-Service ESP Encapsulating Security Protocol FE Functional Entity GAA Generic Authentication Architecture GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture GE Generic Entities GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation HLR Home Location Register HSS Home Subscriber Server HTTP HyperText Transport Protocol IBCF Interconnection Border Control Function I-BGF Interconnection-Border Gateway Function I-CSCF Interrogating-Call Session Control Function ID IDentity IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IF InterFace IKE Internet Key Exchange IMPI IMS Private User ID IMPU IMS Public User ID ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 11 IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem INT INTegrity service IP Internet Protocol IPsec Internet Protocol security IRG IMS Residential Gateway ISIM IMS Subscriber Identity Module IUA ISDN Q.921-User Adaptation KM Key Management service MGC Media Gateway Controller MGCF Media Gateway Control Function n.a. not applicable NAF Network Application Function NASS Network Access SubSystem NAT Network Address Translation NDS Network Domain Security NGN NT NGN Network Termination NGN Next Generation Network P-CSCF Proxy-Call Session Control Function PDBF Profile DataBase Function PEF Policy Enforcement Function PS Packet Switched R1 NGN Release 1 RACS Resource Admission Control Subsystem RAND RANDom RGW Residential GateWay SA Security Association SCS OSA Service Capability Server S-CSCF Serving-Call Session Control Function SEGF SEcurity Gateway Function SIP Session Initiation Protocol SLF Subscription Locator Function SPD Security Policy Database SPDF Service Policy Decision Function THF Topology Hiding Function THIG Topology Hiding Interconnection Gateway TISPAN Telecommunication and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking TLS Transport Layer Security TS Technical Specification UA User Agent UAAF User Access Authorization Function UE User Equipment UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System UPSF User Profile Server Function USIM UMTS Subscriber Identity Module VGW Voice over IP GateWay WLAN Wireless Local Area Network XCAP XML Configuration Access Protocol XML eXtensible Markup Language
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187 003
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4 NGN Security
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This clause provides an overview of the NGN security document. The entire document can be seen as a documented output of a security process that loops through several stages; see figure 1, where arrows indicate logical steps and dependencies. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 12 The present document assumes existence of a well-defined NGN architecture (ES 282 001 [3]) that includes the IMS architecture (TS 123 002 [46]), the network attachment subsystem (NASS) architecture (ES 282 004 [6]), the resource admission subsystem (RACS) architecture (ES 282 003 [5]), and the PSTN/ISDN emulation (PES) architecture (ES 282 002 [4]). Likewise, the present document assumes the corresponding IMS security architecture (TS 133 102 [42]). IMS architecture and IMS security architecture are shown as dashed boxes; those prerequisites are not specified further in the present document. The description of the NGN release 1 security architecture has been divided in a number of smaller blocks describing the security interfaces, the security functions and security protocols, security building blocks and security components. Security Functions Security Building Blocks NGN architecture (NASS, RACS, PES, IMS) IMS Security Architecture NGN Release 1 Security Architecture with security interfaces for NASS, RACS, PES, IMS (TS 187 003) NGN Release 2 Security Architecture with security interfaces (ffs) NGN Release 1 Security Requirements (TS 187 001) Security Domains NGN Release 1 Threat & Risk Analysis (TR 187 002) Security Components/ Security Building Blocks Security Services Security Functions Countermeasures Figure 1: Overview of NGN security documents Security architecture(s) for further and future NGN releases beyond NGN Release 1 will be specified by separate documents.
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4.1 NGN security architecture
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The NGN R1 security architecture basically consists of the following major parts: • NGN security domains (see clause 4.3). • Security services (see clause 5): - authentication; - authorization; - policy enforcement; - key management; - confidentiality; and - integrity. • Security protocols including those contained in: - IMS Access Security (TS 133 203 [8]); - SIP HTTP-digest (RFC 3261 [29]) (for NGN legacy UE); ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 13 - XCAP (TS 183 033 [7]), presence security (TS 133 141 [11]). • Application specific key management. • SEGFs to secure signalling and control communication among network entities/FEs. Security gateways (SEGs) for IMS network domain security - as defined by TS 133 210 [9] - are considered primarily functional components. The present document endorses SEGs and calls them Security Gateway Function (SEGF). • IMS Residential Gateway to secure access of legacy UEs (see clause 6). • NGN-specific security mechanisms at various protocols/logical layers such as: - NASS authentication based on explicit line authentication; - NASS authentication based on implicit physical line authentication; and - NASS-IMS bundled authentication. • NGN subsystem specific security measures (e.g. for PES). Figure 2 provides a high level overview of the security FEs within the NGN security architecture. Three logical security planes with respective FEs are distinguished: • NASS security plane; • IMS security plane; • GAA/GBA key management plane. AMF V - UAAF H - UAAF NASS credentials ISIM AKA mode P - CSCF S - CSCF UPSF BSF NAF/AS NASS Authentication (e.g. IEEE 802.1x/PANA ) IMS AKA Security Association setup (GBA Bootstrapping, opt) DIAMETER ISIM GBA - U mode Secure session PDBF Ut Figure 2: Usage of security FEs in the NGN security architecture The NASS security plane encompasses the security operations during network attachment for gaining access to the NGN access network. The visited UAAF (V-UAAF) in a visited access network relays authentication message to/from the home NGN network; the V-UAAF (if present) may be a proxy while the home UAAF (H-UAAF) shall process the authentication message and decide authorization. The H-UAAF takes into account user profile information that is stored in the PDBF. The PDBF shall hold the profiles of the NASS user. In NGN, an IMS subscriber may register over an IP access session established by a NASS subscriber, which may not be the same as the IMS subscriber. Hence, in such cases, there is no relation at all between the profile/credentials used at the NASS level and at the IMS level. However, the PDBF may be co-located with the UPSF. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 14 NOTE: The dashed lines between H-UAAF and PDBF and between the NAS/AS and the UPSF indicate interfaces which are not defined and standardized in the present document. Specification of such interfaces is left as further study. Nevertheless, such an UAAF-PDBF interface is generally required for carrying out authentication at NASS level. The IMS security plane encompasses the P-CSCF, S-CSCF, I-CSCF (not shown in figure 2) and the UPSF. P-CSCF, S-CSCF and I-CSCF shall be involved in the IMS security procedures for authenticating UE and core network, deciding authorization, as well as for supplying fresh key material as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. The UPSF shall hold the user profiles used at the IMS level. The GBA/GAA security plane (optional) encompasses the NAF and BSF FEs for application layer security. This clause describes the NGN security architecture for Release 1.
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187 003
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4.2 Security domains
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A security domain (see ISO/IEC 10181-1 [30] and ITU-T Recommendation X.810 [33]) is a set of elements under a given security policy administered by a single security authority for some specific security relevant activities. The activities of a security domain involve one or more elements from that domain, however at least one of the elements must be in that domain. In general, a security domain is required to: • protect the integrity, and optionally the confidentiality, of its functional elements and activities; • ensure the availability of, and account for the use of, the elements and activities under its protection. The following principal security domains are identified in the general case where the visited network provider hosts some IMS services and the core IMS provider in the home network domain further provides IMS services: • Customer's domain that includes UE (owned by customer or by operator). • Access network security domain with FEs hosted by the access network provider. • Visited NGN network security domain with FEs hosted by a visited network provider where the visited network may provide access to some application services (AF). The visited network provider may host some applications and may own an own database of subscribers. Alternatively, or additionally, the visited network provider may outsource some application services to the home network provider or even to a 3rd application provider. • Home NGN network security domain with FEs hosted by the home network provider where the home network may provide some application services (AF). The home network provider hosts some applications and owns a database of subscribers. • 3rd party application network security domain with FEs hosted by the ASP where the ASP provides some application services (AF). The ASP may be a separate service provider different from the visited or the home network provider. The ASP may need to deploy authorization information offered by the visited or home network provider. Figure 3 shows the partitioning of the NGN network into security domains. NOTE: The box labelled "APPL" denotes hosted applications; applications are optional. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 15 Visited NGN Network Security Domain Home NGN Network Security Domain UE APPL Access Network Security Domain 3rd party ASP Network Security Domain APPL 3rd party ASP Network Security Domain Figure 3: NGN security domains
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187 003
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4.3 NASS and RACS security architecture
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Figure 4 shows a high-level view of the NASS and RACS subsystems as mapped to the five NGN security domains. Visited NGN Network Security Domain Home NGN Network Security Domain UE RACS APPL Access Network Security Domain NASS 3rd party ASP Network Security Domain NASS RACS NASS RACS APPL 3rd party ASP Network Security Domain Figure 4: NASS and RACS NGN architecture with security domains SEGFs security shall protect the interdomain interfaces between the NGN network security domains. Figure 4 shows the most general case. NASS and RACS functional entities are mapped to the networking domains such as access transport network, visited NGN network and home NGN network. Those networking domains equally represent security domains in the sense of TS 133 210 [9] assuming that each networking domain is being operated by a distinct operator. SEcurity Gateway Functions (SEGFs) within each security domain shall protect the exposed interfaces in-between security domains and ensure that a minimal security policy among security domains is enforced. SEGFs may also optionally protect the (less exposed, internal) interfaces within a security domain; this is left to the discretion of the network operator. The general security architecture case for NASS and RACS subsystems can be collapsed iteratively into fewer (security) domains (not shown): e.g. home network and visited network within one security domain, or access, visited, home network and ASP network all in one security domain. If 3rd party ASP network security domain and home network security domain coincide, then the home network actually hosts the application. The same holds true for the visited network security and the 3rd party ASP network security domain. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 16 It is noted that not all interfaces might occur: • In NASS scenario 1, the interface e2 with the branches V-CLF-to-H_CLF, V-CLF-to-AF and V-PDBF do not occur. • In NASS scenario 2, the interface e2 with the branch V-CLF-to-AF and V-PDBF do not occur. • In NASS scenario 3, the interfaces e5 and e2 with the branches V-UAAF-to-H-UAAF and V-CLF-to-H-CLF do not occur. • In NASS scenario 4, the interfaces e5 and e2 with the branches V-UAAF-to-H-UAAF and V-CLF-to-AF do not occur. It is further noted, that several SEGFs shown as separate functional entities may be co-located; such as for example, the SEGFs around Rq and Di interfaces. It is noted that there might be further application-specific security protocols (not shown) on top of the Za interfaces. Such security protocols (if any) remain for further study. NOTE: On the SEG CA in ASP domains it is observed that those CAs are not peering CAs as among the home/visited and access provider. It remains for further study how such SEG CAs could be deployed in the context of NGN. FE1 FE2 FE FE2 AF FE1 FE FE2 FE1 SEGF SEGF FE1 and FE2 are located in two distinct security domains. All signaling traffic across interface If exchanged between FE1 and FE2 shall be routed through security gateway functions (SEGF). Za interface (IKE+ESP tunnel) is mandatory to implement; Zb (IKE+ESP tunnel) is optional to implement; see TS 133 210 [10] clause 5.6.2. Za Zb Zb If Proprietary, non-standard local interface (in NGN R1). NASS functional entity RACS functional entity Application functional entity (Potentially) co-located functional entity Security domain 1 Security domain 2 Functional entity in the visited (home) NGN network V-FE H-FE Interconnection CA SEG CA SEG Certification Authority Interconnection Certification Authority Figure 5: Legend ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 17 Visited NG N N etw ork H om e N GN N etwork NA CF U E AM F CN GCF V -CLF V - UA AF A- RA CF R CEF L2TP A ccess Node V -BG F SPD F V - PD BF H -BG F Access Transport N etwork H -C LF H- U AA F H - PD BF AR F 3 rd party ASP Network a1 a2 a3 a4 Di IP Edge D s Core Border Node Core Border Node Ra Rq G q’ Ia Re e4 e1 e2 e3 e5 e2 SEGF AF e1 e2 SEG F AF AF 3 rd party A SP N etw ork Interconnection C A SEG CA Interconnection C A SEG CA Interconnection CA SEG C A Interconnection C A SEG C A Interconnection C A SEG CA SEGF SEG F SEG F Figure 6: NGN NASS and RACS security architecture with FEs and security gateway functional components around inter-domain interfaces in access, visited, home and other operator's networks
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187 003
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4.3.1 NASS-IMS Bundled security
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Please refer to clause 4.4.1. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 18
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187 003
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4.4 IMS security architecture
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The IMS security architecture for both 3G environments and for NGN environments is defined in TS 133 203 [8]. UPSF Home NGN I-CSCF Visited NGN P-CSCF Generic IP Transport soft ISIM NGN-UE MM IP networks S-CSCF 1 2 5 3 3 4/5 4/5 UA GE GE Figure 7: IMS Security architecture in an NGN environment (TS 133 203 [8]) Figure 7 depicts the IMS security architecture in an NGN environment as defined in TS 133 203 [8], where the 3GPP specific transport domain is replaced by the Generic IP transport domain. The following observations support figure 7. • The IMS is independent of the transport network. • Generic Entities (GE) equivalent to the 3GPP transport entities will be present in the Generic IP transport domain. • In NGN the AuC functionality is performed by UPSF. • The Security Associations (SA) (referring to the corresponding arrows in figure 7) are retained. - SA-1, SA-3, SA-4 and SA-5 are endorsed as described in TS 133 203 [8]. - SA-2 is endorsed with the extension to ensure transport across NAT/Firewall boundaries. There exist other interfaces and reference points in IMS, which have not been addressed above. Those interfaces and reference points reside within the IMS, either within the same security domain or between different security domains (see figure 8). The protection of all such interfaces and reference points (which may include subsystems like NASS/RACS) apart from the Gm reference point are protected as specified in TS 133 210 [9]. The present document endorses the interfaces (1) to (5) of TS 133 203 [8]. Figure 8 details figure 7 by showing the IMS functional entities in the NGN that runs over a generic IP transport. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 19 UPE HSS UPSF Home Network NGN-UE I-CSCF I-CSCF S-CSCF S-CSCF Zb Zb Zb Zb Zb Zb Generic IP transport P-CSCF NGN-UE Visited Net. Figure 8: Generic IP Transport underneath IMS ( [8]) In the following, IMS components are segregated into the different security domains. Figure 9 shows the IMS components in five different domains. The interconnection between the different IMS components is not shown in the figure and it should be in accordance with ES 282 007 [27]. The segregation is explained below. 1) Customer's domain includes UE and optionally some Residential Gateways (which may be owned by the user/operator). The Residential Gateway shall have ISIM, which has the credentials for IMS authentication. 2) Access network domain is hosted by the access network provider. The access network provider may or may not be the same as the NGN provider. 3) Visited network domain is hosted by a visited network provider. The visited network provider may offer multimedia services and may have his own subscribers. Alternatively, the visited network provider may have agreement with some 3rd party Application Service Provider (ASP) to offer services. The visited network domain may encompass IMS functional entities. 4) Home network domain is hosted by the home network provider. The home network provider offers multimedia services. Alternatively, the visited network provider may have agreement with some 3rd party Application Service Provider (ASP) to offer services. The home network domain encompasses the IMS network. 5) 3rd party application service provider domain is hosted by some ASP different from the operator. The ASP may need to deploy its own AAA infrastructure to interpret the information offered by the visited or home network provider. It should have the IMS functional entities. Figure 9 shows the partitioning of the NGN network with IMS components (pink boxes) into security domains (boxes with curved edge). The figure also shows the two different authentications the clients usually go through for NGN access, in the scope of NGN Release 1 security architecture. 6) The connection marked "Access Authentication" is the authentication between the UE and NASS in the Access Network. 7) The connection marked IMS Authentication" is the authentication between the UE and the S-CSCF in the IMS network. After the successful authentication, a security association is created between the UE and the P-CSCF. 3GPP R5/R6 has recommended IPsec in transport mode for this. The 3GPP R5/R6 solution lacks NAT traversal capability and hence the 3GPP R7 solution capable of NAT traversal is to be used. In the figure 9, two distinct interfaces are depicted: • The connections between the different IMS components (also NGN components) within the same IMS network (NGN network) are the "Zb" interfaces. These interfaces may or may not be protected depending on operator policies. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 20 • The connection between the different Operators, denoted by "Za" in the figure, should be protected (IKE, ESP tunnel). The SEGFs (TS 133 210 [9]) within each security domain protect the exposed interfaces between operators and ensure that a security policy among security domains is enforced. SEGFs may also optionally protect the (less exposed, internal) interfaces within a security domain; this is left to the discretion of the network operator. The outbound IMS/NGN traffic from an operator cannot by-pass the SEGF. SEGFs are used to protect the traffic between two operators. That means traffic from access network IMS entities to IMS entities in the home network of a different operator shall go through SEGF. The UE may either have ISIM in it (in which case, it can directly authenticate to the S-CSCF) or the ISIM credentials may be in the IMS residential gateway (IRG) (wherein, the service authentication has to go through the IRG). The ISIM may also be in both the devices. The Service Providers (ASP) may or may not have the same CA as the visited/home network. This depends on the operator policies. UE Visited Network Home Network Access Network IMS Network RACS Za Zb MGCF RACS NASS MRFC SGF PSTN BGCF S-CSCF UPSF SLF IMS-AS Charging SEGF SEGF IMS Network Zb MGCF MRFC BGCF UPSF SLF IMS-AS Charging NASS IRG (ISIM) ASP ASP NASS T-MGF P-CSCF UE (UICC+ISIM) NAT IMS Authentication Access Authentication I-CSCF RACS MRFP NOTE: Figure 9 does not show any optional SEGF within a security domain for securing the communication among IMS FEs inside the same security domain. Figure 9: IMS security domains
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187 003
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4.4.1 NASS-IMS Bundled security
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The NASS Bundled Authentication (NBA) works by extending the successful authentication in the NASS layer to the service layer. During the network attachment, the NASS authenticates the UE and allocates an IP address. It stores the layer-2 and layer-3 identities in the NASS profile. When UE registers with the P-CSCF, the P-CSCF queries the NASS (actually the CLF functional entity), to obtain its location information. The P-CSCF embeds the location information into the SIP message and forwards it towards the S-CSCF for verification. The S-CSCF verifies this location information with the location information obtained from the UPSF. On successful verification, the user is authenticated at the IMS layer. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 21 At the architectural level, two interfaces are affected: 1) the "e2" interface over which the location info from the NASS is communicated. 2) the "Cx" interface over which the user profile stored in UPSF is transmitted. This is illustrated in figure 10. See also annex D for a visualization of the network flows. AMF UAAF NASS credentials P- CSCF I/S-CSCF UPSF NASS Authentication (e.g. IEEE 802.1x/PANA ) SIP registration PDBF a3 CLF NACF e2 (Pull: location info) Cx (Pull: user profile) NASS Figure 10: Formal mapping of NASS Bundled Authentication
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187 003
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4.5 PES Security architecture
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187 003
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4.5.1 Security for H.248 within PES
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Figure 11 depicts the security architecture for using H.248.1 for PSTN/ISDN service over IP according to ES 283 002 [20]. Access Gateway (AGW), Residential Gateway (RGW), the control subsystem (AGCF with MGC) and the control protocols are considered to belong entirely to a single operator's security domain as indicated by the dashed, red line. The specified H.248 security options should not be used, as these interfaces are considered to be within a security domain. ES 283 002 [20] clause 5.1.3 specifies that no security measures, either IPsec or TLS, are used on the IUA interfaces and no specific countermeasures are applied to the GRE interface carrying packet data. NOTE: In any other case when the H.248, IUA and GRE interfaces do not fall within a single operator's security domain, a different risk may apply and appropriate countermeasures may be needed. A security architecture for such cases is left as for further study. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 22 Legacy User Equipment (terminals, PBXs) RGW (R-MGF) AGW (A-MGF) Control Subsystem (AGCF with MGC) Customer's Premises Operator's Premises Scope of ES 283 002 with H.248, IUA, GRE interfaces Single operator’s security domain IP transport (Access and Core Network) Figure 11: Reference architecture for profile of the Gateway Control Protocol (H.248.1), for controlling access and residential gateways connecting analog lines and ISDN primary and basic accesses, in order to emulate PSTN/ISDN services over IP [20]
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187 003
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4.5.2 IMS-based PES security
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TS 182 012 [41] defines the functional architecture for the IMS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation subsystem. The MGCF maps the encapsulated ISUP information within SIP messages sent/received to/from the BGCF (Mj interface) and to/from the I/S-CSCF (Mg interface) to the ISDN/PSTN network. The MGCF implements the role of a PES Interworking Application while the IBCF implements the role of a PES Interconnection application, see TS 183 043 [40]. Procedures for filtering ISUP information off from SIP messages are specified in TS 183 043 [40] clauses 5.3.3.5.2.4, 5.3.5.4.2.4 and 5.3.6.2. In the context of PES, TR 183 032 [50] clause 6.2 and TR 183 014 [51] provide supplementary information on the feasibility of securing encapsulated ISUP information within SIP.
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4.6 Application security architecture
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The AS architecture enables the user to manage information related to his services, such as creation and assignment of Public Service Identities, management of authorization policies that are used e.g. by Presence service, conference policy management, etc. The XCAP architecture and security architecture is endorsed by TS 183 033 [7]. This defines the usage of a set of security protocols for protection of XCAP traffic on the Ut interface between UE and AS. The two optional method endorsed are HTTP digest over TLS and GAA (TS 133 222 [12]). An authentication proxy may be used optionally for user authentication, as defined in TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12], see figure 12. UE AS Ut Authentication Proxy Ut Figure 12: Authentication proxy in the Ut interface path ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 23 5 Mapping of security requirements to security services and NGN FEs
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187 003
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5.1 Security services in NGN R1 security architecture
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This clause defines the mapping of security services within the NGN R1 security architecture through security functions. Clause 4.2.3 provides a mapping of security services to NGN FEs. The following security services are identified for NGN: • Authentication. • Authorization. • Confidentiality. • Integrity. Tables 1 to 4 show the security services along with the NGN interfaces between the major NGN subsystems (UE/CNG responsible VGW, NASS, RACS, IMS, PES and AS). The tables only show the interfaces with mandatory security; interfaces with optional security measures are not shown. NOTE: Since the table is symmetric, the lower left triangular (shaded grey) is supposed to convey the same entries as shown in the upper right triangular. Table 1: NGN interfaces with required Authentication security services (AUTH) UE/CNG, VGW NASS RACS IMS PES AS UE/CNG, VGW n.a. e1 n.a. Gm Gm Ua, Ub, Ut, Zn NASS a3, e5 e4 n.a n.a. e2 RACS Rq n.a. n.a. Gq' IMS Cx, Dx n.a. Sh, Zh PES n.a. n.a. AS n.a. Table 2: NGN interfaces with required Confidentiality Security services (CONF) UE/CNG, VGW NASS RACS IMS PES AS UE/CNG, VGW n.a. e1 n.a. Gm Gm Ua, Ub, Ut, Zn NASS a3, e5 e4 n.a. n.a. e2 RACS Rq n.a n.a. Gq' IMS Cx, Dx, Ic n.a. Sh, Zh PES n.a. n.a. AS n.a. Table 3: NGN interfaces with required Integrity security services (INT) UE/CNG, VGW NASS RACS IMS PES AS UE/CNG, VGW n.a. e1 n.a. Gm Gm Ua, Ub, Ut, Zn NASS a3, e5, Za e4 n.a n.a. e2 RACS Rq n.a n.a. Gq' IMS Cx, Dx n.a. Sh, Zh PES n.a. n.a. AS n.a. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 24 Table 4: NGN interfaces with required Key Management security services (KM) UE/CNG, VGW NASS RACS IMS PES AS UE/CNG, VGW n.a. e1 n.a. Gm Gm Ua, Ub, Ut, Zn NASS a3, e5, Za e4 n.a n.a. e2 RACS Rq n.a n.a. Gq' IMS Cx, Dx n.a. Sh, Zh PES n.a. n.a. AS n.a.
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5.2 Security Services in NGN FEs
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Table 5 identifies the security services with the security mechanism(s) and countermeasures for each NGN FE. NOTE: Security functions of security services may actually be specified in documents that are referenced indirectly only. Table 5: Security services and countermeasures provided by NGN FEs NGN FE Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH Authentication for AP are as specified by TS 183 019 [22]. AUTHOR Authorization functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 019 [22]. CONF Confidentiality functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 019 [22]. INT Integrity functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 019 [22]. KM Key management functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 019 [22]. Access Point (AP) PEF n.a. AUTH Assumed to be in the trusted domain, see ES 283 002 [20]. AUTHORF Assumed to be in the trusted domain, see ES 283 002 [20]. CONF Assumed to be in the trusted domain, see ES 283 002 [20]. INT Assumed to be in the trusted domain, see ES 283 002 [20]. KM Assumed to be in the trusted domain, see ES 283 002 [20]. AGCF, AGW, RGW PEF Assumed to be in the trusted domain, see ES 283 002 [20]. AUTH Authentication functions for securing the e4 interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 034 [24]. Authentication functions for securing the Rq interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 026 [43]. AUTHOR Authorizations functions for securing the e4 interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 034 [24]. Authorizations functions for securing the Rq interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 026 [43]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing the e4 interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 034 [24]. Confidentiality functions for securing the Rq interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 026 [43]. INT Integrity functions for securing the e4 interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 034 [24]. Integrity functions for securing the Rq interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 026 [43]. KM Key management functions for securing the e4 interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 034 [24]. Key management functions for securing the Rq interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 026 [43]. A-RACF PEF Policy enforcement functions for securing the e4 interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 034 [24]. Policy enforcement functions for securing the Rq interface for A-RACF are as specified by ES 283 026 [43]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 25 NGN FE Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH Authentication functions for AS are as specified by TS 133 141 [11] and by TS 183 033 [7]. Authentication functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for AS are as specified by TS 129 329 [19] and by TS 133 210 [9]. AUTHOR Authorization functions for AS are as specified by TS 133 141 [11] and by TS 183 033 [7]. Authorization functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for AS are as specified by TS 129 329 [19] and by TS 133 210 [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for AS are as specified by TS 133 141 [11] and by TS 183 033 [7]. Confidentiality functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for AS are as specified by TS 129 329 [19] and by TS 133 210 [9]. INT Integrity functions for AS are as specified by TS 133 141 [11] and by TS 183 033 [7]. Integrity functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for AS are as specified by TS 129 329 [19] and by TS 133 210 [9]. KM Key management functions for AS are as specified by TS 133 141 [11] and by TS 183 033 [7]. Key management functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for AS are as specified by TS 129 329 [19] and by TS 133 210 [9]. AS PEF Policy enforcement functions for filtering encapsulated ISUP within SIP in the AS are specified by TS 183 043 [40] clauses 5.3.3.5.2.4 and 5.3.5.4.2.4. AUTH Authentication functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12]. AUTHOR Authorization functions for AP are specified by TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12]. CONF Confidentiality functions for AP are specified by TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12]. INT Integrity functions for AP are specified by TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12]. KM Key management functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12]. Authentication Proxy (AP) PEF Policy enforcement functions for AP are as specified by TS 183 033 [7] and TS 133 222 [12]. AUTH n.a. AUTHOR n.a. CONF n.a. INT n.a. KM n.a. BGCF PEF n.a. AUTH Authentication functions for BSF are as specified by TS 133 220 [13]. AUTHOR Authorization functions for BSF are as specified by TS 133 220 [13]. CONF Confidentiality functions for BSF are as specified by TS 133 220 [13]. INT Integrity functions for BSF are as specified by TS 133 220 [13]. KM Key management functions for BSF are as specified by TS 133 220 [13]. BSF PEF n.a. AUTH Authentication functions for securing the e2 interface of the CLF are as specified by ES 283 035 [23]. AUTHOR Authorizations functions for securing the e2 interface of the CLF are as specified by ES 283 035 [23]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing the e2 interface of the CLF are as specified by ES 283 035 [23]. INT Integrity functions for securing the e2 interface of the CLF are as specified by ES 283 035 [23]. KM Key management functions for securing the e2 interface of the CLF are as specified by ES 283 035 [23]. CLF PEF Policy enforcement functions for securing the e2 interface of the CLF are as specified by ES 283 035 [23]. AUTH n.a AUTHOR Authorization functions for IBCF are as specified by TS 182 006 [28]. CONF Confidentiality functions for IBCF are as specified by TS 182 006 [28]. INT n.a. KM n.a. IBCF PEF Policy enforcement functions for IBCF are as specified by TS 182 006 [28]. Policy enforcement functions for filtering encapsulated ISUP within SIP in the IBCF are specified by TS 183 043 [40], clause 5.3.6.2. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 26 NGN FE Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH IMS-AKA authentication functions for IRG shall are as specified in TS 133 203 [8]; Authentication functions for IPsec packet authentication in the IRG are as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. Optional authentication functions for SIP HTTP-digest in the IRG are as defined in RFC 3261 [29]. AUTHOR Authorization functions in the IRG are as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. CONF Confidentiality functions in the IRG protect IMS-AKA key distribution against loss of confidentiality as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. Confidentiality functions in the IRG encrypt IPsec packets as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. INT Integrity functions in the IRG protect IMS-AKA key distribution against loss of integrity as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. Integrity functions in the IRG protect IPsec packets against loss of integrity as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. KM Key management functions in the IRG provide IMS-AKA as specified in TS 133 203 [8]. IRG PEF n.a. AUTH n.a. AUTHOR n.a. CONF n.a. INT n.a. KM n.a. MGCF PEF Policy enforcement functions for filtering encapsulated ISUP within SIP in the MGCF are specified by [40]. AUTH Authentication functions in NAF are as specified by [12]. AUTHOR Authorization functions in NAF are specified by [12]. CONF Confidentiality functions in NAF are specified by [12]. INT Integrity functions in NAF are specified by [12]. KM Key management functions in NAF are as specified by [12]. NAF PEF n.a. AUTH Authentication functions in the PDBF retrieve authentication data (e.g. user identity, list of supported authentication methods, authentication keys etc.) as outlined in [6]. AUTHOR Authorization functions in the PDBF access PDBF to retrieve authorization data (e.g. user network profile) as outlined in [6]. CONF n.a. INT n.a. KM n.a. PDBF PEF n.a. P-CSCF AUTH Authentication functions in the P-CSCF provide IMS-AKA as specified in [8]. Authentication functions in the P-CSCF provide IPsec packet authentication as specified in [8]. Optional authentication functions in the P-CSCF provide NASS-IMS bundled authentication as specified in [26] and [7]. Optional authentication functions in the P-CSCF support SIP HTTP-digest as defined in [29]. Authentication functions in the P-CSCF secure the e2 interface as specified by [23]. Authentication functions in the P-CSCF secure the e4 interface as specified by [24]. AUTHOR Authorization functions in the P-CSCF provide authorization functions as specified in [8]. Authorization functions in the P-CSCF provide authorizations functions for securing the e2 interface as specified by [23]. Authorization functions in the P-CSCF provide authorizations functions for securing the e4 interface as specified by [24]. Optional authorization functions in the P-CSCF for NASS-IMS bundled authentication feature as specified in [26] and [7]. Optional authorization functions in the P-CSCF support SIP HTTP-digest as defined in [29]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 27 NGN FE Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 CONF Confidentiality functions in the P-CSCF provide IMS-AKA key distribution against loss of confidentiality specified in [8]. Confidentiality functions in the P-CSCF provide IPsec packet encryption as specified in [8]. Confidentiality functions in the P-CSCF secure the e2 interface as specified by [23]. Confidentiality functions in the P-CSCF secure the e4 interface as specified by [24]. INT Integrity functions in the P-CSCF protect IMS-AKA key distribution against loss of integrity as specified in [8]. Integrity functions in the P-CSCF protect IPsec packets against loss of integrity as specified in [8]. Integrity functions in the P-CSCF secure the e2 interface as specified by [23]. Integrity functions in the P-CSCF secure the e4 interface as specified by [24]. KM Key management functions in the P-CSCF provide IMS-AKA as specified in [8]. Key management functions in the P-CSCF shall secure the e2 interface as specified by [23]. Key management functions in the P-CSCF secure the e4 interface as specified by [24]. PEF Policy enforcement functions in the P-CSCF secure the e2 interface as specified by [23]. Policy enforcement functions in the P-CSCF secure the e4 interface as specified by [24]. Policy enforcement functions for filtering encapsulated ISUP within SIP in the P-CSCF are specified by [40] clause 5.3.3.5.2.4. AUTH Authentication functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec in the S-CSCF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. AUTHOR Authorization functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec in the S-CSCF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec in the S-CSCF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. INT Integrity functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec in the S-CSCF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. KM Key management functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec in the S-CSCF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. S-CSCF PEF n.a. AUTH Authentication functions in the SEGF provide IKE as specified in [9]. Authentication functions in the SEGF provide IPsec packet authentication as specified in [9]. AUTHOR Authorization functions in the SEGF provide IKE/IPsec SPD as specified in [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions in the SEGF provide IPsec packet encryption as specified in [10]. INT Integrity functions in the SEGF provide IPsec packet integrity as specified in [10]. KM Key management functions in the SEGF provide IKE as specified in [10]. SEGF PEF Policy enforcement for AUTH, AUTHOR, CONF, INT and KM in the SEGF are as specified in [10]. AUTH n.a. AUTHORF n.a. CONF n.a. INTF n.a. KM n.a. THF, I-CSCF (THIG) PEF Topology hiding functions in THF, I-CSCF (THIG) are as specified in [29] (see TS 124 229 - see bibliography). ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 28 NGN FE Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH Explicit and/or implicit authentication functions for NASS in the UAAF are as specified by [22]; see also [6]. The UAAF terminates the AAA protocol (RADIUS or DIAMETER) as a AAA server, see [6]. AUTHOR Authorization functions for NASS (supported by PDBF) in the UAAF are as specified by [22]. CONF n.a. INT n.a. KM n.a. UAAF PEF The UAAF supports the Privacy Indicator to indicate whether location information can be exported to services and applications; see [6]. AUTH For IMS, the authentication function in the UPSF accesses authentication data stored in the UPSF (see also [3], TR 182 005 [48], see also clause A.2). AUTHOR For IMS, the authorization function in the UPSF accesses authorization data stored in the UPSF (see also [3], TR 182 005 [48], see also clause A.2). CONF For IMS, the confidentiality function in the UPSF accesses keys stored in the UPSF (see also [3], TR 182 005 [48], see also clause A.2). INT For IMS, the integrity function in the UPSF accesses integrity data stored in the UPSF (see also [3], TR 182 005 [48], see also clause A.2). KM For IMS, the key management function accesses key management data stored in the UPSF (see also [3], TR 182 005 [48], see also clause A.2). UPSF NOTE: UPSF does not directly correspond to a security function, nor does UPSF provide a security service. PEF For IMS, the policy enforcement function in the UPSF accesses policy information stored in the UPSF (see also [3], TR 182 005 [48], see also clause A.2).
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5.3 Security Services on NGN Interfaces
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Table 6 identifies the security services (AUTH, INT, CONF, KMF) with the security mechanism(s) and countermeasures for each NGN interface. NOTE 1: Interfaces are not listed in this clause where no security functions are identified. NOTE 2: Security functions of the security services may actually be specified in documents that are referenced indirectly only. Table 6: Security services and countermeasures provided by NGN interfaces NGN IF Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH Authentication functions for the a3 IF are as specified by [22]. CONF Confidentiality functions for the a3 IF are as specified by [22]. INT Integrity functions for the a3 IF are as specified by [22]. a3 (UAAF - AMF) KM Key management functions for the a3 IF are as specified by [22]. AUTH n.a. CONF n.a. INT n.a. a4 (UAAF - CLF) KM n.a. AUTH Authentication functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec for the CX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec for the CX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. INT Integrity functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IPsec for the CX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. Cx (S-CSCF - UPSF) KM Key management functions for securing DIAMETER over SCTP using IKE for the CX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. AUTH Authentication functions for securing DIAMETER for the DX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing DIAMETER for the DX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. INT Integrity functions for securing DIAMETER for the DX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. Dx (S-CSCF - UPSF - SLF) KM Key management functions for securing DIAMETER for the DX IF are as specified by [7] and by [9]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 29 NGN IF Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH Authentication functions for e1 IF are as specified by [22] and by [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for e1 IF are as specified by [22]. INT Integrity functions for e1 IF are as specified by [22]. e1 (CNG-AMF) KM Key management functions for e1 IF are as specified by [22]. AUTH Authentication functions for securing the e2 interface are as specified by [23]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing the e2 interface are as specified by [23]. INT Integrity functions for securing the e2 interface are as specified by [23]. e2 (CLF - AF) KM Key management functions for securing the e2 interface are as specified by [23]. AUTH Authentication functions for securing the e4 interface are as specified by [24]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing the e4 interface are as specified by [24]. INT Integrity functions for securing the e4 interface are as specified by [24]. e4 (CLF - A-RACF) KM Key management functions for securing the e4 interface are as specified by [24]. AUTH Authentication functions for the e5 IF are as specified by [22]. e5 provides the AAA protocol (RADIUS or DIAMETER) as specified by [6]. CONF Confidentiality functions for the e5 IF are as specified by [22]. INT Integrity functions for the e5 IF are as specified by [22]. e5 (UAAF - UAAF) KM Key management functions for the e5 IF are as specified by [22]. AUTH Authentication functions for the Gm IF provide IMS-AKA as specified in [8]. Authentication functions for the Gm IF provide IPsec packet authentication as specified in [8]. Optional authentication functions for the Gm IF provide SIP HTTP-digest as defined in [29]. Optional authentication functions for the Gm IF provide NASS-IMS bundled authentication as specified in [26] and [7]. CONF Confidentiality functions for the Gm IF protect IMS-AKA key distribution against loss of confidentiality specified in [8]. Confidentiality functions for the Gm IF protect IPsec packet encryption as specified in [8]. INT Integrity function for the Gm IF protect IMS-AKA key distribution against loss of integrity as specified in [8]. Integrity function for the Gm IF protect IPsec packet integrity as specified in [8]. Gm (UE/IRG - P-CSCF) (VGW - P-CSCF) KM Key management functions for the Gm IF provide IMS-AKA as specified in [8]. AUTH Authentication functions for securing DIAMETER for Gq' are as defined by [38]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing DIAMETER for Gq' are as defined by [38]. INT Integrity functions for securing DIAMETER for Gq' are as defined by [38]. Gq' (AF - SPDF) KM Key management functions for securing DIAMETER for Gq' are as defined by [38]. AUTH Ia IF does not provide any authentication functions; see [21]. CONF Ia IF does not provide any confidentiality functions; see [21]. INT Ia IF does not provide any integrity functions; see [21]. Ia (SPDF - BGF) KM Ia IF does not provide any key management functions; see [21]. AUTH n.a. CONF Confidentiality functions for Ic are as specified by [28]. INT n.a. Ic (IBCF - IBCF) KM n.a. AUTH n.a. CONF n.a. INT n.a. ISC (CSCF - AS) KM n.a. AUTH n.a. CONF n.a. INT n.a. Mg (CSCF - MGCF) KM n.a. AUTH n.a. CONF n.a. INT n.a. Mj (BGCF - MGCF) KM n.a. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 30 NGN IF Security Services Countermeasure and security mechanism in NGN R1 AUTH Authentication functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Rq IF are as specified by [43]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Rq IF are as specified by [43]. INT Integrity functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Rq IF are as specified by [43]. Rq (SPDF - A-RACF) KM Key management functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Rq IF are as specified by [43]. AUTH Authentication functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Sh IF are as specified by [19] and by [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Sh IF are as specified by [19] and by [9]. INT Integrity functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Sh IF are as specified by [19] and by [9]. Sh (AS - UPSF) (SCS - UPSF) KM Key management functions for securing the DIAMETER protocol for the Sh IF are as specified by [19] and by [9]. AUTH Authentication functions for Ua IF are as specified by [13]. CONF Confidentiality functions for Ua IF are as specified by [13]. INT Integrity functions for Ua IF are as specified by [13]. Ua (NAF - UE) KM Key management functions for Ua IF are as specified by [13]. AUTH Authentication functions for Ub IF are as specified by [13]. CONF Confidentiality functions for Ub IF are as specified by [13]. INT Integrity functions for Ub IF are as specified by [13]. Ub (BSF - UE) KM Key management functions for Ub IF are as specified by [13]. AUTH Authentication functions for Ut IF are as specified by [11], [12] and by [7]. CONF Confidentiality functions for Ut IF are as specified by [11], [12] and by [7]. INT Integrity functions for Ut IF are as specified by [11], [12] and by [7]. Ut (UE - (AP) - AS) KM Key management functions for Ut IF are as specified by [12], [11] and by [7]. AUTH Authentication functions for Za IF are as specified in [9]. CONF Confidentiality functions for Za IF are as specified in [9]. INT Integrity functions for Za IF are as specified in [9]. Za (SEGF - SEGF) KM Key management functions for Za IF are as specified in [9]. AUTH Optional authentication functions for Zb IF areas specified in [9]. CONF Optional confidentiality functions for Zb IF are as specified in [9]. INT Optional integrity functions for Zb IF are as specified in [9]. Zb (SEGF - FE) KM Optional key management functions for Zb IF are as specified in [9]. AUTH Authentication functions for Zh IF are as specified by [13]. CONF Confidentiality functions for Zh IF are as specified by [13]. INT Integrity functions for Zh IF are as specified by [13]. Zh (BSF - UPSF) KM Key management functions for Zh IF are as specified by [13]. AUTH Authentication functions for Zn IF are as specified by [13]. CONF Confidentiality functions for Zn IF are as specified by [13]. INT Integrity functions for Zn IF are as specified by [13]. Zn (BSF - UE) KM Key management functions for Zn IF are as specified by [13].
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5.4 Mapping of 3GPP security FEs to NGN FEs
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NGN shall re-use 3GPP security entities (AuC, HLR and HSS; see TS 123 002 [46]) as follows; see also figure 13 that illustrates a mapping of 3GPP FEs to NGN FEs: • The PDBF at the NASS level shall conceptually encompass the same functionality that is provided by the AuC, see TS 123 002 [46] clause 4.1.1.1.2. Additionally, the PDBF shall contain the NASS level profiles needed for the NASS layer authentication. NOTE 1: Conceptually means that the functionality is not the same as AuC operates at IMS level while PDBF operates at NASS level. Thus, the functions of the AuC need to be transposed into some conceptually equivalent functions at the PDBF. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 31 • When mapping the 3GPP PS domain architecture to the NASS architecture, the H-UAAF conceptually covers the part of the HLR that is used to access the AuC; see figure 13, see TS 123 002 [46] clause 4.1.1.1.1. When mapping the 3GPP WLAN architecture to the NASS architecture, the H-UAAF is equivalent to the WLAN H-AAA server, while the V-UAAF is equivalent to a WLAN AAA proxy; see figure 14, see TS 133 234 [47]) clause 4.1.4. • The UPSF as a generic FE shall encompass: - authentication data for the IMS are held in the non-HLR part of the HSS. However, this part of the HSS is not explicitly termed AuC. This part is shown as AuC' to represent the AuC functionality for the IMS (i.e. ISIM-based). This AuC' functionality is inherited by the UPSF. - some other HSS functionality (different from AuC and HLR). NOTE 2: The HSS is defined in TS 123 002 [46] clause 4.1.1.1. Generally, NGN FEs shall not encompass any 3GPP functionality that relates to supporting the CS and PS domain. Figures 13 and 14 show interfaces: • PDBF - UAAF: This interface is not defined in R1. • Components and interfaces within UPSF are not defined in R1. • Internal interfaces within HSS are not defined in 3GPP. NOTE 3: Figures 13 and 14 show relationships and are not meant to imply exact correspondences. Some details can of course not be mapped precisely. This is because the architectural assumptions on the environment of user data in 3GPP and in NGN are somewhat different. In particular, the scopes of UAAF and HLR are different. NOTE 4: IMS data also contains AuC data related to ISIM. HSS HLR (PS domain) AuC (USIM) AuC' (ISIM) IMS Profile (iFC…) NGN UAAF(h) PDBF AuC' (ISIM) IMS Profile GPRS profile UPSF 3GPP Home IMS Home NASS Figure 13: Mapping of HSS (AuC, HLR) to PDBF, UPSF, UAAF (PS domain) ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 32 HSS AuC (USIM) AuC' (ISIM) IMS Profile (iFC … ) NGN UAAF(h) PDBF AuC' (ISIM) IMS Profile WLAN profile UPSF 3GPP Home IMS Home NASS WLAN AAA Server Figure 14: Mapping of HSS (AuC, HLR) to PDBF, UPSF, UAAF (WLAN case)
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6 NGN IMS Residential Gateway
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User may gain access to NGN IMS services by using a non-ISIM capable SIP UA via a NGN IMS Residential Gateway (IRG). NGN IMS Residential Gateway is an optional functional element within the NGN architecture and serves the purpose to securely connect legacy, non-NGN UE equipment to the NGN that does not have the capability of using an ISIM/UICC. The IRG holds a SIP B2BUA, which has a full NGN IMS Release 1 UA interface towards the NGN IMS network. The interface towards to the local user is not specified by the present document; however, it could be for example IETF compatible SIP UA [29], softphone, IP phone, IAD/DECT or some other possibly proprietary phone system. The IMS Residential Gateway is placed in the customer's domain. One potential realization of IMS Residential Gateway is presented in figure 15. NGN IMS Residential Gateway ISIM on UICC IP connectivity interface Laptop Desktop SIP phone Laptop Desktop ”IRG identity " IAD DECT Phone IP connectivity interface Figure 15: Potential realization of NGN IMS Residential Gateway The ISIM within the IRG represents the required security functionality for IMS in NGN. In NGN R1, the ISIM [18] shall be deployed in conjunction with a UICC [14], [15], [16] and [17]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 33 The operator shall disable all implicit registrations sets from the HSS, on behalf of those ISIMs that are dedicated to IMS Residential Gateways. If there are implicit registrations sets defined in the HSS, then the implementation of IMS Residential Gateway gets a lot harder. It is recommended that the ISIM include only one Public User Identity. IMS Residential Gateway when implemented in a device should be robust, and therefore it should store the registrations states (local and IMS registration states) and security connections states to a memory that is not erased during outages. It is recommended that the IMS Residential Gateway and the local UAs authenticate each other, and communicate using some security mechanism. The content of these security measures are out of the scope of the present document. If the IMS Residential Gateway has phone capabilities by itself, then that phone should be treated like any other local phone. NOTE 1: A typical IMS Residential Gateway would work as follows. When the IMS Residential Gateway device is switched on, and the first local UA is registered, then the IMS Residential Gateway registers the IMS Residential Gateway identity. The gateway identity is one of the public user identities that are stored to the ISIM. IMS Residential Gateway gets all the associated URIs from P-Associated-URI header field during the registration of explicit line identity. Then the IMS Residential Gateway continues processing the local registration request, assuming that the local registration request is related to one of the associated Public User Identities. After these steps the IMS Residential Gateway should monitor the registration state by subscribing to the registration event package in S-CSCF. Subsequent local registration requests do not initiate the registration of explicit line identity. The incoming calls that are directed to the IMS Residential Gateway identity are automatically directed to all connected UAs. Personal identities are always explicitly registered, and incoming calls to them are always directed only to associated UAs. NOTE 2: Devices that have an ISIM do not have to use IMS Residential Gateway. NOTE 3: How to secure the link(s) between UE and IRG is outside the scope of the present document. Annex B includes some informative implementation notes on the IMS Residential Gateway. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 34 Annex A (informative): NGN-relevant security interfaces This clause identifies the security interfaces that are relevant in NGN. This annex extracts relevant material from other NGN specifications. A.1 Network attachment security interfaces The Network Attachment Subsystem provides the following security functionalities; see [6], clause 4.1: • User authentication taking place prior or during the IP address allocation procedure. • Authorization of network access based on user profiles. The Network Attachment Subsystem (NASS) comprises the following security related functional entities that are relevant for Access Domain Security: • Customer Network Gateway (CNG) requests access from the network. • The Access Management Function (AMF) (see [6], clause 5.2.2) forwards requests to the User Access Authorization Function (UAAF) to authenticate the user, authorize or deny the network access, and retrieve user-specific access configuration parameters. In case PPP is applied, the AMF terminates the PPP connection and provides the inter-working with the reference point to the network attachment subsystem e.g. using an AAA protocol (RADIUS or Diameter). The AMF acts as a RADIUS client if the UAAF is implemented in a RADIUS server (the AMF terminates the PPP and translates it to signalling on the a3 reference point). • User Access Authorization Function (UAAF) (see [6], clause 5.2.4) performs user authentication, as well as authorization checking, based on user profiles, for network access. For each user, the UAAF retrieves authentication data and access authorization information from the user network profile contained in the Profile Data Base Function (PDBF). The UAAF also collects accounting data for the changing of the service usage. The User Access Authorization Function (UAAF) acting as proxy can locate and communicate with the UAAF acting as server which can visit the PDBF user authentication data stored in, and forward access and authorization requests, as well as accounting messages, received from the AMF, to the UAAF acting as server. Responses received back in return from the UAAF acting as server will be forwarded to the AMF. • The Profile Database Function (PDBF) (see [6], clause 5.2.5) is the functional entity that contains user authentication data (e.g. user identity, list of supported authentication methods, authentication keys etc.) and information related to the required network access configuration: these data are called "user network profile". In this release the reference point between UAAF and PDBF is not specified, i.e. UAAF and PDBF are either collocated or connected by a non-standardized interface. The PDBF can be co-located with the UPSF (described in [3]) where this makes sense in the context on the business models being supported (e.g. if the same provider operates both the IP connectivity services and the IMS services). Figure A.1 provides an overview of the relationships between these functional entities and related reference points. Further details about these and other NASS functionalities and the complete NASS architecture can be found in [6], clause 5.1. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 35 a4 Service control subsystems and applications TE CNG a3 a1 a2 e1 e2 e4 e3 Resource and Admission Control Subsystem CLF NACF CPECF AMF PDBF UAAF ARF e1 e2 e5 CNGCF UE NOTE: UAAF and PDBF are either co-located, or an interface exists among both FEs. This interface is not specified in NGN Release 1 and is left as for further study. Figure A.1: NASS functions involved with secure network attachment [6] A.1.1 Reference point e1 (CNG - AMF) This reference point enables the user equipment to provide user credentials (password, token, certificate, etc.) to the Network Attachment Subsystem (NASS) in order to perform network access authentication. This reference point may also enable the NASS to provide authentication parameter to the UE to perform the network authentication when mutual authentication procedure is required. Based on the authentication result, the NASS authorizes or denies the network access to the user equipment; see also [6], clause 5.5.2. A.1.2 Reference point e2 (CLF - AF) This reference point enables applications and service control subsystems to retrieve from the CLF network location information. The primary parameter to retrieve the location information shall be the Assigned IP address allocated to the UE; see also [6], clause 5.5.1. The form of location information that is provided by the CLF depends on the requestor. The following information flows are used on the CLF to AF reference point: • Location Information Query. • Location Information Response. A.1.3 Reference point a3 (AMF - UAAF) This reference point allows the AMF to request the UAAF for user authentication and network subscription checking; see also [6], clause 5.5.3. A.1.4 Reference point e5 (UAAF - UAAF) This reference point is intended to be used by a UAAF proxy and a UAAF server, which may be in different administrative domains. This reference point allows the UAAF-proxy to request the UAAF-server for user authentication and authorization, based on user profiles. It also allows the UAAF-proxy to forward accounting data for the particular user session to the UAAF-server; see also [6], clause 5.3.6. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 36 The UAAF-proxy will forward access and authorization requests, as well as accounting messages, received over reference point a3 from the AMF, to the UAAF-server over reference point e5. Responses received back in return from the UAAF-server over interface e5 will be forwarded to the AMF over reference point a3. A bilateral trust relationship will need to be setup between the UAAF-proxy and the UAAF-server in order to facilitate this exchange. This reference point therefore supports AAA message exchange between the UAAF-proxy and the UAAF-server. RADIUS and Diameter are two possible options for carrier protocols on this reference point. A.2. Service layer security interfaces A.2.1 NGN IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) core component of the NGN architecture (Core IMS) supports the provision of SIP-based multimedia services to NGN terminals. It also supports the provision of PSTN/ISDN simulation services. The architecture of this subsystem is further described in [4]. Figure A.2 provides an overview of the architecture, interfaces related to Access Security Domain are marked by dashed line. IP Transport (Access and Core) T -MGF I - BGF AS UPSF I/S- CSCF SLF Charging Functions IWF « Core IMS» Mw Mw/Mk/Mm Mr Mg Mj Mi Mp Mn Gm Gq ' ISC Cx Dx Dh Sh Ic Rf /Ro Rf/Ro Ib Iw Gq ' PSTN/ISDN SGF MRFC MGCF MRFP Resource and Admission Control Subsystem Network Attachment Subsystem e2 Ie Mw IBCF Mk Mk UE Ut BGCF Mw P-CSCF Other IP Networks Figure A.2: NGN IMS architecture - Access security [4] A.2.1.1 Reference point Gm (UE/IMS Residential Gateway - P-CSCF) The Gm reference point supports secure communication between an UE or an IMS Residential Gateway and the IMS, e.g. related to registration and session control; see [27], clause 9.2. Security set-up shall be possible using an ISIM application [18]. The security association between UE or IMS Residential Gateway and P-CSCF is established during IMS registration procedure. All subsequent session control messages will use this security association. NOTE 1: Exact security mechanism for Gm interface is FFS. NOTE 2: According to TS 181 005 (see bibliography), early implementations may use the so-called "line authentication" mechanism. This mechanism is optional for implementation. An interface between the UE and the IMS Residential Gateway is considered outside the scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 37 A.2.1.2 Reference point Cx (CSCF - UPSF) The Cx reference point supports information transfer between CSCF and UPSF. Further information on the Cx reference point is provided in [27], clause 9.3.2. The following security related procedures are supported: 1) Procedures related to authorization (e.g. checking of roaming agreement). 2) Procedures related to authentication: transfer of security parameters of the subscriber between UPSF and CSCF. Cx reference point shall support IMS AKA as mandatory authentication mechanism. A.2.1.3 Reference point Gq' (P-CSCF - RACS) The Gq' reference point is used by P-CSCF to reserve resources from the transport layer; see [27], clause 5.3.2. Important security functionality is related to traffic filtering. C-BGF filters unauthorized media streams, i.e. it only passes media packets through if P-CSCF has authorized them. P-CSCF uses the content of SDP payload of existing SIP sessions when making the authorization decisions. A.2.1.4 Reference point Iw (IWF - non-compatible SIP) Interconnection with external networks supporting a non-compatible version of SIP is performed at the Iw reference point, via the IWF, see [27]. This interface may support TLS as specified in [9]. A.2.1.5 Reference point Ic (IBCF - IMS) IP-based interconnection with external networks supporting IMS is performed at the Ic reference point, via the IBCF; see [27], [28]. Ic interface is protected using 3GPP Network Domain Security as specified in [9]. Network Domain Security refers to security within a NGN operator domain and between NGN operator domains that have a fixed roaming agreement. NGN Domains are networks that are managed by a single administrative authority. The same level of security and usage of security services will be typical within a NGN Domain. A network operated by a single operator will typically constitute one NGN Domain although an operator may subsection its network into separate sub-networks. A.2.1.6 Void A.2.1.7 Reference point Ut (UE - AS) This interface enables the user to manage information related to his services, such as creation and assignment of Public Service Identities, management of authorization policies that are used e.g. by Presence service, conference policy management, etc. [7] defines the Ut interface between a UE and an AS for the purpose of manipulating user controlled setting and variables at the AS; see figure A.3. UE AS Ut Figure A.3: Ut interface Ut interface is protected with TLS. Authentication may be based on the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) as defined in [12] or the HTTP Digest mechanisms defined [39]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 38 A.3 Interconnection security interfaces NGN may interconnect with several types of networks, e.g. at the service layer with SS7-based networks or IP-based networks, and at the transfer level with TDM-based or with IP-based networks. Interconnection may take place within the NGN trust domain, or between NGN and non-NGN trust domains. More details of NGN Release 1 interconnections are available in [3] and in [27]. Figure A.4 represents IP-based interconnection. To/From other IP networks IBCF IWF Control Subsystems Transport Layer Service Layer Transfer Functions Transport control I - BGF Ic Iw Ib Iz Figure A.4: IP Interconnection [3] Figure A.5 illustrates the case where no I-BGF is inserted. Figure A.6 illustrates the case where an I-BGF is inserted by the visited network; see also [27]. S-CSCF P-CSCF IBCF IBCF Mw Mw Ic Core IMS (visited) Core IMS (home) To/from terminating home network Originating Visited Network Originating Home Network Access Transport Network RACS Core Transport Networks C-BGF Media Flows Figure A.5: IMS interconnect scenario without I-BGF [27] ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 39 S-CSCF P-CSCF IBCF IBCF Mw Mw Ic IMS(visited) IMS(home) To/from terminating home network Originating Visited Network Originating Home Network Access Transport Network RACS Core Transport Networks C-BGF Media Flows I-BGF RACS NOTE: As a network operator's option, an I-CSCF with encryption-based topology hiding capabilities (THIG) may also be inserted in the IMS before the IBCF. This is not represented on the above figures. Figure A.6: IMS interconnect scenario with I-BGF [27] [28] describes further interconnect scenarios showing usage of the optional IBCF. A.3.1 Interconnecting security at the transport layer The security of the Iz reference point is out of the scope of the present document. A.3.2 Interconnecting security at the service layer Security measures when interconnecting with SS7 networks are out of the scope of the present document. IP-based interconnection with external networks supporting is performed at the Ic reference point, via the IBCF. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 40 Annex B (informative): Mapping of NGN R1 Security Requirements to Security Services Table B.1 identifies which security functions (AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) are required in the NGN R1 security architecture to fulfil the NGN R1 security requirements TS 187 001 [1]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 41 Table B.1: Mapping of NGN-R1 requirements to security functions Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element Security Policy Requirements R-SP-1 The NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security policies. No Note that the split is a mandate of the regulatory regime but of itself does not require security functional entities, however at deployment the logical and physical separation requires that at the FE level some consideration has to be made for the existence of relay or proxy functions. R-SP-2 Security mechanisms and other parameters beyond default security mechanisms shall be configurable. This shall be static for NNI interface and may be negotiated for UNI interfaces. The security mechanism negotiation shall have a certain minimum level to be defined by the security domain; e.g. avoid bidding-down attacks. Users shall be able to reject communications that do not conform to their minimum security policy. No R-SP-3 The security mechanisms shall be partitioned such that the functions of authentication, data integrity, replay detection, and confidentiality may be implemented and selected independently of each other, insofar as this makes sense. No R-SP-4 The UE shall always offer encryption algorithms for P-CSCF to be used for the session and the P-CSCF policy shall define whether to use encryption or not. No Note that the detail definition of the UE is considered out of scope of NGN. However for confidentiality functions the configuration protocol should be capable of algorithm selection. R-SP-5 UE and the P CSCF shall negotiate the integrity algorithm that shall be used for the session. Yes KM R-SP-6 The policy of the HN shall be used to decide if an authentication shall take place for the registration of different IMPUs e.g. belonging to same or different service profiles. Yes PEF, AUTH R-SP-7 The security gateway functions (SEGF) shall be responsible for enforcing security policies for the interworking between networks. NOTE: The actual inter-security domain policy is not standardized and is left to the discretion of the roaming agreements of the operators. Yes PEF R-SP-8 SEGFs are responsible for security sensitive operations and shall offer capabilities for secure storage of long-term keys used for IKE authentication. Yes SEGF, AUTH Authentication, Authorization, Access Control and Accountability Requirements R-AA-1 Access to NGN networks, services, and applications shall be provided for authorized users only. Yes PEF, AUTHORF R-AA-2 NGN R1 IMS authentication shall support early deployment scenarios (with support for legacy equipments). No ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 42 Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element R-AA-3 In non-early deployment scenarios, IMS authentication shall be independent from access authentication. No R-AA-4 An ISIM shall be used to access any IMS service, however, exceptions may be allowed for emergency calls and early deployment scenarios. No. Insofar as ISIM is not detectable at the interface between UE and NGN. Note that in the provision phase rather than in the activation phase the role of ISIM is clearer. R-AA-5 ISIM based Authentication between the IMS-subscriber and the network shall comply to the authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services [8]. No R-AA-6 ISIM based Re-authentication of an IMS-subscriber shall comply to the authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services [8]. No R-AA-7 It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular ISIM to access NGN networks and services and it should be possible to revoke a specific ISIM. Yes PEF R-AA-8 NGN relevant ISIM specific information shall be protected against unauthorized access or alteration. No R-AA-9 User authentication may either be hardware-based (for 3GPP UE: ISIM; i.e. proof by possession of a physical token) or be software-based (i.e. proof by knowledge of some secret information). No R-AA-10 User Authentication to the NGN IMS using SIP Digest mechanisms shall be supported as a early deployment scenario. Yes AUTH R-AA-11 Where both Digest and ISIM solutions are deployed by an NGN IMS operator, that operator shall determine the authentication mechanism (SIP Digest or ISIM-based) on a per-user basis. The authentication mechanism shall be enforced according to both the subscription information in the user's service profile and the specific policies of the NGN IMS operator. Yes PEF R-AA-12 Transmitted passwords shall be sufficiently protected; e.g. by encryption or other techniques. Yes CONF, INTF R-AA-13 For the special early deployment scenarios (see note 1), where IMS authentication is linked to access authentication, it shall be possible to gain access to IMS services after an authentication procedure. This authentication provides simultaneous access to the access network and IMS services. NOTE 1: The two special early deployment scenarios are (also referred to as NASS Bundled authentication): (A). IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication (no nomadicity) (B). IMS authentication is linked to access authentication for IP Connectivity (limited nomadicity can be provided). NOTE 2: Access authentication may result in IMS services being tied to the access point (line) or to the current IP Connectivity (device). In the latter case limited nomadicity may be available. No IMS specific authentication is therefore required from the CPE/Terminal to gain access to IMS services. Yes AUTH R-AA-14 The NGN subsystems shall be able to define and enforce policy with respect to validity of user authorization. Yes PEF R-AA-15 Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AS before providing authorization. Yes AUTH, AUTHOR ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 43 Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element R-AA-16 It SHOULD also be possible to support an Authentication Proxy based architecture. NOTE: The purpose of the AP is to separate the authentication procedure and the AS specific application logic to different logical entities. Yes AUTH R-AA-17 Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AP. Yes AUTH R-AA-18 The AP shall decide whether a particular subscriber (i.e. the UE), is authorized to access a particular AS. Yes AUTHOR R-AA-19 If an AP is used, the AS shall only authorize the access request to the requested resource. NOTE: The AS does not need to explicitly authenticate the user. Yes AUTHOR R-AA-20 Mutual authentication should be supported between the UE and the NASS during access network level registration. Yes AUTH R-AA-21 The access network shall be able to authenticate and authorize the access subscriber. Yes AUTH, AUTHOR R-AA-22 Authentication and authorization to the Access Network is controlled by the operator of the Access Network. Yes AUTH, AUTHOR, PEF R-AA-23 The attributes required for authentication of a user by the access network maybe provided by the network operator to whom the user has a NGN IMS subscription. Yes AUTHOR R-AA-24 NASS shall support both the use explicit (e.g. PPP or IEEE 802.1x [45]) and/or implicit line authentication (e.g. MAC address authentication or line authentication) of the users/subscribers. In the case of the implicit access authentication, it shall rely only on an implicit authentication through physical or logic identity on the layer 2 (L2) transport layer. Yes AUTH R-AA-25 In case the CNG is a routing modem and the Customer Premises Network (CPN) is a private IP realm, authentication shall be initiated from the CNG. Yes AUTH, PEF R-AA-26 In case the CNG is a bridge, each UE shall authenticate with the NASS as the IP realm in the CPN is known to the Access Network. Yes AUTH R-AA-27 As the interface between the Application Function (AF) and RACS can be inter-operator, the RACS shall authenticate and authorize the Application Function (AF). Yes AUTH, AUTHOR R-AA-28 A media gateway controller must be able to handle authentication of multiple media gateways, i.e. to maintain multiple security associations with different media gateways. Yes AUTH R-AA-29 Authentication of NGN users and authentication of NGN terminals shall be separate. No R-AA-30 Caller id and location information shall be stored according to the Common European regulatory framework by the EMTEL Service Provider. Caller ID and location information shall be validated by the EMTEL Service Provider. No Identity and Secure Registration Requirements R-IR-1 It shall be possible to implicitly register IMPU(s). The implicitly registered IMPU(s) all belong to the same Service Profile. All the IMPU(s) being implicitly registered shall be delivered by the HSS to the S-CSCF and subsequently to the P-CSCF. The S-CSCF shall regard all implicitly registered IMPU(s) as registered IMPU(s). No R-IR-2 An access identity shall be used for access authentication. This identity may or may not be used for other purposes. No ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 44 Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element R-IR-3 The line ID shall be possible to use for line authentication. No Note that identity and the association of identity to service does not imply an FE but may imply an information element within an information flow. Communications and Data Security Requirements R-CD-1 Confidentiality and integrity of IMS signalling shall be applied in a hop-to-hop fashion. (UE-to-P-CSCF and among other NEs). Yes CONF, INTF R-CD-2 Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to [9]. Yes SEGF(AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) R-CD-3 All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs according to [9]. Yes SEGF(AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) R-CD-4 Security shall be provided within the network domain for the Cx interface. Yes SEGF(AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) R-CD-5 An ISIM based solution for IMS access security (authentication, confidentiality and integrity protection) of signalling to and from the user, shall be supported. Yes AUTH, INT, CONF R-CD-6 Secure link shall be provided between UE and the P-CSCF for protection of the Gm reference point. Yes AUTH, AUTHOR, CONF, INT R-CD-7 In case access authentication is independent from IMS authentication: Solutions for access to the NGN core shall provide for secure transfer of signalling to the NGN core independent of the access technology. Solutions for access to the NGN core shall provide for secure transfer of signalling to the NGN core independent of the presence of intermediate IP networks connecting the NGN access with the NGN core. Solutions for access to the NGN core shall allow for mutual authentication of end user and NGN core. It shall be possible for the terminal to authenticate the user. Yes CONF, INT, AUTH, AUTHOR R-CD-8 In the case where IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication the underlying access technology shall provide protection of NGN signalling and user data. No R-CD-9 ISIM specific information shall be updated in a secure manner. No R-CD-10 It shall be possible to protect sensitive data (such as Presence information and notifications) from attacks (e.g. eavesdropping, tampering, and replay attacks). Yes CONF, INT, AUTH, AUTHOR R-CD-11 The Rq and Gq' reference points shall provide mechanism to assure security of the information exchanged. Yes SEGF(AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) R-CD-12 All data related to configuring the UE through the e3 if shall be protected against loss of confidentiality and against loss of integrity. Yes AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 45 Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element Integrity and Replay Protection Requirements R-CD-13 Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided. Yes INT, AUTH, AUTHOR R-CD-14 It shall be possible to ensure the origin, integrity and freshness of authentication data, particularly of the cipher key. Yes INT, AUTH, AUTHOR R-CD-15 Integrity protection shall be applied between the UE and the P-CSCF for protecting the SIP signalling. Yes INT, AUTH, AUTHOR R-CD-16 Integrity protection between Network Elements (e.g. between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in [9]. Yes SEGF(AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) R-CD-17 Data integrity shall be supported between the UE and the Application Server. Yes INT, AUTH, AUTHOR Confidentiality Requirements R-CD-18 Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption. Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls. Yes CONF R-CD-19 Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should allow a choice in the algorithm to be used. Yes CONF R-CD-20 IMS specific confidentiality protection shall be provided for the SIP signalling between UE and P-CSCF. Yes CONF R-CD-21 Confidentiality protection between Network Functions (e.g. between CSCFs, or between CSCFs and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in [9]. Yes SEGF(AUTH, AUTHOR, KM, CONF, INT, PEF) R-CD-22 It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed by a provider. Yes CONF Privacy Requirements R-P-1 It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis for signalling and management protocols. Yes PEF R-P-2 User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure. Yes PEF R-P-3 It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data. Yes CONF R-P-4 Anonymous communication sessions shall be supported in NGN either in a permanent mode or in a temporary mode communication by call. In this case the originating party identity shall not be presented to the destination party. The network to which the destination party is connected to is responsible to handle this service. Yes PEF R-P-5 NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right (e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous. Yes PEF R-P-6 The Anonymous Communications Rejection (ACR) simulation service shall allow the served user to reject incoming communication from users or subscribers who have restricted the presentation of their originating identity according to the OIR simulation service. Yes PEF ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 46 Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element R-P-7 The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN). Yes PEF, AUTH R-P-8 The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if this is not restricted by the session originator. Yes PEF R-P-9 The privacy aspect of presence information and the need for authorization before providing presence information shall be configurable by the user (i.e. presentity). No R-P-10 A principal of a presentity shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) presence information of the presentity is provided, and a principal of a watcher shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) watcher information of the watcher is provided. Yes PEF, AUTHOR R-P-11 Any services using the presence information shall ensure privacy agreement before releasing presence information. The presence service does not address deployment specific issues (e.g. where agreements are stored or how they are negotiated). It only gives requirements for privacy management. Yes PEF R-P-12 It shall be possible for the sender of the message to request to hide its public ID from the recipient. No R-P-13 Users may select the Identity presented when starting a session or sending a message. It shall be possible to verify this identity and to initiate a session or message in reply. Key Management Requirements R-KM-1 Key management and key distribution between SEGFs shall comply to the Network Domain Security [9]. Yes KM R-KM-2 The UE and the AS shall be able to resume a previously established secure session. Yes KM R-KM-3 The key management mechanism must be able to traverse a NAT/NATP device. Yes KM NAT/Firewall Interworking Requirements R-NF-1 NGN security protocols shall work with commonly-used firewalls and shall work in environments with NAT/NATP. No R-NF-2 Filters to screen the IP packets to restrict/grant access to specific bearer streams shall be supported. Yes PEF R-NF-3 The SEGFs may include filtering policies and firewall functionality not required in [9]. Yes PEF Availability and DoS protection Requirements R-AD-1 Mechanisms shall be provided to mitigate denial-of-service attacks. No R-AD-2 Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service. Yes AUTHOR, PEF R-AD-3 It shall be possible to prevent intruders from restricting the availability of services by logical means. Yes AUTHOR, PEF R-AD-4 Availability of and accuracy of location information shall be provided for the EMTEL services. No R-AD-5 Availability of EMTEL PSAPs shall not be decreased by DoS attacks. EMTEL PSAPs shall be able to reconnect. No Assurance Requirements R-AS-1 The NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and systems. No ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 47 Requirement Reference Statement of Requirement Specific Security Function required ? Security Functional Element R-AS-2 Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol. No Requirements on Strength of Security Mechanisms R-SS-1 The guidelines defined in EG 202 238 [44] shall be followed when defining or selecting cryptographic algorithms in NGN. No ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 48 Annex C (informative): Implementation notes on the IMS Residential Gateway The following use cases describe how a non-ISIM SIP User Agent (UA) can register and establish calls via the SIP B2BUA within an IMS Residential Gateway. The use cases are based on [7]. The different parts are how the UA is connected and how the SIP B2BUA maps the identities and the messages. It must be noted, that the operator must not define any implicit registration sets in HSS, on behalf of those ISIMs that are dedicated to B2BUAs. C.1 B2BUA registration The I-CSCF has been excluded in the use case just for simplification. It is still there in the real use case. 3. REGISTER 2. 401 WWW-Authenticate UA1 UA2 SIP B2BUA ISIM P-CSCF S-CSCF HSS 1. REGISTER Integrity and confidentiality protection 4. REGISTER 5.REGISTER 6. Diameter MAR 7. Diameter MAA 8. 401 WWW-Authenticate 9. 401 WWW-Authenticate 10. REGISTER 11. REGISTER 12. 200 13. 200 14. REGISTER 16. REGISTER 17. REGISTER 18. REGISTER 20. 200 19. 200 15. 401 WWW-Authenticate Figure C.1: IMS Residential Gateway registration message flow ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 49 1) The UA1 registers to the SIP B2BUA with a To header including a local username (bob) that is associated to the subscription for the ISIM. example message: REGISTER To: <sip:bob> 2) The B2BUA optionally challenges the user. The subscriber can for example locally configure if local users should be challenged and the passwords to use for the local users. Example message: 401 WWW-Authenticate Digest 3) The UA1 resends the register message if challenged. The message then contains an Authorization header including the identity (bob) of the challenged user included in the username parameter. Example message: REGISTER Authorization Digest username=bob 4) The B2BUA use the Private User Identity stored in the ISIM as the username. The Contact header contains the IP address (or domain name) of the B2BUA. The selected Public User Identity in the To header is the value in the To header from the UA1 or a mapped name (bob.smith@operator.net) where a local username used by the UA1 is mapped to a Public User Identity. The subscriber can locally configure this mapping. Example message: REGISTER Authorization Digest username=IMPI, Security-Client To:<sip:bob.smith@>operator.net> 5) The P-CSCF sends the request to the S-CSCF after excluding some headers (Proxy-Require and Security-Client) and some header information (e.g. sec-agree from the Require header). Example message: REGISTER Authorization Digest username=IMPI To:<sip:bob.smith@>operator.net> 6) The S-CSCF request authentication vectors from HSS in case the client must be authenticated and there are no authentication vectors. The client must initially be authenticated (indicated e.g. by the lack of a downloaded service profile). Example message: Diameter MAR 7) The HSS then returns one or several authentication vectors. Example message: Diameter MAA 8) The S-CSCF challenges the B2BUA/ISIM with a 401 including RAND and AUTN in case client authentication is necessary. Example message: 401 WWW-Authenticate (RAND, AUTN) 9) The P-CSCF adds some headers to the 401 before sending it to the B2BUA. Example message: 401 WWW-Authenticate (RAND, AUTN) Security-Server 10) The B2BUA calculates a RES and verifies the AUTN if challenged by a 401. The B2BUA then sends a new REGISTER including an Authorization header with the digest where RES has been used as the shared key. Example message: REGISTER Authorization username=IMPI, RES Security-Client, Security-Verify To:<sip:bob.smith@>operator.net> 11) The P-CSCF sends the request to the S-CSCF after excluding some headers (Proxy-Require, Security-Verify and Security-Client) and some header information (e.g. sec-agree from the Require header). The S-CSCF verifies the digest based on RES from the B2BUA with the digest calculated with XRES. This is only necessary if the B2BUA has been challenged. Example message: REGISTER Authorization Username=IMPI, RES To:<sip:bob.smith@>operator.net> 12) The S-CSCF responds with a 200 including Path, Service-Route and P-Associated-URI headers. Example message: 200 Path Service-Route P-Associated-URI ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 50 13) The B2BUA stores the content of the Service-Route and P-Associated-URI headers and then removes the Path, Service-Route and P-Associated-URI headers before sending a 200 to the UA1. Example message: 200 14) The UA2 registers to the SIP B2BUA with a To header including a local username (alice) that is associated to the subscription for the ISIM. Example message: REGISTER To: <sip:alice> 15) The B2BUA optionally challenges the user. Example message: 401 WWW-Authenticate Digest 16) The UA2 resends the register message if challenged. The message then contains an Authorization header including the identity (alice) of the challenged user included in the username parameter. Example message: REGISTER Authorization Digest username=alice 17) The B2BUA use the Private User Identity stored in the ISIM as the username. The selected Public User Identity in the To header is the mapped name (alice.smith@operator.net). Example message: REGISTER Authorization username=IMPI, Security-Client Security-Verify To:<sip:alice.smith@operator.net> 18) The P-CSCF sends the request to the S-CSCF after excluding some headers (Proxy-Require, Security-Verify and Security-Client) and some header information (e.g. sec-agree from the Require header). Example message: REGISTER Authorization: username=IMPI, To: <sip:alice.smith@operator.net> 19) Since the S-CSCF has already authenticated the Private User Identity (there is a service context) there is no need to do it again. The S-CSCF responds with a 200 including Path, Service-Route and P-Associated-URI headers. Example message: 200 Path Service-Route P-Associated-URI 20) The B2BUA stores the content of the Service-Route and P-Associated-URI headers and then removes the Path, Service-Route and P-Associated-URI headers before sending a 200 to the UA1. Example message: 200 ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 51 C.2 B2BUA originating session establishment Integrity and confidentiality protection UA1 SIP B2BUA ISIM P-CSCF S-CSCF 1. INVITE 2. 100 Trying 3. INVITE 4. 100 Trying 5. INVITE 6. 100 Trying 7. INVITE 8. 100 Trying 9. 180 Ringing 10. 200 OK 11. ACK Figure C.2: B2BUA originating session establishment message flow 1) The UA1 sends an INVITE to the B2BUA: Example message: INVITE sip:carl.jones@otheroper.net Contact <sip:192.168.1.2> From: <sip:bob> 2) The B2BUA responds with a 100 Trying. 3) The B2BUA adds some headers to the INVITE message. The From header is converted to the Public User Identity that is equal to the personal identity for the user. The P-Preferred-Identity header contains as well the personal identity. The B2BUA changes the Contact header and sends the INVITE to the P-CSCF. Example message: INVITE sip:carl.jones@otheroper.net Contact <sip:130.1.2.3 :5678> From:<sip:bob.smith@operator.net> 4) The P-CSCF responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying 5) The P-CSCF removes the P-Preferred-Identity and inserts instead a P-Asserted-Identity that contains the content of P-Preferred-Identity if that was authorized from the network point of view. The P-CSCF then sends the INVITE to the S-CSCF. Example message: INVITE sip:carl.jones@otheroper.net Contact <sip: 130.1.2.3 :5678> From:<sip:bob.smith@operator.net> 6) The S-CSCF responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 52 7) The S-CSCF removes the P-Access-Network-Info before the INVITE is sent out from the network. Example message: INVITE sip:carl.jones@otheroper.net Contact <sip: 130.1.2.3 :5678> From:<sip:bob.smith@operator.net> 8) A remote CSCF responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying 9) The other party sends a 180 Ringing Example message: 180 Ringing Record-Route 10) The other party sends a 200 OK Example message: 200 OK Record-Route SDP 11) The UA1 acknowledges the 200 OK with an ACK. Example message: ACK C.3 B2BUA terminating session establishment The I-CSCF and HSS are excluded for simplicity. The I-CSCF is the initial point of contact. Integrity and confidentiality protection UA1 SIP B2BUA ISIM P-CSCF S-CSCF 1. INVITE 2. 100 Trying 3. INVITE 4. 100 Trying 5. INVITE 6. 100 Trying 7. INVITE 8. 100 Trying 9. 180 Ringing 10. ACK Figure C.3: B2BUA terminating session establishment message flow ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 53 1) The remote UA sends an INVITE to the S-CSCF. Example message: INVITE sip:bob.smith@operator.net Contact <sip:132.100.101.102 :7654> From:<sip:carl.jones@otheroperator.net> 2) The S-CSCF responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying 3) The S-CSCF picks the contact address stored at registration and inserts it as the Request-URI. The S-CSCF inserts the original Request-URI is inserted in the P-Called-Party-ID header and sends the INVITE to the P-CSCF. Example message: INVITE sip:130.1.2.3 :5678 Contact <sip:132.100.101.102 :7654> From:<sip:carl.jones@otheroperator.net> 4) The P-CSCF responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying 5) The P-CSCF removes the P-Charging-Vector and sends the INVITE to the B2BUA. Example message: INVITE sip:130.1.2.3 :5678 Contact <sip:132.100.101.102 :7654> From:<sip:carl.jones@otheroperator.net> 6) The B2BUA responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying 7) The B2BUA uses the Request-URI in the received request to find the home user that has previously registered. The Request-URI is replaced with the locally stored contact address. The B2BUA sends the INVITE to the UA1. Example message: INVITE sip:192.168.1.2 Contact <sip:192.168.1.1> From:<sip:carl.jones@otheroperator.net> 8) The UA1 responds with 100 Trying. Example message: 100 Trying 9) The UA1 responds with 180 Trying. Example message: 180 Trying 10) The remote UA sends an ACK to the UA1 via the S-CSCF and P-CSCF. Example message: 180 Ringing ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 54 Annex D (informative): Supplementary information on NASS-IMS bundled authentication D.1 Flow diagram for NASS bundled authentication This clause describes how clients authenticate to NASS and simultaneously also gain service layer authentication using the "single-sign-on" NASS bundled authentication. The sequence diagram is depicted in figure D.1. 1) The UE gets network attachment after the authentication at the NASS level. The CLF in the NASS (network attachment subsystem) holds a binding between the IP address and the location information (contains the Line Identifier), which the user holds per the xDSL connectivity. The selection of the authentication (whether NBA is possible or not) is done at UPSF level on IMS-user basis. 2) As the SIP REGISTER message reaches P-CSCF, the P-CSCF knows whether or not a security association is required at this point, based on: - the SIP signalling; - presence of local policies (such as network interface); - L3/L2 address. During the SIP registration, the P-CSCF locates the CLF based on the UE's IP address or/and based on the information of the access network from which the P-CSCF receives the IP packet (P-CSCF may have several logical/physical interfaces toward different Access Networks). P-CSCF performs a "Location Information Query" towards the CLF over the e2 interface. The key for the query is the IP address used by the UE. 3) The CLF sends the response to the P-CSCF including the location information of the UE. 4) The P-CSCF appends the NASS location information to the SIP REGISTER message and forwards the REGISTER message to I-CSCF and eventually to S-CSCF. 5) S-CSCF queries the UPSF over the Cx interface using MAR request. 6) The UPSF returns a message with the location information of the user identified by the IMPI and IMPU (if NASS Bundling is preferred authentication scheme). 7) S-CSCF finally authenticates by comparing the location info embedded in REGISTER message with location information received from the UPSF. If they match the user is successfully authenticated. 8) The S-CSCF sends SAR message to the UPSF and the UPSF sends SAA message back to the S-CSCF. 9) The S-CSCF sends 200 OK message to the UE. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 55 1. Register Visited Network Home Network P - CSCF 4. Register (P-Access Network-info = dsl- location) UE I -CSCF UPSF 5. UAR 6. UAA S - CSCF 8. MAR 9. MAA (Line-Identifier(s)) 14. OK 12. OK 13. OK CLF 2. CLF Query (IP address) 3. CLF Response (Location Info) Security Association required? Compare Line- Identifier (s) NASS Authentication & Network Attachment 7. Register (P-Access Network-info = dsl- location) User profile check S-CSCF selection 10. SAR 11. SAA Figure D.1: Flow Diagram for NASS Bundled Authentication (see [7]) ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 56 Annex E (informative): Open issues in NGN security The following open issues are identified and remain as for further study: 1) ISIM chaining: Usage of ISIM in terminals connected through other ISIM-enabled entities (e.g. IRG). 2) PES/H.248 security: Investigate the H.248 security in case the NGN R1 assumptions do not apply. 3) Usage/licensing of 3GPP security algorithms in NGN context. 4) How to secure the Ic IF? SEGFs could be one possibility; security functions (e.g. integrated SEGF) as part of the IBCF could be another possibility. The current text is not clear on this. 5) Security aspects of Emergency Telecommunications are not addressed yet in the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 57 Annex F (informative): Bibliography • G. Horn, D. Kröselberg, K. Müller: "Security for IP multimedia services in the 3GPP third generation mobile system", Internet Research: Electronic Networking Applications and Policy, Vol. 13 No.2, 2003, pp. 100-106. • Geir M. Køien et al: "Introduction to Access Security in UMTS", IEEE Wireless Communications Magazine, Feb 2004. • ITU-T Recommendation X.800: "Data Communication Networks: Open Systems Interconnection (OSI); Security, Structure And Applications Security Architecture For Open Systems Interconnection For CCITT Applications"; 1991. • ETSI TS 181 005: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networks (TISPAN); Service and Capabilities; Requirements". • DTR/TISPAN-04002-NGN: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networks (TISPAN); ENUM privacy and security". • 3GPP2: "IMS Security Framework; S.R0086-A_v1.0_040614; 06/2004". • ETSI TS 124 229: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3" (3GPP TS 24.229). • ETSI TR 133 919: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description (3GPP TR 33.919)". ETSI ETSI TS 187 003 V1.7.1 (2008-02) 58 History Document history V1.1.1 March 2006 Publication V1.7.1 February 2008 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document identifies NGN OSS requirements and consolidates and categorizes them. Annex B contains an unstructured list of requirements as identified and extracted from numerous sources. Annex A contains a list of consolidated requirements. These requirements represent a first analysis of the requirements captured in annex B where duplications and overlaps have been removed and complex requirements split into single purpose requirements. Annex A is used as the basis of the requirements categorization in clause 4. Clause 4 structures the requirements into a hierarchy (level 0, 1 or 2 requirements) and categorizes them on how they fulfil the NGN Management Vision. It should be noted that individual requirements may be mapped to more than 1 category, where the requirements impacts several areas. In annex A and clause 4 those requirements that impact the development TISPAN_NGN release 1 are identified.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. [1] ETSI TR 188 004: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Management; OSS vision". [2] ETSI TR 180 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Release 1; Release definition". [3] ITU-T Recommendation M.3050: "Enhanced Telecommunications Operations Map". [4] ETSI TS 132 101: "UMTS; Telecommunication management; Principles and high level requirements". [5] ETSI TS 132 102: "UMTS; Telecommunication management; Architecture". [6] ETSI TS 101 303: "Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks (TIPHON) Release 4; Service Independent Requirements Definition; Service and Network Management Framework; Overview and Introduction".
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: access network: collection of network entities and interfaces that provides the underlying IP transport connectivity between the device and the NGN entities NOTE: An example of an "Access Network" is ADSL. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 7 core network: portion of the delivery system composed of networks, systems equipment and infrastructures, connecting the service providers to the access network NOTE: The core network is independent of the connection technology of the terminal (e.g. radio, WLAN, xDSL, etc.) administrative domain: collection of physical or functional entities under the control of a single administration customer: role that contracts for the services offered by a service provider based on a contractual relationship mobility: ability for the user to communicate and access the same services irrespective of changes of the location or access technology capabilities with or without service continuity nomadism: ability of the user to change his network access point on moving; when changing the network access point, the user's service session is completely stopped and then started again, i.e. there is no session continuity or hand-over possible NOTE: It is assumed that normal usage pattern is that users shutdown their service session before moving to another access point. roaming: ability of users to access services while outside of their subscribed home network, i.e. by using an access point of a visited network NOTE: This is usually supported by a roaming agreement between the respective network operators. service provider: entity that offers services to users involving the use of network resources User Equipment (UE): device allowing a user access to network services
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ALC Automatic Level Control CCV Common Communications Vehicle CMIP Common Management Information Protocol CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture DSL Digital Subscriber Line ebXML e-business XML ENUM Electronic Number (RFC 2916) IAD Integrated Access Devices IETF Internet Engineering Task Force ITU-T International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication sector MCU Media Control Unit MEGACO MEdia GAteway COntrol protocol MGCP Media Gateway Control Protocol MPLS Multi Protocol Label Switching NGN Next Generation Networks NGOSS New Generation Operations Systems and Software OLO Other Licensed Operator OSS Operations Support System PSTN Public Switched Telephone Networks QoS Quality of Service SIP Session Initiated Protocol SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol UE User Equipment UMTS Universal Mobil Telecommunications System WLAN Wireless Local Area Network XML eXtended Mark up Language ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 8
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4 Structured requirements
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In this clause the unstructured requirements contained in annex A are structured as follows: • At the highest level, the requirements are grouped into Business Vision requirements, Customer Centric requirements, Technology requirements, Operational requirements and Regulatory requirements (level 0). • The more general requirements, in the unstructured list, are mapped to the "High level Requirements (level 1)". • The more detailed requirements are listed as "level 2" requirements supporting these "level 1" requirements. The level 0 and level 1 requirements are structured as follows: Level 0 Requirements o Level 1 Requirements To support the Business Vision requirements o Support Value Chains of Multiple Service Providers: Multiple Trading Partners with Complex Value Chains and Business Models o Support for a wide range of services, applications and mechanisms o Support of real time/streaming/non-real time and multimedia services o Enrich product offering with contextual information, e.g. location and presence o Shortened product lifecycle To support the Customer Centric requirements o Access to services at any time, any place, through any chosen access mechanism and terminal (user equipment) o Personalization of services based on access mechanism and terminal (user equipment) o Security of personal information o Unified service characteristics for the same service as perceived by the user o Self Service capabilities allowing to aggregate services form different providers o Simple and straightforward conceptual model of services to be created and presented to customers o Straightforward billing models that are easily related to events and configuration changes that the customer can understand, or has access to, and that form part of the simple service description o Customer data might be spread across multiple networks across the value chain o Single Sign On o Mobility To support the Technology requirements o Multi-media services over packet-based transfer o Independence of service-related functions from underlying transport o Separation of control functions o Broadband capabilities o Interworking with legacy networks via open interfaces o Support of multiple last mile technologies o Convergence of fixed and mobile, TDM and packet-based services o Support a variety of identification schemes o Terminal (user equipment) Management To support the Operational requirements o End-to-end QoS o Subscriber Data Management with consolidation of information across the infrastructure and federation of data across the value chain o Problems to be reported in the context of the simple and straightforward service models o Perfect touch and zero fall-out o Automated Service Creation processes o Management of NGN resources (physical and logical) Regulatory requirements o Emergency communications o Security o Privacy o Lawful interception o Unrestricted access by users to different service providers ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 9
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4.1 Customer Centric requirements
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A15 Management systems shall be capable of supporting customer segmentation in the 10 000's. A25 Products codes shall not be tied 1 to 1 with specific tariffs. Y 4.1.1 Access to services at any time, any place, through any chosen access mechanism and terminal (user equipment) Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A21 Management processes shall support the User Access control and trust Processes. Y A23 Management processes shall support "off-net" presentation by users. A37 management shall provide a processes to support a customer wishing to check their subscription configuration. A72 Customer Hotline. A78 Supporting the availability of management services any place any time to any authorized organization or individual (e.g. access to billing records shall be available 24/7). Y 4.1.2 Personalization of services based on access mechanism and terminal (user equipment) Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A6 Management of Personalization of Services. Y 59 To be able to discover limitations imposed by the terminal (user equipment) that the user has connected. (Analogue phone, IP Phone, PC). Y A60 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical ) of an access segment including the source of configuration data. Y To be able to discover which ingress node applies for a particular endpoint or access segment and where admission control is applied. And how it is configured for that endpoint or access segment. To be able to discover the information source used to configure the above and discover the data it contains. To be able to compare the two. To be able to discover the current loading of ingress/admission elements and of queues. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback entities and equipment? A77 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user services to offer customers the ability to personalize end user services and to create new services from service capabilities (potentially from different service providers). Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 10
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4.1.3 Security of personal information
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A33 Management of the subscription related aspects of the user profile (subscription profile) including ownership of components. Y subscription profile components will be needed for: data related to subscription identification and numbering. E.g. private identity, public identity, registration status; data related to roaming; data related to authentication and ciphering; data related to SPOA selection information; data related to applications and service triggers. A35 Subscription management shall be able to control the ownership of components common to the user profile and the subscription profile. Y A36 Modifications by the subscription management to subscription profile components shall be recorded in an historical log. Y A42 Access to customer information shall only be permitted in an authorized and secure manner. Y 4.1.4 Unified service characteristics for the same service as perceived by the user Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A84 Unified service characteristics for the same service as perceived by the user. Y 4.1.5 Self Service capabilities allowing to aggregate services form different providers Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A77 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user services to offer customers the ability to personalize end user services and to create new services from service capabilities (potentially from different service providers). Y A79 Supporting eBusiness Value Networks based upon concepts of business roles (Customer, Service Provider, Complementor, Intermediary, Supplier (e.g. Equipment Vendor)) (ITU-T Recommendations Y.110 (see Bibliography) and M.3050 [3]). Y 4.1.6 Simple and straightforward conceptual model of services to be created and presented to customers Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A16 Management of User Profile information shall allow distribution amongst networks, OSS, admin domains and end user terminals (user equipment). Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 11 4.1.7 Straightforward billing models that are easily related to events and configuration changes that the customer can understand, or has access to, and that form part of the simple service description Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A24 Support multiple billing models, including billing on behalf of others. Y A69 Bill limitations It can be necessary to protect users from bills of unexpected amounts. Further it may be necessary to protect users from misuse of their accounts, and to protect operators from misuse of services. A83 Supporting the collection of charging data for the network operator regarding the utilization of resources in the network either for later use by billing processes (offline charging) or for near-real time interactions with rating applications (online charging). Y 4.1.8 Customer data might be spread across multiple networks across the value chain Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A16 Management of User Profile information shall allow distribution amongst networks, OSS, admin domains and end user terminals (user equipment). Y A22 Management processes shall support dynamic association of access points with User Profile and Subscription information. Y
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4.1.9 Single Sign On
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A89 Single sign on
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4.1.10 Mobility
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A5 Management of Mobility Y (see note) Only nomadism required for release 1 (i.e. no support for hand-over of communications sessions between access networks). NOTE: There are significant impacts in the security and personalization aspects of the services.
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4.2 Business Vision Requirements
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4.2.1 Support Value Chains of Multiple Service Providers: Multiple Trading Partners with Complex Value Chains and Business Models Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A10 Management of storage distribution of applications and content using Digital Rights. These shall cover access control, user and content owners policy and support for creating accounting records for user by users and content application providers of users and management A24 Support multiple billing models, including billing on behalf of others. Y A26 Value Chain technology Support for varying and changing business models shall be supported. Y A27 For B2B, the use of main stream e-commerce solutions shall be supported. Y A34 control the capabilities that need to be offered to Business to Business (B2B) trading partners, such as value add service providers. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 12 Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A39 Interfaces between trading partners shall meet the commercial and legal standards required for the business to business transactions. Y Focus on Accounting and Billing for R1 A40 Interfaces supporting relationships between organizations shall use mainstream e-commerce technology methods. Y A79 Supporting eBusiness Value Networks based upon concepts of business roles (Customer, Service Provider, Complementor, Intermediary, Supplier (e.g. Equipment Vendor)) (ITU-T Recommendations Y.110 and M.3050 [3]). Y A80 Allowing an enterprise and/or an individual to adopt multiple roles in different value networks and also multiple roles within a specific value network (e.g. one role as a retail Service Provider and another role as a wholesale Service Provider) (ITU-T Recommendation M.3050 [3]). Y
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4.2.2 Support for a wide range of services, applications and mechanisms
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A9 Supporting the management Parlay v 4.0 APIs. A18 Service Detail Records and Product codes need to be managed in the 1 000's. 4.2.3 Support of real time/streaming/non-real time and multimedia services Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A11 Management of end to end VPN solutions. Y A85 Support TISPAN Release 1 Services. Y 4.2.4 Enrich product offering with contextual information, e.g. location and presence Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A6 Management of Personalization of Services. Y A7 Management of Location and context Services. Y
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4.2.5 Shortened product lifecycle
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A20 Management processes shall support and automate Product Lifecycle Management. Y
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4.3 Technology requirements
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4.3.1 Multi-media services over packet-based transfer
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A2 Management of end to end connectivity (Transport). Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 13
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4.3.2 Independence of service-related functions from underlying transport
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A8 Management of NGN Service Layer entities. Y A82 Integrating an abstracted view on Resources (network, computing and application), which is hiding complexity and multiplicity of technologies and domains in the resource layer. Y
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4.3.3 Separation of control functions
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A4 Management of Session Control, Media Control and Bearer Control. Y
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4.3.4 Broadband capabilities
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A85 Support TISPAN Release 1 Services. Y
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4.3.5 Interworking with legacy networks via open interfaces
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A81 Allowing the management of hybrid networks comprising NGN and non-NGN (e.g. PSTN, cable network) resources. Y
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4.3.6 Support of multiple last mile technologies
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A3 Support of multiple access technologies (including, as a minimum, Integrated access devices (IAD), DSL and WLAN access, gigabit Ethernet metro core networks). Y
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4.3.7 Convergence of fixed and mobile, TDM and packet-based services
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A2 Management of end to end connectivity (Transport). Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 14
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4.3.8 Support a variety of identification schemes
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A64 From the unique identifier (E164, ENUM etc.), to be able to trace, where applicable, current: log on name and password; network endpoint IP address and hardware address; terminal (user equipment) IP address and hardware address. And the reverse. To be able to identify the functional entities (e.g. DNS, DHCP, and LDAP Server) responsible for: network log on; issue of IP address; configuration of terminal/soft client e.g. from user profile, for network capability; resolution of called party unique identifier e.g. E164, ENUM to transport address(es). And the physical equipment they are hosted on. To be able to discover current configuration data from those entities. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback equipments and entities. Where a "chain of responsibility" exists, to be able to discover the next in line. A88 Support a variety of identification schemes. FFS
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.3.9 Terminal (user equipment) Management
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A1 Management of User Equipment (including configuration and downloading of applications and QoS). Y
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.4 Operational requirements
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.4.1 End-to-end QoS
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A12 Management of IP QoS across technical sub-domains and between operators. Y Interfaces between operators shall not assume a single end to end technical solution for IP QoS. A13 Support the use of protection mechanisms in the Access, core, metro, backhaul and with OLOs. 4.4.2 Subscriber Data Management with consolidation of information across the infrastructure and federation of data across the value chain Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A38 It shall be possible to replicate and distribute the subscription profile components following rules established and defined by subscription management feature. Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 15 4.4.3 Problems to be reported in the context of the simple and straightforward service models Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A31 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user service improvements including customer self service (e.g. provision of service, reporting faults, online billing reports), SLA Enforcement. Y
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.4.4 Perfect touch and zero fall-out
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A88 Perfect touch and zero fall-out.
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.4.5 Automated Service Creation processes
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A19 Management processes shall support flexible, transport technology agnostic, service creation environments. Y A20 Management processes shall support and automate Product Lifecycle Management. Y A28 The service creation process shall support the creation of (software) components whose services are exposed via contracts. Y A29 The components created by the service creation process shall use a common information model. Y A30 The service creation process shall support a directory (or trading) feature for contracts in order to facilitate the design of software from existing (Off the Shelf) components. Y A31 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user service improvements including customer self service (e.g. provision of service, reporting faults, online billing reports), SLA Enforcement. Y A32 Enable reusability by definition of building blocks, which describe and represent unitary service features or network features. Y
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.4.6 Management of NGN resources (physical and logical)
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A41 To claim to be NGN compliant management interfaces shall be open and use industry standard solutions. Y A55 To be able to discover the current policy decision and policy enforcement points for a given access segment/given customer. Y A56 To be able to validate the current policy enforced within the network domain. Y 57 To be able to discover the policy being enforced in an adjacent service or customer domain. 58 To be able to validate that the policies being enforced in an adjacent service or customer domain are compatible. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 16 Req Requirement Release 1 Comments 59 To be able to discover limitations imposed by the terminal (user equipment) that the user has connected. (Analogue phone, IP Phone, PC). Y A60 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical ) of an access segment including the source of configuration data. Y To be able to discover which ingress node applies for a particular endpoint or access segment and where admission control is applied. And how it is configured for that endpoint or access segment. To be able to discover the information source used to configure the above and discover the data it contains. To be able to compare the two. To be able to discover the current loading of ingress/admission elements and of queues. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback entities and equipment. A61 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical ) of the signalling routing. Y To be able to discover the two way routing of signalling between an endpoint and its call control entity, and identify any intermediate Gateways and Interworking Functions, including which network nodes they are hosted on. To be able to discover the current configuration of "Virtual circuits" e.g. MPLS. To be able to discover the current transport network route topology. To be able to use this information to infer the routing of media streams (both directions) for given endpoints, customers, service types. A62 To be able to discover which egress node applies for specific called and calling party pairs. Y Note that where alternate routings apply there can be more than one possible egress node. To be able to discover the type and configuration of these egress nodes, especially any policy enforcement rules and related measurements. To be able to discover the current loading of egress elements and of their queues. A63 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical ) of the core network. Y To be able to discover which instances of call controller; intermediate gateways/IWF; service quality management entities. currently apply for a particular endpoint or access segment, and which physical equipment they are currently hosted on. To be able to discover configuration data from them related to that endpoint or access segment. More work is needed to list out the key configuration information needed. However, it includes: records of improper call terminations and reason codes; call usage records; quality criteria currently applicable for endpoint, customer, service type. Both measurements and rules; in mobile IP, identification of past and present Foreign Agents and their transport addresses; see also addressing clause. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 17 Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A64 From the unique identifier (E164, ENUM etc.), to be able to trace, where applicable, current: log on name and password; network endpoint IP address and hardware address; terminal (user equipment) IP address and hardware address. And the reverse. Y To be able to identify the functional entities (e.g. DNS, DHCP, and LDAP Server) responsible for: network log on; issue of IP address; configuration of terminal/soft client e.g. from user profile, for network capability; resolution of called party unique identifier e.g. E164, ENUM to transport address(es). And the physical equipment they are hosted on. To be able to discover current configuration data from those entities. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback equipments and entities. Where a "chain of responsibility" exists, to be able to discover the next in line. A65 Fault management functions (including Alarm Surveillance) and associated managed objects shall be applicable to all NGN entities. (see note) Fault Management is outside the scope of NGN OSS Release 1. A66 Under Crisis situations (either network related or external) the NGN shall continue to provide essential management information and accept management controls. Y A67 NGN Management will exploit wherever possible the business and service processes as defined by the ITU-T and TeleManagement Forum (TMF) i.e. ITU-T Recommendation M.3050 [3]. Y A68 NGN Management will exploit wherever possible the management communication protocols and information bases already defined. Y NOTE: Egress means here egress from the service provider/network operators Administrative Domain.
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.5 Regulatory requirements
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.5.1 Emergency communications
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Req Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A14 Support national emergency services and international Emergency Telecommunications Services. 4.5.1
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.5.2 Security
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A5 Management of Mobility. Y (see note) Only nomadism required for release 1 (i.e. no support for hand-over of communications sessions between access networks). A21 Management processes shall support the User Access control and trust Processes. Y A42 Access to customer information shall only be permitted in an authorized and secure manner. Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 18 Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A43 Secure mechanisms shall be available for the transfer of data (e.g. customer data) to, from or between authorized entities and shall be appropriate to the level of confidentiality of the data, the endpoints of the transfer and the routes that are available for the transfer of the data. The owner of the data, normally the body storing the master copy of the data, shall be responsible for applying the appropriate level of security to the transfer of the data. Y A44 Before any transfer takes place, it shall be possible for the sender of the data to verify the identity of the recipient. Y A45 It shall be possible for the recipient of data to identify the sender. Y A46 It is permissible for either the sender or recipient of data to employ the services of a third party, known to, and trusted by, both in order to provide authentication of identity. Y A47 The validity of an authentication of identity shall, if required, be subject to a maximum time limit. Y A48 It shall be possible for the sender of data to render the data to be unreadable by any party not authorized to receive it. Y A49 It shall be possible for the recipient of data to detect whether the sender has made any change to the data subsequent to its transmission. Y A50 The security mechanisms shall provide verification that the data has been sent by the sender and received by the recipient (non-repudiation). Y A51 It shall be possible for the sender and/or the recipient to create an audit log of all data transfer transactions of a specified type, provided that this requirement is made known before any transfer takes place. Y A52 Transaction security for the change of data should be available in order to ensure the consistent change of data at different locations. Y A53 Management features will need to bridge between the NGN security functions and the security used in mainstream e-commerce solutions such as those in ebXML. A70 Secure billing administration. Y A71 Authorization control (e.g. via black lists) to prevent fraud. FFS A73 Support Security related reports to the user. A74 Contractual agreements relating to security issues can be included in the roaming agreement between two operators. A75 Contractual agreements between service providers and subscribers relating to security issues shall be included in the conditions for the subscription. Y A76 A secure subscription process to restrict subscription fraud. Y NOTE: There are significant impacts in the security and personalization aspects of the services.
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.5.3 Privacy
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A17 Processes for distribution and synchronization of User Profile information shall enforce policies set by regulation, applicable data protection laws, users and operators. Y A39 Interfaces between trading partners shall meet the commercial and legal standards required for the business to business transactions. Y Focus on Accounting and Billing for R1 A54 Management shall fulfil local privacy regulations. Y
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.5.4 Lawful interception
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A86 Lawful interception. Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 19
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1cf49c4f9f97334122e3126a02a4f904
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188 003
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4.5.5 Unrestricted access by users to different service providers
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Req Requirement Release 1 Comments A87 Unrestricted access by users to different service providers. Y ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 20 Annex A (normative): Unordered List of Consolidated NGN Management Requirements This annex provides a single unordered list of numbered consolidated requirements. This list is the result of an analysis of the requirements identified in annex B. Column 1 provides a unique requirement number. Column 2 provides a link to the unordered list of requirements in annex B. Column 3 identifies if the requirement is applicable to NGN Release 1 [2]. Column 4 identifies which clause the requirement has been mapped to in clause 4: • 4.1 Customer Centric; • 4.2 Business Vision; • 4.3 Technology Requirements; • 4.4 Operator requirements; • 4.5 Regulatory requirements. Column 5 provides comments and additional information. Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A1 B1 Management of User Equipment (including configuration and downloading of applications and QoS). Y 4.3.9 A2 B2 B3 B5 B6 Management of end to end connectivity (Transport). Y 4.3.7, 4.3.1 A3 B4 Support of multiple access technologies (including, as a minimum, Integrated access devices (IAD), DSL and WLAN access, gigabit Ethernet metro core networks). Y 4.3.6 A4 B7 B8 Management of Session Control, Media Control and Bearer Control. Y 4.3.3 A5 B9 Management of Mobility. Y (see note 1) 4.1.10, 4.5.2 Only nomadism required for release 1 (i.e. no support for hand-over of communications sessions between access networks). A6 B10 Management of Personalization of Services. Y 4.1.2, 4.2.4 A7 B11 Management of Location and context Services. Y 4.2.4 A8 B12 Management of NGN Service Layer entities. Y 4.3.2 A9 B13 Supporting the management Parlay v 4.0 APIs. 4.2.2 A10 B14 Management of storage distribution of applications and content using Digital Rights. 4.2.1 These shall cover access control, user and content owners policy and support for creating accounting records for user by users and content application providers of users and management. A11 B15 Management of end to end VPN solutions. Y 4.2.3 ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 21 Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A12 B16 B17 B91 B92 Management of IP QoS across technical sub-domains and between operators. Y 4.4.1 Interfaces between operators shall not assume a single end to end technical solution for IP QoS. A13 B18 Support the use of protection mechanisms in the Access, core, metro, backhaul and with OLOs. 4.4.1 A14 B19 Support national emergency services and international Emergency Telecommunications Services. 4.5.1 A15 B20 Management systems shall be capable of supporting customer segmentation in the 10 000's. 4.1 A16 B21 B43 B44 B45 Management of User Profile information shall allow distribution amongst networks, OSS, admin domains and end user terminals (user equipment). Y 4.1.6, 4.1.8 A17 B22 Processes for distribution and synchronization of User Profile information shall enforce policies set by regulation, applicable data protection laws, users and operators. Y 4.5.3 A18 B23 Service Detail Records and Product codes need to be managed in the 1 000's. 4.2.2 A19 B25 B33 B40 B41 B102 Management processes shall support flexible, transport technology agnostic, service creation environments. Y 4.4.5 A20 B26 B38 B40 B101 B105 B115 Management processes shall support and automate Product Lifecycle Management. Y 4.2.5, 4.4.5 A21 B27 Management processes shall support the User Access control and trust Processes. Y 4.1.1, 4.5.2 A22 B28 Management processes shall support dynamic association of access points with User Profile and Subscription information. Y 4.1.8 A23 B29 Management processes shall support "off-net" presentation by users. 4.1.1 A24 B30 Support multiple billing models, including billing on behalf of others. Y 4.1.7, 4.2.1 A25 B30 products codes shall not be tied 1 to 1 with specific tariffs. Y 4.1 A26 B31 B94 Value Chain technology Support for varying and changing business models shall be supported. Y 4.2.1 A27 B31 For B2B, the use of main stream e-commerce solutions shall be supported. Y 4.2.1 A28 B33 B34 B35 B36 The service creation process shall support the creation of (software) components whose services are exposed via contracts. Y 4.4.5 A29 Objective 8 The components created by the service creation process shall use a common information model. Y 4.4.5 A30 B37 The service creation process shall support a directory (or trading) feature for contracts in order to facilitate the design of software from existing (Off the Shelf) components. Y 4.4.5 ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 22 Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A31 B39 B104 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user service improvements including customer self service (e.g. provision of service, reporting faults, online billing reports), SLA Enforcement. Y 4.4.3, 4.4.5 A32 B40 Enable reusability by definition of building blocks, which describe and represent unitary service features or network features. Y 4.4.5 A33 B41 B42 B48 B50 B52 Management of the subscription related aspects of the user profile (subscription profile) including ownership of components. Y 4.1.3 Subscription profile components will be needed for: data related to subscription identification and numbering. E.g. private identity, public identity, registration status; data related to roaming; data related to authentication and ciphering; data related to SPOA selection information; data related to applications and service triggers. A34 B46 Control the capabilities that need to be offered to Business to Business (B2B) trading partners, such as value add service providers. 4.2.1 A35 B50 Subscription management shall be able to control the ownership of components common to the user profile and the subscription profile. Y 4.1.3 A36 B54 Modifications by the subscription management to subscription profile components shall be recorded in an historical log. Y 4.1.3 A37 B55 Management shall provide a processes to support a customer wishing to check their subscription configuration. 4.1.1 A38 B57 It shall be possible to replicate and distribute the subscription profile components following rules established and defined by subscription management feature. Y 4.4.2 A39 B58 Interfaces between trading partners shall meet the commercial and legal standards required for the business to business transactions. Y 4.2.1, 4.5.3 Focus on Accounting and Billing for R1. A40 B59 Interfaces supporting relationships between organizations shall use mainstream e-commerce technology methods. Y 4.2.1 A41 B60 To claim to be NGN compliant management interfaces shall be open and use industry standard solutions. Y 4.4.6 A42 B62 B53 B56 B97 Access to customer information shall only be permitted in an authorized and secure manner. Y 4.1.3, 4.5.2 ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 23 Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A43 B63 B97 B61 B97 B106 Secure mechanisms shall be available for the transfer of data (e.g. customer data) to, from or between authorized entities and shall be appropriate to the level of confidentiality of the data, the endpoints of the transfer and the routes that are available for the transfer of the data. The owner of the data, normally the body storing the master copy of the data, shall be responsible for applying the appropriate level of security to the transfer of the data. Y 4.5.2 A44 B64 B97 Before any transfer takes place, it shall be possible for the sender of the data to verify the identity of the recipient. Y 4.5.2 A45 B65 B97 It shall be possible for the recipient of data to identify the sender. Y 4.5.2 A46 B66 B97 It is permissible for either the sender or recipient of data to employ the services of a third party, known to, and trusted by, both in order to provide authentication of identity. Y 4.5.2 A47 B67 B97 The validity of an authentication of identity shall, if required, be subject to a maximum time limit. Y 4.5.2 A48 B68 B97 It shall be possible for the sender of data to render the data to be unreadable by any party not authorized to receive it. Y 4.5.2 A49 B69 B97 It shall be possible for the recipient of data to detect whether the sender has made any change to the data subsequent to its transmission. Y 4.5.2 A50 B70 B97 The security mechanisms shall provide verification that the data has been sent by the sender and received by the recipient (non-repudiation). Y 4.5.2 A51 B71 B97 It shall be possible for the sender and/or the recipient to create an audit log of all data transfer transactions of a specified type, provided that this requirement is made known before any transfer takes place. Y 4.5.2 A52 B72 B97 Transaction security for the change of data should be available in order to ensure the consistent change of data at different locations. Y 4.5.2 A53 B73 B97 Management features will need to bridge between the NGN security functions and the security used in mainstream e-commerce solutions such as those in ebXML. 4.5.2 A54 B74 Management shall fulfil local privacy regulations. Y 4.5.3 A55 B76 To be able to discover the current policy decision and policy enforcement points for a given access segment/given customer. Y 4.4.6 A56 B77 To be able to validate the current policy enforced within the network domain. Y 4.4.6 A57 B78 B80 To be able to discover the policy being enforced in an adjacent service or customer domain. 4.4.6 A58 B79 B82 To be able to validate that the policies being enforced in an adjacent service or customer domain are compatible. 4.4.6 ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 24 Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A59 B81 To be able to discover limitations imposed by the terminal (user equipment) that the user has connected. (Analogue phone, IP Phone, PC). Y 4.1.2, 4.4.6 A60 B83 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical) of an access segment including the source of configuration data. Y 4.1.2, 4.4.6 To be able to discover which ingress node applies for a particular endpoint or access segment and where admission control is applied. And how it is configured for that endpoint or access segment. To be able to discover the information source used to configure the above and discover the data it contains. To be able to compare the two. To be able to discover the current loading of ingress/admission elements and of queues. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback entities and equipment. A61 B84 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical) of the signalling routing. Y 4.4.6 To be able to discover the two way routing of signalling between an endpoint and its call control entity, and identify any intermediate Gateways and Interworking Functions, including which network nodes they are hosted on. To be able to discover the current configuration of "Virtual circuits" e.g. MPLS. To be able to discover the current transport network route topology. To be able to use this information to infer the routing of media streams (both directions) for given endpoints, customers, service types. A62 B85 To be able to discover which egress node applies for specific called and calling party pairs. Y 4.4.6 Note that where alternate routings apply there can be more than one possible egress node. To be able to discover the type and configuration of these egress nodes, especially any policy enforcement rules and related measurements. To be able to discover the current loading of egress elements and of their queues (see note 2). ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 25 Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A63 B86 Discovery of the configuration (physical and logical) of the core network. Y 4.4.6 To be able to discover which instances of call controller; intermediate gateways/IWF; service quality management entities. currently apply for a particular endpoint or access segment, and which physical equipment they are currently hosted on. To be able to discover configuration data from them related to that endpoint or access segment. More work is needed to list out the key configuration information needed. However, it includes: records of improper call terminations and reason codes; call usage records; quality criteria currently applicable for endpoint, customer, service type. Both measurements and rules; in mobile IP, identification of past and present Foreign Agents and their transport addresses; see also addressing clause. A64 B87 B75 From the unique identifier (E164, ENUM etc.), to be able to trace, where applicable, current: log on name and password; network endpoint IP address and hardware address; terminal (user equipment) IP address and hardware address. And the reverse. Y 4.4.6 To be able to identify the functional entities (e.g. DNS, DHCP, and LDAP Server) responsible for: network log on; issue of IP address; configuration of terminal/soft client e.g. from user profile, for network capability; resolution of called party unique identifier e.g. E164, ENUM to transport address(es). And the physical equipment they are hosted on. To be able to discover current configuration data from those entities. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback equipments and entities. Where a "chain of responsibility" exists, to be able to discover the next in line. A65 B88 B93 Fault management functions (including Alarm Surveillance) and associated managed objects shall be applicable to all NGN entities. 4.4.6 Fault Management is outside the scope of NGN OSS Release 1. A66 B89 Under Crisis situations (either network related or external) the NGN shall continue to provide essential management information and accept management controls. Y 4.4.6 A67 B90 NGN Management will exploit wherever possible the business and service processes as defined by the ITU-T and TeleManagement Forum (TMF) i.e. ITU-T Recommendation M.3050 [3]. Y 4.4.6 A68 B90 NGN Management will exploit wherever possible the management communication protocols and information bases already defined. Y 4.4.6 ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 26 Req Annex B Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph Comments A69 94bis Bill limitations It can be necessary to protect users from bills of unexpected amounts. Further it may be necessary to protect users from misuse of their accounts, and to protect operators from misuse of services. 4.1.7 A70 B95 Secure billing administration. Y 4.5.2 A71 95bis Authorization control (e.g. via black lists) to prevent fraud. FFS 4.5.2 A72 96 Customer Hotline. 4.1.1 A73 B96bis Support Security related reports to the user. 4.5.2 A74 B98 Contractual agreements relating to security issues can be included in the roaming agreement between two operators. 4.2.2 A75 B99 Contractual agreements between service providers and subscribers relating to security issues shall be included in the conditions for the subscription. Y 4.5.2 A76 B100 A secure subscription process to restrict subscription fraud. Y 4.5.2 A80 B109 Allowing an enterprise and/or an individual to adopt multiple roles in different value networks and also multiple roles within a specific value network (e.g. one role as a retail Service Provider and another role as a wholesale Service Provider) (ITU-T Recommendation M.3050 [3]). Y 4.2.1 A81 B111 Allowing the management of hybrid networks comprising NGN and non-NGN (e.g. PSTN, cable network) resources. Y A82 B112 Integrating an abstracted view on Resources (network, computing and application), which is hiding complexity and multiplicity of technologies and domains in the resource layer. Y 4.3.2 A83 B113 Supporting the collection of charging data for the network operator regarding the utilization of resources in the network either for later use by billing processes (offline charging) or for near-real time interactions with rating applications (online charging). Y 4.1.7 A84 B114 Unified service characteristics for the same service as perceived by the user. Y 4.4 A85 B117 Support TISPAN Release 1 Services. Y 4.2.3 4.3.4 A86 B119 Lawful interception. Y 4.5.4 A87 B120 Unrestricted access by users to different service providers. Y 4.5.6 A88 B121 Support a variety of identification schemes. FFS 4.3.8 A88 B118 Perfect touch and zero fall-out. 4.4.4 A89 B116 Single sign on. 4.1.9 NOTE 1: There are significant impacts in the security and personalization aspects of the services. NOTE 2: Egress means here egress from the service provider/network operators Administrative Domain. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 27 Annex B (informative): List of NGN Management Requirements before consolidation This annex provides an unordered list of numbered requirements and identifies the source of the requirement. New requirements will be added to the end of the list and allocated a new number as they are agreed. B.1 Requirements derived from the NGN Management OSS Vision The following requirements are derived from TR 188 004: OSS NGN Vision [1]. Req#r Requirement B1 Terminal Management Interfaces. Standardized processes and NML-EML interfaces shall be defined for the management of terminals and the configuration and downloading of applications to NGN terminals. These shall cover the requirements of configuration and assurance processes including QoS. B2 Connectivity management. Standardized processes and NML-EML interfaces (Q3 equiv) shall be defined for the management of end to end connectivity paths. B3 Connectivity management. Standardized processes and NML-EML interfaces for connectivity management shall be supported either by management or control plane (signalling control management). B4 Connectivity management. Shall cover as a minimum, Integrated Access Devices (IAD), DSL and WLAN access, gigabit Ethernet metro core networks using DiffServ and MPLS. B5 Connectivity management to OLO networks. Standardized processes and OSS-OSS interfaces (X interface equiv.) shall be defined for the Strategy Infrastructure and Product (SIP-eTOM) groups and the Operations Group of the eTOM. B6 Connectivity management IPv6. Standardized processes and NML-EML interfaces shall be defined for management of IPV6 transport. B7 Signalling management Standardized processes and NML-EML interfaces shall be defined for management of IP Signalling mechanisms including, DIFFSERV, MPLS, BGP4+, OSPF, Note this list needs to be qualified with RFC numbers and it is likely that IETF MIBs and TMF IPNM specs will partially cover this requirement. B8 Traffic management: Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for management of Signalling in A multi-service IP network carried voice and multimedia services. B9 Mobility: Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for management of Mobility services. These shall be aligned with standards deployed in 2G 2.5G and emerging 3G services. Note there are significant impacts in the security and personalization aspects of the services. B10 Intelligence personalization Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for management of Personalization service (I.e. 3GPP VHE and HSS). B11 Intelligence location/ context Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for management of Location and context service. B12 Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for management of Voice and multimedia using SIP Servers and media gateways. B13 Intelligence Parlay Standardized processes SML-NML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for supporting the management Parlay v 4.0 APIs. B14 Intelligence Contents Standardized processes SML-NML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for management of storage distribution of applications and content using Digital Rights These shall cover access control, user and content owners policy and support for creating accounting records for user by users and content application providers of users and management. B15 Intelligence VPN Standardized processes SML-NML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for supporting the management of end to end VPN solutions. B16 QoS Standardized processes and NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall be defined for supporting the management of IP QoS across technical sub-domains and between operators. B17 QoS Standardized processes and OSS-OSS interfaces between operators shall not assume a single end to end technical solution for IP QoS signalling. Assumption shall be restricted to technical capabilities that are required at the interconnect points. B18 Availability backup Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces between operators shall support the use of protection mechanisms in the Access, core, metro, backhaul and with OLOs. B19 Availability emergency services Standardized processes NML-EML and OSS-OSS interfaces between operators shall support the ITU Emergency Telecommunications Service. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 28 Req#r Requirement B20 Service and Network Management systems shall be capable of supporting customer segmentation in the 10 000's. B21 Management of User Profile information shall allow distribution amongst networks, OSS and end user terminals. B22 Processes for distribution and synchronization of User Profile information shall enforce policies set by regulation, applicable data protection laws, users and operators. B23 Service Detail Records and Product codes need to be managed in the 1 000's. B24 <Duplicate> B25 Management processes shall support service creation environments. B26 Management processes shall support and automate Product Lifecycle Management integrated in to OSS for Fulfilment Assurance and Billing. B27 Management processes shall support the configuration and operations of User Access control and trust Processes that work access multiple access technologies. B28 Management processes shall support dynamic association of access points with User Profile and Subscription information. B29 Management processes shall support "off-net" presentation by users. User profile and subscription information shall be dynamically associated with access points. B30 Tariffs for products shall be set by a combination of the products, the User/Customer and the subscription tariff plan. Product codes should not assume a single user independent tariff and products codes shall not be tied 1 to 1 with specific tariffs. B31 Value Chain technology Support for varying and changing business models shall be supported. Use of main stream e-commerce solutions shall be supported. B32 revenue sharing Billing processes, NML and OSS-OSS interfaces shall support models. Support for Billing on Behalf of Others Sponsorship models free trials discount certificates - transferable, advertising and competitions. B.2 Requirements to Support Service Creation The following requirements are derived from contributions submitted to ETSI TISPAN WG8. Req#r Requirement B33 The service creation process shall support the creation of (software) components independent of the underlying CCV technology, i.e., a given service shall be able to work on any given CCV that meets the TM Forum NGOSS requirements. B34 The service creation process shall support the creation of components whose services are exposed via contracts. Each contract definition shall have clearly stated pre-conditions and post-conditions, and a summary of the service provided by the contract. Objective 1 The contract descriptions shall follow the structure stated in TMF 053B, NGOSS Architecture Technology Neutral Specification - Contract Description: Business and System Views. B35 Software components shall be designed to allow for the external orchestration of contracts in support of various business processes. B36 For a given set of software components, it should be possible to support different business processes by using various subsets of the offered contracts in a specific flow with appropriate parameter settings. B37 The service creation process shall support a directory (or trading) feature for contracts in order to facilitate the design of software from existing (Off the Shelf) components. Objective 2 The components created by the service creation process shall use a common information model. [Note: This may be difficult if COTS software is to be used, since it is hard if not impossible to legislate a common information model. The TM Forum SID model would be a good choice if one could legislate a common information model.] Objective 3 With suitable adaptation, the service creation process shall support the incorporation non-compliant software entities, where non-compliant refers to software entities that do not support all of the requirement listed previously. This could be accomplished by adding a contract adaptation layer over the native interfaces offered by the legacy software entities. Of course, the possibility of upgrading legacy software may not always be practical in terms of time and cost. B38 The service creation environment must be sufficiently flexible, ubiquitous, and cost-effective to enable a service provider to define, fulfil, assure, and bill a new service without going through the operations support system (OSS) development cycle. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 29 Req#r Requirement B39 The operational requirements for the service creation architecture include the following: Customer self-servicing and other customer care functions for higher-level services. Ordering Interface and associated business process. Support for activation and validation of the service needs to be automatic, using methods such as rule engines that can realize the actual deployment and management of a service instance from the abstract service description. The service creation process needs to enable flows from servers to the billing SMS. SLA Enforcement. B40 A well-designed Service Model is the basis for effective, flexible service creation. A service model provides multiple benefits such as: Enable innovation in new services, without incurring the full development cycle for operations support functionality. Abstract from network technology, where possible, which enables new services to be created without undue dependency on network technology details. Enable reusability by definition of building blocks, which describe and represent unitary service features or network features. New services can be designed by aggregation of existing blocks and/or creation of new ones. B41 A service model should facilitate all of the following: Achieve rapid, cost effective OSS support as new services are introduced, by efficiently mechanizing the realization of the service model. The service creation model defines services in terms of process needs and information flows. This definition provides rule-based sequencing of the actions related to fulfilment, assurance, and billing Specify and track the dependencies of services on underlying network and service components. Measure and quantify customer satisfaction in terms of the services they receive. Manage a large number of new services and SLAs (internal/external). Be a scalable approach in terms of network impact and operations impact. NOTE 1: In any event, some form of standard contract definition should be used. TMF 053B seems to be a reasonable choice. NOTE 2: This may be difficult if COTS software is to be used, since it is hard if not impossible to legislate a common information model. The TM Forum SID model would be a good choice if one could legislate a common information model. B.3 Requirements derived from TIPHON Management TR The following requirements are derived from TS 132 101 [4], TS 132 102 [5] and TR 101 303 [6]. Req#r Requirement B42 Subscription management shall provide the management of the subscription related aspects of the user profile (subscription profile). B43 Subscription management shall support the replication and distribution of subscriber profile components (fragments of the user profile) across administrative, network and systems domains. B44 Subscription management shall control of the synchronization and distribution of user profile components across administrative, network and systems domains. B45 Subscription management shall control the capabilities required by the customer care operations for the control and modification of user profile information. B46 Subscription management shall control the capabilities that need to be offered to Business to Business (B2B) trading partners, such as value add service providers. B47 The primary area where subscription profile components are stored is in the home network in the home network registration function. This function will be used by the network for distribution and replication of this data in other entities. B48 Subscription management shall allow for the creating, reading, updating and deleting of subscription profile data in the home network registration function. B49 Subscription management shall support the data structures and organization described in UMTS user profiles/service profiles. B50 Subscription management shall be able to control the ownership of components common to the user profile and the subscription profile. B51 Subscription management shall manage subscription profile components within the home network. B52 Subscription profile components will be needed for: data related to subscription identification and numbering. E.g. private identity, public identity, registration status; data related to roaming; data related to authentication and ciphering; data related to SPOA selection information; data related to applications and service triggers. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 30 Req#r Requirement B53 Requirements on Authentication: - subscription management shall be able to create, read, modify and delete data about a user in an authentication system. B54 Modifications by the subscription management to subscription profile components shall be recorded in an historical log. B55 Subscription management shall provide a process to support a subscriber wishing to check their subscription configuration. B56 Authentication of a subscriber shall be provided to prevent anyone other than the subscriber or an authorized person from gaining access to their subscription profile. B57 It shall be possible to replicate and distribute the subscription profile components following rules established and defined by subscription management feature. B58 Interfaces between trading partners shall meet the commercial and legal standards required for the business to business transactions. B59 Interfaces supporting relationships between organizations shall use mainstream e-commerce technology methods. B60 To claim to be NGN compliant management interfaces between Subscription management components within an organization shall be open and use industry standard solutions (e.g. CORBA, CMIP, XML, OSSJ, or SNMP). B61 Secure mechanisms shall be available for the transfer of subscription profile components to, from or between authorized entities. B62 Access to customer information shall only be permitted in an authorized and secure manner. B63 The secure mechanisms to be applied shall be appropriate to the level of confidentiality of the data, the endpoints of the transfer and the routes that are available for the transfer of the data. The owner of the data, normally the body storing the master copy of the data, shall be responsible for applying the appropriate level of security to the transfer of the data. B64 A Before any transfer takes place, it shall be possible for the sender of the data to verify the identity of the recipient. B65 B It shall be possible for the recipient of data to identify the sender. B66 C It is permissible for either the sender or recipient of data to employ the services of a third party, known to, and trusted by, both in order to provide authentication of identity. B67 D The validity of an authentication of identity shall, if required, be subject to a maximum time limit. B68 E It shall be possible for the sender of data to render the data to be unreadable by any party not authorized to receive it. B69 F It shall be possible for the recipient of data to detect whether the sender has made any change to the data subsequent to its transmission. B70 G The security mechanisms shall provide verification that the data has been sent by the sender and received by the recipient (non-repudiation). B71 H It shall be possible for the sender and/or the recipient to create an audit log of all data transfer transactions of a specified type, provided that this requirement is made known before any transfer takes place. B72 I Transaction security for the change of data should be available in order to ensure the consistent change of data at different locations. B73 Management features will need to bridge between the NGN security functions and the security used in mainstream e-commerce solutions such as those in ebXML. B74 Management shall fulfil local privacy regulations. B75 To be able to discover from the E164 number the network endpoint and access segment that currently services the customer. B76 To be able to discover the current policy decision and policy enforcement points for a given access segment/given customer. B77 To be able to validate the current policy enforced within the network domain. B78 To be able to discover the policy being enforced in an adjacent service domain. B79 To be able to validate that the two are compatible. B80 To be able to discover policy being enforced in the customer owned network. B81 To be able to discover limitations imposed by the terminal that the user has connected. (Analogue phone, IP Phone, PC). B82 To be able to validate that this and own network policy are compatible. B83 Admission: To be able to discover which ingress node applies for a particular endpoint or access segment and where admission control is applied. And how it is configured for that endpoint or access segment. To be able to discover the information source used to configure the above and discover the data it contains. To be able to compare the two. To be able to discover the current loading of ingress/admission elements and of queues. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback entities and equipment. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 31 Req#r Requirement B84 Transport And routing: To be able to discover the two way routing of signalling between an endpoint and its call control entity, and identify any intermediate Gateways and Interworking Functions, including which network nodes they are hosted on. To be able to discover the current configuration of "Virtual circuits" e.g. MPLS. To be able to discover the current transport network route topology. To be able to use this information to infer the routing of media streams (both directions) for given endpoints, customers, service types. B85 Egress To be able to discover which egress node applies for specific called and calling party pairs. Note that where alternate routings apply there can be more than one possible egress node. To be able to discover the type and configuration of these egress nodes, especially any policy enforcement rules and related measurements. To be able to discover the current loading of egress elements and of their queues. B86 Service control To be able to discover which instances of call controller; intermediate gateways/IWF; service quality management entities. currently apply for a particular endpoint or access segment, and which physical equipment they are currently hosted on. To be able to discover configuration data from them related to that endpoint or access segment. More work is needed to list out the key configuration information needed. However, it includes: records of improper call terminations and reason codes; call usage records; quality criteria currently applicable for endpoint, customer, service type. Both measurements and rules; in mobile IP, identification of past and present Foreign Agents and their transport addresses; see also addressing clause. B87 From the unique identifier (E164, ENUM etc.), to be able to trace, where applicable, current: log on name and password; network endpoint IP address and hardware address; terminal IP address and hardware address. And the reverse. To be able to identify the functional entities (e.g. DNS, DHCP, and LDAP Server) responsible for: network log on; issue of IP address; configuration of terminal/soft client e.g. from user profile, for network capability; resolution of called party unique identifier e.g. E164, ENUM to transport address(es). And the physical equipment they are hosted on. To be able to discover current configuration data from those entities. Where appropriate, to be able to discover alternate/fallback equipments and entities. Where a "chain of responsibility" exists, to be able to discover the next in line. Fault management B88 Fault management Fault management functions and associated managed objects shall be applicable to all NGN entities (gateways with various PSTN interfaces, call control entities - gatekeepers, media gateway controllers or call agents, MCU, terminals - IP telephones, residential gateways, etc.). In order to meet this requirement, the work should primarily be based on the functional entities of the IP telephony plane Management functions shall be independent of signalling protocols (IETF SIP/MGCP/MEGACO, ITU-T Recommendation H.323/H.248, etc.). This implies a common terminology to reference class members and potential some mapping work (for e.g., when logging events on a particular call, the call identifier parameter should be mapped to its equivalent parameters in all sig protocol: SIP Call-ID general-header field, H.225.0 CallIdentifier, MGCP CallId, etc.). In its first release, information models and TIPHON network management specifications shall be implementable with currently available management protocols. For each management function, the level of requirement must be clearly stated for each TIPHON release; we will define a set of mandatory/optional alarm events and even log attributes for each TIPHON network entities and for each TIPHON releases (alarm perceived severity, alarm status, probable cause, alarm thresholds, etc.). Alarm Severity Assignment profiles should be included. The states of managed objects shall follow the general definitions of X.731 (operational state: disabled | enabled; administrative state: locked | shutting down | unlocked; usage state: idle | active | busy). B89 Under Crisis situations (either network related or external) the NGN shall continue to provide essential management information and accept management controls. B90 the TNM will exploit wherever possible: the business and service processes as defined by the TeleManagement Forum (TMF); the management communication protocols and information bases already defined by IETF and ITU-T. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 32 Req#r Requirement B91 In order to deliver the intended end-to-end speech transmission quality in NGN systems, transmission planning should be performed during the design phase of NGN related equipment. It is not sufficient to design equipment or networks just along the requirement limits of the respective NGN class. Any variation of transmission parameters should only be judged on the basis of E-model calculations for critical end-to end connections. Any assumption whether or whether not a specific parameter variation will be perceived by the user should always be based on E-model calculations. Special care should be taken with devices which dynamically vary one or more transmission parameters, e.g. Automatic Level Control (ALC) devices; experiences with such devices have shown that they have the potential to impact end-to-end speech transmission quality, severely. B92 After NGN equipment and networks have been designed, planned and rendered operative in compliance with one the NGN QoS classes it might - nevertheless - occur that users complain about too low speech quality. In such cases, it is very important to be able to carry through a diagnosis of end-to-end speech transmission performance. For that it will be needed to keep track of all parameter changes (e.g. of send and receive loudness rating) carried out either automatically or by user interaction. This should be considered already during the design phase of NGN equipment and networks, e.g. by providing tools to set parameters back to default values or by providing a log file function. 92bis Even if a specific NGN system has been operated for some time at the desired level of customer satisfaction it will be required to continuously monitor and check the end-to-end speech transmission quality. Verification will require access to the actual settings of all major transmission parameters - including those which were accessible to the user. B93 Alarm surveillance requirements for NGN Alarm surveillance includes alarm reporting, alarm summary, alarm severity assignment profiles, alarm indication management and log control. The definition of alarm surveillance used in this TD is based on ITU-T Recommendation Q.821. From TR 101 303 [6] alarm surveillance functions are used to monitor NEs about events or conditions: the event data is generated by a NE upon the detection of an abnormal condition. Examples of such events are detection of transmission data errors, the violation of a performance threshold, and the detection of faulty equipment; event data can be reported at the time of occurrence, logged for future access, or both. The purpose of this clause is to identify the requirements for NGN entities in NGN release 3, in particular: The level of requirement for each alarm surveillance functions: alarm reporting, alarm summary, alarm event criteria (severity assign.), alarm indication management, log control; Categories of alarm event types for NGN systems: communications alarm type, quality of service alarm type, Processing error alarm type, Equipment alarm type, Environmental alarm type; Event information: Probable causes (define specific list of causes for NGN NE, perceived severity (define severity assignment profile guidelines for each type of VoIP NE), etc.; Log control: event logging including remote logging requirements. B94 Service Level Interconnection: The agreement for service level interconnection will need to specify (TS 101 878: a common base service application or applications that will be inter-worked; common standardized service capabilities at the service level together with the values of any particular parameters (e.g. a form of profile); any additional common but non-standardized functionality at the service level; a common naming scheme with a co-ordinated system for allocating names to users; a service provider identity that the roaming user will use at registration time; an agreed naming scheme for identifying each network (for routing, it is necessary to determine the home network name from the called user name); the technology (protocols) for implementing the interconnection. together with the relevant quality of service values and the commercial arrangements. Roaming level interconnection: The agreement for roaming level interconnection will need to specify: service capabilities needed for the roaming users along with parameters that may be prescribed or signalled during service usage; a service provider identity that the roaming user will use at registration time; service applications that are to be resolved locally (such as emergency calls); the technology (protocols) for implementing the interconnection. together with the relevant quality of service values and the commercial arrangements. Transport level interconnection: The agreement for transport level interconnection will need to specify: any non-standardized functionality at the transport level that is the subject of innovation; technology (Protocols) e.g. IP or ATM used to implement the inter-domain transport and signalling. together with the relevant quality of service values and the commercial arrangements. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 33 Req#r Requirement B 94bis Bill limitations It can be necessary to protect users from bills of unexpected amounts. Further it may be necessary to protect users from misuse of their accounts, and to protect operators from misuse of services. Different methods, or combinations of methods, are possible to realize this requirement: absolute bill limitation: when a subscriber opens an account, there can be an option to set a credit limit on the account. The total amount of the current bill of the subscriber may be checked at call set-up. A policy can be implemented about the acceptance or not of the call in case of exceeding bill limit. This can limit damage if abuse takes place. bill limitation with respect to time: another possible measure would be to limit the bill with respect to time. Thus, the credit limit may be on a day- by-day basis, on a weekly basis, or provide an overall limit. That means, if e.g. a limit per week is agreed and this limit is exceeded (at call set-up or during a call), the user access would be blocked for the rest of the week. origin and destination limits: another security measure may be for certain accounts (for new or less trustworthy subscribers) to limit the destinations of calls. The limit may be within a given area, within the country, or even only to a specified destination address. Likewise, a limit may be put on the caller's location for outgoing calls. B95 7.8.2 Secure billing administration The billing administration may have to consider security very carefully. Billing data and related personal data can be stored, processed, and transmitted in such a way that user privacy and data integrity are guaranteed. Itemized bills may be a means for the NGN subscriber to check the correctness of the billing. Thus, the billing administration can send to the user an explained bill with the called numbers and split in different part like regional calls, national calls, and international calls. However, to avoid conflicts with privacy requirements, the subscriber can also have the possibility to get only summarized bills. 95bis 7.8.3 Subscriber and terminal management Limiting the access to services by means of subscription restriction or equipment restriction can reduce otherwise unacceptable risks. This can be achieved in a number of ways such as by the use of black lists to identify rogue subscribers or rogue equipment. Service may be denied to subscribers or equipment that appears on such a black list. A white list gives unrestricted access to subscribers and equipment (within any limits set by their service profile). Intermediate variants of these lists may be maintained to track potential bad debt or potential fraud. B96 7.8.4 Customer hotline A customer hotline can be provided by the operator in order to answer users' questions like "My service does not work", "I have received too high a bill". This service may be useful for security reasons in case of theft or loss of terminal or in case of unexpected behaviour of the service of a subscriber where specific procedures should be implemented. In case of theft or loss of terminal, this procedure can be: location of the stolen or lost terminal in order to find it; block incoming and outgoing calls; put the NGN number on a black list; no charging for the subscriber of calls performed after the report of the theft; and de-registration of the terminal after location. B96bis Security related reports to the user Recording and presentation of information about actions performed by users in the system (event reporting) may often function as a supporting security service. (Users' knowledge of this fact may in turn work as a deterrent factor). Announcements must be carefully designed to enlighten users and third parties of the different states of their connection or relation with the operator/service provider. There can be a facility to inform NGN users about actions that affect their privacy and security or the charging. This information can be given on-line by announcements, special dial tones, or short messages. For example, the following information can be given to the users: "BILL LIMITATION EXCEEDED". B97 Secure dialogue between operators Secure dialogues can consist of a mutual authentication procedure, a confidentiality service and a data integrity service on the communication link. It can be provided by: mutual authentication; link encryption; link data integrity; non-repudiation; and key management to support this. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 34 Req#r Requirement B98 Contractual agreements between operators Contractual agreements relating to security issues can be included in the roaming agreement between two operators. When agreeing upon a roaming agreement two operators may define some security conditions. Those conditions can be: frequency of exchange of blacklists; liability of a visited network if it does not take the appropriate measures to stop a fraud; level of security audit guaranteed; follow the rules concerning the use of data an other network can get access to; co-operation in case of fraud; integrity of file transfer; minimum frequency of authentication to be performed for visiting NGN users; and, in case of dispute, one network operator should be able to provide the other network with every information related to billing. B99 Contractual agreements between service providers and subscribers Contractual agreements relating to security issues shall be included in the conditions for the subscription. Security conditions to be agreed and signed by the subscriber could be: to follow the rules (as declared by the NGN service provider and adjoined to the subscription contract) regarding secure handling of his PIN if used to protect terminal; to report to the service provider immediately loss of terminal which might lead to fraud or misuse; to accept limitations of service with regard to agreed levels of credit control/bill limitation; and to accept limitations of service which the service provider later on may find necessary to introduce to protect the service as such against misuse or fraud. B100 Secure subscription process A secure subscription process can restrict subscription fraud. A security policy may be applied to new subscribers in order to be to be confident in the ability and motivation of a subscriber to pay any bills. This may be achieved by authenticated or verified delivery of proofs of identity. It may be possible for subscriptions to be made available on a pre-paid (contract less) basis. It can be possible to inhibit service when the pre-payment is exceeded. The operator may restrict the number of subscriptions per subscriber. NOTE 1: It seems to be necessary to define what is in a "policy" for the purposes of performance/quality management. NOTE 2: Egress means here egress from the service provider/network operators Administrative Domain. B.4 Requirements from NGN Release 1 Docs The following requirements are derived from TR 180 001 [2]. Req#r Requirement B101 Providing the ability to manage, through their complete lifecycle, NGN system components, both physical and logical. This includes resources in the core network (including IMS), access networks, interconnect components and customer networks and their terminals. B102 Providing the ability to manage NGN service components independently from the underlying NGN transport components and enabling organizations offering NGN end user services (potentially from different service providers) to build distinctive service offerings to customers. B103 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user services to offer customers the ability to personalize end user services and to create new services from service capabilities (potentially from different service providers). B104 Providing the management capabilities which will enable organizations offering NGN end user service improvements including customer self service (e.g. provision of service, reporting faults, online billing reports). B105 Developing a management architecture and management services which will enable service providers to reduce the time frame for the design, creation and delivery of new services. B106 Supporting the security of management information, including customer and end user information. B107 Supporting the availability of management services any place any time to any authorized organization or individual (e.g. access to billing records shall be available 24/7). B108 Supporting eBusiness Value Networks based upon concepts of business roles (Customer, Service Provider, Complementor, Intermediary, Supplier (e.g. Equipment Vendor)) (ITU-T Recommendations Y.110 and M.3050 [3]). B109 Allowing an enterprise and/or an individual to adopt multiple roles in different value networks and also multiple roles within a specific value network (e.g. one role as a retail Service Provider and another role as a wholesale Service Provider) (ITU-T Recommendation M.3050 [3]). B110 Supporting B2B processes between organizations providing NGN services and capabilities. B111 Allowing the management of hybrid networks comprising NGN and non-NGN (e.g. PSTN, cable network) resources. ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 35 Req#r Requirement B112 Integrating an abstracted view on Resources (network, computing and application), which is hiding complexity and multiplicity of technologies and domains in the resource layer. B113 Supporting the collection of charging data for the network operator regarding the utilization of resources in the network either for later use by billing processes (offline charging) or for near-real time interactions with rating applications (online charging). B.5 Additional requirements The following requirements are derived from contributions to TISPAN WG8. Req#r Requirement Release 1 Categorized in paragraph) Comments B114 Unified service characteristics for the same service as perceived by the user 4.4 B115 Shortened product lifecycle 4.5 B116 Single sign on 4.9 B117 Support TISPAN Release 1 Services Y 4.2.3 4.3.4 B118 Perfect touch and zero fall-out 4.4.4 B119 Lawful interception 4.5.4 B120 Unrestricted access by users to different service providers 4.5.6 B121 Support a variety of identification schemes FFS 4.3.8 ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 36 Annex C (informative): Bibliography IETF RFC 2916: "E.164 number and DNS". ITU-T Recommendation E.164: "The international public telecommunication numbering plan". ITU-T Recommendation Y.110: "Global Information Infrastructure principles and framework architecture". ITU-T Recommendation H.323: "Packet-based multimedia communications systems". ITU-T Recommendation H.248: "Gateway control protocol". ITU-T Recommendation H.225.0: "Call signalling protocols and media stream packetization for packet-based multimedia communication systems". ITU-T Recommendation X.731: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Systems Management: State management function". ETSI TS 101 878: "Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks (TIPHON) Release 4; Service Capability Definition; Service Capabilities for TIPHON Release 4". ETSI ETSI TS 188 003 V1.1.2 (2006-03) 37 History Document history V1.1.1 September 2005 Publication V1.1.2 March 2006 Publication
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188 002-3
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1 Scope
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The purpose of the SuM Functional Architecture is the design of the NGN OSS Service Interfaces (NOSIs) needed for the management of a specific Subscriber, User, Service Profile and User Services within TISPAN NGN. The SuM Functional Architecture shall deliver the necessary NOSIs for the Resource Provisioning and Service Activation processes. The NOSIs related to Service Configuration & Activation shall be network technology agnostic without any knowledge of the NGN functional entities that are involved. The NOSIs related to Resource Provisioning are responsible of NGN functional entities (including CPE and AS) management and shall hide the complexity of the different NGN functional entities to the NOSIs related to Service Configuration & Activation. The specification of the NOSIs comprises the list of operations they are offering and the associated subscription and user data that are specified in the SuM Information model. The set of NGN FEs expose one or more NOSIs for the management of Subscription Management data. The present document is part of specifications related to subscription management that comprises: • TS 188 002-1 [2]: SuM Requirements. • TS 188 002-2 [3]: SuM Information Model. • TS 188 002-3 (the present document): SuM Functional Architecture. The present document is developed according to the specifications of TISPAN R1, including the NGN OSS Architecture specifications described in TS 188 001 [1]. The SuM Functional Architecture meets the requirements of TS 188 002-1 [2].
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188 002-3
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following cases: - if it is accepted that it will be possible to use all future changes of the referenced document for the purposes of the referring document; - for informative references. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. For online referenced documents, information sufficient to identify and locate the source shall be provided. Preferably, the primary source of the referenced document should be cited, in order to ensure traceability. Furthermore, the reference should, as far as possible, remain valid for the expected life of the document. The reference shall include the method of access to the referenced document and the full network address, with the same punctuation and use of upper case and lower case letters. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. ETSI ETSI TS 188 002-3 V2.0.0 (2008-03) 7
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For non-specific references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. [1] ETSI TS 188 001: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN management; OSS Architecture Release 1". [2] ETSI TS 188 002-1: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Subscription Management; Part 1: Requirements". [3] ETSI TS 188 002-2: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Subscription Management; Part 2: Information Model". [4] ETSI TS 122 240: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Service requirements for 3GPP Generic User Profile (GUP); Stage 1 (3GPP TS 22.240 Release 6)". [5] ETSI TS 123 240: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3GPP Generic User Profile (GUP) requirements; Architecture (Stage 2) (3GPP TS 23.240 Release 6)". [6] ETSI TR 123 941: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3GPP Generic User Profile (GUP); Stage 2; Data Description Method (DDM) (3GPP TR 23.941 Release 6)". [7] ETSI TS 129 240: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3GPP Generic User Profile (GUP); Stage 3; Network (3GPP TS 29.240 Release 6)". [8] ETSI TS 132 171: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Subscription Management (SuM) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements (3GPP TS 32.171)". [9] 3GPP TS 32.172: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Telecommunication management; Subscription Management (SuM) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP): Information Service (IS) (Release 8)". [10] ETSI TS 132 175: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Subscription Management (SuM) Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP): eXtensible Markup Language (XML) definition (3GPP TS 32.175)".
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102966fe8d7c74cf46752c05d8b3d701
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188 002-3
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2.2 Informative references
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[11] ETSI TS 132 101: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Principles and high level requirements (3GPP TS 32.101)". [12] ETSI TS 132 150: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Integration Reference Point (IRP) Concept and definitions (3GPP TS 32.150)". [13] ETSI TS 132 311: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Generic Integration Reference Point (IRP) management; Requirements (3GPP TS 32.311)". [14] ETSI TS 132 312: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Generic Integration Reference Point (IRP) management; Information Service (IS) (3GPP TS 32.312)". [15] ETSI TS 132 317: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Generic Integration Reference Point (IRP) management; SOAP Solution Set (SS) (3GPP TS 32.317)". ETSI ETSI TS 188 002-3 V2.0.0 (2008-03) 8 [16] ETSI TS 132 301: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Notification Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements (3GPP TS 32.301)". [17] ETSI TS 132 302: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Notification Integration Reference Point (IRP): Information Service (IS) (3GPP TS 32.302)". [18] ETSI TS 132 307: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Notification Integration Reference Point (IRP): Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) Solution Set (SS) (3GPP TS 32.307)". [19] ETSI TS 132 661: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM; Requirements (3GPP TS 32.661)". [20] ETSI TS 132 662: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM; Information service (IS) (3GPP TS 32.662)". [21] ETSI TS 132 665: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM Integration Reference Point (IRP): eXtensible Markup Language (XML) definitions (3GPP TS 32.665)". [22] ETSI TS 132 667: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Kernel CM Integration Reference Point (IRP): Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) Solution Set (SS) (3GPP TS 32.667)". [23] ETSI TS 132 601: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Basic CM Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements (3GPP TS 32.601)". [24] ETSI TS 132 602: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Basic CM Integration Reference Point (IRP): Information Service (IS) (3GPP TS 32.602)". [25] ETSI TS 132 607: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Basic CM Integration Reference Point (IRP): SOAP Solution Set (SS) (3GPP TS 32.607)". [26] ETSI TS 132 621: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Generic network resources Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements (3GPP TS 32.621)". [27] ETSI TS 132 622: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Generic network resources Integration Reference Point (IRP): Network Resource Model (NRM) (3GPP TS 32.622)". [28] ETSI TS 132 625: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Configuration Management (CM); Generic network resources Integration Reference Point (IRP): Bulk CM eXtensible Markup Language (XML) file format definition (3GPP TS 32.625)". [29] W3C Recommendation: "XML Path Language (XPath)" Version 1.0, 16 November 1999. ETSI ETSI TS 188 002-3 V2.0.0 (2008-03) 9
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188 002-3
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3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AS Application Server CLF Connectivity session Location and repository Function GUP Generic User Profile IOC Information Object Class IRP Integration Reference Point IS Information Service NASS Network Attachment SubSystem NGN FE NGN Functional Entity NOSI NGN OSS Service Interface OSS Operation Support Systems PDBF Profile Data Base Function RAF Repository Access Function RP Resource Provisioning SCA Service Configuration & Activation SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol SS Solution Set SuM Subscription Management TOM Telecommunication Operation Map UPSF User Profile Server Function WSDL Web Services Description Language XML eXtensible Markup Language
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102966fe8d7c74cf46752c05d8b3d701
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188 002-3
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4 SuM Functional Architecture
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102966fe8d7c74cf46752c05d8b3d701
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188 002-3
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4.1 Overview
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Subscription Management is paramount for the NGN service delivery within TISPAN NGN. It aims to define an end- to-end information model and a functional architecture that allows service providers to provision their NGN functional entities with all the mandatory/optional information specific to a subscriber and its users. Subscription Management can be summarized as the framework that offer service providers means for efficient management of all the data related to a specific subscription. The purposes of specifying a SuM Information Model is to capture all the information needed for the management of a specific subscription. The purpose of the SuM Functional Architecture is the design of the NGN OSS Service Interfaces (NOSIs) needed for the management of subscribers and their users, with respect to the requirements defined in [2], and to the NGN OSS Architecture [1]. Subscription Management aligns with subset of the eTOM fulfilment process, in particular the Customer Relationship Management process, the Service Management & Operations process, and the Resource management and operation process. As depicted in figure 1, the current target of the SuM FA is the specification of: • The NOSIs for the realization of the Service Configuration & Activation (SCA NOSIs). • The NOSIs for the realization of the Resource Provisioning (RP NOSIs). • The NOSIs exposed for the management of data stored within NGN FEs (NGN FE NOSIs). ETSI ETSI TS 188 002-3 V2.0.0 (2008-03) 10 Order Handling Service Configuration & Activation (SCA) Resource Provisioning (RP) NGN Function Entities NOSI Interface Figure 1: Subscription Management NOSI Following concepts are introduced: • SCA Service (SCA): Service which exposes at least one SCA NOSI. • RP Service (RP): Service which exposes at least one RP NOSI. • NGN FE Service (NGN FE MA): Service which exposes at least one NGN FE NOSI. The following figure depicts the Subscription Management Functional Architecture based on the precedent concepts and TISPAN NGN OSS Architecture. Common Communication Vehicle NOSI exposed for the management of data stored in NGN FE RP NOSI SCA NOSI NGN OSS Basic Framework Services NOSIs FE Service FE Service FE Service RP Service RP Service RP Service SCA Service SCA Service SCA Service NGN OSS Basic Framework Services Figure 2: Subscription Management NOSIs ETSI ETSI TS 188 002-3 V2.0.0 (2008-03) 11 The NGN OSS basic framework services NOSIs are the NOSIs in charge of aspects such as distribution, transparency, registration, etc., as described in NGN OSS Architecture. The NGN OSS basic framework services NOSIs are out of the scope of the Subscription Management standards.
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188 002-3
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4.2 Service Configuration and Activation
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For the specification of the SCA NOSIs, it is necessary to list all the required capabilities that need to be supported or offered by the NOSIs with respect to SuM requirements, eTOM and to the use cases defined in [2]. There is no assumption on the relations between the required capabilities and the NOSIs that support them. The SCA NOSIs shall expose the following capabilities: • Manage Subscription by the service provider: consist in all the CRUD operations needed for the management of a specific subscription. • Manage Subscription by the subscriber: consist in all the CRUD operation allowed by the service provider for its subscribers (example: subscribe to new services, etc.). • Manage Users: consist in all the CRUD capabilities needed for the management of a user of a specific subscriber. (example: create new user, assign services to a user, etc.). • Manage User Services: consist in all the capabilities needed for the customization of services by users (example: configure a phone number for the call forwarding service, etc.). In addition to the above capabilities, the SCA NOSI shall expose the subscribe/notify capabilities that allows notifications when subscription information change (example: when a phone number for the call forwarding service is configured by a user, the service provider may be informed for legal interception purposes). The precedent capabilities of the SCA NOSIs represent the fact that theses NOSIs are responsible of the management of Subscriber, Subscription and Users.
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102966fe8d7c74cf46752c05d8b3d701
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188 002-3
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4.3 Resource Provisioning
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This clause consists in a description of all the capabilities required for SuM within the Resource Provisioning process group with respect to the Subscription Management Requirements and to eTOM. For the specification of the RP NOSIs, it is necessary to list all the required capabilities that need to be supported or offered by the NOSIs with respect to eTOM and to the use cases defined in [2]. The RP NOSIs shall expose the following capabilities: • Manage NGN Subscription Management Data: consist in all the CRUD capabilities related to the management of Subscription Management information (services, network access, credentials, etc.) for subscription, users, and user services. The precedent capabilities represent the fact that the RP NOSIs allow the management of the information part of the Subscriber, Subscription and Users which are the Services, Credentials, Network Access, etc.
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