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10 Testing negative PAdES baseline signatures
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10.1 PAdES-B-B signatures test cases
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The test cases in this clause have been defined for PAdES-B-B signatures. Table 6 summarizes negative test cases for PAdES-B-B signatures. Table 6: Negative test cases for PAdES-B-B signatures TC ID Description PAdES/BBN/1 Verify a PAdES-B-B signature having a wrong signature (the hash that was signed isn't the hash computed on the specified byte range). PAdES/BBN/2 Verify a PAdES-B-B signature created with an untrusted signing certificate. PAdES/BBN/3 Verify a PAdES-B-B signature created with an expired signing certificate. PAdES/BBN/4 Verify a PAdES-B-B signature created with a revoked/suspended signing certificate. PAdES/BBN/5 Verify a PAdES-B-B signature created with a signing certificate generated by a CA whose certificate is revoked/suspended. PAdES/BBN/6 Verify a PAdES-B-B signature having a wrong byte range.
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10.2 PAdES-B-T signatures test cases
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The test cases in this clause have been defined for PAdES-B-T signatures. Table 7 summarizes negative test cases for PAdES-B-T signatures. Table 7: Negative test cases for PAdES-B-T signatures TC ID Description PAdES/BTN/1 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which, at the time in SignatureTimeStamp, the signer certificate had been already expired PAdES/BTN/2 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which, at the time in SignatureTimeStamp, the signer certificate had been already revoked PAdES/BTN/3 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which the hash value of messageImprint in SignatureTimeStamp does *NOT* match to the hash value of corresponding signature value in signerInfo PAdES/BTN/4 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which, at the time in SignatureTimeStamp, the timestamp signer certificate had been already revoked PAdES/BTN/5 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which, at the time in SignatureTimeStamp, the timestamp signer certificate had been already expired PAdES/BTN/6 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which the timestamp signer certificate was generated by an untrusted CA PAdES/BTN/7 Verify a PAdES-B-T signature in which the timestamp signer certificate was generated by a CA whose certificate is revoked/suspended
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10.3 PAdES-B-LTA signatures test cases
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The test cases in this clause have been defined for PAdES-B-LTA signatures. Table 8 summarizes negative test cases for PAdES-B-LTA signatures. Table 8: Negative test cases for PAdES-B-LTA signatures TC ID Description PAdES/BLTAN/1 Verify a PAdES-B-LTA signature in which the time in the SignatureTimeStamp is ulterior than the time in Document Time Stamp PAdES/BLTAN/2 Verify a PAdES-B-LTA signature in which the Document Time Stamp has a wrong signature (the hash that was signed isn't the hash computed on the specified byte range) ETSI ETSI TS 119 144-2 V2.1.1 (2016-06) 18 History Document history V1.1.1 March 2012 Publication V2.1.1 June 2016 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document: 1) Specifies requirements for qualified certificates, or other non-EU schemes which provide equivalent assurance based ETSI best practices, for electronic seals and website authentication, to be used by payment service providers in order to meet needs of Open Banking including the EU PSD2. These profiles are based on ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1], ETSI EN 319 412-3 [3], ETSI EN 319 412-4 [4], IETF RFC 3739 [7] and ETSI EN 319 412-5 [i.6] (by indirect reference). 2) Specifies additional TSP policy requirements for the management (including verification and revocation) of additional certificate attributes as required by the above profiles. These policy requirements extend the requirements in ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5]. 3) Specifies specific requirements for EU use of the qualified certificates for electronic seals and website authentication, to meet the requirements of the EU PSD2 Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) [i.3]. Certificates for electronic seals can be used for providing evidence with legal assumption of authenticity (including identification and authentication of the source) and integrity of a transaction. Certificates for website authentication can be used for identification and authentication of the communicating parties and securing communications. Communicating parties can be payment initiation service providers, account information service providers, payment service providers issuing card-based payment instruments or account servicing payment service providers. The identifier for the Competent Authority and its country (see clause 5.2.3) can be used to identify the applicable legislation. It can be determined whether a country's' national legislation follows the EU PSD2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2015/2366 [i.2]), and hence whether the RTS [i.3] applies, using the EBA list of NCA identifiers as identified in Annex D. The requirements in clauses 5 and 6 for the certificate profile and policy are common to both EU PSD2 and non- EU Open Banking certificates. The present document identifies information for Open Banking that is provided by a regulatory authority recognized through regulations as competent for providing such information. In the case of EU PSD2 this information is provided through a national register operated by the NCA or a register operated by the European Banking Authority. In addition, the TSP may provide services to the Competent Authority to enable revocation of certificates based on information provided by competent authority. The present document places no requirements on the operation of Competent Authorities providing information for Open Banking.
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI EN 319 412-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures". [2] Void. [3] ETSI EN 319 412-3: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons". ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 8 [4] ETSI EN 319 412-4: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 4: Certificate profile for web site certificates". [5] ETSI EN 319 411-2: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates". [6] Recommendation ITU-T X.680-X.693: "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) & ASN.1 encoding rules". [7] IETF RFC 3739: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile". [8] ISO 3166-1: "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions; Part 1: Country codes". [9] ETSI EN 319 411-1: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements".
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. [i.2] Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC. [i.3] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (Text with EEA relevance). [i.4] Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. [i.5] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". [i.6] ETSI EN 319 412-5: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements". [i.7] IETF RFC 5280: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". [i.8] CA/Browser Forum: "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly- Trusted Certificates". [i.9] EBA/RTS/2017/10: "Final Report on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards setting technical requirements on development, operation and maintenance of the electronic central register and on access to the information contained therein, under Article 15(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (EU PSD2)". ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 9 [i.10] IETF RFC 8446: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3". [i.11] CA/Browser Forum: "Guidelines for The Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates" v1.5.5. [i.12] EBA-Op-2018-7: "Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the use of eIDAS certificates under the RTS on SCA and CSC". [i.13] EBA: "Type of identification numbers used in the EBA PSD2 Register and the EBA Credit Institutions Register". [i.14] EBA: "List of email addresses of the national competent authorities that will follow the process for requesting revocation of eIDAS certificates as set out in the EBA Opinion on the use of eIDAS certificates (EBA-OP-2018-7)". [i.15] EBA: "National identification codes to be used by qualified trust service providers for identification of competent authorities in an eIDAS certificate for PSD2 purposes". [i.16] Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions on a Retail Payments Strategy for the EU (COM(2020) 592 final).
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in EU PSD2 [i.2], ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1], ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] and the following apply: competent authority: authority recognized under the applicable regulations as competent for providing authorization information for open banking EBA PSD2 Register: register of payment institutions and e-money institutions developed, operated and maintained by the EBA under Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 [i.2] NOTE 1: Register is available at https://euclid.eba.europa.eu/register/pir/search. NOTE 2: This is separate from the register of credit institutions developed, operated and maintained by the EBA under Directive 2013/36/EU [i.4]. open banking: regulatory and technical environment for payment and other financial services NOTE 1: In Europe, the regulated environment for Open Banking covers payment is Directive (EU) 2015/2366 [i.2] and associated regulations. NOTE 2: Within the present document Open Banking can include other financial services such as planned for the European Open Finance framework (see COM(2020) 592 [i.16]). NOTE 3: Within the present document, PSD2 on its own is used to denote any regulation for Open Banking. The abbreviation EU PSD2 is used to identify Directive (EU) 2015/2366 and other associated directives or regulations. open banking attributes: attributes representing Open Banking specific information about payment and financial institutions
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3.2 Symbols
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Void. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 10
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1], ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] and the following apply: CRL Certificate Revocation List EBA European Banking Authority EU PSD2 European Payment Services Directive NOTE: See Directive (EU) 2015/2366 [i.2] and national legislation recognized as implementing this directive such as nations in European Economic Area NCA National Competent Authority NOTE: Under EU PSD2 [i.2]. OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol PSP Payment Service Provider PSP_AI Account Information Service Provider PSP_AS Account Servicing Payment Service Provider PSP_IC Payment Service Provider Issuing Card-based payment instruments PSP_PI Payment Initiation Service Provider QSealC Qualified electronic Seal Certificate QTSP Qualified TSP NOTE: See Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1]. QWAC Qualified Website Authentication Certificate RTS Regulatory Technical Standard NOTE: For EU PSD2 strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication. See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 [i.3]. TLS Transport Layer Security NOTE: For example, see IETF RFC 8446 [i.10]. TSP Trust Service Provider
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4 General concepts
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4.1 Use of Certificates for Open Banking
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The present document identifies two classes of certificates used for Open Banking: • A website authentication certificate which makes it possible to establish a Transport Layer Security (TLS, e.g. as specified in IETF RFC 5246 [i.5], IETF RFC 8446 [i.10] or later versions) channel with the subject of the certificate, which secures data transferred through the channel. • A certificate for digital signatures used as electronic seals which allows the relying party to validate the identity of the subject of the certificate, as well as the authenticity and integrity of the signed data. The digital signature provides strong evidence, capable of having legal effect, that given data is originated by the legal entity identified in the certificate. The certificates used for Open Banking are also required to be issued by TSPs which meet any regulatory requirements to ensure their reliability as specified under the applicable regulation. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 11 NOTE: Under EU PSD2 the RTS [i.3] Article 34.1 requires that, for the purpose of identification, payment service providers rely on EU qualified certificates for electronic seals or EU qualified certificates for website authentication. The criteria for recognition of EU qualified certificates are stated in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1] which requires that TSPs issuing EU qualified certificates demonstrate that they meet the requirements for EU qualified trust service providers as per the regulation.
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4.2 Roles
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Roles are attributes which can be used to indicate the specific roles that a payment service provider is authorized to operate under as by the competent authority. Every role is uniquely identified by an ASN.1 [6] object identifier. The roles authorized by the competent authority for the PSP can be unspecified within the certificate and made available, for example, through an open banking directory service. For certificates issued under EU PSD2 the role of the payment service provider can be one or more of the following: i) account servicing (PSP_AS); ii) payment initiation (PSP_PI); iii) account information (PSP_AI); iv) issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC). NOTE 1: A role "issuing of card-based payment instruments" (PSP_IC) is indicated in some public registers as "issuing of payment instruments". NOTE 2: A PSP can be authorized by its Competent Authority to act in one or more roles. NOTE 3: Under EU PSD2 credit institution with a full license can act in its capacity as a third party provider, as specified in EU PSD2 [i.2], and be assigned all three roles under Article 34.3(a)(ii-iv) of the RTS [i.3], namely payment initiation (PSP_PI), account information (PSP_AI), issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC). A credit institution can also act in an account servicing capacity and be assigned the account servicing (PSP_AS) role. NOTE 4: Non-EU PSD2 environments with semantically equivalent roles may use the roles listed above. NOTE 5: If the role is "unspecified" within the certificate then it is expected that information on the activities authorized are made available by other means. NOTE 6: Object identifiers for further roles can be defined outside the scope of the present document. 4.3 Payment Service Provider Authorizations and Services Passporting According to EU PSD2 [i.2] and Capital Requirements Directive [i.4], the Competent Authority (NCA) responsible for payment services approves or rejects authorization of PSPs in their own country. If authorization is granted, the Competent Authority lists the respective PSP in the national public register, together with an identification number, which could be, but is not necessarily, an authorization number. Subject to the Competent Authority approval, PSPs can exercise the right of establishment and freedom to provide services in other Member States. This is called passporting. Information about passporting is published in the public register in the home country of the PSP or the EBA PSD2 Register. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 12 Certificates issued according to the requirements laid down in the present document do not include any attributes granted by countries other than country of the Competent Authority. NOTE: Under EU PSD2 [i.2], certificates do not include any attributes regarding passporting.
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4.4 Authorization Number
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Certificates issued according to the requirements laid down in the present document include an identifier called Authorization Number which can be used by the Competent Authority to uniquely identify a payment service provider. NOTE: Under EU PSD2 for identification, the RTS [i.3] Article 34 requires the registration number used in a qualified certificate, as stated in the official records in accordance with Annex III item I of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1], to be the Authorization Number of the payment service provider. This authorization number is required to be available in the Competent Authority public register pursuant to Article 14 of EU PSD2 [i.2]. For clarification, see https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2019_4679.
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4.5 Registration and Certificate Issuance
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Figure 1 presents the general concept of registration and certificate issuance. The certificate compliant with the profile requirements given in the present document is issued only to payment service providers and related financial institutions authorized by the Competent Authority, confirmation of authorization is publicly available. The Competent Authority can request to be informed about every certificate issued using information it provides. Figure 1: Registration and certificate issuance Before the issuance process can start, the PSP needs to be registered by a Competent Authority and all relevant information needs to be available to TSP for validation: 1) The PSP submits the certificate application and provides all necessary documentation containing Open Banking Attributes to the regulated Trust Service Provider (TSP). NOTE 1: Under EU PSD2 regulated Trust Service Provider (TSP) means granted qualified status according to eIDAS [i.1]. 2) The TSP performs identity validation as described in its certificate policy, which itself shall be compliant with the applicable Open Banking regulatory requirements. 3) The TSP validates Open Banking Attributes using information provided by the Competent Authority. NOTE 2: Under EU PSD2 this includes national public registers, EBA PSD2 Register, EBA Credit Institution Register, other information authenticated by Competent Authority. 4) The TSP issues the certificate in compliance with the profile requirements given in the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 13 5) The TSP sends (e.g. via email) information about the issued certificate to the Competent Authority if that Competent Authority has requested this notification. 6) The PSP uses the certificate. The Competent Authority is the authoritative source of Open Banking Attributes. NOTE 3: According to Article 15 of EU PSD2 [i.2] the European Banking Authority (EBA) operates and maintains an electronic central register (EBA PSD2 Register) that contains the information as notified by the Competent Authorities. This information will be updated regularly in a timely manner as envisaged under Article 15(2) of EU PSD2 [i.2] and Articles 7(5) and 8(5) and (8) of the Regulatory Standards on the EBA Register under EU PSD2 [i.9]. According to the [i.9] the EBA PSD2 Register will contain copies of relevant records of each Competent Authorities' registers. The EBA PSD2 Register can be used instead of the Competent Authority public register as a source of authorization information for payment institutions and electronic money institutions. The EBA Credit Institution Register and the EBA PSD2 Register are two separate registers. NOTE 4: It is suggested that Competent Authorities implement disclosure mechanisms to make registers available to facilitate the verification process of Open Banking entities by TSPs.
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4.6 Certificate Validation and Revocation
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Figure 2 presents the general concept for certificate validation and revocation. Validation process is based on certificate status services provided by the TSP. In addition to handling revocation as specified in ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] a revocation request can originate from the Competent Authority which has authorized or registered the payment service provider. NOTE 1: Under EU PSD2 the list of Competent Authorities following the procedure of revocation as proposed by EBA in EBA-Op-2018-7 [i.12] is published by the European Banking Authority as a related document [i.14]. The TSP revokes the certificate based on a verifiably authentic revocation request. NOTE 2: The present document does not place any specific requirements on the Competent Authority regarding revocation. Figure 2: Illustration of PSP Certificate validation and revocation ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 14
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5 Certificate profile requirements
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5.1 QCStatement for Open Banking
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GEN-5.1-1: The Open Banking Attributes shall be included in a QCStatement within the qcStatements extension as specified in clause 3.2.6 of IETF RFC 3739 [7]. GEN-5.1-2: This QCStatement shall contain the following Open Banking Attributes: a) the role of the payment service provider as identified in clause 4.2; b) the name of the Competent Authority where the payment service provider is registered. This is provided in two forms: the full name string (NCAName) in English and an abbreviated unique identifier (NCAId). See clause 5.2.3 for further details. NOTE 1: Under EU PSD2 specific requirements are laid out in RTS [i.3] Article 34. GEN-5.1-3: The syntax of the defined statement shall comply with ASN.1 [6]. The complete ASN.1 module for all defined statements shall be as provided in Annex A; it takes precedence over the ASN.1 definition provided in the body of the present document, in case of discrepancy. NOTE 2: This extension is not processed as part of IETF RFC 5280 [i.7] path validation and there are no security implications with accepting a certificate in a system that cannot parse this extension. Syntax: etsi-psd2-qcStatement QC-STATEMENT ::= {SYNTAX PSD2QcType IDENTIFIED BY id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement } id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) qcstatement(2) } PSD2QcType ::= SEQUENCE{ rolesOfPSP RolesOfPSP, nCAName NCAName, nCAId NCAId }
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5.2 Encoding specific attributes for Open Banking
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5.2.1 Authorization Number or other recognized identifier for Open Banking GEN-5.2.1-1: The Authorization Number, or other identifier recognized by the Competent Authority, shall be placed in organizationIdentifier attribute of the Subject Distinguished Name field in the certificate: a) for website authentication certificate: as defined in clause 5.3; b) for digital signatures: as defined in clause 5.4. GEN-5.2.1-2: Void. GEN-5.2.1-3: If an Authorization Number was issued by a Competent Authority the subject organizationIdentifier attribute should contain the Authorization Number encoded using the following structure in the presented order: • "PSD" as 3 character legal person identity type reference; • 2 character ISO 3166-1 [8] country code representing the Competent Authority country; • hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8)); • 2-8 character Competent Authority identifier without country code (A-Z uppercase only, no separator); • hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8)); and ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 15 • identifier (authorization number as specified by the Competent Authority. There are no restrictions on the characters used). NOTE 1: Void. NOTE 2: Under EU PSD2 the current list of Competent Authorities identifiers with country codes provided by EBA is referenced in Annex D. Other registries can use underscore ("_") instead of hyphen-minus ("-"), but in the context of the present document hyphen-minus is required when linking country code with a Competent Authority identifier (NCAId). NOTE 3: Other types of identification such as trade registration number or tax identification number can be used instead of the authorization number. NOTE 4: Under EU PSD2 - European Banking Authority published a list of types of identification numbers used in the EBA PSD2 Register and the EBA Credit Institutions Register [i.13]. EXAMPLE: The organizationIdentifier "PSDPL-PFSA-1234567890" means a certificate issued to a PSP where the authorization number is 1234567890, authorization was granted by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (identifier after second hyphen-minus is decided by Polish numbering system). Other examples can include use of non-alphanumeric characters such as "PSDBE-NBB- 1234.567.890" and "PSDFI-FINFSA-1234567-8" and "PSDMT-MFSA-A 12345" (note space character after "A"). NOTE 5: In case of conflict with requirements in ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1], the semantics identifier "id-etsi-qcs- SemanticsId-Legal" specified in clause 5.1.4 of ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1] is not used outside the scope of EU PSD2. GEN-5.2.1-4: If the encoding is not as defined in GEN 5.2.1-3 above another form of identity type shall be carried in organizationIdentifier encoded using the syntax identified by the legal person semantics identifier as defined in ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1], clause 5.1.4.
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5.2.2 Roles of payment service provider
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GEN-5.2.2-1: RolesOfPSP shall contain one or more roles or contain a single entry indicating that the role is unspecified. The roles shall be as declared by a Competent Authority via its public records for the subject PSP. Each role is represented by a role ASN.1 Object Identifier [6] and a name string. GEN-5.2.2-2: If the certificate is issued for EU PSD2 the role object identifier shall be the appropriate one of the four OIDs defined in the ASN.1 snippet below; and GEN-5.2.2-3: If the certificate is issued for EU PSD2 the role name shall be the appropriate one of the abbreviated names defined in clause 5.1: PSP_AS, PSP_PI, PSP_AI or PSP_IC. GEN 5.2.2-3A: If the role is unspecified the role name shall be "Unspecified". GEN-5.2.2-4: For any other role the role object identifier and the role name should be defined and registered by an organization recognized at the European or national level. REG-5.2.2-5: The TSP shall ensure that the name in roleOfPspName is the one associated with the role object identifier held in roleOfPspOid. Syntax: RolesOfPSP ::= SEQUENCE OF RoleOfPSP RoleOfPSP ::= SEQUENCE{ roleOfPspOid RoleOfPspOid, roleOfPspName RoleOfPspName } RoleOfPspOid ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- Object Identifier arc for roles of payment service providers -- defined in the present document etsi-psd2-roles OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) } -- authorised role(s) is Unspecified within the certificate ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 16 id-psd2-role-psp-unspecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 0 } -- Account Servicing Payment Service Provider (PSP_AS) role id-psd2-role-psp-as OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 1 } -- Payment Initiation Service Provider (PSP_PI) role id-psd2-role-psp-pi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 2 } -- Account Information Service Provider (PSP_AI) role id-psd2-role-psp-ai OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 3 } -- Payment Service Provider issuing card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC) role id-psd2-role-psp-ic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 4 } -- Payment Service Provider role name corresponding with OID (i.e. PSP_AS, -- PSP_PI, PSP_AI, PSP_IC) RoleOfPspName ::= UTF8String (SIZE(1..256))
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5.2.3 Name and identifier of the competent authority
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GEN-5.2.3-1: The NCAName shall be plain text using Latin alphabet provided by the Competent Authority itself for purpose of identification in certificates. NCAName ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..256)) NOTE 1: Under EU PSD2 the current list of Competent Authority Names in English provided by EBA is referenced in Annex D. GEN-5.2.3-2: The NCAId shall contain information using the following structure in the presented order: • 2 character ISO 3166-1 [8] country code representing the Competent Authority country; • hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8)); and • 2-8 character Competent Authority identifier without country code (A-Z uppercase only, no separator). GEN-5.2.3-3: The NCAId shall be unique for purpose of identification in certificates and may be provided by the Competent Authority itself. GEN-5.2.3-4: Competent Authority identifier shall be composed of the same values as in the equivalent fields of the authorization number defined in clause 5.2.1. NCAId ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..256)) NOTE 2: The above allows additional buffer space for ASN.1 data encoding in an implementation. See GEN-5.2.3-2 for requirement on the content to be placed in this field. NOTE 3: Under EU PSD2 the current list of Competent Authority Identifiers with country codes provided by EBA is referenced in Annex D. It is not expected that changes to a Competent Authority identifier would affect the validity of certificates already issued. NOTE 4: If the certificate is issued for EU PSD2, NCAId represents the Competent Authority acting under EU PSD2.
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5.3 Profile Requirements for Certificate for TLS Authentication
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GEN-5.3-1: If the certificate issued is for use in TLS authentication outside the context of a web browser then the QNCP-w-gen profile requirements of ETSI EN 319 412-4 [4] should apply. NOTE 1: Void. NOTE 2: Certificates issued for EU PSD2 are required to be Qualified Website Authentication Certificates (QWAC), hence the requirements in ETSI EN 319 412-5 [i.6] for qualified certificates also apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 17 In addition: GEN-5.3-2: The QCStatement for Open Banking as identified in clause 5.1 shall be included in the certificate. GEN-5.3-3: The organizationIdentifier shall be present in the Subject's Distinguished Name and encoded with legal person syntax as specified in clause 5.2.1. NOTE 3: As stated in section 7.1.2.7.10 of the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements [i.8] (as referenced in ETSI EN 319 412-4 [4]) "id‐kp‐serverAuth [RFC5280] MUST be present and id‐kp‐clientAuth [RFC5280] MAY be present". It is not intended that certificates issued under this profile are used just as client authentication certificates. Thus, if the certificate is intended to be used also as a client certificate in mutual authentication then both values id‐kp‐serverAuth and id‐kp‐clientAuth will be present in the extKeyUsage certificate extension.
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5.4 Profile Requirements for Certificates for Digital Signatures
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GEN-5.4-1: If the certificate issued is for electronic seal then the requirements of ETSI EN 319 412-3 [3] shall apply. NOTE 1: Certificates issued for EU PSD2 are required to be Qualified electronic Seal Certificates (QSealC) hence the requirements in ETSI EN 319 412-5 [i.6] for qualified certificates also apply. NOTE 2: Certificate for electronic seal can be recognized as a certificate issued for legal persons. In addition: GEN-5.4-2: The QCStatement for Open Banking as identified in clause 5.1 shall be included in the certificate. GEN-5.4-3: The organizationIdentifier shall be present in the Subject's Distinguished Name and encoded with legal person syntax as specified in clause 5.2.1.
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6 Policy requirements
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6.1 General policy requirements
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OVR-6.1-1: For TSPs issuing QSealCs for EU PSD2: all policy requirements defined for QCP-l shall be applied as specified in ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5]. OVR-6.1-2: For TSPs issuing QWACs: all policy requirements applicable to qualified website certificates shall be applied as specified in ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] except where they conflict with the requirements specified in the present document. OVR-6.1-3: TSPs issuing certificates for EU PSD2 may use the following policy identifier to augment the policy requirements associated with policy identifier QEVCP-w, QNCP-w, or QNCP-w-gen as specified in ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5]. OVR-6.1-3A [CONDITIONAL]: If the certificate is issued for use in TLS authentication outside the context of a web browser, then the QNCP-w-gen policy requirements should apply. OVR-6.1-3B [CONDITIONAL]: If the policy identifier QNCP-w-gen is used, then the TSP shall give precedence to the requirements defined in the present document. OVR-6.1-3C [CONDITIONAL]: If there are no conflicts between the requirements in the present document and those in the CA/Browser Forum EV Guidelines [i.11] then the following QCP-w-psd2 policy identifier may be used in addition to: QEVCP-w. Syntax: -- QCP-w-psd2: certificate policy for EU PSD2 qualified website authentication certificates; qcp-web-psd2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) policy-identifiers(3) 1} ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 18 NOTE 1: If the TSP applies requirements described in the present document that are not in conflict with those described in the CA/Browser Forum EV Guidelines [i.11] and Baseline Requirements [i.8] then a TSP following QCP-w-psd2 can also be conformant to the CA/Browser Forum EV Guidelines [i.11] and Baseline Requirements [i.8]. NOTE 2: Prior to ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] v1.5.1 QEVCP-w was referred to as QCP-w. OVR-6.1-4: For TSPs issuing certificates for digital signatures not for EU PSD2: policy requirements relevant to certificates issued to legal persons defined for NCP shall be applied as specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9]. NOTE 3: This requirement can be met by issuing QSealCs as defined in OVR-6.1-1 above. OVR-6.1-5: For TSPs issuing certificates for website authentication not for EU PSD2 all policy requirements defined for NCP, OVCP or EVCP shall be applied as specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], including requirements for certificates issued to legal persons. NOTE 4: This requirement can be met by issuing QWACs as defined in OVR-6.1-2 above. OVR-6.1-6: The certificates used for Open Banking should be issued by TSPs which are audited by an auditor accredited to carry out audits against ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9] or ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5]. OVR-6.1-7: If the certificate is issued for use in TLS authentication outside the context of a web browser, the requirements specified in CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements [i.8], clause 6.3.2 regarding certificate lifetime need not to be applied.
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6.2 Additional policy requirements
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6.2.1 Certificate profile
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In addition to the applicable requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9] clause 6.2.1, the following shall apply: • OVR-6.2.1-1: The profile requirements specified in clause 5 of the present document shall apply. NOTE: As required for EU PSD2 qualified certificates need also to conform to ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5].
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6.2.2 Initial identity validation
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In addition to the applicable requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], clause 6.2.2 the following shall apply: • REG-6.2.2-1: The TSP shall verify the Open Banking Attributes (see clauses 5.1 and 5.2) provided by the subject using authentic information from the Competent Authority (e.g. a national public register, EBA PSD2 Register, EBA Credit Institution Register, authenticated letter). • REG-6.2.2-2: If the Competent Authority provides rules for validation of these attributes, the TSP shall apply the given rules.
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6.2.3 Identification and authentication for revocation requests
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In addition to the applicable requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], clause 6.2.4 the following shall apply: • REV-6.2.3-1: The TSP shall document the procedure which can be used for submission of certificate revocation requests by Competent Authorities in its certificate policy or practice statement. The TSP shall check the authenticity of certificate revocation requests submitted by NCAs. • REV-6.2.3-2: In addition, the TSP shall provide an email address, or website in English or language understood by the Competent Authority served, for notifications from the Competent Authority about changes of relevant regulatory information of the PSP which can affect the validity of the certificate. The content and format of these notifications may be agreed between the Competent Authority and the TSP. However, the TSP shall investigate this notification regardless of its format. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 19 • REV-6.2.3-3: The TSP shall recognize all of the following methods of authentication of the revocation request issued by the Competent Authority: - a shared secret if it was provided by the TSP to the Competent Authority for revocation; - a digital signature supported by a certificate issued to the Competent Authority by a TSP compliant with a policy according to ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] or another certificate policy as accepted by the TSP. NOTE 1: The digital signature can be used to provide an advanced electronic seal from the Competent Authority or an advanced electronic signature from a signatory acting on behalf of the Competent Authority. • REV-6.2.3-4: If the TSP is notified of an email address where it can contact the respective Competent Authority then it should inform the Competent Authority, using this email address, how the Competent Authority can authenticate itself in revocation requests (see REV-6.2.3-3). NOTE 2: Under EU PSD2 a list of Competent Authorities email addresses notified for this purpose is published by EBA [i.14].
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6.2.4 Publication and repository responsibilities
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In addition to the applicable requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], clause 6.1 the following shall apply: • DIS-6.2.4-1: If the TSP is notified of an email address where it can inform the Competent Authority identified in a newly issued certificate then the TSP shall send to that email address information on the content of the certificate in plain text including the certificate serial number in hexadecimal, the subject distinguished name, the issuer distinguished name, the certificate validity period, as well as contact information and instructions for revocation requests and a copy of the certificate file. NOTE: Under EU PSD2 a list of NCA email addresses notified for this purpose is published by EBA [i.14].
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6.2.5 Certificate renewal
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In addition to the applicable requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], clause 6.3.6 the following shall apply: • REG-6.2.5-1: Before certificate renewal the TSP shall repeat the verification of the Open Banking Attributes to be included in the certificate.
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6.2.6 Certificate revocation
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In addition to the applicable requirements specified in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9], clause 6.3.9 the following shall apply: • REV-6.2.6-1: The TSP shall allow the Competent Authority, as the owner of the Open Banking Attributes, to request certificate revocation following the procedure defined in the TSP's certificate policy or certificate practice statement. The procedure shall allow the Competent Authority to specify a reason, which can be descriptive rather than in a standard form, for the revocation. • REV-6.2.6-2: The TSP shall process such requests and shall validate their authenticity. If it is not clearly indicated or implied why the revocation is requested or the reason is not in the area of responsibility of the Competent Authority, then the TSP may decide to not take action. Based on an authentic request from a Competent Authority, the TSP shall revoke the certificate in a timely manner (see note 2 below) if any of the following conditions holds (in addition to any general requirements of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [9]): - the authorization of the PSP has been revoked; - any PSP role included in the certificate has been revoked. NOTE 1: This does not imply any obligations on the Competent Authority to notify the TSP in such situations. • REV-6.2.6-3: The TSP shall provide an email address, or website in English or language understood by the Competent Authorities served, where a Competent Authority can submit authenticated revocation requests and other notifications relating to revocation. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 20 • REV-6.2.6-4: If the Competent Authority as the owner of the Open Banking Attributes notifies the TSP, that information has changed which can affect the validity of the certificate, but without a properly authenticated request with an acceptable reason for why the certificate should be revoked, the TSP shall investigate this notification regardless of its content and format, and shall revoke the affected certificate(s) if necessary. NOTE 2: As the notification is not specifically requesting revocation the certificate need not be revoke within 24 hours. NOTE 3: Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [i.1] requires that TSPs issuing qualified certificates publish the revocation status of the revoked certificate in a timely manner, and in any event within 24 hours after the receipt of the acceptable revocation request. NOTE 4: Revocation can be considered necessary if the investigation of the TSP confirms based on authentic information that any of the conditions listed above holds. NOTE 5: Granting new PSP roles by the Competent Authority does not necessarily affect the validity of the existing certificate. • REV-6.2.6-5: If the TSP is notified of an email address where it can inform the Competent Authority identified in a revoked certificate then the TSP shall send to that email address information about the certificate revocation. NOTE 6: Under EU PSD2 a list of Competent Authority email addresses notified for this purpose is published by EBA [i.14]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 21 Annex A (normative): ASN.1 Declaration ETSIPSD2QcprofileMod { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) idmod(0) id-mod- psd2qcprofile(0) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS All –- IMPORTS QC-STATEMENT FROM PKIXqualified97 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-qualified-cert-97(35)}; -- statements etsi-psd2-qcStatement QC-STATEMENT ::= {SYNTAX PSD2QcType IDENTIFIED BY id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement } id-etsi-psd2-qcStatement OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) qcstatement(2) } PSD2QcType ::= SEQUENCE{ rolesOfPSP RolesOfPSP, nCAName NCAName, nCAId NCAId } NCAName ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..256)) NCAId ::= UTF8String (SIZE (1..256)) RolesOfPSP ::= SEQUENCE OF RoleOfPSP RoleOfPSP ::= SEQUENCE{ roleOfPspOid RoleOfPspOid, roleOfPspName RoleOfPspName} RoleOfPspOid ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- Object Identifier arc for roles of payment service providers -- defined in the present document etsi-psd2-roles OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) } -- authorised role(s) is Unspecified within the certificate id-psd2-role-psp-unspecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 0 } -- Account Servicing Payment Service Provider (PSP_AS) role id-psd2-role-psp-as OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 1 } -- Payment Initiation Service Provider (PSP_PI) role id-psd2-role-psp-pi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 2 } -- Account Information Service Provider (PSP_AI) role id-psd2-role-psp-ai OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 3 } -- Payment Service Provider issuing card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC) role id-psd2-role-psp-ic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) id-roles(1) 4 } -- Payment Service Provider role name corresponding with OID (i.e. PSP_AS, -- PSP_PI, PSP_AI, PSP_IC) RoleOfPspName ::= UTF8String (SIZE(1..256)) -- Policy Identifiers etsi-psd2-policy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 22 { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) policy-identifiers(3)} -- QCP-w-psd2 certificate policy for PSD2 qualified website authentication certificates qcp-web-psd2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) psd2(19495) policy-identifiers(3) 1} END ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 23 Annex B (informative): Certificates supporting EU PSD2 - clarification of the context The main purpose of a digital certificate is to bind the identity of the owner of a public key to the public key. Using the certificate, it is possible to communicate securely with its owner (the subject). What "securely" means exactly depends on the type of certificate. A website authentication certificate makes it possible to establish a Transport Layer Security (TLS) [i.5] channel with the subject of the certificate, which guarantees confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of all data transferred through the channel. This means that the person or system connecting to the website presenting the certificate can be sure who "owns" the end point of the communication channel (the owner of the certificate), that the data was not changed between the end points, and that nobody else could have read the data along the way. However, the communicated data is only protected while it is travelling through the TLS channel. The data is produced in plain (unencrypted) form by the sender system, and the data will appear in plain (unencrypted) form in the receiver system. Therefore, once the TLS channel is closed, the data loses the protection of its authenticity, integrity and confidentiality, unless it is protected by other means. A website authentication certificate can also be used to identify the calling party (client) when using TLS as described above. This means that the called party (server) can authenticate who "owns" the calling end of the communication channel (the owner of the certificate). Thereby, if both communicating parties have website authentication certificates, they can use them to set up a secure TLS channel providing mutual authentication (MATLS). Qualified website authentication certificates supporting PSD2 are issued only to legal persons and TLS communication between calling party and called party is established between servers. The present document does not directly support natural persons; however, it is suggested that natural persons may represent themselves as legal persons (see below). Under the eIDAS regulation [i.1] an electronic seal is defined in a way which implies that it is created by a legal person. A certificate for electronic seals makes it possible for the owner of the certificate to create electronic seals on any data. The digital signature technology guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the signed/sealed data. This means that the persons receiving digitally signed data can be sure who signed the data (the owner of the certificate), that the data was not changed since it was signed, and they can also present this signed data to third parties as an evidence of the same (who signed it, and that it was not changed since). Therefore, digitally signed data can keep its authenticity and integrity over time when appropriately maintained, regardless of how it is stored or transferred. (An electronic seal can be validated by anyone, at any time, to check whether the integrity and authenticity of the data still holds.) The electronic seal provides strong evidence that given data is originated by the legal entity identified in the certificate. An electronic seal can also protect the authenticity and integrity of data when relayed through a third party, although on its own does not protect against replay attacks. Electronic seals can be applied to requests and responses between PSPs. Whilst electronic seals can only be applied by a legal person, as stated in eIDAS regulation [i.1] recital 68: "The concept of 'legal persons' … leaves operators free to choose the legal form which they deem suitable for carrying out their activity. Accordingly, 'legal persons', within the meaning of the TFEU [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union], means all entities constituted under, or governed by, the law of a Member State, irrespective of their legal form.". Thus, any legally recognized entity can, depending on the applicable legislation, apply an electronic seal including individual persons. Currently, the website certificate profiled in the present document is aimed at legal persons with the same applicability. Certificates for both website authentication and electronic seals can be qualified or non-qualified. The requirements on the issuance of a qualified certificate are more stringent, so using a qualified certificate provides a stronger association of the protected data with the identity of the owner of the certificate. As an example, before issuing a qualified certificate the issuer trust service provider will verify the identity of the owner in a face-to-face meeting and based on government-issued photo ID documents, or by equivalently secure procedures. Hence, qualified certificates can have a stronger legal assumption of the evidential value than non-qualified ones. Both Qualified Website Authentication Certificates (QWACs) and Qualified electronic Seal Certificates (QsealCs) are based on widely implemented technology. QWACs are derived from website certificates supported by all the modern web browsers and commonly used to provide system-to-system secure channels. QsealCs are derived from certificates used with digital signature technology widely employed e.g. for document security, business to business communication and in modern banking networks. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 24 In consequence: • A Qualified Website Authentication Certificate (QWAC) should be used to establish a secure TLS channel to protect the communication (in the transport layer) from potential attackers on the network. The person or system connecting to the website can be sure who they are communicating with, but cannot prove this to third parties. Using QWAC does not give legally assumed evidence of a transaction. • A Qualified electronic Seal Certificate (QSealC) should be used to protect the data or messages (in the application layer) from potential attackers during or after the communication. The electronic seal does not provide confidentiality (i.e. there is no encryption of application data). The person receiving the sealed data can be sure who sealed the data, and can also prove this to third parties even after the communication has ended. QSealC provides evidence of a transaction with legal assumption and can protect the authenticity and integrity of data when relayed through third parties. • A certificate can be either for website authentication or electronic seals, but not both. Therefore, these two types of certificates are not interchangeable. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 25 Annex C (informative): EU PSD2 specific information on QTSP and NCA/EBA interactions C.1 Introduction Whilst the main body of the present document identifies information that can be provided by NCAs and/or the EBA, such as by publishing through their national or European registers, as well as services provided by QTSP that can be used by NCAs, for example to request revocation, the present document places no requirements on the operation of NCAs nor on the EBA. The following text is for information only. C.2 What information is in a qualified certificate RTS [i.3] requires that Payment Service Providers (PSPs) identify themselves. For this purpose, payment service providers are required to rely on: • qualified certificates for electronic seals; or • qualified certificates for website authentication; as defined in the eIDAS Regulation [i.1]. Qualified certificates are issued by Qualified Trust Service Providers (qualified TSPs) on request from Payment Service Provider (PSP). It is aimed that certificates issued by qualified TSPs for PSPs are compliant with the requirements described in the present document. The qualified certificate contains: • identity information about the PSP, such as a PSD2 Authorization Number which makes it possible to unambiguously identify the PSP; • Open Banking Attributes, which can be used by relying parties communicating with the PSP to ascertain its role(s) as authorized by the NCA in the country of registration of the PSP; • the public key of the PSP, which can be used to (depending on the type of certificate) validate the electronic seal or authenticate the website of the PSP. The qualified certificate is a verifiable electronic document, whose integrity and authenticity are protected by the digital signature of the issuing TSP and provides a level of legal assumption under eIDAS Regulation [i.1]. Even when credit institutions are acting only in an account servicing capacity and need not use certificates conforming to the present document, it is highly recommended for them to use qualified certificates for electronic seal and/or qualified certificates for website authentication to secure the communication and documents when communicating with other PSPs. If a payment service provider, including credit institutions, act in its capacity as an account servicing payment service provider, and has decided to use qualified certificates for electronic seal and/or qualified certificates for website authentication to secure the communication and documents when communicating with other PSPs, it is expected to be assigned the role 'account servicing (PSP_AS)' under Article 34(3)(a)(i) of the RTS [i.3]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 26 C.3 Open Banking Attributes in qualified certificates Qualified certificates contain Open Banking Attributes which are: • authorization number if it is issued by the NCA, or registration number recognized on national or European level or Legal Entity Identifier included in the register of credit institutions. The standard requires the registration number to be one recognized under ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1]; • role or roles of PSP; • NCA name (NCAName) and unique identifier (NCAId). C.4 NCA's naming conventions The name of the NCA will be included in the certificate as follows: • NCA Long Name (English Language) Registered name - name registered in appropriate source for PSD2 NCAs. • NCA Identifier containing: - 2 character ISO 3166-1 [8] country code representing the NCA Country; - hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8)); and - 2-8 character NCA identifier (A-Z uppercase only, no separator) without country code, unique within the country. A list of NCA Identifiers including country codes provided by EBA is referenced in Annex D. NCAs can sometimes use underscore ("_") instead of hyphen-minus ("-") but in the context of the present document hyphen-minus is required when linking country code with an NCA identifier. It is not expected that changes to an NCA identifier would affect the validity of certificates already issued. C.5 Validation of Regulatory information about a requesting PSP Before the issuance of any PSD2 certificate, the qualified TSP validates the identity of the requesting PSP and then validates Open Banking Attributes in the public register of the Home NCA (NCA in the country of authorization/registration of the PSP) or the EBA PSD2 Register, which contains updated copy of information from NCA registers, or the EBA Credit Institutions Register. Validation by qualified TSP is based on information and procedure for validation provided by the NCA where available (e.g. a national public register, EBA PSD2 Register, authenticated letter, EBA Credit Institutions Register). When the TSP uses the EBA PSD2 Register for validation of Open Banking Attributes, it will need to check the authenticity of the register. It is suggested that this is done by relying on website authentication certificates. If the information in the EBA PSD2 Register is not sufficient to validate all Open Banking Attributes, the TSP can contact the NCA in the country of registration of the PSP for clarifications. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 27 C.6 Provision of PSD2 Regulatory information about the PSP As per PSD2 [i.2] Article 14, the NCA can provide an online Public Register containing a clear record of the PSP and associated Regulatory information (as mentioned in clause C.3). Article 15 of PSD2 [i.2] defines the EBA PSD2 Register which contains accurate presentation of information originated from NCAs. If the NCA provides the following in a public register this can be used by qualified TSPs to accurately verify the information about the PSP and embed it in a Qualified Certificate as required by the RTS: • A clear definition of the sole Authorization Number to be used by the qualified TSP to represent the PSP, and how it can be identified within the register. • Clear and unambiguous Roles of the PSP, related to a unique Authorization Number, in the context of PSD2, shown in the form: i) account servicing (PSP_AS); ii) payment initiation (PSP_PI); iii) account information (PSP_AI); iv) issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC). • If not clearly stating the Role of the PSP, in the context of PSD2, then a clear mapping to the Services 1-8 as shown in Annex I of PSD2 [i.2], and how the NCA expects unambiguous translation of those to the following roles: i) account servicing (PSP_AS); ii) payment initiation (PSP_PI) as corresponding to payment initiation service as referred to in point (7) of Annex I to PSD2 [i.2]; iii) account information (PSP_AI) as corresponding to account information service as referred to in point (8) of Annex I to PSD2 [i.2]; iv) issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC) as corresponding to issuing of payment instruments and/or acquiring of payment transactions as referred to in point (5) of the Annex I to PSD2 [i.2]. A credit institution can act in its capacity as a third party provider and therefore is expected to use certificates conforming to the present document, this credit institution is assigned all three roles under Article 34.3(a)(ii-iv) of the RTS [i.3], namely payment initiation (PSP_PI), account information (PSP_AI); issuing of card-based payment instruments (PSP_IC). In case there is no PSD2 Authorization Number, other forms of registration recognized by the NCA can be used in place of a PSD2 Authorization Number. If necessary to ensure uniqueness the authorization number can contain a prefix including the type of institution, as listed in PSD2 [i.2] Article 1.1: Credit institution - CI, Payment institution - PI, Electronic money institution (or e-money institution) - EMI, Account information service provider exempted under Article 33 of PSD2 [i.2] (they have only the AIS role) - RAISP. In other case the unique identification number presented in the certificate is e.g. Legal Entity Identifier, VAT number or National Trade Register number. The identification number is required to be one recognized under ETSI EN 319 412-1 [1]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 28 C.7 How NCAs can get information about issued Certificate(s) for PSPs For the purpose of reporting and management of authorizations by the NCA, involving PSD2 Qualified Certificates, the following can be available to NCAs: • In the case of direct interaction between a qualified TSP and an NCA about the issuance of each certificate, then it is suggested that the NCA notifies a contact email address, that TSPs are required to use in order to notify the respective NCA about the issued and/or revoked certificates. • The NCAs can require information about issued certificate to be provided by the qualified TSP, after certificate issuance and acceptance. C.8 How NCAs can request a TSP to revoke issued certificates An NCA can request a qualified TSP to revoke a PSD2 certificate. This can be in the form of an authenticated request which the TSP is required to act upon if valid or a notification which it will investigate. Valid reasons for revocation can include the following scenarios: • information in the Public Register has changed to substantially affect the validity of the PSD2 attributes in the certificate; • the authorization status granted by that NCA has changed (e.g. that PSP is no longer authorized). The qualified TSP will specify the content, format and the communication channels to be used to submit certificate revocation requests in its certificate policy (e.g. a certificate revocation request typically identifies the certificate in question, the submitter of the request and a reason for revocation). It is noted that there is a concern that there is not a common standard for the submission of revocation requests. This could be a matter for future standardization. The qualified TSP will revoke the certificate based on a valid certificate revocation request from the NCA as soon as possible but at least within 24 hours. The request is required to have some form of authentication of the NCA making the request. As an alternative to certificate revocation requests, the NCA as the owner of the information can notify the qualified TSP that relevant information in its public register has changed and it could affect the validity of the certificate. The content and format of these notifications can be agreed between the NCA and the qualified TSP. The qualified TSP will investigate this notification regardless of its format. The notifications can be submitted to the qualified TSP using an agreed communication channel; however, an email address or website will be provided by the qualified TSP as a default means of submission. The qualified TSP revokes the certificate if it finds authentic information which confirms that the Open Banking Attributes in the certificate are no longer valid. The processing of this notification can take longer than the 24 hours required for revocation requests. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 29 Annex D (informative): EU PSD2 specific list of NCA Identifiers provided by European Banking Authority The current list of NCA abbreviations [i.15] is published on the European Banking Authority website at: https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/10180/2882455/5dac742c-c39d-47b5-bd73- f8befb0d2338/NCA%20abbreviations%20for%20inclusion%20in%20eIDAS%20certificates.pdf Note that the list of NCA abbreviations [i.15] is also available through the European Banking Authority website search engine available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/ NCAs can sometimes use underscore ("_") instead of hyphen-minus ("-"), but in the context of the present document, hyphen-minus is required when linking country code with an NCA identifier. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 30 Annex E (informative): Void ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 31 Annex F (informative): Change History Date Version Information about changes May 2018 V1.1.1 Publication. July 2018 V1.1.2 Correction to ASN.1 errors. November 2018 V1.2.1 Added guidance on the interface between QTSPs and PSD2 National Competent Authorities for validating PSD2 specific certificate attributes and supporting revocation. March 2019 V1.3.1 Removed dependency of requirement of CA/B Forum guidelines where this conflicts with ETSI standards. Updated wording. June 2019 V1.3.2 Changed identifier of the Competent Authority HR-CNB to HR-HNB in Annex D. November 2019 V1.4.1 Document contains following changes: • Annex D related to the latest publication by EBA of the list of NCA's identifiers and names. • Procedure for handling future minor and major changes in documents published by EBA, according to QTSP responsibilities and validity of certificates with old identifiers and names in transition period. • Clarifications relating to recent information published by EBA. March 2021 V1.5.1 Making document applicable to open banking outside the EU but based on national regulatory environments equivalent to PSD2. • New definitions of Competent Authority and Open Banking. • Competent Authority identifier defines regulatory environment. • Authorization Number can be used for institutions outside of EU PSD2. • Outside EU PSD2 certificates need not to be qualified. September 2022 V1.6.1 Added Annex E global list of NCA Identifiers provided by Open Banking Europe Update to OVR-6.1-3 to clarify that QCP-w-psd2 policy may be used to augment policies: QEVCP-w (was previously referred to as QCP-w) or the new EN 319 41-1-2 defined policy QNCP-w. June 2024 V1.7.1 1. Adaptation of changes resulting from ETSI EN 319 412-4 V1.3.0 (2023-06). 2. Adaptation of changes resulting from updates to (Qualified) Certificate Policies for Website authentication in EN 319 411-1 and 319 411-2. 3. Update the qualified certificate policies for website authentication recommended for PSD2 and the need for PSD2 specific variant taking into account: • potential use of QNCP-w-gen which does not impose full compliance to CA/B Forum requirements, • PSD2 requirements for certificate renewal, • potential requirement for use with Web browsers as a backup under PSD3. ETSI ETSI TS 119 495 V1.7.1 (2024-07) 32 History Document history V1.1.1 May 2018 Publication (Withdrawn) V1.1.2 July 2018 Publication V1.2.1 November 2018 Publication V1.3.1 March 2019 Publication V1.3.2 June 2019 Publication V1.4.1 November 2019 Publication V1.5.1 April 2021 Publication V1.6.1 November 2022 Publication V1.7.1 July 2024 Publication
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies policy and security requirements for electronic attestation of attributes trust service providers and the attestation of attributes services they provide. More specifically the present document specifies policy and security requirements on attributes issuance and validation of EAA by the trust service provider.
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2 References
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2.1 Normative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI EN 319 401: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers".
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2.2 Informative references
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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. NOTE: The eIDAS regulation as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework. [i.2] ISO/IEC TS 23220-2:2024: "Cards and security devices for personal identification - Building blocks for identity management via mobile devices - Part 2: Data objects and encoding rules for generic eID systems". [i.3] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2977 of 28 November 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards person identification data and electronic attestations of attributes issued to European Digital Identity Wallets. [i.4] OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance. [i.5] EU Architectural Reference Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 8 [i.6] ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022: "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security". [i.7] ISO/IEC 19790:2025: "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Security requirements for cryptographic modules". [i.8] FIPS 140-2: "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules". [i.9] FIPS 140-3: "Development". [i.10] ETSI TS 119 312: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites". [i.11] ETSI EN 319 411-1: "Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements". [i.12] ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 "Personal identification — ISO-compliant driving licence — Part 5: Mobile driving licence (mDL) application".
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI EN 319 401 [1] and the following apply: attribute: characteristic, quality, right or permission of a natural or legal person or of an object NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. attestation of attributes validation: process of verifying and confirming that an attestation of attributes is valid attribute(s) subject: natural persons, legal person or entity the attribute(s) is(are) referring to authentication: electronic process that enables the electronic identification of a natural or legal person to be confirmed, or the origin and integrity of data in electronic form to be confirmed NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. authentic source: repository or system, held under the responsibility of a public sector body or private entity, that contains and provides attributes about a natural or legal person and is considered to be a primary source of that information or recognised as authentic in accordance with Union or national law, including administrative practice NOTE 1: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. NOTE 2: This include any source irrespective of its form that can be relied upon to provide accurate data, information and/or evidence that can be used to provide attributes about a natural or legal person. Electronic Attestation of Attributes (EAA): attestation in electronic form that allows the authentication of attributes NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. electronic attestation of attributes policy: set of rules that indicates the applicability of an EAA to a particular community and/or class of application with common requirements NOTE 1: See clause 4.2.2 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [i.11] for further explanation. NOTE 2: This refers to a sector or service specific policies (i.e. banking, age verification). electronic attestation of attributes practice statement: statement of the practices that an EAASP employs in providing a trust service NOTE: As per ETSI EN 319 401 [1] definition [1]. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 9 electronic attestation of attributes service policy: set of rules that indicates the applicability of EAA service with common controls and security requirements NOTE: See ETSI EN 319 401 [1] trust service policy definition note. Electronic Attestation of Attributes Service Provider (EAASP): natural or legal person who provides one or more EAA services either as a qualified or as a non-qualified trust service provider NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.2]. Electronic Attestation of Attributes subject (EAA subject): natural or legal person that holds the Electronic Attestation of Attributes Electronic Attestation of Attributes subscriber (EAA subscriber): natural or legal person bound by agreement with an Electronic Attestation of Attributes service provider to any subscriber obligations electronic attestation of attributes trust service: electronic service which supports the issuance and/or validation of electronic attestation of attributes electronic identification: process of using person identification data in electronic form uniquely representing either a natural or legal person, or a natural person representing a natural or legal person NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. electronic identification means: material and/or immaterial unit containing person identification data and which is used for authentication to an online service or, where appropriate, to an offline service NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. European digital identity wallet: electronic identification means, which allows the user to securely store, manage and validate identity data and electronic attestations of attributes, to provide them to relying parties and to other users of European Digital Identity Wallets, and to sign by means of qualified electronic signatures or to seal by means of qualified electronic seals NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. Person Identification Data (PID): set of identity attributes that uniquely identifies a natural or legal person in the context of the EEA provisioning NOTE: eIDAS requires PID to be issued in accordance with EU or national law and within the context of a (notified) eID scheme. Qualified Electronic Attestation Of Attributes (QEAA): electronic attestation of attributes, which is issued by a qualified trust service provider and meets the requirements laid down in Annex V of eIDAS Regulation [i.1] NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. Qualified Electronic Attestation Of Attributes Services Provider (QEAASP): electronic attestation of attributes services provider who is granted the qualified status by an EU National Supervisory Authority NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. relying party: natural or legal person that relies upon an electronic identification, European Digital Identity Wallets or other electronic identification means, or a trust service NOTE: As per eIDAS definition [i.1]. wallet unit: specific setup of the wallet solution for an individual user NOTE: As described in CIR (EU) 2024/2977 Article 2.2 [i.3].
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3.2 Symbols
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Void. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 10
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI EN 319 401 [1] and the following apply: ARF EU Architectural Reference Framework CIR Commission Implementing Regulation EAA Electronic Attestation of Attributes EAAP Electronic Attestation of Attributes Policy EAAS Electronic Attestation of Attributes Service EAASP Electronic Attestation of Attributes Service Provider EAASPol Electronic Attestation of Attributes Service Policy EAASPS Electronic Attestation of Attributes Services Practice Statement EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EQ Electronic Qualification EUDIW European Union Digital Identity Wallet HSM Hardware Security Module ISO International Organization for Standardization JWT JSON Web Token LoA Level of Assurance mDL mobile Driving License OpenID4VCI OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance PID Person Identification Data PIM Person Identification Means QEAA Qualified Electronic Attestation of Attributes QEAAS Qualified Electronic Attestation of Attributes Service QEAASP Qualified Electronic Attestation of Attributes Service Provider QSCD Qualified Signature Creation Device QTSP Qualified Trust Service Provider SD-JWT Selective Disclosure JSON Web Token TSP Trust Service Provider VC Verifiable Credentials VI Video Identification WSCA Wallet Secure Cryptographic Application WSCD Wallet Secure Cryptographic Device WUA Wallet Unit Attestation
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3.4 Notation
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Each requirement is identified as follows: REQ-EAASP-< the clause number>-<2-digit number - incremental> identifies requirements referred to the non- qualified service provider. REQ-QEAASP-< the clause number>-<2-digit number - incremental> identifies requirements referred to the qualified service provider. REQ-EAAS-< the clause number>-<2-digit number - incremental> identifies requirements referred to the service.
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4 EAA trust services
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4.1 Overview
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An EAASP is a trusted entity that issues and/or validates attributes referred to attributes' subject. The EAASP acts as a reliable and trusted third-party authority that vouches for the accuracy and validity of the information provided in the EAA. The EEASP is responsible for ensuring the truthfulness, validity, and timeliness of the attributes and data provided by the authentic or other source, the EAA Subject, and the EAA Subscriber. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 11
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4.2 EAA Issuance services
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4.2.1 Initiation
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4.2.1.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.1-01: When issuing an EAA, the EAASP shall verify the identity, along with specific attributes where applicable, of the EAA Subject and/or EAA Subscriber to whom it is issued in accordance with the EAAS and EAASPol. REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.1-02: The EAASP shall verify that the request contains all necessary information for creating the EAA. The EAASP shall collect and verify the following: a) That the EAA subject is identical to the EAA Subscriber; b) When the EAA subject differs from the EAA Subscriber, the EAA Subscriber identity, any additional information required for verification; and c) That the attribute and attribute subject correspond to the EAA Subject. REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.1-03 [CONDITIONAL]: If the requested EAA Subject is not the EAA Subscriber then the EEASP shall obtain and verify evidence (electronic or otherwise) that confirms the right to act on behalf of the EAA Subject. REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.1-04 [CONDITIONAL]: If validation of the attributes is against authentic source, the EAASP shall verify the identity of the authentic source used to verify attributes. EXAMPLE: Verification of identity can be based on a qualified electronic signature or qualified electronic seal. REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.1-05 [CONDITIONAL]: When the EAA Subscriber requests the issuance of an EAA for attributes listed in Annex VI that requires consultation of an authentic source, and provided that national authorities have established a secure access system, the EAASP should be able to verify the authenticity of the attribute(s) by at least electronic means.
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4.2.1.2 EUDIW specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirements apply: REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.2-01 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP is supporting OpenID4VCI [i.4], the EAASP should support an attestation issuance interface compliant with the OpenID4VCI protocol or an equivalent to issue EAAs to Wallet Units, enabling interoperability between trust service providers and Wallet Unit holders. REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.2-02: The EAASP shall implement mechanisms to authenticate Wallet Units before issuing an EAA, verifying that the Wallet Unit comes from a trusted Wallet Provider. REQ-EAASP-4.2.1.2-03: The EAASP shall validate that the Wallet Secure Cryptographic Device (WSCD) of the Wallet Unit complies with the required security level before issuing an EAA. NOTE: This can be validated using information, such a certification information, provided by the Wallet Provider.
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4.2.2 EAA issuance
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4.2.2.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-01: The EAASP shall request only the minimum data necessary for the issuance of the EAA, in line with the principle of data minimization. In particular: REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-02: The EAASP shall ensure that the minimum set of attributes required for the issuance of EAA are acquired in accordance with the EAAP. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 12 REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-03: The EAASP shall verify attributes against one or more authentic or not authentic source, as stated in EAAP. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-04: The EAASP shall define the attributes to be verified by the content and nature of the EAA defined in EAAP. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-05: The EAASP shall not verify identity attributes that are not necessary for the EAA issuance. NOTE: Necessary attributes are those that will be included in the EAA and possibly further attributes, e.g. unique identity, that are necessary to enable validation of the attributes that will be included in the EEA. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-06: The EAASP shall issue EAA securely to maintain their authenticity and integrity. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-07: The EAASP shall take measures against forgery of the EAA. REQ-EAAS-4.2.2.1-08: The EAAS shall be able to authenticate itself towards the subject of the EAA and towards the means into which the EAA is issued. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1.09: The EAASP shall issue an EAA in conformance with the EAASPol and EAAP they claim conformity against. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.1-10 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP supports a status service, EAAS policy shall indicate in EAA revocation information which contains a URL indicating the location where a Relying Party can obtain a status list or revocation list, and an identifier or index for this specific certificate or attestation within that list. EXAMPLE: e.g. short-term EAA does not require a status service to be supported.
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4.2.2.2 Verification of attributes against authentic sources
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REQ-QEAASP-4.2.2.2-01: The QEAASP shall verify the authenticity of the attributes requested by EAA Subject or EAA Subscriber for an identified EAA Subject against the relevant authentic source at national level or via designated intermediaries recognised at national level. REQ-QEAASP-4.2.2.2-02: The verification shall be as required by the EEAP. REQ-QEAASP-4.2.2.2-03: The verification should, if possible, be carried out electronically.
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4.2.2.3 EUDIW specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirements apply: REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-01: Before the EAA is issued to a EUDIW, the EAASP shall verify and validate the PID/LPID received from the Wallet Unit. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-02: The EAASP shall authenticate to the EUDIW instance implementing mutual authentication mechanisms that use an access certificate issued by a qualified Certificate Authority. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-03: The EAASP shall validate the EUDIW instance, whether the EUDIW instance is revoked or suspended. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-04 [CONDITONAL]: When the EAA is issued to a EUDIW with wallet binding, the EAASP SHALL verify that: • the WSCD described in the WUA received from the Wallet Unit has proven possession of the private key corresponding to the public key in the WUA; and • the WSCD has proven possession of the attestation private key. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-05 [CONDITONAL]: When the EAA is issued with wallet binding that includes association between two or more public keys protected by the same WSCD, the EAASP should verify the said keys are associated. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-06 [CONDITIONAL]: When the EAAP specifies that wallet binding is required, the EAASP shall implement device binding, ensuring that the EAA is cryptographically bound to a WSCA used by the EUDI Wallet Unit. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 13 REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-07: The EAASP shall: • verify the authenticity of the Wallet Unit by validating the signature over the Wallet Unit Attestation (WUA); • accept only the trust anchors in the Wallet Provider Trusted List(s) for the Wallet Solutions they support; • verify that the EUDIW Provider is present in a Wallet Provider Trusted List; • authenticate and validate the WUA using the trust anchor(s) registered for the Wallet Provider in the Wallet Provider Trusted List; and • verify that the Wallet Unit's WUA is not revoked. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-08 [CONDITIONAL]: When using the OpenID4VCI protocol or equivalent issuance protocol for issuing EAAs to a EUDIW, the EAASP shall include its access certificate in its client metadata. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-09: The EAASP shall implement measures to mitigate the risk of user linkability, including support for limited-validity attestations or once-only attestations as determined by the EAASP policy. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-10: The EAASP shall support selective disclosure of attributes in issued EAAs, allowing users to share only specific attributes required by a Relying Party without revealing others. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-11: The EAASP shall support mechanisms to mitigate the risk of user linkability, including at least one of the following: a) limited-time attestations that expire after a defined period; b) once-only attestations that can only be presented once; c) rotating-batch attestations that can be used in random order; or d) Per-Relying Party attestations that are unique to specific Relying Parties. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-12 [CONDITIONAL]: When applicable, the EAASP shall implement mechanisms to bind EAAs to the Wallet Unit's device (device binding), ensuring that EAAs cannot be cloned or used from unauthorized devices. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-13: The EAASP shall support batch issuance when requested by the Wallet Unit, allowing multiple EAAs with the same content to be issued simultaneously for privacy-preserving presentations. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-14 [CONDITIONAL]: The EAASP shall ensure that the issued EAA is compatible with both proximity presentation flows (supervised and unsupervised) and remote presentation flows (same-device and cross- device). REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-15: The EAASP may include in the EAA an embedded disclosure policy containing rules determining which types of Relying Party are allowed to receive specific attributes from the attestation. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-16: The EAASP shall implement mechanisms that allow the re-issuance of the EAA upon request from the Wallet Unit, in case of approaching expiration, attribute value changes, or to maintain privacy protections, consistent with the approach chosen to mitigate Relying Party linkability. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-17: The EAASP shall ensure that each EAA contains unique, cryptographically independent elements to prevent tracking across multiple presentations. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-18: The EAASP shall ensure that the technical validity period of EAAs is determined considering both security requirements and privacy implications, particularly the risk of user tracking. REQ-EAASP-4.2.2.3-19: The EAASP should encode and structure the data element identifier and the attribute value according to the schema specified in the relevant rulebook for the Attestation Type. NOTE: PID Rulebook and the mDL Rulebook in Annex 3 of the EU Architectural Reference Framework [i.5]. ISO 23220-2 [i.2] specifies further requirements for attribute schemas which should be applied where no rulebook exists. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 14
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4.2.3 EAA Usage
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4.2.3.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-4.2.3.1-01: The EAASP shall include in its practice statement and terms and conditions at least the following EAA Subject's obligations: a) an obligation to provide the EAASP with accurate and complete information in accordance with the requirements of the present document; b) an obligation for EAA to be only used in accordance with any limitations notified to the EAA Subscriber and/or the EAA Subject; c) prohibition of unauthorized use of the EAA. REQ-EAASP-4.2.3.1-02 [CONDITIONAL]: When the EAA Subscriber acts on behalf of a natural or legal person, the EAASP shall ensure that the EAA Subject has sole control over it, unless national legislation or EAASPol states otherwise.
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4.2.3.2 EUDIW Specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirement applies: REQ-EAASP-4.2.3.2-01: The EAASP shall ensure that issued EAAs can be presented in both proximity flows (supervised and unsupervised) and remote flows (same-device and cross-device), according to user needs and Relying Party requirements.
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4.2.4 EAA Renewal
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4.2.4.1 General
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EAA renewal refers to the issuance of a new EAA to the EAA Subscriber without changing the EAA content, except for the validity period, and public key where present, public key where present, salts hashes, and the issuer signature or sealDone. REQ-EAAS-4.2.4.1-01: Requests for renewal of an EAA issued to an EAA Subscriber shall follow the process set out in the EAAS practice statement. REQ-EAASP-4.2.4.1-02: The EAASP shall check the validity of the EAA to be renewed and that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the EAA Subject is still valid.
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4.2.4.2 EUDIW Specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirement applies: REQ-EAASP-4.2.4.2-03 [CONDITIONAL]: The EAASP shall enable the initiation by a EUDIW Instance of a secured session for re-issuance of attestations issued to this wallet by this EAASP.
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4.2.5 EAA Revocation
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4.2.5.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.1-01: The EAASP shall follow its policies and practices when revoking an EAA. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.1-02: The EAASP shall revoke EAA based on authorized and validated EAA revocation requests as soon as possible and with a delay of no more than 24 hours after the revocation request was received. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.1-03: Revocation process shall always be executed under EAASP's control. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 15 REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.1-04: An EAASP issuing short-term EAA shall explicitly describe in the EAAS practice statement which EAA cannot be revoked through a revocation management service and which EAA cannot be revoked even by the EAASP on its own initiative. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.1-05: The EAASP shall revoke any non-expired EAA when: a) in case of any errors, fraud, or at the request of the EAA Subscriber or EAA Subject; or b) the EAA is no longer compliant with the EAAS practice statement, EAASPol or EAAP under which it has been issued; or c) the EAASP is aware of changes which impact the validity of the EAA; or d) the EAASP is aware of a security incident that affects the EAA. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.1-06: The EAASP shall inform the EAA Subscriber and the EAA Subject, when possible, of a revoked EAA, of the change of status of the EAA. NOTE: It may not be possible to inform the EAA Subject for example, when it is an infant, or when is known to be deceased or otherwise not available to be contacted. REQ-EAAS-4.2.5.1-07: Once an EAA is revoked it shall not be reinstated. REQ-EAAS-4.2.5.1-08: When an EAA is revoked, the revocation shall apply from that time to all instances of the EAA, whether held by the user or previously provided to a relying party.
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4.2.5.2 EUDIW Specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirements apply: REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-01: The EAASP shall implement at least one of the following revocation information mechanisms: • a status list where each bit or group of bits denotes the current revocation status of one EAA, or • a revocation list containing the identifiers of EAAs revoked by the EAASP REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-02: The EAASP shall maintain and publish the necessary information for Relying Parties to verify the authenticity of issued EAAs, including trust anchors and trusted lists when applicable. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-03: The EAASP shall provide a mechanism allowing the Wallet Unit to check the revocation status of an EAA without the need to contact the EAASP directly at the time of presentation, in order to maintain user privacy. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-04 [CONDITIONAL]: If the Wallet Provider has suspended or revoked the Wallet Unit on which that EAA is residing, the EAASP issuing EAAs to EUDIW shall immediately revoke the respective EAAs. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-05: When the EAA is valid for longer than 24 hours, the EAASP shall include in the EAA. • a URL indicating the location where a Relying Party can obtain status information, and • an identifier or index for this specific EAA within that status system. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-06: For EAAs issued to a EUDIW with a validity period of less than 24 hours, the EAASP may omit revocation information if this is explicitly stated in the EAAS practice statement as per REQ-EAASP-4.2.5-05. REQ-EAASP-4.2.5.2-07 [CONDITIONAL]: When multiple EAAs of the same type with the same content and validity are issued in a batch to a EUDIW, the EAASP shall ensure that revocation of one EAA from the batch results in the revocation of all EAAs in that batch. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 16
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4.3 EAA validation services
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4.3.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-4.3.1-01 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAA-policy requires that the EAA supports a status service, the EAASP shall provide information and/or services for checking the validity status of the EAA. In particular: • REQ-EAASP-4.3.1-02: Revocation status information shall be available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Upon system failure, EAAS or other factors which are not under the control of the EAASP, the EAASP shall make best endeavours to ensure that this information service is not unavailable for longer than a maximum period of time as denoted in the EAAS practice statement. • REQ-EAASP-4.3.1-03: The EAASP shall ensure integrity and authenticity of the validity status information. • REQ-EAASP-4.3.1-04: Revocation status information shall include information on the status of EAA at least until the EAA expires. • REQ-EAASP-4.3.1-05: The EAASP shall make revocation status information publicly and internationally available. REQ-QEAASP-4.3.1-06: The QEAASP shall have no information regarding the usage of the (Q)EAAs issued when a validity status check is performed.
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4.3.2 EUDIW Specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirements apply: REQ-EAASP-4.3.2-01: The EAASP shall publish its trust anchors in a Trusted List that is accessible to Relying Parties to enable signature verification. REQ-EAASP-4.3.2-02: The EAASP shall support validation of EAAs presented in both proximity flows (supervised and unsupervised) and remote flows (same-device and cross-device). REQ-EAASP-4.3.2-03: The EAASP shall support at least one of the following attestation formats with their corresponding proof mechanisms: • ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.12] with its defined proof mechanisms • SD-JWT VC (Selective Disclosure for JWT-based Verifiable Credentials) with its defined proof mechanisms REQ-EAASP-4.3.2-04: The EAASP shall provide the necessary mechanisms to enable Relying Parties to verify device binding of the EAA to ensure it was not copied or replayed from another device. REQ-EAASP-4.3.2-05: The EAASP shall support mechanisms that enable verification of combined presentations of attributes when multiple EAAs are presented together, including cryptographic verification that the EAAs belong to the same user. REQ-EAASP-4.3.2-06: The EAASP shall provide validation mechanisms that can verify the WSCD signs them at the required Level of Assurance (LoA).
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5 Risk Assessment
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REQ-EAASP-5-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 5 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 17
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6 General provision on policies and practices
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6.1 EAAS practice statement
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6.1.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-6.1.1-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 6.1 shall apply. In addition to that: • REQ-EAASP-6.1-02: EAASP should document the revocation mechanism in the EAAS practice statement.
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6.1.2 EUDIW specific
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REQ-EAASP-6.1.2-01: The EAASP shall document in its EAAS practice statement how it addresses the risk of Attestation Provider linkability, including measures taken to prevent colluding with Relying Parties to track users.
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6.2 Terms and conditions
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REQ-EAASP-6.2-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 6.2 shall apply. In addition the following particular requirements apply: • REQ-EAASP-6.2-02: The terms and conditions shall include at minimum the elements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], REQ-6.2-02 and the indication of what constitutes EAA service acceptance. • REQ-EAASP-6.2.4-03: The EAASP shall record the agreement with the EAA Subscriber. • REQ-EAASP-6.2.4-04: The agreement shall involve explicit acceptance of the terms and conditions by a wilful act which can be later supported by evidence. • REQ-EAASP-6.2.4-05: The EAASP shall obtain prior consent from EAA Subscribers and EAA Subject, when possible, before informing clearly how their personal data will be used and stored. NOTE: It may not be possible to inform to and obtain prior consent from the EAA Subject for example, when it is an object or an infant. • REQ-EAASP-6.2.4-06: The records identified above shall be retained for the period of time as indicated to the EAA Subscriber as part of the terms and conditions.
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6.3 Information security policy
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REQ-EAASP-6.3-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 6.3 shall apply.
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6.4 EAA policy
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An EAAP is a defined set of rules that outlines the applicability of a specific electronic attestation of attributes to a particular community or class of applications. The EAA policy ensures that the attestation of attributes adheres to common requirements regarding security, integrity, and operational controls, providing a trusted framework for the use of attributes in digital environments. An EAA policy specifies the conditions under which attributes may be attested electronically, ensuring its validity and trustworthiness for use in specific sectors or communities. It establishes the baseline rules that apply to the issuance and usage of attributes. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 18 While EAASP define the mandatory requirements for operating trust services, EAA policies focus specifically on the rules governing the attestation of attributes. In some cases, EAA policies may be included within the broader terms and conditions of a trust service, especially for non-qualified EAA services. EAA policy may apply to various use cases, setting clear guidelines for the community or application in question, ensuring compliance with the regulatory, operational, and security requirements relevant to each case. EXAMPLE: Sectors like, banking, healthcare, or age verification, and varying levels, such as baseline EAA policy (Non-QEAAP) and Extended EAA policy (QEAAP). EAA policy may also include information about EAA elements as the following: • Attribute schema defining the structure, logical organisation, type and namespace(s) of the EAA; and/or • Additional information such as: - information EAA issuer, - EAA verification mechanisms, - underlying identity assurance, - Trust Framework to which the properties are related, and - Proof of possession, and/or • Data formats (e.g. its character sets, encoding and serialisation), and/or • Proof mechanisms defining the methods used to secure the EAA for integrity and authenticity, including selective disclosure.
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7 EAASP management and operation
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7.1 Internal organization
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7.1.1 Organization reliability
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REQ-EAASP-7.1.1-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.1.1 shall apply. In addition the following particular requirements apply: • REQ-EAASP-7.1.1-02: The parts of the EAASP concerned with EAA issuance and revocation management shall be independent for its decisions relating to the establishing, provisioning and maintaining and suspending of services in conformance with the applicable EAAS policies. • REQ-EAASP-7.1.1-03: The senior executive, senior staff and staff in trusted roles, of the EAASP concerned with EAA issuance and revocation management shall be free from any commercial, financial and other pressures which might adversely influence trust in the services it provides. • REQ-EAASP-7.1.1-04: The parts of the EAASP concerned with attestation of attributes issuance and revocation management shall have a documented structure which safeguards impartiality of operations.
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7.1.2 Segregation of duties
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REQ-EAASP-7.1.2-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.1.2 shall apply.
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7.2 Human resources
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REQ-EAASP-7.2-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.2 shall apply.
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7.3 Asset management
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REQ-EAASP-7.3-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.3 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 19
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7.4 Access control
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REQ-EAASP-7.4-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.4 shall apply. In addition the following particular requirements apply: • REQ-EAASP-7.4-02: The EAASP shall enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing EAA issuance. • REQ-EAASP-7.4-03: Continuous monitoring and alarm facilities shall be provided to enable the EAASP to detect, register and react in a timely manner upon any unauthorized and/or irregular attempts to access its resources. • REQ-EAASP-7.4-04: The EAASP shall monitor and log all authentication attempts and failures in order to detect potential malicious activities.
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7.5 Cryptographic controls
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7.5.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-7.5.1-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.5 shall apply.
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7.5.2 Key pair generation and installation
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REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-01 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall generate EAASP keys securely, including keys used by revocation and registration services, and shall keep the private key secret. In particular: • REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-02: The EAASP shall undertake the EAASP key pair generation and the subsequent certification of the public key in a physically secured environment by personnel in trusted roles. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-03: The EAASP shall create the EAA signing key pair under, at least, dual control. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-04: The EAASP shall minimise the number of personnel authorized to carry out EAAS key pair generation, in line with the TSP's practices. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-05: The EAASP shall use an algorithm specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.10] to perform EAAS key pair generation for the EAA signing purposes. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-06: The EAASP shall select a key length and algorithm for the EAAS signing key that is specified in ETSI TS 119 312 [i.10] for EAA signing purposes. REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-07 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall have a documented procedure for conducting EAAS key pair generation for EAA signing keys for all EAAS. REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-08 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall produce a report demonstrating that the ceremony, following the procedure defined in REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-07 above, followed the stated steps and ensured the integrity and confidentiality of the key pair. REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-09 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall include at least the following information in the report for the key ceremony: a) roles participating in the ceremony (internal and external from the organisation); b) functions performed by every role and in which phases; c) responsibilities during and after the ceremony; d) evidence collected of the ceremony; e) the date the ceremony was carried out; ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 20 f) an inventory of the keys generated, which includes, at least, the following information for each key: - a unique identifier for the key; - algorithm, key size and public key fingerprint (SHA256 minimum); - the unique identifier and model of the secure cryptographic device (e.g. HSM) used for this generation ceremony; and - the key generation algorithm and settings configured in the secure cryptographic device during the key ceremony, e.g. operation mode, used random number generator and other cryptographic parameters. REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-10 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP uses keys generated by another TSP, the EAASP shall ensure that the entire process of key generation and installation complies with the requirements specified in REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-01 to REQ-EAASP-7.5.2-09, as applicable, and shall document this in a report demonstrating that integrity and confidentiality were ensured throughout the process.
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7.5.3 EAAS key protection and cryptographic module engineering controls
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REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-01 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall generate EAAS key pairs—including those used for revocation and registration services—within a secure cryptographic device that functions as a trustworthy system. In addition to that: • REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-02: The EAASP shall ensure that this system either: a) holds an assurance level of EAL 4 or higher under ISO/IEC 15408-1 [i.6], or an equivalent national or internationally recognised IT security evaluation scheme, with a security target or protection profile that meets the requirements of the present document, based on a risk analysis and including physical and other non-technical security measures; or b) meets the criteria defined in ISO/IEC 19790 [i.7], FIPS PUB 140-2 [i.8] Level 3, or FIPS PUB 140-3 [i.9] Level 3. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-03 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall operate the secure cryptographic device in the configuration described in the relevant certification guidance documentation or in an equivalent configuration that achieves the same security objective. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-04 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall store and use the EAAS private signing key within a secure cryptographic device that complies with the requirements of REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-01 and REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-03. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-05 [CONDITIONAL]: If EAAS keys are generated on the QSCD delivered by QTSP issuing Qualified Certificate, the EAASP shall verify that the QSCD meets the requirements of REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-01, REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-02, and REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-03. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-06 [CONDITIONAL]: When the EAAS private key is outside the secure cryptographic device, the EAASP shall protect it in a manner that ensures the same level of protection as provided by the secure cryptographic device. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-07 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP backs up, stores, or recovers the EAAS private signing key, the EAASP shall ensure that personnel in trusted roles carry out the process using at least dual control in a physically secured environment. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-08 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall apply the same or a higher level of security controls to copies of the EAAS private signing keys as to the keys currently in use. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-09 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP stores the EAAS private signing keys and any copies in a dedicated secure cryptographic device, the EAASP shall implement access controls to ensure the keys remain inaccessible outside the device. REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-10 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall ensure that the secure cryptographic device remains protected against tampering during shipment and storage. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 21 REQ-EAASP-7.5.3-11 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall destroy the EAAS private signing keys stored on the secure cryptographic device when retiring the device.
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7.5.4 Other aspects of key pair management
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REQ-EAASP-7.5.4-01 [CONDITIONAL]: If the EAASP generates keys for the digital signature of EAA, the EAASP shall use the EAAS private signing keys appropriately. In particular: • REQ-EAASP-7.5.4-02: The EAASP shall stop using the EAAS private signing keys at the end of their life cycle. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.4-03: The EAASP shall use EAAS signing keys only for EAA issuance and issuing revocation status information, and for no other purpose. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.4-04: The EAASP shall use the EAAS signing keys only within physically secure premises.
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7.5.5 EUDIW specific
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In addition, when the EAA is issued to a EUDIW the following requirements apply: • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-01: The EAASP shall implement device binding mechanisms that cryptographically bind the EAA to the Wallet Secure Cryptographic Device (WSCD) of the Wallet Unit, ensuring that the EAA cannot be copied or used from another device. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-02: The EAASP shall verify that the public key included in the EAA is associated with a private key protected by the WSCD described in the Wallet Unit Attestation (WUA). • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-03: The EAASP shall implement cryptographic protocols that support selective disclosure of attributes, enabling users to present only specific attributes without revealing others. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-04: The EAASP shall ensure that the cryptographic mechanisms used support the verification of combined presentation of attributes from multiple EAAs, including verification that they belong to the same user. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-05: The EAASP shall implement cryptographic controls that mitigate the risk of Relying Party linkability and Attestation Provider linkability. EXAMPLE: Using different key pairs for different EAAs issued to the same user. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-06: The EAASP shall maintain controls that ensure its access certificate and associated private keys remain secure, including implementing proper key management procedures. • REQ-EAASP-7.5.5-07: When supporting batch issuance, the EAASP shall support the use of cryptographically independent EAAs within a batch to enhance privacy protection.
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7.6 Physical and environmental security
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REQ-EAASP-7.6-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.6 shall apply.
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119 471
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7.7 Operation security
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REQ-EAASP-7.7-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.7 shall apply. In addition the following particular requirement applies: • REQ-EAASP-7.7-02: EAASP shall monitor capacity demands and projections of future capacity requirements in order to ensure that adequate processing power and storage are available.
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7.8 Network security
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REQ-EAASP-7.8-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.8 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 22 In addition the following particular requirements apply: • REQ-EAASP-7.8-02: The EAASP shall maintain and protect all systems in at least a secure zone and shall implement and configure a security procedure that protects systems and communications between systems inside secure zones and security perimeters. • REQ-EAASP-7.8-03: The EAASP shall configure all systems by removing or disabling all accounts, applications, services, protocols, and ports that are not used in the EAAS operations. • REQ-EAASP-7.8-04: The EAASP shall use secure, encrypted channels for the transmission of attribute data to protect against unauthorized access and data breaches.
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7.9 Vulnerabilities and Incident management
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REQ-EAASP-7.9-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.9 shall apply.
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7.10 Collection of evidence for EAASP internal services
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REQ-EAASP-7.10-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.10 shall apply. In addition, the following particular requirements apply: • REQ-EAASP-7.10-02: Evidence of the EAA issuance process shall be collected and securely archived. • REQ-EAASP-7.10-03: All security events shall be logged, including changes relating to the security policy, system start-up and shutdown, system crashes and hardware failures, firewall and router activities and system access attempts. • REQ-EAASP-7.10-04: All events related to registration including requests for EAA renewal shall be logged. • REQ-EAASP-7.10-05: The EAASP shall document how the information recorded is accessible. • REQ-EAASP-7.10-06: The EAASP shall log all events relating to the EAA life-cycle. • REQ-EAASP-7.10-07: The EAASP shall log all requests and reports relating to revocation, as well as the resulting action. • REQ-EAASP-7.10-08: The EAASP shall precisely document the period of retention of the information mentioned above in its practices statements and shall indicate which information is subject to be handed-over through its termination plan.
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7.11 Business continuity management
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7.11.1 General
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REQ-EAASP-7.11.1-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.11 shall apply. In addition the particular requirements from the following clauses 7.11.2 and 7.11.3 apply.
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7.11.2 Back up
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REQ-EAASP-7.11.2-01: EAASP's systems data necessary to resume operations shall be backed up and stored in safe places, preferably also remote, suitable to allow the EAASP to timely go back to operations in case of incident/disasters. REQ-EAASP-7.1.1.2-02: Back-up copies of essential information and software should be taken regularly. REQ-EAASP-7.11.2-03: Adequate back-up facilities should be provided to ensure that all essential information and software can be recovered following a disaster or media failure. REQ-EAASP-7.11.2-04: Back-up arrangements should be regularly tested to ensure that they meet the requirements of business continuity plans. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 23 REQ-EAASP-7.11.2-05: Backup and restore functions shall be performed by the relevant trusted roles.
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7.11.3 Crisis management
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REQ-EAASP-7.11.3-01: Following a disaster, the EAASP shall, where practical, take steps to avoid repetition of a disaster. REQ-EAASP-7.11.3-02: The EAASP shall inform to the following of the compromise: all EAA Subscribers and/or EAA Subjects, when possible, and other entities with which the EAASP has agreements or other form of established relations, among which relying parties and others TSPs. REQ-EAASP-7.11.3-03: The EAASP shall revoke any EAA it has issued when the EAASP is informed of the compromise.
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7.12 EAASP and EAAS termination and termination plans
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REQ-EAASP-7.12-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.12 shall apply. In addition the following particular requirement applies: • REQ-EAASP-7.12-02: The EAASP shall retain the following records after any EAA based on these records ceases to be valid: a) log of all events relating to the EAA life cycle; and b) attributes attestations data issuance evidence. REQ-EAASP-7.12-03: The retention period shall be defined by the EAASP in accordance with national legislation.
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7.13 Compliance
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REQ-EAASP-7.13-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.13 shall apply. In addition the following particular requirements apply: REQ-EAASP-7.13-02: The EAASP shall enable privacy-preserving techniques to maintain the privacy of EAA Subject and EAA Subscriber personal data. In addition: • REQ-EAASP-7.13-03: The EAASP shall protect confidentiality and integrity of registration data, especially when exchanged with the EAA Subject or between distributed EAASP's system components. • REQ-EAASP-7.13-04: The EAASP shall implement data minimization principles in the design of the EAA Policy, ensuring that only necessary attributes are included in each specific type of EAA. • REQ-EAASP-7.13-05: The EAASP shall not track, link, correlate, or otherwise obtain knowledge of transactions or EAA Subject behaviour post-issuance of the EAA unless explicitly authorized by the EAA Subject. • REQ-EAASP-7.13-06: The EAASP shall keep logically separate attributes and metadata related to EAA Subject and/or EAA Subscribers relating to the provision of EAAS from other data held. • REQ-EAASP-7.13-07: The EAASP shall, outside of the issuing of EAA, not export personal data to other services, whether provided by the EAASP itself or by other actors, unless explicitly authorized by EAA Subject and/or EAA Subscriber. • REQ-EAASP-7.13-08: The EAASP shall ensure that its systems are designed to log minimal information about EAA issuance and usage, sufficient for security and management purposes, to meet statutory requirements and to support auditability and transparency requirements, but not enabling tracking of user activities.
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b4ef3991e7271707fa3e5c56aad9db09
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119 471
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7.14 Supply chain
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REQ-EAASP-7.14-01: All requirements from ETSI EN 319 401 [1], clause 7.14 shall apply. ETSI ETSI TS 119 471 V1.1.1 (2025-05) 24 History Document history V1.1.1 May 2025 Publication
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67d251b1ae290eff4200d8ff44cf22fc
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119 172-3
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1 Scope
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The present document defines an ASN.1 format of machine readable signature policies based on the building blocks that define technical constraints on digital signatures and are specified in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [i.2]. Pure signature applicability rules, directly related to procedural constraints imposed by business processes, are out of the scope of the present document which does not define ASN.1 elements for the building blocks specified in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [i.2] defining only applicability rules. For each element of the machine readable signature policy, the present document references to the semantics described in ETSI TS 119 172-2 [3] and defines the corresponding ASN.1 syntax. The present document defines elements which can be used to describe technical constraints on signature creation, signature validation, and signature augmentation. These elements are designed in a way that it is possible to generate ASN.1 documents that include components of a signature generation policy, or/and signature validation policy, and/or signature augmentation policy. An ASN.1 document conformant to the present specification, defines constraints (on generation, augmentation, validation, any combination of two of them, or the three of them) that one signature has to meet. NOTE: Complex business processes, where several digital signatures need to be managed, having to meet different set of technical constraints, will require several ASN.1 documents conformant to the present document, each one defining one of these sets of technical constraints. It is out of the scope to specify mechanisms for protecting the integrity of the machine-readable signature policy documents specified in the present document.
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67d251b1ae290eff4200d8ff44cf22fc
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119 172-3
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2 References
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