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maximize revenue, but instead to earn the highest possible profit. In the 224 Chapter 9 | Monopoly HealthPill example in Figure 9.4, the highest profit will occur at the quantity where total revenue is the farthest above total cost. This looks to be somewhere in the middle of the graph, but where exactly? It is easier to see the profit maximizing level of output by using the marginal approach, to which we turn next. Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost for a Monopolist In the real world, a monopolist often does not have enough information to analyze its entire total revenues or total costs curves. After all, the firm does not know exactly what would happen if it were to alter production dramatically. However, a monopolist often has fairly reliable information about how changing output by small or moderate amounts will affect its marginal revenues and marginal costs, because it has had experience with such changes over time and because modest changes are easier to extrapolate from current experience. A monopolist can use information on marginal revenue and marginal cost to seek out the profit-maximizing combination of quantity and price. Table 9.3 expands Table 9.2 using the figures on total costs and total revenues from the HealthPill example to calculate marginal revenue and marginal cost. This monopoly faces typical upward-sloping marginal cost and downward sloping marginal revenue curves, as Figure 9.5 shows. Notice that marginal revenue is zero at a quantity of 7, and turns negative at quantities higher than 7. It may seem counterintuitive that marginal revenue could ever be zero or negative: after all, doesn't an increase in quantity sold not always mean more revenue? For a perfect competitor, each additional unit sold brought a positive marginal revenue, because marginal revenue was equal to the given market price. However, a monopolist can sell a larger quantity and see a decline in total revenue. When a monopolist increases sales by one unit, it gains some marginal revenue from selling that extra unit, but also loses some marginal revenue because it must now sell every other unit at a lower price. As the quantity sold becomes higher, at some point the drop in price is proportionally more than the increase in greater quantity of sales, causing a situation where more sales bring in less revenue. In other words, marginal revenue is negative. Figure 9.5 Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost for the HealthPill Monopoly For a monopoly like HealthPill, marginal revenue decreases as it sells additional units of output. The marginal cost curve is upward-sloping. The
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profit-maximizing choice for the monopoly will be to produce at the quantity where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost: that is, MR = MC. If the monopoly produces a lower quantity, then MR > MC at those levels of output, and the firm can make higher profits by expanding output. If the firm produces at a greater quantity, then MC > MR, and the firm can make higher profits by reducing its quantity of output. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 9 | Monopoly 225 Quantity Q Total Revenue TR Marginal Revenue MR Total Cost TC Marginal Cost MC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1,200 2,200 3,000 3,600 4,000 4,200 4,200 4,000 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 –200 Table 9.3 Costs and Revenues of HealthPill 500 775 1,000 1,250 1,650 2,500 4,000 6,400 500 275 225 250 400 850 1,500 2,400 A monopolist can determine its profit-maximizing price and quantity by analyzing the marginal revenue and marginal costs of producing an extra unit. If the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost, then the firm should produce the extra unit. For example, at an output of 4 in Figure 9.5, marginal revenue is 600 and marginal cost is 250, so producing this unit will clearly add to overall profits. At an output of 5, marginal revenue is 400 and marginal cost is 400, so producing this unit still means overall profits are unchanged. However, expanding output from 5 to 6 would involve a marginal revenue of 200 and a marginal cost of 850, so that sixth unit would actually reduce profits. Thus, the monopoly can tell from the marginal revenue and marginal cost that of the choices in the table, the profit-maximizing level of output is 5. The monopoly could seek out the profit-maximizing level of output by increasing quantity by a small amount, calculating marginal revenue and marginal cost, and then either increasing output as long as marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost or reducing output if marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. This process works without any need to calculate total revenue and total cost. Thus, a profit-maximizing monopoly should follow the rule of producing up to the quantity where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost—that is, MR = MC. This quantity is easy to identify graphically, where
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MR and MC intersect. Maximizing Profits If you find it counterintuitive that producing where marginal revenue equals marginal cost will maximize profits, working through the numbers will help. Step 1. Remember, we define marginal cost as the change in total cost from producing a small amount of additional output. MC = change in total cost change in quantity produced Step 2. Note that in Table 9.3, as output increases from 1 to 2 units, total cost increases from $1500 to $1800. As a result, the marginal cost of the second unit will be: MC = $775 – $500 1 = $275 226 Chapter 9 | Monopoly Step 3. Remember that, similarly, marginal revenue is the change in total revenue from selling a small amount of additional output. MR = change in total revenue change in quantity sold Step 4. Note that in Table 9.3, as output increases from 1 to 2 units, total revenue increases from $1200 to $2200. As a result, the marginal revenue of the second unit will be: MR = $2200 – $1200 1 = $1000 Quantity Q Marginal Revenue MR Marginal Cost MC Marginal Profit MP Total Profit,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 −200 500 275 225 250 400 850 1,500 2,400 700 725 575 350 0 −650 −1,500 −2,600 700 1,425 2,000 2,350 2,350 1,700 200 −2,400 Table 9.4 Marginal Revenue, Marginal Cost, Marginal and Total Profit Table 9.4 repeats the marginal cost and marginal revenue data from Table 9.3, and adds two more columns: Marginal profit is the profitability of each additional unit sold. We define it as marginal revenue minus marginal cost. Finally, total profit is the sum of marginal profits. As long as marginal profit is positive, producing increase total profits. When marginal profit turns negative, producing more output will more output will decrease total profits. Total profit is maximized where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. In this example, maximum profit occurs at 5 units of output. A perfectly competitive firm will also find its profit-maximizing level of output where MR = MC. The key difference with a perfectly competitive firm is that in the case of perfect competition, marginal revenue is equal to price (MR = P), while for a monopolist, marginal revenue is not equal to the price, because changes in quantity of output affect the price. Illustrating Monopoly Profits It is straightforward to
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calculate profits of given numbers for total revenue and total cost. However, the size of monopoly profits can also be illustrated graphically with Figure 9.6, which takes the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves from the previous exhibit and adds an average cost curve and the monopolist’s perceived demand curve. Table 9.5 shows the data for these curves. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 9 | Monopoly 227 Quantity Q Demand P Marginal Revenue MR Marginal Cost MC Average Cost AC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Table 9.5 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 –200 500 275 225 250 400 850 1,500 2,400 500 388 333 313 330 417 571 800 Figure 9.6 Illustrating Profits at the HealthPill Monopoly This figure begins with the same marginal revenue and marginal cost curves from the HealthPill monopoly from Figure 9.5. It then adds an average cost curve and the demand curve that the monopolist faces. The HealthPill firm first chooses the quantity where MR = MC. In this example, the quantity is 5. The monopolist then decides what price to charge by looking at the demand curve it faces. The large box, with quantity on the horizontal axis and demand (which shows the price) on the vertical axis, shows total revenue for the firm. The lighter-shaded box, which is quantity on the horizontal axis and average cost of production on the vertical axis shows the firm's total costs. The large total revenue box minus the smaller total cost box leaves the darkly shaded box that shows total profits. Since the price charged is above average cost, the firm is earning positive profits. Figure 9.7 illustrates the three-step process where a monopolist: selects the profit-maximizing quantity to produce; decides what price to charge; determines total revenue, total cost, and profit. Step 1: The Monopolist Determines Its Profit-Maximizing Level of Output The firm can use the points on the demand curve D to calculate total revenue, and then, based on total revenue, 228 Chapter 9 | Monopoly calculate its marginal revenue curve. The profit-maximizing quantity will occur where MR = MC—or at the last possible point before marginal costs start exceeding marginal revenue. On Figure 9.6, MR = MC occurs
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at an output of 5. Step 2: The Monopolist Decides What Price to Charge The monopolist will charge what the market is willing to pay. A dotted line drawn straight up from the profitmaximizing quantity to the demand curve shows the profit-maximizing price which, in Figure 9.6, is $800. This price is above the average cost curve, which shows that the firm is earning profits. Step 3: Calculate Total Revenue, Total Cost, and Profit Total revenue is the overall shaded box, where the width of the box is the quantity sold and the height is the price. In Figure 9.6, this is 5 x $800 = $4000. In Figure 9.6, the bottom part of the shaded box, which is shaded more lightly, shows total costs; that is, quantity on the horizontal axis multiplied by average cost on the vertical axis or 5 x $330 = $1650. The larger box of total revenues minus the smaller box of total costs will equal profits, which the darkly shaded box shows. Using the numbers gives $4000 - $1650 = $2350. In a perfectly competitive market, the forces of entry would erode this profit in the long run. However, a monopolist is protected by barriers to entry. In fact, one obvious sign of a possible monopoly is when a firm earns profits year after year, while doing more or less the same thing, without ever seeing increased competition eroding those profits. Figure 9.7 How a Profit-Maximizing Monopoly Decides Price In Step 1, the monopoly chooses the profitmaximizing level of output Q1, by choosing the quantity where MR = MC. In Step 2, the monopoly decides how much to charge for output level Q1 by drawing a line straight up from Q1 to point R on its perceived demand curve. Thus, the monopoly will charge a price (P1). In Step 3, the monopoly identifies its profit. Total revenue will be Q1 multiplied by P1. Total cost will be Q1 multiplied by the average cost of producing Q1, which point S shows on the average cost curve to be P2. Profits will be the total revenue rectangle minus the total cost rectangle, which the shaded zone in the figure shows. Why is a monopolist’s marginal revenue always less than the price? The marginal revenue curve for a monopolist always lies beneath the market demand curve. To understand why, think about increasing the quantity
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along the demand curve by one unit, so that you take one step down This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 9 | Monopoly 229 the demand curve to a slightly higher quantity but a slightly lower price. A demand curve is not sequential: It is not that first we sell Q1 at a higher price, and then we sell Q2 at a lower price. Rather, a demand curve is conditional: If we charge the higher price, we would sell Q1. If, instead, we charge a lower price (on all the units that we sell), we would sell Q2. When we think about increasing the quantity sold by one unit, marginal revenue is affected in two ways. First, we sell one additional unit at the new market price. Second, all the previous units, which we sold at the higher price, now sell for less. Because of the lower price on all units sold, the marginal revenue of selling a unit is less than the price of that unit—and the marginal revenue curve is below the demand curve. Tip: For a straight-line demand curve, MR and demand have the same vertical intercept. As output increases, marginal revenue decreases twice as fast as demand, so that the horizontal intercept of MR is halfway to the horizontal intercept of demand. You can see this in the Figure 9.8. Figure 9.8 The Monopolist’s Marginal Revenue Curve versus Demand Curve Because the market demand curve is conditional, the marginal revenue curve for a monopolist lies beneath the demand curve. The Inefficiency of Monopoly Most people criticize monopolies because they charge too high a price, but what economists object to is that monopolies do not supply enough output to be allocatively efficient. To understand why a monopoly is inefficient, it is useful to compare it with the benchmark model of perfect competition. Allocative efficiency is an economic concept regarding efficiency at the social or societal level. It refers to producing the optimal quantity of some output, the quantity where the marginal benefit to society of one more unit just equals the marginal cost. The rule of profit maximization in a world of perfect competition was for each firm to produce the quantity of output where P = MC, where the price (P) is a measure of how much buyers value the good and the marginal cost (MC) is a measure of what marginal units cost society to produce. Following this rule assures allocative efficiency. If P > MC, then the marginal
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benefit to society (as measured by P) is greater than the marginal cost to society of producing additional units, and a greater quantity should be produced. However, in the case of monopoly, price is always greater than marginal cost at the profit-maximizing level of output, as you can see by looking back at Figure 9.6. Thus, consumers will suffer from a monopoly because it will sell a lower quantity in the market, at a higher price, than would have been the case in a perfectly competitive market. The problem of inefficiency for monopolies often runs even deeper than these issues, and also involves incentives for efficiency over longer periods of time. There are counterbalancing incentives here. On one side, firms may strive for new inventions and new intellectual property because they want to become monopolies and earn high profits—at least for a few years until the competition catches up. In this way, monopolies may come to exist because of competitive pressures on firms. However, once a barrier to entry is in place, a monopoly that does not need to fear competition can just produce the same old products in the same old way—while still ringing up a healthy rate of profit. John Hicks, who won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1972, wrote in 1935: “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” He did not mean the comment in a complimentary way. He meant that monopolies may bank their profits and slack off on trying to please their customers. 230 Chapter 9 | Monopoly When AT&T provided all of the local and long-distance phone service in the United States, along with manufacturing most of the phone equipment, the payment plans and types of phones did not change much. The old joke was that you could have any color phone you wanted, as long as it was black. However, in 1982, government litigation split up AT&T into a number of local phone companies, a long-distance phone company, and a phone equipment manufacturer. An explosion of innovation followed. Services like call waiting, caller ID, three-way calling, voice mail through the phone company, mobile phones, and wireless connections to the internet all became available. Companies offered a wide range of payment plans, as well. It was no longer true that all phones were black. Instead, phones came in a wide variety of shapes and colors. The end of the telephone monopoly brought lower prices, a greater quantity of services, and also a wave of innovation aimed at attracting and pleasing customers. The Rest is History In
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the opening case, we presented the East India Company and the Confederate States as a monopoly or near monopoly provider of a good. Nearly every American schoolchild knows the result of the “unwelcome visit” the “Mohawks” bestowed upon Boston Harbor’s tea-bearing ships—the Boston Tea Party. Regarding the cotton industry, we also know Great Britain remained neutral during the Civil War, taking neither side during the conflict. these business have unintended and historical consequences? Might Did the monopoly nature of the American Revolution have been deterred, if the East India Company had sailed the tea-bearing ships back to England? Might the southern states have made different decisions had they not been so confident “King Cotton” would force diplomatic recognition of the Confederate States of America? Of course, it is not possible to definitively answer these questions. We cannot roll back the clock and try a different scenario. We can, however, consider the monopoly nature of these businesses and the roles they played and hypothesize about what might have occurred under different circumstances. Perhaps if there had been legal free tea trade, the colonists would have seen things differently. There was smuggled Dutch tea in the colonial market. If the colonists had been able to freely purchase Dutch tea, they would have paid lower prices and avoided the tax. What about the cotton monopoly? With one in five jobs in Great Britain depending on Southern cotton and the Confederate States as nearly the sole provider of that cotton, why did Great Britain remain neutral during the Civil War? At the beginning of the war, Britain simply drew down massive stores of cotton. These stockpiles lasted until near the end of 1862. Why did Britain not recognize the Confederacy at that point? Two reasons: The Emancipation Proclamation and new sources of cotton. Having outlawed slavery throughout the United Kingdom in 1833, it was politically impossible for Great Britain, empty cotton warehouses or not, to recognize, diplomatically, the Confederate States. In addition, during the two years it took to draw down the stockpiles, Britain expanded cotton imports from India, Egypt, and Brazil. Monopoly sellers often see no threats to their superior marketplace position. In these examples did the power of the monopoly blind the decision makers to other possibilities? Perhaps. As a result of their actions, this is how history unfolded. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 9 | Monopoly KEY TERMS 231 allocative efficiency producing the optimal quantity
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of some output; the quantity where the marginal benefit to society of one more unit just equals the marginal cost barriers to entry the legal, technological, or market forces that may discourage or prevent potential competitors from entering a market copyright a form of legal protection to prevent copying, for commercial purposes, original works of authorship, including books and music deregulation removing government controls over setting prices and quantities in certain industries intellectual property the body of law including patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secret law that protect the right of inventors to produce and sell their inventions legal monopoly legal prohibitions against competition, such as regulated monopolies and intellectual property protection marginal profit profit of one more unit of output, computed as marginal revenue minus marginal cost monopoly a situation in which one firm produces all of the output in a market natural monopoly economic conditions in the industry, for example, economies of scale or control of a critical resource, that limit effective competition patent a government rule that gives the inventor the exclusive legal right to make, use, or sell the invention for a limited time predatory pricing when an existing firm uses sharp but temporary price cuts to discourage new competition trade secrets methods of production kept secret by the producing firm trademark an identifying symbol or name for a particular good and can only be used by the firm that registered that trademark KEY CONCEPTS AND SUMMARY 9.1 How Monopolies Form: Barriers to Entry Barriers to entry prevent or discourage competitors from entering the market. These barriers include: economies of scale that lead to natural monopoly; control of a physical resource; legal restrictions on competition; patent, trademark and copyright protection; and practices to intimidate the competition like predatory pricing. Intellectual property refers to legally guaranteed ownership of an idea, rather than a physical item. The laws that protect intellectual property include patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. A natural monopoly arises when economies of scale persist over a large enough range of output that if one firm supplies the entire market, no other firm can enter without facing a cost disadvantage. 9.2 How a Profit-Maximizing Monopoly Chooses Output and Price A monopolist is not a price taker, because when it decides what quantity to produce, it also determines the market price. For a monopolist, total revenue is relatively low at low quantities of output, because it is not selling much. Total revenue is also relatively low at very high quantities of output, because a very high quantity will sell only at a low price. Thus, total revenue for a monopolist will start low, rise, and
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then decline. The marginal revenue for a monopolist from selling additional units will decline. Each additional unit a monopolist sells will push down the overall market price, and as it sells more units, this lower price applies to increasingly more units. 232 Chapter 9 | Monopoly The monopolist will select the profit-maximizing level of output where MR = MC, and then charge the price for that quantity of output as determined by the market demand curve. If that price is above average cost, the monopolist earns positive profits. Monopolists are not productively efficient, because they do not produce at the minimum of the average cost curve. Monopolists are not allocatively efficient, because they do not produce at the quantity where P = MC. As a result, monopolists produce less, at a higher average cost, and charge a higher price than would a combination of firms in a perfectly competitive industry. Monopolists also may lack incentives for innovation, because they need not fear entry. SELF-CHECK QUESTIONS 1. Classify the following as a government-enforced barrier to entry, a barrier to entry that is not governmentenforced, or a situation that does not involve a barrier to entry. a. A patented invention b. A popular but easily copied restaurant recipe c. An industry where economies of scale are very small compared to the size of demand in the market d. A well-established reputation for slashing prices in response to new entry e. A well-respected brand name that has been carefully built up over many years 2. Classify the following as a government-enforced barrier to entry, a barrier to entry that is not governmentenforced, or a situation that does not involve a barrier to entry. a. A city passes a law on how many licenses it will issue for taxicabs b. A city passes a law that all taxicab drivers must pass a driving safety test and have insurance c. A well-known trademark d. Owning a spring that offers very pure water e. An industry where economies of scale are very large compared to the size of demand in the market 3. Suppose the local electrical utility, a legal monopoly based on economies of scale, was split into four firms of equal size, with the idea that eliminating the monopoly would promote competitive pricing of electricity. What do you anticipate would happen to prices? If Congress reduced the period of patent protection from 20 years to 10 years, what would likely happen to the 4. amount of private research and development? 5. Suppose demand
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for a monopoly’s product falls so that its profit-maximizing price is below average variable cost. How much output should the firm supply? Hint: Draw the graph. Imagine a monopolist could charge a different price to every customer based on how much he or she were willing 6. to pay. How would this affect monopoly profits? REVIEW QUESTIONS How is monopoly 7. competition? different from perfect 13. What property? legal mechanisms protect intellectual 8. What is a barrier to entry? Give some examples. 14. In what sense is a natural monopoly “natural”? 9. What is a natural monopoly? 10. What is a legal monopoly? 11. What is predatory pricing? 12. How is intellectual property different from other property? 15. How is the demand curve perceived by a perfectly competitive firm different from the demand curve perceived by a monopolist? 16. How does the demand curve perceived by a monopolist compare with the market demand curve? 17. Is a monopolist a price taker? Explain briefly. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 9 | Monopoly 233 18. What is the usual shape of a total revenue curve for a monopolist? Why? 19. What is the usual shape of a marginal revenue curve for a monopolist? Why? 20. How can a monopolist identify the profitmaximizing level of output if it knows its total revenue and total cost curves? 21. How can a monopolist identify the profitmaximizing level of output if it knows its marginal revenue and marginal costs? CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 25. ALCOA does not have the monopoly power it once had. How do you suppose their barriers to entry were weakened? 26. Why are generic pharmaceuticals significantly cheaper than name brand ones? 27. For many years, the Justice Department has tried to break up large firms like IBM, Microsoft, and most recently Google, on the grounds that their large market share made them essentially monopolies. In a global market, where U.S. firms compete with firms from other countries, would this policy make the same sense as it might in a purely domestic context? PROBLEMS 31. Return to Figure 9.2. Suppose P0 is $10 and P1 is $11. Suppose a new firm with the same LRAC curve as the incumbent tries to break into the market by selling 4,000 units of output
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. Estimate from the graph what the new firm’s average cost of producing output would be. If the incumbent continues to produce 6,000 units, how much output would the two firms supply to the market? Estimate what would happen to the market price as a result of the supply of both the incumbent firm and the new entrant. Approximately how much profit would each firm earn? 22. When a monopolist identifies its profit-maximizing quantity of output, how does it decide what price to charge? Is a monopolist allocatively efficient? Why or why 23. not? 24. How does the quantity produced and price charged by a monopolist compare to that of a perfectly competitive firm? 28. Intellectual property laws are intended to promote innovation, but some economists, such as Milton Friedman, have argued that such laws are not desirable. In the United States, there is no intellectual property protection for food recipes or for fashion designs. Considering the state of these two industries, and bearing in mind the discussion of the inefficiency of monopolies, can you think of any reasons why intellectual property laws might hinder innovation in some cases? 29. Imagine that you are managing a small firm and thinking about entering the market of a monopolist. The monopolist is currently charging a high price, and you have calculated that you can make a nice profit charging 10% less than the monopolist. Before you go ahead and challenge the monopolist, what possibility should you consider for how the monopolist might react? 30. If a monopoly firm is earning profits, how much would you expect these profits to be diminished by entry in the long run? 32. Draw the demand curve, marginal revenue, and marginal cost curves from Figure 9.6, and identify the quantity of output the monopoly wishes to supply and the price it will charge. Suppose demand for the monopoly’s product increases dramatically. Draw the new demand curve. What happens to the marginal revenue as a result of the increase in demand? What happens to the marginal cost curve? Identify the new profit-maximizing quantity and price. Does the answer make sense to you? 234 Chapter 9 | Monopoly 33. Draw a monopolist’s demand curve, marginal Identify the revenue, and marginal cost curves. monopolist’s profit-maximizing output level. Now, think about a slightly higher level of output (say Q0 + 1). According to the graph, is there any consumer willing to pay more than the marginal cost of that new level
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of output? If so, what does this mean? This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 235 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Figure 10.1 Competing Brands? The laundry detergent market is one that is characterized neither as perfect competition nor monopoly. (Credit: modification of work by Pixel Drip/Flickr Creative Commons) The Temptation to Defy the Law Laundry detergent and bags of ice—products of industries that seem pretty mundane, maybe even boring. Hardly! Both have been the center of clandestine meetings and secret deals worthy of a spy novel. In France, between 1997 and 2004, the top four laundry detergent producers (Proctor & Gamble, Henkel, Unilever, and Colgate-Palmolive) controlled about 90 percent of the French soap market. Officials from the soap firms were meeting secretly, in out-of-the-way, small cafés around Paris. Their goals: Stamp out competition and set prices. Around the same time, the top five Midwest ice makers (Home City Ice, Lang Ice, Tinley Ice, Sisler’s Dairy, and Products of Ohio) had similar goals in mind when they secretly agreed to divide up the bagged ice market. If both groups could meet their goals, it would enable each to act as though they were a single firm—in essence, a monopoly—and enjoy monopoly-size profits. The problem? In many parts of the world, including the European Union and the United States, it is illegal for firms to divide markets and set prices collaboratively. These two cases provide examples of markets that are characterized neither as perfect competition nor monopoly. Instead, these firms are competing in market structures that lie between the extremes of monopoly 236 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly and perfect competition. How do they behave? Why do they exist? We will revisit this case later, to find out what happened. Introduction to Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly In this chapter, you will learn about: • Monopolistic Competition • Oligopoly Perfect competition and monopoly are at opposite ends of the competition spectrum. A perfectly competitive market has many firms selling identical products, who all act as price takers in the face of the competition. If you recall, price takers are firms that have no market power. They simply have to take the
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market price as given. Monopoly arises when a single firm sells a product for which there are no close substitutes. We consider Microsoft, for instance, as a monopoly because it dominates the operating systems market. What about the vast majority of real world firms and organizations that fall between these extremes, firms that we could describe as imperfectly competitive? What determines their behavior? They have more influence over the price they charge than perfectly competitive firms, but not as much as a monopoly. What will they do? One type of imperfectly competitive market is monopolistic competition. Monopolistically competitive markets feature a large number of competing firms, but the products that they sell are not identical. Consider, as an example, the Mall of America in Minnesota, the largest shopping mall in the United States. In 2010, the Mall of America had 24 stores that sold women’s “ready-to-wear” clothing (like Ann Taylor and Urban Outfitters), another 50 stores that sold clothing for both men and women (like Banana Republic, J. Crew, and Nordstrom’s), plus 14 more stores that sold women’s specialty clothing (like Motherhood Maternity and Victoria’s Secret). Most of the markets that consumers encounter at the retail level are monopolistically competitive. The other type of imperfectly competitive market is oligopoly. Oligopolistic markets are those which a small number of firms dominate. Commercial aircraft provides a good example: Boeing and Airbus each produce slightly less than 50% of the large commercial aircraft in the world. Another example is the U.S. soft drink industry, which Coca-Cola and Pepsi dominate. We characterize oligopolies by high barriers to entry with firms choosing output, pricing, and other decisions strategically based on the decisions of the other firms in the market. In this chapter, we first explore how monopolistically competitive firms will choose their profit-maximizing level of output. We will then discuss oligopolistic firms, which face two conflicting temptations: to collaborate as if they were a single monopoly, or to individually compete to gain profits by expanding output levels and cutting prices. Oligopolistic markets and firms can also take on elements of monopoly and of perfect competition. 10.1 | Monopolistic Competition By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain the significance of differentiated products • Describe how a monopolistic competitor chooses price and quantity • Discuss entry, exit, and efficiency as they pertain to monopolistic competition • Analyze how
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advertising can impact monopolistic competition Monopolistic competition involves many firms competing against each other, but selling products that are distinctive in some way. Examples include stores that sell different styles of clothing; restaurants or grocery stores that sell a variety of food; and even products like golf balls or beer that may be at least somewhat similar but differ in public perception because of advertising and brand names. There are over 600,000 restaurants in the United States. When products are distinctive, each firm has a mini-monopoly on its particular style or flavor or brand name. However, firms producing such products must also compete with other styles and flavors and brand names. The term “monopolistic competition” captures this mixture of mini-monopoly and tough competition, and the following Clear It Up feature This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 237 introduces its derivation. Who invented the theory of imperfect competition? Two economists independently but simultaneously developed the theory of imperfect competition in 1933. The first was Edward Chamberlin of Harvard University who published The Economics of Monopolistic Competition. The second was Joan Robinson of Cambridge University who published The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Robinson subsequently became interested in macroeconomics and she became a prominent Keynesian, and later a post-Keynesian economist. (See the Welcome to Economics! and The Keynesian Perspective (http://cnx.org/content/m63849/latest/) chapters for more on Keynes.) Differentiated Products A firm can try to make its products different from those of its competitors in several ways: physical aspects of the product, location from which it sells the product, intangible aspects of the product, and perceptions of the product. We call products that are distinctive in one of these ways differentiated products. Physical aspects of a product include all the phrases you hear in advertisements: unbreakable bottle, nonstick surface, freezer-to-microwave, non-shrink, extra spicy, newly redesigned for your comfort. A firm's location can also create a difference between producers. For example, a gas station located at a heavily traveled intersection can probably sell more gas, because more cars drive by that corner. A supplier to an automobile manufacturer may find that it is an advantage to locate close to the car factory. Intangible aspects can differentiate a product, too. Some intangible aspects may be promises like a guarantee of satisfaction or money back, a
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reputation for high quality, services like free delivery, or offering a loan to purchase the product. Finally, product differentiation may occur in the minds of buyers. For example, many people could not tell the difference in taste between common varieties of ketchup or mayonnaise if they were blindfolded but, because of past habits and advertising, they have strong preferences for certain brands. Advertising can play a role in shaping these intangible preferences. The concept of differentiated products is closely related to the degree of variety that is available. If everyone in the economy wore only blue jeans, ate only white bread, and drank only tap water, then the markets for clothing, food, and drink would be much closer to perfectly competitive. The variety of styles, flavors, locations, and characteristics creates product differentiation and monopolistic competition. Perceived Demand for a Monopolistic Competitor A monopolistically competitive firm perceives a demand for its goods that is an intermediate case between monopoly and competition. Figure 10.2 offers a reminder that the demand curve that a perfectly competitive firm faces is perfectly elastic or flat, because the perfectly competitive firm can sell any quantity it wishes at the prevailing market price. In contrast, the demand curve, as faced by a monopolist, is the market demand curve, since a monopolist is the only firm in the market, and hence is downward sloping. 238 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Figure 10.2 Perceived Demand for Firms in Different Competitive Settings The demand curve that a perfectly competitive firm faces is perfectly elastic, meaning it can sell all the output it wishes at the prevailing market price. The demand curve that a monopoly faces is the market demand. It can sell more output only by decreasing the price it charges. The demand curve that a monopolistically competitive firm faces falls in between. The demand curve as a monopolistic competitor faces is not flat, but rather downward-sloping, which means that the monopolistic competitor can raise its price without losing all of its customers or lower the price and gain more customers. Since there are substitutes, the demand curve facing a monopolistically competitive firm is more elastic than that of a monopoly where there are no close substitutes. If a monopolist raises its price, some consumers will choose not to purchase its product—but they will then need to buy a completely different product. However, when a monopolistic competitor raises its price, some consumers will choose not to purchase the product at all, but others will choose to buy a similar product from another firm. If a
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monopolistic competitor raises its price, it will not lose as many customers as would a perfectly competitive firm, but it will lose more customers than would a monopoly that raised its prices. At a glance, the demand curves that a monopoly and a monopolistic competitor face look similar—that is, they both slope down. However, the underlying economic meaning of these perceived demand curves is different, because a monopolist faces the market demand curve and a monopolistic competitor does not. Rather, a monopolistically competitive firm’s demand curve is but one of many firms that make up the “before” market demand curve. Are you following? If so, how would you categorize the market for golf balls? Take a swing, then see the following Clear It Up feature. Are golf balls really differentiated products? Monopolistic competition refers to an industry that has more than a few firms, each offering a product which, from the consumer’s perspective, is different from its competitors. The U.S. Golf Association runs a laboratory that tests 20,000 golf balls a year. There are strict rules for what makes a golf ball legal. A ball's weight cannot exceed 1.620 ounces and its diameter cannot be less than 1.680 inches (which is a weight of 45.93 grams and a diameter of 42.67 millimeters, in case you were wondering). The Association also tests the balls by hitting them at different speeds. For example, the distance test involves having a mechanical golfer hit the ball with a titanium driver and a swing speed of 120 miles per hour. As the testing center explains: “The USGA system then uses an array of sensors that accurately measure the flight of a golf ball during a short, indoor trajectory from a ball launcher. From this flight data, a computer calculates the lift and drag forces that are generated by the speed, spin, and dimple pattern of the ball.... The distance limit is 317 yards.” Over 1800 golf balls made by more than 100 companies meet the USGA standards. The balls do differ in various ways, such as the pattern of dimples on the ball, the types of plastic on the cover and in the cores, and other factors. Since all balls need to conform to the USGA tests, they are much more alike than different. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 239 In other words,
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golf ball manufacturers are monopolistically competitive. However, retail sales of golf balls are about $500 million per year, which means that many large companies have a powerful incentive to persuade players that golf balls are highly differentiated and that it makes a huge difference which one you choose. Sure, Tiger Woods can tell the difference. For the average amateur golfer who plays a few times a summer—and who loses many golf balls to the woods and lake and needs to buy new ones—most golf balls are pretty much indistinguishable. How a Monopolistic Competitor Chooses Price and Quantity The monopolistically competitive firm decides on its profit-maximizing quantity and price in much the same way as a monopolist. A monopolistic competitor, like a monopolist, faces a downward-sloping demand curve, and so it will choose some combination of price and quantity along its perceived demand curve. As an example of a profit-maximizing monopolistic competitor, consider the Authentic Chinese Pizza store, which serves pizza with cheese, sweet and sour sauce, and your choice of vegetables and meats. Although Authentic Chinese Pizza must compete against other pizza businesses and restaurants, it has a differentiated product. The firm’s perceived demand curve is downward sloping, as Figure 10.3 shows and the first two columns of Table 10.1. Figure 10.3 How a Monopolistic Competitor Chooses its Profit Maximizing Output and Price To maximize profits, the Authentic Chinese Pizza shop would choose a quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, or Q where MR = MC. Here it would choose a quantity of 40 and a price of $16. Quantity Price Total Revenue Marginal Revenue Total Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost 10 20 30 40 $23 $20 $18 $16 $230 $400 $540 $640 $23 $17 $14 $10 Table 10.1 Revenue and Cost Schedule $340 $400 $480 $580 $34 $6 $8 $10 $34 $20 $16 $14.50 240 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Quantity Price Total Revenue Marginal Revenue 50 60 70 80 $14 $12 $10 $8 $700 $720 $700 $640 $6 $2 –$2 –$6 Table 10.1 Revenue and Cost Schedule Total Cost $700 $840 $1,020 $1,280 Marginal Cost Average Cost $12 $14 $18 $26 $14 $14 $14.57 $16 We can multiply the combinations of price and quantity at
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each point on the demand curve to calculate the total revenue that the firm would receive, which is in the third column of Table 10.1. We calculate marginal revenue, in the fourth column, as the change in total revenue divided by the change in quantity. The final columns of Table 10.1 show total cost, marginal cost, and average cost. As always, we calculate marginal cost by dividing the change in total cost by the change in quantity, while we calculate average cost by dividing total cost by quantity. The following Work It Out feature shows how these firms calculate how much of their products to supply at what price. How a Monopolistic Competitor Determines How Much to Produce and at What Price The process by which a monopolistic competitor chooses its profit-maximizing quantity and price resembles closely how a monopoly makes these decisions process. First, the firm selects the profit-maximizing quantity to produce. Then the firm decides what price to charge for that quantity. Step 1. The monopolistic competitor determines its profit-maximizing level of output. In this case, the Authentic Chinese Pizza company will determine the profit-maximizing quantity to produce by considering its marginal revenues and marginal costs. Two scenarios are possible: • • If the firm is producing at a quantity of output where marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost, then the firm should keep expanding production, because each marginal unit is adding to profit by bringing in more revenue than its cost. In this way, the firm will produce up to the quantity where MR = MC. If the firm is producing at a quantity where marginal costs exceed marginal revenue, then each marginal unit is costing more than the revenue it brings in, and the firm will increase its profits by reducing the quantity of output until MR = MC. In this example, MR and MC intersect at a quantity of 40, which is the profit-maximizing level of output for the firm. Step 2. The monopolistic competitor decides what price to charge. When the firm has determined its profitmaximizing quantity of output, it can then look to its perceived demand curve to find out what it can charge for that quantity of output. On the graph, we show this process as a vertical line reaching up through the profitmaximizing quantity until it hits the firm’s perceived demand curve. For Authentic Chinese Pizza, it should charge a price of $16 per pizza for a quantity of 40. Once the firm has chosen price and quantity, it’s in a position to calculate
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total revenue, total cost, and profit. At a quantity of 40, the price of $16 lies above the average cost curve, so the firm is making economic profits. From Table 10.1 we can see that, at an output of 40, the firm’s total revenue is $640 and its total cost is $580, so profits are $60. In Figure 10.3, the firm’s total revenues are the rectangle with the quantity of 40 on the horizontal axis and the price of $16 on the vertical axis. The firm’s total costs are the light shaded rectangle with the same quantity of 40 on the horizontal axis but the average cost of $14.50 on the vertical axis. Profits are total revenues minus total costs, which is the shaded area above the average cost curve. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 241 Although the process by which a monopolistic competitor makes decisions about quantity and price is similar to the way in which a monopolist makes such decisions, two differences are worth remembering. First, although both a monopolist and a monopolistic competitor face downward-sloping demand curves, the monopolist’s perceived demand curve is the market demand curve, while the perceived demand curve for a monopolistic competitor is based on the extent of its product differentiation and how many competitors it faces. Second, a monopolist is surrounded by barriers to entry and need not fear entry, but a monopolistic competitor who earns profits must expect the entry of firms with similar, but differentiated, products. Monopolistic Competitors and Entry If one monopolistic competitor earns positive economic profits, other firms will be tempted to enter the market. A gas station with a great location must worry that other gas stations might open across the street or down the road—and perhaps the new gas stations will sell coffee or have a carwash or some other attraction to lure customers. A successful restaurant with a unique barbecue sauce must be concerned that other restaurants will try to copy the sauce or offer their own unique recipes. A laundry detergent with a great reputation for quality must take note that other competitors may seek to build their own reputations. The entry of other firms into the same general market (like gas, restaurants, or detergent) shifts the demand curve that a monopolistically competitive firm faces. As more firms enter the market, the quantity demanded at a
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given price for any particular firm will decline, and the firm’s perceived demand curve will shift to the left. As a firm’s perceived demand curve shifts to the left, its marginal revenue curve will shift to the left, too. The shift in marginal revenue will change the profit-maximizing quantity that the firm chooses to produce, since marginal revenue will then equal marginal cost at a lower quantity. Figure 10.4 (a) shows a situation in which a monopolistic competitor was earning a profit with its original perceived demand curve (D0). The intersection of the marginal revenue curve (MR0) and marginal cost curve (MC) occurs at point S, corresponding to quantity Q0, which is associated on the demand curve at point T with price P0. The combination of price P0 and quantity Q0 lies above the average cost curve, which shows that the firm is earning positive economic profits. Figure 10.4 Monopolistic Competition, Entry, and Exit (a) At P0 and Q0, the monopolistically competitive firm in this figure is making a positive economic profit. This is clear because if you follow the dotted line above Q0, you can see that price is above average cost. Positive economic profits attract competing firms to the industry, driving the original firm’s demand down to D1. At the new equilibrium quantity (P1, Q1), the original firm is earning zero economic profits, and entry into the industry ceases. In (b) the opposite occurs. At P0 and Q0, the firm is losing money. If you follow the dotted line above Q0, you can see that average cost is above price. Losses induce firms to leave the industry. When they do, demand for the original firm rises to D1, where once again the firm is earning zero economic profit. Unlike a monopoly, with its high barriers to entry, a monopolistically competitive firm with positive economic profits will attract competition. When another competitor enters the market, the original firm’s perceived demand curve shifts to the left, from D0 to D1, and the associated marginal revenue curve shifts from MR0 to MR1. The new profit- 242 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly maximizing output is Q1, because the intersection of the MR1 and MC now occurs at point U. Moving vertically up from that quantity on the new demand curve, the optimal price is at P1. As long as the firm is earning positive economic profits, new competitors will
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continue to enter the market, reducing the original firm’s demand and marginal revenue curves. The long-run equilibrium is in the figure at point Y, where the firm’s perceived demand curve touches the average cost curve. When price is equal to average cost, economic profits are zero. Thus, although a monopolistically competitive firm may earn positive economic profits in the short term, the process of new entry will drive down economic profits to zero in the long run. Remember that zero economic profit is not equivalent to zero accounting profit. A zero economic profit means the firm’s accounting profit is equal to what its resources could earn in their next best use. Figure 10.4 (b) shows the reverse situation, where a monopolistically competitive firm is originally losing money. The adjustment to long-run equilibrium is analogous to the previous example. The economic losses lead to firms exiting, which will result in increased demand for this particular firm, and consequently lower losses. Firms exit up to the point where there are no more losses in this market, for example when the demand curve touches the average cost curve, as in point Z. Monopolistic competitors can make an economic profit or loss in the short run, but in the long run, entry and exit will drive these firms toward a zero economic profit outcome. However, the zero economic profit outcome in monopolistic competition looks different from the zero economic profit outcome in perfect competition in several ways relating both to efficiency and to variety in the market. Monopolistic Competition and Efficiency The long-term result of entry and exit in a perfectly competitive market is that all firms end up selling at the price level determined by the lowest point on the average cost curve. This outcome is why perfect competition displays productive efficiency: goods are produced at the lowest possible average cost. However, in monopolistic competition, the end result of entry and exit is that firms end up with a price that lies on the downward-sloping portion of the average cost curve, not at the very bottom of the AC curve. Thus, monopolistic competition will not be productively efficient. In a perfectly competitive market, each firm produces at a quantity where price is set equal to marginal cost, both in the short and long run. This outcome is why perfect competition displays allocative efficiency: the social benefits of additional production, as measured by the marginal benefit, which is the same as the price, equal the marginal costs to society of that production. In a monopolistically competitive market, the rule for maximizing profit is to set MR =
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MC—and price is higher than marginal revenue, not equal to it because the demand curve is downward sloping. When P > MC, which is the outcome in a monopolistically competitive market, the benefits to society of providing additional quantity, as measured by the price that people are willing to pay, exceed the marginal costs to society of producing those units. A monopolistically competitive firm does not produce more, which means that society loses the net benefit of those extra units. This is the same argument we made about monopoly, but in this case the allocative inefficiency will be smaller. Thus, a monopolistically competitive industry will produce a lower quantity of a good and charge a higher price for it than would a perfectly competitive industry. See the following Clear It Up feature for more detail on the impact of demand shifts. Why does a shift in perceived demand cause a shift in marginal revenue? We use the combinations of price and quantity at each point on a firm’s perceived demand curve to calculate total revenue for each combination of price and quantity. We then use this information on total revenue to calculate marginal revenue, which is the change in total revenue divided by the change in quantity. A change in perceived demand will change total revenue at every quantity of output and in turn, the change in total revenue will shift marginal revenue at each quantity of output. Thus, when entry occurs in a monopolistically competitive industry, the perceived demand curve for each firm will shift to the left, because a smaller quantity will be demanded at any given price. Another way of interpreting this shift in demand is to notice that, for each quantity sold, the firm will charge a lower price. Consequently, the marginal revenue will be lower for This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 243 each quantity sold—and the marginal revenue curve will shift to the left as well. Conversely, exit causes the perceived demand curve for a monopolistically competitive firm to shift to the right and the corresponding marginal revenue curve to shift right, too. A monopolistically competitive industry does not display productive or allocative efficiency in either the short run, when firms are making economic profits and losses, nor in the long run, when firms are earning zero profits. The Benefits of Variety and Product Differentiation Even though monopolistic competition does not provide productive efficiency or allocative efficiency, it does have benefits of its own. Product differentiation is based on variety and innovation. Most people would
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prefer to live in an economy with many kinds of clothes, foods, and car styles; not in a world of perfect competition where everyone will always wear blue jeans and white shirts, eat only spaghetti with plain red sauce, and drive an identical model of car. Most people would prefer to live in an economy where firms are struggling to figure out ways of attracting customers by methods like friendlier service, free delivery, guarantees of quality, variations on existing products, and a better shopping experience. Economists have struggled, with only partial success, to address the question of whether a market-oriented economy produces the optimal amount of variety. Critics of market-oriented economies argue that society does not really need dozens of different athletic shoes or breakfast cereals or automobiles. They argue that much of the cost of creating such a high degree of product differentiation, and then of advertising and marketing this differentiation, is socially wasteful—that is, most people would be just as happy with a smaller range of differentiated products produced and sold at a lower price. Defenders of a market-oriented economy respond that if people do not want to buy differentiated products or highly advertised brand names, no one is forcing them to do so. Moreover, they argue that consumers benefit substantially when firms seek short-term profits by providing differentiated products. This controversy may never be fully resolved, in part because deciding on the optimal amount of variety is very difficult, and in part because the two sides often place different values on what variety means for consumers. Read the following Clear It Up feature for a discussion on the role that advertising plays in monopolistic competition. How does advertising impact monopolistic competition? The U.S. economy spent about $180.12 billion on advertising in 2014, according to eMarketer.com. Roughly one third of this was television advertising, and another third was divided roughly equally between internet, newspapers, and radio. The remaining third was divided between direct mail, magazines, telephone directory yellow pages, and billboards. Mobile devices are increasing the opportunities for advertisers. Advertising is all about explaining to people, or making people believe, that the products of one firm are differentiated from another firm's products. In the framework of monopolistic competition, there are two ways to conceive of how advertising works: either advertising causes a firm’s perceived demand curve to become more inelastic (that is, it causes the perceived demand curve to become steeper); or advertising causes demand for the firm’s product to increase (that is, it causes the firm’s perceived demand curve
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to shift to the right). In either case, a successful advertising campaign may allow a firm to sell either a greater quantity or to charge a higher price, or both, and thus increase its profits. However, economists and business owners have also long suspected that much of the advertising may only offset other advertising. Economist A. C. Pigou wrote the following back in 1920 in his book, The Economics of Welfare: It may happen that expenditures on advertisement made by competing monopolists [that is, what we now call monopolistic competitors] will simply neutralise one another, and leave the industrial position exactly as it would have been if neither had expended anything. For, clearly, if each of two rivals makes equal efforts to attract the favour of the public away from the other, the total result is the same as it would have been if neither had made any effort at all. 244 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 10.2 | Oligopoly By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain why and how oligopolies exist • Contrast collusion and competition • • Evaluate the tradeoffs of imperfect competition Interpret and analyze the prisoner’s dilemma diagram Many purchases that individuals make at the retail level are produced in markets that are neither perfectly competitive, monopolies, nor monopolistically competitive. Rather, they are oligopolies. Oligopoly arises when a small number of large firms have all or most of the sales in an industry. Examples of oligopoly abound and include the auto industry, cable television, and commercial air travel. Oligopolistic firms are like cats in a bag. They can either scratch each other to pieces or cuddle up and get comfortable with one another. If oligopolists compete hard, they may end up acting very much like perfect competitors, driving down costs and leading to zero profits for all. If oligopolists collude with each other, they may effectively act like a monopoly and succeed in pushing up prices and earning consistently high levels of profit. We typically characterize oligopolies by mutual interdependence where various decisions such as output, price, and advertising depend on other firm(s)' decisions. Analyzing the choices of oligopolistic firms about pricing and quantity produced involves considering the pros and cons of competition versus collusion at a given point in time. Why Do Oligopolies Exist? A combination of the barriers to entry that create monopolies and the product differentiation that characterizes monopolistic competition can create the setting for an oligopoly. For example
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, when a government grants a patent for an invention to one firm, it may create a monopoly. When the government grants patents to, for example, three different pharmaceutical companies that each has its own drug for reducing high blood pressure, those three firms may become an oligopoly. Similarly, a natural monopoly will arise when the quantity demanded in a market is only large enough for a single firm to operate at the minimum of the long-run average cost curve. In such a setting, the market has room for only one firm, because no smaller firm can operate at a low enough average cost to compete, and no larger firm could sell what it produced given the quantity demanded in the market. Quantity demanded in the market may also be two or three times the quantity needed to produce at the minimum of the average cost curve—which means that the market would have room for only two or three oligopoly firms (and they need not produce differentiated products). Again, smaller firms would have higher average costs and be unable to compete, while additional large firms would produce such a high quantity that they would not be able to sell it at a profitable price. This combination of economies of scale and market demand creates the barrier to entry, which led to the Boeing-Airbus oligopoly (also called a duopoly) for large passenger aircraft. The product differentiation at the heart of monopolistic competition can also play a role in creating oligopoly. For example, firms may need to reach a certain minimum size before they are able to spend enough on advertising and marketing to create a recognizable brand name. The problem in competing with, say, Coca-Cola or Pepsi is not that producing fizzy drinks is technologically difficult, but rather that creating a brand name and marketing effort to equal Coke or Pepsi is an enormous task. Collusion or Competition? When oligopoly firms in a certain market decide what quantity to produce and what price to charge, they face a temptation to act as if they were a monopoly. By acting together, oligopolistic firms can hold down industry output, charge a higher price, and divide the profit among themselves. When firms act together in this way to reduce output and keep prices high, it is called collusion. A group of firms that have a formal agreement to collude to produce the monopoly output and sell at the monopoly price is called a cartel. See the following Clear It Up feature for a more in-depth analysis of the difference between the two. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12
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170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 245 Collusion versus cartels: How to differentiate In the United States, as well as many other countries, it is illegal for firms to collude since collusion is anticompetitive behavior, which is a violation of antitrust law. Both the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have responsibilities for preventing collusion in the United States. The problem of enforcement is finding hard evidence of collusion. Cartels are formal agreements to collude. Because cartel agreements provide evidence of collusion, they are rare in the United States. Instead, most collusion is tacit, where firms implicitly reach an understanding that competition is bad for profits. Economists have understood for a long time the desire of businesses to avoid competing so that they can instead raise the prices that they charge and earn higher profits. Adam Smith wrote in Wealth of Nations in 1776: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” Even when oligopolists recognize that they would benefit as a group by acting like a monopoly, each individual oligopoly faces a private temptation to produce just a slightly higher quantity and earn slightly higher profit—while still counting on the other oligopolists to hold down their production and keep prices high. If at least some oligopolists give in to this temptation and start producing more, then the market price will fall. A small handful of oligopoly firms may end up competing so fiercely that they all find themselves earning zero economic profits—as if they were perfect competitors. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Because of the complexity of oligopoly, which is the result of mutual interdependence among firms, there is no single, generally-accepted theory of how oligopolies behave, in the same way that we have theories for all the other market structures. Instead, economists use game theory, a branch of mathematics that analyzes situations in which players must make decisions and then receive payoffs based on what other players decide to do. Game theory has found widespread applications in the social sciences, as well as in business, law, and military strategy. The prisoner’s dilemma is a scenario in which the gains from cooperation are larger than the rewards from pursuing self-interest. It applies well to oligopoly. The story behind the prisoner’s dilemma goes like this: Two co-conspiratorial criminals
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are arrested. When they are taken to the police station, they refuse to say anything and are put in separate interrogation rooms. Eventually, a police officer enters the room where Prisoner A is being held and says: “You know what? Your partner in the other room is confessing. Your partner is going to get a light prison sentence of just one year, and because you’re remaining silent, the judge is going to stick you with eight years in prison. Why don’t you get smart? If you confess, too, we’ll cut your jail time down to five years, and your partner will get five years, also.” Over in the next room, another police officer is giving exactly the same speech to Prisoner B. What the police officers do not say is that if both prisoners remain silent, the evidence against them is not especially strong, and the prisoners will end up with only two years in jail each. The game theory situation facing the two prisoners is in Table 10.2. To understand the dilemma, first consider the choices from Prisoner A’s point of view. If A believes that B will confess, then A should confess, too, so as to not get stuck with the eight years in prison. However, if A believes that B will not confess, then A will be tempted to act selfishly and confess, so as to serve only one year. The key point is that A has an incentive to confess regardless of what choice B makes! B faces the same set of choices, and thus will have an incentive to confess regardless of what choice A makes. To confess is called the dominant strategy. It is the strategy an individual (or firm) will pursue regardless of the other individual’s (or firm’s) decision. The result is that if prisoners pursue their own self-interest, both are likely to confess, and end up doing a total of 10 years of jail time between them. 246 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Prisoner B Remain Silent (cooperate with other prisoner) Confess (do not cooperate with other prisoner) Prisoner A Remain Silent (cooperate with other prisoner) A gets 2 years, B gets 2 years A gets 8 years, B gets 1 year Confess (do not cooperate with other prisoner) A gets 1 year, B gets 8 years A gets 5 years B gets 5 years Table 10.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Problem The game is
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called a dilemma because if the two prisoners had cooperated by both remaining silent, they would only have had to serve a total of four years of jail time between them. If the two prisoners can work out some way of cooperating so that neither one will confess, they will both be better off than if they each follow their own individual self-interest, which in this case leads straight into longer jail terms. The Oligopoly Version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma The members of an oligopoly can face a prisoner’s dilemma, also. If each of the oligopolists cooperates in holding down output, then high monopoly profits are possible. Each oligopolist, however, must worry that while it is holding down output, other firms are taking advantage of the high price by raising output and earning higher profits. Table 10.3 shows the prisoner’s dilemma for a two-firm oligopoly—known as a duopoly. If Firms A and B both agree to hold down output, they are acting together as a monopoly and will each earn $1,000 in profits. However, both firms’ dominant strategy is to increase output, in which case each will earn $400 in profits. Firm B Hold Down Output (cooperate with other firm) Increase Output (do not cooperate with other firm) Firm A Hold Down Output (cooperate with other firm) A gets $1,000, B gets $1,000 A gets $200, B gets $1,500 Increase Output (do not cooperate with other firm) A gets $1,500, B gets $200 A gets $400, B gets $400 Table 10.3 A Prisoner’s Dilemma for Oligopolists Can the two firms trust each other? Consider the situation of Firm A: • • If A thinks that B will cheat on their agreement and increase output, then A will increase output, too, because for A the profit of $400 when both firms increase output (the bottom right-hand choice in Table 10.3) is better than a profit of only $200 if A keeps output low and B raises output (the upper right-hand choice in the table). If A thinks that B will cooperate by holding down output, then A may seize the opportunity to earn higher profits by raising output. After all, if B is going to hold down output, then A can earn $1,500 in profits by expanding output (the bottom left-hand choice in the
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table) compared with only $1,000 by holding down output as well (the upper left-hand choice in the table). Thus, firm A will reason that it makes sense to expand output if B holds down output and that it also makes sense to expand output if B raises output. Again, B faces a parallel set of decisions that will lead B also to expand output. The result of this prisoner’s dilemma is often that even though A and B could make the highest combined profits by cooperating in producing a lower level of output and acting like a monopolist, the two firms may well end up in This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 247 a situation where they each increase output and earn only $400 each in profits. The following Clear It Up feature discusses one cartel scandal in particular. What is the Lysine cartel? Lysine, a $600 million-a-year industry, is an amino acid that farmers use as a feed additive to ensure the proper growth of swine and poultry. The primary U.S. producer of lysine is Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), but several other large European and Japanese firms are also in this market. For a time in the first half of the 1990s, the world’s major lysine producers met together in hotel conference rooms and decided exactly how much each firm would sell and what it would charge. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), however, had learned of the cartel and placed wire taps on a number of their phone calls and meetings. From FBI surveillance tapes, following is a comment that Terry Wilson, president of the corn processing division at ADM, made to the other lysine producers at a 1994 meeting in Mona, Hawaii: I wanna go back and I wanna say something very simple. If we’re going to trust each other, okay, and if I’m assured that I’m gonna get 67,000 tons by the year’s end, we’re gonna sell it at the prices we agreed to... The only thing we need to talk about there because we are gonna get manipulated by these [expletive] buyers—they can be smarter than us if we let them be smarter.... They [the customers] are not your friend. They are not my friend. And we gotta have �
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�em, but they are not my friends. You are my friend. I wanna be closer to you than I am to any customer. Cause you can make us... money.... And all I wanna tell you again is let’s—let’s put the prices on the board. Let’s all agree that’s what we’re gonna do and then walk out of here and do it. The price of lysine doubled while the cartel was in effect. Confronted by the FBI tapes, Archer Daniels Midland pled guilty in 1996 and paid a fine of $100 million. A number of top executives, both at ADM and other firms, later paid fines of up to $350,000 and were sentenced to 24–30 months in prison. In another one of the FBI recordings, the president of Archer Daniels Midland told an executive from another competing firm that ADM had a slogan that, in his words, had “penetrated the whole company.” The company president stated the slogan this way: “Our competitors are our friends. Our customers are the enemy.” That slogan could stand as the motto of cartels everywhere. How to Enforce Cooperation How can parties who find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation avoid the undesired outcome and cooperate with each other? The way out of a prisoner’s dilemma is to find a way to penalize those who do not cooperate. Perhaps the easiest approach for colluding oligopolists, as you might imagine, would be to sign a contract with each other that they will hold output low and keep prices high. If a group of U.S. companies signed such a contract, however, it would be illegal. Certain international organizations, like the nations that are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have signed international agreements to act like a monopoly, hold down output, and keep prices high so that all of the countries can make high profits from oil exports. Such agreements, however, because they fall in a gray area of international law, are not legally enforceable. If Nigeria, for example, decides to start cutting prices and selling more oil, Saudi Arabia cannot sue Nigeria in court and force it to stop. Visit the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/OPEC) and learn more about its history and how it defines itself. 248 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Because olig
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opolists cannot sign a legally enforceable contract to act like a monopoly, the firms may instead keep close tabs on what other firms are producing and charging. Alternatively, oligopolists may choose to act in a way that generates pressure on each firm to stick to its agreed quantity of output. One example of the pressure these firms can exert on one another is the kinked demand curve, in which competing oligopoly firms commit to match price cuts, but not price increases. Figure 10.5 shows this situation. Say that an oligopoly airline has agreed with the rest of a cartel to provide a quantity of 10,000 seats on the New York to Los Angeles route, at a price of $500. This choice defines the kink in the firm’s perceived demand curve. The reason that the firm faces a kink in its demand curve is because of how the other oligopolists react to changes in the firm’s price. If the oligopoly decides to produce more and cut its price, the other members of the cartel will immediately match any price cuts—and therefore, a lower price brings very little increase in quantity sold. If one firm cuts its price to $300, it will be able to sell only 11,000 seats. However, if the airline seeks to raise prices, the other oligopolists will not raise their prices, and so the firm that raised prices will lose a considerable share of sales. For example, if the firm raises its price to $550, its sales drop to 5,000 seats sold. Thus, if oligopolists always match price cuts by other firms in the cartel, but do not match price increases, then none of the oligopolists will have a strong incentive to change prices, since the potential gains are minimal. This strategy can work like a silent form of cooperation, in which the cartel successfully manages to hold down output, increase price, and share a monopoly level of profits even without any legally enforceable agreement. Figure 10.5 A Kinked Demand Curve Consider a member firm in an oligopoly cartel that is supposed to produce a quantity of 10,000 and sell at a price of $500. The other members of the cartel can encourage this firm to honor its commitments by acting so that the firm faces a kinked demand curve. If the oligopolist attempts to expand output and reduce price slightly, other firms also cut prices immediately—so if the firm expands output to 11,000, the price per unit falls dramatically, to $300. On the
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other side, if the oligopoly attempts to raise its price, other firms will not do so, so if the firm raises its price to $550, its sales decline sharply to 5,000. Thus, the members of a cartel can discipline each other to stick to the pre-agreed levels of quantity and price through a strategy of matching all price cuts but not matching any price increases. Many real-world oligopolies, prodded by economic changes, legal and political pressures, and the egos of their top executives, go through episodes of cooperation and competition. If oligopolies could sustain cooperation with each This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 249 other on output and pricing, they could earn profits as if they were a single monopoly. However, each firm in an oligopoly has an incentive to produce more and grab a bigger share of the overall market; when firms start behaving in this way, the market outcome in terms of prices and quantity can be similar to that of a highly competitive market. Tradeoffs of Imperfect Competition Monopolistic competition is probably the single most common market structure in the U.S. economy. It provides powerful incentives for innovation, as firms seek to earn profits in the short run, while entry assures that firms do not earn economic profits in the long run. However, monopolistically competitive firms do not produce at the lowest point on their average cost curves. In addition, the endless search to impress consumers through product differentiation may lead to excessive social expenses on advertising and marketing. Oligopoly is probably the second most common market structure. When oligopolies result from patented innovations or from taking advantage of economies of scale to produce at low average cost, they may provide considerable benefit to consumers. Oligopolies are often buffered by significant barriers to entry, which enable the oligopolists to earn sustained profits over long periods of time. Oligopolists also do not typically produce at the minimum of their average cost curves. When they lack vibrant competition, they may lack incentives to provide innovative products and highquality service. The task of public policy with regard to competition is to sort through these multiple realities, attempting to encourage behavior that is beneficial to the broader society and to discourage behavior that only adds to the profits of a few large companies, with no corresponding benefit to consumers. Monopoly and Antitrust Policy discusses the delicate judgments that go
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into this task. The Temptation to Defy the Law Oligopolistic firms have been called “cats in a bag,” as this chapter mentioned. The French detergent makers chose to “cozy up” with each other. The result? An uneasy and tenuous relationship. When the Wall Street Journal reported on the matter, it wrote: “According to a statement a Henkel manager made to the [French anti-trust] commission, the detergent makers wanted ‘to limit the intensity of the competition between them and clean up the market.’ Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, a price war had broken out among them.” During the soap executives’ meetings, sometimes lasting more than four hours, the companies established complex pricing structures. “One [soap] executive recalled ‘chaotic’ meetings as each side tried to work out how the other had bent the rules.” Like many cartels, the soap cartel disintegrated due to the very strong temptation for each member to maximize its own individual profits. How did this soap opera end? After an investigation, French antitrust authorities fined Colgate-Palmolive, Henkel, and Proctor & Gamble a total of €361 million ($484 million). A similar fate befell the icemakers. Bagged ice is a commodity, a perfect substitute, generally sold in 7- or 22-pound bags. No one cares what label is on the bag. By agreeing to carve up the ice market, control broad geographic swaths of territory, and set prices, the icemakers moved from perfect competition to a monopoly model. After the agreements, each firm was the sole supplier of bagged ice to a region. There were profits in both the long run and the short run. According to the courts: “These companies illegally conspired to manipulate the marketplace.” Fines totaled about $600,000—a steep fine considering a bag of ice sells for under $3 in most parts of the United States. Even though it is illegal in many parts of the world for firms to set prices and carve up a market, the temptation to earn higher profits makes it extremely tempting to defy the law. 250 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly KEY TERMS cartel a group of firms that collude to produce the monopoly output and sell at the monopoly price collusion when firms act together to reduce output and keep prices high differentiated product a product that is consumers perceive as distinctive in some
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way duopoly an oligopoly with only two firms game theory a branch of mathematics that economists use to analyze situations in which players must make decisions and then receive payoffs based on what decisions the other players make imperfectly competitive firms and organizations that fall between the extremes of monopoly and perfect competition kinked demand curve a perceived demand curve that arises when competing oligopoly firms commit to match price cuts, but not price increases monopolistic competition many firms competing to sell similar but differentiated products oligopoly when a few large firms have all or most of the sales in an industry prisoner’s dilemma a game in which the gains from cooperation are larger than the rewards from pursuing self-interest product differentiation any action that firms do to make consumers think their products are different from their competitors' KEY CONCEPTS AND SUMMARY 10.1 Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic competition refers to a market where many firms sell differentiated products. Differentiated products can arise from characteristics of the good or service, location from which the firm sells the product, intangible aspects of the product, and perceptions of the product. The perceived demand curve for a monopolistically competitive firm is downward-sloping, which shows that it is a price maker and chooses a combination of price and quantity. However, the perceived demand curve for a monopolistic competitor is more elastic than the perceived demand curve for a monopolist, because the monopolistic competitor has direct competition, unlike the pure monopolist. A profit-maximizing monopolistic competitor will seek out the quantity where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. The monopolistic competitor will produce that level of output and charge the price that the firm’s demand curve indicates. If the firms in a monopolistically competitive industry are earning economic profits, the industry will attract entry until profits are driven down to zero in the long run. If the firms in a monopolistically competitive industry are suffering economic losses, then the industry will experience exit of firms until economic losses are driven up to zero in the long run. A monopolistically competitive firm is not productively efficient because it does not produce at the minimum of its average cost curve. A monopolistically competitive firm is not allocatively efficient because it does not produce where P = MC, but instead produces where P > MC. Thus, a monopolistically competitive firm will tend to produce a lower quantity at a higher cost and to charge a higher price than a perfectly competitive firm. Monopolistically competitive industries do offer benefits to consumers in the form of greater variety and incentives for improved products and services. There
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is some controversy over whether a market-oriented economy generates too much variety. 10.2 Oligopoly An oligopoly is a situation where a few firms sell most or all of the goods in a market. Oligopolists earn their This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 251 highest profits if they can band together as a cartel and act like a monopolist by reducing output and raising price. Since each member of the oligopoly can benefit individually from expanding output, such collusion often breaks down—especially since explicit collusion is illegal. The prisoner’s dilemma is an example of the application of game theory to analysis of oligopoly. It shows how, in certain situations, all sides can benefit from cooperative behavior rather than self-interested behavior. However, the challenge for the parties is to find ways to encourage cooperative behavior. SELF-CHECK QUESTIONS 1. Suppose that, due to a successful advertising campaign, a monopolistic competitor experiences an increase in demand for its product. How will that affect the price it charges and the quantity it supplies? 2. Continuing with the scenario in question 1, in the long run, the positive economic profits that the monopolistic competitor earns will attract a response either from existing firms in the industry or firms outside. As those firms capture the original firm’s profit, what will happen to the original firm’s profit-maximizing price and output levels? 3. Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand, marginal cost, and marginal revenue curve for firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this example, we assume firms have zero fixed costs. a. Suppose the firms collude to form a cartel. What price will the cartel charge? What quantity will the cartel supply? How much profit will the cartel earn? b. Suppose now that the cartel breaks up and the oligopolistic firms compete as vigorously as possible by cutting the price and increasing sales. What will be the industry quantity and price? What will be the collective profits of all firms in the industry? c. Compare the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit for the cartel and cutthroat competition outcomes. 252 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 4. Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Firm A) is large and the other firm (F
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irm B) is small, as the prisoner’s dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. Firm B colludes with Firm A Firm B cheats by selling more output Firm A colludes with Firm B A gets $1,000, B gets $100 A gets $800, B gets $200 Firm A cheats by selling more output A gets $1,050, B gets $50 A gets $500, B gets $20 Table 10.4 Assuming that both firms know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case? REVIEW QUESTIONS 5. What differentiation and monopolistic competition? relationship between product the is 6. How is the perceived demand curve for a monopolistically competitive firm different from the perceived demand curve for a monopoly or a perfectly competitive firm? 7. How does a monopolistic competitor choose its profit-maximizing quantity of output and price? Is a monopolistically 10. firm productively efficient? Is it allocatively efficient? Why or why not? competitive 11. Will the firms in an oligopoly act more like a monopoly or more like competitors? Briefly explain. 12. Does each individual in a prisoner’s dilemma benefit more from cooperation or from pursuing selfinterest? Explain briefly. 8. How can a monopolistic competitor tell whether the price it is charging will cause the firm to earn profits or experience losses? 13. What stops oligopolists from acting together as a monopolist and earning the highest possible level of profits? 9. If the firms in a monopolistically competitive market are earning economic profits or losses in the short run, would you expect them to continue doing so in the long run? Why? CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 14. Aside from advertising, how can monopolistically competitive firms increase demand for their products? 15. Make a case for why monopolistically competitive industries never reach long-run equilibrium. 16. Would you rather have efficiency or variety? That is, one opportunity cost of the variety of products we have is that each product costs more per unit than if there were only one kind of product of a given type, like shoes. Perhaps a better question is, “What is the right amount of variety? Can there be too many varieties of shoes, for example?” This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 17. Would you expect the kinked demand curve to be more extreme (like a right angle) or less extreme
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(like a normal demand curve) if each firm in the cartel produces a near-identical product like OPEC and petroleum? What if each firm produces a somewhat different product? Explain your reasoning. Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 253 18. When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term—that the incentives for individual members to cheat would become too strong. More than forty years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons. PROBLEMS 19. Andrea’s Day Spa began to offer a relaxing aromatherapy treatment. The firm asks you how much to charge to maximize profits. The first two columns in Table 10.5 provide the price and quantity for the demand curve for treatments. The third column shows its total costs. For each level of output, calculate total revenue, marginal revenue, average cost, and marginal cost. What is the profit-maximizing level of output for the treatments and how much will the firm earn in profits? Price Quantity TC $25.00 $24.00 $23.00 $22.50 $22.00 $21.60 $21.20 Table 10.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 $130 $275 $435 $610 $800 $1,005 $1,225 20. Mary and Raj are the only two growers who provide organically grown corn to a local grocery store. They know that if they cooperated and produced less corn, they could raise the price of the corn. If they work independently, they will each earn $100. If they decide to work together and both lower their output, they can each earn $150. If one person lowers output and the other does not, the person who lowers output will earn $0 and the other person will capture the entire market and will earn $200. Table 10.6 represents the choices available to Mary and Raj. What is the best choice for Raj if he is sure that Mary will cooperate? If Mary thinks Raj will cheat, what should Mary do and why? What is the prisoner’s dilemma result? What is the preferred choice if they could ensure cooperation? A = Work independently; B = Cooperate and Lower Output. (Each results entry lists Raj’s earnings first, and Mary's earnings second.) A Mary
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B ($100, $100) ($200, $0) ($0, $200) ($150, $150) Raj A B Table 10.6 254 Chapter 10 | Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly 21. Jane and Bill are apprehended for a bank robbery. They are taken into separate rooms and questioned by the police about their involvement in the crime. The police tell them each that if they confess and turn the other person in, they will receive a lighter sentence. If they both confess, they will be each be sentenced to 30 years. If neither confesses, they will each receive a 20-year sentence. If only one confesses, the confessor will receive 15 years and the one who stayed silent will receive 35 years. Table 10.7 below represents the choices available to Jane and Bill. If Jane trusts Bill to stay silent, what should she do? If Jane thinks that Bill will confess, what should she do? Does Jane have a dominant strategy? Does Bill have a dominant strategy? A = Confess; B = Stay Silent. (Each results entry lists Jane’s sentence first (in years), and Bill's sentence second.) Jane B (15, 35) (20, 20) A (30, 30) (35, 15) Bill A B Table 10.7 This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 255 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Figure 11.1 Oligopoly versus Competitors in the Marketplace Large corporations, such as the natural gas producer Kinder Morgan, can bring economies of scale to the marketplace. Will that benefit consumers, or is more competition better? (Credit: modification of work by Derrick Coetzee/Flickr Creative Commons) More than Cooking, Heating, and Cooling If you live in the United States, there is a slightly better than 50–50 chance your home is heated and cooled using natural gas. You may even use natural gas for cooking. However, those uses are not the primary uses of natural gas in the U.S. In 2016, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, home heating, cooling, and cooking accounted for just 16% of natural gas usage. What accounts for the rest? The greatest uses for natural gas are the generation of electric power (36%) and in industry (28%). Together these three uses for natural gas touch many areas of our lives, so
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why would there be any opposition to a merger of two natural gas firms? After all, a merger could mean increased efficiencies and reduced costs to people like you and me. In October 2011, Kinder Morgan and El Paso Corporation, two natural gas firms, announced they were merging. The announcement stated the combined firm would link “nearly every major production region with markets,” cut costs by “eliminating duplication in pipelines and other assets,” and that “the savings could be passed on to consumers.” The objection? The $21.1 billion deal would give Kinder Morgan control of more than 80,000 miles of pipeline, making the new firm the third largest energy producer in North America. Policymakers and the public wondered whether the new conglomerate really would pass on cost savings to consumers, or would the merger give Kinder Morgan a strong oligopoly position in the natural gas marketplace? That brings us to the central questions this chapter poses: What should the balance be between corporate size and a larger number of competitors in a marketplace, and what role should the government play in this balancing act? 256 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Introduction to Monopoly and Antitrust Policy In this chapter, you will learn about: • Corporate Mergers • Regulating Anticompetitive Behavior • Regulating Natural Monopolies • The Great Deregulation Experiment The previous chapters on the theory of the firm identified three important lessons: First, that competition, by providing consumers with lower prices and a variety of innovative products, is a good thing; second, that largescale production can dramatically lower average costs; and third, that markets in the real world are rarely perfectly competitive. As a consequence, government policymakers must determine how much to intervene to balance the potential benefits of large-scale production against the potential loss of competition that can occur when businesses grow in size, especially through mergers. For example, in 2006, AT&T and BellSouth proposed a merger. At the time, there were very few mobile phone service providers. Both the Justice Department and the FCC blocked the proposal. The two companies argued that the merger would benefit consumers, who would be able to purchase better telecommunications services at a cheaper price because the newly created firm would take advantage of economies of scale and eliminate duplicate investments. However, a number of activist groups like the Consumer Federation of America and Public Knowledge expressed fears that the merger would reduce competition and lead to higher prices for consumers for decades to come. In December 2006, the federal government
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allowed the merger to proceed. By 2009, the new post-merger AT&T was the eighth largest company by revenues in the United States, and by that measure the largest telecommunications company in the world. Economists have spent – and will still spend – years trying to determine whether the merger of AT&T and BellSouth, as well as other smaller mergers of telecommunications companies at about this same time, helped consumers, hurt them, or did not make much difference. This chapter discusses public policy issues about competition. How can economists and governments determine when mergers of large companies like AT&T and BellSouth should be allowed and when they should be blocked? The government also plays a role in policing anticompetitive behavior other than mergers, like prohibiting certain kinds of contracts that might restrict competition. In the case of natural monopoly, however, trying to preserve competition probably will not work very well, and so government will often resort to regulation of price and/or quantity of output. In recent decades, there has been a global trend toward less government intervention in the price and output decisions of businesses. 11.1 | Corporate Mergers By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain antitrust law and its significance • Calculate concentration ratios • Calculate the Herfindahl-Herschman Index (HHI) • Evaluate methods of antitrust regulation A corporate merger occurs when two formerly separate firms combine to become a single firm. When one firm purchases another, it is called an acquisition. An acquisition may not look just like a merger, since the newly purchased firm may continue to operate under its former company name. Mergers can also be lateral, where two firms of similar sizes combine to become one. However, both mergers and acquisitions lead to two formerly separate firms operating under common ownership, and so they are commonly grouped together. Regulations for Approving Mergers Since a merger combines two firms into one, it can reduce the extent of competition between firms. Therefore, when This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 257 two U.S. firms announce a merger or acquisition where at least one of the firms is above a minimum size of sales (a threshold that moves up gradually over time, and was at $76.3 million in 2015), or certain other conditions are met, they are required under law to notify the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC
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). The left-hand panel of Figure 11.2 (a) shows the number of mergers submitted for review to the FTC each year from 2002 to 2015. Mergers follow the business cycle, falling after the 2001 recession, peaking in 2007 as the Great Recession struck, and then rising since 2009. The right-hand panel of Figure 11.2 (b) shows the distribution of those mergers submitted for review in 2015 as measured by the size of the transaction. It is important to remember that this total leaves out many small mergers under $50 million, which companies only need to report in certain limited circumstances. About a third of all reported merger and acquisition transactions in 2015 exceeded $500 million, while about 15 percent exceeded $1 billion. Figure 11.2 Number and Size of Mergers (a) The number of mergers grew from 2003 to 2007, then fell dramatically during the 2008-2009 Great Recession, before recovering since. (b) In 2015, the greatest number of mergers submitted for review by the Federal Trade Commission was for transactions between $500 million and $1 billion. The laws that give government the power to block certain mergers, and even in some cases to break up large firms into smaller ones, are called antitrust laws. Before a large merger happens, the antitrust regulators at the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice can allow the merger, prohibit it, or allow it if certain conditions are met. One common condition is that the merger will be allowed if the firm agrees to sell off certain parts. For example, in 2006, Johnson & Johnson bought the Pfizer’s “consumer health” division, which included well-known brands like Listerine mouthwash and Sudafed cold medicine. As a condition of allowing the merger, Johnson & Johnson was required to sell off six brands to other firms, including Zantac® heartburn relief medication, Cortizone anti-itch cream, and Balmex diaper rash medication, to preserve a greater degree of competition in these markets. The U.S. government approves most proposed mergers. In a market-oriented economy, firms have the freedom to make their own choices. Private firms generally have the freedom to: • expand or reduce production • set the price they choose • open new factories or sales facilities or close them • hire workers or to lay them off • start selling new products or stop selling existing ones If the owners want to acquire a firm or be acquired, or to merge with another firm, this
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decision is just one of many that firms are free to make. In these conditions, the managers of private firms will sometimes make mistakes. They may close down a factory which, it later turns out, would have been profitable. They may start selling a product that ends up losing money. A merger between two companies can sometimes lead to a clash of corporate personalities that makes both firms worse off. However, the fundamental belief behind a market-oriented economy is that firms, not governments, are in the best position to know if their actions will lead to attracting more customers or producing 258 more efficiently. Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Government regulators agree that most mergers are beneficial to consumers. As the Federal Trade Commission has noted on its website (as of November, 2013): “Most mergers actually benefit competition and consumers by allowing firms to operate more efficiently.” At the same time, the FTC recognizes, “Some [mergers] are likely to lessen competition. That, in turn, can lead to higher prices, reduced availability of goods or services, lower quality of products, and less innovation. Some mergers create a concentrated market, while others enable a single firm to raise prices.” The challenge for the antitrust regulators at the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice is to figure out when a merger may hinder competition. This decision involves both numerical tools and some judgments that are difficult to quantify. The following Clear It Up explains the origins of U.S. antitrust law. What is U.S. antitrust law? In the closing decades of the 1800s, many industries in the U.S. economy were dominated by a single firm that had most of the sales for the entire country. Supporters of these large firms argued that they could take advantage of economies of scale and careful planning to provide consumers with products at low prices. However, critics pointed out that when competition was reduced, these firms were free to charge more and make permanently higher profits, and that without the goading of competition, it was not clear that they were as efficient or innovative as they could be. In many cases, these large firms were organized in the legal form of a “trust,” in which a group of formerly independent firms were consolidated by mergers and purchases, and a group of “trustees” then ran the companies as if they were a single firm. Thus, when the U.S. government sought to limit the power of these trusts, it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act
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in 1890 - the nation's first antitrust law. In an early demonstration of the law’s power, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1911 upheld the government’s right to break up Standard Oil, which had controlled about 90% of the country’s oil refining, into 34 independent firms, including Exxon, Mobil, Amoco, and Chevron. In 1914, the Clayton Antitrust Act outlawed mergers and acquisitions (where the outcome would be to “substantially lessen competition” in an industry), price discrimination (where different customers are charged different prices for the same product), and tied sales (where purchase of one product commits the buyer to purchase some other product). Also in 1914, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created to define more specifically what competition was unfair. In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act extended the Clayton Act by restricting vertical and conglomerate mergers. A vertical merger occurs when two or more firms, operating at different levels within an industry's supply chain, merge operations. A conglomerate merger is a merger between firms that are involved in totally unrelated business activities. In the twenty-first century, the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice continue to enforce antitrust laws. The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio Regulators have struggled for decades to measure the degree of monopoly power in an industry. An early tool was the concentration ratio, which measures the combined market share (or percent of total industry sales) which account for the largest firms (typically the top four to eight). For an explanation of how high market concentrations can create inefficiencies in an economy, refer to Monopoly. Say that the market for replacing broken automobile windshields in a certain city has 18 firms with the market shares in Table 11.1, where the market share is each firm’s proportion of total sales in that market. We calculate the fourfirm concentration ratio by adding the market shares of the four largest firms: in this case, 16 + 10 + 8 + 6 = 40. We do not consider this concentration ratio especially high, because the largest four firms have less than half the market. If the market shares for replacing automobile windshields are: Smooth as Glass Repair Company 16% of the market Table 11.1 Calculating Concentration Ratios from Market Shares This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 259 If the market
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shares for replacing automobile windshields are: The Auto Glass Doctor Company Your Car Shield Company 10% of the market 8% of the market Seven firms that each have 6% of the market 42% of the market, combined Eight firms that each have 3% of the market 24% of the market, combined Then the four-firm concentration ratio is 16 + 10 + 8 + 6 = 40. Table 11.1 Calculating Concentration Ratios from Market Shares The concentration ratio approach can help to clarify some of the fuzziness over deciding when a merger might affect competition. For instance, if two of the smallest firms in the hypothetical market for repairing automobile windshields merged, the four-firm concentration ratio would not change—which implies that there is not much worry that the degree of competition in the market has notably diminished. However, if the top two firms merged, then the four-firm concentration ratio would become 46 (that is, 26 + 8 + 6 + 6). While this concentration ratio is modestly higher, the four-firm concentration ratio would still be less than half, so such a proposed merger might barely raise an eyebrow among antitrust regulators. Visit this website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/Google_FTC) to read an article about Google’s run-in with the FTC. The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index A four-firm concentration ratio is a simple tool, which may reveal only part of the story. For example, consider two industries that both have a four-firm concentration ratio of 80. However, in one industry five firms each control 20% of the market, while in the other industry, the top firm holds 77% of the market and all the other firms have 1% each. Although the four-firm concentration ratios are identical, it would be reasonable to worry more about the extent of competition in the second case—where the largest firm is nearly a monopoly—than in the first. Another approach to measuring industry concentration that can distinguish between these two cases is called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). We calculate HHI by summing the squares of the market share of each firm in the industry, as the following Work It Out shows. 260 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Calculating HHI Step 1. Calculate the HHI for a monopoly with a market share of 100%. Because there is only one firm, it has 100% market share. The HHI is
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1002 = 10,000. Step 2. For an extremely competitive industry, with dozens or hundreds of extremely small competitors, the HHI value might drop as low as 100 or even less. Calculate the HHI for an industry with 100 firms that each have 1% of the market. In this case, the HHI is 100(12) = 100. Step 3. Calculate the HHI for the industry in Table 11.1. In this case, the HHI is 162 + 102 + 82 + 7(62) + 8(32) = 744. Step 4. Note that the HHI gives greater weight to large firms. Step 5. Consider the earlier example, comparing one industry where five firms each have 20% of the market with an industry where one firm has 77% and the other 23 firms have 1% each. The two industries have the same four-firm concentration ratio of 80. However, the HHI for the first industry is 5(202) = 2,000, while the HHI for the second industry is much higher at 772 + 23(12) = 5,952. Step 6. Note that the near-monopolist in the second industry drives up the HHI measure of industrial concentration. Step 7. Review Table 11.2 which gives some examples of the four-firm concentration ratio and the HHI in various U.S. industries in 2016. (You can find market share data from multiple industry sources. Data in the table are from: Statista.com (for wireless), The Wall Street Journal (for automobiles), Gartner.com (for computers) and the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (for airlines).) U.S. Industry Four-Firm Ratio HHI Wireless Largest five: Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, US Cellular Personal Computers Largest five: HP, Lenovo, Dell, Asus, Apple, Acer Airlines Largest five: American, Southwest, Delta, United, JetBlue Automobiles Largest five: Ford, GM, Toyota, Chrysler, Nissan 98 76 69 58 2,736 1,234 1,382 1,099 Table 11.2 Examples of Concentration Ratios and HHIs in the U.S. Economy, 2016 In the 1980s, the FTC followed these guidelines: If a merger would result in an HHI of less than 1,000, the FTC would probably approve it. If a merger would result in
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an HHI of more than 1,800, the FTC would probably challenge it. If a merger would result in an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800, then the FTC would scrutinize the plan and make a case-by-case decision. However, in the last several decades, the antitrust enforcement authorities have moved away from relying as heavily on measures of concentration ratios and HHIs to determine whether they will allow a merger, and instead they carry out more case-by-case analysis on the extent of competition in different industries. New Directions for Antitrust Both the four-firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index share some weaknesses. First, they begin This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 261 from the assumption that the “market” under discussion is well-defined, and the only question is measuring how sales are divided in that market. Second, they are based on an implicit assumption that competitive conditions across industries are similar enough that a broad measure of concentration in the market is enough to make a decision about the effects of a merger. These assumptions, however, are not always correct. In response to these two problems, the antitrust regulators have been changing their approach in the last decade or two. Defining a market is often controversial. For example, Microsoft in the early 2000s had a dominant share of the software for computer operating systems. However, in the total market for all computer software and services, including everything from games to scientific programs, the Microsoft share was only about 14% in 2014. A narrowly defined market will tend to make concentration appear higher, while a broadly defined market will tend to make it appear smaller. In recent decades, there have been two especially important shifts affecting how we define markets: one centers on technology and the other centers on globalization. In addition, these two shifts are interconnected. With the vast improvement in communications technologies, including the development of the internet, a consumer can order books or pet supplies from all over the country or the world. As a result, the degree of competition many local retail businesses face has increased. The same effect may operate even more strongly in markets for business supplies, where so-called “business-to-business” websites can allow buyers and suppliers from anywhere in the world to find each other. Globalization has changed the market boundaries. As recently as the 1970s, it
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was common for measurements of concentration ratios and HHIs to stop at national borders. Now, many industries find that their competition comes from the global market. A few decades ago, three companies, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, dominated the U.S. auto market. By 2014, however, production of these three firms accounted for less than half of U.S. auto sales, and they were facing competition from well-known car manufacturers such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen, Mitsubishi, and Mazda. When analysts calculate HHIs with a global perspective, concentration in most major industries—including cars—is lower than in a purely domestic context. Because attempting to define a particular market can be difficult and controversial, the Federal Trade Commission has begun to look less at market share and more at the data on actual competition between businesses. For example, in February 2007, Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Market announced that they wished to merge. These were the two largest companies in the market that the government defined as “premium natural and organic supermarket chains.” However, one could also argue that they were two relatively small companies in the broader market for all stores that sell groceries or specialty food products. Rather than relying on a market definition, the government antitrust regulators looked at detailed evidence on profits and prices for specific stores in different cities, both before and after other competitive stores entered or exited. Based on that evidence, the Federal Trade Commission decided to block the merger. After two years of legal battles, the FTC eventually allowed the merger in 2009 under the conditions that Whole Foods sell off the Wild Oats brand name and a number of individual stores, to preserve competition in certain local markets. For more on the difficulties of defining markets, refer to Monopoly. This new approach to antitrust regulation involves detailed analysis of specific markets and companies, instead of defining a market and counting up total sales. A common starting point is for antitrust regulators to use statistical tools and real-world evidence to estimate the demand curves and supply curves the firms proposing a merger face. A second step is to specify how competition occurs in this specific industry. Some possibilities include competing to cut prices, to raise output, to build a brand name through advertising, and to build a reputation for good service or high quality. With these pieces of the puzzle in place, it is then possible to build a statistical model that estimates the likely outcome for consumers if the two firms are allowed to merge. These models do require some degree of subjective judgment, and so they can become the
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subject of legal disputes between the antitrust authorities and the companies that wish to merge. 262 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 11.2 | Regulating Anticompetitive Behavior By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Analyze restrictive practices • Explain tying sales, bundling, and predatory pricing • Evaluate a real-world situation of possible anticompetitive and restrictive practices The U.S. antitrust laws reach beyond blocking mergers that would reduce competition to include a wide array of anticompetitive practices. For example, it is illegal for competitors to form a cartel to collude to make pricing and output decisions, as if they were a monopoly firm. The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice prohibit firms from agreeing to fix prices or output, rigging bids, or sharing or dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce. In the late 1990s, for example, the antitrust regulators prosecuted an international cartel of vitamin manufacturers, including the Swiss firm Hoffman-La Roche, the German firm BASF, and the French firm Rhone-Poulenc. These firms reached agreements on how much to produce, how much to charge, and which firm would sell to which customers. Firms bought the high-priced vitamins like General Mills, Kellogg, Purina-Mills, and Proctor and Gamble which pushed up the prices more. Hoffman-La Roche pleaded guilty in May 1999 and agreed both to pay a fine of $500 million and to have at least one top executive serve four months of jail time. Under U.S. antitrust laws, monopoly itself is not illegal. If a firm has a monopoly because of a newly patented invention, for example, the law explicitly allows a firm to earn higher-than-normal profits for a time as a reward for innovation. If a firm achieves a large share of the market by producing a better product at a lower price, such behavior is not prohibited by antitrust law. Restrictive Practices Antitrust law includes rules against restrictive practices—practices that do not involve outright agreements to raise price or to reduce the quantity produced, but that might have the effect of reducing competition. Antitrust cases involving restrictive practices are often controversial, because they delve into specific contracts or agreements between firms that are allowed in some cases but not in others. For example, if a product manufacturer is selling to a group of dealers who then sell to the general public it is illegal for the manufacturer to demand a minimum
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resale price maintenance agreement, which would require the dealers to sell for at least a certain minimum price. A minimum price contract is illegal because it would restrict competition among dealers. However, the manufacturer is legally allowed to “suggest” minimum prices and to stop selling to dealers who regularly undercut the suggested price. If you think this rule sounds like a fairly subtle distinction, you are right. An exclusive dealing agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer can be legal or illegal. It is legal if the purpose of the contract is to encourage competition between dealers. For example, it is legal for the Ford Motor Company to sell its cars to only Ford dealers, and for General Motors to sell to only GM dealers, and so on. However, exclusive deals may also limit competition. If one large retailer obtained the exclusive rights to be the sole distributor of televisions, computers, and audio equipment made by a number of companies, then this exclusive contract would have an anticompetitive effect on other retailers. Tying sales happen when a customer is required to buy one product only if the customer also buys a second product. Tying sales are controversial because they force consumers to purchase a product that they may not actually want or need. Further, the additional, required products are not necessarily advantageous to the customer. Suppose that to purchase a popular DVD, the store required that you also purchase a certain portable TV model. These products are only loosely related, thus there is no reason to make the purchase of one contingent on the other. Even if a customer were interested in a portable TV, the tying to a particular model prevents the customer from having the option of selecting one from the numerous types available in the market. A related, but not identical, concept is bundling, where a firm sells two or more products as one. Bundling typically offers an advantage for consumers by allowing them to acquire multiple products or services for a better price. For example, several cable companies allow customers to buy products like cable, internet, and a phone line through a special price available through bundling. Customers are also welcome to purchase these products separately, but the This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 263 price of bundling is usually more appealing. In some cases, we can view tying sales and bundling as anticompetitive. However, in other cases they may be legal and even common. It is common for people to purchase season tickets to
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a sports team or a set of concerts so to guarantee tickets to the few contests or shows that are most popular and likely to sell out. Computer software manufacturers may often bundle a number of different programs, even when the buyer wants only a few. Think about the software that is included in a new computer purchase, for example. Recall from the chapter on Monopoly that predatory pricing occurs when the existing firm (or firms) reacts to a new firm by dropping prices very low, until the new firm is driven out of the market, at which point the existing firm raises prices again. This pattern of pricing is aimed at deterring new firms from entering the market. However, in practice, it can be hard to figure out when pricing is predatory. Say that American Airlines is flying between two cities, and a new airline starts flying between the same two cities, at a lower price. If American Airlines cuts its price to match the new entrant, is this predatory pricing or is it just market competition at work? A commonly proposed rule is that if a firm is selling for less than its average variable cost—that is, at a price where it should be shutting down—then there is evidence for predatory pricing. However, calculating in the real world what costs are variable and what costs are fixed is often not obvious, either. The Microsoft antitrust case embodies many of these gray areas in restrictive practices, as the next Clear It Up shows. Did Microsoft® engage in anticompetitive and restrictive practices? The most famous restrictive practices case of recent years was a series of lawsuits by the U.S. government against Microsoft—lawsuits that some of Microsoft’s competitors encouraged. All sides admitted that Microsoft’s Windows program had a near-monopoly position in the market for the software used in general computer operating systems. All sides agreed that the software had many satisfied customers and that the computer software capabilities were compatible with Windows. Software that Microsoft and other companies produced had expanded dramatically in the 1990s. Having a monopoly or a near-monopoly is not necessarily illegal in and of itself, but in cases where one company controls a great deal of the market, antitrust regulators look at any allegations of restrictive practices with special care. The antitrust regulators argued that Microsoft had gone beyond profiting from its software innovations and its dominant position in the software market for operating systems, and had tried to use its market power in operating systems software to take over other parts of the software industry. For example, the government argued that Microsoft had engaged in an anticompetitive form
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of exclusive dealing by threatening computer makers that, if they did not leave another firm’s software off their machines (specifically, Netscape’s Internet browser), then Microsoft would not sell them its operating system software. Government antitrust regulators accused Microsoft of tying together its Windows operating system software, where it had a monopoly, with its Internet Explorer browser software, where it did not have a monopoly, and thus using this bundling as an anticompetitive tool. The government also accused Microsoft of a form of predatory pricing; namely, giving away certain additional software products for free as part of Windows, as a way of driving out the competition from other software makers. In April 2000, a federal court held that Microsoft’s behavior had crossed the line into unfair competition, and recommended that the company be split into two competing firms. However, the court overturned that penalty on appeal, and in November 2002 Microsoft reached a settlement with the government that it would end its restrictive practices. The concept of restrictive practices is continually evolving, as firms seek new ways to earn profits and government regulators define what is permissible. A situation where the law is evolving and changing is always somewhat troublesome, since laws are most useful and fair when firms know what they are in advance. In addition, since the law is open to interpretation, competitors who are losing out in the market can accuse successful firms of anticompetitive restrictive practices, and try to win through government regulation what they have failed to accomplish in the market. 264 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Officials at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are, of course, aware of these issues, but there is no easy way to resolve them. 11.3 | Regulating Natural Monopolies By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Evaluate the appropriate competition policy for a natural monopoly Interpret a graph of regulatory choices • • Contrast cost-plus and price cap regulation Most true monopolies today in the U.S. are regulated, natural monopolies. A natural monopoly poses a difficult challenge for competition policy, because the structure of costs and demand makes competition unlikely or costly. A natural monopoly arises when average costs are declining over the range of production that satisfies market demand. This typically happens when fixed costs are large relative to variable costs. As a result, one firm is able to supply the total quantity demanded in the market at lower cost than two or more firms—so splitting up the natural monopoly would raise the average cost of production and force customers to pay more.
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Public utilities, the companies that have traditionally provided water and electrical service across much of the United States, are leading examples of natural monopoly. It would make little sense to argue that a local water company should be divided into several competing companies, each with its own separate set of pipes and water supplies. Installing four or five identical sets of pipes under a city, one for each water company, so that each household could choose its own water provider, would be terribly costly. The same argument applies to the idea of having many competing companies for delivering electricity to homes, each with its own set of wires. Before the advent of wireless phones, the argument also applied to the idea of many different phone companies, each with its own set of phone wires running through the neighborhood. The Choices in Regulating a Natural Monopoly What then is the appropriate competition policy for a natural monopoly? Figure 11.3 illustrates the case of natural monopoly, with a market demand curve that cuts through the downward-sloping portion of the average cost curve. Points A, B, C, and F illustrate four of the main choices for regulation. Table 11.3 outlines the regulatory choices for dealing with a natural monopoly. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 265 Figure 11.3 Regulatory Choices in Dealing with Natural Monopoly A natural monopoly will maximize profits by producing at the quantity where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal costs (MC) and by then looking to the market demand curve to see what price to charge for this quantity. This monopoly will produce at point A, with a quantity of 4 and a price of 9.3. If antitrust regulators split this company exactly in half, then each half would produce at point B, with average costs of 9.75 and output of 2. The regulators might require the firm to produce where marginal cost crosses the market demand curve at point C. However, if the firm is required to produce at a quantity of 8 and sell at a price of 3.5, the firm will suffer from losses. The most likely choice is point F, where the firm is required to produce a quantity of 6 and charge a price of 6.5. Quantity Price Total Revenue* Marginal Revenue Total Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 14.7 14.7 12.4 24.7 10.6 31.7 9.3 8
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.0 6.5 5.0 3.5 2.0 37.2 40.0 39.0 35.0 28.0 18.0 14.7 10.0 7.0 5.5 2.8 –1.0 –4.0 –7.0 –10.0 11.0 19.5 25.5 31.0 35.0 39.0 42.0 45.5 49.5 - 8.5 6.0 5.5 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 11.00 9.75 8.50 7.75 7.00 6.50 6.00 5.70 5.5 Table 11.3 Regulatory Choices in Dealing with Natural Monopoly (*We obtain total revenue by multiplying price and quantity. However, we have rounded some of the price values in this table for ease of presentation.) The first possibility is to leave the natural monopoly alone. In this case, the monopoly will follow its normal approach to maximizing profits. It determines the quantity where MR = MC, which happens at point P at a quantity of 4. The firm then looks to point A on the demand curve to find that it can charge a price of 9.3 for that profit-maximizing quantity. Since the price is above the average cost curve, the natural monopoly would earn economic profits. A second outcome arises if antitrust authorities decide to divide the company, so that the new firms can compete. As a simple example, imagine that the company is cut in half. Thus, instead of one large firm producing a quantity of 4, two half-size firms each produce a quantity of 2. Because of the declining average cost curve (AC), the average 266 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy cost of production for each of the half-size companies each producing 2, as point B shows, would be 9.75, while the average cost of production for a larger firm producing 4 would only be 7.75. Thus, the economy would become less productively efficient, since the good is produced at a higher average cost. In a situation with a downward-sloping average cost curve, two smaller firms will always have higher average costs of production than one larger firm for any quantity of total output. In addition, the antitrust authorities must worry that splitting the natural monopoly into pieces may be only the start of their problems. If one of the two firms grows larger than the other, it will have lower average costs and may be
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able to drive its competitor out of the market. Alternatively, two firms in a market may discover subtle ways of coordinating their behavior and keeping prices high. Either way, the result will not be the greater competition that was desired. A third alternative is that regulators may decide to set prices and quantities produced for this industry. The regulators will try to choose a point along the market demand curve that benefits both consumers and the broader social interest. Point C illustrates one tempting choice: the regulator requires that the firm produce the quantity of output where marginal cost crosses the demand curve at an output of 8, and charge the price of 3.5, which is equal to marginal cost at that point. This rule is appealing because it requires price to be set equal to marginal cost, which is what would occur in a perfectly competitive market, and it would assure consumers a higher quantity and lower price than at the monopoly choice A. In fact, efficient allocation of resources would occur at point C, since the value to the consumers of the last unit bought and sold in this market is equal to the marginal cost of producing it. Attempting to bring about point C through force of regulation, however, runs into a severe difficulty. At point C, with an output of 8, a price of 3.5 is below the average cost of production, which is 5.7, so if the firm charges a price of 3.5, it will be suffering losses. Unless the regulators or the government offer the firm an ongoing public subsidy (and there are numerous political problems with that option), the firm will lose money and go out of business. Perhaps the most plausible option for the regulator is point F; that is, to set the price where AC crosses the demand curve at an output of 6 and a price of 6.5. This plan makes some sense at an intuitive level: let the natural monopoly charge enough to cover its average costs and earn a normal rate of profit, so that it can continue operating, but prevent the firm from raising prices and earning abnormally high monopoly profits, as it would at the monopoly choice A. Determining this level of output and price with the political pressures, time constraints, and limited information of the real world is much harder than identifying the point on a graph. For more on the problems that can arise from a centrally determined price, see the discussion of price floors and price ceilings in Demand and Supply. Cost-Plus versus Price Cap Regulation Regulators of public utilities for many decades followed the general approach of attempting to choose a point like F
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in Figure 11.3. They calculated the average cost of production for the water or electricity companies, added in an amount for the normal rate of profit the firm should expect to earn, and set the price for consumers accordingly. This method was known as cost-plus regulation. Cost-plus regulation raises difficulties of its own. If producers receive reimbursement for their costs, plus a bit more, then at a minimum, producers have less reason to be concerned with high costs—because they can just pass them along in higher prices. Worse, firms under cost-plus regulation even have an incentive to generate high costs by building huge factories or employing many staff, because what they can charge is linked to the costs they incur. Thus, in the 1980s and 1990s, some public utility regulators began to use price cap regulation, where the regulator sets a price that the firm can charge over the next few years. A common pattern was to require a price that declined slightly over time. If the firm can find ways of reducing its costs more quickly than the price caps, it can make a high level of profits. However, if the firm cannot keep up with the price caps or suffers bad luck in the market, it may suffer losses. A few years down the road, the regulators will then set a new series of price caps based on the firm’s performance. Price cap regulation requires delicacy. It will not work if the price regulators set the price cap unrealistically low. It may not work if the market changes dramatically so that the firm is doomed to incurring losses no matter what it does—say, if energy prices rise dramatically on world markets, then the company selling natural gas or heating oil to homes may not be able to meet price caps that seemed reasonable a year or two ago. However, if the regulators compare the prices with producers of the same good in other areas, they can, in effect, pressure a natural monopoly in one area to compete with the prices charged in other areas. Moreover, the possibility of earning greater profits or experiencing losses—instead of having an average rate of profit locked in every year by cost-plus regulation—can provide the natural monopoly with incentives for efficiency and innovation. With natural monopoly, market competition is unlikely to take root, so if consumers are not to suffer the high prices This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 267 and restricted output of an unrestricted monopoly, government
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regulation will need to play a role. In attempting to design a system of price cap regulation with flexibility and incentive, government regulators do not have an easy task. 11.4 | The Great Deregulation Experiment By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Evaluate the effectiveness of price regulation and antitrust policy • Explain regulatory capture and its significance Governments at all levels across the United States have regulated prices in a wide range of industries. In some cases, like water and electricity that have natural monopoly characteristics, there is some room in economic theory for such regulation. However, once politicians are given a basis to intervene in markets and to choose prices and quantities, it is hard to know where to stop. Doubts about Regulation of Prices and Quantities Beginning in the 1970s, it became clear to policymakers of all political leanings that the existing price regulation was not working well. The United States carried out a great policy experiment—the deregulation that we discussed in Monopoly—removing government controls over prices and quantities produced in airlines, railroads, trucking, intercity bus travel, natural gas, and bank interest rates. The Clear It Up discusses the outcome of deregulation in one industry in particular—airlines. What are the results of airline deregulation? Why did the pendulum swing in favor of deregulation? Consider the airline industry. In the early days of air travel, no airline could make a profit just by flying passengers. Airlines needed something else to carry and the Postal Service provided that something with airmail. Thus, the first U.S. government regulation of the airline industry happened through the Postal Service, when in 1926 the Postmaster General began giving airlines permission to fly certain routes based on mail delivery needs—and the airlines took some passengers along for the ride. In 1934, the antitrust authorities charged the Postmaster General with colluding with the major airlines of that day to monopolize the nation’s airways. In 1938, the U.S. government created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to regulate airfares and routes instead. For 40 years, from 1938 to 1978, the CAB approved all fares, controlled all entry and exit, and specified which airlines could fly which routes. There was zero entry of new airlines on the main routes across the country for 40 years, because the CAB did not think it was necessary. In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act took the government out of the business of determining airfares and schedules. The new
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law shook up the industry. Famous old airlines like Pan American, Eastern, and Braniff went bankrupt and disappeared. Some new airlines like People Express were created—and then vanished. The greater competition from deregulation reduced airfares by about one-third over the next two decades, saving consumers billions of dollars a year. The average flight used to take off with just half its seats full; now it is two-thirds full, which is far more efficient. Airlines have also developed hub-and-spoke systems, where planes all fly into a central hub city at a certain time and then depart. As a result, one can fly between any of the spoke cities with just one connection—and there is greater service to more cities than before deregulation. With lower fares and more service, the number of air passengers doubled from the late 1970s to the start of the 2000s—an increase that, in turn, doubled the number of jobs in the airline industry. Meanwhile, with the watchful oversight of government safety inspectors, commercial air travel has continued to get safer over time. The U.S. airline industry is far from perfect. For example, a string of mergers in recent years has raised concerns over how competition might be compromised. 268 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy One difficulty with government price regulation is what economists call regulatory capture, in which the firms that are supposedly regulated end up playing a large role in setting the regulations that they will follow. When the airline industry was regulated, for example, it suggested appointees to the regulatory board, sent lobbyists to argue with the board, provided most of the information on which the board made decisions, and offered well-paid jobs to at least some of the people leaving the board. In this situation, it is easy for regulators to poorly represent consumers. The result of regulatory capture is that government price regulation can often become a way for existing competitors to work together to reduce output, keep prices high, and limit competition. The Effects of Deregulation Deregulation, both of airlines and of other industries, has its negatives. The greater pressure of competition led to entry and exit. When firms went bankrupt or contracted substantially in size, they laid off workers who had to find other jobs. Market competition is, after all, a full-contact sport. A number of major accounting scandals involving prominent corporations such as Enron, Tyco International, and WorldCom led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The government designed Sarbanes-Ox
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ley to increase confidence in financial information provided by public corporations to protect investors from accounting fraud. The Great Recession, which began in late 2007, was caused at least in part by a global financial crisis, which began in the United States. The key component of the crisis was the creation and subsequent failure of several types of unregulated financial assets, such as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs, a type of mortgage-backed security), and credit default swaps (CDSs, insurance contracts on assets like CMOs that provided a payoff even if the holder of the CDS did not own the CMO). Private credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poors, Moody’s, and Fitch rated many of these assets very safe. The collapse of the markets for these assets precipitated the financial crisis and led to the failure of Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank, numerous large commercial banks, such as Wachovia, and even the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae), which had to be nationalized—that is, taken over by the federal government. One response to the financial crisis was the Dodd-Frank Act, which majorly attempted to reform the financial system. The legislation’s purpose, as noted on dodd-frank.com is: To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to fail,” to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices... All market-based economies operate against a background of laws and regulations, including laws about enforcing contracts, collecting taxes, and protecting health and the environment. The government policies that we discussed in this chapter—like blocking certain anticompetitive mergers, ending restrictive practices, imposing price cap regulation on natural monopolies, and deregulation—demonstrate the role of government to strengthen the incentives that come with a greater degree of competition. More than Cooking, Heating, and Cooling What did the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decide on the Kinder Morgan / El Paso Corporation merger? After careful examination, federal officials decided there was only one area of significant overlap that might provide the merged firm with strong market power. The FTC approved the merger, provided Kinder Morgan divest itself of the overlap area. Tallgrass purchased Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission, Trailblazer Pipeline Co. LLC, two processing facilities in Wyoming, and Kinder Morgan’s 50 percent interest in the Rockies Express Pipeline to
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meet the FTC requirements. The FTC was attempting to strike a balance between potential cost reductions resulting from economies of scale and concentration of market power. Did the price of natural gas decrease? Yes, rather significantly. In 2010, the wellhead price of natural gas was $4.48 per thousand cubic foot. In 2012 the price had fallen to just $2.66. Was the merger responsible for the large drop in price? The answer is uncertain. The larger contributor to the sharp drop in price was the overall increase in the supply of natural gas. Increasingly, more natural gas was able to be recovered by fracturing shale deposits, a process called fracking. Fracking, which is controversial for environmental reasons, enabled This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 269 the recovery of known reserves of natural gas that previously were not economically feasible to tap. Kinder Morgan’s control of 80,000-plus miles of pipeline likely made moving the gas from wellheads to end users smoother and allowed for an even greater benefit from the increased supply. 270 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy KEY TERMS acquisition when one firm purchases another antitrust laws laws that give government the power to block certain mergers, and even in some cases to break up large firms into smaller ones bundling a situation in which multiple products are sold as one concentration ratio an early tool to measure the degree of monopoly power in an industry; measures what share of the total sales in the industry are accounted for by the largest firms, typically the top four to eight firms cost-plus regulation when regulators permit a regulated firm to cover its costs and to make a normal level of profit exclusive dealing an agreement that a dealer will sell only products from one manufacturer four-firm concentration ratio the percentage of the total sales in the industry that are accounted for by the largest four firms Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) share of each firm in the industry approach to measuring market concentration by adding the square of the market market share the percentage of total sales in the market merger when two formerly separate firms combine to become a single firm minimum resale price maintenance agreement to sell for at least a certain minimum price an agreement that requires a dealer who buys from a manufacturer price cap regulation when the regulator sets a price that a firm cannot exceed over the next few years regulatory capture when the supposedly regulated firms end up playing a large role in setting the regulations that
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they will follow and as a result, they “capture” the people usually through the promise of a job in that “regulated” industry once their term in government has ended restrictive practices practices that reduce competition but that do not involve outright agreements between firms to raise prices or to reduce the quantity produced tying sales a situation where a customer is allowed to buy one product only if the customer also buys another product KEY CONCEPTS AND SUMMARY 11.1 Corporate Mergers A corporate merger involves two private firms joining together. An acquisition refers to one firm buying another firm. In either case, two formerly independent firms become one firm. Antitrust laws seek to ensure active competition in markets, sometimes by preventing large firms from forming through mergers and acquisitions, sometimes by regulating business practices that might restrict competition, and sometimes by breaking up large firms into smaller competitors. A four-firm concentration ratio is one way of measuring the extent of competition in a market. We calculate it by adding the market shares—that is, the percentage of total sales—of the four largest firms in the market. A HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) is another way of measuring the extent of competition in a market. We calculate it by taking the market shares of all firms in the market, squaring them, and then summing the total. The forces of globalization and new communications and information technology have increased the level of competition that many firms face by increasing the amount of competition from other regions and countries. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 271 11.2 Regulating Anticompetitive Behavior Antitrust firms block authorities from openly colluding to form a cartel that will reduce output and raise prices. Companies sometimes attempt to find other ways around these restrictions and, consequently, many antitrust cases involve restrictive practices that can reduce competition in certain circumstances, like tie-in sales, bundling, and predatory pricing. 11.3 Regulating Natural Monopolies In the case of a natural monopoly, market competition will not work well and so, rather than allowing an unregulated monopoly to raise price and reduce output, the government may wish to regulate price and/or output. Common examples of regulation are public utilities, the regulated firms that often provide electricity and water service. Cost-plus regulation refers to government regulating a firm which sets the price that a firm can charge over a period of
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time by looking at the firm’s accounting costs and then adding a normal rate of profit. Price cap regulation refers to government regulation of a firm where the government sets a price level several years in advance. In this case, the firm can either earn high profits if it manages to produce at lower costs or sell a higher quantity than expected or suffer low profits or losses if costs are high or it sells less than expected. 11.4 The Great Deregulation Experiment The U.S. economy experienced a wave of deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the government eliminated a number of regulations that had set prices and quantities produced in a number of industries. Major accounting scandals in the early 2000s and, more recently, the Great Recession have spurred new regulation to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Regulatory capture occurs when the regulated industries end up having a strong influence over what regulations exist. SELF-CHECK QUESTIONS Is it true that a merger between two firms that are not already in the top four by size can affect both the four-firm 1. concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index? Explain briefly. Is it true that the four-firm concentration ratio puts more emphasis on one or two very large firms, while the 2. Herfindahl-Hirshman Index puts more emphasis on all the firms in the entire market? Explain briefly. 3. Some years ago, two intercity bus companies, Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Trailways Transportation System, wanted to merge. One possible definition of the market in this case was “the market for intercity bus service.” Another possible definition was “the market for intercity transportation, including personal cars, car rentals, passenger trains, and commuter air flights.” Which definition do you think the bus companies preferred, and why? 4. As a result of globalization and new information and communications technology, would you expect that the definitions of markets that antitrust authorities use will become broader or narrower? 5. Why would a firm choose to use one or more of the anticompetitive practices described in Regulating Anticompetitive Behavior? 272 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 6. Urban transit systems, especially those with rail systems, typically experience significant economies of scale in operation. Consider the transit system data in Table 11.4. Note that the quantity is in millions of riders. Demand: Quantity Price Marginal Revenue Costs: Marginal Cost Average Cost Table 11.4 1 10
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10.5 6.7 5.2 4 8 3 –4 5 9 2 –6 7 10 1 –8 10 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.9 5.4 Draw the demand, marginal revenue, marginal cost, and average cost curves. Do they have the normal shapes? 7. From the graph you drew to answer Exercise 11.6, would you say this transit system is a natural monopoly? Justify. Use the following information to answer the next three questions. In the years before wireless phones, when telephone technology required having a wire running to every home, it seemed plausible that telephone service had diminishing average costs and might require regulation like a natural monopoly. For most of the twentieth century, the national U.S. phone company was AT&T, and the company functioned as a regulated monopoly. Think about the deregulation of the U.S. telecommunications industry that has occurred over the last few decades. (This is not a research assignment, but a thought assignment based on what you have learned in this chapter.) 8. What real world changes made the deregulation possible? 9. What are some of the benefits of the deregulation? 10. What might some of the negatives of deregulation be? REVIEW QUESTIONS 11. What acquisition? is a corporate merger? What is an 12. What is the goal of antitrust policies? 13. How do we measure a four-firm concentration ratio? What does a high measure mean about the extent of competition? 14. How do we measure a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index? What does a low measure mean about the extent of competition? 15. Why can it be difficult to decide what a “market” is for purposes of measuring competition? 16. What is a minimum resale price maintenance agreement? How might it reduce competition and when might it be acceptable? 18. What is a tie-in sale? How might competition and when might it be acceptable? it reduce 19. What is predatory pricing? How might it reduce competition, and why might it be difficult to tell when it should be illegal? If public utilities are a natural monopoly, what 20. would be the danger in deregulating them? 21. If public utilities are a natural monopoly, what would be the danger in splitting them into a number of separate competing firms? 22. What is cost-plus regulation? 23. What is price cap regulation? 24. What is deregulation? Name some industries that have been deregulated in the United States. 17. What
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is exclusive dealing? How might it reduce competition and when might it be acceptable? 25. What is regulatory capture? This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 273 26. Why does the persuasiveness of the case for regulating industries for the benefit of consumers? regulatory capture reduce CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 27. Does either the four-firm concentration ratio or the HHI directly measure the amount of competition in an industry? Why or why not? 32. Why are urban areas willing to subsidize urban transit systems? Does the argument for subsidies make sense to you? 33. Deregulation, like all changes in government policy, always has pluses and minuses. What do you think some of the minuses might be for airline deregulation? 34. Do you think it is possible for government to outlaw everything that businesses could do wrong? If so, why does government not do that? If not, how can regulation stay ahead of rogue businesses that push the limits of the system until it breaks? 28. What would be evidence of serious competition between firms in an industry? Can you identify two highly competitive industries? 29. Can you think of any examples of successful predatory pricing in the real world? 30. If you were developing a product (like a web browser) for a market with significant barriers to entry, how would you try to get your product into the market successfully? 31. In the middle of the twentieth century, major U.S. cities had multiple competing city bus companies. Today, there is usually only one and it runs as a subsidized, regulated monopoly. What do you suppose caused the change? PROBLEMS 35. Use Table 11.5 to calculate the four-firm concentration ratio for the U.S. auto market. Does this indicate a concentrated market or not? 36. Use Table 11.5 and Table 11.6 to calculate the Herfindal-Hirschman Index for the U.S. auto market. Would the FTC approve a merger between GM and Ford? GM Ford Toyota Chrysler 19% 17% 14% 11% Table 11.5 Global Auto Manufacturers with Top Four U.S. Market Share, June 2013 (Source: http://www.zacks.com/commentary/27690/autoindustry-stock-outlook-june-2013) Honda Nissan Hyundai Kia Subaru Volkswagen 10%
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7% 5% 4% 3% 3% Table 11.6 Global Auto Manufacturers with additional U.S. Market Share, June 2013 (Source: http://www.zacks.com/ commentary/27690/auto-industry-stock-outlookjune-2013) Use Table 11.4 to answer the following questions. 274 Chapter 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy 37. If the transit system were allowed to operate as an unregulated monopoly, what output would it supply and what price would it charge? 38. If the transit system were regulated to operate with no subsidy (i.e., at zero economic profit), what approximate output would it supply and what approximate price would it charge? 39. If the transit system were regulated to provide the most allocatively efficient quantity of output, what output would it supply and what price would it charge? What subsidy would be necessary to insure this efficient provision of transit services? This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 275 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities Figure 12.1 Environmental Debate Across the country, countless people have protested, even risking arrest, against the Keystone XL Pipeline. (Credit: modification of image by “NoKXL”/Flickr Creative Commons) Keystone XL You might have heard about Keystone XL in the news. It is a pipeline system designed to bring oil from Canada to the refineries near the Gulf of Mexico, as well as to boost crude oil production in the United States. While a private company, TransCanada, will own the pipeline, U.S. government approval is required because of its size and location. There are four phases in building the pipeline, with the first two currently in operation, bringing oil from Alberta, Canada, east across Canada, south through the United States into Nebraska and Oklahoma, and northeast again to Illinois. The project's third and fourth phases, known as Keystone XL, would create a pipeline southeast from Alberta straight to Nebraska, and then from Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico. Sounds like a great idea, right? A pipeline that would move much needed crude oil to the Gulf refineries would increase oil production for manufacturing needs, reduce price pressure at the gas pump, and increase overall economic growth. Supporters argue that the pipeline is one of the safest pipelines built yet, and would reduce America’s dependence on politically vulnerable Middle Eastern oil imports. Not so fast, say
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its critics. The Keystone XL would be constructed over an enormous aquifer (one of the largest in the world) in the Midwest, and through an environmentally fragile area in Nebraska, causing great concern among environmentalists about possible destruction to the natural surroundings. They argue that leaks could taint valuable water sources and pipeline construction could disrupt and even harm indigenous species. Environmentalist groups have fought government approval of the proposed pipeline construction, and as of press time the pipeline projects remain stalled. Environmental concerns matter when discussing issues related to economic growth. However, how much should economists factor in these issues when deciding policy? In the case of the pipeline, how do we know 276 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities how much damage it would cause when we do not know how to put a value on the environment? Would the pipeline's benefits outweigh the opportunity cost? The issue of how to balance economic progress with unintended effects on our planet is the subject of this chapter. Introduction to Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities In this chapter, you will learn about: • The Economics of Pollution • Command-and-Control Regulation • Market-Oriented Environmental Tools • The Benefits and Costs of U.S. Environmental Laws • International Environmental Issues • The Tradeoff between Economic Output and Environmental Protection In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Ohio was so polluted that it spontaneously burst into flame. Air pollution was so bad at that time that Chattanooga, Tennessee was a city where, as an article from Sports Illustrated put it: “the death rate from tuberculosis was double that of the rest of Tennessee and triple that of the rest of the United States, a city in which the filth in the air was so bad it melted nylon stockings off women’s legs, in which executives kept supplies of clean white shirts in their offices so they could change when a shirt became too gray to be presentable, in which headlights were turned on at high noon because the sun was eclipsed by the gunk in the sky.” The problem of pollution arises for every economy in the world, whether high-income or low-income, and whether market-oriented or command-oriented. Every country needs to strike some balance between production and environmental quality. This chapter begins by discussing how firms may fail to take certain social costs, like pollution, into their planning if they do not need to pay these costs. Traditionally, policies for environmental protection have focused on governmental limits on how much of each pollutant could be emitted. While this approach has had some success,
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economists have suggested a range of more flexible, market-oriented policies that reduce pollution at a lower cost. We will consider both approaches, but first let’s see how economists frame and analyze these issues. 12.1 | The Economics of Pollution By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain and give examples of positive and negative externalities • • Evaluate how firms can contribute to market failure Identify equilibrium price and quantity From 1970 to 2012, the U.S. population increased by one-third and the size of the U.S. economy more than doubled. Since the 1970s, however, the United States, using a variety of anti-pollution policies, has made genuine progress against a number of pollutants. Table 12.1 lists the change in carbon dioxide emissions by energy users (from residential to industrial) according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The table shows that emissions of certain key air pollutants declined substantially from 2007 to 2012. They dropped 740 million metric tons (MMT) a year—a 12% reduction. This seems to indicate that there has been progress made in the United States in reducing overall carbon dioxide emissions, which contribute to the greenhouse effect. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 277 Primary Fossil Fuels Purchased Electric Power Total Primary Fossil Fuels Coal Petroleum Natural End-use Sector Residential Commercial 0 (4) (16) 16 Industrial (40) (77) Transportation 0 (174) Power (637) (31) Change 2007–2015 (686) (282) Gas 3 (13) (65) 4 (154) (232) (182) (168) (161) (1) - (−521) (202) (145) (222) (171) - (740) Table 12.1 U.S. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions from Fossil Fuels Consumed 2007–2012, Million (Source: EIA Monthly Energy Review) Metric Tons (MMT) per Year Despite the gradual reduction in emissions from fossil fuels, many important environmental issues remain. Along with the still high levels of air and water pollution, other issues include hazardous waste disposal, destruction of wetlands and other wildlife habitats, and the impact on human health from pollution. Externalities Private markets, such as the cell phone industry, offer an
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efficient way to put buyers and sellers together and determine what goods they produce, how they produce them and who gets them. The principle that voluntary exchange benefits both buyers and sellers is a fundamental building block of the economic way of thinking. However, what happens when a voluntary exchange affects a third party who is neither the buyer nor the seller? As an example, consider a concert producer who wants to build an outdoor arena that will host country music concerts a half-mile from your neighborhood. You will be able to hear these outdoor concerts while sitting on your back porch—or perhaps even in your dining room. In this case, the sellers and buyers of concert tickets may both be quite satisfied with their voluntary exchange, but you have no voice in their market transaction. The effect of a market exchange on a third party who is outside or “external” to the exchange is called an externality. Because externalities that occur in market transactions affect other parties beyond those involved, they are sometimes called spillovers. Externalities can be negative or positive. If you hate country music, then having it waft into your house every night would be a negative externality. If you love country music, then what amounts to a series of free concerts would be a positive externality. Pollution as a Negative Externality Pollution is a negative externality. Economists illustrate the social costs of production with a demand and supply diagram. The social costs include the private costs of production that a company incurs and the external costs of pollution that pass on to society. Figure 12.2 shows the demand and supply for manufacturing refrigerators. The demand curve (D) shows the quantity demanded at each price. The supply curve (Sprivate) shows the quantity of refrigerators that all firms in the industry supply at each price assuming they are taking only their private costs into account and they are allowed to emit pollution at zero cost. The market equilibrium (E0), where quantity supplied equals quantity demanded, is at a price of $650 per refrigerator and a quantity of 45,000 refrigerators. Table 12.2 reflects this information in the first three columns. 278 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities Figure 12.2 Taking Social Costs into Account: A Supply Shift into account, then its supply curve will be Sprivate, and the market equilibrium will occur at E0. Accounting for additional external costs of $100 for every unit produced, the firm’s supply curve will be Ssocial. The new equilibrium will occur at E
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1. If the firm takes only its own costs of production Price Quantity Demanded Quantity Supplied before Considering Pollution Cost Quantity Supplied after Considering Pollution Cost $600 50,000 $650 45,000 $700 40,000 $750 35,000 $800 30,000 $850 25,000 $900 20,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000 65,000 70,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000 Table 12.2 A Supply Shift Caused by Pollution Costs However, as a by-product of the metals, plastics, chemicals and energy that refrigerator manufacturers use, some pollution is created. Let’s say that, if these pollutants were emitted into the air and water, they would create costs of $100 per refrigerator produced. These costs might occur because of adverse effects on human health, property values, or wildlife habitat, reduction of recreation possibilities, or because of other negative impacts. In a market with no anti-pollution restrictions, firms can dispose of certain wastes absolutely free. Now imagine that firms which produce refrigerators must factor in these external costs of pollution—that is, the firms have to consider not only labor and material costs, but also the broader costs to society of harm to health and other costs caused by pollution. If the firm is required to pay $100 for the additional external costs of pollution each time it produces a refrigerator, production becomes more costly and the entire supply curve shifts up by $100. As Table 12.2 and Figure 12.2 illustrate, the firm will need to receive a price of $700 per refrigerator and produce This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 279 a quantity of 40,000—and the firm’s new supply curve will be Ssocial. The new equilibrium will occur at E1. In short, taking the additional external costs of pollution into account results in a higher price, a lower quantity of production, and a lower quantity of pollution. The following Work It Out feature will walk you through an example, this time with musical accompaniment. Identifying the Equilibrium Price and Quantity Table 12.3 shows the supply and demand conditions for a firm that will play trumpets on the streets when requested. We measure output is measured as the number of songs played. Price Quantity Demanded Quantity
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Supplied without paying the costs of the externality Quantity Supplied after paying the costs of the externality $20 $18 $15 $12 $10 $5 0 1 2.5 4 5 7.5 10 9 7.5 6 5 2.5 8 7 5.5 4 3 0.5 Table 12.3 Supply and Demand Conditions for a Trumpet-Playing Firm Step 1. Determine the negative externality in this situation. To do this, you must think about the situation and consider all parties that might be impacted. A negative externality might be the increase in noise pollution in the area where the firm is playing. Step 2. Identify the initial equilibrium price and quantity only taking private costs into account. Next, identify the new equilibrium taking into account social costs as well as private costs. Remember that equilibrium is where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied. Step 3. Look down the columns to where the quantity demanded (the second column) is equal to the “quantity supplied without paying the costs of the externality” (the third column). Then refer to the first column of that row to determine the equilibrium price. In this case, the equilibrium price and quantity would be at a price of $10 and a quantity of five when we only take into account private costs. Step 4. Identify the equilibrium price and quantity when we take into account the additional external costs. Look down the columns of quantity demanded (the second column) and the “quantity supplied after paying the costs of the externality” (the fourth column) then refer to the first column of that row to determine the equilibrium price. In this case, the equilibrium will be at a price of $12 and a quantity of four. Step 5. Consider how taking into account the externality affects the equilibrium price and quantity. Do this by comparing the two equilibrium situations. If the firm is forced to pay its additional external costs, then production of trumpet songs becomes more costly, and the supply curve will shift up. Remember that the supply curve is based on choices about production that firms make while looking at their marginal costs, while the demand curve is based on the benefits that individuals perceive while maximizing utility. If no externalities existed, private costs would be the same as the costs to society as a whole, and private benefits would be the same as the benefits to society as a whole. Thus, if no externalities existed, the interaction of demand and supply will coordinate social costs
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and benefits. 280 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities However, when the externality of pollution exists, the supply curve no longer represents all social costs. Because externalities represent a case where markets no longer consider all social costs, but only some of them, economists commonly refer to externalities as an example of market failure. When there is market failure, the private market fails to achieve efficient output, because either firms do not account for all costs incurred in the production of output and/or consumers do not account for all benefits obtained (a positive externality). In the case of pollution, at the market output, social costs of production exceed social benefits to consumers, and the market produces too much of the product. We can see a general lesson here. If firms were required to pay the social costs of pollution, they would create less pollution but produce less of the product and charge a higher price. In the next module, we will explore how governments require firms to account for the social costs of pollution. 12.2 | Command-and-Control Regulation By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain command-and-control regulation • Evaluate the effectiveness of command-and-control regulation When the United States started passing comprehensive environmental laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a typical law specified to companies how much pollution their smokestacks or drainpipes could emit and imposed penalties if companies exceeded the limit. Other laws required that companies install certain equipment—for example, on automobile tailpipes or on smokestacks—to reduce pollution. These types of laws, which specify allowable quantities of pollution and which also may detail which pollution-control technologies companies must use, fall under the category of command-and-control regulation. In effect, command-and-control regulation requires that firms increase their costs by installing anti-pollution equipment. Thus, firms are required to account for the social costs of pollution in deciding how much output to produce. Command-and-control regulation has been highly successful in protecting and cleaning up the U.S. environment. In 1970, the Federal government created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to oversee all environmental laws. In the same year, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act to address air pollution. Just two years later, in 1972, Congress passed and the president signed the far-reaching Clean Water Act. These command-and-control environmental laws, and their amendments and updates, have been largely responsible for America’s cleaner air and
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water in recent decades. However, economists have pointed out three difficulties with command-and-control environmental regulation. First, command-and-control regulation offers no incentive to improve the quality of the environment beyond the standard set by a particular law. Once firms meet the standard, polluters have zero incentive to do better. Second, command-and-control regulation is inflexible. It usually requires the same standard for all polluters, and often the same pollution-control technology as well. This means that command-and-control regulation draws no distinctions between firms that would find it easy and inexpensive to meet the pollution standard—or to reduce pollution even further—and firms that might find it difficult and costly to meet the standard. Firms have no reason to rethink their production methods in fundamental ways that might reduce pollution even more and at lower cost. legislators and EPA analysts write the command-and-control regulations, and so they are subject to Third, compromises in the political process. Existing firms often argue (and lobby) that stricter environmental standards should not apply to them, only to new firms that wish to start production. Consequently, real-world environmental laws are full of fine print, loopholes, and exceptions. Although critics accept the goal of reducing pollution, they question whether command-and-control regulation is the best way to design policy tools for accomplishing that goal. A different approach is the use of market-oriented tools, which we discussed in the next section. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 281 12.3 | Market-Oriented Environmental Tools By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Show how pollution charges impact firm decisions • Suggest other laws and regulations that could fall under pollution charges • Explain the significance of marketable permits and property rights • Evaluate which policies are most appropriate for various situations Market-oriented environmental policies create incentives to allow firms some flexibility in reducing pollution. The three main categories of market-oriented approaches to pollution control are pollution charges, marketable permits, and better-defined property rights. All of these policy tools which we discuss, below, address the shortcomings of command-and-control regulation—albeit in different ways. Pollution Charges A pollution charge is a tax imposed on the quantity of pollution that a firm emits. A pollution charge gives a profitmaximizing firm an incentive to determine ways to reduce its emissions—as long
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as the marginal cost of reducing the emissions is less than the tax. For example, consider a small firm that emits 50 pounds per year of small particles, such as soot, into the air. This particulate matter causes respiratory illnesses and also imposes costs on firms and individuals. Figure 12.3 illustrates the marginal costs that a firm faces in reducing pollution. The marginal cost of pollution reduction, like most most marginal cost curves increases with output, at least in the short run. Reducing the first 10 pounds of particulate emissions costs the firm $300. Reducing the second 10 pounds would cost $500; reducing the third ten pounds would cost $900; reducing the fourth 10 pounds would cost $1,500; and the fifth 10 pounds would cost $2,500. This pattern for the costs of reducing pollution is common, because the firm can use the cheapest and easiest method to make initial reductions in pollution, but additional reductions in pollution become more expensive. Figure 12.3 A Pollution Charge If a pollution charge is set equal to $1,000, then the firm will have an incentive to reduce pollution by 30 pounds because the $900 cost of these reductions would be less than the cost of paying the pollution charge. Imagine the firm now faces a pollution tax of $1,000 for every 10 pounds of particulates it emits. The firm has the choice of either polluting and paying the tax, or reducing the amount of particulates it emits and paying the cost of abatement as the figure shows. How much will the firm pollute and how much will the firm abate? The first 10 pounds would cost the firm $300 to abate. This is substantially less than the $1,000 tax, so the firm will choose to abate. The 282 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities second 10 pounds would cost $500 to abate, which is still less than the tax, so it will choose to abate. The third 10 pounds would cost $900 to abate, which is slightly less than the $1,000 tax. The fourth 10 pounds would cost $1,500, which is much more costly than paying the tax. As a result, the firm will decide to reduce pollutants by 30 pounds, because the marginal cost of reducing pollution by this amount is less than the pollution tax. With a tax of $1,000, the firm has no incentive to reduce pollution more than 30 pounds. A firm that has to pay a pollution tax will have an incentive to figure out
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the least expensive technologies for reducing pollution. Firms that can reduce pollution cheaply and easily will do so to minimize their pollution taxes; whereas firms that will incur high costs for reducing pollution will end up paying the pollution tax instead. If the pollution tax applies to every source of pollution, then there are no special favoritism or loopholes for politically well-connected producers. For an example of a pollution charge at the household level, consider two ways of charging for garbage collection. One method is to have a flat fee per household, no matter how much garbage a household produces. An alternative approach is to have several levels of fees, depending on how much garbage the household produces—and to offer lower or free charges for recyclable materials. As of 2006 (latest statistics available), the EPA had recorded over 7,000 communities that have implemented “pay as you throw” programs. When people have a financial incentive to put out less garbage and to increase recycling, they find ways to make it happen. this website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/payasyouthrow) Visit to learn more about pay-as-you-throw programs, including viewing a map and a table that shows the number of communities using this program in each state. A number of environmental policies are really pollution charges, although they often do not travel under that name. For example, the federal government and many state governments impose taxes on gasoline. We can view this tax as a charge on the air pollution that cars generate as well as a source of funding for maintaining roads. Gasoline taxes are far higher in most other countries than in the United States. Similarly, the refundable charge of five or 10 cents that only 10 states have for returning recyclable cans and bottles works like a pollution tax that provides an incentive to avoid littering or throwing bottles in the trash. Compared with command-and-control regulation, a pollution tax reduces pollution in a more flexible and cost-effective way. Visit this website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/bottlebill) to see the current U.S. states with bottle bills and the states that have active campaigns for new bottle bills. You can also view current and proposed bills in Canada and other countries around the world. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 283 Marketable Permits When a city or state government sets up a marketable permit program (
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e.g. cap-and-trade), it must start by determining the overall quantity of pollution it will allow as it tries to meet national pollution standards. Then, it divides a number of permits allowing only this quantity of pollution among the firms that emit that pollutant. The government can sell or provide these permits to pollute free to firms. Now, add two more conditions. Imagine that these permits are designed to reduce total emissions over time. For example, a permit may allow emission of 10 units of pollution one year, but only nine units the next year, then eight units the year after that, and so on down to some lower level. In addition, imagine that these are marketable permits, meaning that firms can buy and sell them. To see how marketable permits can work to reduce pollution, consider the four firms in Table 12.4. The table shows current emissions of lead from each firm. At the start of the marketable permit program, each firm receives permits to allow this level of pollution. However, these permits are shrinkable, and next year the permits allow the firms to emit only half as much pollution. Let’s say that in a year, Firm Gamma finds it easy and cheap to reduce emissions from 600 tons of lead to 200 tons, which means that it has permits that it is not using that allow emitting 100 tons of lead. Firm Beta reduces its lead pollution from 400 tons to 200 tons, so it does not need to buy any permits, and it does not have any extra permits to sell. However, although Firm Alpha can easily reduce pollution from 200 tons to 150 tons, it finds that it is cheaper to purchase permits from Gamma rather than to reduce its own emissions to 100. Meanwhile, Firm Delta did not even exist in the first period, so the only way it can start production is to purchase permits to emit 50 tons of lead. The total quantity of pollution will decline. However, buying and selling the marketable permits will determine exactly which firms reduce pollution and by how much. With a system of marketable permits, the firms that find it least expensive to do so will reduce pollution the most. Current emissions—permits distributed free for this amount How much pollution will these permits allow in one year? Actual emissions one year in the future Firm Alpha Firm Beta Firm Gamma Firm Delta 200 tons 400 tons 600 tons 0 tons 100 tons 200 tons 300 tons 0 tons 150 tons 200 tons 200 tons 50 tons Buyer or seller of marketable permit? Buys permits for 50 tons Doesn’
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t buy or sell permits Sells permits for 100 tons Buys permits for 50 tons Table 12.4 How Marketable Permits Work Another application of marketable permits occurred when the U.S. government amended the Clean Air Act in 1990. The revised law sought to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from electric power plants to half of the 1980 levels out of concern that sulfur dioxide was causing acid rain, which harms forests as well as buildings. In this case, the 284 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities marketable permits the federal government issued were free of charge (no pun intended) to electricity-generating plants across the country, especially those that were burning coal (which produces sulfur dioxide). These permits were of the “shrinkable” type; that is, the amount of pollution allowed by a given permit declined with time. Better-Defined Property Rights A clarified and strengthened idea of property rights can also strike a balance between economic activity and pollution. Ronald Coase (1910–2013), who won the 1991 Nobel Prize in economics, offered a vivid illustration of an externality: a railroad track running beside a farmer’s field where the railroad locomotive sometimes emits sparks and sets the field ablaze. Coase asked whose responsibility it was to address this spillover. Should the farmer be required to build a tall fence alongside the field to block the sparks, or should the railroad be required to place a gadget on the locomotive’s smokestack to reduce the number of sparks? Coase pointed out that one cannot resolve this issue until one clearly defines property rights—that is, the legal rights of ownership on which others are not allowed to infringe without paying compensation. Does the farmer have a property right not to have a field burned? Does the railroad have a property right to run its own trains on its own tracks? If neither party has a property right, then the two sides may squabble endlessly, doing nothing, and sparks will continue to set the field aflame. However, if either the farmer or the railroad has a well-defined legal responsibility, then that party will seek out and pay for the least costly method of reducing the risk that sparks will hit the field. The property right determines whether the farmer or the railroad pays the bills. The property rights approach is highly relevant in cases involving endangered species. The U.S. government’s endangered species list includes about 1,000 plants and animals, and about 90% of these species live on privately owned land. The
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protection of these endangered species requires careful thinking about incentives and property rights. The discovery of an endangered species on private land has often triggered an automatic reaction from the government to prohibit the landowner from using that land for any purpose that might disturb the imperiled creatures. Consider the incentives of that policy: If you admit to the government that you have an endangered species, the government effectively prohibits you from using your land. As a result, rumors abounded of landowners who followed a policy of “shoot, shovel, and shut up” when they found an endangered animal on their land. Other landowners have deliberately cut trees or managed land in a way that they knew would discourage endangered animals from locating there. How effective are market-oriented environmental policy tools? Environmentalists sometimes fear that market-oriented environmental tools are an excuse to weaken or eliminate strict limits on pollution emissions and instead to allow more pollution. It is true that if pollution charges are set very low or if marketable permits do not reduce pollution by very much then marketlaws can also be full of oriented tools will not work well. However, command-and-control environmental loopholes or have exemptions that do not reduce pollution by much, either. The advantage of market-oriented environmental tools is not that they reduce pollution by more or less, but because of their incentives and flexibility, they can achieve any desired reduction in pollution at a lower cost to society. A more productive policy would consider how to provide private landowners with an incentive to protect the endangered species that they find and to provide a habitat for additional endangered species. For example, the government might pay landowners who provide and maintain suitable habitats for endangered species or who restrict the use of their land to protect an endangered species. Again, an environmental law built on incentives and flexibility offers greater promise than a command-and-control approach when trying to oversee millions of acres of privately owned land. Applying Market-Oriented Environmental Tools Market-oriented environmental policies are a tool kit. Specific policy tools will work better in some situations than in others. For example, marketable permits work best when a few dozen or a few hundred parties are highly interested in trading, as in the cases of oil refineries that trade lead permits or electrical utilities that trade sulfur dioxide This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 285 permits. However, for cases in which millions of users emit small amounts of pollution—such as emissions from car engines
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or unrecycled soda cans—and have no strong interest in trading, pollution charges will typically offer a better choice. We can also combine market-oriented environmental tools. We can view marketable permits as a form of improved property rights. Alternatively, the government could combine marketable permits with a pollution tax on any emissions not covered by a permit. 12.4 | The Benefits and Costs of U.S. Environmental Laws By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Evaluate the benefits and costs of environmental protection • Explain the effects of ecotourism • Apply marginal analysis to illustrate the marginal costs and marginal benefits of reducing pollution Government economists have estimated that U.S. firms may pay more than $200 billion per year to comply with federal environmental laws. That is a sizable amount of money. Is the money well spent? Benefits and Costs of Clean Air and Clean Water We can divide the benefits of a cleaner environment into four areas: (1) people may stay healthier and live longer; (2) certain industries that rely on clean air and water, such as farming, fishing, and tourism, may benefit; (3) property values may be higher; and (4) people may simply enjoy a cleaner environment in a way that does not need to involve a market transaction. Some of these benefits, such as gains to tourism or farming, are relatively easy to value in economic terms. It is harder to assign a monetary value to others, such as the value of clean air for someone with asthma. It seems impossible to put a clear-cut monetary value on still others, such as the satisfaction you might feel from knowing that the air is clear over the Grand Canyon, even if you have never visited the Grand Canyon. Although estimates of environmental benefits are not precise, they can still be revealing. For example, a study by the Environmental Protection Agency looked at the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 1990. It found that total costs over that time period were roughly $500 billion—a huge amount. However, it also found that a middlerange estimate of the health and other benefits from cleaner air was $22 trillion—about 44 times higher than the costs. A more recent EPA study estimated that the environmental benefits to Americans from the Clean Air Act will exceed their costs by a margin of four to one. The EPA estimated that “in 2010 the benefits of Clean Air Act programs will total about $110 billion. This estimate represents the value of avoiding increases in illness and premature death which would
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have prevailed.” Saying that overall benefits of environmental regulation have exceeded costs in the past, however, is very different from saying that every environmental regulation makes sense. For example, studies suggest that when breaking down emission reductions by type of contaminants, the benefits of air pollution control outweigh the costs primarily for particulates and lead, but when looking at other air pollutants, the costs of reducing them may be comparable to or greater than the benefits. Just because some environmental regulations have had benefits much higher than costs does not prove that every individual regulation is a sensible idea. Ecotourism: Making Environmentalism Pay The definition of ecotourism is a little vague. Does it mean sleeping on the ground, eating roots, and getting close to wild animals? Does it mean flying in a helicopter to shoot anesthetic darts at African wildlife, or a little of both? The definition may be fuzzy, but tourists who hope to appreciate the ecology of their destination—“eco tourists”—are the impetus to a big and growing business. The International Ecotourism Society estimates that international tourists interested in seeing nature or wildlife will take 1.56 billion trips by 2020. Visit The International Ecotourism Society’s website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/ecotourism) to learn more about The International Ecotourism Society, its programs, and tourism’s role in sustainable community development. 286 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities Realizing the attraction of ecotourism, the residents of low-income countries may come to see that preserving wildlife habitats is more lucrative than, say, cutting down forests or grazing livestock to survive. In South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, for example, a substantial expansion of both rhinoceros and elephant populations is broadly credited to ecotourism, which has given local communities an economic interest in protecting them. Some of the leading ecotourism destinations include: Costa Rica and Panama in Central America; the Caribbean; Malaysia, and other South Pacific destinations; New Zealand; the Serengeti in Tanzania; the Amazon rain forests; and the Galapagos Islands. In many of these countries and regions, governments have enacted policies whereby they share revenues from ecotourism with local communities, to give people in those local communities a kind of property right that encourages them to conserve their local environment. Ecotourism needs careful management, so that the combination of eager tourists and local entrepreneurs does not destroy what the visitors are
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coming to see. However, whatever one’s qualms are about certain kinds of ecotourism—such as the occasional practice of rich tourists shooting elderly lions with high-powered rifles—it is worth remembering that the alternative is often that low-income people in poor countries will damage their local environment in their effort to survive. Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs We can use the tools of marginal analysis to illustrate the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of reducing pollution. Figure 12.4 illustrates a theoretical model of this situation. When the quantity of environmental protection is low so that pollution is extensive—for example, at quantity Qa—there are usually numerous relatively cheap and easy ways to reduce pollution, and the marginal benefits of doing so are quite high. At Qa, it makes sense to allocate more resources to fight pollution. However, as the extent of environmental protection increases, the cheap and easy ways of reducing pollution begin to decrease, and one must use more costly methods. The marginal cost curve rises. Also, as environmental protection increases, one achieves the largest marginal benefits first, followed by reduced marginal benefits. As the quantity of environmental protection increases to, say, Qb, the gap between marginal benefits and marginal costs narrows. At point Qc the marginal costs will exceed the marginal benefits. At this level of environmental protection, society is not allocating resources efficiently, because it is forfeiting too many resources to reduce pollution. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 287 Figure 12.4 Marginal Costs and Marginal Benefits of Environmental Protection Reducing pollution is costly—one must sacrifice resources. The marginal costs of reducing pollution are generally increasing, because one can make the least expensive and easiest reductions, leaving the more expensive methods for later. The marginal benefits of reducing pollution are generally declining, because one can take the steps that provide the greatest benefit first, and steps that provide less benefit can wait until later. As society draws closer to Qb, some might argue that to use market-oriented environmental tools to hold down the costs of reducing pollution. Their objective would be to avoid environmental rules that would provide the quantity of environmental protection at Qc, where marginal costs exceed marginal benefits. The following Clear It Up feature delves into how the EPA measures its policies – and the monetary value of our lives. it becomes more important What's a life worth? The U.S. Environmental Protection
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Agency (EPA) must estimate the value of saving lives by reducing pollution against the additional costs. In measuring the benefits of government environmental policies, the EPA’s National Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE) values a statistical human life at $7.4 million (in 2006 U.S. dollars). Economists value a human life on the basis of studies of the value that people actually place on human lives in their own decisions. For example, some jobs have a higher probability of death than others, and these jobs typically pay more to compensate for the risk. Examples are ocean fishery as opposed to fish farming, and ice trucking in Alaska as opposed to truck driving in the “lower forty-eight” states. Government regulators use estimates such as these when deciding what proposed regulations are “reasonable,” which means deciding which proposals have high enough benefits to justify their cost. For example, when the U.S. Department of Transportation makes decisions about what safety systems should be required in cars or airplanes, it will approve rules only where the estimated cost per life saved is $3 million or less. Resources that we spend on life-saving regulations create tradeoff. A study by W. Kip Viscusi of Vanderbilt University estimated that when a regulation costs $50 million, it diverts enough spending in the rest of the economy from health care and safety expenditures that it costs a life. This finding suggests that any regulation that costs more than $50 million per life saved actually costs lives, rather than saving them. 288 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 12.5 | International Environmental Issues By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain biodiversity • Analyze the partnership of high-income and low-income countries in efforts to address international externalities Many countries around the world have become more aware of the benefits of environmental protection. Yet even if most nations individually took steps to address their environmental issues, no nation acting alone can solve certain environmental problems which spill over national borders. No nation by itself can reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases by enough to solve the problem of global warming—not without the cooperation of other nations. Another issue is the challenge of preserving biodiversity, which includes the full spectrum of animal and plant genetic material. Although a nation can protect biodiversity within its own borders, no nation acting alone can protect biodiversity around the world. Global warming and biodiversity are examples of international externalities. Bringing the nations of the world together to address environmental issues requires a difficult set
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of negotiations between countries with different income levels and different sets of priorities. If nations such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and others are developing their economies by burning vast amounts of fossil fuels or by stripping their forest and wildlife habitats, then the world’s high-income countries acting alone will not be able to reduce greenhouse gases. However, low-income countries, with some understandable exasperation, point out that high-income countries do not have much moral standing to lecture them on the necessities of putting environmental protection ahead of economic growth. After all, high-income countries have historically been the primary contributors to greenhouse warming by burning fossil fuels—and still are today. It is hard to tell people who are living in a low-income country, where adequate diet, health care, and education are lacking, that they should sacrifice an improved quality of life for a cleaner environment. Can rich and poor countries come together to address global environmental spillovers? At the initiative of the European Union and the most vulnerable developing nations, the Durban climate conference in December 2011 launched negotiations to develop a new international climate change agreement that covers all countries. The outcome of these negotiations was the Paris Climate Agreement, passed in 2016. The Paris Agreement committed participating countries to significant limits on CO2 emissions. To date, 129 nations have signed on, including the two biggest emitters of greenhouse gases—China and the United States. The U.S. contribution to the agreement was the Clean Power Plan, which planned to reduce power plant CO2 emissions across the U.S. by 17% to pre-2005 levels by 2020, and to further reduce emissions by a cumulative 32% by 2030. In early 2017, the Trump Administration announced plans to back out of the Paris Climate Agreement. Trump opposes the Clean Power plan, opting instead to shift focus to the use of natural gas. This represents a significant blow to the success of the Paris Agreement. Visit this website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/EC) to learn more about the European Commission. If high-income countries want low-income countries to reduce their greenhouse emission gases, then the high-income countries may need to pay some of the costs. Perhaps some of these payments will happen through private markets. For example, some tourists from rich countries will pay handsomely to vacation near the natural treasures of low- This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities
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289 income countries. Perhaps some of the transfer of resources can happen through making modern pollution-control technology available to poorer countries. The practical details of what such an international system might look like and how it would operate across international borders are forbiddingly complex. However, it seems highly unlikely that some form of world government will impose a detailed system of environmental command-and-control regulation around the world. As a result, a decentralized and market-oriented approach may be the only practical way to address international issues such as global warming and biodiversity. 12.6 | The Tradeoff between Economic Output and Environmental Protection By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Apply the production possibility frontier to evaluate the tradeoff between economic output and the • environment Interpret a graphic representation of the tradeoff between economic output and environmental protection We can analyze the tradeoff between economic output and the environment with a production possibility frontier (PPF) such as the one in Figure 12.5. At one extreme, at a choice like P, a country would be selecting a high level of economic output but very little environmental protection. At the other extreme, at a choice like T, a country would be selecting a high level of environmental protection but little economic output. According to the graph, an increase in environmental protection involves an opportunity cost of less economic output. No matter what their preferences, all societies should wish to avoid choices like M, which are productively inefficient. Efficiency requires that the choice should be on the production possibility frontier. Figure 12.5 The Tradeoff between Economic Output and Environmental Protection Each society will have to weigh its own values and decide whether it prefers a choice like P with more economic output and less environmental protection, or a choice like T with more environmental protection and less economic output. Economists do not have a great deal to say about the choice between P, Q, R, S and T in Figure 12.5, all of which lie along the production possibility frontier. Countries with low per capita gross domestic product (GDP), such as China, place a greater emphasis on economic output—which in turn helps to produce nutrition, shelter, health, education, and desirable consumer goods. Countries with higher income levels, where a greater share of people have access to the basic necessities of life, may be willing to place a relatively greater emphasis on environmental protection. However, economists are united in their belief that an inefficient choice such as M is undesirable. Rather than choosing M, a nation could achieve either greater economic output with the same environmental protection
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, as at 290 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities point Q, or greater environmental protection with the same level of output, as at point S. The problem with commandand-control environmental laws is that they sometimes involve a choice like M. Market-oriented environmental tools offer a mechanism for providing either the same environmental protection at lower cost, or providing a greater degree of environmental protection for the same cost. Keystone XL How would an economist respond to claims of environmental damage caused by the Keystone XL project? Clearly, we can consider the environmental cost of oil spills a negative externality, but how large would these external costs be? Furthermore, are these costs “too high” when we measure them against any potential for economic benefit? As this chapter indicates, in deciding whether pipeline construction is a good idea, an economist would want to know not only about the marginal benefits resulting from the additional pipeline construction, but also the potential marginal costs—and especially the pipeline's marginal external costs. Typically these come in the form of environmental impact statements, which are usually required for such projects. The most recent impact statement, released in March 2013 by the Nebraska Department of State, considered the possibility of fewer pipeline miles going over the aquifer system and avoiding completely environmentally fragile areas. It indicated that pipeline construction would not harm "most resources". The Obama Administration declined to approve construction of the Keystone XL project. However, the Trump administration has already announced its willingness to do so. While we may fairly easily quantify the economic benefits of additional oil in the United States, the social costs are more challenging to measure. It seems that, in a period of less than robust economic growth, people are giving the benefit of the doubt that the marginal costs of additional oil generation will be less than the marginal benefits. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 291 KEY TERMS additional external cost additional costs incurred by third parties outside the production process when a unit of output is produced biodiversity the full spectrum of animal and plant genetic material command-and-control regulation laws that specify allowable quantities of pollution and that also may detail which pollution-control technologies one must use externality a market exchange that affects a third party who is outside or “external” to the exchange; sometimes called a “spillover” international externalities externalities that cross national borders and that a single nation acting alone cannot resolve market failure When
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the market on its own does not allocate resources efficiently in a way that balances social costs and benefits; externalities are one example of a market failure marketable permit program a permit that allows a firm to emit a certain amount of pollution; firms with more permits than pollution can sell the remaining permits to other firms negative externality a situation where a third party, outside the transaction, suffers from a market transaction by others pollution charge a tax imposed on the quantity of pollution that a firm emits; also called a pollution tax positive externality a situation where a third party, outside the transaction, benefits from a market transaction by others property rights the legal rights of ownership on which others are not allowed to infringe without paying compensation social costs costs that include both the private costs incurred by firms and also additional costs incurred by third parties outside the production process, like costs of pollution spillover see externality KEY CONCEPTS AND SUMMARY 12.1 The Economics of Pollution Economic production can cause environmental damage. This tradeoff arises for all countries, whether high-income or low-income, and whether their economies are market-oriented or command-oriented. An externality occurs when an exchange between a buyer and seller has an impact on a third party who is not part of the exchange. An externality, which is sometimes also called a spillover, can have a negative or a positive impact on the third party. If those parties imposing a negative externality on others had to account for the broader social cost of their behavior, they would have an incentive to reduce the production of whatever is causing the negative externality. In the case of a positive externality, the third party obtains benefits from the exchange between a buyer and a seller, but they are not paying for these benefits. If this is the case, then markets would tend to under produce output because suppliers are not aware of the additional demand from others. If the parties generating benefits to others would somehow receive compensation for these external benefits, they would have an incentive to increase production of whatever is causing the positive externality. 12.2 Command-and-Control Regulation Command-and-control regulation sets specific limits for pollution emissions and/or specific pollution-control technologies that firms must use. Although such regulations have helped to protect the environment, they have three shortcomings: they provide no incentive for going beyond the limits they set; they offer limited flexibility on where and how to reduce pollution; and they often have politically-motivated loopholes. 292 Chapter 12
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| Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 12.3 Market-Oriented Environmental Tools Examples of market-oriented environmental policies, also called cap and trade programs, include pollution charges, marketable permits, and better-defined property rights. Market-oriented environmental policies include taxes, markets, and property rights so that those who impose negative externalities must face the social cost. 12.4 The Benefits and Costs of U.S. Environmental Laws We can make a strong case, taken as a whole, that the benefits of U.S. environmental regulation have outweighed the costs. As the extent of environment regulation increases, additional expenditures on environmental protection will probably have increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits. This pattern suggests that the flexibility and cost savings of market-oriented environmental policies will become more important. 12.5 International Environmental Issues Certain global environmental issues, such as global warming and biodiversity, spill over national borders and require addressing with some form of international agreement. 12.6 The Tradeoff between Economic Output and Environmental Protection Depending on their different income levels and political preferences, countries are likely to make different choices about allocative efficiency—that is, the choice between economic output and environmental protection along the production possibility frontier. However, all countries should prefer to make a choice that shows productive efficiency—that is, the choice is somewhere on the production possibility frontier rather than inside it. Revisit Choice in a World of Scarcity for more on these terms. SELF-CHECK QUESTIONS 1. Identify the following situations as an example of a negative or a positive externality: a. You are a birder (bird watcher), and your neighbor has put up several birdhouses in the yard as well as planting trees and flowers that attract birds. Investments in private education raise your country’s standard of living. b. Your neighbor paints his house a hideous color. c. d. Trash dumped upstream flows downstream right past your home. e. Your roommate is a smoker, but you are a nonsmoker. 2. Identify whether the market supply curve will shift right or left or will stay the same for the following: a. Firms in an industry are required to pay a fine for their carbon dioxide emissions. b. Companies are sued for polluting the water in a river. c. Power plants in a specific city are not required to address the impact of their air quality emissions. d. Companies that use fracking to remove oil and gas from rock are required to clean up the damage. 3. For each of your answers
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to Exercise 12.2, will equilibrium price rise or fall or stay the same? This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 293 4. Table 12.5 provides the supply and demand conditions for a manufacturing firm. The third column represents a supply curve without accounting for the social cost of pollution. The fourth column represents the supply curve when the firm is required to account for the social cost of pollution. Identify the equilibrium before the social cost of production is included and after the social cost of production is included. Price Quantity Demanded Quantity Supplied without paying the cost of the pollution Quantity Supplied after paying the cost of the pollution $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 450 440 430 420 410 Table 12.5 400 440 480 520 560 250 290 330 370 410 5. Consider two approaches to reducing emissions of CO2 into the environment from manufacturing industries in the United States. In the first approach, the U.S. government makes it a policy to use only predetermined technologies. In the second approach, the U.S. government determines which technologies are cleaner and subsidizes their use. Of the two approaches, which is the command-and-control policy? 6. Classify the following pollution-control policies as command-and-control or market incentive based. a. A state emissions tax on the quantity of carbon emitted by each firm. b. The federal government requires domestic auto companies to improve car emissions by 2020. c. The EPA sets national standards for water quality. d. A city sells permits to firms that allow them to emit a specified quantity of pollution. e. The federal government pays fishermen to preserve salmon. 7. An emissions tax on a quantity of emissions from a firm is not a command-and-control approach to reducing pollution. Why? 294 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 8. Four firms called Elm, Maple, Oak, and Cherry, produce wooden chairs. However, they also produce a great deal of garbage (a mixture of glue, varnish, sandpaper, and wood scraps). The first row of Table 12.6 shows the total amount of garbage (in tons) that each firm currently produces. The other rows of the table show the cost of reducing garbage produced by the first five tons, the second five tons, and so on. First, calculate the cost of requiring each firm to reduce the weight of its garbage by one-fourth
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. Now, imagine that the government issues marketable permits for the current level of garbage, but the permits will shrink the weight of allowable garbage for each firm by one-fourth. What will be the result of this alternative approach to reducing pollution? Elm Maple Oak Cherry Current production of garbage (in tons) 20 40 60 80 Cost of reducing garbage by first five tons $5,500 $6,300 $7,200 $3,000 Cost of reducing garbage by second five tons $6,000 $7,200 $7,500 $4,000 Cost of reducing garbage by third five tons $6,500 $8,100 $7,800 $5,000 Cost of reducing garbage by fouth five tons $7,000 $9,000 $8,100 $6,000 Cost of reducing garbage by fifth five tons $0 $9,900 $8,400 $7,000 Table 12.6 9. The rows in Table 12.7 show three market-oriented tools for reducing pollution. The columns of the table show three complaints about command-and-control regulation. Fill in the table by stating briefly how each market-oriented tool addresses each of the three concerns. Incentives to Go Beyond Flexibility about Where and How Pollution Will Be Reduced Political Process Creates Loopholes and Exceptions Pollution Charges Marketable Permits Property Rights Table 12.7 This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 295 10. Suppose a city releases 16 million gallons of raw sewage into a nearby lake. Table 12.8 shows the total costs of cleaning up the sewage to different levels, together with the total benefits of doing so. (Benefits include environmental, recreational, health, and industrial benefits.) Total Cost (in thousands of dollars) Total Benefits (in thousands of dollars) Current situation Current situation 50 150 500 1200 800 1300 1650 1900 16 million gallons 12 million gallons 8 million gallons 4 million gallons 0 gallons Table 12.8 a. Using the information in Table 12.8, calculate the marginal costs and marginal benefits of reducing sewage emissions for this city. See Production, Costs and Industry Structure if you need a refresher on how to calculate marginal costs. b. What is the optimal level of sewage for this city? c. Why not just pass a law that firms can emit zero sewage? After all, the total benefits of zero emissions exceed the total costs.
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11. The state of Colorado requires oil and gas companies who use fracking techniques to return the land to its original condition after the oil and gas extractions. Table 12.9 shows the total cost and total benefits (in dollars) of this policy. Land Restored (in acres) Total Cost Total Benefit 0 100 200 300 400 Table 12.9 $0 $20 $80 $160 $280 $0 $140 $240 $320 $380 a. Calculate the marginal cost and the marginal benefit at each quantity (acre) of land restored. See Production, Costs and Industry Structure if you need a refresher on how to calculate marginal costs and benefits. If we apply marginal analysis, what is the optimal amount of land to be restored? b. 296 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 12. Consider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a prisoner’s dilemma of the sort studied in Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly. Say that there are two countries, A and B. Each country can choose whether to protect the environment, at a cost of 10, or not to protect it, at a cost of zero. If one country decides to protect the environment, there is a benefit of 16, but the benefit is divided equally between the two countries. If both countries decide to protect the environment, there is a benefit of 32, which is divided equally between the two countries. a. In Table 12.10, fill in the costs, benefits, and total payoffs to the countries of the following decisions. Explain why, without some international agreement, they are likely to end up with neither country acting to protect the environment. Country B Protect Not Protect Country A Protect Not Protect Table 12.10 13. A country called Sherwood is very heavily covered with a forest of 50,000 trees. There are proposals to clear some of Sherwood’s forest and grow corn, but obtaining this additional economic output will have an environmental cost from reducing the number of trees. Table 12.11 shows possible combinations of economic output and environmental protection. Combos Corn Bushels (thousands) Number of Trees (thousands) P Q R S T Table 12.11 9 2 7 2 6 5 30 20 40 10 a. Sketch a graph of a production possibility frontier with environmental quality on the horizontal axis, measured by the number of trees, and the quantity of economic output, measured in corn, on the vertical axis. b. Which choices display productive efficiency? How can you tell?
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c. Which choices show allocative efficiency? How can you tell? d. e. f. In the choice between T and R, decide which one is better. Why? In the choice between T and S, can you say which one is better, and why? If you had to guess, which choice would you think is more likely to represent a command-and-control environmental policy and which choice is more likely to represent a market-oriented environmental policy, choice Q or S? Why? REVIEW QUESTIONS 14. What is an externality? 15. Give an example of a positive externality and an example of a negative externality. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 297 16. What is the difference between private costs and social costs? 17. In a market without environmental regulations, will the supply curve for a firm account for private costs, external costs, both, or neither? Explain. 18. What regulation? is command-and-control environmental 19. What are the three problems that economists have noted with regard to command-and-control regulation? 20. What is a pollution charge and what incentive does it provide for a firm to take external costs into account? 21. What is a marketable permit and what incentive does it provide for a firm to account for external costs? 22. What are better-defined property rights and what incentive do they provide to account for external costs? CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS 29. Suppose you want to put a dollar value on the external costs of carbon emissions from a power plant. What information or data would you obtain to measure the external [not social] cost? 30. Would environmentalists favor command-andcontrol policies as a way to reduce pollution? Why or why not? 31. Consider two ways of protecting elephants from poachers in African countries. In one approach, the government sets up enormous national parks that have sufficient habitat for elephants to thrive and forbids all local people to enter the parks or to injure either the elephants or their habitat in any way. In a second approach, the government sets up national parks and designates 10 villages around the edges of the park as official tourist centers that become places where tourists can stay and bases for guided tours inside the national park. Consider local villagers—who often are very poor—in each of these plans. Which plan seems more likely to help the elephant population? incentives
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of the different 32. Will a system of marketable permits work with thousands of firms? Why or why not? 23. As the extent of environmental protection expands, would you expect marginal costs of environmental protection to rise or fall? Why or why not? you 24. As the extent of environmental protection expands, of would environmental protection to rise or fall? Why or why not? the marginal benefits expect 25. What are the economic tradeoffs between lowincome and high-income countries in international conferences on global environmental damage? 26. What arguments do low-income countries make in international discussions of global environmental cleanup? 27. In the tradeoff between economic output and environmental protection, what do the combinations on the protection possibility curve represent? 28. What does a point inside the production possibility frontier represent? Is zero pollution possible under a marketable 33. permits system? Why or why not? Is zero pollution an optimal goal? Why or why 34. not? 35. From an economic perspective, is it sound policy to pursue a goal of zero pollution? Why or why not? 36. Recycling is a relatively inexpensive solution to much of the environmental contamination from plastics, glass, and other waste materials. Is it a sound policy to make it mandatory for everybody to recycle? 37. Can extreme levels of pollution hurt the economic development of a high-income country? Why or why not? 38. How can high-income countries benefit from covering much of the cost of reducing pollution created by low-income countries? innovations shift 39. Technological the production possibility curve. Look at graph you sketched for Exercise 12.13 Which types of technologies should a country promote? Should “clean” technologies be promoted over other technologies? Why or why not? 298 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 43. A city currently emits 16 million gallons (MG) of raw sewage into a lake that is beside the city. Table 12.13 shows the total costs (TC) in thousands of dollars of cleaning up the sewage to different levels, together with the total benefits (TB) of doing so. Benefits include environmental, and industrial recreational, health, benefits. TC TB Current Current 50 150 500 1200 800 1300 1850 2000 16 MG 12 MG 8 MG 4 MG 0 MG Table 12.13 a. Using the information in Table 12.13 calculate the marginal costs and marginal benefits of reducing sewage emissions for this city. b. What is the optimal level of sewage for this city? How can you tell? PROBLEMS 40. Show the
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market for cigarettes in equilibrium, assuming that there are no laws banning smoking in public. Label the equilibrium private market price and quantity as Pm and Qm. Add whatever is needed to the model to show the impact of the negative externality from second-hand smoking. (Hint: In this case it is the consumers, not the sellers, who are creating the negative externality.) Label the social optimal output and price as Pe and Qe. On the graph, shade in the deadweight loss at the market output. 41. Refer to Table 12.2. The externality created by the refrigerator production was $100. However, once we accounted for both the private and additional external costs, the market price increased by only $50. If the external costs were $100 why did the price only increase by $50 when we accounted for all costs? 42. Table 12.12, shows the supply and demand conditions for a firm that will play trumpets on the streets when requested. Qs1 is the quantity supplied without social costs. Qs2 is the quantity supplied with social costs. What is the negative externality in this situation? Identify the equilibrium price and quantity when we account only for private costs, and then when we account for social costs. How does accounting for the externality affect the equilibrium price and quantity? P Qd Qs1 Qs2 $20 $18 $15 $12 $10 $5 0 1 2.5 4 5 10 9 7.5 6 5 7.5 2.5 Table 12.12 8 7 5.5 4 3 0.5 This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities 299 44. In the Land of Purity, there is only one form of pollution, called “gunk.” Table 12.14 shows possible combinations of economic output and reduction of gunk, depending on what kinds of environmental regulations you choose. Combos Eco Output Gunk Cleaned Up J K L M N 800 500 600 400 100 Table 12.14 10% 30% 40% 40% 90% a. Sketch a graph of a production possibility frontier with environmental quality on the horizontal axis, measured by the percentage reduction of gunk, and with the quantity of economic output on the vertical axis. b. Which choices display productive efficiency? How can you tell? c. Which choices show allocative efficiency
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? How d. e. f. can you tell? In the choice between K and L, can you say which one is better and why? In the choice between K and N, can you say which one is better, and why? If you had to guess, which choice would you think is more likely to represent a command-andcontrol environmental policy and which choice is more likely to represent a market-oriented environmental policy, choice L or M? Why? 300 Chapter 12 | Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods 301 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods Figure 13.1 View from Voyager I Launched by NASA on September 5, 1977, Voyager 1’s primary mission was to provide detailed images of Jupiter, Saturn, and their moons. It took this photograph of Jupiter on its journey. In August of 2012, Voyager I entered interstellar space—the first human-made object to do so—and it is expected to send data and images back to earth until 2025. Such a technological feat entails many economic principles. (Credit: modification of work by NASA/JPL) The Benefits of Voyager I Endure The rapid growth of technology has increased our ability to access and process data, to navigate through a busy city, and to communicate with friends on the other side of the globe. The research and development efforts of citizens, scientists, firms, universities, and governments have truly revolutionized the modern economy. To get a sense of how far we have come in a short period of time, let’s compare one of humankind’s greatest achievements to the smartphone most of us have in our coat pocket. In 1977 the United States launched Voyager I, a spacecraft originally intended to reach Jupiter and Saturn, to send back photographs and other cosmic measurements. Voyager I, however, kept going, and going—past Jupiter and Saturn—right out of our solar system. At the time of its launch, Voyager had some of the most sophisticated computing processing power NASA could engineer (8,000 instructions per second), but today, we Earthlings use handheld devices that can process 14 billion instructions per second. Still, the technology of today is a spillover product of the incredible feats NASA accomplished forty years ago. NASA research, for instance, is responsible for the kidney dialysis and mammogram machines that we 302 Chapter 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods use today
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. Research in new technologies not only produces private benefits to the investing firm, or in this case to NASA, but it also creates benefits for the broader society. In this way, new knowledge often becomes what economists refer to as a public good. This leads us to the topic of this chapter—technology, positive externalities, public goods, and the role of government in encouraging innovation and the social benefits that it provides. Introduction to Positive Externalities and Public Goods In this chapter, you will learn about: • Why the Private Sector Underinvests in Technologies • How Governments Can Encourage Innovation • Public Goods Can you imagine a world in which you did not own a cellular phone or use Wikipedia? New technology changes how people live and work and what they buy. Technology includes the invention of new products, new ways of producing goods and services, and even new ways of managing a company more efficiently. Research and development of technology is the difference between horses and automobiles, between candles and electric lights, between fetching water in buckets and indoor plumbing, and between infection and good health from antibiotics. In December 2009, ABC News compiled a list of some of the technological breakthroughs that have revolutionized consumer products in the past 10 years: • GPS tracking devices, originally developed by the defense department and available to consumers in 2000, give users up-to-date information on location and time through satellite technology. • In 2000, Toyota introduced the Prius hybrid car, which greatly improved fuel efficiency. • Also in 2000, AT&T offered its customers the ability to text on a mobile phone. • In 2001, Wikipedia launched a user-generated encyclopedia on the Web. • Even though Napster died in 2001, the company launched music downloading and file sharing, which revolutionized how consumers obtain their music and videos. • Friendster kicked off the social networking business in 2003, and Twitter and Facebook followed. • In 2003, international scientists completed the Human Genome project. It helps to fight disease and launch new pharmaceutical innovations. • Also in 2003, the search engine became a way of life for obtaining information quickly. The search engine companies also became innovators in the digital software that dominates mobile devices. • In 2006, Nintendo launched Wii and changed the way we play video games. Players can now be drawn into the action and use their bodies to respond rather than a handheld device. • Apple introduced the iPhone in 2007 and launched an entire smartphone industry. In 2015, cell phones now recognize human voices via artificial intelligence. With all new technologies, however, there are new
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challenges. This chapter deals with some of these issues: Will private companies be willing to invest in new technology? In what ways does new technology have positive externalities? What motivates inventors? Does government have a role to play in encouraging research and technology? Are there certain types of goods that markets fail to provide efficiently, and that only government can produce? What happens when consumption or production of a product creates positive externalities? Why is it unsurprising when we overuse a common resource, like marine fisheries? This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods 303 13.1 | Why the Private Sector Underinvests in Innovation By the end of this section, you will be able to: Identify the positive externalities of new technology. • • Explain the difference between private benefits and social benefits and give examples of each. • Calculate and analyze rates of return Market competition can provide an incentive for discovering new technology because a firm can earn higher profits by finding a way to produce products more cheaply or to create products with characteristics consumers want. As Gregory Lee, CEO of Samsung said, “Relentless pursuit of new innovation is the key principle of our business and enables consumers to discover a world of possibilities with technology.” An innovative firm knows that it will usually have a temporary edge over its competitors and thus an ability to earn above-normal profits before competitors can catch up. In certain cases, however, competition can discourage new technology, especially when other firms can quickly copy a new idea. Consider a pharmaceutical firm deciding to develop a new drug. On average, it can cost $800 million and take more than a decade to discover a new drug, perform the necessary safety tests, and bring the drug to market. If the research and development (R&D) effort fails—and every R&D project has some chance of failure—then the firm will suffer losses and could even be driven out of business. If the project succeeds, then the firm’s competitors may figure out ways of adapting and copying the underlying idea, but without having to pay the costs themselves. As a result, the innovative company will bear the much higher costs of the R&D and will enjoy at best only a small, temporary advantage over the competition. Many inventors over the years have discovered that their inventions brought them less profit than they might have reasonably expected. • Eli Whitney (1765–1825)
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invented the cotton gin, but then southern cotton planters built their own seedseparating devices with a few minor changes in Whitney’s design. When Whitney sued, he found that the courts in southern states would not uphold his patent rights. • Thomas Edison (1847–1931) still holds the record for most patents granted to an individual. His first invention was an automatic vote counter, and despite the social benefits, he could not find a government that wanted to buy it. • Gordon Gould came up with the idea behind the laser in 1957. He put off applying for a patent and, by the time he did apply, other scientists had laser inventions of their own. A lengthy legal battle resulted, in which Gould spent $100,000 on lawyers, before he eventually received a patent for the laser in 1977. Compared to the enormous social benefits of the laser, Gould received relatively little financial reward. • In 1936, Alan Turing delivered a paper titled, "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem," in which he presented the notion of a universal machine (later called the “Universal Turing Machine," and then the "Turing machine") capable of computing anything that is computable. The central concept of the modern computer was based on Turing’s paper. Today scholars widely consider Turing as the father of theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence; however, the UK government prosecuted Turing in 1952 for homosexual acts and gave him the choice of chemical castration or prison. Turing chose castration and died in 1954 from cyanide poisoning. A variety of studies by economists have found that the original inventor receives one-third to one-half of the total economic benefits from innovations, while other businesses and new product users receive the rest. The Positive Externalities of New Technology Will private firms in a market economy underinvest in research and technology? If a firm builds a factory or buys a piece of equipment, the firm receives all the economic benefits that result from the investments. However, when a firm invests in new technology, the private benefits, or profits, that the firm receives are only a portion of the overall social benefits. The social benefits of an innovation account for the value of all the positive externalities of the new idea or product, whether enjoyed by other companies or society as a whole, as well as the private benefits the firm that developed the new technology receives. As you learned in Environmental Protection and Negative Externalities, positive externalities are beneficial spillovers to a third party, or parties.
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304 Chapter 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods Consider the example of the Big Drug Company, which is planning its R&D budget for the next year. Economists and scientists working for Big Drug have compiled a list of potential research and development projects and estimated rates of return. (The rate of return is the estimated payoff from the project.) Figure 13.2 shows how the calculations work. The downward-sloping DPrivate curve represents the firm’s demand for financial capital and reflects the company’s willingness to borrow to finance research and development projects at various interest rates. Suppose that this firm’s investment in research and development creates a spillover benefit to other firms and households. After all, new innovations often spark other creative endeavors that society also values. If we add the spillover benefits society enjoys to the firm’s private demand for financial capital, we can draw DSocial that lies above DPrivate. If there were a way for the firm to fully monopolize those social benefits by somehow making them unavailable to the rest of us, the firm’s private demand curve would be the same as society’s demand curve. According to Figure 13.2 and Table 13.1, if the going rate of interest on borrowing is 8%, and the company can receive the private benefits of innovation only, then the company would finance $30 million. Society, at the same rate of 8%, would find it optimal to have $52 million of borrowing. Unless there is a way for the company to fully enjoy the total benefits, then it will borrow less than the socially optimal level of $52 million. Figure 13.2 Positive Externalities and Technology Big Drug faces a cost of borrowing of 8%. If the firm receives only the private benefits of investing in R&D, then we show its demand curve for financial capital by DPrivate, and the equilibrium will occur at $30 million. Because there are spillover benefits, society would find it optimal to have $52 million of investment. If the firm could keep the social benefits of its investment for itself, its demand curve for financial capital would be DSocial and it would be willing to borrow $52 million. Rate of Return DPrivate (in millions) DSocial (in millions) 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% $72 $52 $38 $30 $26 Table 13.1 Return and Demand for Capital $84 $72 $62 $52 $44 Big Drug’s original demand for financial capital (DPrivate) is
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based on the profits received the firm receives. However, other pharmaceutical firms and health care companies may learn new lessons about how to treat certain medical conditions and are then able to create their own competing products. The social benefit of the drug takes into account the value of all the drug's positive externalities. If Big Drug were able to gain this social return instead of other companies, its demand for financial capital would shift to the demand curve DSocial, and it would be willing to borrow and invest $52 million. However, if Big Drug is receiving only 50 cents of each dollar of social benefits, the firm will not spend as much on creating new products. The amount it would be willing to spend would fall somewhere in between DPrivate and DSocial. This OpenStax book is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col12170/1.7 Chapter 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods 305 Why Invest in Human Capital? The investment in anything, whether it is the construction of a new power plant or research in a new cancer treatment, usually requires a certain upfront cost with an uncertain future benefit. The investment in education, or human capital, is no different. Over the span of many years, a student and her family invest significant amounts of time and money into that student’s education. The idea is that higher levels of educational attainment will eventually serve to increase the student’s future productivity and subsequent ability to earn. Once the student crunches the numbers, does this investment pay off for her? Almost universally, economists have found that the answer to this question is a clear “Yes.” For example, several studies of the return to education in the United States estimate that the rate of return to a college education is approximately 10-15%. Data in Table 13.2, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers, Third Quarter 2014, demonstrate that median weekly earnings are higher for workers who have completed more education. While these rates of return will beat equivalent investments in Treasury bonds or savings accounts, the estimated returns to education go primarily to the individual worker, so these returns are private rates of return to education. Median Weekly Earnings (full-time workers over the age of 25) Less than a High School Degree High School Degree, No College Bachelor’s Degree $519 $698 $1,270 Table 13.2 Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers, Fourth Quarter 2016 (Source:
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http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf) What does society gain from investing in the education of another student? After all, if the government is spending taxpayer dollars to subsidize public education, society should expect some kind of return on that spending. Economists like George Psacharopoulos have found that, across a variety of nations, the social rate of return on schooling is also positive. After all, positive externalities exist from investment in education. While not always easy to measure, according to Walter McMahon, the positive externalities to education typically include better health outcomes for the population, lower levels of crime, a cleaner environment and a more stable, democratic government. For these reasons, many nations have chosen to use taxpayer dollars to subsidize primary, secondary, and higher education. Education clearly benefits the person who receives it, but a society where most people have a good level of education provides positive externalities for all. Other Examples of Positive Externalities Although technology may be the most prominent example of a positive externality, it is not the only one. For example, vaccinations against disease are not only a protection for the individual, but they have the positive spillover of protecting others who may become infected. When a number of homes in a neighborhood are modernized, updated, and restored, not only does it increase the homes' value, but other property values in the neighborhood may increase as well. The appropriate public policy response to a positive externality, like a new technology, is to help the party creating the positive externality receive a greater share of the social benefits. In the case of vaccines, like flu shots, an effective policy might be to provide a subsidy to those who choose to get vaccinated. Figure 13.3 shows the market for flu shots. The market demand curve DMarket for flu shots reflects only the marginal private benefits (MPB) that the vaccinated individuals receive from the shots. Assuming that there are no spillover costs in the production of flu shots, the market supply curve is given by the marginal private cost (MPC) of producing the vaccinations. The equilibrium quantity of flu shots produced in the market, where MPB is equal to MPC, is QMarket and the price of flu shots is PMarket. However, spillover benefits exist in this market because others, those who chose not to purchase a flu shot, receive a positive externality in a reduced chance of contracting the flu. When we add the spillover benefits to the
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marginal private benefit of flu shots, the marginal social benefit (MSB) of flu shots is given by DSocial. Because the MSB is greater than MPB, we see that the socially optimal level of flu shots is greater than the market quantity 306 Chapter 13 | Positive Externalities and Public Goods (QSocial exceeds QMarket) and the corresponding price of flu shots, if the market were to produce QSocial, would be at PSocial. Unfortunately, the marketplace does not recognize the positive externality and flu shots will go under produced and under consumed. How can government try to move the market level of output closer to the socially desirable level of output? One policy would be to provide a subsidy, like a voucher, to any citizen who wishes to get vaccinated. This voucher would act as “income” that one could use purchase only a flu shot and, if the voucher were exactly equal to the per-unit spillover benefits, would increase market equilibrium to a quantity of QSocial and a price of PSocial where MSB equals MSC. Suppliers of the flu shots would receive payment of PSocial per vaccination, while consumers of flu shots would redeem the voucher and only pay a price of PSubsidy. When the government uses a subsidy in this way, it produces the socially optimal quantity of vaccinations. Figure 13.3 The Market for Flu Shots with Spillover Benefits (A Positive Externality) The market demand curve does not reflect the positive externality of flu vaccinations, so only QMarket will be exchanged. This outcome is inefficient because the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal social cost. If the government provides a subsidy to consumers of flu shots, equal to the marginal social benefit minus the marginal private benefit, the level of vaccinations can increase to the socially optimal quantity of QSocial. 13.2 | How Governments Can Encourage Innovation By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain the effects of intellectual property rights on social and private rates of return. Identify three U.S. Government policies and explain how they encourage innovation • including: guaranteeing A number of different government policies can increase the incentives to innovate, intellectual property rights, government assistance with the costs of research and development, and cooperative research ventures between universities and companies. Intellectual Property Rights One way to increase new technology is to guarantee the innovator an exclusive right to that new product or process. Intellectual property rights include patents, which give the inventor the exclusive legal right to make, use, or sell the invention for
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