buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 2 508	english stringlengths 2 924 ⌀
nahyasataḥ svabhāvāparityāge sati tadrūpatāpattir yuktā / parityāge vā na tarhi asadeva sadrūpatāṃ pratipannam iti siddhyet /	If the non-existent does not relinquish its essential nature, it cannot acquire the nature of the existent; and if it does relinquish [its nature], then it cannot be established that the non-existent has become existent.
anyadeva hi sadrūpamanyaccāsadrūpaṃ parasparaparihāreṇa tayor avasthitatvāt /	For the nature of the existent is entirely different from the nature of the non-existent, since these two exist in mutual exclusion.
tasmād yadasattadaśakyakriyam eva /	Therefore, what is non-existent is indeed impossible to produce.
tathābhūtapadārthakāritvābhyupagame hi kāraṇānām aśakyakāritvamevābhyupagataṃ syāt /	For if it were accepted that causes can produce such things [i.e., non-existent things], then it would amount to accepting that causes can only produce what is impossible to produce.
na cāśakyaṃ kenacit kriyate yathā gaganāmbhoruhaṃ /	And what is impossible [to produce] cannot be produced by anyone, just like a sky-lotus.
ataḥ śaktipratiniyamādityanuttarametat //	Therefore, this [argument about] the restriction of potency is indeed unanswerable.
kāryasyaivamayogāc ca kiṃkurvatkāraṇaṃ bhavet / tataḥ kāraṇabhāvo 'pi bījāder na vikalpate //	And since the effect is thus impossible, what would [something] produce to be [called] a cause? Therefore, even the causal nature of seeds and such cannot be conceived.
yadvā yathoktāddhetucatuṣṭayāt /	Or rather, due to the four reasons stated above.
asatkāryavāde sarvathāpi kāryasyāyogāt kiṃkurvadbījādi kāraṇaṃ bhavet / tataścaivaṃ śakyate vaktuṃ / na kāraṇaṃ bījādiravidyamānakāryatvād gaganābjavad iti /	In the theory of non-existent effect, since the effect is impossible in every way, what would seeds and such produce to be [called] causes? Thus it can be said: "Seeds and such are not causes, because their effect is non-existent, like a sky-lotus."
na caivaṃ bhavati / tasmād viparyaya iti siddhaṃ prāgutpatteḥ satkāryam iti //	And [yet] this is not the case. Therefore it is established that the opposite [view is correct], namely that the effect exists prior to [its] production.
syād etadyadyapi nāma satkāryamityevaṃ siddhaṃ	[Even] if it may be taken as established that the effect [pre-]exists,
pradhānād evaite kāryabhedāḥ pravartante ityetat tu kathaṃ siddhyatītyāha sukhādyanvitam ityādi	But how is it proved that these diverse effects emanate from pradhāna itself?" [To this] he responds [by referring to the verse beginning with] "sukhādi."
sukhādyanvitam etac ca vyaktaṃ vyaktaṃ samīkṣyate	This manifest [world] is observed to be connected with pleasure and [other qualities]
tatra pradhānāstitvasādhane pañcāmī vītaprayogāḥ parairuktāḥ	For proving the existence of pradhāna, five positive arguments have been stated by others [i.e., the Sāṃkhyas]
yathoktam bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt samanvayāt śaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya kāraṇamastyavyaktaṃ iti	As has been said: "Because of the finite nature of specific [effects], because of coordination, because of evolution through potency, because of the distinction between cause and effect, [and] because of the merger of all forms [into one], the unmanifest cause exists."
ayam arthaḥ asti pradhānaṃ bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt	The meaning is this: pradhāna exists because specific [effects] are finite.
iha loke yasya kartā bhavati tasya parimāṇaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ	In this world, whatever has a maker is observed to be finite.
yathā kulālaḥ parimitān mṛtpiṇḍātparimitaṃ ghaṭaṃ karoti prasthagrāhiṇamāḍhakagrāhiṇaṃ	For example, a potter makes from finite clay-lumps a finite pot that holds [either] a prastha or an āḍhaka [measure].
idaṃ ca mahadādi vyaktaṃ parimitaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ ekā buddherko 'haṅkāra pañca tanmātrāṇyekādaśendriyāṇi pañcabhūtāni	And this manifest [world], beginning with mahat, is observed to be finite: one buddhi, one ahaṅkāra, five tanmātras, eleven indriyas, [and] five elements.
ato 'numānena sādhayāmo 'sti pradhānaṃ yatparimitaṃ vyaktamutpādayatīti	Therefore, through inference we establish that pradhāna exists, [as that] which produces the finite manifest [world].
yadi pradhānaṃ na syān niṣparimāṇam idaṃ vyaktaṃ syāt	If pradhāna did not exist, this manifest [world] would be without finite measure.
itaścāsti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anvayadarśanāt /	And for this [reason] also Pradhāna exists, because of the perception of homogeneity in diverse [things].
yajjātisamanvitaṃ hi yadupalabhyate tat tanmayakāraṇasambhūtaṃ /	For whatever is perceived as possessing a [particular] genus, that has originated from a cause consisting of that [genus].
yathā ghaṭaśarāvādayo bhedā mṛjjātyanvitās te mṛdātmakakāraṇasambhūtaḥ /	For example, various [things] like jars and bowls, which possess the genus "clay," have originated from a cause consisting of clay.
sukhaduḥkhamohādijātisamanvitaṃ cedaṃ vyaktam upalabhyate /	And this manifest [world] is perceived as possessing genera such as pleasure, pain, delusion, etc.
kutaḥ prasādatāpadainyādikāryopalabdheḥ /	How [do we know this]? Because of the perception of effects such as serenity, distress, dejection, etc.
tathā hi prasādalāghavābhiṣvaṅgoddharṣaprītayaḥ satvasya kāryaṃ /	Thus indeed, serenity, lightness, attachment, elation, and joy are effects of sattva.
sukham iti ca sattvamevocyate /	And pleasure is indeed called sattva.
tāpaśoṣabhedastambhodvegāpadvegā rajasaḥ kāryaṃ /	Heat, dryness, piercing pain, rigidity, anxiety, calamity, and agitation are effects of rajas.
rājaś ca duḥkhaṃ /	And rajas is pain.
tamaś ca mohaśabdenocyate /	And tamas is expressed by the word "delusion."
eṣāṃ ca mahadādīnāṃ prasādatāpadainyādikāryamupalabhyate /	And in these [evolutes] beginning with mahat, effects such as serenity, distress, and dejection are perceived.
tasmāt sukhaduḥkhamohānāṃ trayāṇām ete sanniveśaviśeṣā ityavamīyate /	Therefore it is inferred that these are particular arrangements of the three [attributes]: pleasure, pain, and delusion.
te asiddhameṣāṃ prasādādikāryataḥ sukhādyanvitatvaṃ tadanvayāc ca tanmayaprakṛtisambhūtatvam siddhaṃ tat siddhau ca sāmarthyādyāsau prakṛtistat pradhānam iti siddham asti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anvayadarśanād iti	From [their] being products of pleasure and other [constituents], [these things] possess pleasure and other [qualities], and from this homogeneity [it follows that] they have emanated from a Source consisting of these [qualities]; this being established, by implication that Source is Prakṛti, that [is] Pradhāna; thus Pradhāna is established due to the observation of homogeneity in diverse [things].
itaścāsti pradhānaṃ śaktaiḥ pravṛtteḥ	And for this [further] reason also Pradhāna exists: because activity proceeds from capacities.
iha loke yo yasminnarthe pravartate sa tatra śakto yathā tantuvāyaḥ paṭakaraṇe	In this world, whoever engages in whatever activity, he [must be] capable of it, just as a weaver [is capable] in the making of cloth.
ataḥ sādhayāmaḥ pradhānasyāsti śaktir yayā vyaktamutpādayatīti	From this we establish that Pradhāna has a capacity by which it produces the manifest.
sā ca śaktir nirāśrayā na sambhavati	And that capacity cannot exist without a substratum.
tasmād asti pradhānaṃ yatra śaktir vartata iti	Therefore Pradhāna exists, wherein that capacity resides.
itaścāsti pradhānaṃ kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt	And for this [further] reason also Pradhāna exists: because of the distinction between cause and effect.
iha loke kāryakāraṇayor vibhāgo dṛṣṭaḥ tathā hi mṛtpiṇḍaḥ kāraṇaṃ ghaṭaḥ kāryaṃ sa ca mṛtpiṇḍādvibhaktasvabhāvaḥ tathā hi ghaṭo madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇasamarthāḥ na mṛtpiṇḍaḥ	In this world, a distinction between cause and effect is observed; thus a lump of clay [is] the cause, a pot [is] the effect, and it [the pot] has a nature distinct from the lump of clay; for the pot is capable of holding honey, water and milk, [but] not the lump of clay.
evam idaṃ mahadādikāryaṃ dṛṣṭvā sādhayāmo 'sti pradhānaṃ yasmān mahadādikāryamutpannam iti	Similarly, seeing this effect consisting of mahat and the rest, we establish that there is Pradhāna from which the effect consisting of mahat and the rest has arisen.
itaścāsti pradhānaṃ vaiśvarūpyasyāvibhāgāt	And for this [further] reason also Pradhāna exists: because of the mergence of the entire universe.
vaiśvarūpyam iti trayo lokā ucyante	By "entire universe" the three worlds are meant.
ete hi pralayakāle kvacid avibhāgaṃ gacchanti /	These [entities], indeed, at the time of dissolution, merge into something indistinguishable.
tathā hi pañcabhūtāni pañcasi tanmātreṣvavibhāgaṃ gacchanti tanmātrāṇ pañcendriyāṇi cāhaṅkāre ahaṅkāro buddhau buddhiḥ pradhāne tadevaṃ pralayakāle trayo lokā avibhāgaṃ gacchanti /	Thus indeed, the five elements merge indistinguishably into the five subtle elements, [and] the subtle elements and the five sense organs [merge] into the I-principle, the I-principle [merges] into the cosmic intelligence, [and] the cosmic intelligence [merges] into the primordial matter; thus at the time of dissolution the three worlds merge indistinguishably.
avibhāgo nāma avivekaḥ yathā kṣīrāvasthāyama anyatkṣīmanyad dadhīti viveko na śakyate kartuṃ tadvad pralayakāle idaṃ vyaktam idam avyaktam iti viveko na śakyate kartuṃ /	"Merging" means non-discrimination, just as in the state of milk one cannot make the discrimination that "this milk is different from [that] curd"; similarly, at the time of dissolution, the discrimination that "this is manifest [and] this is unmanifest" cannot be made.
ato manyāmahe 'sti pradhānaṃ yatra mahadādiliṅgamavibhāgaṃ gacchatīti /	Therefore, we conclude that there exists primordial matter wherein the cosmic intelligence and other characteristics merge indistinguishably.
tadatrācāryeṇa samanvayādityayam eva heturuktaḥ pariśiṣṭānām upalakṣaṇārthaḥ /	Here, the teacher [Śāntarakṣita] has mentioned only this reason of homogeneity, which serves to indicate the remaining [reasons].
tatra sukhādītyādiśabdena duḥkhamohayor grahaṇaṃ /	There, by the word "ādi" in "sukhādi" ("pleasure, etc."), pain and delusion are [meant to be] included.
vyaktam iti mahadādibhūtaparyantaṃ /	The [term] "manifest" [refers to everything] from cosmic intelligence down to the elements.
spaṣṭamupalabhyata ity arthaḥ /	The meaning is "is clearly perceived."
katham ity āha prasādetyādi /	How? [The text] says "through composure, etc."
ādiśabdaḥ pratyekamabhisambadhyate /	The word "ādi" ("etc.") is connected with each [term].
etaccāsmābhiḥ pūrvam eva vyākhyātaṃ /	And this has been explained by us earlier.
evaṃ samanvayādityasya hetoḥ siddhimupādarśya pramāṇaṃ racayannāha tata ityādi	Having thus shown the validity of the reason [called] "coherence," [the author] proceeds to present the proof, saying "tataḥ" etc.
tatastanmayasambhūtaṃ tajjāyanvayadarśanāt	Therefore, [the universe] must have emanated from what consists of that [i.e., the three guṇas], because we see the presence of that generic character [in it]
kuṭādibhedavat tac ca pradhānam iti kāpilāḥ	And that [cause] is Pradhāna [primordial matter], like [in the case of] pots and other diverse objects - thus [say] the followers of Kapila
tanmayasambhūtam iti	[The phrase] "emanated from what consists of that" [means the following:]
sukhādimayaṃ yatkāraṇaṃ tasmāt sambhūtam ity arthaḥ	[It] means "emanated from that cause which consists of pleasure and the other [guṇas]"
ayaṃ ca sādhyanirdeśaḥ	And this is the statement of what is to be proved
tajjātyanvayadarśanād iti hetuḥ	"Because we see the presence of that generic character" is the reason
tayā traiguṇyalakṣaṇayā jātyā anugatatvadarśanād ity arthaḥ	[It] means "because we see [everything] is pervaded by that generic character which consists in having the three guṇas"
kuṭādibhedavad iti ghaṭādibhedavat	"Like pots and other diverse objects" means "like jars and other diverse objects"
yac ca tanmayaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatpradhānam iti kāpilāḥ sāṅkhyā varṇayanti	And the Kāpilas, [that is] the Sāṃkhyas, explain that this cause consisting of that [the three guṇas] is Pradhāna
tadatretyādinā pratividhānam ārabhate tadatra sudhiyaḥ prāhus tulyā satve 'pi codanā	[The author] begins the refutation with "tadatra" etc.: "Here the wise ones say that the objection applies equally [to both views], even regarding existence"
yat tasyāmuttaraṃ vaḥ syāt tattulyaṃ sudhiyām api	Whatever answer you would have to that [objection] would be the same for the wise ones also
tatra yat tāvad uktaṃ pradhānāder amī kāryabhedās tadrūpā eva pravartanta iti tatredaṃ nirūpyate	Regarding what was first stated - that "these various effects proceeding from Pradhāna and other [causes] have exactly the same nature [as their causes]" - the following is now examined
yadyamī kāryabhedāḥ pradhānasvabhāvā eva tat katham eṣāṃ tataḥ kāryatayā pravṛttir bhavati	If these various effects have exactly the same nature as Pradhāna, then how can they proceed from it as its effects?
nahi yadyasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tasya kāryaṃ vā yuktaṃ bhinnalakṣaṇatvāt kāryakāraṇayoḥ	For what is non-different from something cannot be its effect, because cause and effect must have different characteristics
anyathā hīdaṃ kāryam idaṃ kāraṇaṃ vetyasaṅkīrṇavyavasthā kathaṃ bhavet	If it were not so, how could there be any clear distinction [between things] such as "this is the effect" and "this is the cause"?
tataśca yadbhavadbhir mūlaprakṛteḥ kāraṇatvam eva bhūtendriyalakṣaṇasya ṣoḍaśakasya gaṇasya kāryatvam eva buddhyahaṅkāratanmātrāṇāṃ ca pūrvottarāpekṣayā kāryatvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ ceti vyavasthānaṃ kṛtaṃ tan na syāt	And thus, your determination that primordial matter (mūlaprakṛti) is solely a cause, that the group of sixteen characterized by the elements and sense organs is solely an effect, and that buddhi, ahaṅkāra and the tanmātras are [both] effects and causes in relation to what precedes and follows—[all] this would not be possible.
yathoktam mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta	As it has been stated: "The primordial matter is never a product; the seven beginning with mahat are both products and producers;
ṣoḍaśakaśca vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ	the group of sixteen is [only] a product; puruṣa is neither a product nor a producer."
iti	Thus.
sarveṣām eva hi parasparāvyatirekātkāryatvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ vā prasajyeta	Indeed, due to [their] non-difference from each other, everything would end up being either an effect or a cause [of everything else].
yadvāpekṣikatvātkāryakāraṇabhāvasya rūpāntarasya cāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt sarveṣāṃ puruṣavan na prakṛtitvaṃ nāpi vikṛtitvaṃ syāt	Or else, due to the relativity of the causal relationship and the absence of any other form to be considered, nothing would be either a producer or a product, just like puruṣa.
āha ca	And it is said:
yadeva dadhi tatkṣīraṃ yatkṣīraṃ taddadhīti ca vadatā rudrilenaiva khyāpitā vindhyavāsitā	"That which is curd is milk, and that which is milk is curd"—by saying this, Rudrila himself revealed [his] foolishness.
yaccedaṃ hetumattvādidharmayogi vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktam iti varṇitaṃ tadapi bālapralapitam eva	And what has been described—that the manifest possesses properties like having a cause etc., [while] the unmanifest is the opposite—that too is mere childish prattle.
nahi yadyasmādabhinnasvabhāvaṃ tat tadviparītaṃ yuktaṃ rūpāntaratvalakṣaṇatvād vaiparītyasya	For indeed, that which has a nature non-different from something cannot reasonably be opposite to it, since opposition is characterized by having a different form.
anyathā bhedavyavahāroccheda eva syāt	Otherwise, there would be an absolute end to all practical dealings based on difference.
sarvam eva viśvamekarūpaṃ syāt	The entire universe would be of one form.
anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt	Otherwise, there would be undesirable consequences.
kiṃ cānvayavyatirekaniścayasamadhigamyo loke kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ prasiddhaḥ	Moreover, in the world, the relation of cause and effect is well-known to be ascertained through positive and negative concomitance.
na ca pradhānādibhyo mahahādyutpattivyavahāraḥ / nacāpi nityasya kāraṇabhāvo 'sti /	Neither is there any practical usage [that would establish] the origination of mahat etc. from pradhāna and other [principles], nor does anything eternal possess the nature of being a cause.
yena pradhānāt kāryabhedānāmutpattiḥ siddhyet / nityasya kramākramābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt /	By which [nature] the origination of different effects from pradhāna could be established, since there is a contradiction in an eternal [entity] performing an action either gradually or simultaneously.
syād etat nāsmābhirapūrvasvabhāvotpattyā kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'bhīṣṭo yena svarūpābhede sati sa virudhyate yāvatā pradhānaṃ sarpakuṇḍalādivan mahadādirūpeṇa pariṇāmaṃ gacchatteṣāṃ mahadādīnāṃ kāraṇam iti vyapadiśyate teca mahadādayas tatpariṇāmarūpatvāt tatkāryatayā vyapadiśyante /	[One might object:] "We do not maintain a causal relation through the production of a new nature, which would contradict [the principle of] non-difference in essential form. Rather, pradhāna undergoes modification into the form of mahat etc., just like a coiled serpent [modifies into an extended form], and thus it is designated as the cause of mahat etc., and these—mahat and the rest—being of the nature of its modifications, are designated as its effects."
pariṇāmaścaikavastvadhiṣṭhānatvād abhede 'pi na virudhyata iti /	"And modification, being based on a single substance, is not contradictory even in [a state of] non-difference."
tadetad asamyak /	This [position] is incorrect.
tathā hi pariṇāmo bhavet pūrvarūpaparityāgād vā bhavedaparityāgād vā / yadyaparityāgāt tadāvasthāsāṅkaryaṃ syāt bṛhattvādyavasthāyām api yuvatvādyavasthopalabdhiprasaṅgāt /	For modification would have to occur either through abandonment of the prior form or through non-abandonment. If through non-abandonment, then there would be a confusion of states, as even in the state of maturity one would perceive the state of youth and so forth.
atha parityāgāt tadā svabhāvahāniprasaṅgaḥ tataśca pūrvakaṃ svabhāvāntaraṃ niruddhamapūrvaṃ svabhāvāntaramutpannam iti na kasyacit pariṇāmaḥ siddhyet /	If through abandonment, then there would follow a loss of essential nature, and consequently the previous different nature would be destroyed and a new different nature would arise, so no modification of anything could be established.
na tāvad ekadeśena ekasyaikadeśāsambhavāt /	[Modification] cannot occur partially, because a single [entity] cannot have parts.
nāpi sarvātmanā tadarthāntarotpāde pūrvaināśaprasaṅgāt /	Nor [can it occur] totally, because that would entail the production of a different thing and the destruction of the previous [thing].
tasmān na tasyaivānyathātvaṃ yuktaṃ svabhāvāntarotpādanibandhanatvāt tasyeti /	Therefore it is not logical that there is alteration of the same thing, since this would be based on the production of a different essential nature.
athāpi syād vyavasthitasya dharmiṇo dharmāntaranivṛttyā dharmātnaraprādurbhāvaḥ pariṇāmo varṇyate natu svabhāvasyānyathātvād iti /	It might be argued that "while the substance [itself] remains constant, modification means the disappearance of one property and appearance of another property, and not that the very essence [of the thing] becomes different."
tadetad asamyak /	This [argument] is not correct.
tathā hi sa pravartamāno nivartamānaś ca dharmo dharmiṇo 'rthāntarabhūto vā syād anarthāntarabhūto vā /	For when a property appears and disappears, would that property be something different (arthāntara) or non-different from the substance?
yadyarthāntarabhūtas tadā dharmī tadavastha eveti katham asau pariṇato nāma /	If it were something different, then since the substance remains exactly the same, how can it be called modified?
nahyarthāntarabhūtayoḥ paṭāśvayorutpādavināśaṃ satyavicalitātmasvarūpasyaghaṭādeḥ pariṇāmo bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt /	For when two entirely different things like cloth and horse are produced or destroyed, this is not considered a modification of things like a jar [whose own nature remains unchanged], as [accepting this] would lead to an absurdity.

nahyasataḥ svabhāvāparityāge sati tadrūpatāpattir yuktā / parityāge vā na tarhi asadeva sadrūpatāṃ pratipannam iti siddhyet /

If the non-existent does not relinquish its essential nature, it cannot acquire the nature of the existent; and if it does relinquish [its nature], then it cannot be established that the non-existent has become existent.

anyadeva hi sadrūpamanyaccāsadrūpaṃ parasparaparihāreṇa tayor avasthitatvāt /

For the nature of the existent is entirely different from the nature of the non-existent, since these two exist in mutual exclusion.

tasmād yadasattadaśakyakriyam eva /

Therefore, what is non-existent is indeed impossible to produce.

tathābhūtapadārthakāritvābhyupagame hi kāraṇānām aśakyakāritvamevābhyupagataṃ syāt /

For if it were accepted that causes can produce such things [i.e., non-existent things], then it would amount to accepting that causes can only produce what is impossible to produce.

na cāśakyaṃ kenacit kriyate yathā gaganāmbhoruhaṃ /

And what is impossible [to produce] cannot be produced by anyone, just like a sky-lotus.

ataḥ śaktipratiniyamādityanuttarametat //

Therefore, this [argument about] the restriction of potency is indeed unanswerable.

kāryasyaivamayogāc ca kiṃkurvatkāraṇaṃ bhavet / tataḥ kāraṇabhāvo 'pi bījāder na vikalpate //

And since the effect is thus impossible, what would [something] produce to be [called] a cause? Therefore, even the causal nature of seeds and such cannot be conceived.

yadvā yathoktāddhetucatuṣṭayāt /

Or rather, due to the four reasons stated above.

asatkāryavāde sarvathāpi kāryasyāyogāt kiṃkurvadbījādi kāraṇaṃ bhavet / tataścaivaṃ śakyate vaktuṃ / na kāraṇaṃ bījādiravidyamānakāryatvād gaganābjavad iti /

In the theory of non-existent effect, since the effect is impossible in every way, what would seeds and such produce to be [called] causes? Thus it can be said: "Seeds and such are not causes, because their effect is non-existent, like a sky-lotus."

na caivaṃ bhavati / tasmād viparyaya iti siddhaṃ prāgutpatteḥ satkāryam iti //

And [yet] this is not the case. Therefore it is established that the opposite [view is correct], namely that the effect exists prior to [its] production.

syād etadyadyapi nāma satkāryamityevaṃ siddhaṃ

[Even] if it may be taken as established that the effect [pre-]exists,

pradhānād evaite kāryabhedāḥ pravartante ityetat tu kathaṃ siddhyatītyāha sukhādyanvitam ityādi

But how is it proved that these diverse effects emanate from pradhāna itself?" [To this] he responds [by referring to the verse beginning with] "sukhādi."

sukhādyanvitam etac ca vyaktaṃ vyaktaṃ samīkṣyate

This manifest [world] is observed to be connected with pleasure and [other qualities]

tatra pradhānāstitvasādhane pañcāmī vītaprayogāḥ parairuktāḥ

For proving the existence of pradhāna, five positive arguments have been stated by others [i.e., the Sāṃkhyas]

yathoktam bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt samanvayāt śaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya kāraṇamastyavyaktaṃ iti

As has been said: "Because of the finite nature of specific [effects], because of coordination, because of evolution through potency, because of the distinction between cause and effect, [and] because of the merger of all forms [into one], the unmanifest cause exists."

ayam arthaḥ asti pradhānaṃ bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt

The meaning is this: pradhāna exists because specific [effects] are finite.

iha loke yasya kartā bhavati tasya parimāṇaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ

In this world, whatever has a maker is observed to be finite.

yathā kulālaḥ parimitān mṛtpiṇḍātparimitaṃ ghaṭaṃ karoti prasthagrāhiṇamāḍhakagrāhiṇaṃ

For example, a potter makes from finite clay-lumps a finite pot that holds [either] a prastha or an āḍhaka [measure].

idaṃ ca mahadādi vyaktaṃ parimitaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ ekā buddherko 'haṅkāra pañca tanmātrāṇyekādaśendriyāṇi pañcabhūtāni

And this manifest [world], beginning with mahat, is observed to be finite: one buddhi, one ahaṅkāra, five tanmātras, eleven indriyas, [and] five elements.

ato 'numānena sādhayāmo 'sti pradhānaṃ yatparimitaṃ vyaktamutpādayatīti

Therefore, through inference we establish that pradhāna exists, [as that] which produces the finite manifest [world].

yadi pradhānaṃ na syān niṣparimāṇam idaṃ vyaktaṃ syāt

If pradhāna did not exist, this manifest [world] would be without finite measure.

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anvayadarśanāt /

And for this [reason] also Pradhāna exists, because of the perception of homogeneity in diverse [things].

yajjātisamanvitaṃ hi yadupalabhyate tat tanmayakāraṇasambhūtaṃ /

For whatever is perceived as possessing a [particular] genus, that has originated from a cause consisting of that [genus].

yathā ghaṭaśarāvādayo bhedā mṛjjātyanvitās te mṛdātmakakāraṇasambhūtaḥ /

For example, various [things] like jars and bowls, which possess the genus "clay," have originated from a cause consisting of clay.

sukhaduḥkhamohādijātisamanvitaṃ cedaṃ vyaktam upalabhyate /

And this manifest [world] is perceived as possessing genera such as pleasure, pain, delusion, etc.

kutaḥ prasādatāpadainyādikāryopalabdheḥ /

How [do we know this]? Because of the perception of effects such as serenity, distress, dejection, etc.

tathā hi prasādalāghavābhiṣvaṅgoddharṣaprītayaḥ satvasya kāryaṃ /

Thus indeed, serenity, lightness, attachment, elation, and joy are effects of sattva.

sukham iti ca sattvamevocyate /

And pleasure is indeed called sattva.

tāpaśoṣabhedastambhodvegāpadvegā rajasaḥ kāryaṃ /

Heat, dryness, piercing pain, rigidity, anxiety, calamity, and agitation are effects of rajas.

rājaś ca duḥkhaṃ /

And rajas is pain.

tamaś ca mohaśabdenocyate /

And tamas is expressed by the word "delusion."

eṣāṃ ca mahadādīnāṃ prasādatāpadainyādikāryamupalabhyate /

And in these [evolutes] beginning with mahat, effects such as serenity, distress, and dejection are perceived.

tasmāt sukhaduḥkhamohānāṃ trayāṇām ete sanniveśaviśeṣā ityavamīyate /

Therefore it is inferred that these are particular arrangements of the three [attributes]: pleasure, pain, and delusion.

te asiddhameṣāṃ prasādādikāryataḥ sukhādyanvitatvaṃ tadanvayāc ca tanmayaprakṛtisambhūtatvam siddhaṃ tat siddhau ca sāmarthyādyāsau prakṛtistat pradhānam iti siddham asti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anvayadarśanād iti

From [their] being products of pleasure and other [constituents], [these things] possess pleasure and other [qualities], and from this homogeneity [it follows that] they have emanated from a Source consisting of these [qualities]; this being established, by implication that Source is Prakṛti, that [is] Pradhāna; thus Pradhāna is established due to the observation of homogeneity in diverse [things].

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ śaktaiḥ pravṛtteḥ

And for this [further] reason also Pradhāna exists: because activity proceeds from capacities.

iha loke yo yasminnarthe pravartate sa tatra śakto yathā tantuvāyaḥ paṭakaraṇe

In this world, whoever engages in whatever activity, he [must be] capable of it, just as a weaver [is capable] in the making of cloth.

ataḥ sādhayāmaḥ pradhānasyāsti śaktir yayā vyaktamutpādayatīti

From this we establish that Pradhāna has a capacity by which it produces the manifest.

sā ca śaktir nirāśrayā na sambhavati

And that capacity cannot exist without a substratum.

tasmād asti pradhānaṃ yatra śaktir vartata iti

Therefore Pradhāna exists, wherein that capacity resides.

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt

And for this [further] reason also Pradhāna exists: because of the distinction between cause and effect.

iha loke kāryakāraṇayor vibhāgo dṛṣṭaḥ tathā hi mṛtpiṇḍaḥ kāraṇaṃ ghaṭaḥ kāryaṃ sa ca mṛtpiṇḍādvibhaktasvabhāvaḥ tathā hi ghaṭo madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇasamarthāḥ na mṛtpiṇḍaḥ

In this world, a distinction between cause and effect is observed; thus a lump of clay [is] the cause, a pot [is] the effect, and it [the pot] has a nature distinct from the lump of clay; for the pot is capable of holding honey, water and milk, [but] not the lump of clay.

evam idaṃ mahadādikāryaṃ dṛṣṭvā sādhayāmo 'sti pradhānaṃ yasmān mahadādikāryamutpannam iti

Similarly, seeing this effect consisting of mahat and the rest, we establish that there is Pradhāna from which the effect consisting of mahat and the rest has arisen.

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ vaiśvarūpyasyāvibhāgāt

And for this [further] reason also Pradhāna exists: because of the mergence of the entire universe.

vaiśvarūpyam iti trayo lokā ucyante

By "entire universe" the three worlds are meant.

ete hi pralayakāle kvacid avibhāgaṃ gacchanti /

These [entities], indeed, at the time of dissolution, merge into something indistinguishable.

tathā hi pañcabhūtāni pañcasi tanmātreṣvavibhāgaṃ gacchanti tanmātrāṇ pañcendriyāṇi cāhaṅkāre ahaṅkāro buddhau buddhiḥ pradhāne tadevaṃ pralayakāle trayo lokā avibhāgaṃ gacchanti /

Thus indeed, the five elements merge indistinguishably into the five subtle elements, [and] the subtle elements and the five sense organs [merge] into the I-principle, the I-principle [merges] into the cosmic intelligence, [and] the cosmic intelligence [merges] into the primordial matter; thus at the time of dissolution the three worlds merge indistinguishably.

avibhāgo nāma avivekaḥ yathā kṣīrāvasthāyama anyatkṣīmanyad dadhīti viveko na śakyate kartuṃ tadvad pralayakāle idaṃ vyaktam idam avyaktam iti viveko na śakyate kartuṃ /

"Merging" means non-discrimination, just as in the state of milk one cannot make the discrimination that "this milk is different from [that] curd"; similarly, at the time of dissolution, the discrimination that "this is manifest [and] this is unmanifest" cannot be made.

ato manyāmahe 'sti pradhānaṃ yatra mahadādiliṅgamavibhāgaṃ gacchatīti /

Therefore, we conclude that there exists primordial matter wherein the cosmic intelligence and other characteristics merge indistinguishably.

tadatrācāryeṇa samanvayādityayam eva heturuktaḥ pariśiṣṭānām upalakṣaṇārthaḥ /

Here, the teacher [Śāntarakṣita] has mentioned only this reason of homogeneity, which serves to indicate the remaining [reasons].

tatra sukhādītyādiśabdena duḥkhamohayor grahaṇaṃ /

There, by the word "ādi" in "sukhādi" ("pleasure, etc."), pain and delusion are [meant to be] included.

vyaktam iti mahadādibhūtaparyantaṃ /

The [term] "manifest" [refers to everything] from cosmic intelligence down to the elements.

spaṣṭamupalabhyata ity arthaḥ /

The meaning is "is clearly perceived."

katham ity āha prasādetyādi /

How? [The text] says "through composure, etc."

ādiśabdaḥ pratyekamabhisambadhyate /

The word "ādi" ("etc.") is connected with each [term].

etaccāsmābhiḥ pūrvam eva vyākhyātaṃ /

And this has been explained by us earlier.

evaṃ samanvayādityasya hetoḥ siddhimupādarśya pramāṇaṃ racayannāha tata ityādi

Having thus shown the validity of the reason [called] "coherence," [the author] proceeds to present the proof, saying "tataḥ" etc.

tatastanmayasambhūtaṃ tajjāyanvayadarśanāt

Therefore, [the universe] must have emanated from what consists of that [i.e., the three guṇas], because we see the presence of that generic character [in it]

kuṭādibhedavat tac ca pradhānam iti kāpilāḥ

And that [cause] is Pradhāna [primordial matter], like [in the case of] pots and other diverse objects - thus [say] the followers of Kapila

tanmayasambhūtam iti

[The phrase] "emanated from what consists of that" [means the following:]

sukhādimayaṃ yatkāraṇaṃ tasmāt sambhūtam ity arthaḥ

[It] means "emanated from that cause which consists of pleasure and the other [guṇas]"

ayaṃ ca sādhyanirdeśaḥ

And this is the statement of what is to be proved

tajjātyanvayadarśanād iti hetuḥ

"Because we see the presence of that generic character" is the reason

tayā traiguṇyalakṣaṇayā jātyā anugatatvadarśanād ity arthaḥ

[It] means "because we see [everything] is pervaded by that generic character which consists in having the three guṇas"

kuṭādibhedavad iti ghaṭādibhedavat

"Like pots and other diverse objects" means "like jars and other diverse objects"

yac ca tanmayaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatpradhānam iti kāpilāḥ sāṅkhyā varṇayanti

And the Kāpilas, [that is] the Sāṃkhyas, explain that this cause consisting of that [the three guṇas] is Pradhāna

tadatretyādinā pratividhānam ārabhate tadatra sudhiyaḥ prāhus tulyā satve 'pi codanā

[The author] begins the refutation with "tadatra" etc.: "Here the wise ones say that the objection applies equally [to both views], even regarding existence"

yat tasyāmuttaraṃ vaḥ syāt tattulyaṃ sudhiyām api

Whatever answer you would have to that [objection] would be the same for the wise ones also

tatra yat tāvad uktaṃ pradhānāder amī kāryabhedās tadrūpā eva pravartanta iti tatredaṃ nirūpyate

Regarding what was first stated - that "these various effects proceeding from Pradhāna and other [causes] have exactly the same nature [as their causes]" - the following is now examined

yadyamī kāryabhedāḥ pradhānasvabhāvā eva tat katham eṣāṃ tataḥ kāryatayā pravṛttir bhavati

If these various effects have exactly the same nature as Pradhāna, then how can they proceed from it as its effects?

nahi yadyasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tasya kāryaṃ vā yuktaṃ bhinnalakṣaṇatvāt kāryakāraṇayoḥ

For what is non-different from something cannot be its effect, because cause and effect must have different characteristics

anyathā hīdaṃ kāryam idaṃ kāraṇaṃ vetyasaṅkīrṇavyavasthā kathaṃ bhavet

If it were not so, how could there be any clear distinction [between things] such as "this is the effect" and "this is the cause"?

tataśca yadbhavadbhir mūlaprakṛteḥ kāraṇatvam eva bhūtendriyalakṣaṇasya ṣoḍaśakasya gaṇasya kāryatvam eva buddhyahaṅkāratanmātrāṇāṃ ca pūrvottarāpekṣayā kāryatvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ ceti vyavasthānaṃ kṛtaṃ tan na syāt

And thus, your determination that primordial matter (mūlaprakṛti) is solely a cause, that the group of sixteen characterized by the elements and sense organs is solely an effect, and that buddhi, ahaṅkāra and the tanmātras are [both] effects and causes in relation to what precedes and follows—[all] this would not be possible.

yathoktam mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta

As it has been stated: "The primordial matter is never a product; the seven beginning with mahat are both products and producers;

ṣoḍaśakaśca vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ

the group of sixteen is [only] a product; puruṣa is neither a product nor a producer."

iti

Thus.

sarveṣām eva hi parasparāvyatirekātkāryatvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ vā prasajyeta

Indeed, due to [their] non-difference from each other, everything would end up being either an effect or a cause [of everything else].

yadvāpekṣikatvātkāryakāraṇabhāvasya rūpāntarasya cāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt sarveṣāṃ puruṣavan na prakṛtitvaṃ nāpi vikṛtitvaṃ syāt

Or else, due to the relativity of the causal relationship and the absence of any other form to be considered, nothing would be either a producer or a product, just like puruṣa.

āha ca

And it is said:

yadeva dadhi tatkṣīraṃ yatkṣīraṃ taddadhīti ca vadatā rudrilenaiva khyāpitā vindhyavāsitā

"That which is curd is milk, and that which is milk is curd"—by saying this, Rudrila himself revealed [his] foolishness.

yaccedaṃ hetumattvādidharmayogi vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktam iti varṇitaṃ tadapi bālapralapitam eva

And what has been described—that the manifest possesses properties like having a cause etc., [while] the unmanifest is the opposite—that too is mere childish prattle.

nahi yadyasmādabhinnasvabhāvaṃ tat tadviparītaṃ yuktaṃ rūpāntaratvalakṣaṇatvād vaiparītyasya

For indeed, that which has a nature non-different from something cannot reasonably be opposite to it, since opposition is characterized by having a different form.

anyathā bhedavyavahāroccheda eva syāt

Otherwise, there would be an absolute end to all practical dealings based on difference.

sarvam eva viśvamekarūpaṃ syāt

The entire universe would be of one form.

anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt

Otherwise, there would be undesirable consequences.

kiṃ cānvayavyatirekaniścayasamadhigamyo loke kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ prasiddhaḥ

Moreover, in the world, the relation of cause and effect is well-known to be ascertained through positive and negative concomitance.

na ca pradhānādibhyo mahahādyutpattivyavahāraḥ / nacāpi nityasya kāraṇabhāvo 'sti /

Neither is there any practical usage [that would establish] the origination of mahat etc. from pradhāna and other [principles], nor does anything eternal possess the nature of being a cause.

yena pradhānāt kāryabhedānāmutpattiḥ siddhyet / nityasya kramākramābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt /

By which [nature] the origination of different effects from pradhāna could be established, since there is a contradiction in an eternal [entity] performing an action either gradually or simultaneously.

syād etat nāsmābhirapūrvasvabhāvotpattyā kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'bhīṣṭo yena svarūpābhede sati sa virudhyate yāvatā pradhānaṃ sarpakuṇḍalādivan mahadādirūpeṇa pariṇāmaṃ gacchatteṣāṃ mahadādīnāṃ kāraṇam iti vyapadiśyate teca mahadādayas tatpariṇāmarūpatvāt tatkāryatayā vyapadiśyante /

[One might object:] "We do not maintain a causal relation through the production of a new nature, which would contradict [the principle of] non-difference in essential form. Rather, pradhāna undergoes modification into the form of mahat etc., just like a coiled serpent [modifies into an extended form], and thus it is designated as the cause of mahat etc., and these—mahat and the rest—being of the nature of its modifications, are designated as its effects."

pariṇāmaścaikavastvadhiṣṭhānatvād abhede 'pi na virudhyata iti /

"And modification, being based on a single substance, is not contradictory even in [a state of] non-difference."

tadetad asamyak /

This [position] is incorrect.

tathā hi pariṇāmo bhavet pūrvarūpaparityāgād vā bhavedaparityāgād vā / yadyaparityāgāt tadāvasthāsāṅkaryaṃ syāt bṛhattvādyavasthāyām api yuvatvādyavasthopalabdhiprasaṅgāt /

For modification would have to occur either through abandonment of the prior form or through non-abandonment. If through non-abandonment, then there would be a confusion of states, as even in the state of maturity one would perceive the state of youth and so forth.

atha parityāgāt tadā svabhāvahāniprasaṅgaḥ tataśca pūrvakaṃ svabhāvāntaraṃ niruddhamapūrvaṃ svabhāvāntaramutpannam iti na kasyacit pariṇāmaḥ siddhyet /

If through abandonment, then there would follow a loss of essential nature, and consequently the previous different nature would be destroyed and a new different nature would arise, so no modification of anything could be established.

na tāvad ekadeśena ekasyaikadeśāsambhavāt /

[Modification] cannot occur partially, because a single [entity] cannot have parts.

nāpi sarvātmanā tadarthāntarotpāde pūrvaināśaprasaṅgāt /

Nor [can it occur] totally, because that would entail the production of a different thing and the destruction of the previous [thing].

tasmān na tasyaivānyathātvaṃ yuktaṃ svabhāvāntarotpādanibandhanatvāt tasyeti /

Therefore it is not logical that there is alteration of the same thing, since this would be based on the production of a different essential nature.

athāpi syād vyavasthitasya dharmiṇo dharmāntaranivṛttyā dharmātnaraprādurbhāvaḥ pariṇāmo varṇyate natu svabhāvasyānyathātvād iti /

It might be argued that "while the substance [itself] remains constant, modification means the disappearance of one property and appearance of another property, and not that the very essence [of the thing] becomes different."

tadetad asamyak /

This [argument] is not correct.

tathā hi sa pravartamāno nivartamānaś ca dharmo dharmiṇo 'rthāntarabhūto vā syād anarthāntarabhūto vā /

For when a property appears and disappears, would that property be something different (arthāntara) or non-different from the substance?

yadyarthāntarabhūtas tadā dharmī tadavastha eveti katham asau pariṇato nāma /

If it were something different, then since the substance remains exactly the same, how can it be called modified?

nahyarthāntarabhūtayoḥ paṭāśvayorutpādavināśaṃ satyavicalitātmasvarūpasyaghaṭādeḥ pariṇāmo bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt /

For when two entirely different things like cloth and horse are produced or destroyed, this is not considered a modification of things like a jar [whose own nature remains unchanged], as [accepting this] would lead to an absurdity.