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gao_NSIAD-96-161	gao_NSIAD-96-161_0	Data Does Not Support the CORM Depot Privatization Savings Assumption The CORM, in support of its depot privatization savings assumption, cites reported savings from public-private competitions under OMB Circular A-76. These activities are characterized by highly competitive markets with low-skill labor, little capital investment, and simple, routine and repetitive tasks that can readily be identified in a contract statement-of-work. These studies did not specifically address outsourcing to the private sector when the public sector did not participate in the competition. Under current conditions, privatizing essentially all depot workloads (1) would not likely achieve expected savings and could prove more costly, (2) could adversely impact readiness, and (3) would be difficult if not impossible under existing laws. The CORM assumed depot workload privatization savings would result from private sector competition. Limited or No Competition for Most Contracted Depot Workloads The CORM’s recommendation to privatize essentially all depot maintenance assumed that meaningful competition would be obtained for most of the work. Original equipment manufacturers were awarded 158 of the 182 noncompetitive contracts. The types of existing public workloads where private sector competition may be limited include: (1) workloads where data rights necessary for competition have not been acquired, (2) small workloads that do not justify large private sector capital investment costs, (3) workloads for older and/or highly specialized systems, (4) workloads with erratic requirements where DOD cannot guarantee a stable workload, and (5) workloads that would be costly to move from one source of repair to another. Such contracts are used for many depot maintenance workloads. Large-Scale Privatization Could Affect Readiness Our analysis of depot maintenance work currently contracted with the private sector found that contractors, for the most part, were responsive to DOD’s needs in terms of meeting contractual requirements for delivery and performance. The military services have considered the readiness and sustainability risks of privatizing existing depot workloads and determined that the risks for privatizing most workloads were too high. We noted that the DOD’s risk assessment process is based to a large extent on subjective judgements. However, DOD materiel managers noted that DOD depots provide greater flexibility than contractors and can more quickly respond to nonprogrammed, quick-turnaround requirements. The CORM assumed, however, that there were only a few cases in which such competitions would be required. As noted earlier in this report, most depot workloads currently contracted to the private sector are noncompetitive and obtaining private sector competition for those workloads currently in the public depots could prove difficult and costly. The Chairman requested that we review a number of issues related to the Commission’s report; this report provides information on the Commission’s assumptions that privatization could reduce maintenance costs by 20 percent and the potential impact of privatization on military readiness and sustainability.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Commission on Roles and Missions' (CORM) privatization assumptions to determine whether privatization would adversely affect military readiness and sustainability. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the CORM's depot privatization savings and readiness assumptions are based on conditions that do not currently exist for many depot workloads; (2) privatizing essentially all depot maintenance under current conditions would not likely achieve expected savings and, according to the military services, would result in unacceptable readiness and sustainability risks; (3) the extent to which DOD's long-term privatization plans and market forces will effectively create more favorable conditions for outsourcing is uncertain; (4) the CORM assumed a highly competitive and capable private market exists or would develop for most depot workloads; (5) however, GAO found that most of the depot workloads contracted to the private sector are awarded noncompetitively, mostly to the original equipment manufacturer; (6) additionally, a number of factors would likely limit private sector competition for many workloads currently in the public depots; (7) the CORM data does not support its depot privatization savings assumption; (8) the CORM's assumption is based primarily on reported savings from public-private competitions for commercial activities under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, but these commercial activities were generally dissimilar to depot maintenance activities because they involved relatively simple, routine, and repetitive tasks that did not generally require large capital investment or highly skilled and trained personnel; (9) GAO's analysis of depot maintenance workloads currently contracted to the private sector found, for the most part, that the contractors were responsive to contract requirements for delivery and performance; (10) however, DOD officials noted that DOD depots provide greater flexibility than contractors and can more quickly respond to nonprogrammed, quick-turnaround requirements; (11) the military services periodically assess the readiness and sustainability risks of privatizing depot workloads, and if the risks are determined to be too high, the workloads are retained in the public depots; (12) the CORM assumed that public-private competitions would only be used in the absence of private sector competition and would be limited to only a few cases; (13) public-private depot maintenance competitions have resulted in savings and benefits and can provide a cost-effective way of making depot workload allocation decisions for certain workloads; and (14) the beneficial use of such competitions could have significantly more applicability than the Commission assumed.
gao_GAO-03-1168T	gao_GAO-03-1168T_0	Impact of Emerging Trends and Fiscal Challenges Periodic reexamination and reevaluation of federal agencies’ activities has never been more important than it is today. The federal government must address and adapt to major trends in our country and around the world. At the same time, our nation faces a serious, long-term fiscal challenge. Our country’s transition into the 21st century is characterized by a number of key trends, including: the national and global response to terrorism and other threats to our personal and national security; the increasing interdependence of enterprises, economies, markets, civil societies, and national governments, commonly referred to as globalization; the shift to market-oriented, knowledge-based economies; an aging and more diverse U.S. population; rapid advances in science and technology and the opportunities and challenges created by these changes; challenges and opportunities to maintain and improve the quality of life for the nation, communities, families, and individuals; and the changing and increasingly diverse nature of governance structures and tools. Fundamental reexamination of federal agencies’ roles, functions, and structure is never easy. Reorganizing government can be an immensely complex and politically charged activity. Those who would reorganize government must make their rationale clear and build a consensus for change if proposed reorganizations are to succeed. All key players must be involved in the process—the Congress, the President, affected executive branch agencies, their employees and unions, and other interested parties, including the public. Need to Reassess How Federal Agencies Do Business Regardless of the number and nature of federal entities, the government’s goal should be to create high-performing organizations. We need to look at not only at what business we are in, but how we do business. Practices that were good 50 years ago may not make sense today. Old, outdated practices and systems result in inefficiency and waste of resources that we cannot afford. Management reform will be vitally important for agencies to transform their cultures to address the changing role of the government in the 21st century. Importance of Strategic Human Capital Management Strategic human capital management should be a centerpiece of any serious change management initiative or any effort to transform the cultures of government agencies. It is a vital element to the success of any government restructuring efforts, whether within an existing agency or across current agency boundaries. People are an agency’s most important organizational asset. An organization’s people define its character, affect its capacity to perform, and represent the knowledge base of the organization. The Congress and the executive branch have taken a number of steps to address the federal government’s human capital shortfalls. This has been the case at GAO. We need to reassess how the federal government does business. We cannot afford unnecessary redundancy and inefficient operations, and taxpayers deserve better.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO has sought to assist the Congress and the executive branch in considering the actions needed to support the transition to a more high-performing, results-oriented, and accountable federal government. GAO provided perspectives on the federal government's overall structure and the need for reorganization to improve performance. What GAO Found Through normal evolution and inertia over the years, the United States now has a government that is weighed down by organizations with significant performance and management problems as well as duplicative and overlapping missions and functions. This situation is exacerbated by ways of doing business that, in some cases, are better suited for the beginning of the 20th century than the 21st century. Given the changed circumstances and stark fiscal realities, the nation simply cannot afford unnecessary, redundant, or inefficient organizations, programs, or operations. Periodic reexamination and reevaluation of federal agencies' activities have never been more important than they are today. The federal government must address and adapt to major trends in the nation and around the world. At the same time, our nation faces serious, long-term fiscal challenges. Fundamental reexamination of federal agencies' roles, functions, and structure is never easy. Reorganizing government can be an immensely complex and politically charged activity. Those who would reorganize government must make their rationale clear and build a consensus for change if proposed reorganizations are to succeed. All key players must be involved in the process--the Congress, the President, affected executive branch agencies, their employees and unions, and other interested parties, including the public. Regardless of the number and nature of federal entities, the government's goal should be to create high-performing organizations. The federal government needs to look not only at what business it is in, but how it does business. Practices that were good 50 years ago may not make sense today. Old, outdated practices and systems result in inefficiency and waste of resources that the nation cannot afford. Management reform will be vitally important to agencies in transforming their cultures to address the changing role of the government in the 21st century. Strategic human capital management should be a centerpiece of any serious change management initiative or any effort to transform the cultures of government agencies. It is a vital element to the success of any government restructuring efforts, whether within an existing agency or across current agency boundaries. People are an agency's most important organizational asset. An organization's people define its character, affect its capacity to perform, and represent the knowledge base of the organization.
gao_GAO-17-513	gao_GAO-17-513_0	ACPVs differ from traditional DOD military armored vehicles in various ways. The guidance and regulation associated with major defense acquisition programs is generally not applicable to ACPVs. The Departments of Defense and State Have Similar Guidance for ACPV Procurement DOD and its components—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Defense Intelligence Agency, the largest buyer of ACPVs in DOD—are subject to a plethora of guidance related to the procurement of ACPVs, much of which is similar—and, in most cases, identical—to that used by State. For DOD, that guidance exists at the overall federal level, the department level, and the individual component level. For both agencies, the guidance covers key aspects of ACPV acquisitions, including procurement methods, protection levels, vendor clearances, inspection and acceptance, warranties, and fleet oversight. Agency officials at State and DOD components cited the FAR as the capstone guidance for their procurement activities. Further, we found evidence of in-progress inspections of DOD’s ACPVs, although the Army conducted such inspections for only a single contract action. According to DIA officials, implementing a process for oversight may be challenging for their agency. The Army Did Not Consistently Conduct In- Progress Inspections State and all selected DOD components, with the exception of the Army, provided evidence of in-progress inspections for each contract action used to procure ACPVs between 2011 and 2015. All contract actions reviewed included provisions for inspections and acceptance, including in-progress inspections. Army Utilizes a Decentralized Approach for ACPV Management With the exception of the Army, all the DOD components we reviewed have a central point of contact and mechanisms for managing and organizing their ACPV information. This decentralized approach for ACPV management leaves the Army with an incomplete picture of various ACPV-related matters, including consistency of procurement and inspection methods. Federal standards for internal control call for mechanisms that allow for oversight intended to help an organization, such as the Army, meet objectives and manage risks for activities such as ACPV procurement. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure that ACPV armoring and quality standards are met, that evolving department and component policies are consistent, and that they are consistently applied, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense: Until the department approves and implements the updated armoring and inspection standards, direct the Secretary of the Army to conduct in-progress inspections at the armoring vendor’s facility for each procurement; and Direct the Secretary of the Army to designate a central point of contact for collecting and reporting ACPV information to facilitate DIA’s oversight of armoring and inspection standards in these contracts. The objectives are to determine (1) DOD’s guidance and procedures for acquiring ACPVs and how they compare with those at State; and (2) the extent to which selected DOD components adhere to guidance, policy, and procedures for ensuring the safety and quality of ACPVs. To determine the extent to which selected DOD components—namely the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and DIA, the largest procurer of these vehicles for use overseas—adhered to guidance, policy, and procedures for ensuring the safety and quality of armored commercial passenger- carrying vehicles, we worked with DOD and State officials to identify contract actions that were used to acquire ACPVs that DOD components received between 2011 and 2015.	Why GAO Did This Study DOD uses armored military vehicles for combat and operational support, but it also uses armored commercial vehicles to transport military and civilian personnel in areas that pose a threat to their safety. These vehicles differ in many ways, including mission and appearance. The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contained a provision for GAO to assess multiple aspects of DOD's procurement practices for ACPVs. This report assesses (1) DOD's guidance and procedures for acquiring ACPVs and how they compare with those at the Department of State; and (2) the extent to which selected DOD components adhere to guidance and procedures for ensuring the safety and quality of ACPVs. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed policies, procedures, and regulations that govern aspects of acquiring, armoring, inspecting, and managing ACPVs; interviewed DOD and State Department officials; and compared armoring standards DOD components—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Intelligence Agency—use for ACPVs against minimally acceptable protection standards. GAO reviewed contract actions for selected DOD components between 2011 and 2015. What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) and the defense components in GAO's review—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Defense Intelligence Agency, the largest buyer of armored commercial passenger-carrying vehicles (ACPV) in DOD—have a plethora of guidance related to ACPV procurement. This guidance is similar to that used by the Department of State, which also procures a large number of these vehicles (see figure). DOD officials GAO spoke with cited the Federal Acquisition Regulation as the capstone guidance for procurement activities. For DOD, guidance also exists department-wide and at the individual component levels. Guidance covers numerous aspects of ACPV acquisitions, including procurement methods, protection levels, inspection and acceptance, warranties, and oversight. ACPV-related contract actions for the selected DOD components generally complied with guidance, policies, and procedures for ensuring the safety and quality of ACPVs and included contract language that met minimum armoring standards. However, opportunities exist for the Army to improve its processes for in-progress inspections—inspections that occur as the vehicle is being armored—as the Army instead depended primarily on the vendors' quality control processes. GAO's review of contract actions used to procure ACPVs for selected DOD components between 2011 and 2015 showed that in-progress inspections were conducted, with the exception of the Army, which conducted such inspections for only a single contract action. Without in-progress inspections, the Army is accepting risk in the safety of its vehicles. Further, with the exception of the Army, all the DOD components have a central office and mechanisms for reporting ACPV information. This decentralized approach leaves the Army with an incomplete picture of various ACPV-related matters, including procurement and inspection methods. Federal standards for internal control call for mechanisms that allow for oversight intended to help an organization, such as the Army, ensure compliance with armoring and inspection standards. Without a designated central point of contact, the Army may face challenges for reporting ACPV information to DOD officials responsible for overseeing the implementation of armoring and inspection standards department-wide. What GAO Recommends The Secretary of Defense should require the Army to conduct in-progress inspections and designate a central point of contact for ACPV information. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-17-512	gao_GAO-17-512_0	Advantages and Disadvantages of the Dual-Hat Arrangement, and Actions That Could Mitigate Potential Risks Associated with Ending the Arrangement Officials from various DOD components identified advantages and disadvantages of the dual-hat leadership of NSA/CSS and CYBERCOM. As of March 2017, DOD officials informed us that DOD had not determined whether it would end the dual-hat leadership arrangement and was reviewing the steps and funding necessary to meet the requirements established in the law. DOD Components and Congress Have Identified Actions That Could Mitigate Potential Risks Associated with Ending the Dual-Hat Leadership Arrangement Actions Identified by DOD Component Officials to Mitigate Potential Risks Associated with Ending the Dual-Hat Leadership Arrangement In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, President Obama supported elevating CYBERCOM to a unified combatant command and stated that NSA/CSS and CYBERCOM should have separate leaders who are able to devote themselves to each organization’s respective missions and responsibilities, but who should continue to leverage the shared capabilities and synergies developed under the dual-hat arrangement. DOD officials also cited the potential for less communication between CYBERCOM and NSA/CSS and slower decision-making if the leadership arrangement were ended. Performing this assessment would have provided DOD with an opportunity to articulate its perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of the dual-hat leadership arrangement. DOD’s Implementation of Key Strategic Cybersecurity Guidance Reflects Varied Progress DOD’s implementation of key strategic cybersecurity guidance—the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy, The DOD Cyber Strategy, and the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign—to help manage and focus its cybersecurity efforts has varied. The department has implemented the cybersecurity objectives identified in the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy, and it has made progress in implementing The DOD Cyber Strategy and DOD Cybersecurity Campaign. However, the department’s process for monitoring implementation of The DOD Cyber Strategy has resulted in the closure of tasks as implemented before the tasks were fully implemented. For example, DOD closed the task that required the department to assess the cybersecurity of current and future weapon systems. Unless DOD modifies its process for deciding whether a task identified in The DOD Cyber Strategy is implemented, the department may not be able to ensure that the outcomes articulated in the strategy are achieved. As noted in the table above, DOD has implemented two of the objectives identified in the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign. Specifically, the department does not have timeframes for the objective associated with transitioning to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that DOD implements the tasks and objectives of key cybersecurity guidance to strengthen its cybersecurity posture, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: Direct the Principal Cyber Advisor to modify the criteria for closing tasks from The DOD Cyber Strategy to reflect whether tasks have been implemented, and to re-evaluate tasks that have been previously determined to be completed to ensure that they meet the modified criteria; Direct the Commander of CYBERCOM, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and DOD CIO, to establish a timeframe and monitor implementation of the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign objective to develop cybersecurity readiness assessments to help ensure accountability. In its written comments, DOD partially concurred with both of our recommendations. If DOD takes the actions it outlined, it will meet the intent of our recommendation.	Why GAO Did This Study DOD acknowledges that malicious cyber intrusions of its networks have negatively affected its information technology systems, and that adversaries are gaining capability over time. In 2010, the President re-designated the director of the NSA as CYBERCOM's commander, establishing a dual-hat leadership arrangement for these agencies with critical cybersecurity responsibilities. House Reports 114-537 and 114-573 both included provisions for GAO to assess DOD's management of its cybersecurity enterprise. This report, among other things, examines (1) DOD officials' perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of the dual-hat leadership arrangement of NSA/CSS and CYBERCOM, and actions that could mitigate risks if the leadership arrangement ends, and (2) the extent to which DOD has implemented key strategic cybersecurity guidance. GAO analyzed DOD cybersecurity strategies, guidance, and information and interviewed cognizant DOD officials. What GAO Found Officials from Department of Defense (DOD) components identified advantages and disadvantages of the “dual-hat” leadership of the National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS) and Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) (see table). Also, DOD and congressional committees have identified actions that could mitigate risks associated with ending the dual-hat leadership arrangement, such as formalizing agreements between NSA/CSS and CYBERCOM to ensure continued collaboration, and developing a persistent cyber training environment to provide a realistic, on-demand training capability. As of April 2017, DOD had not determined whether it would end the dual-hat leadership arrangement. DOD's progress in implementing key cybersecurity guidance—the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy , The DOD Cyber Strategy , and the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign —has varied. DOD has implemented the cybersecurity elements of the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy and has made progress in implementing The DOD Cyber Strategy and DOD Cybersecurity Campaign . However, DOD's process for monitoring implementation of The DOD Cyber Strategy has resulted in the closure of tasks before they were fully implemented; for example, DOD closed a task that, among other things, would require completing cyber risk assessments on 136 weapon systems. Officials acknowledged they are on track to complete the assessments by December 31, 2019, but as of May 2017, the task was not complete. Unless DOD modifies its process for deciding whether a task identified in its Cyber Strategy is implemented, it may not be able to achieve outcomes articulated in the strategy. Also, DOD lacks a timeframe and process for monitoring implementation of the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign objective to transition to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. Unless DOD improves the monitoring of its key cyber strategies, it is unknown when DOD will achieve cybersecurity compliance. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD take the following two actions: (1) modify its criteria for closing tasks from The DOD Cyber Strategy ; and (2) establish a timeframe and monitoring for implementing an objective of the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign to transition to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. DOD partially concurred with these recommendations and identified actions it plans to take. If implemented, GAO believes these actions would satisfy the intent of the recommendations.
gao_GAO-14-153	gao_GAO-14-153_0	CRNAs Billed for Few Selected Chronic Pain Procedures, Most of Which Were in Rural Areas From 2009 through 2012, CRNAs billed Medicare FFS for a small share of our selected chronic pain procedures, while pain physicians and other physicians billed for the largest shares. The share billed by NPs, PAs, and CRNAs combined grew from 1.4 to 2.6 percent, with CRNA’s billing for less than ½ of 1 percent of all chronic pain procedures in each year. Of All CRNA-Billed Chronic Pain Procedures from 2009 through 2011, Most Were Rural; In 2012, Urban CRNAs Were Dominant Although the number of selected chronic pain procedures billed by all rural providers increased somewhat from 2009 through 2012, the number of procedures billed by CRNAs in rural areas declined over the period. Of all CRNA claims for selected procedures, the share submitted by providers in rural areas fell from 66 percent in 2009 to 39 percent in 2012; meanwhile, the share of selected procedures nationwide billed by all rural provider types was roughly 11 percent in both 2009 and in 2012. 3.) After Noridian Began Denying CRNA Claims, Changes in the Number of Chronic Pain Procedures Billed Varied across Three Selected States In mid-2011, Noridian began denying certain chronic pain management services that were billed by CRNAs and maintained this policy through 2012. 6): allowed payment to CRNAs for all selected procedures in 19 states, allowed payment to CRNAs for a subset of selected procedures in 30 states and the District of Columbia, and denied payment to CRNAs for all selected procedures in the remaining state. In the 30 states and the District of Columbia where MACs allowed payment to CRNAs for only certain chronic pain procedures, MAC payment policies indicated substantial variation in the specific procedures that can and cannot be billed. Three MACs Took Steps to Implement CMS Policy, While Remaining Six Did Not Revisit Payment Policies for 2013 Three MACs took steps to implement CMS’s 2013 rule on CRNA payment and updated their CRNA payment policies, when necessary. CMS officials told us that they rely on MACs to determine whether CRNAs are allowed to provide specific services by reviewing each state’s CRNA scope of practice laws. Most MACs reported challenges interpreting state scope of practice laws to make determinations about which services CRNAs are allowed to provide, noting that state scope of practice laws are generally vague and lack details about which specific services CRNAs can perform. Two MACs assumed that Medicare’s rule requiring physician supervision of anesthesia services provided by CRNAs in hospital and ASC settings applied to chronic pain services in all settings; this assumption has potential implications for CRNA billing of chronic pain services. By applying this rule to office settings, these MACs may have unnecessarily restricted the services for which CRNAs in 10 of the states under these MACs’ jurisdictions are allowed to bill. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to ensure consistent implementation of CRNA payment policy, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS (1) provide specific instructions to MACs on how to determine coverage with reference to a state’s scope of practice laws, including instructions on how to proceed if the state scope of practice laws are not explicit, and (2) clarify the applicability of the CRNA supervision rule to payment for CRNA-provided chronic pain management services. Analysis of Medicare Claims Data To determine trends in billing for the selected procedures, we analyzed 100 percent of Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) paid claims from 2009 through 2012.	Why GAO Did This Study Chronic pain costs the nation about $600 billion each year, a quarter of which is borne by Medicare. One MAC, Noridian Healthcare Solutions (Noridian), began denying CRNA claims for certain chronic pain services in 2011, citing patient safety concerns. CMS issued a rule, effective January 2013, clarifying that CRNAs can bill Medicare for “any services that a [CRNA] is legally authorized to perform in the state in which the services are furnished,” including chronic pain management services. GAO was asked to review Medicare's payment policy regarding the provision of chronic pain management services by CRNAs. This report examines, among other things, (1) trends in Medicare provider billing for selected chronic pain procedures; (2) in which states MACs allowed payment for selected procedures billed by CRNAs as of early 2013; and (3) how MACs implemented the payment policy. To do this, GAO selected seven categories of chronic pain procedures, in consultation with pain care experts. GAO analyzed Medicare claims data from 2009 through 2012, by provider type and geography. To determine which MACs allow CRNA payments and how MACs implemented CMS's policy, GAO interviewed medical directors at all nine MACs. What GAO Found From 2009 through 2012, certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNA)—a type of advanced-practice nurse specializing in anesthesia care—billed Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) for a minimal share of selected chronic pain procedures, less than ½ of 1 percent of these procedures in each year. Physicians without board certification in pain medicine billed for the majority of selected procedures each year, while pain physicians consistently billed for roughly 40 percent of selected procedures. Furthermore, although the number of chronic pain procedures billed by all rural providers increased from 2009 through 2012, the number of procedures billed by rural CRNAs declined over the period. Of all CRNA claims for selected procedures, the share billed by CRNAs in rural areas fell from 66 percent in 2009 to 39 percent in 2012. As of early 2013, Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC)—entities that pay medical claims on behalf of Medicare—allowed payment to CRNAs for all selected procedures in 19 states, allowed payment for a subset of selected procedures in 30 states and the District of Columbia, and denied payments for all selected procedures in 1 state. Where MACs allowed payment to CRNAs for only certain procedures, payment policies indicated substantial variation in the specific allowed procedures. Three of the nine MACs took steps to implement a Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) rule, effective January 2013, that defers to state scope of practice laws to inform coverage for CRNAs. CMS relies on MACs to review each state's CRNA scope of practice laws. However, most MACs reported difficulty interpreting state scope of practice laws regarding the services that CRNAs are allowed to provide; MACs noted that state scope of practice laws generally lack detail on which specific services CRNAs can perform. In addition, two MACs assumed that Medicare's rule requiring physician supervision for anesthesia services provided by CRNAs in hospital and ambulatory surgical center settings applied to chronic pain management services provided in all settings; this may have unnecessarily restricted the services for which CRNAs are allowed to bill in certain states. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CMS provide specific instructions to MACs on (1) how to determine coverage with reference to a state's scope of practice laws, and (2) the application of the CRNA supervision rule. HHS concurred with these recommendations.
gao_GAO-08-754	gao_GAO-08-754_0	U.S. GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. First, State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in Africa, and supported the training of over 1,300 stability police, but it is unlikely that GPOI will meet its goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 due to the time it takes to expend program funds, and State and DOD have encountered delays in delivering nonlethal training equipment. Second, State has provided equipment to deployed missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone; and initiated a process for peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for their transportation and logistics needs, but some efforts have been delayed. State and DOD Have Encountered Problems in Providing and Accounting for Training Equipment State has provided about $31 million in nonlethal training equipment to military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. State Has Targeted a Smaller Share of Resources to Build Peacekeeping Skills and Infrastructure in Africa Compared with Other Regions and Faces Delays in Completing Activities State and DOD have conducted a number of activities to enhance peacekeeping skills and infrastructure to develop the ability of countries to conduct training for their own peacekeeping missions and to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Although African partners receive the majority of GPOI funds, State has targeted a smaller share of resources, comparatively, for activities to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure among Africa peacekeepers, in part due to the needs and capabilities of the region and its focus on training and equipping peacekeepers to serve in current missions. In comparison, of the $98 million spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on assisting with peacekeeping skills and infrastructure. More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its Training Program State and DOD provide training on a number of military peacekeeping skills, and 56 percent of these trained military peacekeepers from 13 countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, as of April 2008. However, State faces challenges in assessing the quality and effectiveness of its training program. Third, State is unable to fully account for the activities of trained instructors to measure the program’s impact in building countries’ capability to continue this training. State Cannot Assess the Proficiency of Trainees to Determine if Capabilities Are Comparable to Other GPOI- Trained Peacekeepers State does not have an established process for measuring the proficiency of trainees who receive similar types of training. We found that military peacekeepers and stability police were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses, as required by State guidance for the legislative requirements. We found that most of the 52 partner countries met the participation criteria, but 24 countries had identified human rights violations by security personnel in State’s human rights reporting for 2007. 2. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology In response to a congressional mandate in the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act to review the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), we assessed (1) the progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether program participants are adequately screened for human rights abuses. We selected 14 countries with documented human rights violations by security forces that received training in 2007 and assessed whether individuals and units trained in these countries were vetted for human rights violations. 5.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has allocated $374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the program. Congress mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted field work in eight countries. What GAO Found State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However, State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DOD have trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions. While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepers--primarily from Africa--have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the overall outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training. State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, State's human rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses. For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received military training but were not screened for human rights violations.
gao_GAO-06-606T	gao_GAO-06-606T_0	NNSA also operates the Nevada Test Site. Events over the past several years have served to intensify concern about how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation’s strategy should be for transforming the weapons complex. Subsequently, in January 2005, the Secretary of Energy requested the SEAB to form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force to assess the implications of presidential decisions on the size and composition of the stockpile; the cost and operational impacts of the new Design Basis Threat; and the personnel, facilities, and budgetary resources required to support a smaller stockpile. As a result of this process, NNSA recently offered a proposal for transforming the weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA officials stated that NNSA will decide on the RRW design competition in November 2006 and, assuming that the RRW is technically feasible, will seek authorization to proceed to engineering development and production; NNSA is requesting an additional $15.6 million in its fiscal year 2007 budget request to dismantle legacy weapons material at the Pantex Plant; and NNSA is requesting about $15 million for fiscal year 2007, as well as over $30 million annually from fiscal years 2008 through 2011, to support the implementation of its responsive infrastructure strategy, including the creation of an Office of Transformation within the Office of Defense Programs. However, NNSA does not plan to adopt the SEAB task force’s recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of consolidating all Category I and II quantities of Special Nuclear Material at the CNPC. Instead, NNSA has proposed the following plan for the 2030 weapons complex, which it states will achieve many of the benefits of the SEAB task force’s approach in a way that is technically feasible and affordable over both the near and longer term: Consolidated plutonium center. Modernizing the remaining production sites. In addition, NNSA would build a new, nonnuclear component production facility by 2012 at an unspecified location. Four Actions Will Be Critical to Successfully Transforming the Complex Regardless of the approach chosen to transform the weapons complex, any attempt to change such an extremely complex enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. We have identified four actions that, in our view, are critical to the successful transformation of the weapons complex. Given NNSA’s performance to date with the life extension programs and the current unresolved questions about the RRW, in our view, DOD will need to establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile before NNSA can make any final decisions about transforming the weapons complex. Specifically, DOD, working with NNSA through the Nuclear Weapons Council, needs to determine the types and quantities of nuclear weapons that will provide for our nation’s nuclear deterrent over the long term. NNSA Will Need to Provide Accurate Estimates of the Costs of Transformation Once a decision about the size and composition of the stockpile is made, NNSA will need accurate estimates of the costs of proposals for transforming the weapons complex. Some cost estimates to transform the weapons complex were included in the SEAB task force report. As a result, NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear milestones that all involved can work toward and that the Congress can use to hold NNSA accountable. Therefore, in our view, it is imperative that the proposed Office of Transformation (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; (2) be given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement its recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real change within the weapons complex.	Why GAO Did This Study Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. At the direction of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board's (SEAB) Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force issued a report in October 2005 that provided a systematic review of the requirements for the weapons complex for the next 25 years and offered its vision for an agile and responsive weapons complex. GAO was asked to discuss (1) the current actions NNSA is taking to address the SEAB task force's recommendations and (2) the critical steps that will be needed to achieve and sustain a meaningful, cost-effective transformation of the weapons complex. What GAO Found The SEAB task force report contained the following five recommendations: (1) immediately begin to modernize the cold war nuclear stockpile by designing a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW); (2) create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that contains a modern set of production facilities in one location; (3) consolidate all weapons-grade material and weapons components at the CNPC; (4) aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile; and (5) create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of the nuclear weapons complex. NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the nuclear weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1) will decide on a design competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2) have requested an increase of over $15 million in funding for dismantling legacy weapons in fiscal year 2007, and (3) have requested $15 million in their fiscal year 2007 budget proposal to create an Office of Transformation, among other things. However, NNSA does not support the SEAB task force's recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of consolidating weapons-grade material at the CNPC, primarily because it views these recommendations as too costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a consolidated center for processing plutonium, removing weapons-grade material from the three weapons laboratories, and modernizing the remaining production capabilities at their existing locations. Regardless of the approach chosen, any attempt to change an extremely complex enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. GAO has identified the following four actions that, in its view, are critical to successfully transforming the weapons complex: (1) the Department of Defense will need to establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile by determining the types and quantities of nuclear weapons needed to provide for our nation's nuclear deterrent; (2) after the Department of Defense determines the size and composition of the future stockpile, NNSA will need to develop accurate cost estimates of the proposals for transforming the weapons complex because current estimates of the costs of transforming the weapons complex contain considerable uncertainty; (3) after NNSA selects a proposal based on accurate cost estimates, it will need to develop a clear transformation plan containing measurable milestones so that it can evaluate progress and the Congress can hold it accountable; and (4) the proposed Office of Transformation must have authority to make and enforce its decisions on transformation and must be held accountable by the Congress for achieving timely and cost-effective results.
gao_GAO-17-43	gao_GAO-17-43_0	However, the development of Indian energy resources can be a complex process involving a range of stakeholders, including federal, tribal, and state agencies. Figure 2 shows various roles federal agencies may have in the development of Indian energy resources. Multiple federal agencies have a regulatory role associated with Indian energy development. According to DOE and Interior officials, since May 2014, the federal agencies that formed the Energy Subgroup have taken the following actions: IE and IEED signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2016 as a format for collaboration between the two agencies; IE and IEED began to meet regularly in August 2015 to discuss projects involving both agencies and grant release dates, among other things; IE, with input from numerous other agencies, developed a web-based tool that provides information about grant, loan, and technical assistance programs available to support tribal energy projects; IE hosted events to encourage tribal engagement, such as the September 2015 National Tribal Energy Summit: A Path to Economic Sovereignty; and IE, Interior, USDA, GSA, DOD, and Treasury convened a meeting to discuss opportunities to provide technical and financial assistance to a planned 1-gigawatt wind and transmission infrastructure project. The Effectiveness of the Energy Subgroup and Service Center in Helping Overcome Factors Hindering Indian Energy Development May Be Limited by Several Factors The Energy Subgroup Has Not Fully Incorporated Leading Practices for Collaboration, Which May Limit Its Effectiveness The Energy Subgroup has not fully incorporated leading practices that can help agencies enhance and sustain collaborative efforts, which may limit its effectiveness in addressing long-standing factors that hinder Indian energy development. Federal agencies have dedicated few staff and financial resources to the Energy Subgroup, have not identified the resources needed to accomplish its goals, and do not have an agreed-upon funding model. A few federal officials told us the effectiveness of the Subgroup in accomplishing tasks is limited without dedicated resources. Without dedicated resources, key activities completed to date are generally the result of individual federal agencies that voluntarily identified and applied their own budgetary resources to specific work activities. Without documenting how all members in the Subgroup are expected to collaborate, it is unclear how participating agencies will organize their individual and joint activities to address the factors that hinder Indian energy development. Interior has recognized the need for collaboration in the regulatory process and described the Service Center as a center point of collaboration for permitting that will break down barriers between federal agencies. By not serving as a central point of contact or lead agency, the Service Center will be limited in its ability to improve efficiencies in the federal regulatory process to only those activities that can benefit from increased coordination between BIA and BLM. BIA Has Not Incorporated Key Workforce Management Practices In June 2015, we reported that BIA’s long-standing workforce challenges, such as inadequate staff resources and staff at some offices without the skills needed to effectively review energy-related documents, were also factors hindering Indian energy development. In this review, we found that BIA also has high vacancy rates at some agency offices, and it has not conducted key workforce planning activities that may be further contributing to its long-standing workforce challenges. BIA has not identified key skills needed or skill gaps. Conclusions Recognizing the importance of a collaborative federal approach to help Indian tribes achieve their energy goals and to more efficiently fulfill regulatory responsibilities and manage some Indian energy resources, the President and Interior undertook two key initiatives, in the form of the Energy Subgroup and the Service Center. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorization of a preference for tribal entities has the potential to increase tribal access to the largest single purchaser of energy in the United States—the federal government. However, GSA—the primary entity responsible for purchasing power for the federal government—has not developed guidance to implement the authority to provide a tribal preference government-wide. We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior, as Chair of the White House Council on Native American Affairs, direct the co-chairs of the Council’s Energy Subgroup to take the following two actions: (1) Identify appropriate resources needed for the Subgroup to accomplish its goals, as well as a funding model. We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to take the following six actions: (1) Include the other regulatory agencies in the Service Center, such as FWS, EPA, and the Army Corps of Engineers, so that the Service Center can act as a single point of contact or a lead agency to coordinate and navigate the regulatory process. (5) Incorporate effective workforce planning standards by assessing critical skills and competencies needed to fulfill BIA’s responsibilities related to energy development and by identifying potential gaps. We recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration develop implementing guidance to clarify how contracting officials should implement and apply the statutory authority to provide a tribal preference to future acquisitions of energy products.	Why GAO Did This Study Indian tribes and their members hold considerable energy resources and may use these resources to provide economic benefits and improve the well-being of their communities. However, GAO and others have found that Indian energy development is hindered by several factors, such as a complex regulatory framework, BIA workforce challenges, and limited access to energy markets. Tribes and their members determine how to use their energy resources. In doing so, they work with multiple federal agencies with various roles in the development process—including a regulatory role, a role as provider of technical and financial assistance, or as a purchaser of energy. GAO was asked to evaluate issues related to Indian energy development. This report examines, among other things, (1) federal efforts to help overcome factors that hinder development, (2) BIA's efforts to address workforce challenges, and (3) federal efforts to implement a preference authority to purchase energy from tribes. GAO analyzed federal data and documents and interviewed tribal and federal officials. What GAO Found Two key federal initiatives led by the Department of the Interior (Interior)—the interagency White House Council on Native American Affairs’ Energy Subgroup (Energy Subgroup) and Interior’s Indian Energy Service Center (Service Center)—were implemented to help improve collaboration and the effectiveness of federal efforts to fulfill management responsibilities for Indian lands, assist tribes in developing their energy resources, and overcome any related challenges. However, the Energy Subgroup and the Service Center have not incorporated leading collaborative practices, which may limit the effectiveness of these initiatives to address the factors that hinder Indian energy development. For example, GAO found the following: Energy Subgroup: Participating agencies have dedicated few staff and financial resources to the Subgroup and have not identified resources needed or a funding model—a leading practice to sustain collaborative efforts. Some participating agency officials noted that the effectiveness of the Subgroup is limited without dedicated resources. They also stated that key activities completed to date by the Subgroup are the result of agencies voluntarily applying budgetary resources to specific activities. Without dedicated resources and a funding model to support its activities, the extent to which the Energy Subgroup will be able to effectively accomplish its goals is unclear. Service Center: Interior has recognized the need for collaboration in the regulatory process and described the Service Center as a central point of collaboration for permitting that will break down barriers between federal agencies. However, some regulatory agencies, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have not been included as participants. Without the involvement of key regulatory agencies, the Service Center will be limited in its ability to improve efficiencies in the regulatory process for Indian energy development. GAO and others have previously reported that Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has longstanding workforce challenges that have hindered Indian energy development. In this review, GAO found that BIA has high vacancy rates at some agency offices and that the agency has not conducted key workforce planning activities, such as an assessment of work skills gaps. These workforce issues further contribute to BIA’s inability to effectively support Indian energy development. Federal internal control standards recommend agencies identify the key skills and competencies their workforces need to achieve their goals and assess any skills gaps. Until BIA undertakes such activities, it cannot ensure that it has a workforce with the right skills, appropriately aligned to meet the agency’s goals and tribal priorities. A provision in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorizes the federal government, the largest single consumer of energy in the nation, to give preference to tribes for purchases of electricity or other energy products. However, the General Services Administration (GSA), the federal agency with primary responsibility for purchasing energy, has not developed guidance to implement this provision government-wide; doing so could help to increase tribal access to the federal government’s energy purchasing programs. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 10 recommendations, including that the Secretary of the Interior identify resources and a funding model for the Energy Subgroup, involve other agencies in the Service Center so it is a single point of contact for the regulatory process, and require BIA to undertake workforce planning activities. GAO is also recommending that the Administrator of the GSA develop implementing guidance relating to purchasing energy from tribes. Interior, DOE, and GSA concurred with GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-08-99	gao_GAO-08-99_0	Under the QI program, foreign financial institutions sign a contract with IRS to withhold and report U.S. source income sent offshore. Since U.S. persons generally are taxed on their worldwide income, while NRAs are taxed only on certain U.S. source income, the difference in taxation, withholding, and reporting for NRAs and U.S. persons may motivate some U.S. individuals or businesses to seek to appear to be NRAs. QI Program Provides Some Assurance That Tax Is Properly Withheld and Reported Compared to U.S withholding agents, IRS has additional assurance that QIs are properly withholding the correct amount of tax on U.S. source income sent offshore. A high percentage of U.S. source income flows through U.S. withholding agents, but IRS has not determined how much of the income, or the associated withholding, to U.S. withholding agents flows through QIs versus NQIs. Source Income Flows through U.S. Withholding Agents Although the QI program provides IRS some assurance that tax benefits are being properly applied, a low percentage of U.S. source income flows through QIs. Regarding U.S. withholding agents and QIs’ reported transactions with “unknown recipients” within various countries for tax year 2003, U.S. withholding agents and QIs reported a combined $7 billion of U.S. source income sent to offshore unknown recipients, from which about $233 million was withheld at a rate of 3.4 percent. Two approaches could help IRS determine whether and to what extent this reduced withholding on funds flowing to undisclosed jurisdictions and unknown recipients was proper. However, within their limited scope, auditors of QIs are not responsible for following up on possible indications of fraud or illegal acts that could have a material impact on the matters being tested or reporting actual fraud and illegal acts detected, as they would under U.S. Government Auditing Standards. In addition, IRS obtains considerable data from withholding agents but does not make effective use of these data to ensure that withholding agents perform their duties properly. IRS generally does not have the legal authority to audit a foreign financial intermediary, but IRS requires specific periodic procedures to be performed by external auditors to determine whether QIs are documenting customers’ identities and accurately withholding and reporting to IRS. Data on both paper and electronically filed returns must also be reviewed for errors. In general, lacking proper identification of a customer, including the customer’s residence, U.S. withholding agents and QIs should withhold at the 30 percent rate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report are to (1) describe features of the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program intended to improve withholding and reporting, (2) assess whether weaknesses exist in the U.S. withholding system that complicate identifying beneficial owners of U.S. source income, and (3) determine whether weaknesses exist in QI external reviews and the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) use of program data. IRS AUP guidance requires third-party reviewers to sample QI accounts.	Why GAO Did This Study U.S. source income flows to recipients offshore through foreign financial institutions and U.S. withholding agents. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) established the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program to improve tax withholding and reporting on such income. QIs are foreign financial institutions that contract with IRS to withhold and report U.S. tax. GAO was asked to (1) describe program features, (2) assess whether weaknesses exist in the U.S. withholding system for U.S. source income, and (3) identify any weaknesses in QI external reviews and IRS's use of program data. GAO interviewed agency officials and private practitioners and reviewed the latest IRS data on U.S. source income flowing offshore. What GAO Found The QI program provides IRS some assurance that tax on U.S. source income sent offshore is properly withheld and reported. For example, QIs, located overseas, are more likely to have a direct working relationship with customers who claim tax benefits, such as reduced withholding, and agree to have independent parties review a sample of accounts and report to IRS. However, a low percentage of U.S. source income sent offshore flows through QIs. For tax year 2003, about 12.5 percent of the $293 billion in U.S. income flowed through QIs. The rest or about 87.5 percent flowed through U.S. withholding agents. While QIs are required to verify account owners' identities, U.S. withholding agents can accept owners' self-certification of their identity at face value. IRS does not measure the extent to which withholding agents rely on self-certification and use this data in its compliance efforts. In addition, U.S. persons may evade taxes by masquerading as foreign corporations. In 2003, 68.4 percent of U.S. income flowed through foreign corporations whose ownership is not reported to IRS. GAO's analyses showed that U.S. withholding agents and QIs reported billions of dollars in funds flowing to undisclosed jurisdictions and unknown recipients in 2003. Lacking proper identification, U.S. withholding agents and QIs should withhold taxes at the 30 percent rate. GAO found that withholding on these accounts was much lower than 30 percent. The contractually required independent reviews of QIs' accounts help provide assurance that taxes are properly withheld. However, the external auditors are not required to follow up on indications of fraud or illegal acts, as would reviews under U.S. Government Auditing Standards. As a result, IRS has less information on whether QIs are adequately preventing fraud or illegal acts. Further, while IRS obtains considerable data from information returns, it does not effectively use it to ensure proper withholding and reporting. IRS has not consistently entered data from paper information returns into a database and matched the data to tax returns to identify inappropriate disbursal of tax benefits. IRS could require electronic filing by QIs whenever possible.
gao_GAO-02-99	gao_GAO-02-99_0	The study also modeled the en-route airbases needed to support the movement of forces and equipment. The study did not model any scenarios without forward-deployed U.S. troops and equipment in Europe. Forward Presence Components Affect Mobility Requirements to Varying Degrees A U.S. forward presence in Europe reduces mobility requirements, mobility costs, war-fighting risk, and time required for deployment to operations in Europe or Southwest Asia. Central Command officials have told us that the U.S presence in Europe, particularly the en-route system of airbases and the Air Force assets, would be critical to the success of their operations in Southwest Asia.European Command officials also told us that the U.S. presence allows the Commander to manage the missions assigned to the Command more easily, such as the small-scale contingencies in Bosnia and Kosovo. DOD officials suggested a relative ranking of U.S. military presence in Europe starting with the en- route system of airbases as having the greatest impact on mobility, followed by prepositioned equipment, Air Force aircraft and personnel, and finally Army combat forces. Air Force aircraft deployed in Europe allow forces to move more quickly to small-scale contingencies and reduce the burden on airlift and sealift. Also, European-based units deploy to Bosnia and Kosovo primarily by rail and road transportation, and are therefore less costly to move than forces requiring air transportation.	What GAO Found The United States maintains 100,000 military personnel in Europe to provide rapid response in the event of a military crisis and help shape the international environment. These forward-deployed forces and equipment also facilitate the movement of U.S. forces to an area of operations. DOD has not quantified the impact of a forward presence in Europe on mobility requirements. However, Defense officials believe that, without forward-deployed forces and equipment in Europe, mobility requirements and costs would be considerably higher and deployment times longer, increasing war-fighting risk. The U.S. en-route system of airbases is critical to operations in Europe and Southwest Asia. U.S. prepositioned weapons and equipment in Europe facilitate military operations in nearby areas. Air Force aircraft and personnel deployed in Europe allow forces to move more quickly to small-scale contingencies in the area and reduce the airlift and sealift burden on U.S.-based units. As with the Air Force, Army combat and support units stationed in Europe allow forces to move more quickly and at less cost to small-scale contingencies in the area.
gao_T-NSIAD-98-115	gao_T-NSIAD-98-115_0	An important element of the Defense Reform Initiative is that the Secretary has established a Defense Management Council to serve, in effect, as DOD’s internal board of directors. Reducing the cost of excess infrastructure activities is critical to maintaining high levels of military capabilities and adequately maintaining needed facilities infrastructure. Infrastructure Initiatives Face Significant Challenges The DRI report identifies a range of facility infrastructure initiatives designed to revitalize some facilities; eliminate excess structures; and consolidate, restructure, and regionalize many support agencies and activities. Questions exist about the costs and savings associated with the new initiative, as well as concerns about the extent to which this new program will be able to address the full range of military housing needs. Privatization Is Off to a Slow Start The housing privatization initiative clearly offers a powerful new tool to help address DOD’s housing problem. However, our ongoing review of the initiative has shown that the initiative is off to a slow start and may not achieve the desired results within the expected time frame. Demolition of Excess Facilities Is an Option for Reducing Excess Infrastructure In May 1997, we reported that opportunities existed for DOD components to use demolition as an option for eliminating old, excess buildings that are relatively costly to maintain and can be a drain on declining O&M funding. As with the reengineering initiatives, most of these initiatives have been going on for several years but still face implementation challenges. It has also been developing regional maintenance business plans, including initiatives and estimates of savings to be achieved. However, our work suggested that the military services have not taken sufficient advantage of potential opportunities to achieve significant savings in base operating support costs through greater reliance on larger-scale interservicing arrangements. Once these criteria are approved, which is expected by May 1998, DFAS plans to take from 3 to 6 months to further study its infrastructure needs and select the sites that will be closed. Key elements of the BRAC legislation that DOD and BRAC commission officials said contributed to the success of prior rounds included (1) the establishment of an independent commission and nomination of commissioners by the President, in consultation with the congressional leadership; (2) the development of clearly articulated, published criteria for decision making; (3) use of data certified as to its accuracy; (4) the requirement that the President and the Congress accept or reject in their entirety the lists of closures adopted by the BRAC commission; and (5) the creation of tight time frames to force the process to reach decisions in a timely manner. Existing Plans Have Important Limitations Our May 1997 report on demolition noted that planning by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services for facilities maintenance and repair, including revitalization of facilities infrastructure, was limited.Those plans that did exist were not focused on long-term comprehensive strategies for facilities revitalization, replacement, and maintenance, and they were not tied to measurable goals to be accomplished over specified time frames or linked to funding. The need for improved planning for facilities infrastructure is also underscored by the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act. Related GAO Products Defense Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Defense Reform Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-98-122, Mar.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed selected Defense Reform Initiatives pertaining to facilities infrastructure, focusing on the: (1) need for infrastructure reform; (2) significant challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in implementing its infrastructure initiatives and achieving significant savings in the short term; and (3) need to integrate these initiatives into an overall facilities infrastructure plan. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) infrastructure reform within DOD is an extremely difficult task but one that is very much needed; (2) therefore, GAO strongly supports the need to further reduce excess support infrastructure, as well as the need for improved planning to address remaining infrastructure needs; (3) GAO's work continues to show that significant opportunities remain to further streamline operations, consolidate functions, eliminate duplication of effort, and improve efficiency; (4) GAO is concerned about DOD's ability to achieve the expected level of savings and questions whether many of the initiatives can overcome significant challenges and be implemented in a timely, efficient, and effective manner; (5) GAO's work relating to various defense reform initiatives shows that estimated savings often are not as great as first estimated and that the initiatives often take much longer than expected to be achieved; (6) the following are some key points GAO believes Congress and DOD should take into consideration as they assess expected results of the Defense Reform Initiative Report initiatives involving facilities infrastructure: (a) the military housing privatization initiative offers a powerful new tool to help address the military's housing problem, however, implementation is off to a slow start and it is unclear whether the initiative will result in overall budget savings; (b) demolition can be a viable option for reducing excess structures and operating costs on military basis, however, while this program recently has received increased emphasis within DOD, the availability of funding, against other competing priorities in a constrained budget environment, could affect implementation over time; (c) despite their potential, most of the initiatives to consolidate, restructure, and regionalize many of its support agencies have been going on for several years and still face implementation challenges; and (d) while GAO believes there are significant savings from prior base realignment and closure rounds, questions continue to exist about the magnitude of savings; (7) the Secretary of Defense's identification of the need to shed excess infrastructure as a key component of the Defense Reform Initiatives has brought high-level attention to this area; (8) however, the services currently lack comprehensive long-range plans to guide them in reducing excess infrastructure and better managing remaining assets; and (9) the need for such planning is underscored by the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act.
gao_GAO-04-45	gao_GAO-04-45_0	1). Without directly linking financial information from agencies’ audited financial statements, the information in the CFS may not be reliable. The lack of direct linkage also affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit of the CFS. As Treasury is designing its new compilation process, which it expects to implement beginning with the fiscal year 2004 CFS, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, working in coordination with the Controller of OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management, to design the new compilation process to directly link information from federal agencies’ audited financial statements to amounts reported in all the applicable CFS and related footnotes, and consider the other applicable recommendations in this report when designing and implementing the new compilation process. Controls over the Compilation Process We identified specific areas of internal control in Treasury’s process for preparing the CFS that need to be strengthened. Documentation of Transactions and Internal Control While Treasury has documented some portions of its process for compiling the CFS, it has not fully documented its policies and procedures for preparing the CFS report. Reconciliation of Intragovernmental Activity and Balances Federal agencies are unable to fully reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances. The Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Surplus (or Deficit) (hereafter referred to as the reconciliation statement) is expected to explain certain differences that occur because the CFS are prepared on the accrual basis in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Treasury should document the consistency of the significant line items on this statement to agencies’ audited financial statements; request, through its closing package, that federal agencies provide the net outlays reported in their Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources and explanations for any significant differences between net outlay amounts reported in the Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources and the budget of the U.S. government; investigate the differences between net outlays reported in federal agencies’ Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources and Treasury’s records in the STAR system to ensure that the proper amounts are reported in the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities; explain and document the differences between the operating revenue amount reported on the Statement of Operations and Changes in Net Position and unified budget receipts reported on the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities; and provide support for how the line items in the “other activities” section of this statement relate to either the underlying Balance Sheet or related notes accompanying the CFS. 2. Other Weaknesses Identified During our audit we found certain issues related to (1) management representation letters, (2) legal representation letters, and (3) information on major treaties and other international agreements that will require certain actions by Treasury and OMB.	Why GAO Did This Study For the past 6 years, since GAO began auditing the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO has been unable to express an opinion on them because of material weaknesses in internal control and financial reporting. Contributing to GAO's inability to express an opinion has been the federal government's lack of adequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare its consolidated financial statements. The purpose of this report is to discuss in greater detail weaknesses in financial reporting procedures and internal control over the process for preparing the CFS that GAO identified and to recommend improvements to address those weaknesses. What GAO Found GAO found deficiencies in the compilation and reporting process in the following areas: (1) controls over the compilation process, (2) unreconciled transactions affecting the change in net position, (3) reconciliation of intragovernmental activity and balances, (4) elimination of intragovernmental activity and balances, (5) reconciliation of net operating costs and unified budget surplus (or deficit), (6) statements of changes in cash balance from unified budget and other activities, (7) defining and documenting of the reporting entity, and (8) conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Another key deficiency in the compilation and reporting process for the CFS was the failure of the Department of the Treasury's process for compiling the CFS to directly link information from federal agencies' audited financial statements to amounts reported in the CFS. Without this direct link, the information in the CFS may not be reliable. The lack of a direct link also affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the CFS audit. Treasury is designing a new compilation process that it expects to directly link this information beginning with the fiscal year 2004 CFS. GAO identified three additional areas related to the compilation and reporting process for the CFS that warrant the attention of Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB): (1) management representation letters, (2) legal representation letters, and (3) information on treaties and other international agreements.
gao_GAO-16-273	gao_GAO-16-273_0	In general, about 75 percent of these projects were less than about $80,000; however, about 2 percent of the projects were valued at $1.9 million or higher. Unforeseen Site Conditions Are Common, but Impacts on Reviewed Projects Were Limited Both Industry Stakeholders and GSA Officials Told Us Unforeseen Site Conditions Are Common in Repair and Alteration Projects According to industry stakeholders we interviewed, unforeseen site conditions are common in repair and alteration projects. On nine of the 11 projects we selected that experienced unforeseen site conditions, the cost for remediating those conditions accounted for 1 to 5 percent of the project’s original construction contract award (see fig. 2). On one of the 11 projects—a prospectus project to, among other things, modernize the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system at the New Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C.—the cost for addressing unforeseen site conditions was approximately 6 percent of the original construction contract award. All of the reported costs for remediating unforeseen site conditions on the projects we reviewed were below the typical 10 percent construction contingency that GSA attaches to repair and alteration projects. These ranged from 23 to 105 days due to the unforeseen site condition. For example, as the figure shows, for projects we reviewed, incomplete building drawings and lack of building information were among the possible causes for unforeseen site conditions. GSA Has a Variety of Methods to Identify and Assess Risks of Unforeseen Conditions but Risk Identification Could Benefit from Analysis of Project Information Variety of Methods Are Available to Identify and Assess Potential Project Risks and GSA Generally Used These Methods on Projects We Reviewed GSA policies and procedures describe a variety of methods available to identify and assess potential risks on repair and alteration projects. Tools available during this phase include facility condition assessments and site surveys. GSA officials told us that contract change orders and modifications are used to document unforeseen site conditions. We found that, in general, GSA prepared PMPs for our selected projects. For example, GSA prepared PMPs for 13 of the 18 RWA and prospectus projects we reviewed. Five projects did not have PMPs—three were RWA projects associated with larger projects and no separate PMP was prepared for the RWA project, and for two projects, GSA officials were not sure if a PMP was prepared and were unable to provide documentation of a PMP. 4). On 11 of the projects we reviewed that experienced an unforeseen site condition, GSA did not identify risks that later materialized. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that an agency’s approach to assessing risks should comprehensively identify agency risks using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods and estimate the significance of those risks to help decide how to manage those risks and plan what actions should be taken. Analyzing contract modifications and change orders to identify the causes of project cost growth and schedule delays would not only allow GSA to better know what role unforeseen site conditions play in project cost growth or schedule delays but also the magnitude of this type of risk. In particular, GSA can better analyze the information it has available, like contract change orders and modifications, an approach that would allow a more comprehensive identification of types of project risks, the role these risks play in repair and alteration projects, and the impacts these risks have on project costs, schedules, or scope of work. Recommendation for Executive Action To improve risk assessments for repair and alteration projects, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA develop and implement a plan to periodically analyze information GSA already collects, for example, based on a representative sample of repair and alterations projects, in order to: identify the specific impacts unforeseen conditions have had on project costs, schedules, and scope of work; analyze the causes of these conditions for those projects that experienced unforeseen site conditions; and identify actions that will be taken to address the potential causes of unforeseen site conditions. In its written comments reproduced in appendix III, GSA agreed with the recommendation and said it will develop a plan to address it. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to (1) identify information about the extent, impact, and cause of unforeseen site conditions during selected repair and alteration projects in federally owned buildings held by the General Services Administration (GSA) and to (2) determine how GSA identifies and assesses the risks of unforeseen site conditions. There were a total of six prospectus projects that received funding from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. We interviewed GSA project managers and contracting officers for the projects we selected and reviewed project documents to determine if the projects encountered unforeseen site conditions. This included a description of the unforeseen condition, the cost to remediate the condition, and any schedule delays experienced.	Why GAO Did This Study GSA annually spends hundreds of millions of dollars making major and minor repairs and alterations to the more than 1,500 federally owned buildings that it holds. GAO's past work has indicated that GSA sometimes encounters “unforeseen site conditions”—conditions that are different from what was expected—in performing this work. Unforeseen conditions can add both time and cost to repair and alteration projects. GAO was asked to review issues related to tenant repair and alteration projects. This report addresses (1) information about the extent, impact, and cause of unforeseen site conditions on selected projects, and (2) how GSA identifies and assesses the risks of unforeseen conditions. GAO reviewed 18 non-generalizable repair and alteration projects funded from fiscal year 2010 to 2013, valued at $2 million or more; interviewed GSA project managers and contracting officers about these projects; reviewed project documents; and interviewed a non-generalizable sample of organizations and individuals knowledgeable about the construction industry (industry stakeholders). What GAO Found Both industry stakeholders and General Services Administration (GSA) officials told GAO that unforeseen conditions in repair and alteration projects are common. Such conditions, for example, included an unknown wood subflooring discovered during demolition work. Among the impacts identified by the stakeholders were increased project costs and schedule delays. In general, data are limited on unforeseen conditions since GSA does not analyze this type of information. Most of the repair and alteration projects GAO reviewed—11 of 18 projects--experienced an unforeseen condition. The overall impact of the unforeseen conditions on the 18 projects GAO reviewed was largely limited. On 9 of the 11 projects that experienced such conditions, the cost to remediate them accounted for 1 to 5 percent of the project's original construction contract award amount, and on one project the cost was approximately 6 percent. These amounts were below the typical 10 percent construction contingency GSA adds to project costs. Schedule impacts were also limited: 4 of the 11 projects experienced delays ranging from 23 to 105 days. GAO also found that three projects reviewed that did not experience unforeseen conditions were attached to larger projects that did experience these conditions. In two of these larger projects the cost increases from unforeseen conditions were about $2 million each. Incomplete building drawings and lack of building information were among the possible causes of the unforeseen conditions experienced in the projects GAO reviewed. GSA has a variety of methods to identify and assess risks of unforeseen conditions. GSA's Project Planning Guide states that, among other things, facility condition assessments and site surveys should be conducted initially. GSA guidance also calls for preparation of a project management plan (PMP), which includes a risk assessment matrix. GAO found that, in general, GSA used at least one of its risk identification methods on the projects reviewed. For example, GAO found that GSA prepared PMPs for 13 of the 18 projects reviewed. Three of the remaining five projects were attached to larger projects that had PMPs and GSA was unable to provide a PMP for the other two projects. However, GSA's risk identification was sometimes inconsistent with unforeseen conditions that were actually experienced. For example, on 11 of the projects, GSA did not identify risks that later materialized during the project. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should comprehensively identify risks using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods. GSA officials told GAO that contract change orders are used to document unforeseen conditions that result in a change to the contract, but that these change orders are not analyzed to identify what role these conditions represent on projects or their causes or impacts. As shown in the projects GAO reviewed, unforeseen conditions can delay schedules and increase project costs—in some cases in the millions of dollars. Analyzing project information such as change orders would allow GSA to better know what role unforeseen conditions play in repair and alteration projects and the magnitude of this risk. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that GSA develop and implement a plan for analyzing information it collects to identify the role of unforeseen conditions in repair and alteration projects and the specific causes and impacts of these conditions. GSA agreed with the recommendation and the agency stated it will develop a plan to address it.
gao_GAO-06-276	gao_GAO-06-276_0	Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this study were to (1) determine the feasibility of designing and using trigger mechanisms to constrain growth in mandatory spending and (2) provide an analysis of the factors (legislative, economic, and technical) that led to differences between estimated and actual outlays in seven mandatory budget accounts during fiscal years 2000 through 2004. A “soft” response prompts special consideration of a program or a proposal for action when a certain threshold or target is breached. Issues to Consider in Designing the Triggered Response Whether a triggered response is soft, hard, or a combination of the two, efforts to constrain growth in mandatory programs need to be focused at the program level. Some of the experts expressed strong support for budget triggers. Many tax expenditures operate like mandatory spending programs and generally are not subject to reauthorization. The analysis we applied to spending in this report would also be useful in examining tax expenditures. Reasons for Differences between Estimated and Actual Outlays in Selected Accounts Varied To better appreciate the reasons behind growth in mandatory accounts and thus inform our thinking on triggers, we examined the reasons for differences between originally estimated and actual outlays for seven mandatory accounts that experienced relatively large dollar changes. Finally, technical factors, which cover a broad spectrum, most significantly drove 13 out of 40 differences. In many cases, a combination of factors resulted in differences. By identifying significant increases in mandatory spending relatively early and acting to constrain it, Congress may avert even larger fiscal challenges in the future. While we appreciate the concerns raised by budget experts, in our opinion, establishing budget triggers warrants serious consideration in order to constrain growth in mandatory spending programs. In any case, recognizing the natural tension in balancing both long-term fiscal challenges and other public policy goals, each program needs to be considered individually to ensure that any responses triggered strike the appropriate balance between the long-term fiscal challenge and the program goals. Once a trigger is tripped, Congress could either accept or reject all or a portion of the response to the spending growth. One idea to constrain growth in mandatory programs is to develop triggers that, when tripped, would cause some automatic cost-cutting or revenue- increasing response—such as changes in eligibility criteria, benefit formulas, or fees—automatically to go into effect unless Congress and the President act to make other changes. If a trigger were established that resulted in a contractionary response, it could undermine these important goals and exacerbate the effects of unemployment on the economy.	Why GAO Did This Study Prepared as part of GAO's basic statutory responsibility for monitoring the condition of the nation's finances, the objectives of this report were to (1) determine the feasibility of designing and using trigger mechanisms to constrain growth in mandatory spending programs and (2) provide an analysis of the factors that led to differences between estimated and actual outlays in seven mandatory budget accounts during fiscal years 2000 through 2004. What GAO Found One idea to constrain growth in mandatory programs is to develop program-specific triggers that, when tripped, prompt a response. A trigger could result in a "hard" or automatic response, unless Congress and the President acted to override or alter it. Alternatively, reaching a trigger could require a "soft" response, such as a report on the causes of the overage, development of a plan to address it, or an explicit and formal decision to accept or reject a proposed action or increase. By identifying significant increases in the spending path of a mandatory program relatively early and acting to constrain it, Congress may avert larger financial challenges in the future. However, both in establishing triggers and in designing the subsequent responses, the integrity of program goals needs to be preserved. In addition, tax expenditures operate like mandatory programs but do not compete in the annual appropriations process. The analysis GAO applied to spending in this report would also be useful in examining tax expenditures. The budget experts GAO consulted had mixed views of triggers. Proponents of triggers noted that mandatory spending is currently unconstrained and a mechanism that causes decision makers to at least periodically reevaluate spending is better than allowing spending to rise unchecked. Others, however, expressed considerable skepticism about the effectiveness of triggers; many felt they would either be circumvented or ignored. While GAO appreciates the views expressed by budget experts, in our opinion establishing budget triggers warrants consideration in efforts to constrain significant and largely unchecked growth in mandatory programs. However, recognizing the natural tension in balancing both long-term fiscal challenges and other public policy goals, each program needs to be considered individually to ensure that any responses triggered strike the appropriate balance between the long-term fiscal challenge and the program goals. To better understand growth in mandatory spending and thus inform GAO's thinking on triggers, for seven case study accounts GAO categorized the reasons provided by agencies for differences between estimated and actual outlays during a 5-year period as the result of legislative, economic, or technical changes. Out of 40 differences, subsequent legislation was the primary reason for 19, economic changes for 7, and technical changes for 13. In many cases, a combination of these factors caused the differences.
gao_GAO-06-134	gao_GAO-06-134_0	DOD relies on four active components—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—and four reserve and two National Guard components—the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve—to meet its mission. In order to meet legislatively mandated authorized personnel levels, DOD must balance accessions and losses. DOD’s Components Met Most Aggregate Recruiting and Retention Goals in the Past 6 Fiscal Years, but Recent Trends Prompt Concerns While DOD’s active, reserve, and National Guard components met most of their aggregate recruiting and retention goals in the past 6 fiscal years, they faced greater recruiting difficulties in fiscal year 2005. DOD previously reported that over half of today’s youth between the ages of 16 and 21 are not qualified to serve in the military because they fail to meet the military’s entry standards. Delayed Entry Program All of the active components are experiencing shrinking numbers of new recruits in their delayed entry programs. Components Have Exceeded Authorized Personnel Levels for Some Occupational Specialties and Experienced Shortages in Others All components exceeded authorized personnel levels for some occupational specialties and did not meet others. First, what is the cost to the taxpayer to retain thousands more personnel than necessary in consistently overfilled occupational specialties? Second, how can DOD components continue to effectively execute their mission with consistently underfilled occupational specialties? However, because DOD lacks information from the components on all over- and underfilled occupational specialties, including reasons why these occupational specialties are over- and underfilled, it cannot address these questions and develop a plan to assist the components in addressing the root causes of its recruiting and retention challenges. Certain Occupational Specialties Have Been Consistently Over- or Underfilled Compared to Their Authorized Personnel Levels Of nearly 1,500 enlisted occupational specialties across DOD, about 19 percent were consistently overfilled and about 41 percent were consistently underfilled from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, as shown in figure 2. At the same time, DOD was not able to fill over 112,000 positions in consistently underfilled occupational specialties. We believe that consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties are a systemic problem for DOD that raises questions about the validity of occupational specialty authorizations. Components Provide Limited Justifications to DOD on Financial Incentives Given to Servicemembers in Overfilled Occupational Specialties Although we found that the components regularly offered financial incentives to servicemembers in consistently underfilled occupational specialties, we also found that each of the active duty components provided enlistment bonuses, selective reenlistment bonuses, or both to servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties. By not requiring the components to fully justify their rationale for providing incentives to servicemembers in the consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties, OUSD lacks the information needed to provide assurance to the Secretary of Defense and Congress that the amount of funding spent on recruiting and retention efforts is appropriately and effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which the components have the greatest need. While there may be valid reasons for providing these incentives to some servicemembers in these occupational specialities, DOD does not require the components to fully justify their decisions on financial incentives, which restricts the department’s ability to provide assurance to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the taxpayer that the increasing funding spent on recruiting and retention is appropriately and effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which components have the greatest need. Recommendations for Executive Action To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and retention issues and improve the department’s oversight for these issues, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to take the following two actions: Require the 10 components to report annually on all (not just critical) over- and underfilled occupational specialties, provide an analysis of why occupational specialties are over- and report annually on and justify their use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in occupational specialties that exceed their authorized personnel levels. In prior work, we determined that it costs the federal government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate each enlisted active duty servicemember in fiscal year 2004; thus we believe each individual serving in an occupational specialty that is over the authorized personnel level represents a significant cost to the government. To determine the extent to which the active duty, reserve, and National Guard components met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, we compared accession and reenlistment goals to their actual figures for fiscal years 2000 through 2005.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) must recruit and retain hundreds of thousands of servicemembers each year to carry out its missions, including providing support in connection with events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition to meeting legislatively mandated aggregate personnel levels, each military component must also meet its authorized personnel requirements for each occupational specialty. DOD reports that over half of today's youth cannot meet the military's entry standards for education, aptitude, health, moral character, or other requirements, making recruiting a significant challenge. GAO, under the Comptroller General's authority (1) assessed the extent to which DOD's active, reserve, and National Guard components met their enlisted aggregate recruiting and retention goals; (2) assessed the extent to which the components met their authorized personnel levels for enlisted occupational specialties; and (3) analyzed the steps DOD has taken to address recruiting and retention challenges. What GAO Found DOD's active, reserve, and National Guard components met most aggregate recruiting and retention goals for enlisted personnel from fiscal years (FY) 2000-2004. However, for FY 2005, 5 of 10 components--the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Navy Reserve--missed their recruiting goals by 8 to 20 percent. Most of the components met their aggregate retention goals for FY 2000-2004, but the Navy experienced shortages in FY 2005 of up to 8 percent. Also, factors such as the shrinking numbers of new recruits in delayed entry programs and the use of stop loss, which delays servicemembers from leaving active duty, indicate that the components may experience future recruiting challenges. All components exceeded authorized personnel levels for some occupational specialties and did not meet others. Specifically, GAO found that 19 percent of DOD's 1,484 occupational specialties were consistently overfilled and 41 percent were consistently underfilled from FY 2000-2005. While the components offered reasons why occupational specialties may be over- or underfilled, GAO believes that consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties are a systemic problem for DOD that raises two critical questions. First, what is the cost to the taxpayer to retain thousands more personnel than necessary in consistently overfilled occupational specialties? Second, how can DOD components continue to effectively execute their mission with consistently underfilled occupational specialties? In FY 2005, almost 31,000 more servicemembers than authorized served in occupational specialties that have been consistently overfilled. GAO determined that it costs the federal government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate each enlisted active duty servicemember in FY 2004. In contrast, DOD was unable to fill over 112,000 positions in consistently underfilled occupational specialties, raising concerns about the validity of the authorized personnel levels. DOD requires the active components to report on critical occupational specialties for recruiting and retention, which amounts to at most 16 percent of their 625 specialties. However, DOD does not require them to report on their noncritical occupational specialties, and does not require the reserve or National Guard components to report on any of their 859 specialties. Consequently, DOD does not have the necessary information to develop an effective plan to address the root causes of the components' recruiting and retention challenges. DOD has taken steps to enhance recruiting and retention, but lacks information on financial incentives provided for certain occupational specialties. GAO found that the components offered financial incentives to servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties. However, because DOD only requires the components to provide minimal justification for their use of financial incentives, it lacks the information needed to provide assurance to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the taxpayer that the increasing amount of funding spent on recruiting and retention is appropriately and effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which the components have the greatest need.
gao_GAO-14-233	gao_GAO-14-233_0	The 504 loan program provides long-term, fixed-rate financing to new or growing small businesses for fixed assets such as owner-occupied real estate or long-term equipment and machinery. CDCs are generally nonprofit corporations that provide funding to small businesses in order to contribute to economic development within their communities. SBA Lending Standards Address 504 Requirements and Default Risk, but SBA Lacks Guidance on Determining Jobs Supported SBA has established lending standards and guidance for CDCs that address 504 program requirements and protect against default risk. Without clear and specific guidance on compiling jobs supported data, SBA cannot ensure that CDCs are compiling and supporting this information consistently and in accordance with SBA’s expectations. Loans approved in fiscal year 2007 experienced the highest 18-month default rate at 4.9 percent. SBA Reviews CDC Eligibility and Loan Applications, but Does Not Confirm Compliance with Some Requirements SBA has processes to review CDCs’ eligibility to participate in the 504 loan program but, as previously mentioned, does not require or examine support for CDC-reported data on jobs created or retained. SBA Reviews CDC Eligibility, but Does Not Confirm Compliance with Jobs-Supported and Retained-Earnings Requirements SBA has established a process for approving CDCs to participate in the 504 loan program, which includes a probationary period. However, federal internal control standards require that federal agencies have control activities in place, such as verification, to ensure compliance with key program requirements. According to SBA officials, SBA rarely declines to close a debenture. They also are to be used to assess CDCs for renewal of their ALP authority. Creating and retaining jobs is a key economic development goal of the 504 program. Further, SBA’s current annual report review and risk-based review guidance do not require SBA staff to request and review supporting documentation for CDC-reported data on jobs supported or assess compliance with the requirement that CDCs invest retained earnings in local economic development. Federal internal control standards require agencies to establish control activities to ensure that program participants report information accurately and comply with requirements. Without developing guidance for CDCs and reviewing at least some documentation on jobs data and compliance with the retained-earnings requirement, SBA cannot be assured that self- reported information on jobs supported is consistent and accurate and that CDCs are following program requirements. In addition, while SBA has established multiple reviews for 504 loan applications, the agency does not verify certifications made by CDCs with ALP authority that borrowers are still able to repay a 504 loan at loan closing, which can take place years after the loan was initially approved. To help ensure that CDCs with ALP authority are taking the necessary steps to determine whether there has been no adverse change to borrowers’ financial condition prior to loan closing, we recommend that the SBA Administrator include oversight of CDCs’ compliance with this requirement in the agency’s process for renewing ALP authority. SBA generally agreed with our recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them. In response to our recommendations regarding the 504 loan program’s jobs-supported requirement, SBA stated that it will (1) work to provide guidance on the compilation of job creation and retention information and document maintenance requirements and (2) consider ways to phase in the implementation of jobs data sampling and review of supporting documentation in its annual report and risk-based reviews. As noted in the report, a 504 loan is not closed until after project-related construction is complete, which can be up to 4 years after initial approval. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to examine (1) the lending standards and performance indicators that the Small Business Administration (SBA) has established to help ensure that loans meet key requirements, as well as 504 loan program performance, (2) the extent to which SBA has implemented procedures to help ensure that certified development companies (CDC) are eligible to participate in the program and that loan applications comply with program requirements, and (3) the extent to which SBA has implemented procedures to monitor CDC compliance with program requirements. We selected these CDCs to ensure a range of CDCs based on factors such as size and geographic location. We also reviewed SBA’s annual performance reports for fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify SBA’s performance measures for the 504 loan program and assessed whether they addressed the program’s economic development goals and were consistent with GAO standards for performance measurement. Finally, we compared SBA compliance processes to federal internal control standards.	Why GAO Did This Study Title V of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 established what is commonly referred to as the “504 loan program” to provide small businesses with financing for long-term fixed assets, such as land and buildings. SBA oversees the program, and about 270 CDCs issue “504 loans” that generally cover up to 40 percent of project costs. The program aims to encourage economic development primarily by enabling small businesses to create or retain jobs within their communities. This report examines (1) the lending standards and performance measures SBA has established to help ensure that loans meet key requirements, as well as 504 loan performance, and (2) SBA's processes for reviewing CDCs' eligibility to participate in the program, loan applications, and CDCs' compliance with program requirements. GAO analyzed SBA data, SBA's lending standards and compliance process documentation, and interviewed SBA officials and 10 CDCs selected based on factors such as size and location. What GAO Found The Small Business Administration (SBA) has established lending standards to protect against default and has measured program performance, but lacks guidance on determining the number of jobs supported by 504 program-funded projects. SBA's guidance for certified development companies (CDC)—nonprofits that provide funding to small businesses to promote local economic development in their communities and are certified by SBA—includes credit underwriting standards for determining ability to repay. SBA also has established performance indicators—such as the number of small businesses assisted and jobs supported—for the 504 loan program. However, SBA does not describe how CDCs should calculate jobs created and retained by 504 projects, a key program requirement. Federal internal control standards require control activities that help participants report information accurately. Without specific guidance, SBA cannot ensure that CDCs are calculating this information consistently or accurately. GAO's analysis of SBA data showed that 504 loans approved in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 had the highest 18-month default rates, which correlated with trends in the private sector for commercial real estate loans. SBA has processes to review (1) CDCs' eligibility to participate in the 504 program, (2) loan applications, and (3) CDCs' compliance with program requirements. The agency is revising some of these processes and expects to finalize the changes by June 2014. However, GAO identified two key areas where additional improvement is needed: Jobs supported and retained earnings . SBA has guidance for reviewing CDCs' annual reports (used to assess CDC eligibility) and for risk-based reviews of CDCs' compliance with program requirements. However, this guidance does not require SBA staff to review supporting documentation on jobs supported or assess whether CDCs are investing retained earnings in local economic development, as required by regulation. Federal internal control standards require control activities to ensure that program participants report information accurately and comply with requirements. Without reviewing CDCs' information on jobs data and compliance with the retained-earnings requirement, SBA cannot be assured that information on jobs supported is accurate and CDCs are supporting economic development activities as required. Certification by CDCs with delegated authority . SBA provides initial approval for a 504 loan upon application, but the 504 loan is not closed until after project-related construction is complete (which can be up to 4 years after initial approval). SBA has delegated to certain CDCs additional authority to close a 504 loan. For example, at closing CDCs with this delegated authority can certify that borrowers are still able to repay a 504 loan rather than submit documentation to SBA for approval, as regular CDCs are required to do. SBA renews delegated authority periodically but does not verify that CDCs can support these certifications. Federal internal control standards require agencies to verify compliance with requirements. Without verifying these certifications, SBA lacks assurance that CDCs with delegated authority are following program requirements. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that SBA issue guidance on calculating jobs created and retained, expand its review of CDCs' annual reports and risk-based reviews of selected CDCs to include assessment of data on jobs supported and compliance with the retained- earnings requirement, and expand its process for renewing the delegated authority of certain CDCs to include a review of CDCs' certifications of borrowers' ability to repay made prior to loan closing. SBA generally agreed with the recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take in response.
gao_HEHS-96-129	gao_HEHS-96-129_0	Health Insurance Coverage for Children at Lowest Reported Level Since 1987 In 1994, the percentage of children with private health insurance reached the lowest level reported in the last 8 years—65.6 percent or 46.3 million children. Present law mandates eligibility for children from birth to 5 years old with income at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty level and for poor children born after September 30, 1983. We estimate that 14.3 million children in 1994 were eligible for Medicaid by federal mandate because of their age and family income. The 2.9 million uninsured, Medicaid-eligible children accounted for 30 percent of all uninsured children. Compared with children on Medicaid, higher percentages of uninsured, Medicaid-eligible children had a working parent in 1994 (80.4 percent). More Uninsured Teens Will Become Eligible for Medicaid Coverage in the Next 6 Years Poor teens under 19 years old will be phased into Medicaid eligibility in the next 6 years if current federal Medicaid eligibility mandates for children are maintained. In 1994, an estimated 4.1 million children 13 to 18 years old were poor. As long as private coverage continues to decrease for children, the number of children uninsured or on Medicaid will continue to grow. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the number of uninsured Medicaid-eligible children in 1994. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the percentage of children without health insurance was 14.2 percent in 1994; (2) the percentage of children with private health insurance has steadily decreased since 1987; (3) while there has been a decline in coverage for poor children, coverage for nonpoor children has remained stable; (4) Medicaid coverage for children was lower in 1994 due to methodological changes in the Current Population Survey; (5) there were 2.9 million Medicaid-eligible children that were not enrolled in Medicaid in 1994; (6) these children represented 30 percent of all uninsured children from birth to 5 years old, and had family incomes that fell below the federal poverty level; (7) the number of children eligible for Medicaid will increase in the next 6 years to include poor teens aged 13 to 19 years old; and (8) Medicaid will cover even more uninsured children as soon as the families of eligible uninsured children learn that they qualify for Medicaid.
gao_GAO-10-887	gao_GAO-10-887_0	The typical supply chain process for transporting cargo containers to the United States involves many steps and participants. S&T’s overall objective for each of these container security technology projects is the development and delivery of performance standards for the technologies to DHS’s Office of Policy Development and CBP. DHS Has Made Progress in Researching and Developing Container Security Technologies, but Needs to Conduct Testing Using Defined Operational Scenarios before Delivering Performance Standards From 2004 through 2009, S&T spent over $60 million and made varying levels of progress in the research and development of its four container security technology projects—ACSD, CSD, Hybrid Composite Container, and MATTS—to support the development of performance standards for these container security projects. According to S&T and CSTE team officials, meeting the requirements of the ACSD program, including detecting intrusion on all six sides of a container, has proven to be very challenging. The container incorporates an embedded sensor grid to provide six-sided intrusion detection. However, S&T’s plans for conducting Phase II trade lane testing of these container security technologies do not reflect all the operational scenarios agreed upon within DHS for how the technologies could be implemented. Before S&T can provide performance standards, per the technology transition agreements signed by S&T, the Office of Policy Development, and CBP, the technologies are to have been proven to work in their final form and under expected operational conditions. Key Steps and Challenges Remain before Implementation of Container Security Technologies Can Move Forward If S&T determines that the container security technologies are mature enough to provide performance standards for these technologies to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, key steps and associated challenges remain before DHS and CBP can implement the container security technologies in the supply chain that meet those performance standards. Based on our discussions with Office of Policy Development and CBP officials, we identified three key steps that remain before implementation can occur: (1) obtaining support from trade industry and international partners, (2) developing a concept of operations (CONOPS) that describes how the technologies are to be deployed, and (3) certifying the technologies for use in the supply chain. Until all intended operational scenarios are tested, S&T cannot provide reasonable assurance that the container security technologies would effectively function in all the operational scenarios identified by the Office of Policy Development and CBP for potential implementation. Recommendation for Executive Action To ensure that the container security technologies being developed will function in their intended operational environments, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Policy, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate, to test and evaluate the container security technologies consistent with all of the operational scenarios DHS identified for potential implementation, before S&T provides performance standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP. DHS concurred with our recommendation. Several vendors responded to S&T’s 2004 broad agency announcement (BAA) for the Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD) project and 2003 small business innovative research (SBIR) solicitation for the Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS). Requirements that must be met by products to ensure they will function as intended.	Why GAO Did This Study Cargo containers could be used to transport unlawful cargo, including weapons of mass destruction, illicit arms, stowaways, and illegal narcotics into the United States. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for container security. To enhance container security, CBP has partnered with DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to develop performance standards--requirements that must be met by products to ensure they will function as intended--for container security technologies. After successful completion of testing, S&T plans to deliver performance standards to DHS's Office of Policy Development and CBP. As requested, this report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has made progress in conducting research and development and defining performance standards for the technologies, and (2) the remaining steps and challenges, if any, DHS could face in implementing the technologies. GAO, among other things, reviewed master test plans for S&T's four ongoing container security technology projects, and interviewed DHS officials. What GAO Found DHS has conducted research and development for four container security technology projects, but has not yet developed performance standards for them. From 2004 through 2009, S&T spent approximately $60 million and made varying levels of progress in the research and development of its four container security technology projects. These projects include the Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), to detect intrusion on all six sides of a container; the Container Security Device (CSD), to detect the opening or removal of container doors; the Hybrid Composite Container, a lightweight container with an embedded sensor grid to detect intrusion on all six sides of the container; and the Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS), to track containers. The ACSD and Hybrid Composite Container technologies have not yet completed laboratory testing, but the CSD and MATTS are proceeding to testing in an operational environment, which will determine if the technologies can operate in the global supply chain--the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers. S&T's master plans for conducting operational environment testing, however, do not reflect all of the operational scenarios the Office of Policy Development and CBP are considering for implementation. According to DHS guidance, before S&T can provide performance standards to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, the technologies are to have been proven to work in their final form and under expected operational conditions. Until the container security technologies are tested and evaluated consistent with all of the operational scenarios DHS identified for potential implementation, S&T cannot provide reasonable assurance that the technologies will effectively function as the Office of Policy Development and CBP intend to implement them. If S&T determines that the container security technologies are mature enough to provide performance standards for these technologies to the Office of Policy Development and CBP, key steps and challenges remain before implementation can occur. These key steps involve (1) obtaining support from the trade industry and international partners, (2) developing a concept of operations (CONOPS) detailing how the technologies are to be deployed, and (3) certifying the technologies for use. The Office of Policy Development and CBP plan to take these steps if and when S&T provides performance standards. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS test and evaluate the container security technologies consistent with all the operational scenarios DHS identified for potential implementation. DHS concurred with our recommendation.
gao_GAO-07-645	gao_GAO-07-645_0	A number of different private-sector and government institutions participate in the mortgage market. FHA’s Market Share Declined from 1996 through 2005, While the Conventional Market Share Increased, Especially among Minority and Lower-Income Borrowers FHA’s share of the market for home purchase mortgages in terms of numbers of loans declined 13 percentage points from 1996 through 2005, while the prime share increased slightly and the subprime share grew 13 percentage points. Although the decline in FHA’s market share was broad- based, FHA experienced particularly sharp decreases in submarkets where it traditionally has had a strong presence, such as among minority and lower-income borrowers. At the same time, subprime market share increased 14 percentage points (from 1 to 15 percent) among lower-income borrowers and 12 percentage points (from 2 to 14 percent) among upper-income borrowers. The Decline in FHA’s Market Share Was Associated with Several Factors and Has Been Accompanied by Higher Costs for Certain Conventional Borrowers and Increased Credit Risk for FHA During the period from 1996 through 2005, a combination of factors created conditions that favored conventional mortgages over FHA products. These factors included (1) FHA’s product restrictions and lack of process improvements relative to the conventional market and (2) product innovations and expanded loan origination and funding channels in the conventional market. Most subprime mortgages, which grew in popularity as FHA’s market share declined, had higher ultimate costs, in part because their initial interest rates could reset to higher rates. In contrast to the subprime market, the large majority of FHA-insured loans are fixed-rate mortgages. Certain factors associated with FHA’s decline in market share also contributed to a worsening in indicators of credit risk among FHA borrowers. These trends raise questions about FHA’s ability to fulfill its traditional role and operate successfully in a changing and competitive mortgage market. For example, relatively high default and foreclosure rates for subprime mortgages and a contraction of this market segment could shift market share to FHA. The extent to which this occurs will depend partly on the efforts of conventional mortgage providers, including Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to provide alternatives to subprime borrowers. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine (1) trends in the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) share of the market for home purchase mortgages and selected submarkets from 1996 through 2005, and how they compared with the trends for the prime, subprime, and government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) market segments; and (2) the major factors associated with the trends in FHA’s market share and the potential implications of these trends for homebuyers and FHA. Specifically, tables 6, 7, and 8 contain information on selected borrower and loan characteristics for Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured, prime, and subprime loans.	Why GAO Did This Study The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) historically has been an important participant in the mortgage market, which includes loans that carry government insurance or guarantees (such as FHA-insured mortgages) and those that do not (conventional mortgages). The conventional market comprises prime loans for the most creditworthy borrowers and subprime loans for borrowers with impaired credit. Reduced demand for FHA-insured mortgages--which are used primarily by borrowers who would have difficulty obtaining conventional prime loans--has raised questions about the agency's role in and ability to adapt to the mortgage market. This report discusses (1) trends in FHA's share of the market for home purchase mortgages from 1996 through 2005, and how they compared with the trends for other market segments; and (2) factors associated with the trends in FHA's market share and the implications of these trends for homebuyers and FHA. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed FHA and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and interviewed officials from FHA and other mortgage institutions. What GAO Found From 1996 through 2005, FHA's share of the market for home purchase mortgages in terms of numbers of loans declined 13 percentage points (from 19 to 6 percent), while the prime and subprime shares grew 3 and 13 percentage points, respectively. The agency experienced a sharp decrease among populations where it traditionally has had a strong presence. For example, FHA's market share dropped 25 percentage points (from 32 to 7 percent) among minority borrowers and 16 percentage points (from 26 to 10 percent) among low- and moderate-income borrowers. At the same time, subprime market share among these groups rose dramatically. The decline in FHA's market share was associated with a number of factors and has been accompanied by higher ultimate costs for certain conventional borrowers and a worsening in indicators of credit risk among FHA borrowers. More specifically, (1) FHA's product restrictions and lack of process improvements relative to the conventional market and (2) product innovations and expanded loan origination and funding channels in the conventional market--coupled with interest rate and house price changes--provided conditions that favored conventional over FHA-insured mortgages. In contrast to FHA-insured loans, the majority of conventional subprime loans had higher ultimate costs to borrowers, partly because their initial low interest rates could increase substantially in a short period of time. Relatively high default and foreclosure rates for subprime mortgages and a contraction of this market segment could shift market share to FHA. The extent to which this occurs will depend partly on the ability of FHA and other market participants to offer mortgage alternatives to borrowers considering or struggling to maintain higher-priced subprime loans.
gao_GAO-11-394T	gao_GAO-11-394T_0	For our 2011 high-risk update, we determined that two areas warranted removal from the High-Risk List: the Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Security Clearance Program and the 2010 Census. New High-Risk Area: Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources We have designated the Department of the Interior’s management of federal oil and gas on leased federal lands and waters as high risk because Interior (1) does not have reasonable assurance that it is collecting its share of revenue from oil and gas produced on federal lands; (2) continues to experience problems in hiring, training, and retaining sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil and gas operations on federal lands and waters; and (3) is currently engaged in a broad reorganization of both its offshore oil and gas management and revenue collection functions. With regard to this organizational effort, there are many open questions about whether Interior has the capacity to undertake such a reorganization while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that billions of dollars of revenue owed the public are being properly assessed and collected and that oil and gas exploration and production on federal lands and waters is well-managed. GAO made recommendations to address these issues. Remaining High-Risk Areas While there has been some progress on nearly all of the issues that remain on the High-Risk List, the nation cannot afford to allow problems to persist. Addressing high-risk problems can save billions of dollars each year. Several areas on GAO’s list illustrate both the challenges of addressing difficult and tenacious high-risk problems and the opportunities for savings that can accrue if progress is made to address high-risk problems. Further, CMS could take other actions to help better address the issue of improper payments in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The level of importance CMS, HHS, and the administration place on the efforts to implement the requirements established by recent laws and guidance and implementation of our recommendations will be key factors in reducing improper payments in the Medicare and Medicaid programs and ensuring that federal funds are used efficiently and for their intended purposes. In fiscal year 2009, agencies reported underutilized buildings accounted for $1.66 billion in annual operating costs. Senior Defense officials have stated that further reductions may be needed to ensure that its infrastructure is appropriately sized to carry out its missions in a cost- effective manner. Over the next 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to invest almost $343 billion (in fiscal year 2011 dollars) on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs. With the prospect of slowly growing or flat defense budgets for the foreseeable future, DOD must get better value for its weapon system spending and find ways to deliver needed capability to the warfighter for less than it has spent in the past. Sustaining Progress on High-Risk Programs Overall, the government continues to take high-risk problems seriously and is making long-needed progress toward correcting them. Continued perseverance in addressing high-risk areas will ultimately yield significant benefits. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the American public, and strengthen public confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of our national government. The GAO’s high-risk update and High Risk and Other Major Government Challenges Web site, www.gao.gov/highrisk/, can help inform the oversight agenda for the 112th Congress and guide efforts of the administration and agencies to improve government performance and reduce waste and risks. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal government is the world's largest and most complex entity, with about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2010 funding a broad array of programs and operations. GAO maintains a program to focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. This testimony summarizes GAO's 2011 High-Risk Update, which describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2009 and identifies any new high-risk area needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen the performance and accountability of the U.S. government. What GAO Found This year, GAO removed the high-risk designation from two areas--the DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program and the 2010 Census--and designated one new high-risk area--Interior's Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources. These changes bring GAO's 2011 High-Risk List to a total of 30 areas. While many positive developments have occurred, additional progress is both possible and needed in all 30 high-risk areas to save billions of dollars and further improve the performance of federal programs and operations. Congressional oversight and sustained attention by top administration officials are essential to ensuring further progress. The high-risk effort is a top priority for GAO. Working with Congress, agency leaders, and the Office of Management and Budget, GAO will continue to provide insights and recommendations on needed actions to solve high-risk areas. Regarding the new high-risk area, Interior does not have reasonable assurance that it is collecting its share of billions of dollars of revenue from oil and gas produced on federal lands, and it continues to experience problems in hiring, training, and retaining sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil and gas operations on federal lands and waters. Further, Interior recently began restructuring its oil and gas program, which is inherently challenging, and there are many open questions about whether Interior has the capacity to undertake this reorganization while carrying out its range of responsibilities, especially in a constrained resource environment. While there has been some progress on nearly all of the issues that remain on the High-Risk List, the nation cannot afford to allow problems to persist. This statement discusses opportunities for savings that can accrue if progress is made to address high-risk problems. For example: (1) Billions of dollars are estimated in Medicare and Medicaid improper payments. The effective implementation of recent laws, including the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, and administration guidance will be key factors in determining the overall effectiveness of reducing improper payments in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. (2) Federal agencies' real property holdings include thousands of excess and/or underutilized buildings and cost over $1.6 billion annually to operate. If this issue is not addressed, the costs to maintain these properties will continue to rise. (3) Over the next 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to invest over $300 billion (in fiscal year 2011 dollars) on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs. DOD must get better value for its weapon system spending and find ways to deliver needed capability to the warfighter for less than it has spent in the past. The High-Risk update contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving progress. GAO is dedicated to continue working with Congress and the executive branch to help ensure additional progress is made.
gao_GAO-14-51	gao_GAO-14-51_0	The Army has plans to expand the capabilities of LMP. LMP Supports AMC’s Industrial Operations, but Additional Development Is Needed to Meet Certain Critical Requirements AMC is using LMP to support its industrial operations, but additional development of LMP is necessary, according to the Army, because the current system does not support certain critical requirements that have emerged since the initial development of LMP and because the current system will not enable the Army to generate auditable financial statements. Officials at the 14 AMC sites we visited stated that LMP provided the core functionality they needed to support their operations. They stated that over time they are improving in their ability to use LMP, and some sites have locally developed tools to augment its capabilities. Army officials stated that although LMP is functional, the current system does not support certain critical requirements, such as requirements related to automatically tracking repair and manufacturing operations on the shop floor of depots and arsenals. In addition, according to Army officials, the current system will not enable the Army to generate financial statements validated as ready for audit by 2017, the statutory deadline for this goal. Increment 2 is intended to address these shortcomings. LMP product office and AMC officials told us that the Army cannot meet this requirement with the functionality currently provided by Increment 1, and the Army’s fiscal year 2013 and 2014 working capital fund budget documents state that although LMP is functional at AMC’s life cycle management commands, it requires the enhancements and upgrades of Increment 2 to generate auditable financial statements. As a further justification for expanding LMP, the Army estimates that Increment 2 will cost $730 million through fiscal year 2026 but achieve approximately $1.4 billion in financial benefits. LMP Has Provided Some Benefits to the Army, but the Extent of Financial Benefits to Date Is Unknown The use of LMP has provided the Army some benefits, but whether the system has delivered the expected financial benefits to date is unknown because AMC does not have a process to track these benefits. For example, because LMP relies on accurate data to perform effectively and efficiently, the Army has made data accuracy a priority. Additionally, the use of LMP has improved accountability for inventory stored at AMC depots and has increased visibility over Army assets. Federal guidelines and standards outline the need for assessing whether expected benefits from an investment are achieved. We also found that, since our prior reviews, AMC has made progress in improving the accuracy of LMP data that it uses to support industrial operations by conducting data assessments, correcting data problems, and placing management emphasis on data accuracy. Data accuracy is necessary in order for enterprise resource planning systems such as LMP to perform effectively and efficiently. Finally, AMC officials stated that LMP has enabled them to develop and begin to implement a set of standardized, enterprise-wide performance measures to better assess the business operations of AMC sites. They told us that the measures previously used to assess AMC performance were inadequate, in part because they were not standardized. Without a process in place to track financial benefits associated with LMP, the Army does not have a way to determine whether LMP’s projected financial benefits are materializing. The Army expected significant financial benefits from the deployment of LMP Increment 1 across AMC, which was completed in October 2010. According to a 2009 study prepared by the Army to support the fiscal year 2010 Investment Review Board certification of LMP, the system was expected to lead to over $750 million in financial benefits by fiscal year 2012 and eventually achieve more than two dollars in benefits for every dollar spent. Officials did not provide an explanation for why they did not have a process to track financial benefits, but they stated that the inability to quantify financial benefits from LMP-driven performance improvements was due in part to the fluctuations in AMC workload resulting from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, the Army is in the process of developing an initial operational performance baseline for sites that will pilot Increment 2. Recommendation for Executive Action To determine whether the Army is achieving its estimated financial benefits in LMP, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a process to track the extent of financial benefits realized from the use of LMP during the remaining course of its life cycle. This process should be linked with the LMP performance baseline now being developed by the Army for use at AMC industrial sites. To determine the extent to which the Army has realized expected benefits from deploying the system, we obtained and reviewed Army documentation describing the expected benefits to be achieved from deploying LMP, including briefings describing the expected benefits and functionality of the system, a 2009 study supporting the fiscal year 2010 Investment Review Board certification of LMP, Army budget documents, and evidence that AMC headquarters, the individual sites, and the LMP Product Office were able to provide regarding actual benefits, if any, achieved to date. Defense Logistics: Observations on Army’s Implementation of the Logistics Modernization Program.	Why GAO Did This Study LMP is an Army enterprise resource planning system that supports industrial operations conducted by AMC at its life cycle management commands and its maintenance, manufacturing, and storage sites. Increment 1 of LMP was fully deployed in October 2010, and the Army has spent approximately $1.4 billion on LMP through fiscal year 2012. In order to expand the system's capabilities, the Army plans to deploy a second increment of LMP. The life cycle cost for LMP Increment 1 and Increment 2, from fiscal year 2000 through 2026, is estimated to be over $4 billion. GAO was asked to evaluate AMC's use of LMP. This report assesses the extent to which (1) LMP supports AMC's industrial operations and (2) the Army has realized the expected benefits from deploying LMP. GAO reviewed Army documents regarding LMP usage and interviewed officials from AMC headquarters, the LMP product office, and 14 AMC sites that use LMP to conduct their operations. What GAO Found The Army Materiel Command (AMC) is using the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) Increment 1 to support its industrial operations, but additional development is necessary, according to the Army, because the current system does not support certain critical requirements, including enabling the Army to generate auditable financial statements by fiscal year 2017. Officials at the 14 AMC sites GAO visited stated that LMP provided the core functionality they needed to support their operations and that they are improving in their ability to use the system. Additionally, some sites have locally developed tools to augment LMP capabilities. Army officials stated that although LMP is functional, it currently does not support certain critical requirements that have emerged since its initial development, such as automatically tracking repair and manufacturing operations on the shop floor of depots and arsenals. In addition, according to Army officials, the current system will not enable the Army to generate auditable financial statements by 2017, the statutory deadline for this goal. Increment 2, which is estimated to cost $730 million through fiscal year 2026, is expected to address these shortcomings. The Army is in the process of developing Increment 2 and expects to complete fielding by September 2016. The use of LMP Increment 1 has provided the Army some benefits, but whether the system has delivered the expected financial benefits to date is unknown because AMC does not have a process for tracking financial benefits realized. Since its deployment, LMP has provided some benefits to the Army. For example, because LMP relies on accurate data to perform effectively and efficiently, the Army has made data accuracy a priority and improved the accuracy of its data by conducting data assessments, correcting data problems, and placing management emphasis on data accuracy. Additionally, the use of LMP has improved accountability for inventory stored at AMC depots, increased visibility over Army assets, and resulted in other efficiencies--such as providing faster access to information. AMC officials also stated that LMP has enabled them to develop and begin to implement a set of standardized, enterprise-wide performance measures to better assess the business operations of AMC sites. The officials stated that these performance measures, which were being used during AMC leadership reviews in June 2013, were necessary because the measures previously used to assess AMC performance were inadequate. However, the extent to which financial benefits have been realized from deploying LMP is unknown. The Army expected LMP to lead to over $750 million in financial benefits by fiscal year 2012 and eventually achieve more than two dollars in benefits for every dollar spent. Army officials told us that there currently is no accurate process in place to track financial benefits associated with LMP. Officials stated that the inability to quantify benefits from LMP-driven performance improvements was due in part to the fluctuations in AMC workload resulting from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is in the process of developing a performance baseline for sites that will pilot Increment 2, and it intends to apply these metrics to other AMC sites before May 2015. Federal guidelines and standards outline the need for assessing whether the benefits expected from an investment are achieved. Without a process in place to track the financial benefits associated with LMP, the Army does not have a way to determine whether LMP's projected financial benefits are materializing. What GAO Recommends To enable the Army to determine whether the expected financial benefits of LMP are being achieved, GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement a process to track the extent of financial benefits realized from the use of LMP during the remaining course of its life cycle. This process should be linked with the LMP performance baseline now being developed by the Army for use at AMC industrial sites. The Army concurred with GAOs recommendation.
gao_GAO-11-20	gao_GAO-11-20_0	NARA Relies on Information Systems to Accomplish Its Mission NARA depends on a number of key information systems to conduct its daily business functions and support its mission. For example, it has developed a policy for granting or denying access rights to its resources, employs mechanisms to prevent and respond to security breaches, and makes use of encryption technologies to protect sensitive data. NARA had not securely configured several of its systems. Media can include magnetic tapes, optical disks (such as compact disks), and hard drives. NIST recommends that organizations test sanitization equipment and procedures to verify correct performance. However, NARA has not always ensured that equipment used for removing sensitive information was tested annually. NARA conducted the appropriate background investigations for the employees and contractors we reviewed. Incompatible Duties Were Not Always Effectively Segregated Segregation of duties refers to the policies, procedures, and organizational structures that help ensure that no single individual can independently control all key aspects of a process or computer-related operation and thereby gain unauthorized access to assets or records. NARA did not always implement effective segregation of duties controls. NARA Has Not Fully Implemented All Elements of Its Information Security Program A key reason for the weaknesses in information security controls intended to protect NARA’s systems is that the agency has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities for complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, which is to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and which includes testing the management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. However, NARA did not always include required controls in its system security plans. 2). For example, a POA&M for a system designed to receive, preserve, and provide access to electronic records is dated December 2008. However, NARA was not able to locate all of its weekly reports for incidents and did not consistently apply its criteria for incident categorization. III), the Archivist of the United States stated that he was pleased with the positive recognition of NARA’s efforts and that he generally concurred with our recommendations. In addition, the Archivist in his comments disagreed with three of the report’s findings. Thus, we continue to believe our finding is valid. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology The objective of our review was to determine whether the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. Using our Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual which contains guidance for reviewing information system controls that affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computerized information; National Security Agency guidance; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and guidance; and NARA’s policies, procedures, practices, and standards, we evaluated these controls by reviewing network access paths to determine if boundaries were adequately protected; reviewing the complexity and expiration of password settings to determine if password management was enforced; analyzing users’ system authorizations to determine whether they had more permission than necessary to perform their assigned functions; observing methods for providing secure data transmissions across the network to determine whether sensitive data were being encrypted; reviewing software security settings to determine if modifications of sensitive or critical system resources were monitored and logged; observing physical access controls over unclassified and classified areas to determine if computer facilities and resources were being protected from espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft; examining configuration settings and access controls for routers, network management servers, switches, and firewalls; inspecting key servers and workstations to determine if critical patches had been installed and/or were up to date; reviewing media handling policy, procedures, and equipment to determine if sensitive data were cleared from digital media before media were disposed of or reused; reviewing nondisclosure agreements at select locations to determine if they are required for personnel with access to sensitive information; and examining access roles and responsibilities to determine whether incompatible functions were segregated among different individuals.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is responsible for preserving access to government documents and other records of historical significance and overseeing records management throughout the federal government. NARA relies on the use of information systems to receive, process, store, and track government records. As such, NARA is tasked with preserving and maintaining access to increasing volumes of electronic records. GAO was asked to determine whether NARA has effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. To do this, GAO tested security controls over NARA's key networks and systems; reviewed policies, plans, and reports; and interviewed officials at nine sites. What GAO Found NARA has not effectively implemented information security controls to sufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. Although it has developed a policy for granting or denying access rights to its resources, employed mechanisms to prevent and respond to security breaches, and made use of encryption technologies to protect sensitive data, significant weaknesses pervade its systems. NARA did not fully implement access controls, which are designed to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. Specifically, the agency did not always (1) protect the boundaries of its networks by, for example, ensuring that all incoming traffic was inspected by a firewall; (2) enforce strong policies for identifying and authenticating users by, for example, requiring the use of complex (i.e., not easily guessed) passwords; (3) limit users' access to systems to what was required for them to perform their official duties; (4) ensure that sensitive information, such as passwords for system administration, was encrypted so as not to be easily readable by potentially malicious individuals; (5) keep logs of network activity or monitor all parts of its networks for possible security incidents; and (6) implement physical controls on access to its systems and information, such as securing perimeter and exterior doors and controlling visitor access to computing facilities. In addition to weaknesses in access controls, NARA had mixed results in implementing other security controls. For example: (1) NARA did not always ensure equipment used for sanitization (i.e., wiping clean of data) and disposal of media (e.g., hard drives) was tested to verify correct performance. (2) NARA conducted appropriate background investigations for employees and contractors to ensure sufficient clearance requirements have been met before permitting access to information and information systems. (3) NARA did not consistently segregate duties among various personnel to ensure that no one person or group can independently control all key aspects of a process or operation. The identified weaknesses can be attributed to NARA not fully implementing key elements of its information security program. Specifically, the agency did not adequately assess risks facing its systems, consistently prepare and document security plans for its information systems, effectively ensure that all personnel were given relevant security training, effectively test systems' security controls, consistently track security incidents, and develop contingency plans for all its systems. Collectively, these weaknesses could place sensitive information, such as records containing personally identifiable information, at increased and unnecessary risk of unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, or loss. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 11 recommendations to the Archivist of the United States to implement elements of NARA's information security program. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Archivist generally concurred with GAO's recommendations but disagreed with some of the report's findings. GAO continues to believe that the findings are valid.
gao_RCED-96-217	gao_RCED-96-217_0	Some food authorities have contracted with private food service management companies (FSMC) to operate their school food services. In response to this mandate, and as agreed with the offices of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the House Committees on Agriculture and on Economic and Educational Opportunities, we (1) determined the extent to which food authorities use FSMCs to operate their food services and the impacts that their use has had on various aspects of the lunch program, such as student participation, school food service employment, the generation of revenues through school meal sales, and a la carte sales of food in schools; (2) described the terms and conditions under which schools that participate in the lunch program use FSMCs; and (3) determined the extent to which schools that participate in the lunch program are provided with fast foods and snack foods in vending machines, described the most frequently used types and brands of fast foods commonly offered, and described their nutritional content. Finally, about one-half to two-thirds of the FSMC contracts do not contain all provisions required by USDA’s guidance that we reviewed. The required provisions most often not found in the contracts were those intended to ensure that the food authorities maintain control of the school meals programs. A cost-plus-a-fixed-fee payment structure may include one or more of these fees and may also be quantified as a per-meal fee and/or an annual fee. Many FSMC Contracts Do Not Contain All Eight Required Contractual Provisions That We Reviewed USDA’s guidance for food authorities’ contracts with FSMCs specifies a number of provisions that must appear in the contracts to ensure that federal requirements are met. The Percentage of Schools Offering Brand-Name Fast Foods Has Increased The percentage of public schools that participate in the lunch program and offer brand-name fast foods increased substantially from school year 1990-91 through school year 1995-96—from about 2 percent to about 13 percent. Schools’ use of brand-name fast foods appeared to have little effect on the number of schools’ food service workers. 4.4.) 1.5 oz.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO examined the extent to which schools use private food service companies to operate their lunch programs, focusing on the: (1) terms and conditions of the contracts between schools and food service management companies (FSMC); and (2) percentage of schools offering brand-name fast foods that participate in the National School Lunch Program. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the number of food authorities participating in the school lunch program and contracting with FSMC has increased from 4 to 8 percent; (2) most food authorities use FSMC to reduce their budget deficit and increase revenue; (3) the advantages of using FSMC include paying lower costs for food, payroll, employee benefits, and administration; (4) schools with food service contracts have fewer students participating in school lunch programs than those schools not using FSMC; (5) more food service workers remain employed as a result of schools' contracting with FSMC; (6) food service contracts vary depending on the type of meal and the federal regulations governing the contracts; (7) most food service contracts require an annual fee, half stipulate a per-meal fee, and some stipulate both fees; (8) about one-half to two-thirds of FSMC contracts do not contain standard contractual provisions to ensure compliance with federal requirements; (9) the provisions most often omitted from the contracts are intended to ensure that the food authority maintains control of the school meals program; (10) the failure to include these provisions creates uncertainty regarding FSMC responsibilities and diminishes the food authority's ability to ensure that FSMC adheres to federal requirements; and (11) although the percentage of schools offering brand-name fast foods has increased, the number of items offered is limited.
gao_GAO-05-33	gao_GAO-05-33_0	Background The National Strategy for Homeland Security sets out a plan to improve homeland security through the cooperation and partnering of federal, state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of functions. The strategy also identifies the major initiatives to be addressed within each of these six mission areas. In all, the strategy cites 43 initiatives across the six mission areas. Finally, our work did not assess the status or quality of the work being planned or implemented. Domestic Counterterrorism The Domestic Counterterrorism mission area has six initiatives. All of the initiatives are covered by at least one department’s planning or implementation activities (see table 3). All 6 initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 as reported by one or more departments (see table 9). Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets The strategy identifies eight initiatives under the Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets—commonly referred to as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)— mission area. Crosscutting Issues Our recent work has also identified homeland security challenges that cut across the various mission areas. Such governmentwide challenges that we have identified include balancing homeland security needs with other national requirements by formulating realistic budget and resource plans that support the implementation of an efficient and effective homeland security program; providing timely and transparent homeland security funding information that sets forth detailed information concerning the obligation of the funding provided; improving risk management methods for resource allocation and investments by developing a commonly accepted framework and supporting tools to guide agency analysts in providing information to management; establishing baseline performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve prevention efforts, evaluate vulnerability reduction, and gauge responsiveness to damage and recovery needs at all levels of government; clarifying the roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and the private sector through the development and implementation of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process; developing a national blueprint—called an enterprise architecture—to help integrate different organizations’ efforts to improve homeland security; and improving governmentwide information technology management through the consistent application of effective strategic planning and performance measurement practices. Concluding Observations All 43 initiatives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security were included in plans and implementation activities in fiscal year 2004 by at least one of the six key departments we reviewed. While DHS was identified as the lead for the most initiatives (37), there were multiple leads for 12 of these 42 initiatives. Given the large number of initiatives being implemented by multiple agencies, the fact that some of the leads were implied rather than clear, and the fact that about a third of the initiatives had multiple leads, coordination across federal departments will be a key factor required for the successful implementation of the strategy. The six departments are the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State. This work is based exclusively on a review of challenges identified in GAO products issued since September 11, 2001. Summary of Departmental Activities on the Initiatives All 12 Emergency Preparedness and Response initiatives are being addressed in key departments’ planning and implementation activities. State demonstrated 2004 activities in 15 of the 43 initiatives, spanning all six mission areas; and DOJ identified 2004 activities in 13 of the 43 initiatives, covering four of the six mission areas (the exceptions: Border and Transportation Security and Defending against Catastrophic Threats).	Why GAO Did This Study The National Strategy for Homeland Security sets forth a plan to improve homeland security through the cooperation of federal, state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of functions. These functions are organized into the six distinct "critical mission areas" of (1) intelligence and warning, (2) border and transportation security, (3) domestic counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical infrastructures and key assets, (5) defending against catastrophic threats, and (6) emergency preparedness and response. Within each of these mission areas, the strategy identifies "major initiatives" to be addressed. In all, the strategy cites 43 initiatives across the six mission areas. GAO reviewed the strategy's implementation to (1) determine whether its initiatives are being addressed by key departments' strategic planning and implementation activities, whether the initiatives have lead agencies identified for their implementation, and whether the initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 by such agencies and (2) identify ongoing homeland security challenges that have been reflected in GAO products since September 11, 2001, by both mission area and issues that cut across mission areas. What GAO Found Key federal departments--Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State--have addressed the strategy's 43 initiatives to some extent in their strategic planning and implementation activities. All 43 of the initiatives were included in some of the planning or implementation activities of at least one of these six departments. Most of the initiatives (42 of the 43) also had departments identified as the lead agencies for their implementation, which helps to ensure accountability for implementation. However, many of these 42 initiatives had multiple lead agencies, indicating that interagency coordination of roles and activities will be important, particularly on those initiatives involving domestic counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection. All of the initiatives were being implemented in fiscal year 2004 by at least one department. While GAO determined that implementation was occurring, it did not assess the status or quality of the various departments' implementation of the initiatives. While departments have incorporated these initiatives into their planning and implementation activity, the United States faces significant challenges in fully implementing the strategy in a coordinated and integrated manner. Some of the most difficult challenges being confronted are those that cut across the various critical mission areas, such as balancing homeland security funding needs with other national requirements, improving risk management methods for resource allocation and investments, developing adequate homeland security performance measures, developing a national enterprise architecture for homeland security, and clarifying the roles and responsibilities among the levels of government and the private sector. GAO has also identified a large diversity of other challenges in each of the six critical mission areas since September 11.
gao_GAO-04-498	gao_GAO-04-498_0	Factors Causing Prices to Increase We identified five factors that accounted for about 95 percent of the sales price increase from $119.99 per direct labor hour in fiscal year 2000 to $237.84 per hour in fiscal year 2004. By far the most significant of these factors was material costs, which accounted for about 67 percent of the total increase. Air Force depot maintenance officials have yet to complete an effective and comprehensive analysis to determine the underlying causes of the material cost increases. Our analysis also showed that the fiscal year 2004 cash surcharge was unnecessary because the Air Force Working Capital Fund’s $2.5 billion cash balance as of January 31, 2004, was already more than $1.3 billion higher than the maximum level allowed by DOD policy. Either the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Congress could use this unneeded cash to satisfy other requirements. Further, our analysis showed that about 61 percent of the higher labor cost was due to factors that are largely beyond the activity group’s control, such as annual cost-of-living increases and increased costs for health benefits for federal employees. The $2.5 billion amount was more than $1.3 billion higher than the maximum allowed by DOD policy. When we contacted Office of the Secretary of Defense officials in March 2004 about the Air Force Working Capital Fund’s excess cash, in general, and the depot maintenance activity group’s fiscal year 2004 cash surcharge, in particular, they stated that they allowed the Air Force to include a cash surcharge in its depot maintenance activity group’s fiscal year 2004 sales prices because (1) problems related to ongoing efforts to implement a new accounting system made the reliability of the activity group’s accounting data questionable and (2) uncertainty related to ongoing actions to remove contract depot maintenance operations from the Air Force Working Capital Fund made it difficult to reliably project future cash collections and disbursements. Prices Charged Customers Were Not Set High Enough to Recover Costs Prices that the depot maintenance activity group charged customers were not set high enough to recover the group’s reported costs of performing the work. Air Force officials at the three air logistics centers and the Air Force Materiel Command informed us that the activity group’s prices were not set high enough because the Air Force artificially constrained the activity group’s prices for fiscal years 2000 through 2003 by not including all anticipated costs in the prices. The Air Force changed its sales price development philosophy in 2002 in an effort to bring prices charged customers in fiscal year 2004 more in line with operating costs. In addition, the Air Force allowed out-of-cycle price increases in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to alleviate projected losses. Customer Sales Prices Constrained Air Force officials told us the prices were constrained to help ensure that the activity group’s customers would be able to get needed work done with the amount of funds provided them through the budget process. Although these efforts represent a positive step in trying to better understand and control its depot maintenance costs, the Command has not (1) completed a successful methodology for analyzing the reasons for the rapid material cost increases and (2) entered data into a data repository that is to be used to share cost-saving ideas among the three air logistics centers on process improvements and track the costs and savings for these improvements. Scope and Methodology To determine what factors were primarily responsible for causing the composite sales price to increase from $119.99 per hour in fiscal year 2000 to $237.84 per hour in fiscal year 2004, we obtained and analyzed budget documents that provided information on cost factors, such as material costs, overhead costs, and salaries used in developing the prices. To determine if the Air Force has taken effective steps to improve efficiency and control the activity group’s costs, we obtained the Command’s depot maintenance database that contained 108 initiatives aimed at improving depot maintenance operations.	Why GAO Did This Study The Air Force depot maintenance activity group in-house operations generate about $5 billion in annual revenue principally by repairing aircraft, missiles, engines, and other assets. In doing so, the group operates under the working capital fund concept, where customers are to be charged the anticipated costs of providing goods and services to them. The group's average price for in-house work almost doubled between fiscal years 2000 and 2004 from $119.99 per hour to $237.84 per hour. GAO was asked to determine (1) what factors were primarily responsible for the price increase, (2) if the prices charged recovered the reported actual costs of performing the work, and (3) if the Air Force has taken effective steps to improve efficiency and control the activity group's costs. What GAO Found GAO identified five primary factors that showed why the Air Force depot maintenance activity group's average price increased from $119.99 per direct labor hour of work in fiscal year 2000 to $237.84 per hour in fiscal year 2004. An increase in material costs accounted for about 67 percent of the total increase and was by far the most significant factor. The Air Force has identified some of the causes of the higher material costs such as aging aircraft, but has yet to complete an effective and comprehensive analysis of material cost increases. As a result, it (1) cannot quantify the extent to which individual causes contributed to higher costs and (2) does not know if it has identified all of the major causes. GAO's analysis of the other four factors showed that (1) the increase in labor costs was due largely to events beyond the group's control, such as annual salary increases, (2) the increase in business operations costs was due partly to costs related to implementing a new accounting system, (3) a surcharge intended to recoup anticipated losses on work carried over from the previous fiscal year may have been unnecessary, and (4) a surcharge intended to generate additional cash in fiscal year 2004 for the Air Force Working Capital Fund was unnecessary. GAO's analysis showed that due in part to these surcharges (1) the Air Force Working Capital Fund, which includes the depot maintenance and several other activity groups, had a $2.5 billion cash balance as of January 31, 2004 and (2) this balance was more than $1.3 billion higher than the maximum level allowed by DOD policy. Either the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Congress could use this unneeded cash to satisfy other requirements. DOD officials told us that they are exploring options on what to do with the excess cash. GAO's analysis of the group's financial reports showed that prices charged customers were not set high enough to recover about $1.1 billion of the group's reported costs for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. The activity group is required by DOD policy to set prices to recoup the cost of doing work. However, Air Force officials informed us that the prices were artificially constrained to help ensure that the group's customers would be able to get needed work done with the amount of funds provided to them through the budget process. The Air Force changed its sales price development philosophy to bring prices charged customers in fiscal year 2004 more in line with operating costs. In addition, the Air Force allowed out-of-cycle price increases in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to alleviate projected losses. Further, the Air Force Materiel Command has not been successful in its efforts to control costs. Although several promising initiatives are underway, the Command has not (1) developed a successful methodology for analyzing the reasons for the rapid material cost increase and (2) effectively utilized an established data repository for sharing cost-saving ideas among the three air logistics centers on process improvements and to demonstrate whether its cost savings initiatives have been successful.
gao_GGD-98-10	gao_GGD-98-10_0	The Results Act requires a strategic plan that includes six elements: (1) a comprehensive agency mission statement, (2) long-term goals and objectives for the major functions and operations of the agency, (3) approaches or strategies to achieve goals and objectives and the various resources needed to do so, (4) a discussion of the relationship between long-term goals/objectives and annual performance goals, (5) an identification of key external factors beyond agency control that could significantly affect achievement of strategic goals, and (6) a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations. Although OMB’s July draft included elements addressing its mission, goals and objectives, strategies, and key external factors affecting its goals, we suggested that these elements could be enhanced to better reflect the purposes of the Results Act and to more explicitly discuss how OMB will achieve its governmentwide management responsibilities. OMB’s September plan addresses the six required elements of the Results Act. At the same time, enhancements could make the plan more useful to OMB and the Congress in assessing OMB’s progress in meeting its goals. However, OMB’s plan could more specifically address how OMB intends to work with agencies to resolve long-standing management problems and high-risk issues with governmentwide implications. Such efforts are noteworthy because some of OMB’s activities, such as developing the President’s budget or coordinating the administration’s legislative program, present challenges for defining quantifiable performance measures and implementation schedules. OMB’s discussion of program evaluation could provide more information about how evaluations were used in developing its plan and how evaluations will be used to assess OMB’s and federal agencies’ capacity and progress in achieving the purposes of the Results Act. As we noted in our review of the July draft plan, evaluations are especially critical for providing a source of information for the Congress and others to ensure the validity and reasonableness of OMB’s goals and strategies and to identify factors likely to affect the results of programs and initiatives. In summary, OMB has made significant improvements in its strategic plan.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed how well the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) strategic plan addresses the Government Performance and Results Act's requirements and some of the challenges remaining for OMB to address in future planning efforts. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) since its July 1997 draft, OMB has made changes to the plan based on its continuing planning efforts, congressional consultations, and comments from others; (2) overall, OMB's September 1997 plan addresses all required elements of the Results Act and reflects several of the enhancements GAO suggested in its review of the July draft; (3) specific improvements include: (a) goals and objectives that show a clearer results-orientation; (b) more clearly defined strategies for achieving these goals and objectives; and (c) an increased recognition of some of the crosscutting issues OMB needs to address; (4) however, additional enhancements to several of the plan's required elements and a fuller discussion of major management challenges confronting the federal government could help make the plan more useful to the Congress and OMB; (5) for example, the plan could provide a more explicit discussion of OMB's strategies on such subjects as information technology, high-risk issues, overlap among federal missions and programs, and strengthening program evaluation; (6) OMB's strategic plan indicates that the agency will use its annual performance plan, the governmentwide performance plan, other functional management plans, and the President's Budget to provide additional information about how it plans to address some of these and other critical management issues; (7) GAO will continue to review OMB's plans and proposals as additional detail concerning objectives, time frames, and priorities is established; and (8) GAO's intention is to apply an integrated perspective in looking at these plans, consistent with the intent of the Results Act, to ensure that OMB achieves the results expected by its statutory authorities.
gao_GAO-17-601	gao_GAO-17-601_0	A DOD Executive Agent is the head of a DOD component. This information is based on our analysis of ODCMO’s list of DOD Executive Agents. Weaknesses Exist in DOD’s Approach to Tracking Its DOD Executive Agents We found that DOD has weaknesses in its approach to tracking its DOD Executive Agents, resulting in ODCMO not having an accurate accounting of the number of DOD Executive Agents. For example, we found 10 designations on DOD’s list of DOD Executive Agents that were not accurate, including the following: Disestablished DOD Executive Agents: Three DOD Executive Agent designations that were on ODCMO’s list had been disestablished; however, they had not been removed from the list. Without taking steps to ensure that it is accurately tracking its Executive Agents, ODCMO will not be able to effectively oversee the DOD Executive Agent program. As a result, DOD’s list of Executive Agents will continue to be out dated and incomplete. About Half of the DOD Executive Agents Who Responded to Our Questionnaire Were Not Assessed According to the 70 DOD Executive Agents responding to our questionnaire, OSD Principal Staff Assistants responsible for assessing DOD Executive Agents have not conducted assessments of about half (37 of 70) of the DOD Executive Agents in the past 3 years, as required by DOD guidance. 2.) The directive also assigns ODCMO the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the directive. Without verifying that the OSD Principal Staff Assistants for all DOD Executive Agents have completed required assessments and providing implementing guidance requiring the documentation of the assessments, the department does not have reasonable assurance that OSD Principal Staff Assistants are assessing DOD Executive Agents or that DOD Executive Agents—as a management arrangement—are accomplishing department objectives. According to DOD officials, conducting these periodic assessments would assist the department in reviewing DOD Executive Agent designations to ensure that the department is managing its resources efficiently and effectively. However, ODCMO faces challenges in overseeing DOD Executive Agents. Recommendations for Executive Action We recommend that DOD’s Deputy Chief Management Officer take the following three actions: strengthen its approach to track DOD Executive Agents to ensure that its list and contact information are current and complete; verify that the OSD Principal Staff Assistants for all DOD Executive Agents have completed their required assessments every 3 years; and issue implementing guidance that OSD Principal Staff Assistants should document the assessments of DOD Executive Agents, including documenting how the assessments address the DOD Executive Agents’ continued need, currency, and effectiveness and efficiency in meeting end-user needs. In written comments, which are summarized below and reprinted in appendix II, DOD concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: List of Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agents The Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (ODCMO) maintains a list of DOD Executive Agents. The list includes information about each DOD Executive Agent, such as the title of the DOD Executive Agent assignment, the office assigned as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Principal Staff Assistant, the department official who designated the DOD Executive Agent, and the date of the DOD Executive Agent assignment.	Why GAO Did This Study DOD maintains military forces with unparalleled capabilities. However, the department continues to confront weaknesses in the management of its business functions that support these forces. DOD uses Executive Agents, which are intended to facilitate collaboration, to achieve critical department objectives. Senate Report 114-255, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision that GAO review DOD Executive Agents. This report (1) describes the number and focus of DOD Executive Agents; and evaluates the extent to which DOD (2) tracks its Executive Agents and (3) conducts periodic assessments of its Executive Agents. GAO reviewed relevant DOD directives and the list of Executive Agents; developed and implemented a questionnaire to DOD's Executive Agents; and interviewed relevant DOD officials. What GAO Found Based on GAO's analysis, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 81 Executive Agents—management arrangements where the head of a DOD component is designated specific roles and responsibilities to accomplish objectives when more than one component is involved. These Executive Agents are assigned to 12 DOD components and support a range of activities, including managing technology and developing training programs. The Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent for almost half of them (38 of 81). DOD's Executive Agent directive requires that the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (ODCMO) maintain a list of Executive Agent designations and oversee their assessments, among other things. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Principal Staff Assistants are required to assess their respective Executive Agents every 3 years to determine their continued need, currency, efficiency, and effectiveness. GAO found weaknesses in DOD's approach to tracking its Executive Agents, resulting in inaccuracies regarding 10 Executive Agents. For example, DOD's list of Executive Agents included several that are not currently active. While ODCMO is required to maintain a list of Executive Agents, ODCMO officials rely on self-reported information from DOD Executive Agents and OSD Principal Staff Assistants. Without taking steps to accurately track DOD Executive Agents, DOD's list will continue to be out dated and ODCMO cannot effectively oversee DOD Executive Agents. Principal Staff Assistants had not periodically assessed more than half (37 of 70) of DOD Executive Agents that responded to GAO's questionnaire (see figure). ODCMO is responsible for overseeing the implementation of DOD's Executive Agents directive, which requires that Principal Staff Assistants conduct assessments; however, ODCMO officials told GAO they do not ensure that Principal Staff Assistants have conducted these assessments. GAO also found that Principal Staff Assistants are not required to document these assessments. Without verifying the completion of these assessments and issuing guidance requiring their documentation, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that DOD Executive Agents are accomplishing department objectives. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that ODCMO strengthen its approach to track DOD Executive Agents; verify assessments are conducted; and issue implementing guidance for documenting assessments. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-10-116	gao_GAO-10-116_0	Water plays a critical role in many aspects of this life cycle. Water is also important for conversion of feedstocks into biofuels. In particular, water is used for heating and cooling as well as for processing. Each Stage of Biofuel Production Affects Water Resources, but the Extent Depends on the Feedstock and Region The extent to which increased biofuel production will affect the nation’s water resources will depend on which feedstocks are selected for production and which areas of the country they are produced in. This will happen because corn requires high applications of fertilizers relative to soybeans and other potential biofuel feedstocks, such as perennial grasses. Little Is Yet Known about the Water Resource Implications of Next Generation Feedstocks Next generation feedstocks for biofuels have the potential for fewer negative effects on water resources, although several of the experts and officials that we spoke with said that the magnitude of these effects remains largely unknown because these feedstocks have not yet been grown on a commercial scale. Conversion of these next generation feedstocks is expected to use less water when compared to conventional feedstocks in the long run, according to some experts. They said the technology has not been optimized and commercial-scale production has not yet been demonstrated, therefore any estimates on water use by cellulosic biorefineries are simply projections at this time. The Effect of Increased Biofuel Production Will Vary by Region, Due to Differences in Water Resources and State Laws According to many experts and officials that we contacted, as biofuel production increases, farmers and the biofuel production industry will need to consider regional differences in water supply and quality when choosing which feedstocks to grow and how and where to expand their biofuel production capacity. Agricultural Practices, Technological Innovations, and Alternative Water Sources Can Mitigate Some Water Resource Effects of Biofuels Production, but There Are Barriers to Adoption Agricultural conservation practices can reduce the effects of increased biofuel feedstock cultivation on water supply and water quality, but there are several barriers to widespread adoption of these practices. Similarly, the process of converting feedstocks to biofuels, technological innovations, and the use of alternative water sources can help reduce water supply and water quality impacts, but these options can be cost prohibitive and certain noneconomic barriers to their widespread use remain. Furthermore, according to EPA, planting drought-resistant crops, such as corn, may lead to increased cultivation in areas where it has not previously occurred and may result in problems including increased nutrient runoff. For example, technologies such as dry cooling systems are often prohibitively expensive and can increase energy consumption. Experts Identified a Variety of Key Research and Data Needs Related to Increased Biofuels Production and Local and Regional Water Resources Many of the experts and officials we spoke with identified areas where additional research is needed to evaluate and understand the effects of increased biofuel production on water resources. These needs fall into two broad areas: (1) research on the water effects of feedstock cultivation and conversion and (2) better data on local and regional water resources. Many experts and officials cited the need for more research into the development of drought-tolerant and water- and nutrient-efficient crop varieties to decrease the amount of water needed for irrigation and the amount of fertilizer that needs to be applied to biofuel feedstocks. However, according to the National Research Council, the current evapotranspiration rates of crops grown on such lands is not well known. Cultivation of algae. In addition, several experts and officials said that research is needed to understand the cultural pressures that may make farmers slow to adopt agricultural conservation practices. Conversion. For example, research into new technologies that further reduce water needs for biorefinery cooling systems would have a significant impact on the overall water use at a biorefinery, according to several experts. Some experts also noted the need for research on the availability of lower-quality water sources such as brackish groundwater, which could be used for cultivation of some next generation feedstocks, especially algae. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to USDA, DOE, DOI, and EPA for review and comment. USDA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its general comments, DOI stated that the report is useful and agreed with the finding on the need for better data on water resources to aid the decision about where to cultivate feedstocks and locate biorefineries. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives for this review were to describe (1) the known water resource effects of biofuel production in the United States; (2) the agricultural conservation practices and technological innovations that exist or are being developed to address these effects and any barriers that may prevent the adoption of these practices and technologies; and (3) key research needs regarding the effects of biofuel production on water resources. Reduces pesticide use.	Why GAO Did This Study In response to concerns about the nation's energy dependence on imported oil, climate change, and other issues, the federal government has encouraged the use of biofuels. Water plays a crucial role in all stages of biofuel production--from cultivation of feedstock through its conversion into biofuel. As demand for water from various sectors increases and places additional stress on already constrained supplies, the effects of expanded biofuel production may need to be considered. To understand these potential effects, GAO was asked to examine (1) the known water resource effects of biofuel production in the United States; (2) agricultural conservation practices and technological innovations that could address these effects and any barriers to their adoption; and (3) key research needs regarding the effects of water resources on biofuel production. To address these issues, GAO reviewed scientific studies, interviewed experts and federal and state officials, and selected five states to study their programs and plans related to biofuel production. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. A draft of this report was provided to the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy (DOE), and the Interior (DOI); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). USDA, DOE, and DOI concurred with the report and, in addition to EPA, provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found The extent to which increased biofuels production will affect the nation's water resources depends on the type of feedstock selected and how and where it is grown. For example, to the extent that this increase is met from the cultivation of conventional feedstocks, such as corn, it could have greater water resource impacts than if the increase is met by next generation feedstocks, such as perennial grasses and woody biomass, according to experts and officials. This is because corn is a relatively resource-intensive crop, and in certain parts of the country requires considerable irrigated water as well as fertilizer and pesticide application. However, experts and officials noted that next generation feedstocks have not yet been grown on a commercial scale and therefore their actual effects on water resources are not fully known at this time. Water is also used in the process of converting feedstocks to biofuels, and while the efficiency of biorefineries producing corn ethanol has increased over time, the amount of water required for converting next generation feedstocks into biofuels is still not well known. Finally, experts generally agree that it will be important to take into account the regional variability of water resources when choosing which feedstocks to grow and how and where to expand their production in the United States. The use of certain agricultural practices, alternative water sources, and technological innovations can mitigate the effects of biofuels production on water resources, but there are some barriers to their widespread adoption. According to experts and officials, agricultural conservation practices can reduce water use and nutrient runoff, but they are often costly to implement. Similarly, alternative water sources, such as brackish water, may be viable for some aspects of the biofuel conversion process and can help reduce biorefineries' reliance on freshwater. However, the high cost of retrofitting plants to use these water sources may be a barrier, according to experts and officials. Finally, innovations--such as dry cooling systems and thermochemical processes--have the potential to reduce the amount of water used by biorefineries, but many of these innovations are currently not economically feasible or remain untested at the commercial scale. Many of the experts GAO spoke with identified several areas where additional research is needed. These needs fall into two broad areas: (1) feedstock cultivation and biofuel conversion and (2) data on water resources. For example, some experts noted the need for further research into improved crop varieties, which could help reduce water and fertilizer needs. In addition, several experts identified research that would aid in developing next generation feedstocks. For example, several experts said research is needed on how to increase cultivation of algae for biofuel to a commercial scale and how to control for potential water quality problems. In addition, several experts said research is needed on how to optimize conversion technologies to help ensure water efficiency. Finally, some experts said that better data on water resources in local aquifers and surface water bodies would aid in decisions about where to cultivate feedstocks and locate biorefineries.
gao_GAO-16-808T	gao_GAO-16-808T_0	Several Factors Affect the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance to People inside Syria We identified three key factors that affect delivery of humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria. U.S. Agencies and Their Implementing Partners Have Assessed Some Risks to Their Programs, but Most Partners Have Not Assessed Fraud Risks State, USAID, and their implementing partners have assessed some types of risk to their programs inside Syria, but most partners have not assessed the risk of fraud. In the context of Syria, such risks could include theft and diversion; fraud; safety; security; program governance; and implementing partner capacity risks. Although most of the implementing partners in our sample did not conduct assessments of the risk of fraud, there are elevated risks for fraud in U.S. funded humanitarian assistance projects for people inside Syria. Further, in May 2016, USAID OIG reported the identification of bid- rigging and multiple bribery and kickback schemes related to contracts to deliver humanitarian aid in Syria, investigations of which resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and individuals involved with aid programs from Turkey. Agencies Could Improve Oversight We found that partners in our sample had implemented controls to mitigate certain risks of delivering humanitarian assistance inside Syria. State and USAID have taken steps to oversee partner programs delivering humanitarian assistance inside Syria; nevertheless, opportunities to assess and mitigate the potential impact of fraud risks remain. U.S. officials cited a variety of oversight activities. Further, in October 2015, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance hired a third party monitoring organization to review its projects in Syria. Given the opportunity for fraud that exists in humanitarian assistance programs, as well as the ongoing USAID OIG investigations, without instructions to specifically collect data on fraud and training to identify it, USAID may be missing an opportunity to assist in its activities to mitigate fraud risks and design appropriate controls. In addition, USAID should ensure its field monitors (1) are trained to identify potential fraud risks and (2) collect information on them.	Why GAO Did This Study This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's July 2016 report, entitled Syria Humanitarian Assistance: Some Risks of Providing Aid inside Syria Assessed, but U.S. Agencies Could Improve Fraud Oversight ( GAO-16-629 ). What GAO Found Delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria is complicated by three factors including a dangerous operating environment, access constraints, and remote management of programs. Active conflict creates a dangerous environment characterized by attacks on aid facilities and workers, and humanitarian organizations face difficulties accessing those in need. Additionally, U.S. agency officials must manage programs in Syria remotely, increasing risks to the program, including opportunities for fraud. Despite these challenges, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. humanitarian assistance has reached 4 million people inside Syria per month. The Department of State (State), USAID, and their implementing partners have assessed some types of risk to their programs inside Syria, but most partners have not assessed the risk of fraud. Of the 9 implementing partners in GAO's sample of funding instruments, most assessed risks related to safety and security, but only 4 of 9 assessed fraud risks. Such an assessment is important as USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has uncovered multiple instances of fraud affecting U.S. programs delivering humanitarian assistance to Syria. In May 2016, USAID OIG reported that 1 of its active fraud investigations resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and individuals. Given the challenging environment in Syria, fraud risk assessments could help U.S. agencies better identify and address risks to help ensure aid reaches those in need. Partners have implemented controls to mitigate certain risks, but U.S. agencies could improve financial oversight. For example, almost all partners in our sample have controls to mitigate safety risks and some use technology to monitor the transport of goods. Additionally, U.S. agencies have taken steps to oversee activities in Syria, such as quarterly meetings with partners and spot checks of partner warehouses. Further, in October 2015, USAID hired a third party monitor to improve oversight of its activities and help verify progress of its programs. However, the monitors' training curriculum lacks modules on identifying fraud risks. Without such training, monitors may overlook potential fraud risks and miss opportunities to collect data that could help USAID improve its financial oversight.
gao_HEHS-97-34	gao_HEHS-97-34_0	In addition to introducing new programs, almost every state used federal funds to fill gaps in existing FPS services. States Place Somewhat More Emphasis on Family Support Services As the law requires, most states are spending a significant portion of their federal funds for family preservation services and family support services. According to federal and state officials, some states had already spent considerable state or other federal funds for family preservation services and decided—either at the onset or based on planning results—to place greater emphasis on family support services. Most of these states said that they experienced delays in designing or developing FPS services. Other Activities Are Designed to Improve Service Delivery While states appear to be using most of their federal FPS funds to initiate or expand family preservation or family support services, many states are also undertaking a variety of activities to enable the service-delivery system to serve vulnerable children and families more effectively and efficiently. States Will Use Various Measures and Methods to Track Results States plan to track the results of federally funded services by using a variety of measures. At a minimum, all states report that they will track the number of children and families served and most will measure the extent to which their needs are being met. Finally, at least 45 states plan to monitor traditional indicators of child welfare, such as the number of child abuse and neglect reports, and changes over time in one or more aspects of the service-delivery system. Federal Evaluations Are Designed to Assess Impact Two federal evaluations are underway to rigorously assess the impact of FPS programs on children and families—one for family preservation and the other for family support services. Early Results Are Few, but Service-Delivery Approaches Have Been Affected Although it is too early to identify service impacts on children and families, 10 states reported that program results were available on federally funded FPS services. In particular, HHS emphasized the availability of new and expanded programs for both family preservation and support services, the focus on family support as a balance to family preservation, and the extension of services to families otherwise overlooked. The Congress has asked us to study the nature and extent of new family preservation and support services since the enactment of OBRA 1993, and how states are assessing the impact of these services on families, children and communities. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Expand existing family preservation programs to new locations? 5. of types of (2) (3) (1) (1) know (2) 1. 2. 4. Changes in parent-child relationships, family satisfaction, or family functioning? 11.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of states' use of funds for family preservation and support (FPS) services, focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of states' use of federal funds for new and expanded FPS services; and (2) states' plans to assess the impact of these services on children and their families and impacts identified to date. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) all states reported that they are using federal funds to increase the availability of family preservation and family support services either by creating new programs or expanding existing programs; (2) 44 states said that they introduced new programs; (3) 47 states reported enhancing their existing programs or expanding them to serve more clients; (4) as required by the law, GAO's analysis shows that states appear to be allocating a significant portion of their federal funds to both family preservation and family support services: (5) in the last 2 years, states budgeted 56 percent of their service dollars to family support and 44 percent to family preservation; (6) the somewhat greater emphasis on family support services reflects priorities established through state and community planning efforts; (7) moreover, many states already had family preservation programs in place and decided to bolster family support services; (8) to determine whether this infusion of federal funds improves services for children and families, GAO identified a number of efforts that are underway or planned to assess programs providing FPS services; (9) states plan to track the results of their federally funded services, for example, by measuring the number of clients served and the extent to which their needs are met, improvements in parent-child relationships, the degree that services are coordinated, and indicators of community well-being, such as child abuse rates; (10) although not required to do so, at least 11 states are also planning formal evaluations to determine whether the services actually improve outcomes for families; (11) two federally sponsored evaluations are underway to assess the effectiveness of family preservation and family support services; (12) early results from 10 states indicate some successes, such as preventing child removal and continued maltreatment; and (13) while it is too early to determine the impact of these programs, federal and state officials report that the extensive community and interagency collaboration required by the law has resulted in improved identification of service needs, setting of priorities, and receipt of services by at-risk families otherwise overlooked.
gao_GAO-14-288	gao_GAO-14-288_0	They provide financial and technical assistance to agricultural producers and rural communities. In addition to closing offices, NRCS offered buyout and early retirement incentives to employees affected by the soil survey office closures. Develop workforce reshaping strategies that fully consider alternative methods. This was also the case for the percentage change in the size of the workforces from fiscal years 2011 to 2012. USDA’s Policy on Supervisory Ratios Did Not Align with OPM Guidance in Fiscal Year 2012 In fiscal year 2012, USDA policy on supervisory ratios, which targeted a uniform supervisory ratio of one supervisor for at least nine employees at all USDA agencies, did not align with OPM guidance. OPM’s guidance states that analyzing customer needs and workload distribution can help agencies achieve the right balance of supervisory and nonsupervisory positions to support their missions. USDA officials were not able to provide us with a documented basis for this target ratio. USDA’s Service Center Agencies Generally or Partially Followed Leading Practices When Closing Offices and Reducing Staff in Fiscal Year 2012 In fiscal year 2012, USDA’s service center agencies followed or partially followed four leading practices when closing offices. FSA and RD fully followed two of the four leading practices and partially followed two others. Demonstrate a Clear Linkage to Workforce Reshaping or Overarching Strategic Goals NRCS followed, FSA partially followed, and RD did not follow the leading practice of demonstrating a clear linkage to workforce reshaping or overall strategic goals when using buyout and early retirement incentives (FSA , as shown in fig. In addition, RD officials did not have a human capital or workforce plan to clearly document links between its incentives and its workforce reshaping goals. Specifically, without linking buyout and early retirement incentives to workforce reshaping or broader strategic goals, RD could not show whether its remaining workforce has the right balance of skills in the right locations to support its mission. Consider Employees’ Needs NRCS and RD followed and FSA partially followed the leading practice of considering employees needs when using buyout and early retirement incentives (FSA , RD , NRCS , as shown in fig. USDA’s policy governing organizational changes does not direct agencies to fully follow leading practices such as presenting all elements of a business-case or cost-benefit analysis or measuring progress toward stated goals. In its comment letter, USDA generally agreed with some of the findings and disagreed with one finding and recommendation. USDA did not explicitly comment on other recommendations. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines: (1) how the workforces of USDA’s service center agencies changed from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2012, (2) the extent to which USDA’s policy on supervisory ratios aligned with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance in fiscal year 2012, and (3) the extent to which USDA’s service center agencies followed leading practices when closing offices and reducing staff in fiscal year 2012. We chose the three USDA service center agencies—the Farm Service Agency (FSA), Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and Rural Development (RD)—because, of the eight USDA agencies that had announced they would close offices and programs in fiscal year 2012, these agencies had the largest staffing level percent reductions. To determine the extent to which USDA policy on supervisory ratios aligned with OPM guidance in fiscal year 2012, we reviewed OPM guidance on its Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework and compared it with USDA’s policy on supervisory ratios; analyzed workforce data from OPM and USDA databases on supervisory ratios; reviewed reports from USDA’s service center agencies on their supervisory ratios and compared them with USDA guidance on calculating supervisory ratios, as well as standards for internal control in the federal government; and interviewed officials from OPM, USDA, and USDA’s service center agencies. 9).	Why GAO Did This Study FSA, NRCS, and RD, USDA's service center agencies, interact directly with agricultural producers and rural communities through extensive field office structures. Achieving their missions depends in part on sustaining workforces with the necessary knowledge and skills. In fiscal year 2012, FSA, NRCS, and RD closed field offices and offered buyout and early retirement incentives to employees. GAO was asked to review aspects of USDA's human capital management. This report examines: (1) how the workforces of USDA's service center agencies changed from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2012, (2) the extent to which USDA's policy on supervisory ratios aligned with OPM guidance in fiscal year 2012, and (3) the extent to which USDA's service center agencies followed leading practices when closing offices and reducing staff in fiscal year 2012. GAO analyzed workforce data from OPM and USDA, reviewed documents, interviewed relevant officials, and compared leading practices with the actions agencies took to close offices and reduce staff in fiscal year 2012. What GAO Found From fiscal years 2003 to 2012, the size of the workforces declined at the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) service center agencies—the Farm Service Agency (FSA), Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and Rural Development (RD). The size of USDA's service center agencies declined by a higher percentage from fiscal years 2011 to 2012 than the average annual percent decline from fiscal years 2003 to 2012 (see fig.). In fiscal year 2012, USDA policy on supervisory ratios did not align with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance that states that an analytical approach can help agencies achieve the right balance of supervisory and nonsupervisory positions to support their missions. Instead, USDA's policy stated that all its agencies, regardless of their missions, should aim for a target ratio of one supervisor for at least nine employees (1:9). USDA officials were not able to provide a documented basis for this target ratio. In addition, USDA did not ensure that the service center agencies calculated their supervisory ratios the same way. As a result, USDA did not receive comparable information on supervisory ratios. In fiscal year 2012, USDA's service center agencies generally followed or partially followed leading practices that GAO has identified when closing offices and using buyout and early retirement incentives as follows: In closing offices, NRCS fully followed, and FSA and RD partially followed, the practice to present a business-case or cost-benefit analysis. USDA's policy on organizational changes did not direct agencies to follow leading practices to demonstrate to stakeholders they considered information such as underlying assumptions and other alternatives. In using buyout and early retirement incentives, all three agencies fully followed practices to identify reshaping goals and to develop strategies that consider alternatives. However, NRCS followed, FSA partially followed, and RD did not follow the practice to link incentives to workforce reshaping or overall strategic goals. FSA and RD did not have human capital or workforce plans to clearly document how these strategies linked with broader efforts and could not show whether their remaining workforces had the right balance of skills in the right locations to support their missions. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends, among other things, that USDA take actions to revise its supervisory ratios policy; amend its policy on organizational changes to follow leading practices; and require RD and FSA to document links between various incentives and reshaping or strategic goals. USDA generally agreed with GAO's findings but disagreed with one finding and recommendation on supervisory ratios. GAO continues to believe in the need for a revised supervisory ratios policy.
gao_GAO-04-426	gao_GAO-04-426_0	National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide the Process for Acquiring Firefighting Resources National policies and procedures were in place and provided the framework to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring firefighting resources for the Biscuit Fire. To facilitate the swift suppression of new fires—called the “initial attack” phase of a fire—local dispatch center personnel can first contact neighboring dispatch centers directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource requests to the regional or national level. Grants Pass Dispatch Center Personnel Sought a Variety of Firefighting Resources for the Initial Attack of the Biscuit Fire When the first two fires were found on the afternoon of July 13, 2002, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have the firefighting resources needed locally to fight the fires. The fires, located in the Siskiyou National Forest, were initially small—two trees and 1 acre. Figure 6 shows the new fires found in southern Oregon and Northern California on July 13 and 14. At 6:40 p.m., in response to the July 13 request for a helicopter, a regional dispatch official in Portland working with officials in the Northern California regional dispatch center in Redding, the Fortuna dispatch center, and the Grants Pass dispatch center arranged for a CDF helicopter with a water bucket to respond to the Biscuit fires, as allowed under the provisions of the mutual aid agreement. However, a Forest Service official also working at Fortuna to dispatch firefighting resources had a differing opinion, saying that even if Fortuna had sent the helicopter to Oregon, he believes that it likely would have been diverted back to California to suppress other higher priority fires in Fortuna’s direct protection area. Because Grants Pass dispatch did not request assistance from Fortuna on the first day of the Biscuit Fire, there was no discussion at that time about whether this would have been the best use of the helicopter. Reduced Availability of Key Personnel Hampered the Ability to Effectively Fight the Biscuit Fire Following the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed personnel hampered efforts to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire in three key ways. This was largely because the Biscuit fires were not threatening lives and property. Some Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State and Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified There are some differences in certification standards for personnel between state and federal wildland firefighting agencies, but these differences did not appear to have affected efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire. In the case of the Biscuit Fire, Grants Pass dispatch personnel did communicate resource needs to their regional dispatch center in Portland, but no resources were immediately available due to other higher priority fires in the region. Whether this would have resulted in any resources being provided for the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire is unclear because personnel in the Fortuna dispatch center disagree on whether any resources could have been spared, given that fires were also burning in Northern California at the time. Since no request was made, the priority of the Biscuit Fire relative to other ongoing fires within the Fortuna dispatch center’s direct protection area was not discussed on the first day of the Biscuit Fire, and the outcome of such a request, had it been made, remains unclear. The Forest Service commented that the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments. Scope and Methodology To determine whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified, we reviewed national policies and procedures that included the National Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations and the National Interagency Mobilization Guide. To determine what differences, if any, existed in key personnel certification standards at federal and state agencies involved in fighting wildland fires— particularly in Oregon—we reviewed the interagency qualification standards established by NWCG.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire seasons in the past 50 years--almost 7 million acres burned. These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century--the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3- day period beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost over $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments. What GAO Found National policies and procedures were in place and provided the framework to guide personnel in the local interagency dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring resources to fight the Biscuit Fire. These policies and procedures provide for a multilevel dispatching system where, if sufficient firefighting personnel and equipment are not available locally, resource requests can be elevated to other dispatch centers at the regional and, if necessary, national level. To facilitate the swift suppression of new fires, local dispatch center personnel can contact neighboring centers directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource requests. When the first two fires were found on July 13, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient firefighting resources available locally. Grants Pass personnel requested resources from the responsible regional center in Portland, as well as from a dispatch center in central Oregon, but no resources were immediately available in the region due to other higher priority fires that were threatening lives and property. Grants Pass personnel did not request resources from a neighboring interagency dispatch center in Fortuna, California, located in an adjoining dispatch region, because they believed the center had no available resources due to fire activity there. State officials working at the Fortuna dispatch center later said that a Fortuna-based helicopter fighting fires in Northern California near the first of the five Biscuit fires could have been made available to suppress this fire. However, Forest Service officials working with Fortuna personnel disagreed, saying that the helicopter had been needed to fight fires in California. Because no request was made, there was no discussion on that first day about whether the Biscuit Fire would have been the best use of the helicopter, and it is unclear, in any case, what the outcome of such a request would have been. Following the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed personnel hampered efforts to fight the rapidly growing fire. Specifically, officials faced problems obtaining (1) highly experienced management teams to direct suppression strategies and crews to carry the strategies out, (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment, and (3) support staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted crews. An unusually severe fire season, with many other higher priority fires, affected the availability of personnel needed to fight the Biscuit Fire. Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for personnel between federal and state agencies responsible for fighting wildland fires, these differences did not appear to affect efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire.
gao_HEHS-96-196	gao_HEHS-96-196_0	Given the magnitude of the financial problems facing the Social Security system and the nature of the proposals for changing the system, we can expect the debate over the financing and structure of the Social Security system to continue and intensify in the coming years. To manage the disability caseload growth, increase efficiency, and improve service to its customers, SSA has started a massive effort to fundamentally change how disability decisions are made. Complicating SSA’s efforts is its aging workforce: 47 percent of SSA’s senior executives and 30 percent of its grade 13 to 15 personnel are eligible to retire over the next 5 years. Observations on Leadership Needed to Manage Challenges As the 21st century approaches, SSA faces dramatic challenges: funding future retirement benefits, rethinking disability processes and programs, combating fraud and abuse, and restructuring how work is performed and services delivered. SSA’s success in meeting these challenges is critical. It also stated that it has made progress in redesigning its disability claims process and in returning disabled beneficiaries to work. Copies also will be available to others on request. SSA Disability: Program Redesign Necessary to Encourage Return to Work (GAO/HEHS-96-62, Apr. Social Security Administration: Leadership Challenges Accompany Transition to an Independent Agency (GAO/HEHS-95-59, Feb. 15, 1995).	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Social Security Administration's (SSA): (1) progress in meeting challenges; and (2) status as an independent agency. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) while SSA is starting to manage for results and improve financial accountability, it has not taken steps to contribute to the public debate on the future financing of the Social Security system; (2) unless changes are made to the system, the Social Security trust funds will be depleted by 2029; (3) SSA disability caseloads are growing, and SSA is trying to fundamentally redesign the disability claims process; (4) SSA has not adequately promoted return-to-work programs in redesigning its disability processes; (5) SSA should do more to combat fraud and abuse in the Supplemental Security Income Program; (6) SSA is reducing its staff, and nearly half of its senior executives will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years; (7) these workload challenges will complicate the tasks SSA faces; (8) SSA is working to modernize its information systems, but this effort will be costly and complex; and (9) effective leadership is critical to SSA efforts to modernize and meet future challenges.
gao_GAO-10-419T	gao_GAO-10-419T_0	These reports have provided a window into the U.S. population’s exposure to chemicals, and the CDC continues to develop new methods for collecting data on additional chemical exposures with each report. Biomonitoring research is difficult to integrate into this risk assessment process, since estimates of human exposure to chemicals have historically been based on the concentration of these chemicals in environmental media and on information about how people are exposed. EPA Has Made Limited Use of Biomonitoring Data in Assessing Risks Posed by Chemicals EPA has made limited use of biomonitoring data in its assessments of risks posed by chemicals. The most comprehensive biomonitoring effort providing data relevant to the entire U.S. population includes only 212 chemicals, whereas EPA is currently focusing its chemical assessment and management efforts on the more than 6,000 chemicals that companies produce in quantities of more than 25,000 pounds per year at one site. A second reason we reported for the agency’s limited use of biomonitoring data is that EPA often lacks the additional information needed to make biomonitoring studies useful in its risk assessment process. For most of the chemicals studied under current biomonitoring programs, more data on chemical effects are needed to understand whether the levels measured in people pose a health concern, but EPA’s ability to require chemical companies to develop such data is limited. Subsequently, the EPA Administrator set forth goals for updated legislation that would give EPA the mechanisms and authorities to promptly assess and regulate chemicals. EPA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Usefulness of Biomonitoring Data but Lacks a Comprehensive Research Strategy EPA has several biomonitoring research projects under way, but the agency has no system in place to track progress or assess the resources needed specifically for biomonitoring research. Also, EPA has not coordinated its biomonitoring research with that of the many agencies and other groups involved in biomonitoring research, which could impair its ability to address the significant data gaps in this field of research. Similarly, the National Academies of Science found that the lack of a coordinated research strategy allowed widespread exposures to go undetected, including exposure to flame retardants known as polybrominated diphenyl ethers—chemicals which may cause liver damage, among other things, according to some toxicological studies. However, though EPA agreed with our recommendation, th agency still lacks such a comprehensive strategy to guide its own research efforts. EPA’s Authority to Obtain Biomonitoring Data under TSCA Is Untested and May Be Limited EPA has not determined the extent of its authority to obtain biomonitoring data under TSCA, and this authority is generally untested and may be limited. However, biomonitoring data indicate only the presence of a chemical in a person’s body and not its impact on the person’s health. Other TSCA provisions allow EPA to collect existing information on chemicals that a company already has, knows about, or could reasonably ascertain. For example, section 8(e) requires chemical companies to report to EPA any information they have obtained that reasonably supports the conclusion that a chemical presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment. EPA asserts that biomonitoring data are reportable as demonstrating a substantial risk if the chemical in question is known to have serious toxic effects and the biomonitoring data indicate a level of exposure previously unknown to EPA. However, EPA’s authority to obtain biomonitoring data under section 8(e) of TSCA remains untested in court. Given the uncertainties regarding TSCA authorities, we have recommended that EPA should determine the extent of its legal authority to require companies to develop and submit biomonitoring data under TSCA. However, EPA has not yet attempted a comprehensive review of its authority to require the companies to develop and submit biomonitoring data. The agency did not disagree with our recommendation, but commented that a case-by-case explanation of its authority might be more useful than a global assessment.	Why GAO Did This Study Biomonitoring, which measures chemicals in people's tissues or body fluids, has shown that the U.S. population is widely exposed to chemicals used in everyday products. Some of these have the potential to cause cancer or birth defects. Moreover, children may be more vulnerable to harm from these chemicals than adults. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to control chemicals that pose unreasonable health risks. One crucial tool in this process is chemical risk assessment, which involves determining the extent to which populations will be exposed to a chemical and assessing how this exposure affects human health This testimony, based on GAO's prior work, reviews the (1) extent to which EPA incorporates information from biomonitoring studies into its assessments of chemicals, (2) steps that EPA has taken to improve the usefulness of biomonitoring data, and (3) extent to which EPA has the authority under TSCA to require chemical companies to develop and submit biomonitoring data to EPA. What GAO Found EPA has made limited use of biomonitoring data in its assessments of risks posed by commercial chemicals. One reason is that biomonitoring data relevant to the entire U.S. population exist for only 212 chemicals. In addition, biomonitoring data alone indicate only that a person was somehow exposed to a chemical, not the source of the exposure or its effect on the person's health. For most of the chemicals studied under current biomonitoring programs, more data on chemical effects are needed to understand if the levels measured in people pose a health concern, but EPA's authorities to require chemical companies to develop such data is limited. However, in September 2009, the EPA Administrator set forth goals for updated legislation to give EPA additional authorities to obtain data on chemicals. While EPA has initiated several research programs to make biomonitoring more useful to its risk assessment process, it has not developed a comprehensive strategy for this research that takes into account its own research efforts and those of the multiple federal agencies and other organizations involved in biomonitoring research. EPA does have several important biomonitoring research efforts, including research into the relationships between exposure to harmful chemicals, the resulting concentration of those chemicals in human tissue, and the corresponding health effects. However, without a plan to coordinate its research efforts, EPA has no means to track progress or assess the resources needed specifically for biomonitoring research. Furthermore, according to the National Academy of Sciences, the lack of a coordinated national research strategy has allowed widespread chemical exposures to go undetected, such as exposures to flame retardants. While EPA agreed with GAO's recommendation that EPA develop a comprehensive research strategy, the agency has not yet done so. EPA has not determined the extent of its authority to obtain biomonitoring data under TSCA, and this authority is untested and may be limited. The TSCA section that authorizes EPA to require companies to develop data focuses on health and environmental effects of chemicals. However, biomonitoring data indicate only the presence of a chemical in the body, not its impact on health. It may be easier for EPA to obtain biomonitoring data under other TSCA sections, which allow EPA to collect existing information on chemicals. For example, TSCA obligates chemical companies to report information that reasonably supports the conclusion that a chemical presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment. EPA asserts that biomonitoring data are reportable if a chemical is known to have serious toxic effects and biomonitoring data indicates a level of exposure previously unknown to EPA. EPA took action against a chemical company under this authority in 2004. However, the action was settled without an admission of liability by the company, so EPA's authority to obtain biomonitoring data remains untested. GAO's 2009 report recommended that EPA clarify this authority, but it has not yet done so. The agency did not disagree, but commented that a case-by-case explanation of its authority might be more useful than a global assessment.
gao_GAO-15-551	gao_GAO-15-551_0	See table 1. DHS’s small business goal for fiscal year 2015, as negotiated with SBA, is that 32 percent of its prime contract dollars will be awarded to small businesses department wide with no less than 5 percent to small disadvantaged businesses, including Section 8(a) small businesses; 5 percent to women-owned small businesses; 3 percent to SDVOSB small businesses; and three percent to small businesses in HUBZones. To further enhance small business opportunities, DHS also established procedures in the EAGLE II ordering guide—used by component contracting staff to issue task orders under the contracts—to facilitate the use of small business set-aside opportunities. In addition, a DHS small business specialist told us that the DHS Office of Procurement Operations sponsored meetings between awardees within each of EAGLE II’s small business tracks and DHS program managers to promote use of the small business tracks. EAGLE did not have a mechanism to replace these vendors with other small businesses. In addition, DHS created a new mechanism known as an “on ramp,” which according to DHS, permits DHS to replenish the pool of small businesses by reopening the EAGLE II solicitation to award additional IDIQ contracts to small businesses. CPO officials also noted that the use of teaming on EAGLE II allowed prime contractors to designate team members for the purpose of strengthening their offers. DHS Has Issued Most Task Orders to Small Businesses, but It Is Too Soon to Evaluate the Full Effect of the Key Steps As of March 31, 2015, DHS issued 74 EAGLE II task orders with a total estimated value of $591 million, almost all of which—about 94 percent— was issued to small businesses. However, this amount represents only about three percent of EAGLE II’s potential value of $22 billion. DHS Established Performance Goals, but Has Not Fully Assessed Progress for Some Goals DHS set five goals and objectives for EAGLE II and set performance measures for most of the goals, as shown in Table 3. DHS has not fully set performance measures for two of DHS’s stated goals for EAGLE II: fulfillment of socioeconomic goals and enhancing DHS mission performance capabilities. However, as reflected in table 3, DHS does not have performance measures or collect information that would allow them to assess the extent to which: (1) use of core team members may be furthering EAGLE II’s socioeconomic goals and (2) the activities of teaming coordinators may have furthered DHS’s goal of enhancing its mission capabilities by finding subcontractors with new and innovative services. DHS CPO officials explained that they considered inclusion of core team members and teaming coordinators in the EAGLE II solicitation to be sufficient to meet goals. However, only a fraction of the anticipated $22 billion in spending has occurred to date, so it is too soon to fully assess the effectiveness of steps taken. Without this information, it will be difficult for DHS to assess their contributions towards its EAGLE II goals such as promoting small business participation. Recommendations for Executive Action To support effective implementation of EAGLE II goals for enhancing small business participation and access to innovative technology, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer to take the following two actions: Collect and review information on the use of small business core team members to determine whether their use is helping to increase small business participation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology Enterprise Acquisition Gateway for Leading-Edge Solutions II (EAGLE II) is a suite of strategic sourcing contracts, which serves as the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) preferred source for procuring information technology services. Our objectives were to assess (1) the key steps DHS has taken to enhance small business participation and (2) EAGLE II’s goals and performance measures and progress made to date. We then reviewed federal internal control standards and assessed whether DHS had established performance measures for program goals consistent with these standards.	Why GAO Did This Study DHS's EAGLE II is a suite of strategic sourcing contracts, valued at $22 billion, which serves as DHS's mandatory source for information technology services. Strategic sourcing is a process that moves an organization away from numerous individual procurements toward a broader aggregate approach to achieve cost savings and other efficiencies. The small business community has raised questions about strategic sourcing reducing contracting opportunities. GAO was asked to examine the EAGLE II program. This report assesses (1) key steps DHS has taken to enhance small business participation and (2) EAGLE II goals, performance measures, and progress made to date. GAO reviewed EAGLE II acquisition planning documents and interviewed DHS procurement and small business staff. GAO analyzed federal procurement data from fiscal year 2013 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2015 and assessed reliability by comparing data to a nonprobability sample of 10 EAGLE II contracts selected from a variety of DHS components. What GAO Found Department of Homeland Security (DHS) procurement officials reported taking three key steps to enhance small business participation in the Enterprise Acquisition Gateway for Leading-Edge Solutions II (EAGLE II) contracts: Creating small business tracks within each of EAGLE II's three lines of business, including socioeconomic set-aside tracks, to exclusively target competitions to small businesses in the first line of business. See table. Establishing a process to maintain a steady pool of eligible small businesses by reopening the EAGLE II solicitation after requiring businesses that outgrow their small size status to leave the program. Requiring small business track prime contractors to team only with other small businesses. As of March 2015, DHS had issued 74 EAGLE II task orders worth an estimated $591 million, almost all of which—94 percent—went to small businesses. However, it is too soon to evaluate the full impact of these steps because only about 3 percent of the anticipated $22 billion in task orders have been issued. DHS established five goals for EAGLE II and developed performance measures to assess progress in meeting most of them. DHS established performance measures for the three EAGLE II goals related to cost savings and efficiencies through a methodology to assess cost savings, but has not fully set performance measures for the remaining two, relating to (1) the small business socioeconomic goal and (2) enhancing DHS mission capabilities. For its socioeconomic goal, DHS assesses progress via the percentage of the value of orders issued to small businesses. However, DHS does not assess whether use of team members (other small businesses) supports this goal, although DHS procurement officials told us teaming is key to enhancing small business participation. Further, DHS has not set a performance measure for assessing how the use of teaming coordinators contributes to the EAGLE II goal of enhancing DHS's mission capabilities. According to DHS, prime contractors are required to have teaming coordinators identify subcontractors with innovative services. Federal internal control standards highlight the importance of developing measures to compare expected outcomes to actual results. Without such measures, it will be difficult for DHS to have needed information to assess the extent to which the use of team members and teaming coordinators contribute toward their respective EAGLE II goals. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends the Secretary of Homeland Security support implementation of EAGLE II goals by assessing the use of team members and teaming coordinators. DHS did not concur with GAO recommendations, citing actions already taken in soliciting and awarding the contracts. GAO believes there is still value in assessing whether team members are used for task orders, and that DHS's plan to survey EAGLE II users has merit.
gao_HEHS-98-128	gao_HEHS-98-128_0	Section 781 is within title VII of the Public Health Service Act, which authorizes numerous programs for health professions education and training. The second phase is graduate medical education—or residency training—where residents receive 3 to 8 years of clinical training in a medical specialty. Throughout these three phases, a variety of formal accreditation and certification processes are used to test student competency and to judge the quality of instruction and training. For each of the seven palliative care topics we asked about, at least half of the 125 U.S. medical schools that responded to our survey said they had some degree of required instruction. 1.) Instruction in palliative care for chronic illness was required by the fewest number of schools (56 percent). Many schools reported a need to change palliative care instruction, particularly in the area of clinical training. 2.) Plans to Use Section 781 for Palliative Care Projects Are Limited The fiscal year 1998 conference committee report on HHS appropriations specifies $452,000 for section 781. Officials in HRSA plan to use $150,000 of this amount for seven medical education projects, including one project on palliative care. Because budgets are not maintained separately for each project, HRSA and medical education research center officials were not able to specify the amount of funding dedicated for the palliative care project. The remaining $302,000 will be used to support projects focused on increasing the knowledge about the needs and resources of the nation’s health professions. HRSA did not include palliative care research for medical education in its fiscal year 1999 budget justification. HRSA officials do not plan to fund any of the other types of palliative care topics authorized under the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act. Some of these projects directly address the types of research, training, and demonstration projects authorized in the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act, including the following: Research authorized by the act includes projects to advance biomedical knowledge of pain management and assess the quality of care for patients with terminal illness by measuring and reporting specific outcomes. Last Acts aims to raise awareness of the need to improve the care of persons who are dying, improve communication and decisionmaking related to end-of-life care, and change the way health care and health care institutions approach care for dying people. Private entities also provide funding for a variety of other projects in palliative care—some with a specific focus in physician education or improving access and quality to palliative care. Scope and Methodology We discussed the extent that palliative care issues were taught and tested in medical schools, residency programs, and continuing medical education with representatives from cognizant professional associations including the AMA, the American Osteopathic Association, the AAMC, the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine; faculty from various educational institutions; representatives from entities administering national examinations necessary for medical licensure and board certification, such as the National Board of Medical Examiners and the American Board of Internal Medicine; representatives from accrediting bodies for medical schools, residency programs, and continuing education, including the Liaison Committee for Medical Education, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, and the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education; and recognized experts in the field of palliative medicine. To gather more specific information about the extent to which the palliative care subjects addressed in the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act were taught in medical schools, we developed and administered a survey to all accredited U.S. allopathic and osteopathic medical schools regarding their curriculum, training, and testing of student knowledge in pain management, depression identification and treatment, and palliative care. We discussed other federal and private palliative care research and education initiatives funded outside section 781 with HHS agencies and private entities involved in similar palliative care activities. Additional copies are $2 each.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reported on the extent to which projects under section 781 of the Public Health Service Act have furthered the knowledge and practice of palliative care, particularly with regard to curricula offered and used in medical schools. GAO's preliminary work showed that no fiscal year (FY) 1998 funding for section 781 projects would be awarded by its April 30, 1998 reporting date, so GAO focused on determining: (1) the extent to which the physician education and training process currently teaches and tests student competency in palliative care issues; (2) the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) plans for funding palliative care projects under section 781; and (3) other federal and private palliative care research and education initiatives. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) physicians receive varying amounts of instruction in palliative care topics as they progress through 4 years of medical school and 3 to 8 years of subsequent specialized training in a residence program; (2) each of the seven palliative care areas in GAO's survey was required by 56 percent or more of the 125 medical schools responding to its survey; (3) similarly, about half of the 7,787 specialty and subspecialty residency programs educated students in end-of-life care; (4) GAO's survey showed that many medical schools are interested in providing additional instruction and training in palliative care; (5) about one-third of the schools reported a need to change their curriculum for addressing palliative care for the chronically and terminally ill; (6) close to half reported a need to include more clinical training in managing pain and depression for these patient populations; (7) HHS officials plan to use $150,000 of the $452,000 specified for section 781 in the FY 1998 appropriations conference report to support seven medical education research projects, including one palliative care project; (8) officials from HHS and the medical education research center receiving these funds were not able to specify the amount being spent on the palliative care project because separate budgets are not developed for each project; (9) of the remaining section 781 funds, all $302,000 will be used to support research for improving the distribution and diversity of the health care workforce; (10) because of the higher priority that HHS has assigned to this other research, officials do not plan to use any funds for palliative care research, training, or demonstration projects in 1999; (11) nevertheless, a substantial amount of research related to palliative care is being funded in ways other than through section 781; (12) over the last few years, HHS and private entities have invested tens of millions of dollars into projects similar to those specified in the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act; (13) some HHS agencies have more general projects, not specified in the act, that could also benefit palliative care in the areas of increasing health care access, improving quality of care, and advancing biomedical research; and (14) private foundations and other private organizations have spent millions of dollars to educate and train health care professionals in palliative care and improve the quality of care for the terminally and chronically ill.
gao_GAO-01-69	gao_GAO-01-69_0	All states require that physicians practicing in the state be licensed to do so. State Medical Boards Are Concerned About the Prescribing Services Offered by Some Internet Pharmacies State medical boards have concerns about the growing number of Internet pharmacies that issue prescriptions on the basis of a simple online questionnaire rather than a face-to-face examination. Conclusions The unique qualities of the Internet pose new challenges for enforcing state pharmacy and medical practice laws because they allow pharmacies and physicians to reach consumers across state and international borders and remain anonymous.	What GAO Found The first Internet pharmacies began online service in early 1999. Public health officials are concerned about Internet pharmacies that do not adhere to state licensing requirements and standards. Public officials are also concerned about the validity of prescriptions and international drugs that are not approved in the United States being sent by mail. The unique qualities of the Internet pose new challenges for enforcing state pharmacy and medical practice laws because they allow pharmacies and physicians to reach consumers across state and international borders and remain anonymous. Congress is considering legislation to strengthen oversight of Internet pharmacies.
gao_GAO-09-23	gao_GAO-09-23_0	Use of Stewardship Contracting Is Increasing, but Agency Data Are Incomplete The agencies awarded increasing numbers of stewardship contracts during fiscal years 2003 through 2007; however, details about their overall use of stewardship contracting are incomplete because the agencies did not begin to collect nationwide data until recently, and even these data are not complete or consistent across agencies. From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the number of stewardship contracts that the agencies awarded increased each year. For other aspects of stewardship projects, however, reliable data were available only for more limited periods of time. The agencies did not begin maintaining nationwide data on stewardship contracting projects until recently—primarily because of difficulties in adapting their systems to account for all aspects of stewardship projects. During Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007, the Agencies Awarded Increasing Numbers of Stewardship Contracts From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the Forest Service and BLM awarded a total of 535 stewardship contracts. The Forest Service collaborated with the local rural fire department as well as with community members and environmental groups. Accordingly, the regions require substantial appropriated dollars to supplement the value of the timber and pay for the necessary services such as hazardous fuel reduction. BLM officials typically refer to their stewardship contracts as “service contracts with embedded products.” Because the value of the services acquired typically exceeds the value of the product sold (as with Forest Service IRSCs), BLM generally uses fuel reduction or forest management funds to pay for a portion of the service work. Although BLM’s stewardship contracting guidance makes an exception to the set-aside policy in cases where “non-traditional entities (e.g., local governments, nongovernmental entities, and nonprofit organizations) have expressed an interest” in a project, BLM contracting officials told us they set aside all stewardship contracts regardless, because, in their words, “the FAR trumps BLM guidance.” Despite the Benefits of Stewardship Contracting, Challenges Persist, Especially in the Use of Long-Term Multiyear Contracts, for which the Agencies Lack a Strategy The agencies cited as key benefits of stewardship contracting the ability to accomplish more work on the ground and to build collaborative partnerships. For example, according to the Department of Defense’s acquisition regulation, if a contract contains a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100 million but the budget for that contract does not include proposed funding for the costs of contract cancellation up to that ceiling, then the head of the agency must provide written notification to the congressional defense committees and to the Office of Management and Budget before awarding the contract. One element of stewardship contracting has not been widely explored, however: the authority to enter into 10-year contracts. Although we frequently heard that this authority is essential in helping develop markets for timber, woody biomass, and other materials (by allowing the agencies to provide potential contractors and industry operators more certainty of supply), the suitability of long-term multiyear stewardship contracts to encourage investment in infrastructure has yet to be demonstrated. The stakes are further raised by the need for a potentially sizable up-front obligation of funds to protect both the contractor’s and the government’s interests. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which, and for what purposes, federal agencies are using stewardship contracting; (2) what processes the agencies use in planning, implementing, and monitoring stewardship projects to manage resources; and (3) what successes and challenges the agencies have experienced in using stewardship contracting. Our review was limited to the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the two agencies with stewardship contracting authority.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) have stewardship contracting authority, which allows the agencies to trade goods--such as timber--for services (e.g., thinning forests or rangelands) that the agencies would otherwise pay for with appropriated dollars, and to enter into stewardship contracts lasting up to 10 years. The authority is set to expire in 2013. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, (1) the extent to which the agencies are using stewardship contracting and (2) what successes and challenges the agencies have experienced in using it. In doing so, GAO assessed agency data, reviewed project files, and visited projects in numerous locations. What GAO Found From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the Forest Service and BLM awarded a combined total of 535 stewardship contracts, with the number increasing each year--from 38 in fiscal year 2003 to 172 in fiscal year 2007. However, for certain aspects of stewardship contracting, such as the acres involved or the value of the services exchanged for goods, reliable data were not available for the full 5-year fiscal period because neither agency has had a comprehensive database of its stewardship contracting activity since 2003. The agencies did not begin to maintain nationwide stewardship data until recently, primarily because of difficulties in adapting their systems to account for all aspects of stewardship contracting. Further, these data are not complete, and reside in myriad systems, not all of which interface with one another. These deficiencies keep the agencies and Congress from accurately assessing the costs and value of stewardship contracting. The agencies credit stewardship contracting with allowing them to accomplish more work--by allowing them to trade goods for services, thereby extending their budgets for thinning and other services--and spurring collaboration with members of the community and environmental groups. But stewardship contracting has its challenges too, including some resistance to its use (e.g., by contractors unfamiliar with it) and a paucity of markets for the small trees typically removed in stewardship projects. Also, although agency officials view long-term multiyear contracts as crucial to market development, these contracts can involve financial challenges. These contracts are attractive because they offer contractors and industry operators some certainty of supply, enabling them to obtain loans for equipment or processing facilities, which can then spur demand for materials resulting from stewardship projects. But such contracts can require a substantial up-front obligation of funds--to protect the contractor's investment if the government later cancels the contract--that may exceed the budget of a field unit (e.g., a national forest). Also, funding the annual work specified in the contract can force a unit to scale back its other programs if the value of the timber removed is not sufficient to pay for that work. Yet neither agency has developed a strategy for using such contracts, a step that could help field units determine which projects are appropriate for these long-term contracts and how they would be funded.
gao_GAO-14-95	gao_GAO-14-95_0	Scope and Methodology To address our objective, we (1) obtained and reviewed the DOI OIG audit report and supporting workpapers; (2) interviewed Foundation management and selected staff members to determine the extent to which its actions to improve internal controls and the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) assessment process have been sufficiently documented (i.e., whether such changes have been issued in final form or whether draft policies of planned changes have been reviewed by senior management and the in-house General Counsel); (3) obtained and reviewed documentation related to the Foundation’s actions to improve internal controls and its FMFIA assessment process; and (4) assessed the Foundation’s actions against the criteria established under Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control (December 21, 2004) (OMB Circular Office No. Background The Foundation was established as an independent executive branch agency in 1992 to honor Morris K. Udall’s 30 years of service in the U.S. House of Representatives as a leader on issues related to the environment and Native Americans. The DOI OIG’s audit report also found that the Foundation was missing key internal controls over its personnel and contracting practices. Major elements of the Corrective Action Plan include performing a complete assessment of the Foundation’s current internal control structure to identify adequate, inadequate, and missing controls, and developing (or contracting to have developed) policies and procedures to implement appropriate internal controls in all areas where inadequate or missing controls are identified.The Corrective Action Plan included steps to address deficiencies in the Foundation’s (1) FMFIA internal control monitoring and assessment process, (2) internal control related to its personnel processes, and (3) internal control related to its contracting processes. For those actions that were sufficiently documented at the time of our review, we found that their design was consistent with internal control standards and applicable laws and regulations, as discussed in the following sections. Foundation Actions to Improve FMFIA Internal Control Monitoring and the Assessment Process Since the release of the DOI OIG audit report, the Foundation has experienced significant turnover in its senior management ranks, and new management has acknowledged that the Foundation did not (1) maintain adequate documentation of the controls in place, (2) perform monitoring activities that included direct testing of the controls as part of the internal control assessment process required under FMFIA, (3) document the assessment process and methodology that management used to support its assertion as to the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and (4) include appropriate representations from officials and personnel responsible for monitoring, improving, and assessing internal controls. In addition, new management at the Foundation acknowledged that the Foundation’s failure to comply with FMFIA requirements and implementing OMB Circular No. Specifically, the Foundation contracted with an external consultant to perform an internal control review with an overall goal of achieving compliance with OMB Circular No. We determined that the design of this action to contract for the performance of a thorough internal control review is consistent with internal control standards related to monitoring operations and internal controls and with FMFIA requirements to monitor and assess the effectiveness of its internal controls. Because the Foundation’s planned actions to improve its internal controls related to employees’ outside employment and termination of employment were not finalized, it was too soon for us to assess the design of these actions and whether they are consistent with internal control standards and applicable laws, regulations, and guidance. Foundation Actions to Address Internal Control Deficiencies Related to Contracting The bona fide needs rule is based on the Time Statute (31 U.S.C. We determined that the design of this action is consistent with internal control standards and applicable guidance for federal executive agencies. Specifically, the Foundation’s interagency agreement with IBC for managing environmental conflict resolution contracts is generally consistent with OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 2008 policy guidance on management and use of interagency acquisitions. Pursuant to the terms of the interagency agreement, IBC has agreed to assist the Foundation on contracts related to environmental conflict resolution activities, including mediation, facilitation, and assessment services. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Foundation for comment. The Foundation also provided a summary of the changes it has made in its operations and structure since the DOI OIG audit report.	Why GAO Did This Study The Foundation was established as an executive branch agency to provide educational opportunities related to environmental policy and Native American health care and tribal policy, and also to assist in resolving environmental disputes that involve federal agencies. In December 2012, a DOI OIG audit of the Foundation identified significant issues primarily related to the Foundation's failure to appropriately monitor and assess the effectiveness of its internal controls as required by FMFIA and the absence of key internal controls over its personnel and contracting practices. GAO was asked to review whether the Foundation has sufficient internal controls to ensure that it is complying with applicable laws and regulations regarding financial management and contracting. The objective of this report is to describe the Foundation's actions to improve its internal control assessment process and its controls over personnel and contracting, and determine the extent to which the design of the Foundation's actions that have been sufficiently documented is consistent with internal control standards and applicable laws and regulations. To address this objective, GAO reviewed relevant documents, interviewed Foundation management, and assessed the Foundation's actions against relevant standards and guidance. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Foundation accepted GAO's results in full. The Foundation also provided a summary of the changes it has made in its operations and structure since the DOI OIG report. What GAO Found Officials at the Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation (Foundation) developed a Corrective Action Plan to address the findings in the Department of the Interior (DOI) Office of Inspector General's (OIG) December 2012 audit report. The Corrective Action Plan included steps to address deficiencies in the Foundation's (1) internal control monitoring and assessment process, (2) internal control related to personnel issues, and (3) internal control related to contracting. For those actions that were sufficiently documented at the time of its review, GAO found that their design was consistent with internal control standards and applicable laws and regulations. To address identified deficiencies in its internal control monitoring and assessment processes under 31 U.S.C. 3512(c), (d), commonly known as the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA), and implementing guidance, the Foundation contracted with an external consultant to perform an internal control review with an overall goal of achieving compliance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. GAO determined that the design of this action to contract for the performance of a thorough internal control review is consistent with internal control standards related to monitoring operations and internal controls and with FMFIA requirements to monitor and assess the effectiveness of internal controls. To address deficiencies in its internal control related to personnel issues, the Foundation developed policies and procedures to address specific DOI OIG findings in the areas of outside employment and termination of employees. The procedures were still in draft form, and it was too soon for GAO to assess the design of the changes. To address the DOI OIG's findings related to its contracting practices, the Foundation entered into a 5-year interagency agreement with the DOI Interior Business Center (IBC), under which IBC agreed to assist the Foundation on contracts related to the Foundation's environmental conflict resolution activities, including mediation, facilitation, and assessment services. GAO determined that the design of this action is consistent with internal control standards and applicable guidance for federal executive agencies. For example, the Foundation's interagency agreement with IBC for managing environmental conflict resolution contracts is generally consistent with OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy guidance on management and use of interagency acquisitions. For other contracts, the Foundation planned to issue a policy and guidance on internal contracting processes, but it was not finalized at the time of GAO's review.
gao_GAO-02-409	gao_GAO-02-409_0	The option also allows states to implement a portion of the simplified program in which only the food stamp work requirement is replaced by TANF’s work requirement. States Used Eligibility Options and Waivers Primarily to Increase Access to Food Stamps Almost all states used one or more options or waivers to change their food stamp eligibility determination process. Thirty-three states used available options to exempt some or all vehicles from counting as assets. States used these options to increase the number of households to be eligible for food stamps, to simplify the administrative process for eligibility workers, and to support working families; however, most of these states considered them a cumbersome way to increase access to food stamps. States Used Reporting Options and Waivers Primarily to Reduce Payment Errors and Simplify Paperwork Almost all states used a reporting option or waiver to change the way households with earnings are required to report changes in their circumstances that could affect their eligibility for food stamps as well as their benefit amount. The most frequently used reporting alternatives were those that eliminated the requirement to report changes in earned income of $25 or more per month. No State Is Using All Aspects of the Simplified Food Stamp Program Option No state is implementing or plans to implement all aspects of the Simplified Food Stamp Program option. However, as we reported earlier, since not all needy households receive both TANF and food stamps, the states selecting the simplified program option would, in effect, be operating three programs: one program for TANF recipients following state TANF rules; one program for food stamp recipients following federal food stamp regulations; and the simplified program for recipients of both food stamps and TANF. Eight states are aligning their food stamp and TANF work requirements.	What GAO Found To help states administer their Food Stamp Programs, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) offers options and waivers to their program rules and regulations. Almost all states used options or waivers in their food stamp eligibility determination process. More than half of the states chose to make households receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) services automatically eligible for food stamps. Thirty-three states exempted some or all vehicles in the determination of food stamp eligibility. Although most states used these options and waivers, they considered them a cumbersome way to increase access to the program for families owning a vehicle. Almost all states used at least one option or waiver to change the reporting methods required of food stamp household earnings. The most frequently used reporting waivers exempted recipients from reporting changes in earned income of $25 or more per month. States used these options and waivers to simplify paperwork requirements for both the food stamp recipient and eligibility worker. Although few states were using the new option to provide food stamp benefits to families leaving TANF, 20 other states planned to implement the option. No state was implementing or planning to implement all aspects of the simplified program option, which allows states to merge their TANF and Food Stamp Program for families receiving both types of assistance. States told GAO that the simplified program option would make administering the programs more difficult because it creates a separate program, covering only a subset of food stamp recipients. However, nine states were using a portion of the simplified program to align their food stamp and TANF work or reporting requirements.
gao_GAO-09-142	gao_GAO-09-142_0	These operations support U.S. national interests by carrying out mandates to help stabilize regions and promote international peace. UN Peacekeeping Operations Have Evolved into Large, Complex Operations Concentrated in Less Developed Countries Since 1998, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on more complex and ambitious mandates, taken place in increasingly challenging environments, and grown in size and scope. The 16 operations in 1998 had mandates averaging three tasks or objectives each. In 1998, multidimensional operations averaged fewer than 1,000 troops and military observers. The UN also has deployed more police to peacekeeping operations over the past 10 years. A Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Require Significant Resources As a way to assess UN capacity, we developed a potential new peacekeeping operation to illustrate the detailed and likely resources the UN would need to deploy a new operation. We estimate that this operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian staff, and UN officials noted that it would have logistical needs comparable to those of other large, complex operations in similar environments. The Potential New Operation’s Logistics Needs Would Likely Be Comparable to Those of Other Recent Large Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa UN officials could not provide an estimate of the logistical needs for the potential new operation without detailed planning in the field that precedes actual deployments. The UN Would Likely Face Difficulty in Obtaining Troops, Police, Civilians, and Logistics Needed for the Potential New Operation The UN would likely face difficulty in obtaining troops, military observers, police, and civilians for the potential new operation. The UN Faces Challenges in Obtaining Needed Military Units As of September 2008, about 77,000 troops and military observers were deployed to existing UN peacekeeping operations, an overall gap of 18,000, or about 20 percent, below the authorized level of approximately 95,000. The gap between deployed and authorized FPUs stems mainly from the lack of units for operations in Darfur. In contrast with its reliance on member states to contribute and deploy FPUs as a unit, the UN recruits and deploys UN police individually. This has hindered some operations from fully carrying out their mandates. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our review focused on four objectives related to the evolution of peacekeeping operations and the United Nations’ (UN) capacity to deploy new operations: Specifically, in this report, we examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution and UN planning scenarios; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face in deploying this potential new operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping. We categorized each mission as traditional or multidimensional, based on the number of mandated tasks and whether the mandated tasks were traditional, such as observing cease-fires or whether they were ambitious, such as helping restore government institutions.	Why GAO Did This Study The United Nations (UN) supports U.S. interests in maintaining international security by deploying and operating 16 peacekeeping operations in locations in conflict, including Darfur, Lebanon, and Haiti. Over the past 10 years, the number of deployed UN personnel increased from about 41,000 peacekeepers and civilian staff to about 109,000 in 2008. In this report on the UN's capacity to deploy further operations, GAO was asked to examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the likely characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face deploying this operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping. GAO reviewed UN documents, developed a methodology to assess the requirements for a potential new operation with UN assistance, interviewed UN headquarters and mission officials, and assessed U.S. government documents on UN peacekeeping. What GAO Found UN peacekeeping operations since 1998 have taken on increasinglyambitious mandates, been located in more challenging environments, and grown in size and scope. UN operations in 1998 averaged three mandated tasks, such as observing cease-fires; in 2008, they averaged nine more ambitious tasks, such as restoring government institutions. Operations in 2008 were located in some of the world's most unstable countries, were larger and more complex than in 1998, and deployed thousands of civilians. Based on trends in peacekeeping and recent UN planning options, GAO analysis indicates that a potential new operation would likely be large and complex, take place in sub-Saharan Africa, and have nine mandated tasks. This potential new operation would likely require member states to contribute 21,000 troops and military observers, including those in engineering and aviation units, and 1,500 police to carry out the mandate. The UN would likely need to deploy 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. The operation's logistics needs also would be large and complex. The ability to fully deploy any potential new operation would likely face challenges, in view of current UN resource constraints. As of September 2008, ongoing UN operations had about a 20 percent gap between troops and military observers authorized to carry out operations and actual deployments. For police, the gap was about 34 percent; it was similar for civilians. Some gaps reflect UN difficulties in obtaining and deploying resources to carry out operations. Lack of these resources, such as special military units, prevented some operations from executing mandates. Lack of infrastructure in the potential new operation's environment would challenge the UN to provide logistical needs.
gao_GAO-05-304	gao_GAO-05-304_0	In the years since, the original business case has been severely weakened as threats, missions, and requirements have changed. Further, the program milestones have slipped, the development period lengthened to more than 19 years, development costs more than doubled, and a modernization program was added. F/A-22 Modernization Program Lacks Business Case and May Not Be Executable as Planned The Air Force, in the face of significant changes to the F/A-22, has not prepared a new business case to justify the resources needed to add a much more robust ground attack capability and to assume new missions. A December 2004 budget decision reduced procurement funding and quantities but did not cut funding for modernization. This has made the current modernization plan obsolete as key ground attack and intelligence gathering enhancements had been slated for aircraft that have now been eliminated from the F/A-22 procurement program. To enhance the utility of the F/A-22 for today and the future, the Air Force now plans to develop a robust air-to- ground attack capability to allow the aircraft to engage a greater variety of ground targets, such as surface-to-air missiles systems, that pose a significant threat to U.S. aircraft. In March 2003, OSD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the Air Force would need $11.7 billion for the planned modernization programs through fiscal year 2018. The Air Force’s latest estimated cost for the modernization program is about $5.4 billion through 2011. This and other events will reduce the Air Force’s expected buy to no more than 178 aircraft. Operational Testing Considered Successful by Air Force, but Ground Attack Role Has Not Yet Been Tested Reports detailing the results from IOT&E were not available for our review, but Air Force test officials told us that testing showed the F/A-22 was “overwhelmingly effective” as an air superiority fighter and that its supporting systems were “potentially suitable.” Some deficiencies were noted, particularly in reliability and maintainability, but Air Force officials believe these deficiencies can be corrected in time to meet the warfighter’s needs by the scheduled initial operational capability date in December 2005. The F/A-22 initial operational test and evaluation was conducted by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center from April through December 2004 to support the full-rate production decision planned for March 2005. We recommend the Secretary of Defense complete a new business case that determines the continued need for the F/A-22 and that specifically: (a) justifies the F/A-22’s expanded air-to-ground capabilities based on an assessment of alternatives to include both operational assets and planned future weapon systems; (b) justifies the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions; (c) provides evidence that the planned quantity and capabilities are affordable within current and projected budgets and the statutory funding limitation; (d) addresses impacts of the recent budget decision on the need for and cost of future developmental activities, long-term logistical support and basing decisions, and the ability to take advantage of cost reduction efforts, such as multiyear contracting and productivity improvement; and (e) justifies the need for investments for a new computer architecture and avionics processor, and F/A-22 infrastructure deficiencies.	Why GAO Did This Study The Air Force is preparing a modernization plan that expands the capabilities of the F/A-22, which was first designed to serve as an air-to-air fighter aircraft with very limited ability to strike targets on the ground. The Air Force now intends to transform it by adding robust air-to-ground capabilities to attack enemy ground threats and by adding onboard intelligence data gathering capabilities. After the recent budget cut, DOD estimates F/A-22 cost at $63.8 billion for 178 aircraft. It has been in development for more than 19 years, a decade longer than originally envisioned. In the face of significant cost and schedule overruns, Congress mandates that GAO annually assess the F/A-22 program. In this report, GAO addresses (1) the Air Force's business case for the F/A-22 modernization plan and (2) the recently completed initial operational test and evaluation. What GAO Found The Air Force has yet to produce a business case for the next-generation F/A-22. Much has changed in the years since the F/A-22 program began nearly 2 decades ago--adversarial threats against U.S. aircraft have evolved, and a plan to modernize the F/A-22 significantly different than the original aircraft is in progress. A DOD cost estimate in 2003 projected the Air Force's modernization plan to cost $11.7 billion through 2018. A December 2004 budget decision reduced procurement funding and quantities but did not cut funding for modernization. The decision to terminate procurement after fiscal year 2008 places the current modernization plan in doubt as key ground attack and intelligence-gathering enhancements had been slated for aircraft now eliminated from the program. Without a new business case for adding a more robust ground attack capability and for new intelligence missions, the Air Force may be at a disadvantage when the time comes to justify the modernization plan in the face of future budget constraints. DOD is set to conduct the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review to weigh the merits of transformational priorities and investments to determine if the best choices are being made to meet military needs within available funding levels. This may further influence an F/A-22 business case. The F/A-22 program recently underwent initial operational testing, but testing did not include the air-to-ground missions that the Air Force envisions for the aircraft. The Air Force does not expect to conduct testing of these capabilities until after a decision is made to enter full-rate production. Although a final test report was not available for our review, Air Force officials told us that the F/A-22 was extremely effective in performing its air-to-air missions. Evaluation results of capabilities needed to sustain combat operations and maintain aircraft were not as favorable. Additional testing will be required to assess corrective actions for deficiencies identified and to evaluate new ground attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities added by the modernization program.
gao_GAO-12-540	gao_GAO-12-540_0	VA Pension Program Design and Management Do Not Ensure Only Those with Financial Need Receive Benefits Program Allows Claimants to Transfer Assets Prior to Applying, Unlike Other Means-Tested Programs We found several potential vulnerabilities in the VA pension program’s design, as well as in VA’s policies and procedures, that hinder the department’s ability to ensure that only those in financial need receive benefits. For example, we identified a case involving a pension recipient who transferred over a million dollars in assets into an irrevocable trust less than 3 months prior to applying for these benefits. In contrast, for Medicaid—another means tested program—federal law explicitly restricts eligibility for coverage for long term care for certain individuals who transfer assets for less than fair market value prior to applying., As a result, when an individual applies for Medicaid coverage for long-term care, states conduct a look-back—a review to determine if the applicant transferred assets for less than fair market value prior to applying. While the instructions on the pension application forms ask claimants to report all income sources and assets they own, the forms do not provide spaces for claimants to report some types of income and assets. However, VA still needs to know about any asset transfers when assessing a claimant’s financial eligibility because, consistent with VA’s regulations, the department must determine whether the claimant retains ownership and control of the transferred asset and if this asset should be counted as part of the claimant’s net worth. Unclear Guidance on Assessing Financial Eligibility May Lead to Inconsistent Decisions VA’s guidance to claims processors on assessing financial eligibility for VA pension benefits is unclear about when certain assets should be counted as part of an applicant’s net worth. VA’s procedures manual states that pension claims should be denied if a claimant’s financial resources are sufficient enough to pay for their living expenses for a “reasonable period of time,” but it does not define this term. As a result, claims processors must use their own discretion to determine what period of time is reasonable for claimants to use their assets before needing the assistance of the VA pension. Many Organizations Help VA Pension Claimants Transfer Assets to Qualify for Benefits Over 200 Organizations Market Services to Help Qualify Veterans and Surviving Spouses for VA Pension Benefits We identified over 200 organizations located throughout the country that market their services to help veterans and surviving spouses qualify for VA pension benefits by transferring or preserving excess assets.organizations consist primarily of financial planners and attorneys offering products and services such as annuities and the establishment of trusts, to enable potential VA pension claimants with excess assets to meet financial eligibility criteria for VA pension benefits. Among the 19 organizations our investigative staff contacted, about half advised transferring excess assets into an irrevocable trust with a family member as the trustee to direct funds to pay for the veteran’s expenses. About half also advised placing excess assets into some type of annuity. Some Products and Services May Adversely Affect Claimants Some products may not be suitable for elderly veterans because they may lose access to funds they may need for future expenses, such as medical care. Among organizations that did charge for services, fees ranged from a few hundred dollars for benefits counseling to up to $10,000 for the establishment of a trust. In particular, claims processors’ reliance on unverified self-reported information when assessing eligibility means that VA cannot be assured that it is obtaining all relevant financial information from claimants, including information on asset transfers, trusts, annuities, and other forms of retirement income. Matter for Congressional Consideration To ensure that only those in financial need are granted VA pension benefits, Congress should consider establishing a look-back and penalty period for claimants who transfer assets for less than fair market value prior to applying, similar to other means-tested programs. 2. This may include requesting supporting documentation such as bank statements and tax returns, or using automated databases that can verify financial information. 3. 4. III), VA generally agreed with our conclusions, concurred with three of our recommendations, and concurred in principle with one other recommendation. VA concurred in principle with our second recommendation that the department verify financial information during the initial claims process. VA said it expects to complete an analysis by November 1, 2012 of whether financial information can be verified without placing undue burdens on claimants and recipients. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to examine (1) how the design and management of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) pension program ensure that only those with financial need receive pension benefits and (2) what is known about organizations that are marketing financial products and services to veterans and survivors to enable them to qualify for VA pension benefits. GAO INVESTIGATOR: There’s no fee for you, at all? COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE: Hang on a second. This is . So that’s not the issue. VA’s Fiduciary Program: VA Plans to Improve Program Compliance and Policies, but Sustained Management Attention is Needed.	Why GAO Did This Study The VA pension program is intended to provide economic benefits to wartime veterans and survivors with financial need. GAO was asked to examine (1) how the design and management of VAs pension program ensure that only those with financial need receive pension benefits and (2) what is known about organizations that are marketing financial products and services to enable veterans and survivors to qualify for VA pension benefits. GAOs study included a review of VAs policies and procedures, site visits to VAs three Pension Management Centers, and online research and interviews of organizations that market financial and estate planning services to help veterans and survivors qualify for VA pension benefits. What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) pension program design and management do not adequately ensure that only veterans with financial need receive pension benefits. While the pension program is means tested, there is no prohibition on transferring assets prior to applying for benefits. Other means-tested programs, such as Medicaid, conduct a look-back review to determine if an individual has transferred assets at less than fair market value, and if so, may deny benefits for a period of time, known as the penalty period. This control helps ensure that only those in financial need receive benefits. In contrast, VA pension claimants can transfer assets for less than fair market value immediately prior to applying and be approved for benefits. For example, GAO identified a case where a claimant transferred over a million dollars less than 3 months prior to applying and was granted benefits. Also, VAs process for assessing initial eligibility is inadequate in several key respects. The application form does not ask for some sources of income and assets such as private retirement income, annuities, and trusts. As a result, VA lacks complete information on a claimants financial situation. Also, the form does not ask about asset transfersinformation VA needs to determine whether these assets should be included when assessing eligibility. In addition, VA does not verify all the information it does request on the form. For example, VA does not routinely request supporting documents, such as bank statements or tax records, unless questions are raised. VAs fiduciary program, which appoints individuals to manage the financial affairs of beneficiaries who are unable to do so themselves, collects financial information that may affect some pension recipients eligibility, but VA pension claims processors do not have access to all this information. Further, guidance on when assets should be included as part of a claimants net worth is unclear; and VA claims processors must use their own discretion when assessing eligibility for benefits, which can lead to inconsistent decisions. GAO identified over 200 organizations that market financial and estate planning services to help pension claimants with excess assets meet financial eligibility requirements for these benefits. These organizations consist primarily of financial planners and attorneys who offer products such as annuities and trusts. GAO judgmentally selected a nongeneralizable sample of 25 organizations, and GAO investigative staff successfully contacted 19 while posing as a veterans son seeking information on these services. All 19 said a claimant can qualify for pension benefits by transferring assets before applying, which is permitted under the program. Two organization representatives said they helped pension claimants with substantial assets, including millionaires, obtain VAs approval for benefits. About half of the organizations advised repositioning assets into a trust, with a family member as the trustee to direct the funds to pay for the veterans expenses. About half also advised placing assets into some type of annuity. Some products and services provided, such as deferred annuities, may not be suitable for the elderly because they may not have access to all their funds for their care within their expected lifetime without facing high withdrawal fees. Also, these products and services may result in ineligibility for Medicaid for a period of time. Among the 19 organizations contacted, the majority charged fees, ranging from a few hundred dollars for benefits counseling to $10,000 for establishment of a trust. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider establishing a look-back and penalty period for pension claimants who transfer assets for less than fair market value prior to applying, similar to other federally supported means-tested programs. VA should (1) request information about asset transfers and other assets and income sources on application forms, (2) verify financial information during the initial claims process, (3) strengthen coordination with VAs fiduciary program, and (4) provide clearer guidance to claims processors assessing claimants eligibility. In its comments on this report, VA concurred with three of GAOs recommendations and concurred in principle with one, citing concerns about the potential burden on claimants and recipients of verifying reported financial information. VA agreed to study the issue further.
gao_GGD-95-78	gao_GGD-95-78_0	Similar to general employees, when Members retire under these provisions, their benefits are reduced by 2 percent for each year they are younger than age 55. Any employee who has a premium pay included in the high-3 salary average must also make contributions from his/her premium pay. Of all the employee groups covered by CSRS, only law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers are subject to mandatory retirement provisions. However, FERS continued the CSRS practice of allowing Members of Congress to retire at younger ages and with fewer years of service than general employees and congressional staff. Retirement Benefit Formulas The benefit formulas for Members of Congress, congressional staff, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers are all the same under the FERS pension plan. The FERS pension plan allows Members of Congress, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers to receive deferred benefits at the same ages and years of service as general employees if they were not eligible for optional retirement at the time of separation. Deferred benefits for law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers under these circumstances are calculated under the general employee formula, but Members of Congress and congressional staff retain their special benefit formula. Employee Contribution Requirements Like CSRS, the FERS pension plan requires the groups with preferential benefits to make greater contributions to the retirement fund than general employees. Features of the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) This appendix lists CSRS provisions that differ for the various employee groups they cover.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the retirement benefits available to members of Congress and congressional staff with those available to other employees under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) CSRS provisions for congressional members are generally more generous than those for general employees; (2) Members of Congress, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers may retire at a younger age and with fewer years of service than general and congressional employees; (3) Members, congressional staff, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and court judges enjoy a higher benefit formula than general employees; (4) air traffic controllers are covered by the general employee benefit formula, but they are guaranteed a minimum 50-percent pension; (5) general employees and Members are subject to having their pensions reduced if they retire early; (6) some special employee groups have their premium pay included in their benefit formulas; (7) employees who receive preferential benefits are required to make greater payroll contributions; (8) the FERS pension plan has many of the CSRS advantages for Members, congressional staff, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers and has eliminated or changed some CSRS provisions; and (9) under FERS, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and air traffic controllers enjoy provisions similar to those for Members of Congress.
gao_GAO-09-775	gao_GAO-09-775_0	In this regard, the departments have achieved planned capabilities for three of the interoperability objectives—refine social history data, share physical exam data, and demonstrate initial network gateway operation. For the remaining three objectives, the departments have partially achieved planned capabilities, with additional work needed to fully meet the objectives. Regarding the objective to expand questionnaires and self- assessment tools, this additional work is intended to be completed by September 2009. With respect to the objectives to expand Essentris and demonstrate initial document scanning, department officials stated that they also intend to meet these objectives; however, additional work will be required beyond September to perform all the activities necessary to meet clinicians’ needs for health information. DOD/VA Interagency Program Office Has Made Progress in Becoming Operational, but Is Not Fully Functioning as a Single Point of Accountability The DOD/VA Interagency Program Office is not yet effectively positioned to serve as a single point of accountability for the implementation of fully interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities. Since we last reported in January 2009, the departments have made progress in setting up the office by hiring additional staff, although they continue to fill key leadership positions on an interim basis. In addition, the office has begun to demonstrate responsibilities outlined in its charter, but is not yet fulfilling key IT management responsibilities in the areas of performance measurement, scheduling, and project planning. Table 2 provides the status of selected key activities to establish the interagency program office. Moreover, in the absence of these critical activities, the office is not effectively positioned to function as the single point of accountability for achieving full interoperability. In particular, the departments have taken steps to meet their six interoperability objectives by September 30, 2009. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To evaluate the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Veterans Affairs’ (VA) progress toward developing electronic health record systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability of personal health care information, we reviewed our previous work on DOD and VA efforts to develop health information systems, interoperable health records, and interoperability standards to be implemented in federal health care programs. We obtained and analyzed agency documentation and interviewed program officials to determine DOD’s and VA’s progress towards achieving full interoperability by September 30, 2009, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to accelerate their exchange of health information and to develop systems or capabilities that allow for interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data) by September 30, 2009. It also required compliance with federal standards and the establishment of a joint interagency program office to function as a single point of accountability for the effort. Further, the act directed GAO to semiannually report on the progress made in achieving these requirements. For this third report, GAO evaluated (1) the departments' progress and plans toward sharing fully interoperable electronic health information that comply with federal standards and (2) whether the interagency program office is positioned to function as a single point of accountability. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documentation on project status and conducted interviews with agency officials. What GAO Found DOD and VA have taken steps to meet six objectives that they identifiedforachieving full interoperability in compliance with applicable standards (see table) by September 30, 2009. Specifically, the departments have achieved planned capabilities for three of the objectives--refine social history data, share physical exam data, and demonstrate initial network gateway operation. For the remaining three objectives, the departments have partially achieved planned capabilities, with additional work needed to fully meet the objectives. Regarding the objective to expand questionnaires and self-assessment tools, this additional work is intended to be completed by the deadline. The departments' officials have stated that they intend to meet the objectives to expand DOD's inpatient medical records system and demonstrate initial document scanning; however, additional work will be required beyond September to perform all the activities necessary to meet clinicians' needs for health information. The DOD/VA Interagency Program Office is not yet effectively positioned to function as a single point of accountability for the implementation of fully interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities between DOD and VA. While the departments have made progress in setting up the office by hiring additional staff, they continue to fill key leadership positions on an interim basis. Further, while the office has begun to demonstrate responsibilities outlined in its charter, it is not yet fulfilling key information technology management responsibilities in the areas of performance measurement (as GAO previously recommended), project planning, and scheduling, which are essential to establishing the office as a single point of accountability for the departments' interoperability efforts.
gao_GAO-07-1094	gao_GAO-07-1094_0	Four Agencies Obligated about $5 Billion for Rural Water Supply and Wastewater Projects during Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006 RUS, EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps obligated $4.7 billion to 3,104 rural water supply and wastewater projects from fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Of these obligations, RUS obligated nearly $4.2 billion (or about 90 percent) of the funding—about $1.5 billion in grants and about $2.7 billion in loans—to about 2,800 projects. EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps provided a combined $500 million in grants to rural communities for about 300 water supply and wastewater projects. Agencies Fund Similar Rural Water Supply and Wastewater Projects, but their Eligibility Criteria Vary While the types of projects RUS, EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps fund are similar, varying agency eligibility criteria can limit funding to certain communities based on their population size, economic need, or geographic location. Specifically, RUS and EDA have established nationwide programs with standardized eligibility criteria and processes under which communities compete for funding. In contrast, Reclamation and the Corps have historically provided funding to congressionally authorized projects in certain geographic locations, without standardized eligibility criteria. While Reclamation primarily provides funding for water supply projects, RUS, EDA, and the Corps fund both water supply and wastewater projects. These projects primarily include the construction or upgrading of water or wastewater distribution lines, treatment plants, and pumping stations. Although the Corps continues to provide assistance to projects under specific congressional authorizations, many of which are pilot programs, the Rural Water Supply Act of 2006 directed Reclamation to establish a rural water supply program with standardized eligibility criteria. In 2006, the Congress passed the Rural Water Supply Act directing Reclamation to develop a rural water supply program. When the Congress authorized the Corps to fund these various pilot programs, it also required the agency to evaluate the effectiveness of several of them and recommend to the Congress whether these pilot programs should be implemented on a national basis. Recommendation for Executive Action To ensure that the Congress has the information it needs to determine whether the Corps should continue to fund rural water supply and wastewater projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commanding General and the Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide a comprehensive report on the water supply and wastewater projects that the Corps has funded under its pilot programs and determine whether these pilot programs duplicate other agency efforts and should be discontinued, or whether these pilot programs address an unmet need and should be expanded and made permanent at a national level. To determine the extent to which each RUS, EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps eligibility criteria and the projects they fund differed, we reviewed and analyzed applicable statutes, agency regulations, and policy guidance.	Why GAO Did This Study funds for constructing and upgrading water supply and wastewater treatment facilities. As a result, they typically rely on federal grants and loans, primarily from the Rural Utilities Service (RUS), Economic Development Administration (EDA), Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), to fund these projects. Concern has been raised about potential overlap between the projects these agencies fund. For fiscal years 2004 through 2006 GAO determined the (1) amount of funding these agencies obligated for rural water projects and (2) extent to which each agency's eligibility criteria and the projects they fund differed. GAO analyzed each agency's financial data and reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. What GAO Found From fiscal years 2004 through 2006, RUS, EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps obligated nearly $4.7 billion to about 3,100 rural water supply and wastewater projects. RUS obligated the majority of these funds--about $4.2 billion--to about 2,800 projects. Of this $4.2 billion, RUS loans accounted for about $2.7 billion, and RUS grants accounted for about $1.5 billion. EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps, combined, obligated a total of about $500 million in grants to rural communities for about 300 water projects. RUS, EDA, Reclamation, and the Corps fund similar rural water supply and wastewater projects, but they have varied eligibility criteria that limit funding to certain communities based on population size, economic need, or geographic location. RUS, EDA, and the Corps provide funding for both water supply and wastewater projects, while Reclamation provides funding only for water supply projects. Eligible water projects can include constructing or upgrading distribution lines, treatment plants, and pumping stations. RUS and EDA have formal nationwide programs with standardized eligibility criteria and processes under which communities compete for funding. In contrast, Reclamation and the Corps fund water projects in defined geographic locations under explicit congressional authorizations. In 2006 the Congress passed the Rural Water Supply Act, directing Reclamation to develop a rural water supply program with standard eligibility criteria. The Corps continues to fund rural water supply and wastewater projects under specific congressional authorizations, many of which are pilot programs. The Congress required the Corps to evaluate the effectiveness of these various pilot programs and recommend whether they should be implemented on a national basis. The Corps has only completed some of the required evaluations and, in most cases, has not made the recommendations that the Congress requested about whether or not the projects carried out under these pilot programs should be implemented on a national basis.
gao_NSIAD-95-12	gao_NSIAD-95-12_0	Background Prior to recent congressional deliberations on the Navy’s fiscal year 1995 budget, the Navy planned to spend over $2.5 billion to add limited ground attack capability and other improvements to 210 F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft (53 F-14Ds, 81 F-14Bs, and 76 F-14As). Although the F-14 generally has greater range and endurance than the F/A-18C, the majority of littoral targets should be within the F/A-18C’s range, even with an aircraft carrier operating 100 miles or more offshore. Upgraded F-14s Will Be Less Capable Than Some Attack Aircraft The Block I F-14 aircraft will not have all of the capability of the Air Force’s F-15E Strike Eagle (a long range, all-weather, multimission strike fighter with precision weapons capability), the Navy’s own F/A-18C Hornet, or its A-6E Intruder (see table 2). Upgraded F-14s Will Not Reach the Fleet Before A-6Es Are Retired Although the Navy justified the F-14 upgrade as necessary to fill the gap between A-6E retirements and delivery of F/A-18E/Fs, no F-14s, under the original Block I plan, were scheduled to begin receiving upgrades until fiscal year 1998, a year after the last A-6s were retired. Therefore, the Congress may wish to defer authorizing or appropriating additional monies for the F-14 until the Navy can demonstrate that planned upgrades are essential when considering (1) the current F/A-18C capabilities; (2) the net weapon capability gain over current F-14A/B levels; (3) the absence of a ground attack radar in 157 of the 210 aircraft; (4) the lack of precision stand-off weapons capability in all 210 F-14 aircraft that limits the versatility and use of these aircraft in combat; (5) the nearly simultaneous delivery of upgraded F-14s and F/A –18E/Fs; and (6) the Navy’s willingness to deploy carriers without A-6Es or upgraded F-14s, as evidenced by the upcoming deployment of the USS Constellation. Scope and Methodology Our data gathering and analysis focused on the Navy’s decision to upgrade 210 F-14 aircraft.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the Navy's decision to spend about $2.5 billion between fiscal years 1994 and 2003 for a limited ground attack upgrade and other modifications to about 200 F-14 Tomcat fighters. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) although the Navy has justified F-14 attack upgrades as necessary to replace the loss of A-6E aircraft, most upgraded F-14 aircraft will be less capable than F/A-18C aircraft; (2) although upgraded F-14 aircraft have greater range than F/A-18C aircraft, this capability may not be needed, since the Navy's shift to a littoral warfare strategy will bring the Navy's targets within range of the F/A-18C and other weapons systems; (3) delivery of upgraded F-14 aircraft is not scheduled to begin until after the A-6E fleet is retired, even though the Navy stated that the aircraft are needed to fill a gap between A-6E retirement and the introduction of the F/A-18E/F aircraft; (4) for several years, the Navy will deploy carriers without A-6E or upgraded F-14 aircraft and will rely on its F/A-18C fleet for all attack missions; and (5) the Navy has not adequately justified its $2.5-billion plan to upgrade the F-14 fleet.
gao_GAO-09-58	gao_GAO-09-58_0	HHS’s and DHS’s Lack of Comprehensive Procedures for Information Sharing and Coordination and CBP Inspection Deficiencies Hindered the Response to the TB Incidents Various factors—a lack of comprehensive procedures for information sharing and coordination as well as border inspection shortfalls—hindered the federal response to the two TB incidents. They had established a memorandum of understanding in October 2005 creating a broad agreement to communicate and coordinate during public health emergencies. HHS and DHS Lacked Comprehensive Procedures to Share Information and Coordinate Their Responses and Resources in the Two TB Incidents Despite the memorandum of understanding between HHS and DHS in place at the time of the incidents, the departments lacked comprehensive procedures needed to share information with each other and coordinate resources to deter cross-border travel of nonadherent individuals with infectious disease, such as TB. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for (1) management to ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals and (2) effective communication flowing down, across, and up the organization to enable managers to carry out their internal control responsibilities. CDC Lacked Procedures to Coordinate with State and Local Health Officials to Determine Use of Federal Isolation and Quarantine Authorities CDC had not developed procedures to inform state and local health officials about the process for coordinating with CDC to determine whether federal isolation and quarantine authorities should be used to deter the travel of an individual with TB, causing the initial delay in the federal response. CBP Inspection Deficiencies Contributed to Delays in Locating the Individuals with TB Deficiencies in CBP’s traveler inspection operations further contributed to the delay in federal efforts to locate the two individuals with TB and direct them to treatment. When responding to HHS’s request for assistance to deter the U.S. citizen from traveling, CBP issued a TECS alert to determine when the U.S. citizen planned to return to the United States. HHS and DHS Implemented Procedures and Tools to Address Response Deficiencies, but Could Take Further Steps to Complete Actions Identified as a Result of the 2007 TB Incidents HHS and DHS have implemented various procedures and tools intended to address deficiencies identified by the 2007 TB incidents. Finally, HHS and DHS have identified additional actions that need to be taken to further strengthen the departments’ ability to respond to incidents involving individuals with TB who intend to travel. HHS and DHS Implemented New Procedures and Tools Intended to Address Information Sharing, Coordination, and Public Health Screening and Border Inspection Deficiencies Identified by the TB Incidents HHS and DHS officials—including officials from CDC, CBP, and TSA—met in June 2007 to develop new procedures and tools to determine how DHS might be able to help HHS respond to public health incidents, develop a framework for coordinating with each other during responses to public health incidents, and ensure the appropriate level of agency involvement and use of agency resources. To help promote enhanced information sharing across and within both departments, HHS and DHS developed new procedures for HHS to request assistance from DHS. These new procedures are consistent with practices identified in our past work for enhancing and sustaining agency collaboration and for establishing leadership, capabilities, and accountability for preparedness and response. CDC Has Made Some Efforts to Inform State and Local Health Officials of New Procedures and Tools, but Has Not Completed All Actions Although CDC has made some efforts to educate health officials, according to CDC officials the agency has not yet completed all actions to provide information to health officials who work with individuals with TB about the new procedures and tools, or about the criteria for adding individuals to or removing them from the Do Not Board list or TECS. HHS and DHS Have Activities Under Way to Assess Their Ability to Respond to TB Incidents According to CDC officials, both departments have activities under way to assess the effectiveness of the new procedures and tools. Additionally, HHS and DHS have more opportunities to improve their information-sharing efforts in responding to future TB incidents. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security.	Why GAO Did This Study In spring 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and state and local health officials worked together to interdict two individuals with drug-resistant infectious tuberculosis (TB) from crossing U.S. borders and direct them to treatment. Concerns arose that HHS's and DHS's responses to the incidents were delayed and ineffective. GAO was asked to examine (1) the factors that affected HHS's and DHS's responses to the incidents, (2) the extent to which HHS and DHS made changes to response procedures as a result of the incidents, and (3) HHS's and DHS's efforts to assess the effectiveness of changes made as a result of the incidents. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials about the procedures in place at the time of the incidents and changes made since. What GAO Found Various factors--a lack of comprehensive procedures for information sharing and coordination and border inspection shortfalls--hindered the federal response to the two TB incidents. GAO's past work and federal internal control standards call for collaborative communication and coordination across agencies; communication flowing down, across, and up agencies to help managers carry out their internal control responsibilities; and effective leadership, capabilities, and accountability to ensure effective preparedness and response to hazardous situations. HHS and DHS finalized a memorandum of understanding in October 2005 intended to promote communication and coordination in response to public health incidents, but they had not fully developed operational procedures to share information and coordinate their efforts. Thus, HHS and DHS lost time locating or identifying the individuals to interdict them at the U.S. border. Also, HHS lacked procedures to coordinate with state and local health officials to determine when to use federal isolation and quarantine authorities, which further contributed to the delay in the federal response to one of the incidents. Finally, DHS had deficiencies in its process for inspecting individuals at the border, which caused delays in locating the individuals with TB. HHS and DHS have subsequently implemented procedures and tools intended to address deficiencies identified by the incidents, consistent with GAO's past work and internal control standards, but the departments could take additional steps to enhance their ability to respond to future TB incidents. Since the 2007 incidents, HHS and DHS have developed formal procedures for HHS to request DHS's assistance, and DHS has (1) developed a watch list for airlines to identify individuals with TB and other infectious diseases who are to be stopped from traveling and (2) revised its border inspection process to include a requirement that individuals with TB identified by HHS be subject to further inspection. DHS has also enhanced its process for creating public health alerts based on some variations of biographic information (e.g., name, date of birth, or travel document information), but has not explored the benefits of creating these alerts based on other variations, which impeded DHS's ability to interdict one of the individuals at the border. In addition, HHS has not yet completed efforts to provide information on changes in procedures to state and local health officials, who typically originate requests for assistance, to help mitigate delays in accessing federal assistance. HHS and DHS identified additional actions that need to be taken to further strengthen their response, but have not developed plans for completing them. HHS and DHS have activities under way to assess the effectiveness of the new procedures and tools, including performance monitoring and cross-agency meetings to discuss and revise the new procedures and tools based on actual experiences. HHS and DHS have coordinated on more than 70 requests for assistance since the 2007 incidents through February 2008; officials said they view each incident as a test of the efficacy of their responses.
gao_GAO-08-650T	gao_GAO-08-650T_0	For example, Medicaid payments by law must be “consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality care,” and states must share in Medicaid costs in proportions established according to a statutory formula. The agency also published in May 2007 a final rule related to Medicaid payment and financing. This rule would, among other things, limit payments to government providers to their cost of providing Medicaid services. Concerns about Certain Medicaid Financing Arrangements That Undermine Medicaid’s Fiscal Integrity Are Long-standing From 1994 through 2005, we have reported numerous times on a number of financing arrangements that create the illusion of a valid state Medicaid expenditure to a health care provider. The supplemental payments connected with these arrangements were illusory, however, because states required these government providers to return part or all of the payments to the states. Financing arrangements involving illusory payments to Medicaid providers have significant fiscal implications for the federal government and states. The exact amount of additional federal Medicaid funds generated through these arrangements is not known, but was in the billions of dollars. First, inappropriate state financing arrangements effectively increased the federal matching rate established under federal law by increasing federal expenditures while state contributions remain unchanged or even decrease. Under its Medicaid matching formula, the state paid $10.5 million and CMS paid $30.5 million as the federal share of the supplemental payment. Second, CMS had no assurance that these increased federal matching payments were retained by the providers and used to pay for Medicaid services. Third, these state financing arrangements undermined the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program because they enabled states to make payments to government providers that could significantly exceed their costs. CMS Oversight Initiative to End State Financing Arrangements Lacked Transparency Our March 2007 report on a recent CMS oversight initiative to end certain financing arrangements where providers did not retain the payments provides context for CMS’s May rule. Responding to concerns about states’ continuing use of creative financing arrangements to shift costs to the federal government, CMS has taken steps starting in August 2003 to end inappropriate state financing arrangements by closely reviewing state plan amendments on a state-by-state basis. As a result of the CMS initiative, from August 2003 through August 2006, 29 states ended one or more arrangements for financing supplemental payments, because providers were not retaining the Medicaid payments for which states had received federal matching funds. CMS’s initiative was a departure from the agency’s past oversight approach, which did not focus on whether individual providers were retaining the supplemental payments they received. CMS had not used any of the means by which it typically provides information to states about the Medicaid program, such as its published state Medicaid manual, standard letters issued to all state Medicaid directors, or technical guidance manuals, to inform states about the specific standards it used for reviewing and approving states’ financing arrangements. We have ongoing work to examine the amount and distribution of states’ Medicaid supplemental payments, but have not reported on the May 2007 rule or other rules related to Medicaid financing issued this year. The extent to which the rule would address concerns about the transparency of CMS’s initiative and review standards will depend on how CMS implements it. The federal government and states have a responsibility to administer the program in a manner that ensures that expenditures benefit those low-income people for whom benefits were intended. Ensuring the program’s long-term fiscal sustainability is important for beneficiaries, providers, states, and the federal government.	Why GAO Did This Study Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, financed the health care for about 59 million low-income people in fiscal year 2006. States have considerable flexibility in deciding what medical services and individuals to cover and the amount to pay providers, and the federal government reimburses a portion of states' expenditures according to a formula established by law. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal agency responsible for overseeing Medicaid. Growing pressures on federal and state budgets have increased tensions between the federal government and states regarding this program, including concerns about whether states were appropriately financing their share of the program. GAO's testimony describes findings from prior work conducted from 1994 through March 2007 on (1) certain inappropriate state Medicaid financing arrangements and their implications for Medicaid's fiscal integrity and (2) outcomes and transparency of a CMS oversight initiative begun in 2003 to end such inappropriate arrangements. What GAO Found GAO has reported for more than a decade on varied financing arrangements that inappropriately increase federal Medicaid matching payments. In reports issued from 1994 through 2005, GAO found that some states had received federal matching funds by paying certain government providers, such as county-operated nursing homes, amounts that greatly exceeded established Medicaid rates. States would then bill CMS for the federal share of the payment. However, these large payments were often temporary, since some states required the providers to return most or all of the amount. States used the federal matching funds obtained in making these payments as they wished. Such financing arrangements had significant fiscal implications for the federal government and states. The exact amount of additional federal Medicaid funds generated through these arrangements is unknown, but was in the billions of dollars. Because such financing arrangements effectively increase the federal Medicaid share above what is established by law, they threaten the fiscal integrity of Medicaid's federal and state partnership. They shift costs inappropriately from the states to the federal government, and take funding intended for covered Medicaid costs from providers, who do not under these arrangements retain the full payments. In 2003, CMS began an oversight initiative that by August 2006 resulted in 29 states ending one or more inappropriate financing arrangements. Under the initiative, CMS sought satisfactory assurances that a state was ending financing arrangements that the agency found to be inappropriate. According to CMS, the arrangements had to be ended because the providers did not retain all payments made to them but returned all or a portion to the states. GAO reported in 2007 that although CMS's initiative was consistent with Medicaid payment principles, it was not transparent in implementation. CMS had not used any of the means by which it normally provides states with information about Medicaid program requirements, such as the published state Medicaid manual, standard letters issued to all state Medicaid directors, or technical guidance manuals. Such guidance could be helpful by informing states about the specific standards used for reviewing and approving states' financing arrangements. In May 2007, CMS issued a final rule that, if implemented, would, among other things, limit Medicaid payments to government providers' costs. We have not reviewed the substance of the May 2007 rule. The extent to which the May 2007 rule would respond to GAO's concerns about the transparency of CMS's initiative and review standards will depend on how CMS implements it.
gao_NSIAD-95-113	gao_NSIAD-95-113_0	Forces Command. Our specific objectives were to describe and assess (1) the level of U.S. participation, training, and operational impacts; (2) the actual cost of MFO operations, the U.S. contribution, and any cost-saving opportunities; (3) State oversight of the U.S. contribution; and (4) views of the State Department and other relevant parties on the MFO performance and lessons learned. The United States provides the largest military contingent, constituting 49.6 percent of the total force at the time of our review. According to MFO and U.S. Army officials, opportunities may exist to reduce the number of U.S. Army logistical personnel. Participation Increases The MFO has progressively reduced its operating cost since fiscal year 1982. This is because although U.S. troop levels have decreased, their salaries and the offset costs have increased. According to State officials, the MFO is an operationally and cost-effective peacekeeping operation that has helped bridge confidence and communication between Egypt and Israel. U.S. Army officials, while viewing the MFO as operationally effective, have concerns about the level of U.S. participation, the operational impacts to the Army, and the lack of an end date. These officials view the MFO as an indefinite Army commitment. Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of State improve the oversight of the MFO by (1) examining the MFO annual published financial statements for discrepancies, (2) requesting and reviewing all reports issued by the MFO external auditors, (3) request the MFO to have its external auditor periodically perform a separate audit of the MFO management and internal accounting controls and provide a copy of the resulting report to State, and (4) include the U.S. annual assessment cost contribution of one-third of the MFO operating costs in its annual report to Congress on the MFO.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), focusing on: (1) U.S. contributions to MFO and measures taken to reduce MFO costs; (2) the operational impacts of U.S. participation in MFO; (3) the Department of State's oversight of U.S. participation in MFO; and (4) views of MFO performance and lessons learned. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the United States provides one-third of MFO operating expenses and the largest military contingent; (2) while U.S. annual assessments of MFO operating costs have steadily declined since 1989, the Department of Defense's (DOD) costs have increased, mainly due to salary increases; (3) Army operations have been impacted by the cumulative effects of DOD contingency efforts, but opportunities may exist to reduce the impact by reducing the number of logistical troops and using reserve forces; (4) despite MFO operational success and its ability to reduce certain costs, State needs to improve its oversight of U.S. participation in MFO because of inadequate internal controls and auditing procedures and the quality of its reporting to Congress; and (5) State and international officials view MFO as an operationally effective peacekeeping operation that has helped sustain peace between Egypt and Israel since 1982, while DOD views MFO as a limited operation that is not applicable to more hostile peacekeeping environments.
gao_GAO-04-482T	gao_GAO-04-482T_0	Congress is considering several legislative proposals that would grant DHS, or DHS and EPA, the authority to require chemical facilities to take security steps. S. 994 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to promulgate regulations specifying which facilities should be required to conduct vulnerability assessments and to prepare and implement site security plans, a timetable for completing the vulnerability assessments and security plans, the contents of plans, and limits on the disclosure of sensitive information. An Attack Against Chemical Facilities Could Cause Economic Harm and Loss of Life Experts agree that chemical facilities present an attractive target for terrorists intent on causing massive damage because many facilities house toxic chemicals that could become airborne and drift to surrounding areas if released. Justice has concluded that the risk of an attempt in the foreseeable future to cause an industrial chemical release is both real and credible. However, RMP facilities must submit to EPA estimates, including the residential population located within the range of a toxic gas cloud produced by a “worst-case” chemical release, called the “vulnerable zone.” According to EPA, 123 chemical facilities located throughout the nation have toxic “worst-case” scenarios where more than one million people could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas. Currently, no one has comprehensively assessed security across the nation at facilities that house chemicals. No Federal Requirements Specifically Require Chemical Facilities to Address the Threat of Terrorism No federal laws explicitly require all chemical facilities to take security actions to safeguard their facilities against a terrorist attack. A number of federal laws also impose safety requirements on chemical facilities, but these requirements do not specifically and directly address security preparedness against terrorism. Second, both the Clean Air Act risk management plan provisions and the hazard analyses under the Occupational Safety and Health Act require facility operators to identify the areas of their facilities that are vulnerable to a chemical release. As we reported in March 2003, there are a number of practical and legal arguments against this interpretation. Federal Agencies Have Not Comprehensively Assessed the Vulnerability of the Chemical Industry to Terrorism, but Have Taken Some Preliminary Steps Despite a congressional mandate to do so, the federal government has not conducted the assessments necessary to develop comprehensive information on the chemical industry’s vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. Federal agencies have taken preliminary steps to assist the industry in its preparedness efforts. However, neither EPA nor DHS is currently monitoring the extent to which the industry has implemented security measures. Chemical Industry Has Taken Voluntary Actions to Address Security Concerns but Faces Significant Challenges in Preparing Against Terrorist Attacks The chemical manufacturing industry has undertaken a number of voluntary initiatives to address security concerns at chemical facilities, including developing security guidelines and tools to assess vulnerabilities, but major challenges remain. In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, ACC—whose members own or operate approximately 1,000 RMP facilities —-now requires its members, as a condition of membership, to rank facilities using a screening tool to evaluate its facilities’ risk level. ACC generally requires third-party verification that the facility has made the improvements identified in its vulnerability assessment. Despite industry associations’ efforts to encourage security actions at facilities, the extent of participation in voluntary initiatives is unclear. The chemical industry faces a number of challenges in preparing facilities against terrorist attacks, including ensuring that facilities obtain adequate information on threats and determining the appropriate security measures given the level of risk. Finally, industry officials stated that the industry faces a challenge in engaging all chemical facilities in voluntary security efforts.	Why GAO Did This Study The events of September 11, 2001, triggered a national re-examination of the security of thousands of industrial facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals in quantities that could potentially put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious injury or death in the event of a terrorist-caused chemical release. GAO was asked to examine (1) available information on the threats and risks from terrorism faced by U.S. chemical facilities; (2) federal requirements for security preparedness and safety at facilities; (3) actions taken by federal agencies to assess the vulnerability of the industry; and (4) voluntary actions the chemical industry has taken to address security preparedness, and the challenges it faces in protecting its assets and operations. GAO issued a report on this work in March 2003 (GAO-03-439). What GAO Found Chemical facilities may be attractive targets for terrorists intent on causing economic harm and loss of life. Many facilities exist in populated areas where a chemical release could threaten thousands. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that 123 chemical plants located throughout the nation could each potentially expose more than a million people if a chemical release occurred. To date, no one has comprehensively assessed the security of chemical facilities. No federal laws explicitly require that chemical facilities assess vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their facilities from attack. However, a number of federal laws impose safety requirements on facilities that may help mitigate the effects of a terrorist-caused chemical release. Although EPA believes that the Clean Air Act could be interpreted to require security at certain chemical facilities, the agency has decided not to attempt to require these actions in light of the litigation risk and importance of an effective response to chemical security. Ultimately, no federal oversight or third-party verification ensures that voluntary industry assessments of vulnerability are adequate and that security vulnerabilities are addressed. Currently, the federal government has not comprehensively assessed the chemical industry's vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. EPA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice have taken preliminary steps to assist the industry in its preparedness efforts, but no agency monitors or documents the extent to which chemical facilities have implemented security measures. Consequently, federal, state, and local entities lack comprehensive information on the vulnerabilities facing the industry. To its credit, the chemical manufacturing industry, led by its industry associations, has undertaken a number of voluntary initiatives to address security at facilities. For example, the American Chemistry Council, whose members own or operate approximately 1,000, or 7 percent, of the facilities subject to Clean Air Act risk management plan provisions, requires its members to conduct vulnerability assessments and implement security improvements. The industry faces a number of challenges in preparing facilities against attacks, including ensuring that all chemical facilities address security concerns. Despite the industry's voluntary efforts, the extent of security preparedness at U.S. chemical facilities is unknown. In October 2002 both the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of EPA stated that voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to assure the public of the industry's preparedness. Legislation is now pending that would mandate chemical facilities to take security steps to protect against the risk of a terrorist attack.
gao_GAO-12-446	gao_GAO-12-446_0	1.) Methodology for Allocating CHS Funds IHS uses three primary methods—base funding, annual adjustments, and program increases—to determine the allocation of CHS funds to the IHS area offices, which then distribute the funds to individual CHS programs. 2.) 3 years. IHS’s Allocation of CHS Funds Varied Widely across IHS Areas in Fiscal Year 2010 CHS funding varied widely across IHS area offices in fiscal year 2010. Total CHS funding for fiscal year 2010 ranged across the 12 area offices from nearly $17 million to more than $95 million. Per capita CHS funding for fiscal year 2010 varied widely, ranging across the area offices from $299 to $801. In addition, per capita CHS funding was sometimes not related to areas’ dependence on CHS for the provision of IHS-funded inpatient services. Base funding, which is based solely on funding from the prior year, accounts for the great majority of CHS funds and therefore maintains any funding variations. For example, in fiscal year 2010, the year in which IHS received its largest program increase, base funding accounted for 82 percent of total CHS funds allocated to IHS area offices. The active user estimates that IHS used to allocate program increases therefore included an unknown proportion of patients who had not received contract health services, but rather had received only direct care services. IHS Has Taken Few Steps to Address the Funding Variation within the CHS Program IHS has taken few steps to evaluate the funding variations within the CHS program. IHS officials told us that they have not evaluated the effectiveness of base funding and the CHS Allocation Formula in meeting the health care needs of American Indians and Alaska Natives across the IHS areas and they do not plan to do so with respect to the determination of base funding amounts. Without such assessments, IHS cannot determine the extent to which the current variation in CHS funding reflects variation in health care needs. The workgroup recommended that an evaluation of the current CHS Allocation Formula be postponed until at least fiscal year 2013. The workgroup members said that the CHS program had only begun receiving substantial increases in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and the full impact of these increases needed to be reviewed before making recommendations to change the formula. In contrast, we found that IHS has used the formula to allocate program increases, at least in part, in 5 years since 2001. IHS’s Ability to Address Funding Variations Is Limited by Statute Federal law restricts IHS’s ability to reallocate funding should the agency desire to do so. In addition, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act imposes a congressional reporting requirement for proposed reductions in base funding for any recurring program, project, or activity of a service unit of 5 percent or more.officials told us that no such proposal to reallocate base funding has been transmitted to the Congress. IHS can improve the equity of how it allocates program increase funds to areas through improvements in its implementation of the CHS Allocation Formula, primarily by using counts of actual CHS users rather than by using the current method of estimating the number of overall IHS users, which now includes patients who never used a CHS service, and by refining the access to care factor to account for differences in available health care services at IHS and tribally operated facilities. However, because of the predominant influence of base funding and the relatively small contribution of program increases to overall CHS funding, it would take many years to achieve funding equity just by revising the methods for distributing CHS program increase funds. Matter for Congressional Consideration In order to ensure an equitable allocation of CHS program funds, the Congress should consider requiring IHS to develop and use a new method to allocate all CHS program funds to account for variations across areas that would replace the existing base funding, annual adjustment, and program increase methodologies, notwithstanding any restrictions currently in federal law. Recommendations for Executive Action To make IHS’s allocation of CHS program funds more equitable, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Director of the Indian Health Service to take the following three actions for any future allocation of CHS funds: require IHS to use actual counts of CHS users, rather than all IHS users, in any formula for allocating CHS funds that relies on the number of active users; require IHS to use variations in levels of available hospital services, rather than just the existence of a qualifying hospital, in any formula for allocating CHS funds that contains a hospital access component; and develop written policies and procedures to require area offices to notify IHS when changes are made to the allocations of funds to CHS programs. In its comments, HHS concurred with two of our recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation.	Why GAO Did This Study IHS, an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health care to American Indians and Alaska Natives. When care at an IHS-funded facility is unavailable, IHSs CHS program pays for care from non-IHS providers if the patient meets certain requirements and funding is available. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires GAO to study the administration of the CHS program, including a focus on the allocation of funds. IHS uses three primary methods to determine the allocation of CHS funds to the 12 IHS geographic area offices: base funding, which accounts for most of the allocation; annual adjustments; and program increases, which are provided to expand the CHS program. GAO examined (1) the extent to which IHSs allocation of CHS funding varied across IHS areas, and (2) what steps IHS has taken to address funding variation within the CHS program. GAO analyzed IHS funding data, reviewed agency documents and interviewed IHS and area office officials. What GAO Found The Indian Health Services (IHS) allocation of contract health services (CHS) funds varied widely across the 12 IHS geographic areas. In fiscal year 2010, CHS funding ranged from nearly $17 million in one area to more than $95 million in another area. Per capita CHS funding for fiscal year 2010 also varied widely, ranging across the areas from $299 to $801 and was sometimes not related to the areas dependence on CHS inpatient services, as determined by the availability of IHS-funded hospitals. The allocation pattern of per capita CHS funds has been generally maintained from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2010. This is due to the reliance on base fundingwhich incorporates all CHS funding from the prior year to establish a new base each yearand accounts for the majority of funding. In fiscal year 2010, when CHS had its largest program increase and base funding was the smallest proportion of funding for any year, base funding still accounted for 82 percent of total CHS funds allocated to areas. Further, allocations of program increase funds are largely dependent on an estimate of CHS service users that is imprecise. IHS counts all users who obtained at least one service either funded by CHS or provided directly from an IHS-funded facility during the preceding 3-year period. This count therefore includes an unknown number of individuals who received IHS direct care only and who had not received contract health services. IHS has taken few steps to evaluate funding variation within the CHS program and IHSs ability to address funding variations is limited by statute. IHS officials told GAO that the agency has not evaluated the effectiveness of base funding and the CHS Allocation Formula. Without such assessments, IHS cannot determine the extent to which the current variation in CHS funding accurately reflects variation in health care needs. While IHS has formed a workgroup to evaluate the existing formula for allocating program increases, the workgroup recommended, and the Director of IHS concurred, that the CHS Allocation Formula for distributing program increases would not be evaluated until at least 2013. The workgroup members maintained that the CHS program had only begun receiving substantial increases in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and the full impact of these increases needed to be reviewed before making recommendations to change the formula. However, GAO found that IHS has used the formula to allocate program increases, at least in part, in 5 years since 2001. GAO also concluded that, because of the predominant influence of base funding and the relatively small contribution of program increases to overall CHS funding, it would take many years to achieve funding equity just by revising the methods for distributing CHS program increase funds. Further, federal law restricts IHSs ability to reallocate funding, specifically limiting reductions in funding for certain tribally-operated programs, including some CHS programs, and imposing a congressional reporting requirement for proposed reductions in base funding of 5 percent or more. According to IHS officials, no such IHS proposal to reallocate base funding has ever been transmitted to the Congress. What GAO Recommends GAO suggests that Congress consider requiring IHS to develop and use a new method to allocate all CHS program funds to account for variations across areas, notwithstanding any restrictions now in federal law. GAO also recommends, among other things, IHS use actual counts of CHS users in methods for allocating CHS funds. HHS concurred with two of GAOs recommendations, but did not concur with the recommendation to use actual counts of CHS users. GAO believes that its recommendation would provide a more accurate count of CHS users.
gao_GAO-15-673T	gao_GAO-15-673T_0	Benefit overpayments can occur when beneficiaries do not report work or SSA does not take action on work reports in an appropriate or timely manner. SSA’s DI cumulative overpayment debt has almost doubled over the last decade, growing from $3.2 billion at the end of fiscal year 2004 to $6.3 billion at the end of fiscal year 2014, according to SSA data. Most DI Overpayment Amounts Are Associated with Work-Related Activity That Exceeds Program Limits According to preliminary data provided by SSA, the agency overpaid DI beneficiaries a total of about $20 billion during fiscal years 2005 through 2014, and more than half of this total ($11 billion) was a result of beneficiaries’ work-related earnings exceeding program limits. SSA’s annual stewardship reviews provide limited insight into the causes of overpayments. In its last six stewardship reports, SSA reported that deficiency dollars related to beneficiaries’ incomes being above DI program limits were consistently a leading cause of improper overpayments in the DI program. SSA also attributed some of these deficiencies to not taking appropriate or timely action to adjust payments when it was notified of beneficiaries’ work activity. Process Vulnerabilities and Complex Program Rules May Pose Challenges to Correctly Handling Work Reports Vulnerabilities in Processing DI Work Reports Based on our discussions with SSA staff in field offices and teleservice centers, we identified a number of situations where beneficiaries report work or earnings, but staff may not enter information into the system, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, or may not provide a receipt, as mandated by law. Issuing a receipt is required by law and valuable to the beneficiary for two reasons: (1) the beneficiary can review the receipt to ensure that the information is correct; and (2) a beneficiary who later receives an overpayment can produce work report receipts to prove that he/she properly reported work activity. However, SSA’s ability to determine the extent of these vulnerabilities is hindered, in part, due to data limitations. SSA’s eWork system does not capture data that would help the agency determine how many work reports are filed by fax, mail, or in person. However, the agency has not established policies or procedures detailing the steps staff must take in screening these reports. Without explicit policies or procedures on how to screen a work report—that is, how to evaluate whether it should be closed or referred to a work CDR to determine whether the beneficiary’s benefits should be adjusted—there is an increased risk that a report could be improperly closed, and result in a beneficiary being overpaid. SSA also lacks guidance and processes for ensuring the accuracy and quality of its work report decisions. In accordance with federal internal control standards, agencies should assure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, and assess the quality of performance over time. The absence of oversight and feedback increases the risk that the agency may not identify errors with work report decisions in a timely manner. SSA Has Not Automated DI Beneficiary Work Reporting SSA does not offer automated reporting options for DI beneficiaries — similar to those currently used in SSA’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program— even though such options could address vulnerabilities we identified. They also told us these efforts were not resumed because the automated reporting in the DI program would not have the same return on investment as in the SSI program, due to the complexity of DI program rules. Unclear Guidance and Complex Program Rules May Result in Confusion Regarding Work Reporting Requirements Overpayments may arise because of unclear work reporting requirements and staff’s differing interpretations of complex DI program rules. For example, SSA’s regulations and its policy manual both state that DI beneficiaries should “promptly” report changes to work activity, but SSA has not defined this term, leaving this open to interpretation by both beneficiaries and SSA staff. SSA has developed a proposal to reduce complexity in the DI program, but has not tested or implemented this proposal to date. In its fiscal year 2012 budget request, SSA proposed the Work Incentives Simplification Pilot (WISP), to test a streamlined approach to evaluating DI Program work activity and reduce administrative workloads by making it simpler and less time-consuming for staff to verify earnings and validate benefits. Nevertheless, one SSA representative/ manager indicated that the page signed by beneficiaries when they are initially approved for benefits could specifically include information about work reporting requirements, which would make it more difficult for beneficiaries who incur an overpayment to claim that they were unaware of their reporting responsibilities. In contrast, in fiscal year 2014, SSA began providing a web-based service designed to prompt SSI beneficiaries to report wages, using notices, emails and reminders—an option not currently available for DI beneficiaries. Finally, although the initial application and annual letter mention potential liability for overpayments for beneficiaries who fail to report work, SSA’s “Working While Disabled” pamphlet—which contains details about work incentives and is provided to beneficiaries who contact SSA about work—does not explain circumstances under which a beneficiary could be found liable for an overpayment.	Why GAO Did This Study SSA's DI program is one of the nation's largest cash assistance programs. To ensure that beneficiaries remain eligible, SSA regulations require that beneficiaries promptly report their work activity—including starting a job or a change in wages—to the agency in a timely manner. If the beneficiary does not report changes or if SSA does not properly process reported work information, SSA may pay out benefits in excess of what is due, resulting in an overpayment. In fiscal year 2014, SSA identified $1.3 billion in DI benefit overpayments. Avoiding overpayments is imperative as they pose a burden for beneficiaries who must repay excess benefits and result in the loss of taxpayer dollars when they cannot be repaid. In this statement based on ongoing work, GAO discusses preliminary observations regarding: 1) what is known about the extent of work-related DI overpayments; and 2) factors affecting SSA's handling of work activity reported by beneficiaries. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, policies, and procedures, and prior GAO, OIG and SSA reports; analyzed 10 years of SSA data on overpayments; interviewed staff at SSA headquarters and at field offices and teleservice centers for three regions, selected to represent a range of relevant DI workloads. What GAO Found Over the last decade, preliminary data provided by the Social Security Administration (SSA) indicate that more than half of the $20 billion overpaid in the Disability Insurance (DI) program was associated with beneficiary work activity. Specifically, SSA's data indicate that between fiscal years 2005 and 2014, a total of $11 billion in DI overpayments were paid to beneficiaries with work earnings that exceeded program limits, with an annual average of 96,000 DI beneficiaries incurring an average work-related overpayment of $12,000. In its last 6 annual stewardship reports, SSA attributed some improper payments to its not taking appropriate action when notified of beneficiaries' work activity. GAO identified a number of factors that affect handling of work activity reports by beneficiaries—factors that stem from weaknesses in SSA's policies and procedures that are inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Such weaknesses increase the risk that overpayments may occur even when DI beneficiaries diligently try to follow program rules and report work and earnings. These weaknesses include: Vulnerabilities in processing work reports. Based on interviews with SSA staff, GAO identified process vulnerabilities that could result in staff not: (1) issuing a receipt that proves the beneficiary's work was reported—one of two criteria a beneficiary must meet for SSA to waive an overpayment; and (2) initiating tracking of work activity, which would help prevent overpayments. Data are not available to determine the extent to which this might occur. Limited guidance for processing and monitoring work reports. While SSA has metrics to ensure that staff take action on work reports in a timely manner, it lacks procedures detailing steps staff must take in screening these reports and for ensuring that pending work reports are systematically reviewed and closed with appropriate action, consistent with federal internal control standards. Not leveraging technology. In contrast to SSA's Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program—a means-tested disability benefits program—the DI program lacks automated tools for beneficiaries to report work. SSI recipients can report wages through an automated telephone reporting system and a smartphone app. SSA cited complex DI program rules and an unclear return on investment for not pursuing these options. However, this conclusion was based on a limited evaluation of costs. Meanwhile, SSA's current manual approach is vulnerable to error and may discourage reporting by beneficiaries who experience long wait times when they try to report work in person at offices or by telephone. Confusing work incentive rules. The DI program has complex work incentive rules, such that SSA staff interviewed by GAO had varying interpretations of program rules and gave beneficiaries differing instructions on how often to report their work and earnings. In 2012, SSA developed a proposal to simplify program rules, but stated that it does not currently have the authority to test or implement such changes. SSA requested authority that would allow it to conduct such tests in its 2016 budget proposal. What GAO Recommends As GAO finalizes its work for issuance later this year, it will consider making recommendations, as appropriate. GAO sought SSA's views on information included in this statement, but SSA was unable to provide its views in time to be incorporated.
gao_GAO-12-30	gao_GAO-12-30_0	CPSIA requires, at a minimum, that the submitter include the following eight pieces of information when submitting a report of harm: (1) description of the consumer product sufficient to distinguish the product as a product or component part regulated by CPSC; (2) identity of the manufacturer or private labeler by name; (3) description of the harm related to use of the consumer product; (4) approximate or actual date of the incident; (5) category of submitter; (6) submitter’s contact information; (7) submitter’s verification that the information contained therein is true and accurate; and (8) consent to publication of the report of harm. Our analysis of CPSC data showed that as of July 7, 2011, 5,464 reports of harm were received by CPSC from eligible submitters. Instead, the only identification information required in a report is “a word or phrase sufficient to distinguish the product as a consumer product, a component part of a consumer product, or a product or substance regulated by the Commission.” In the 1,847 published reports we reviewed, submitters included descriptions of the product in various fields, including a field for numeric information and fields for a more general description of the incident or product. Majority of Reports of Harm Contain Numeric Identifiers, but CPSC Could Analyze This Information More Thoroughly When we asked CPSC how many reports of harm contained model numbers and serial numbers, it analyzed its data and reported to us that model information or serial numbers appeared in 84 percent of reports of harm published on SaferProducts.gov as of June 2011. CPSC does not currently analyze its data to identify the number of reports of harm that contain either model numbers or serial numbers. Instead its method of analysis combines numeric identifiers—model or serial numbers—and text entries. Furthermore, some submitters include model and serial numbers in other database fields that CPSC does not include in its analysis. As noted earlier, on August 12, 2011, a new law was signed containing a requirement for CPSC to attempt to obtain the model number or serial number from submitters who did not provide this information in a report of harm. To determine which reports to follow up on to fulfill this new requirement, CPSC must identify all reports of harm that are missing model numbers or serial numbers. The report involved a product that was outside of CPSC’s jurisdiction. CPSC published 1,085 of these reports of harm with responses on SaferProducts.gov, and 94 percent of these (1,020) were published within 10 business days of CPSC’s having notified the company that a report of harm had been submitted. To address concerns about the time allowed to respond to claims of harm, Congress passed amendments to CPSIA to allow for a 15 business day publication time frame from the time CPSC transmits a report of harm to the manufacturer or private labeler in certain situations (when an MII claim is made or the report does not contain a model number or serial number), during which CPSC reviews any response the company submits and determines whether or not to publish the report on SaferProducts.gov. According to CPSC officials, the agency plans to conduct outreach to businesses to increase the number of manufacturers and private labelers registered to receive electronic notifications. Unless CPSC strengthens the analytic methods used to identify reports with missing model numbers or serial numbers, it will not be able to identify all reports that require the agency to contact the submitter for more product information because it currently does not track all reports of harm missing such information. Recommendation for Agency Action To effectively implement the recent amendments to CPSIA, we recommend that CPSC enhance the analytic methods it uses to identify product information in a report of harm, such as by verifying whether the model field in its data contains a number (versus a text response, which would not meet the statutory requirement) or by searching for model numbers or serial numbers that may be listed in other fields. We report this fact, but also acknowledge that an additional 24 percent of submitters stated that the victim was the child, spouse, parent, or other relative of the submitter. The minority commissioners also raised issues concerning the resources required of CPSC to recover additional information to resolve questions of public safety and material inaccuracy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The reporting objectives were to examine (1) the information required for submitting a report of harm to SaferProducts.gov, (2) the extent to which the information required for submitting a report of harm is sufficient to identify the product and to allow CPSC to review a manufacturer’s claim that a report of harm contains materially inaccurate information, and (3) the length of time CPSC takes to review and resolve manufacturers’ claims of material inaccuracy in a report of harm.	Why GAO Did This Study In the wake of increased product recalls in 2007-2008, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA). Among other things, CPSIA requires the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to establish a database on the safety of consumer products that is publicly available, searchable, and accessible through the CPSC Web site. In response, CPSC launched SaferProducts.gov in March 2011. The Department of Defense and Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 requires GAO to report on the data collected by CPSC in its safety information database. This report examines (1) the information required for submitting a report of harm to SaferProducts.gov, (2) the information used to identify the product and to allow CPSC to review manufacturer claims of material inaccuracy in a report of harm, and (3) the length of time CPSC takes to review a manufacturer's claim that a report contains materially inaccurate information. To do this work, GAO analyzed agency data, regulations, and CPSC program documentation and interviewed CPSC staff and various industry and consumer representatives. What GAO Found To be eligible for publication on SaferProducts.gov, reports of harm involving a consumer product must contain several types of information, such as descriptions of the product and the associated harm. Reports may be submitted by consumers, government agencies, and health care professionals, among others. GAO's analysis of CPSC data as of July 7, 2011, showed that 38 percent of the 5,464 reports submitted to CPSC contained information that CPSIA requires for publication. Of these reports, 1,847 were published on SaferProducts.gov. Although not required, many submitters appear to have firsthand knowledge of the product--37 percent of published reports stated that the submitter was also the victim, and 24 percent stated that the victim was the child, spouse, parent, or other relative of the submitter. Also, most submitters provided their optional consent for CPSC to release their contact information to the manufacturer. Numeric information, such as a model number or serial number, can be helpful in identifying potentially unsafe products. However, this information is optional rather than required in a report of harm. Instead, submitters must only include a word or phrase sufficient to distinguish the product as one within CPSC's jurisdiction. All manufacturers we spoke with considered the required information insufficient for identifying products in a report of harm. On August 12, 2011, a new law was signed containing a requirement for CPSC to attempt to obtain the model number or serial number, or a photograph of the product, from submitters who did not provide this information in a report of harm. To meet this requirement, CPSC must identify all reports of harm that do not contain either a model number or a serial number. However, CPSC does not currently analyze its data to identify reports of harm that contain this numeric information. Instead, its method of analysis combines numeric identifiers--model numbers or serial numbers--and less precise text entries, such as product descriptions or names. Furthermore, some submitters include model numbers and serial numbers in other database fields that CPSC does not include in its analysis. Unless CPSC strengthens its analytic methods to identify model numbers or serial numbers in a report of harm, it will likely not be able to identify all reports that require the agency to contact the submitter for more product information because it does not track all reports of harm missing such information. Prior to recent amendments to CPSIA, CPSC had 10 business days from its transmission of a report to the manufacturer in which to publish a report of harm (after the amendments, CPSC has up to 5 additional business days to publish a report when a claim of materially inaccurate information is made or when a report does not contain a model number or serial number). Most reports to which manufacturers responded that were published met the 10-day time frame. Of the 1,085 published reports of harm to which companies responded, 1,020 (94 percent) were published within 10 business days after CPSC notified the company that the report had been submitted. CPSC published 160 reports with claims of materially inaccurate information, and, of these reports, most were resolved and published within 10 business days. CPSC plans to conduct outreach to increase the number of manufacturers registered to receive electronic notifications to yield a more rapid response to its notifications. What GAO Recommends To effectively implement the recent amendments to CPSIA, GAO recommends that CPSC strengthen the analytic methods used to identify product information in a report of harm. CPSC agreed with GAO's recommendation. The minority commissioners also raised a number of concerns about the accuracy and usefulness of the new database.
gao_GAO-12-889T	gao_GAO-12-889T_0	Background Current domestic uses of UAS are limited and include law enforcement, monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security, weather research, and scientific data collection. Obstacles to Safe and Routine Integration of UAS In 2008, we reported that UAS could not meet the aviation safety requirements developed for manned aircraft and posed several obstacles to operating safely and routinely in the national airspace system. Sense and avoid technologies. Consequently, the UAS must possess the capability to sense and avoid an object using on-board equipment, or with the assistance of a human on the ground or in a chase aircraft, or by other means, such as radar. Command and control communications. Similar to what we previously reported, ensuring uninterrupted command and control for UAS remains a key obstacle for safe and routine integration into the national airspace. do not contain provisions to address issues relating to unmanned aircraft. The lack of final regulations could hinder the acceleration of safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace. Given the remaining obstacles to UAS integration, we stated in 2008 that Congress should consider creating an overarching body within FAA to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector efforts in meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine access to the national airspace system. While it has not created this overarching body, FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office has taken on a similar role. Additionally, we made two recommendations to FAA related to its planning and data analysis efforts to facilitate the process of allowing UAS routine access to the national airspace, which FAA has implemented. Role of the Department of Homeland Security in Domestic UAS Use DHS is one of several partner agencies of FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) working to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace. TSA has the authority to regulate the security of all transportation modes, including non-military UAS, and according to TSA officials, its aviation security efforts include monitoring reports on potential security threats regarding the use of UAS. Security is a significant issue that could be exacerbated with an increase in the number of UAS, and could impede UAS use even after all other obstacles have been addressed. In our 2008 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of TSA to examine the security implications of future, non-military UAS operations in the national airspace and take any actions deemed appropriate. FAA granted DHS authority to operate UAS to support its national security mission along the United States northern and southern land borders, among other areas. Preliminary Observations on Emerging UAS Issues Our ongoing work has identified several UAS issues that, although not new, are emerging as areas of further consideration in light of the efforts towards safe and routine access to the national airspace. These include concerns about 1) privacy as it relates to the collection and use of surveillance data, 2) the use of model aircraft, which are aircraft flown for hobby or recreation, and 3) the jamming and spoofing of the Global Positioning System (GPS). Currently, no federal agency has specific statutory responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to UAS. The Federal Bureau of Investigation report of the arrest and criminal prosecution of a man plotting to use a large remote-controlled model aircraft filled with plastic explosives to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol in September 2011 has highlighted the potential for model aircraft to be used for non-approved or unintended purposes. However, apart from FAA’s voluntary safety standards for model aircraft operators, FAA has no regulations relating to model aircraft. We plan to report more fully this fall on these same issues, including the status of efforts to address obstacles to the safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.	Why GAO Did This Study UAS aircraft do not carry a human operator on board, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or by following commands from pilot-operated ground stations. An aircraft is considered to be a small UAS if it is 55 pounds or less, while a large UAS is anything greater. Current domestic uses of UAS are limited and include law enforcement, monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security, weather research, and scientific data collection by the federal government. FAA authorizes military and non-military UAS operations on a limited basis after conducting a case-by-case safety review. Several other federal agencies also have a role or interest in UAS, including DHS. In 2008, GAO reported that safe and routine access to the national airspace system poses several obstacles. This testimony discusses 1) obstacles identified in GAOs previous report on the safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace, 2) DHSs role in the domestic use of these systems, and 3) preliminary observations on emerging issues from GAOs ongoing work. This testimony is based on a 2008 GAO report and ongoing work, and is focused on issues related to non-military UAS. In ongoing work, GAO analyzed FAAs efforts to integrate UAS into the national airspace, the role of other federal agencies in achieving safe and routine integration, and other emerging issues; reviewed FAA and other federal agency efforts and documents; and conducted selected interviews with officials from FAA and other federal, industry, and academic stakeholders. What GAO Found GAO earlier reported that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) could not meet the aviation safety requirements developed for manned aircraft and posed several obstacles to operating safely and routinely in the national airspace system. These include 1) the inability for UAS to detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft and airborne objects in a manner similar to see and avoid by a pilot in a manned aircraft; 2) vulnerabilities in the command and control of UAS operations; 3) the lack of technological and operational standards needed to guide the safe and consistent performance of UAS; and 4) the lack of final regulations to accelerate the safe integration of UAS into the national airspace. GAO stated in 2008 that Congress should consider creating an overarching body within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address obstacles for routine access. FAAs Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) has taken on a similar role. FAA has implemented GAOs two recommendations related to its planning and data analysis efforts to facilitate integration. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of several partner agencies of JPDO working to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace. Since 2005, FAA has granted DHS authority to operate UAS to support its national security mission in areas such as the U.S. northern and southern land borders. DHSs Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the authority to regulate security of all modes of transportation, including non-military UAS, and according to TSA officials, its aviation security efforts include monitoring reports on potential security threats regarding the use of UAS. Security considerations could be exacerbated with routine UAS access. TSA has not taken any actions to implement GAOs 2008 recommendation that it examine the security implications of future, non-military UAS. GAOs ongoing work has identified several UAS issues that, although not new, are emerging as areas of further consideration in light of greater access to the national airspace. These include concerns about privacy relating to the collection and use of surveillance data. Currently, no federal agency has specific statutory responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to UAS. Another emerging issue is the use of model aircraft (aircraft flown for hobby or recreation) in the national airspace. FAA is generally prohibited from developing any rule or regulation for model aircraft. The Federal Bureau of Investigation report of a plot to use a model aircraft filled with plastic explosives to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol in September 2011 has highlighted the potential for model aircraft to be used for unintended purposes. An additional emerging issue is interruption of the command and control of UAS operations through the jamming and spoofing of the Global Positioning System between the UAS and ground control station. GAO plans to report more fully this fall on these issues, including the status of efforts to address obstacles to the safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace.
gao_GAO-14-43	gao_GAO-14-43_0	The Coast Guard administers the U.S. port state control program for foreign-flagged cruise vessels that enter U.S. waters or a U.S. port, to The Coast enforce maritime safety and security in the United States.Guard exercises this enforcement through port state control activities, which include initial, annual, and periodic examinations of foreign flag cruise vessels. The accident resulted in 32 deaths, including 2 U.S. citizens. However, as of December 2013, the Coast Guard and MARAD were in the process of developing and publicizing new regulations before moving forward with the implementation of the remaining provisions related to items such as new technology and training certifications required or authorized by the CVSSA. Guidance was provided in the following 11 areas: (1) rail heights; (2) peepholes in passenger stateroom doors, (3) security latches and time-sensitive keys for stateroom doors, (4) safety information provided to passengers, (5) medical licensing and proper equipment to perform sexual assault exams, (6) patient access to information and communications in the event of sexual assault, (7) confidentiality of sexual assault examination and support information, (8) crew access to passenger staterooms, (9) logbook and reporting requirements for CVSSA crimes, (10) availability of crime data on the Coast Guard’s website and the link on cruise lines’ webpages to the Coast Guard’s website, and (11) training standards and curricula—which resulted in the development of the required course on crime scene preservation. Officials from all five of the cruise lines we spoke with, as well as CLIA, told us that there were minor issues with implementing these 11 CVSSA requirements and that most of the safety and security measures required by the law were already in place when the CVSSA was enacted, in July 2010. While the Coast Guard is drafting its NPRM to address these three outstanding CVSSA provisions, in July 2013, legislation was introduced that would amend the video recording requirements of the CVSSA, among other items. MARAD CVSSA Provision For the fourth CVSSA provision, MARAD issued a notice of proposed new policy in the Federal Register in May 2013 for certifying providers of the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence While the CVSSA did not mandate that preservation, and reporting.MARAD develop a training provider certification—the language of the CVSSA states that MARAD “may” develop a certification—MARAD officials stated that they were intent on pursuing certification because there were requests from both the Coast Guard and CLIA to provide clarity on the certification portion of the CVSSA. The CVSSA then requires the Coast Guard to publish on its website a statistical compilation of all allegations of CVSSA crimes reported to the FBI that are no longer under FBI investigation. When an alleged crime occurs aboard a cruise vessel, according to cruise line officials, the security officer onboard the vessel typically receives notification of the alleged crime. For example, the crime data currently reported are limited in that (1) allegations for which investigations are not opened are not reported, (2) the data reported are not timely, and (3) the data reported are not put into context that would provide the public with the magnitude of crime on vessels, as discussed below. An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we interviewed stated that without complete data on the crimes that have occurred on cruise vessels, the public may not have the necessary information to make informed decisions about cruise travel. In addition to using rates to compare the prevalence of cruise vessel crime with the prevalence of land-based crime, presenting cruise crime data in a rate-based format may also be useful in comparing crime statistics among cruise lines. According to CLIA, in August 2013, six cruise lines—which account for over 90 percent of the North American cruise passengers—began to voluntarily report on their respective websites the number of alleged CVSSA crimes that had been reported onboard their cruise vessels. As of November 2013, however, the cruise lines’ voluntary reporting had just begun and the CVSSA bills remained in committee, and thus we cannot assess whether, or to what extent, these efforts may address the data limitations. The Cruise Industry Made Changes after the Costa Concordia Accident and Potential International Regulations Remain under Consideration The cruise industry responded to the Costa Concordia accident by reviewing safety practices and implementing changes across the industry and potential international regulatory actions are under consideration at the IMO. The Coast Guard began witnessing passenger musters in February 2012, soon after the Costa Concordia accident, and has participated in a mass rescue exercise involving a cruise vessel. The Cruise Industry Adopted Safety-Related Policies Identified following the Costa Concordia Accident In response to the Costa Concordia accident, CLIA initiated an operational safety review and member cruise lines adopted 10 safety- related policies. The resulting 10 policies relate to various safety enhancements, such as improvements to passenger musters, vessel passage planning, and life jacket stowage. Representatives from all five cruise lines we spoke with said they have included, or plan to include, the safety-related changes they have made as a result of their internal reviews into their SMSs. International Safety Measures Are Under Consideration and the Coast Guard Has Taken Some Initial Actions IMO Adopted Muster Regulation and Is Considering Other Potential Measures IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)—a key IMO committee charged with addressing all matters related to the safety of shipping—has adopted one regulation, issued 18 interim safety recommendations, and is considering additional safety-related measures that it may take following the Costa Concordia accident. Specifically, MSC adopted a regulation in June 2013 to be effective on January 1, 2015, which requires that newly embarked passengers muster prior to or immediately upon departure, instead of within 24 hours, as stated in current regulations. Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act This appendix provides summary information on the provisions of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, including time frames for implementation.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2011, almost 11 million passengers took a cruise from a U.S. port. Media reports about passenger personal safety while aboard cruise vessels--including those related to the January 2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy, which resulted in 32 deaths--combined with the increasing number of passengers taking cruises has raised questions about passenger safety and security. With the enactment of the CVSSA in 2010, cruise vessels that visit U.S. ports were required to meet certain security and safety requirements, such as having rail heights of at least 42 inches and reporting allegations of certain crimes to the FBI. GAO was asked to review cruise vessel safety as well as security issues--related to keeping passengers safe from crime. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the cruise vessel industry and federal agencies have implemented the CVSSA, and (2) any actions taken following the Costa Concordia accident to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports. GAO reviewed the CVSSA and related agency and industry documents, and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, FBI, CLIA, five cruise lines which accounted for over 80 percent of North American cruise vessel passengers in 2012, and two crime victim advocacy groups. The cruise lines were selected based on several factors including their volume of North American passengers. Crime victim advocacy groups were selected based on their knowledge about cruise ship crime issues. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. What GAO Found The cruise industry and federal agencies have implemented 11 of 15 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) provisions, but implementation of 4 provisions requires the development of regulations and policy, and is underway. Officials from all five cruise lines GAO met with said most required measures were in place when the CVSSA was enacted. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, a notice of proposed rulemaking is in development to address 3 of the 4 remaining provisions. The 3 provisions relate to technologies to (1) detect a person going overboard, (2) maintain a video surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel, and (3) transmit communications and warnings from the ship to anyone in surrounding waters. A policy linked to the fourth provision on the certification of trainers who provide the CVSSA course on crime scene preservation to cruise line personnel, is, as of December 2013, undergoing review at the Department of Transportation. With respect to CVSSA crime-reporting requirements, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Coast Guard have implemented these provisions as required. Accordingly, the agencies publish on a website information on reported crimes that are no longer under investigation. However, GAO identified some limitations in the usefulness of the publicly reported data. Specifically, (1) allegations for which investigations are not opened are never published; (2) the data are not timely--due to the length of the criminal justice process--and thus, crime data may be posted months or years after the alleged crime occurred and (3) the data reported are not put into context, such as a city's crime rate, to provide the public with the information needed to compare rates and make decisions. However, some cruise lines are making efforts to improve reported crime data. In August 2013, several cruise lines began voluntarily disclosing alleged crime data on their websites. Also, in July 2013, legislation was introduced to amend the CVSSA that would revise and expand crime-reporting requirements, among other items. As of November 2013, however, these actions were either new or pending. Thus, GAO could not assess whether, or to what extent, the voluntary reporting or potential legislation might provide more useful data than current requirements. Following the Costa Concordia accident, the cruise industry, an international maritime organization, and the Coast Guard took actions to improve passenger safety. The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)--which represents over 98 percent of cruise lines in the United States--identified 10 safety-related policies in 2012 that were adopted by all member cruise lines by July 2013. These policies include improvements to vessel passage planning and life jacket stowage, among other things. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)--a United Nations agency responsible for maritime matters--has also adopted a regulation, effective January 2015, requiring passengers to participate in a safety and evacuation exercise (muster drill) prior to or immediately upon departure--rather than within 24 hours of departure. CLIA member cruise lines adopted a similar muster policy weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. The Coast Guard is monitoring IMO's consideration of additional regulations. The agency has also started witnessing predeparture muster drills and has reported no major concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard has worked with the cruise industry for several years to plan and hold disaster exercises, including one in April 2013 to practice a mass rescue from a cruise vessel.
gao_GAO-06-784	gao_GAO-06-784_0	Excluding BAH When Determining Income Would Extend Eligibility to More Servicemembers, Assuming No Additional Household Income Assuming that the primary components of military pay were the only sources of servicemembers’ household incomes, excluding BAH payments from income when determining servicemembers’ eligibility for federal rental housing programs would have substantially increased the percentage that would have been eligible to apply for the programs as of December 2005. Specifically, most junior enlisted members would have been eligible for the programs, as would have much smaller percentages of senior servicemembers. Most Junior Enlisted Members and Some Senior Members Would Have Been Eligible if Military Pay Were Their Sole Source of Income Assuming that the primary components of servicemembers’ military pay were their only sources of household income in 2005, we found that by excluding BAH from income determinations, 19.9 percent of servicemembers of all grades would have been eligible for federal rental housing programs that used an income limit of 50 percent of AMI, compared with less than 1 percent of servicemembers with BAH included. The same was true even if BAH were excluded from income determinations. DOD officials said that servicemembers would be unlikely to need federal rental housing programs because BAH rates cover median local housing costs and would adjust annually to reflect any increases in market rents that resulted from increased demand for housing near growing installations. Yet, some community officials said that the LIHTC program could be used to build more affordable housing if more servicemembers were eligible. However, states would have to award tax credits to projects in these communities, and housing market factors—such as the financial feasibility of building market-rate units with rents that low-ranking servicemembers could afford—could affect developers’ interest in using the LIHTC program. Furthermore, although HUD and USDA programs could help some eligible servicemembers rent existing units, the programs are not entitlements; the limited availability of this rental assistance may preclude servicemembers from using the programs. Although these data, which pertain to personnel already located at these installations as of December 2005, do not indicate how many incoming personnel might be eligible to live in tax-credit units, they suggest that substantial percentages of those at the rural installations might become eligible if BAH were excluded from income determinations. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Objectives Our objectives were to determine (1) how excluding the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) from income determinations would have affected the eligibility of servicemembers receiving BAH as of December 2005 and (2) programmatic and market factors that could affect eligible servicemembers’ participation in the programs in selected communities gaining military personnel. Scope and Methodology The federal rental housing programs in our scope include the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) public housing, Housing Choice Voucher, and project-based Section 8 programs; the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Section 515 Rural Rental Housing Loans and Section 521 Rural Rental Assistance programs; and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and tax-exempt multifamily housing bond programs, which are jointly administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the states.	Why GAO Did This Study Although the Department of Defense (DOD) pays active-duty servicemembers who do not live in military housing a Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) to help them afford private market residences, expected growth at some military installations has raised concerns about whether nearby communities will have enough affordable rental housing for incoming personnel. In response to a congressional mandate, GAO assessed (1) how excluding BAH would affect servicemembers' eligibility to apply for federal rental housing programs and (2) factors that could affect their use of the programs in selected communities gaining military personnel. GAO compared servicemembers' eligibility for the programs as of December 2005 by including and excluding BAH from income determinations and examined factors affecting potential program use near four growing military installations. What GAO Found Excluding BAH from income determinations for federal rental housing programs would have substantially increased the percentage of servicemembers eligible to apply for the programs as of December 2005, assuming military pay was their only income. To be eligible to apply for rental assistance programs of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Agriculture (USDA), or to live in units produced by the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, households must have incomes at or below a specific limit, generally 50 percent or 60 percent of the median household income for their area. At the 50 percent income limit, 20 percent of servicemembers who received BAH would have been eligible if BAH were excluded from income determinations, compared with 1 percent with BAH included. Most junior enlisted members would have been eligible if BAH were excluded, as would have small percentages of senior personnel. However, at all levels, many would not have been eligible if their households had even modest income from other sources. Agency and community officials cited factors that could limit the role of federal programs in building housing or helping servicemembers afford existing units near four installations that GAO examined. DOD officials said that servicemembers would be unlikely to need the programs because BAH payments provide for the median cost of market-rate housing. Some community officials said the tax-credit program, which spurs housing production, could be useful if more servicemembers qualified. But developers would have to compete for tax credits, and market factors--such as the financial feasibility of building units that junior enlisted members could afford--could limit their interest. The HUD and USDA programs might help some servicemembers rent existing units, but--because the programs are not entitlements--servicemembers could face lengthy waits, and eligible civilians might wait longer for assistance.
gao_GAO-16-10	gao_GAO-16-10_0	OTS is an electronic monitoring technology consisting of hardware, such as an ankle bracelet (see fig. 2), used for collecting and transmitting data on an individual’s location, and software for analyzing data collected from the hardware device. NIJ Collaborated with a Variety of Stakeholders, but Earlier Manufacturer Involvement Could Have Expedited Development of the OTS Standard NIJ collaborated with stakeholders by leveraging expertise from a broad variety of criminal justice and technical experts. Participants in the OTS development process include criminal justice practitioners from all levels of government representing parole, probation, and pretrial services agencies. While the standards development process NIJ employed for developing the OTS standard is consistent with the process outlined by ANSI, earlier and ongoing inclusion of OTS manufacturers could have expedited development of the OTS standard. For example, OTS manufacturers could have better informed and facilitated development of the OTS standard by providing insights on OTS capabilities and limitations at the outset. While the OTS standard and associated testing methods remain under development, coordination between NIJ and manufacturers has improved since 2012. For example, through the second public comment period for the draft standard, NIJ has communicated to the manufacturers that their major concerns related to minimum performance requirements and testing methods have been addressed. NIJ is currently in the final stages of OTS standard development and plans to issue the standard by March 2016. Specifically, it has asked manufacturers to provide samples of their equipment. Draft OTS Standard and Companion Guide Address Many Common Needs and Challenges Identified by Stakeholders Draft OTS Standard Addresses Common Needs; Performance Requirements Vary by Agency NIJ’s draft OTS standard sets minimum performance standards that address common operational and circumvention detection needs identified by the 9 criminal justice agencies from which we collected procurement and policy documents. Common Operational and Circumvention Detection Needs The draft standard addresses common operational and circumvention detection needs, such as location accuracy, the ability to obtain an offender’s location on demand, programming “zones”—geographical areas an offender is or is not to enter— and alerts to report device tampering, among others. See appendix I for additional information on specific requirements in the draft standard and summary data on the extent to which the requirements met stakeholder needs. The OTS Standard’s Draft Companion Guide Addresses Potential Challenges and Other Considerations Officials from the 10 criminal justice agencies we met with also identified programmatic challenges with implementing offender tracking programs, such as managing public expectations of what the technology can achieve, as well as technical limitations that could affect the success of their offender tracking programs. NIJ’s draft guide provides information and guidance on these challenges and other considerations. In recognition of the range of agencies, environments, resources, and objectives of offender tracking, the draft guide does not offer “one size fits all” solutions. According to officials, common misconceptions include the beliefs that (1) officers are stationed at computers and watch the live movement of offenders 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and (2) offender tracking technology allows officers to prevent bad behavior before it happens. Investigating Crimes Global Positioning System (GPS) data from offender tracking systems (OTS) can be used to help investigate and solve crimes. Workload. For example, the draft guide provides information on common procurement processes and what to look for in a vendor. The draft guide provides information and guidance for how to mitigate these challenges. Officials from all 10 criminal justice agencies stated that there are areas in their jurisdictions that lack sufficient cellular coverage to allow devices to perform as designed. GPS signal reception.	Why GAO Did This Study OTS is an electronic monitoring technology consisting of hardware, such as an ankle bracelet, used for collecting Global Positioning System (GPS) signals to determine an individual's location, and software for analyzing data collected from the hardware device. While demand for GPS-based electronic monitoring devices has increased, there are currently no standards that OTS devices are required to meet. In 2009, NIJ initiated development of a voluntary OTS standard and companion guide, which is expected to be published no later than March 2016. GAO was asked to review NIJ's approach for developing the OTS standard. This report examines the extent to which (1) NIJ collaborated with stakeholders in developing the standard, and (2) the standard and guide address stakeholder needs and challenges. GAO analyzed NIJ's draft OTS standard, companion guide, and standard development process. To obtain perspectives on the standard development process and OTS needs and challenges, GAO interviewed stakeholders including NIJ officials, practitioners and experts who developed the standard, criminal justice and victims' associations, manufacturers, and officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 criminal justice agencies that employ OTS. GAO selected the 10 criminal justice agencies based upon a combination of factors, including ensuring a range of federal, state, and local jurisdictions, among other things. What GAO Found The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) collaborated with a variety of criminal justice and technical experts to develop a draft standard for offender tracking systems (OTS), but earlier involvement of manufacturers could have expedited its development. For example, the committee that developed the draft standard included practitioners spanning all levels of government and program areas such as pretrial, probation, and parole services and technical experts with backgrounds in developing test methods for performance standards. NIJ invited manufacturers to provide input through a workshop held in May 2011 and two subsequent public comment periods. GAO found that earlier and ongoing involvement of OTS manufacturers could have better informed and facilitated development of the OTS standard by, for example, providing insights on OTS capabilities and limitations at the outset. Coordination has improved since 2012, and manufacturers' major concerns have been addressed. Global Positioning System (GPS) Offender Tracking System NIJ's draft OTS standard and guide address many common stakeholder needs and challenges. The draft standard includes requirements for common operational and circumvention detection needs. For example, requirements for location accuracy and the ability to provide alerts when an offender tries to remove the device or is at a prohibited location are included in the standard. In addition, the draft guide provides information and guidance related to challenges identified by the criminal justice agencies GAO met with as well as other considerations for implementing an OTS program. These challenges include misconceptions among the public and victims that OTS allows agencies to prevent bad behavior before it happens; developing appropriate protocols to respond to OTS alerts, such as those for tampering with the tracking device; and workload issues, such as whether there is sufficient staff or resources to respond to OTS alerts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In recognition of the range of agencies, resources, and objectives of offender tracking, the guide provides information and guidance, and does not offer “one size fits all” solutions.
gao_GAO-17-700	gao_GAO-17-700_0	These companies either purchase or facilitate the purchase of a relocating employee’s home. Under AVO, the relocation management company buys an employee’s home for its appraised value if it cannot be sold during a stated period of time. GSA’s Role GSA’s role in the employee relocation process includes issuing regulations that apply to all federal agencies, managing a contract that relocation management companies and agencies can use, and providing assistance and guidance to agencies. This is a new policy since 2015, according to VA officials. First, actions built directly into operational processes to support the entity in achieving its objectives and addressing related risks are transaction control activities. For example, 18 of the 20 agencies reported the AVO approval process must be complete before payments are made. Second, assessing and responding to misconduct risks includes considering how misuse of authority or position can be used for personal gain. For example, 19 of the 20 agencies reported their AVO had safeguards to prevent AVO from being used for the personal gain of employees. An agency could strengthen the approval process for its permanent change of station program by requiring an independent review to ensure moves and expenses are appropriate and justified. While the 20 agencies with an operational AVO that completed our questionnaire reported they had not examined whether AVO improved recruitment or retention of staff during fiscal years 2012 to 2016, 12 of the 20 agencies anecdotally provided examples of how AVO has been beneficial. Four other agencies reported AVO assisted them in recruiting the most qualified employees or assisted them in recruiting and retaining employees for hard-to-fill positions. In interviews with GSA officials, they noted the following good practices which they believe agencies should incorporate into their AVO. We examined the extent to which VA’s AVO included the good practices based on lessons learned from GSA. We found that VA’s AVO included all of these practices. For example, VA offers pre-decision counseling and VA employees work with the relocation company before their home is put on the market. VA Strengthened Its Controls over AVO but Is Not Tracking Data on Whether AVO Improves Recruitment and Retention VA Strengthened the Administration of AVO by Implementing New Policies That Include Internal Controls VA conducted two recent reviews that had recommendations related to AVO. In addition, VA implemented new AVO policies that include internal controls since fiscal year 2016 when VA suspended AVO, as shown in table 2. However, VA is not tracking the data that would help it determine whether the use of AVO is improving recruitment and retention of employees specifically in hard-to-fill Senior Executive Service positions or mission critical skills occupations. However, VA stated it is not tracking data on whether the use of AVO improves recruitment and retention of employees because it does not have the resources or capabilities to do so. Conclusions Employee relocation, including home sale assistance, can help agencies position skilled employees optimally and recruit and retain employees. VA’s Inspector General found instances of officials misusing AVO to relocate for their personal benefit rather than in the interest of the government. As VA continues to seek ways to address recruitment and retention challenges, such data could be useful in identifying trends and options for targeting certain occupations or skill sets that may improve the agency’s use of home sales to support relocation. Without tracking these data, VA will be unable to determine whether the use of AVO has improved recruitment and retention. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this engagement were to review the administration of Appraised Value Offer (AVO) at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and government-wide. Specifically, this report (1) describes federal agencies’ and VA’s use of AVO; (2) describes federal agencies’ key AVO internal controls, evaluations of whether AVO improved recruitment and retention of employees, and lessons learned; and (3) analyzes the extent to which VA has implemented additional internal controls for AVO since 2015 and has evaluated whether the use of AVO improved the recruitment and retention of employees. According to GSA officials, about 80 percent of federal agencies’ home sale relocation transactions occur through GSA’s contract with relocation management companies. GSA stated that the number of agencies that use its contract for home sales can differ from year to year. We distributed the questionnaire we developed via email to the 28 agencies or components of agencies with completed home sale transactions through GSA’s contract in fiscal year 2015 or 2016. Please describe any lessons learned your agency has identified.	Why GAO Did This Study Employee relocation is a critical tool to help agencies position skilled employees optimally and for workforce recruitment, retention, and development. Agencies can facilitate the sale of a relocating employee's home when the relocation of a specific employee to a different location is in the interest of the government. After a 2015 VA Inspector General report found that two VA employees abused AVO to relocate for their personal benefit, VA suspended AVO in October 2015 and reinstated it in fiscal year 2017. GAO was asked to review the administration of AVO at VA and government-wide. This report (1) describes federal agencies' and VA's use of AVO; (2) describes federal agencies' key AVO internal controls, evaluations, and lessons learned; and (3) analyzes the extent to which VA has implemented additional internal controls since 2015 for AVO and has evaluated whether AVO improved recruitment and retention. GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed VA and GSA officials. GAO also distributed a questionnaire to 28 agencies or their components that had completed home sale transactions through GSA's contract in fiscal years 2015 or 2016. Twenty of these agencies responded that they had an operational AVO and provided information on the types of controls they use and any lessons learned. What GAO Found About 80 percent of federal agencies' home sale transactions to support employee relocations are through the contract that the General Services Administration (GSA) manages with relocation management companies. To support relocations, agencies can use an Appraised Value Offer (AVO). Under an AVO, the relocation management company buys a relocating employee's home for its appraised value if it cannot be sold during a stated period of time. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, use of AVO varied for federal agencies, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). For example, in fiscal year 2012, the federal agencies that used GSA's contract spent over $66 million on 936 homes and in fiscal year 2016 they spent over $42 million on 601 homes. In response to GAO's questionnaire (which was not sent to VA), most of the 20 agencies that were using AVO identified the following two types of critical internal controls as part of their AVO policies. First are transaction control activities, which are actions built directly into operational processes to support the entity in achieving its objectives and addressing related risks. For example, 18 agencies reported that the AVO approval process must be complete before payments are made. Second is assessing and responding to misconduct risks by considering how misuse of authority or position can be used for personal gain. For example, 19 agencies reported that their AVO had safeguards to prevent it from being used for the personal gain of employees. An agency could require an independent review of its permanent change of station program. While none of the 20 agencies reported they had evaluated whether AVO improved recruitment and retention of employees, 12 of the 20 agencies provided examples of how AVO had been beneficial. For example, four agencies noted the use of AVO had helped them recruit the most qualified employees or assisted with hard-to-fill positions. GSA officials also identified six good practices based on lessons learned from their role, which includes managing the relocation contract that they believe agencies should incorporate into their AVO. When GAO compared these good practices to VA's AVO process, it found that all of these good practices had been adopted by VA. For example, VA offers pre-decision counseling and VA employees work with the relocation company before their home is put on the market. Since fiscal year 2016, VA has strengthened the administration of AVO by implementing new policies that include internal controls, but does not track data on whether AVO improves recruitment and retention. For example, VA revised its policies to require approval prior to initiating recruitment efforts and that a relocating employee's participation cannot be approved by the employee's subordinates. VA officials stated AVO is beneficial for hard-to-fill Senior Executive Service positions and for mission critical skills occupations, however, VA does not track data to determine whether AVO improves the recruitment and retention of employees. VA officials stated the agency does not have the resources or capabilities to track such data. These data could be useful in identifying trends and options for targeting certain occupations or skill sets that may improve the agency's use of home sales to support relocation. Without tracking these data, VA will be unable to determine whether AVO has improved recruitment and retention. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that VA track data to determine whether AVO improves recruitment and retention. VA concurred with the recommendation.
gao_GAO-03-828	gao_GAO-03-828_0	OR&R Headquarters Improved Response Time for Issuing Prospective Rulings Our review of a sample of prospective ruling request cases showed that in response to the Customs Commissioner’s January 2002 mandate, OR&R headquarters improved its response time for issuing prospective rulings. Our review showed that about 75 percent of the cases were completed in 120 days or less, the old goal, and about 64 percent were completed within 90 days, the new goal. OR&R reported that its efforts to eliminate the backlog of 757 headquarters ruling request cases open 90 days or more as of February 1, 2002, were successful. Actions Taken by OR&R Headquarters to Improve the Timeliness of Rulings and Eliminate the Backlog Since the Customs Commissioner required in January 2002 that OR&R issue rulings within 90 days and the existing backlog of ruling requests be eliminated, OR&R has given ruling requests its highest priority, according to OR&R officials. Conclusions OR&R headquarters improved the timeliness of its prospective rulings since we issued our September 2000 report concluding that most rulings were untimely. LCIS, OR&R’s automated database, continued to face data reliability challenges. OR&R has taken corrective actions to improve the accuracy and reliability of LCIS data. However, these actions do not provide assurance that OR&R has resolved its LCIS data reliability challenges because some of the actions lack specific procedures for their effective implementation. In addition, our report identifies that OR&R improved its response time for cases in the latter part of our sample (i.e., cases opened and closed from July through October 2002, after OR&R had made significant progress in reducing the size of its ruling request backlog), with an estimated 94 percent of these cases completed within 90 days. We excluded other prospective ruling cases that the Trade Act of 2002 did not require us to study. OR&R Headquarters Actions on Rulings To determine what actions OR&R headquarters took to improve the timeliness of its prospective rulings and eliminate its backlog of ruling request cases, we interviewed OR&R management officials and collected and reviewed pertinent documentation (e.g., OR&R reports to the Commissioner regarding the status of efforts to implement procedural changes to issue rulings within 90 days and eliminate the backlog; the July 2002 draft Standard Operating Procedure intended to provide a standardized approach for processing and issuing rulings).	Why GAO Did This Study GAO previously reported that the U.S. Customs Service Office of Regulations and Rulings (OR&R) headquarters was not timely in issuing most of its prospective rulings, which establish the duties importers pay on imported goods. The Trade Act of 2002 required GAO to determine whether OR&R has improved the timeliness of its prospective rulings. In addition, GAO determined what actions OR&R took to improve the timeliness of rulings and whether OR&R resolved challenges it faced with the reliability of automated rulings data. What GAO Found OR&R headquarters improved its response time for issuing prospective rulings since GAO issued a September 2000 report concluding that most rulings were untimely. GAO's review of a sample of prospective ruling request cases opened and closed from February through October 2002 showed that OR&R headquarters completed about 75 percent of these cases within its prior goal of 120 days, with about 64 percent of the cases completed within the 90-day goal mandated by the Customs Commissioner in January 2002. For cases in the latter part of our sample that were opened and closed from July through October 2002, after significant progress had been made in reducing a backlog of ruling requests, OR&R completed an estimated 94 percent of the cases within 90 days. OR&R also reported that it was successful in its efforts to eliminate the February 1, 2002 backlog of 757 ruling requests that had been open more than 90 days. Since the Commissioner's January 2002 mandate to issue rulings within 90 days, OR&R has given ruling requests the highest priority, with increased attention to balancing workloads and increased management oversight. OR&R has also taken other actions to help issue rulings within 90 days and prevent delays. OR&R continued to face data reliability challenges with its automated rulings database. OR&R has taken corrective actions to improve the accuracy and reliability of the database. However, these corrective actions do not provide assurance that OR&R has resolved the data reliability challenges because some of the actions lack specific procedures for their effective implementation.
gao_NSIAD-99-61	gao_NSIAD-99-61_0	Purchased material—new material shipped from a commercial source to a storage activity. Our analysis of financial reports showed that NAVICP Philadelphia was responsible for about $2.5 billion, or 84 percent, of these losses. Classified and sensitive items included aircraft-guided missile launchers, military night vision devices, and communications equipment. Third, NAVICP Philadelphia and its issuing activities, intended recipients, and commercial carriers have not adequately investigated cases in which warehoused material was not acknowledged as received. Fourth, NAVICP Philadelphia has not monitored the receipt of purchased material from commercial sources. End Users’ Receipts of Material Were Not Routinely Reported End users have not routinely reported receipt of items to NAVICP Philadelphia. However, the Navy did not identify significant weaknesses in internal controls over NAVICP’s in-transit inventory in its Financial Integrity Act statements over the past 3 years, despite the fact that it had written off as lost inventory valued at more than $3 billion. Moreover, the Navy has not established any performance measures, milestones, or timetables for reducing the risk of its in-transit inventory to undetected theft or misplacement. Our review of items that the Navy had reported as being lost in transit indicated that at least some had in fact been acknowledged as received. For secondary items, the law requires that DOD’s plan address such issues as the vulnerability of in-transit items to loss through fraud, waste, and abuse; loss of oversight of in-transit items, including items transported by commercial carriers; and loss of accountability over in-transit items due to either a delay of delivery of the items or a lack of notification of the delivery. Conclusions The Navy has not effectively controlled its in-transit inventory, leaving significant amounts of inventory unaccounted for. Scope and Methodology Our objectives for this report were to (1) identify the reported value and types of inventory in transit within and between storage and repair activities, vendors, and end users that were unaccounted for (or lost) and (2) assess the Navy’s adherence to procedures for controlling such in-transit inventory. To assess the Navy’s procedures for controlling in-transit inventory and identify the reported types and amounts of in-transit items that were not accounted for, we took the following steps: We reviewed policies and procedures and obtained other relevant documentation related to in-transit inventory from officials at the Defense Logistics Management Standards Office, McLean, Virginia; the Defense Automated Addressing System Office, Dayton, Ohio; and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Using the financial reports, we identified the Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) Philadelphia as the Navy’s inventory control activity with the highest reported dollar value of in-transit inventory losses. Receiving Activity Storage activity Repair facility Reports receipt?	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the Navy's management procedures for controlling items in transit, focusing on the: (1) reported value and types of inventory in transit within and between storage and repair activities, vendors, and end users that were unaccounted for (or lost); and (2) Navy's adherence to procedures for controlling such in-transit inventory. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the Navy has not effectively controlled its in-transit inventory and places enormous amounts of inventory at risk of undetected theft or misplacement; (2) for fiscal years 1996-1998, the Navy reported that it had lost over $3 billion in in-transit inventory, including some classified and sensitive items such as aircraft guided-missile launchers, military night vision devices, and communications equipment; (3) the Navy's Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) at Philadelphia, which manages the largest portion of the Navy's inventory, reported the largest losses--$2.5 billion, or 84 percent of the Navy's in-transit losses; (4) however, GAO's work showed that a few of the items reported as lost by NAVICP Philadelphia had in fact been accounted for in inventory records; (5) Navy activities involved in issuing and receiving inventory items have not always followed the Navy's control procedures to ensure that in-transit items are accounted for; (6) Navy units have not always reported to NAVICP Philadelphia that they received requested items; (7) ineffective accounting systems have been used to monitor receipts of items redistributed between storage activities, shipped to and from repair facilities, and shipped from end users; (8) NAVICP Philadelphia and its shipping and receiving activities have not adequately investigated unreported receipts of items redistributed between storage activities, shipped to and from repair facilities, and shipped from end users; (9) NAVICP Philadelphia has not monitored receipts of items it purchased from commercial sources; (10) as early as 1990, GAO reported that there were indications of inadequate internal controls over procured assets; (11) Naval Supply Systems Command and NAVICP Philadelphia oversight of in-transit inventory has not been adequate; (12) although Navy officials have initiated actions intended to correct the problems GAO cited, the Navy has not established any performance measures, milestones, or timetable for reducing the vulnerability of in-transit inventory to theft or loss; and (13) the Navy has not identified management of in-transit inventory as a significant weakness in its assessments of internal controls, as provided in the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982.
gao_GAO-08-1069T	gao_GAO-08-1069T_0	IHS Has Had Millions of Dollars in Lost or Stolen Property We substantiated the allegation of gross mismanagement of property at IHS. Specifically, we found that thousands of computers and other property, worth millions of dollars, have been lost or stolen over the past several years. Despite IHS attempts to obstruct our investigation, our full physical inventory at headquarters and our random sample of property at 7 field locations, identified millions of dollars of missing property. IHS Records Indicate at Least $15.8 Million of Property Is Lost or Stolen Our analysis of Report of Survey records from IHS headquarters and field offices show that from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007, IHS property managers identified over 5,000 lost or stolen property items worth about $15.8 million. First, IHS does not consistently document lost or stolen property items. For example, 9 of the 12 IHS regional offices did not perform a full physical inventory in fiscal year 2007. Some of the egregious examples of lost or stolen property include: In April 2007, a desktop computer containing a database of uranium miners’ names, social security numbers, and medical histories was stolen from an IHS hospital in New Mexico. In September 2006, IHS property staff in Tucson attempted to write off over $275,000 worth of property, including Jaws of Life equipment valued at $21,000. GAO Inventory Testing Reveals Lost or Stolen IT Equipment at IHS Headquarters To substantiate the whistleblower’s allegation of missing IT equipment, we performed our own full inventory of IT equipment at IHS headquarters. These items, valued at around $2 million, included computers, computer servers, video projectors, and digital cameras. GAO Testing Identifies Lost or Stolen IT Equipment at Seven IHS Field Locations We selected a random sample of IT equipment inventory at seven IHS field offices to determine whether the lack of accountability for inventory was confined to headquarters or occurred elsewhere within the agency. Specifically, we estimate that for the 7 locations, about 1,200 equipment items or 17 percent, with a value of $2.6 million were lost, stolen or unaccounted for. Weak Tone at the Top and Other Control Weaknesses Leave IHS Highly Vulnerable to Loss, Theft, and Waste The lost or stolen property and waste we detected at IHS can be attributed to the agency’s weak internal control environment and its ineffective implementation of numerous property policies. In particular, IHS management has failed to establish a strong “tone at the top” by allowing inadequate accountability over property to persist for years and by neglecting to fully investigate cases related to lost and stolen items.	Why GAO Did This Study In June 2007, GAO received information from a whistleblower through GAO's FraudNET hotline alleging millions of dollars in lost and stolen property and gross mismanagement of property at Indian Health Service (IHS), an operating division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). GAO was asked to conduct a forensic audit and related investigations to (1) determine whether GAO could substantiate the allegation of lost and stolen property at IHS and identify examples of wasteful purchases and (2) identify the key causes of any loss, theft, or waste. GAO analyzed IHS property records from fiscal years 2004 to 2007, conducted a full physical inventory at IHS headquarters, and statistically tested inventory of information technology (IT) equipment at seven IHS field locations in 2007 and 2008. GAO also examined IHS policies, conducted interviews with IHS officials, and assessed the security of property. What GAO Found Millions of dollars worth of IHS property has been lost or stolen over the past several years. Specifically: IHS identified over 5,000 lost or stolen property items, worth about $15.8 million, from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. These missing items included all-terrain vehicles and tractors; Jaws of Life equipment; and a computer containing sensitive data, including social security numbers. GAO's physical inventory identified that over 1,100 IT items, worth about $2 million, were missing from IHS headquarters. These items represented about 36 percent of all IT equipment on the books at headquarters in 2007 and included laptops and digital cameras. Further, IHS staff attempted to obstruct GAO's investigation by fabricating hundreds of documents. GAO also estimates that IHS had about 1,200 missing IT equipment items at seven field office locations worth approximately $2.6 million. This represented about 17 percent of all IT equipment at these locations. However, the dollar value of lost or stolen items and the extent of compromised data are unknown because IHS does not consistently document lost or stolen property, and GAO only tested a limited number of IHS locations. Information related to cases where GAO identified fabrication of documents and potential release of sensitive data was referred to the HHS Inspector General for further investigation. GAO identified that the loss, theft, and waste can be attributed to IHS's weak internal control environment. IHS management has failed to establish a strong "tone at the top," allowing property management problems to continue for more than a decade with little or no improvement or accountability for lost and stolen property and compromise of sensitive personal data. In addition, IHS has not effectively implemented numerous property policies, including the proper safeguards for its expensive IT equipment. For example, IHS disposed of over $700,000 worth of equipment because it was "infested with bat dung."
gao_T-RCED-96-99	gao_T-RCED-96-99_0	However, the agency’s capability to conduct such oversight is limited. In large measure, under NEPA and other laws, EPA relies on the agencies themselves to have their own internal environmental monitoring programs. EPA does not keep records of classified EISs that have been sent to it for review and does not store them, although it does have some classified storage capability. Agencies are required to submit unclassified and classified EISs for EPA’s review, but according to activities office officials, EPA is not charged with conducting outreach to ensure that all such EISs are submitted. Furthermore, environmental compliance officials within the agencies may not be reviewing all classified research activities. Environmental Oversight of Agencies’ Classified Operations According to EPA headquarters and regional enforcement officials, EPA and the states have been conducting enforcement activities at known classified federal research facilities, but management oversight of such enforcement has not been systematic. They said they receive a degree of cooperation at known DOE and DOD classified facilities but are constrained by secrecy and need-to-know considerations. Known Exemptions of Federal Facilities From Environmental Laws Have Been Rare Although federal environmental laws allow the President to provide exemptions from environmental requirements in cases involving the paramount interest of the U.S. or in the interest of national security, federal agencies appear to have rarely sought these exemptions. 3, 1995). 2, 1992).	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed its review of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) capability to conduct environmental oversight of classified federal research. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) EPA conducts limited oversight of classified federal research, primarily relying on agencies' internal environmental monitoring programs; (2) although agencies are required to submit environmental impact statements (EIS) to EPA for review, EPA does not ensure that agencies submit all EIS or know the liaisons for some agencies' environmental issues; (3) environmental compliance officials within agencies may not be reviewing all classified research activities; (4) EPA conducts environmental enforcement activities at known classified federal facilities when the agencies cooperate, but it does not have a complete inventory of all facilities and is sometimes hindered by secrecy and need-to-know considerations; (6) while it is possible that federal agencies have secretly sought exemptions from environmental requirements, it appears that they have rarely sought such exemptions; and (7) agencies have occasionally sought special emergency arrangements concerning environmental standards because of national security concerns.
gao_GAO-10-491	gao_GAO-10-491_0	The ESG program is targeted at persons experiencing homelessness. Grantees and Subgrantees We Visited Reported a Range of Administrative Activities Whose Costs Generally Were Not Fully Covered by the ESG Allowance We found that ESG grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited performed a range of administrative activities, but the program’s allowance for administrative costs generally did not fully cover the cost of these activities. In addition, there are minimal standards that can be used as guidance for evaluating the appropriateness of ESG administrative costs, and we found that grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited monitored ESG administrative costs at varying levels of detail. Our review found these grantees’ ESG administrative activities generally focused on awarding subgrants and monitoring subgrantee performance. Our review found that their ESG administrative activities generally focused on operating programs and reporting outcomes. Overall, the unfunded administrative costs reported to us across the eight grantees and 22 subgrantees we visited for which information was available averaged an estimated 13.2 percent of the ESG allocation, with a range of 2.5 percent to 56 percent. Thus, reliance on private donations to cover unfunded ESG administrative costs may become more challenging. Some grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited told us the need to cover unfunded ESG administrative costs using other funding sources has diminished their ability to fund other program activities. Funding and Treatment of Administrative Costs Varied Across Selected Federal Grant Programs We found that the funding and treatment of administrative costs varied across the other targeted federal homeless grant programs we reviewed. Among programs with a maximum administrative allowance, the ESG program’s current 5 percent maximum administrative allowance for grantees is one of the lower allowances. The maximum administrative allowance for the other programs that have specified a maximum allowance ranges from 4 percent to 50 percent. For example, HUD’s Supportive Housing Program requires grantees to share administrative allowances with subgrantees, but does not specify the amount. Third, we found that program guidance on the appropriateness of administrative costs differed across the targeted homeless programs we reviewed, and that no program offered comprehensive direction on eligible and ineligible administrative activities. Some ESG Recipients Expect the Nature of Administrative Costs to Change and the Amount to Increase under New Activities Authorized by the HEARTH Act A number of grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited and others told us they expect that the newly allowable ESG activities authorized by the HEARTH Act will result in different kinds of administrative activities that in many cases will be more costly than before. Overall, grantees and subgrantees told us they expect changes in areas including client screening and eligibility verification, technical assistance to subgrantees, number of applicants for grants, and facility management and collaboration with third parties, which in turn could affect administrative costs. Although the HEARTH Act makes significant changes to allowable ESG activities, it remains unclear when actual program changes might be implemented. Uncertainty over how and when the new ESG program might be implemented, as well as variation in the nature of administrative activities seen in the current ESG program, complicate any attempt to determine the appropriate size of the program’s administrative allowance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the types of administrative activities performed and costs incurred under the Emergency Shelter Grants Program (ESG) of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the extent to which grant proceeds cover these administrative costs, we made site visits to four states: California, Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. To determine how the ESG program’s allowance for administrative costs compares with administrative cost allowances for selected other targeted federal homeless grant programs, plus selected other HUD formula-based grant programs, we interviewed officials from HUD and the Departments of Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services. To determine how the nature or amount of administrative costs might be different under the changes Congress made to the ESG program in the Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009, we reviewed relevant provisions of the act detailing the newly allowable activities.	Why GAO Did This Study The Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009 (HEARTH Act) directed GAO to study the appropriate administrative costs of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Emergency Shelter Grants Program (ESG)--a widely used, formula-based program that supports services to persons experiencing homelessness. This report discusses (1) for selected recipients, the types of administrative activities performed and administrative costs incurred under the ESG program, and the extent to which grant proceeds cover these administrative costs; (2) how the ESG program's allowance for administrative costs compares with administrative cost allowances for selected other targeted federal homeless grant programs, plus selected other HUD formula-based grant programs; and (3) how the nature or amount of administrative costs might be different under changes Congress made to the ESG program in the HEARTH Act that expand the types of activities that may be funded. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant policies and documents, interviewed officials of HUD and other agencies, made site visits in four states, reviewed HUD and other available standards on eligible administrative costs for federal grants, and reviewed cost allowances for homeless programs of the Departments of Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. What GAO Found ESG grantees and subgrantees we visited in four states performed a range of administrative activities, but the ESG program's allowance for administrative costs--currently 5 percent--did not fully cover the cost of these activities. Grantees generally focused their administrative activities on awarding subgrants and monitoring subgrantee performance, while subgrantees focused their administrative activities on operating their programs and reporting results to their respective grantees. To cover unfunded ESG administrative costs, grantees and subgrantees told us they used other sources, such as other grants or private donations. They added that these estimated unfunded administrative costs, which averaged 13.2 percent and ranged from amounts equal to 2.5 percent to 56 percent of their ESG grant proceeds, diminished their ability to support other program activities. In addition, we found minimal standards available for evaluating the appropriateness of ESG administrative costs, and grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited monitored ESG administrative costs in varying levels of detail. The funding and treatment of administrative costs varied across other targeted federal homeless grant programs we reviewed. For example, the maximum administrative allowance for grantees ranged from 4 percent to 50 percent for programs with such a provision; the ESG program's current 5 percent allowance is thus one of the lower amounts provided. Programs with similar funding structures varied in their requirements for grantees to share their administrative allowance with subgrantees; the ESG program generally does not require grantees to share their allowance. In addition, none of the programs we reviewed offered comprehensive direction on eligible and ineligible administrative activities. Overall, these and other varying program features make it difficult to make direct comparisons between the administrative cost provisions of the ESG program and those of other targeted federal homeless grant programs. A number of ESG grantees and subgrantees we visited told us they expect the new ESG activities authorized by the HEARTH Act will result in different kinds of administrative activities that in many cases will be more costly. They cited client screening and eligibility verification, technical assistance to subgrantees, number of grant applicants, and facility management and collaboration with third parties as among areas where administrative costs may increase. Although the HEARTH Act makes significant changes, including increasing the administrative cost allowance to 7.5 percent, it remains unclear when new program activities might be implemented. Uncertainty over how and when the new ESG program might be implemented, plus variation in administrative activities under the current program, complicate any attempt to determine the appropriate size of the ESG administrative allowance. HUD told us in comments on a draft of this report that some subgrantees appear to be confusing program and administrative costs, thus potentially overstating any need for a larger administrative allowance.
gao_GAO-01-293	gao_GAO-01-293_0	Background Federal funds for subsidizing child care for low-income families, particularly those on welfare, are primarily provided to the states through two block grants—CCDF and TANF. Families who receive child care subsidies under CCDF must be offered the choice of using a voucher, which is a certificate assuring a provider that the state will pay a portion of the child care fee, or using a provider who has a contract with the state to provide care to subsidized families. States’ Child Care Spending Grew to Over $16 Billion Using CCDF, TANF, and State Funds Nationwide, states spent increasingly larger amounts of their CCDF, TANF, and state money on child care between fiscal years 1997 and 1999—a total of more than $16 billion, as shown in table 1. State Funding Sufficient for Child Care Subsidies to Highest-Priority Families— Those on TANF According to CCDF plans for fiscal years 2000 through 2001, more than half the states list TANF and TANF-transitional families either first or second on their priority list of families who are eligible for receiving child care subsidies. But, among the seven states we examined, no state reported that it was currently unable to fund the child care needs of these families who requested services. While child care program officials in most of the states we reviewed reported serving all eligible low-income families who applied, California, Connecticut, Texas, and Oregon expressed concern that their funding of child care was not sufficient to provide child care subsidies for all eligible families. CCDF expenditures for quality reported to HHS by these seven states show that expenditures grew from around $22 million in fiscal year 1997 to about $98 million in fiscal year 1999, totaling over $180 million for this period.	What GAO Found Nationwide, states reported that federal and state expenditures for child care under the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) block grant and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant grew from $4.1 billion in fiscal year 1997 to $6.9 billion in fiscal year 1999 and totaled over $16 billion in constant fiscal year 1997 dollars for this three-year period. More than half of the children whose child care was subsidized with CCDF funds were cared for in centers, and CCDF subsidies for all types of care were primarily provided through vouchers. Eligible parents who were subsidized by CCDF were offered a choice of receiving a voucher to pay a provider of their choosing or using a provider who had a contract with the state. More than half of all the states gave TANF and former TANF families transitioning to work first or second priority for receiving child care subsidies while other eligible low-income families were assigned lower priorities. Officials reported that their states funded the child care needs of their TANF and former TANF families transitioning to work, and were serving all of these families who requested child care assistance. However, some of these officials were concerned that their states' funding levels were not sufficient to serve all other low-income families who were eligible for aid.
gao_T-HEHS-96-205	gao_T-HEHS-96-205_0	At the federal level, the Secretary of HHS has delegated to the OIG the authority under sections 1128 and 1156 of the Social Security Act to exclude health care providers from most federal health care programs.The OIG, through its Office of Investigations, is required to exclude, nationwide, providers who have been convicted of Medicare- or Medicaid-related fraud and patient abuse or neglect, and felonies related to health care fraud and controlled substances. We also observed apparent inconsistencies in the way field offices are processing permissive cases. OIG Not Notified of Certain Withdrawals From State Medicaid Programs During our state visits we found that states were not always notifying the OIG of certain providers effectively excluded from the respective state’s Medicaid program. This official speculated that had Illinois not aggressively moved to remove these providers from the Medicaid program through voluntary withdrawals, the providers would still be in the program. These providers, once sanctioned, can change employers or move to other states and potentially continue to provide services through federal health care programs without detection. In our visits to OIG field offices, we found that they were not always able to fully account for the number of referrals they received from the states. Nevertheless, we believe that more attention must be paid to a system that works to protect beneficiaries from substandard care and helps ensure the integrity of federal health programs. For example, the OIG could provide more guidance for OIG field staff and the states to facilitate the prompt preparation of case files—including required documentation—for OIG decisions. Furthermore, it could explore ways to ensure that states quickly identify and act to remove OIG-excluded providers from Medicaid participation.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed whether the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Inspector General's (OIG) process for removing fraudulent health care providers from all federal health programs. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) weaknesses within HHS OIG allow sanctioned health care providers to remain in federal health care programs; (2) these weaknesses include lengthy delays in the OIG decision-making process, inconsistencies among OIG field offices, states not informing OIG of the providers withdrawing from state Medicaid programs, and states using information from OIG to remove excluded providers from state programs; (3) these problems compromise the financial integrity of the Medicaid program; (4) OIG field offices are unable to account for the number of referrals they receive from OIG state offices; (5) health care providers deemed unfit in one state continue to participate in Medicaid programs in other states; (6) OIG needs to consider whether it is capable of protecting beneficiaries from substandard care and ensuring the integrity of the federal health care system; and (7) OIG could become more efficient in detecting fraudulent health care providers by providing more guidance for OIG field staff, timely preparing individual case files, clarifying guidance for OIG field offices, ensuring that states act quickly in removing OIG-excluded providers from Medicaid participation, and requiring states to report providers' voluntary withdrawal from Medicaid programs to OIG field offices.
gao_RCED-99-191	gao_RCED-99-191_0	As agreed with the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Committees on Resources and on Commerce, this report responds to that mandate and addresses the effects of lifting the export ban on (1) Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil prices and production and (2) refiners, consumers, and the oil-shipping industry (including the tanker fleet, the tanker building industry, and the tanker repair industry) on the U.S. West Coast. Lifting the Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil Production Lifting the export ban raised the prices of Alaskan North Slope and some California oils between $.98 and $1.30 higher per barrel than they would have been had the ban not been lifted. To date, these price increases have not had an observable effect on Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil production. Nevertheless, future oil production should be higher than it would have been had the ban not been lifted because higher crude oil prices have given producers an incentive to produce more oil. According to oil industry officials, new oil fields developed in Alaska since the ban was lifted are expected to increase Alaskan North Slope oil production by an average of 115,000 barrels per day for the next two decades. However, we could not separate the effects of lifting the ban on expected production from the effects of broader oil market changes occurring at the same time. For example, relatively high world oil prices in 1996 and 1997 encouraged oil producers to expand exploration and development, while low prices in 1998 caused producers to close wells and reduce development. Moreover, this expected production increase will not reverse the decade-long decline of Alaska and California oil production, which is expected to continue as aging oil fields become depleted. Prices of Some West Coast Oil Rose as a Result of Lifting the Ban While world oil prices have been volatile since the export ban was lifted, the price of Alaskan North Slope and some California oil sold in the West Coast market is higher than it would have been had the export ban not been removed. There have also been minimal effects on the shipping industry to date, although shipbuilding and repair industry officials are concerned that business may shift in the future to low-cost foreign shipyards. Some Refiners’ Crude Oil Acquisition Costs Rose, but the Extent Is Uncertain While higher prices for Alaskan North Slope and comparable California oil increased the costs of some individual refiners, we could not determine the extent of the cost increase for these refiners or for the West Coast market in general.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed Alaska and California energy production, focusing on the effects of lifting the export ban on: (1) Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil prices and production; and (2) refiners, consumers, and the oil shipping industry on the West Coast. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) lifting the export ban raised the relative prices of Alaskan North Slope and comparable California oils between $.98 and $1.30 higher per barrel than they would have been had the ban not been lifted; (2) these price increases have not had an observable effect on Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil production; (3) nevertheless, future oil production should be higher than it would have been because higher crude oil prices have given producers an incentive to produce more oil; (4) according to projections by the Alaska Department of Revenue and to oil industry officials, new oil fields developed in Alaska since the ban was lifted are expected to increase Alaskan North Slope oil production by an average of 115,000 barrels per day for the next two decades; (5) however, it was not possible for GAO to separate the effects of lifting the ban on expected production from the effects of broader oil market changes occurring at the same time; (6) relatively high world oil prices in 1996 and 1997 encouraged oil producers to expand exploration and development activities, while low prices in 1998 caused producers to close wells and reduce development activities; (7) moreover, this expected production increase will not reverse the decade-long decline of Alaska and California oil production, which is expected to continue as aging oil fields become depleted; (8) lifting the export ban increased some refiners' costs but had limited effects on consumers and the oil-shipping industry on the West Coast; (9) while higher prices for Alaskan North Slope and comparable California oil increased the costs of some individual refiners using that oil, it was not possible to determine the extent of cost increases for those refiners or the West Coast market in general; (10) despite higher crude oil prices for some refiners, no observed increases occurred in the prices of three important petroleum products used by consumers on the West Coast--gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel; (11) lifting the ban has also had a minimal effect to date on most oil tanker operators that transport Alaskan North Slope oil, the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and the West Coast ship repair industry; and (12) however, shipbuilding and ship repair industry officials on the West Coast are concerned that Alaskan North Slope oil tanker business may shift in the future to low-cost foreign shipyards.
gao_GAO-05-83	gao_GAO-05-83_0	Systems Thinking Finally, our ethnographic research approach was systemic. We looked not only at the Program’s key elements, in the darkly shaded boxes in figure 2, but also at what surrounds them—the context of the medical facilities’ culture—and whether the culture supports the adoption of the Program. In fiscal year 1999, NCPS defined three major initiatives: (1) a more focused system for mandatory close call and adverse event reporting, including a renewed focus on close calls; (2) reviews of close calls and adverse events, including RCAs, using interdisciplinary teams at each facility to discover system flaws and recommends redesign to prevent harm to patients; and (3) staff feedback on system changes and communication about improvements to patient safety. Chapter 3 is an examination of whether the culture at the four facilities supports the Patient Safety Program and chapter 4 provides examples of management practices that promote patient safety. In general, we found progress in clinicians’ understanding and participation in the Patient Safety Program. Of the staff who had participated in RCAs, many indicated that it was a positive learning experience, but facilities varied in ensuring clinicians’ broad participation. At one facility, we found broad participation by physicians because management required it. For example, nurses told us that they had to speak up when they disagreed with the medication or dosage doctors had ordered. Improving Assessment of, Familiarity with, Participation in, and Cultural Support for the Program Although VA conducted a cultural assessment survey in 2000 and plans to resurvey VA staff in the near future, it has not measured staff familiarity with, participation in, and cultural support for the Program. Although the 2000 survey did describe some important attitudes about patient safety, such as shame and punishment related to reporting adverse events, it did not explicitly measure mutual trust among staff, a central theme of VA clinicians in describing what affected patient safety and a supportive culture. One way to do this is by repeating stories that demonstrate that VA leaders encourage a culture that supports the Program and an atmosphere of open reporting and learning from past close calls and adverse events. Nurse 1: People are rewarded for reporting close calls and adverse events—and not punished. Recommendations for Executive Action To better assess the adequacy of clinicians’ familiarity with, participation in, and cultural support for the Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following three actions: 1. set goals for increasing staff familiarity with the Program’s major concepts (close call reporting, confidential reporting program with NASA, root cause analysis), participation in root cause analysis teams, and cultural support for the Program by measuring the extent to which each facility has mutual trust and comfort in reporting close calls and adverse events; 2. develop tools for measuring goals by facility; and 3. develop interventions when goals have not been met.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) introduced its Patient Safety Program in 1999 in order to discover and fix system flaws that could harm patients. The Program process relies on staff reports of close calls and adverse events. GAO found that achieving success requires a cultural shift from fear of punishment for reporting close calls and adverse events to mutual trust and comfort in reporting them. GAO used ethnographic techniques to study the Patient Safety Program from the perspective of direct care clinicians at four VA medical facilities. This approach recognizes that what people say, do, and believe reflects a shared culture. The focus included (1) the status of VA's efforts to implement the Program, (2) the extent to which a culture exists that supports the Program, and (3) practices that promote patient safety. GAO combined more traditional survey methods with those from ethnography, including in-depth interviews and observation. What GAO Found GAO found progress in staff familiarity with and participation in the VA Patient Safety Program's key initiatives, but these achievements varied substantially in the four facilities we visited. In our study conducted from November 2002 through August 2004, three-fourths of the clinicians across the facilities were familiar with the concepts of teams investigating root causes of unintentional adverse events and close calls. One-third of the staff had participated in such teams, and most who participated in these teams found it a positive learning experience. The cultural support clinicians expressed for the Program also differed. At three of four facilities, GAO found a supportive culture, but at one facility the culture blocked participation for many clinicians. Clinicians articulated two themes that could stimulate culture change: leadership actions and open communication. For example, nurses need the confidence to disagree with physicians when they find an unsafe situation. Although VA has conducted a cultural survey, it has not set goals or explicitly measured, for example, staff familiarity and mutual trust. Clinicians reported management practices at one facility that had helped them adopt the Program, including (1) story-telling techniques such as leaders telling about a case in which reporting an adverse event resulted in system change, (2) management efforts to coach staff, and (3) reward systems. The Patient Safety Program Process shows how ideally (1) clinicians have cultural support for reporting adverse events and close calls, (2) teams investigate root causes, (3) systems are changed, (4) feedback and reward systems encourage reporting, and (5) patients are safer.
gao_GAO-11-452	gao_GAO-11-452_0	The registration and subsequent LD-2 reports must disclose: the name of the organization, lobbying firm, or self-employed individual that is lobbying on that client’s behalf; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during whether any lobbyists served as covered executive branch or legislative branch officials in the previous 20 years, known as a “covered official” position; the name of and further information about the client, including a general description of its business or activities; information on the general issue areas and corresponding issue codes used to describe lobbying activities; any foreign entities that have an interest in the client; whether the client is a state or local government; information on which federal agencies and house(s) of Congress the lobbyist contacted on behalf of the client during the reporting period; the amount of income related to lobbying activities received from the client (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) during the quarter rounded to the nearest $10,000; and a list of constituent organizations that contribute more than $5,000 for lobbying in a quarter and actively participate in planning, supervising, or controlling lobbying activities, if the client is a coalition or association. Documentation Supporting Disclosure Reports Varied and Newly Registered Lobbyists Largely Met Reporting Requirements Lobbyists for Most LD-2 Reports Provided Documentation to Support the Amount of Income and Expenses Reported, but Provided Less Documentation to Support Other Elements of the LD- 2 While no specific requirements exist for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation in support of the reports they file, LDA guidance issued by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House recommends lobbyists retain copies of their filings and supporting documentation for at least 6 years after their reports are filed. Lobbyists for an estimated 97 percent of LD-2 reports were able to provide documentation for income and expenses for the fourth quarter of 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010. As of March 2011, 12 of those 21 lobbyists had filed amended LD-2 reports. Of the 80 LD-203 reports sampled with no contributions reported, 1 of the sampled reports failed to disclose political contributions that were documented in the FEC database. We estimate that among all reports a minimum of 2 percent failed to disclose one or more political contributions. While the electronic filing system used for lobbying reports may reduce the amount of time filers must spend on data entry, a few lobbyists stated that they misreported on their LD-2 reports because they carried information from old reports to new reports without properly updating information. As a result, some lobbyists now have to amend their LD-2 reports to accurately reflect the lobbying activity for the quarter under review. d To enforce LDA compliance, the Office has primarily focused on sending letters to lobbyists who have potentially violated the LDA by not filing disclosure reports as required. Officials from the Office stated that they have sufficient civil and criminal statutory authorities to enforce the LDA. The Office has developed a system to address that recommendation. The current system provides a foundation that allows the Office to better focus its lobbying compliance efforts by tracking and recording the status and disposition of enforcement activities. In addition, the system allows the Office to monitor lobbyists who continually fail to file the required disclosure reports. The Office stated that they plan to formalize data review, refine summary data, and institute procedures to ensure data are accurate and reliable in the next few months. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. We met with the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, who on behalf of the Attorney General responded that DOJ had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Consistent with the audit requirements in the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, our objectives were to: determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), as amended by providing documentation to support information contained on reports filed under the LDA; identify any challenges that lobbyists report to compliance and potential improvements; and describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office), and the efforts the Office has made to improve enforcement of the LDA, including identifying trends in past lobbying disclosure compliance. To assess the extent to which lobbyists could provide evidence of their compliance with reporting requirements, we examined a stratified random sample of 100 LD-2 reports from the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 and the first, second, and third quarters of calendar year 2010, with 25 reports selected from each quarter.	Why GAO Did This Study The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 requires that GAO annually (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify any challenges that lobbyists report to compliance, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (the Office), and the efforts the Office has made to improve its enforcement of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA). This is GAO's fourth report under the mandate. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 100 lobbying disclosure reports filed from the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 through the third quarter of calendar year 2010. GAO also selected two random samples totaling 160 reports of federal political campaign contributions from year-end 2009 and midyear 2010. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 55,282 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity. GAO also met with officials from the Office regarding efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia responded on behalf of the Attorney General that the Department of Justice had no comments on the draft of this report. What GAO Found Lobbyists were generally able to provide documentation to support the amount of income and expenses reported; however, less documentation was provided to support other items in their disclosure reports. This finding is similar to GAO's results from prior reviews. There are no specific requirements for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation related to disclosure reports they file under the LDA. For income and expenses, two key elements of the reports, GAO estimates that lobbyists could provide documentation for approximately 97 percent of the disclosure reports for the fourth quarter 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010. According to the documentation lobbyists provided for income and expenses, we estimate the amount disclosed was supported for 68 percent of disclosure reports. After GAO's review, 21 lobbyists stated that they planned to amend their disclosure reports to make corrections on one or more data elements. As of March 2011, 12 of the 21 amended their disclosure reports. For political contributions reports, GAO estimates that a minimum of 2 percent of reports failed to disclose political contributions that were documented in the Federal Election Commission database. The majority of lobbyists who newly registered with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives in the last quarter of 2009 and first three quarters of 2010 filed required disclosure reports for that period. GAO could identify corresponding reports on file for lobbying activity for 90 percent of registrants. The majority of lobbyists felt that the terms associated with disclosure reporting were clear and understandable. For the few lobbyists who stated that disclosure reporting terminology remained a challenge, areas of potential inconsistency and confusion in applying the terms associated with disclosure reporting requirements have been highlighted. Some lobbyists reported a lack of clarity in determining lobbying activities versus non-lobbying activities. A few lobbyists stated that they misreported on their disclosure reports because they carried information from old reports to new reports without properly updating information. The Office is responsible for enforcement of the LDA and has the authority to pursue a civil or criminal case for noncompliance. To enforce LDA compliance, the Office has primarily focused on sending letters to lobbyists who have potentially violated the LDA by not filing disclosure reports. For calendar years 2008 and 2009, the Office sent 1,597 noncompliance letters for disclosure reports and political contributions reports. About half of the lobbyists who received noncompliance letters are now compliant. In response to an earlier GAO recommendation, the Office has developed a system to better focus enforcement efforts by tracking and recording the status of enforcement activities. The system allows the Office to monitor lobbyists who continually fail to file the required disclosure reports. The Office stated that they plan to institute procedures to formalize data review, refine summary data, and ensure data are accurate and reliable in the next few months.
gao_GAO-14-873T	gao_GAO-14-873T_0	Background FSOC has 10 voting and 5 nonvoting members (fig. The 10 voting members include 9 federal regulators and an independent insurance expert. FSOC Has Made Some Progress in Responding to GAO’s 2012 Recommendations FSOC has taken steps to address some of our recommendations, such as those related to communication. Monitoring Systemic Risks and Identifying Emerging Threats In September 2012, we made two recommendations to FSOC that were designed to improve its efforts to identify and report on sources of systemic risk and emerging threats to financial stability. We reported that FSOC had taken steps to meet its statutory responsibilities related to identifying risks and potential emerging threats to U.S. financial stability, including by setting up a Systemic Risk Committee—one of the seven standing FSOC committees—that is responsible for systemic risk monitoring and plays a key role in reviewing sources of systemic risk. As we noted in 2012 this approach may facilitate analysis of risks that could benefit from interagency discussions and responses, but may not help to identify new risks or threats that FSOC member agencies have not already identified on their own. However, the Markets Monitor does not appear to be focused on risks to the financial system, and the Financial Stability Monitor remains in a prototype phase—and neither yet reflect the systematic sharing of key financial risk indicators to assist in identifying potential threats to financial stability. Since then, FSOC made some progress in addressing this recommendation but could do more. Transparency and Accountability Although FSOC had adopted communication methods to provide information on their activities to the public and taken steps to be transparent and accountable, we reported in 2012 that some of these efforts could be strengthened and made four recommendations. FSOC should develop a communication strategy to improve communications with the public; keep detailed records of closed door sessions of principals meetings and to the extent possible make them publicly available after an amount of time has passed; make recommendations in its annual report more specific by identifying which member agency or agencies, as appropriate, are recommended to monitor or implement such actions within specified time frames; and establish a collaborative and comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of decisions for designating financial market utilities (FMU) and nonbank financial companies on those entities and the wider economy. In May 2014, FSOC updated its transparency policy. FSOC staff said that this effort was the result of a review of other entities’ governance practices and that the policy reflected a commitment to improve communication with the public. FSOC has said it will provide more information in its minutes but has also argued that some of the information discussed is protected. The Dodd-Frank Act transferred the oversight of these companies from the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Federal Reserve. However, FSOC is uniquely positioned to address According to FSOC staff, the recurring study required under Section 123 of the Dodd-Frank Act (next required no later than January 2016) is the appropriate mechanism for evaluating the overall impact of the designations process. FSOC staff said that they had not begun planning for a study and did not know when planning for it would begin. We noted in our 2012 report that such an evaluation would require collaboration among several members of FSOC and emphasized the importance of advance planning for retrospective studies so that needed data are collected. Collaboration and Coordination In our September 2012 report, we also made three recommendations to improve FSOC’s collaboration and coordination. We recommended that it establish formal collaboration and coordination policies that clarify issues such as when collaboration or coordination should occur and FSOC’s role in facilitating that coordination. GAO-12-151. The Deputies Committee’s bylaws and the ongoing effort to review FSOC’s governance structures are positive developments in providing additional clarification on the roles and responsibilities of FSOC committees. FSOC staff told us that the statute did not give FSOC the authority to direct actions of individual members including requiring members to coordinate rulemakings. Finally, we recommended in our September 2012 report that FSOC and OFR clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including among FSOC members and member agencies. We maintain that actions to address these recommendations are needed. Our past work has shown that the lack of clear roles and coordination can lead to duplication, confusion, and regulatory gaps.	Why GAO Did This Study The 2007-2009 financial crisis focused attention on weaknesses in the U.S. regulatory structure, including the lack of an agency or mechanism responsible for monitoring and addressing risks across the financial system. To address this weakness, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created FSOC to identify and address threats to financial stability. Among other statutorily defined authorities, FSOC may designate nonbank financial companies for heightened supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. FSOC consists of 10 voting members and 5 nonvoting members. The 10 voting members include 9 federal regulators and an independent insurance expert. In September 2012, GAO issued a report on FSOC's challenges, efforts to establish management mechanisms, activities for supporting collaboration among its members and external stakeholders, and processes for issuing reports and rules. GAO made nine recommendations to FSOC to improve the transparency and accountability of its decisionmaking, among other things. This testimony is based on GAO's September 2012 report ( GAO-12-886 ). It discusses FSOC's efforts to respond to GAO's 2012 recommendations. From June through September 2014, GAO obtained updated information from FSOC staff and reviewed documents related to GAO's recommendations. What GAO Found The Financial Stability Oversight Council's (FSOC) has taken steps to address some of GAO's September 2012 recommendations, but additional efforts are needed. GAO made nine recommendations to FSOC in three areas: emerging threats and risks identification, transparency and accountability, and collaboration and coordination. GAO recommended, among other things, that FSOC: develop a systematic approach that includes collecting and sharing key financial risk indicators to help identify potential threats to financial stability; develop a strategy to improve communications with the public; keep detailed records of closed-door sessions; create a framework for assessing the impact of its decisions to designate nonbanks for enhanced supervision; develop policies to clarify when collaboration or coordination should occur; adopt leading practices, such as joint strategies, for collaboration; and clarify roles and responsibilities for monitoring threats to the financial system. FSOC still lacks a comprehensive, systematic approach to identify emerging threats to financial stability. In 2012, GAO reported that FSOC's approach might not help identify new risks or threats that member agencies had not already identified. The Office of Financial Research (OFR) has made some progress in developing data tools to support FSOC since the 2012 report, but GAO's observations of two of these tools suggest that one tool does not focus on risks to the financial system, while another remains in a prototype phase. FSOC has taken steps to improve its communication with the public but could do more to improve transparency and accountability. In May 2014, FSOC approved a revised transparency policy, and FSOC staff said they had attempted to provide more information in the minutes of meetings. But FSOC staff said that they did not intend to keep detailed minutes because of the confidential information discussed. Also, FSOC staff also said that the impact of designating nonbanks for enhanced supervision would be assessed as part of a mandated January 2016 study. However, FSOC has not begun to prepare for this study. GAO has reported on the importance of advance planning for retrospective studies so that needed data are collected. FSOC has taken steps to improve collaboration and coordination among member agencies but does not plan to act on some of GAO's recommendations on coordination. In May 2014, FSOC approved one formal mechanism that supported coordination—bylaws for the Deputies Committee of senior officials from member agencies that describe its role in coordinating FSOC activities. FSOC staff said they did not plan to clarify the roles and responsibilities of FSOC, OFR, and member agencies because the overlapping responsibilities for monitoring systemic risk had not been problematic. Officials also said that FSOC would not adopt practices to coordinate rulemaking across member agencies, as it does not have the authority to direct independent agencies. GAO maintains that action is needed as its past work has shown that the lack of clear roles and coordination can lead to duplication, confusion, and regulatory gaps.
gao_GAO-05-266	gao_GAO-05-266_0	FAA’s mission performance depends on the adequacy and reliability of the nation’s air traffic control system. An Enterprise Architecture Is Critical to Successful Systems Modernization Effective use of enterprise architectures, or modernization blueprints, is a trademark of successful public and private organizations. OMB has released Version 1.0 of the profile. Our experience with federal agencies has shown that making IT investments without defining these investments in the context of an architecture often results in systems that are duplicative, not well integrated, and unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface. The agency also reports that it has allocated adequate resources to these project offices and that chief architects have been assigned to head the architecture projects. However, FAA has not established other key architecture management capabilities, such as designating a committee or group representing the enterprise to direct, oversee, or approve the architecture effort; having an approved policy for developing, maintaining, and implementing the architecture; and fully developing architecture products that meet contemporary guidance and describe both the “As Is” and “To Be” environments and a sequencing plan for transitioning between the two. FAA Has Yet to Implement Key Best Practices for Managing Its NAS Architecture Project As we first reported in 1997, it is critical that FAA have and use a comprehensive NAS architecture to guide and constrain its air traffic control system investment decisions. Develop an architecture program management plan. Further, it has established a project office that is responsible for architecture development and maintenance and has assigned a chief architect to the project. Our research of successful organizations and our experience in reviewing other agencies’ enterprise architecture efforts show that not having these controls is, among other things, a function of limited senior management understanding of and commitment to an enterprise architecture and cultural resistance to having and using one. These officials stated that the agency recognizes the need to establish an effective non-NAS architecture project, and it intends to do so. For example, the agency’s strategic plan includes the goal of having an approved enterprise architecture policy requiring the development, maintenance, and implementation of an enterprise architecture by September 2005, and the agency intends to establish a steering committee. Objective, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to determine whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has established effective processes for managing the development and implementation of an enterprise architecture.	Why GAO Did This Study The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the U.S. airspace system. To this end, FAA is modernizing its air traffic control systems, a multibillion dollar effort that GAO has designated as a high-risk program. GAO's research into the practices of successful public- and private-sector organizations has shown that developing and using an enterprise architecture, or blueprint, to guide and constrain systems investments is crucial to the success of such a modernization effort. GAO was asked to determine whether FAA has established effective processes for managing the development and implementation of an enterprise architecture. What GAO Found FAA has two architecture projects--one for its National Airspace System (NAS) operations and one for its administrative and mission support activities--that together constitute its enterprise architecture program. However, it has established only a few of the management capabilities for effectively developing, maintaining, and implementing an architecture. For example, the agency reports that it has allocated adequate resources to the projects, and it has established project offices to be responsible for developing the architecture, designated a chief architect for each project, and released Version 5.0 of its NAS architecture. But the agency has yet to establish other key architecture management capabilities--such as designating a committee or group that represents the enterprise to direct, oversee, or approve the architecture, and establishing an architecture policy. FAA agreed that the agency needs an effective enterprise architecture program and stated that it plans to improve its management of both projects. For example, the agency intends to establish a steering committee; develop a policy that will govern the development, maintenance, and implementation of the architecture program; and have an approved architecture project management plan for the non-NAS architecture. GAO's experience in reviewing other agencies has shown that not having an effective enterprise architecture program can be attributed to, among other things, an absence of senior management understanding and support and cultural resistance to having and using one. It has also shown that attempting major systems modernization programs like FAA's without having and using an enterprise architecture often results in system implementations that are duplicative, are not well integrated, require costly rework to interface, and do not effectively optimize mission performance.
gao_GAO-01-833	gao_GAO-01-833_0	Other data necessary to evaluate HUD’s contributions toward achieving the outcome are not currently part of the report. Improved Community Economic Vitality And Quality of Life HUD’s performance report indicates that the Department made some progress toward achieving this outcome. Comparison of HUD’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in HUD’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report, and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. The report shows that HUD did not achieve many of the results expected, but no assessment was made on the significance of not achieving the desired results to the overall achievement of the strategic goals. However, HUD did not achieve all of the performance measures for the four key outcomes. HUD generally agreed with the information presented in our report. GAO’s Comments 1.	Why GAO Did This Study This report reviews the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan to assess the agency's progress in achieving selected key outcomes important to the agency's mission. What GAO Found GAO found that although HUD did not attain all of the goals pertaining to the selected key outcomes in its fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan, the performance report shows that HUD made some progress toward achieving the outcomes. However, HUD's progress varied for each outcome, and the information presented in the performance report does not always provide enough information for the reader to evaluate HUD's contribution to achieving the outcome. In general, HUD's strategies for achieving these outcomes appear to be clear and reasonable.
gao_GAO-13-442T	gao_GAO-13-442T_0	Certification is a Key Component of FAA’s Aviation Safety Oversight Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues certificates that approve the design and production of new aircraft and equipment before they are introduced into service; these certificates demonstrate that the aircraft and equipment meet FAA’s airworthiness requirements. In addition, in September 2011 we reported that FAA did a good job following its certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing’s 787 against its airworthiness standards. FAA recognizes the value of certification as a safety tool, however the agency faces some significant challenges, including resources and maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry changes. In response to a provision in the 2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline the process. Better Quality and More Complete Data Could Help FAA Further Improve Safety Oversight As we stated above, FAA plans to continue using data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and is implementing a proactive approach—called an SMS approach—in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents. FAA is also overseeing SMS implementation throughout the aviation industry. Safety management systems are intended to continually monitor all aspects of aviation operations and collect appropriate data to identify emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property damage. Data limitations and the lack of data may inhibit FAA’s ability to manage safety risks. Our recent work on aviation safety and FAA oversight issues has identified a number of specific areas where FAA’s risk-based oversight could be improved through improved data collection and analysis, including: runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, general aviation, pilot training, unmanned aircraft systems, and commercial space. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues in many of these areas, including making changes to or committing to make changes to its data collection practices in response to our recommendations in most of these areas. Nonetheless, sustained FAA attention will be necessary to ensure that the agency’s ability to comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk is not impaired. Runway and ramp safety. Safety in the terminal area could be improved by additional information about surface incidents, which is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions and certain airborne incidents, but does not include runway overruns or incidents in ramp areas. FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and analyze data on runway overruns, something we recommended in 2011, but it will be several years before FAA has obtained sufficient information about these incidents to be able to assess risks.still collects no comprehensive data on ramp area incidents and NTSB does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. We reported that FAA’s risk-based process for assessing airborne losses of separation is too narrow to account for all potential risk and changes in how errors are reported affect FAA’s ability to identify trends. General aviation. In 2010, FAA estimated that there were more than 220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation fleet, comprising more than 90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. For example, FAA estimates of annual general aviation flight hours may not be reliable because of methodological and conceptual limitations with the survey upon which flight activity estimates are based. data found that, while FAA requires its inspectors to conduct on-site inspections of each of these schools and their pilot examiners at least once per year, the agency does not have a comprehensive system in place to adequately measure its performance in meeting its annual inspection requirements. Standards for UAS operations are a key step in the process of safely integrating regular UAS operations into the national airspace. FAA is responsible for licensing and monitoring the safety of such launches and of spaceports (sites for launching spacecraft). Aviation Safety: FAA Has An Opportunity to Enhance Safety and Improve Oversight of Initial Pilot Training.	Why GAO Did This Study Even with nearly 80,000 flights each day within the national airspace system, there has not been a fatal commercial aviation accident in more than 4 years. The U.S. airspace system is arguably one of the safest in the world, with key aviation stakeholdersthe FAA, airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)working together to ensure these results. As the federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of civil aviation in the United States, FAA is responsible for, among other things: setting aircraft certification standards, collecting fleet and flight activity data, conducting safety oversight of pilot training and general aviation operations, and safely integrating aircraft into the national airspace. As the aviation industry evolves, FAA must remain diligent in its efforts to ensure the continued safety of aviation. In 2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, which, in part, called for FAA to better manage safety risks. This testimony focuses on (1) FAAs aircraft certification process and (2) FAAs use of data to enhance safety and improve aviation oversight. The testimony is based on GAOs previous work and updated with industry reports and information provided by FAA officials. GAO has previously recommended that FAA address several data quality weaknesses. FAA concurred with most of these recommendations and has taken steps toward addressing some. What GAO Found The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for approving the design and airworthiness of new aircraft and equipment before they are introduced into service. FAA approves changes to aircraft and equipment based on evaluation of industry submissions against standards set forth in federal aviation regulations and related guidance documents. In September 2011, we reported that, overall, FAA did a good job following its certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing's 787 against its airworthiness standards. However, the approval process--referred to as certification--presents challenges for FAA in terms of resources and maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry practices, two issues that may hinder FAA's efforts to conduct certifications in an efficient and timely manner. FAA is currently assessing its certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline it. FAA plans to continue analyzing data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and to augment this approach through implementation of a safety management system (SMS). SMS is a proactive approach that includes continually monitoring all aspects of aviation operations and collecting and analyzing appropriate data to identify emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property damage. FAA has put in place various quality controls for its data; however, GAO has identified a number of areas where FAA does not have comprehensive risk-based data or methods of reporting that capture all incidents. The following are among the key areas GAO identified as needing improved data collection and analysis. Runway and ramp safety . Additional information about surface incidents could help improve safety in the airport terminal area, as data collection is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions, which involve the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway and certain airborne incidents, and does not include runway overruns, which occur when an aircraft veers off a runway or incidents in ramp areas, which can involve aircraft and airport vehicles. Airborne operational errors . FAA's metric for airborne losses of separation--a type of operational error--is too narrow to account for all potential risk. General aviation . FAA estimates of annual flight hours for the general aviation sector, which includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military, may not be reliable. Pilot training . FAA does not have a comprehensive system in place to measure its performance in meeting its annual pilot school inspection requirements. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues and data challenges in many of these areas. For example, FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and analyze data on runway overruns, but it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough information about these incidents to assess risks. Sustained attention to these data collection and analysis issues will be necessary to ensure that FAA can more comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk.
gao_GAO-03-411	gao_GAO-03-411_0	This program aims to provide safe, secure, and cost-effective buildings for the thousands of U.S. employees working overseas. State estimates this will cost more than $6.2 billion. Additional funding will be needed after this time to continue the program. Finally, the process was further complicated by other factors, such as frequent personnel turnover and breakdowns in communication among multiple agencies. In Belgrade, officials acknowledged that the projection exercise was not taken seriously and that projections were not developed using a disciplined approach. Officials from each of the 14 posts we contacted reported that their headquarters bureaus had not provided specific, formal guidance on important factors to consider when developing staffing projections. In addition, we found that most agencies with staff overseas are not consistently considering operational costs when developing their staffing projections. In addition, we found little evidence to show that staffing projections were consistently vetted with all other agencies’ headquarters to ensure that the projections were as accurate as possible. Government Aims to Distribute Costs of Overseas Facilities among Users The State Department, which historically has been responsible for funding the construction and maintenance of U.S. embassies and consulates, recently proposed a capital security cost-sharing plan that would require federal agencies to help fund its embassy construction program. OMB is examining State’s and other cost-sharing proposals designed to create more discipline in the process for determining overseas staffing requirements. Therefore, as OMB and the interagency committee work to develop a new cost-sharing mechanism, they also need to develop consensus on many issues, including how the cost-sharing mechanism would be structured—for example, as capital reimbursement for new embassy compounds, or as a rent surcharge applied to all embassy occupants worldwide or just those at new embassy compounds; the basis for fees—such as full reimbursement of capital costs in a year or amortized over time, or rent based on local market rates, an average of market rates within a region, or one flat rate applied worldwide; how charges would be assessed—based on the amount of space an agency uses or on its per capita presence—and whether charges would be applied on a worldwide level, at the post level, or just for posts receiving new facilities; whether different rates would be applied to staff requiring controlled access rather than noncontrolled access space; whether agencies would be charged for staff not located within facilities operated by the State Department—for example, USAID staff working in USAID-owned facilities outside an embassy compound or staff who work in office space at host country ministries and departments; if and how costs associated with staff providing shared services would be offset, and whether costs associated with Marine and other security services would be covered; how fees would be paid and who would collect the payments—whether through an interagency transfer of funds or through an existing structure such as ICASS; and whether potential legal barriers exist and, if so, what legislation would be necessary to eliminate them. Given that the size and cost of new facilities are directly related to anticipated staffing requirements for these posts, it is imperative that future staffing needs be projected as accurately as possible. USAID also agreed that U.S. agencies do not take a consistent approach to determining long-term staffing needs for new embassy compounds.	Why GAO Did This Study The 1998 terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa highlighted security deficiencies in diplomatic facilities, leading the Department of State to embark on an estimated $16 billion embassy construction program. The program's key objective is to provide safe, secure, and cost-effective buildings for employees overseas. Given that the size and cost of new facilities are directly related to agencies' anticipated staffing needs, it is imperative that future requirements be projected as accurately as possible. GAO was asked to (1) assess whether State and other federal agencies have adopted a disciplined process for determining future staffing requirements and (2) review cost-sharing proposals for agencies with overseas staff. What GAO Found U.S. agencies' staffing projections for new embassy compounds are developed without a systematic approach or comprehensive rightsizing analyses. State's headquarters gave embassies little guidance on factors to consider in developing projections, and thus U.S. agencies did not take a consistent or systematic approach to determining long-term staffing needs. Officials from each of the 14 posts GAO contacted reported that their headquarters bureaus had not provided specific, formal guidance on important factors to consider when developing staffing projections. The process was further complicated by the frequent turnover of embassy personnel who did not maintain documentation on projection exercises. Finally, staffing projections were not consistently vetted with all other agencies' headquarters. Because of these deficiencies, the government could construct wrong-sized buildings. In fact, officials at two embassies GAO visited said that due to poor projections, their sites may be inadequate almost immediately after staff move onto the new compound. State has proposed a cost-sharing plan that would require federal agencies to help fund new embassy construction. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is leading an interagency committee to develop a cost-sharing mechanism that would provide more discipline when determining overseas staffing needs and encourage agencies to think more carefully before posting personnel overseas. Numerous issues will need to be resolved for such a program to be successful, including how to structure the program and how payments will be made.
gao_GAO-07-1246T	gao_GAO-07-1246T_0	VA Is Transforming its IT Organization to a Centralized Model In response to the challenges that we and others noted, the department officially began its effort to provide the CIO with greater authority over IT in October 2005. By July 2006, the department’s realignment contractor began work to assist with the realignment effort. By implementing these improved processes, VA expects to correct deficiencies it has encountered as a result of its decentralized management approach. Among the significant factors we identified as critical for ensuring the success of VA’s move to centralized management are ● ensuring commitment from top leadership, ● establishing a governance structure to manage resources, linking the IT strategic plan to the organization strategic plan, ● using workforce strategic management to identify proper roles for ● communicating change to all stakeholders, and ● dedicating an implementation team to manage change. Successful Implementation of the Realignment Effort Requires Continued Focus on Critical Success Factors and Implementation of Improved Management Processes In our recent review of the department’s effort to realign its IT program, we evaluated, among other things, whether the realignment plan includes the critical factors for successful transformation as discussed above. We reported that VA’s realignment plan included elements of several of the six critical success factors that we identified. The department had fully addressed the first critical success factor, ensuring commitment from top leadership, as demonstrated by the Secretary’s actions in support of the realignment. Although it had highlighted the importance of managing change in its realignment documentation, VA did not plan to establish a realignment implementation team. Without such a dedicated group, it is less likely that VA will be able to ensure that the realignment is managed effectively throughout its implementation. With regard to the new IT management processes, the department had begun to take action, but it had not made significant progress at the time of our report. As of May 2007, it had begun pilot testing two of the new processes: the risk management process and the solution (that is, business application) test and acceptance process. If VA does not continue to address the critical success factors we identified and develop and implement the new management processes by their target date, the department may continue to operate in a decentralized manner and risk not fully realizing the long-term benefits of the realignment. Improved Processes Planned under the Realignment Are Not Yet in Place for IT Programs and Initiatives Although IT management has been centralized under the CIO, at the time of our review, IT programs and initiatives continued to be managed under previously established processes. The key processes to be used as the foundation for the realignment had not yet had an impact on IT programs (specifically, security and inventory management) or initiatives (such as VBA’s modernization efforts and VHA’s initiatives on sharing medical data with DOD). Although VA had taken some actions to improve controls over IT equipment (such as issuing several new policies to establish guidance and controls for IT security) and had reorganized and centralized the IT function within the department under the CIO, we reported that these actions had not yet been fully implemented. As we testified in May 2007, VA and DOD have made progress in sharing health information, but much work remains to achieve the goal of a shared electronic medical record and seamless transition between the two departments. In their long-term initiatives, each department is developing its own modern health information system to replace its legacy systems, and they are collaborating on a program to develop an interface to enable these modernized systems to share data and ultimately to have interoperable electronic medical records. Through all these efforts, VA and DOD have achieved exchanges of health information. In addition, the departments have not yet projected a completion date for the project as a whole. The department continues to work on improving such programs as information security and asset control, and it currently has many significant initiatives under way, for which substantial investments have been made. Yet we continue to see management weaknesses in these programs and initiatives (many of a long-standing nature), which are the very weaknesses that VA aims to alleviate with its reorganized management structure. However, until the department provides the foundation for its new IT management structure by carrying out its plans to establish a comprehensive set of improved management processes, the impact of this vital undertaking will be diminished.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) depends on information technology (IT) to effectively serve our nation's veterans, with an IT budget of about $1 billion annually. However, it has encountered numerous challenges in managing its IT programs and initiatives. To address these challenges, VA is realigning its IT organization and management to a centralized model founded on a defined set of improved management processes. Begun in October 2005, the realignment is planned to be complete by July 2008. In this testimony, GAO discusses its recent reporting on VA's realignment effort and its management of other IT programs and initiatives, including ongoing systems development efforts and work to share electronic health information with the Department of Defense (DOD). To prepare this testimony, GAO reviewed its past work in these areas. What GAO Found VA has made progress in moving to a centralized management structure for IT; however, at the time of GAO's review in May 2007, the department had still to address certain critical success factors for transformation, and it had not yet institutionalized key IT management processes. VA's plans for realigning the management of its IT program include elements of several of the six factors that GAO identified as critical for the department's implementation of a centralized management structure, and it had fully addressed one factor--ensuring commitment from top leadership--having obtained the Secretary's approval of the realignment and the new IT governance structure. However, as of May 2007, the department did not plan to address one of the critical success factors: dedicating an implementation team to manage change. Having such a team is important, since the implementation of the realignment is expected to continue until July 2008. Without a dedicated team, it is less likely that the implementation will be managed effectively. In addition, although the department had begun to take action to establish improved management processes--a cornerstone of the realignment--it had not made significant progress. As of May 2007, it had begun pilot testing 2 of 36 planned new processes. Until it institutionalizes key processes throughout the department, the full benefits of the realignment may not be realized. At the same time that it is implementing the realignment, VA is managing ongoing IT programs such as information security and inventory control, and it is continuing initiatives to develop IT systems. The department is managing these programs and initiatives using existing management processes, many of which display the long-standing weaknesses that VA aims to alleviate through its realignment. Some progress has been made: for example, the department took actions to improve controls over IT equipment, such as issuing several new policies to establish guidance and controls for information security, but because the realignment was not yet fully implemented, improved processes for inventory control had not been established. In addition, progress on the development of a modernized compensation and benefits system occurred after the project implemented improved management processes, which the department now plans to apply to all its IT projects. VA also achieved a milestone in the long-term effort to share electronic health information with DOD, having begun to exchange limited medical data with DOD (at selected sites) through an interface between the data repositories for the modern health information systems that each department is developing. To achieve their long-term vision, VA and DOD have much work still to do (such as extending the current capability throughout both departments), and the two departments have not yet projected a final completion date for the whole initiative. Further progress in VA's IT programs and initiatives could be significantly aided by the improved processes that are the cornerstone of the realignment. Until these are fully implemented, the impact of the realignment on these programs and initiatives is uncertain
gao_GAO-09-532T	gao_GAO-09-532T_0	Background The purpose of the HUBZone program, which was established by the HUBZone Act of 1997, is to stimulate economic development, through increased employment and capital investment, by providing federal contracting preferences to small businesses in economically distressed communities or HUBZone areas. To be certified to participate in the HUBZone program, a firm must meet the following four criteria: must be small by SBA size standards; must be at least 51 percent owned and controlled by U.S. citizens; principal office—the location where the greatest number of employees perform their work—must be located in a HUBZone; and at least 35 percent of the full-time (or full-time equivalent) employees must reside in a HUBZone. More than 4,200 HUBZone firms obtained approximately $8.1 billion in federal contracts in fiscal year 2007. Our June 2008 report found problems with SBA’s HUBZone map. To improve its ability to ensure that only eligible firms participate in the program, we recommended in our June 2008 report that SBA develop and implement guidance to more routinely and consistently obtain supporting documentation upon application and conduct more frequent site visits, as appropriate, to ensure that firms applying for certification are eligible. Because of SBA’s limited progress, ineligible firms may still be able to participate in the HUBZone program and receive federal contracts based on their HUBZone certification. According to HUBZone program officials, the agency lacked sufficient staff to complete the recertifications. In response to our recommendation, SBA temporarily obtained additional staff for the HUBZone program and eliminated the backlog by September 30, 2008. In our report, we recommended that SBA formalize and adhere to a specific time frame for processing firms proposed for decertification. SBA Has Not Developed Measures or Implemented Plans to Assess the Effectiveness of the HUBZone Program In June 2008, we reported that SBA had taken limited steps to assess the effectiveness of the HUBZone program. During subsequent discussions we held with agency staff about this issue, they stated that they have initiated a new effort to address this issue.	Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program. Created in 1997, the HUBZone program provides federal contracting assistance to small businesses located in economically distressed communities, or HUBZone areas, with the intent of stimulating economic development in those areas. In fiscal year 2007, federal agencies awarded contracts valued at about $8 billion to HUBZone firms. Firms that participate in the program must be located in a HUBZone and employ residents of HUBZones to facilitate the goal of bringing capital and employment opportunities to distressed areas. My statement today is based on work we performed to update the status of recommendations we made in our June 2008 report on the HUBZone program and reiterated in a July 2008 testimony. These recommendations called for SBA to improve its controls over the HUBZone program and assess the program's effectiveness. Specifically, this testimony discusses SBA's progress in (1) ensuring that the HUBZone map is accurate; (2) developing and implementing guidance to ensure that participating firms are eligible; (3) eliminating the backlog of recertifications; (4) formalizing and adhering to time frames for decertifying ineligible firms; and (5) developing measures and implementing plans to assess the effectiveness of the program. What GAO Found At the time of the July 2008 testimony and in subsequent correspondence we received from SBA, we observed that the agency did not recognize the commitment required to address the HUBZone program's deficiencies and implement our recommendations. SBA officials told us that they recognize the commitment required to implement our recommendations. Consistent with this recognition, SBA is now working with a contractor to re-engineer its HUBZone program. In summary, SBA has initiated some steps to address the HUBZone program's deficiencies and implement our recommendations.
gao_GAO-06-171	gao_GAO-06-171_0	TC-AIMS II Has Not Been Managed in Accordance with Certain DOD System Acquisition Policies and Related Guidance The Army, as DOD’s acquisition agent for TC-AIMS II, has not managed this program in accordance with certain department acquisition policies, and related guidance, that are intended to reasonably ensure that a proposed system is the right solution to meet mission needs. In particular, the Army has not economically justified the program on the basis of reliable estimates of life-cycle costs and benefits, and it has not ensured that this program, which is intended to produce a departmentwide military deployment management system, is aligned with a departmentwide business enterprise architecture or an integrated blueprint for business systems modernization. As a result, the Army does not know that investment in TC-AIMS II as planned is warranted, represents a prudent use of limited DOD resources, and will be interoperable with and not be duplicative of related systems. Even if TC-AIMS II happens to be the right system, both economically and architecturally, the Army has not fully implemented risk management and has not fully employed performance-based contracting practices. However, it has largely managed system requirements, commercial components, and contractor tracking and oversight in accordance with DOD policies and related guidance. Investment in TC-AIMS II Has Not Been Adequately Justified on the Basis of Costs and Benefits DOD’s acquisition management policy and related guidance recognize the importance of developing reliable economic analyses to support investment decision making. As a result, the Army currently lacks an adequate basis to justify its planned investment in TC-AIMS II. This means that TC-AIMS II as a DOD-wide program is based on a service-specific architecture and not a DOD-wide architecture, thus increasing the risk that TC-AIMS II, as defined, will not properly fit within the context of future DOD enterprisewide business operations and IT environments. DOD has long operated without a well-defined enterprise architecture for its business environment. To its credit, the Army has performed key activities related to tracking and oversight. Conclusions It is unclear whether the Army’s planned investment in TC-AIMS II is warranted. This is due in large part to the evident change in the scope of the program, which was initiated on the basis of the four military services using TC-AIMS II but has not been revised to reflect that two services have stated their intentions not to use the system. To accomplish this, the Secretary of the Army should take the following three actions: collaborate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Army Cost Analysis Division to prepare a reliable economic analysis; ensure that development of this economic analysis (1) complies with cost-estimating best practices and relevant Office of Management and Budget cost benefit guidance, (2) incorporates available data on whether deployed TC-AIMS II capabilities are actually producing benefits, and (3) addresses that the Air Force and Marines are not planning to use the system; and collaborate with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to ensure that TC-AIMS II is adequately aligned with the evolving DOD business enterprise architecture. In addition, the department stated that even though its economic analysis showed a slight negative return on investment, the system’s intangible benefits bolster the program’s overall value. Objective, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to determine whether the Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II) was being managed according to important aspects of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition policies and guidance, as well as other relevant acquisition management best practices.	Why GAO Did This Study Because of the importance of the Department of Defense's (DOD) adherence to disciplined information technology (IT) acquisition processes in successfully modernizing its business systems, GAO was asked to determine whether the Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II) program is being managed according to important aspects of DOD's acquisition policies and guidance, as well as other relevant acquisition management best practices. TC-AIMS II was initiated in 1995 as a joint services system to help manage force and equipment movements within the United States and abroad. The U.S. Department of the Army has the lead responsibility for managing the system's acquisition and estimates its life-cycle cost to be $1.7 billion over 25 years. What GAO Found The Army has managed the TC-AIMS II program in accordance with some, but not all, key aspects of DOD's system acquisition management policies and related guidance. These policies and guidance are intended to reasonably ensure that investment in a given IT system represents the right solution to fill a mission need--and, if it does, that acquisition and deployment of the system are handled in a manner that maximizes the chances of delivering defined system capabilities on time and within budget. The Army has not managed the program in accordance with those DOD policies and related guidance, including related federal and other best practice guidance, that are intended to reasonably ensure that a proposed system is the right solution to meet mission needs. Specifically, the Army has not economically justified its investment in TC-AIMS II on the basis of reliable estimates of costs and benefits. For example, the most recent economic justification included cost and benefit estimates predicated on all four military services using the system. However, two services (U.S. Department of the Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps) have stated that they do not intend to use it. The Army has not invested in TC-AIMS II within the context of a well-defined enterprise architecture, which is an institutional blueprint to control program investment decisions in a way that promotes interoperability and reduces redundancy among systems. The Army has instead focused on aligning TC-AIMS II with its logistics architecture; this means that even though TC-AIMS II is intended to be a DOD-wide program, it has been based on a service-specific architecture rather than a DOD-wide architecture. As a result, it may not properly fit within departmentwide plans. To its credit, the Army has largely managed the program in accordance with key policies and related guidance that are intended to reasonably ensure that the acquisition and deployment of a given system are handled in a manner that maximizes the chances of delivering defined capabilities on time and within budget. However, some aspects of this policy and guidance have not been followed. For example, the Army has not fully implemented risk management and has not adhered to a key feature of performance-based contracting. Reasons the Army cited for not following policies and guidance ranged from management inattention to lack of training. As a result, the Army, among other things, does not know whether the system is the right solution. Until this uncertainty and the previously discussed problems are addressed, it will remain unclear whether further planned investment in TC-AIMS II is warranted, and certain aspects of the program's management will be limited.
gao_GAO-05-92	gao_GAO-05-92_0	IRS has periodically measured EITC compliance. For tax year 1999, (the most current data available), IRS estimated the EITC overclaim rates at 27 to 32 percent of EITC dollars claimed, or $8.5 billion to $9.9 billion. IRS Implemented Three Tests on Leading Sources of EITC Noncompliance and Reported Spending Most of the Funding Received on the Tests In an effort to implement the joint IRS/Treasury task force recommendations, IRS implemented three new tests—qualifying child certification, filing status, and income misreporting—in 2004. This form requires taxpayers to provide documentation as to why they did not file as married for tax year 2003. The task force recommended that taxpayers claiming the EITC (1) provide IRS with documentation to prove a qualifying child’s residency prior to payment of the credit (the qualifying child test), (2) submit additional data to establish that they are claiming the correct filing status (the filing status test), and (3) use a new screening process to select tax returns from an existing program to identify taxpayers likely to have the most significant underreporting of income on their tax return and, therefore, the highest potential EITC overclaim amount (income misreporting test). Postal Service. As a result, this lack of documentation hindered not only test monitoring and oversight, but also did not foster a common understanding of the tests. IRS has some evidence that taxpayers are willing to certify in advance of the filing season because about 800 taxpayers did so as part of the 2004 qualifying child test, even though they were only asked to do so when filing their returns. IRS also is testing two refinements in the sample selection criteria for the 2005 filing status tests to determine whether the selection criteria can be improved. IRS’s 2004 Evaluation Plans Lacked Sufficient Documented Detail to Allow for Oversight; Evaluation Plans for 2005 Tests Were Not Completed Before Two of the Tests Had Begun IRS’s plans for evaluating the three 2004 tests lacked sufficient documented detail to facilitate managerial review and stakeholders’ oversight and thereby help ensure that the evaluation of the tests’ results would be as sound as possible and the results would be communicated with full recognition of their strengths and limitations. In essence, an evaluation plan is used to manage the evaluation endeavor. Despite the importance of having detailed plans prior to implementation, IRS had not completed its evaluation plans for the 2005 tests before two of those tests had begun. The primary goal of all three tests was to reduce overclaim rates. Conclusions The EITC program lifts millions of low-income taxpayers and their families out of poverty. Recommendations for Executive Action The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should adopt a policy of documenting the rationale for key policy decisions and other significant events as the 2005 tests are implemented; develop a means of gathering information during the 2005 tests on the use of such locations as LITCs and walk-in sites on the level and quality of service provided by those sites, particularly in light of IRS’s plans to draw its sample from a single community for the qualifying child test; ensure that reports disseminating the results of the 2004 and 2005 test evaluations clearly outline aspects of test design and evaluation shortcomings that limit the interpretation and utility of the results; and complete the development of comprehensive and adequately detailed evaluation plans for the 2005 tests. To describe the status of IRS’s evaluation plan for the fiscal year 2005 tests, we primarily relied on interviews with IRS officials.	Why GAO Did This Study Research has shown that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has helped lift millions of individuals out of poverty. In recent years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has paid approximately $30 billion annually to about 20 million EITC recipients. However, the program also has experienced a high rate of noncompliance. IRS estimated that EITC overclaim rates for tax year 1999, the most recent data available, were between 27 and 32 percent of dollars claimed or $8.5 billion and $9.9 billion, respectively. We were asked to describe the three tests IRS has begun to reduce overclaims and how the funds appropriated for them were spent; assess how well IRS implemented the tests and describe planned refinements for the 2005 tests; and assess whether IRS's evaluation plans had sufficient documented detail to facilitate managerial review and stakeholder oversight and describe the status of the 2005 evaluation plans. What GAO Found IRS implemented three tests in 2004 to address leading sources of EITC errors: a qualifying child test, where selected taxpayers were asked to document that their child lived with them for more than half the year in 2003; a filing status test, where selected taxpayers were asked to provide documentation to prove the accuracy of their 2003 filing status, and an income misreporting test, where a new screening process was used to select EITC returns that identify taxpayers likely to have the most significant changes in their assessments due to underreporting of income on their tax return. IRS's implementation of the tests proceeded smoothly and largely as planned. However, some information, such as a key change in the filing status test, was not well documented and the level and quality of some services provided to test participants were not measured. This lack of documentation hindered monitoring, oversight, and did not foster a common understanding of the tests. For the 2005 tests, IRS made key changes to the qualifying child test to encourage taxpayers to certify in advance of filing their return and to attempt to simulate what might happen with nationwide implementation. IRS also changed the sample selection criteria for the filing status test to better target noncompliant taxpayers. IRS's plans for evaluating the 2004 tests generally lacked documentation and detail for many key issues, which undermined their value to managers and stakeholders. For example, IRS did not specify how it planned to analyze some qualifying child survey data. In essence, an evaluation plan is the management plan or roadmap for the evaluation endeavor and well-developed plans facilitate test management and oversight. Despite the importance of having evaluation plans prior to implementation, IRS had not completed its plans for the 2005 tests before two of the tests had begun.
gao_GAO-08-620T	gao_GAO-08-620T_0	The FY 2009 Budget Request Proposes to Maintain Taxpayer Service at Recent Levels and Increase Enforcement The President’s budget request is proposing to maintain taxpayer service levels with fewer staff by realizing efficiency gains; it also proposes to increase enforcement by adding staff. The President’s FY 2009 budget request of $11.4 billion for IRS is 4.3 percent more than the FY 2008 enacted budget and represents an increase of less than 1 percent for taxpayer service and 7 percent for enforcement, as shown in table 1. In order to maintain taxpayer service at recent levels despite a decrease in real spending and staffing, IRS expects to realize efficiency gains. The budget request for IRS’s enforcement programs includes nonlegislative and legislative initiatives. The revenue expected from IRS’s enforcement initiatives is modest compared to the net tax gap, which was last estimated at $290 billion for tax year 2001. If IRS were to fall behind in its hiring efforts, it would not need all $226 million of the funding for staff for FY 2009 initiatives. Although the budget request for IRS provides performance measure data, it does not provide ROI analyses for programs or activities other than the new initiatives. We recently reported that while IRS has continued to make progress in implementing BSM projects and improving modernization management controls and capabilities, challenges and risks remain, and further improvements are needed. When we asked about the impact of this reduction on its operations, IRS told us that the proposed funding level will allow it to continue developing and delivering its primary modernization projects but did not provide details on how plans to deliver specific projects or benefits to taxpayers would be affected. However, the agency has yet to develop long-term plans for completing BSM and consolidating and retiring legacy systems. IRS Estimates the Cost of Implementing the Economic Stimulus Legislation May Be Up to a Total of $767 Million and Expects Declines in Some Taxpayer Services The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 is resulting in a significant workload increase not anticipated in the FY 2008 budget. As part of the legislation, IRS received $202 million in a supplemental appropriation. As part of the legislation, IRS received a supplemental appropriation of $202 million to help fund its costs for implementing the stimulus package. IRS is expecting 2.4 million additional telephone calls in March and April with questions for IRS assistors about the economic stimulus legislation. IRS originally estimated that the revenue foregone by shifting ACS staff to be up to $681 million. Because of the increased call volume, IRS expects its assistor level of service to drop from 82 percent (the 2008 goal) to as low as 74 percent—the lowest level since 2002. IRS is already experiencing some declines in telephone service.	Why GAO Did This Study The fiscal year 2009 budget request for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is a road map for how IRS plans to allocate resources and achieve ambitious goals for improving enforcement, improving taxpayer service, increasing research, and continuing to invest in modernized information systems. One complicating factor in implementing IRS's plans in the immediate future is the recent passage of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which creates additional, unanticipated workload for IRS. GAO was asked to (1) assess how the President's budget request for IRS allocates resources and justifies proposed initiatives; (2) determine the status of IRS's efforts to develop and implement its Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program; and (3) determine the total costs of administering the economic stimulus legislation. To meet these objectives, GAO drew upon and updated recently issued reports. What GAO Found The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request for IRS is $11.4 billion, 4.3 percent more than last year's enacted amount. The request proposes to maintain taxpayer service at recent levels, in part by realizing efficiency gains from electronic filing, despite a decrease in staffing. It also proposes a 7 percent increase in enforcement spending, including spending for 21 legislative and nonlegislative initiatives. The legislative proposals are projected to cost $23 million in fiscal year 2009, funding that IRS would not need if the proposals are not enacted. Similarly, if IRS were to fall behind in its proposed enforcement hiring efforts, it would not need all $226 million of the associated funding. IRS justified its nonlegislative enforcement initiatives with return on investment (ROI) analyses, which are useful, despite limitations, for making resource allocation decisions. The budget request does not provide ROI information for activities that constitute a large part of the budget request--activities other than the proposed initiatives. The request for BSM is over $44 million lower than the fiscal year 2008 enacted amount. IRS said this funding level will allow it to continue its primary modernization projects, but it did not describe how specific projects or benefits to taxpayers would be affected. IRS has continued to make progress in implementing BSM projects and improving modernization management controls and capabilities. However, further improvements are needed. For example, the agency has yet to develop long-term plans for completing BSM and consolidating and retiring legacy systems. IRS estimated that the costs of implementing the economic stimulus legislation may be up to a total of $767 million--including a $202 million supplemental appropriation. In addition to the supplemental appropriation, IRS is reallocating hundreds of collections staff to answering taxpayer telephone calls, resulting in up to $565 million in foregone enforcement revenue. In addition, IRS expects some deterioration in telephone service because of the increased call volume. For example, IRS is expecting its assistor level of service to drop to as low as 74 percent compared to its goal of 82 percent.
gao_GAO-17-7	gao_GAO-17-7_0	DOD Has Developed Guidance for the Joint Exercise Program and Has Implemented an Approach to Assess Program Effectiveness DOD Has Developed a Body of Guidance for the Joint Exercise Program and Is Working to Update a Key Guidance Document That Is Outdated DOD has developed a body of guidance for the Joint Exercise Program and is working to update a key outdated guidance document that identifies overarching roles and responsibilities for military training in accordance with a congressional requirement in a House Committee on Armed Services report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. The Director of the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability office reviews the performance measures created by the combatant commands against the SMART rubric and provides input and coaching on improving the measures through an ongoing and collaborative process. DOD Uses Two Key Information Technology Systems to Manage the Joint Exercise Program, but the Data in the System That Tracks the Most Recent Funding Execution Data Does Not Have Required Supporting Documentation and Its Data Quality Is Questionable DOD uses two key information technology systems—JTIMS and the Execution Management System—to manage the execution of the Joint Exercise Program, but DOD does not have assurance that the Execution Management System produces quality information. In addition, TRANSCOM officials randomly selected exercises in JTIMS to show us the type of information entered in the system and we noted that the level of detail provided sometimes varied significantly by combatant command. Furthermore, officials from two of the four combatant commands we visited stated that sometimes the information captured in JTIMS is not useful and could negatively affect their ability to coordinate training with other combatant commands or extract pertinent information about exercises from the system that would be helpful in planning them. Consequently, to help improve the consistency and standardization of information across combatant commands, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a user guide for JTIMS that is intended to mitigate inconsistencies in the information entered there, standardize the use of the system across DOD, and improve the overall understanding of the system. Based on our review, we found that two— STRATCOM and NORTHCOM—of the four combatant commands we visited had uploaded supporting documentation, as required by the Execution Management System guidance, for fiscal years 2013-16. Based on our review of a nongeneralizable sample of supporting documentation for fiscal years 2014 through 2016 that was uploaded into the Execution Management System, we found that the sum of the individual expenditures reported in supporting documentation did not match the corresponding total expenditures entered in the system for any of the four combatant commands we visited. Without ensuring that supporting documentation is uploaded and implementing effective internal controls to ensure the completeness and accuracy of financial information captured for the Joint Exercise Program, DOD and other key decision makers may not have the correct financial information to defend the Joint Exercise Program’s budget. Recommendations for Executive Action To better ensure quality financial execution information is available to guide the Joint Exercise Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness to take the following two actions: direct the combatant commanders to take steps to comply with current Execution Management System guidance to upload supporting documentation that is reconcilable to funds executed from the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation account; and as the department implements financial improvement plans in accordance with the FIAR guidance, it should include specific internal control steps and procedures to address and ensure the completeness and accuracy of information captured for the Joint Exercise Program’s Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation account. In its written comments, which are summarized below and reprinted in appendix IV, DOD partially concurred with both recommendations. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report (1) describes guidance the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed for its Joint Exercise Program and DOD’s approach to assess the effectiveness of the program and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD uses two key information systems—the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) and the Execution Management System–to manage the Joint Exercise Program. We reviewed DOD’s approach to make performance measures specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-phased (commonly referred to as the SMART rubric) to assess the return on investment for the Joint Exercise Program.	Why GAO Did This Study The Joint Exercise Program is the principal means for combatant commanders to maintain trained and ready forces, exercise contingency and theater security cooperation plans, and conduct joint and multinational training exercises. These exercises are primarily aimed at developing the skills needed by U.S. forces to operate in a joint environment and can also help build partner-nation capacity and strengthen alliances. House Report 114-102 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's Joint Exercise Program. This report (1) describes guidance DOD has developed for its Joint Exercise Program and DOD's approach to assess the effectiveness of the program and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD uses two information technology systems to manage the program. GAO observed data in JTIMS and analyzed fiscal years 2014-16 financial data and supporting documentation in the Execution Management System. What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed a body of guidance for the Joint Exercise Program and has implemented an approach to assess the effectiveness of the program. In addition to the body of guidance for the program, DOD is working to update a key guidance document for military training in accordance with a congressional requirement. DOD's approach to assess the effectiveness of the Joint Exercise Program is aimed at ensuring that its performance measures are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-phased (commonly referred to as the SMART rubric). The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability office reviews the performance measures created by the combatant commands against this rubric and provides input and coaching on improving the measures through an ongoing and collaborative process. DOD uses two key information technology systems—the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) and the Execution Management System—to manage the execution of the Joint Exercise Program, but does not have assurance that funding execution data in the Execution Management System are reliable. JTIMS is the system of record for the Joint Exercise Program that combatant commanders use to plan and manage their joint training exercises. GAO observed significant variation in the type and quality of information entered in JTIMS. Combatant command and Joint Staff officials stated that information in JTIMS lacked consistency in the level of detail provided, sometimes making it difficult to coordinate training with other combatant commands or extract pertinent information about exercises from the system that would be helpful in planning other exercises. Consequently, to help improve the consistency and standardization of information across combatant commands, the Joint Staff published a user guide for JTIMS. Regarding the Execution Management System, a web-based database DOD uses to track the most recent funding execution data for the Joint Exercise Program, GAO found that DOD does not have assurance that the system produces quality information because supporting documentation is not consistently uploaded into the system and, when it is uploaded, it is not reconcilable to the data entered there. Only U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command uploaded supporting documentation for fiscal years 2013-16 as required by the Execution Management System guidance. Reviewing a nongeneralizable sample of uploaded supporting documentation for fiscal years 2014-16, GAO found that the sum of the individual expenditures reported in supporting documentation did not match corresponding total expenditures entered in the system for any of the four combatant commands included in GAO's review. Further, the four combatant commands GAO visited, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness had not implemented effective internal controls similar to those identified in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to ensure the completeness and accuracy of financial information captured for the Joint Exercise Program. Without such internal controls, DOD and other key decision makers may not have the financial information of sufficient quality to defend the Joint Exercise Program's budget. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD comply with current guidance to upload supporting documentation in the Execution Management System and implement effective internal controls to ensure the completeness and accuracy of financial information. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations, noting existing controls in other related systems of record. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in this report.
gao_HEHS-98-64	gao_HEHS-98-64_0	Consolidating Services Into Three Chicago Hospitals Appears to Be a Viable Option for Meeting Veterans’ Health Care Needs Based on the extent of unused inpatient capacity and the decreasing demand for services, VHA can meet veterans’ current and future inpatient and outpatient demands by closing one of its four Chicago hospitals. Veterans’ access to VHA care would remain essentially unchanged, because most veterans using the Lakeside and West Side hospitals live in the same area now served by three of the four hospitals. VHA’s four Chicago hospitals operated 1,665 medicine, surgery, and psychiatry beds at the beginning of fiscal year 1997. Veterans used an average of 850 of these beds a day during 1997. For example, if VHA closed West Side, then it could use 51 beds at Lakeside, 244 beds at North Chicago, and the 262 beds at Hines. Chicago-area veterans’ demand for inpatient care (currently at 850 beds) is expected to decrease, which will further increase VHA’s supply of unused beds. On the basis of the 56 hospitals that responded to a 1995 American Hospital Association survey, these hospitals have more than 5,700 excess beds a day. By reopening some wards, VHA can close one of the facilities, shift the workload to the other three hospitals, and continue to provide the same level of inpatient service that is now available to veterans in the Chicago area. Meeting Veterans’ Health Care Needs in Three Rather Than Four Hospitals Could Save Millions If VHA consolidated services into three hospitals it could reduce expenditures over the next 10 years by about $200 million or more for (1) facility operating and maintenance costs and (2) renovation costs. Additionally, VHA may be able to generate revenues through the lease or sale of the fourth hospital. VHA could save millions of dollars by consolidating into three locations and avoiding future capital investments at the Lakeside or West Side location. VHA engineers at both hospitals estimate that a total of almost $73 million will be needed to improve these facilities so that VHA can continue to meet veterans’ health care needs, about $6 million to $27 million of which will be needed within the next 5 years for West Side and Lakeside, respectively. As with education opportunities, the medical schools would likely need to share research laboratories as well as patients. But in 1997, these hospitals planned to provide 686 (about 40 percent) of their 1,665 operating beds. We believe that our study provides sufficient data to show how workload could be accommodated if a hospital is closed. In addition, we considered whether outpatient clinics can be used to a greater extent to meet veterans’ primary care needs. Cook County Public and Private Sector Hospitals St. Francis Hospital and Health Center St. James Hospital and Health Centers Doctor’s Hospital of Hyde Park Mercy Hospital and Medical Center Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center Mount Sinai Hospital and Medical Center Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center Provident Hospital of Cook County (continued) Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center Saint Joseph Health Centers and Hospital Thorek Hospital and Medical Center University of Illinois Medical Center Little Company of Mary and Health Centers Suburban Cook County TB Sanitorium District (continued) Veterans’ Usage of VHA Hospitals, by City of Chicago Zip Code City of Chicago zip code (continued) Comments From Northwestern University Medical School Comments From the University of Illinois at Chicago GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: Walter Gembacz collected and analyzed facility operating and maintenance costs data and acted as an adviser throughout this assignment; John Borrelli assessed the impact on VHA’s health care missions related to medical education and research; Lesia Mandzia conducted a survey to determine the impact on veterans of closing a hospital; John Kirstein helped collect and analyze facility operating and maintenance costs data; Jonathan Ratner provided guidance in analyzing and reporting the costs of closing a facility; and Joan Vogel and Ann McDermott provided technical support.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) could serve veterans in Chicago, Illinois, with three hospitals, focusing on: (1) the extent of the resources that could be redirected to improve patient care; and (2) the potential impact of one hospital closure on VHA's other missions. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) VHA can meet the health care needs of Chicago-area veterans by operating three hospitals instead of four; (2) VHA began fiscal year (FY) 1997 operating 1,665 inpatient medicine, surgery, and psychiatry beds at the four Chicago hospitals, and veterans used 850 beds a day, on average; (3) the large supply of unused beds provides sufficient capacity to meet the needs of veterans now using Lakeside or West Side Hospitals; (4) for example, during FY 1997, veterans used an average of 145 and 198 beds a day at Lakeside and West Side, respectively, while during the same period Hines Hospital closed 262 beds and North Chicago Hospital closed 244 beds; (5) moreover, veterans' demand for VHA hospital care is expected to continue declining as: (a) treatments shift from inpatient to outpatient settings; and (b) the Chicago-area veteran population continues to decrease; (6) in addition, other Chicago public and private hospitals have about 5,700 excess beds, which VHA could use on a contract basis to meet veterans' inpatient needs closer to their homes, as VHA does elsewhere; (7) regardless, veterans would continue to have good access to health care if either Lakeside or West Side hospital is closed because most of the veterans using these facilities live in essentially the same residential areas; (8) GAO's analysis showed that consolidating services into three locations could reduce VHA expenditures an estimated $200 million over the next 10 years by lowering facility operating and maintenance costs as well as avoiding $6 million to $27 million in renovation costs; (9) in addition, VHA could potentially generate millions of dollars in revenues through the lease or sale of property from the closed location; (10) VHA would, however, incur one-time costs for relocating some clinical services, but the savings could be used to enhance services to veterans, including adding needed new community-based outpatient clinics and buying new equipment; (11) VHA would also be able to meet its education, research, and Department of Defense contingency missions by operating three hospitals; (12) this is because the three remaining locations would likely carry the same workload that four locations would have, thereby providing a sufficient number of patients for VHA to maintain a comparable level of education and research opportunities; and (13) VHA will also be able to provide a flexible portion of its operating beds for military casualties, if needed, which was set at about 40 percent in 1997.
gao_GAO-17-357	gao_GAO-17-357_0	For example, some state and local governments have adopted laws and ordinances requiring property owners to establish and maintain defensible space. Figure 3 shows various actions federal agencies and nonfederal entities may take to reduce wildfire risk in and around communities. Some federal-nonfederal collaboration at the national level encompasses all types of risk-reduction efforts. Factors Such as Agency Initiatives and Joint Planning Were Cited by Federal Officials and Stakeholders in Our Review as Affecting Collaboration Federal officials and stakeholders we interviewed identified federal authorities, agency initiatives, joint community-level planning, leadership, community engagement, and agency resources for collaboration as directly affecting federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities. In some cases these factors enhanced collaboration, according to officials, while in other cases they hindered collaboration. Federal officials and stakeholders also identified factors that indirectly affect federal and nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk in the WUI. Some federal officials and stakeholders said that federal and nonfederal entities are reluctant to use the Good Neighbor Authority and the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 because the authorities are unclear or because not all agency staff are aware of how to use them. In addition, many officials and stakeholders said that the Cohesive Strategy, issued in 2014, enhances collaboration because it emphasizes the importance of coordination across multiple agencies through an “all lands approach” and frames comprehensive goals that, taken together, may mitigate wildland fire risk. In contrast, some federal officials and stakeholders identified several potential impediments to community engagement. Federal Officials and Stakeholders in Our Review Identified Several Actions They Said May Improve Their Ability to Reduce Wildland Fire Risk Federal officials and stakeholders we interviewed said that improving implementation of the Cohesive Strategy, increasing collaborative planning, expanding education, increasing prevention efforts, and improving local timber-processing capabilities could improve federal agencies’ and nonfederal entities’ ability to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Officials and stakeholders also identified actions that, while not necessarily within federal agencies’ control, could help reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Some officials and stakeholders said it is important to increase accountability for implementing the Cohesive Strategy, such as through the use of performance measures as part of implementing the strategy. The Cohesive Strategy states that its successful implementation depends in part on monitoring and accountability, noting that “A set of national outcome performance measures will allow Congress, the national wildland fire management community, and other stakeholders to monitor and assess progress toward achieving the results for each of the three national goals.” This emphasis on monitoring and accountability is consistent with key characteristics we have described for developing and implementing effective national strategies. More broadly, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC)—the interagency organization responsible for oversight and leadership in implementing the Cohesive Strategy (and which includes the Forest Service and Interior as members)—has not developed measures to assess progress on the part of federal and nonfederal participants in meeting the national goals of the Cohesive Strategy. By working with the interagency body WFLC to establish such measures, the Forest Service and Interior, together with federal and nonfederal partners, could better assess national progress toward achieving the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. Recommendation for Executive Action To help determine the extent to which the goals of the Cohesive Strategy are being met, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the Director of the Office of Wildland Fire, respectively, to work with WFLC to develop measures to assess national progress toward achieving the strategy’s goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines (1) factors federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders cited as affecting federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities and (2) actions federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders said could help improve their ability to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. We also interviewed headquarters officials from each of the five federal land management agencies responsible for wildland fire management—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior—as well as Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire.	Why GAO Did This Study Dense vegetation, drought, and other factors have resulted in more severe wildland fires in recent years. At the same time, development in and around wildlands continues to increase, with some communities experiencing devastating effects from wildland fire. To reduce risk to communities, federal agencies and nonfederal stakeholders can collaborate in various ways. GAO was asked to review collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. This report examines federal officials' and stakeholders' views on (1) factors that affect federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities and (2) actions that could improve their ability to reduce risk to communities. GAO reviewed laws and documents about collaboration on wildland fire management; compared agency efforts with guidance; and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 federal land management units selected based on wildland fire potential, geographic diversity, and other factors. GAO also interviewed stakeholders including community members near the selected units and representatives of nonfederal entities involved in fire risk-reduction efforts. What GAO Found Officials GAO interviewed from the five federal agencies responsible for wildland fire management—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service within the Department of the Interior—and nonfederal stakeholders, including state and local officials, homeowners, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, identified several factors as affecting federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities. In some cases these factors were cited as enhancing collaboration, while in other cases they were cited as hindering it. Among the factors identified were federal authorities, agency initiatives, joint community-level planning, and others. For example, several officials and stakeholders cited laws such as the Good Neighbor Authority and Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 as enhancing collaboration because they provide federal and nonfederal entities the authority to work across jurisdictions on projects to reduce risk. In addition, several officials and stakeholders cited the 2014 National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy) as helpful for collaboration because it emphasizes the importance of coordination across multiple agencies and includes comprehensive fire management goals. In contrast, some officials and stakeholders said collaboration on certain types of projects was hindered by the difficulty in sharing project costs between federal and nonfederal entities. Federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders also identified several actions they said could improve federal agencies' and nonfederal entities' ability to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Among the actions cited was improving the implementation of the Cohesive Strategy. Some agency officials and stakeholders noted the importance of increasing accountability for implementing the Cohesive Strategy, such as through the use of performance measures. The strategy states that its success depends in part on monitoring and accountability, and calls for national outcome measures. This is consistent with previous GAO findings regarding national strategies. However, GAO found that the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC)—the interagency body charged with overseeing and implementing the Cohesive Strategy and which includes the Forest Service and Interior as members—has not developed measures to assess progress on the part of federal and nonfederal participants in meeting the national goals of the Cohesive Strategy. In 2013, WFLC proposed several measures but concluded that implementing them could place undue burden on the agencies and nonfederal partners. In 2016, however, WFLC reported that recent research findings could help quantify the strategy's effects over time. By working with WFLC to develop such measures, the Forest Service and Interior, together with federal and nonfederal partners, could better assess national progress toward achieving the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. Federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders also identified actions that, while not necessarily within the federal agencies' control, could be taken to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. For example, these actions include adopting state laws that require property owners to take risk-reducing actions such as using fire-resistant building materials or reducing vegetation around their homes. Some states have adopted laws to promote such actions. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Forest Service and Interior work with WFLC to develop measures to assess progress toward achieving the Cohesive Strategy's goals. The Forest Service agreed with GAO's recommendation, while Interior did not. GAO believes the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.
gao_GAO-09-154	gao_GAO-09-154_0	To qualify for selection, a city had to develop and be ready to quickly implement a comprehensive, integrated, and innovative approach to reducing congestion through the use of the 4Ts. 1.) However, New York City failed to meet its April 2008 deadline for obtaining congestion pricing authority from the state legislature. The Department Communicated Most Selection Information to Applicants, but Gave Two Applicants Assistance over Others The department clearly communicated 10 of the 11 criteria it used to select urban partners, but it could have better communicated to applicants the relative weights it would assign to the selection criteria and the amount of funding available under the UPA initiative. We also found that the department provided additional attention to two applicants after they were selected as PUPs, but in the absence of government-wide guidance it is unclear on how to assess the appropriateness of this attention. These procedures allow applicants to make informed decisions when preparing their applications and help ensure the selection process is as fair and equitable as possible. 2.) Senior department officials considered the political boldness of a city’s projects when selecting urban partners. The department subsequently told us that political boldness was the same as political and technical feasibility. The Department Had the Authority to Allocate Funds to the UPA Initiative, and to Consider Congestion Pricing as a Priority Selection Factor for Underlying Grant Programs The department had the legal authority to allocate appropriated funds to the UPA initiative as long as the funds were spent for the purposes authorized in the appropriations legislation, and the department complied with the restrictions and requirements of the underlying grant statutes. Each of the nine grant statutes either explicitly permitted the consideration of congestion pricing or afforded the department discretion to consider congestion pricing because it is rationally related to statutory objectives. The Department Has a Framework to Ensure That Award Conditions Are Being Met and That Results Will Be Evaluated The department is tracking urban partners’ progress in completing the conditions of their awards, such as obtaining their authority to use congestion pricing where needed. In addition, the department has contracted with Battelle Memorial Institute to evaluate the outcomes of UPA projects, such as the extent to which congestion is mitigated. According to Florida Department of Transportation officials, Miami did this to make its UPA application more competitive and because at the time, Miami did not know that the department would provide funding for this activity. We did not determine whether the evaluation methodologies proposed by Battelle or Miami were reasonable, because these methodologies have not been fully developed. With minor exceptions, the department did a good job of letting applicants know which criteria it would use in selecting urban partners and of the funding available for the initiative. Second, for the Transportation, Community, and System Preservation program, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Administrator, FHWA, to give priority consideration only to applicants that meet all five statutory factors, as required by the grant statute. However, it was not clear in this document what portion of the $329 million would be dedicated to Corridors. We did not assess these new efforts. To describe the steps the department is taking to ensure that award conditions are met and that results will be evaluated, we reviewed documents on the department’s actions to monitor UPA award conditions and plans to evaluate each urban partner’s projects to reduce congestion. Appendix V: The Department’s Legal Compliance in Awarding Grants to Support the UPA Initiative Introduction and Summary of Conclusions As part of our review of the department’s National Strategy to Reduce Congestion on America’s Transportation Network, we examined whether, for fiscal year 2007, the department had legal authority to allocate its lump-sum appropriations to 10 existing discretionary grant programs in order to “fund” the UPA initiative, and if so, whether the department could use tolling (specifically, congestion pricing) as a priority or priority consideration factor in deciding which applicants would be awarded grants under those programs. After narrowing the 26 applicants to 9 potential urban partners, the department selected Miami, Minneapolis, New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle as urban partners in August 2007. . . (3) address traffic management .	Why GAO Did This Study As part of a broad congestion relief initiative, the Department of Transportation awarded about $848 million from 10 grant programs to five cities (Miami, Minneapolis, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle) in 2007 as part of the Urban Partnership Agreements (UPA) initiative. The UPA initiative is intended to demonstrate the feasibility and benefits of comprehensive, integrated, and innovative approaches to relieving congestion, including the use of tolling (congestion pricing), transit, technology, and telecommuting (4Ts). Congestion pricing involves charging drivers a fee that varies with the density of traffic. This report addresses congressional interest in (1) how well the department communicated UPA selection criteria, (2) whether it had discretion to allocate grant funds to UPA recipients and consider congestion pricing as a priority selection factor, and (3) how it is ensuring that UPA award conditions are met and results are assessed. GAO reviewed departmental documents, statutes and case law, and interviewed department officials and UPA applicants. What GAO Found Although GAO did not assess the merits of the UPA initiative's design, it has reported on its support for integrated approaches to help reduce congestion. With minor exception, the department did a good job communicating the criteria it would use to select urban partners and how much funding was available, but it did not clearly communicate the relative priority of the criteria or extend the same outreach to all applicants. The department clearly communicated 10 of the 11 selection criteria--such as the political and technical feasibility of projects--that it used to decide which cities to select as urban partners, but it did not publicize which criteria, other than the 4Ts, were most important. In addition, over time, the department provided information indicating that about $852 million was available for these projects--a figure short of the actual $1.02 billion but sufficient to give applicants a rough idea of the program's size. Clearly communicating selection criteria, their relative priority, and the available funding allows applicants to make informed decisions when preparing their applications. GAO also found that the department told two semifinalists for being named urban partners how to revise their applications to make them more competitive, but did not do so for the other semifinalists. Both were ultimately selected as urban partners. However, in the absence of government-wide or departmental guidance, it is unclear how to assess the appropriateness of this assistance. The department acted within its authority to allocate about $848 million of its fiscal year 2007 appropriation under 10 grant programs to five UPA cities. Typically these funds have been awarded through congressional direction (earmarks) to thousands of jurisdictions; but the department's 2007 funds were not subject to such directives. In addition, the department had authority to consider congestion pricing as a priority selection factor when awarding funds because the underlying statutes either explicitly permit it or provide the department with the authority to do so. However, GAO found that the department likely did not comply with statutory requirements of the Transportation, Community, and System Preservation program by failing to require applicants to meet all five statutory factors in order to receive "priority consideration," but this may not have affected the selection outcome. The department has developed a framework to ensure that UPA award conditions are met and the initiative's results will be evaluated. The department is monitoring urban partners' completion of award conditions, such as obtaining congestion-pricing authority, and has already acted when conditions have not been met, such as by taking away New York City's funding when it could not obtain congestion pricing authority from the state. In addition, the department plans to evaluate urban partners' strategies for, and results in, reducing congestion. The evaluation, to be conducted by To view the full product, including the scope Battelle Memorial Institute, is in its early stages.
gao_GAO-01-712	gao_GAO-01-712_0	For example, Treasury’s fiscal year 2000 performance report listed five IRS-wide measures that Treasury designated as key performance indicators related to the outcome. Delinquent Tax Collection On the basis of information in Treasury’s 2000 performance report, we could not assess Treasury’s progress in improving its collection of delinquent taxes because none of the performance measures were linked to this outcome. However, some measures for the strategies and programs that are designed to achieve this outcome provide an incomplete measure of performance. Comparison of Treasury’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in Treasury’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report, and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. The strategic goals and objectives of IRS, FMS, Customs, and ATF were not always directly reflected in the broader departmental goals, limiting the reports’ usefulness in determining whether these agencies are making progress in meeting their strategic goals in general and these outcomes in particular. First, Treasury elevated its objective of Improve Customer Satisfaction to a strategic goal. Second, it added a strategic goal of Improve Employee Satisfaction. In addition, GAO has identified five major management challenges facing the Department of the Treasury. We found that Treasury’s performance report discussed the agency’s progress in resolving many of its challenges, but it did not discuss the agency’s progress in resolving the following challenge: Strategic Human Capital Management.	Why GAO Did This Study This report reviews the Department of the Treasury's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance report plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act. What GAO Found Specifically, GAO discusses Treasury's progress in addressing several key outcomes that are important to Treasury's mission. In general, GAO could not adequately determine Treasury's progress on five key outcomes because the fiscal year 2000 performance report lacked at least some measures needed to directly assess each of the outcomes. However, other information that GAO reviewed and GAO's past work suggest that Treasury may be at risk of not achieving these outcomes. In assessing Treasury's strategies, GAO identified shortcomings in its plans for each of the outcomes it reviewed. Chief among the limitations common to both the Treasury's fiscal year 1999 and 2000 performance reports was that the performance goals and measures of Treasury's agencies were not always directly reflected in the broader departmental goals, limiting the reports' usefulness in determining whether these agencies are making progress in meeting their strategic goals in general and the outcomes GAO reviewed in particular. Treasury improved the fiscal year 2000 report by elevating its objective of Improve Customer Satisfaction to a strategic goal and adding a strategic goal of Improve Employee Satisfaction. Treasury's performance report discussed the progress made in resolving many of its major management challenges, but it did not specifically discuss the agency's progress in resolving challenges related to strategic human capital management.
gao_GGD-95-95	gao_GGD-95-95_0	The Holding Company’s Financial Troubles Led to Monarch Life’s Takeover Financial troubles of the holding company endangered the solvency of Monarch Life and led to the regulatory takeover. In effect, the pool account represented loans from Monarch Life to the holding company and other subsidiaries. Monarch Life faced additional risk by acting as a loan guarantor for some of the holding company’s real estate operations. The Massachusetts Division of Insurance Was Unaware of the Problems Endangering Monarch Life Until the holding company’s disclosures in November 1990, the Massachusetts Division of Insurance was unaware of the interaffiliate transactions that depleted Monarch Life’s assets and undermined its solvency. Once the holding company disclosed that its inability to repay Monarch Life endangered the insurer’s solvency, Massachusetts regulators responded swiftly to protect the insurer’s policyholders. Regulatory examinations took months or even years to complete. Effective regulation of insurance holding company systems requires state regulators to review consolidated financial statements with uniform accounting standards and to examine the financial transactions among the parent holding company and its affiliates as a unitary economic enterprise.” At the time of the Monarch Life takeover in 1991, Massachusetts lacked the authority, recommended under NAIC’s model Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act, to prevent abusive interaffiliate transactions. However, the regulatory approach continues to rely on a holding company system to reveal potentially abusive transactions involving an insurance subsidiary.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the placing of Monarch Life Insurance Company in receivership, focusing on: (1) whether the actions of the parent holding company or affiliated companies endangered the solvency of Monarch Life; and (2) the adequacy of regulatory oversight leading up to the insurance receivership. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the holding company pledged Monarch Life stock as collateral on a loan which endangered its solvency and led to the regulatory takeover by the holding company's creditors; (2) the holding company diverted about $165 million from Monarch Life to fund its real estate activities, but it was unable to repay the loan; (3) Monarch Life lost $54 million in real estate investments and faced additional risk by acting as a loan guarantor for the holding company's real estate operations; (4) the Massachusetts Division of Insurance was unaware of Monarch Life's insolvency until the holding company disclosed its inability to repay its loans in 1990; (5) previous regulatory examinations of Monarch Life's financial statements did not reveal any solvency problems due to inadequate information on interaffiliate transactions; (6) once the holding company publicly announced that its financial condition endangered Monarch Life's solvency, state regulators acted quickly to protect the insurance policyholders; and (7) although Massachusetts expanded its regulatory authority to prevent abusive interaffiliate transactions between insurance companies, it continues to rely on insurer disclosure to enforce insurance holding company laws.
gao_GAO-09-608	gao_GAO-09-608_0	Some SWFs have existed for many years, but recently a number of new funds have been created. Some funds that do publish information on the value of their investment portfolios have reported losses in certain types of assets. Although the United States has an overall policy of openness to foreign investment through policy statements and treaties and international agreements addressing investment, we identified the banking, agriculture, transportation, natural resources and energy, communications, and defense sectors as having federal laws that apply to foreign investment specifically. National emergency declarations are governed by the National Emergencies Act. Foreign banks must receive prior approval of FRB before opening certain types of banking operations in the United States. These restrictions apply to the company and to any company that owns the foreign company. Finally, foreign investors face no federal restrictions on investments in U.S. agricultural land, but are required to report purchases above a minimum threshold. State Laws Restricting Foreign Investment Largely Limit Investments in Real Estate and Insurance In addition to federal laws that may affect foreign investment, we identified various state laws that may affect foreign investors’ ability to invest in U.S. assets, based on information available from government and private sources with relevant expertise. Restrictions on foreign investment in real estate also exist in many states. Agencies Described Processes Addressing Key Elements of Enforcing Laws Affecting Foreign Investment; Using Supplemental Information Could Assist Some Agencies Agencies responsible for enforcing laws specifically addressing foreign investment in six sectors have processes addressing the key elements of enforcement. We determined that in order for agencies to have the necessary information to determine whether the requirements of the laws were being met, they would, at a minimum, need processes to (1) identify all transactions that are subject to the law, (2) verify the identity and amount of foreign ownership and control to ensure that the portion of foreign ownership and control is below the legal limit for restrictive statutes, and (3) monitor changes to ownership that occur after the initial transaction, and ensure that foreign ownership and control remains below the legal limit for blocking statutes. For five of the sectors we reviewed—transportation, banking, communications, nuclear energy, and mineral leases—entities seeking to establish new operations or invest in existing ones must generally seek approval from the federal oversight agencies through a licensing or approval process. While each agency has various processes for monitoring ownership changes, staff at DOT, FCC, and Agriculture do not routinely review information from certain additional sources, including those maintained by other government agencies or private sources, to supplement the information they use to identify possible unreported ownership changes. In addition, while officials at Interior did not report using any government or private sources to monitor changes in ownership, the law requires that leaseholders be U.S. citizens but does not limit foreign ownership of a leaseholder. Recommendation for Executive Action To enhance their oversight of sectors subject to laws restricting or requiring disclosure of foreign investments, we recommend that the Chairman of the FCC and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Transportation review the current sources of the information their agencies currently monitor to detect changes in ownership of U.S. assets— which are subject to restriction or disclosure requirements applicable to foreign investors—and assess the value of supplementing these sources with information from other government and private data sources on investment transactions. To identify and describe the U.S. laws that specifically affect foreign investment, we (1) reviewed laws affecting foreign investment in the United States, (2) reviewed documents concerning those laws, and (3) talked to legal experts on foreign investment both inside and outside the federal government about laws they considered important for foreign investors in the United States. U.S. policy statements on foreign investment. Legal issues related to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, as these issues have been addressed in other GAO reports. We did not conduct any independent review or analysis of state level investment laws. We also reviewed regulations and agency documents describing their processes for enforcing the laws. With respect to merchant shipping, a vessel may only be registered as a U.S. flag vessel if it has not been registered under the laws of a foreign country and it is wholly owned by one or more of the following: (1) the U.S. government; (2) a state government; (3) an individual U.S. citizen; (4) an association, trust, joint venture, or other entity where all members are U.S. citizens; (5) a partnership in which all the general partners are citizens of the U.S. and a controlling interest in the partnership is owned by U.S. citizens; or (6) a corporation if it is incorporated under U.S. law, its chief executive and chairman of the board are U.S. citizens, and no more of its directors are noncitizens than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Under Section 310(a) of the Act, foreign governments or their representatives may not hold radio licenses.	Why GAO Did This Study Foreign investors in U.S. companies or assets include individuals, companies, and government entities. One type of foreign investor that has been increasingly active in world markets is sovereign wealth funds (SWF), government-controlled funds that seek to invest in other countries. As the activities of these funds have grown they have been praised as providing valuable capital to world markets, but questions have been raised about their lack of transparency and the potential impact of their investments on recipient countries. GAO's second report on SWFs reviews (1) U.S. laws that specifically affect foreign investment, including that by SWFs, in the United States and (2) processes agencies use to enforce them. GAO reviewed policy statements, treaties, and U.S. laws, and interviewed and obtained information from agencies responsible for enforcing these laws. GAO also interviewed legal experts and organizations that track state foreign investment issues. What GAO Found While the United States has a general policy of openness to foreign investment, it does restrict foreign investment, including from SWFs, in certain U.S. assets. The U.S. government has issued policy statements supporting openness to foreign investment and entered into international agreements to protect investors. However, sectors with specific restrictions on foreign investments include transportation, communications, and energy. For example, foreign governments may not be issued radio communications licenses and foreign entities are not allowed to own or control more than 25 percent of the voting interest of any U.S. airline. In other cases, foreign investors can purchase companies or assets in a sector but face restrictions on their activities once they invest. For example, foreign companies can invest in U.S. banks, but if a company's stake exceeds 25 percent or the company would control the bank, the company must receive prior approval and become regulated by banking regulators and would be limited in the types of nonbanking activities in which it can also invest. Foreign investors can generally invest in U.S. agricultural land, but must disclose purchases above certain thresholds to the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture). In addition, while not specifically a restriction on foreign investment, a recently strengthened U.S. law authorizes interagency reviews of certain foreign investments, potentially in any sector, for national security considerations. Most federal laws limiting foreign investment were put in place decades ago in response to national security or economic concerns at the time. GAO's analysis of state-level restrictions on foreign investment indicated that some states had restrictions on foreign entities' ability to invest in real estate, including agricultural land, and some had restrictions on foreign government ownership of insurance companies. The agencies responsible for enforcing the U.S. laws affecting foreign investment--Agriculture, Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Reserve Board, Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Department of the Interior--have processes for addressing key elements of enforcement, including those for (1) identifying all transactions subject to the law, (2) verifying the identity and amount of foreign ownership, and (3) monitoring changes in ownership. To identify investments potentially subject to restrictions and disclosure laws, each agency largely relies on requirements that entities seeking to establish new operations or invest in existing ones must first seek approval or licensing, or disclose their activity. To verify foreign ownership and ensure limits are not exceeded, agencies obtain and verify information about investor identities through information provided by the investors. Finally, to ensure that subsequent changes of ownership are disclosed and do not exceed legal limits, agencies review information from required ownership change declarations. Some agencies reported additional processes to identify new investments and ownership changes such as monitoring press releases, and receiving tips from competitors. Some agencies, but not all, reported using data from other government or private sources to independently verify changes in ownership information self-reported by entities in their sector.
gao_GAO-04-1028	gao_GAO-04-1028_0	IRAC’s Mission and Placement Have Evolved Since 1922 IRAC’s role and placement have evolved over the last 80 years. In 1952, IRAC’s mission was formally expanded to include responsibilities for formulating and recommending policies, plans, and actions for federal government spectrum use. Since its formation, IRAC has advised the different entities responsible for exercising the authority of the President to assign radio frequencies to federal government users. By executive order, in 1978, the Office of Telecommunications Policy was abolished and its spectrum functions were transferred to the Department of Commerce. As shown in figure 2, IRAC is currently comprised of 20 federal agencies that use radio spectrum, a chairman and an executive secretary from NTIA, and FCC as a nonvoting liaison. In addition to the full committee, IRAC mission responsibilities are also carried out in six standing subcommittees, as well as a number of ad hoc committees and working groups. IRAC Representatives’ Assessment of IRAC Is Mostly Positive, but Some Are Concerned That an Uneven Level of Technical Knowledge and a Lack of Seniority Limit IRAC’s Effectiveness IRAC representatives generally agree that IRAC is effective in coordinating federal government spectrum use but are concerned about training and succession planning. In our interviews with IRAC representatives, they generally agreed that IRAC is effectively accomplishing these spectrum coordination tasks. According to NTIA, only one agency on IRAC has assigned a member of the senior executive service as the agency representative to IRAC and 13 of the 20 representatives said that the assistant secretary who oversees spectrum management in their agency has little or no direct involvement in spectrum management. He told us that he has gone outside of the IRAC framework when he needed advice on such contentious policy issues, such as those related to the introduction of new commercial communications services. As an advisor representing government spectrum concerns, IRAC must rely on NTIA to negotiate with FCC in disputes between government and commercial users over the use of spectrum. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to improve the effectiveness of IRAC’s contribution in spectrum management, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce take the following two actions: Direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information to seek IRAC’s assistance in establishing a set of best practices in human capital for agencies that participate in IRAC that include information on the appropriate knowledge and training levels for IRAC representatives, goals for continuing education in emerging technologies, and agency succession planning. The primary difference between the Federal Task Force recommendation and ours is that the Federal Task Force recommended that a group of senior agency executives be formed outside of IRAC to advise on policy issues, and we recommended that the group be formed within the structure of IRAC. Telecommunications: Federal Communications Commission Spectrum Management.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) within the Department of Commerce manages the federal government's use of the radio frequency spectrum with coordination and policy input from the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), comprised of 20 federal agencies that use spectrum. In recent years, the use of spectrum in wireless applications has expanded dramatically, leading occasionally to contentious disputes between government and commercial users over access to spectrum. Considering IRAC's key role in spectrum management, Congress asked us to (1) describe the evolution of IRAC and (2) obtain IRAC agency representatives' assessment of IRAC's spectrum coordination and policy advice, role as an advisor, and whether IRAC needs to be reformed. What GAO Found The mission and placement of IRAC have evolved over time. IRAC began in 1922 by assisting in the assignment of frequencies to federal users and coordinating federal government spectrum use. In 1952, IRAC's mission was expanded to include responsibilities for formulating and recommending policies, plans, and actions for federal government spectrum use. Initially advising the Department of Commerce, IRAC has reported to or through various different entities, including at different times the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Office of the President. Since 1978, IRAC has directly advised the Department of Commerce's NTIA. Currently, IRAC is comprised of a full committee, six standing subcommittees, and various ad hoc committees and working groups. In interviews with GAO, IRAC agency representatives made two key points in assessing IRAC. First, IRAC is effective in accomplishing spectrum coordination tasks, but its effectiveness is at times limited by representatives' uneven level of technical knowledge. This problem could worsen, as one-half of the 20 current IRAC representatives are currently eligible to retire. Second, IRAC's ability to advise on national spectrum policy issues is limited because of representatives' lack of seniority within their agencies. The chair of IRAC (an NTIA senior executive) is in agreement with representatives on these points. He said that he has gone outside IRAC directly to senior agency executives when he needed advice on contentious spectrum disputes such as those related to the introduction of new commercial communications services that would use federally controlled spectrum. A federal task force recently released a report that identified similar issues regarding IRAC's effectiveness and areas in need of reform.
gao_AIMD-98-5	gao_AIMD-98-5_0	Status of the Migration Effort Defense reported that it has selected 363 systems for migration. Defense has identified 1,938 legacy systems for potential termination. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology We were asked (1) for information on the number and cost of systems designated for migration, the number of legacy systems already terminated or scheduled for termination, and savings resulting from terminations of legacy systems and (2) whether Defense’s management control and oversight processes for migration systems are ensuring that the investments are economically sound and in compliance with Defense’s technical and data standards. However, Defense’s primary corporate-level control mechanism for ensuring that sound management and development practices were followed for each migration investment has not been effective. Had there been more rigorous attention to oversight in both areas, Defense may well have avoided the migration problems we identified in previous reviews that cost the Department hundreds of millions of dollars. In implementing the migration strategy, Defense did not ensure that it had adequate visibility over status, costs, and progress. As a result, it has not been able to (1) demonstrate whether the migration strategy has been successful, (2) provide the Congress with accurate and reliable information needed for oversight purposes, and (3) provide its own decisionmakers at the headquarters level with information needed to oversee the strategy. However, both the PSAs and the ASD C3I did not adhere to this oversight process. Ineffective Review and Preparation of Economic Analyses A principal tool of acquisition oversight is the economic analysis because it helps to ensure that the system chosen for development is cost-effective. Thus, many of the benefits that could be derived from this tool have not been realized. DOD Implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act As a first step in implementing the Clinger-Cohen Act, on June 2, 1997, the Secretary of Defense outlined his expectations for improvements in information technology-related management processes and information resources. We believe the expectations identified by the Secretary are an excellent starting point for implementing the Clinger-Cohen Act and bringing meaningful change to the current information technology management process. DOD still has not established information technology performance measures. Modify the DIST system or acquire/develop a new Defense-wide management information system or systems for tracking and reporting key schedule, progress, and performance information on migration systems and other Defense information systems and ensure the system or systems contain complete, current, and accurate schedule data necessary to track the progress of each migration system’s development/deployment and each legacy system’s termination; budgeted and actual cost data on each system for which the Department maintains such data (an alternative to putting budget and cost data in DIST is to establish the capability to directly interface with other systems in the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller’s) Office or other Defense organizations containing systems’ budget and/or cost data); data necessary to track the progress of each migration system in complying with applicable Defense technical and data standards, including whether each system has been independently certified to be in compliance with applicable technical and data standards; data for tracking progress in accomplishing the mission-based performance goals and information management performance goals for the functional areas supported by each system once these data have been identified; information determined to be needed for oversight by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), MAISRC, and PA&E; and other information determined to be needed for management and oversight by the Defense CIO, the CIO Council, other Defense senior managers, and the Congress. However, even here, we found that DOD for the most part, was not providing sufficient assurance that migration investments were worthwhile.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative, focusing on: (1) the number and cost of systems designated for migration, the number of legacy systems already terminated or scheduled for termination, and savings resulting from terminations of legacy systems; and (2) whether DOD's management control and oversight processes for migration systems are ensuring that the investment in CIM-related technology is economically sound and in compliance with its technical and data standards. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) from fiscal years 1995 through 2000, DOD plans to spend at least $18 billion on migration; (2) DOD has selected 363 migration systems and has targeted 1,938 legacy systems for potential termination; (3) despite this substantial investment, DOD did not adhere to decisionmaking and oversight processes it established to ensure that the economical and technical risks associated with migration projects have been mitigated; (4) DOD's primary corporate-level control mechanism for ensuring that sound management and development practices were followed for each migration investment has not been effective; (5) DOD does not have assurance that the migration systems being developed will help achieve its technology goals and that sound business decisions were made in selecting the systems; (6) DOD's traditional acquisition oversight processes also did not support the migration effort because they have not fully ensured that economic analyses for migration projects are prepared and reviewed and that the systems comply with technical and data standards; (7) had there been more rigorous attention to established oversight procedures and sound business practices, DOD might well have avoided the migration problems GAO identified in previous reviews, which unnecessarily cost it hundreds of millions of dollars; (8) in implementing the migration strategy, DOD did not ensure that it had adequate departmentwide visibility over status, costs, and progress; (9) as a result, it could not provide accurate and reliable information, as requested, on the number and cost of systems designated for migration, and the numbers of systems terminated and scheduled to be terminated; (10) DOD has not been able to convincingly demonstrate whether the migration strategy has been successful, and it has not been able to provide the Congress with accurate and reliable information needed for decisionmaking purposes; (11) DOD has taken a positive step to turn around its information technology investment process as part of its implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996; (12) the Secretary of Defense outlined his expectations for improvements in management processes and information resources related to information technology; and (13) these expectations incorporate some of the most important elements of the Clinger-Cohen Act and are an excellent starting point for bringing meaningful change to the current information technology management process.
gao_T-HEHS-98-230	gao_T-HEHS-98-230_0	There are a number of criteria an individual must meet to be eligible for DI benefits, including a sufficient work history and a lost capacity to work due to a disability. The trial work period allows DI beneficiaries to work for a limited time without their earnings affecting their disability benefits. The extended period of eligibility begins the month following the end of the trial work period. The two most frequently reported factors—health interventions and encouragement—appear to have been the most critical in helping beneficiaries become employed. Respondents told us they received encouragement from family, friends, health professionals, and coworkers. They were helpful to me in assessing the merits and benefits of potential job offers. . . . I can call him at any time. Role of SSA Work Incentives and Staff Involvement Based on our discussions with beneficiaries, DI program incentives for reducing risks associated with attempting work appear to have played a limited role in beneficiaries’ efforts to become employed. Moreover, 42 respondents were unaware of the option to purchase Medicare upon leaving the rolls. As a result, some of these beneficiaries may decide to limit their employment for fear of losing health care coverage, while others, planning to leave the rolls, may think they are putting themselves at risk of foregoing health care coverage entirely upon program termination. Moreover, some respondents indicated that SSA suddenly informed them that they needed to repay cash benefits mistakenly paid to them in the past. Among the 44 respondents without employer-based health insurance coverage, 29 plan to stay on the DI rolls into the foreseeable future or are unsure of their future plans. However, changes to work incentives may help some individual beneficiaries or groups of beneficiaries more than others. Moreover, improving the work incentives could also keep some in the program who might otherwise have left. The costs of proposed reforms are difficult to estimate with certainty because of the lack of information on entry and exit effects. Related GAO Products Social Security Disability Insurance: Multiple Factors Affect Beneficiaries’ Ability to Return to Work (GAO/HEHS-98-39, Jan. 12, 1998). Social Security Disability: Improving Return-to-Work Outcomes Important, but Trade-offs and Challenges Exist (GAO/T-HEHS-97-186, July 23, 1997). 2, 1995).	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the factors affecting the return to work of the beneficiaries in the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program, focusing on: (1) factors that working beneficiaries believe are helpful in becoming and staying employed; and (2) tradeoffs and challenges that exist in improving work incentives. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the group of DI beneficiaries interviewed identified a range of factors that enabled them to return to work; (2) factors most prominently cited were an improved ability to function in the workplace as a result of successful health care and encouragement from family, friends, health care providers, and coworkers; (3) on the other hand, DI work incentives--such as purchasing Medicare upon exit from the rolls--and assistance from Social Security Administration staff appeared to play a limited role in helping beneficiaries become employed; (4) a number of respondents said, however, that the provisions that allow them to work for a period of time without losing cash and medical benefits and to retain health care coverage for a limited time period after cash assistance ends were helpful; (5) availability of worksite-based health insurance appears to differentiate respondents who plan to leave the rolls in the future from respondents who plan to stay; (6) in addition, GAO's analysis of some of the proposed changes to work incentives--such as gradually reducing the DI cash benefit level as earnings increase--indicates that there will be difficult tradeoffs in any attempt to change the work incentives; and (7) although GAO's work sheds additional light on this issue, the lack of empirical analysis with which to accurately predict outcomes of possible interventions reinforces the value of testing and evaluating alternatives to determine what strategies can best tap the work potential of beneficiaries without jeopardizing the availability of benefits for those who cannot work.
gao_GAO-07-720T	gao_GAO-07-720T_0	IRS’s Filing Season Performance Is Improved in Some Areas with Challenges in Others, and the Effect of Tax System Changes Has Been Minimal IRS’s key filing season efforts are processing electronic and paper individual income tax returns and issuing refunds, as well as providing assistance or services to taxpayers. According to IRS data and officials, performance is comparable to last year. The latest release of CADE became operational in early March, 2 months behind schedule because of problems identified during testing. Although this is significantly less than planned, it is almost two and a half times the approximate 7.4 million taxpayer accounts posted last year on CADE. Electronic filing also improves service to taxpayers. As of March 17, 2007, IRS processed about 2.6 million free file returns, which is a decrease of 5.2 percent from the same period last year. Taxpayers’ ability to access IRS’s telephone assistors is somewhat less than last year, but IRS is meeting its goals. IRS officials reported that tax system changes have had minimal impact on telephone operations so far this filing season. TETR-related calls are a small fraction of what IRS projected. Use of Some Web Site Applications Continues to Increase, and Performance Remains High Use of IRS’s Web site has increased so far this filing season compared to prior years except for downloads of forms and publications and tax law questions. Web site assistance is important because it is available to taxpayers 24 hours a day and it is less costly to provide than telephone and walk-in assistance. IRS’s plan for TETR was consistent with good management practices identified in previous GAO reports. However, there are different types of preparers. Last year we reported to this Committee on errors made by commercial chain preparers, including the results of undercover visits to 19 locations. Some of the most serious problems involved preparers not reporting business income in 10 of 19 cases; not asking about where a child lived or ignoring our answer to the question and, therefore, claiming an ineligible child for the earned income tax credit in 5 out of the 10 applicable cases; failing to take the most advantageous postsecondary education tax benefit in 3 out of the 9 applicable cases; and failing to itemize deductions at all or failing to claim all available deductions in 7 out of the 9 applicable cases. The limited data did not permit observations about the quality of the work of paid tax preparers in general. Undoubtedly, many paid preparers do their best to provide their clients with tax returns that are both fully compliant with the tax law and cause them to neither overpay nor underpay their federal income taxes. To date, this research has not been completed. Recent suits filed by the Justice Department highlight the obligations of paid preparers. The Justice Department filed suits to stop fraudulent return preparation at more than 125 outlets in four states of one preparation chain for allegedly taking part in preparation scams that led to fraudulent returns. Because they help the majority of taxpayers prepare their returns, paid preparers are a critical quality control checkpoint for the tax system. Due diligence by paid preparers has potential to prevent non-compliance and reduce IRS’s cost and intrusiveness. Despite progress made in implementing BSM projects and improving modernization management controls and capabilities, significant challenges and serious risks remain, and further program improvements are needed, which IRS is working to address. In addition, more work remains to be done by the agency to fully address our prior recommendation of developing a long-term vision and strategy for completing the BSM program, including establishing time frames for consolidating and retiring legacy systems. For example, delays in deploying the latest release of CADE to support the current filing season have resulted in continued contention for key resources and will likely impact the design and development of the next two important releases, which are planned to be deployed later this year. IRS’s fiscal year 2008 budget request includes a proposal for a rolling NRP sample of individual taxpayers and a dedicated cadre of examiners to conduct these research audits. In previous GAO products, we have observed that doing compliance studies once every few years does not give IRS or others information about what is happening in the intervening years, and that a rolling sample should reduce costs by eliminating the need to plan entirely new studies every few years or more and train examiners to carry them out.	Why GAO Did This Study The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) tax filing season performance is a key indicator of how well IRS serves taxpayers. This year's filing season was expected to be risky because of tax system changes, including the telephone excise tax refund (TETR) which can be requested by all individuals and entities that paid the excise tax. GAO was asked to describe IRS's service to taxpayers so far this filing season (including the impact of this year's tax systems changes). GAO was also asked to provide updates of previous assessments of the performance of paid tax preparers, IRS's efforts to modernize its information systems, and what IRS is doing to better measure taxpayer compliance. GAO compared IRS's filing season performance to prior years' and goals and based analyses of paid preparers, information systems, and compliance research efforts on recent reports. What GAO Found IRS's interim filing season performance is improved in some areas. The number of individual income tax returns processed to date is comparable to last year, and the number filed electronically is almost 6 percent greater. Taxpayers' ability to reach an IRS telephone assistor was somewhat less than last year, but the accuracy of answers to taxpayers' questions was about the same. Use of IRS's Web site increased, important because it is available 24 hours a day and is less costly than some other types of assistance. However, there have been challenges. Taxpayers' use of the Free File program, which provides free tax preparation and electronic filing through IRS's Web site--is 5.2 percent below last year at this time. Also, the Customer Account Data Engine (CADE), a modern tax return processing system, became operational 2 months behind schedule. IRS still expects to post 17 -19 million taxpayer accounts to CADE, which is about two and a half times more than last year. Tax systems changes have not had a significant effect on filing season performance. For example, IRS has received a fraction of the TETR-related telephone calls it expected to date. Because paid preparers prepared over 62 percent of all individual income tax returns last year, they are a critical quality control for tax administration by helping to prevent noncompliance. Last year, GAO reported to this Committee about errors made by paid preparers. Some of the most serious errors involved not reporting business income and failing to itemize deductions. GAO's limited work last year did not permit observations about the quality of the work of paid tax preparers in general and undoubtedly, many preparers do their best to prepare tax returns that are compliant with tax laws. In response to GAO's report, IRS has scheduled compliance reviews of some preparers. In addition, recent Justice Department suits to stop fraudulent return preparation at more than 125 outlets of one preparation chain for allegedly taking part in tax preparation scams highlight the importance and obligations of paid preparers. Despite progress made in implementing Business Systems Modernization projects, including CADE, and improving modernization management controls and capabilities, significant challenges and serious risks remain. Delays in the latest release of CADE resulted in continued contention for key resources and will likely impact future releases. Also, IRS has more to do to fully address GAO's prior recommendations such as developing a long-term strategy that would include timeframes for retiring legacy computer systems. GAO has long supported IRS's research to better understand taxpayers' compliance. IRS's fiscal year 2008 budget request includes a proposal for annual research instead of larger but intermittent efforts. GAO considers this to be a good approach because it will allow compliance data to be continually refreshed and should reduce costs by eliminating the need to plan new studies every few years.
gao_GAO-13-711	gao_GAO-13-711_0	Since 2011, the Army has conducted five of them, and has projected the cumulative cost of the events at $791 million. Army Not Taking Full Advantage of Potential Knowledge from NIEs The Army has made steady improvements in the NIE process since its inception and the evaluations continue to give the Army useful information and helpful insights into current and emerging networking capabilities. However, some resulting Army decisions are at odds with knowledge produced during the NIEs. Additionally, as we reported previously, the Army has not yet tapped into the potential to use the NIE to gain insight into the effectiveness and performance of the overall tactical network. The NIEs allowed the Army to formulate a network architecture baseline that will serve as the foundation upon which the Army plans to add networking capabilities in the future; evaluate industry-developed systems that may help address Army- identified capability gaps in the future; integrate the new capability sets into operational units and to create new tactics, techniques, and procedures for using the new systems in operations; and provide soldiers with an opportunity to both provide input into the designs of networking systems and to integrate the systems before the Army fields them to operational brigades. According to DOT&E, the intended NIE objective to test and evaluate network components together in a combined event is sound, as is the opportunity to reduce overall test and evaluation costs by combining test events. NIEs also offer the opportunity for a more comprehensive evaluation of a mission command network instead of piecemeal evaluation of individual network components. Two of these SUTs performed poorly during developmental testing. However, the Army has been unable to buy many of these systems because it did not have a strategy in place to rapidly buy promising technologies. Even so, Army officials did not develop alternative acquisition approaches before they began the NIE process. The Army also has an opportunity to work more closely with the test community to further improve NIE execution and results. Army Is Implementing Corrective Actions to Improve NIE Process and Network Modernization The Army has identified inefficiencies or less-than-optimal results in its network modernization and the NIE process and has begun implementing corrective actions to mitigate some of them. Through this initiative, the Army performs technology evaluations, assessments, and integration of vendor systems. The Army is now developing a strategy to address these barriers. DOD Has Begun to Define Network Outcome-based Performance Metrics In our initial report on the Army’s tactical network, we concluded that it will also be important for the Army to assess the cost effectiveness of Moreover, to individual initiatives before and during implementation.facilitate oversight, we concluded that it is important for the Army and DOD to develop metrics to assess the actual contributions of the initial capability set the Army will field in fiscal year 2013 and use the results to inform future investments. The Army has worked closely with the test community to plan, conduct, and evaluate the NIEs. Tension between the acquisition and testing communities has been long- standing. Additional opportunities exist for leadership of the Army and the test community to work together to further improve NIE execution and results. A good starting point would be for the Army to consider addressing the test community observations and recommendations from previous NIEs. On the other hand, even with a new strategy for procurement of emerging capabilities to fill capability gaps, the Army may still face an expectation gap with industry. Until it has clearly demonstrated the means to rapidly buy and field emerging capabilities and provided this information to industry, the Army may need to manage industry expectations of how many new networking systems it can buy and how rapidly. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve outcomes for its entire network modernization strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following four actions: Require that network systems from major defense acquisition programs obtain a positive Assessment of Operational Test Readiness (now called a Developmental Test and Evaluation Assessment) recommendation before being scheduled for operational testing during the NIE; Correct network system performance and reliability issues identified during the NIEs before moving to buy and field these systems; Provide results to industry on the Army’s actual experience in buying and fielding successfully demonstrated systems under evaluation and the length of time it has taken to date; and Collaborate with all network stakeholder organizations to identify and correct issues that may result in improved network outcomes, including addressing the observations and recommendations of the test community related to the NIEs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the results of the Network Integration Evaluations (NIE) conducted to date and identify the extent to which the Army has procured and fielded proposed network solutions; and (2) Army actions and additional opportunities to enhance the NIE process.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2011, the Army began a major undertaking to modernize its tactical network to improve communication and provide needed information to soldiers on the battlefield. The Army has identified the network as its number one modernization priority requiring approximately $3 billion per year indefinitely. NIEs provide semi-annual assessments of newly developed systems. Given the importance of the network, GAO was asked to examine elements of the process the Army is using to acquire network capabilities. This report examines (1) the results of the NIEs conducted to date and the extent to which the Army has procured and fielded network solutions, and (2) Army actions to enhance the NIE process. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed key documents, observed testing activities, and interviewed acquisition and testing officials. What GAO Found Since 2011, the Army has conducted five Network Integration Evaluations (NIE), which have provided extensive information and insights into current network capabilities and potential solutions to fill network capability gaps. According to senior Department of Defense (DOD) test officials, the NIE objective to test and evaluate network components together in a combined event is sound, as is the opportunity to reduce overall test and evaluation costs by combining test events. Further, the NIEs offer the opportunity for a more comprehensive evaluation of the broader network instead of piecemeal evaluation of individual network components. However, the Army is not taking full advantage of the potential knowledge that could be gained from the NIEs, and some resulting Army decisions are at odds with knowledge accumulated during the NIEs. For example, despite poor results in developmental testing, the Army moved forward to operational testing for several systems during the NIEs and they demonstrated similarly poor results. Yet the Army plans to buy and field several of these systems. Doing so increases the risk of poor performance in the field and the need to correct and modify deployed equipment. On the other hand, the Army has evaluated many emerging network capabilities--with generally favorable results--but has bought very few of them, in large part because it did not have a strategy to buy these promising technologies. Army officials have stated that the success of network modernization depends heavily on industry involvement but, with few purchases, it is unclear whether industry will remain interested. Finally, the Army has not yet developed metrics to determine how network performance has improved over time, as GAO recommended in an earlier report. The Army has several actions under way or planned to enhance the NIE process and has further opportunities to collaborate with the test community. The Army has identified issues in the NIE process and its network modernization strategy that were causing inefficiencies or less-than-optimal results and has begun implementing actions to mitigate some of those issues. For example, the Army has begun performing technology evaluations, and integration of vendor systems in a lab environment to weed out immature systems before they get to the NIE. The Army has also developed a strategy and has an acquisition plan to address requirements, funding, and competition issues that will help enable it to buy emerging capabilities rapidly. However, the Army will need to validate the new strategy and plan and provide results to industry, which could help to manage industry expectations about how many of and how quickly it can buy these capabilities. DOD has started to identify and evaluate network metrics and to re-focus NIEs to gather additional data and insights. Taking these actions will ultimately allow the periodic review and evaluation of the actual effectiveness of network capabilities and the likely effectiveness of proposed investments. The test community has worked closely with the Army on the NIEs but has also voiced various concerns about the NIEs including their being a schedule-driven event. Tension between the acquisition and test communities has been long-standing. Additional opportunities exist for Army leadership and the test community to work together to further improve NIE execution and results and to reduce tensions between the two communities. A good starting point for the Army would be to take a fresh look at the test community observations and recommendations from previous NIEs. What GAO Recommends To improve outcomes for the Armys network modernization strategy, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to (1) require successful developmental testing before moving to operational testing at an NIE, (2) correct issues identified during testing at NIEs prior to buying and fielding systems, (3) provide results to industry on Armys efforts to rapidly acquire emerging capabilities, and (4) pursue additional opportunities for collaboration with the test community on the NIEs. DOD agreed with the recommendations to varying degrees, but generally did not offer specific actions to address them. GAO believes all recommendations remain valid.
gao_GAO-17-239	gao_GAO-17-239_0	DOE’s and NNSA’s 2014 and 2015 Annual Security Reports Did Not Fully Meet the Definition of Quality Information under the Federal Internal Control Standards DOE’s and NNSA’s 2014 and 2015 annual reports on the security of nuclear facilities holding category I and category II quantities of special nuclear material did not fully meet the definition of quality information in the 2014 federal internal control standards. The information and communication standard defines quality information as appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis. DOE’s and NNSA’s 2014 and 2015 Annual Security Reports Did Not Always Contain Complete Information on the Important Assessments Used to Certify Sites’ Security We found that DOE’s and NNSA’s 2014 and 2015 annual security reports did not always meet the definition of quality information as called for in the 2014 federal internal control standards because they did not always contain complete information that provided the basis for the agencies’ certifications in the reports that sites are secure. For example, DOE’s 2015 annual security report did not mention whether a vulnerability assessment was conducted at two of its four sites or include any information regarding the date or outcome of the most recent vulnerability assessments at three of its four sites. In general, without complete information on the assessments—that is, security plans, vulnerability assessments, independent assessments, and other assessments—that officials said were used to determine each site’s overall security assessment, it was not always possible to determine the basis for the site security certification solely using the information contained in the reports. The Administrator of NNSA is required to provide NNSA’s report to DOE by September 30, and the Secretary of Energy is required to submit NNSA’s and DOE’s reports to Congress by December 1 of each year. DOE officials told us that they would promptly report any serious security issues to Congress using means other than the annual security reports. Known Challenges Could Affect Some Sites’ Physical Security, and DOE Could Take Additional Steps to Address Them The annual security reports and our interviews with agency officials indicate the agencies have identified challenges that could affect physical security at some NNSA and DOE sites but that DOE has not completed plans to address these challenges. Concerning the second shared challenge, DOE’s and NNSA’s annual security reports and officials at the agencies noted that the physical security infrastructure at many DOE and NNSA facilities is outdated and requires extensive continued maintenance to ensure proper functioning. DOE officials told us they do not have a similar requirement to develop a physical security infrastructure plan and that, while several of their sites face significant physical security issues related to aging infrastructure, they have not fully developed plans that would allow them to prioritize decisions based on infrastructure needs or estimated costs to address those needs. The 2011 order required sites to develop implementation plans within 6 months. DOE officials told us that although the 2014 and 2015 DOE annual security reports discussed this issue, neither report fully conveyed the potential seriousness of it nor had any of the detailed information—timelines and resources needed to implement the 2011 order, and a description of the vulnerabilities and impacts created by the delayed implementation of the requirements of the order—been communicated to Congress through the reports or through other means. In addition, the reports have not been provided in a timely manner, in part because of a lengthy internal review process. We recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, take the following two actions. Better align the internal review process and mandated report publication deadlines. In the comments, which DOE transmitted, DOE raised concerns about the first finding and recommendation, stated it accepted the second, agreed with the third, and said it had already implemented the fourth, as discussed below. We continue to believe, however, that when reports are issued late, Congress may not routinely receive timely notice of issues so that it can take actions to improve sites’ security. DOE stated it has already implemented our last recommendation to include in future annual security certification reports the reasons for the delayed implementation of the June 2011 order at some sites, as well as the steps DOE and its sites are taking to implement it and provide Congress with information on any vulnerabilities or deficiencies in the security at sites that may potentially exist while the sites complete implementation of the order as well as information on any concomitant adjustment to their security posture that is required.	Why GAO Did This Study DOE and NNSA operate sites with facilities holding special nuclear material that can be used to make nuclear weapons. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 requires the Secretary of Energy to submit to congressional committees a report detailing the status of security at sites holding key quantities of special nuclear material, along with a certification that the sites meet DOE's security standards and requirements by December 1 of each year. The law requires DOE's reports to include a similar report from NNSA. A report accompanying the legislation included a provision for GAO to evaluate these efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which these DOE and NNSA reports meet the definition of quality information under federal internal control standards, and (2) any significant physical security challenges at sites that the reports or agency officials identified and the extent to which the agencies have addressed them. GAO reviewed the 2014 and 2015 reports and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Found The Department of Energy's (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) annual reports for 2014 and 2015 on the security of nuclear facilities holding special nuclear material did not fully meet the definition of quality information under the federal internal control standards. These standards define quality information as appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis. GAO found that, in general, while the reports were based on current information and were accessible to Congress, they did not fully meet quality information standards because the reports: did not always contain complete information on the assessments used to support the agencies' certifications that sites are secure and were not provided to Congress in a timely manner. For example, DOE's 2015 annual security report did not mention whether an important assessment was conducted at two of its four sites or include information regarding the date or outcome of the assessment at three of its four sites. NNSA's 2015 annual security report noted its sites conducted these assessments; however, it did not provide information regarding the date or outcome at one site. Without complete information on the assessments used to determine each site's overall security assessment, it was not always possible to determine the basis for the site security certification solely using the information contained in the reports. In addition, GAO found that DOE's and NNSA's annual 2014 and 2015 security reports were issued several months late. DOE officials told GAO the delay was partly due to the lengthy internal review process. DOE and NNSA stated that they would promptly report any serious security issues to Congress using means other than the annual security reports. When the reports are issued late, however, Congress may not routinely receive timely notice of issues so that it can take actions to improve sites' security. GAO's review of the annual security status reports and interviews with agency officials indicated that DOE and NNSA share significant challenges that could affect their ability to maintain physical security at sites and certify them as secure. For example, security infrastructure, such as fences, alarms, and sensors, at many DOE and NNSA facilities is outdated and requires extensive maintenance to ensure proper functioning. NNSA is developing a physical security infrastructure plan to be issued in spring 2017, but DOE has not fully developed plans or estimated costs to address its needs. Additionally, DOE has not fully implemented a June 2011 order, which could result in some nuclear materials requiring additional security. GAO found that even though the order called for implementation plans within 6 months of its issuance, one DOE site, with the approval of the Deputy Secretary of Energy, will not have an implementation plan until 2018. Based on GAO's review and the comments of agency officials, neither the 2014 and 2015 security reports provided comprehensive risk and potential vulnerability information to Congress nor had these issues been communicated through other means. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOE include more complete information in the reports, better align the review process and mandated deadlines, plan for infrastructure needs, and inform Congress of the reason for delays in implementing its June 2011 order and any identified vulnerabilities. DOE raised concerns with the first recommendation, generally agreed with the second and the third, and stated it had already implemented the fourth. In response, GAO modified the first recommendation and will assess DOE's implementation of the fourth.
gao_GAO-15-625T	gao_GAO-15-625T_0	In the 1930s, when most rural residents worked on farms and rural areas generally were poorer than urban areas, Congress authorized separate housing assistance for rural areas and made USDA responsible for administering it. The Section 514 and 516 Farm Labor Housing Loan and Grant Program (farm labor housing program) provides direct loans and grants for the development of on-farm and off-farm housing for farmworker tenants. Opportunities Exist to Increase Collaboration and Consider Consolidation of RHS and HUD Programs Our prior work assessing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in selected housing programs concluded that increased collaboration or even consolidation of certain housing programs (including RHS programs) could make the programs and program administration more effective. In an August 2012 report, we found that overlap exists between selected single-family federal housing programs—particularly those of RHS and HUD—in the products offered and populations (income groups) and geographic areas they served. Our August 2012 report also found overlapping purposes in selected RHS, HUD, and Treasury multifamily programs, but differing products, areas served, and delivery methods. We recommended that to build on efforts already under way to coordinate, consolidate, or improve housing programs, and help inform Congress’s decision-making process, HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA should evaluate and report on the specific opportunities for consolidating similar housing programs, including those that would require statutory changes. HUD, USDA, and VA generally agreed with the recommendation. However, the recommendation has yet to be implemented. Additional Actions Are Needed to Address GAO Recommendations on Improper Rental Assistance Payments and Oversight of Farm Labor Housing In our prior work on RHS’s rental assistance and farm labor housing programs, we concluded that RHS could take additional steps to enhance program oversight and efficiency. Our May 2012 report on improper rental assistance payments made seven recommendations to RHS, three of which are implemented. In a March 2011 report on oversight of the farm labor housing program, we made seven recommendations to RHS, three of which are implemented. Further actions are needed to address the remaining recommendations. For example, USDA’s Performance and Accountability Reports (1) did not contain a description of steps the agency took to ensure managers were accountable for reducing and recovering improper payments; and (2) did not fully discuss whether the agency had the internal controls, human capital, information systems, and other infrastructure to reduce improper payments. Preliminary Observations on Risk Management of RHS’s Single-Family Loan Guarantee Program As requested by this Subcommittee, we are conducting ongoing work on RHS that focuses on RHS’s methods of estimating credit subsidy costs and risk-management practices for its single-family guarantee program. Overall, our work as of May 2015 indicates that while aspects of RHS’s risk-management practices broadly align with selected federal requirements, other aspects are not fully consistent with requirements and leading practices. RHS has policies, procedures, and practices for a number of risk- management functions addressed in OMB Circular A-129. RHS has policies and procedures for overseeing lenders that underwrite or service RHS-guaranteed mortgages. Based on our ongoing work, we have found elements of RHS’s risk management that are not fully consistent with federal requirements and leading practices, which may limit the effectiveness of RHS’s overall risk- management efforts. While RHS uses a number of benchmarks to assess the performance of its guaranteed portfolio, two key benchmarks have limitations that diminish their usefulness. The weakness in the benchmark is two-fold. However, FHA has at times exhibited shortcomings in this area. RHS does not have written procedures for a key part of its risk-management structure. Specifically, since 2009 RHS has had a Credit Policy Committee that, according to RHS officials, meets regularly to detect, discuss, and analyze credit quality issues and address them through policy changes. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should have effective control activities, including policies and procedures, to help mitigate risks and should document significant events. Additionally, our ongoing work has identified shortcomings in certain aspects of RHS’s risk management for the single-family guarantee program. Appendix I: Content and Status of Relevant GAO Recommendations The following table summarizes the status of our prior recommendations to USDA from our August 2012, May 2012, and March 2011 reports that discuss RHS housing assistance programs.	Why GAO Did This Study RHS, an agency within USDA, administers a number of direct loan, loan guarantee, and grant programs that support affordable housing and community development for rural residents. According to USDA financial and budget data, RHS manages a portfolio of almost $120 billion in housing loans and loan guarantees and administers more than $1 billion in rental assistance payments each year. GAO issued three reports since March 2011 on RHS housing assistance programs (see GAO-11-329 , GAO-12-554 , and GAO-12-624 ) and has ongoing work in this area. This testimony is based on those three reports and ongoing GAO work. It discusses (1) prior GAO findings on the extent to which the housing programs of RHS and HUD overlap and related implications for program collaboration and consolidation; (2) the status of GAO recommendations on the rental housing assistance program and farm labor housing loan and grant program; and (3) preliminary observations from the ongoing review of risk-management practices for the single-family loan guarantee program. To update the status of recommendations, GAO reviewed RHS policies, procedures, and reports. For its ongoing work, GAO reviewed federal requirements and leading practices for risk management and compared them with RHS policies, procedures, and practices. GAO also interviewed RHS officials. GAO makes no new recommendations in this testimony, but may consider making additional recommendations once its ongoing work is complete. What GAO Found Overlap in housing assistance programs—particularly those of the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Rural Housing Service (RHS) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—highlight opportunities for increased collaboration and consolidation. GAO's August 2012 report found overlap in the products offered and populations (income groups) and geographic areas served by RHS and HUD single-family mortgage guarantee programs. GAO also found selected multifamily housing programs served similar purposes. The report made three recommendations to RHS. RHS generally agreed with the recommendations and implemented one by formalizing collaborative efforts with other federal agencies on single-family housing programs. However, RHS and other federal housing agencies have not yet taken other recommended steps to build on interagency efforts—for example, by evaluating specific opportunities for consolidating similar housing programs, including those that would require statutory changes. RHS generally agreed with and has addressed some of GAO's prior recommendations for the rental assistance and farm labor housing programs, but others require further attention. Specifically, RHS implemented three of the seven recommendations GAO made in May 2012 to enhance the agency's efforts to identify and reduce improper rental assistance payments. Additional steps are needed to implement the remaining recommendations, which address shortcomings in the way RHS estimates and reports on improper payments. RHS also addressed three of the seven recommendations GAO made in March 2011 on oversight of the farm labor housing program. Further actions are required to implement the other four, which address weaknesses in RHS controls for ensuring tenant eligibility, among other issues. Ongoing GAO work indicates that aspects of RHS's risk management for the single-family mortgage guarantee program broadly align with federal requirements, while others are not fully consistent with requirements and leading practices. For example, RHS has policies and procedures for a number of risk- management functions addressed in Office of Management and Budget guidance (such as determining borrower creditworthiness and overseeing lenders). However, GAO's ongoing work indicates that, contrary to federal internal control standards, RHS does not have written policies and procedures for a committee responsible for evaluating credit quality issues and addressing them through policy changes. Also, certain benchmarks RHS uses to help assess the performance of its guaranteed portfolio have limitations that diminish their value for assessing risk and are not fully consistent with leading practices for successful performance measures. These shortcomings may limit the effectiveness of RHS's risk-management efforts.
gao_RCED-98-235	gao_RCED-98-235_0	1). Comparing Unexpended Budget Authority With Future Needs for Each Housing Agency Has Yielded an Estimated Excess of $439 Million In January 1998, HUD estimated that the excess budget authority in the Section 8 MOD REHAB Program was $814 million before adjustments. After subtracting amounts required to cover future requirements and contingencies, HUD estimated that $439 million could be recaptured from the housing agencies that administer the program. The Accuracy of HUD’s Estimate Cannot Be Determined Without Evidence of Reliable Data We cannot evaluate the accuracy of HUD’s estimate at this time because the Department has not completed its efforts to reconcile discrepancies between the data in its information system and contract documentation contained in field offices’ files. For its Section 8 tenant-based program, HUD engaged a contractor to independently evaluate its estimate of excess budget authority. HUD plans to require the contractor that will be correcting contract discrepancies to perform a similar evaluation of the accuracy of the MOD REHAB Program’s information system. HUD Has Not Finalized Its Plans to Recapture the Excess Budget Authority in Its Mod Rehab Program Although HUD plans to recapture the available excess budget authority from housing agencies’ accounts, the Department has not finalized its plans for this activity, according to officials in HUD’s offices of Public and Indian Housing and the Chief Financial Officer. For example, in addition to completing the data cleanup efforts discussed above, HUD also needs to develop and test the formula it will use to recapture the excess budget authority from housing agencies’ accounts. While some factors in the formula, such as the inflation rate and certain economic assumptions prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget, are not within HUD’s discretion to change, other aspects of the formula are still undetermined. For example, HUD may decide after its field offices complete their efforts to clean up the data that it no longer needs to keep the full $184 million in the housing agencies’ accounts to cover contingencies, as it originally had estimated in January 1998. This means that the actual amount recaptured and available for rescission may change and perhaps be more than the $439 million estimated in HUD’s January 1998 analysis. HUD officials could not provide us with a firm estimate of when the Department will finalize its recapture plan and could not predict a date for completing the recapture. In commenting on the report, HUD said that it generally agreed with our assessment of the steps being taken to properly report to the Congress the amount of excess budget authority in the Section 8 MOD REHAB Program. To determine what HUD plans to do with the excess budget authority in the Section 8 MOD REHAB Program, we interviewed program and budget officials and officials in HUD’s Office of the General Counsel about the Department’s plans and legal authority to recapture the program’s excess budget authority and reuse it to meet ongoing needs for housing assistance. Comments From the Department of Housing and Urban Development The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) financial management of the Section 8 rental assistance program, focusing on: (1) the amount of excess budget authority in the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation (MOD REHAB) Program and how HUD estimated this amount; (2) the accuracy of HUD's estimate; and (3) HUD's plans for recapturing this excess budget authority from housing agencies. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) in January 1998, HUD estimated that the amount of excess budget authority in the Section 8 MOD REHAB Program before necessary adjustments was $814 million; after subtracting amounts required to cover future requirements and contingencies, HUD estimated that $439 million could be recaptured from the housing agencies that the Department contracts with to administer the program; (2) HUD estimated these amounts after first addressing certain known problems with the data in its information system and then comparing the level of unspent program funds at each participating housing agency with that agency's future need for funding under its current contract with HUD; (3) GAO cannot determine the accuracy of HUD's estimate of excess budget authority in the Section 8 MOD REHAB Program at this time because HUD has neither completed identifying and correcting discrepancies in its data on the program nor tested the reliability of the data it used to estimate the excess budget authority; (4) because HUD still is not confident that its program data are sufficiently accurate, the Department plans to require its field staff to identify and address discrepancies in the accuracy of contract data and to work with a contractor to further address the data's problems on-site at housing agencies; (5) HUD officials do not expect these data cleanup efforts to be completed before the end of fiscal year 1998; (6) HUD plans to require its contractor to perform a statistically valid test of the accuracy of its information system; (7) although HUD plans to recapture the excess budget authority in the Section 8 MOD REHAB Program, the Department has not finalized its approach or timeframe to accomplish this task; (8) in addition to completing the planned data cleanup efforts in the field, HUD must also develop and test the formula it will use to recapture the excess budget authority from the housing agencies' accounts; (9) while some factors in the formula are not within HUD's discretion to change, policy decisions still need to be made to define other factors; (10) for example, HUD may decide that it does not need to leave as much excess budget authority in the housing agencies' accounts to cover contingencies as it originally had estimated in January 1998; (11) therefore, the actual amount recaptured from housing agencies and available for rescission by Congress may change and perhaps be more than the estimated amount in HUD's January 1998 analysis; and (12) HUD officials could not provide GAO with a firm estimate of when the Department will finalize its recapture plan and could not predict a date of completion.
gao_GAO-01-568	gao_GAO-01-568_0	However, NNSA and its laboratory or production facility are not allowed to transfer funds to the private partner(s). NNSA Laboratories and Production Facilities Have Reduced Partnership Activities Not Fully Funded by Private Partners In response to the phasing out of dedicated funding for partnerships, NNSA’s laboratories and production facilities have reduced their CRADAs and technical assistance to small businesses while entering into more agreements that are fully funded by the business partners. Sandia National Laboratories has entered into more CRADAs than any other NNSA laboratory. Lawrence Livermore has shifted its emphasis from using CRADAs with private partners to using procurement contracts with its contractors to develop new technologies important for its mission, according to laboratory officials. Generally, partnerships that relied on DOE funds have decreased, while those predominantly funded by businesses have grown. CRADAs Offer Both Advantages and Disadvantages NNSA officials and laboratory managers identified various advantages and disadvantages of collaborative research under a CRADA. In addition to research funds, NNSA’s laboratories have used other DOE funds, including their “laboratory-directed research and development” funds and Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative funds, to support certain CRADAs. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties.	Why GAO Did This Study Congress enacted the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act to encourage federal laboratories operated by contractors to enter into cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA) with businesses, universities, and other private partners. This act was designed to improve the United States' competitive position in the world economy by facilitating the transfer of technology from federal laboratories to U.S. businesses. This report reviews the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) (1) use of CRADAs and (2) views on the advantages and disadvantages of CRADAs. What GAO Found GAO found that NNSA has reduced its use of CRADAs while entering into more agreements fully funded by private partners. Dedicated funding for CRADAs was gradually phased out and program managers at the laboratories were supposed to rely on regular research funding to make up the shortfall. However, NNSA laboratory managers have stated that because the funding has not been replaced with research funds, their laboratories have either prematurely terminated many CRADAs or required the private partners to fully fund the work. According to NNSA officials, CRADAs offers both advantages and disadvantages. CRADAs have enabled laboratories to recruit and retain experienced staff and have improved U.S.' businesses position in the global economy. However, CRADAs also compete for limited funding and generally take longer to execute because of the complexity of the agreements.
gao_GAO-11-228	gao_GAO-11-228_0	Since fiscal year 2006, Congress also has taken annual actions in appropriations legislation that have effectively prevented the operation of horse slaughtering facilities in the United States by prohibiting USDA’s use of federal funds to (1) inspect horses being transported for slaughter and (2) inspect horses intended for human consumption at slaughtering facilities. Slaughter Horse Market Has Changed Since Domestic Slaughter Ceased in 2007 The U.S. slaughter horse market has changed since domestic slaughter for food ceased in 2007, particularly in terms of increased exports to Canada and Mexico and lower domestic sales and prices, especially for lower- value horses, according to our analysis of available trade data and horse auction sales data. From 2006 through 2010, Canadian and Mexican imports increased by 148 percent and 660 percent, respectively, with the total number of horses imported from the United States for slaughter increasing from about 33,000 in 2006 to about 138,000 in 2010. These estimates suggest that the closing of domestic horse slaughtering facilities had a significant and negative impact on horse prices at the low- to-mid levels of price at these auctions, while relatively higher-priced horses appear not to have lost their value due to the cessation of slaughter. For example, data from Colorado showed a 50- percent increase in investigations for abuse and neglect from 1,067 in 2005 to 1,588 in 2009. State and Local Governments, Tribes, and Animal Welfare Organizations Are Affected by Neglected and Abandoned Horses, as Is the Federal Government State and local governments, tribes, and animal welfare organizations, especially horse rescues, are facing growing pressures to care for abandoned and neglected horses at a time of economic recession and tight budgets. Other officials, including those from animal welfare organizations, questioned the relevance of the cessation of domestic slaughter to the rise in abandoned and neglected horses, which they attributed more to the economic downturn. Second, legislative prohibitions on using federal funds for inspecting horses prior to slaughter impede USDA’s ability to ensure horse welfare. Consequently, the regulation does not apply to horses that are moved first to an assembly point, feedlot, or stockyard before going to slaughter. The current regulation does not define equine for slaughter and only applies to those equines being transported directly to slaughtering facilities. For example, to assist APHIS, CFIA agreed to ensure, either at points of entry or slaughtering facilities, the following regarding shipments of U.S. horses to Canada for slaughter: health certificates for the horses are endorsed by USDA-accredited veterinarians within the 30 days prior to export; horses are clinically healthy, fit for travel, and transported humanely to the points of entry; owner/shipper certificates are properly completed, including the date, time, and location the horses were loaded; horses are listed correctly on the owner/shipper certificate, so that for example, the backtags on the horses match the backtags listed on the certificate; an ante-mortem inspection of each horse is performed; date and time the shipment arrived at the facility is noted on the copies of all relevant documents (e.g., owner/shipper certificates) are returned to APHIS each month. Cessation of Domestic Slaughter Has Diminished APHIS’s Ability to Implement the Transport Regulation to Protect Horse Welfare According to APHIS and animal protection officials, horse welfare is likely to suffer as a consequence of horses traveling significantly farther to slaughter since the cessation of domestic slaughter, including an increased possibility of injuries when horses are confined in a conveyance with other horses over longer transport distances and travel times. However, now that the slaughter of U.S. horses occurs in Canada and Mexico, FSIS can no longer provide this assistance. With U.S. horses now being shipped to Canada and Mexico for slaughter, APHIS depends upon cooperation with these countries, or state officials at the borders, to help it implement the transport regulation, but it does not have effective agreements that make clear each party’s obligations and that help ensure cooperation will continue as personnel change. Matters for Congressional Consideration In light of the unintended consequences on horse welfare from the cessation of domestic horse slaughter, Congress may wish to reconsider the annual restrictions first instituted in fiscal year 2006 on USDA’s use of appropriated funds to inspect horses in transit to, and at, domestic slaughtering facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action To better protect the welfare of horses transported to slaughter, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to take the following four actions: Issue as final a proposed rule to amend the Commercial Transportation of Equines to Slaughter regulation to define “equines for slaughter” so that USDA’s oversight and the regulation’s protections extend to more of the transportation chain. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our report objectives were to examine (1) the effect on the U.S. horse market, if any, since domestic slaughter of horses for food ceased in 2007; (2) the impact, if any, of these changes on horse welfare and on states, local governments, tribes, and animal welfare organizations; and (3) challenges, if any, to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) oversight of the transport and welfare of U.S. horses exported for slaughter. That result was highly statistically significant and consistent across all horse price quantiles. Economic downturn.	Why GAO Did This Study Since fiscal year 2006, Congress has annually prohibited the use of federal funds to inspect horses destined for food, effectively prohibiting domestic slaughter. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for overseeing the welfare of horses transported for slaughter. Congress directed GAO to examine horse welfare since cessation of domestic slaughter in 2007. GAO examined (1) the effect on the U.S. horse market, if any, since cessation; (2) any impact of these market changes on horse welfare and on states, local governments, tribes, and animal welfare organizations; and (3) challenges, if any, to USDA's oversight of the transport and welfare of U.S. horses exported for slaughter. GAO analyzed horse price and shipping data, and interviewed officials from USDA, state and local governments, tribes, the livestock industry, and animal welfare organizations, and reviewed documents they provided.. What GAO Found Since domestic horse slaughter ceased in 2007, the slaughter horse market has shifted to Canada and Mexico. From 2006 through 2010, U.S. horse exports for slaughter increased by 148 and 660 percent to Canada and Mexico, respectively. As a result, nearly the same number of U.S. horses was transported to Canada and Mexico for slaughter in 2010--nearly 138,000--as was slaughtered before domestic slaughter ceased. Available data show that horse prices declined since 2007, mainly for the lower-priced horses that are more likely to be bought for slaughter. GAO analysis of horse sale data estimates that closing domestic horse slaughtering facilities significantly and negatively affected lower-to-medium priced horses by 8 to 21 percent; higher-priced horses appear not to have lost value for that reason. Also, GAO estimates the economic downturn reduced prices for all horses by 4 to 5 percent. Comprehensive, national data are lacking, but state, local government, and animal welfare organizations report a rise in investigations for horse neglect and more abandoned horses since 2007. For example, Colorado data showed that investigations for horse neglect and abuse increased more than 60 percent from 975 in 2005 to 1,588 in 2009. Also, California, Texas, and Florida reported more horses abandoned on private or state land since 2007. These changes have strained resources, according to state data and officials that GAO interviewed. State, local, tribal, and horse industry officials generally attributed these increases in neglect and abandonments to cessation of domestic slaughter and the economic downturn. Others, including representatives from some animal welfare organizations, questioned the relevance of cessation of slaughter to these problems. USDA faces three broad challenges in overseeing the welfare of horses during transport to slaughter. First, among other management challenges, the current transport regulation only applies to horses transported directly to slaughtering facilities. A 2007 proposed rule would more broadly include horses moved first to stockyards, assembly points, and feedlots before being transported to Canada and Mexico, but delays in issuing a final rule have prevented USDA from protecting horses during much of their transit to slaughtering facilities. In addition, GAO found that many owner/shipper certificates, which document compliance with the regulation, are being returned to USDA without key information, if they are returned at all. Second, annual legislative prohibitions on USDA's use of federal funds for inspecting horses impede USDA's ability to improve compliance with, and enforcement of, the transport regulation. Third, GAO analysis shows that U.S. horses intended for slaughter are now traveling significantly greater distances to reach their final destination, where they are not covered by U.S. humane slaughter protections. With cessation of domestic slaughter, USDA lacks staff and resources at the borders and foreign slaughtering facilities that it once had in domestic facilities to help identify problems with shipping paperwork or the condition of horses before they are slaughtered. GAO suggests that Congress may wish to reconsider restrictions on the use of federal funds to inspect horses for slaughter or, instead, consider a permanent ban on horse slaughter. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that USDA issue a final rule to protect horses through more of the transportation chain to slaughter and consider ways to better leverage resources for compliance activities. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted specific actions it will take to implement them.
gao_RCED-98-69	gao_RCED-98-69_0	The Quality of the Air Inside the NIEHS Building in April 1981 NIEHS does not have data showing what the air quality was inside its new facility when employees began moving into it on April 11, 1981, or during the first 5.5 months that the building was occupied. The initial monitoring, which took place on September 28 and 29, 1981, found that the formaldehyde levels on the second floor of module A ranged from 0.1 to 0.34 ppm—well below OSHA’s standard in effect in 1981. NIEHS officials said that adjustments were made to balance the air flow and introduce more outside air in module A during the first 5.5 months to alleviate respiratory problems that some employees reported. Health Effects Associated With Exposure to Formaldehyde The short-term effect of formaldehyde is irritation of the eyes and respiratory tract—in particular the nose and throat and, possibly, the lungs with concentrations as low as 0.41 ppm. Moreover, the effects it has on the eyes and respiratory tract usually pass quickly once the exposure ends. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, short-term exposure to concentrations of 20 ppm of formaldehyde is immediately dangerous to the life and health of humans. Long-term exposure of laboratory animals to formaldehyde at a concentration of 2.0 ppm has not been shown to produce nasal cancer. But at concentrations of 14.1 to 14.3 ppm, studies have shown sharp increases in cancer of the animals’ nasal linings. NIEHS’ Current Management Practices for Monitoring Air Quality NIEHS’ current management is more aware of the need to have adequate air handling systems in buildings and to better monitor indoor air levels to reduce employees’ exposure to indoor air pollutants. For example, before moving into a recently completed laboratory module at Research Triangle Park, NIEHS initiated a number of health and safety measures to ensure the quality of the module’s indoor air, including improved air handling and monitoring measures and the use of less polluting building materials and furnishings. In addition, according to EPA officials, the manufacturing standards for building materials and office furnishings are more stringent today to ensure that the off-gassing levels of chemicals, such as formaldehyde, are much lower than in past years.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the: (1) quality of air inside the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) building when it was occupied in 1981; (2) health effects associated with exposure to formaldehyde; and (3) current management practices at NIEHS for air handling and air monitoring. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) NIEHS does not have data showing what the air quality was inside its new facility during the first 5.5 months that the building was occupied; (2) however, in response to some employees' concerns, the agency began monitoring the air in September 1981; (3) the agency found that formaldehyde levels ranged from 0.1 to 0.34 parts per million (ppm), well below the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's safety standard in effect in 1981; (4) officials of the NIEHS said that during the first 5.5 months, they made adjustments to the air handling system to balance the air flow and introduce more outside air to help alleviate the respiratory problems that some employees were experiencing; (5) formaldehyde is a known irritant; (6) short-term exposure to formaldehyde at concentrations as low as 0.41 ppm can irritate the eyes and the respiratory tract; (7) such effects usually pass quickly, however once exposure ends; (8) according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, short-term exposure to very high concentrations of formaldehyde at levels of 14.1 to 14.3 ppm has produced cancer in the nasal passages of laboratory animals; (9) because it is carcinogenic in animals and is known to damage genetic material in cell cultures, formaldehyde has been classified as a probable human carcinogen; (10) however, examination of epidemiological evidence has not demonstrated a firm relationship between formaldehyde and cancer in humans; (11) the NIEHS' current managers are more aware of the need for adequate air handling systems in buildings and for routinely monitoring indoor air levels to protect employees from exposure to indoor air pollutants than managers were in 1981; (12) for example, prior to a recent move into a new laboratory module at Research Triangle Park, the agency took a number of steps to ensure the quality of the building's indoor air, including improved air handling and monitoring measures; and (13) the manufacturing standards for building materials and office furnishings are more stringent today to ensure that the off-gassing levels of chemicals such as formaldehyde are much lower than in the past years.
gao_GAO-12-158	gao_GAO-12-158_0	1). In May 2011, we reported on a number of internal control weaknesses that contributed to CVISN award violations including: problems with grants management policies and procedures, such as an erroneous internal policy FMCSA issued that provided incorrect guidance regarding the extent to which states were available to receive certain CVISN funds, as well as a lack of written policies and procedures; a failure to track CVISN grants awarded by the Federal Highway Administration, which managed CVISN before FMCSA, statutory cap violations for CVISN awards; insufficient FMCSA oversight over the CVISN program, including the lack of legal review by FMCSA’s Office of the Chief Counsel to ensure that all awards complied with relevant laws; and a lack of training provided to FMCSA staff on how to manage the CVISN program. NHTSA uses its grant programs, totaling about $744 million in fiscal year 2010, to help support that mission. Internal Control Weaknesses Across FMCSA Grant Programs Increased the Risk of Mismanagement and Irregularities in Pre- Fiscal Year 2010 Grant Awards Decentralized Grants Management and Limited Training Contributed to a Weak Control Environment Prior to fiscal year 2010, FMCSA’s control environment for managing grant awards was inadequate, and issues such as a lack of centralized oversight of policies and procedures and limited grants management training, increased the risk of irregularities and mismanagement of grant awards. As a result, grants management staff did not have access to a single set of comprehensive documented policies and procedures to guide them in awarding and managing FMCSA grants, and FMCSA management could not have reasonable assurance that applicable laws and FMCSA policies were followed. FMCSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Internal Controls, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Ensure Continued Improvement FMCSA has Strengthened Internal Controls, but Some Challenges Remain Since fiscal year 2010, FMCSA has taken a number of steps to standardize and improve internal controls over the agency’s grants management. These actions are broadly outlined in the agency’s April 2011 Grants Management Program Roadmap, and include (1) centralizing grants management oversight and planning to create a centralized GMO to oversee and administer many grants management practices, (2) standardizing and documenting policies and procedures in its finalized Grants Management Manual mentioned above, (3) requiring legal reviews of all grant awards, (4) establishing a new grants management training program, (5) implementing new systems to manage and automate aspects of the grants management process and manage grant award documentation, and (6) improving its communications. However, despite the GMO being central to the agency’s grant management improvements, FMCSA has not conducted a workforce analysis that could help the agency identify and fill gaps in expertise, including those that might be needed for the proposed GMO. While the Manual strengthens FMCSA’s internal controls, grant program staff’s roles and responsibilities are still not sufficiently documented. FMCSA reported that training will help grants management staff better understand the FMCSA policies, as well as the laws and regulations that they should follow when managing grant awards. Despite the improvements in the curriculum, FMCSA does not have a system for management to easily track employee training to ensure that staff complete required training and are continuing to keep their skills and knowledge up to date. FMCSA’s ongoing initiatives reflect the agency’s progress in implementing the first three of these practices, but it is unclear if the agency will be able to make progress in the other two—ensuring it has appropriate leadership and establishing goals to measure its progress. Further, FMCSA has not set metrics to measure its performance in meeting grants management goals. In 2011, DOT determined that it had violated federal appropriations statutes, including the Antideficiency Actin awarding some CVISN grants from fiscal years 2006 to 2010. In order to determine actions FMCSA is taking to improve its grants management to reduce the risk for financial irregularities in awarding grants and the challenges that remain, we interviewed FMCSA management about the agency’s efforts to improve grants management and reviewed documentation related to these efforts including the Grants Management Program Roadmap, Grants Management Manual, and documentation on FMCSA’s proposed grants management office.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2011, the Department of Transportation (DOT) determined that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) had violated federal appropriations statues in awarding some grants for 1 of its 10 grant programs from fiscal years 2006 to 2010. This was caused in part by weaknesses in FMCSAs internal controls and may have affected FMCSAs ability to carry out its mission to reduce motor carrier (large truck and bus) accidents and fatalities. To the extent that these weaknesses existed in FMCSAs other grant programs, it is possible that FMCSA also incorrectly awarded other grant funds. As requested, this report examines (1) internal control weaknesses in FMCSAs other grant programs prior to fiscal year 2010 that could have increased the risk of irregularities in grant awards and (2) FMCSAs actions to improve grants management, and remaining challenges. GAO analyzed FMCSA grants management documents related to internal controls over grants both before and after fiscal year 2010 and recent actions, and interviewed FMCSA officials. What GAO Found Prior to fiscal year 2010, FMCSAs internal controls over management of all of its grant awards were weak, which increased the risk that FMCSA awarded grants that violated laws or FMCSA policies. Internal controls like those related to workforce training and policies and procedures can help provide assurance that operations, including grants management, are efficient and transactions comply with laws. However, FMCSA had only limited formal grants management training, limited documentation of grants management policies and procedures, and, according to FMCSA grants management staff, did not require legal review to help ensure that all awards complied with governing laws and regulations. As a result, FMCSA could not be certain that staff were trained in managing grant awards or followed relevant policies and laws in awarding grants, increasing the risk for mismanagement. Since fiscal year 2010, FMCSA has taken a number of actions to transform its grants management practices, including planning to centralize oversight through a Grants Management Office, standardizing policies and procedures, developing grants management training, and implementing grants management systems to manage award processes and documentation. While these actions help address some existing internal control weaknessesfor example, clearly documented and standardized policies and procedures should help ensure that grants management staff follow policies when awarding grantssome challenges remain. Specifically, FMCSA has not conducted a strategic workforce analysis that could help it identify and fill gaps in expertise, as well as support its budget request to staff a Grants Management Office. Also, FMCSAs grants management policies and procedures lack details on some grant program staffs roles and responsibilities, and the agency does not have a system to easily track and ensure that staff complete required training. The agency also has not set metrics related to its grants management program or developed a method to measure progress in meeting those metrics. Further, since FMCSA has only recently implemented these actions, it is unclear how effective these new initiatives will be in improving its grants management. Regardless, it will be important that the agency have leadership in place that can continue to drive its transformation, as well as metrics to measure its progress in achieving its grants management goals.
gao_GAO-11-504T	gao_GAO-11-504T_0	Evidence indicates that many U.S. consumers could benefit from improved financial literacy efforts. The Federal Government’s Approach to Financial Literacy Has Been Fragmented Federal financial literacy programs and resources are spread widely among many different federal agencies, raising concerns about fragmentation and potential duplication of effort. We conducted a review of the Commission in 2006 and made recommendations related to enhancing public-private partnerships, conducting independent reviews of duplication and effectiveness, and conducting usability testing of the Commission’s MyMoney.gov Web site. Our 2006 review also found that while the Commission’s initial national strategy was a useful first step in focusing attention on financial literacy, it was largely descriptive rather than strategic. To supplement this national strategy, the Commission has said it will be releasing an implementation plan for the strategy by the end of this fiscal year. While the new national strategy clearly identifies action areas and related goals and objectives, it still needs to incorporate specific provisions for performance measures, resource needs, and roles and responsibilities, which we believe to be essential for an effective strategy. The new strategy will benefit if the forthcoming implementation plan incorporates these elements, as well as addresses the fragmentation of federal financial literacy efforts. More recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires the establishment of an Office of Financial Education within the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, further underscoring the need for coordination among federal agencies on this topic. Coordination and partnership among federal, state, nonprofit, and private sectors are also essential in addressing financial literacy, and there have been positive developments in these areas in recent years. The Federal Government Must Determine What Works and Focus Resources Accordingly Although numerous financial literacy initiatives are conducted by federal, state, local, nonprofit, and private entities throughout the country, there is little definitive evidence available on what specific programs and approaches are most effective. In addition, discerning the impact of the financial literacy program as distinct from other influences, such as changes in the overall economy, can often be difficult. Nonetheless, given that federal agencies have limited resources, focusing federal financial literacy resources on initiatives that work is important. The Financial Literacy and Education Commission and many federal agencies have recognized the need for a greater understanding of which programs are most effective in improving financial literacy. Moreover, we are pleased to see that the Commission’s new 2011 national strategy sets as one of its four goals to “identify, enhance, and share effective practices.” The new strategy sets objectives for reaching this goal that include, among other things, (1) encouraging research on financial literacy strategies that affect consumer behavior, (2) establishing a clearinghouse for evidence-based research and evaluation studies, (3) developing and disseminating tools and strategies to encourage and support program evaluation, and (4) forming a network for sharing research and best practices. In addition, it is important to note that financial education is not the only approach—or necessarily always the best approach—for improving consumers’ financial behavior. We will host another forum on financial literacy later this year to bring together experts in financial literacy and education from federal and state agencies, nonprofit organizations representing consumers, educational and academic institutions, and private sector employers. This forum will address the gaps that exist in financial literacy efforts, challenges that federal agencies may face in addressing these gaps, and opportunities for improving the federal government’s approach to financial literacy. In addition, as part of our audit and oversight function, we will continue to conduct evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of federal financial literacy efforts. While personal financial decisions are made by individuals and their families, the federal government can play a role in helping ensure that its citizens have easy access to financial information and the tools they need to make sound decisions. Financial Literacy and Education Commission: Progress Made in Fostering Partnerships, but National Strategy Remains Largely Descriptive Rather Than Strategic. Highlights of a GAO Forum: The Federal Government’s Role in Improving Financial Literacy.	Why GAO Did This Study Financial literacy plays an important role in helping ensure the financial health and stability of individuals, families, and our broader national economy. Economic changes in recent years have highlighted the need to empower Americans to make informed financial decisions, yet evidence indicates that many U.S. consumers could benefit from a better understanding of financial matters. For example, recent surveys indicate that many consumers have difficulty with basic financial concepts and do not budget. This testimony discusses (1) the state of the federal government's approach to financial literacy, (2) observations on overall strategies for addressing financial literacy, and (3) the role GAO can play in addressing and raising awareness on this issue. This testimony is based largely on prior and ongoing work, for which GAO conducted a literature review; interviewed representatives of organizations that address financial literacy within the federal, state, private, nonprofit, and academic sectors; and reviewed materials of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission. While this statement includes no new recommendations, in the past GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at improving financial literacy efforts.. What GAO Found Federal financial literacy efforts are spread among more than 20 different agencies and more than 50 different programs and initiatives, raising concerns about fragmentation and potential duplication of effort. The multiagency Financial Literacy and Education Commission, which coordinates federal efforts, has acted on recommendations GAO made in 2006 related to public-private partnerships, studies of duplication and effectiveness, and the Commission's MyMoney.gov Web site. While GAO's 2006 review of the Commission's initial national strategy for financial literacy found that it was a useful first step in focusing attention on financial literacy, it was largely descriptive rather than strategic. The Commission recently released a new strategy for 2011, which laid out clear goals and objectives, but it still needs to incorporate specific provisions for performance measures, resource needs, and roles and responsibilities, all of which GAO believes to be essential for an effective strategy. However, the Commission will be issuing an implementation plan to accompany the strategy later this year and the strategy will benefit if the plan incorporates these elements. The new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection will also have a role in financial literacy, further underscoring the need for coordination among federal entities. Coordination and partnership among federal, state, nonprofit, and private sectors is also essential in addressing financial literacy, and there have been some positive developments in fostering such partnerships in recent years. There is little definitive evidence available on what specific programs and approaches are most effective in improving financial literacy, and relatively few rigorous studies have measured the impact of specific financial literacy programs on consumer behavior. Given that federal agencies have limited resources for financial literacy, it is important that these resources be focused on initiatives that are effective. To this end, the Commission's new national strategy on financial education sets as one of its four goals identifying, enhancing, and sharing effective practices. However, financial education is not the only approach for improving consumers' financial behavior. Several other mechanisms and strategies have also been shown to be effective, including financial incentives or changes in the default option, such as automatic enrollment in employer retirement plans. The most effective approach may involve a mix of financial education and these other strategies. GAO will continue to play a role in supporting and facilitating knowledge transfer on financial literacy. GAO will host a forum on financial literacy later this year to bring together experts from federal and state agencies and nonprofit, educational, and private sector organizations. The forum will address gaps, challenges, and opportunities related to federal financial literacy efforts. In addition, as part of GAO's audit and oversight function, GAO will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of federal financial literacy programs, as well as identify opportunities to improve the efficient and cost-effective use of these resources.
gao_GAO-02-753T	gao_GAO-02-753T_0	Most States Have Found MTBE in Groundwater from Releases at Tank Sites; Fewer Have Found It in Their Drinking Water Portions of 17 states and the District of Columbia currently use gasoline potentially containing the additive MTBE to limit air pollution (see figure 1). About half of the states also reported finding MTBE that they could not attribute to a leaking tank and suspected that it came from other sources, such as above-ground tanks used to store fuel. Some of the states that have identified MTBE contamination have also found that it reached drinking water sources. States Rely on Their Own Programs and Private Parties to Pay for Cleanups, but May Require Federal Funding to Accelerate Cleanups and Address Abandoned Tanks States have relied primarily on their own funding programs and private parties to pay for cleanups, using the relatively small federal trust fund grants they receive for staff, program administration, and to a lesser extent, cleanups. State Funding Programs and Private Parties Have Paid for Most Cleanups In creating the Underground Storage Tank program, the Congress expected tank owners and operators to take financial responsibility for cleaning up contamination from their tanks, correcting environmental damage, and compensating third parties for any injuries. However, a Maryland program official pointed out that the size of the annual federal grants to states has not kept pace with the salary and other costs they must cover for staff.	What GAO Found To help limit air pollution, about a third of the states use gasoline that contains methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), which burns cleaner. However, MTBE has migrated into wells and groundwater from leaking underground tanks used to store gasoline. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsibility through the Underground Storage Tank Program and works through the states to ensure that tanks do not leak and, if they do, that the contamination is cleaned up. To help states cover the program costs, Congress annually provides grants from a trust fund it created in 1986. Most of the 50 states have reported finding MTBE when they discover gasoline contamination in their tank sites and increasingly, in their groundwater, surface water, and drinking water. States have made progress in addressing the releases they have discovered, including MTBE contamination, but face a continuing and substantial cleanup workload. States typically depend on tank owners or operators to pay some of the cleanup costs and cover the remainder with their own funding programs and depend on relatively small federal trust fund grants to pay staff to oversee cleanups and administer their programs.

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