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6.2.2.1 Pseudonymity
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Pseudonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or service without disclosing its user identity, but can still be held accountable for that use. A pseudonym is an identifier allocated by an NGN authority to a single entity or group of entities and which bears no relation to the true identity of the entity or group. In this way, it is only the NGN authority that is able to resolve a pseudonym to a true identity. By changing pseudonyms on a regular basis the real identity can also be protected from behavioural analysis attacks.
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6.2.2.2 Unlinkability
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Unlinkability ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to link these uses together. This means that within the NGN from the perspective of an unauthorized party, NGN users and their actions in the NGN are no more and no less related after an observation than they are related concerning the a-priori knowledge. Therefore, the probability of particular actions being related to particular NGN users remains the same after an observation as it was before. The unlinkability of two (or more) messages may depend on whether their content is protected against a particular attacker. Messages may be considered to be unlinkable if the attacker is unable to acquire information on the sender or recipient of a message by analyzing the message. Nevertheless, even simple analysis of the contents of a number of messages can reveal certain characteristics which link them together - for example, similarities in structure and style, the use of particular words or phrases and the consistent use of specific grammatical errors. Pseudonyms may serve as a basis for unlinkability but their use does not, on its own, guarantee that any link between users and their behaviour will be hidden from an attacker.
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6.2.3 Confidentiality measures
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The confidentiality of identities, identity revealing information, private information and data that can be used to relate behaviour to identity shall be ensured when transferred within the NGN. This is of particular importance for ensuring unlinkability.
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6.2.4 Integrity measures
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6.2.4.1 Transmitted data protection (integrity)
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The integrity of identities and any identity-revealing data should be assured when it is transferred within the NGN. If there is any doubt about the integrity of received data which is required by an invoked service capability, that service capability should be terminated. The NGN system shall provide integrity services classified by the criteria given in ISO/IEC 10181-6 [i.14], as follows: 1) By the type of violation they protect against. The types of violation are: - unauthorized data modification; - unauthorized data creation; - unauthorized data deletion; - unauthorized data insertion; ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 19 - unauthorized data replay. 2) By the type of protection they support. The types of protection are: - prevention of integrity compromise; - detection of integrity compromise. 3) By whether they include recovery mechanisms or not: - with recovery: may be possible to recover the original data (and possibly signal a recovery action or an error for purposes such as audit) whenever the validation of received data indicates that an alteration has occurred; - without recovery: it is unlikely to be possible to recover the original data whenever the validation of received data indicates that an alteration has occurred.
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6.2.5 Credential management
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The security capabilities described in clauses 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 use a number of cryptographic keys and other security credentials in order to be effective. The credential management capability provides assurance that these items are created, transmitted and stored securely without modification, interference or observation by unauthorized parties. These credentials are as follows: I-AK Infrastructure Identity Authentication Key U-AK User Identity Authentication Key I-IK Infrastructure Integrity Key U-IK User Integrity Key IU-SCK Infrastructure to User Session Confidentiality Key IG-SCK Infrastructure to Group Session Confidentiality Key UI-SCK User to Infrastructure Session Confidentiality Key Table 9 identifies how each of the credentials is used within different types of security association. Table 9: NGN security credentials Origin Destination Authenticity Integrity Confidentiality Association User User I-AK, I-AK I-IK, U-IK UI-SCK, IU-SCK Indirect (note 1) User User-Group I-AK, U-AK I-IK, U-IK UI-SCK, IG-SCK Indirect NGN User U-AK I-IK I-CK Direct (note 2) NGN User-Group I-AK I-IK G-CK Direct User NGN U-AK U-IK UI-SCK Direct NOTE 1: An indirect association depends upon the separate direct associations between each terminating user and the NGN to imply the authentication, integrity and confidentiality parameters associated with the end-to-end session. NOTE 2: A direct association depends only on the authentication, integrity and confidentiality parameters specified for itself.
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6.2.6 Audit and accounting measures
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The actions of the NGN user may be recorded for the purposes of accounting leading to billing. In addition the actions of the NGN user have to be recorded for Data Retention [5]. In each case the data recorded should be only visible to authorised entities and removed after consumption (or expiry in the case of data retained in accordance with the Data Retention directive). ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 20
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7 Identity Protection Framework
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7.1 PKI-based Framework elements
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The NGN identity protection framework comprises three elements, as follows: 1) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); 2) Public Key Certification Schema (PKC); and 3) Privileged Management Infrastructure (PMI). Each is described in the following clauses.
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7.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
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A public key infrastructure (PKI) enables users of public networks to securely and privately exchange data through the use of a public and a private cryptographic key pair that is obtained and shared through a trusted authority. The main elements of a public key infrastructure are a digital certificate that can identify an individual or an organization and directory services that can store and, when necessary, revoke the certificates. PKI assumes the use of public key cryptography for authenticating a message sender or for encrypting a message. A public key infrastructure consists of: • a certificate authority (CA) that issues and verifies digital certificates - a certificate includes the public key or information about the public key; • a registration authority (RA) that acts as the verifier for the certificate authority before a digital certificate is issued to a requestor; • one or more directories where the certificates (with their public keys) are held; and • a certificate management system. Additionally, PKI requires an effective key distribution and management model which includes revocation capabilities that scale to the size of the network and the number of its communicating entities. As the authenticity of a message is established by verification of the certificate included by the message sender, the communicating parties need to be notified if and when certificates have been compromised or are, for other reasons, no longer valid. The revocation of certificates is challenging, particularly within the NGN where it might be necessary to operate with multiple authorities and sub domains offering a variety of communication services.
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7.2.1 Public Key Certification (PKC)
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A public key certificate (also known as a digital certificate or identity certificate) is an electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind together a public key with an identity. The information that defines the identity information of a person or organization includes: • their name; • their address; • their location; • any explicit identity revealing information; and • any information that can be used to link specific behaviour to specific individuals. A certificate is used to verify that a public key belongs to an individual. It is validated by the digital signature of an authoritative entity known to all communicating parties. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 21 There are two types of PKC of relevance for NGN: 1) time-variant pseudonym certificate; and 2) anonymous certificates. Both types of PKC include an authoritative identity which is traceable back to the real identity only by the CA.
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7.2.1.1 Traceable time-variant pseudonym certificates with authoritative identity
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Messages in the NGN may contain different identifiers at each layer of the protocol stack. Such identifiers may carry information that can be used to derive the real identity of the user or to link behaviour to specific NGN users, particularly at the application layer. Examples of such information include user's name, user's address, location and equipment identities. To prevent an eavesdropper from acquiring this personal information, the NGN uses a variety of identifiers across its sub-systems and services. Some of these identifiers can be looked upon as "pseudonyms" that are not directly linked to the user's true identity while others can be directly traced to specific NGN users. The NGN needs to be able to trace traffic to a specific NGN user so that the user can be billed for the use of all non- anonymous subscription services. However, it is still necessary to protect users' identities and their right to privacy so no identity revealing information shall be transmitted and pseudonymity shall be ensured at all layers of the protocol stack. Pseudonymity ensures that a user may have access to a resource or service without disclosing its true identity but can still be held accountable for that use. A pseudonym is an identifier allocated by an NGN authority to a single entity or group of entities and which bears no relation to the true identity of the entity or group. In this way, it is only the NGN authority that is able to resolve a pseudonym to a true identity. By changing pseudonyms on a regular basis the real identity can also be protected from behavioural analysis attacks. The use of pseudonyms can only be considered effective if the method used is able to guarantee that: • the user's true identity is hidden from all other users; • the user's true identity cannot be derived from observation of that user's behaviour; and • only authoritative entities can trace the pseudonym back to a real NGN user identity.
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7.2.1.2 Traceable anonymous certificates with authoritative identity
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The NGN may offer services that are free of charge or that, for other reasons, are not reliant upon the use of identity and identity revealing information for charging and billing. These services are referred to as anonymous services and require anonymous certificates which are defined in RFC 5636 [11]. NOTE: It is assumed that overall the NGN is a paid for facility but that some services may be provided without the need for explicit identification of the user (thus anonymous) and may include the receiving of broadcast services over the NGN (e.g. IPTV). An anonymous certificate is one which contains no information related to the holder's true identity in the subject field. Anonymous certificates can be used to enhance user privacy. However, as an X.509 certificate must contain an identifier to comply with PKI format standards and a CA must not issue multiple certificates with the same Subject name to different entities, the level of privacy offered by anonymous certificates depends on the type and randomness of the identifiers used. There is a need to balance privacy and accountability when issuing anonymous certificates for audit and other reasons. If a CA or RA is unable to resolve an anonymous certificate to the real user to whom it was issued, the user is able to abuse the anonymity afforded by the certificate because there would be no recourse for relying parties. An anonymous certificate should, therefore, be traceable by the CA or RA back to the user to whom it was issued. It is imperative that only authoritative entities are able to establish this link. This can be ensured if the authoritative entity initially identifies the user and maintains a database that relates the user's true identity to the random identifier carried in the certificate's Subject field. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 22
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7.2.2 Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)
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A Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) is a cryptographic certificate-based approach to asserting the rights of a user or application to access or modify data or invoke services within a system. A PMI carries user privileges in the form of attributes in an Attribute Certificate (AC) which is issued to the user by either s Source of Authority (SOA) or an Attribute Authority (AA). PMIs rely on an underlying public key model because ACs need to be digitally signed by the issuing AA and because a network-wide, known, trusted and non-forgeable authoritative identity information must be used to validate the AA's signature. Examples of PMIs are ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [3], Kerberos and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML).
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7.2.2.1 ITU-T Recommendation X.509
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ITU-T X.509 [3] privilege management. uses the attributes in an attribute certificates (ACs) to communicate, assert and validate user privileges. Access rights are held within the privilege attributes of Acs that are issued to users. Each privilege attribute describes one or more of the user's access rights. A target resource reads a received AC to validate that the originating user is authorized to perform the action that is being requested. The SOA is the owner of the resource and is responsible for assigning privileges to other entities which are either Attribute Authorities if they can delegate their privileges further or privilege holders if they are not. An AA is permitted to delegate privileges to other entities (both AAs and privilege holders) but may or may not be able to assert the privileges itself. The privilege verifier is the entity that checks the asserted privileges and makes a yes/no decision as to whether the privilege may be used or not. The privilege verifier trusts the SOA and checks that the privilege holder has been directly or indirectly authorised by the SOA.
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7.2.2.2 Kerberos
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Kerberos is a ticket-based authorization system which provides a means of verifying the identities of the principals (e.g. an NGN user and a server) of a transaction in an open (unprotected) network. This is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system, without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical security of all the hosts on the network and under the assumption that packets travelling through the network can be read, modified and manipulated at will. Kerberos authenticates a user be means of conventional (shared secret key) cryptography before granting the user authorization to access a remote server. Extensions to Kerberos can provide for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of authentication. The basic Kerberos authorization process proceeds as follows: 1) A client sends a request to the authentication server (AS) for "credentials" for a given server. 2) The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the client's key. The credentials consist of a "ticket" for the server and a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). 3) The client transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. 4) The session key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the client and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further communication. NOTE: Many applications use the functions of Kerberos only upon the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an application performs encryption or integrity protection for the data stream, the identity verification applies only to the initiation of the connection, and it does not guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate from the same principal.
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7.2.2.3 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
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Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [12] is an XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains, i.e. between an identity provider (a producer of assertions) and a service provider (a consumer of assertions). SAML has been developed by the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee to provide Web Browser Single Sign-On (SSO) but has been extended to be an authorization mechanism that can be used for various types of network. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 23 It assumes that the principal (the NGN user) has enrolled with at least one identity provider which is responsible for ensuring local authentication services to the principal. This means that the service providers in the network (those offering services to the users) rely on the identity provider for registration services. This registration results in what is called a SAML assertion which on the user's request is passed to the service provider. The service provider makes access control decisions based on the forwarded SAML assertions. SAML is built upon a number of existing standards: • Extensible Markup Language (XML): - most SAML exchanges are expressed in a standardized dialect of XML; • XML Schema: - SAML assertions and protocols are specified (in part) using XML Schema; • XML Signature: - digital signatures based on the XML Signature standard are used for authentication and message integrity; • XML Encryption: - SAML 2.0 uses XML Encryption to provide elements for encrypted name identifiers, encrypted attributes, and encrypted assertions (SAML 1.1 does not have encryption capabilities); • Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP): - SAML relies on HTTP as its communications protocol; • Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP): - SAML specifies the use of SOAP 1.1. SAML defines XML-based assertions and protocols, bindings, and profiles. The term SAML Core refers to the general syntax and semantics of SAML assertions as well as the protocol used to request and transmit those assertions from one system entity to another. SAML protocol refers to what is transmitted, not how (the latter is determined by the choice of binding).
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7.2.2.4 Access control models in PMI
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PMI supports all of the three traditional access control models: • Discretionary Access Control (DAC); • Mandatory Access Control (MAC); and • Role Based Access Control (RBAC). The scheme for verifying privileges is independent of the model used. DAC leaves the granting and revoking of access privileges to the discretion of the individual user. A DAC mechanism allows users to grant or revoke access to any of the objects under their control without the intercession of an authority. MAC enforces access controls on the basis of security labels which are attached to users (more precisely, to subjects) and objects and are controlled by a central authority. Users can only access objects assigned an equal or lower security label than their own. The underlying principle is to provide information to higher levels in the hierarchy (write-up) and access information from lower down in the hierarchy (read-down). Access control decisions are often determined by the roles individual users take on as part of an organization. This includes the specification of duties, responsibilities and qualifications. For example, the roles of an individual NGN user can be associated with subscription groups, the way that the NGN is used or the way that the NGN bundles services such as IPTV to deliver to users. Role based access control (RBAC) enables access control decisions to be made based on the functions a user is authorized to perform within the NGN. Unlike DAC, the user cannot pass access permissions on to other users at their discretion. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 24
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7.3 Analysis of framework elements
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This evaluation of potential NGN identity protection framework elements makes explicit the consequences of each element on the NGN architecture, sub-systems and services. Each element is evaluated in the context of the security capabilities needed to comply with the regulatory requirements identified in clause 5. There are two implementation strategies specified for the NGN Identity Protection Framework elements based on the countermeasure strategies defined in TS 102 165-1 [i.1], as follows: (i) asset redesign: - removal of identified identity protection problem areas through fundamental design changes in the NGN architecture or affected NGN subsystems; - can reduce both the likelihood and the overall impact of a successful attack. (ii) asset hardening: - specification of additional security capabilities and services to the NGN that will mask the effects of an identity protection problem area rather than remove it completely; - likely to be used in cases where: the cost of asset redesign is unacceptable; the change itself is unnecessarily complex; or redesign does not reduce the risk level to Minor; - can only affect the likelihood of a successful attack, not the impact. The costs involved with each of the framework elements are evaluated in terms of the following: • impact on standards design: - No impact, Low impact, Medium impact and Major impact. • impact on implementation costs: - No impact, Low impact, Medium impact and Major impact. • impact on operation costs: - No impact, Low impact, Medium impact and Major impact. • regulatory impact: - Severe negative impact, Negative impact, No impact, Positive impact, Significant positive impact. • market acceptance: - Severe negative impact, Negative impact, No impact, Positive impact, Significant positive impact.
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7.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
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The costs of implementing an NGN-wide PKI or a hierarchical NGN PKI across multiple administrative domains are evaluated as follows: Impact on standards design - Major Impact on implementation - Major Impact on Operation - Major Regulatory impact - Positive Market acceptance - Negative ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 25 • Implementation strategy: - Asset redesign. • Advantages: - Enables verification of authenticity of messages. - Protects the confidentiality of message contents. - Public keys can be used to derive integrity keys for protecting the integrity of identity information. - Includes authoritative identity information (depending on the key management schema). • Disadvantages: - Public keys include information about the key holder and therefore reveal identity relevant information. - Public key operations are slow relative to symmetric key operations and may not be feasibility for some NGN services. - Jurisdiction of CA may be complex - are they national / EU-wide / other? - Distributing revocation information may aspire DoS like circumstances reducing the resources available to NGN services. - Distributing revocation information may be complex as there are multiple administrative domains. - It involves additional administrative activities for the users. • Implications on NGN Architecture, sub-systems and services: - Addition of a CA hierarchy across administrative domains that can effectively distribute and revoke keys. - Addition of a trust hierarchy between the Cas in the multi-domain CA hierarchy and procedures to continuously evaluate these trust relations. - Additions of entities in the NGN that can detect and act upon misuse of keys. • Ability to address relevant regulatory requirements: - Addresses the regulatory requirement "Where data is transferred in the NGN and contains identity or identity revealing data the confidentiality of the transferred data should be assured". - Addresses the regulatory requirement "Where data is transferred in the NGN and contains identity or identity revealing data the integrity of the transferred data should be assured".
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7.3.2 Public Key Certification
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The costs of extending the NGN with a PKC mechanism are evaluated as follows: Impact on standards design - Medium Impact on implementation - Minor Impact on Operation - Minor Regulatory impact - Positive Market acceptance - Negative • Implementation strategy: - Asset hardening. • Advantages: - Digital signatures can be used to derive confidentiality and integrity keys. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 26 - Enables integrity of identity and identity-related information. - Enables confidentiality of identity and identity-related information (pseudonyms). - Public key of an authoritative entity represent an authoritative identity in a certificate and can be used to enable validation of the authenticity of messages. • Disadvantages: - Certificate hierarchy may be complex as NGN involves multiple administrative domains. - Distributing revocation information may aspire DoS like circumstances reducing the resources available to NGN services. - Distributing revocation information may be complex as there are multiple administrative domains. • Implications on NGN Architecture, sub-systems and services: - Addition of certificate hierarchy and procedure for continuously evaluating and managing trust relations within the hierarchy. - Addition of certification revocation services. - Additions of entities in the NGN that can detect and act upon misuse of certificates. • Ability to address relevant regulatory requirements: - Addresses the regulatory requirement "Where data is transferred in the NGN and contains identity or identity revealing data the confidentiality of the transferred data should be assured". - Addresses the regulatory requirement "Where data is transferred in the NGN and contains identity or identity revealing data the integrity of the transferred data should be assured". - Addresses the regulatory requirement "The NGN shall ensure that any third party is unable to determine the real user name bound to the NGN identity". - Addresses the regulatory requirement "The NGN shall ensure that any third party is unable to determine whether any visible NGN transactions were caused by the same NGN user.
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7.3.3 Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI)
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The costs of introducing PMI into the NGN are evaluated as follows: Impact on standards design - Medium Impact on implementation - Medium Impact on Operation - Medium Regulatory impact - Positive Market acceptance - No impact • Implementation strategy: - Asset redesign and asset hardening. • Advantages: - PMI supports all three traditional access control models and can therefore easily extend existing authorization schemas. - Authorization does not need to include identity information traceable to individual users and can be based on e.g. subscription groups. - Allows multiple SoA and AA across administrative domains and easy transfer of rights to issue authorization tickets (AC). - Support symmetric and asymmetric keying and encryption. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 27 • Disadvantages: - Adds a further level of key management to NGN. - Makes it more difficult for service providers to associate traffic or service usage to individual users. • Implications on NGN Architecture, sub-systems and services: - Addition of an authoritative hierarchy across administrative domains to use for authorization in the NGN. - Addition of application layer security services to handle ACs and authorization requests. - Involve change to current charging routines (may add extra services to trace service usage to individual users or subscribers). • Ability to address relevant regulatory requirements: - Addresses the regulatory requirement: "Only authorized parties can access services and the bindings of the identifiers of an NGN user". - Addresses the regulatory requirement "Where data is transferred in the NGN and contains identity or identity revealing data the confidentiality of the transferred data should be assured". - Addresses the regulatory requirement "Where data is transferred in the NGN and contains identity or identity revealing data the integrity of the transferred data should be assured". - Enables audit without revealing true identity or information that can be used to deduce the true identity.
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7.3.4 Summary of analysis results and recommendations
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The following list of observations summarizes the results of the analysis of the NGN Identity Protection Framework elements: • Identity protection in the NGN requires a combination of registration, authentication and authorization: - registration must ensure that identity and identity-related information are not communicated in clear-text as part of authentication requests, authorization requests and service consumption. • PMI provides all the necessary security capabilities except anonymity, pseudonymity and unlinkability within reasonable cost. • PKC provides all the necessary security capabilities. • PKI does not provide all the necessary security capabilities but includes relatively large implementation and operation costs and implies a major impact on standards design. Therefore, the authentication and authorization model of identity protection in the NGN should be based on the core principles in PMI, extended with a registration and privacy mechanism based on PKC.
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8 Identity management and protection within the NGN
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8.1 NGN identifiers
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TS 184 002 [8] provides a complete overview (dated October 2006) of the identifiers in the NGN and is supplemented by more recent work for IPTV that specifies the iptv:uri in TS 184 009 [9]. The current state identified in these documents is summarised in Table 10 and structured here against the ECN&S regulatory model. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 28 Table 10: NGN identifiers ECN&S layer Abbreviation Long form OSI layer Used as AKA principal ECS IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 7, used as registration name Yes, UMTS-AKA MSISDN Mobile Station international ISDN number 7, used as telephone number SIP URI SIP Universal Resource Identifier Used in SIP Protocol IMPU (as NAI) IMS Public User Identity Used in SIP (equivalent to MSISDN for 2G domain) IMPI (as NAI) IMS Private User Identity Used in SIP REGISTER message to identify subscription Yes, IMS-AKA E.164 ID E.164 telephone number 7, used as name Tel URI Telephone URI Used in SIP Protocol ECN IP address The IP address of the attached user equipment Layer 3 (network) Address realm The addressing domain in which the IP address is significant Layer 3 Physical Access ID The identity of the physical access to which the user equipment is connected Layer 1 and 2 (MAC address) Logical Access ID The identity of the logical access used by the attached user equipment. In the xDSL case, the Logical Access ID may explicitly contain the identity of the port, VP and/or VC carrying the traffic Layer 2 Not defined Subscriber Id The identity of the attached user Not used for communication IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity Not used in communication
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8.2 Identity protection in SIP (current state)
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The SIP protocol in RFC 3325 [10] offers two mechanisms for use in exchanging an asserted identity within trusted networks (a single trust domain). The mechanisms are not intended to offer a general privacy or identity model suitable for use between different trust domains and thus may not apply to the generic NGN where the NGN is modelled as a set of co-operating trust domains. • p-asserted-identity: - The P-Asserted-Identity header is used among trusted SIP entities (typically intermediaries) to carry the identity of the user sending a SIP message as it was verified by authentication. • p-preferred-identity.
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8.2.1 SIP privacy handling in the NGN
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Some support for SIP privacy handling in the NGN is described in TS 133 203 [i.15]. • SIP Privacy handling in IMS Networks: - Privacy may in many instances be equivalent with confidentiality i.e. to hide the information (using encryption and encryption keys) from all entities except those who are authorized to understand the information. The SIP Privacy Extensions for IMS Networks do not provide such confidentiality. The purpose of the mechanism is rather to give an IMS subscriber the possibility to withhold certain identity information of the subscriber as specified in RFC 3323 [i.18] and RFC 3325 [10]. NOTE: It is recommended that the privacy mechanism for IMS networks does not create states in the CSCFs other than the normal SIP states. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 29 • SIP Privacy handling when interworking with non-IMS Networks: - When a Rel-6 IMS is interworking with a non-IMS network, the CSCF in the IMS network shall decide the trust relation with the other end. The other end is trusted when the security mechanism for the interworking (see clause 6.5) is applied as well as the availability of an inter-working agreement. If the interworking non-IMS network is not trusted, the privacy information shall be removed from the traffic towards to this non-IMS network. When receiving SIP signalling, the CSCF shall also verify if any privacy information is already contained. If the interworking non-IMS network is not trusted, the information shall be removed by the CSCF, and retained otherwise. - Because absence of the security mechanism for the interworking (see clause 6.5) indicates an untrusted non-IMS network, separate CSCFs are usually needed to interface with IMS and non-IMS networks. The CSCF interfacing with IMS networks implicitly trusts all IMS networks reachable via the SEG that establishes security according to TS 33.210 [i.20]. A Rel-5 CSCF always assumes this trust relationship and network configuration. For a Rel-6 CSCF, this implicit trust setting shall be a configuration option, that an operator can set according to his network and interface configuration.
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8.3 Identity protection in IMS (IMS-AKA)
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8.3.1 Overview
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Identity protection in IMS is covered by authentication of the IMPI and by registration of IMPUs to the IMPI with any SIP messages containing identity revealing data protected by the allocation of an Ipsec tunnel between the UE and the edge of the IMS network.
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8.3.2 IMS security analysis
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As defined in TS 133 203 [i.15] a set of security associations between the multimedia client and the IMS is required before access is granted to multimedia services. The specification of IMS credentials and their management on a UICC is defined in TS 131 103 [i.16] whilst the algorithm set used by IMS-AKA is described in TS 133 102 [i.17]. NOTE 1: IMS AKA is only mandated when the IMS user accesses IMS through UMTS but is recommended (Annex L of TS 133 203 [i.15]) for when the transport domain is modelled as a Generic IP Transport stratum. UPSF Home NGN I-CSCF Visited NGN P-CSCF Generic IP Transport soft ISIM NGN-UE MM IP networks S-CSCF 1 2 5 3 3 4/5 4/5 UA GE GE Figure 2: The IMS security architecture for fixed broadband access defined in TS 133 203 [i.15] ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 30 For the five different security associations defined for security protection in the IMS shown in Figure 2 there is no relationship between the Transport domain and the IMS domain but only the following associations for the relationship of the NGN user and the NGN core network are considered: 1) Provides mutual authentication between the HSS (through the S-CSCF as a proxy) and the UE. The long-term key in the ISIM and the HSS is associated with the IMPI and the key is exchanged only by means of the UICC containing ISIM. 2) Provides a secure link and a security association between the UE and a P-CSCF for protection of the Gm reference point and the IMS (SIP) signalling it carries where Ipsec ESP is the protection mechanism used. NOTE 2: A pair of associations is created between the source IP address of the UE and the destination IP address of the P-CSCF, and between the source IP address of the P-CSCF and the destination IP address if the UE. The associations are identified by different (and ideally system unique) SPI values. In addition to the explicit relationships considered above there are implicit relationships for protection of the user managed within the network and provided by the Ipsec functionality of Network Domain Security described in TS 33.210 [i.20]. The NDS functionality explicitly protects the following points shown on Figure 2: 1) Provides security within the network domain internally for the Cx-interface. 2) Provides security between different networks for SIP capable nodes and is only applicable when the P-CSCF resides in the Visited Network. 3) Provides security within the network internally between SIP capable nodes and applies when the P-CSCF resides in the HN. Whilst other interfaces and reference points exist in IMS there is no explicit points user centred security association and any protection of data of user data is solely determined by the application of NDS by the operators. The specific security features offered for IMS are as follows: • Secure access to IMS: - Authentication of the subscriber and the network: Applied to the IMPI as principal associated with a shared secret that is pre-configured on the UICC. NOTE 3: Whilst the UICC is mandated in the body of TS 133 203 [i.15] to be in the UE it is also allowed for non- UMTS access to be provided in the IMS Residential Gateway (see Annex L of TS 133 203 [i.15]). - Re-Authentication of the subscriber. - Confidentiality protection: Applied between the UE and P-CSCF (point 2 on Figure 2) using the confidentiality key derived during ISIM authentication and applied to Ipsec ESP for protection of all signalling at IP between the UE and the P-CSCF. - Integrity protection: Applied between the UE and P-CSCF (point 2 on Figure 2) using the integrity key derived during ISIM authentication and applied to Ipsec ESP for protection of all signalling at IP between the UE and the P-CSCF. • Network topology hiding: - The operational details of an operator's network are sensitive business information that operators are reluctant to share with their competitors. While there may be situations (partnerships or other business relations) where the sharing of such information is appropriate, the possibility should exist for an operator to determine whether or not the internals of its network need to be hidden. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 31 For the confidentiality and integrity services defined in TS 133 203 [i.15] the Ipsec security associations require knowledge of the IP addresses of the UE and P-CSCF to be exchanged to allow the Sas to be established. A broad assumption in the IMS/UMTS infrastructure is that the algorithm set is common for key derivation (i.e. to generate the cipher key (CK) and the integrity key (IK)). In the IMS domain CK and IK are used with Ipsec ESP to establish a tunnel between the UA and the P-CSCF. This requires that private data (cryptographic keys) belonging to the IMS (ECS) domain is shared with the Transport (ECN) domain and each domain may be maintained by distinct providers. NOTE 4: This vulnerability (sharing of private data) is common to all SIP environments that rely upon security from the transport domain. NOTE 5: It is noted that it is possible that keys used to protect SIP signalling (CK and IK) on Ipsec may also be used in the UMTS connection.
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8.4 Resolution protocols in NGN
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8.4.1 DNS and ENUM
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The role of DNS, and of ENUM as a specialisation of DNS, is to map a name to an address. From a security and privacy perspective as DNS was not originally designed with security in mind it has evolved with a number of security issues. A TVRA of ENUM (incorporating DNS) is given in TR 187 002 [i.11]. The ENUM and DNS entries contain data that may reveal private data. As the nature of ENUM and DNS is to share data.
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8.5 NGN Authentication, Registration and Authorization
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8.5.1 Overview
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The NGN is a multi-provider network infrastructure where there may be a large number of access providers and service providers. This makes it particularly difficult to protect identities and identity-related information while ensuring that behavioural details cannot be linked to true identities. A multi-provider environment requires the exchange of identity and addressing information so that services can be delivered to the requesting user and that user is correctly charged for the services consumed. Identity information and behavioural details must be both protected for privacy reasons and traced to enable service delivery and charging. Therefore, the NGN must be extended with three conceptual models for identity protection and accountability. The first model handles authentication, registration and forwarding of identity information in the NGN. The second model is the authorization model based on PMI protecting identity and identity related information during service requests and consumption. The third model is an extension to PMI for audit purposes to ensure that NGN users can be held accountable for their actions whilst being protected against identity crime. This means that identification, authentication, authorization and accountability in NGN require the two following mechanisms that each record data for audit: 1) registration; and 2) authorization.
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8.5.2 NGN Authentication and Registration
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8.5.3 NGN Authorization
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NOTE: A model for access control is given in TS 102 165-2 [i.10] that is extended here for NGN authorization. The primary purpose of the NGN Authorization (as a form of access control) service is to counter the threat of unauthorized invocation of operations on the communications system. The use of access control is often considered to explicitly counter threats and their associated threat agents that lead to attacks of unauthorized use, disclosure, modification, destruction and denial of service. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 32 Authorization counter-measures act independently of authentication and confidentiality countermeasures but are used to determine if the identity (confirmed through authentication) is authorized to use the service requested. Figure 3 shows a view of the access control problem wherein a user, represented by the NGN user identifier, is offered access to many services at potentially multiple attachment points. User Registrant- id Registrar SpoA Service 1 m 1 m k 1 m m n n NOTE 1: A single user may be associated with many registrant-ids. NOTE 2: A registrant-id shall be associated with only one user. NOTE 3: A registrant-id shall be associated with only one registrar. NOTE 4: A registrar may be associated with many registrant-ids. NOTE 5: A service may be associated with many SpoAs. NOTE 6: In any registration instance a service shall be associated with only one SpoA. NOTE 7: An SpoA shall be associated with only one Service. NOTE 8: A registrant-id may be associated with many Services. Figure 3: Ordinal relations in the NGN On receipt of a request to access a service from a known entity shall be validated against the access policy maintained for the service. The access policy may be applied in a number of ways: • all requests conforming to a pattern have access; • requests conforming to a pattern from authorized parties have access (white list); • requests conforming to a pattern from known unauthorized parties are denied access (black list). If the requestor is not allowed access to the named service access shall be denied. In the event of any protocol failure no access shall be granted. The generic model for an access control system consists of 3 functional elements: • Access requestor: - The entity requesting access to a specific network entity. • Access policy verifier: - The entity that checks to see if the requestor is allowed to access the specific network entity and which instructs the policy enforcer to enable/disable access. • Access enforcer: - The entity that enables or disables access to a resource for the access requestor under control of the policy validator. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 33 class Access control architecture AccessEnforcer AccessPolicyVerifier AP AccessRequestor «asset» ProtectedEntity May be colocated to protected entity AP-in AP-out +VerifiesPolicy +RequestsAccessTo Figure 4: Pattern for access control mechanism There are a number of deployment models that offer different protection and performance opportunities. The model offered in figure 5 places the access enforcer as a firewall-like entity that intercepts every input to the protected asset, validates it and either forwards it or rejects it. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 34 sd Logical View :AccessRequestor «asset» :ProtectedEntity :AccessPolicyVerifier AccessRequest ValidateAccessRequest ConfirmAccessRequest ValidatedAccessRequest :AccessEnforcer Figure 5: Interaction diagram for access control pattern (firewall mode) The firewall model may be applied in a number of ways: • all requests conforming to a pattern have access; • requests conforming to a pattern from authorized parties have access (white list); • requests conforming to a pattern from known unauthorized parties are denied access (black list).
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8.6 Gap analysis
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8.7 Detailed requirements
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FFS. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 35 Annex A (normative): Protection Profile Proforma for Identity Protection in the NGN Protection Profile Introduction Doc No. TS 187 016 Version 3.1.1 Date 2010-06 Full Title Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Identity Protection (Protection Profile) Overview The present document specifies countermeasures to assure that users of the NGN have protection from abuse of identity. This covers authenticity and integrity countermeasures, including use of existing systems, and credential management in support of identity protection. The present document: • identifies the security objectives, • defines the functional requirements (including those from ISO/IEC 15408-2 [i.6] that apply), • defines the detail requirements for protection of identity in the NGN. In doing so the present document: • defines measures that provide protection of the NGN user identity from malicious traffic analysis; • identifies those measures that allow compliance with the privacy legislation in the regions where the NGN is to be deployed where such legislation is known and public. • identifies in annex B a number of countermeasures in the form of policies or procedures. The present document follows the recommendations of ES 202 382 [2] and provides an IdM PP Proforma which may be used as a basis for developing a PP for identity protection in an NGN subsystem deployment. The identity protection PP proforma is provided in Annex A. TOE Description See Annex D. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 36 Protection Profile TOE Security Environment a.1 Assumptions a.1.1 SIP is the primary signalling system used within the NGN Annex D a.1.2 The UE connects to the NGN at three distinct logical points (Transport, IMS/Service, Application) Annex D a.1.3 The transport attachment is a normal IP termination Annex D a.1.4 it is possible to invoke end-user services directly at the transport layer Annex D a.1.5 It is possible to bypass any service normally connected at either the IMS/Service or Application layers by direct IP access Annex D a.2 Assets (See clause 8.1 and annex D as a basis.) a.2.1 a.2.2 a.3 Threat agents (See clauses 4 and 5 and TR 187 010 [i.19] as a basis.) a.3.1 a.3.2 a.4 Threats (See clauses 4 and 5 and TR 187 010 [i.19] as a basis.) a.4.1 a.4.2 a.5 Security policies (OPTIONAL) a.5.1 a.5.2 Security Objectives 1 Access to NGN services should only be granted to users with appropriate authorization Clause 4 2 The identity of an NGN user should not be compromised by any action of the NGN Clause 4 3 No action of the NGN should make an NGN user liable to be the target of identity crime Clause 4 4 No change in the ownership, responsibility, content or collection of personal data pertaining to an NGN user should occur without that user's consent or knowledge Clause 4 5 Personal data pertaining to an NGN user should be collected by the NGN using legitimate means only Clause 4 6 An audit trail of all transactions having an impact on personal data pertaining to NGN users should be maintained within the NGN Clause 4 7 The identity of an NGN user should not be compromised by any action of the NGN Clause 4 8 No action of the NGN should make an NGN user liable to be the target of identity crime Clause 4 9 The NGN shall comply with the European regulations on privacy (EC Directives 2002/58/EC [4] and 2006/24/EC [5]) Clause 4 10 The NGN shall comply with the European regulations on data protection (EC Directive 95/46/EC [7]) Clause 4 11 The NGN shall comply with the requirements to support law enforcement (EC Directive 2006/24/EC [5] and COM 96/C329/01 [6]) Clause 4 ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 37 Protection Profile c IT Security Requirements (See table 1 in clause 6.1 as a basis.) c.1 TOE security requirements c.1.1 TOE security functional requirements c.1.1.1 c.1.1.2 c.1.2 TOE security assurance requirements (This is business and market segment specific. See ISO/IEC 15408-3 [i.13] for guidelines.) c.1.2.1 c.1.2.2 c.2 Environment security requirements (OPTIONAL) c.2.1 c.2.2 d Application notes (OPTIONAL) e Rationale ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 38 Annex B (informative): Policy and Procedure countermeasures It should not be possible to determine the identifier associated with a particular NGN user by observation or knowledge of another unrelated NGN user. For example, there should be no direct correlation between the NGN identifiers of two fixed line subscribers living in adjacent houses. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 39 Annex C (informative): Security terms and concepts C.1 Security associations The detail design of security in the context of UPM (and user profiles in general) requires consideration of the security associations between objects, i.e. those relationships between objects that are open to attack and which are protected by the provisions of the architecture. Such associations exhibit a number of properties with respect to security and have to be considered in the overall design. Security associations are: • Links that determine assurance. • Links that determine security functionality. A security association defines: • Algorithms used for each security capability. • What security capabilities are available. • What keys are to be used. C.2 Confidentiality The aim of confidentiality measures are to ensure that communication between Alice and Bob, if intercepted by Eve, remains confidential. In other words Eve cannot access the content of the communication. C.3 Integrity The aim of integrity measures is to provide assurance that text has not been modified. The method of operation of an integrity protection and validation mechanism generally involves the following steps: • Prepare a digest of the text at source. • Prepare a digest of the text at the destination. • Compare it to a digest of the text calculated at the destination. If the digests are the same there is a high assurance that there has been no manipulation of the text in transit. The aim of any cryptographic algorithm for integrity is to give assurance that the integrity check sum can only be generated from the original text and that any change in the text will result in a different integrity check sum (i.e. relies on inability of attacker to create a matching check value with random tools and data). C.4 Authenticity The aim of authenticity measures are to prove that Ann is really Ann with the intention to make it difficult for Bob to masquerade as Ann. The person or entity being authenticated is termed the Principal and authentication methods rely upon something that the Principal is, has or knows: • Is = Biometric data. • Has = Token, smartcard. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 40 • Knows = Password. This is sometimes supplemented by how the principal does things (behaviour). The methods of achieving authentication fall into two root classes (for cryptographic authentication): • Challenge - response: - The authenticator challenges the authenticate, who responds, and the authenticator checks the response. The method relies on inability of an attacker to guess the correct response even with knowledge of the challenge and the algorithm used to generate the response. • Keyed digest: - Process some data using tools only the transmitter should have to give a summary, send it. If the receiver can only match the summary using matching tools then it was created and sent by the transmitter. Relies on inability of attacker to create a match with random tools and data. C.5 Authority Authority is the ability to answer the question "is Anne allowed to that?" where "allowed" is a statement of Anne's authority. In many computer systems files have attributes of Read, Write, Delete (and others) and the rights of the user determine which of these capabilities are available to each user. In a more distributed environment such as in telecommunications the assertions of authority are more complex and require some form of Authority Management Infrastructure (AMI) which can be found in two main suites of protocols and objects: • Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). • Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) in X.509 Attribute Certificates. For both SAML and PMI authority, and its validation, may be described as follows: • Authority A was issued at time t by issuer R regarding subject S provided conditions C are valid. A pre-requisite of authority validation is authentication, and that itself has a pre-requisite of identification. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 41 Annex D (informative): Privacy in the NGN - TVRA D.1 Identification of the ToE The concept of a Target of Evaluation (ToE) in security analysis [i.6] is used to set the boundary for an analysis and for specifying the goal, purpose and scope of the analysis. The identification of the ToE is part of producing the inventory of the assets (step 3) of the TVRA method. The ToE specifies the scope of the analysis, describes the assets and their relations, and provides a focus for the analysis. For the purposes of the Identity Protection TVRA, the ToE has been identified as the NGN itself with only the NGN user in the uncontrolled ToE environment. The ToE environment is used to specify the communicating entities associated with possible attack interfaces into the ToE. This is shown in Figure D.1. ECS ECN SpoA TpoA Gm e1, e3, Dj NGN user CpoA: Content point of Attachment ECN: Electronic Communications Network ECS: Electronic Communications Service SpoA: Service point of Attachment TpoA: Transport point of Attachment CpoA Ut ToE (the NGN) Content Provider Figure D.1: Identification of ToE For the purposes of analysis the NGN is considered based on the ECN&S structure identified in the framework directive and inside the NGN the main reference points that equate to the ECN, ECS and Content Provider elements are identified as below: • To ECN: e1 and e3 for address allocation, authentication and authorization; • To ECN: Dj for sending and receiving media and media control flows; • To ECS: Gm for access to IMS; • To Content Provider: Ut. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 42 Figure D.2: Overview of distributed ToE from ISO/IEC 15408-2 [i.6] D.2 Observations on the ToE There is a very strong relationship between IMS AKA and UMTS as defined in clause 6 of TS 133 203 [i.15] and there is a unstated inference that UMTS-AKA and IMS-AKA share a common primary secret as they share the mechanisms for generation of the authentication vector. SIP is one of a class of protocols called Representational State Transfer (REST) that refer to a variant of client-server architecture for distributed systems. The concept of REST is of a request-response dialogue between the client and server where the state of the interaction is not held on the server, but forms a client side only state machine whose current state is communicated to the server with each request. In the NGN use of SIP the responses from the server (the CSCFs) indicate to the client (the UE) the expected content of the next SIP message. This means that the conventional Authentication-challenge, Authentication-response, Authentication-result stage 2 information flows are implemented in SIP using the following messages (see TS 133 203 clause 6.1.1 [i.15]): SIP-Register (to bind IMPI and IMPU); 4xx Auth_Challenge (containing the challenge and keys within the trusted domain); SIP Register (containing the authentication response); 2xx Auth_OK (containing the result). 1) SIP is the primary signalling system used within the NGN and previous studies have demonstrated a number of core weaknesses in the SIP protocol [i.11]; ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 43 2) The UE connects to the NGN at three distinct logical points (Transport, IMS/Service, Application) and the transport attachment is a normal IP termination it is possible to invoke end-user services directly at the transport layer and by that bypassing any equivalent service normally connected at either the IMS/Service or Application layers. NOTE: The impact of any attack that exploits this weakness varies from the point of observation of the attack whereas the likelihood is constant. ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 44 Annex E (informative): Bibliography ETSI TS 133 221: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA)". ETSI TR 180 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Release 3 definition". E.1 NGN ETSI ES 282 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Functional Architecture Release 1". E.2 RACS ETSI ES 282 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control Sub-system (RACS); Functional Architecture". ETSI ES 283 018 (V2.7.1): "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control: H.248 Profile for controlling Border Gateway Functions (BGF) in the Resource and Admission Control Subsystem (RACS); Protocol specification". ETSI TR 183 025 (V2.5.1): "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); H.248 Non-call related procedures and management system interaction". ETSI TS 183 048: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control System (RACS); Protocol Signalling flows specification; RACS Stage 3". ETSI TS 183 017: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control: DIAMETER protocol for session based policy set-up information exchange between the Application Function (AF) and the Service Policy Decision Function (SPDF); Protocol specification". ETSI ES 283 026: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN);Resource and Admission Control; Protocol for QoS reservation information exchange between the Service Policy Decision Function (SPDF) and the Access-Resource and Admission Control Function (A-RACF) in the Resource and Protocol specification". E.3 NASS ETSI TS 183 019: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Network Attachment; User-Network Interface Protocol Definitions". ETSI ES 283 034: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Network Attachment Sub-System (NASS); e4 interface based on the DIAMETER protocol". ETSI ES 282 004: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Functional Architecture; Network Attachment Sub-System (NASS)". E.4 PSTN/ISDN Emulation ETSI ES 282 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES); Functional architecture". E.5 IMS ETSI TS 182 006: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2 description (3GPP TS 23.228 v7.2.0, modified)". ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 45 E.6 CPN ETSI TS 185 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Customer Network Gateway Architecture and Reference Points". ETSI TS 185 005: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Services requirements and capabilities for customer networks connected to TISPAN NGN". ETSI TS 185 006: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Customer Devices architecture and Reference Points". ETSI TS 185 010: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Customer Premises Networks: Protocol Specification (Stage 3)". E.7 TISPAN Adopted 3GPP specifications ETSI TS 131 102: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application (3GPP TS 31.102 Release 6)". ETSI TS 133 141: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Presence service; Security (3GPP TS 33.141 version 8.1.0 Release 8)". ETSI TS 123 003: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification (3GPP TS 23.003 Release 6)". ETSI TS 123 228: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.228 Release 6)". ETSI TS 129 228: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx Interfaces; Signalling flows and message contents (3GPP TS 29.228 Release 6)". ETSI ETSI TS 187 016 V3.1.1 (2010-06) 46 History Document history V3.1.1 June 2010 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies the Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes of the Communication Waiting (CW) service, based on stage 1 and stage 2 of the ISDN call waiting supplementary services. It provides the protocol details in the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and the Session Description Protocol (SDP).
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following cases: - if it is accepted that it will be possible to use all future changes of the referenced document for the purposes of the referring document; - for informative references. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For non-specific references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. [1] ETSI TS 124 615: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Communication Waiting (CW) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem; Protocol Specfication (3GPP TS 24.615 version 8.0.1 Release 8)".". [2] ETSI TS 186 022-1: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN simulation services; Communication Waiting (CW); Part 1: Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS)".
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2.2 Informative references
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The following referenced documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Not applicable. ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 6
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 124 615 [1] apply.
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TS 124 615 [1] apply.
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4 Test Suite Structure (TSS) and Configuration
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Table 1a CW destination_UE CW_U01_xxx originating_UE CW_U02_xxx AS CW_N01_xxx interaction CDIV CW_N02_xxx configuration CW_N03_xxx
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4.1 Configuration
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The scope of the the present document is to test the signalling and procedural aspects of the stage 3 requirements as described in [1]. The stage 3 description respects the requirements to several network entities and also to requirments regarding to end devices. Therfore several interfaces (reference points) are addressed to sadisfy the test of the different entities. Therfore to test the appropriate entities the configurations below are applicable: Testing of the Application Server: This entitie is responsible to perform the service. Hence the ISC interface is the appropriate access point. Figure 1 points to this Figure 1: Applicable interface to test AS functionalities If the ISC interface is not accessable it is also applicable to perform the test of the AS using any NNI (Mw, Mg, Mx) interface (consider figure 2). In case only the Gm interface is accessable this shall be used instead. In this case, be aware that the verification of several requirements is impeded. ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 7 CSCF (and/or AS) Implementation under Test Test System Test System Mw, Mg, Mx Mw, Mg, Mx Figure 2: Applicable interfaces to test using the (generic) NNI interface Figure 3 illustrates the usage of any NNI interface. Testing of User Equipment: There are several requirements regarding to the end devices. Therfore a special configuration appears User Equipment Implementation under Test Test System Gm Figure 3: Applicable configuration to test the User Equipment
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186 022-2
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5 Test Purposes (TP)
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186 022-2
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5.1 Introduction
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For each test requirement a TP is defined.
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eeedf345bea31a43668c7f61aa04eca2
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186 022-2
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5.1.1 TP naming convention
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TPs are numbered, starting at 001, within each group. Groups are organized according to the TSS. Additional references are added to identify the actual test suite and whether it applies to the network or the user (see table 1). ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 8 Table 1: TP identifier naming convention scheme Identifier: <ss>_<iut><group>_<nnn> <ss> = supplementary service: e.g. "CW" <iut> = type of IUT: U User - equipment N Network <group> = group 2 digit field representing group reference according to TSS <nnn> = sequential number (001-999)
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186 022-2
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5.1.2 Test strategy
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As the base standard TS 124 615 [1]contains no explicit requirements for testing, the TPs were generated as a result of an analysis of the base standard and the PICS specification TS 186 022-1 [2]. The criteria applied include the following: • whether or not a test case can be built from the TP is not considered.
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eeedf345bea31a43668c7f61aa04eca2
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186 022-2
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5.2 TPs for Communication Waiting (CW)
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186 022-2
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5.2.1 Test purposes at the destination (user B) UE
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TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_001 Reference 4.5.5.3.2 Selection expression PICS 2/1 AND PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment applies the Communication Waiting indication to the user. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able to notify the user that the communication establishment is waiting. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication INVITE 100 Trying 180 Ringing Indicate Communication Waiting to the user Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 9 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_002 Reference 4.5.5.3.2 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment sends a 180 Ringing if UDUB does not apply. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able to send a 180 Ringing if the termina is not User determined User Busy. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication INVITE 100 Trying 180 Ringing Apply post test routine TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_003 Reference 4.5.5.3.2 Selection expression PICS 2/3 AND PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment sends a 180 Ringing if UDUB does not apply. A Communication Waiting indication is contained in the 180. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able to send a 180 Ringing if the termina is not User determined User Busy. Ensure that Communication Waiting is contained in the Alert-Info header and the value is <urn:alert:service:call-waiting>. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication INVITE 100 Trying 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 10 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_004 Reference 4.5.5.3.2 Selection expression PICS 2/3 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment is able to sent a Communication Waiting indication in a 180 response. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able accept a waiting communication and sends a Communication Waiting indication I the 180 Ringing response. An Alert-Info header is contained in the 180 and the value is <urn:alert:service:call-waiting>. Preconditions: SIP header values: 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication INVITE 100 Trying 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Apply post test routine TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_005 Reference 4.5.5.3.3 Selection expression PICS 2/4 AND PICS 3/2 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment starts timer TAS-CW and the timer is expiered. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able starts timer TAS-CW. If the timer is exired, the User Equipment stops the Communication Waiting to the user. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication INVITE 100 Trying 180 Ringing Start timer TAS-CW Timeout TAS-CW 480 Temporarily Unavailable ACK Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 11 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_006 Reference 4.5.5.3.2 Selection expression NOT PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment sends a 415 Unsupported Media Type if the received INVITE contains a XML CW MIME attachment indicating CW Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able to send a 415 Unsupported Media Type if the User Equipment does not support the CW XML MIME attachment indicating Communication Waiting. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication INVITE 415 Unsupported Media Type ACK ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 12 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_007 Reference 4.5.5.3.3 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment hold s current communication and accepts the waiting call. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able set the current active communication on hold and accepts the waiting communication. After the communication with the previous waiting communication is active, the CW indication is stopped. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication (1) INVITE (2) 100 Trying 180 Ringing (2) INVITE (1, sendonly) 200 OK INVITE (1, recvonly) ACK 200 OK INVITE (2) ACK Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 13 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_008 Reference 4.5.5.3.3 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment is able to release current communication and accepts the waiting call. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able release the current active communication and accepts the waiting communication. After the communication with the previous waiting communication is active, the CW indication to the user is stopped. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication (1) INVITE (2) 100 Trying 180 Ringing (2) BYE (1) 200 OK BYE (1) 200 OK INVITE (2) ACK Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 14 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_009 Reference 4.5.5.3.3 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment is able to accept the waiting call after the current active communication is released by the User A. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able to accept the waiting communication after the remote actove user (user A) realeased the active communication. After the communication with the previous waiting communication is active, the CW indication to the user is stopped. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication (1) INVITE (2) 100 Trying 180 Ringing (2) BYE (1) 200 OK BYE (1) 200 OK INVITE (2) ACK Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 15 TSS CW/destination_UE TP CW_U01_010 Reference 4.5.5.3.3 Selection expression PICS 2/4 Test purpose The terminating User Equipment is able to accept the waiting call after the current active communication is released by the User C. Ensure that the user B User Equipment is able apply the terminating UE procedures upon receipt of BYE from user C. After the communication with the previous waiting communication is released, the CW indication to the user is stopped. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System User Equipment Establish a confirmed communication (1) INVITE (2) 100 Trying 180 Ringing (2) CASE A BYE (2) 200 OK BYE (2) 487 Request Terminated ACK CASE B CANCEL (2) 200 OK CANCEL (2) 487 Request Terminated ACK Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 16
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eeedf345bea31a43668c7f61aa04eca2
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186 022-2
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5.2.2 Test purposes at the originating (user C) UE
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TSS CW/originating_UE TP CW_U02_001 CB reference clause 4.5.2.10 Selection expression PICS 2/2 Test purpose The originating user receives the Communication waiting indication. Ensure that the originating user equipment has the ability to receive the "communication is waiting" indication in the Alert-Info header value <urn:alert:service:call-waiting>. Ensure that this notification is reported to the user. Preconditions: SIP header values: 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: User Equipment Test System INVITE 100 Trying 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Apply post test routine
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eeedf345bea31a43668c7f61aa04eca2
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186 022-2
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5.2.3 Test purposes at the Application Server
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TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_001 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 Test purpose CW indication determined by approaching NDUB condition. The indicationfor CW is sent to the terminating user. Ensure that on receipt of an INVITE request that fulfils the approaching NDUB condition for user B the AS determines that a Communication Waiting condition has occurred. The As sends an INVITE request to the served user. Ensure that the INVITE contains: • a MIME body with the "call-waiting-indication" element contained in a "action" element, with that "action" element in turn contained in a "alternative-service" element, with that "alternative-service" element in turn contained in the "ims-3gpp" root element; and • the Content-Type header field is set to "application/3gpp-ims+xml"; and • the Content-Disposition header field is set to "3gpp-alternative-service". The 180 Ringing sent to the originating user may insert an Alert-Info header indicating Communication Waiting by value <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Preconditions: Terminating user subscribes to the CW simulation service SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication 180 Ringing: possible Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System (ISC) AS Test System (ISC) INVITE INVITE 100 Trying 100 Trying 180 Ringing 180 Ringing Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 17 TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_002 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 AND PICS 1/3 Test purpose CW indication determined by approaching NDUB condition. The AS applies an announcement to the originating user. Ensure that on receipt of an INVITE request that fulfils the approaching NDUB condition for user B the AS determines that a Communication Waiting condition has occurred. The As sends an INVITE request to the served user. Ensure that the INVITE contains: • a MIME body with the "call-waiting-indication" element contained in a "action" element, with that "action" element in turn contained in a "alternative-service" element, with that "alternative-service" element in turn contained in the "ims-3gpp" root element; and • the Content-Type header field is set to "application/3gpp-ims+xml"; and • the Content-Disposition header field is set to "3gpp-alternative-service". Ensure that an announcement is applied to the originating user. The 180 Ringing sent to the originating user may insert an Alert-Info header indicating Communication Waiting by value <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Preconditions: Terminating user subscribes to the CW simulation service SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication 180 Ringing: possible Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System (ISC) AS Test System (ISC) INVITE INVITE 100 Trying 100 Trying 180 Ringing 180 Ringing Apply announcement to originating user Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 18 TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_003 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/2 Test purpose CW indication determined by approaching NDUB condition. Call establishment unsuccessful due to the terminating User Equipment do not support the CW indication in the received INVITE. Ensure that on receipt of an INVITE request that fulfils the approaching NDUB condition for user B the AS determines that a Communication Waiting condition has occurred. The As sends an INVITE request to the served user. Ensure that the INVITE contains: • a MIME body with the "call-waiting-indication" element contained in a "action" element, with that "action" element in turn contained in a "alternative-service" element, with that "alternative-service" element in turn contained in the "ims-3gpp" root element; and • the Content-Type header field is set to "application/3gpp-ims+xml"; and • the Content-Disposition header field is set to "3gpp-alternative-service". If a 415 Unsupported Media Type final response is received from the terminating user, a 486 Busy Here is sent to the originating user. Preconditions: Terminating user subscribes to the CW simulation service SIP header values: INVITE: MIME body Content-Type: application/3gpp-ims+xml Content_Disposition: 3gpp-alternative-service MIME XML ims-3gpp version="1" alternative-service action call-waiting-indication Comments: Test System (ISC) AS Test System (ISC) INVITE INVITE 486 Busy Here 415 Unsupported Media Type ACK ACK TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_004 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/1 Test purpose CW indication determined by receiving a 180 (Ringing) response with a Alert-Info header field set to "urn:alert:service:call-waiting". Ensure that on receipt of an 180 (Ringing) response with a Alert-Info header field set to "urn:alert:service:call-waiting" Communication Waiting is determined. Ensure that the 180 Ringing is passed to the originating user. Preconditions: SIP header values: 180 Ringing: Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System (ISC) AS Test System (ISC) INVITE INVITE 100 Trying 100 Trying 180 Ringing Alert-Info <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> 180 Ringing Alert-Info <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 19 TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_005 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/3 Test purpose CW indication determined by receiving a 180 (Ringing) response with a Alert-Info header field set to "urn:alert:service:call-waiting". An announcement is applied to the originating user. Ensure that on receipt of an 180 (Ringing) response with a Alert-Info header field set to "urn:alert:service:call-waiting" Communication Waiting is determined. Ensure that an announcement is applied to the originating user. Ensure that the 180 Ringing is passed to the originating user. Preconditions: SIP header values: 180 Ringing: Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System (ISC) AS Test System (ISC) INVITE INVITE 100 Trying 100 Trying 180 Ringing Alert-Info <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> 180 Ringing Alert-Info <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Apply announcement to originating user Apply post test routine TSS CW/AS TP CW_N01_006 Reference 4.5.5.2/ [1] Selection expression PICS 1/1 AND PICS 3/1 Test purpose CW indication determined by receiving a 180 (Ringing) response with a Alert-Info header field set to "urn:alert:service:call-waiting". The TAS-CW timer expires. Ensure that on receipt of an 180 (Ringing) response with a Alert-Info header field set to "urn:alert:service:call-waiting" Communication Waiting is determined. Ensure that the 180 Ringing is passed to the originating user. Preconditions: SIP header values: 180 Ringing: Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> 480 Temporarily unavailable: Reason: SIP;cause=408 Comments: Test System (ISC) AS Test System (ISC) INVITE INVITE 100 Trying 100 Trying 180 Ringing Alert-Info <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> 180 Ringing Alert-Info <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Start timer TAS-CW TAS-CW expired 480 Temporarily unavailable CANCEL ACK 200 OK CANCEL 487 Request Terminated ACK ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 20
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186 022-2
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5.3 Interaction with other supplementary services
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eeedf345bea31a43668c7f61aa04eca2
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186 022-2
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5.3.1 Communication diversion services (CDIV)
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TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_001 CB reference 4.6.8.1 Selection expression PICS 1/5 Test purpose A Communication diversion activation is successful while a communication is waiting Ensure that communication forwarding unconditional supplementary service can be activated while a communication is waiting. Preconditions: Configuration of simulation services via Ut interface is applicable SIP header values: HTTP PUT <simservs <call-waiting active="true"/> </simservs> Comments: Test System (Ut) XCAP server Establish a confirmed communication (SIP, Gm) Establish a waiting dialogue (SIP, Gm) HTTP PUT HTTP 200 OK PUT Apply post test routine TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_002 CB reference 4.6.8.1 Selection expression Test purpose A forwarded communication can invoke the CW service Ensure that a forwarded communication (CFU) can invoke the CW service. Preconditions: Configuration of simulation services via Ut interface is applicable SIP header values: INVITE; History-Info header <sip:URI any (PIXIT);index=1, <sip:URI CW served user; cause=302>;index=1.1 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System AS CW AS CDIV Test System Establish a confirmed communication (SIP, Gm) INVITE INVITE 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiti ng> 180 Ringing (2) Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waitin g> Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 21 TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_003 CB reference 4.6.8.3 Selection expression Test purpose A waiting communication can be forwarded no reply. Ensure that if user B has activated the communication forwarding no reply service, then a waiting communication shall still be offered Ensure that waiting communication is able to be forwarded on no reply when the CFNR timer expires. The communication waiting ceases. Preconditions: communication forwarding no reply supplementary service is activated SIP header values: 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System AS CW AS CDIV Test System Establish a confirmed communication (1) INVITE INVITE (2) 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiti ng> 180 Ringing (2) Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waitin g> CANCEL (2) CANCEL (2) 200 OK CANCEL (2) 200 OK CANCEL (2) 487 (2) 487 (2) ACK (2) ACK (2) INVITE (3) INVITE (3) 180 Ringing 180 Ringing 180 Ringing Apply post test routine TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_004 CB reference 4.6.8.3 Selection expression Test purpose A forwarded no reply communication invokes the CW supplementary service. Ensure that forwarded communication invokes the call waiting communication. The "communication is waiting" indication is sent in the 180 Ringing response. Ensure that an active communication is successful after the current commincation is terminated. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: History-Info: <sip: URI any (PIXIT);index=1, <sip: URI CW served user; cause=408;>;index=1.1 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System AS CW AS CDIV Test System Establish a confirmed communication (SIP, Gm) INVITE INVITE 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiti ng> 180 Ringing (2) Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waitin g> Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 22 TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_005 CB reference 4.6.8.5 Selection expression Test purpose A waiting communication can be deflected. Ensure that when receiving the communication waiting indication, user B can invoke the communication deflection service. Preconditions: communication forwarding no reply supplementary service is activated SIP header values: 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System AS CW AS CDIV Test System Establish a confirmed communication (1) INVITE INVITE (2) 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiti ng> 180 Ringing (2) Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waitin g> 302 Moved Temorarily 302 Moved Temorarily ACK ACK INVITE (3) INVITE (3) 180 Ringing 180 Ringing Apply post test routine TSS CW/interaction/CDIV TP CW_N02_006 CB reference 4.6.8.5 Selection expression PICS 1/4 Test purpose A deflected communication invokes the CW supplementary service. Ensure that forwarded communication invokes the call waiting communication. The "communication is waiting" .indication is sent in the 180 Ringing response. Ensure that an active communication is successful after the current commincation is terminated. Preconditions: SIP header values: INVITE: History-Info: <sip: URI any (PIXIT);index=1, <sip: URI CW served user; cause=480;>;index=1.1 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiting> Comments: Test System AS CW AS CDIV Test System Establish a confirmed communication (SIP, Gm) INVITE INVITE 180 Ringing Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waiti ng> 180 Ringing (2) Alert-Info: <urn:alert:service:call-waitin g> Apply post test routine ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 23
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186 022-2
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5.4 Test purposes for Service Configuration
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TSS CW/int TP CW_N03_001 CB reference 4.8 Selection expression PICS 1/5 Test purpose Communication Waiting can successful activated using Ut interface. Ensure that Communication Waiting can be activated by the user, a XML document is sent to the XCAP server. Preconditions: Configuration of simulation services via Ut interface is applicable SIP header values: HTTP PUT <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <simservs xmlns="http://uri.etsi.org/ngn/params/xml/simservs/xcap" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> <call-waiting active="true"/> </simservs> Comments: Test System (Ut) XCAP server HTTP PUT HTTP 200 OK PUT TSS CW/int TP CW_N03_002 CB reference 4.5.1 Selection expression NOT PICS 1/5 Test purpose Communication Waiting can successful SIP based activated. Ensure that Communication Waiting can be activated by the user, the contents of the Request-URI in a SIP INVITE request is used to convey the configuration code to the Application Server that hosts the supplementary service. Preconditions: Configuration of simulation services via CW Application Server is applicable SIP header values: INVITE: sip:<service code>;phone-context=home1.net;user=dialstring SIP/2.0 Comments: Test System (Ut) CW AS INVITE 200 OK INVITE ACK BYE 200 OK BYE NOTE: Service code e.g "*43*" ETSI ETSI TS 186 022-2 V2.1.1 (2009-07) 24 History Document history V2.1.1 July 2009 Publication
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c1de86b509a7d0992f5b1174a12013d6
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187 005
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1 Scope
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The requirement for provision of lawful interception for all Communication Service Providers (CSP) is described in TS 101 331 [3] and the present document gives the stage 1 and stage 2 definition for provision of an interception capability in TISPAN NGN R1. The present document specifies the stage 1 and stage 2 model for Lawful Interception (LI) of TISPAN NGN services as specified by TR 180 001 [5] and covering the following services explicitly: • PSTN/ISDN emulation services (non IMS); and • IMS based services. The provisions in the present document apply only when the target of interception is an NGN user identified as specified in TS 184 002 [6], and when the network supplying services on behalf of the CSP is an NGN as specified by TISPAN in TR 180 001 [5] and ES 282 001 [1]. A guide to the application of the handover specifications is given in informative annexes. NOTE: Handover aspects are not specified in the present document but are described in TS 133 108 [8], ES 201 671 [2] and TS 102 232 [4].
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187 005
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. [1] ETSI ES 282 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Functional Architecture Release 1". [2] ETSI ES 201 671 (V2.1.1): "Telecommunications security; Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". [3] ETSI TS 101 331 (V1.2.1): "Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies". [4] ETSI TS 102 232 V1.4.1: " Lawful Interception (LI); Handover specification for IP delivery". [5] ETSI TR 180 001: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Release 1; Release definition". [6] ETSI TS 184 002: "Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Identifiers (IDs) for NGN". [7] ETSI TS 133 107: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Lawful interception architecture and functions". [8] ETSI TS 133 108: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Handover interface for Lawful Interception (LI)". ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 6 [9] ETSI TR 102 528: " Lawful Interception (LI); Interception domain Architecture for IP networks". [10] ETSI ES 282 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES); Functional architecture". [11] ETSI ES 282 007: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Functional architecture". [12] ETSI TS 182 012: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS-based PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem; Functional architecture".
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187 005
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3 Definitions, and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ES 201 671 [2] and the following apply: Content of Communication (CC): information exchanged between two or more users of a telecommunications service, excluding intercept related information NOTE: This includes information which may, as part of some telecommunications service, be stored by one user for subsequent retrieval by another. Handover Interface (HI): physical and logical interface across which the interception measures are requested from Communications Service Provider (CSP), and the results of interception are delivered from a CSP to a law enforcement monitoring facility interception: action (based on the law), performed by a CSP, of making available certain information and providing that information to a law enforcement monitoring facility interception interface: physical and logical locations within the CSP telecommunications facilities where access to the content of communication and intercept related information is provided NOTE: The interception interface is not necessarily a single, fixed point. intercept related information: collection of information or data associated with telecommunication services involving the target identity, specifically communication associated information or data (e.g. unsuccessful communication attempts), service associated information or data and location information internal network interface: network's internal interface between the Internal Intercepting Function (IIF) and a mediation device Law Enforcement Agency (LEA): organization authorized by a lawful authorization based on a national law to request interception measures and to receive the results of telecommunications interceptions Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF): law enforcement facility designated as the transmission destination for the results of interception relating to a particular interception subject mediation device: equipment, which realizes the mediation function Mediation Function (MF): mechanism which passes information between a network operator, an access provider or service provider and a handover interface, and information between the internal network interface and the handover interface ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 7 target identity: technical identity (e.g. the interception's subject directory number), which uniquely identifies a target of interception NOTE: One target may have one or several target identities.
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AF Administration Function CC Content of Communication CCCI Content of Communication Control Interface CCTF Content of Communication Trigger Function CCTI Content of Communication Trigger Interface CR Change Request CSP Communications Service Provider DF Delivery Function FE Functional Entity FFS For Further Study GSN GPRS Support Node HI Handover Interface HI1 Handover Interface Port 1 (for Administrative Information) HI2 Handover Interface Port 2 (for Intercept Related Information) HI3 Handover Interface Port 3 (for Content of Communication) IIF Internal Interception Function IMS IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem INI Internal Network Interface IRI Intercept Related Information LEA Law Enforcement Agency LEMF Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility LI Lawful Interception MF Mediation Function NGN Next Generation Network NGN-R1 NGN Release 1 PES PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem PoI Point of Interception PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network RTP Real Time Protocol URI Universal Resource Identifier URL Universal Resource Locator
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4 Interception in the NGN
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4.1 LI architecture model
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The architecture for lawful interception consists of a Point of Interception (PoI) for each of the signalling plane and the transport plane, collocated with an NGN Functional Entity (NGN FE) (the specific NGN FE varies with the service being intercepted), that delivers intercepted material to a Mediation Function (MF). The MF acts to mediate between the nationally specified handover interface and the internal interception interface of the NGN as specified in the present document. The target is a specialist NGN user that receives service from the NGN. NOTE 1: A service offered to the NGN user may invoke many NGN-FEs. NOTE 2: There are a number of terms used across ETSI to refer to the various functions outlined in the first paragraph of this clause (4.1). The MF is also known as a Delivery Function (DF) in 3GPP documents, the Internal Network Interception interfaces are also referred to in 3GPP as X interfaces. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 8 The LI capability in the NGN shall always be available and shall be invoked on receipt of instruction from the Law Enforcement Agency or its authorizing agency. The functions of the LI capability shall only be visible to, and their operation shall only be invoked by, authorized parties within the NGN and shall not alter or be impacted by the operation of any other functional entity in the NGN.
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4.2 LI reference model
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The present document adopts the generic reference model for the interception domain from TR 102 528 [9], its internal intercept functions, IRI-IIF, CCTF, and CC-IIF, and the internal interfaces INI1, INI2, INI3, CCTI and CCCI as shown in figure 1. Mediation Function (MF) HI1 HI2 HI3 INI2 INI3 HI INI1a CCCI LEA DOMAIN CSP DOMAIN CCTI CC Internal Intercept Function (CC-IIF) LEA Administration Function Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) INI1b INI1c Administration Function (AF) CC Trigger Function (CCTF) IRI Internal Intercept Function (IRI-IIF) NOTE: Interfaces INI1, INI1a, INI1b, INI1c, CCTF, CCTI and CCCI are not defined in the present document but are shown in the figure for completeness. Figure 1: Reference Model for Lawful Interception from TR 102 528 [9] The reference model depicts the following functions and interfaces: • Intercept Related Information Internal Intercept Function (IRI-IIF) generates signalling intercept material. • Content of Communication Internal Intercept Function (CC-IIF) generates content intercept material. • Content of Communication Trigger Function (CCTF) controls the CC-IIF. • Internal interface INI1 carries provisioning information from the Lawful Interception Administration Function (AF) to the Internal Intercept Functions (IIF). • Internal interface INI2 carries Intercept Related Information (IRI) from the IRI-IIF to the MF. • Internal interface INI3 carries Content of Communication (CC) information from the CC-IIF to the MF. • Content of Communication Trigger Interface (CCTI) carries trigger information from the IRI-IIF to the CCTF. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 9 • Content of Communication Control Interface (CCCI) carries controls information from the CCTF to the CC-IIF. The reference model introduces the CCTF FE that may be used to in a number of configurations to allow for the provisioning of CC-IIF in an IP network. The location of the CCTF is not defined in the present document but considered configuration options are as follows: • CCTF co-located with the LIAF: INI1b is internal to the AF and CCTF. • CCTF co-located with the IRI-IIF: CCTI is internal to the IRI-IIF and CCTF. • CCTF co-located with the IRI-IIF and CC-IIF: CCTI and CCCI are internal to the IRI-IIF, CCTF and CC-IIF. • CCTF co-located with the MF: CCTI is merged with INI2. • A stand alone CCTF: Both CCTI and CCCI are external interfaces. A complete explanation of the functions and interface is found in clause 4 of TR 102 058 [9].
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4.3 Content of interception
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The point of interception shall provide the following data when available in the intercepting network from the communication of the target: • Date and time of interception. • Identity of the target and the correspondents of the target. • Location of the target if available. • Activity of the target. NOTE: Whilst each element of the interception may be described separately they may be delivered in combination, or may be delivered implicitly if no changes are reported (e.g. if location is not changed this knowledge may be delivered implicitly but when location is changed it may be explicitly reported). 5 Interception of non-IMS PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem (PES)
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5.1 Architecture for interception of PES
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The Point of Interception shall be at premises of the CSP, i.e. IRI-IIF and CC-IIF shall reside in equipment under full control (physical access, etc.) of the CSP. Figure 1 (in clause 4.2) identifies the generic architecture for LI. The specific provision of the CC-IIF and IRI-IIF in the NGN for PES services is as shown in figure 2. This architecture for LI applies to a PES whose architecture conform to ES 282 002 [13]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 10 NOTE: Location of CC-IIF is subject to implementation and not all possible options need to be implemented. Figure 2: Reference architecture for interception in the PES environment The point of interception (as defined in clause 4) with respect to IRI, the IRI-IIF, should be implemented in the NGN-FE that hosts the service state machine. The point of interception (as defined in clause 4) with respect to CC, the CC-IIF, should be implemented in a mediastream entity, e.g. Border Gateway.
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6 Interception of IMS
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6.1 Architecture for interception of IMS
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The Point of Interception shall be at premises of the CSP, i.e. IRI-IIF and CC-IIF shall reside in equipment under full control (physical access, etc.) of the CSP. Figure 1 (in clause 4.2) identifies the generic architecture for LI. The specific provision of the CC-IIF and IRI-IIF in the NGN for IMS services is as shown in figure 3. This architecture for LI applies to the IMS subsystem as described in ES 282 007 [11] and TS 182 012 [12]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 11 Figure 3: Reference architecture for interception in the IMS environment
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6.2 Activation, deactivation and interrogation
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The principles described in TS 133 107 [7] apply, with the exception that the list of target identities is restricted to be a SIP URI or a TEL URL.
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6.3 Intercept Related Information
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Communications to or from a targeted subscriber and communications initiated on behalf of a targeted subscriber are intercepted at the P-CSCF or S-CSCF as described in TS 133 107 [7]. The stage 2 definition for interception of IMS found in TS 133 107 [7] shall apply for TISPAN NGN R1. Annex A specifies the parts of TS 133 107 [7] that apply. NOTE 1: When IMS is providing a PES service the interception service identified above and defined in TS 133 107 [7] still applies. In addition, the AGCF may be used as an alternative point of interception. NOTE 2: If the IMS is used for the support of transit communication and national LI requires their interception then the interception of communications in transit may take place at the IBCF or MGCF depending on the characteristics of the interconnected networks involved in the communication.
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6.4 Content of Communication
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Interception of the content of communications takes place at transport processing functional entities identified in the TISPAN NGN R1 architecture (ES 282 001 [1]). Transport processing entities that may provide the CC-IIF are: • An Access Media Gateway Function (A-MGF). • A Core Border Gateway Function (C-BGF). • An Interconnect Border Gateway Function (I-BGF). • A Trunking Media Gateway Function (T-MGF). • A Multimedia Resource Function Processor (MRFP). NOTE 1: Interception at an A-MGF, C-BGF or MRFP takes place when the target of interception is a subscriber of the IMS network. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 12 NOTE 2: If the IMS is used for the support of transit communication and national LI requires their interception then the interception of communications in transit may take place at the I-BGF or T-MGF depending on the characteristics of the interconnected networks involved in the communication. When the interception of communication contents takes place at a C-BGF or I-BGF, interactions between the IRI-IIF and the CC-IIF takes place through the SPDF or the MF. The SPDF or the MF plays the role of a CCTF as identified in clause 4.3. When the interception of communication contents takes place at an A-MGF or T-MGF, the AGCF or MGCF plays the role of the IRI-IIF, and the CCTF (as identified in clause 4.3) is located in the AGCF, MGCF or MF. When the interception of communication contents takes place at an MRFP, the associated MRFC and an Application Server Function collectively, or the MF, play the role of a CCTF. The ASF controls the MRFC via the S-CSCF. In order to ensure that the Application Server gets involved in the communications subject to interception, the Administration Function (ADMF) provisions the S-CSCF with the address of the Application Server or creates an appropriate Initial Filter Criteria in the targeted subscriber's profile in the UPSF. The instances in the network where the interception takes place (Point of Interception) shall be at premises of the CSP, i.e. IRI-IIF and CC-IIF shall reside in equipment under full control (physical access, etc.) of the CSP.
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7 Identification of target of interception
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7.1 ISDN/PSTN services
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In the context of PSTN/ISDN emulation and services, the target shall be identified in the service domain by a globally unique E.164 identity. NOTE: The PES offers seamless ISDN/PSTN service to existing core network customers who will remain identified by their E.164 identity that may be mapped to a system unique SIP-identity.
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7.2 IMS services
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IMS service users shall be identified by either a SIP-url or a tel-url [6].
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8 Security considerations
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The guidelines for security identified in TS 101 331 [3] apply. The provision and actions of the interception measure should be confidential and not discoverable, or alterable, by unauthorized parties. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 13 Annex A (normative): Endorsement statement for TS 133 107 For the stage 2 definition of the interception of IMS and generic IP subsystem parts of TS 133 107 [7] apply normatively in the context of TISPAN NGN. This annex summarizes those parts of TS 133 107 [7] that apply in the context of TISPAN NGN LI. NOTE: Where no specific endorsement statement is given the text in the endorsed document is considered to have only background relevance and not to form part of the normative specification for NGN-R1 interception. Clause Applicability in TISPAN NGN R1 1 2 3 4 Figure 1d applies 5 6 Does not apply 7 Does not apply 7A Applies in full 7A.1 Does not apply (refers only to GSNs) 7A.2 Applies in full 7A.3 Applies in full with extensions defined in the present document 7A.4 Applies in full 7A.5 Does not apply (service defined only for cellular network) 8 9 Does not apply Annex A Does not apply Annex B Does not apply Annex C Annex D Does not apply Annex G Does not apply (informative annex showing history of CRs applied to the document) NOTE: Annexes E and F do not exist in TS 133 107 [7]. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 14 Annex B (informative): Endorsement statement for TS 133 108 NOTE 1: This annex is provided for information pending a full stage 3 mapping from TISPAN NGN to TS 133 108 [8]. NOTE 2: The endorsements stated are indicative and further work is required to fully analyse the data and operations in TS 133.108 and how they should apply in TISPAN NGN. This annex summarizes those parts of TS 133 108 [8] that apply in the context of TISPAN NGN LI. NOTE 3: Where no specific endorsement statement is given the text in the endorsed document is considered to have only background relevance and not to form part of the normative specification for NGN-R1 interception. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 15 Clause Applicability in TISPAN NGN R1 1 2 3 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4.1 Applies in full 4.4.2 4.5 Applies in full 4.5.1 Applies in full 4.5.2 Applies in full 4.5.3 Applies in full 5 Does not apply 6 7 7.1 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 Correlation to the relevant CC is necessary 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Yes / for correlation ASN.1 parameter correlation had to be used 7.5.1 Yes / for correlation ASN.1 parameter correlation had to be used 7.6 Annex A Annex B Requires detail study of ASN.1 to confirm applicability. May not apply B.1 May not apply B.2 May not apply B.3 May not apply B.3a May not apply B.4 May not apply B.5 May not apply B.6 May not apply Annex C Annex D Annex E Annex F Annex G Annex H Applies in full Annex J Does not apply Annex K Does not apply (informative annex showing history of CRs applied to the document) NOTE: Whereas the scope of the present document is interception in the NGN domain the scope of TS 133 108 [8] is handover for the PLMN, the data emanating from the PLMN is described and covers a range of capabilities more specific than those of the NGN (although the NGN is a superset of the capabilities that form the PLMN). ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 16 Annex C (informative): Endorsement statement for TS 102 232 NOTE 1: This annex is provided for information pending a full stage 3 mapping from TISPAN NGN to TS 102 232 [4]. NOTE 2: The endorsements stated are indicative and further work is required to fully analyse the data and operations in TS 102 232 [4] and how they should apply in TISPAN NGN. ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 17 Annex D (informative): Endorsement statement for ES 201 671 NOTE 1: This annex is provided for information pending a full stage 3 mapping from TISPAN NGN to ES 201 671 [2]. NOTE 2: The endorsements stated are indicative and further work is required to fully analyse the data and operations in ES 201 671 [2] and how they should apply in TISPAN NGN. Clause Title Applicability in TISPAN NGN R1 1 Scope 2 References 3 Definitions and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions 3.2 Abbreviations 4 General requirements 4.1 Basic principles for the Handover Interface Applies in full 4.2 Legal requirements Applies in full 4.3 Functional requirements Applies in full 5 Overview of Handover Interface Applies in full 5.1 Handover Interface port 1 (HI1) No: national implementation 5.1.1 Manual interface No: national implementation 5.1.2 Electronic interface No: national implementation 5.2 Handover Interface port 2 (HI2) Applies in full 5.3 Handover Interface port 3 (HI3) Applies in full 6 Specific identifiers for LI Applies in full 6.1 Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID) Applies in full 6.2 Communication Identifier (CID) Applies in full 6.2.1 Network Identifier (NID) Applies in full 6.2.2 Communication Identity Number (CIN) – optional Applies in full 7 HI1: Interface port for administrative information 7.1 Information for the activation of lawful interception Applies in full 7.2 LI notifications towards the LEMF No: national implementation 8 HI2: Interface port for Intercept Related Information 8.1 Data transmission protocols 8.1.1 Application for IRI (HI2 information) 8.2 Types of IRI records 9 HI3: Interface port for Content of Communication 10 Performance and quality 10.1 Timing 10.2 Quality 11 Security aspects Advisable 11.1 Security properties Advisable 11.2 Security mechanisms Advisable 12 Quantitative aspects national matter Annex A (normative): Circuit switched network handover Applies in full Annex B (normative): Packet switched network handover Applies in full Annex C (normative): HI2 Delivery mechanisms and procedures C.1 ROSE C.2 FTP Annex D (normative): Structure of data at the Handover Interface (ASN.1) Annex E (informative): Use of subaddress and calling party number to carry correlation information National matter Annex F (informative): GPRS HI3 Interface Annex G (informative): LEMF requirements – handling of unrecognized fields and parameters ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 18 Clause Title Applicability in TISPAN NGN R1 Annex H (informative): IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) handover Annex I (informative): Latest ASN.1 module versions No Annex J (informative): Bibliography Annex K (informative): Change Request history No ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 19 Annex E (informative): ISDN/PSTN LI reference configurations The figures contained in this annex identify a number of reference configurations for lawful interception in TISPAN NGN networks. Interception configurations for communications to or from a targeted TISPAN NGN subscriber are shown in figures E.1, E.2 and E.3. Interception of communications in transit are shown in figures E.4 and E.5. P-CSCF / AGCF (IRI-IIF) C-BGF (CC-IIF) INI2 IRI Mediation Function /DF2 CC Mediation Function /DF3 HI2 HI3 ADMF IN1a INIc INI3 LEMF HI1 SPDF Figure E.1: Interception at the edge (case 1) AGCF (IRI-IIF) A-MGF (CC-IIF) INI2 IRI Mediation Function /DF2 CC Mediation Function /DF3 HI2 HI3 ADMF INI1a INI1c INI3 LEMF HI1 Figure E.2: Interception at the edge (case 2) ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 20 S-CSCF (IRI-IIF) MRFP (CC-IIF) UPSF INI2 IRI Mediation Function /DF2 CC Mediation Function /DF3 HI2 HI3 ADMF INI1a INI1a INI1c INI3 LEMF HI1 ASF MRFC INI1a Figure E.3: Interception in the core MGCF T-MGF INI2 IRI Mediation Fuction /DF2 CC Mediation Function /DF3 HI2 HI3 ADMF INI1a INI1c INI3 LEMF HI1 Figure E.4: Interception of communications in transit (TDM case) ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 21 IBCF I-BGF INI2 IRI Mediation Fuction /DF2 CC Mediation Function /DF3 HI2 HI3 ADMF INI1a INI1c INI3 LEMF HI1 SPDF Figure E.5: Interception of communications in transit (IP case) ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 22 Annex F (informative): Selection of handover interface Handover of intercepted material should be made by reference to one or more of the following specifications: • ES 201 671 [2]: Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic. • TS 133 108 [8]: Handover interface for Lawful Interception. • TS 102 232 [4]: Handover specification for IP delivery. NOTE: National specifications may be used instead of any of the ETSI specifications cited above. Figure F.1 illustrates configurations of mediation function to map the Handover Interface to the intercepted data that are subject to bilateral agreement between Network Provider and LEA. NOTE 1: CS interception formats from the NGN may map to CS capabilities in TS 133 108 but there may be a requirement for extensions to TS 133 108 in some instances. NOTE 2: IMS interception formats from the NGN may map to IMS capabilities in TS 133 108 but there may be a requirement for extensions to TS 133 108 in some instances. NOTE 3: SIP interception formats from the NGN map to IMS capabilities in TS 133 108 but there may be a requirement for extensions to TS 133 108 in some instances. Figure F.1: Reference Model for LI Mediation Function ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 23 Annex G (informative): Bibliography G.1 ETSI Specifications [A] ETSI EN 300 356 (all parts): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Signalling System No.7; ISDN User Part (ISUP) version 3 for the international interface". [B] ETSI EN 300 403-1 (V1.3.2): "Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. one (DSS1) protocol; Signalling network layer for circuit-mode basic call control; Part 1: Protocol specification [ITU-T Recommendation Q.931 (1993), modified]". [C] ETSI ES 201 158: "Telecommunications security; Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements for network functions". [D] ETSI ETR 330: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); A guide to legislative and regulatory environment". [F] ETSI TS 101 671: "Handover Interface for the lawful interception of telecommunications traffic". [G] ETSI ES 283 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation Sub-system (PES); NGN Release 1 H.248 Profile for controlling Access and Residential Gateways" G.2 3GPP specifications [H] 3GPP TS 29.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification". [I] 3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Numbering, addressing, and identification". [J] 3GPP TS 23.107: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Quality of Service QoS concepts and architecture". [K] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2". [L] 3GPP TS 24.008: "3GPP Technical Specification Group Core Network; Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification, Core network protocol; Stage 3". [M] 3GPP TS 29.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) across the Gn and Gp interface". [N] 3GPP TS 32.215: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Telecommunication Management; Charging Management; Charging data description for the Packet Switched (PS) domain)". [O] 3GPP TS 33.106: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Lawful Interception Requirements". [P] 3GPP TS 23.032: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Universal Geographical Area Description (GAD)". [Q] 3GPP TR 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 24 G.3 ITU-T specifications [R] ITU-T Recommendation Q.763: "Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part formats and codes". [S] ITU-T Recommendation Q.931: "ISDN user-network interface layer 3 specification for basic call control". [T] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation". [U] ITU-T Recommendation X.681: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information Object Specification". [V] ITU-T Recommendation X.682: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint Specification". [W] ITU-T Recommendation X.683: "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications". [X] ITU-T Recommendation X.690: "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)". [Y] ITU-T Recommendation X.880: "Information technology - Remote Operations: Concepts, model and notation". [Z] ITU-T Recommendation X.882: "Information technology - Remote Operations: OSI realizations - Remote Operations Service Element (ROSE) protocol specification". G.4 IETF specifications [AA] IETF STD 0005 (RFC 0791): "Internet Protocol". [AB] IETF STD 0007 (RFC 0793): "Transmission Control Protocol". [AC] IETF STD 0009 (RFC 0959): "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)". [AD] IETF RFC 1006: "ISO Transport Service on top of the TCP". [AE] IETF RFC 2126: "ISO Transport Service on top of TCP (ITOT)". [AF] IETF RFC 2806: "URLs for Telephone Calls". [AG] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". G.5 ISO specifications [AH] ISO 3166-1: "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: Country codes". G.6 ANSI specifications [AI] ANSI/J-STD-025-A: "Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance". ETSI ETSI TS 187 005 V1.1.1 (2006-12) 25 History Document history V1.1.1 December 2006 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies interoperability tests for IMS-based IPTV system for NGN Release 3. It covers the use of main IPTV functionality via different methods as defined in NGN Release 2 as well as NGN Release 3 new use cases and features for IPTV and possible interactions with Voice/Data communications such as Social TV, Incoming Voice call management and notification on TV screen. Interoperability test descriptions have been specified following the ETSI IPT test specification framework described in EG 202 568 [i.1] and interoperability testing methodology defined in EG 202 237 [i.2], i.e. interoperability testing with a conformance relation. Each interoperability test description includes an end user test sequence as well as a table for checking of high level message flows at key standardized reference points in the TISPAN IMS-based IPTV infrastructure [1] and [2].
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2 References
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.
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2.1 Normative references
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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 182 027 (V3.4.1): "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IPTV Architecture; IPTV functions supported by the IMS subsystem". [2] ETSI TS 183 063 (V3.5.2): "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS-based IPTV stage 3 specification". [3] IETF RFC 2326: "Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)". [4] IETF RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". [5] ETSI TS 102 034: "Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB); Transport of MPEG-2 TS Based DVB Services over IP Based Networks". [6] IETF RFC 3376: "Internet Group Management protocol, Version 3". [7] IETF RFC 2616: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1". [8] ETSI TS 183 048: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control System (RACS); Protocol Signalling flows specification; RACS Stage 3". [9] ETSI TS 183 017 (V2.3.1): "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Resource and Admission Control: DIAMETER protocol for session based policy set-up information exchange between the Application Function (AF) and the Service Policy Decision Function (SPDF); Protocol specification". [10] ETSI TS 102 539: "Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB); Carriage of Broadband Content Guide (BCG) information over Internet Protocol (IP)". [11] ETSI TS 102 323: "Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB); Carriage and signalling of TV-Anytime information in DVB transport streams". ETSI ETSI TS 186 020 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 8 [12] ETSI TS 181 016: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Service Layer Requirements to integrate NGN Services and IPTV". [13] ETSI ES 283 030: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Presence Service Capability; Protocol Specification [3GPP TS 24.141 V7.0.0, modified and OMA-TS-Presence-SIMPLE-V1-0, modified]". [14] OMA-TS-SIMPLE-IM-V1-0-20100322-C:"OMA: Instant Messaging using SIMPLE".
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2.2 Informative references
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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI EG 202 568: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); Internet Protocol Testing (IPT); Testing: Methodology and Framework". [i.2] ETSI EG 202 237: "Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); Internet Protocol Testing (IPT); Generic approach to interoperability testing". [i.3] K. Taniguchi and K. Ishikawa: "MSF IMS-based IPTV Test Plan for GMI 2008", Multi Service Forum (MSF) contribution 2008.169.06. [i.4] SCTE-130 part 1: "Advertising Systems Overview".
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3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project A-RACS Access - Resource and Admission Control Subsystem AAA AA-Answer AAR AA-Request AS (IMS) Application Server BC Broadcast CF (Test) Configuration CoD Content On Demand CoDS Content on Demand Server CSCF Call Session Control Function EPG Electronic Program Guide FEC Forward Error Correction I-CSCF Interrogating CSCF IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem IP Internet Protocol IP EN IP Edge Node IPTV Internet Protocol Television MCF Media Control Function MDF Media Delivery Function MLD Multicast Listener Discovery nPVR network-side Personal Video Recorder P-CSCF Proxy CSCF PO Point of Observation PVRS Personal Video Recorder Server RCEF Resource Control Enforcement Function RTSP Real Time Streaming Protocol S-CSCF Serving CSCF SIP Session Initiation Protocol SDP Session Description Protocol ETSI ETSI TS 186 020 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 9 SCF Service Control Function SDF Service Discovery Function SPDF Service-based Policy Decision Function SSF Service Selection Function STA Session-Termination-Answer STR Session-Termination-Request T&A Transport and Access TCP Transmission Control Protocol TD Test Description TISPAN Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking UGC User Generated Content UE User Equipment UPSF User Profile Server Function URI Uniform Record Identifier
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4 IMS-based IPTV Interoperability Test Specification
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4.1 Introduction
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The IMS-based IPTV interoperability test descriptions (TDs) defined in the following clauses are mainly derived from MSF 2008.169.06 [i.3], TS 183 063 [2] and TS 182 027 [1]. More specifically, these TDs focus on SIP/SDP [5], HTTP [7], RTSP [4], IGMP [6] related messaging procedures without RACS described in clauses 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of TS 183 063 [2]. TDs where RACS is involved are described in part in TS 183 048 [8]. The use of FLUTE and DVBSTP transport protocols on Xa reference point as well as IPv6 MLD are at this point not within the scope of the present document.
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4.2 Test Prerequisites
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4.2.1 IP Version and protocols
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4.2.1.1 IP
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The present document assumes that IP-based protocols all use IPv4.
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4.2.1.2 RTSP
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The present document assumes RTSP [3] messages are sent only via TCP.
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4.2.1.3 SIP
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The present document assumes that all SIP [4] messages are sent via UDP to ensure retransmission procedures based on SIP only and to simplify the match procedure between the message flows and real network capture.
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4.2.1.4 IGMP
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The present document assumes that IPTV aware UE requests for multicast group use IGMPv3 [6].
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4.2.1.5 Media transport
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The present document assumes that content is transported using one of the following transport technologies: MPEG2TS encapsulation or direct RTP transport (e.g. H264 over RTP). Further it is assumed that transport of IPTV content within MPEG2-TS layer over RTP and UDP is performed according the procedures defined in TS 102 034 [5]. ETSI ETSI TS 186 020 V3.1.1 (2011-07) 10
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4.2.2 Authentication and Security
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4.2.2.1 SIP
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The present document assumes that no SIP-based authentication is performed.
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4.2.2.2 HTTP
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Personalized service selection is out of the scope of the document. Hence, no HTTP authentication is required from the UE toward SSF or SCF. Also no authentication proxy is needed between the UE and the SCF.
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4.2.3 Supported Options
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4.2.3.1 Signalling Compression
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"No SigComp" is the default signalling configuration in all test descriptions. Tests may be executed with signalling compression if the required nodes support it.
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4.2.3.2 SIP Provisional Message Reliability
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The present document assumes there is no use of SIP 100rel option tag.
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4.2.3.3 SIP precondition option tag
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The present document assumes there is no use of SIP precondition option tag.
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4.2.3.4 SIP timer option tag (Session Timers)
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The present document assumes there is use of SIP timer option tag which supports session timer extension. The inclusion of this option tag in a Supported header field of a SIP request or response indicates that the UE is capable of performing refreshes. The inclusion of this option tag in a Require header of a SIP request indicates that the IMS core network should understand the session timer extension to process the request. Its inclusion in a Require header field of a SIP response indicates that the UE should look for the Session-Expires header field in the response and process it according to [4].
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4.2.4 Content related options
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