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8.1.4 Signature attribute requirements
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Control objective Ensure that the signature is applied to the right signature attributes and that the attributes are not altered accidentally or maliciously. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 27: The user interface shall allow the signer to view the signature attributes. In particular, the signer shall be able to check the content of the following: a) the signer's certificate, in particular the distinguished name (DN) of the subject and the DN of the issuer; b) the SD data content type (if present); c) the signature policy (if present); and NOTE 1: The signature policy is generally represented in the signature attributes by means of a signature policy identifier and the hash value of the signature policy. d) the commitment type (if present). SCP 28: The SCA shall ensure that the signature attributes presented to the signer are the same as those that will be signed in the signature process. SCP 29: The DA shall ensure that the signature attributes (if any) selected by the signer for signing are the same as those that will be given to the SCA. SCP 30: The user interface should warn the signer if the attribute type allows the presence of any hidden text, macros or active code in the attribute, or of any detected hidden elements. Control objective Ensure that the right certificate is used for creating the signature and no signature is created using an expired certificate. If possible, ensure that the certificate is not revoked at the moment of the signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 22 Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 31: When more than one signing certificate is available to be used by the signer, the DA shall allow the signer to select the certificate to be used for creating the signature. The DA may provide a default selection for the user. If there is only a single choice possible, this step may be omitted. SCP 32: The SCA shall obtain the identifier from the DA needed to use the signature creation data associated with the selected certificate for signing. SCP 33: The user interface shall allow the signer to inspect at least the following components of the certificates selected for inclusion in the DTBS: a) the distinguished name (DN) of the subject; b) the serial number; and c) the DN of the issuer. SCP 34: The SCA shall verify the signing certificate validity period, and if the current time is found outside that period, the SCA shall prevent the signer from using the corresponding signature creation data (SCD). SCP 35: The SCA should verify for the certificates in the certificate chain from the signing certificate up to, but not including, the trust anchor, the validity period, and if the time of signature is found outside that period, the SCA should prevent the signer from using the signature creation data corresponding to this chain. NOTE 2: Due to the direct trust in the trust anchor it is not needed to verify its status. SCP 36: If the SCA has (on-line) access to the revocation information of the certificate, it may verify the revocation status information of the certificates in the certificate chain from the signing certificate up to, but not including, the trust anchor. If the signing certificate is found revoked, it shall prevent the signer from using the corresponding signature creation data. If another certificate of the chain is found revoked, it shall warn the user and the SCA should prevent the signer from using the SCD corresponding to this chain. Control objective Ensure that the correct (reference to) or signing certificate and other attributes are indicated in the signature and that this information is protected against substitution attacks. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 37: The SCA shall protect the reference to or copy of the signing certificate within the signature from undetected replacement after the signature has been created. NOTE 3: This typically is realized by signing this data along with the document and by putting it in e.g. the authenticated attributes section of the signature format. Control objective Ensure that the signature contains all attributes necessary to the purpose of the signature according to the business requirements, if this is not already clear from the context and content of the SD. Ensure that the signer is aware of the purpose of its signature. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 38: The SCA shall ensure that the commitment is appropriately encoded in the signature, if a specific commitment was selected by the DA, the SCA or the user. SCP 39: If a commitment type will be included into the signature, the user interface shall present the commitment type to the user. Control objective The user should be able to know which signature creation policy is used in the signature process. In the case that the business process foresees different signature creation policies to be selected by the signer, ensure that the signer knows which signature creation policies are supported. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 23 Control (Signature Creation Process) SCP 40: When more than one signature creation policy is available the signer may select the policy among available ones. In this case the SVA or DA shall: a) provide to the user the list of possible signatures creation policies; b) inform the user of the content of the signatures creation policies; and c) request the user to select one. SCP 41: If the user does not select a specific policy or if there is no explicit signature creation policy a default signature creation policy may be applied. SCP 42: The signer should be able to request the applied signature policy used. Control objective Ensure that the explicit signature creation policy used for creating the signature and/or signature policy recommended to be used for validation of the signature is conveyed to the relying parties, if this is needed by the business, legal or policy requirements. NOTE 4: An explicit signature policy included into the signature, can be wider than just a signature creation policy, e.g. it can include a signature validation policy or a signature augmentation policy. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 43: If an explicit signature policy is needed by business, legal or policy requirements, the DA shall provide such a signature policy to the SCA. SCP 44: If an explicit signature policy is provided by the DA, the SCA shall include an unambiguous identification of the exact provided policy within the signature. NOTE 5: This can be done using a hash of the policy. SCP 45: If the signer selected a signature creation policy, the DA shall provide it to the SCA with no change.
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8.1.5 Time and sequence
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Control objective Ensure that the signature creation process follows the foreseen sequence of events. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 46: The SCA shall compute the signature only after the signer has given its consent on calculating the signature. SCP 47: If the business process contains the presentation of the DTBS or the SD to the signer, the SCA shall compute the signature only after the DTBS or SD was presented to the signer. NOTE: In the case of bulk signing the signer may not get all the DTBS/SD presented. SCP 48: If the signature creation policy requires the use of one or more signature time-stamps, the SCA shall request a time-stamp token after the signature has been created. If a time-stamp token cannot be acquired within a time-limit specified by the policy the signature creation process shall be aborted.
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8.1.6 Signature invocation requirements
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Control objective Ensure that each signature generated is the result of an explicit signature invocation. The user interface can be part of the SCA and/or of the DA. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 24 Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 49: The user interface shall limit accidental invocation of the signature process by the signer. SCP 50: The SCA shall ensure that the signature is applied with the intent of the signer. SCP 51: If the expression of will is a goal of the signature, prior to initiation of the signature process, the user interface shall request the signer to perform a non-trivial signature invocation interaction with the SCA that is unlikely to occur accidentally. EXAMPLE 1: An example for a non-trivial action is scrolling down to the end of the document to be signed before accepting the signature, and not just selecting "next". SCP 52: The user interface shall convey clear information that a signature is going to be created. SCP 53: The user interface should be able to provide advice and information on all aspects of the signature, e.g. on process and legal status, if such information is available. Control objective Prevent situations where the SCA and SCDev are in the state where the signer's authentication data has been provided and the signer remains inactive for long periods of time, e.g. where the signer has been distracted from signature processing and another unauthorized person might possibly be able to complete the signature process on a modified or substituted SDs and signature. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 54: In the SCA, a limit shall be defined on the idle time the SCA neither interacts with the signer, nor is processing. If this time limit elapses, then the signer shall authenticate again to the SCDev. Control objective Prevent situations where a misguided signer can perform operations in a wrong way so that an attacker can capture confidential data (e.g. a PIN or a password that would lead to signer's impersonation). Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 55: The user interface shall be as straightforward as the application can implement, to prevent the signer from creating security loopholes. EXAMPLE 2: If the dialog is not clear, the user can enter confidential data into fields which are not secured. SCP 56: The user interface shall be cleared of signer's confidential data after a time limit sufficient to perform normal operations. The fields where the confidential data were presented shall be overridden by other "neutral" data, to prevent latent images.
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8.1.7 Cryptographic algorithm choice
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Control objective Ensure that all algorithms involved in calculating any element of the signature are based on algorithms and key lengths that are appropriate for the business requirements. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 57: If the implicit or explicit signature creation policy requires a specific signature creation suite, including the key length, the SCA shall use the specified algorithm. SCP 58: If a signature creation policy is used, the SCA shall check that the policy indicates which cryptographic algorithms can be used. If the policy does not contain such information, the SCA should warn the user of this fact and which algorithm is used. SCP 59: If no signature creation policy is used or the policy does not contain any requirements on the cryptographic algorithms, algorithms and key length corresponding to ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25] should be used. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 25 NOTE: Information on suitable algorithms and the time for which they are considered being secure can be found in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25].
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8.1.8 Signer's authentication requirements
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8.1.8.1 General requirements
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Control objective Ensure that only the legitimate SCDev user can request creation of a digital signature value. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 60: For knowledge based signer authentication, the authentication data (e.g. PIN or password) should withstand practical guessing and brute force attacks. SCP 61: When the signer's authentication data transits through the SCA, the SCA shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the authentication data and shall securely erase it as soon as it is no longer needed (e.g. they are substituted or the signer's enrolment is removed). SCP 62: Where authentication data (like a PIN or a PW) is sent from an external input device (like a PIN pad or a keyboard), then the data transmission between the input device and the SCDev shall be done over a trusted path. SCP 63: If allowed by the SCDev, a function for securely changing knowledge based signer authentication data should be provided. SCP 64: When entering knowledge based authentication data, like a PW or a PIN, the feedback shall not reveal its value. This may be done by providing the feedback of a typed digit or character to the signer by an appropriate symbol or method that does not reveal more than one digit or character at a time and only during a short period of time. This should be done by a feedback that does not reveal the digit or character at all. NOTE: This masking is not needed for entering an OTP, since it is used only once. SCP 65: Neither the SCA nor the signer's authentication component shall prevent the management of PIN/PW by the SCDev. Therefore they shall: a) handle PIN/PW of the maximum length allowed for by the SCDev; and b) not prevent signers to modify their own PIN/PW at will. SCP 66: When changing the PIN/PW, the SCA shall require the presentation of a new PIN/PW twice and check whether both presentations are identical before delivering the new PIN/PW to the SCDev. When possible, the SCA should avoid that the user reuses the last used PWs or PINs. Control objective Ensure that brute force attacks are countered, e.g. the number of retries is protected by a retry counter. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 67: The SCDev shall be configured with a maximum number of allowed consecutive wrong signer's authentication data. SCP 68: When the signer provides the wrong signer's authentication data and the maximum as defined in SCP 67 is not reached, an error response shall be provided to the signer and the signer should be allowed to make a new try. No information on the type of mistake shall be provided to the user. SCP 69: When the signer provides the wrong signer's authentication data and the maximal number of consecutive wrong signer's authentication data, as defined in SCP 67, is reached, the SCDev shall block the signer's authentication method and shall inform the signer. SCP 70: The number of unsuccessful comparisons with the signer's authentication data shall be recorded with a retry counter. The SCDev may also provide a means for resetting the retry counter to its initial value (e.g. by presenting a reset code, also referred as Personal Unblocking Key (PUK)). ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 26 Control objective Make sure that it is not possible to observe the signer's authentication data (for example, PIN/PW or biometric data). Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 71: The user should be informed by the documentation of steps to be taken to keep the signer's authentication data secure, including ensuring that the user is not overlooked by persons or cameras. SCP 72: It shall not be possible to copy the signer's authentication data from the input of the SCA. SCP 73: In the case where the application is used in a public area, the keyboard used to key in the information into the SCA, shall: a) be protected from spying and over the shoulder peering, and b) not emit keying sounds different for each key.
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8.1.8.2 Requirements for biometric authentication methods
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Control objective Ensure that it is made difficult or practically impossible to make an impersonation attack with fakes of the biometric features. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 74: Environment requirements suitable to prevent attacks to biometric devices, such as submission of "fake" biometric elements (silicon fingers, usage of latent images, etc.) shall be in place, if biometric devices are used. Control objective Ensure that replay attacks are countered: if biometric methods based on potentially publicly known data (face, ear shape, or fingerprint) are used, then the signer's authentication data is protected to ensure authenticity, e.g. an attacker can get public biometric features such as face and fingerprint images and derive the signer's authentication data from it in order to misuse the SCDev. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 75: If biometric devices are used, a trusted path, providing integrity, authenticity and confidentiality, shall be provided for the transmission of biometric data between the biometric sensor unit and the SCDev. SCP 76: If biometric devices are used, biometric sensors shall protect the user's biometric identification data from being used in replay attacks. Control objective Ensure that it is made practically impossible at enrolment time to link a person to someone else's biometric template. E.g. malicious code could intercept the data of the person to be enrolled and link it to a biometric data belonging to a different person, to later on export this association that will be used by the impostor to impersonate the authentic user. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 77: If biometric devices are used, biometric data association to the user should not occur outside a trusted path or the SCDev. Control objective Ensure that it is made practically impossible at authentication time to alter the result of the signer's authentication data verification. E.g. an attacker could intercept the reply of the authentication process, in order to either give a false positive response (to authenticate an unauthorized person) or to give negative response (to enact a denial of service attack). Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 78: If biometric devices are used, matching of biometric data should not occur inside the SCA. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 27
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8.1.9 DTBS preparation requirements
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Control objective Ensure that an attacker cannot provide the SCA with forged signature components and prevent the SCA from applying the entire signature components specific to the format chosen to achieve a given purpose. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 79: The SCA shall verify the validity, authenticity and completeness of all the components obtained in order to produce the correct DTBS format selected by the signer. SCP 80: The SCA should use only hash algorithms specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25]. SCP 81: The SCA should use only signature suites specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.25].
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8.1.10 DTBSR preparation
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Control objective Ensure that the data to be signed representation (DTBSR) is correctly composed. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 82: The SCA shall select the signature attributes according to the applicable rules or selected implicit or explicit signature creation policy. SCP 83: The SCA shall produce the correct data to be signed representation (DTBSR) for a signature. SCP 84: The SCA shall compute the DTBSR according to the applicable rules or selected implicit or explicit signature creation policy, by formatting, encoding and hashing of the DTBS. The hashing may be done in the SCDev, the formatting and encoding shall always done by the SCA. SCP 85: The SCA shall maintain the integrity of the DTBS when computing the DTBSR.
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8.1.11 Signature creation device
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Control objective Ensure that the signature creation device used for creating a signature has the right legal and technical level according to the business requirements. NOTE: A possible way to convey this information to the SCA is the signature creation policy. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 86: If the implicit or explicit signature creation policy requires a specific type of signature creation device, and this type can be checked automatically, the SCA shall check that the signature creation device corresponds to the given requirements. EXAMPLE: If a qualified signature creation device is required by the signature creation policy, the SCA can check the related QCStatement (ETSI EN 319 412-5 [i.26]) within the signer certificate. Control objective Ensure that the SCDev is used as intended. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 87: If the documentation of the SCDev contains an operational guide or equivalent information on how to use the device, the usage of the SCDev shall take into account any applicable guidance. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 28
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8.1.12 SCDev/SCA interface (SSI) requirements
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The signature creation device (SCDev)/SCA Interface is responsible for the connection between the SCDev and the SCA. Control objective Ensure that the communication between SCA and SCDev is protected. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 88: The SSI component shall prevent data communicated over the interface to be observed or changed. SCP 89: For the types of SCDev that the SSI component claims to support, the SSI component shall support all items relevant to the physical interface in the specified range or with its specified characteristics to ensure proper operation. SCP 90: The SSI component shall select the correct SCDev functionality, if the platform, on which the SCDev functionality is implemented requires a selection. SCP 91: The SSI component shall select the signing certificate and then the related signature creation data.
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8.1.13 Bulk signing requirements
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Control objective Ensure that a bulk signature process is not less secure than a process where each document would be signed separately. Ensure that no documents are signed that are not intended to be signed by the signer. Controls (Signature Creation Process) SCP 92: When bulk signing is supported, the SCA shall allow the signer to individually display any SD that is part of the bulk signature process. SCP 93: When bulk signing is supported, the SCA shall ensure that a document that was not selected by the signer cannot be part of the bulk signature process. SCP 94: When bulk signing is supported, the SCA should provide a report of a bulk signature process including a list of every SD included in the bulk signing.
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8.2 Signature validation process
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8.2.1 Introduction
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The signature validation process validates a signature against a set of validation constraints. These constraints are expressed in a signature validation policy, be it implicit or explicit, which reflects business, legal and security policy requirements. One or more signature validation policies that are adapted to the business requirements can be defined. A signature validation is always based on an implicit or explicit signature validation policy. It can be defined using: • a description of that policy using a syntax like text, XML or ASN.1; or • a set of configuration parameters. When the signature that is received contains a signature policy identifier the driving application (DA) can use the signature policy to determine which signature validation policy is appropriate, but can also decide that another signature validation policy is more appropriate. When the signature that is received does not contain a signature policy identifier, then the DA provides the signature policy. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 29 A signature validation application (SVA) receives signed data and other input from the DA, validates the signature against a set of validation constraints and outputs a validation report. This report consists of a main validation result accompanied by additional data items, providing the details of the technical validation of each of the tested constraints, in particular when an invalid or an indeterminate result is being returned. The validation can have one of the following results: • TOTAL-PASSED: The signature is considered technically valid; • TOTAL-FAILED: The signature is not to be considered technically valid; • INDETERMINATE: The available information is insufficient to ascertain the signature to be valid or invalid. The report can include additional information (e.g. time of validation, explanations and other information to be displayed) that has been found relevant by the SVA and can be relevant for the driving application (DA) in interpreting the results (see ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8]). Within a validation process, the signature verification consists of checking the cryptographic value of the digital signature value using signature verification data. The conceptual model of signature validation is described in ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8].
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8.2.2 Main functionalities requirements
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Control objective Ensure that the main functionalities of the SVA are well documented. Controls (Signature Validation Process) SVP 1: The SVA documentation shall contain a description of: a) the supported signature/container formats (e.g. CAdES [i.10], XAdES [i.11], PAdES [i.12], ASiC [i.13], etc.); b) the supported signature/container levels for validation as specified in CAdES [i.10], XAdES [i.11], PAdES [i.12], and ASiC [i.13]); and c) any specific restrictions on the supported signatures/containers. EXAMPLE: Examples for such restrictions might be that only attached signatures are supported, or that signatures containing elements from older version of a standard are not supported. SVP 2: The SVA shall be controlled to support the functionalities, as documented in SVP 1.
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8.2.3 Validation process rules
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Control objective A sound process for signature validation is defined and followed. Such a process establishes whether a signature is technically valid against a signature validation policy. Controls (Signature Validation Process) SVP 3: Process rules shall be described in the SVA documentation (at least by reference to a relevant document). They shall define a procedure to validate signatures. This validation procedure should consider the validation of "old" signatures, where certificates may have expired or may have been revoked or even where the usage period of cryptographic algorithms may have been exceeded. SVP 4: The validation procedure described in ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8] or procedures providing the same results should be used. SVP 5: SVA implementation shall be controlled against the signature validation procedures defined as per SVP 3. SVP 6: When the signature validation policy and/or some additional constraints of the DA mandate that some specific elements within the signature need to be present and signed, e.g. a commitment type, then the SVA shall verify that these elements are indeed present and signed. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 30 SVP 7: The SVA documentation shall contain which signature validation policy is used by default, if there is any, and which validation constants can be configured and how.
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8.2.4 Validation policy
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Control objective If the signature that is received contains a signature policy identifier, then the DA can use the signature policy identifier to determine which signature validation policy to use, but can also decide that another signature policy is more appropriate. The selection of the implicit or explicit signature policy used for the validation is up to the DA and depends on the business process and the purpose of the validation. For the verifier, the fact that a signature validation policy different from the one contained in the signature is a useful information. Controls (Signature Validation Process) SVP 8: If the signature contains a policy OID which is different from the policy used by the validation, then the SVA shall provide this information to the DA. SVP 9: If the signature contains a policy OID which is different from the policy used by the validation, then the user should be informed.
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8.2.5 Validation user interface
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Control objective Depending on the business model, the constraints and inputs to the validation process can either be provided by the DA (e.g. a default policy or a policy selected amongst a set of supported policies, according to the context; in this case, the driving application is able to select the signature validation policy to be used and can be allowed to override some of the default parameters) or fully or partly by the user. In the second case, the user interface allows the selection of a signature validation policy by the user. In some cases a validation policy can even be parameterized by the user, in this case the interface allows the user to parameterize the selected validation policy. Controls (Signature Validation Process) SVP 10: According to the legal and business requirements, the SVA shall allow the DA or the user to select a) the SDO to verify and the SD to verify if it is not included in the SDO; b) if the attributes of the SDO do not contain the certificate(s) needed, the certificate(s) to be used for the validation; c) if the SDO contains multiple signatures, the specific signature to be verified; and d) the implicit or explicit signature validation policy to be used amongst the available ones. SVP 11: The SVA may allow the user to provide further inputs for the validation process (i.e. elements to parameterize the validation policy such as the term of preservation, a trust anchor, etc.). This latter option should only be proposed in business contexts where the user has some notions of validation policies. Control objective Ensure that the user interface provides the result of the verification in a clear way to the user, if a user interface is part of the application. Controls (Signature Validation Process) SVP 12: The user interface shall be able to present, upon request from the user, a summary of the validation result to the user in a human readable form and shall be able to provide a validation report as per SVP 22. SVP 13: The user interface shall be able to present the purported signer's identity, including: a) the signer's certificate subject's distinguished name; b) the distinguished name of the issuing CA; and ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 31 c) the distinguished name of the hierarchically superior CAs up to a root that is acceptable for the signature validation policy.
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8.2.6 Validation inputs and outputs
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Control objective Ensure that: • During the validation of a signature, the inputs required by the processing rules, the applicable signature validation policy, validation data (e.g. certificates, CRLs and OCSP responses) and a time-source are present and that all checks required by the verifier's signature validation policy are implemented. • The validation process implemented provides the output status and output data as requested by the DA which presents the validation report. NOTE 1: The output status and the output data can be presented either by the DA or by the SVA. Controls (Signature Validation Process) 1. Inputs SVP 14: The DA shall provide the signature to the SVA. SVP 15: If the signature does not contain the signed document, the DA shall provide the signed document to the SVA. SVP 16: The DA shall provide to the SVA the signature validation policy to be used in the validation process. SVP 17: The SVA shall use in the signature validation process any applicable rules defined in the signature validation policy. SVP 18: The DA or the SVA shall fetch the validation data as necessary using both the rules defined in the signature validation policy in the validation process and the pointers present in already fetched validation data. SVP 19: The SVA shall have a reference time-source available. 2. Outputs SVP 20: The SVA shall provide to the DA: the main validation result (valid, invalid, indeterminate), the time of validation and if requested a validation report. SVP 21: The SVA shall provide further information about the elements of signature validation that pass or fail and additional information relating to the signature validation (certificates, revocation information, and time- stamps). SVP 22: The user interface shall be able to present to the verifier the main validation results. SVP 23: The user interface shall allow the user to learn: a) the signature policy used in the signature validation; NOTE 2: The validation always uses a signature policy, even if it is not explicitly specified by a signature policy identifier. An example of implicit signature policy is the applicable law. b) when an explicit signature policy is used, the content or reference to this signature policy; c) the name of the signer; and d) any known commitment implied by the signature. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 32
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8.3 Signature augmentation process
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8.3.1 Introduction
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Augmenting signatures is the process by which certain material (e.g. time stamps, validation data and even archival-related material) is incorporated to the signatures for making them more resilient to change or for enlarging their longevity. A Signature Augmentation Application (SAA) receives signatures as well as other inputs from a driving application (DA) and augments a received signatures according to a set of constraints and outputs an augmentation report, optionally with an augmented signature. The augmentation report shall indicate one of the three following results based on the signature augmentation policy: successful: the signature has been successfully augmented. augmentation unnecessary: the signature has not been augmented since the input signature is already compliant with the requirements of the signature augmentation policy. EXAMPLE: Implicit or explicit augmentation policy requires signature with time and the signature already contains a signature time-stamp. unsuccessful: the signature could not be successfully augmented. The augmentation report consists of a main augmentation result accompanied by additional data items, in particular when an unsuccessful result is being returned. The format of the augmentation report is out of scope of the present document. A signature augmentation process can be used in addition to a signature creation process, in addition to a signature validation process or independently of any signature creation process or signature validation process. The three cases are further addressed in the next clause.
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8.3.2 The three use cases
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8.3.2.1 Signature augmentation process used by a SCA
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A SCA provides to verifiers at least a Basic Signature as defined in ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8], so that it can be validated against a signature validation policy. However, if the SCA has an on-line access, it can provide more than this minimum format. The SCA can thus apply, in addition to a signature creation policy, a signature augmentation policy. EXAMPLE 1: It can provide, in accordance with a signature augmentation policy, a time-stamp token that will be applied to the signature. This allows to maintain the validity of a signature in case the signing certificate is revoked after the UTC time that is indicated within that time-stamp token. EXAMPLE 2: It can include validation data (e.g. certificates, CRLs or OCSP responses), according to a validation policy, that can avoid a verifier to fetch this data.
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8.3.2.2 Signature augmentation process used by a SVA
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A SVA validates signatures against a signature validation policy and indicates to verifiers whether a signature is valid, invalid or whether its status cannot be determined. However, generally the SVA has an on-line access and thus can augment the received signature with validation data, if this is requested by the verifier and if the signature has been successfully checked as being valid. If it has a connection to a TSA, it can also include a new time-stamp token within the signature. The SVA can thus apply, in addition to a signature validation policy, a signature augmentation policy.
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8.3.2.3 Independent signature augmentation process
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In this case, a Signature Augmentation Application (SAA) is used independently of a SCA or of a SVA and adds to the signature the data elements required by the signature augmentation policy. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 33 This independent process can be useful for signatures that have already been successfully verified and that have been archived. This means that an independent SAA does not need to validate signatures. However, it can check which cryptographic algorithms and hash functions are being used in a signature that is eligible to be augmented as well as the validity of the last applied time-stamp token to determine when the signature needs to be augmented.
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8.3.3 Main functionalities requirements
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Control objective Ensure that the main functionalities of the SVA are well documented. Controls (Signature Augmentation Process) SAP 1: The SAA documentation shall indicate: a) all supported signature/container levels to which it can augment the signature/container; and b) any restrictions that apply on the augmentation. EXAMPLE: Examples for such restrictions are supported hash algorithms, or if augmentation of detached, or parallel signatures are supported. SAP 2: The SAA shall be controlled to support the functionalities, as documented in SAP 1.
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8.3.4 Augmentation procedures
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Control objective Ensure that sound procedures for signature augmentation are defined and followed. Controls (Signature Augmentation Process) SAP 3: The implemented signature augmentation procedures shall be described in the SAA documentation (at least by reference to a relevant document). SAP 4: The augmentation procedures described in ETSI TS 119 102 [i.8] should be used. SAP 5: SAA implementation shall be controlled against the signature augmentation procedures defined as per SAP 3.
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8.3.5 Data inclusion
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Control objective Ensure that the signature contains all the necessary data after the augmentation of the signature. Controls (Signature Augmentation Process) SAP 6: If the signature creation time is required by the chosen level to which the signature is augmented, then the SAA shall capture a time assertion (e.g. time-stamp, time mark or evidence record) as soon as possible after starting the augmentation process to provide a point of time that can be used to compare with the dates of possible events (e.g. key compromise, revocation, expiry). SAP 7: If required by the chosen signature level to which the signature is augmented, information on certificates and their revocation status for the whole certificate path from the signer's certificate up to a trusted CA's certificate, shall be included by the SAA in the signature and, when relevant, protected by a trusted time. When the verification of the certificate path is not possible, the SAA may continue with the cryptographic signature verification and include this information in the result delivered to the DA.
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8.3.6 Validation of the input signature to the augmentation process
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Control objective Ensure that the input signature is validated before augmentation if required by the signature augmentation policy. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 34 Controls (Signature Augmentation Process) SAP 8: If required by the signature augmentation policy, the input signature shall be validated. SAP 9: If the signatures was validated, the augmentation report shall include the validation result.
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9 Development and coding policy requirements
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9.1 Secure development methods and application security
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Control objective Ensure the usage of appropriate (software) development methodology, tools and the implementation of adequate security measures. Controls (Security Development Methods) SDM 1: Use of (software) development methodology. The first set of requirements is related to the use and implementation of a software development methodology. SDM 1.1: A description of the used and implemented software development methodology shall be available. SDM 1.2: The implemented methodology should follow formal processes. EXAMPLE: An example for process assessment for Information technology can be found in ISO/IEC 15504 [i.3]. SDM 1.3: Control procedures should be available and documented. SDM 1.4: The implementation of the methodology should be controlled against existing and documented procedures. SDM 2: Functional and technical specifications: SDM 2.1: The code shall be verified according to its functional and technical specifications. SDM 2.2: Code control procedures shall be available and documented. SDM 2.3: The code implementing the functional and technical specifications shall be controlled against existing and documented procedures. SDM 3: Up to date security fixes in the software development environment shall be used. SDM 4: The security measures for the software development environment should be as in ISO/IEC 27002 [i.6] or based on a detailed risk analysis.
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9.2 Testing conformance requirements
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Control objective Ensure implementations are compliant with the standards they implement. Controls (Testing Conformance requirements) TC 1: If conformance to a standard is stated, then the conformance of the application shall be tested as described in the specifications on conformance testing, if such specifications exist. NOTE: For general overview and requirements on conformance testing and interoperability see ETSI TS 119 104 [i.15]. For the implementation of specific signature formats see the corresponding documents for the implemented formats: ETSI TS 119 124 [i.16] for CAdES, ETSI TS 119 134 [i.17] for XAdES, ETSI TS 119 144 [i.18] for PAdES and ETSI TS 119 164 [i.19] for ASiC. For the conformance testing and interoperability of signature policies see ETSI TS 119 174 [i.20]. TC 2: The applied conformance tests shall be recorded and controlled. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 35 TC 2.1: A description of the used methodology for conformance testing shall be available. TC 2.2: Conformance testing procedures should be available and documented. TC 2.3: The implementation of the methodology should be controlled against existing and documented procedures, as defined in TC 2.2. TC 2.4: An implementation conformance statement (ICS) shall be made available for every implementation claiming conformance to a set of standards. TC 2.5: The ICS should contain the following information: a) administrative information identifying the manufacturer and the implementation (e.g. product name and version number); b) identification of the standards to which conformance is claimed, including version numbers (and any profiles, if applicable); c) identify which optional features of the standards are supported, if any; d) identify any implementation dependent limitations (ranges, sizes, etc.). TC 2.6: Whenever a new product version is released, at least regression tests shall be performed, which ensure that compatibility is maintained.
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10 Signature application practice statement
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A signature application practice statement (SAPS) may be established. An SAPS may be used on its own to state the rules to be applied to conform to the security and policy requirements or as part of a signature policy as described in ETSI TS 119 172 [i.14]. When such a document is established, its table of content (ToC) shall comply with the requirements stated in annex A. The numbering of the clauses of the table of content is provided as it shall appear in the SAPS by removing the starting "A.". Each clause shall appear except clause A.0. If the clause does not apply, "not applicable" shall be written after the clause title. The text provided in each clause of annex A specifies the expected content of each clause. This text shall not be copied in the SAPS. The clause in the SAPS corresponding to clause A.2 shall describe a set of rules with regards to the practices used by the application and its environment to properly implement the generation, augmentation and/or validation of signatures. This clause shall include, either by reference or explicitly, the set of policy and security practices requirements that the SCA, SAA and/or the SVA will have to meet when generating, augmenting and/or validating signatures in compliance with the SAPS and the applicable signature policy. When an explicit set of policy and security practices requirements is chosen, the clause shall conform to the structure defined in clause A.2. EXAMPLE 1: A community of users defines as part of a signature policy the applicable requirements with regards to those practices any application will have to meet in order to comply with the community signature policy. EXAMPLE 2: A signature policy refers to an external set of practice statements that describes the practices used by an application that generates, validates or augments signatures according to several signature policies defined by several communities of users. EXAMPLE 3: A signature policy is defined in the context of a specific legal context and defines a set of rules to create, validate or augment a signature meeting specific legal requirements (e.g. a qualified electronic signature as defined in the applicable European legislation framework) including specific requirements on signature creation applications (SCAs), signature validation applications (SVAs), and signature augmentation applications (SAAs) and their environments. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 36 NOTE: A SAPS stating such signature application practice defining requirements or making statements on the way signature applications are meeting application level policy and security requirements when creating or validating signatures, whatever and independently of the type of signature and of the set of requirements ruling the creation or validation of a type of signature (i.e. the applied signature policy), can be compared to a signature policy like a certification practice statement can be compared to a certificate policy. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 37 Annex A (normative): Table of content for signature application practice statement A.0 The right to copy Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document may freely reproduce the SAPS proforma in this annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and may further publish the completed SAPS. A.1 Introduction A.1.1 Overview This clause shall provide a general introduction to the document being written. It shall provide a synopsis of the business or application domain and the specific business or application process to which the SAPS applies. Depending on the complexity and scope of the particular business or application process implementing signatures, a diagrammatic representation may be included. A.1.2 Business or application domain A.1.2.1 Scope and boundaries of SAPS This clause shall describe the scope and boundaries of the business (application) domain in which the SAPS is suitable for use. NOTE: The business (application) domain is any business or commercial transaction process(es), which can involve several actors/participants and/or multiple actions and which can require one or multiple signatures to give it effect. EXAMPLE: This can range from a purely corporate internal process or set of processes, through a multi-party trading network whose parties can negotiate and agree on the applicable terms and rules, up to nationwide rules governing the use of signatures in eGovernment and eBusiness processes. The SAPS may be applicable to one or several domains of applications (e.g. B2B, B2C, Gov2B, Gov2C, contractual, financial, medical/health, consumer transactions, e-notary services, etc.), whether mono-organization, corporate or cross-organizations, nationwide or cross-borders, horizontal or vertical (e.g. eProcurement, eInvoice, eHealth, eJustice, etc.). A.1.2.2 Domain of applications This clause shall further describe each domain of applications that is considered for the use of the SCA/SVA/SAA. A.1.2.3 Transactional context This clause shall provide additional information about the transactional context, when applicable. EXAMPLE: Request for proposal, any form of offer, exchange of documents of certain specific types, draft of contractual terms and nature of those terms (e.g. contract, non-disclosure agreement, etc.), approval, any type of acknowledgement (e.g. of receipt, of delivery, of sending, etc.), documents requiring specific types of authorization (e.g. because of value, because of applicable law or legal requirements, etc.), etc. A.1.3 SAPS distribution points This clause shall provide information about where the SAPS is available (e.g. a URL or by email) and how a paper/hard copy can be made available. ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 38 A.1.4 SAPS issuer This clause shall include the name of the organization that is issuing the SAPS. When the SAPS is signed digitally, it shall also provide information identifying the digital certificate certifying the public key corresponding to the private key used by the SAPS issuer to digitally sign the SAPS. A.1.5 SAPS administration A.1.5.1 Organization administering the document This clause shall include the name and mailing address of the organization that is responsible for the drafting, registering, maintaining, and updating of the SAPS. A.1.5.2 Contact person When the contact point is a person, this clause shall include the: • first name and last name; • electronic mail address; • telephone number; and • fax number, if applicable, of the person. In other cases, it shall include: • a title or role; • an electronic mail alias; and • other generalized contact information. This clause may state that its contact person, alone or in combination with others, is available to answer questions about the SAPS. A.1.6 Definitions and acronyms This clause shall contain a list or a reference to a list of definitions for defined terms used within the document, as well as a list or a reference to a list of acronyms and their meanings. A.2 Signature creation/augmentation/validation application practice statements A.2.1 General requirements This clause shall contain other general requirements, control objectives and controls in connection with: 1) the user interface (as specified in clause 5.1); 2) general security measures (as specified in clause 5.2; and 3) system completeness (as specified in clause 5.3). ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 39 A.2.2 Legal driven policy requirements This clause shall contain requirements, control objectives and controls in connection with: 1) the processing of personal data (as specified in clause 6.2); and 2) the accessibility to persons with disabilities (as specified in clause 6.3). A.2.3 Information security (management system) requirements This clause shall contain requirements, control objectives and controls in connection with information security and information security management systems, and in particular: 1) network protection (as specified in clause 7.2); 2) information system protection (as specified in clause 7.3); 3) software integrity of the application (as specified in clause 7.4); 4) data storage security (as specified in clause 7.5); and 5) event logs (as specified in clause 7.6). A.2.4 Signature creation, signature validation and signature augmentation processes requirements This clause shall contain requirements, control objectives and controls in connection with: 1) Signature creation process and systems, and in particular: a) main functionalities (as specified in clause 8.1.2); b) data content type management (as specified in clause 8.1.3); c) signature attributes (as specified in clause 8.1.4); d) timing and sequencing enforcement (as specified in clause 8.1.5); e) signature invocation (as specified in clause 8.1.6); f) cryptographic algorithm choice (as specified in clause 8.1.7); g) signer's authentication procedure (and access control management) (as specified in clause 8.1.8); h) DTBS preparation (as specified in clause 8.1.9); i) data to be signed representation (DTBSR) (as specified in clause 8.1.10); j) signature creation device management (as specified in clause 8.1.11); k) protection of the communication between SCDev and SCA (as specified in clause 8.1.12); and l) bulk signing operation (as specified in clause 8.1.13). 2) Signature validation process and systems, and in particular: a) main validation functionalities (as specified in clause 8.2.2); b) validation process rules enforcement (as specified in clause 8.2.3); c) validation policy (as specified in clause 8.2.4); d) validation user interface (as specified in clause 8.2.5); and e) validation input/output relative conformance (correctness of the implemented validation procedure) (as specified in clause 8.2.6). ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 40 3) Signature augmentation process and systems, and in particular: a) main augmentation functionalities (as specified in clause 8.3.3); b) augmentation process rules enforcement (as specified in clause 8.3.4); c) data inclusion during the augmentation (as specified in clause 8.3.5); and d) validation of the input signature (as specified in clause 8.3.6). A.2.5 Development and coding policy requirements This clause shall contain requirements, control objectives and controls in connection with the development and coding policies, in particular with: 1) the secure development methods (as specified in clause 9.1); and 2) testing conformance (as specified in clause 9.2). ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 41 Annex B (informative): Bibliography • ISO 22301: "Societal security -- Business continuity management systems --- Requirements". • ISO 22313: "Societal security -- Business continuity management systems -- Guidance". • ETSI TR 119 000: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); The framework for standardization of signatures: overview". • ETSI TR 119 100: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Guidance on the use of standards for signature creation and validation". ETSI ETSI TS 119 101 V1.1.1 (2016-03) 42 History Document history V1.1.1 March 2016 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies a type of PDF digital signatures, as specified in ISO 32000-1 [1], based on time-stamps. It specifies a format for PAdES digital signatures using a Document Time-stamp - as defined in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] - as a digital signature intended to specifically prove the integrity and existence of a PDF document as defined in ISO 32000-1 [1], rather than proving any form of authentication or proof of origin. NOTE: This format does not meet the requirements of advanced electronic signature and advanced electronic seal as defined in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.4], as it is not capable of identifying the signer.
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents that are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ISO 32000-1: "Document management - Portable document format - Part 1: PDF 1.7". NOTE: Also available at http://www.adobe.com/devnet/acrobat/pdfs/PDF32000_2008.pdf. [2] ETSI EN 319 142-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES digital signatures; Part 1: Building blocks and PAdES baseline signatures".
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI EN 319 142-2: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES digital signatures; Part 2: Additional PAdES signatures profiles". [i.2] IETF RFC 3161 (2001): "Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)". [i.3] IETF RFC 5816 (2010): "ESSCertIDv2 Update for RFC 3161". [i.4] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. ETSI ETSI TS 119 142-3 V1.1.1 (2016-12) 6
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3 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ISO 32000-1 [1], ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] and the following apply: digital signature: data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by the recipient digital signature value: result of the cryptographic transformation of a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by the recipient PAdES signature: digital signature that satisfies the requirements specified within ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] or ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.1] proof of existence: evidence that proves that an object existed at a specific date/time proof of integrity: evidence that proves the accuracy and completeness of an object (electronic) time-stamp: data in electronic form which binds other electronic data to a particular time establishing evidence that these data existed at that time NOTE: In the case of IETF RFC 3161 [i.2] updated by IETF RFC 5816 [i.3] protocol, the electronic time-stamp is referring to the timeStampToken field within the TimeStampResp element (the TSA's response returned to the requesting client).
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4 General syntax
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4.1 General requirements for PAdES-DTS signatures
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The type of PAdES signature defined in the present document is called PAdES-DTS and it builds on PDF signatures as specified in ISO 32000-1 [1]. While other PAdES signature profiles defined in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] and ETSI EN 319 142-2 [i.1] incorporate signed and unsigned attributes aimed at proving the authenticity of the signer by means of a digital certificate issued to a natural or legal person, this PAdES signature profile is based on Document Time-stamp as defined in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2]. This means that instead of authenticating the identity of a user and the document's contents, this type of digital signature provides only a proof of integrity of the content represented in the PDF document, and the use of a Document Time- stamp adds a proof of existence of the document itself. All the following requirements shall apply: a) The Signature Dictionary of a PAdES-DTS signature, as defined in ISO 32000-1 [1], clause 12.8.1, table 252, shall be a Document Time-stamp Dictionary as described in clause 5.4.3 of ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2]. b) All the requirements described in clause 5.4.3 of ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] shall apply. c) Other requirements for handling PDF Signatures as specified in ISO 32000-1 [1], clause 12.8, shall apply except where overridden by the present document.
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4.2 Extending the validity of PAdES-DTS signatures
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The lifetime of the protection offered by a PAdES-DTS signature may be further extended beyond the lifetime of its Document time-stamp. In that case, a new Document time-stamp and DSS information shall be added as described in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.4. ETSI ETSI TS 119 142-3 V1.1.1 (2016-12) 7
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5 Attributes syntax and semantics
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5.1 Extensions dictionary
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The extensions dictionary (see ISO 32000-1 [1], clause 7.12) should include an entry <</ESIC <</BaseVersion /1.7 /ExtensionLevel 1 >> >> to identify that a PDF document includes extensions as identified in clause 4.1. NOTE: As an alternative to the above entry, use of extensions as identified in clause 4.1 can also be identified by the following entry from Adobe® defining equivalent extensions to the PDF document format: <</ADBE <</BaseVersion /1.7 /ExtensionLevel 8 >> >>
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5.2 Requirements on encryption
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A PDF document can be encrypted to protect its contents from unauthorized access. When encryption and signatures are combined together in a single PDF document, encryption shall be applied as described in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.5.
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6 PAdES-DTS signature profiles
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6.1 Signature levels
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The profiles in this clause define PAdES signatures based on the building blocks defined in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2]. These profiles define two levels of PAdES-DTS signatures. PAdES-DTS-BET level defines requirements for the generation of a basic PAdES-DTS signature providing a proof of existence and integrity of the document. PAdES-DTS-A level defines requirements for the incorporation of electronic time-stamps that allow validation of the PAdES-DTS signature long time after its generation. This level aims to tackle the long term availability and integrity of the validation material.
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6.2 General requirements
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6.2.1 Requirements from Part 1
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The requirements given in clauses 4.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 6.2.1 of ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] (PAdES Part 1) shall apply to all levels in this clause. ETSI ETSI TS 119 142-3 V1.1.1 (2016-12) 8
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6.2.2 Notation for requirements
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This clause describes the notation used for defining the requirements of the different PAdES signature levels. The requirements on the elements and services are expressed in tables. A row in the table either specifies requirements for an element or a service. These tables contain five columns. 1) Column "Elements/Services": a) In the case where the cell identifies a Service, the cell content starts with the keyword "Service:" followed by the name of the service. b) In the case where the element provides a service, this cell contains "SPO:" (for Service Provision Option), followed by the name of the element. c) Otherwise, this cell contains the name of the element. 2) Column "Presence in DTS-BET level". This cell contains the specification of the presence of element, or the provision of a service, for PAdES-DTS-BET signatures. 3) Column "Presence in DTS-A level". This cell contains the specification of the presence of the element, or the provision of a service, for PAdES-DTS-A signatures. 4) Below follows the values that can appear in columns "Presence in DTS-BET level" and "Presence in DTS-A level": - "shall be present": means that the element shall be present, and shall be as specified in the document referenced in column "References", further profiled with the additional requirements referenced in column "Requirements", and with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "shall be provided": means that the service identified in the first column of the row shall be provided as further specified in the SPO-related rows. This value only appears in rows that contain requirements for services. It does not appear in rows that contain requirements for elements. - "conditioned presence": means that the presence of the item identified in the first column is conditioned as per the requirement(s) specified in column "Requirements" and requirements referenced by column "References" with the cardinality indicated in column "Cardinality". - "*": means that the attribute or signature field (service) identified in the first column should not be present (provided) in the corresponding level. Upper signature levels may specify other requirements. 5) Column "Cardinality". This cell indicates the cardinality of the attribute or signature field as follows: - 0: The signature shall not incorporate any instance of the attribute or signature field. - 1: The signature shall incorporate exactly one instance of the attribute or signature field. - 0 or 1: The signature shall incorporate zero or one instance of the attribute or signature field. - ≥ 0: The signature shall incorporate zero or more instances of the attribute or signature field. - ≥ 1: The signature shall incorporate one or more instances of the attribute or signature field. 6) Column "Additional notes and requirements". This cell contains numbers referencing notes and/or letters referencing additional requirements on the attribute or signature field. Both notes and additional requirements are listed below the table. 7) Column "Reference". This cell contains either the number of the clause specifying the attribute or signature field in the present document, or a reference to the document and clause that specifies the attribute or signature field. ETSI ETSI TS 119 142-3 V1.1.1 (2016-12) 9
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6.3 Requirements on components and services
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This clause defines requirements on elements and services that PAdES signatures have to fulfil. Table 1 shows the presence and cardinality requirements on the elements and services indicated in the first column for the two PAdES-DTS levels, namely: PAdES-DTS-BET and PAdES-DTS-A. Additional requirements are detailed below the table suitably labelled with the letter indicated in the last column. Table 1: Requirements for PAdES-DTS-BET and PAdES-DTS-A signatures Elements/Service Presence in DTS-BET level Presence in DTS-A level Cardinality Additional requirements and notes References SERVICE: proof of integrity shall be provided shall be provided - a - SPO: document-time- stamp shall be present shall be present ≥ 1 ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.4.3 SERVICE: provide certificate and revocation values * shall be provided - b, c - SPO: DSS * shall be present DTS-BET: ≥ 0 DTS-A: ≥ 1 d, e, f, g ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.4.2.2 SPO: DSS / VRI * conditioned presence ≥ 0 h ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.4.2.3 SERVICE: provide trusted time for existence of the validation data * shall be provided - b, c - SPO: document-time- stamp * shall be present DTS-BET: ≥ 0 DTS-A: ≥ 1 a, I, j ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.4.3 Additional requirements: a) The value of SubFilter shall be ETSI.RFC3161. b) The signature shall contain a document security store as defined in clause 5.4.2 in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2] followed by a document time-stamp as specified in clause 5.4.3 in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2]. c) A new Document time-stamp and DSS information shall be added as described in ETSI EN 319 142-1 [2], clause 5.4. d) The applications should include certificate values within the DSS. The full set of certificates, including the trust anchor when it is available in the form of a certificate, that have been used to validate the signature and which are not already present shall be included. This set includes certificates required for validating any time- stamp token's signing certificate (i.e. a TSA certificate) already incorporated to the signature. e) Duplication of certificate values within the signature should be avoided. f) The full set of revocation data (CRL or OCSP responses) that have been used in the validation of the signer and CA certificates used in timestamp shall be included. This set includes all certificate status information required for validating any time-stamp token's signing certificate (i.e. a TSA certificate) already incorporated to the signature. g) The DER encoding shall be used for the certificate-values and the revocation-values. h) The VRI dictionary should not be used. The inclusion of VRI dictionary entries is optional. All validation material referenced in VRI entries is also referenced in DSS entries. i) PAdES-DTS-A signatures may have more than one document-time-stamp applied after the DSS and DSS/VRI. ETSI ETSI TS 119 142-3 V1.1.1 (2016-12) 10 j) Before generating and incorporating a document-time-stamp attribute, applications shall include all the validation material, which are not already in the timestamp, required for validating the timestamp. This validation material includes all the certificates and all certificate status information (like CRLs or OCSP responses) required for validating any time-stamp token's signing certificate (i.e. a TSA certificate). This validation material should be incorporated within DSS. ETSI ETSI TS 119 142-3 V1.1.1 (2016-12) 11 History Document history V1.1.1 December 2016 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies communication between the M2M Authentication Function (MAF) and MAF clients on the reference point Mmaf and between the M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) and MEF clients on the reference point Mmef.
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 118 101: "oneM2M; Functional Architecture (oneM2M TS-0001)". [2] ETSI TS 118 103: "oneM2M; Security solutions (oneM2M TS-0003)". [3] ETSI TS 118 104: "oneM2M; Service Layer Core Protocol Specification (oneM2M TS-0004 )". [4] ETSI TS 118 108: "oneM2M; CoAP Protocol Binding (oneM2M TS-0008)". [5] ETSI TS 118 109: "oneM2M; HTTP Protocol Binding (oneM2M TS-0009)". [6] ETSI TS 118 110: "oneM2M; MQTT Protocol Binding (oneM2M TS-0010)". [7] ETSI TS 118 111: "oneM2M; Common Terminology (oneM2M TS-0011)". [8] ETSI TS 118 120: "oneM2M; WebSocket Protocol Binding (oneM2M TS-0020)". [9] ETSI TS 118 122: "oneM2M; Field Device Configuration (oneM2M TS-0022)".
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] oneM2M Drafting Rules. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 7 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 118 111 [7], ETSI TS 118 103 [2] and the following apply: MAF Client: functionality for performing MAF procedures on behalf of an associated CSE or AE, or on behalf of CSE or AE(s) present on an associated Node MAF interface: communication interface between a MAF and a MAF Client identified by reference point Mmaf MEF Client: functionality for performing MEF procedures on behalf of an associated CSE or AE, or on behalf of CSE or AE(s) present on an associated Node, or an associated MAF MEF interface: communication interface between a MEF and a MEF Client identified by reference point Mmef
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3.2 Symbols
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Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 118 111 [7], ETSI TS 118 103 [2] and the following abbreviations apply: ADN Application Dedicated Node AE Application Entity AE-ID Application Entity Identifier API Application Programming Interface ASN Application Service Node BBF Broadband Forum CDT Common Data Types CRUD Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete (operation) CSE Common Services Entity CSE-ID Common Services Entity Identifier DM Device Management DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol IN Infrastructure Node MAF M2M Authentication Function MEF M2M Enrolment Function MN Middle Node MQTT Message Queue Telemetry Transport MTE M2M Trust Enabler NP Not Present RSPF Remote Security Provisioning Framework RO Read-Only RW Read-Write SEC Security SP Service Provider SP-ID Service Provider Identifier SUID Security Usage Identifier TLS Transport Layer Security WO Write-Only XML Extensible Markup Language ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 8 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4
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4 Conventions
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The key words "Shall", "Shall not", "May", "Need not", "Should", "Should not" in the present document are to be interpreted as described in the oneM2M Drafting Rules [i.1].
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5 General Description
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5.1 MAF Interface
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5.1.1 Introduction
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The MAF Interface is a simple variant of the Mcc/Mca reference points specifying the interaction of MAF Clients with a M2M Authentication Function (MAF), acting on behalf of an administrating stakeholder such as an M2M SP or third party M2M Trust Enabler (MTE). The present document does not specify the operation and management of the MAF required to support these procedures. A MAF Client interacts with the MAF on behalf of a Node (ADN, ASN, IN or MN), or a CSE or an AE. Figure 5.1.1-1 defines the reference point Mmaf between MAF clients and a MAF. Figure 5.1.1-1: Reference Architecture for MAF The administrating stakeholder authorizes the MAF's services to MAF clients, and oversees authorizing the distribution of symmetric keys. A MAF may provide its services on behalf of multiple administrating stakeholders. A MAF Client may be associated with multiple administrating stakeholders, each administrating the use of the MAF within a different scope. NOTE 1: The administrating stakeholder could be an M2M SP administrating the registration and distribution of credentials used for SAEFs and ESPrim within the M2M SP's Domain. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 9 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 NOTE 2: The administrating stakeholder could be an MTE administrating the registration and distribution of credentials for ESPrim and ESData to MAF Clients belonging to a particular Application Service Provider, where the MAF Clients could be distributed over multiple M2M SP domains. The present document has no impact on the specifications in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] and ETSI TS 118 104 [3]. However, the MAF Interface uses much of the specification in ETSI TS 118 104 [3] and in particular allows use of the HTTP binding in ETSI TS 118 108 [4], the CoAP binding in ETSI TS 118 109 [5] and the WebSocket binding in oneM2M ETSI TS 118 120 [8]. NOTE 3: The MQTT binding in oneM2M ETSI TS 118 110 [6] is not suitable for the MAF Interface, because the MAF Interface assumes a TLS or DTLS connection from the MAF Client to the MAF – which is not possible using the MQTT binding. The MAF Interface incorporates the following concepts from the Mcc/Mca reference points: • The concept of operations acting on resources. • The resource addressing from Mcc/Mca is used. • The universal attributes and some common attributes of resources. The MAF Interface differs from Mcc/Mca in the following ways: • The MAF Client can only communicate directly with the MAF – there are no transited CSEs. Only Blocking Mode communication method is supported. • None of the resource types applicable on Mcc/Mca are used: - Access control decisions use simple access control list for Retrieve access, and <accessControlPolicy> resources are not used for resources hosted by the MAF. A consequence of this is that the accessControlPolicyIDs attributes are not needed in the resources hosted by the MAF. - The <subscription> resource and NOTIFY operations are not supported. - There is no AE registration or CSE registration, but a similar process where a MAF Client creates a <mafClientReg> (MAF Client registration record) resource on the MAF. - There are no announced resources. The hierarchy of resources hosted by a MAF shall be as follows: • <MAFBase> resource type is the structural root for all the resources that are residing on a MAF. This resource is implicitly created by the MAF and uses the fixed resource name "maf" and contains following child resources: - <mafClientReg> resource. It confirms the MAF Client's registration to an administrating stakeholder, and can contain configuration information to be returned to the MAF Client. - <symmKeyReg> resources. It is created by the MAF Client, and contains symmetric keys for retrieval by another MAF Client.
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5.1.2 MAF Interface Overview
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This MAF Interface overview is based on the specification in clause 6 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3]. Identifiers such as M2M-SP-ID, AE-ID and CSE-ID as defined in 6.2.3 of [3] also apply to the MAF Interface. M2M Trust Enablers (MTEs) are identified using an M2M-SP-ID. Resources are addressed as specified in clause 6.2.4 in [3]. Common data types applicable to the MAF Interface are inherited from clause 6.3 of [3]. However, for any parameters or elements which have assigned the enumerated data type m2m:resourceType, the applicable enumeration values are interpreted as specified in Table 5.1.2-4. This applies to the Resource Type primitive parameter, the common resourceType attribute, and the @type attribute of m2m:childResourceRef. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 10 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Tables 5.1.2-1 and 5.1.2-2 list the request and response primitive parameters inherited from clauses 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 in ETSI TS 118 104 [3], respectively; the data types of these parameters are unchanged. The From parameter shall include the MAF client ID which can be a Node-ID, AE-ID or CSE-ID, depending on whether the client acts on behalf of a node, AE or CSE. Note that this is in contrast to primitives on the Mca and Mcc interface, where the From primitive parameter cannot include a Node-ID. NOTE: All other optional request and response primitive parameters defined in clause 6.4.1 of oneM2M ETSI TS 118 104 [3] are not used on the MAF Interface. Table 5.1.2-1: MAF Interface request primitive parameters Parameter Multiplicity Notes Operation 1 To 1 From 0..1 If not present, the MAF internally assigns From to be the identity of the Node, CSE or AE associated with the credential used for the MAF Handshake procedure. Request Identifier 1 Resource Type 0..1 values of m2m:resourceType interpreted as in Table 5.1.2-4 Content 0..1 Result Content 0..1 Table 5.1.2-2: MAF Interface response primitive parameters Parameter Multiplicity Notes Response Status Code 1 Request Identifier 1 Content 0..1 Data types associated with resources applicable to the MAF Interface are defined in clause 7. Table 5.1.2-3 lists the response status codes from clause 6.6 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] which are supported by the MAF Interface. Table 5.1.2-3: Response status codes supported by the MAF Interface Response status codes Interpretation 2000 OK 2001 CREATED 2002 DELETED 2004 UPDATED 4000 BAD_REQUEST 4004 NOT_FOUND 4005 OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED 4103 ACCESS_DENIED 5000 INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR Table 5.1.2-4: Interpretation of enumeration values of m2m:resourceType Value Interpretation Note 1 MAFBase 2 MEFBase 3 mafClientReg 4 mefClientReg 5 symmKeyReg 6 mefClientCmd The MIME media types defined on clause 6.7 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] shall be supported on the MAF interface. The notification related Media types vnd.onem2m-ntfy+json, vnd.onem2m-ntfy+cbor, vnd.onem2m-preq+xml do not apply to the MAF interface. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 11 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Virtual resources (clause 6.8 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3]) are not supported by the MAF Interface.
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5.2 MEF Interface
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5.2.1 Introduction
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The M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) is an essential part of the oneM2M Remote Security Provisioning architecture. Clause 6.1.2.1 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2] defines the following three variants of Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (RSPF): • Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key RSPF • Certificate-Based RSPF • GBA-based RSPF The MEF interface defined in the present specification applies to Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key RSPF and Certificate-Based RSPF only. For interfaces and procedures applicable to GBA-based RSPF, see clause 8.3.2.3 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. When using Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key RSPF or Certificate-Based RSPF, the MEF serves a number of different use cases which are summarized as follows: 1) The MEF provisions an Enrolee to perform MAF Security Framework procedures with a MAF as defined in clause 8.8.2 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. 2) The MEF provisions an Entity A and an Entity B to perform Security Association Establishment as defined in clauses 8.2.2.1 and 8.2.2.2 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. 3) The MEF provisions an originator and a receiver of a primitive with credentials to enable End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPRIM) with security credentials as specified in clause 8.4 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. 4) The MEF provisions the source and target endpoints of End-to-End Security of Data (ESDATA) as specified in clause 8.5 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. The present document defines messages and procedures for the above listed MEF use cases. NOTE 1: A MEF may also be implemented as a Device Management server using device management protocols such as OMA DM, OMA LwM2M and BBF TR-069. Such procedures are defined in ETSI TS 118 103 [2] and ETSI TS 118 122 [9]. Like the Mmaf Interface, the Mmef Interface is a simple variant of the Mcc/Mca reference points specifying the interaction of MEF Clients with a M2M Enrolment Function (MEF), managing symmetric keys on behalf of an administrating stakeholder such as an M2M SP or third party M2M Trust Enabler (MTE). The present document does not specify the operation and management of the MEF required to support these procedures. A MEF Client interacts with the MEF on behalf of a Node (ADN, ASN, IN or MN), or a CSE or an AE for use cases 1) and 2) in the above list. Figure 5.2.1-1 defines the reference point Mmef between MEF clients and a MEF, and between MEF and MAF. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 12 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Figure 5.2.1-1: Reference Architecture for MEF The administrating stakeholder authorizes the MEF's services to MEF clients. A MEF may provide its services on behalf of multiple administrating stakeholders. A MEF Client may be associated with multiple administrating stakeholders, each administrating the use of the MEF within a different scope. NOTE 2: The administrating stakeholder could be an M2M SP administrating the registration and distribution of credentials used for SAEFs and ESPrim within the M2M SP's Domain. NOTE 3: The administrating stakeholder could be an MTE administrating the registration and distribution of credentials for ESPrim and ESData to MEF Clients belonging to a particular Application Service Provider, where the MEF Clients could be distributed over multiple M2M SP domains. The present document has no impact on the specifications in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] and ETSI TS 118 104 [3]. However, the MEF Interface uses much of the specification in ETSI TS 118 104 [3] and in particular allows use of the HTTP binding in ETSI TS 118 108 [4], the CoAP binding in ETSI TS 118 109 [5] and the WebSocket binding in ETSI TS 118 120 [8]. NOTE 4: The MQTT binding in ETSI TS 118 110 [6] is not suitable for the MEF Interface, because the MEF Interface assumes a TLS or DTLS connection from the MEF Client to the MEF – which is not possible using the MQTT binding. The MEF Interface incorporates the following concepts from the Mcc/Mca reference points: 1) The concept of operations acting on resources. 2) The resource addressing from Mcc/Mca is used. 3) The universal attributes and some common attributes of resources. The MEF Interface differs from Mcc/Mca in the following ways: 4) The MEF Client can only communicate directly with the MEF - there are no transited CSEs. Only Blocking Mode communication method is supported. MEF ADN MEF Client AE AE AE ADN AE AE AE MEF Client MEF Client MEF Client Legend: Mcc Mca Mmef Distributing keys within a Node IN- CSE MEF Client AE AE MN / (ASN) AE CSE MEF Client MEF Client MEF Client MEF Client ASN / (MN) MEF Client AE AE AE CSE MAF MEF Client ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 13 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 5) None of the resource types applicable on Mcc/Mca are used: - Access control decisions use simple access control list for Retrieve access, and <accessControlPolicy> resources are not used for resources hosted by the MEF. A consequence of this is that the accessControlPolicyIDs attributes are not needed in the resources hosted by the MEF. - The <subscription> resource and NOTIFY operations are not supported. - There is no AE registration or CSE registration, but a similar process where a MEF Client creates a <mefClientReg> (MEF Client registration record) resource on the MEF. - There are no announced resources. The hierarchy of resources hosted by a MEF shall be as follows: 6) <MEFBase> resource type is the structural root for all the resources that are residing on a MEF. This resource is implicitly created by the MEF and uses the fixed resource name "mef" and contains following child resources: - <mefClientReg> resource. It confirms the MEF Client's registration to an administrating stakeholder, and can contain configuration information to be returned to the MEF Client. - <symmKeyReg> resources. It is created by the MEF Client, and contains symmetric keys for retrieval by another MEF Client.
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5.2.2 MEF Interface Overview
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This MEF Interface overview is based on the specification in clause 6 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3]. Identifiers such as M2M-SP-ID, AE-ID and CSE-ID as defined in 6.2.3 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] also apply to the MEF Interface. M2M Trust Enablers (MTEs) are identified using an M2M-SP-ID. Resources are addressed as specified in clause 6.2.4 in [3]. Common data types applicable to the MEF Interface are inherited from clause 6.3 of [3]. However, for any parameters or elements which have assigned the enumerated data type m2m:resourceType, the applicable enumeration values are interpreted as specified in Table 5.1.2-4. This applies to the Resource Type primitive parameter, the common resourceType attribute, and the @type attribute of m2m:childResourceRef. Tables 5.2.2-1 and 5.2.2-2 list the request and response primitive parameters inherited from clauses 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 in ETSI TS 118 104 [3], respectively; the data types of these parameters are unchanged. The From parameter shall include the MEF client ID which can be a Node-ID, AE-ID or CSE-ID, depending on whether the client acts on behalf of a node, AE or CSE. Note that this is in contrast to primitives on the Mca and Mcc interface, where the From primitive parameter cannot include a Node-ID. NOTE: All other optional request and response primitive parameters defined in clause 6.4.1 of [3] are not used on the MEF Interface. Table 5.2.2-1: MEF Interface request primitive parameters Parameter Multiplicity Notes Operation 1 To 1 From 0..1 If not present, the MEF internally assigns From to be the identity of the Node, CSE or AE associated with the credential used for the MEF Handshake procedure. Request Identifier 1 Resource Type 0..1 values of m2m:resourceType interpreted as in Table 5.1.2-4. Content 0..1 Result Content 0..1 ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 14 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Table 5.2.2-2: MEF Interface response primitive parameters Parameter Multiplicity Notes Response Status Code 1 Request Identifier 1 Content 0..1 Data types associated with resources applicable to the MEF Interface are defined in clause 7. The response status codes listed in table 5.1.2-3 also apply to the MEF Interface. The MIME media types defined on clause 6.7 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] shall be supported on the MEF interface. The notification related Media types vnd.onem2m-ntfy+json, vnd.onem2m-ntfy+cbor, vnd.onem2m-preq+xml do not apply to the MEF interface. Virtual resources (clause 6.8 of [3]) are not supported by the MEF Interface.
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6 Processing and Representation of Primitives
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6.1 Common aspects of the MAF and MEF interface
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This clause corresponds to the specification in clauses 7 and 8 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3]. Both, MAF and MEF Interface request primitive formats conform to clause 7.2.1.1 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3], constrained to the CRUD operations, with request parameters listed in table 5.1.2-1 and table 5.2.2-1, respectively. Both, MAF and MEF Interface response primitive formats conform to clause 7.2.1.2 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3], constrained to the CRUD operations, with response parameters listed in table 5.1.2-2 and table 5.2.2-2, respectively.
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The MAF Interface generic resource request procedure for originators and receivers conforms to clauses 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3], with the following clarification: • The MAF Client acts as the originator, and the MAF acts as the receiver and resource hosting entity. • The MAF Handshake procedure (clause 8.8.2.2 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]) is used for mutual authentication of the MAF Client and MAF. • The operation shall be one of the CRUD operations. • The request and response parameters shall conform to table 5.1.2-1 and table 5.1.2-2. • "Blocking Mode" communication method shall be used. • The step Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator" is replaced by the authorization processes described in the MAF Interface resource-type specific procedures in clause 8. The originator actions, receiver actions and Hosting CSE actions conform to clause 7.3 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3], with clause 7.3.3.15 of [3] replaced by the authorization processes described in the MAF Interface resource-type specific procedures in clause 8. The management common operations in clause 7.3.4 of [3] do not apply to the MAF Interface. The resource-type-specification conventions apply to the specification in clause 8, but the remainder of clause 7.4 of [3] does not apply to the MAF Interface. Clause 7.5.1 of [3] (regarding Notification) does not apply to the MAF Interface. Elements contained in the Content primitive parameter conform to clause 7.5.2 of [3]. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 15 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 The representation of MAF Interface primitives in data transfer conforms to clause 8. Clause 9 contains additional short names specific to both, the MAF and MEF Interfaces.
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The MEF Interface generic resource request procedure for originators and receivers conforms to clauses 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] with the following clarification: • The MEF Client acts as the originator, and the MEF acts as the receiver and resource hosting entity. • The MEF Handshake procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.2 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]) is used for mutual authentication of the MEF Client and MEF. • The operation shall be one of the CRUD operations. • The request and response parameters shall conform to table 5.2.2-1 and table 5.2.2-2. • "Blocking Mode" communication method shall be used. • The step Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator" is replaced by the authorization processes described in the MEF Interface resource-type specific procedures in clause 8. The originator actions, receiver actions and Hosting CSE actions conform to clause 7.3 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3], with clause 7.3.3.15 of [3] replaced by the authorization processes described in the MEF Interface resource-type specific procedures in clause 8. The management common operations in clause 7.3.4 of [3] do not apply to the MEF Interface. The resource-type-specification conventions apply to the specification in clause 8, but the remainder of clause 7.4 of [3] does not apply to the MEF Interface. Clause 7.5.1 of [3] (regarding Notification) does not apply to the MEF Interface. Elements contained in the Content primitive parameter conform to clause 7.5.2 of [3]. The representation of MEF Interface primitives in data transfer conforms to clause 8. Clause 9 contains additional short names specific to the both, the MAF and MEF Interfaces.
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7 Resource types definitions
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7.1 Namespaces used for resource and data types
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Representations of resources applicable to the MAF and MEF Interfaces employ the namespace identifier "sec:" for global XML elements associated with a resource type. Data types of the attributes and complex-type elements of these resource types may use any of the name space identifiers listed in table 7.1-1. Any data types of XML elements defined for use in present document shall be one of name spaces in table 7.1-1. Table 7.1-1: Namespaces applicable to resource types defined in the present document Name space prefix Name space definition Types defined in oneM2M Security sec: http://www.onem2m.org/xml/securityProtocols the present document and ETSI TS 118 103 [2] oneM2M protocol CDT m2m: http://www.onem2m.org/xml/protocol ETSI TS 118 104 [3] Device Configuration dcfg: http://www.onem2m.org/xml/deviceConfig ETSI TS 118 122 [9]
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7.2 Resource Type <MAFBase>
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The <MAFBase> resource shall represent a MAF. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 16 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 The <MAFBase> resource shall contain the child resources specified in table 7.2-1. Table 7.2-1: Child resources of <MAFBase> resource Child Resources of <MAFBase> Child Resource Type Multiplicity Description [variable] <mafClientReg> 0..n See clause 7.3 [variable] <symmKeyReg> 0..n See clause 7.4 The <MAFBase> resource shall contain the attributes specified in table 7.2-2. Table 7.2-2: Attributes of <MAFBase> resource Attributes of <MAFBase> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description resourceType 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceName 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Shall be fixed to "maf". creationTime 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. labels 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1].
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118 132
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7.3 Resource Type <MEFBase>
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The <MEFBase> resource shall represent a MEF. The <MEFBase> resource shall contain the child resources specified in table 7.3-1. Table 7.3-1: Child resources of <MEFBase> resource Child Resources of <MEFBase> Child Resource Type Multiplicity Description [variable] <mefClientReg> 0..n See clause 7.4 [variable] <symmKeyReg> 0..n See clause 7.6 The <MEFBase> resource shall contain the attributes specified in table 7.3-2. Table 7.3-2: Attributes of <MEFBase> resource Attributes of <MEFBase> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description resourceType 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceName 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Shall be fixed to "mef". creationTime 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. labels 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1].
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118 132
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7.4 Resource Type <mafClientReg>
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The <mafClientReg> resource shall represent a MAF Client enrolled with an M2M SP or M2M Trust Enabler (MTE). NOTE: A single MAF Client can be enrolled with at most one M2M SP and any number of MTEs (typically enabling end-to-end security to MAF Clients outside the MAF Client's M2M SP's domain). Consequently, a single MAF Client can be associated with multiple <mafClientReg> resources on multiple MAFs. It is also possible that a single MAF Client can be associated with multiple <mafClientReg> resources on a single MAF acting on behalf of multiple administrating stakeholders. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 17 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 The <mafClientReg> resource shall contain no child resources. The <mafClientReg> resource shall contain the attributes specified in table 7.4-1. Table 7.4-1: Attributes of <mafClientReg> resource Attributes of <mafClientReg> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description resourceType 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceName 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. parentID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creationTime 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. labels 1 RW See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. expirationTime 1 WO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creator 1 WO This attribute shall include the identifier of the MAF client which has created this resource. adminFQDN 1 WO FQDN of the M2M SP or MTE who is the administrating stakeholder of this enrolment. assignedSymmKeylID 0..1 RO When the MAF Client uses a symmetric key to authenticate to the MAF, then the MAF may use this attribute to provide a symmetry key identifier within the domain of the MAF. Assigned by the MAF.
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7.5 Resource Type <mefClientReg>
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The <mefClientReg> resource shall represent a MEF Client enrolled with an M2M SP or M2M Trust Enabler (MTE). NOTE: A single MEF Client can be enrolled with at most one M2M SP and any number of MTEs (typically enabling end-to-end security to MEF Clients outside the MEF Client's M2M SP's domain). Consequently, a single MEF Client can be associated with multiple <mefClientReg> resources on multiple MEFs. It is also possible that a single MEF Client can be associated with multiple <mefClientReg> resources on a single MEF acting on behalf of multiple administrating stakeholders. The <mefClientReg> resource shall contain no child resources. The <mefClientReg> resource shall contain the child resources specified in table 7.5-1. Table 7.5-1: Child resources of <mefClientReg> resource Child Resources of <mefClientReg> Child Resource Type Multiplicity Description "cmd" <mefClientCmd> 1 See clause 7.7 The <mefClientReg> resource shall contain the attributes specified in table 7.5-2. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 18 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Table 7.5-2: Attributes of <mefClientReg> resource Attributes of <mefClientReg> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description resourceType 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceName 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. parentID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creationTime 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. labels 1 RW See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. expirationTime 1 WO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creator 1 WO This attribute shall include the identifier of the MEF client which has created this resource. adminFQDN 1 WO FQDN of the M2M SP or MTE who is the administrating stakeholder of this enrolment. assignedSymmKeylID 0..1 RO When the MEF Client uses a symmetric key to authenticate to the MEF, then the MEF may use this attribute to provide a symmetry key identifier within the domain of the MEF. Assigned by the MEF. sourceIDs 0..1 RW List of AE-IDs and CSE-IDs associated with a MEF client acting on behalf of a Node. This attribute shall be supplied if the creator attribute includes a Node-ID
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7.6 Resource Type <symmKeyReg>
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The <symmKeyReg> resource shall represent a symmetric key that a source MAF Client or a source MEF Client has established with the MAF or MEF, respectively, for distributing to authorized Target MAF or MEF Clients and/or another MAF or MEF. The MAF or MEF Client provides a list of authorized Targets when the resource is created - the present document does not specify how the MAF or MEF associates the list with the resource. The MAF or MEF, in coordination with the identified administrating stakeholder (M2M SP or MTE), can modify the list of authorized Targets and the expirationTime. The <symmKeyReg> resource shall contain no child resources. The <symmKeyReg> resource shall contain the attributes specified in table 7.6-1. Table 7.6-1: Attributes of <symmKeyReg> resource Attributes of <symmKeyReg> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description resourceType 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceName 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. This value is used as the relative part of the identifier for the symmetric key in security protocols. parentID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creationTime 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. labels 0..1 RW See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. expirationTime 1 WO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creator 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. adminFQDN 1 WO FQDN of the administrating stakeholder (M2M SP or MTE) associated with this enrolment. SUID 1 WO An SUID constraining the use of the symmetric key associated with this resource. targetIDs 1 (L) RW List of AE-ID(s) and/or CSE-ID(s) and/or and/or Node-ID(s) identifying the AE(s) and/or CSE(s) and/or Node(s) authorized to retrieve the resource. Only the creator and administrating stakeholder (identified by adminFQDN) are authorized to access this attribute. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 19 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Attributes of <symmKeyReg> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description keyValue 1 WO The value of the key to be provided to the identifier targets. May be provided in the Create request or derived by the MAF or MEF Client and MAF or MEF from the TLS handshake parameters.
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118 132
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7.7 Resource Type <mefClientCmd>
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A <mefClientCmd> resource includes instructions for the MEF client associated with the parent <mefClientReg> resource to be executed. The <mefClientCmd> resource shall contain no child resources. The <mefClientCmd> resource shall contain the attributes specified in table 7.7-1. Table 7.7-1: Attributes of <mefClientCmd> resource Attributes of <mefClientCmd> Multiplicity RW/ RO/ WO Description resourceType 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. resourceName 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. parentID 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. creationTime 1 RO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. labels 1 RW See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. expirationTime 1 WO See clause 9.6.1.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. cmdID 1 RW This attribute shall include a MEF-assigned identifier of a command issued by the MEF. See clause 8.3.9.1 of [2] for further details. cmdDescription 1 RO This attribute provides the description of a command issued by the MEF to be executed by the MEF client. See clause 8.3.9.5 of [2] for further details. cmdStatusCode 1 RW This attribute shall be used forthe status of the command issued by the MEF. See clause 8.3.9.6 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2] for further details.
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8 Resource-type specific procedures and definitions
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8.1 Resource Type <MAFBase>
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118 132
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8.1.1 Introduction
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A <MAFBase> resource shall represent a MAF. This <MAFBase> resource shall be the root for all the resources that are residing on the MAF. Table 8.1.1-1: Data Type Definition of <MAFBase> Data Type ID File Name Note MAFBase SEC-MAFBase-v2_1_0.xsd The <MAFBase> resource has no resource-specific attributes. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 20 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Table 8.1.1-2: Child resources of <MAFBase> resource Child Resource Type Child Resource Name Multiplicity Ref. to Resource Type Definition <mafClientReg> [variable] 0..n Clause 7.4 <symmKeyReg> [variable] 0..n Clause 7.6
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118 132
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8.1.2 <MAFBase> resource specific procedures on CRUD operations
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118 132
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8.1.2.1 Create
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Originator: The <MAFBase> resource shall not be created via API. Receiver: Primitive specific operation on Recv-1.0 "Check the syntax of received message": 1) If the request is received, the MAF shall execute the following steps in order: a) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED" error. b) "Send the Response primitive".
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.1.2.2 Retrieve
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Originator: No change from the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.1 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1 and 6. Receiver: Same as the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.2 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1 and 6, and performing the following step in the place of step Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator": The Receiver shall allow all Originator's to retrieve this resource.
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.1.2.3 Update
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Originator: The <MAFBase> resource shall not be updated via API. Receiver: Primitive specific operation on Recv-1.0 "Check the syntax of received message": 1) If the request is received, the MAF shall execute the following steps in order: a) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED" error. b) "Send the Response primitive".
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.1.2.4 Delete
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Originator: The <MAFBase> resource shall not be DELETEed via API. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 21 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Receiver: Primitive specific operation on Recv-1.0 "Check the syntax of received message": 1) If the request is received, the MAF shall execute the following steps in order: a) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED" error. b) "Send the Response primitive".
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118 132
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8.2 Resource Type <MEFBase>
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118 132
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8.2.1 Introduction
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A <MEFBase> resource shall represent a MEF. This <MEFBase> resource shall be the root for all the resources that are residing on the MEF. Table 8.2.1-1: Data Type Definition of <MEFBase> Data Type ID File Name Note MEFBase SEC-MEFBase-v2_1_0.xsd The <MEFBase> resource has no resource-specific attributes. Table 8.2.1-2: Child resources of <MEFBase> resource Child Resource Type Child Resource Name Multiplicity Ref. to Resource Type Definition <mefClientReg> [variable] 0..n Clause 7.5 <symmKeyReg> [variable] 0..n Clause 7.6
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.2.2 <MEFBase> resource specific procedures on CRUD operations
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118 132
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8.2.2.1 Create
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Originator: The <MEFBase> resource shall not be created via API. Receiver: Primitive specific operation on Recv-1.0 "Check the syntax of received message": 1) If the request is received, the MEF shall execute the following steps in order: a) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED" error\. b) "Send the Response primitive".
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118 132
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8.2.2.2 Retrieve
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Originator: No change from the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.1 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.2 and 6. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 22 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Receiver: Same as the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.2 of [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.2 and 6, and performing the following step in the place of step Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator": 1) The Receiver shall allow all Originator's to retrieve this resource.
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.2.2.3 Update
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Originator: The <MEFBase> resource shall not be updated via API. Receiver: Primitive specific operation on Recv-1.0 "Check the syntax of received message": 1) If the request is received, the MEF shall execute the following steps in order: a) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED" error. b) "Send the Response primitive".
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.2.2.4 Delete
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Originator: The <MEFBase> resource shall not be DELETEed via API. Receiver: Primitive specific operation on Recv-1.0 "Check the syntax of received message": 1) If the request is received, the MEF shall execute the following steps in order: a) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED" error. b) "Send the Response primitive".
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118 132
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8.3 Resource Type <mafClientReg>
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118 132
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8.3.1 Introduction
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A <mafClientReg> resource shall represent a MAF Client enrolled with the MAF on behalf of an M2M Service Provider or M2M Trust Enabler. A <mafClientReg> resource shall be a child resource of the MAF's <MAFBase> resource. Table 8.3.1-1: Data Type Definition of <mafClientReg> Data Type ID File Name Note mafClientReg SEC-mafClientReg-v2_1_0.xsd ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 23 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.1-2: Universal/Common Attributes of <mafClientReg> resource Attribute Name Request Optionality Create Update @resourceName NP NP resourceType NP NP resourceID NP NP parentID NP NP creationTime NP NP labels O O expirationTime M M creator NP NP Table 8.3.1-3: Resource Specific Attributes of <mafClientReg> resource Attribute Name Request Optionality Data Type Default Value and Constraints Create Update adminFQDN M NP xs:anyURI No default assignedSymmKeyID NP NP sec:credentialID No default The <mafClientReg> resource shall contain no child resources.
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118 132
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8.3.2 <mafClientReg> resource specific procedures on CRUD operations
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118 132
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8.3.2.1 Create
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This procedure is denoted MAF Client Registration in clause 8.8.2.3 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. The To parameter of the <mafClientReg> create request primitive includes the MAF-FQDN and the character "–" (dash) as a shorthand notation for the name of the <MAFBase> resource: //{MAF-FQDN}/–/ EXAMPLE: //maf123.mafprovider.org/–/ The MAF-FQDN represents a globally unique identifier of a MAF (aka. MAF ID). The From parameter of the <mafClientReg> create request primitive shall be left empty if the MAF client does not have a MAF Client ID assigned yet. If the MAF client interfaces with the MAF on behalf of the node (see clause 5.1.1), the Node-ID of the respective ADN, ASN, MN or IN shall serve as MAF Client ID. Originator: No change from the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.1 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2, and with following differences. In step Orig-6.0: "Process Response primitive", if the Originator used a symmetric key to authenticate to the MAF, and the <mafClientReg> resource in the response contained an assignedSymmKeyID attribute then the originator shall use the assignedSymmKeyID attribute to identify this symmetric key when it is subsequently used in authenticating to the MAF. Receiver: Same as the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.2 of [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2, and with following differences. The Receiver shall perform the following steps in order in the place of Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator": 1) The Receiver shall determine if the Originator is authorized to register with the administrating stakeholder (M2M SP or MTE) identified by adminFQDN attribute. The present document does not specify how the Receiver makes this determination: a) If the Originator is not authorized, then the Receiver shall execute the following steps in order: ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 24 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 i) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "ACCESS_DENIED" error. ii) "Send the Response primitive". b) If the Originator is authorized, then the Receiver shall allow the request. The Receiver shall perform the following steps in order as part of "Create the resource" (clause 7.3.3.5 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] ) during Step Recv-6.5: "Create/Update/Retrieve/Delete/Notify operation is performed": 2) If the Originator authenticated using symmetric key with a key identifier which does not use the Receiver's FQDN, then: a) The Receiver shall assign a symmetric key identifier with the Receiver's FQDN and with relative part which is unique within the scope of symmetric key identifiers issued by the Receiver. The Receiver shall associate this symmetric key identifier with the symmetric key used for authenticating the Originator. b) The Receiver shall set the assignedSymmKeyID attribute to be the Credential-ID formed from the assigned symmetric key identifier as specified in clause 10.4 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. 3) If the Originator authenticated using a symmetric key with a key identifier which does not use the Receiver's FQDN, or if the Originator authenticated using a certificate, then the Receiver shall not include an assignedSymmKeyID attribute in the created resource. 4) The Receiver shall assign the creator attribute to an AE-ID or CSE-ID or Node-ID on instructions from the administrating stakeholder. The present document does not specify any details of how the AE-ID or CSE-ID or Node-ID is determined.
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.3.2.2 Retrieve
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This procedure is denoted MAF Client Configuration Retrieval in clause 8.8.2.4 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. This procedure is used to retrieve the <mafClientReg> resource. Originator: No change from the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.1 of [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2. Receiver: Same as the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.2 of [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2, performing the following steps in order in the place of Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator": 1) The Receiver shall determine if the Originator is authorized by checking if the Originator is the creator of the resource: a) If the Originator is not authorized, then the Receiver shall execute the following steps in order: i) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "ACCESS_DENIED" error. ii) "Send the Response primitive". b) If the Originator is authorized, then the Receiver shall allow the request.
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.3.2.3 Update
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This procedure is denoted MAF Client Configuration Update in clause 8.8.2.5 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. This procedure is used to update attributes of the <mafClientReg> resource, such as e.g. labels, expiration time. Originator: The <mafClientReg> resource shall not be updated by a MAF client via API. ETSI MAF and MEF Interface Specification 25 oneM2M TS-0032 version 4.0.1 Release 4 Receiver: Same as the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.2 of [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2, and with the following differences: The Receiver shall perform the following step in the place of Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator": 1) The Receiver shall determine if the Originator is authorized by checking if the Originator is the creator of the resource: a) If the Originator is not authorized, then the Receiver shall execute the following steps in order: i) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "ACCESS_DENIED" error. ii) "Send the Response primitive". b) If the Originator is authorized, then the Receiver shall allow the request. The Receiver shall perform the following step as part of "Update the resource" (clause 7.3.3.7 of [3] )" during Step Recv-6.5: "Create/Update/Retrieve/Delete/Notify operation is performed": 2) If the Originator was the Creator of the resource, then the Receiver shall perform steps 2 and 3 in clause 8.3.2.1.
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f79ebc546ee99cff801e6f7eb4386a8e
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118 132
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8.3.2.4 Delete
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This procedure is denoted MAF Client De-Registration in clause 8.8.2.6 of ETSI TS 118 103 [2]. This procedure enables the MAF client to delete its own <mafClientReg> resource on a MAF. Originator: No change from the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.1 of ETSI TS 118 104 [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2. Receiver: Same as the generic procedures in clause 7.2.2.2 of [3] with clarifications discussed in clauses 5.1.2 and 6.2, performing the following step in the place of Recv-6.3: "Check authorization of the Originator": 1) The Receiver shall determine if the Originator is authorized by checking if the Originator is the creator of the resource: a) If the Originator is not authorized, then the Receiver shall execute the following steps in order: i) "Create an unsuccessful Response primitive" with the Response Status Code indicating "ACCESS_DENIED" error. ii) "Send the Response primitive". b) If the Originator is authorized, then the Receiver shall allow the request.
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