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crs_R44607	crs_R44607_0	Introduction The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Clean Energy Incentive Program (CEIP) as a voluntary complement to its regulatory program known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP). The goal of the CPP is to reduce CO 2 emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired electric power plants, which produced 30% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2014. The CPP has generated considerable controversy and garnered interest from Congress and a wide range of stakeholders. Some Members in the 114 th Congress have made several attempts to hinder the implementation of the CPP. In particular, after EPA published its CPP final rule in October 2015, both the Senate and the House passed a resolution of disapproval pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. President Obama vetoed the resolution in December 2015. More recently, the House passed H.R. 5538 (Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017) on July 14, 2016. Section 495 of this bill would prohibit EPA from using appropriations to "finalize, implement, administer, or enforce" the CEIP proposed rule. The CEIP, as described in the proposed rule, is a voluntary program that would encourage states to support energy efficiency measures and renewable energy projects before the first CPP compliance obligations are scheduled to take effect in 2022. The CPP allows states to use either emission rate targets (measured in pounds of CO 2 emissions per megawatt-hour [MWh] of electricity generation) or mass-based targets (measured in tons of CO 2 emissions). In addition, states would need to include particular design elements in their plans in order to participate in the CEIP. The CEIP would establish a system to award either emission rate credits or emission allowances for two categories of activities: 1. Energy efficiency and solar renewable energy projects in low-income communities, and 2. Renewable energy projects in participating states. Renewable energy projects would receive one credit/allowance from the state and one credit from EPA for every two MWh of renewable energy generation in 2020 and 2021. For mass-based programs, EPA would match up to the equivalent of 300 million emission allowances nationally during the CEIP program life. Half of the EPA's pool of matching credits would support renewable energy projects, and half would support energy efficiency and solar energy projects in low-income communities. The amount of EPA credits/allowances potentially available to each state participating in the CEIP depends on the relative amount of emission reduction each state is required to achieve. States with greater reduction requirements would have access to a greater share of the EPA credits. If the rule is ultimately upheld, some of the deadlines for the states will likely be delayed. EPA's release of the CEIP proposed rule following the Supreme Court's order has raised questions regarding the agency's legal authority to move forward with the CEIP and other related measures while the CPP is stayed. Although some have interpreted the stay to require EPA to "put its pencil down" and stop all work related to the CPP, EPA believes that the stay halts only the legal effect and enforceability of the CPP and does not prevent EPA from continuing activities that relate to the CPP but that do not impose legal obligations. In contrast, EPA believes that it has sufficient authority to move forward with rulemakings that relate to the stayed CPP. EPA points to several instances when it continued to revise provisions related to stayed regulations. There are few judicial opinions that address the types of agency activities allowed during a judicial stay.	In 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Clean Energy Incentive Program (CEIP) as a voluntary complement to its regulatory program known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP). The goal of the CPP is to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired electric power plants, which produced 30% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2014. The CEIP would support that objective by promoting CO2 emission reductions before the CPP is scheduled to take effect in 2022. The CEIP is a voluntary program that would encourage states to develop energy efficiency measures and renewable energy projects. To participate, a state would need to include specific design elements in its CPP state plan that is submitted to EPA for approval. The CEIP would establish a system to award either emission rate credits (measured in pounds of CO2 emissions per megawatt-hour) or emission allowances (measured in tons of CO2 emissions) that can be used to meet state emission reduction targets for two categories of activities: 1. Energy efficiency and solar renewable energy projects in low-income communities, and 2. Renewable energy projects in participating states. Renewable energy projects would receive one credit/allowance from the state and one credit from EPA for every two megawatt-hour of renewable energy generation. Projects in low-income communities would receive double credits. Under a mass-based approach, EPA would match up to the equivalent of 300 million emission allowances nationally: Half of the credits/allowances would support renewable energy projects, and half would support energy efficiency and solar energy projects in low-income communities. The amount of EPA credits/allowances potentially available to each state participating in the CEIP would depend on the relative amount of emission reduction each state is required to achieve under the CPP. Thus, states with greater reduction requirements would have access to a greater share of the EPA credits. EPA's CPP has generated significant interest from Congress and a wide range of stakeholders. Some Members in the 114th Congress have made several attempts to prevent the implementation of the CPP and more recently the CEIP. In particular, both the Senate and the House passed a resolution of disapproval pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, which President Obama vetoed in December 2015. In July 2016, the House passed H.R. 5538 (Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017), which would prohibit EPA from using appropriations to "finalize, implement, administer, or enforce" the CEIP proposed rule. The CPP is the subject of ongoing litigation involving most states and over 100 entities. In February 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the rule for the duration of the litigation. The CPP final rule therefore currently lacks enforceability or legal effect, and if the rule is ultimately upheld, some of the deadlines would likely be delayed. EPA published the CEIP proposed rule in June 2016 to provide additional implementation details for states wishing to participate in the program. EPA's release of the CEIP proposed rule has raised questions regarding the agency's legal authority to move forward with the CEIP while the CPP is stayed. Although some argue that the stay requires EPA to "put its pencil down" and stop all work related to the CPP, EPA believes that it has sufficient authority to move forward with rulemakings that relate to the stayed CPP. To support this assertion, EPA points to several instances when it continued to revise provisions related to previously stayed regulations. However, there are few judicial opinions that address the types of activities allowed during a judicial stay.
crs_R41579	crs_R41579_0	A defendant in a Section 504 suit may assert as an affirmative defense to liability that accommodating the plaintiff's disability would constitute an "undue burden." Relying in part on the findings of that study, the American Council of the Blind and two individuals with visual impairments (collectively "the Council") sued the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Henry Paulson, in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2002. The Council alleged that the Department of Treasury violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by issuing banknotes that were not readily identifiable for people with visual disabilities. The U.S. district court concluded that (1) the Council met its burden to show that the visually impaired are denied meaningful access to U.S. paper currency; and (2) the Department of Treasury had failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that no effective accommodation could be implemented without imposing an undue burden on the department. Before a final remedy was ordered, the Department of Treasury appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Circuit Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the district court to address the Council's request for injunctive relief. The court disagreed. Recent Developments The Department of Treasury did not appeal the D.C. On May 20, 2010, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) within the Department of Treasury published a notice of proposed action identifying the accommodations that it is considering in the wake of American Council of the Blind . BEP stated that it will (1) develop and deploy a raised tactile feature as part of the next currency redesign; (2) continue its practice of adding large, high-contrast numerals and different and distinct color schemes to each denomination; and (3) implement a "Supplemental Currency Reader Program" to provide electronic currency readers to people with visual impairments. In light of these concerns, the Council urged BEP to provide specific details about the timelines for implementing the accessible features on the currency itself and establish performance specifications for devices that are distributed through the currency reader program. The Council also strongly opposed BEP's suggested eligibility requirements for the currency reader program. BEP proposed to distribute readers to people who provide documentation verifying that they need a reader to accurately identify the denomination of U.S. banknotes.	In May 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued a decision in The American Council of the Blind v. Paulson. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holding that the U.S. Department of the Treasury violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by issuing paper currency in denominations that people with visual impairments cannot readily identify. Specifically, the court ruled that the current design of U.S. banknotes denies people with visual impairments meaningful access to the benefits of using U.S. currency. Furthermore, the Treasury Department was not exempted from liability on the grounds that accommodating the plaintiffs' disabilities would impose an undue burden. The court found that Treasury failed to substantiate its claims about the financial cost of achieving Section 504 compliance and the poor durability of certain proposed remedial tactile features. The Department of Treasury did not appeal the circuit court's decision. The case was remanded for consideration of an appropriate remedy, and, on October 3, 2008, the district court issued an injunction order. The injunction order required the Department of Treasury to make changes to accommodate people with visual impairments by the time the next currency redesign is approved. On May 20, 2010, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) within the Department of Treasury published a notice of proposed action in the Federal Register. The notice identifies changes that BEP proposes to make to U.S. currency to accommodate people who are visually impaired. These changes are (1) developing and deploying a raised tactile feature as part of the next currency redesign; (2) adding large, high-contrast numerals and different and distinct color schemes to each denomination; and (3) implementing a "Supplemental Currency Reader Program" to provide electronic currency readers to people with visual impairments. In comments submitted to BEP, the American Council of the Blind expressed concern over the institution of the Supplemental Currency Reader Program. The Council urged BEP, inter alia, to provide specific details about the timelines for implementing the accessible features on the currency itself and establish performance specifications for readers that are distributed through the program. The Council also strongly opposed BEP's proposed eligibility requirements for the reader program, contending that they unnecessarily restricted the types of professionals who could verify a person's eligibility for a currency reader. Under the proposed regulation, only certain nurses and doctors would be authorized to verify a person's eligibility for a currency reader. The Council would like a variety of other professionals to be authorized as well, including social workers and professional staff at hospitals and other institutions.
crs_R42036	crs_R42036_0	Introduction Immigration has not been a front-burner issue for the 112 th Congress. The 112 th Congress has, however, taken legislative action on some immigration-related measures. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ) contains provisions on border security, visa security, tourist visas, refugees, and other immigration issues. 112-176 extends the authorization for four immigration programs (EB-5 visa program, E-Verify, Conrad State program, and special immigrant religious worker program) for three years, until September 30, 2015. Legislation has also been enacted on military service-based immigration benefits ( P.L. 112-58 ), border tunnels ( P.L. 112-127 ), the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) initiative ( P.L. 112-205 ), and E-2 treaty investor visas ( P.L. In addition, the House and Senate have each passed other immigration-related legislation. Both houses have passed different bills ( H.R. 4970 , S. 1925 ) to reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The House has passed bills that would reform permanent employment-based and family-based admissions ( H.R. 6429 ); and reauthorize the H-1C temporary worker category for nurses ( H.R. It also has passed legislation on border security at and between ports of entry ( H.R. 1299 ) and student visa reform ( H.R. 2830 ), immigrant detention ( H.R. 1932 ), and diversity visas ( H.R. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 112 th Congress. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in a separate report and, for the most part, are not covered here. The Department of Homeland Security Authorization (DHSA) Act of 2011 ( S. 1546 ), as reported by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, would direct DHS to develop a workforce staffing model and to ensure that CBP has instituted an outbound inspections program at land, air, and maritime ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security Authorization bills, as ordered to be reported by the House Homeland Security Committee ( H.R. House and Senate FY2012 DHS authorization and appropriations bills include related provisions, as discussed below. 112-205 ), which provides statutory authority for the Border Enforcement Security Task Force. H.R. Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Visas Rather than change the per-country limits on permanent admissions to address the issue of oversubscribed countries in the employment-based system, as discussed in the preceding section, some policymakers have proposed creating a separate visa category for prospective LPRs with graduate degrees in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields. The House Committee on the Judiciary has reported H.R. P.L. H.R. 2830 ), has been ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. A Senate reauthorization bill, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011 ( S. 1301 ), has been reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. In May 2012, the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement held a hearing on H.R. H.R. H.R. 110-229 made the INA applicable to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), a U.S. territory in the Pacific. In addition, H.R.	Immigration has not been a front-burner issue for the 112th Congress. During the past two years, however, Congress has taken legislative action on some measures containing provisions on a range of immigration-related topics. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74) contains provisions on border security, visa security, tourist visas, and refugees. It also includes limited language on other issues, such as employment eligibility verification and the H-2B temporary worker visa. P.L. 112-176 extends the authorization for four immigration programs (EB-5 visa program, E-Verify, Conrad State program, and special immigrant religious worker program) for three years, until September 30, 2015. P.L. 112-205 provides statutory authority for the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) initiative. P.L. 112-58 concerns military service-based immigration benefits; P.L. 112-127 concerns border tunnels. P.L. 112-130 makes Israeli nationals eligible for E-2 treaty investor visas. Both the House and the Senate have passed different bills (H.R. 4970, S. 1925) to reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). In addition, the House has passed bills that would make changes to permanent employment-based and family-based admissions (H.R. 3012); create new visa categories for prospective LPRs with graduate degrees in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields (H.R. 6429); and reauthorize a temporary worker category for foreign nurses (H.R. 1933). It has also passed legislation with provisions on border security at and between ports of entry (H.R. 1299) and student visa reform (H.R. 3120). In other action on immigration-related legislation, the House Judiciary Committee has reported or ordered reported bills on electronic employment eligibility verification (H.R. 2885), immigrant detention (H.R. 1932), visa security (H.R. 1741), and the diversity visa (H.R. 704). House and Senate Committees have considered different DHS authorization bills. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has reported S. 1546, and the House Homeland Security Committee has ordered reported H.R. 3116. Bills on victims of trafficking have been reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee (S. 1301) and ordered reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee (H.R. 2830). The House Natural Resources Committee has reported bills addressing border enforcement activities on federal lands (H.R. 1505, which also was included as an amendment to H.R. 3116) and foreign residents of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), a U.S. territory in the Pacific (H.R. 1466). In addition, House and Senate committees and subcommittees have held hearings on a number of immigration-related issues. This report discusses immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 112th Congress. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R41982, Homeland Security Department: FY2012 Appropriations, and, for the most part, are not covered here.
crs_R43781	crs_R43781_0	107-228 ), it lists its "purpose" as being "to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity." The act establishes in statute the State Department position of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and states that the Special Coordinator's "central objective" is "to promote substantive dialogue between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives." They include U.S. government assistance for nongovernmental organizations to work in Tibetan communities in China; an educational and cultural exchange program with "the people of Tibet"; Voice of America and Radio Free Asia Tibetan-language broadcasting into Tibet; assistance for Tibetan refugees in South Asia; a scholarship program for Tibetans living outside Tibet; and National Endowment for Democracy human rights and democracy programs relating to Tibet. China charges that many congressional actions amount to support for challenges to Chinese rule in Tibet and thus threaten Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. In recent years, three bills seeking to update the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 have passed the House. 4194 , the Government Reports Elimination Act of 2014, passed the House with a provision that would eliminate a report required by the TPA; the provision was removed in the Senate-passed bill. 2601 in the 109 th Congress both included substantial revisions to the TPA, although neither bill was acted on by the Senate. H.R. These are: (1) coordinate U.S. Government policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet; (2) vigorously promote the policy of seeking to protect the distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and national identity of Tibet, and pressing [sic] for improved respect for human rights; (3) maintain close contact with religious, cultural, and political leaders of the Tibetan people, including regular travel to Tibetan areas of the People's Republic of China, and to Tibetan refugee settlements in India and Nepal; (4) consult with Congress on policies relevant to Tibet and the future and welfare of the Tibetan people; (5) make efforts to establish contacts in the foreign ministries of other countries to pursue a negotiated solution for Tibet; and (6) take all appropriate steps to ensure adequate resources, staff, and bureaucratic support to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of the Special Coordinator. Congress has passed other laws and resolutions showing its strong interest in this objective. H.R. 2410 : Like H.R. To what degree, if any, should Congress consider policy toward Tibet in the context of relations with China? As noted above (see " The U.S. Congress and the Question of Tibet's Political Status "), while the executive branch considers Tibet to be a part of China, in the early 1990s, Congress passed legislation declaring Tibet to be "an occupied country" and stating that, "Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in exile as recognized by the Tibetan people." A number of subsequent legislative measures, however, have implied Congress's acceptance of a status for Tibet as part of China. What should be the balance between U.S. programs, activities, and policies focused on the 6 million Tibetans living under Chinese Communist Party rule and those focused on the approximately 130,000 Tibetans living in exile in South Asia? With the dialogue process stalled since January 2010, should Section 621(c) of the TPA continue to define the "central objective" of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues to be "to promote substantive dialogue between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives"?	The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA) is a core legislative measure guiding U.S. policy toward Tibet. Its stated purpose is "to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity." Among other provisions, the TPA establishes in statute the State Department position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and defines the Special Coordinator's "central objective" as being "to promote substantive dialogue" between the government of the People's Republic of China and Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, or his representatives. The Special Coordinator is also required, among other duties, to "coordinate United States Government policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet"; "vigorously promote the policy of seeking to protect the distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and national identity of Tibet"; and press for "improved respect for human rights." While the Special Coordinator coordinates Tibet-related U.S. government programs, congressional mandates and earmarked appropriations for most such programs are contained in legislation other than the TPA. The programs include assistance for nongovernmental organizations to work in Tibetan communities in China; an educational and cultural exchange program with "the people of Tibet"; Voice of America and Radio Free Asia Tibetan-language broadcasting into Tibet; assistance for Tibetan refugees in South Asia; a scholarship program for Tibetans outside Tibet; and National Endowment for Democracy programs relating to Tibet. Congress has shown a strong interest in Tibet since the 1980s, passing dozens of laws and resolutions related to Tibet, speaking out about conditions in Tibet, and welcoming visits by the Dalai Lama and, more recently, the political head of the India-based Central Tibetan Administration. Such actions have long been a source of friction in the U.S.-China relationship. China charges that they amount to support for challenges to Chinese rule in Tibet. Since passage of the TPA, three bills seeking to update it have passed the House of Representatives. In the 113th Congress, H.R. 4194, the House-passed Government Reports Elimination Act of 2014, would eliminate a report required by the TPA: the provision was removed in the Senate-passed bill. H.R. 2410 in the 111th Congress and H.R. 2601 in the 109th Congress both included substantial revisions to the TPA, but the Senate did not act on either bill. If Congress again considers amending the TPA, questions it may wish to consider include: To what degree, if any, should policy toward Tibet be considered in the context of relations with China? Should Congress clarify its position on Tibet's political status? In the early 1990s, Congress passed legislation declaring Tibet to be an "occupied country," but subsequent legislation has often implied congressional acceptance of a status for Tibet as part of China. What should be the balance between U.S. programs, activities, and policies focused on the 6 million Tibetans living under Chinese Communist Party rule and those focused on the approximately 130,000-strong Tibetan diaspora in South Asia? With dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama's representatives stalled since January 2010, should the TPA continue to define promotion of such dialogue as the Special Coordinator's "central objective"?
crs_R41728	crs_R41728_0	This damage has released some radioactive materials, and there are widespread fears about the health effects of current and possible future releases. Travel time: The longer radioactive material is in the air, the more of it will decay. Rain and snow: Precipitation washes some particles out of the air. A press report of March 22 stated that equipment in Charlottesville, VA, detected radiation from the reactor incident, but that "health experts said that the plume's radiation had been diluted enormously in its journey of thousands of miles and thatâat least for now, with concentrations so lowâits presence will have no health consequences in the United States." What Is Radiation?9 Many atoms are stable: they will remain in their current form indefinitely. Some atoms are unstable, or radioactive. They have no electrical charge and may be highly penetrating, depending on their speed. For example, when uranium-235 decays, it emits gamma rays, most of which are of 186 keV (a low energy) or less, and alpha particles; cesium-137 emits gamma rays, virtually all of which are of 662 keV, a medium energy, and beta particles. Uranium-235 and plutonium-239 can support a nuclear chain reaction: to oversimplify, one neutron fissions one atom, which releases two neutrons that fission two atoms, releasing four neutrons that fission four atoms, and so on. A nuclear reactor cannot explode like an atomic bomb because the fuels and configurations differ. In addition, a bomb must be configured in one of two ways to create a large enough mass to support a runaway chain reaction; reactors are arranged in an entirely different configuration. A nuclear reactor uses pellets of LEU or mixed oxides (MOX, i.e., uranium oxide and plutonium oxide) for fuel. If the crusts are thick enough, they can block water from circulating between the fuel rods. As the rods heat up, their zirconium cladding can ignite, which may cause the uranium inside to melt and release radioactive material. When the ratio of fission products to fissile material rises to the point at which a fuel rod can no longer efficiently maintain a chain reaction, it is referred to as spent fuel. When fuel rods are first removed from a nuclear reactor, they have a high level of short-lived radionuclides, unlike new fuel rods, so they are intensely radioactive. This radioactivity generates intense heat, so spent fuel rods are placed in pools of water to cool them, typically for several years, until most of the short-lived radionuclides decay. This possibility led to concern about the spent fuel rods at Fukushima Daiichi NPP reactor 4: The spent fuel pools can be even more dangerous than the active fuel rods, as they are not contained in thick steel containers like the reactor core. This explains the concern about that reactor, as it is the only one that uses MOX fuel, although irradiation of uranium fuel also creates plutonium. Water is being pumped into the spent fuel pools at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP reactors as well to cool the fuel rods and prevent additional radiation release. The biological impact of ionizing radiation, however, depends not just on the absorbed dose (i.e., the amount of energy absorbed) but on the type of radiation. Iodine-131 posed the most important health risk following the incident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. As a result, potassium iodide tablets, taken shortly before exposure to iodine-131, offer protection from thyroid cancer. As the next section of this report discusses, the amount of radioactive material that has reached the United States from the Japanese nuclear reactor incident is minuscule. http://www3.nhk.or.jp/ daily/ english/ 01_33.html Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency "Countermeasures for TohokuâPacific Ocean Earthquake": includes updates of information on radiation levels http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/ english/ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet "The Prime Minister in Action": includes messages, statements, and a blog by the Prime Minister http://www.kantei.go.jp/ foreign/ index-e.html Tokyo Electric Power Company Home page of the company that owns the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant: includes press releases and monitoring data http://www.tepco.co.jp/ en/ index-e.html Other American Nuclear Society "Fukushima": Links to many news sources, updates on reactor status, an archive of updates and news http://ansnuclearcafe.org/ fukushima/ Areva "The Fukushima Daiichi Incident," by Matthias Braun: provides a detailed description, with photos and diagrams, of plant design, accident progression, radiological releases, spent fuel pools, and sources of information http://www.seyth.com/ ressources/ quake/ AREVA-Document.pdf Health Physics Society "Fukushima Nuclear Plant Update": health aspects of radiation exposure in general and from the Fukushima Daiichi incident http://www.hps.org/ fukushima/ International Atomic Energy Agency "Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log": daily detailed updates of the situation http://www.iaea.org/ newscenter/ news/ tsunamiupdate01.html New York Times "Status of the Nuclear Reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant": for each reactor, daily updates of the situation along with recent developments http://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/ 2011/ 03/ 16/ world/ asia/ reactors-status.html?	Japan's nuclear incident has engendered much public and congressional concern about the possible impact of radiation on the Japanese public, as well as possible fallout on U.S. citizens. This report provides information on technical aspects of the nuclear incident, with reference to human health. While some radioactive material from the Japanese incident may reach the United States, it appears most unlikely that this material will result in harmful levels of radiation. In traveling thousands of miles between the two countries, some radioactive material will decay, rain will wash some out of the air, and its concentration will diminish as it disperses. Many atoms are stable; they remain in their current form indefinitely. Other atoms are unstable, or radioactive. They "decay" or "disintegrate," emitting energy through various forms of radiation. Each form has its own characteristics and potential for human health effects. Nuclear reactors use uranium or mixed oxides (uranium oxide and plutonium oxide, or MOX) for fuel. Uranium and plutonium atoms fission, or split, releasing neutrons that cause additional fissions in a chain reaction, and also releasing energy. A nuclear reactor's core consists of fuel rods made of uranium or MOX encased in zirconium, and neutron-absorbing control rods that are removed or inserted to start or stop the chain reaction. This assembly is placed underwater to carry off excess heat. The incident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant prevented water from circulating in the core of several reactors, causing water to evaporate and temperature to rise. High heat could melt the fuel rods and lead to a release of radioactive material into the air. When uranium and plutonium fission, they split into smaller atoms that are highly radioactive and generate much heat; indeed, fuel rods that have just been removed from a reactor are much more radioactive, and hotter, than fuel rods before they have been inserted into a reactor. After fuel rods can no longer efficiently produce energy, they are considered "spent" and are placed in cooling pools of water for several years to keep them from overheating while the most radioactive materials decay. A concern about the spent fuel pool at reactor 4 is that it may have lost most or all of its water, yet it has more fuel rods than pools at the other five reactors, as it contains all the active fuel rods that were temporarily removed from the reactor core in November 2010 to permit plant maintenance in addition to spent fuel rods. A nuclear reactor cannot explode like an atomic bomb because the concentration of the type of uranium or plutonium that fissions easily is too low to support a runaway chain reaction, and a nuclear weapon requires one of two configurations, neither of which is present in a reactor. Some types of radiation have enough energy to knock electrons off atoms, creating "ions" that are electrically charged and highly reactive. Ionizing radiation is thus harmful to living cells. It strikes people constantly, but in doses low enough to have negligible effect. A concern about the reactor incident is that it will release radioactive materials that pose a danger to human health. For example, cesium-137 emits gamma rays powerful enough to penetrate the body and damage cells. Ingesting iodine-131 increases the risk of thyroid cancer. Potassium iodide tablets protect the thyroid, but there is no need to take them absent an expectation of ingesting iodine-131. This update adds a section on useful links.
crs_R40240	crs_R40240_0	It is recognized that the statutory requirements have been met by the catchall provisions in appropriations acts. In the absence of authorization legislation, intelligence activities continue to be carried out, and expensive and complex intelligence systems continue to be approved; but the process is somewhat different from that intended when the intelligence committees were established in the late 1970s and there are significant implications for congressional oversight of intelligence activities and, arguably, for the nation's intelligence effort as a whole. The first intelligence authorization bill that became law was that for FY1979 ( P.L. From FY1979 to FY2005, annual intelligence authorization bills were enacted, although on many occasions the intelligence authorization acts were not signed until well into the fiscal year for which they authorized funds. When appropriations legislation has passed prior to enactment of intelligence authorization bills, Congress has met the requirement for specific authorization of intelligence activities through the use of a "catchall" provision in defense appropriations acts. This provision meets the requirements of the National Security Act while acknowledging the potential for subsequent passage of an intelligence authorization act. 108-487 , the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005, on December 23, 2004, until September 2010, the two intelligence committees reported authorization bills (of which some have been passed by the respective chambers and one of which—that for FY2008—passed by both houses only to be vetoed by the President). Each of these bills was accompanied by a report that provided extensive guidance for intelligence agencies and addressed a number of issues that the committees considered important. The House intelligence committee is responsible for authorizing "intelligence and intelligence-related activities of all ... departments and agencies of the Government, including the tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense." For instance, the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. Congress returned to the issue in FY2011 Defense Authorization legislation. 111-259 . Several provisions of the final FY2010 bill addressed DNI authorities. The DNI could also transfer funds into these accounts. In December 2012 the House and Senate passed S. 3454 , the Intelligence Authorization for FY2013, which was signed into law by the President on January 14, 2013 ( P.L. 112-277 ). The challenge for the 113 th Congress will be to work within its existing structure to help shape intelligence priorities while a more integrated intelligence community adjusts to new budget realities. In March 2013 before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Mr. Clapper noted that cuts to the National Intelligence Program would be spread across six Cabinet departments and two independent agencies. He warned of "another damaging downward spiral" similar to that which he said occurred in the 1990s, and asked for the committee's support for his efforts to reprogram funds to mitigate the effect of budget cuts. The two intelligence committees are positioned to have the most comprehensive information on intelligence activities broadly defined, including those conducted by agencies wholly independent of DOD.	Since President Bush signed the FY2005 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-487) in December 2004, no subsequent intelligence authorization legislation was enacted until the FY2010 bill was signed by President Obama in October 2010 (after the end of FY2010), becoming P.L. 111-259. Although the National Security Act requires intelligence activities to be specifically authorized, this requirement had been satisfied in previous years by one-sentence catchall provisions in defense appropriations acts authorizing intelligence activities. This procedure meets the statutory requirement but has, according to some observers, weakened the ability of Congress to oversee intelligence activities. Over the last two years, Congress has met its statutory requirement by passing three intelligence authorization bills that included classified schedules of authorizations and that were signed into law. Most recently, in December 2012, the House and Senate passed S. 3454, the intelligence authorization for FY2013, which was signed into law by the President on January 14, 2013 (P.L. 112-277). Key issues debated during the passage of these bills included the adequacy of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) authorities, Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit authority over the intelligence community, and measures to combat national security leaks. These three bills appear to reflect a determination to underscore the continuing need for specific annual intelligence authorization legislation. Annual intelligence authorization acts were first passed in 1978 after the establishment of the two congressional intelligence committees and were enacted every year until 2005. These acts provided specific authorizations of intelligence activities and were accompanied by reports that provided detailed guidance to the nation's intelligence agencies. The recent absence of intelligence authorization acts has meant that key intelligence issues have been addressed in defense authorization acts and defense appropriations acts that focus primarily on the activities of the Department of Defense (DOD). Several Members have maintained that this procedure has been characterized by misplaced priorities and wasteful spending estimates that could run into billions. One example is the eventual cancellation of a highly classified and very costly overhead surveillance system that had been approved without support from the two intelligence committees. The challenge for the 113th Congress will be to help shape intelligence priorities while the intelligence community shifts from a decade of growth to a time of shrinking budgets. Reforms since 9/11 have attempted to create a more collaborative, integrated community. Reflecting that reality, intelligence priorities, and corresponding budget cuts, will be spread across six Cabinet departments and two independent agencies. The two intelligence committees are positioned to have the most comprehensive information on intelligence activities broadly defined, including those conducted by agencies and those within DOD. Congress has an important role in intelligence oversight and in helping the community to avoid what DNI James Clapper in March 2013 called "another damaging downward spiral" similar to that which he said occurred after budget cuts in the 1990s. The annual intelligence authorization bill will be one of its most valuable legislative tools.
crs_RL33965	crs_RL33965_0	Introduction The diversity rationale for affirmative action in public education has long been a topic of political and legal controversy. Many colleges and universities have established affirmative action policies not only to remedy past discrimination, but also to achieve a racially and ethnically diverse student body or faculty. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the use of race-based policies to promote diversity in higher education may be constitutional in two cases involving the University of Michigan's admissions policies—namely Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger —the Court had never, until recently, considered whether diversity is a constitutionally permissible goal in the elementary and secondary education setting. To resolve this question, the Supreme Court agreed to review two cases that involved the use of race to maintain racially diverse public schools. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 , a consolidated ruling that resolved both cases, the Court ultimately struck down the school plans at issue, holding that they violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. This report provides an overview of the Court's decision, as well as a discussion of its implications for future educational efforts to promote racial diversity.	The diversity rationale for affirmative action in public education has long been a topic of political and legal controversy. Many colleges and universities have established affirmative action policies not only to remedy past discrimination, but also to achieve a racially and ethnically diverse student body or faculty. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the use of race-based policies to promote diversity in higher education may be constitutional, the Court had never, until recently, considered whether diversity is a constitutionally permissible goal in the elementary and secondary education setting. To resolve this question, the Supreme Court recently agreed to review two cases that involved the use of race to maintain racially diverse public schools and to avoid racial segregation. In a consolidated ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court held that the Seattle and Louisville school plans at issue violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. This report provides an overview of the Court's decision, as well as a discussion of its implications for future educational efforts to promote racial diversity.
crs_RS21569	crs_RS21569_0	They are thus commercially valuable.As intellectualproperty, geographical indications are eligible for relief from acts of infringement and/or unfair competition. (2) The use of geographical indications for wines and dairy products particularly, which some countries consider to be protectedintellectualproperty, and others consider to be generic or semi-generic terms, has become a contentious international trade issue. How Are Geographical Indications Protected in the United States? What GI Issues Are Being Debated in the Doha Round? The debate over extending protection for geographical indications of agricultural products is reflected in the U.S. request forconsultations (the first step in WTO dispute settlement) with the EU on EU regulations for the protection ofgeographical indicationsfor wines and spirits (Community Regulation 1493/99) and for other agricultural products (Community Regulation2081/92). Outlook and Congressional Role Decisions about geographical indications will be on the agenda of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun.	The issue of expanding intellectual property protections for geographical indicationsforwines, spirits, and agricultural products is being debated in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Geographicalindications areimportant in international trade because they are commercially valuable. Some European and developing countrieswant to establish tougher restrictions and limits on the use of geographical names for products, while the United States and associatedcountries arguethat the existing level of protection of such terms is adequate. Decisions about the future scope of protection ofgeographicalindications will be made as the current (Doha) round of multilateral trade negotiations continues. Congress ismonitoring thenegotiations and their potential impacts on U.S. producers. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_RS22984	crs_RS22984_0	The current global economic slowdown (especially among its major export markets—the United States, the EU, and Japan) is having a significant negative impact on China's export sector and industries that depend on FDI flows. The Chinese economy slowed sharply in 2008 and early 2009. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China was the single most important contributor to world economic growth in 2007. However, China's economy has not been immune to effects of the global financial crisis, given its heavy reliance on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) for its economic growth. China's stimulus, if fully implemented, would likely constitute one of the largest economic stimulus packages (both in spending levels and as a percent of GDP) that have been announced by the world's major economies to date, although it is unclear to what extent the stimulus package represents new spending versus projects that were already in the works before the economic downturn hit China. The government has also announced plans to boost agricultural subsidies to farmers. Has China's Economy Bottomed Out? They note a number of positive developments: GDP in the second quarter of 2009 grew by 7.9%, compared to 6.1% growth in the first quarter 2009, on a year-on-year basis. In addition, many analysts have raised concerns that the large level of borrowing by local governments and state-owned enterprises could lead to a sharp rise in non-performing loans on the balance sheets of China's major banks, and could cause local governments to be become heavily indebted. Some have charged that China has rolled backed some it its economic reforms by boosting industrial subsidies and increasing trade and investment barriers, in order to assist firms deemed by the government to be vital to future development. Many economists contend that China's long-term economic growth prospects will likely depend on the ability of the government to rebalance the economy by promoting greater domestic consumption and to deepen market-oriented economic reforms. Some have speculated that China may, in order to help stabilize its most important trading partner (the United States), boost purchases of U.S. securities (especially Treasury securities) in order to help fund the hundreds of billions of dollars that are expected to be spent by the U.S. government to purchase troubled assets and stimulate the economy. One concern could be whether increased Chinese investments in the U.S. economy would produce long-term economic benefits for China. Many analysts (including some in China) have questioned the wisdom of China's policy of investing a large volume of foreign exchange reserves in U.S. government securities (which offer a relatively low rate of return) when China has such huge development needs at home. For example, various Chinese government officials reportedly suggested on a number of occasions in the past that China could dump (or threaten to dump) a large share of its holdings in order to counter U.S. pressure (such as threats of trade sanctions) on various trade issues (such as China's currency policy).	Over the past several years, China has enjoyed one of the world's fastest-growing economies and has been a major contributor to world economic growth. However, the current global financial crisis has significantly slowed China's economy; real gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 13.0% in 2007 to 8.0% in 2008. Several Chinese industries, particularly the export sector, have been hit hard by crisis, and millions of workers have reportedly been laid off. This situation is of great concern to the Chinese government, which views rapid economic growth as critical to maintaining social stability. China is a major economic power and holds huge amounts of foreign exchange reserves, and thus its policies could have a major impact on the global economy. The Chinese government has stated that it plans to rebalance the economy by lessening its dependence on exports for economic growth while boosting domestic demand. In November 2008, the Chinese government announced a $586 billion spending package to help stimulate the domestic economy, largely geared towards new infrastructure projects. In addition, the government ordered banks to sharply expand loans to local governments and businesses to expand investment. The government has also offered a number of programs to stimulate domestic consumption of consumer products (such as cars and appliances), especially in the rural areas. As a result, China's economy has shown some improvement. For example, its GDP in the second quarter of 2009 grew by 7.9%, compared to 6.1% growth in the first quarter 2009, on a year-on-year basis. However, from January to July 2009, China's trade was down 23% over the same period in 2008, while foreign direct investment fell 18%. Some analysts have criticized various aspects of China's economic stimulus policies. Some contend that China, in an effort to assist firms impacted by the global economic slowdown, has imposed numerous new trade-distorting policies, such as extensive industrial subsidies and trade and investment restrictions on foreign firms. In addition, many analysts warn that the easy lending policies of Chinese state-owned banks may later lead to a sharp increase in the level of non-performing loans by these banks if loans go to investments that fail to produce long-term returns. China's efforts to stabilize its economy are of major concern to U.S. policy makers. If successful, such policies could boost Chinese demand for U.S. products. In addition, China is a major purchaser of U.S. Treasury securities, which help fund the Federal Government's borrowing needs, and thus its decision whether or not to continue to purchase U.S. debt could impact the U.S. economy. U.S. policy makers also want to ensure that, despite the sharp downturn in the Chinese economy from the effects of current global economic downturn, China will continue to reform its economy and liberalizes its trade regime and refrain from imposing policies that restrict or distort trade.
crs_R44451	crs_R44451_0	In December 2015, delegations from 195 nations, including the United States, adopted an agreement in Paris that creates an international structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, and cooperate to achieve these ends, including financial and other support. Pursuant to that agreement, the United States pledged (in 2015) to reduce GHG emissions by 26%-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels. At the date of this report, U.S. involvement in the Paris Agreement remains uncertain. However, some recent reports indicate that President Trump is expected to withdraw from the agreement. Whether the United States ultimately achieves the 2020 and 2025 targets will likely depend, to some degree, on GHG emission levels, particularly CO 2 emissions, from electric power plants—one of the largest sources of U.S. emissions. During the Obama Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated standards for CO 2 emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired electric power plants. The rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), appeared in the Federal Register on October 23, 2015. The fate of the CPP is uncertain. First, the rule is the subject of ongoing litigation. On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the rule for the duration of the litigation. U.S. GHG levels in 2015 were 11% below 2005 levels. Accurately forecasting future emission levels is a complex and challenging endeavor. In general, actual emissions have remained well below projections. The electric power sector contributes the second-largest percentage (35%) of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion (1 percentage point behind the transportation sector). CO2 Emissions from Electricity Generation Figure 5 compares U.S. electricity generation with CO 2 emissions from the electricity sector between 1976 and 2016. While electricity generation remained flat after 2010, CO 2 emissions continued a general trend of reduction. Electricity is generated from a variety of sources in the United States. Fossil fuels generate different amounts of CO 2 emissions per unit of electricity generated. Electricity CO2 Emission Projections and the CPP As previously discussed, CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion account for the vast majority (77%) of total U.S. GHG emissions, and the electric power sector contributes a large percentage (35%) of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Some of these factors, identified below in no particular order, are interrelated: economic impacts (e.g., level of GDP growth); prices of fossil fuels—particularly natural gas—and renewable energy sources; electricity generation portfolio (e.g., whether recent trends in coal, natural gas, and renewable energy use continue); federal and/or state policy developments (e.g., CPP implementation, state renewable energy requirements); and improvements in demand-side energy efficiency (e.g., commercial and residential electricity use). Concluding Observations Recent international negotiations and domestic policy developments have increased interest in current and projected U.S. GHG emission levels. However, in 2010, their courses diverged. Thus in 2016, electricity generation was essentially equivalent to generation in 2005, while CO 2 emissions were 25% below 2005 levels. Multiple factors generally impact CO 2 emission levels from the electric power sector. Recent changes in the U.S. electricity generation portfolio between 2005 and 2016 played a key role: coal's contribution to total electricity generation decreased from 50% to 30%; natural gas's contribution to total electricity generation increased from 19% to 34%, surpassing coal in percentage of total generation in 2016; and renewable energy's contribution to total electricity generation increased from 2% to 8%. If these recent trends in the electric power sector continue, CO 2 emissions in that sector may continue to decrease. However, modeling results cited above indicate that the CPP would have a substantial impact on future CO 2 emission levels from the electric power sector.	Recent international negotiations and domestic policy developments have generated interest in current and projected U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels. GHG emissions are generated throughout the United States from millions of discrete sources. Of the GHG source categories, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion account for the largest percentage (77%) of total U.S. GHG emissions. The electric power sector contributes the second-largest percentage (35%) of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion (1 percentage point behind the transportation sector). In December 2015, delegations from 195 nations, including the United States, adopted an agreement in Paris that creates an international structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, and cooperate to achieve these ends, including financial and other support. Pursuant to that agreement, the United States pledged (in 2015) to reduce GHG emissions by 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels. At the date of this report, U.S. involvement in the Paris Agreement remains uncertain. However, some recent reports indicate that President Trump is expected to withdraw from the agreement. U.S. GHG levels in 2015 were 11% below 2005 levels. Whether the United States achieves its goals would likely depend, to some degree, on CO2 emissions from power plants. In 2015, under President Obama, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated standards for CO2 emissions from existing electric power plants. The rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), is the subject of ongoing litigation involving a number of entities. On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the rule for the duration of the litigation. Multiple factors generally impact CO2 emission levels from the electric power sector. Some factors are listed below in no particular order: economic growth/recession, relative prices of energy sources for electricity—particularly natural gas and renewable energy sources, electricity generation portfolio (i.e., the ratio of electricity generation from coal, natural gas, and renewable energy sources), national and/or state policy developments (e.g., CPP implementation), and demand-side efficiency improvements (e.g., commercial and residential electricity use). Recent changes in the electric power sector may be informative. Between 1975 and 2010, electricity generation and CO2 emissions from the electric power sector generally increased. However, in 2010, their courses diverged. While electricity generation remained relatively flat after 2010, CO2 emissions from the electric power sector decreased. Thus in 2016, electricity generation was essentially equivalent to generation in 2005, while CO2 emissions were 25% below 2005 levels. Recent changes in the U.S. electricity generation portfolio played a key role in the CO2 emission decrease. The electricity portfolio affects CO2 emission levels because different sources of electricity generation produce different rates of CO2 emissions per unit of electricity (zero in the case of some renewables). For example, between 2005 and 2016, coal's contribution to total electricity generation decreased from 50% to 30%; natural gas's contribution to total electricity generation increased from 19% to 34%; and renewable energy's contribution to total electricity generation increased from 2% to 8%. Accurately forecasting future CO2 emission levels is a complex and challenging endeavor. A comparison of actual CO2 emissions (from energy use) between 1990 and 2017 with selected emission projections illustrates this difficulty. In general, actual emissions have remained well below projections. As the future of the CPP is uncertain, some have questioned whether existing policies and trends in electricity generation would continue to lower CO2 emissions. Modeling results indicate that CO2 emissions in the electricity sector are expected to continue declining. However, modeling results indicate that the declines would be substantially greater if the CPP were implemented.
crs_R44049	crs_R44049_0	It includes loss of western rangelands to invasive plants, blockage of power plant intakes to invasive mussels, and major declines of birds and mammals to invasive snakes in the Everglades. So vast is this "bioinvasion" (as some have termed it) that only rough estimates can be made of the numbers of non-native species now in North America or in the rest of the world. Moreover, despite a few rare successes, eradication of these species, once they become established, is extremely improbable. But because of the number and variety of non-native species, it is unclear how best to manage or prevent these effects or what legislation would be needed to address these problems. The absence of a general federal responsibility for wildlife affects the federal role in addressing invasive species. The National Invasive Species Council (NISC) was created by Executive Order 13112 in 1999, and has addressed some aspects of the invasive species problem. However, legislative efforts to date have tended to focus on well-established problems: the invasion of a single species, a specific pathway of introduction, or damage or risks to agriculture. The mild climates of Hawaii and Florida make it easier for the rich flora and fauna from other tropical and semitropical regions to survive, and they also make the states attractive to businesses that import, maintain, or breed non-native animals and plants, such as tropical fishes and ornamental plants. Easy transportation access increases the likelihood of invasion in aquatic habitats such as the Great Lakes. The areas around airports, with increased levels of international traffic and tourism, also are at risk. The arrival of a number of beetle species has played a similar role in focusing attention on pallet wood, packing crates, live plants, and airport warehouses as pathways and centers of biotic invasion. This evidence may be based on experience with the species domestically or in other countries. Preventing the spread of the species after it enters the United States may rely on public education, penalties for shippers, monitoring, and other means. This approach allows more flexibility for industries that depend on the importation of new species of plants or animals. With the white list approach, there is an attempt to predict potential harm before a species' arrival. Any species not on the list would be excluded. Issues for Congress: Actions and Approaches Federal laws concerning invasive species form a patchwork, stronger in some areas, such as agriculture and ballast water, and weaker or absent in other areas. Current laws do not clearly address prevention of biological invasion across foreseeable pathways (with the exception of ship ballast water); or early detection and rapid response (EDRR) before the establishment of the new species, when the focus of effort shifts from less expensive prevention to more expensive and less efficient control. Approaches to Regulation: Species-by-Species Versus Pathways Legislation to address invasive species could take a species-by-species approach, a pathway approach, or a combination of the two. Both agencies would benefit from faster assessments of either species or pathways so they could direct resources to the most critical areas. Its goals put prevention on an equal or higher footing compared with control of species that are already established. The list below is compiled from many sources. Review of industries dependent on importing and transferring non-native species . Since the creation of NISC, agencies have begun to respond across a broad front in the days, weeks, or months after an invasion is discovered.	For the first few centuries after the arrival of Europeans in North America, plants and animals of many species were sent between the two continents. The transfer of non-natives consisted not only of intentional westbound species ranging from pigs to dandelions but also of intentional eastbound species, such as gray squirrels and tomatoes. And for those centuries, the remaining non-native species crossing the Atlantic, uninvited and often unwelcome, were ignored if they were noticed at all. They were joined by various species arriving deliberately or accidentally from Asia and Africa. The national focus on invasive species arose in the 19 th century, primarily owing to losses in agriculture (due to weeds or plant diseases), the leading industry of the time. A few recently arrived invasive species, and estimates of adverse economic impacts exceeding $100 billion annually, have sharpened that focus. Very broadly, the unanswered question regarding invasive species concerns whose responsibility it is to ensure economic integrity and ecological stability in response to the actual or potential impacts of invasive species. As this report shows, the current answer is not simple. It may depend on answers to many other questions: Is the introduction deliberate or accidental? Does it affect agriculture? By what pathway does the new species arrive? Is the potential harm from the species already known? Is the species already established in one area of the country? Finally, if the answers to any of these questions are unsatisfactory, what changes should be made? The specific issue before Congress is whether new legislative authorities and funding are needed to address issues related to invasive species and their increasing economic and ecological impacts on such disparate matters as power plant operations, grazing lands, and coral reef fishes. Such legislation could affect domestic and international trade, tourism, industries dependent on importing non-native species and those dependent on keeping them out, and, finally, the variety of natural resources that have little direct economic value and yet affect the lives of a broad segment of the public. In the century or so of congressional responses to invasive species, the usual approach has been an ad hoc attack on the particular problem, from impure seed stocks to Asian carp in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. A few notable attempts have begun to address specific pathways by which invasives arrive (e.g., ship ballast water), but no current law addresses the broad general concern over non-native species and the variety of paths by which they enter this country. A 1999 executive order took a step in bringing together some of the current authorities and resources to address a problem that has expanded with both increasing world trade and travel and decreasing transit time for humans and cargo. Multiple bills have been introduced on this subject in recent Congresses as well as in the 114 th Congress. There are two basic approaches to addressing invasive species: a species-by-species assessment of the risks or benefits of admitting or excluding species, and a policy based on controlling pathways of entry in which vigilance is maintained on incoming ballast tanks, cargo holds, packing materials, and similar vehicles for unwanted organisms. These two approaches may complement each other. Policymakers also have the choice of an emphasis on preventing the arrival or establishment of more invasive species versus post hoc control of species that have already arrived and become established.
crs_RL34514	crs_RL34514_0	ATF Mission Located in the Department of Justice (DOJ), the ATF is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms and explosives. As part of the Homeland Security Act, Congress transferred ATF's enforcement and regulatory functions for firearms and explosives to the DOJ from the Department of the Treasury, adding "explosives" to ATF's title. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, as well as criminal violations of federal laws governing the manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol and tobacco. For example, for the past two fiscal years, FY2009 and FY2010, Congress has provided ATF with program increases to address illegal gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico under an initiative known as "Project Gunrunner." For FY2008, Congress also provided ATF with a program increase for domestic gun trafficking, and the focus of this program increase was also largely on the Southwest border. As a result, for those three fiscal years, Congress has provided over $49 million in program increases to address gun trafficking, which is the diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. Congress has also provided nearly $30 million for the construction of a National Center for Explosives Training and Research (NCETR). 3288 ), Congress matched the Administration's request and appropriated $1.121 billion for ATF, or $24.0 million (3.9%) more than the agency's total FY2009 appropriations ($1.078 billion). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 In P.L. 111-117 , Congress appropriated $1.121 billion for ATF for FY2010. 111-366 ) indicated that the act included the following increases: $18 million for Project Gunrunner, the same amount requested by the Administration and included in the Senate-reported and Housed-passed bills (described below); $10 million to increase for ATF-led inter-agency task forces known as Violent Crime Impact Teams, which are dedicated to reducing violent crime and illegal gang activity, as originally included in the House-passed bill; $6 million for construction (phase two) of the NCETR, instead of the $25 million requested by the Administration, an amount included in the Senate bill, or the $10 million under the House bill; and $1.5 million to complete ATF headquarters construction projects. FY2009 Appropriations Congress appropriated $1.054 billion for ATF in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( H.R. 111-8 ). Congress also provided ATF with $10 million in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). In addition, Congress provided ATF with $14 million in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. As a result, for FY2009, Congress appropriated a sum total of $1.078 billion for ATF, or $66.6 million (6.6%) more than the FY2008-enacted amount ($1.012 billion). 111-32 ). Conference report language indicated that the ATF supplemental appropriation included $4 million to support ATF's role in the global war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, $4 million to upgrade and share ballistic imaging technology with the government of Mexico, and $6 million for other ongoing efforts focused on stemming illegal gun trafficking to Mexico under Project Gunrunner. 110-161 ). In sum total, Congress appropriated $1.012 billion for ATF for FY2008, or $23.5 million (2.4%) more than the FY2007 appropriations ($988.1 million). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 In P.L. Program increases included $23.5 million for the construction of NCETR and $6.3 million for gun trafficking investigations. FY2008 Iraq Supplemental Appropriation In the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ; H.R. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 6028 ; H.Rept. In the 111 th Congress, similar bills have been introduced ( S. 205 , H.R. 1448 , and H.R. 1867 ).	The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of firearms and explosives. Congress transferred ATF's enforcement and regulatory functions for firearms and explosives from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice as part of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, as well as criminal violations of federal laws governing the manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol and tobacco. For the past two fiscal years, FY2009 and FY2010, Congress has provided ATF with program increases to address illegal gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico under an initiative known as "Project Gunrunner." For FY2008, Congress also provided ATF with a program increase for domestic gun trafficking, but the focus of this program increase was also largely on the Southwest border. As a result, for those three fiscal years, Congress has provided over $49 million in program increases to address gun trafficking. Congress has also provided nearly $30 million for the construction of a National Center for Explosives Training and Research (NCETR). In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), Congress matched the Administration's request and appropriated $1.121 billion for ATF, or 3.9% more than the agency's FY2009 appropriations ($1.078 billion). Conference report language (H.Rept. 111-366) indicated that the act included an increase of $18 million for Project Gunrunner, the same amount requested by the Administration; $10 million to increase the Violent Crime Impact Team program; $6 million for construction (phase two) of NCETR; and $1.5 million to complete ATF headquarters construction projects. In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), Congress appropriated $1.054 billion for ATF. This amount included at least a $5 million increase for Project Gunrunner. Congress also appropriated ATF an additional $14 million in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32). This amount included a $4 million increase to upgrade and share ballistic imaging technology with the government of Mexico, and an additional $6 million increase for Project Gunrunner. In addition, Congress appropriated an additional $10 million for Project Gunrunner in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Hence, Congress provided $25 million in FY2009 budget enhancements to address Southwest border gun trafficking. For FY2009, in sum total, Congress appropriated ATF $1.078 billion, or 6.6% more than the FY2008 appropriation ($1.012 billion). In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), Congress appropriated $1.008 billion for ATF. This act included an increase of $6.3 million to address domestic gun trafficking and $23.5 million for the construction of NCETR. In the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), Congress appropriated an additional $4 million for ATF to provide explosives and cigarette trafficking training and support to Iraqi authorities. The total FY2008 ATF appropriation was $1.012 billion, or 2.4% more than the FY2007 appropriations ($988.1 million). In the 110th Congress, the House passed a bill (H.R. 6028) that would have authorized increasing ATF appropriations over three years, for FY2008 through FY2010, by nearly $74 million to address Southwest border gun trafficking. Similar bills have been introduced in the 111th Congress (S. 205, H.R. 495, H.R. 1448, and H.R. 1867). This report will not be updated.
crs_R42658	crs_R42658_0	105-220 ) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development. In addition, Title I authorizes the establishment of a One-Stop delivery system through which state and local WIA training and employment activities are provided and through which certain partner programs must be coordinated; Title II—Adult Education and Literacy—provides education services to assist adults in improving their literacy and completing secondary education; Title III—Workforce Investment-Related Activities—amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 to integrate the U.S. Employment Service (ES) into the One-Stop system established by WIA; and Title IV—Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998—amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides employment-related services to individuals with disabilities. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) expired at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. In the 108 th and 109 th Congresses, bills to reauthorize WIA were passed in both the House and the Senate; however, no further action was taken. In the 112 th Congress, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) released discussion drafts in June 2011 of legislation to amend and reauthorize WIA. While markup of this legislation was scheduled, it was ultimately postponed indefinitely. No legislation has been introduced. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce, however, has ordered reported H.R. 4297 —the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2012. This bill was introduced on March 29, 2012, by Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina, the chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training, (for herself, Representative Howard P. "Buck" McKeon of California, and Representative Joseph Heck of Nevada). A legislative hearing on H.R. 4297 was held before the full Committee on Education and the Workforce on April 17, 2012. On June 7, 2012, the committee, after considering 23 amendments to H.R. 4297 , ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 15. This report summarizes each of the WIA titles and highlights the major features of H.R. The report also compares the proposed provisions of H.R. 4297 to current law in the following tables: Table 1 . WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 career centers nationwide. H.R. H.R.	The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development activities, including job search assistance, career development, and job training. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 One-Stop career centers nationwide. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the WIA expired at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. In the 108th and 109th Congresses, bills to reauthorize WIA were passed in both the House and the Senate; however, no further action was taken. In the 112th Congress, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) released discussion drafts in June 2011 of legislation to amend and reauthorize WIA. While markup of this legislation was scheduled, it was ultimately postponed indefinitely. No legislation has been introduced. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce, however, has ordered reported H.R. 4297—the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2012. This bill was introduced on March 29, 2012, by Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina, the chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training (for herself, Representative Howard P. "Buck" McKeon of California, and Representative Joseph Heck of Nevada). A legislative hearing on H.R. 4297 was held before the full Committee on Education and the Workforce on April 17, 2012. On June 7, 2012, the committee, after considering 23 amendments to H.R. 4297, ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 15. H.R. 4297 would maintain the One-Stop delivery system established by WIA but would repeal numerous programs authorized by WIA and other federal legislation, and it would consolidate other programs into a new single funding source—the Workforce Investment Fund. In addition, H.R. 4297 would increase the role of business representatives in the state and local governance structure of WIA and would increase the ability for states to propose further program consolidation in the funding and delivery of workforce services. Adult Education and Vocational Rehabilitation retain separate titles and funding in H.R. 4297. This report first provides a brief introduction to the four main titles of WIA and then compares the proposed provisions of H.R. 4297 to the current law provisions by each of the four titles.
crs_R40126	crs_R40126_0	Domestic Situation Located along the Pacific coast of South America, Chile is a politically stable, upper-middle-income nation of 18 million people. President Bachelet has quickly moved forward with her policy agenda since assuming office for a four-year term in March 2014. President Bachelet signed into law several initial education reforms in May 2015. Over the course of the next year, the Bachelet Administration intends to educate citizens about the issues involved, hold a national dialogue to hear what Chileans would like to include in the constitution, and send a measure to the Chilean Congress that would authorize the next Congress—scheduled to take office in 2018—to select a mechanism for considering a new constitution. In addition to these large-scale reforms of Chile's tax, education, and political systems, Bachelet and her New Majority coalition are pushing ahead with a number of other notable policy initiatives. While students, unions, and other groups have continued to hold demonstrations and have called on Bachelet and the Chilean Congress to enact more far-reaching policy changes more quickly, some economic and political analysts maintain that Chilean policymakers should slow down in order to reassure the business community and establish broader consensus on significant policy changes. President Bachelet's approval rating has declined significantly since she took office, with divisions regarding her reform agenda, recent corruption scandals, and the weakening economy (see " Economic Challenges " below) taking a toll on her popularity. Chile's economic growth slowed to 1.9% in 2014. Economic analysts attribute the deceleration to a sharp decline in private investment stemming from the drop in copper prices and other external factors, as well as a fall in business confidence that appears to be related to the Bachelet Administration's reforms. The Chilean government has sought to stimulate economic growth over the past year. Buoyed by these measures, Chile's annual economic growth is forecast to accelerate slightly to 2.3% in 2015. Commercial Ties U.S.-Chilean trade relations have grown considerably since the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement entered into force on January 1, 2004. Total bilateral trade has quadrupled since the agreement was signed, growing from $7.9 billion in 2003 to $31 billion in 2014 (see Figure 2 ). Trans-Pacific Partnership Chile and the United States have both participated in negotiations concerning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed 12-member Asia-Pacific regional trade agreement that includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The 114 th Congress may consider the TPP under the rules and procedures set forth in the Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Priorities Act ( P.L. 114-26 ), commonly known as trade promotion authority (TPA), which the House and Senate approved, and President Obama signed into law, in June 2015. In February 2010, the United States and Chile signed an income tax treaty designed to encourage investment in both countries by providing certainty on the tax treatment of investors and reducing tax-related barriers to investment. President Obama submitted the agreement to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent in May 2012 ( Treaty Doc. 112-8 ). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing to consider the treaty, along with seven other pending agreements, on October 29, 2015, and reported the treaty favorably on November 10, 2015. In order to foster closer security ties, the United States provides some foreign aid to Chile. In June 2013, the United States and Chile signed an extradition treaty. President Obama submitted the agreement, known as the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Republic of Chile," to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent in September 2014 ( Treaty Doc. The countries currently cooperate on a range of issues, including trade, security, energy, and scientific research.	Chile, located along the Pacific coast of South America, is a politically stable, upper-middle-income nation of 18 million people. In 2013, Michelle Bachelet and her center-left "New Majority" coalition won the presidency and sizeable majorities in both houses of the Chilean Congress after campaigning on a platform of ambitious reforms designed to reduce inequality and improve social mobility. Since her inauguration to a four-year term in March 2014, President Bachelet has signed into law significant changes to the tax, education, and electoral systems. She has also proposed a number of other economic and social policy reforms, as well as a process for adopting a new constitution. Although a significant majority of the public initially supported the reforms, Chileans have grown more divided over time, with some groups pushing for more far-reaching policy changes and others calling for Bachelet to scale back her agenda. Disapproval of the reforms, a corruption scandal that implicated her son, and Chile's slowing economy have taken a toll on President Bachelet's approval rating, which has declined to 29%. Chile's economic growth has slowed considerably in recent years, falling to 1.9% in 2014. Analysts have largely attributed the slowdown to the end of the global commodity boom and the coinciding drop in copper prices, which have a significant impact on the Chilean economy. There are also indications that the Bachelet Administration's policy reforms may have reduced business confidence and dampened growth. In order to stimulate the economy, the Chilean government has implemented expansive fiscal and monetary policies over the past year. Growth is forecast to accelerate slightly to 2.3% in 2015 and gradually increase in the following years. President Obama and President Bachelet have sought to build upon the long-standing partnership between the United States and Chile. Commercial ties are particularly strong. Total trade in goods and services reached $31 billion in 2014, more than quadrupling since the implementation of a free trade agreement in 2004. Trade and investment flows could increase if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, which includes the United States, Chile, and 10 other nations in the Asia-Pacific region, is approved. The United States and Chile also work together to address regional and global security challenges, such as instability in Haiti. The United States provided Chile with an estimated $1 million in foreign aid in FY2015 to strengthen the capabilities of Chilean security forces and foster closer security ties. The countries' mature partnership includes additional collaboration on issues such as energy development and scientific research. The 114th Congress is currently considering several measures related to U.S.-Chilean relations. Congress may consider implementing legislation for the TPP agreement under the rules and procedures set forth in the Bipartisan Comprehensive Trade Priorities Act (P.L. 114-26, "trade promotion authority"), which both houses passed and the President signed into law in June 2015. The Senate also may consider a bilateral income tax treaty with Chile (Treaty Doc. 112-8), which was signed in 2010, submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent in 2012, and reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 10, 2015. An extradition treaty with Chile (Treaty Doc. 113-6), which was signed in 2013 and submitted to the Senate in September 2014, also awaits the Senate's advice and consent.
crs_R41283	crs_R41283_0	Introduction This report provides summary data on the number of Senators and Members of the House who first entered Congress between the 64 th Congress (1915-1917) and the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). Since the convening of the 64 th Congress, 4,201 individuals have entered the House of Representatives for their first, or "freshman," terms as a Representative. An additional 28 have begun service as a Delegate or Resident Commissioner. During th e same period, 844 individuals began their first terms in the Senate. First-term membership is divided into two broad categories in each chamber: Members chosen prior to the convening of a Congress, and those chosen after a Congress convenes. The resulting data, combining pre-convening and post-convening first-term Members, provide a count of all Members who served a first term in the House or Senate. Data on pre-convening first-term Members provide partial insight into the extent of membership turnover in the House and Senate since 1915, and are discussed in greater detail below. Post-convening first-term Member data do not reveal clear patterns within individual Congresses, or over time. This is due in part to the wide range of reasons that a seat in the House and Senate may become vacant in the course of a Congress, and the circumstances under which it may be filled. The data suggest that while there is no consistent pattern of change from Congress to Congress, the overall number of new, pre-convening, first-term Representatives has declined. This appears to be consistent with some academic findings that argue that the durations of Members' careers have been increasing in the past century.	This report provides summary data on the number of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who first entered Congress between the 64th Congress (1915-1917) and the 114th Congress (2015-2016). First-term membership is divided into two broad categories in each chamber: Members chosen prior to the convening of a Congress, and those chosen after a Congress convenes. The resulting data, combining pre-convening and post-convening first-term Members, provide a count of all Members who served a first term in the House or Senate. Since the convening of the 64th Congress, 4,201 individuals have entered the House of Representatives for their first, or "freshman," terms as Representatives. An additional 28 have begun service as Delegates or Resident Commissioners. During the same period, 844 individuals began their first terms in the Senate. Data on pre-convening first-term Members provide partial insight into the extent of membership turnover in the House and Senate since 1915. In both chambers, the data suggest that the overall number of first-term Members elected to Congress who take their seats at the convening of a new Congress has declined since the 64th Congress. This appears to be consistent with findings that argue that the duration of Members' careers has been increasing in the past century. Taken on their own, post-convening first-term Member data do not reveal clear patterns within individual Congresses, or over time. This is due in part to the wide range of reasons that a seat in the House and Senate may become vacant in the course of a Congress, and the circumstances under which it may be filled.
crs_R42659	crs_R42659_0	18 U.S.C. § 1385. This report provides an historical analysis of the use of the Armed Forces to execute domestic law and of the Posse Comitatus Act, including their apparent theoretical and constitutional underpinnings. The report then outlines the current application of the Posse Comitatus Act as well as its statutory exceptions, and reviews the consequences of its violation. After the deficiencies were corrected and a proclamation was issued, the general officer in charge of federal troops requested clarification as to the disposition of federal troops and espoused the doctrine that whenever a state government asks for assistance under the Insurrection Act, federal military power should supplant local civil authority: When the governor of a State has declared his inability to suppress an insurrection and has called upon the President of the United States under the Constitution to do so, that from that time commences a state not of peace but of war, and that although civil local authority still exists, yet the only outcome is to resort to force through the Federal military authorities, and that can only be through a subordination of the State authorities for the time being and until lawful order is restored; otherwise there can be no complete exercise of power in a military way within the limits of the State by the Federal officers. It permits Congress to authorize the use of the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." And it guarantees the states protection against invasion or usurpation of their "republican form of government," and, upon the request of the state legislature, against "domestic violence." When the Posse Comitatus Act Does Not Apply In addition to any express constitutional exceptions, the use of the Armed Forces to execute federal law does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act when (1) an act of Congress expressly authorizes use of part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the law; (2) the activity in question does not involve use of part of the Armed Forces covered by the proscription; or (3) the activity in question does not constitute "execution of the law." § 251 (then codified at 10 U.S.C. Even if the Posse Comitatus Act were read to apply only to the use of personnel, would the use of military personnel to maintain equipment loaned to civilian authorities violate the act's proscription? Analysis of constitutional or statutory exceptions is unnecessary in such cases. Coverage of the Posse Comitatus Act Willful Use The act is limited to "willful" misuse of the Army or Air Force. Existing case law and commentary indicate that "execution of the law" in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act occurs (a) when the Armed Forces perform tasks ordinarily assigned not to them but to an organ of civil government, or (b) when the Armed Forces perform tasks assigned to them solely for purposes of civilian government. At least when suggested that the Armed Forces have been improperly used as a police force, the tests used by most contemporary courts to determine whether military activity in support of civilian authorities violates the Posse Comitatus Act were developed out of disturbances at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota and inquiry: 1. whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the law"; 2. whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or 3. whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature." As a practical matter, however, the Coast Guard is statutorily authorized to perform law enforcement functions. And the courts have said that members of the National Guard when not in federal service are not covered by the Posse Comitatus Act. Congress does appear to have intended the authority and restrictions contained in 10 U.S.C. The regulations implementing 10 U.S.C. Consequences of Violation Prosecution The Posse Comitatus Act is a criminal statute under which there has never been an officially reported prosecution, although it appears there were two prosecutions shortly after the act was passed. As administrative adoption of the act for the Navy and Marines demonstrates, the military has a long-standing practice of avoiding involvement in civilian affairs which it believes are contrary to the act.	The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the use of the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." And it guarantees the states protection against invasion or usurpation of their "republican form of government," and, upon the request of the state legislature, against "domestic violence." These constitutional provisions are reflected in the Insurrection Acts, which have been invoked numerous times both before and after passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1385, in 1878. Congress has also enacted a number of statutes that authorize the use of land and naval forces to execute their objective. The Posse Comitatus Act outlaws the willful use of any part of the Army or Air Force to execute the law unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. History supplies the grist for an argument that the Constitution prohibits military involvement in civilian affairs subject to only limited alterations by Congress or the President, but the courts do not appear to have ever accepted the argument unless violation of more explicit constitutional command could also be shown. The express statutory exceptions include the legislation that allows the President to use military force to suppress insurrection or to enforce federal authority, 10 U.S.C. Sections 251-255, and laws that permit the Department of Defense to provide federal, state and local police with information, equipment, and personnel, 10 U.S.C. §§ 271-284. Case law indicates that "execution of the law" in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act occurs (a) when the Armed Forces perform tasks assigned to an organ of civil government, or (b) when the Armed Forces perform tasks assigned to them solely for purposes of civilian government. Questions concerning the act's application arise most often in the context of assistance to civilian police. At least in this context, the courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the Posse Comitatus Act is violated when (1) civilian law enforcement officials make "direct active use" of military investigators; or (2) the use of the military "pervades the activities" of the civilian officials; or (3) the military is used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature." The act is not violated when the Armed Forces conduct activities for a military purpose. The language of the act mentions only the Army and the Air Force, but it is applicable to the Navy and Marines by virtue of administrative action and commands of other laws. The law enforcement functions of the Coast Guard have been expressly authorized by act of Congress and consequently cannot be said to be contrary to the act. The act has been applied to the National Guard when it is in federal service, to civilian employees of the Armed Forces, and to off-duty military personnel. The act probably only applies within the geographical confines of the United States, but supplemental provisions of 10 U.S.C. §§ 271-284 appear to apply worldwide. Finally, the act is a criminal statute under which there has been but a handful of known prosecutions. Although violations will on rare occasions result in the exclusion of evidence, the dismissal of criminal charges, or a civil cause of action, as a practical matter compliance is ordinarily the result of military self-restraint. This report provides an historical analysis of the use of the Armed Forces to execute domestic law and of the Posse Comitatus Act, including their apparent theoretical and constitutional underpinnings. The report then outlines the current application of the act as well as its statutory exceptions, and reviews the consequences of its violation. This report appears in abridged form as CRS Report R42669, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch.
crs_RL33923	crs_RL33923_0	In the latter half of this decade, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in nine patent cases, perhaps in recognition of the increasing importance of intellectual property to technological innovation, as well as in order to correct errors in lower courts' interpretation and application of patent law. The factual history of Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I is as follows. In June 2003, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") affirmed the district court's determination as to Merck's liability. Merck appealed the Federal Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. October Term 2005 Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich One of the statutory bars to patentability of an invention is "novelty." In May 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated the Federal Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion in this case. The Supreme Court has articulated limits for patentability, previously stating that "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" may not be patented. In reply, Metabolite's briefs argued that the Supreme Court should dismiss the case on procedural grounds. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.88 Section 103(a) of the Patent Act provides one of the statutory bars for patentability of inventions, such that a patent claim is invalid if "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." October Term 2007 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. More importantly, the appellate court's decision clarified the standards concerning patentability of process claims.	Patent law jurisprudence is continually being developed through litigation over activities that allegedly infringe a patent holder's rights. The losing party in these cases may appeal the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized tribunal established by Congress that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. Parties dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit's rulings may petition the U.S. Supreme Court to review the appellate court's decision. However, the Supreme Court is not required to entertain the appeal; it has discretion to decide whether to grant certiorari to review the case. While the Supreme Court has left the Federal Circuit's opinions undisturbed in the vast majority of patent cases since the creation of the specialized patent court in 1982, the Court has shown, over the past several terms, an increased willingness to hear cases that raise patent law issues. The Supreme Court Justices' apparent newfound interest in patent cases perhaps stems from a recognition of the growing importance of intellectual property to the nation's information-based economy, as well as a desire to correct perceived errors in lower courts' interpretation and application of patent law. This report provides a brief summary of the Supreme Court's patent law jurisprudence in the following nine cases that have been decided since 2005: Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, eBay v. MercExchange, Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., MedImmune v. Genentech, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., Microsoft v. AT&T, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., and Bilski v. Kappos.
crs_R41786	crs_R41786_0	Introduction Thermoelectric generating plants and many manufacturing facilities withdraw large volumes of water for use in production and, especially, to absorb waste heat from their industrial processes. Together, water withdrawals by manufacturers and electricity generators represent more than one-half of the 410 billion gallons of water withdrawn daily for various uses in the United States. Withdrawing water from streams, rivers, lakes, and coastal waters is a necessity for most electricity generating and manufacturing facilities, but facilities that require water for cooling also present special problems for aquatic resources. And the process of drawing surface water into the plant or facility can simultaneously pull fish, shellfish, and tiny organisms into the plant, generally killing them. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been engaged in regulatory efforts to implement Section 316(b) for more than 35 years. In March 2011, EPA proposed national requirements to be implemented through CWA discharge permits to minimize adverse environmental impact of cooling water intake structures at existing electricity generating and manufacturing facilities. Even before release, the proposed regulations were highly controversial among stakeholders and some Members of Congress. The issue for Congress has been whether a stringent and costly environmental mandate could jeopardize reliability of electricity supply in the United States. Many industry stakeholders feared, while environmental groups hoped, that EPA would require installation of technology called closed-cycle cooling that most effectively minimizes impingement and entrainment, but also would be the most costly technology option. However, as discussed in this report, the EPA proposal declined to mandate closed-cycle cooling universally and instead proposed a less costly, more flexible regulatory option. EPA's efforts to implement Section 316(b) have a long and complicated history, including legal challenges at every step by industry groups and environmental advocates (for details, see the Appendix ). It was published in the Federal Register on August 15, 2014, with an effective date of October 14, 2014. In total, the final rule would apply to approximately 1,065 facilities. The universe of steam electric generators that would be affected by the final rule is 544 facilities. EPA concluded that closed-cycle cooling reduces impingement and entrainment mortality to a greater extent than other technologies. Thus, in the proposed rule, the agency rejected closed-cycle cooling as the uniform basis for national entrainment controls at existing facilities. This conclusion was based on four factors. This is referred to as energy penalty. Fossil-fueled facilities would need to burn additional fuel to compensate for the energy required to operate cooling towers, thus emitting additional pollutants, including nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, mercury, and especially additional particulate matter formation associated with plume drifts. Land availability concerns might limit the feasibility of installing cooling towers on a site-specific basis. Industry groups and some states endorsed the flexibility provided in this part of the proposal to not establish a blanket requirement that closed-cycle cooling be installed at all existing facilities, while environmental advocacy groups and some states were critical of it. Based on potential energy penalty and other factors, EPA recommended site-specific determination of the need for entrainment mortality controls, which might require cooling towers, or it might not. To the extent that permitting authorities already incur costs for administering permits based on Best Professional Judgment, incremental costs of the final rule to permitting authorities are overstated. Uncertainties of Compliance Cost Estimates EPA acknowledged a number of uncertainties about compliance cost estimates in the final rule. Industry groups were pleased that EPA did not propose closed-cycle cooling for all existing facilities—as many in industry had feared—so they focused their critiques on the impingement standards and urged EPA to revise the rule to provide greater flexibility that would be more cost-effective. States were somewhat divided in their responses, with many favoring more flexibility in the rule to lessen the administrative burden on permitting authorities, but some advocating a more prescriptive approach regarding entrainment, rather than one calling for site-specific determinations, as in EPA's preferred option in 2011. Stakeholder groups again differ in evaluating the final rule, but their views diverge from those on the 2011 proposal. Environmental groups, who had advocated that EPA include stringent closed-cycle cooling as a uniform requirement representing BTA, said that they were extremely disappointed with the final rule and likely would challenge it in federal court. Since release of the final rule, some Members of Congress argue that the rule's costs threaten the affordability and reliability of electricity.	Thermoelectric generating plants and manufacturing facilities withdraw large volumes of water for production and, especially, to absorb heat from their industrial processes. Water withdrawals by power producers and manufacturers represent more than one-half of water withdrawn daily for various uses in the United States. Although water withdrawal is a necessity for these facilities, it also presents special problems for aquatic resources. In particular, the process of drawing surface water into the plant through cooling water intake structures (CWIS) can simultaneously pull in fish, shellfish, and tiny organisms, injuring or killing them. Congress enacted Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) specifically to address CWIS. Regulatory efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement Section 316(b) have a long and complicated history over more than 35 years, including legal challenges at every step by industry groups and environmental advocates. Currently most new facilities are regulated under a rule issued in 2001, while a rule for existing facilities was challenged and remanded to EPA for revisions. In response, in 2011 EPA proposed national requirements affecting approximately 1,150 existing electric power plants and manufacturing facilities. Even before release, the proposed regulations were highly controversial among stakeholders and some Members of Congress. The issue for Congress has been whether a stringent and costly environmental mandate could jeopardize reliability of electricity supply in the United States. Many in industry feared, while environmental groups hoped, that EPA would require installation of technology called closed-cycle cooling that most effectively minimizes the adverse environmental impacts of CWIS, but also is the most costly technology option. The EPA proposal declined to mandate closed-cycle cooling universally and instead favored a less costly, more flexible regulatory option. EPA's recommended approach in the 2011 proposal would essentially codify current CWIS permitting procedures for existing facilities, which are based on site-specific determinations and have been in place administratively for some time because of legal challenges to previous rules. EPA acknowledges that closed-cycle systems reduce the adverse effects of CWIS to a greater extent than other technologies, but in the proposed rule it rejected closed-cycle cooling as a uniform requirement to minimize entrainment at existing facilities. The agency based that conclusion on four factors: additional energy needed by electricity and manufacturing facilities to operate cooling equipment (i.e., energy penalty), additional air pollutants that would be emitted because fossil-fueled facilities would need to burn more fuel as compensation for the energy penalty, land availability concerns in some locations, and limited remaining useful life of some facilities that would not justify retrofit costs. Not surprisingly, stakeholder groups viewed the proposal differently. Environmental groups endorsed the parts of the rule that would establish nationally uniform requirements, but criticized those allowing for site-specific determinations. Industry groups urged EPA to provide greater flexibility that would be more cost-effective. State permitting authorities were divided on modifying the rule to be more flexible. The final rule was delayed several times, largely due to EPA's consultation with federal wildlife services on potential impact of the rule on threatened and endangered species. The final rule was published in the Federal Register on August 15, 2014, with an October 14 effective date. EPA again declined to mandate closed-cycle cooling as a uniform requirement and provided several compliance options that are more flexible and less costly than the 2011 proposal. EPA estimates the annual compliance costs of the final rule to be $275 million and the annualized benefits to be $33 million. Projected costs do not reflect any site-specific requirements that permitting authorities may establish. Stakeholder groups differ in evaluating the final rule, and their views diverge from those on the 2011 proposal. Environmental groups, who had advocated that EPA include closed-cycle cooling as a uniform requirement at existing facilities, said that they were extremely disappointed with the final rule, and they have already filed several challenges to it in federal court. The petroleum industry also has filed a legal challenge, as did representatives of the electric power industry, even though the latter indicated overall approval of the final rule. Some Members of Congress have criticized the final rule's cost as a threat to affordability and reliability of the nation's electricity supply.
crs_R41938	crs_R41938_0	Particularly popular when there is dissatisfaction with debt or deficit levels, such proposals seek to establish a legal mandate for a budgetary policy or fiscal objective, such as a specific limit on the deficit level, or the requirement for a balanced federal budget. This report focuses specifically on one such budget process reform: the concept of creating a statutory limit on total spending. A total spending limit, often referred to as an overall spending cap or an omnicap, consists of statutory long-term or permanent limits on federal spending, encompassing both discretionary and direct spending (also referred to as mandatory or entitlement spending). Further, the analysis in this report concerns measures that propose a total spending limit that also include an automatic statutory mechanism to enforce the spending limit in the event that compliance is not achieved through legislative action. In the event of a breach, an automatic enforcement mechanism would impose reductions in spending. The recent growth in spending, both in dollar terms and relative to the economy as a whole, has garnered support for total limits on spending. Several groups and organizations have recommended a total spending cap, though few provide detail on what such a legislative proposal might include. In addition, the House-passed budget resolution for FY2012, H.Con.Res. 34 , includes a policy statement on budget enforcement that calls for Congress to enact total spending limits, and on July 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 2560 , which includes total spending limits for FY2013-FY2021. The next section of the report discusses typical features of total spending limits and provides information on how they may vary. The final section of the report includes observations on compliance with the spending limits, based on historical experiences with statutory budget controls. Statutory limits on total spending address at least two perceived limitations of the congressional budget resolution. Finally, levels of direct spending are especially subject to unpredictable variations. Criticisms Criticisms that have been raised of spending limit proposals have rested on several grounds. Lastly, it can be argued that relying on automatic reductions to fulfill budgetary levels cedes Congress's control over levels and details of spending. H.R. Others, such as S. 245 , and H.R. Similarly, H.R. Automatic Reduction Mechanism (Sequestration) The purpose of including automatic enforcement mechanisms in proposals to create total spending limits is to enforce spending limits on spending that results from already enacted legislation.	Often when there is dissatisfaction with budgetary levels, budget process reforms are proposed to mandate a specific budgetary policy or fiscal objective. This report focuses specifically on one such budget process reform—the concept of creating a statutory limit on total spending. As discussed in this report, a total spending limit consists of statutory long-term or permanent limits on federal spending coupled with a statutory enforcement mechanism that would make automatic reductions in spending in the event that compliance with the limits is not achieved through legislative action. Such spending limits would comprise any new spending as well as spending that results from previously enacted law. By encompassing all types of spending, and by including a statutory enforcement mechanism, a total spending limit attempts to remedy a perceived limitation of the congressional budget resolution, under which Congress establishes limits on spending in various categories that can be enforced or waived by Congress at its own discretion. The recent growth in spending, both in dollar terms and relative to the economy, has generated support for total limits on spending. Several groups and organizations have recommended a total spending cap, and on July 19, 2011, the House passed H.R. 2560, the Cut, Cap and Balance Act of 2011, which includes total spending limits for FY2013 through FY2021. In addition, the House-passed budget resolution for FY2012, H.Con.Res. 34, includes a policy statement calling for Congress to enact total spending limits. Other legislative proposals introduced in the 112th Congress include total spending limits, such as S. 245, H.R. 1605, H.R. 1848, and H.R. 2041. The potential effectiveness of a statutory limit on total spending is complicated by projection uncertainty, unforeseen events, and especially the complex nature of direct spending. Statutory limits have been subject to criticism for ceding Congress's "power of the purse," targeting spending rather than the deficit or debt, attempting to address a budgetary problem through procedure instead of policy changes that would themselves reduce spending, and for other reasons. This report provides information on the concept of a statutory limit on total spending, including objectives, complications, and criticisms. The report also includes information on the many features of spending limit proposals, which can vary considerably. Lastly, the report provides observations on budgetary controls, similar to statutory spending limits, from an historical perspective.
crs_RL32891	crs_RL32891_0	As Congress perform oversight in the 110 th Congress, biodefense research, biosecurity, and the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in this area may become of interest. Congressional oversight of federal programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered to play a key role in ensuring transparency. The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is a program office within the DHS Science and Technology Directorate that funds biodefense research and other activities. It will then discuss select policy issues, such as funding for NBACC facility construction, oversight of NBACC research, and the potential for duplication of federal effort between NBACC and other agencies. To provide a unique home for research overseen by the NBACC program, DHS is constructing an NBACC laboratory at Fort Detrick, MD as part of the National Interagency Biodefense Campus. The NBACC facility is operated as a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC). Missions of Component Centers The mission of the NBACC program is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The Biodefense Knowledge Center supports NBACC facility component centers and has its own functions and missions.	The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and bio-terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities. A laboratory facility dedicated to executing the NBACC mission and to contain two NBACC component centers is being built at Fort Detrick, Maryland, as part of the National Interagency Biodefense Campus. The laboratory facility, with an estimated construction cost of $141 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization appear to be evolving, as conflicting information has been provided during previous budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication and coordination of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
crs_RL31119	crs_RL31119_0	An SDT, according to the executive order, is aperson found to pose a significant risk of disrupting the Middle East peace process, or to have materiallysupported acts of violence toward that end. These groups are discussed in this report, even though they operate outside the Near East region, because of theiralleged connections to the bin Laden network and the Taliban of Afghanistan. Since the uprising began, Hamas and its smaller ally, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), have escalatedterrorist attacks against Israelis. war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. History. Both seek to replace Egypt's pro-Western, seculargovernment with an Islamic state. The following Egyptian Islamist figures have beennamed as SDTs or as subject to enhanced financial restrictions under Executive Order 13224: (1) Shaykh UmarAbd al-Rahman, who was acquitted in 1984 of inciting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's assassination, is in amedical detention facility in Missouri following his October 1995 conviction for planning terrorist conspiraciesin the New York area; (2) Ayman al-Zawahiri, about 51, who is a top lieutenant of bin Laden (see below) andwas convicted in Egypt for the Sadat assassination; (14) (3) Mohammad Atef, who, as noted above, was apparentlykilled in the U.S.-led war on Al Qaeda; (4) Rifa'i Taha Musa, about 48, who was arrested in Syria and extraditedto Egypt in October 2001; (5) Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the remnants of the original Jihad who is serving a 40year sentence in Egypt; (6) Talat Qasim, about 44, a propaganda leader of the Islamic Group; and (7) MuhammadShawqi Islambouli, about 46, the brother of the lead gunman in the Sadat assassination. The September 11, 2001 suicide hijacking attacks, allegedly by Al Qaeda, on the World Trade Center andPentagon were considered a threat to U.S. national security and led to a U.S. military campaign against Al Qaedain its primary sanctuary in Afghanistan, and against Al Qaeda's protector, the Islamic fundamentalist Talibanregime. Others say that much of the Al Qaeda network is based outside Afghanistan and its members still pose asubstantial threat to U.S. and other targets in the United States and abroad. Although most governments have agreed with the United States that the evidence of Al Qaeda's responsibility for September 11 is clear and compelling, there is little agreement on responsibility for thespate of anthrax mailings in the United States that followed the September 11 events. Some government workers are believed to have personal ties to individualIslamists there. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (31) As have other non-Islamist Palestinian groups, the DFLP has revived some of its operations since the Palestinian uprising began in September 2000. During its most active period, the PLF conducted several high-profile attacks. The episode expanded U.S. concerns about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism by indicating a linkbetween Iran and Palestinian groups who are not Islamic in nature and with which Tehran has previously had fewlinks. Although no major international terrorist attacks have been linked to Iran since Khatemi took office in August 1997, the United States has not publicly noted any diminution of Iranian material support for terrorist groupsopposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, such as those groups discussed earlier in this paper. (42) After an article to this effectappeared in January 2002, Bush Administration officialssought to downplay the possibility that Libya would be removed from the list anytime soon. The United States has tried to promote further progress on terrorism by slowly increasing engagement with Sudan. The effectiveness of other U.S. military action against terrorist groups or state sponsors is difficult to judge. economic sanctions, by themselves, can force major changes in the behavior of state sponsors of terrorism. The Clinton Administration rejected thoserecommendations as well. Since September 11, the UnitedStates has made cooperation against terrorism fundraising a major priority in its dealings with other countries,particularly Middle Eastern countries where much of the fundraising for Al Qaeda is conducted. On the other hand, critics believe that terrorism listcountries are likely to view a U.S. policy of engagement as a sign that supporting terrorism will not adverselyaffect relations with the United States. Legal Action Legal action against terrorist groups and state sponsors had become an increasingly large component of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, although the September 11 attacks and U.S. military response has, to some extent,diminished support among observers for this option.	The Al Qaeda terrorist network founded by Osama bin Laden is believed to pose a continuing, although diminished, threat to the United States at home and to U.S. interests and allies abroad following the network'sdefeat in its base in Afghanistan. As stated in taped appearances by its leaders since the September 11, 2001terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the goal of Al Qaeda is to destroy high profile U.S.targets in order to end what Al Qaeda claims is U.S. suppression of Islamic societies. In these appearances, binLaden virtually claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks. Throughout its history, Al Qaeda has soughtto oust pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and gain removal of U.S. troops from the region. Before September 11, signs pointed to a decline in state sponsorship of terrorism. Since the attacks, some countries that are designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran and Sudan, havecooperated to an extent with the U.S.-led war against Al Qaeda and its Taliban protectors in Afghanistan. Inspite of its cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Iran is still considered a major sponsor of radicalIslamic groups that conduct terrorism against Israel. The Arab-Israeli peace process is a longstanding major U.S. foreign policy interest, and the Administration and Congress are concerned about any terrorist groups or state sponsors that oppose the process. Possibly because ofa breakdown in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in September 2000, Palestinian organizations such asHamas, as well as older groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine that have been inactivefor years, have stepped up operations against Israelis. Following several major terrorist attacks against Israelissince December 2001, the United States has strongly criticized Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat forfailing to exert sufficient efforts to constrain these and other groups. Some analysts assert that Israel's actionsagainst the Palestinians have contributed to increased Palestinian support for violence against Israel. U.S. differences with other governments on the strategies for countering terrorism in the Near East have to some extent narrowed since September 11. The United States, in the past, differed with its allies, particularly on howto deal with state sponsors of terrorism; most allied governments believe that engaging these countriesdiplomatically might sometimes be more effective than trying to isolate or punish them. The United States hasgenerally been more inclined than its European allies to employ sanctions and military action to compel statesponsors and groups to abandon terrorism. Post-September 11 developments seem to have validated theimportance of both diplomacy and, in certain circumstances, more forceful responses in dealing with terrorism. Differences with allies have begun to reemerge as the Bush Administration expands its "war on terrorism,"indicating it will seek to prevent the emergence of threats by regimes -- some of which also have ties to terroristgroups -- that are developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This report will be updated annually.
crs_R45202	crs_R45202_0	The Great Recession adversely affected federal budget outcomes through revenue declines and spending increases from FY2008 through FY2013. Overview Each fiscal year Congress and the President engage in a number of practices that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) computes current-law baseline projections using assumptions set out in budget enforcement legislation. On the revenue side of the budget, the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. On the spending side, baseline discretionary spending levels are largely constrained by the caps and automatic spending reductions enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and further modified on several occasions, most recently with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). CBO's current baseline projections, released in April 2018, show rising budget deficits over the next several years. Mandatory spending increases are largely due to the rising cost of Social Security and Medicare programs, and declines in federal revenues. Discretionary spending is controlled by the annual appropriations acts. Changes made in the 2017 tax revision include the following: temporary modifications (scheduled to expire at the end of tax year 2025) to individual income tax brackets, with a reduction in the top rate from 39.6% to 37%, an increase in the income threshold for the top bracket, and a temporary increase in the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) exemption; a permanent modification in corporate income tax rates from a graduated rate structure with a top rate of 35% to a flat rate of 21%, and a permanent repeal of the corporate AMT; numerous modifications, mostly temporary, to the tax expenditures available to individual and corporate income tax filers, which include changes made to the standard deduction, the mortgage interest deduction, and the deduction for state and local taxes paid; a temporary (scheduled to expire at the end of tax year 2025) increase in the federal estate and gift tax exclusion; and a permanent shift in the taxation of foreign income from a modified version of a worldwide basis (where all income from U.S. firms earned in other countries is subject to U.S. taxation) to a modified version of a territorial profits basis (where profits are taxed on the basis of the country where they are earned). Before enactment of BBA 2018, the deficit reduction measures established by the BCA were amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67 ), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74 ). Budget for FY2019 The Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget to Congress on February 12, 2018. Deficit Projections in the President's FY2019 Budget The Trump Administration provided two deficit projections in its FY2019 budget. In FY2019, the Administration projects that the deficit will reach $984 billion (4.7% of GDP). FY2019 Congressional Budget Activity Following passage of full-year FY2018 appropriations, Congress has turned its attention to the FY2019 budget. The budget committees in the House and Senate each may develop budget legislation as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the CBO, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. Issues related to deficit reduction and the long-term budget outlook may continue to arise in policy discussions. Congress may also choose to modify the statutory debt limit. CBO, GAO, and the Trump Administration agree that the current mix of federal fiscal policies is unsustainable in the long term.	The federal budget is a central component of the congressional "power of the purse." Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of activities that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. This report offers context for the current budget debate and tracks legislative events related to the federal budget. After a decline in budget deficits over the past several years, the deficit is projected to increase significantly in FY2019. Enactment of the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123) are projected to decrease revenues and increase outlays relative to past years, thus increasing deficits. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) implemented several measures intended to reduce deficits from FY2012 through FY2021, and deficits declined from FY2012 through FY2015. In its April 2018 forecast, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline projects that the FY2019 deficit will equal $981 billion (4.6% of GDP), its highest value since the economy was recovering from the Great Recession in FY2012. The 2017 tax revision and BCA will continue to affect budget outcomes in FY2019 and beyond. Congress may debate amending the BCA as it has in the past through the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240), Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67), Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74), and BBA 2018. The annual appropriations process, the statutory debt limit, and further tax modifications may also draw congressional attention in FY2019. Additionally, Congress may choose to debate structural changes to the federal budget, including reforms to mandatory and discretionary spending programs proposed by the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration released its FY2019 budget on February 12, 2018. Proposed policy changes in the budget include increases in discretionary defense spending and relatively large decreases in mandatory spending other than Social Security and Medicare and in nondefense discretionary programs. Following passage of full-year FY2018 appropriations, Congress has turned its attention to the FY2019 budget. The Budget Committees in the House and Senate each develop budget legislation as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. Trends resulting from current federal fiscal policies are generally thought by economists to be unsustainable in the long term. Projections suggest that achieving a sustainable long-term trajectory for the federal budget would require deficit reduction. Reductions in deficits could be accomplished through revenue increases, spending reductions, or some combination of the two.
crs_R40448	crs_R40448_0	Recent Developments1 On June 14, 2012, Andry Rajoelina, the president of Madagascar's unelected transitional government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT, its French acronym), agreed to meet with Marc Ravalomanana, the country's former, most recently elected president. Their failure to do so has long been seen as a key stumbling block in internationally mediated efforts—as stated in a June 1 Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state summit communiqué—"to ensure full implementation of the Roadmap and create an enabling environment for holding credible, free and fair elections." Prim e Minister Appointed. Passage of the law as enacted—with the murder reference included—was not surprising, in light of repeated efforts by the Rajoelina administration to prevent Ravalomanana from returning to Madagascar, most recently in January 2012, and reportedly widespread, if not unanimous, public support for this position. A political deal to address the impasse over amnesty is seen as feasible because Ravalomanana's prosecution, conviction, and sentencing—in what he characterized in 2010 as a "mock trial" with a "political objective to accuse me unfairly in order to prevent me from running in the next presidential elections" and to undermine the transitional peace and reconciliation process—is widely viewed as politically motivated and illegitimate by the international community. Background Madagascar, a former French colony, is the world's fourth-largest island. Madagascar is extremely biologically diverse and is unique in many ways; over 85% of its species are estimated to be endemic. Madagascar is estimated to have as many as 150,000 species of flora and fauna that are unique to the island. Some reports suggest that illegal logging and endangered wildlife exports have substantially increased since 2009, when Madagascar's democratically elected government was dissolved. Development challenges in Madagascar have been compounded by periodic political unrest that has hampered economic growth and limited public investment. With most donor aid to the government currently suspended due to the 2009 coup, public spending has dramatically decreased. Tensions Rise between Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina President Ravalomanana's popularity, while considerable after his re-election, failed to help his TIM party's candidate win the December 2007 mayoral election in his former stronghold, Antananarivo, a city of almost 2 million people. They were followed by anti-government protests, some of which were suppressed by security forces, resulting in several fatalities. Southern African leaders then suspended the country from SADC. After assuming office, Rajoelina remained defiant in spite of international pressure. Ravalomanana and the country's three main opposition parties denounced the proposed cabinet, charging that it violated the terms of the Maputo agreement. As discussed in the introduction of this report, in September 2011 10 of 11 major political movements signed onto an SADC-endorsed transitional governance processes roadmap. U.S. Relations with Madagascar The United States government maintains diplomatic relations with the High Transitional Authority, but does not regard it as a legitimately established government, and has suspended assistance to the HAT government. Congress has expressed concern with natural resource degradation in the country, and in 2009, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 839 , condemning the March 2009 coup and the illegal extraction of Madagascar's natural resources. Madagascar signed the first Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, worth almost $110 million over four years, in April 2005. Due to the HAT's undemocratic assumption of power, MCC operations in Madagascar were suspended on March 20, 2009, and the compact was terminated in May 2009.	Madagascar, an Indian Ocean island country, ranks among the world's poorest countries; is the world's fourth-largest island; and is extremely biologically diverse, with thousands of unique species of flora and fauna. It has experienced political instability since early 2009, initiated by tensions between the country's last elected president, Marc Ravalomanana, and an opposition movement led by Andry Rajoelina, then the mayor of the capital city, Antananarivo. Mass protests in early 2009 and eventual military support for the ouster of President Ravalomanana culminated in his forced resignation from office. Rajoelina then seized power and, with other leaders, formed an interim self-declared transitional government, the High Transitional Authority (HAT, after its French acronym). Ravalomanana now lives in exile in South Africa. Periodic protests by Ravalomanana supporters after the takeover led to violent clashes with security forces. Negotiations between the parties led to the signing of an agreement in 2009 in Maputo, Mozambique, to establish an inclusive, transitional government, but Rajoelina subsequently appointed a cabinet seen to be primarily composed of his own supporters. Southern African leaders and Madagascar's opposition parties rejected the proposed government, and negotiations resumed. Two later agreements also failed to result in a unified transitional process. The unconstitutional change of power and resulting political impasse have negatively affected economic growth and development efforts and strained Madagascar's relations with international donors. Foreign governments, including the United States, reacted to Rajoelina's seizure of power by sanctioning the government in various ways (e.g., through suspension of membership in some multilateral bodies, restrictions on aid, personal sanctions on some individuals, and removal of trade benefits). Aid restrictions have significantly decreased public spending. As a result of the coup d'état, U.S. aid is restricted to selected humanitarian and development programs delivered through non-governmental channels. Madagascar's Millennium Challenge Account compact, worth an estimated $110 million, was terminated in May 2009. Madagascar is also subject to aid restrictions due to its poor performance in addressing the problem of trafficking in persons. Until September 2011, when a Southern African Development Community (SADC)-mediated transitional roadmap was signed by most key political movements, international mediation and national efforts to agree upon a transition process had foundered. Notwithstanding continuing political disputes, implementation of the roadmap has gone relatively smoothly. In April, a political amnesty law was enacted, but it remains controversial, as it does not cover former president Ravalomanana due to his conviction for murder in absentia in August 2010; he has not been permitted to return to Madagascar. An impasse over these issues has long stymied the transition process. Madagascar faces a host of environmental pressures, however, and illegal logging and endangered wildlife exports have reportedly substantially increased under the HAT. Congress has expressed concern with threats to Madagascar's unique ecosystem, as well as with the country's ongoing political and development challenges. The House of Representatives passed legislation in 2009, H.Res. 839, condemning the 2009 coup and the illegal extraction of Madagascar's natural resources.
crs_RL32878	crs_RL32878_0	O n November 21, 2013, the Senate reinterpreted Senate Rule XXII, lowering the number of Senators needed to invoke cloture on most nominations from three-fifths of the Senate to a simple majority. Since the reinterpretation of the rule, the use of cloture on nominations has changed considerably. This report was originally written prior to the reinterpretation of the rule. It presents data on all nominations on which cloture motions were offered from 1949, when the Senate altered the rule to allow cloture to be moved on any matter, including nominations, until November 20, 2013 (see Table 6 ). When the Senate adopts a motion for cloture on a matter, known as "invoking cloture," further consideration of the matter becomes subject to a time limit, and upon the expiration of that time, a vote will occur. The large number of nominations submitted to the Congress, particularly at the outset of a new presidential administration, can lead the majority to seek unanimous consent rather than cloture in order to approve nominations more quickly. Cloture Motions Do Not Correspond With Filibusters Although cloture affords the Senate a means for overcoming a filibuster, it is erroneous to assume that cases in which cloture is sought are always the same as those in which a filibuster occurs. Filibusters may occur without cloture being sought, and cloture may be sought when no filibuster is taking place. It often appears that Senate leaders attempt to avoid bringing to the floor matters, including legislation as well as nominations, on which they foresee a likelihood that filibusters will occur. Except by unanimous consent, indeed, cloture can be moved only on a question already pending on the floor. From 1949 through November 20, 2013 (81 st Congress through the start of the 113 th Congress), cloture was sought on 143 nominations. (This total and other data presented in this report do not include four failed cloture attempts on four nominations that occurred prior to November 21, 2013, because subsequent successful cloture votes were held on all four nominations after the reinterpretation of the rule.) Table 6 , following the text of this report, identifies the 143 nominations, the number of separate cloture motions filed on each, the ultimate outcome of the cloture attempt in each case, and the disposition of each nomination. Even after Senate rules began to permit the use of cloture on nominations in 1949, it was not deemed necessary to seek cloture on any until 1968 (90 th Congress), when a motion to proceed to consider the nomination of Supreme Court Associate Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice was debated at length. Cloture was sought on no other nomination until 1980. Cloture was invoked, and the nomination was confirmed. From the 90 th through the 107 th Congress (1967-2002), cloture was only once (103 rd Congress, 1993-1994) sought on more than five nominations. In the five Congresses from the 108 th through the 113 th (2003-2013), by contrast, cloture was only once (110 th Congress, 2007-2008) sought on fewer than 14 nominations. It is also pertinent, however, that the President's party had a Senate majority in the six Congresses before 2014 in which cloture was sought on 12 or more nominations. In all other Congresses (or, when cloture was attempted on only a few nominations in each of several consecutive Congresses, as shown in Table 2 , in the group of consecutive Congresses as a whole), the Senate ultimately voted against cloture on no more than one-quarter of the nominations in question. In both of the periods identified in Table 3 that cover several consecutive Congresses, as well as in the 108 th Congress (2003-2004) and the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), nominations to judicial positions were the main focus of cloture action. In the 103 rd (1993-1994), 109 th (2005-2006), 111 th (2009-2010), and 113 th (through November 21, 2013) Congresses, cloture motions on executive branch nominations were more prevalent. Few of the nominations on which cloture was attempted prior to the reinterpretation of the cloture rule were to positions of the first rank in the federal government. In relation to offices at lower levels of the executive branch, it can be discerned from Table 6 that cloture attempts have occurred particularly often on nominations to positions in the Department of State and the Department of Justice.	The motion for cloture is available in the Senate to limit debate on nominations, as on other matters. Table 6 lists all nominations against which cloture was moved from 1949, when the Senate changed the cloture rule to allow it to be moved on nominations, until November 21, 2013, when the Senate reinterpreted the rule to lower the threshold for invoking cloture on most nominations from three-fifths of the Senate to a majority of Senators voting. The reinterpretation of the rule significantly altered the use of cloture in the Senate, such that conclusions drawn from the data in this report are not applicable to similar data collected since that time. The initial version of this report was written prior to the 2013 reinterpretation of the rule; the report will not be further updated to reflect cloture action on nominations after that time. Because cloture can be used to end consideration of a nomination, it can be used to overcome a filibuster against a nomination. Table 6 shows the outcome of each cloture attempt on a nomination through November 20, 2013, and the final disposition of the nomination. It would be erroneous, however, to treat this table as a list of filibusters on nominations. Filibusters can occur without cloture being attempted, and cloture can be attempted when no filibuster is evident. Moreover, it appears that Senate leaders generally avoided bringing to the floor nominations on which a filibuster seemed likely. There are no means to identify the merely threatened filibuster. From 1949 through November 20, 2013, cloture was sought on 143 nominations that were disposed of prior to the rule reinterpretation. On 59 of these nominations cloture was invoked, and on 55 others no cloture motion received a vote. All but 3 of these 114 nominations were confirmed. Only on the remaining 32 nominations did the Senate ultimately reject cloture; of these, 26 were not confirmed. Until 1968, cloture was moved on no nominations, and from then through 1978, it was moved on only two. Even thereafter, in no single Congress from the 96th through the 102nd (1979 through 1992) was cloture sought on more than three nominations, and in no Congress from the 104th through the 107th (1995 through 2002) was it sought on more than five. Between these last two periods, however, the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) foreshadowed a more recent pattern, with cloture action on 12 nominations. In every Congress between 2003 and 2013, except the 110th (2007-2008), cloture was attempted on at least 14 nominations. The same five Congresses that saw cloture action on 12 or more nominations were those in which the Senate minority was of the party opposite that of the President. In all the Congresses or periods identified, no more than a quarter of nominations with cloture attempts failed of confirmation, except in the 108th Congress (2003-2004), when almost 80% of nominations subjected to cloture attempts (mostly judicial) were not confirmed. Prominent in this Congress were discussions of making cloture easier to get on nominations by changing Senate rules through procedures not potentially subject to a supermajority vote. In the 112th Congress, by contrast, cloture was moved on a record 33 nominations (again mostly to judicial positions), but on 23 of these nominations, the nomination was confirmed without a cloture vote. Overall, cloture was sought on nominations to 74 executive and 69 judicial positions. Judicial nominations, however, predominated in the two Congress just noted and before 2003, except in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994). Executive branch nominations predominated in that Congress and the 111th (2009-2010), both at the beginning of a new presidential Administration, as well as in the 109th Congress (2005-2006) and the start of the 113th Congress (2013). Few of the nominations on which cloture was sought prior to the rule reinterpretation were to positions at the highest levels of the government. These included 4 nominations to the Supreme Court and 11 to positions at the Cabinet level.
crs_R45083	crs_R45083_0	This is followed by Appendix B , which provides an overview of the LHHS-related floor amendments that were offered in the House during its consideration of H.R. 3354 , an omnibus appropriations measure that was ultimately not taken up by the Senate. The LHHS bill provides appropriations for the following federal departments and agencies: the Department of Labor; most agencies at the Department of Health and Human Services, except for the Food and Drug Administration (funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill), the Indian Health Service (funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (also funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill); the Department of Education; and more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Railroad Retirement Board. FY2018 Rescissions Proposal On May 8, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress a proposal for rescissions of budget authority totaling $15.8 billion. In the proposal were a number of LHHS-related rescissions of both mandatory and discretionary funding for accounts at DOL, HHS, the Corporation for National and Community Service, and the Railroad Retirement Board. After it was introduced as H.R. No further action on this measure has occurred as of the date of this report. FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations On March 23, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018 ( H.R. 1625 , P.L. 115-141). LHHS discretionary appropriations in the FY2018 omnibus totaled $186.5 billion (this total does not include emergency funding provided by an earlier supplemental appropriations act for FY2018, P.L. This amount is 7.6% more than FY2017 levels and 25.3% more than the FY2018 budget request from the Trump Administration. The omnibus also provided $817.5 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined FY2018 LHHS total of $1.004 trillion. Concurrently, a series of deadly wildfires struck California. 1892 ; P.L. The second of these, which was enacted as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, contained a total of $4.0 billion in supplemental appropriations for accounts and purposes traditionally associated with the LHHS appropriations bill, all of which were designated as emergency spending. These funds were distributed to DOL, HHS, and ED as follows: $100 million to the Employment and Training Administration for dislocated worker assistance (DOL); $30.9 million to Job Corps (DOL); $200 million to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for CDC-wide Activities and Program Support (HHS); $50 million to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of the Director (HHS); $650 million to the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) Children and Family Services Programs account for the Head Start Program (HHS); $162 million to the HHS Office of the Secretary for the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund (HHS); $2.7 billion for Hurricane Education Recovery (ED); $5 billion for Higher Education Act waiver authority (ED); and $90 billion for the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Supplemental Loan Program (ED). The FY2018 enacted totals throughout this report do not include these emergency funds. 115-90 ). 1370 ; P.L. After a funding gap that commenced on January 20, 2018, a fourth CR was enacted two days later that extended funding through February 8, 2018 ( H.R. 1892 ; P.L. With limited exceptions, these CRs generally funded discretionary LHHS programs at FY2017 levels minus a reduction of about two-thirds of one percent (-0.6791%). 115-56 , as amended by P.L. 115-96 . Congressional Action on an LHHS Bill FY2018 LHHS Action in the House The House Appropriations Committee's version of the FY2018 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 19, 2017, by a vote of 28-22, and reported to the House on July 24 ( H.R. As reported by the full committee, this bill would have provided $168.9 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, a 2.6% decrease from FY2017 enacted levels. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $817.4 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $986.3 billion for LHHS as a whole. 3358 did not receive floor consideration in the House, the text of this measure (with minor alterations) was included in an omnibus appropriations bill, the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3354 are discussed in Appendix B . FY2018 LHHS Action in the Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2018 LHHS appropriations bill on September 7, 2017, by a vote of 29-2 ( S. 1771 ). This bill would have provided $174.4 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This would have been 0.6% more than FY2017, and 17.2% more than the FY2018 President's request. In addition, the Senate committee bill would have provided an estimated $817.4 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $991.9 billion for LHHS as a whole. FY2018 President's Budget Request On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration released the FY2018 President's budget. The President requested $148.9 billion in discretionary appropriations for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which is a decrease of 14.1% from FY2017 levels. In addition, the President requested $815.8 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of $964.7 billion for the LHHS bill as a whole. This is $525 million (+8.4%) more than HRSA's FY2017 discretionary funding level and $1.2 billion (+21.6%) more than the FY2018 President's budget request. This is $2.9 billion (+8.7%) more than FY2017 and $10.3 billion (+40%) more than the Trump Administration's FY2018 discretionary request. This is $1.4 billion (+38.5%) more than SAMHSA's FY2017 funding level and $1.7 billion (+53.3%) more than the President's FY2018 budget request. This was $178 million (+9.1%) more than FY2017. The FY2018 enacted discretionary ED appropriations were 3.9% higher than FY2017 levels. Typically, each of the remaining related agencies receives less than $1 billion from the annual LHHS appropriations bill. 3358 ). 115-123), which was enacted on February 9, 2018. 3354 While the House committee-reported version of the LHHS bill ( H.R. 3354 ) that was amended on the floor and passed by the House on September 14, 2017. The LHHS-related amendments to H.R.	This report offers an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2018 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill includes all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It also provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). Finally, the LHHS bill provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). FY2018 Rescissions Proposal: On May 8, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress a proposal for rescissions of budget authority totaling $15.8 billion. The proposal included a number of LHHS-related rescissions of both mandatory and discretionary funding. After it was introduced as H.R. 3, this proposal passed the House on June 7, 2018, but has not been taken up by the Senate as of the date of this report. FY2018 Omnibus: On March 23, 2018, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) was enacted, providing LHHS appropriations in Division H. FY2018 LHHS discretionary appropriations totaled $186.5 billion (excluding emergency-designated amounts provided by an earlier supplemental appropriations act for FY2018). This amount is 7.6% more than FY2017 levels and 25.3% more than the FY2018 budget request from the Trump Administration. The omnibus also provided $817.5 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined FY2018 LHHS total of $1.004 trillion. The distribution of discretionary funding is as follows: DOL: $12.2 billion, 1.1% more than FY2017. HHS: $88.2 billion, 12.8% more than FY2017. ED: $70.9 billion, 3.9% more than FY2017. Related Agencies: $15.3 billion, 2.8% more than FY2017. FY2018 Supplemental Appropriations: On February 9, 2018, supplemental appropriations to address the 2017 hurricane season and a series of deadly wildfires in California were enacted as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. In total, $4.0 billion in emergency-designated appropriations for accounts and purposes traditionally associated with the LHHS appropriations bill were enacted for accounts at DOL, HHS, and ED. The FY2018 enacted totals presented throughout this report do not include these emergency funds. FY2018 Continuing Resolutions: Prior to the enactment of the omnibus, FY2018 appropriations were provided by five continuing resolutions (CRs): P.L. 115-56, P.L. 115-90, P.L. 115-96, P.L. 115-120, and P.L. 115-123. Government-wide funding was interrupted between the third and fourth CR due to a funding gap that commenced on January 20, 2018, and ended on January 22, 2018. With limited exceptions, the FY2018 CRs generally funded discretionary LHHS programs at FY2017 levels minus a reduction of about two-thirds of one percent (-0.6791%). FY2018 LHHS House Action: The House Appropriations Committee's version of the FY2018 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 19, 2017, by a vote of 28-22, and reported to the House on July 24 (H.R. 3358). This bill would have provided $168.9 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, a 2.6% decrease from FY2017 enacted levels. This amount is 13.4% more than the FY2018 President's request. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $817.4 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $986.3 billion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $10.6 billion, 12.6% less than FY2017. HHS: $77.6 billion, 0.7% less than FY2017. ED: $66.0 billion, 3.2% less than FY2017. Related Agencies: $14.7 billion, 1.1% less than FY2017. The House committee-reported version of the LHHS bill (H.R. 3358) did not receive floor consideration, but the text of this measure (with minor alterations) was included in an omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 3354) that was amended on the floor and passed by the House on September 14, 2017. Comprehensive figures that account for the budgetary effects of the LHHS-related floor amendments to H.R. 3354 are generally not available. As a result, this report does not present funding levels from this House-passed measure. However, Appendix B includes a discussion of the LHHS-related amendments that were offered during floor consideration of H.R. 3354. This measure was not taken up in the Senate. FY2018 LHHS Senate Action: The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2018 LHHS appropriations bill on September 7, 2017, by a vote of 29-2 (S. 1771). This bill would have provided $174.4 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This is 0.6% more than FY2017, and 17.2% more than the FY2018 President's request. In addition, the Senate committee bill would have provided an estimated $817.4 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $991.9 billion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $12.0 billion, 0.5% less than FY2017. HHS: $79.8 billion, 2.1% more than FY2017. ED: $68.3 billion, 0.04% more than FY2017. Related Agencies: $14.4 billion, 3.6% less than FY2017. FY2018 President's Budget Request: On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration released the FY2018 President's budget. The President requested $148.9 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which is a decrease of 14.1% from FY2017 levels. In addition, the President requested $815.8 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of $964.7 billion for the LHHS bill as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $9.7 billion, 19.4% less than FY2017. HHS: $63.0 billion, 19.3% less than FY2017. ED: $62.9 billion, 7.8% less than FY2017. Related Agencies: $13.2 billion, 11.1% less than FY2017.
crs_R43732	crs_R43732_0	Introduction Benefits for retired employees are of particular interest to policymakers, who often are concerned with the income security of retirees, a large and fast-growing population. One aspect of this congressional concern is what happens when bankrupt employers are unable to provide promised pension and health benefits to their retired employees. The bankruptcy of the General Motors Corporation (Old GM) in 2009 was the fourth-largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, and it was accompanied by a period of federal aid to the automotive industry. To facilitate increasing their benefits, salaried retirees formed their own labor association, the Delphi Salaried Workers Association (DSRA). Various proposals dealing with pensions and health benefits provided by bankrupt coal employers have been advanced over the last several years. These proposals were influenced by the July 2012 bankruptcy of the Patriot Coal Corporation, an employer with coal mines in West Virginia. Certain types of pensions are guaranteed by a quasi-public agency, but no such guarantee exists for retiree health insurance. In short, employers in chapter 7 bankruptcy usually are unable to fund any retiree health benefits and are able to pay pension benefits only if their pension trust fund has sufficient assets. The relationship between labor and management in bankruptcies involving collective negotiations depends on whether the union is a single-employer union (such as the UAW), a multiemployer union (such as the UMWA), or an association (such as the DSRA). Most unions are single- employer unions in which representatives of one employer's management and the union (on behalf of the employer's employees) bargain over the terms and conditions of employment. (These categories are related because active employees may someday become retired employees.) Pension plan sponsors generally may not reduce workers' vested pension benefits. To fund its benefit obligations, the PBGC collects insurance premiums from employers that sponsor insured pension plans, receives funds from the pension plans it takes over, and earns money from investments. The insurance premiums are set by Congress. If a participant in a terminated pension plan had been promised a pension greater than that amount per month from the employer, he or she would receive a lower monthly pension from the PBGC than had been promised by the employer. The PBGC never becomes the trustee of a multiemployer plan. Two multiemployer pension plans are thought to be a particular threat to the multiemployer trust's overall solvency. The original pension plan must meet five conditions to be eligible for partitioning: 1. the plan must be in critical and declining status; 2. the plan sponsor must have taken all reasonable measures to avoid insolvency; 3. the PBGC must reasonably expect that the partition will reduce its expected long-term loss from the plan and that the partition is necessary for the plan to remain solvent; 4. the partition must not impair the PBGC's ability to meet existing financial assistance obligations; and 5. the cost of the partition must come from the PBGC's multiemployer fund. Protections for Retirees' Health Insurance: VEBAs ERISA does not require retiree health insurance benefits to be prefunded. One way to guarantee at least some funding for health insurance benefits is for the (active and/or retired) employees to form a Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA). Nevertheless, the creation of a VEBA cannot be characterized across-the-board as a victory for either the employer or the employees; each individual VEBA differs with respect to funding levels and other terms, and the funding levels and other terms themselves depend on the relative bargaining power of the employer and employees. For current and future retirees to receive promised benefits there must be sufficient funds in the VEBA to cover the cost of benefits. The calculation of the level of funding needed to meet such a guarantee typically involves forecasting the following variables: the expected date of retirement for each employee working on December 31, 2014; each employee's (and his or her covered family's) life expectancy; each employee's (and his or her covered family's) health care utilization over time; the rate of medical inflation over time; the return on the VEBA trust's assets over time; and changes in the tax code affecting the value of the VEBA. Some VEBAs are created as part of the course of doing business, and others are created during chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Financial negotiations can be contentious. The remainder of this report provides three examples of bankruptcy proceedings in unionized entities where the retirees' pensions and health insurance benefits received substantial federal attention. The first example is Old General Motors and the United Auto Workers, the second example is Delphi and the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association, and the final example is Patriot and the United Mine Workers of America. Despite this underfunding, pensions were not a central bargaining issue in the late 2000s. Pension controversies did emerge after the bankruptcy. During the 2007 contract negotiations, Old GM agreed to contribute a percentage of its projected retiree health liabilities to an independent VEBA intended to fund retiree health benefits for 80 years. Because Old GM had a large debt load and no cash flow when it entered bankruptcy, the UAW accepted a contribution of stock in New GM. These retirees did not receive the same pension and retiree health benefits as the unionized retirees. Once the PBGC assumed responsibility for the remaining Delphi pensions, some Delphi salaried retirees (who were not union members) saw their pension benefits reduced because their monthly benefit (as previously promised by Delphi) was larger than the statutory maximum benefit. Patriot was formed in 2007 as a spin-off company from Peabody Energy. It provides retiree health benefits for UMWA employees (and their surviving spouses and dependents) who retired on or before July 20, 1992, and did not have another source of retiree health benefits because they were orphan retirees.	Benefits for retired employees are of particular interest to policymakers, who often are concerned with the income security of retirees, a large and fast-growing population. One aspect of this congressional concern is what happens when bankrupt employers are unable to provide promised pension and health benefits to their retired employees. In chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, the employer receives protections against its financial commitments in the hope that it may once again become profitable. This protection could include not having to honor obligations concerning pensions and retiree health insurance. Its employees may therefore be at risk of not receiving some of their promised benefits. Unionized and nonunionized employees may be treated differently under the law because unionized workers have a legal contract governing their terms and conditions of employment. The costs to employers for the pension, health insurance, and other benefits promised to retired employees are known as legacy costs, and different costs are subject to different federal laws. Although employers are required to prefund their defined benefit pension trusts, the level of required funding may not be present as the employer enters bankruptcy. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a quasi-public agency, monitors the finances of pension plans. The PBGC becomes the trustee of and pays benefits to participants in terminated, underfunded single-employer pension plans. PBGC benefits are subject to a statutory maximum that may be less than the retiree was promised by his or her employer. The PBGC has been running deficits for several years, and the deficit for one of its two programs is at an all-time record high. PBGC funding comes from employer premiums set by Congress, the assets of the plans it takes over, and investment returns. There is no taxpayer funding. Some retirees receive health benefits from their former employer. Retiree health benefits, however, are not insured by any public agency, and employers are not required to prefund health benefits. However, health benefits (for active and retired employees) can be funded through a tax-preferred trust fund known as a Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA). When an employer and union agree to form a VEBA, and it is approved by a bankruptcy court, the employer generally contributes a collectively bargained level of funding to the VEBA. Providing this contribution usually fulfills the employer's total responsibility for retiree health care. All subsequent retiree health benefit decisions are transferred to the trustees of the VEBA. (VEBAs often are created outside of bankruptcy and are not restricted to unionized work places. In addition, VEBAs may be funded by employers only, by employees only, or jointly by both employers and employees.) After a discussion of these issues, this report provides three examples of bankruptcy proceedings in which the retirees' pensions and health insurance benefits received substantial federal attention: the General Motors Corporation, the Delphi Corporation, and the Patriot Coal Corporation. During bankruptcy proceedings for the General Motors Corporation (commonly known as Old GM or pre-bankruptcy GM), retiree health benefits were central and pensions, although underfunded, were not a major issue. Old GM's main union, the United Auto Workers (UAW), accepted stock in the General Motors Company (commonly known as New GM or post-bankruptcy GM) as a partial funding source for its retiree health care VEBA, which has covered retiree health benefits since 2010. The VEBA was intended to cover retiree health benefits for 80 years, but it is unclear how long its funding will last. Pensions were a central source of controversy during the Delphi Corporation's bankruptcy. Some (union and nonunion) employees had been promised a pension greater than the PBGC maximum. When the various Delphi pension plans were terminated by the PBGC, most unionized employees did not see their pensions fall because of supplemental pension coverage originally negotiated by Old GM and the UAW. The salaried Delphi workers, however, had no union, and some found themselves receiving lower pension benefits than had been promised by Delphi. Salaried workers formed a labor association, the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association (DSRA), with hopes of strengthening their position. The DSRA has been unsuccessful in its efforts to have its members' pensions increased, and a subsequent court case has not yet been settled. Both pension and retiree health benefits were central to the complicated and contentious negotiations during the bankruptcy of the Patriot Coal Corporation. The relevant union, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), is a multiemployer union in which the collectively bargained contracts cover the employees of many employers. The UMWA Pension Trust was underfunded before the Patriot bankruptcy, and it remains underfunded today. In fact, some consider the potential insolvency of the coal employers' pension plan a threat to the overall solvency of PBGC's program on multiemployer pension plans. Because many Patriot retirees were employees of another employer, Peabody Energy, when they were actively working, the bankruptcy court ruled that Peabody, and not Patriot, was responsible for funding the VEBA created to cover health benefits.
crs_R44216	crs_R44216_0	Introduction Established in 2010, "Feed the Future" (FTF) is a major Obama Administration foreign assistance initiative designed to alleviate global poverty and improve health and food security. FTF is a new federal investment paradigm targeting sustainable reductions in international hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity. FTF seeks to foster transparency and accountability and track and assess program implementation progress through the use of publicly released metrics to justify U.S. investments in each recipient country and each development program, indicators to monitor and evaluate progress, and annual reports to Congress. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) selects the main FTF recipient countries—known as "focus countries" under the initiative—based on country ownership potential, need, and opportunity for reducing food insecurity. Key FTF operating principles include recipient-country ownership of and commitment of resources to country-specific investment plans; reliance on measurable indicators to assess initial needs; monitor progress toward targets; and evaluate whether corrections, adjustments, or wholesale changes are needed mid-course; use of a whole-of-government implementation strategy that cuts across existing U.S. international development programs to facilitate coordination and potentially prevent duplication and gaps; and an emphasis on coordinating and partnering with recipient-country organizations and private sector entities, as well as with other donors and international organizations. Congress is presently evaluating the overall merits of FTF and whether to permanently authorize the initiative. Background The Administration established FTF to support implementation of President Obama's 2009 pledge to reduce global hunger—a multi-year U.S. food security commitment made at the G8 Summit in 2009—and his 2010 Policy Directive on Global Development. In July 2009, at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, President Obama pledged to provide at least $3.5 billion over three years (FY2010 to FY2012) to global food security programs as part of the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security (hereinafter the Global Partnership), a component of the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, which was intended to promote global agricultural development, improved nutrition, and food security ( Table 1 ). The FTF initiative also includes "aligned" agricultural programs in additional countries. FTF also funds cooperative agricultural development programs with "strategic partner countries," which include Brazil, India, and South Africa. Focus Country Selection A U.S. governmental interagency process, led by USAID, selects focus countries based on assessments that measure suitability using the following set of five criteria: 1. Based on these criteria, FTF has prioritized investment in 19 focus countries ( Table 2 ). Other USG agencies, such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, may also contribute to the broader research objectives and goals of FTF. Since 2010, Congress has allocated nearly $1 billion annually to food security and agricultural development activities under SFOPS appropriations. As a result, it can be difficult to determine FTF funding patterns based on appropriations acts. Under the whole-of-government approach, FTF's operational strategy applies to other federal programs that invest in international agricultural development, even those that derive funding outside of FTF funding in the SFOPS appropriation. USAID publishes FTF progress reports as part of its effort to establish a transparent set of overarching guidelines for justifying and implementing U.S. non-emergency food aid and agricultural development activities. Linkages with Food for Peace Food Aid Under the FTF whole-of-government approach, Food for Peace (FFP) development food aid programs are considered to be part of the FTF initiative, at least to the extent that they are coordinated with FTF goals and monitoring and evaluation strategies. For example, FFP Title II and McGovern-Dole (Food for Education) funding derives from annual agricultural appropriations.	The Obama Administration's Feed the Future (FTF) Initiative is a U.S. international development program launched in 2010 that invests in food security and agricultural development activities in a select group of developing countries in an effort to reduce hunger, malnutrition, poverty, and food insecurity. The bulk of FTF funding supports 19 "focus countries" selected based on country ownership potential, needs, and opportunities to achieve success. FTF supports additional countries under aligned and regional programs and through assistance to three "strategic partners"—Brazil, India, and South Africa—to increase regionally based sustainable development capacities. The FTF initiative originated largely as the U.S. component of the international response to the heightened food insecurity resulting from the global food price crisis of 2007-2008. In July 2009, at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, President Obama pledged to provide at least $3.5 billion over three years to a global agriculture and food security initiative referred to as the Global Partnership. In total, the international donor community pledged $22 billion to promote global agricultural development, improved nutrition, and food security. Since its origin, FTF has expanded into a whole-of-government effort. In addition to the Global Partnership, FTF also supports implementation of President Obama's 2010 Policy Directive on Global Development and coordination of previously existing U.S. agricultural development policies. Key features of FTF include a published set of metrics to justify U.S. investments in each recipient country and each development program; emphasis on coordination and partnering with recipient-country organizations, private sector entities, and international organizations to implement FTF activities; reliance on a set of common goals and measurable indicators to monitor and evaluate progress; and annual reports to Congress. Furthermore, the FTF strategy is being extended, under a whole-of-government framework, to all U.S. international agricultural development programs, including the Food for Peace Title II non-emergency (i.e., development) food aid, the Food for Progress program, and McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program. From FY2010 through FY2014, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has invested $4.7 billion in direct food security and agricultural development activities under FTF. Other federal agencies active in implementing FTF have invested as much as $6.6 billion in development activities under the initiative. Over these five years, USAID has reported some initial success in reducing the prevalence of poverty and chronic malnutrition in several of the focus countries; however, results to date are available for only a select group of focus countries. Because FTF is a presidential initiative, its institutional longevity beyond the current Obama Administration is uncertain. Congress is presently evaluating the overall merits of FTF and whether to permanently authorize it in statute. Several issues related to FTF are of potential interest to Congress. The FTF whole-of-government approach, which involves the coordination of activities across different government agencies in 19 focus countries, can be difficult to implement and monitor if interagency roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined. Authorities and appropriations underpinning FTF may also be incongruent with those governing long-standing separate programs, such as Food for Peace. In addition, some civil society actors have expressed concerns that FTF's goal of country-led planning could privilege government-led planning and marginalize citizen and civil society-focused development efforts.
crs_RL34690	crs_RL34690_0	§47) and later in the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 (hereinafter "the 1971 Act") (16 U.S.C. The law covers wild horses and burros on lands of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, and assigns management responsibility to these agencies. Under the 1971 Act, the agencies conduct inventories of horse and burro populations on federal land to determine appropriate management levels (AMLs). First, the agencies are to destroy old, sick, or lame animals by the most humane means available. Second, they are to remove healthy animals for private adoption. Third, if adoption demand is insufficient, the remaining healthy animals are to be destroyed; however, the agencies have not used this authority since 1982. One change directed the agencies to sell, "without limitation," excess animals (or their remains) that are deemed too old (more than 10 years old) or otherwise unable to be adopted (offered unsuccessfully at least three times). The number of animals on BLM lands significantly exceeds this figure; there were an estimated 38,497 wild horses and burros (145% of AML) on BLM land as of February 28, 2011. Thousands of additional animals—41,874 as of September 2011—are in agency holding facilities. Key issues for Congress have included the adequacy of authorities for managing wild horses and burros and achieving AML on federal lands; the effectiveness of agency management of wild horses and burros and of options for achieving AML; and the sufficiency of funding for managing wild horses and burros and achieving AML. Specifically, among the most contentious issues are whether BLM should destroy healthy animals under the authority provided in the 1971 Act, and sell animals "without limitation" as provided in the 108 th Congress changes. Other controversial issues include the priority given wild horses and burros in land use decisions; whether, and to what extent, to remove animals from the range; the disposal of healthy animals through the adoption and sales programs; the extent of holding animals in facilities, particularly long-term (pasture) facilities; the use of fertility control to slow the rate of production; and the costs of management and whether funding is appropriate. For instance, an October 2008 report by GAO recommended that BLM use different methods to estimate populations, issue a policy to achieve consistency in setting AMLs, provide information to the public on treatment of animals, and develop alternatives to caring for animals in facilities. Also, in November 2008, the Wild Horse and Burro Advisory Board made recommendations to BLM on how to reduce wild horse and burro herd sizes, population growth, and costs of management, among other issues. Proposals by the Secretary of the Interior, released on October 7, 2009, had a different approach. No broad legislation to amend the 1971 Act has been introduced in the 112 th Congress as of December 2, 2011. Euthanization of healthy wild horses and burros has long been controversial. For FY2011, the appropriation for BLM wild horse and burro management was higher still—$75.8 million. According to GAO, the development of alternatives to caring for animals in facilities is necessary for the long-term sustainability of the wild horse and burro program, due to the cost of caring for animals in facilities. The emphasis of the proposed strategy, issued on February 28, 2011, is on advancing Secretary Salazar's proposals to reduce wild horse and burro populations, pursue new options for animals removed from the range, and reduce program costs. Ecosanctuaries 2011 Solicitation of Proposals to Establish Ecosanctuaries BLM has begun to pursue partnerships with other landowners for the establishment of wild horse ecosanctuaries for the long-term care of wild horses and burros determined to be excess and removed from the range. They are to consist exclusively of non-reproducing herds in an effort to limit population growth.	The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 (the 1971 Act) protects wild horses and burros on federal lands, and places them under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS). Under the 1971 Act, the agencies are to inventory horse and burro populations on federal land to determine appropriate management levels (AMLs). They are authorized to remove animals exceeding the range's carrying capacity. First, the agencies are to destroy "old, sick, or lame animals" by the most humane means available. Second, they are to remove healthy animals for private adoption. Third, if adoption demand is insufficient, the remaining healthy animals are to be destroyed. However, the agencies have not used this authority since 1982, and the FY2011 Interior appropriations law prohibited funds from being used to slaughter healthy animals. In addition, under a 108th Congress change, the agencies are to sell, "without limitation," excess animals (or their remains) that essentially are too old or otherwise unadoptable. BLM has not achieved reduction to the national AML, which is 26,576 for all herds. There were an estimated 38,497 wild horses and burros on BLM lands as of February 28, 2011. Another 41,874 animals were in BLM holding facilities as of September 2011. More than half of BLM's $75.8 million FY2011 appropriation for wild horses and burros was used to care for animals in holding facilities. A much smaller number of horses and burros are on FS lands—4,700. Management of wild horses and burros has long been controversial, with most attention centering on BLM. Among the most contentious issues are whether BLM should destroy healthy animals under the authority provided in the 1971 Act, and sell animals "without limitation" as provided in the 108th Congress change. Other controversial issues include the priority given wild horses and burros in land use decisions; whether, and to what extent, to remove animals from the range; the disposal of healthy animals through the adoption and sales programs; the extent of holding animals in facilities, particularly long-term (pasture) facilities; the use of fertility control to slow the rate of reproduction; and the costs of management and whether funding is appropriate. Several sets of options are being considered or implemented for reaching AML, limiting the number of animals in holding, reducing program costs, and generally improving the care and management of wild horses and burros, primarily by BLM. An October 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office recommended that BLM use different methods to estimate populations, issue a policy to achieve consistency in setting AMLs, provide information to the public on treatment of animals, and develop alternatives to caring for animals in facilities. In November 2008, the Wild Horse and Burro Advisory Board made recommendations to BLM on how to reduce wild horse and burro herd sizes, population growth, and costs of management, among other issues. On October 7, 2009, the Secretary of the Interior, calling the BLM wild horse and burro program "unsustainable," announced proposals to establish wild horse preserves for the care of non-producing herds, and to reduce population growth rates through such methods as expanded use of fertility control. In February 2011, BLM released a draft strategy to advance the Secretary's proposals, pursue new options for animals removed from the range, and reduce program costs. In spring 2011, BLM began to solicit proposals to establish wild horse and burro sanctuaries, either on BLM or combined public-private land, for the long-term care of non-reproducing herds. Further, the National Academy of Sciences is developing recommendations for BLM on using the best science in caring for wild horses and burros. Two recent reports (Department of the Interior and American Association of Equine Practitioners) found overall quality care for wild horses and burros, while providing recommendations. No broad legislation to amend the 1971 Act has been introduced in the 112th Congress.
crs_R44629	crs_R44629_0	Background Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) are a special type of government-owned, contractor-operated research centers—commonly referred to as "GOCOs"—that conduct research and development (R&D) and related activities in support of a federal agency's mission. They differ from other performers of federal R&D—such as federal laboratories, universities, non-profit organizations, and private firms—in that they are designed to meet a "special long-term research or development need which cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor resources" and that they have "access, beyond that which is common to the normal contractual relationship, to Government and supplier data, including sensitive and proprietary data, and to employees and installations equipment and real property. " The appropriate role of FFRDCs in the federal R&D enterprise may remain an issue in the 115 th Congress. Current FFRDCs Currently, 12 federal agencies sponsor a total of 42 FFRDCs. These FFRDCs provide R&D capabilities in a broad range of areas—from energy and cybersecurity to cancer and astronomy. According to the FAR, FFRDCs are intended to address an R&D need that cannot be met as effectively by the federal government or the private sector alone. Additionally, under the FAR, a long relationship is required to enable the FFRDC to maintain in-depth expertise, stay familiar with the needs of the agency, provide a quick response capability, and maintain objectivity and independence. On average, between FY1967 and FY2015, the federal government has obligated 9.1% of its federal R&D spending to FFRDCs. Effectiveness of Oversight and Management The adequacy of agency oversight and management of FFRDCs is a long-standing congressional concern. Additionally, some critics have pointed out that the R&D capabilities of the private sector have increased dramatically since World War II and the continued use of FFRDCs is in direct opposition to their original intent—to conduct R&D that cannot be done as effectively by the private sector or the federal government. FFRDCs are widely seen as contributing to U.S. technological and economic leadership. Mission Creep The diversification of FFDRC activities or "mission creep" is an issue closely related to concerns about competition with the private sector. However, some Members of Congress, GAO, and others have criticized the use of noncompetitive procedures for FFRDC contracts. Number of FFRDCs, FY1967–FY2017	The federal government supports research and development (R&D) that is conducted by a wide variety of performers, including federally owned and operated laboratories, universities, private companies, and other research institutions. A special class of research institutions referred to as federally funded research and development centers, or FFRDCs, are owned by the federal government, but operated by contractors, including universities, other non-profit organizations, and industrial firms. FFRDCs are intended to provide federal agencies with R&D capabilities that cannot be effectively met by the federal government or the private sector alone. FFRDCs are required to have a long-term strategic relationship with the federal agency that supports them. This relationship is presumed to convey a number of benefits, including the ability of an FFRDC to recruit and retain scientific and technical expertise; an in-depth knowledge of, and the capability to rapidly respond to, the R&D needs of the federal agency; and the capacity to offer independent and objective scientific and technical advice. Currently, 12 federal agencies sponsor a total of 42 FFRDCs. These FFRDCs provide R&D capabilities in support of federal agency missions in a broad range of areas—from energy and cybersecurity to cancer and astronomy. In FY2015, the federal government obligated $11.1 billion or 8.6% of its total R&D spending to FFRDCs. Congress maintains a continuing interest in FFRDCs due to their contributions to U.S. technological and economic leadership. However, some Members of Congress have questioned the appropriate role of FFRDCs in the federal R&D enterprise and the ability of FFRDCs to effectively address federal agency R&D needs. The following issues have been of particular interest: (1) the effectiveness of federal agency oversight and management of FFRDCs; (2) competition between FFRDCs and the private sector for federal R&D funding; (3) the diversification of FFDRC activities or "mission creep"; and (4) the award of noncompetitive FFRDC management and operation contracts.
crs_RS21356	crs_RS21356_0	Overview All unemployment benefits including regular state Unemployment Compensation (UC), extended benefits (EB), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), and railroad unemployment benefits are potentially subject to the federal income tax. For income tax purposes, all temporary benefits, such as the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) benefits, are also included within this category. In addition to being subject to federal income taxes, in most states that have an income tax, unemployment benefits are taxed. Benefit claimants wishing to have federal income tax withheld from their UC benefits must file form W-4V, Voluntary Withholding Request . In 1982, Congress lowered the AGI thresholds for taxation of UC benefits. Congress made UC benefits fully taxable in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ( P.L. As of the date of this report, no relevant legislation in the current Congress has been introduced.	Unemployment compensation (UC) benefits have been fully subject to the federal income tax since the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). Under tax law, unemployment compensation is a broad category that includes regular state UC benefits, Extended Benefits (EB), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), and railroad unemployment benefits, as well as the now expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) benefits. Individuals who receive UC benefits during a year may elect to have the federal (and in some cases state) income tax withheld from their benefits. UC benefits are considered income and may be subject to federal income tax. This report provides an overview of the taxation of UC benefits and legislation related to taxing UC benefits.
crs_R41048	crs_R41048_0	Introduction In the 2010 census, as in prior decennial censuses, the total population of the United States was counted, including U.S. citizens, lawfully present aliens, and unauthorized aliens. One question raised by this idea is whether the exclusion of aliens could be done by amending the federal census statutes (Title 13 of the U.S. Code ), or whether such action would require an amendment to the Constitution. The Constitution requires a decennial census to determine the "actual Enumeration" of the "whole number of persons" in the United States. The Fairness in Representation Act ( H.R. An amendment introduced by Senator Vitter to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 ( S.Amdt. 2644 to H.R. 2847 ) would have cut off funding for the census unless the census form included questions on U.S. citizenship and immigration status. The amendment was subsequently ruled to be non-germane. 11 proposed an amendment to the Constitution so that only U.S. citizens would be counted in the apportionment calculation. On the other side of the issue, the Every Person Counts Act ( H.R. 3855 ) would have prohibited the Census Bureau from asking about U.S. citizenship or immigration status. If so, then it would appear that any exclusion would have to be done by constitutional amendment. As mentioned above, it appears some are concerned that aliens, particularly those individuals in the country unlawfully, are included in the data used to apportion House seats among the states and determine voting districts within the states. Data for Apportionment Purposes Constitutional issues could arise if aliens were excluded by statute from the census count for purposes of apportioning House seats among the states. The data must be used to apportion the House seats among the states, although there is no constitutional requirement it be used to determine voting districts within the states. The term "whole number of persons" appears broad enough to include all individuals, regardless of citizenship status, and thus would appear to require the entire population be included in the apportionment calculation. As such, a constitutional amendment, such as that found in H.J.Res. 11 in the 111 th Congress, would likely be necessary in order to exclude any individuals from the census count for the purpose of apportioning House seats. Selected Legislation to Exclude Aliens from the Census From time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would exclude all aliens or only unauthorized aliens from being included in the census to apportion the House seats among the states. Such legislation would have either amended the Census Clause of the Constitution or enacted or amended federal census statutes.	In the 2010 decennial census, the Census Bureau counted the total population of the United States. This included, as in previous censuses, all U.S. citizens, lawfully present aliens, and unauthorized aliens. Some have suggested excluding aliens, particularly those who are in the country unlawfully, from the census count, in part so that they would not be included in the data used to apportion House seats among the states and determine voting districts within them. One question raised by this idea is whether the exclusion of aliens could be done by amending the federal census statutes, or whether such action would require an amendment to the Constitution. The Constitution requires a decennial census to determine the "actual enumeration" of the "whole number of persons" in the United States. The data must be used to apportion the House seats among the states, although there is no constitutional requirement it be used to determine intrastate districts. It appears the term "whole number of persons" is broad enough to include all individuals, regardless of citizenship status, and thus would appear to require the entire population be included in the apportionment calculation. As such, it appears a constitutional amendment would be necessary to exclude any individuals from the census count for the purpose of apportioning House seats. From time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would exclude all aliens or prevent only unauthorized aliens from being included in the census for purposes of apportioning House seats among the states. Such legislation would have either amended the Census Clause of the Constitution or enacted or amended federal census statutes. Although such legislation has yet to be introduced in the 112th Congress, in the 111th Congress, legislation was introduced that used both approaches. The Fairness in Representation Act would have statutorily excluded aliens from the population count for apportionment purposes (H.R. 3797 and S. 1688). Under the above analysis, it would not appear to be constitutionally sufficient for Congress to amend the federal census statutes in such manner. Meanwhile, H.J.Res. 11 would take the other approach and amend the Constitution so that only U.S. citizens would be counted in the apportionment calculation. Other legislation in the 111th Congress would not have raised the same constitutional issues since it would not appear to require the exclusion of any individuals for apportionment purposes. An amendment introduced by Senator Vitter to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (S.Amdt. 2644 to H.R. 2847), would have cut off funding for the census unless the census form included questions regarding citizenship and immigration status. The amendment was subsequently ruled to be non-germane. On the other side of the issue, the Every Person Counts Act (H.R. 3855) would have prohibited the Census Bureau from asking about U.S. citizenship or immigration status.
crs_RL30877	crs_RL30877_0	There are more than 30 types of tax-exempt organizations described in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Most tax-exempt organizations fall into one of five types: the organizations described in IRC Â§Â§ 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), 501(c)(6), and 527. This report was developed to answer frequently asked questions about the differences among these organizations: how they are defined; what they can and cannot do; how they obtain exempt status; and what kind of information they must disclose to the IRS and the public. Similarly, a trade association might have a lobbying affiliate, a charitable affiliate, and a political action committee. 527 organizations have an additional reporting requirement that 501(c) organizations are not subject to. The information contained in this report is summarized in the following chart.	This report addresses the differences among the tax-exempt organizations described in Internal Revenue Code subsections 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), 501(c)(6), and section 527âcharitable organizations, social welfare organizations, labor unions, trade associations, and political organizations, respectively. Each type of organization has a unique statutory definition, enjoys benefits from obtaining tax-exempt status, is subject to statutory limitations on its activities, and must disclose certain information to the IRS and the general public. At the end of the report is a chart that summarizes the organizations' characteristics and reporting requirements.
crs_RS22754	crs_RS22754_0	The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) was designated as the lead agency with the leadership role in the planning, implementation, and coordination of operational security for events of national significance—as designated by the President. On December 19, 2000, Congress enacted P.L. The special events were entitled National Special Security Events (NSSEs). Some events categorized as NSSE include presidential inaugurations, major international summits held in the United States, major sporting events, and presidential nominating conventions. Since the establishment of the department, the DHS Secretary—as the President's representative—has had the responsibility to designate NSSEs. NSSE Security When an event is designated an NSSE, USSS becomes the lead federal agency in developing, exercising, and implementing security operations.	Major events that are considered to be nationally significant may be designated by the President—or his representative, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—as National Special Security Events (NSSE). Beginning in September 1998 through February 2008, there have been 28 events designated as NSSEs. Some of these events have included presidential inaugurations, presidential nominating conventions, major sports events, and major international meetings. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating, planning, exercising, and implementing security for NSSEs, and was designated as the lead agency in P.L. 106-544. This report provides information on USSS legislative authority for NSSEs, NSSE designation funding and training, and NSSE funding. This report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant.
crs_RL31993	crs_RL31993_0	(2) U.S. nuclear warheads include a primary and a secondary stage. All weapons now in the U.S. stockpile use pits made there. (5) The National Nuclear Security Administration's Program for Pit Production The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is NNSA's effort to restore pit production. (8) Short-Term Goal: W88 Pits Rocky Flats Plant ceased production abruptly when it was only part-way through the planned production run of pits for the W88, a nuclear warhead used on the Trident II submarine-launchedballistic missile. Only one W88 pit remains for destructive evaluation. Table 1. To meet the need for W88 pits, NNSA decided to create at Los Alamos a facility that could produce pits at a low rate. Los Alamos manufactured thefirst certifiable W88 pit in April 2003. NNSA's view is thatmaintaining the stockpile indefinitely therefore requires, in the longer term, a higher pit fabricationcapacity than PF-4 can offer in order to replace pits removed due to aging or destructive testing. NNSA estimates that MPF operations will start in FY2019 and that the plant willachieve full production capability in FY2021. The SenateArmed Services Committee in 2002 estimated the cost of MPF at $2 billion to $4 billion. MPF's schedule has slipped between June 2003 and February 2004, as Table 2 shows. Table 2. Congressional Actions Congress has expressed interest in the pit program for many years. Both Houses haverepeatedly raised concerns over such management issues as budgeting and planning, and over theslow pace of pit certification. (48) For FY2002, the House Appropriations Committee recommended the requested amount, $128.5 million, for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign, but asserted that DOE cannot show"that it has a viable plan to manufacture and certify pits on the schedule dictated by national securityneeds," criticized the project as "years behind schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars over theoriginal cost estimate," and stated that it would judge NNSA's success on how well the pit projectsucceeds. NNSA stated its plans to "certify a W88 pit built at [Los Alamos National Laboratory] without underground nuclear testing by FY 2009, with a goal ofachieving an earlier date of FY 2007." (59) The FY2004 Request For FY2004, the Administration requested a substantial increase to items in this campaign: $126.8 million for manufacturing the pit for the W88 warhead, $108.6 million for W88 pitcertification, $19.7 million for pit activities not specifically supporting the W88, and $22.8 millionfor planning for the Modern Pit Facility. In addition, it requested $42.4 million for "subcriticalexperiments [at Nevada Test Site] which support the certification of the W88 pit." Table 3. Issues dealt with include pit certification; theneed for new pits (beyond limited quantities for W88 warheads); if new pits are needed, what is therequired capacity; how might that capacity be obtained, and how quickly could or should that bedone. Is NNSA's Plan for Certification Reasonable? Does the United States Need New Pits (Beyond Limited Quantitiesfor W88)? Yes: In one view, greater pit manufacturing capability is needed tohedge against uncertainty in pit life in order to ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent remainseffective. If So, What Capacity Is Needed? PF-4 could replace the few pitswithout spares that are destroyed during surveillance. Can NNSA Expand PF-4 to Build Enough Pits Without MPF? While the FY2004 National Defense AuthorizationAct provided the funding requested for the entire pit program, including MPF, the Energy and WaterDevelopment Appropriations Act cut MPF funding from $22.8 million to $10.8 million and theconferees, as noted, stated it was premature to pursue further decisions on MPF pending a report onthe stockpile plan. Should Congress and the Administration Delay MPF's Schedule? If at that time plutonium aging did notappear to be a problem, or if the stockpile were projected to shrink, or if fewer types of nuclearweapons were deployed, or the likelihood of using nuclear weapons had become more remote thanat present, then the United States would, for a fraction of the cost of MPF, have purchased a hedgein case MPF needed to be built on the current schedule. Table 4. 1, esp.	A "pit" is the fissile core of a nuclear warhead. In modern warheads, it creates a nuclear explosion that triggers a substantially larger thermonuclear explosion. All pits currently in the U.S.nuclear stockpile were made at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, CO, which opened in 1952. TheDepartment of Energy (DOE) halted pit manufacturing operations there in 1989; the United Stateshas been unable to make stockpile-quality pits -- and therefore complete nuclear warheads -- sincethen. Inability to make pits may have adverse consequences. For example: (1) The United States cannot replace pits for the W88 warhead (for the Trident II missile) that are destroyed duringevaluation; currently, only one W88 evaluation pit remains, so use of more W88 pits would reducedeployable warheads. (2) Pits deteriorate over time, though the rate at which that happens is understudy. If pits of a given type deteriorate so much as to be no longer reliable, or if an unanticipateddefect arises, then hundreds to thousands of deployed warheads might have to be withdrawn. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the U.S. nuclear weapons program, has a five-part plan to restore pit production capability: (1) Establish a smallfacility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (NM) to fabricate pits, initially for the W88. LosAlamos manufactured the first pit to stockpile standards in April 2003. (2) Develop procedures tocertify W88 pits -- to provide high confidence without nuclear testing that the pits will work asintended. NNSA expects that, in 2007, Los Alamos will be able to certify W88 pits that it makes.Only certified pits can enter the stockpile. (3) Conduct experiments (not nuclear tests) in supportof W88 pit certification at the Nevada Test Site. (4) Conduct pit manufacturing and certification forother pits. (5) Plan a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) with a higher capacity than PF-4, to reach fulloperational capability in FY2021. NNSA estimates total cost at $1.46 billion for items (1) and (2),smaller amounts for items (3) and (4), and $2 billion to $4 billion for item (5). Congress has long shown interest in the program. It generally supports low-rate production at Los Alamos. It raised concern over budgeting and the pace of pit certification, but now praisesNNSA for "turning around" the W88 pit program. On MPF, the FY2004 defense authorization actsupported the Administration's schedule. The appropriations act reduced funding; conferees statedthat until Congress reviews nuclear stockpile plans, "it is premature to pursue further decisions" onMPF. MPF's schedule to reach full operational capability slipped a year between 2003 and 2004. Congress faces several issues as it considers the pit program. Is NNSA's plan for certification reasonable? Does the United States need new pits (beyond limited quantities for the W88)? If so,what capacity is needed? Can PF-4 be expanded to build enough pits to avoid the need for MPF? Could MPF's schedule be accelerated? Should its schedule be delayed? This report is intended for those interested in the U.S. nuclear weapons program. It will track the pit budget request and program, and will be updated as needed.
crs_RL32806	crs_RL32806_0	Absent a statutory or constitutional recognition of journalists' privilege, a reporter may be compelled to testify in legal, administrative, or other governmental proceedings. Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have recognized a journalists' privilege through enactment of press "shield laws," which protect the relationship between reporters, their source, and sometimes, the information that may be communicated in that relationship. Another 16 states have recognized a journalists' privilege through court decisions; Wyoming is the only state that has no legislatively or judicially adopted journalists' privilege. The journalists' privilege is distinct from other recognized privileges in that it vests only with the journalist, not with the source of the information. The remainder of this report sets forth the full text of the state shield statutes. a.	Absent a statutory or constitutional recognition of journalistic privilege, a reporter may be compelled to testify in legal, administrative, or other governmental proceedings. To date, 33 states and the District of Columbia have recognized a journalists' privilege through enactment of press "shield" statutes, which protect the relationship between reporters, their source, and sometimes, the information that may be communicated in that relationship. Another 16 states have adopted a journalists' privilege through court decisions; Wyoming is the only state without a legislatively or judicially adopted journalists' privilege. The journalists' privilege is distinct from other recognized privileges, in that the privilege vests only with the journalist, not with the source of the information. This report briefly provides a brief overview of the state shield statutes and then sets forth the full text of each.
crs_RL32773	crs_RL32773_0	In October 2008, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI's mandate. On June 10, 2009, the House passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 ( H.R. Purposes and Goal Established to train 75,000 international peacekeepers by 2010, GPOI was the George W. Bush Administration's signature initiative to build international peacekeeping capacity. The Administration launched the five-year $660 million (in FY2005-FY2009 funds) initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and "gendarmes," as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them ("Gendarmes," also known as constabulary police or stability police, are police with a combination o f policing and military skills considered vital to the semi-stable environments of peace operations, where the potential for outbreaks of rioting and other violence creates a need for specially-trained police forces.). In addition, GPOI has supported the training of 1,932 police trainers from 29 countries at the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy. With these funds, GPOI has provided for the training of 57,595 peacekeepers and peacekeeping trainers as of January 31, 2009. Background Before mid-2004, the United States provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme (constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section below); and Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there. Through GPOI, the State Department also supports a G8++ Global Clearinghouse information exchange to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide. U.S. Peacekeeping Training and Assistance, Pre-GPOI, in Sub-Saharan Africa From 1996 through 2004, the United States provided field and staff training to develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA. (Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.) GPOI's Africa ACOTA component now consists of 24 partners: 22 partner countries and two partner organizations. Development of a "Beyond Africa" Program In July 2005, the State Department initiated a training and equipping program for countries outside of Africa (informally referred to at the time as the "Beyond Africa" program) in order to extend GPOI training to three new regions: Latin America, Europe, and Asia. The United States is CoEPSU's primary foreign supporter. Administration Funding Requests and Congressional Action FY2005-FY2009 GPOI Funding Funding for GPOI totaled $374.46 million from FY2005 through FY2008. The State Department allocated almost $4 million more. FY2010 Funding Request In its May 2009 budget request for FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). As in previous years, funding for GPOI is requested under the State Department Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. 2410) In its first action on GPOI during the 111 th Congress, the House passed legislation which would authorize the Secretary of State to carry out and to expand GPOI programs and activities. As of 2008, Congress requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate a number of remaining issues: the GAO expressed several concerns about GPOI performance and management in a June 2008 report.	In its May 2009 budget request for FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested $96.8 million for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI was established in mid-2004 as a five-year program with intended annual funding to total $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. (Actual funds allocated to the GPOI program from FY2005 through FY2009 totaled, as of April 2009, some $480.4 million.) The centerpiece of the Bush Administration's efforts to prepare foreign security forces to participate in international peacekeeping operations, GPOI's primary purpose has been to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. In October 2008, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee approved a five-year renewal of GPOI's mandate. Congressional approval of the FY2010 budget request would provide funding for the first year of this extension. To date, GPOI also provides support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an Italian "train-the-trainer" training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy. In addition, GPOI promotes the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and encourages information exchanges to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises. Through GPOI, the United States supports and participates in a G* Africa Clearinghouse and a G8++ Global Clearinghouse, both to coordinate international peacekeeping capacity building efforts. GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs for Africa. From FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over $121 million on GPOI's predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account: the Clinton Administration's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor, the Bush Administration's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (ACOTA is now GPOI's principal training program in Africa.) Some 16,000 troops from ten African nations were trained under the early ACRI/ACOTA programs. Some $33 million was provided from FY1998 to FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Within a year after GPOI was initiated in late 2004, the Administration began expanding its geographical scope to selected countries in Central America, Europe, and Asia. In 2006 and 2007, the program was further expanded to countries in Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. GPOI now includes 53 "partner" countries and two partner organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa. According to figures provided by the State Department, almost 57,600 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers were trained as of January 31, 2009.. Congress has tended to view the concept of the GPOI program favorably, albeit sometimes with reservations. Over the years, the State Department has addressed various congressional concerns. In a June 2008 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended several further improvements (GAO-08-754). In its first action on GPOI during the 111th Congress, the House passed legislation authorizing the Secretary of State to carry out and expand GPOI programs and activities (Section 1108 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, H.R. 2410, passed June 10, 2009).
crs_RS22895	crs_RS22895_0	Background Campaign-related activity by entities commonly referred to as 527 groups or 527s has increased over the past several election cycles. These groups are a subset of the political organizations that qualify for tax-exempt status under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Although these "issue advocacy" communications are widely viewed as intending to influence elections, some argue that they are not regulated—and cannot be constitutionally regulated—by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) due to an interpretation of the Supreme Court's campaign finance law jurisprudence only permitting regulation of communications expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. IRC § 527 provides beneficial tax treatment to qualifying "political organizations." FEC Rule and Enforcement Action 18 In 2004, after considering but not adopting several approaches for classifying 527 groups as political committees under FECA, the FEC adopted a regulation relevant to political committees. Summary of Selected Legislation In the 110 th Congress, the 527 Reform Act of 2007 ( H.R. 420 and S. 463 ) would have amended FECA to define "political committee" to include any committee, club, association, or group of persons that has given notice to the IRS of its status as a § 527 political organization. Legislation regulating 527 organizations has not yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress.	During recent election cycles, there has been controversy regarding the increased campaign-related activity of 527 groups and to what extent they are regulated under federal law. The controversy stems from the intersection between the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which regulates "political committees," and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which provides tax-exempt status to "political organizations." Some groups that qualify for beneficial tax treatment as "political organizations" seemingly intend to influence federal elections in ways that may place them outside the FECA definition of "political committee." This report refers to this subset of Section 527 political organizations as 527 groups or 527s. Considerable debate has been generated about the extent to which FECA currently regulates 527 groups as "political committees" and the constitutional parameters of such regulation. In the 110th Congress, the 527 Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 420 and S. 463) would have amended FECA to generally treat all Section 527 political organizations active in federal elections as "political committees." Similar legislation has not yet been introduced in the 111th Congress.
crs_RL34130	crs_RL34130_0	Background Renewable energy policy in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 , 2008 farm bill) builds on earlier programs, many of which were established in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-171 , 2002 farm bill). The energy title authorized grants, loans, and loan guarantees to foster research on agriculture-based renewable energy, to share development risk, and to promote the adoption of renewable energy systems. The 2008 farm bill became law six months after the enactment of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ). The emphasis on cellulosic ethanol also reflects increasing concerns about the economic and environmental issues associated with corn starch-based ethanol. The "food versus fuel" debate intensified during the 2008 farm bill debate as food price inflation accelerated both in the U.S. and globally—highlighting some of the potential problems associated with replacing even a small share of the nation's gasoline consumption with corn-based ethanol. Research provisions relating to renewable energy are found in Title VII and tax and trade provisions are found in Title XV. 15321), and promotion of cellulosic feedstocks production (Sec. 9002); support for rural energy efficiency and self-sufficiency (Sec. 9006); reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol (Sec. 15331); and continuation of the import duty on ethanol (Sec. Energy Policy Issues in the 2008 Farm Bill Emphasis on Cellulosic Biofuels The 2008 farm bill energy title provides $1 billion in financial incentives and support to encourage the production of advanced (mainly cellulosic) biofuels. For instance, the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP, Section 9001) supports the production of dedicated crop and forest cellulosic feedstocks and provides incentives for post-production collection, harvest, storage, and transport (CHST). These programs are supported by increased funding for advanced biofuels research under the Agricultural Bioenergy Feedstock and Energy Efficiency Research and Extension Initiative (Section 7207), and the Sun Grant Program (Section 7526) which support and coordinate advanced biofuels research, extension, and development between government agencies, universities, and research institutions. Modification and Extension of Tax Credits and Tariffs Title XV of the 2008 farm bill contains provisions which extend and modify tax credits and tariffs on ethanol. 4853 ) extended both the ethanol blender tax credit and the import tariff for ethanol. Reports and Studies on the Economic Impacts of Ethanol Production The impact of increased ethanol production on agricultural and rural economies was a subject of debate during the farm bill process. Funding for Energy Programs The 2008 farm bill authorizes over $1 billion in mandatory funding for FY2008 through FY2012 ( Table 1 ), compared with $800 million in the 2002 farm bill (FY2002-FY2007). Mandatory authorization in the 2008 farm bill includes $320 million to the Biorefinery Assistance Program, $300 million to the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels, $255 million to the Rural Energy for America Program (REAP), $118 million to the Biomass Research and Development Act (BRDA), and potentially unlimited funding (such sums as necessary) for the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP).	The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, the 2008 farm bill) extends and expands many of the renewable energy programs originally authorized in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171, 2002 farm bill). The bill also continues the emphasis on the research and development of advanced and cellulosic bioenergy authorized in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140). Farm bill debate over U.S. biomass-based renewable energy production policy focused mainly on the continuation of subsidies for ethanol blenders, continuation of the import tariff for ethanol, and the impact of corn-based ethanol on agriculture. The enacted bill requires reports on the economic impacts of ethanol production, reflecting concerns that the increasing share of corn production being used for ethanol had contributed to high commodity prices and food price inflation. Title VII, the research title of the 2008 farm bill, contains numerous renewable energy related provisions that promote research, development, and demonstration of biomass-based renewable energy and biofuels. The Sun Grant Initiative coordinates and funds research at land grant institutions on biobased energy technologies. The Agricultural Bioenergy Feedstock and Energy Efficiency Research and Extension Initiative provides support for on-farm biomass energy crop production research and demonstration. Title IX, the energy title of the farm bill, authorizes mandatory funds (not subject to appropriations) of $1.1 billion, and discretionary funds (subject to appropriations) totaling $1.0 billion, for the FY2008-FY2012 period. Energy grants and loans provided through initiatives such as the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels promote the development of cellulosic biorefinery capacity. The Repowering Assistance Program supports increasing efficiencies in existing refineries. Programs such as the Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) assist rural communities and businesses in becoming more energy-efficient and self-sufficient, with an emphasis on small operations. The Biomass Crop Assistance Program, the Biorefinery Assistance Program, and the Forest Biomass for Energy Program provide support to develop alternative feedstock resources and the infrastructure to support the production, harvest, storage, and processing of cellulosic biomass feedstocks. Cellulosic feedstocks—for example, switchgrass and woody biomass—are given high priority both in research and funding. Title XV of the 2008 farm bill contains tax and trade provisions. It continued current biofuels tax incentives, reducing those for corn-based ethanol but expanding tax credits for cellulosic ethanol. The tariff on ethanol imports was also extended. For information concerning the status of implementation of the farm bill's energy provisions and a brief discussion of related emerging issues, see CRS Report R41985, Renewable Energy Programs and the Farm Bill: Status and Issues.
crs_R45314	crs_R45314_0	Typically, aliens within the United States may not be removed without due process. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government may exclude an alien seeking to enter this country without affording him the traditional due process protections that otherwise govern formal removal proceedings; instead, an alien seeking initial entry is entitled only to those procedural protections that Congress expressly authorized. Under this streamlined removal procedure, which Congress established through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, such aliens may be summarily removed without a hearing or further review. In limited circumstances, however, an alien subject to expedited removal may be entitled to certain procedural protections before he may be removed from the United States. For example, an alien who expresses a fear of persecution may obtain administrative review of his claim and, if the review determines that his fear is credible, the alien will be placed in "formal" removal proceedings where he can pursue asylum and related protections. Additionally, an alien may seek administrative review of a claim that he is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident (LPR), admitted refugee, or asylee. Unaccompanied alien children also are not subject to expedited removal. In addition to providing for expedited removal of certain arriving aliens, INA Section 235(b)(1) also confers the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the ability to expand the use of expedited removal to aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled if they have been in the country less than two years and do not have valid entry documents or have attempted to gain their admission by fraud or misrepresentation. Therefore, existing Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes that the federal government has broad plenary power over the admission and exclusion of aliens seeking to enter the United States, and may deny admission without affording due process protections such as the right to a hearing. Before IIRIRA, federal immigration law distinguished between arriving aliens and aliens who had entered the United States. In a separate provision, Congress gave the Attorney General (now the Secretary of DHS) "the sole and unreviewable discretion" to apply this procedure to "certain other aliens" inadmissible on the same grounds if (1) they were not admitted or paroled into the United States, and (2) they could not establish that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for two years at the time of their apprehension. While the expedited removal statute governs the removal of certain aliens who are "arriving" in the United States, it does not define this group. Over the years, however, the INS and its successor agency DHS gradually expanded the implementation of expedited removal authority to cover (1) aliens who entered the United States by sea without being admitted or paroled by immigration authorities, and who have been in the country less than two years; (2) aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the U.S. border within 14 days of entering the country, and who have not been admitted or paroled by immigration authorities; and, (3) ultimately, Cuban nationals who met the criteria for expedited removal. Arriving aliens seeking entry into the United States at a designated port of entry. Instead, the regulations require the immigration officer to determine whether the alien is considered to be applying for admission into the United States. Nonetheless, the court believed that these constitutional concerns were pertinent to INA Section 235(b), despite this provision primarily addressing aliens seeking initial entry to the United States, because it could in some circumstances apply to returning LPRs who are entitled to more robust protections than aliens seeking initial entry into the United States. However, in part because of the strict limitations to judicial review of an expedited order of removal, courts have largely dismissed such challenges for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the few occasions where courts have entertained such challenges, rejected them on substantive grounds. Potential Expansions of Expedited Removal and Legal Implications Since the enactment of the expedited removal statute, immigration authorities have implemented expedited removal with respect to three overarching categories of aliens: (1) those who arrive in the United States at a designated port of entry; (2) those who arrived in the United States by sea, and who have been in the country for less than two years; and (3) those found within 100 miles of the U.S. border, within 14 days of entering the country. To that end, on January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing the DHS Secretary to apply expedited removal within the broader framework of INA Section 235(b)(1).	The federal government has broad authority over the admission of non-U.S. nationals (aliens) seeking to enter the United States. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government may exclude such aliens without affording them the due process protections that traditionally apply to persons physically present in the United States. Instead, aliens seeking entry are entitled only to those procedural protections that Congress has expressly authorized. Consistent with this broad authority, Congress established an expedited removal process for certain aliens who have arrived in the United States without permission. In general, aliens whom immigration authorities seek to remove from the United States may challenge that determination in administrative proceedings with attendant statutory rights to counsel, evidentiary requirements, and appeal. Under the streamlined expedited removal process created by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and codified in Section 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), however, certain aliens deemed inadmissible by an immigration officer may be removed from the United States without further administrative hearings or review. INA Section 235(b)(1) applies only to certain aliens who are inadmissible into the United States because they either lack valid entry documents or have attempted to procure their admission through fraud or misrepresentation. The statute generally permits the government to summarily remove those aliens if they are arriving in the United States. The statute also authorizes, but does not require, the government to apply this procedure to aliens who are inadmissible on the same grounds if they have been physically present in the country for less than two years. As a matter of practice, however, immigration authorities have applied expedited removal in more limited fashion than potentially authorized by statute—in general, the process is applied strictly to (1) arriving aliens apprehended at a designated port of entry; (2) aliens who arrived in the United States by sea without being admitted or paroled into the country by immigration authorities, and who have been physically present in the United States for less than two years; or (3) aliens who are found in the United States within 100 miles of the border within 14 days of entering the country, who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States by immigration authorities. Nevertheless, expedited removal accounts for a substantial portion of the alien removals each year. And in January 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing the Department of Homeland Security to expand expedited removal within the broader framework of INA Section 235(b)(1). The agency has yet to promulgate regulations implementing this directive. In some circumstances, however, an alien subject to expedited removal may be entitled to certain procedural protections before he may be removed from the United States. For example, an alien who expresses a fear of persecution may obtain administrative review of his claim, and if his fear is determined credible the alien will be placed in formal removal proceedings where he can pursue asylum and related protections. Additionally, an alien may seek administrative review of a claim that he is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, admitted refugee, or asylee. Unaccompanied alien children also are statutorily exempted from expedited removal. Given the streamlined nature of expedited removal and the broad discretion afforded to immigration officers to implement that process, challenges have been raised contesting the procedure's constitutionality. In particular, some have argued that the procedure violates aliens' due process rights because aliens placed in expedited removal do not have the opportunity to seek counsel or contest their removal before a judge or other arbiter. Reviewing courts have largely dismissed such challenges for lack of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, rejected the claims on the grounds that aliens seeking entry into the United States generally do not have constitutional due process protections. But such cases have concerned aliens arriving at the U.S. border or designated ports of entry, and such aliens may be entitled to lesser constitutional protections than aliens located within the United States. Expanding the expedited removal process to aliens located within the interior could compel courts to tackle questions involving the relationship between the federal government's broad power over the entry and removal of aliens and the due process rights of aliens located within the United States.
crs_R41531	crs_R41531_0	Although decreasing amounts of oil were observed on the ocean surface following the well containment, oil spill response officials and researchers have found oil in other places. A pressing question raised by many stakeholders is where did the oil go? Because evaluating the actual fate of the oil may take time and may prove difficult, perceptions of the oil's fate may influence congressional interest and action, with consequences for the affected stakeholders. These perceptions may be influenced by multiple factors, including oil spill assessments and their methods, the group that prepared the assessment (and perceived biases of the group), and the manner in which the assessment is presented. If policymakers have the perception that the oil has degraded with minimal impacts to the environment, attention to oil spill's consequences and associated impacts may wane. On the other hand, a perception that a substantial volume of oil remains and poses a threat to the environment could result in continuing pressure on Gulf industries and livelihoods. These include the chemical composition of the oil, a complex collection of natural processes and pathways, the location of the spill or discharge, and human intervention. In situ burning removes the oil from the marine environment, but may transfer some of the pollution risk to the air. The Federal Government's Oil Budget Estimates On August 4, 2010, the National Incident Command (the spill response leadership team of the federal government) made public an estimate of the oil spill budget for the Deepwater Horizon incident. On November 23, 2010, the federal government released a peer-reviewed "Technical Document" that further explained how the estimates were derived; in some cases, the November document modified the August estimates. Evaporated or dissolved: The budget estimates that 1.2 million barrels (~50 million gallons) of oil evaporated or dissolved—24% of the total estimated release ( Figure 3 ). Other The "other" category is essentially the portion that remains after subtracting the above category measurements/estimates from the total amount of oil estimated to have released. What Happened to the Remaining Oil? Even assuming that approximately half of the oil has been removed from the Gulf marine environment through direct recovery, burning, skimming, or evaporation, a substantial portion of oil—over 100 million gallons—remained in the Gulf as of the Oil Budget estimate. It is debatable whether the fate of the remaining oil will ever be established conclusively. Multiple challenges hinder this objective: the complexity of the Gulf system; resources required to collect data; and varied interpretations over the results and observations. Moreover, as time progresses, determining the fate of the oil will likely become more difficult. Regardless, the question of oil fate will likely be addressed through an incremental process. Researchers are continuing to study various components of the Gulf, specifically damages to natural resources. Some of these efforts may provide clues to the oil's fate.	The April 20, 2010, explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig led to the largest oil spill in U.S. waters. Federal government officials estimated that the deepwater well ultimately released (over 84 days) over 200 million gallons (or 4.9 million barrels) of crude oil. Although decreasing amounts of oil were observed on the ocean surface following the well's containment on July 15, 2010, oil spill response officials and researchers have found oil in other places. A pressing question that has been raised by many stakeholders is where did the oil go? On August 4, 2010, the federal government released an estimate of the oil spill budget for the Deepwater Horizon incident. On November 23, 2010, the federal government released a peer-reviewed "Technical Document" that further explained how the estimates were derived, and in some cases, modified the initial estimates. The oil budget estimates divide the released oil into seven categories, accounting for the following percentages of the total oil released. These categories generally fall into three groups: 1. Human intervention: direct recovery from the well (17%), in situ burning (5%), skimmed (3%), chemically dispersed (16%). 2. Natural Processes: naturally dispersed (13%), evaporated or dissolved (24%). 3. Other (22%): refers to the oil remaining after subtracting the above estimates from the total estimated release; possible fates include remaining in the water column, settling to the sea floor, mixing with sediment, ingested by microbes, or collected during shore cleanup activities. Direct observation and measurement of the fate of the vast majority of the estimated 200 million gallons of oil presents a considerable challenge. In some cases, the estimates used to calculate these percentages contain considerable uncertainty. Even assuming that approximately half of the oil has been removed from the Gulf ecosystem through direct recovery, burning, skimming, or evaporation, the fate of the remaining ("other") oil is unknown. It is debatable whether the fate of the remaining oil will ever be established conclusively, because multiple challenges hinder this objective: the complexity of the Gulf system, resources required to collect data, and varied interpretations over the results and observations. Moreover, as time progresses, determining the fate of the oil will likely become more difficult. Regardless, the question of oil fate will likely be answered through an incremental process. Researchers are continuing to study various components of the Gulf, specifically damages to natural resources. Some of these efforts may provide clues to the oil's fate. Because evaluating the actual fate of the oil may take time and may prove difficult, perceptions of the oil's fate may influence congressional interest and action, with consequences for the affected stakeholders. The perception of the spill's fate may be influenced by multiple factors, including oil spill assessments, the group that prepared the assessment, and the manner in which the assessment is presented. If policymakers have the perception that the oil has degraded with minimal impacts to the environment, attention to the oil spill's consequences and associated impacts may wane. On the other hand, a perception that a substantial volume of oil remains and poses a threat to the environment could result in continuing pressure on Gulf industries and livelihoods.
crs_R44558	crs_R44558_0	Introduction The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. On Wednesday, June 22, 2016, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up and ordered reported the following five bills that would amend selected HEA programs and activities: H.R. 3179 , the Empowering Students Through Enhanced Financial Counseling Act; H.R. 5529 , the Accessing Higher Education Opportunities Act; and H.R. 5530 , the HBCU Capital Financing Improvement Act. This report identifies and describes how the proposals made in these five bills would amend the programs and activities authorized under the HEA. Each bill is described separately. 5528, the Simplifying the Application for Student Aid Act Under federal student aid need analysis procedures, a student's calculated ability to pay for higher education is known as the "expected family contribution" (EFC). Information to calculate the EFC is collected via the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). If applicable, family members who have submitted their income tax returns for the applicable tax year prior to completing the FAFSA may be able to import tax information to the FAFSA using the Internal Revenue Service Data Retrieval Tool (IRS-DRT). 5528 directs ED to "make the electronic version of the forms ... available through a technology tool that can be used on mobile devices." 3178, the Strengthening Transparency in Higher Education Act The HEA was amended by the HEOA to establish a number of provisions that require the reporting and publication of detailed information about institutions of higher education and their offerings, the students who attend them, and college costs and prices. College Dashboard The HEA currently requires the Department of Education to make certain types of consumer information about IHEs that participate in the Title IV federal student aid programs publicly available on the College Navigator website. 3179 would make numerous amendments to the current loan counseling requirements, with the intent of enhancing the timing, frequency, and content of the counseling to enable borrowers to make sound borrowing decisions. Information to Pell Grant Recipients H.R. 5529 would expand the authorized uses of Title V-A HSI grants to include (1) the operation of student support services designed to enable the successful advancement of students from four-year institutions of higher education to postbaccalaureate doctoral degree programs for healthcare occupations, and (2) the development and expansion of access to dual or concurrent enrollment programs and early college high school programs. H.R. 5530 would make several changes to the program's operations, support, and congressional oversight.	On Wednesday, June 22, 2016, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up and ordered reported five bills that would amend several of the programs and activities authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). H.R. 5528, the Simplifying the Application for Student Aid Act, would amend procedures for completing the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) to mandate the use of income and tax information from the second preceding (prior-prior) year for purposes of calculating a student's expected family contribution (EFC), to require development of a tool that facilitates completion of the FAFSA using a mobile device, and to promote enhancements in the capacity of the Internal Revenue Service Data Retrieval Tool (IRS-DRT) to be used to populate portions of the FAFSA. H.R. 3178, the Strengthening Transparency in Higher Education Act, would revise the types of consumer information about institutions of higher education that must be disclosed through a new Department of Education College Dashboard, which would succeed the current College Navigator website and revise the types of information on college costs and prices that must be made available through net-price calculators. H.R. 3179, the Empowering Students Through Enhanced Financial Counseling Act, would establish annual requirements for the counseling of federal student loan and Pell Grant recipients, with the aim of enhancing the timing, frequency, and content of the counseling to better enable borrowers to make sound decisions concerning their federal student aid. H.R. 5529, the Accessing Higher Education Opportunities Act, would amend the Developing Hispanic-Serving Institutions program to allow the use of funds for offering student support services to enable the advancement of students from baccalaureate programs to postbaccalaureate degree programs for healthcare occupations. H.R. 5530, the HBCU Capital Financing Improvement Act, would make several changes to the Historically Black College and University (HBCU) Capital Financing Program to enhance program operations, support, and congressional oversight. This report identifies and describes how the proposals made in these five bills would amend the affected programs and activities authorized under the HEA. Each bill is described separately. This report will be updated to reflect legislative developments.
crs_R44039	crs_R44039_0	As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2.1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense. Congress provides budget authority by law to federal agencies to obligate money for goods and services. After the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction did not reach a deficit-reduction deal and triggered backup budgetary enforcement measures of steeper reductions to the initial BCA caps beginning in FY2013, the "security" category was revised to the narrower "defense" category, which included only discretionary programs in the national defense budget function (050). The discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L . The spending limits (or caps ) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority. The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration , which automatically cancels previously enacted spending by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels. The defense discretionary spending limits apply to national defense (budget function 050) but not to funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or emergencies. What are the BCA limits on the Department of Defense (DOD)? The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ), enacted on February 9, 2018, amended the BCA to raise defense discretionary spending caps for FY2018 and FY2019, with increases more than three times larger than previous changes (see Figure 2 ). While the deficit decreased from $1.1 trillion (6.8% of Gross Domestic Product) in FY2012 to $665 billion (3.5% of GDP) in FY2017, it is projected to increase to $1.1 trillion (4.9% of GDP) in FY2021. Over the same period, federal debt held by the public has increased from $11.3 trillion (70.4% of GDP) in FY2012 to $14.7 trillion (76.5% of GDP) in FY2017 and is projected to further increase to $19 trillion (83.1% of GDP) in FY2021. 112-25 ) as amended.	Enacted on August 2, 2011, the Budget Control Act of 2011 as amended (P.L. 112-25, P.L. 112-240, P.L. 113-67, P.L. 114-74, and P.L. 115-123) sets limits on defense and nondefense spending. As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2.1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense. The spending limits (or caps) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority. Budget authority is authority provided by law to a federal agency to obligate money for goods and services. The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration. Sequestration automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations (a form of budget authority) by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels. The defense spending limits apply to national defense (budget function 050) but not to funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or emergencies. Some defense policymakers and officials argue the spending restrictions impede the Department of Defense's (DOD's) ability to adequately prepare military personnel and equipment for operations and other national security requirements. Others argue the limits are necessary to curb rising deficits and debt. After lawmakers did not reach a deficit-reduction deal and triggered steeper reductions to the initial BCA caps, Congress repeatedly amended the legislation to raise the spending limits. Most recently, President Donald Trump on February 9, 2018, signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The bill amended the BCA to increase discretionary defense spending caps by the largest amounts to date—by $80 billion to $629 billion in FY2018 and by $85 billion to $647 billion in FY2019. It did not change the spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021. The annual federal budget deficit decreased from $1.1 trillion (6.8% of Gross Domestic Product) in FY2012 to $665 billion (3.5% of GDP) in FY2017, but is projected to increase to $1.1 trillion (4.9% of GDP) in FY2021. Meanwhile, federal debt held by the public has increased from $11.3 trillion (70.4% of GDP) in FY2012 to $14.7 trillion (76.5% of GDP) in FY2017, and is projected to further increase to $19 trillion (83.1% of GDP) in FY2021.
crs_R40009	crs_R40009_0	Introduction For over 30 years, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) required broadcast licensees to present controversial issues of public importance and to do so in a manner that was fair and balanced. Discussion continues among scholars and lawmakers regarding the Fairness Doctrine's effectiveness, constitutionality, and reinstatement. The political editorial rule required that when a broadcaster endorsed a particular political candidate, the broadcaster was required to provide the other qualified candidates for the same office (or their representatives) the opportunity to respond over the broadcaster's facilities. Second, the Court examined whether requiring broadcasters to cover issues of public importance and to present opposing views on those issues fairly violated the broadcasters' First Amendment rights to free speech. However, the history of the doctrine would not end there. The repeal of the doctrine occurred later in 1987. The court upheld the order of the FCC, but did not reach the constitutional issue. Constitutional Issues Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Broadcast Licensees Because of the FCC ruling determining that the Fairness Doctrine violated the First Amendment, it is likely that any reinstatement of the doctrine, either by Congress or by the FCC, would be met by a court challenge on First Amendment grounds. In reviewing the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine as applied to broadcast licensees, the Court would likely be faced with two questions: (1) what standard of constitutional scrutiny to apply, and (2) whether the Fairness Doctrine withstands the chosen level of scrutiny. The FCC argued in its 1987 decision that the scarcity rationale was no longer applicable. The agency also noted the increase in information sources and viewpoints available to the public via cable and satellite channels. Because the Supreme Court has struck down regulations similar to the Fairness Doctrine when applied to other types of media, it seems unlikely that the Fairness Doctrine would survive review under strict scrutiny. It is also possible that the Supreme Court will maintain the scarcity rationale for applying a lower standard of scrutiny to restrictions on broadcasters' speech and will continue to apply intermediate scrutiny to the Fairness Doctrine. Therefore, broadcasters could avoid enforcement actions for violations of the Fairness Doctrine by simply not covering the issue of public importance at all. Continuing Congressional Debate Since the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, debate among legislators regarding whether to reinstate the doctrine has continued. Commission Letter Regarding Repeal of Regulations On May 31, 2011, Chairman Upton of the House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, along with other members of the Energy and Commerce Committee, sent a letter to the chairman of the FCC urging the Commission to remove the rules in the Code of Federal Regulations that reference the Fairness Doctrine, as well as the political-editorial and personal attack rules (47 C.F.R.	The Fairness Doctrine was a policy of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) that required broadcast licensees to cover issues of public importance and to do so in a fair manner. Issues of public importance were not limited to political campaigns. Nuclear plant construction, workers' rights, and other issues of focus for a particular community could gain the status of an issue that broadcasters were required to cover. Therefore, the Fairness Doctrine was distinct from the so-called "equal time" rule, which requires broadcasters to grant equal time to qualified candidates for public office, because the Fairness Doctrine applied to a much broader range of topics. In 1987, after a period of study, the FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine. The FCC found that the doctrine likely violated the free speech rights of broadcasters, led to less speech about issues of public importance over broadcast airwaves, and was no longer required because of the increase in competition among mass media. The repeal of the doctrine did not end the debate among lawmakers, scholars, and others about its constitutionality and impact on the availability of diverse information to the public. The debate in Congress regarding whether to reinstate the doctrine continues today. Recently, Chairman Upton of the House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology sent a letter to FCC Chairman Genachowski urging the Commission to remove the regulations relating to the Fairness Doctrine from the Code of Federal Regulations. Chairman Genachowski responded by reasserting his lack of support for the Fairness Doctrine and agreeing to begin the process of repealing the regulations. Any attempt to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine likely would be met with a constitutional challenge. Those opposing the doctrine would argue that it violates their First Amendment rights. In 1969, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine, but applied a lower standard of scrutiny to the First Amendment rights of broadcasters than it applies to other media. Since that decision, the Supreme Court's reasoning for applying a lower constitutional standard to broadcasters' speech has been questioned. Furthermore, when repealing the doctrine, the FCC found that, as the law stood in 1987, the Fairness Doctrine violated the First Amendment even when applying the lower standard of scrutiny to the doctrine. No reviewing court has examined the validity of the agency's findings on the constitutional issue. Therefore, whether a newly instituted Fairness Doctrine would survive constitutional scrutiny remains an open question.
crs_R45007	crs_R45007_0	On June 30, 2017, DOJ filed its reply brief in the case and requested that the Court of Appeals reverse the judgment of the district court (related to the legal authority of DOL to use salary level as part of the EAP exemption) but not rule on the validity of the salary level set in the 2016 rule. Goals and Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the primary federal statute providing labor standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Its major provisions include a federal minimum wage, overtime pay requirements, child labor protections, and recordkeeping requirements. In addition, the FLSA does not limit the number of hours an employee may be required to work in a day or a week. Section 7(a) of the FLSA specifies requirements for overtime pay for weekly hours worked in excess of the maximum hours. In general, unless an employee is specifically exempted in the FLSA, he or she is considered to be a covered nonexempt employee and must receive pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times ("time-and-a-half") the regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Employers may choose to pay more than time-and-a-half for overtime or to pay overtime to employees who are exempt from overtime pay requirements under the FLSA. Although not necessarily elaborated upon at the time of enactment, the general rationale for including the EAP exemptions in the FLSA is often construed to be related to the type of work and the presumed labor market power of EAP employees: (1) the nature of the work performed by EAP employees seemed to make standardization difficult, and thus the output of EAP employees was not as clearly associated with hours of work per day as the output for typical nonexempt work (e.g., manual labor); and (2) bona fide EAP employees were considered to have other forms of compensation (e.g., above-average benefits, greater opportunities for advancement, greater job security, greater mobility) not available to nonexempt workers. Following enactment of the FLSA in 1938, DOL issued regulations defining required duties for exemption for two categories of employees—"executive and administrative" and "professional"—and required salary thresholds for exemption for each of these two categories. The long tests combined relatively lower salary thresholds with a duties test that included quantitative limits on the percentage of work time an exempt employee could spend on nonexempt work. Since the enactment of the FLSA in 1938, DOL has required that an employee earn above a certain salary in order to qualify for the EAP exemption. Importantly, as will be discussed below, DOL determined the EAP salary level thresholds for the long test first, and the short test salary level was typically set as percentage of the long test salary levels. The methodologies that DOL used in the eight revisions to the EAP salary level since 1938 have differed in specifics but generally may be categorized into three periods based on the approaches used to define and delimit the EAP exemptions: the 1940 and 1949 rules; the 1958, 1963, 1970, and 1975 rules; and the 2004 and 2016 rules. Specifically, the 2004 rule on the EAP exemptions eliminated the long and short duties tests in favor of a single, standard duties test (the 2016 rule kept the standard test) and used a wage distribution from a data source that included exempt and nonexempt employees to set the salary level threshold for exemption. Data in Figure 1 show the 2016 standard salary level of $913 per week compared to the previous inflation-adjusted weekly salary levels used in the short test (1949-1975) and the standard test (2004). Upon introducing the standard duties test in 2004, DOL acknowledged that differences between the standard and short duties tests were minimal: Given the lack of data on the duties being performed by specific workers in the Current Population Survey, the Department concludes that it is impossible to quantitatively estimate the number of exempt workers resulting from the deminimis differences in the standard duties tests compared to the current short duties tests. From 1950 through 1975, the ratios averaged 2.94. In increasing the salary level for the administrative exemption from $30 to $50 per week, DOL did not include a limit on nonexempt work for employees in this category. DOL justified a new, separate short test for duties and salary on the basis of findings that the higher the salaries they were paid, the more likely employees were to meet all requirements for exemption; the use of a higher salary threshold with a lower, more qualitative duties test (compared to the percentage cap on nonexempt work in the long test) was intended to provide a "short-cut test of exemption" to ease administration of the EAP exemptions; the short test salary level needed to be "considerably higher" than the long test level so that it would include employees about whose exemption status there was normally no question; and the new short test was unlikely to lead to "injustice" because a bona fide EAP employee not meeting the higher salary test would still be likely to qualify for exemption under the long test. In establishing the salary level at the 40 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried employees, rather than the 20 th percentile used in 2004, DOL argues that the 2004 threshold was too low because of the elimination of the long tests and the adoption of a standard test based on the short duties test.	The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the primary federal statute providing labor standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. The FLSA standards require that "non-exempt" employees working excess hours in a workweek receive pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times their regular rate for hours worked over 40 hours. The requirements in the FLSA for overtime pay beyond this threshold refer to the "maximum hours," but the FLSA does not actually limit the number of hours that may be worked. Instead, it establishes standards for the pay required for hours beyond 40 hours in a workweek. The FLSA also provides several exemptions to the maximum hours requirement, some of the largest of which are the EAP (executive, administrative, and professional employees, or "white collar") exemptions. In effect, these exempt employers from overtime pay requirements for certain employees. The FLSA authorizes the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to "define and delimit" the EAP exemptions, rather than setting the specific parameters of the exemptions in the law itself. Since defining and delimiting the EAP exemptions upon the enactment of the FLSA in 1938, DOL has adjusted their parameters eight additional times, most recently in a 2016 rule. In August 2017, a U.S. District Court invalidated the 2016 rule and DOL has subsequently indicated that it is in the process of formulating a new proposal on the EAP exemptions. As will be discussed in detail in the remainder of this report, the major features of DOL's rulemaking on the EAP exemptions are as follows: In every rulemaking since 1938, DOL has required that EAP employees meet three tests to qualify for exemption from overtime pay (i.e., when employees are exempt, employers are not required to pay them for work in excess of 40 hours): (1) exempt employees must perform certain EAP duties ("duties" test), (2) exempt employees must be salaried ("salary basis" test), and (3) exempt employees must earn a salary in excess of the level set by DOL ("salary level" test). From 1949 to 2004, DOL used a "long" duties test paired with a relatively lower salary level along with a "short" duties test paired with a relatively higher salary level to determine exemption for EAP employees. The main difference between the long and short duties tests was a quantitative limit in the long test on the amount of time an EAP employee could spend performing nonexempt work (no more than 20% in a workweek). During this 55-year period of using long and short tests, the salary level for the short test averaged 149% of the salary for the long test. The logic of using the two approaches was that higher-salaried employees were more likely to meet all requirements for exemption, while lower-salaried employees needed a more-stringent duties test to qualify for exemption. In the 2004 rulemaking, DOL switched from the long and short tests to a standard duties test and salary level test for exemption. The standard duties test did not include a quantitative limit on the percentage of time performing nonexempt work, making it closer in nature to the defunct short duties test. In addition, the new standard salary level test was lower than the inflation-adjusted salary levels used in the previous short tests. In other words, the 2004 rule generally paired a short duties test with a salary level below the short test levels used in the past. The 2016 rule, which was subsequently invalidated, increased the standard salary level and left the standard duties test unchanged. Compared to the six previous rulemakings using the short and/or standard tests for exemption, the salary level in the 2016 rule ($913 per week) is below the inflation-adjusted levels in all but the 2004 rule. In addition, the ratio of the salary level test to the weekly minimum wage equivalent (40 hours per week at the prevailing minimum wage) in the 2016 rule is 3.15. The average ratio at the time of enactment of each new EAP salary threshold from 1949 through 2016 is 2.99, with a high of 3.33 (1949) and a low of 2.21 (2004). Since 1938, measures of the salary level have fluctuated according to DOL's identification of data sources most suitable for studying wage distributions and the department's determinations of the proportion and types of workers who should be below salary thresholds, as well as its determinations of whether regional, industry, or cost-of-living considerations should be factored into salary tests.
crs_R41939	crs_R41939_0	Status of Legislation Appropriation On February 14, 2011, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress his request for military construction appropriations to support federal government operations during FY2012, which will begin on October 1, 2011. The House Committee on Appropriations introduced its Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2012 ( H.R. 2055 ) on May 31. The House began debate on June 2 and passed the bill on June 14, 2011. On June 30, the committee reported the bill as an amendment in the form of a substitute ( S.Rept. 112-29 ). 2055 was laid before the Senate by unanimous consent on July 14. 2055 before the beginning of FY2012, Congress passed, and the President signed, a series of temporary funding bills the generally continued funding for military construction projects at levels consistent with those enacted for FY2011. 2017 , P.L. 112-33 , through October 4, 2011), the Second FY2012 Continuing Resolution (the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, H.R. 2608 , P.L. 112-36 , through November 18, 2011), the Third FY2012 Continuing Resolution (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, H.R. 2112 , P.L. 112-55 , through December 16, 2011), the Fourth Continuing Resolution ( H.J.Res. 94 , P.L. 112-67 , through December 17, 2011) and the Fifth Continuing Resolution ( H.J.Res. 95 , through December 23, 2011). The conference began on December 8, 2011, and in their opening statements, conferees Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and Representative Harold Rogers, his contemporary on the House committee, noted that the conference intended to pull the nine FY2012 appropriations bills remaining to be enacted into an amended H.R. He signed it into law on December 23, whereupon it became P.L. 112-74 . The House Committee on Armed Services reported its amendment of the bill on May 17 ( H.Rept. The conferees filed their report ( H.Rept. 112-329 ) on December 12. He signed it on December 31, whereupon it became P.L. Title I: Department of Defense Military Construction The military construction appropriations account includes a number of appropriations subaccounts: Military Construction accounts provide funds for new construction, construction improvements, and facility planning and design in support of active and reserve military forces and DOD agencies. Key Budget Issues Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC): Completing the 2005 Round September 15, 2011, is the statutorily mandated completion date for implementing all of the recommendations made by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (also known as the BRAC Commission) and approved by President George W. Bush. Nevertheless, Section 2208 of S. 1253 , the Senate's version of the NDAA for 2012, would have barred the obligation or expenditure of any appropriated funds or funds provided to the United States by the government of Japan to implement the Marine relocation to Guam until the Commandant of the Marine Corps provided to the congressional defense committees his "preferred force lay-down" in the Pacific Region and the Secretary of Defense provided a master construction plan supporting that lay-down, certified that "tangible progress" had been made on the relocation of MCAS Futenma, and provided an interagency plan for the work necessary on Guam's non-military facilities to prepare for the relocation. Congress originally granted this authority in FY2004 and has renewed it for each subsequent year. Title II: Department of Veterans Affairs Agency Overview The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers directly, or in conjunction with other federal agencies, programs that provide benefits and other services to veterans and their spouses, dependents, and beneficiaries. Both the House passed and Senate Appropriations Committee versions of H.R. In the FY2011 appropriation, mandatory funding was 53.3%, while for FY2012 mandatory funding is 54.4% of total funding for the VA in the House-passed version of H.R. Title III: Related Agencies American Battle Monuments Commission The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) is responsible for the maintenance and construction of U.S. monuments and memorials commemorating the achievements in battle of U.S. Armed Forces since the nation's entry into World War I; the erection of monuments and markers by U.S. citizens and organizations in foreign countries; and the design, construction, and maintenance of permanent cemeteries and memorials in foreign countries. U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was established by the Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act of 1988 ( P.L. Table 6 shows the FY2011 enacted appropriations, the Administration request, and H.R.	The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds advance appropriations for veterans' medical services. President Barack Obama submitted his request to Congress for FY2012 appropriations on February 14, 2011. For the appropriations accounts included in this bill, his request totaled $145.2 billion in new budget authority, divided into three major categories: Title I (military construction and family housing) at $14.8 billion; Title II (veterans affairs) at $130.2 billion; and Title III (related agencies) at $246.4 million. Of the total, $75.7 billion (52.1%) would be discretionary appropriations, with the remainder considered mandatory. Congress passed less than the request, appropriating $13.6 billion for Title I (less $547 million in funds rescinded from prior years), $122.2 billion for Title II, and $236 million for Title III. Military construction funding amounts requested by the President and enacted by Congress have fallen off as the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) round has reached completion. Funding support for military family housing construction has also declined as the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) continue their efforts to privatize formerly government-owned accommodations. Funding for the VA between FY2011 and FY2012 in the Administration request, and both the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2055, reflects increases for veterans' benefits and health care and reductions in general administration. The largest percentage increases between FY2011 and FY2012 are for mandatory benefits—disability compensation and pension benefits, and readjustment benefits (where the largest component is for education benefits). The House Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2012 bill (H.R. 2055) on May 31, 2011 (H.Rept. 112-94), and the House passed it on June 14. The Senate referred the bill to its Appropriations Committee, which reported it with an amendment in the form of a substitute on June 30 (S.Rept. 112-29). The Senate began debate on July 14 and passed the bill on July 20, 2011. Failing enactment before the beginning of the fiscal year, military construction was funded in the interim by temporary appropriations, including the First (H.R. 2017, P.L. 112-33, through October 4, 2011), Second (H.R. 2608, P.L. 112-36, through November 18, 2011), Third (H.R. 2112, P.L. 112-55, through December 16, 2011), Fourth (H.J.Res. 94, P.L. 112-67, through December 17, 2011) and Fifth Continuing Resolutions (H.J.Res. 95, through December 23, 2011). H.R. 2055 became the vehicle for a number of unenacted appropriations, and the conference began on December 8, 2011. Conferees filed their report (H.Rept. 112-331) on what was now the "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012" on December 15, which was agreed to in the House on December 16 and in the Senate on December 17, 2011. The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012, formed Division H of the larger bill. The President signed the legislation on December 23, 2011, which subsequently became P.L. 112-74.
crs_RL32703	crs_RL32703_0	Introduction The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which began operations in 1969 as the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, is the world's largest source of population and reproductive health programs and the principal unit within the United Nations for global population issues. In 2009, the organization provided services in 155 developing and transition countries, with funds totaling $783.1 million, drawn exclusively from voluntary contributions made by governments and some foundations. In the past three decades, there has been continuing and contentious debate within the United States, and especially among Members of Congress, as to whether the United States should financially contribute to UNFPA. The debate has centered on the extent to which, if any, UNFPA aids China's coercive family planning programs and policies. From FY2002 through FY2008, the George W. Bush Administration found UNFPA ineligible for U.S. funding under Kemp-Kasten and transferred proposed annual contributions to other foreign aid activities. In March 2009, President Barack Obama announced that the United States would resume U.S. contributions to UNFPA, specifying that $50 million would be made available to the organization as directed in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-117 ). The Cairo Conference marked a turning point in the international debate over the impact of population issues on global development and established a policy framework that continues to guide current family planning and reproductive health policies. The Plan of Action that emerged from the Cairo Conference, to a much greater extent than before, integrated population concerns into the broad context of development, concluding that education and health (including reproductive health), were prerequisites for sustainable development. While UNFPA receives voluntary contributions from many countries and from some private foundations, most of its income for regular country programs and operating expenses comes from a handful of donors. The Netherlands and Japan have consistently been the largest contributors. In 2009, the first year the United States contributed to UNFPA since 2001, it was the fourth-largest donor, representing approximately 9.5% of the UNFPA regular budget. U.S. Policy Towards UNFPA The United States was an important actor in the launch of UNFPA in 1969. During the mid-to-late 1960s, Congress began to express heightened concern over the impact of rapid population growth on development prospects in poor countries, noting that the world's population was growing by about 2% annually compared with only a 1% growth in food production. In 1967, for the first time, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to specifically authorize and earmark funds for population assistance programs, urging the United States especially to channel family planning resources through the United Nations and other international organizations. Obama Administration Kemp-Kasten Determination President Barack Obama has expressed his support for UNFPA. 111-8 ). FY2011 Request For FY2011, the Obama Administration requested $50 million for U.S. contributions to UNFPA, which would be drawn from the International Organizations and Programs account (IO&P). FY2010 Administration Request and Appropriations On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. Division F of that bill, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, directed that $55 million shall be made available for UNFPA under the International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account. As previously mentioned, initial UNFPA programs in China concentrated on bolstering China's capacity for data collection and analysis, and maternal and child health/family planning activities.	The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), established in 1969, is the world's largest source of population and reproductive health programs and the principal unit within the United Nations for global population issues. In 2009, the organization provided services in 155 developing and transition countries, with funds totaling $783.1 million, drawn primarily from voluntary contributions made by nations and some foundations. The United States, with strong support from Congress, was an important actor in the launch of UNFPA in 1969. During the mid-to-late 1960s, Congress began to express heightened concern over the impact of rapid population growth on development prospects in poor countries. In 1967, Congress earmarked funds for population assistance programs, urging the United States to channel family planning resources through the United Nations and other international organizations. Since it was established, UNFPA has transitioned from an organization focused on statistical collection and analysis to an agency providing maternal and child health/family planning assistance. UNFPA played a large role in shaping the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo. The Cairo Conference marked a turning point in the international debate over the impact of population issues on global development, and established a policy framework called the Plan of Action that continues to guide current family planning and reproductive health policies, including the work of UNFPA. The Plan integrated population concerns into the broad context of development—concluding that education and health, including reproductive health, were prerequisites for sustainable development. In the past three decades, there has been continuing and contentious debate within the United States, especially among Members of Congress, as to whether the United States should financially support UNFPA. This debate has centered on the extent to which, if any, UNFPA aids China's coercive family planning programs and policies. In 15 of the past 25 years, the United States did not contribute to the organization as a result of executive branch determinations that UNFPA's program in China violated the "Kemp-Kasten" amendment, which bans U.S. aid to organizations involved in the management of coercive family planning programs. From FY2002 through FY2008, the George W. Bush Administration found UNFPA ineligible for funding under the Kemp-Kasten amendment. In March 2009, President Barack Obama expressed his support for UNFPA and announced that the United States would contribute $50 million to the organization as directed in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117). Division F of that bill, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, directed that $55 million should be made available for UNFPA. For FY2011, the Obama Administration requested $50 million for U.S. contributions to UNFPA, which would be drawn from the International Organizations and Programs account (IO&P). While UNFPA receives voluntary contributions from many countries and some private foundations, most of its income comes from a handful of donors. The Netherlands, Sweden, and Japan have consistently been the largest contributors. In 2009, the U.S. contribution to UNFPA was the fourth-largest donation, representing approximately 9.5% of UNFPA's annual regular budget. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_RL33315	crs_RL33315_0	In the principal federal criminal money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, and to varying degrees in several other federal criminal statutes, money laundering involves the flow of resources to and from several hundred other federal, state, and foreign crimes. It consists of: engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds of certain crimes in order to conceal the nature, source, or ownership of proceeds they produced; engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds of certain crimes in order to promote further offenses; transporting funds generated by certain criminal activities into, out of, or through the United States in order to promote further criminal activities, or to conceal the nature, source, or ownership of the criminal proceeds, or to evade reporting requirements; engaging in a financial transaction involving criminal proceeds in order to evade taxes on the income produced by the illicit activity; structuring financial transactions in order to evade reporting requirements; spending more than $10,000 of the proceeds of certain criminal activities; traveling in, or use of the facilities of, interstate or foreign commerce in order to distribute the proceeds of certain criminal activities; traveling in, or use of the facilities of, interstate or foreign commerce in order to promote certain criminal activities; transmitting the proceeds of, or funds to promote, criminal activity in the course of a money transmitting business; transmitting funds in the course of an unlawful money transmitting business; smuggling unreported cash across a U.S. border; or failing to comply with the Department of the Treasury's anti-money laundering provisions. The following is an overview of the elements and other legal attributes and consequences of a violation of Sections 1956 and 1957, as well as selected related federal criminal statutes. § 1956 Section 1956 outlaws four kinds of laundering—promotional, concealment, structuring, and tax evasion—committed or attempted under one or more of three jurisdictional conditions (i.e., laundering involving certain financial transactions, laundering involving international transfers, and stings). Moreover, the RICO predicate offense list encompasses by cross-reference the federal crimes of terrorism cataloged in 18 U.S.C. Gross receipts of a predicate offense may serve as qualifying "proceeds," for concealment as well as for promotional offenses. Imprisonment Any violation of Section 1956 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. While Sections 1956 and 1957 punish transactions involving promoting, concealing, spending, and depositing tainted funds, the Travel Act punishes interstate or foreign travel (or use of the facilities of interstate or foreign commerce) conducted with the intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of a more modest list of predicate offenses ("unlawful activity"), (2) promote or carry on such offenses when there is an overt act in furtherance of that intent, or (3) commit some violent act in their furtherance. It is also a RICO predicate offense, but unlike most RICO predicates is not a Section 1956 or 1957 money laundering predicate offense. In United States v. Bajakajian , the Supreme Court held that the confiscation of $357,144 for a violation of 31 U.S.C. Violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years (not more than 10 years if committed in conjunction with another federal offense or if committed as part of a pattern of activity involving $100,000 or more) and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), with the fine maximum doubled if the offense is committed in conjunction with another federal crime or as part of a pattern of activity involving $100,000. Any property involved in a structuring violation of the section is subject to confiscation. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) As noted earlier, all RICO predicate offenses are by definition money laundering predicate offenses under Sections 1956 and 1957. §§ 1956, 1957)(Maximum Terms of Imprisonment Noted) -7 U.S.C. § 1956 (laundering of monetary instruments) (20 years);* -18 U.S.C. State Money Laundering Laws (Citations) State Money Transmission Laws (Citations) Selected Federal Money Laundering Laws (Text) 18 U.S.C.	This report provides an overview of the elements of federal criminal money laundering statutes and the sanctions imposed for their violation. The most prominent is 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Section 1956 outlaws four kinds of money laundering—promotional, concealment, structuring, and tax evasion laundering of the proceeds generated by designated federal, state, and foreign underlying crimes (predicate offenses)—committed or attempted under one or more of three jurisdictional conditions (i.e., laundering involving certain financial transactions, laundering involving international transfers, and stings). Its companion, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, prohibits depositing or spending more than $10,000 of the proceeds from a predicate offense. Section 1956 violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 1957 carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. Property involved in either case is subject to confiscation. Misconduct that implicates either offense may implicate other federal criminal statutes as well. Federal racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (RICO) provisions outlaw acquiring or conducting the affairs of an enterprise (whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce) through the patterned commission of a series of underlying federal or state crimes. RICO violations are also 20-year felonies. The Section 1956 predicate offense list automatically includes every RICO predicate offense, including each "federal crime of terrorism." A second related statute, the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), punishes interstate or foreign travel, or the use of interstate or foreign facilities, conducted with the intent to distribute the proceeds of a more modest list of predicate offenses or to promote or carry on such offenses when an overt act is committed in furtherance of that intent. Such misconduct is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. Other federal statutes proscribe, with varying sanctions, bulk cash smuggling, layering bank deposits to avoid reporting requirements, failure to comply with federal anti-money laundering provisions, or conducting an unlawful money transmission business. Section 1956's ban on attempted international transportation of tainted proceeds for the purpose of concealing their ownership, source, nature, or ultimate location is limited to instances where concealment is a purpose rather than an attribute of the transportation (simple smuggling is not proscribed as such), as the Supreme Court explained in Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008). In a second case, the Court held that the "proceeds" of a predicate offense often referred to the profits rather than the gross receipts realized from the offense. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). Congress responded by defining "proceeds" for money laundering purposes as the property obtained or retained as a consequence of a predicate offense, including gross receipts. P.L. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1618 (2009) (S. 386) (111th Cong.). The text of the statutes discussed, citations of state money laundering and money transmission statutes, and a list federal predicate offenses with their accompanying maximum terms of imprisonment appear at the end of the report. This report appears in abridged form, without footnotes, full citations, or appendixes, as CRS Report RS22401, Money Laundering: An Abridged Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and Related Federal Criminal Law. Related CRS Reports include CRS Report R44776, Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1127, Anti-Terrorist/Anti-Money Laundering Information-Sharing by Financial Institutions Under FinCEN's Regulations, by [author name scrubbed] (available to congressional clients upon request).
crs_R42375	crs_R42375_0	Introduction On February 16, 2012, the House Natural Resources Committee ordered reported H.R. 1837 , the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act. 102-575 ), as well as state and federal environmental laws (e.g., the federal Endangered Species Act, its state equivalent, and possibly state rules implemented to comply with the federal Clean Water Act). The bill also addresses many other issues associated with California water management, including making substantial changes to the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act (Title X of P.L. 111-11 ) and allowing early or accelerated repayment by private parties of outstanding construction cost obligations. The bill would make numerous changes to federal and state law regarding the management of water, fish, and wildlife resources in California. It also preempts "any" law (subject to certain state water rights priorities identified in Title IV of the bill) pertaining to operation of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the California State Water Project (SWP) and substitutes for those laws operational principles elaborated in a 1994 interim agreement among CVP and SWP parties and others, known as the Bay-Delta Accord. Overall, some south-of-Delta contractors have received 90%-100% of their contracts in just five of the last 20 years. At the same time, fish populations throughout the Central Valley of California have dramatically declined due to water diversions and other factors. Fishing communities have also experienced significant losses as a result of salmon population declines. Also at issue is to what degree Congress is willing to change or allow preemption of long-standing federal and state environmental laws, including state water quality and endangered species laws, and at what benefit and cost. For example, what are the tradeoffs embedded in the bill's preemption of state law and fish and wildlife protections as a means to increase the water deliveries to some irrigation contractors and municipalities? 1837 . Compounding the controversy over water allocation are other factors that limit water deliveries—namely state water quality control requirements, variable hydrological limitations, the state system of water rights priorities, and implementation of state and federal endangered species and other environmental laws. Consequently, how deliveries to Friant water contractors might be reduced in any given year depends on many factors. For example, Section 201 of H.R. 1837 ). Section 402 would place new limits on water supply reductions for Sacramento Valley agricultural water service contractors in times of water shortages, similar to those enjoyed by senior water contractors and wildlife refuges (e.g., the Secretary of the Interior in operation of the CVP would have to deliver not less than 75% of water service contractors' contracted water supply in a "dry" year). It is unclear what impacts such changes would have on other water users in the state. H.R. 1837 would make extensive changes to implementation of federal reclamation law under the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, the contracting provisions under the 1939 Reclamation Project Act, restoration efforts under the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, and state and federal relationships under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902. While much attention has been paid to the effects of federal and state environmental laws on reductions in water supplies south of the Delta, the extent to which the bill would relieve water supply shortages, particularly in drought years, is uncertain. H.R. However, some argue that the bill would undermine efforts to achieve the "co-equal" goals of "providing for a more reliable water supply for California and protecting, restoring, and enhancing the Bay-Delta ecosystem," which is the foundation of state and federal efforts in development of the BDCP.	For most of the last 20 years, some water contractors in California have received less than their full contract water supplies from federal and state facilities. Although such allocations are in part the result of the prior appropriation doctrine in western water law and are consistent with the expectation of a "junior" water user in times of drought, tensions over water delivery reliability have been exacerbated by reductions in deliveries even in non-drought years. Such reductions are significant because much of the California urban and agricultural economy operates under junior water rights, and reductions in water allocations can cause significant disruption and economic loss for individual farmers and communities, particularly in drought years. At the same time, fish populations throughout the Central Valley of California have dramatically declined due to water diversions and other factors, and have been accompanied by significant losses for fishing communities and others dependent on fish and wildlife resources. The state and federal governments have been working to address water supply reliability and ecosystem issues through pursuit of a Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP); however, the plan is not complete and remains controversial. On February 16, 2012, the House Natural Resources Committee ordered reported H.R. 1837, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act. Proponents of H.R. 1837 argue that implementation of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA) and state and federal environmental laws (e.g., the federal Endangered Species Act and its state equivalent) have compounded the impact of drought on water deliveries; the bill is designed to remedy these effects. Others argue that the bill would harm the environment and resource-dependent local economies, particularly coastal communities. Some also argue that it would undermine efforts to resolve environmental and water supply reliability issues through development of the BDCP. At issue for Congress is the extent to which the bill changes decades of federal and state law, including state and federal environmental laws, and at what benefit and cost. For example, there are tradeoffs embedded in the bill's preemption of state water law, including fish and wildlife protections, as a means to increase the water deliveries to some irrigation contractors and municipalities. It appears these changes likely would most benefit water contractors in the southern portion of the CVP service area, but might harm others and potentially reduce environmental protections and improvements and the services and industries they support (e.g., recreational and fishing industries). What impact such tradeoffs might have on other stakeholders is unclear. H.R. 1837 would preempt "any" (including state and federal) law pertaining to operation of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and California's State Water Project (SWP) and substitute for those laws operational principles from a 1994 interim agreement, originally supported by many diverse parties, known as the Bay-Delta Accord. The bill also addresses other California water management issues, making significant changes to the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act and allowing early repayment of CVP construction cost obligations. While much attention has been paid to the effects of federal and state environmental laws on reductions in water supplies south of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers delta confluence with San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta, or Delta), the extent to which the bill would relieve water supply shortages, particularly in drought years, is uncertain. For example, many factors affect pumping restrictions and the overall water allocation regime for CVP contractors. The federal ESA and CVPIA are only two factors in the regime. Other key factors include state water quality regulations (particularly flow and salinity requirements in the Delta), SWP pumping, and state water rights. How H.R. 1837 would in practice affect these factors remains uncertain.
crs_RL33869	crs_RL33869_0	President George W. Bush sent no formal ICA rescission requests to Congress, but some controversy developed over his use of "cancellation statements" proposing spending reductions. Impoundment Control Act of 1974 The Impoundment Control Act (ICA) was included as Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, signed into law on June 12, 1974 (88 Stat. 332). Section 1017 of the ICA establishes expedited procedures for congressional action on "any rescission bill introduced with respect to a special message" submitted by the President. Section 207 involved the use of rescission authority. Under the ICA, unless Congress takes action to approve of a rescission request from the President within the 45-day period, the funds must be released. As noted previously, Congress may approve more or less than the amount requested by the President. In addition, absent a specific request from the President, Congress of its own accord may initiate rescission actions, by cancelling previously appropriated funds in a subsequent law. In the early months under the new framework, the number of presidentially proposed rescissions increased. During his first year in office President Reagan submitted more rescission proposals (133) than had President Carter during his entire administration. President Bush, while evidently reluctant to use existing rescission authority provided in the ICA, repeatedly called for enactment of a measure that would give the President greater authority to reject items of spending and that also would pass constitutional muster. Some Concluding Observations According to GAO data, from FY1974 to FY2009, Presidents requested 1,178 rescissions under the ICA, totaling somewhat over $76 billion. Close to a third of the proposals were approved by Congress, with approximately 40% of the total dollar amount of presidential rescission requests ($25 billion) enacted by Congress. The sum of rescissions requested by the President and subsequently enacted exceeded $1 billion in only four of the 30-plus years since the ICA was enacted (FY1981, FY1982, FY1992 and FY1994). During the same period Congress initiated 1,880 rescission actions amounting to nearly $197.1 billion, over eight times the total dollar amount of presidentially requested rescissions enacted. The trend toward an increasing number of rescissions being initiated by Congress has already been noted. As discussed above, the LIVA reversed the burden of action regarding rescission proposals; cancellations of the President became permanent unless disapproved by Congress (ultimately requiring rejection by a 2/3 majority in both chambers to override a presidential veto of a disapproval bill). During this period the President also had authority to cancel new items of direct (mandatory) spending and certain targeted tax benefits as well as items of discretionary spending. CBO figures indicate that all the cancellations made by President Clinton in FY1998 (including those overturned) totaled some $355 million, with a projected five-year savings just under $1 billion. In 2006 the Legislative Line Item Veto Act ( H.R. 93-344 , until such time as the President transmits a special message on Congress on subsequent rescission proposals or deferrals no cumulative reports are required to be transmitted to the Congress."	The Impoundment Control Act (ICA) was included as Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, signed into law on June 12, 1974 (88 Stat. 332). Under the ICA, unless Congress takes action to approve a rescission request from the President within the 45-day review period prescribed by the law, the funds must be released. With respect to a presidential rescission message, Congress may approve more or less than the amount requested by the President. In addition, absent a specific request from the President, Congress on its own accord may initiate rescission actions, by cancelling previously appropriated funds in a subsequent law. According to data compiled by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), from FY1974 through FY2008, Presidents requested 1,178 rescissions under the ICA, totaling somewhat over $76 billion. Close to a third of the proposals were approved by Congress, with approximately 40% of the total dollar amount of presidential rescission requests ($25 billion) enacted by Congress. The sum of rescissions requested by the President and subsequently enacted exceeded $1 billion in only four of the 35-plus years (FY1981, FY1982, FY1992 and FY1994). During this period Congress initiated 1,880 rescission actions amounting to $197.1 billion, nearly eight times the total of presidentially requested rescission subsequently enacted, reflecting a trend toward an increasing number of rescissions being initiated by Congress. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (P.L. 93-344), in effect for less than eighteen months before being overturned by the Supreme Court in 1998, gave the President enhanced rescission authority by reversing the burden of action regarding rescission proposals; cancellations of the President became permanent unless disapproved by Congress (ultimately requiring rejection by a 2/3 majority in both chambers). During this time, the President also had authority to cancel new items of direct spending and certain targeted tax benefits as well as items of discretionary spending. Figures from the Congressional Budget Office indicate that the 82 cancellations made by President Clinton in FY1998 (including those overturned) totaled some $355 million, with a projected five-year savings just under $1 billion. President Clinton's use of the short-lived enhanced rescission authority thus was not notably different from the prior annual record of presidential rescissions under the ICA framework. During his two terms in office, President George W. Bush sent no formal ICA rescission requests to Congress, but some controversy developed over his use of alternative means to propose spending reductions. President Bush, while evidently reluctant to use existing rescission authority contained in the ICA, called repeatedly for enactment of a measure that would give the President greater authority to reject items of spending. Such a bill passed the House in the 109th Congress and was reported in the Senate. A contentious issue is whether such a measure might give preference to presidential spending priorities over congressional spending priorities, arguably affecting the legislative power of the purse. During his first year in office, President Barack Obama sent no formal ICA rescission requests to Congress. On May 24, 2010, however, the President transmitted to Congress a draft proposal, the "Reducing Unnecessary Spending Act," which would establish expedited procedures for congressional consideration of certain rescission messages. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R41538	crs_R41538_0	Introduction In October 2010, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Bruesewitz v. Wyeth , a case which involves the scope of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. The issue before the Court was whether 42 U.S.C. Section 300aa-22(b)(1) of the act precludes all vaccine design defect claims even if the vaccine's side effects were avoidable, in other words whether the section preempts vaccine design defect claims categorically, or whether the vaccine manufacturer has to show on a case-by-case basis that the side effects could not have been avoided by some alternatively designed vaccine. This report provides an overview of the structure of the Vaccine Act and the relevant facts of the Bruesewitz case. It then examines the lower court decisions before reviewing the Supreme Court decision. Finally, it discusses the decision's potential effect on preemption jurisprudence as well as on the existing Vaccine Act litigation. Under the Vaccine Act, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (Compensation Program) was established to handle claims against drug manufacturers for vaccine-related injuries and deaths. Separately, recent scientific publications, which have declared that there appears to be no link between immunizations and autism or other serious medical problems, may also hinder current and future claimants' ability to prove their claims. In the past, Congress has introduced legislation to overturn a decision by the Supreme Court.	While recent scientific publications have declared that there appears to be no link between immunizations and autism or other serious medical problems, a recent Journal of Pediatrics survey of parents with children between the ages of six months and six years old reveals that about 13% of parents used a vaccination plan that varied from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-recommended schedule, because of concerns that receiving multiple vaccinations in a short span of time is less safe than delaying certain vaccines. Whether parents follow the government-recommended schedule or an alternative schedule, should their child suffer harm after receiving a vaccination, they must first seek relief through the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. On February 22, 2011, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, a case involving the scope of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. The Supreme Court considered whether 42 U.S.C. Section 300aa-22(b)(1) of the act precludes all vaccine design defect claims even if the vaccine's side effects were avoidable, or whether the vaccine manufacturer has to show on a case-by-case basis that the side effects could not have been avoided by some alternatively designed vaccine. Both parties had fundamentally differing interpretations of the statute's text and of Congress's intent behind the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. This report provides an overview of the structure of the Vaccine Act and the relevant facts of the Bruesewitz case. It then examines the opinions of the lower court and the Supreme Court decision. Lastly, this report analyzes the impact of the decision both in terms of its potential effect on preemption jurisprudence and ongoing vaccine litigation. It also discusses past congressional legislation related to the Vaccine Injury Act.
crs_R44990	crs_R44990_0	Of the 33 expiring provisions addressed in the most recent tax extender legislation, included in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123 ), 18 were energy-related. Thirteen of the energy tax provisions addressed in BBA18 were provisions that had expired in 2016 and were extended through 2017. The expired energy tax provisions are diverse in purpose, providing various types of tax incentives for renewable electricity, alternative and renewable fuels, vehicles, building energy efficiency, and other energy activities. This law retroactively extended temporary tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014. Further discussion of these provisions is not included in this report, as these provisions did not expire in 2017. Ultimately, provisions that expired at the end of 2017 could be extended. For more information, see CRS Report R43453, The Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. Incentives for Alternative Fuel and Alternative Fuel Mixtures19 The tax code provides tax credits for alternative fuels and alternative fuel mixtures. Qualified second generation biofuel production is second generation biofuel produced by the taxpayer and sold by the taxpayer to another person for use (1) in the production of a qualified biofuel fuel mixture in such person's trade or business (other than casual off-farm production), (2) as a fuel in a trade or business, or (3) as biofuel sold at retail to another person and placed in the fuel tank of such other person. The special depreciation allowance for second generation biofuel plant property was introduced by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. When enacted, the provision was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011. Credits for two-wheeled plug-in electric vehicles were enacted as a unique provision, since they do not qualify for other plug-in electric vehicle tax credits. Building Energy Efficiency Credit for Construction of Energy-Efficient New Homes27 Before 2017, contractors building energy-efficient homes and producers of manufactured energy-efficient homes were eligible for a tax credit for each qualifying new home they built. Since 2014, short-term extensions of the deduction for energy-efficient commercial building property have been included in "tax extenders" legislation. 110-343 ) reinstated and modified the Section 25C credit for the 2009 tax year.	Thirteen temporary energy tax provisions expired at the end of 2017. All of these provisions had expired at the end of 2016, and were retroactively extended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123) and made available for the 2017 tax year. This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of energy-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017, including the following: Renewable energy property provisions Production Tax Credit (PTC) for Nonwind Facilities Alternative and renewable fuels provisions Incentives for Biodiesel and Renewable Diesel Incentives for Alternative Fuel and Alternative Fuel Mixtures Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property Second Generation (Cellulosic) Biofuel Producer Credit Special Depreciation Allowance for Second Generation (Cellulosic) Biofuel Plant Property Vehicles provisions Alternative motor vehicle credit for qualified fuel cell vehicles Credit for two-wheeled plug-in electric vehicles Building energy efficiency provisions Credit for Construction of Energy-Efficient New Homes Energy-Efficient Commercial Building Deduction Credit for Section 25C Nonbusiness Energy Property Other provisions Special Rule to Implement Electric Transmission Restructuring Credit for Production of Indian Coal This report does not include provisions that in the past have been classified as individual or business related. For a general overview of expired tax provisions and tax extenders, see CRS Report R44677, Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed]. For an overview of individual and business provisions, see CRS Report R44925, Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44930, Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 ("Tax Extenders"), coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
crs_RS22914	crs_RS22914_0	Integration With the World Economy Over the past several years, the United States has become increasingly integrated with the world economy. Many commercial activities in the United States that impact trade are not always reflected in U.S. trade data. These difficulties have generated debate over the future role of multilateral negotiations and the WTO itself as a tool of trade policy. The Commerce Department and Labor Department administer Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs for firms (Commerce) and workers (Labor) that are negatively affected by trade in order to help them adjust. Challenges include reaching a consensus on how to lower the U.S. trade deficit (without slowing the economy), the design and funding of programs to assist displaced workers, the extent U.S. trade remedy laws should be used to respond to unfair trade practices (without becoming protectionist), policies the federal government can initiate to help the U.S. economy become more globally competitive, strategies the United States can take to induce other countries to lower their trade barriers (multilaterally in the WTO and/or bilaterally through FTAs), and the extent that trade policy should be used to promote environment (e.g., global climate change) and worker rights. Some policymakers oppose extending TPA, contending that trade liberalization has had little positive impact on the U.S. economy and has hurt some U.S. workers, while others have argued that failure to renew TPA will undermine U.S. leadership on free trade and will enable other countries (such as China) to form trade blocs that exclude the United States, thus putting U.S. exporting firms at a disadvantage.	The United States has become increasingly integrated with the rest of the world economy. This integration has offered benefits and presented challenges to U.S. business, agriculture, labor, and consumers. Those who can compete in the more integrated economy have enjoyed opportunities to broaden their success, while those who are challenged by increased foreign competition have been forced to adjust and some have exited the market or relocated overseas. Some observers contend that, in order to remain globally competitive, the United States must continue to support trade liberalization policies, while assisting those hurt by trade. Others have raised doubts over whether free trade policies benefit the U.S. economy (e.g., some blame such policies for the large U.S. trade deficit, declining wages, and growing income disparity). Many contend that trade liberalization works only when everyone plays by the rules and have urged the aggressive enforcement of U.S. trade laws to address unfair trade practices. Still others maintain that such issues as labor rights, the environment, and climate change should be linked to trade policies. These competing views are often reflected in the struggle between Congress and the Executive branch in shaping U.S. trade policy. This report provides an overview and background on the debate over the future course of U.S. trade policy and will be updated as events warrant.
crs_95-602	crs_95-602_0	Efforts to Restore Aristide The overthrow of Haiti's first democratically elected president in September 1991 propelledHaiti into its worst crisis since protests brought down the 29-year dictatorship of the Duvalier familyin 1986. The leaders of the coup faced stronger international sanctions than did previous coupleaders in Haiti, largely because a democratic government was overthrown. For more than three years, the regime resisted international demands that Aristide be restoredto office. The OAS's frustration lead to the involvement of the United Nations. civilian observer mission to oversee the restoration of order andmonitor human rights conditions. As the de facto Haitian government resisted the call for Aristide's return, the internationalcommunity responded with increased sanctions. U.S. Policy After the Coup Following the September 1991 coup in Haiti, the main U.S. foreign policy concern was therestoration of democracy. Closely related to this was the issue of Haitians attempting to flee to theUnited States by boat. On June 6, 1993, the OAS called for reenforcement of its embargo by the U.N. and proposedsuspending commercial flights to Haiti. The President further stated that "the United States strongly supports the GovernorsIsland Agreement and restoration of democracy in Haiti" and that the measures to deploy U.S. forces"are consistent with United States goals and interests and constitute crucial support for the worldcommunity's strategy to overcome the persistent refusal of Haitian military and police authorities tofulfill their commitments under the Governors Island Agreement." OnOctober 7, it passed a political amnesty for the Haitian army. After three years in exile, President Aristide returned to office in Haiti on October 15,1994, calling for reconciliation and an end to violence. Several months later the United Statesdeclared that a "secure and stable environment" had been established.	The overthrow of Haiti's first democratically elected president in September 1991 propelledHaiti into its worst crisis since protests brought down the 29-year dictatorship of the Duvalier familyin 1986. The leaders of the coup faced stronger international sanctions than did previous coupleaders in Haiti, largely because a democratic government was overthrown. For more than three years, the regime resisted international demands that PresidentJean-Bertrand Aristide be restored to office. U.S. policy consisted of pressuring the de facto Haitiangovernment to restore constitutional democracy to Haiti. Measures included: cutting off assistanceto the Haitian government; imposing trade embargoes, as called for by the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) and the United Nations (U.N.); supporting OAS and U.N. diplomatic efforts; andimposing sanctions targeted at the leadership blocking Aristide's return. On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had been launched,the military regime signed an agreement with the United States providing for Aristide's return. Italso called for the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S. troops, a legislative amnesty for the military,and the resignation of the military leadership. Under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops, President Aristide returned to Haiti onOctober 15, 1994, calling for reconciliation and an end to violence. On March 31, 1995, havingdeclared that a "secure and stable environment" had been established, the United States transferredresponsibility for the mission to the U.N. During this period, the main U.S. foreign policy concern was the restoration of thedemocratic process to Haiti. Closely related to this was the issue of Haitians attempting to flee tothe United States by boat. Congressional concerns focused on human rights, Haitian migration,socioeconomic conditions, and drug trafficking.
crs_RL32495	crs_RL32495_0	Background: Title I Outcome Accountability and the AYP Concept Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the largest federal K-12 education program, authorizes financial aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children and youth at the preschool, elementary, and secondary levels. 100-297 ), the accountability provisions of this program have been increasingly focused on achievement and other outcomes for participating pupils and schools. 103-382 ), and particularly under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ), a key concept embodied in these outcome accountability requirements is that of "adequate yearly progress (AYP)" for schools, LEAs, and (more recently) states overall. The primary purpose of AYP requirements is to serve as the basis for identifying schools and LEAs where performance is inadequate, so that these inadequacies may be addressed, first through provision of increased support and, ultimately, through a variety of consequences. The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111 th Congress may consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information. Under NCLB, the Title I-A requirements for state-developed standards of AYP were substantially expanded in scope and specificity. As under the IASA, AYP is defined primarily on the basis of aggregate scores of pupils on state assessments of academic achievement. One of the most important differences between AYP standards under NCLB and previous requirements is that under NCLB, AYP calculations must be disaggregated ; that is, they must be determined separately and specifically for not only all pupils but also for several demographic groups of pupils within each school, LEA, and state. In contrast to the previous statute, under which AYP standards had to be applied only to pupils, schools, and LEAs participating in Title I-A, AYP standards under NCLB must be applied to all public schools, LEAs, and for the first time to states overall, if a state chooses to receive Title I-A grants. However, consequences for failing to meet AYP standards need only be applied under federal law to schools and LEAs participating in Title I-A. Another major break with the past is that state AYP standards must incorporate concrete movement toward meeting an ultimate goal of all pupils reaching a proficient or advanced level of achievement by the end of the 2013-2014 school year. Data on Schools and LEAs Identified as Failing to Meet AYP The most recent available compilations of state AYP data are discussed below in two categories: reports focusing on the number and percentage of schools failing to meet AYP standards for one or more years versus reports on the number and percentage of public schools and LEAs identified for improvement—that is, they had failed to meet AYP standards for two consecutive years or more . The AYP provisions of NCLB are challenging and complex, and have generated substantial criticism from several states, LEAs, and interest groups. These include the provision for an ultimate goal, use of confidence intervals and data-averaging, population diversity effects, minimum pupil group size (n), separate focus on specific pupil groups, number of schools identified and state variations therein, the 95% participation rule, state variations in assessments and proficiency standards, and several issues specific to the use of growth models to determine AYP. On the basis of assessment results for 2007-2008, 35% of all public schools nationwide failed to make AYP.	Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), authorizes financial aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children and youth at the preschool, elementary, and secondary levels. Over the last several years, the accountability provisions of this program have been increasingly focused on achievement and other outcomes for participating pupils and schools. Since 1994, and particularly under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), a key concept embodied in these requirements is that of "adequate yearly progress (AYP)" for schools, LEAs, and states. AYP is defined primarily on the basis of aggregate scores of various groups of pupils on state assessments of academic achievement. The primary purpose of AYP requirements is to serve as the basis for identifying schools and LEAs where performance is unsatisfactory, so that inadequacies may be addressed first through provision of increased support and, ultimately, a variety of "consequences." Under NCLB, the Title I-A requirements for state-developed standards of AYP were substantially expanded. AYP calculations must be disaggregated—determined separately and specifically for not only all pupils but also for several demographic groups of pupils within each school, LEA, and state. In addition, while AYP standards had to be applied previously only to pupils, schools, and LEAs participating in Title I-A, AYP standards under NCLB must be applied to all public schools, LEAs, and to states overall, if a state chooses to receive Title I-A grants. However, consequences for failing to meet AYP standards need be applied under federal law only to schools and LEAs participating in Title I-A. Another major break with the pre-NCLB period is that state AYP standards must incorporate concrete movement toward meeting an ultimate goal of all pupils reaching a proficient or advanced level of achievement by 2014. The overall percentage of public schools identified as failing to make AYP for one or more years on the basis of test scores in 2007-2008 was approximately 35% of all public schools. The percentage of schools for individual states in 2007-2008 varied from 7% to 80%. Approximately 13% of public schools were in the "needs improvement" status (i.e., they had failed to meet AYP standards for 2 consecutive years or more) on the basis of AYP determinations for 2007-2008 and preceding school years. The AYP provisions of NCLB are challenging and complex, and they have generated substantial interest and debate. Debates regarding NCLB provisions on AYP have focused on the provision for an ultimate goal, use of confidence intervals and data-averaging, population diversity effects, minimum pupil group size (n), separate focus on specific pupil groups, number of schools identified and state variations therein, the 95% participation rule, state variations in assessments and proficiency standards, and several issues specific to the use of growth models to determine AYP. The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111th Congress may consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information.
crs_RL33945	crs_RL33945_0	The report will be updated as determined by events. Trends and Policy Implications Developing countries have become an increasingly significant factor in U.S. trade over the last two or more decades, and this influence is reflected in the issues on the trade agenda of the 110 th Congress: the possible renewal of trade promotion authority (TPA) (or fast track trade authority); implementing legislation for FTAs; reauthorization of trade adjustment assistance (TAA) for workers and firms; review and possible re-authorization of GSP and other trade preference programs; oversight of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round negotiations in the WTO; and other issues. The growth of developing countries' foreign trade presents the United States with opportunities and challenges. The imports from many developing economies provide U.S. consumers with an ever widening range of choices of products at lower prices, raising real incomes and contributing to a higher U.S. standard of living. A number of the developing countries have also become robust markets for U.S. exports. At the same time, U.S. workers are competing with a growing pool of lower-wage labor from India, China, and other developing countries. Some U.S.-based firms are induced to use labor-saving technology, to move production offshore, or to shut down their operations completely. Even workers in the services sector, such as computer programmers, are feeling the pressures of competition from some developing countries. Trade with developing countries also raises a set of virtually unique issues regarding labor rights, environment protection, and intellectual property rights, among others, that have become fixtures on the U.S. trade agenda. At the same time, developing countries are challenging U.S. trade policies on trade remedies, high tariffs on wearing apparel and other import-sensitive products, pricing of medicines, and the temporary entry of foreign workers, among other issues. If current trade trends hold, developing countries can be expected to account for increasing shares of U.S. exports and imports and of world trade. As a result, these opportunities and challenges will likely continue, if not expand. The analysis of U.S. trade trends also exposes a significant divide among groups of developing countries. Some countries, such as those in East Asia, Mexico, and Chile, have made great strides, and are expanding their role in U.S. and world trade. Others including most of Africa, many countries in South Asia, and some in Latin America, lag behind or are losing shares of U.S. and world trade. These differences suggest that an effective U.S. trade policy needs to differentiate among the various groups of developing countries. These differences could play a role in how the United States proceeds on trade preferences, regional and bilateral trade agreements, and multilateral negotiations in the WTO.	Developing countries, a heterogeneous group of low- and middle-income countries, have become an increasingly significant factor in U.S. trade flows and trade policy over the last two or more decades. Their influence is reflected in the issues on the trade agenda of the 110th Congress: the possible renewal of fast track trade authority/Trade Promotion Authority; implementing legislation for free trade agreements; re-authorization of trade adjustment assistance (TAA) for workers and firms; review and possible re-authorization of Generalized System of Preferences and other trade preference programs; and oversight of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round negotiations in the WTO. The growth of developing countries' economies and foreign trade presents the United States with opportunities and challenges. The imports from many developing economies provide U.S. consumers with an ever widening range of choices of products at lower prices, raising real incomes and contributing to a higher U.S. standard of living. A number of the developing countries have also become robust markets for U.S. exports because of rapid economic growth and trade liberalization. At the same time, many U.S. workers are competing with an expanding pool of lower-wage labor from India, China, and other developing countries. Such competition induces U.S.-based firms to reduce costs by using labor-saving technology, moving production offshore, or shutting down, forcing workers to adjust. Even workers in the high-end services sector are feeling the pressures of competition from some developing countries. Trade with developing countries also raises a set of virtually unique issues regarding labor rights, environment protection, intellectual property rights, among others, that have become fixtures on the U.S. trade agenda. At the same time, developing countries are challenging U.S. policies on trade remedies, high tariffs on wearing apparel and other import-sensitive products, pricing of medicines, and the temporary entry of foreign workers. If current trade trends hold, developing countries can be expected to account for increasing shares of U.S. exports and imports and for world trade. As a result, these opportunities and challenges will likely continue, if not expand. The analysis of U.S. trade trends also exposes a significant divide among groups of developing countries. Some countries, such as China, South Korea, Mexico and Chile, have made great strides and, are expanding their role in U.S. and world trade. Others including most of Africa, many in South Asia, and some in Latin America, lag behind or are losing shares of U.S. and world trade. These differences suggest that effective U.S. trade policy may need to differentiate among the various groups of developing countries. These differences could play a role in how the United States proceeds on trade preferences, regional and bilateral trade agreements, and multilateral negotiations in the WTO. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R41493	crs_R41493_0	The RES concept would require certain retail electric providers to obtain a minimum percentage of the power they sell from renewable energy sources or energy efficiency. Background Electric Power Generation in the United States The choice of power generation technology in the United States is heavily influenced by the cost of fuel. Historically, the use of fossil fuels has provided some of the lowest prices for generating electricity. Growing concerns over GHG emissions, other environmental costs associated with burning fossil fuels, and existing or anticipated state and federal policies addressing these issues are leading some utilities and energy providers to deploy more renewable energy technologies to meet power demands. Renewable Portfolio Standards in States Many states are essentially picking up where federal research and development dollars left off, using a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to create a market for renewable energy via mandatory requirements or voluntary goals. But as is illustrated in Figure 3 , about 12 states have existing provisions expiring by 2015, and approximately 14 states and the District of Columbia have existing RPS or related provisions scheduled to expire by 2020. Debate over a National Renewable Electricity Standard The United States has traditionally relied on market forces and tax incentives to encourage the development and deployment of new technologies. This strategy is the "business as usual" model. However, several other forces are in play that call into question the "business as usual" model for innovation and deployment of renewable energy technologies. The need for wide deployment of renewable energy technologies on a national scale is at the heart of policy discussion for a RES. Advocates of a federal RES say it offers an opportunity to drive renewable energy market growth by creating a compliance requirement nationally, bridging the gap of expiring or lesser state RPS standards into future years. Even with generous tax incentives and resource growth potential, non-hydro renewable electricity constituted approximately 4% of U.S. electric power industry production as of 2009. If renewable electricity is to play a larger role in the electricity future of the United States, many maintain that federal action may be necessary. As a result, some observers have argued for governmental action to bolster and accelerate U.S. activities relating to renewable energy. RES and Options for Green Jobs Growth Jobs growth from renewable and clean energy development is one of the greater goals of RES policy development. Embedded energy efficiency requirements could also act to reduce the need for new renewable electricity generation facilities. The future global clean energy market has been estimated by 2020 to have sales as high as $2.3 trillion, and, as such, would be one of the world's biggest industries. Many nations are moving to secure a share of the expected rewards. FITs are an incentive policy to drive renewable energy growth via a mandatory purchase requirement by electric utilities, thus guaranteeing payments to renewable energy developers producing electricity. Many argue what still appears to be missing is a long-term national energy policy which has fully considered the current and future energy needs of the United States, balanced by a deliberate evaluation of the costs (including externalities) and benefits (including employment). The vision and clarity of a plan of action coming out of a well-defined U.S. national energy policy may provide the transparency and regulatory certainty the investment community has long claimed as necessary to help finance the modernization of the U.S. electricity sector.	The choice of power generation technology in the United States is heavily influenced by the cost of fuel. Historically, the use of fossil fuels has provided some of the lowest prices for generating electricity. But growing concerns over greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental costs associated with burning fossil fuels are leading some utilities and energy providers to deploy more renewable energy technologies to meet power demands. State governments have generally led the way in encouraging deployment of renewable energy technologies. Many states are essentially picking up where federal research and development dollars left off, using a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to create a market for renewable energy via mandatory requirements. While most RPS goals are expected to be met, about 12 states have existing provisions expiring by 2015, and approximately 14 states and the District of Columbia have existing RPS or related provisions scheduled to expire by 2020. Wide-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies is at the heart of policy discussion for a national Renewable Electricity Standard (RES), which would require certain retail electricity suppliers to provide a minimum percentage of the electricity they sell from renewable energy sources or energy efficiency. Green jobs growth from renewable and clean energy development is one of the goals of RES policy development; however, embedded energy efficiency requirements could also act to reduce the need for new renewable electricity generation facilities. An alternative Clean Energy Standard would provide incentives to certain advanced coal and nuclear facilities while also targeting retirement of older, polluting fossil fuel generation. Most of the opposition to an RES concerns the potentially higher cost to consumers of compliance using renewable electricity technologies. The United States has traditionally relied primarily on market forces and temporary tax incentives to encourage the development and deployment of new technologies. This strategy is the "business as usual" model. However, several other forces are in play that call into question the "business as usual" model for innovation and deployment of renewable energy technologies. Even with generous tax incentives, non-hydro renewable electricity constituted approximately 4% of U.S. electric power industry capacity as of 2009. If renewable electricity is to play a larger role in the electricity future of the United States, many maintain that federal action may be necessary. As a result, some observers have argued for governmental intervention to bolster and accelerate U.S. activities relating to renewable energy. A federal RES could offer an opportunity to drive renewable energy market growth by creating a compliance requirement nationally, bridging the gap of expiring or lower state RPS standards into future years. A Feed-in Tariff (FIT) is an alternative incentive concept to drive renewable energy growth via a mandatory purchase requirement by electric utilities. However, current U.S. law limits options for a national FIT. The future global clean energy market has been estimated by 2020 to have sales as high as $2.3 trillion, and, as such, would be one of the world's biggest industries. Many nations are moving to secure a share of the expected rewards. Many argue what still appears to be missing is a long-term U.S. national energy policy that fully considers the costs and benefits of paths forward. The vision and clarity of a U.S. plan of action coming out of a well-defined national energy policy could provide the transparency and regulatory certainty the investment community has long claimed as necessary to help finance the modernization of the U.S. electricity sector.
crs_RL33012	crs_RL33012_0	Introduction In the 1990s, wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to infiltrate the Balkans. However, U.S. and European peacekeeping troops, aid, and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration have helped to bring more stability to the region in recent years. Moreover, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States underscored for the countries of the region the dangers of global terrorism, and resulted in increased U.S. attention and aid to fight the terrorist threat. As a result of these factors, many experts currently do not view the Balkans as a key region harboring or funding terrorists, at least when compared to the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. Nevertheless, experts caution that the region may continue to play a role in terrorist plans, largely as a transit route for terrorists, as well as for bases for attacks in other regions, such as Western Europe. Moreover, observers agree that the region's continuing problems leave it vulnerable to terrorist groups in the future. U.S. Policy U.S. officials have cited the threat of terrorism in the Balkans as an important reason for the need for continued U.S. engagement in the region. In addition to the need to combat terrorist infrastructure in the region, U.S. officials say that U.S. efforts to bring stability to the region also help to fight terrorism. They note that political instability, weak political and law enforcement institutions and poverty provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups. These objectives are also outlined in the President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the United States to work with other countries to deny terrorists sponsorship, support and sanctuary, as well as to work to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. The United States has a variety of instruments to fight terrorism in the Balkans. One is the direct involvement of U.S. troops. The overall U.S. aid program to the region, aimed at bringing stability to the region through strengthening the rule of law and promoting economic reform, also serves to combat the sometimes lawless climate in the region in which terrorists can thrive. U.S. aid also helps to develop Bosnia's export control regime, including over weapons of mass destruction and dual-use technology. The United States has encouraged regional cooperation on terrorism and international crime through the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). U.S. assistance also includes bilateral aid to the countries of the region to fight terrorism. In the longer term, efforts to stabilize the region and thereby perhaps reduce its attractiveness to terrorists, are also dependent upon integrating it into Euro-Atlantic institutions.	In the 1990s, wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to infiltrate the Balkans. However, U.S. and European peacekeeping troops, aid, and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration have helped to bring more stability to the region in recent years. Moreover, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States underscored for the countries of the region the dangers of global terrorism, and resulted in increased U.S. attention and aid to fight the terrorist threat. In part as a result, many experts currently do not view the Balkans as a key region harboring or funding terrorists, in contrast to the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. However, experts note that the region may play a secondary role in terrorist plans, as a transit point for terrorists, as well as for recuperation. Moreover, they agree that the region's continuing problems continue to leave it vulnerable to terrorist groups in the future. U.S. officials have cited the threat of terrorism in the Balkans as an important reason for the need for continued U.S. engagement in the region. In addition to the need to take steps to directly combat terrorist infrastructure in the region, U.S. officials say that U.S. efforts to bring stability to the region also help to fight terrorism. They note that political instability, weak political and law enforcement institutions and poverty provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups. U.S. objectives are also outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report and the President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the United States to work with other countries to deny terrorists sponsorship, support and sanctuary, as well as working to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. The United States has a variety of instruments to fight terrorism in the Balkans. One is the direct involvement of U.S. troops in Kosovo. The United States provides bilateral counterterrorism assistance to the countries of the region. The overall U.S. aid program to the region, aimed at bringing stability through strengthening the rule of law and promoting economic reform, also serves to combat the sometimes lawless climate in which terrorists can thrive. U.S. aid helps to develop Bosnia's export control regime, including over weapons of mass destruction and dual-use technology. The United States has encouraged regional cooperation on terrorism and international crime through the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). In the longer term, efforts to stabilize the region, and thereby perhaps reduce its attractiveness to terrorists, are also dependent upon integrating it into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The second session of the 110th Congress may consider legislation affecting possible terrorist threats in the Balkans, including in the FY2009 foreign aid appropriations process. For more information on terrorism, see CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32522, U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32518, Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_R44361	crs_R44361_0	Overview The Obama Administration has pursued the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations as the primary economic component of its "strategic rebalance" of U.S. foreign policy priorities to the Asia-Pacific region. The 12 participating countries announced the conclusion of negotiations and released the text of the agreement in late 2015, and signed the proposed FTA on February 4, 2016. Congress had an active role in the TPP negotiations through oversight, consultations with the Administration, and formal negotiating objectives established in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation. Ultimately, Congress would need to pass implementing legislation before the TPP could take effect in the United States. In broad terms, however, arguments about the TPP's strategic importance relate to the United States using the agreement as a tool to exert influence in the region and beyond, in both economic and broader political and security spheres, and creating conditions that facilitate other U.S. policy tools. Such arguments maintain that through the TPP, the United States can strengthen regional alliances and partnerships; maintain U.S. leadership and influence in the Asia-Pacific region; enhance U.S. national security; liberalize trade, encourage market-oriented reforms, and drive economic growth; strengthen regional and potentially global trade architecture; and establish and update regional trade rules and disciplines consistent with U.S. interests and modern commercial realities. China is not a TPP member, but features prominently in analysis of U.S. influence in the region. Some opponents of the agreement argue that focusing on the strategic elements of the TPP distracts the debate from what they view should be its main criteria: the agreement's potential impact on the U.S. economy. Geo-Political Arguments Surrounding TPP Since the end of World War II, the United States has advanced trade agreements and institutions such as FTAs to promote its broader foreign policy goals. To some observers, TPP is an important test of U.S. credibility as a regional leader. The proposed agreement is the Obama Administration's signature economic initiative in the Asia-Pacific region. Administration officials argue that the agreement is a key signal that the United States is actively integrated into Asia's economic and diplomatic structures. However, when elaborating on security rationales for supporting passage of TPP, many of the agreement's backers do not identify specific, concrete ways that a successful deal would invigorate U.S. security partnerships in the region. The flip side of this argument is that many Asian policymakers—correctly or not—could interpret a failure of TPP in the United States as a symbol of the United States' declining interest in the region and inability to assert leadership. The TPP and U.S. Trade Policy The TPP may also have implications for U.S. influence on regional and global efforts to shape trade and investment. Proponents argue that the rules established in the TPP will promote economic growth and advance U.S. interests by influencing trade regimes at several levels: encouraging market opening and economic reforms among TPP's current members, particularly in emerging markets such as Malaysia and Vietnam; creating incentives for other Asia-Pacific nations to follow suit, to match the preferential access that TPP member countries would gain in major markets such as the United States and Japan; and addressing new trade barriers through new trade rules and disciplines, laying groundwork to influence and potentially spur future multilateral or plurilateral negotiations at the WTO or future FTA negotiations, and update critical gaps in existing trade rules. This led eventually to the establishment of the international rules-based trade architecture of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the GATT. In addition, the existing ASEAN FTAs often do not include or have less extensive intellectual property rights, investment, and labor and environmental provisions than the TPP. Some analysts go further, arguing that China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to minimize U.S. presence and power and that TPP is a necessary means of countering this effort. By encouraging a diverse group of nations to accept the rules and disciplines contained in the TPP, the argument holds, the United States will have reinforced U.S. leadership in the region, given space to Asia-Pacific leaders who seek greater economic and (perhaps) political reform, and encouraged a group of nations to adopt a more U.S.-supportive foreign policy outlook. Are the potential strategic benefits of the agreement contingent on its ability to drive economic growth and prosperity? If other initiatives are advisable, which nations or multilateral groups should be targeted? Congress also may wish to consider whether it is strategically important that TPP expand to include other countries outside the region. Implications for the Multilateral Trading System.	On February 4, 2016, Ministers of the 12 countries participating in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations signed the proposed free trade agreement (FTA). TPP is one of the Obama Administration's signature trade policy initiatives, an effort to reduce and eliminate trade and investment barriers and establish new rules and disciplines to govern trade and investment among the 12 countries. TPP proponents, including Administration officials, argue that the proposed TPP would have substantial strategic benefits for the United States in addition to its direct economic impact. They argue that the agreement would enhance overall U.S. influence in the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region and advance U.S. leadership in setting and modernizing the rules of commerce in the region and potentially in the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Congress plays a key role in the TPP. Through U.S. trade negotiating objectives established in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation and informal consultations and oversight, Congress has guided the Administration's negotiations. Ultimately, Congress would need to pass implementing legislation if the concluded agreement is to take effect in the United States. The geo-political arguments surrounding TPP are widely debated, as are the arguments about its potential economic impact. To some, the TPP is an important litmus test of U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific region. As the leading economic component of the Administration's "strategic rebalancing" to the region, the TPP, proponents argue, would allow the United States to reaffirm existing alliances, expand U.S. soft power, spur countries to adopt a more U.S.-friendly foreign policy outlook, and enhance broader diplomatic and security relations. Many Asian policymakers—correctly or not—could interpret a failure of TPP in the United States as a symbol of the United States' declining interest in the region and inability to assert leadership. Some critics argue that TPP backers often do not identify specific, concrete ways that a successful deal would invigorate U.S. security partnerships in the region, and that an agreement should be considered solely for its economic impact. They maintain that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics and that U.S. bilateral relations are based on each country's broader national interests. The Administration is also pursuing strategic economic goals in the TPP. Through the agreement, proponents argue, the United States can play a leading role in "writing the rules" for commerce with key trading partners, addressing gaps in current multilateral trade rules, and setting a precedent for future regional and bilateral FTA negotiations or multilateral trade talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The core of this argument is the assertion that the TPP's potential components—including tariff and non-tariff liberalization, strong intellectual property rights and investment protections, and labor and environmental provisions—would build upon the U.S.-led economic system that has expanded world trade and investment enormously since the end of World War II. Although most U.S. observers agree it is in the U.S. interest to lead in establishing global and regional trade rules, less consensus exists on what those rules should be, yielding some criticism on the strength and breadth of various TPP provisions. In addition, some argue that crafting new rules through "mega-regional" agreements rather than the WTO could undermine the multilateral trading system, create competing trading blocs, lead to trade diversion, and marginalize the countries not participating in regional initiatives. China is not a TPP member, but features prominently in discussion of the agreement's potential strategic effects. Some argue that China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to minimize U.S. presence and power. In this line of reasoning, the TPP serves as a counter to growing Chinese economic and political influence, implying that failure to conclude TPP could, in effect, allow China to shape regional rules of commerce and diplomacy through its own trade and investment initiatives. Others, however, argue that TPP is complementary to other FTAs and trade agreements throughout the region, including those championed by China, and that new members—possibly including China—will be critical for the TPP to influence regional norms. Trade agreements occur at the intersection of foreign and domestic policy, which can create tensions in balancing competing policy priorities. Key issues Congress faces as it continues its role regarding TPP include (1) how strongly to weigh geo-political implications of TPP; (2) the potential impact of the TPP on the multilateral trading system and other trade and economic institutions; and (3) the possible expansion of the agreement to include additional members.
crs_RL32461	crs_RL32461_0	This active role in foreign investment continues to drive a national debate over various aspects of foreign investment, including the impact on employment; the implications for national security of foreign direct investment in U.S. industrial firms; the effect on corporate research and development; and the implications for high-technology jobs, especially on science and engineering activities that are deemed to be important for continuing economic advancement. During the decades of the 1990s and the 2000s, manufacturing production experienced a slow decline as a share of U.S. parent company gross product, falling from 53% of total output in 1994, to 39.2% in 2010, reflecting the slowdown in the rate of growth in the U.S. economy and the decline overall in the share of the U.S. economy devoted to the manufacturing sector. In general, such acquisitions are not characterized as creating new jobs, but they may well sustain U.S. employment and production and potentially prevent job losses. Such structural changes are different from cyclical changes in the economy that represent short-term expansions and contractions in the economy. Traditional economic theory argues that firms and nations export goods and services that reflect their international comparative advantage. Most explanations of such capital flows argue that direct investment is just another form of international capital flows and that capital flows to locations where the rate of return is the highest. Evidence indicates that there is little empirical basis for expecting a universal linkage between foreign investment and trade. Conclusion This report utilizes a broad collection of data on direct investment published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce to assess the impact of U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in the United States on the U.S. economy. Data published by the BEA are the most extensive set of published data on foreign investment activities, but they were not developed to address the issue of jobs outsourcing and it is not possible with the BEA data to track job losses or gains in specific industries, specific companies, or specific plants with changes in jobs abroad. Broad, comprehensive data on U.S. multinational companies published by the BEA lag behind current events by two years, which means that assessing these activities may seem to be out of sync with the more limited anecdotal examples that appear in the popular press and raises questions about the relevancy of the data to assessing short-term developments compared with long term trends. U.S. parent companies may or may not respond to the economic slowdown by outsourcing jobs abroad because the dominating presence of the U.S. economy in the world economy means that an economic slowdown in the United States likely reduces economic growth abroad as well and that the foreign affiliates of those parent companies may not be a position to add more jobs.	The impact of foreign direct investment on U.S. employment continues to attract national attention. While local communities compete with one another for investment projects, many of the residents of those communities fear losing their jobs as U.S. companies seek out foreign locations and foreign workers to perform work that traditionally has been done in the United States, generally referred to as outsourcing. Some observers suggest that current U.S. experiences with outsourcing are different from those that have preceded them and that this merits legislative actions by Congress to blunt the economic impact of these activities. Other observers argue that investing abroad by U.S. multinational companies impedes the growth of new jobs in the economy and thwarts the nation's investments in high technology sectors. Some opponents also argue that mid-career workers who lose good-paying manufacturing and service-sector jobs likely will never recover their standard of living. Economists and others generally argue that free and unimpeded international flows of capital ultimately have a positive impact on both domestic and foreign economies. Direct investment is unique among international capital flows because it adds permanently to the capital stock and skill set of a nation, but it also challenges the general theory of capital flows because of the presence of strong cross-border and intra-industry investment. Supporters contend that to the extent that foreign investment shifts jobs abroad, it is a minor component of the overall economic picture and that it is offset somewhat by the investment of foreign firms in the U.S. economy (referred to as insourcing), which supports existing jobs and creates new jobs in the economy. Broad, comprehensive data on U.S. multinational companies generally lag behind current events by two years and were not developed to address the issue of jobs outsourcing. Many economists argue, however, that there is little evidence to date to support the notion that the overseas investment activities of U.S. multinational companies play a significant role in the rate at which jobs are created in the U.S. economy. Instead, they argue that the source of job creation in the economy is rooted in the combination of macroeconomic policies the nation has chosen, the rate of productivity growth, and the availability of resources. This report addresses these issues by analyzing the extent of direct investment into and out of the economy, the role such investment plays in U.S. trade, jobs, and production, and the relationship between direct investment and the broader economic changes that are occurring in the U.S. economy.
crs_R44771	crs_R44771_0	Introduction Tax reform has been a subject of debate in the past several Congress and many policymakers agree that the U.S. tax system is in need of reform. To assist Congress as it continues to debate tax reform options, this report provides a review of recent legislative proposals introduced since the 113 th Congress. Although no comprehensive tax reforms have been introduced into legislation yet in the 115 th Congress, two 2016 reform proposals appear to be at the forefront of current congressional debates—the House GOP's "A Better Way" tax reform proposal, released in June, 2016, and President Trump's campaign reform proposal, released in September 2016. The House GOP's tax reform proposal is intended to be revenue neutral. Legislative Proposals Reform the Income Tax System As of the date of this report, no legislation has been introduced that would provide a comprehensive reform of the individual and corporate income tax systems. The Fair Tax Act of 2017 ( H.R. 25 and S. 18 ) proposes to repeal the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, all payroll taxes, the self-employment tax, and the estate and gift taxes. These taxes would be effectively replaced with a 23% (tax-inclusive, meaning that the rate is a proportion of the after-tax rather than the pre-tax value) national retail sales tax. Other Tax Reform Proposals The Tax Code Termination Act ( H.R. Please see " Tax Reform in the 115th Congress " for more details on these proposals. Replace the Income Tax System Several proposals to replace the income tax system were introduced in the 114 th Congress: the Fair Tax Act of 2015 ( H.R. 29 , introduced in the 115 th Congress.) 1) The Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. This formal legislative proposal was preceded by several tax reform discussion drafts, the first of which was introduced during the 112 th Congress. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 would have made substantial changes to the current federal tax system, modifying individual, corporate, and business income taxes, as well as the tax treatment of multinational corporations. The proposal also would have made a number of changes related to the treatment of tax-exempt entities, tax administration and compliance, and excise taxes.	Many agree that the U.S. tax system is in need of reform. Congress continues to explore ways to make the U.S. tax system simpler, fairer, and more efficient. In doing so, lawmakers confront challenges in identifying and enacting policies, including consideration of competing proposals and differing priorities. To assist Congress as it continues to debate the intricacies of tax reform, this report provides a review of legislative tax reform proposals introduced since the 113th Congress. Although no comprehensive tax reforms have been introduced into legislation yet in the 115th Congress, two 2016 reform proposals appear to be at the forefront of current congressional debates—the House GOP's "A Better Way" tax reform proposal, released in June 2016, and President Trump's campaign reform proposal, released in September 2016. As with most recent tax reform proposals, both of these plans call for lower tax rates coupled with a broader tax base. In either case, numerous technical details would need to be addressed before either plan could be formulated into legislation. Several proposals have already been introduced in the 115th Congress to replace the current income tax system. The Fair Tax Act of 2017 (H.R. 25/S. 18) would repeal the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, all payroll taxes, the self-employment tax, and the estate and gift taxes. These taxes would be effectively replaced with a 23% (tax-inclusive, meaning that the rate is a proportion of the after-tax rather than the pre-tax value) national retail sales tax. The Tax Code Termination Act (H.R. 29) would terminate the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and declares that its replacement meet several criteria regarding simplicity, fairness, and efficiency. Both of these proposals have been introduced in previous Congresses. In the 114th Congress, no comprehensive proposals to reform the individual and corporate income tax systems were introduced. There were, however, reform proposals to replace the income tax with an alternative system or abolish the current system altogether. In the 113th Congress, then-chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means Dave Camp introduced the Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1). This legislative proposal was preceded by several tax reform discussion drafts, the first of which was introduced during the 112th Congress. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 would have made substantial changes to the current federal tax system, modifying individual, corporate, and business income taxes, as well as the tax treatment of multinational corporations. The proposal would also have made a number of changes related to the treatment of tax-exempt entities, tax administration and compliance, and excise taxes. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative changes.
crs_RS21558	crs_RS21558_0	(1) Given a highly competitive international soybean market and growinginternational debate over the nature of production and trade in genetically- engineered (GE) crops, controversy hasemerged in recentyears over the growing pirated use of Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans, a GE variety, by producers in Argentina andBrazil. For example, U.S. farmers pay a technology feeestimated at $7.44 oneach 50-pound bag of RR planting seed. Universal Adoption of RR Soybeans in Argentina Although RR soybean seeds are not patented in Argentina, Monsanto has agreements with other seed firms in Argentina allowingthem to use the RR technology in their seeds. (8) As a result, Argentine farmers save about $8 to $9per metric ton on the technology fee. (9) This is aconsiderable cost advantage over U.S. soybeans in a highly competitive internationalsoybean market. (12) As in Argentina, notechnology fees are paid by RR soybean growers in Brazil. Because Brazil's courts have been unable to resolve the crisis prior to this year's October-December planting period, the Lulagovernment has been forced to issue a second temporary reprieve from the GE planting ban. Some analysts suggest that the current widespread planting of GE crops in Brazil is already irreversible. U.S. Perspective According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. is committed to a policy of promoting increased intellectual property protection,both through the negotiation of free trade agreements that strengthen existing international laws and through useof U.S. statutorytools as appropriate.	U.S. soybean growers and trade officials charge that Argentina and Brazil -- the UnitedStates' two major export competitors in international soybean markets -- gain an unfair trade advantage by routinelysavinggenetically-engineered (GE), Roundup Ready (RR) soybean seeds from the previous harvest (a practice prohibitedin the UnitedStates) for planting in subsequent years. These groups also argue that South American farmers pay no royalty feeson the saved seed,unlike U.S. farmers who are subject to a technology fee when they purchase new seeds each year. The cost savingto South Americansoybean growers on the technology fee alone nets out to about $8 to $9 per metric ton -- a considerable costadvantage over U.S.soybeans in the highly competitive international soybean market. This practice also raises concerns about theintellectual propertyrights (IPR) of Monsanto (the developer of RR technology). Commercial use of RR soybeans in Brazil remains illegal despite apparent widespread planting. A 1998government approval of theircommercial use remains suspended by court injunction, and resolution over their commercial legality is beingconsidered by anappellate court. However, two recent Presidential decrees have given temporary reprieve to the ban on planting andmarketing GEsoybeans through December 2004. The eventual outcome on commercial legalization of GE crops in Brazil mayhave importantconsequences for intellectual property rights, as well as for international trade in GE crops. This report will beupdated as needed.
crs_RL31053	crs_RL31053_0	Introduction and Most Recent Developments Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, and the entry into force of a new Kosovo constitution on June 15, have ushered in a "new reality" in the Balkans, but one still with many uncertainties. The Kosovo Serb minority as well as leaders in Serbia insist that "Kosovo is Serbia" and have pledged never to recognize Kosovo's independence. Nevertheless, Kosovo's leaders have pledged to implement the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan, presented by the U.N. envoy in March 2007, which outline terms for Kosovo's supervised independence with extensive rights for the Kosovo Serb minority and other minority communities. Not all of the EU's 27 member states support Kosovo's independence, although a majority are expected eventually to recognize the new state and all agreed to launch the new EU-led missions. As a consequence, UNSC Resolution 1244 remains in force, with the various international missions in co-existence for the time being. U.S. Policy Overview In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Kosovo region. These efforts culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999. Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province in June 1999, clearing the way for the deployment of U.S. and other NATO peacekeepers. Some critics of U.S. engagement in the Balkans say that the situation in Kosovo does not have as large an impact on vital U.S. interests as other issues, particularly the war on terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the war in Iraq, as well as a host of other foreign policy and national security challenges. Post-1999 Developments in Kosovo Kosovo's Governing Institutions After June 1999, Kosovo was primarily administered by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Constitutional Framework did not address the question of Kosovo's final status. UNMIK and KFOR—Pre-Status U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) has formed the basis of the international role in Kosovo since the end of the war. In the early years after 1999, the United States and other Western countries, as well as Kosovo's neighbors except Albania, opposed independence for Kosovo. The Ahtisaari Proposal14 U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was expected to present his proposal for Kosovo's status to the contact group and the U.N. Security Council in late 2006. Kosovo's Declaration of Independence and Aftermath Without further action in the U.N. Security Council, Kosovo's authorities prepared to make a declaration of independence in early 2008 as part of a process closely coordinated with the international community. 445 , which states that the United States should refrain from any unilateral action, especially outside the United Nations, toward Kosovo's independence.	Close to nine years after NATO intervened militarily in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, Kosovo declared itself an independent and sovereign state on February 17, 2008. A new Kosovo constitution came into force on June 15. These developments marked a new stage in, but not the end of, international concern and engagement in the western Balkan region. Serbia strenuously objects to and does not recognize Kosovo's independence. Kosovo represented the last major unfinished business from the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s. In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies engaged in collective action to end escalating violence in Kosovo. These efforts culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing campaign (Operation Allied Force) against Serbia from March until June 1999, when then-Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province. Afterward, Kosovo was governed through a combination of U.N. and local Kosovar interim governing structures. Under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) retained ultimate political authority in the province. A NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, was charged with providing a secure environment. UNSC Resolution 1244 did not settle Kosovo's disputed status. The ethnic Albanian majority demanded full independence for Kosovo; Serbs insisted that Kosovo remain an integral part of Serbia. In mid-2005, the U.N. began a lengthy process to address Kosovo's status. U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari proposed in early 2007 that Kosovo gain supervised independence with extensive minority rights. The Ahtisaari proposal stalled in the U.N. Security Council for the rest of the year, with the United States and some European countries in the Council strongly backing it, but with Russia opposed and threatening to wield its veto. Instead, the United States and many European countries worked closely with Kosovo leaders to coordinate Kosovo's move toward independence and establish new international missions to help implement the Ahtisaari plan. Kosovo's Serbian community, Serbia, and Russia claim that Kosovo's independence is illegal and do not recognize the legitimacy of the EU-led missions. As a consequence, UNSC Resolution 1244 remains in force, leaving UNMIK and the EU-led presences in co-existence for the time being. KFOR continues to fulfill its security responsibilities under Resolution 1244. The United States, in concert with European members of the international contact group, continues to shape international policy on Kosovo. The United States has committed peacekeeping troops to Kosovo since 1999, and currently maintains around 1,600 troops with KFOR. The Bush Administration warmly welcomed Kosovo's independence declaration in February 2008. In the 110th Congress, some introduced resolutions have addressed the prospect of Kosovo's independence. For additional information on post-independence developments in Kosovo, see CRS Report RS21721, Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_R41781	crs_R41781_0	The welfare reform debates from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s focused on issues related to families headed by a single mother (which comprised most of the families on the assistance rolls during that period), and, specifically, concerns that welfare itself helped contribute to economic disadvantage of families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare law. Basic assistance, the category of expenditure most commonly associated with TANF, represents only 30% of all TANF and MOE funds used in FY2010. It provides FY2012 funding for the basic TANF block grant, healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood competitive grants, and certain other funds at their FY2011 levels. It does not provide FY2012 funding for TANF supplemental grants (discussed in detail below). In addition, P.L. Under the short-term extension of TANF, the 112 th Congress would have to act again to continue the program beyond September 30, 2012 (the end of FY2012). Most federal TANF policy focuses on historical concerns related to cash assistance for needy families with children, which led to the 1996 welfare law more than 15 years ago. Assessing the Performance of TANF-Funded Activities All of the current TANF performance measures focus on the cash assistance caseload. TANF's Responsiveness To a Recession The recession of 2007-2009 represents the first deep and long economic slump since the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law. However, the fund was exhausted in early FY2010 based on grants made to relatively few states (18 states and the District of Columbia). Congress augmented the regular contingency fund by creating a temporary, Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF), funded at $5 billion for two years, FY2009 and FY2010. However, the ECF (discussed above) provided grants of $1.3 billion to help finance subsidized employment during FY2009 and FY2010. The ECF was estimated to have funded 262,500 job slots during its lifetime. Subsidized employment programs can also provide more income for families than TANF cash assistance benefits provide. Congress could consider establishing a dedicated funding stream for subsidized employment; and/or creating non-financial inducements for states to expand their subsidized employment programs, such as counting participation in subsidized employment for those not on the ongoing cash assistance rolls toward a state's work participation standard. These fathers—like their single mother counterparts—tend to have lower levels of educational attainment and face above-average rates of health barriers to employment. Or Congress might consider ways states could make more extensive use of existing TANF funds to serve disadvantaged noncustodial parents by, for example, continuing DRA-established programs, possibly emphasizing activities such as employment services in addition to training in social skills; providing states with the incentive to expand subsidized jobs programs for noncustodial parents; an example of such an incentive is allowing states to count participants in subsidized employment who are not recipients of ongoing cash assistance toward the TANF work participation standard; establishing a TANF state plan requirement that requires states to discuss and set goals for noncustodial parents; this could be paired with requiring states to assess their efforts at aiding noncustodial parents. P.L. 112-96 ( H.R. It provides funding for increases in cash assistance, non-recurrent short-term benefits, and subsidized employment.	P.L. 112-96 funds TANF through the end of FY2012. It generally provides FY2012 TANF funding at FY2011 levels, but does not fund TANF "supplemental grants." In addition, P.L. 112-96 prevents electronic benefit transaction access to TANF cash at certain establishments, and also revises TANF reporting standards to facilitate data exchanges with other programs. The short-term extension of TANF defers major budget and policy decisions related to the block grant. Most federal TANF policy focuses on historical concerns related to cash assistance for needy families with children, which led to the 1996 welfare law. However, TANF has evolved into a funding stream that funds a wide range of economic aid and human services that address economic and social disadvantage for families with children. In FY2010, only 30% of all federal TANF and associated state dollars were used for basic monthly cash assistance. The recent recession was the first long and deep one since the enactment of the 1996 welfare law. TANF's contingency fund, established in 1996 to provide extra grants during recessions, was exhausted in early FY2010. Congress created a $5 billion temporary Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF) for FY2009 and FY2010 that provided extra funding to help pay for increased cash assistance caseloads, short-term aid, and subsidized employment. The ECF expired on September 30, 2010. Congress might consider policy alternatives to provide states with extra funding during the next economic downturn. A TANF-funded activity that was substantially expanded during the recent economic downturn was subsidized employment. The ECF provided $1.3 billion for subsidized employment for an estimated 262,500 slots during the lifetime of the fund. TANF-funded subsidized employment can be for those on the assistance rolls as well as other low-income parents, caretakers, or youth. Congress might consider ways to encourage states to continue subsidized employment activities, including providing dedicated funding for this activity and/or considering participation in subsidized employment for individuals not receiving ongoing assistance when assessing state TANF performance. Additionally, most traditional welfare reform issues have focused on families headed by a single mother. Current law provides TANF grants to community-based organizations for initiatives to promote both healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood. However, poor noncustodial fathers, like their poor single mother counterparts, tend to have low levels of educational attainment, weak attachment to work, and health barriers to employment. They might also have a criminal record. Congress might examine ways to expand TANF-funded work and employment services for disadvantaged noncustodial fathers.
crs_R41258	crs_R41258_0	Introduction The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for agencies and programs in three separate federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service (IHS) in the Department of Health and Human Services—as well as funds for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Congress typically debates a variety of funding and policy issues when considering each year's appropriations legislation. These issues have included onshore and offshore energy development, wildland fire fighting, Indian trust fund management, royalty relief, climate change, DOI science programs, and wild horse and burro management. Other issues have included the appropriate funding levels for Bureau of Indian Affairs law enforcement and education; Indian Health Service construction and contract health services; wastewater/drinking water needs; the arts; land acquisition through the Land and Water Conservation Fund; and the Superfund program. FY2011: Final Appropriations The FY2011 appropriation for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was $29.67 billion, a reduction of $2.65 billion (8%) from the FY2010 level of $32.32 billion. The FY2011 funding was included in the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Division B, P.L. While most of the major agencies funded by the FY2011 law received reduced appropriations relative to FY2010, a few received additional funding. Among the decreases for FY2011 from FY2010 appropriations were the following: $1.59 billion (15%) for the Environmental Protection Agency, $602.0 million (11%) for the Forest Service, $140.6 million (9%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service, and $127.2 million (5%) for the National Park Service. Among the increases were the following: $72.7 million (53%) for the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, and $25.0 million (0.6%) for the Indian Health Service. The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act provided funding for accounts in the bill through the end of the fiscal year (September 30, 2011), with many accounts funded at less than the FY2010 account level. However, no regular appropriations bill to fund Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2011 was enacted before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010. Between September 30, 2010, and April 9, 2011, a series of seven laws was enacted to continue appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for relatively short periods, mostly at FY2010 account levels. 112-10 . The FY2011 law did not generally identify funding below the account level, but rather directed the BLM (and other agencies) to submit plans for spending below the account level to the Appropriations Committees within 30 days of enactment.	The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities. The FY2011 appropriation for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was $29.67 billion, a reduction of $2.65 billion (8%) from the FY2010 level of $32.32 billion. The FY2011 funding was included in the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10). While most of the major agencies funded by the law received reduced appropriations relative to FY2010, a few received additional funding. Among the decreases for FY2011 from FY2010 appropriations were the following: $1.59 billion (15%) for the Environmental Protection Agency, $602.0 million (11%) for the Forest Service, $140.6 million (9%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service, and $127.2 million (5%) for the National Park Service. Among the increases were the following: $72.7 million (53%) for the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, and $25.0 million (0.6%) for the Indian Health Service. No regular appropriations bill to fund Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2011 had been enacted before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010. Initially, a series of laws was enacted to continue appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for relatively short periods, mostly at FY2010 account levels. However, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act provided funding for accounts in the bill through the end of the fiscal year (September 30, 2011), with many accounts funded at less than the FY2010 level. The FY2011 law did not generally identify funding below the account level for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Rather, it directed the agencies to submit plans for spending for activities and programs below the account level, to the Appropriations Committees, within 30 days of enactment. The law was enacted on April 15, 2011. Congress typically debates a variety of funding and policy issues when considering each year's appropriations legislation. These issues have included energy development onshore and offshore, wildland fire fighting, Indian trust fund management, royalty relief, climate change, DOI science programs, and wild horse and burro management. Other issues have included the appropriate funding levels for Bureau of Indian Affairs law enforcement and education; Indian Health Service construction and contract health services; wastewater/drinking water needs; the arts; land acquisition through the Land and Water Conservation Fund; and the Superfund program.
crs_R44516	crs_R44516_0	For FY2017, President Obama proposed $152.333 billion for R&D, an increase of $6.195 billion (4.2%) over the estimated FY2016 enacted R&D funding level of $146.138 billion. Under President Obama's FY2017 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received more than 95% of total federal R&D funding: the Department of Defense (DOD), 49.5%; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (primarily the National Institutes of Health [NIH]), 21.3%; Department of Energy (DOE), 8.6%; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 8.4%; National Science Foundation (NSF), 4.3%; Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2.0%; and Department of Commerce (DOC), 1.5%. The largest agency R&D increases in President Obama's FY2017 request (as measured in dollars), compared with FY2016, were for DOE, up $2.755 billion (19.1%); DOD, up $1.953 billion (2.8%); HHS, up $772 million (2.4%); NSF, up $412 million (6.7%); and USDA, up $249 million (9.3%). In President Obama's FY2017 budget request, the Department of Health and Human Services, primarily NIH, accounted for nearly half (47.3%) of all federal funding for basic research. Multiagency R&D Initiatives President Obama's FY2017 budget request supported several multiagency R&D initiatives. Global Change Research Program14 The U.S. Two R&D-focused components of the AMP are the National Robotics Initiative (NRI) and the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI). As of September 28, 2016, Congress had not completed action on any of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2017. The House Committee on Appropriations had reported all nine of the regular appropriations bills that provide R&D funding, and the House had passed three of them. The Senate Committee on Appropriations had reported all nine of the regular appropriations bills that provide R&D funding, and the Senate had passed three of them. 114-254 ). Division A, Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017, generally provides continuing appropriations for most federal agencies at 99.8% of FY2016 funding through April 28, 2017, subject to other provisions in the act, pending final action on the remaining 11 regular appropriations acts for FY2017. Division B, Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, includes additional funding for DOD RDT&E, designated by Congress as Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism funding. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act ( P.L. 114-223 ). This act, among other things, had provided continuing appropriations for most federal agencies through December 10, 2016, at about 99.5% of FY2016 funding. The act provides FY2017 funding for most federal agencies, except those already provided for in P.L. Where possible, R&D funding provided under this act is identified in the following sections of this report. For some agencies, however, funding for R&D is included in appropriations line items that also include non-R&D activities; therefore, it is not possible to identify precisely how much of the funding provided in appropriations laws is allocated to R&D specifically. On December 10, President Obama signed into law the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. Precision Medicine Initiative. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. Research . Construction . The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development would have received $1.254 billion, an increase of $59 million (4.9%). In May 2017, Congress enacted P.L. 114-223 ). 115-31 , providing FY2017 funding for the Department of the Interior and other departments and agencies. 115-31 , is intended for R&D activities, due to the inclusion of R&D funding in accounts that also include non-R&D funding.	President Obama's budget request for FY2017 included $152.333 billion for research and development (R&D), an increase of $6.195 billion (4.2%) over the estimated FY2016 enacted R&D funding level of $146.138 billion. Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. Under President Obama's FY2017 budget request, seven federal agencies would have received 95.6% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (47.8%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (21.5%) accounting for nearly 70% of all federal R&D funding. In dollars, the largest increases in agency R&D funding in President Obama's request would have gone to the Department of Energy (up $2.755 billion, 19.1%), the Department of Defense (up $1.953 billion, 2.8%), and the Department of Health and Human Services (up $772 million, 2.4%). President Obama's FY2017 request sought to continue support for a number of multiagency R&D initiatives: the National Nanotechnology Initiative, Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative, Precision Medicine Initiative, Cancer Moonshot, Materials Genome Initiative, National Robotics Initiative, and National Network for Manufacturing Innovation. As of September 28, 2016, Congress had not completed action on any of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2017. The House Committee on Appropriations had reported all nine of the regular appropriations bills that provide R&D funding, and the House had passed three of them. The Senate Committee on Appropriations had reported all nine of the regular appropriations bills that provide R&D funding, and the Senate had passed three of them. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act (P.L. 114-223). This act, among other things, provided full-year funding for military construction and the Department of Veteran's Affairs, as well as continuing appropriations for most federal agencies through December 9, 2016, at about 99.5% of FY2016 funding. On December 10, President Obama signed into law the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 114-254). Division A, Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017, generally provides continuing appropriations for most federal agencies at 99.8% of FY2016 funding through April 28, 2017, subject to other provisions in the act, pending final action on the remaining 11 regular appropriations acts for FY2017. Division B, Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, included additional funding for DOD RDT&E, designated by Congress as Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism funding. In May 2017, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). The act provides FY2017 funding for most federal agencies, except those already provided for in P.L. 114-223. Where possible, R&D funding provided under this act is identified in the following sections of this report. For some agencies, however, funding for R&D is included in appropriations line items that also include non-R&D activities; therefore, it is not possible to identify precisely how much of the funding provided in appropriations laws is allocated to R&D specifically. No further updates of this report are anticipated. Completion of the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year and the use of continuing resolutions can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and acquisition of R&D-related equipment.
crs_RL34037	crs_RL34037_0	Parliamentarians have noted an apparent disinclination of the House to consider censure as part of the impeachment procedure. It has, however, become accepted congressional practice to employ a simple resolution of one house of Congress, or a concurrent resolution by both houses, for certain nonlegislative matters, such as to express the opinion or the sense of the Congress or of one house of Congress on a public matter, and a resolution expressing an opinion of "no confidence" in, or other expression of censure or disapproval of an executive branch official within a concurrent or simple resolution would appear to be in the nature of such a "sense of Congress" or "sense of the Senate" (or House) resolution. The practice of the House, Senate, or Congress to express facts or opinion in simple or concurrent resolutions has been recognized since its earliest days as an inherent authority of the Congress and of democratic legislative institutions generally, and the adoption of "sense of" the House or Senate resolutions on various subjects and in reference to various people, is practiced with some frequency in every Congress. Adoption of a resolution expressing a lack of confidence could have symbolic effects as an expression of the sense of Congress (or of either house). A vote expressing "no confidence" of the Senate or the House in a particular official of the government, while it may certainly have political implications, would have no specific legal import. Joint resolutions, however, are normally lawmaking vehicles, and require passage by both chambers and presentation to the President. In 2014 the House adopted a simple resolution ( H.Res. Concluding Observations Although there has been discussion in both houses of Congress of the appropriateness of such actions, resolutions have been introduced and considered in each house of Congress in the past, and on occasion have been adopted, wherein the House or the Senate has expressed the "sense" of the institution that an official in the executive branch has engaged in conduct worthy of censure, condemnation, or other expression of disapprobation; should resign or be removed by the President; and, in a few circumstances, expressly stating in the preamble or the operative portion of the resolution that the public or the particular house of Congress has lost "confidence" in the official.	The House and the Senate have, from time to time in the past, proposed and—on some occasions—adopted a resolution which has expressed the body's disapproval, condemnation, censure, or lack of confidence regarding a particular official in the executive branch of the federal government. Such actions have not been considered as part of the express impeachment authority of the House within the Constitution (nor the authority to try such impeachments in the Senate), nor have they generally been considered as either part of the inherent contempt authority of either house of Congress or the express constitutional authority of each house of Congress to discipline its own Members. Rather, such actions seem to be in the nature of a "sense of the House" or a "sense of the Senate" resolution, whereby a simple resolution is proposed and adopted by one house of Congress, without the concurrence of the other house of Congress, and without a requirement for a "presentment" to the President (as would be required of a "bill"). Such simple resolutions adopted by one house (or concurrent resolutions adopted by both houses) have come to be recognized by parliamentarians as a vehicle to express the opinion and sense of Congress on a nonlegislative matter; and "sense of" the House, Senate, or Congress resolutions concerning a wide range of subjects have been used frequently in the past by the House and Senate. The adoption of a simple or concurrent resolution expressing the House's or Senate's "censure," "condemnation," or "no confidence" in a particular officer of the federal government does not have any immediate or binding legal import, but does express a particular moral judgment and may have both symbolic as well as political implications. This report has been updated from an earlier version, and may be updated in the future to reflect new rulings, practices, or precedents.
crs_RL31806	crs_RL31806_0	The bill includes funding for the Interior Department,except for the Bureau of Reclamation (funded by Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations laws), and funds for some agencies or programs in three otherdepartments -- Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. The Senate-passed version of the FY2004 Interior and related agencies appropriations bill, H.R. FY2004 Budget and Appropriations President Bush's FY2004 budget for Interior and related agencies totaled $19.89 billion. On July 17, 2003, the House passed H.R. 2691 (268-152) containing a total of $19.60 billion for Interior and related agencies for FY2004. 2691 on September 23, 2003. 108-330 ) was filed on October 28, 2003, and narrowlypassed the House (216-205) on October 30 and was approved by the Senate (87-2)on November 3. 2691 into law on November 10, 2003, as P.L. The FY2004 enacted level was slightly less than enacted for FY2003 (less than 1% lower). The FY2004 level was essentially the same as the amount approvedby the Senate (less than 1% higher), and higher than the House-passed total (2%higher) and the President's request (less than 1% higher). The appropriate levels offunding for wildland firefighting and land acquisition were among the major issuesdebated. The FY2004 law contained $2.76 billion for wildland fire fighting by theForest Service and the Department of the Interior, approximately 13% less than thetotal enacted for FY2003. For landacquisition (and state assistance) by the four major federal land managementagencies, the FY2004 law contained $263.4 million, 36% less than enacted forFY2003. Many controversial issues arose during consideration of the FY2004 Interior andrelated agencies appropriations bill, and were addressed by conferees. The FY2004law (1) continued the automatic renewal of expiring grazing permits and leases forFY2004 -- FY2008 (see "Bureau of Land Management" section below); (2)extended the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program (see "National Park Service"section below); (3) modified procedures for seeking judicial review of timber salesin Alaska, primarily in the Tongass National Forest (see "Forest Service" sectionbelow); (4) capped funds for competitive sourcing efforts of agencies and requireddocumentation on the initiative (see the "Competitive Sourcing of Government Jobs"section below); and (5) led to a stay of a court decision requiring an accounting ofIndian trust funds and trust asset transactions since 1887 (see Litigation in the"Office of Special Trustee for American Indians" section below ). The FY2004 law dropped language barring funds from being used (1) to implement changes to BLM regulations on Recordable Disclaimers of Interest inLand, (see "Bureau of Land Management" section below) (2) for the Klamath FisheryManagement Council (see "Klamath River Basin" section below), and (3) for OuterContinental Shelf leasing activities in the North Aleutian Basin planning area, whichincludes Bristol Bay, Alaska (see "Minerals Management Service" section below). Land Acquisition. d Figures reflect an across-the-board cut of 0.646% in the FY2004 Interior and Related AgenciesAppropriationslaw ( P.L.108-108 ) and a 0.59% across-the-board cut in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004 ( P.L.108-199 ).	The Interior and related agencies appropriations bill includes funds for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for some agencies or programs withinthree other departments -- Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services. It also fundsnumerous smaller related agencies. President Bush's FY2004 budget for Interior and related agencies totaled $19.89 billion, $220.5million (1%) less than enacted for FY2003 ($20.11 billion). On July 17, 2003, the House passed H.R. 2691 (268-152) containing a total of $19.60 billion for Interior and relatedagencies for FY2004. On September 23, 2003, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2691 with a total of $20.01 billion. A conference report was filed on October 28, 2003, and agreedto by the House (216-205) on October 30 and approved by the Senate (87-2) on November 3, 2003. The bill was signed into law on November 10, 2003 ( P.L. 108-108 ). The final FY2004 appropriation provided $20.01 billion for the Department of Interior andRelated agencies, which reflected two across-the-board cuts: a 0.646% cut in the Interiorappropriations statute ( P.L.108-108 ), and a 0.59% cut in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ). The FY2004 enacted level is slightly less than enacted for FY2003 (less than 1% lower). It is essentially the same as the amount approved by the Senate (less than 1% higher), and higher thanthe House-passed total (2% higher) and the President's request (less than 1% higher). Theappropriate levels of funding for wildland firefighting and land acquisition were among the majorissues debated. The FY2004 law contained $2.76 billion for wildland fire fighting by the ForestService and the Department of the Interior, approximately 13% less than the total enacted forFY2003. For land acquisition (and state assistance) by the four major federal land managementagencies, the law contained $263.4 million, 36% less than enacted for FY2003. Many controversial issues arose during consideration of the FY2004 Interior and relatedagencies appropriations bill, and were addressed by conferees. The FY2004 law (1) continued theautomatic renewal of expiring grazing permits and leases for FY2004 -- FY2008; (2) extended theRecreational Fee Demonstration Program; (3) modified procedures for seeking judicial review oftimber sales in Alaska, primarily in the Tongass National Forest; (4) capped funds for competitivesourcing efforts of agencies and required documentation on the initiative; and (5) led to a stay of acourt decision requiring an accounting of Indian trust funds and trust asset transactions since 1887. The law dropped language barring funds from being used (1) to implement changes to regulationsof the Bureau of Land Management on Recordable Disclaimers of Interest in Land, (2) for theKlamath Fishery Management Council, and (3) for Outer Continental Shelf leasing activities in theNorth Aleutian Basin planning area, which includes Bristol Bay, Alaska. Key Policy Staff a Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic Social Policy; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI =Resources, Science, and Industry.
crs_R40670	crs_R40670_0	Introduction Federal policymakers are debating a range of potential initiatives for reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from U.S. energy sources. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2454 ), which is viewed as the most widely discussed such legislative proposal in Congress, would set a more aggressive goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. Key among these is end-use energy efficiency, which is viewed by many as the measure with the greatest potential to reduce CO 2 emissions quickly and at relatively low cost. But increasing the efficiency of buildings is not a new priority in the United States. The advisory committee released its report, Carbon Lock-In: Barriers To Deploying Climate Change Mitigation Technologies (hereinafter referred to as the Lock-in report) in November 2007. 94-163 ) Congress has enacted policies addressing efficiency barriers due to industry structure, imperfect information, and high first costs. 95-619 ), Congress pursued technical risk policies more vigorously in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. It stands to reason that uncertainty about the future price of energy would complicate decisions about building efficiency investments, and could deter conservative building owners from considering all but the most highly cost effective improvements. As it happens, recent U.S. energy price volatility is at historic highs. Market evidence, therefore, suggests that energy price uncertainties may be having a greater negative impact on the nature and timing of building efficiency investments in the private sector than is commonly understood. In the context of building energy efficiency, there may be many policy options available to reduce electricity price uncertainty, but there has been relatively little identification or consideration of them in the policy community. Neither the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 ( H.R. 2454 ), now under consideration, nor any other current legislative proposals contain these kinds of provisions. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. Looking back on federal efficiency statutes in the context of the Lock-in report, it appears that congressional policies since 1975 have been focused persistently on the critical barriers of industry structure, imperfect information, and high first costs. Congress has a history of addressing technical risk, too, by encouraging technology demonstration, although this issue appears to have been a lower priority over the last few years—perhaps due to the imperative of accelerating the implementation of well-demonstrated efficiency measures. In successive statutes, Congress has attempted to "push the envelope" in these areas through ever tighter efficiency standards, new financial incentives, and other measures. Congress also has a history of addressing unfavorable fiscal policies among utilities. Until 2009, this history could be characterized as a single significant, but largely ineffective, attempt to advance efficiency-oriented utility rates under P.L. 102-486 . Market risks, especially energy price risks, seem to have received relatively little policy attention from Congress to date. 111-5 . Using the "critical" barriers from the congressionally mandated Lock-in report as a guide, it appears that significant policy gaps remain with respect to utility fiscal policies and market risks. To the extent that these barriers continue to impede private investment in building efficiency measures, they may reduce the likelihood of achieving federal targets for carbon control associated with efficiency. Therefore, policymakers may benefit from a complete and integrated understanding of the full set of barriers to building efficiency and the range of carbon outcomes they imply.	Federal policymakers are debating a range of potential initiatives to limit U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), for example, would set a target of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, including CO2 emissions, 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. In the electricity industry, increasing the energy efficiency of buildings is viewed by many as the measure with the greatest potential to reduce CO2 emissions quickly and at relatively low cost. In light of the efficiency initiatives the federal government has taken since the 1970s, questions arise as to what additional policies might be considered to achieve more ambitious efficiency goals under a national policy of carbon control. In November 2007, a congressionally-mandated advisory committee released a report examining barriers to the deployment of greenhouse gas reducing technologies and practices, including energy efficiency. The report, Carbon Lock-In: Barriers To Deploying Climate Change Mitigation Technologies, identified the following six "critical" barriers to end-use efficiency in buildings: industry structure, incomplete/imperfect information, high (first) costs, technical risks, market risks, and unfavorable utility fiscal policies. Looking back on key federal efficiency statutes in the context of the Carbon Lock-in report, it seems that congressional policies since 1975 have been focused persistently on the critical barriers of industry structure, imperfect information, and high first costs. Congress has a history of addressing technical risk, too, by encouraging technology demonstration, although this issue appears to have been a lower priority over the last few years. In successive statutes, Congress has attempted to "push the envelope" in these four areas through ever tighter efficiency standards, new financial incentives, and other measures. Congress has a more limited history of addressing unfavorable rate policies among utilities. Until 2009, this history could be characterized as a single significant, but largely ineffective, attempt to advance efficiency-oriented utility rates under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486). However, new rate provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5) are another significant attempt to lower utility rate policy barriers, although it will be years before Congress can gauge their effects. Market risks, especially energy price risks, seem to have received relatively little policy attention from Congress to date. It stands to reason that uncertainty about the future price of energy would complicate decisions about building efficiency investments, and could deter conservative building owners from considering all but the most highly cost effective improvements. As it happens, recent U.S. energy price volatility is at historic highs. Market evidence suggests that energy price uncertainties may be having a greater negative impact on the nature and timing of building efficiency investments in the private sector than is commonly understood. In the context of building energy efficiency, there may be many policy options available to reduce energy price uncertainty, but there has been relatively little identification or consideration of them in the policy community. Neither the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), now under consideration, nor any other current legislative proposals contain these kinds of provisions. Using the "critical" barriers from the congressionally mandated Lock-in report as a guide, it appears that significant policy gaps remain with respect to utility rate policies and market risks. To the extent that these barriers continue to impede private investment in building efficiency, they may reduce the likelihood of achieving federal targets for carbon control associated with efficiency. Therefore, policymakers may benefit from a complete and integrated understanding of the full set of barriers to building efficiency and the range of carbon outcomes they imply.
crs_RS22673	crs_RS22673_0	The subject of such conjecture is an EU law for Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) in EU commerce, which went into force June 1, 2007. Background On June 1, 2007, the EU began to implement a new approach to the management of chemicals in EU commerce. The REACH directive simplifies and consolidates more than 40 former regulations in an effort to balance two EU goals: to protect public health and the environment from hazardous chemicals and to ensure the continuing competitiveness of European industry. Some U.S. chemical industry representatives believe that REACH is "impractical." For example, REACH reduces and coordinates EU regulatory requirements for providing health and safety information about chemicals new to the EU market (as well as the number of new chemicals subject to such requirements), while at the same time increasing collection of such information for chemicals already in the EU market, thus potentially removing disincentives to innovation and encouraging substitution of less toxic for more toxic chemicals in various chemical applications. Some public interest groups are urging U.S. legislators to adopt a similar legislative approach.	On June 1, 2007, the European Union (EU) began to implement a new law governing chemicals in EU commerce: Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). It is intended to protect human health and the environment from hazardous chemicals while at the same time protecting the competitiveness of European industry. REACH evolved over eight years and reflects compromises reached among EU stakeholders. The final regulation reduces and coordinates EU regulatory requirements for chemicals new to the EU market and increases collection of such information for chemicals already in the EU market, thus potentially removing disincentives to innovation that existed under the former law. It also shifts responsibility for safety assessments from government to industry and encourages substitution of less toxic for more toxic chemicals in various chemical applications. Some U.S. chemical industry representatives believe that REACH is "impractical," in part due to the large number of chemicals and difficulties of identifying end uses of chemicals in many products. In contrast, some public-interest groups are urging U.S. legislators to adopt a similar legislative approach.
crs_RL33873	crs_RL33873_0	Introduction The failure of the U.S. Intelligence Community to provide better warning of the September 11, 2001, attacks has been widely attributed to the existence of "walls" between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In December 2002, the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, established by the two congressional intelligence committees, made a factual finding that the "important point is that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Usama Bin Ladin's plan to attack the United States on September 11, 2001." FISA permitted the dissemination to the law enforcement community of information relating to criminal activity incidentally acquired during a FISA electronic surveillance or physical search. Concern about these divisions did exist and there had been major initiatives largely as a result of concerns about the development of barriers between law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the aftermath of the controversy surrounding the illegal activities of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in the early 1990s. Members of Congress began to seek administrative and statutory changes that could facilitate information sharing in this area. Pursuant to P.L. Criticisms of the approach taken by the legislation were voiced by some civil libertarians. The Justice Department's opposition in 2000 to legislative proposals to remove barriers has been noted. It is clear in retrospect that there were those in both the Executive Branch and Congress who realized the need to lower barriers to sharing law enforcement and intelligence information, but their views did not, prior to 9/11, reflect a consensus in either branch. It was agreed that the counterterrorism effort must be based on sharing information from whatever source. Although a discussion of all the complex provisions that were included in the USA PATRIOT Act lies beyond the scope of this Report, several provisions address the sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information. 108-458 ) required that procedures be established under which federal agencies can share intelligence and law enforcement information about international terrorism. The political controversy surrounding NSA's electronic surveillance efforts and other data mining programs may come to focus on the sharing of information that some argue was not lawfully obtained, and this concern could lead to efforts to restrict information sharing across the boards. Ultimately, an information sharing policy that is largely consistent with public opinion and is held to account by rigorous oversight should enhance the chances that the dots can be connected without jeopardizing the rights of Americans. Observers see a danger, however, that gridlock in both the Executive and Legislative Branches might inhibit the government's ability to find effective and sensible ways to acquire and analyze information on new threats to the national security.	Almost all assessments of the attacks of September 11, 2001, have concluded that U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies had failed to share information that might have provided advance warning of the plot. This realization led Congress to approve provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) and subsequent legislation that removed barriers to information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and mandated exchanges of information relating to terrorist threats. Most experts agreed that statutory changes, albeit difficult to enact, were essential to change the approaches taken by executive branch agencies. The barriers that existed prior to September 2001 had a long history based on a determination to prevent government spying on U.S. persons. This had led to the establishment of high statutory barriers to the sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information. The statutes laid the foundation of the so-called "wall" between intelligence and law enforcement that was buttressed by regulations, Justice Department policies, and guidance from the judicial branch. Despite the widespread acceptance of a barrier between law enforcement and intelligence, by the early 1990s it had become apparent to some that the two communities could mutually support efforts to combat international criminal activities including narcotics smuggling. Later in the decade dangerous threats to the U.S. posed by international terrorists came into sharper focus. Nevertheless, efforts to adjust laws, regulations, and practices did not succeed, drawing strong opposition from civil libertarians. Only the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks overcame earlier concerns and led Congress and the executive branch to remove most statutory barriers to information sharing. Laws and regulations have changed significantly since September 2001 and an Information Sharing Executive (ISE) has been established within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to design and implement information sharing procedures. It is clear, however, that sustaining the exchange of law enforcement and intelligence information remains a challenge. In particular, there is continued concern about sharing of information that might in some way jeopardize the rights of free speech or association of U.S. persons. This opposition has contributed to the difficulty Congress has had in addressing legislation in this area and can be expected to continue. Some argue that, given the extent of legislation enacted in recent years, extensive oversight of information sharing efforts may be an appropriate way to ensure that the balance between ensuring domestic security and protecting civil liberties can be maintained. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available.
crs_R41010	crs_R41010_0	On March 28, 2011, the Supreme Court declined to review the lower court opinion. At the same time, it denied petitions for writs of certiorari and habeas corpus, leaving for another day the underlying question. The dissenting member of the panel argued that the application to permit a second habeas petition should be granted when a death row inmate makes a viable claim of actual innocence. After Davis filed his petition with the Supreme Court, the Court transferred his petition for habeas relief to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia with instructions to "receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner's innocence." Justice Stevens suggested three avenues to relief in response to Justice Scalia's dissenting quip that the transfer sends the district court on a "fool's errand"—it has been instructed to probe the evidence of Davis's innocence but must conclude that habeas relief is barred in another event. The District Court may conclude that §2254(d)(1) does not apply, or does not apply with the same rigidity, to as original habeas petition such as this. In re Davis, 130 S.Ct. Original Habeas Petitions in the Supreme Court The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the federal court system, declared that "all the before mentioned courts of the United States [, the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and district courts] shall have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus.... And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment." Herrera, convicted of murder and sentenced to death 10 years earlier, sought habeas relief based on newly discovered evidence which he asserted established his innocence. Faced with a claim of actual innocence unsupported by any claim of constitutional defect, the Court declared: We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim. The case does indicate, however, that the level of persuasion required of a freestanding innocence claim is higher than that required of an innocence-plus-constitutional-defect claim—for House was found to have met the innocence-plus standard, but not the freestanding innocence standard. Davis To succeed, Davis's petition may have to survive several inquiries. Fifth, if actual innocence is a basis for habeas relief, how persuasive must be the proof of innocence to warrant relief? Sixth, does the evidence in Davis meet this standard? Only two thought otherwise. The section is built upon an earlier Supreme Court second or successive petition rule that used a standard of probability rather than clear and convincing evidence ("The Carrier standard requires the habeas petitioner to show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Regardless of any standard established, it remains to be seen whether Davis—unlike Herrera or House before him—will be able to assemble and present evidence sufficient to satisfy it. Davis after Transfer The District Court conducted a hearing and an extensive examination of the record. This he could not do. On March 28, 2011, it did so without written opinion.	In re Davis presented the Supreme Court with another opportunity to decide whether a state death row inmate, who on the basis of newly available evidence establishes that he is actually innocent, is entitled to habeas corpus relief to prevent his execution. Under existing law, newly discovered evidence of innocence may permit a federal court to consider an inmate's claim (otherwise barred) that his conviction or sentence was the product of constitutional error (constitutional error plus innocence). The Court has never held that a freestanding claim of innocence may alone suffice. On two occasions, in Herrera and in House, however, it has said that, assuming for argument the right to consideration of a freestanding claim, the evidence on the record in the cases before it did not satisfy the level of persuasion necessary for such relief. Davis, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a moonlighting police officer, had to overcome several obstacles before habeas relief could be granted. First, the Court would have to recognize the right to relief based solely on a claim of innocence. Then, it would have to identify the level of persuasion required for relief on that basis (i.e., how compelling must proof of innocence be?). Then, the evidence (new and old) would have to satisfy that standard. Before those issues could be reached, however, Davis had to overcome the statutory bar on claims previously rejected in state court (second or successive petition bar). In an effort to do so, Davis filed his habeas petition with the Supreme Court rather than with a lower federal court. The Court transferred Davis's "original" petition to a federal district court with instructions to receive evidence and make findings of fact relating to Davis's claim of innocence. Justice Scalia, in dissent, described as a fool's errand sending the district court on search for evidence of innocence when the statutory bar would preclude relief regardless of the result of the search. Justice Stevens disagreed in a separate concurring opinion. He argued that the district court might conclude either that the statutory bar does not apply to original petitions; or does not apply in the same manner; or does not apply because the bar is constitutionally invalid in cases of actual innocence. The District Court conducted an extensive examination of the evidence and concluded that (1) the Eighth Amendment precludes execution of the actually innocent; (2) the clear and convincing evidence standard is the appropriate standard by which to judge such claims; and (3) Davis failed to satisfy the standard. Both the District and Circuit Court concluded any appeal must be to the Supreme Court. On March 28, 2011, the Supreme Court declined to review the lower court opinion and denied petitions for writs of certiorari and habeas corpus, leaving for another day the broader issues raised in Davis. Related CRS Reports include CRS Report R41011, Habeas Corpus Legislation in the 111th Congress (includes a discussion of "actual innocent" proposals); CRS Report RL33391, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Brief Legal Overview; and CRS Report RS22432, Federal Habeas Corpus: An Abridged Sketch.
crs_RS22811	crs_RS22811_0	Political Situation and Economic Conditions In snap elections on October 21, 2007, Poles turned out the rightist Law and Justice (PiS) party, which had ruled the country for a tumultuous 15 months. Led by identical twins Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski, who served as Prime Minister and President, respectively, PiS had held a slight lead in early polls, but an unusually strong performance by opposition leader Donald Tusk in a nationally televised debate with Jaroslaw on October 15 apparently convinced many Poles that they should turn the reins of government over to Tusk and his party. The vote, held a full two years ahead of schedule, was prompted by the collapse of the PiS-led government. Some have argued that PO's approach to governance—and to international relations—likely will differ more in style than in content from the outgoing regime. Despite its center-right label, PiS was characterized as having somewhat statist economic policies. Under the Kaczynski government, Poland's bilateral relations with Germany and Russia became strained at times. After the new government was settled in, two actions seemed to signal an improvement in relations: in late November, the Tusk government dropped Poland's objection to Russia joining the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, and the following month Russia announced that it would lift its two year-old restrictions on the importation of Polish meat. Relations with the United States Poland and the United States have historically close relations.	After a governmental deadlock caused by intra-coalition squabbling, Poland held snap parliamentary elections on October 21, 2007; the vote was seen by many as a referendum on the governing style and policies of the then-ruling Law and Justice party. Under that government, the presidency and prime minister's post were held by twin brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Their government's nationalist policies caused controversy domestically and in the international arena as well. Many observers believe that under the new center-right Civic Alliance-led government, domestic policies will change more in tone than in substance. Poland's relations with neighboring states and the European Union are expected to improve, but ties with the United States may become more complicated. This report may be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RS22509, Poland: Background and Policy Trends of the Kaczynski Government, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_RL33223	crs_RL33223_0	Introduction The Constitution states that those accused of a federal crime shall be tried in the state in which the crime occurred and by a jury selected from the district in which the crime occurred: The Trial of all Crimes . Courts differ over whether venue can be accurately described as an element of the offense, but agree that the government need only establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, a court in an improper venue enjoys the judicial authority to proceed to conviction or acquittal, if the accused waives objection. Crimes Occurring in More Than One District Other than when the accused seeks a change of venue, venue is only an issue when a crime occurs, or can be said to occur, in more than one district or outside of any district. Section 3237 governs venue for certain multi-district crimes. Conspiracy, it declared, in Hyde v. United States , may be tried in any district in which an overt act in its furtherance is committed, at least when the conspiracy statute has an overt act requirement. The government may try aiders and abettors either where they provided assistance or where the underlying offense may be prosecuted. A defendant commits a crime and may be tried where he commits any of its conduct elements, it explained. (Congress has provided that continuing offenses can be tried 'in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed,' 18 U.S.C. Venue for a Hobbs Act violation is generally considered proper in any district in which there is an obstruction of commerce. The court may not grant a request that is not timely. These provisions dictate venue decisions unless they contravene constitutional requirements. § 1329 (immigration offenses generally); 15 U.S.C. Special venue provisions governing prosecution of a few other crimes simply replicate the features of Rule 18, i.e. Section 3238 now reads as follows: The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia. Pre-trial publicity usually supplies the basis for a change of venue request under Rule 21(a). In a compelling case, the court may order trial to be held elsewhere within the district under Rule 18, which allows the trial court to set the place of trial, and in a rare case may grant a change of venue. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that convenience and the interests of justice compel a transfer. 24 ... which declares a new offense in America, and deprives the American subject of a constitutional trial by jury of the vicinage, by authorizing the trial of any person charged with the committing [of] any offense described in the said act, out of the realm, to be indicted and tried for the same in shire or county within the realm ... On the other hand, when it came time to list colonial complaints against the British Crown in the Declaration of Independence, that document mentioned only venue: He [the King of Great Britain] has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their acts of pretended Legislation: ... For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses … The men who drafted the Constitution apparently never seriously questioned the proposition that became Article III, §2, cl.3 ("The trial of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed"), for it was feature of each of the preliminary proposals—as language in the Pinckney Plan, as well as in the Hamilton Plan, and in all probability figured in the formulation of the New Jersey or Patterson Plan.	The United States Constitution assures those charged with a serious federal crime that they will be prosecuted in the state and district in which the crime occurred. A crime occurs in any district in which any of its "conduct" elements are committed. Some offenses are committed entirely within a single district; there they may be tried. Other crimes have elements that have occurred in more than one district. Still other crimes have been committed overseas and so have occurred outside any district. Statutory provisions, court rules, and judicial interpretations implement the Constitution's requirements and dictate where multi-district crimes or overseas crimes may be tried. Most litigation involves either a question of whether the government's selection of venue in a multi-district case is proper or whether the court should grant the accused's request for a change of venue. The government bears the burden of establishing venue by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant may waive trial in a proper venue either explicitly or by failing to object to prosecution in an improper venue in a timely manner. Section 3237 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code supplies three general rules for venue in multi-district cases. Tax cases may be tried where the taxpayer resides. Mail and interstate commerce offenses may be tried in any district traversed during the course of a particular crime. And continuous or overlapping offenses may be tried in any district in which they begin, continue, or are completed. For example, conspiracy, perhaps the most common continuous offense, may be tried where the scheme is joined or where any overt act in its furtherance is committed. These general rules aside, a few crimes, like murder or immigration offenses, have individual venue provisions. In most instances, overseas crimes are tried in the district in which the accused is arrested or into which he is first brought from abroad. An accused may request a change of venue for reasons of prejudice, convenience, plea, or sentence. Besides his venue rights, an accused is entitled to trial by an impartial jury. Inflammatory pre-trial publicity and other circumstances may hopelessly taint the pool of potential jurors. Nevertheless, before granting a change of venue, the courts will ordinarily exhaust alternative measures such as examination of potential jurors to ensure their impartiality. Beyond prejudice, a court may also grant a change of venue for the convenience of the accused, the government, the victim, or the witnesses. It rarely does. Finally, with the government's concurrence, the court may grant a defendant's request to plea or be sentenced in the district in which they are found. "Venue" ordinarily refers to both where a crime may be tried and the district from which the trial jury must be drawn, although technically the latter is more properly referred to as vicinage.
crs_RL32899	crs_RL32899_0	In addition to these overarching issues, other proposals addressed in the 109 th Congress included legislation to create a stronger regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and revisions to the FHA loan insurance program. In the area of the budget generally, as of the date of this report, Congress had not yet enacted an FY2007 spending bill for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It included reductions for several programs, including the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, and increases for other programs, such as the Section 8 voucher program. At the time of this update, Congress has enacted three continuing resolutions that provide funding for HUD; the third of these expires on February 15, 2007. After Hurricane Katrina, Congress enacted two FY2006 funding bills that provided funds to HUD for hurricane recovery and reconstruction ( P.L. 109-148 and P.L. 109-234 ). In this budget environment, Congress faced pressure to reduce funding for HUD's programs in the FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations processes. The law included $5.2 billion in additional CDBG assistance for the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The law contained provisions regarding the use and administration of funds that do the following: require that at least $1 billion of the CDBG amount be used for repair and reconstruction of affordable rental housing in the impacted areas; allow each state to use no more than 5% of its supplemental CDBG allocation for administrative expenses; allow the affected states to seek waivers of program requirements, except those related to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, and environmental review; allow Governors of the affected states to designate one or more entities to administer the program; decrease the low- and moderate-income targeting requirement from 70% to 50% of the funds awarded; require each state to develop a plan for the proposed use of funds to be reviewed and approved by HUD; direct HUD to ensure that each state's proposed plan gives priority to activities that support infrastructure development and affordable rental housing activities; require each state to file quarterly reports with House and Senate Appropriations Committees detailing the use of funds; require HUD to file quarterly reports with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees identifying actions by the Department to prevent fraud and abuse, including the duplication of benefits; and prohibit the use of CDBG funds to meet matching fund requirements of other federal programs. 109-148 , which was signed by the President on December 30, 2005. 1999 was referred to the House Financial Services Committee; no action was taken on either bill before the end of the 109 th Congress. 5443 , the Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2006. Another HOPE VI reauthorization bill, H.R. In FY2006, Congress appropriated $735 million for elderly housing programs. The House would have provided $747 million for Section 202, while the Senate Appropriations Committee would have provided $750 million. In FY2007, for the second year in a row, the President's budget proposed to cut funding for the Section 811 program nearly in half, from $237 million in FY2006 to $119 million. Another bill, H.R. H.R. Two bills were introduced in the first session of the 109 th Congress to strengthen the oversight of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the banks under a single regulator. H.R. H.R. The House passed H.R. 1461 on October 26, 2005. 1461 . The Senate Banking and Urban Affairs Committee ordered S. 190 reported to the Senate on July 28, 2005. 5121 . The 109 th Congress did not enact any of these predatory lending bills. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Modifications The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ( P.L. H.R. 659 and H.R.	The 109 th Congress considered a number of housing-related issues in its two sessions. These included appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); assistance for families and communities affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma; reform of the Government Sponsored EnterprisesâFannie Mae and Freddie Macâand Federal Home Loan Banks (GSEs and FHLBs); revisions to the FHA loan insurance program; and changes to existing housing programs such as the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program. However, the 109 th Congress adjourned without completing action in many of these areas. During the appropriations process for both FY2006 and FY2007, Congress faced possible cuts in various HUD programs. In FY2006, the President proposed to reduce the HUD budget by 9%, which included removing the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program from HUD. Congress did not make the majority of the reductions requested by the President. In FY2007, the President proposed to reduce funding to at least 13 HUD programs, while increasing funding for 11 others. In its proposed spending bills, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees restored many of the proposed cuts. However, at the end of calendar year 2006, Congress had not passed a budget bill for FY2007. Instead, it provided funding for HUD, among other agencies, through three continuing resolutions, the third of which expires on February 15, 2007. For most HUD programs, this means that funding continues at the FY2006 level. Congress twice appropriated funds to HUD after the 2005 hurricanes. First, Congress provided $11.5 billion for the CDBG program to be used in affected areas ( P.L. 109-148 ). This amount was divided among the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. The second appropriation ( P.L. 109-234 ) provided $5.2 billion more to the CDBG program for hurricane recovery. In addition to these two allocations of CDBG funds, in P.L. 109-148 Congress provided $390 million in supplemental funding for Section 8 vouchers for families that had received HUD assistance before being displaced by Hurricane Katrina. Other activities in the 109 th Congress included consideration of two bills to strengthen oversight of the GSEs and FHLBs under one regulator ( S. 190 and H.R. 1461 ). The House passed H.R. 1461 on October 26, 2005, while the Senate Banking and Urban Affairs Committee reported S. 190 to the Senate on July 28, 2005. Another bill ( H.R. 5121 ) would have raised the FHA one-family mortgage limit, and allowed mortgage premiums based on the borrower's risk. In the area of affordable housing, the House Financial Services Committee considered and passed a number of housing bills, including H.R. 5443 to reform the Section 8 voucher program and H.R. 5347 , a bill to reauthorize the HOPE VI program. Legislation was also introduced in the first session that would have increased Low-Income Housing Tax Credits available to develop affordable housing ( H.R. 2681 , H.R. 659 , and H.R. 3159 ). However, none of the aforementioned bills was enacted before the close of the 109 th Congress.
crs_RL33569	crs_RL33569_0	Background The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically accordingto a predetermined schedule unless explicitly renewed by law. (1) Since 1997, RepresentativeKevin Brady and others have supported the creation of a federal sunset commission, modeled on thesunset commission in Texas. He reintroduced his bill in the 109th Congress as H.R. 3282 . (2) In May 2006 the House leadership announced plans to bring sunset legislation quickly to theHouse floor, along with other budget process reforms favored by the Republican Study Committee(RSC), in return for RSC backing of the FY2007 budget resolution. In the effort to craft a consensusbill, attention came to focus on H.R. 2470 ,sponsored by Representative Todd Tiahrt, which would create a "Commission on the Accountabilityand Review of Federal Agencies (CARFA)," modeled on the Base Realignment and ClosureCommission (BRAC) approach. (3) On July 14, 2006, Representative Tiahrt introduced a revisedversion of H.R. 2470 as H.R. Although the CARFA and FRCs would address concerns similar to those envisaged for the FederalAgency Sunset Commission in H.R. Although technically inaccurate, both bills are often referred to as sunset measures,however. (4) On July 19, 2006, the House Government Reform Committee held a hearing on H.R. 5766 . 3282 favorably to the House. Both votes were largely along party lines. 3282. (6) Supporters of the measures suggest that there are too many overlapping and ineffectivefederal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit, that Congress lacks time for thoroughoversight of all existing agencies and programs, and that the commissions would assist Congress inperforming its oversight function, thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. Critics of the measurescounter that the bills would cede too much power to the executive branch and the majority politicalparty, would burden Congress with a tremendous workload with mandatory reauthorization of everyagency and program, and would facilitate elimination of federal programs that provide a safety netfor the most vulnerable in society. Under the sunset provisions in the bill, an agency would be abolished within one year of theCommission's review, unless the agency received statutory extension. This means that followingcongressional approval of a reauthorization bill, the measure would have to go to the President inorder to be signed into law. If the President were to veto the bill, a two-thirds majority in bothchambers would be necessary to override the veto and extend the life of the program or agency. 5766, as Amended H.R. 3282, thereby allowing additional time for Congress to act on areauthorization bill. The sunset commission established under H.R. Selected Features in H.R. 3282 and H.R.5766	The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically on apredetermined schedule, following a systematic evaluation of past performance, unless explicitlyrenewed by law. In each Congress since the 105th, bills to create a federal sunset commissionmodeled on the sunset commission in Texas have been introduced by Representative Kevin Brady,including H.R. 3282 in the 109th Congress. President Bush supports creation of afederal sunset commission. In May 2006 the House leadership announced plans to bring sunset legislation quickly to theHouse floor, along with other budget process reforms favored by the Republican Study Committee,in return for the group's backing of the FY2007 budget resolution. In the effort to craft a consensusbill, attention came to focus on H.R. 3282 , and on H.R. 2470 , sponsoredby Representative Todd Tiahrt, which would create a "Commission on the Accountability andReview of Federal Agencies (CARFA)," modeled on the Base Realignment and Closure Commission(BRAC) approach. On July 14, 2006, Representative Tiahrt introduced a revised version of H.R. 2470 as H.R. 5766 , the Government Efficiency Act, to provide for the establishmentof Federal Review Commissions (FRCs) which would apparently address concerns similar to thoseenvisaged for the sunset commission in H.R. 3282 . Although H.R. 5766 isoften referred to as a sunset bill, this is technically inaccurate, since it contains no action-forcingmechanism. Under H.R. 3282, an agency would be abolished within one year of theCommission's review, unless the agency received statutory extension. If Congress passed areauthorization bill, the measure would then go to the President to be signed into law. If thePresident instead vetoed the bill, a two-thirds majority in both chambers would be necessary tooverride the veto and extend the life of the program or agency. On July 20, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform voted to report H.R. 3282 favorably, and at the same time, voted to report favorably H.R. 5766 , as amended. The votes to order the bills reported were largely along party lines. Supporters of the bills contendthat there are too many overlapping and ineffective federal programs that contribute to the growingfederal deficit and that the commission would assist Congress in performing its oversight function,thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. Critics of the measures counter that the bills would cedetoo much power to the executive branch, would burden Congress with a tremendous workload withmandatory reauthorization of every agency and program, and would facilitate elimination of federalprograms that provide a safety net for the most vulnerable in society. This report examines the two bills and compares selected features, such as membership,powers of the commission, criteria for program review, public participation, and provisions forimplementing commission recommendations. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R43909	crs_R43909_0	Introduction Under the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) statute, FY2017 is the last year federal CHIP funding is provided, even though the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) child maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement is in place through FY2019. The ACA MOE provision requires states to maintain income eligibility levels for CHIP children through September 30, 2019, as a condition for receiving federal Medicaid payments (notwithstanding the lack of corresponding federal CHIP appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019). This report discusses the ACA MOE requirement for children if federal CHIP funding expires. It begins with a brief background of CHIP, including information regarding program design and financing. The report then describes the ACA child MOE requirements for CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and for separate CHIP programs and discusses potential coverage implications. CHIP Background CHIP is a federal-state program that provides health coverage to certain uninsured, low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but do not have health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states and is administered by the states. The federal government sets basic requirements for CHIP, but states have the flexibility to design their own version of CHIP within the federal government's basic framework. As a result, there is significant variation across CHIP programs. In FY2015, CHIP enrollment totaled 5.9 million and federal and state CHIP expenditures totaled $13.7 billion. Program Design States may design their CHIP programs in three ways: a CHIP Medicaid expansion, a separate CHIP program, or a combination approach in which the state operates a CHIP Medicaid expansion and one or more separate CHIP programs concurrently. Together, these MOE requirements for Medicaid and CHIP impact CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and separate CHIP programs differently. When a state's federal CHIP funding is exhausted, the state's financing for these children switches from CHIP to Medicaid. These provisions contain a couple of exceptions: states may impose waiting lists or enrollment caps to limit CHIP expenditures, or after September 1, 2015, states may enroll CHIP-eligible children in qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges that have been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to be "at least comparable" to CHIP in terms of benefits and cost sharing. In addition, in the event that a state's CHIP allotment is insufficient to fund CHIP coverage for all eligible children, a state must establish procedures to screen CHIP-eligible children for Medicaid eligibility and to enroll those who are eligible in Medicaid. For children not eligible for Medicaid, the state must establish procedures to enroll CHIP-eligible children in qualified health plans offered in the health insurance exchanges that have been certified by the Secretary of HHS to be "at least comparable" to CHIP in terms of benefits and cost sharing.	The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but do not have health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states and administered by the states. The federal government sets basic requirements for CHIP, but states have the flexibility to design their own version of CHIP within the federal government's basic framework. States may design their CHIP programs in three ways: a CHIP Medicaid expansion, a separate CHIP program, or a combination approach in which the state operates a CHIP Medicaid expansion and one or more separate CHIP programs concurrently. As a result, there is significant variation across CHIP programs. In FY2015, CHIP enrollment totaled 5.9 million and federal and state CHIP expenditures totaled $13.7 billion. Under the CHIP statute, FY2017 is the last year federal CHIP funding is provided, even though the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) child maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement is in place through FY2019. The MOE provision requires states to maintain income eligibility levels for CHIP children through September 30, 2019, as a condition for receiving federal Medicaid payments (notwithstanding the lack of corresponding federal CHIP appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019). The MOE requirement impacts CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and separate CHIP programs differently. For CHIP Medicaid expansion programs, when federal CHIP funding is exhausted, the CHIP-eligible children in these programs will continue to be enrolled in Medicaid but financing will switch from CHIP to Medicaid. For separate CHIP programs, states are provided a couple of exceptions to the MOE requirement: (1) states may impose waiting lists or enrollment caps to limit CHIP expenditures, and (2) after September 1, 2015, states may enroll CHIP-eligible children in qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges. In addition, in the event that a state's CHIP allotment is insufficient to fund CHIP coverage for all eligible children, a state must establish procedures to screen children for Medicaid eligibility and enroll those who are Medicaid eligible. For children not eligible for Medicaid, the state must establish procedures to enroll CHIP children in qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges that have been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to be "at least comparable" to CHIP in terms of benefits and cost sharing. This report discusses the ACA MOE requirement for children if federal CHIP funding expires. It begins with a brief background about CHIP, including information regarding program design and financing. The report then describes the ACA child MOE requirements for CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and for separate CHIP programs and discusses potential coverage implications.
crs_RL30244	crs_RL30244_0	The text then is considered for amendment, section by section. Committee members may offer amendments to each section after it is read but before the next section is read. Instead, it is voting on what amendments, if any, the committee will recommend that the House adopt when it considers the bill on the floor. In committee, members offer their amendments to each section of the bill in sequence unless the committee agrees otherwise by unanimous consent. As noted earlier, House rules do make in order a non-debatable motion in committee to dispense with the first reading of a bill at the very beginning of the markup. An amendment in the nature of a substitute—that is, an amendment that proposes to replace the entire text of the bill or resolution—is in order only at the beginning or the end of the amending process. These are (1) the motion to order the previous question, and (2) the motion to close debate. The previous question may be moved on a pending amendment (and amendments to it), or it may be moved on the entire bill if the last section of the bill has been read or if the reading of the bill has been waived by unanimous consent so that the bill is open to amendment at any point. A member may move to close the debate (1) on the pending amendment (and any pending amendments to it), or (2) on the section, title, or chapter (and any pending amendments to it) that is open for amendment, or (3) on the entire text of the bill (and any pending amendments to it), but only if the reading of the bill has been completed or dispensed with. On the other hand, members move to close the debate on a pending section of the bill because a motion to order the previous question on the section is not in order. To put it differently, the minority members of a committee can insist that a bill be marked up one section at a time and that each section be read. For all other votes and for other proceedings during a markup, most committees may set their own quorum requirement in their committee rules, so long as that quorum is not less than one-third of the committee's members (Rule XI, clause 2(h)(3)). Like the Speaker, however, the chair is responsible for maintaining order, insisting on proper decorum, and enforcing applicable procedures. A point of order may be made against an amendment (or any other debatable motion) after it has been read or the committee has waived the reading of the amendment, but before debate on it has begun. After voting on the last amendment to be offered, the chair recognizes a majority party member to move that the committee order the bill reported to the House with whatever amendments the committee has adopted during the markup, and with the recommendation that the House agree to those amendments and then pass the bill as amended. If the committee has marked up H.R. The committee may agree to a unanimous consent request that the committee report an amendment in the nature of a substitute instead of the several amendments. This means that, at the conclusion of the markup, the marked-up text must be prepared as a bill, it must be introduced while the House is in session, and the newly introduced, clean bill must be numbered and referred back to the committee before the committee may act on it.	At the beginning of a markup, committee members often make opening statements, usually not exceeding five minutes apiece. The first reading of the text of the bill to be marked up can be waived, either by unanimous consent or by adopting a non-debatable motion. The bill then is read for amendment, one section at a time, with committee members offering their amendments to each section after it is read but before the next section is read. By unanimous consent only, the committee may agree to dispense with the reading of each section, or to consider a bill for amendment by titles or chapters instead of by sections. Also by unanimous consent, the committee may consider the entire bill as having been read and open to amendment at any point. Each amendment must be read in full unless the committee waives that reading by unanimous consent. Committees debate amendments under the five-minute rule. A committee can end the debate on an amendment by ordering the previous question on it, or by agreeing to a motion to close debate on it. A committee also can order the previous question or close debate on the entire bill, once it has been read or that reading has been waived by unanimous consent. However, the committee can only close debate, not order the previous question, on individual sections (titles, chapters) of the bill. The various kinds of amendments, as well as most of the other motions, that are in order on the House floor are in order in committee as well. Committees do not actually change the texts of the bills they mark up. Instead, committees vote on amendments that their members want to recommend that the House adopt when it considers the bill on the floor. The committee concludes a markup not by voting on the bill as a whole, but by voting on a motion to order the bill reported to the House with whatever amendments the committee has approved. A majority of the committee must be present when this final vote occurs. For all other stages of markups, committees may set their own quorum requirements, so long as that quorum is at least one-third of the committee's membership. Like the Speaker of the House, committee chairs are responsible for maintaining order and for enforcing proper procedure, either at their own initiative or by ruling on points of order that other committee members make. Chairs also frequently respond to questions about procedure in the form of parliamentary inquiries. A committee may report a bill back to the House without amendment, with several amendments, or with an amendment in the nature of a substitute that proposes an entirely different text for the bill. Alternatively, a committee may report a new or "clean" bill on the same subject as the bill (or other text) that it has marked up.
crs_R40088	crs_R40088_0	Federal budget decisions express Congress's priorities among competing aims and reinforce Congress's influence on federal policies. These federal interventions have helped stimulate economic activity and reduce dislocation in financial markets, but may also expose the federal government to substantial credit risks. Concern remains about the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. The rising costs of federal health care programs and the effects of the baby boom generation's retirement present serious challenges to fiscal stability. Operating these programs in their current form may pass on substantial economic burdens to future generations. Overview Revenues, Outlays, and Deficits for FY2008 Over the past decade, federal spending has accounted for approximately a fifth of the economy (as measured by gross domestic product—GDP) and federal revenues have ranged between just under a sixth and just over a fifth of GDP, as shown in Figure 1 . In FY2008, the U.S. government collected $2.5 trillion in revenue and spent almost $3.0 trillion. Outlays as a proportion of GDP rose from 18.4% in FY2000 to 21.0% of GDP in FY2008. Federal revenues as a proportion of GDP reached a post-WWII peak of 20.9% in FY2000 and then fell to 16.3% of GDP in FY2004 before rising to 17.7% of GDP in FY2008. Deficit projections for the next several fiscal years are high relative to historic standards. The FY2009 total deficit was $1,417 billion (10.0% of GDP), the largest in proportion to GDP since FY1946. Federal spending tied to means-tested social programs has been increasing due to rising unemployment, while federal revenues will likely fall as individuals' incomes drop and corporate profits sink. The ultimate costs of these responses will depend on how the economy performs, how well firms with federal credit guarantees weather future financial shocks, and whether or not the government receives positive returns on its asset purchases. 38 , P.L. According to OMB, this should be the last war-related supplemental. 111-32 ) on June 24. 1007, P.L. Budget Fiscal Year 2010 The Obama Administration released an outline of the FY2010 budget on February 26, 2009, the full budget proposal on May 7 and 11, 2009, and the Mid-Session Review on August 25, 2009. The Conference Report on the budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 13 ) was agreed to on April 29, 2009. As of July 30, 2009, the House had passed all 12 regular appropriations acts. The Legislative Branch appropriations bill ( P.L. 111-68 ), enacted October 1, 2009, contained a continuing resolution to extend funding to the end of the month. On October 30, 2009, the Interior-Environment appropriations bill ( P.L. 111-88 ), which included a second continuing resolution to extend funding until December 18, became the fifth regular appropriations bill to be signed into law. Five of the remaining regular appropriations bills (Commerce-Justice-Science; Financial Services; Labor-HHS; Military Construction-VA; and State-Foreign Operations) were folded into the Transportation-HUD bill, creating an omnibus spending measure ( H.R. The President signed the bill on December 16, which became P.L. 111-117 . The defense bill ( H.R. 111-118 , finishing the regular appropriations process for FY2010. The final deficit projection, the Proposed Budget, illustrates the impact on the budget outlook if all of the policies of the Obama Administration are implemented. The main policy initiatives he emphasized include significant spending and investment targeted toward health care reform, clean energy, and education. A budget resolution conference agreement was filed on April 27, 2009, and included $2,322 billion in revenues and $3,555 billion in outlays for FY2010, resulting in a projected deficit of $1,233 billion.	The federal budget helps implement Congress's "power of the purse" by expressing Congress's spending priorities among competing aims. The Obama Administration's FY2010 budget described several important changes, including increased funding for certain domestic priorities, major programmatic reforms, and proposed spending cuts in some programs. The current economic climate continues to pose major challenges to policymakers. Federal spending tied to means-tested social programs rose due to rising unemployment, while federal revenues are projected to fall as individuals' incomes have dropped and corporate profits have sunk. Federal deficits, according to OMB and CBO projections, will likely be high relative to historic norms over the next few years, as spending rises and revenues fall relative to previously anticipated levels. FY2009 outlays rose to $3,522 billion (24.9% of GDP) and revenues fell to $2,105 billion (14.7% of GDP), yielding a total federal deficit of $1,417 billion (10.0% of GDP). Over the past decade, federal spending has accounted for approximately a fifth of the economy (as measured by gross domestic product—GDP) and federal revenues have ranged between just under a sixth to just over a fifth of GDP. In FY2008, the U.S. government collected $2.5 trillion in revenue and spent almost $3.0 trillion. Outlays as a proportion of GDP rose from 18.4% in FY2000 to 21.0% of GDP in FY2008. Federal revenues as a proportion of GDP reached a post-WWII peak of 20.9% in FY2000 and then fell to 16.3% of GDP in FY2004 before rising slightly to 17.7% of GDP in FY2008. The Obama Administration released the FY2010 budget outline on February 26, 2009, followed by the remaining budget documents on May 7 and 11, 2009. Major policy initiatives included new spending targeted toward health care reform, clean energy, and education. The budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13), which followed most of the President's initiatives, was agreed to on April 29, 2009. It specified $2,322 billion in revenues and $3,555 billion in outlays, resulting in a projected FY2010 deficit of $1,233 billion. A FY2009 war funding supplemental (P.L. 111-32) was enacted in June 2009. The House passed all 12 regular FY2010 appropriations acts by the end of July 2009. The Legislative Branch appropriations bill (P.L. 111-68) enacted October 1 contained a continuing resolution to extend funding to the end of the month. On October 30, the Interior-Environment bill (P.L. 111-88), which included a second continuing resolution to extend funding until December 18, was enacted. Five remaining bills (Commerce-Justice-Science; Financial Services; Labor-HHS; Military Construction-VA; and State-Foreign Operations) were folded into the Transportation-HUD bill, creating an omnibus spending measure (H.R. 3288; P.L. 111-117) that was enacted on December 16. Finally, the defense bill (H.R. 3326; P.L. 111-118), was signed into law on December 19, finishing the regular appropriations process for FY2010. The federal government made significant financial interventions aimed at alleviating economic recession. The final costs of federal responses to this turmoil will depend on the pace of economic recovery, how well firms with federal credit guarantees weather future financial shocks, and how much the government loses or gains on its asset purchases. Federal loans or loan guarantee programs may help provide liquidity to distressed financial markets and stimulate economic activity, but may also expose the federal government to substantial credit risks. While many economists concurred on the need for short-term fiscal stimulus despite adverse impact on the deficit, concerns remain about the federal government's long-term fiscal situation. Rising costs of federal health care programs and Baby Boomer retirements present serious challenges to fiscal stability. Operating these programs in their current form may pass on substantial economic burdens to future generations. This report will not be updated.
crs_97-552	crs_97-552_0	The Discharge Rule and Agenda Setting in the House The "discharge rule" of the House of Representatives (Rule XV, clause 2) provides a means for the House to bring to the floor for consideration a measure (a bill or resolution) that has not been reported from committee. A discharge motion may be offered on the floor only if a majority of the entire membership of the House, 218 Members, first signs a petition in support of the action. The motion to discharge may then be offered on the floor, but only at the beginning of a day's session that falls at least seven legislative days after the motion is entered; only on a "discharge day" (the second or fourth Monday of each month); and not during the last six days of a session of Congress. If a measure reaching the floor by discharge is a "money bill" (including an authorization, appropriation, or revenue bill) House Rules mandate that it initially be considered in the Committee of the Whole; the proper motion is therefore that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole for its consideration. On agreement to this motion, the House considers the measure under the "one-hour rule," which permits the Member calling up the measure to move the previous question after one hour of debate. At that point, the measure the special rule makes in order either must have remained in committee for at least 30 legislative days or must have been reported. Recovery of Agenda Control Through the Rules Committee Although the Rules Committee cannot nullify a discharge attempt directed against a special rule by reporting the special rule, in recent years it has often taken another course of action by which it may recover control of the floor agenda. Often after a discharge petition has obtained the required 218 signatures, and sometimes when such a result has seemed imminent, the committee has reported not the special rule on which discharge was being sought but its own special rule for considering the same measure (or, sometimes, for considering an alternative measure on the same subject). House Committee on Rules.	The "discharge rule" of the House of Representatives allows a measure to come to the floor for consideration even if the committee of referral does not report it and the leadership does not schedule it. To initiate this action, a majority of House Members must first sign a petition for that purpose. After a petition has garnered 218 signatures, a motion to discharge may then be offered on the floor—but only after at least seven legislative days and only on a second or fourth Monday of a month. The rule allows for two main methods of action: (1) The committee of referral may be discharged from a measure that has been before it for 30 legislative days or more; or (2) the Committee on Rules may be discharged from a special rule for considering such a measure if the rule has been before the committee for at least seven legislative days. If a measure dealing with raising or spending money reaches the floor through the first method of action, it is considered in the Committee of the Whole, as if under an open rule. Other measures reaching the floor through this method of action are considered in the House under the one-hour rule, with the previous question in order. Under the second method of action, if the House takes up a measure under a special rule from which the Committee on Rules has been discharged, it is considered under the terms provided by the special rule. Under either method of action, the layover periods required by the discharge rule permit the Committee on Rules to preempt the discharge attempt, and recover control of the floor agenda, by securing House adoption of an alternative special rule for considering the measure.
crs_RL33915	crs_RL33915_0	3043 , S. 1710 ), which the President vetoed, and Defense bill ( H.R. 2764 ) that incorporated 10 remaining regular appropriations bills into the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill and a fourth continuing resolution ( H.J.Res. 72 ). On December 26, the President signed the omnibus measure, entitled the Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), which provided $555 billion in discretionary budget authority. The CBO baseline showed a FY2012 surplus of $170 billion and a projected $249 billion surplus in FY2017. Outlays would be much higher were these war costs included in projections. The conference announced an agreement on May 16, which the House and Senate adopted ( H.Rept. By mid-July, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations had approved most of the 12 regular appropriations bills. At the end of FY2007, the House had passed all 12 appropriations bills and the Senate had passed four. The Senate passed three more appropriations bills in October. During the last week of FY2007, Congress passed a continuing resolution (H.J. Res 52) to fund government operations until November 16, which the President signed on September 29 ( P.L. On November 8, Congress approved the Labor-HHS-Education bill ( H.R. 3222 , P.L. 110-116 ), which he signed. On December 19, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations bill ( H.R. By FY2012, according to Administration projections, defense spending will drop to $546 billion. The House Budget Committee reported its version of the FY2008 budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. Figure 2 shows four alternative paths for outlays as a percentage of GDP through FY2017: the President's FY2008 budget proposal (February 2007), the President's revised proposal ( Mid-Session Review , July 2007), an alternative outlook derived from CBO data (March 2007), and the March 2007 CBO reestimate of the President's original FY2008 proposals. The Administration's proposals included extending the current relief from the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for FY2007 and FY2008. The conference agreement ( H.Rept. On the revenue side, the baseline assumes the lack of a fix to the expanding coverage of the AMT and, as required by current law, the expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts at the end of calendar year 2010. Deficits in Congressional Budget Legislation The House- and Senate-passed budget resolutions included FY2008 deficits similar to the deficit in the President's budget (see Table 5 ). 110-153 ) had a deficit of $252 billion in FY2008, becoming a surplus of $41 billion in FY2012. Comparing Projections of Federal Deficits and Surpluses The President's policy proposals assumed additional spending for defense in FY2007 and FY2008, tight controls on domestic discretionary spending, a slight slowing in the growth of Medicare and Medicaid spending, no additional AMT relief after FY2008, and the creation of personal accounts for Social Security in FY2012. The current structure of the Federal Government's major entitlement programs will place a growing and unsustainable burden on the budget in the long-term.... By 2050, spending on these three entitlement programs [Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid] is projected to be more than 15 percent of GDP, or more than twice as large as spending on all other programs combined, excluding interest on the public debt. The retirement of the baby boom generation, which will rapidly expand the population eligible for federal programs serving the elderly, along with continuing increase in health care costs will put enormous pressure on the federal budget.	On February 5, 2007, President Bush presented his fiscal year (FY) 2008 budget to Congress. The President's budget predicted a deficit of $239 billion for FY2008 and a steady improvement of the federal government's fiscal position, including a surplus of $61 billion in FY2012, the last year projected. Major proposals included large defense supplementals for FY2007 and FY2008, extensions of the expiring tax cuts, limited increases in domestic discretionary spending, and limited increases in defense spending after FY2008. The Administration also proposed a temporary halt to the expanding reach of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) in FY2007 and FY2008. Medicare and Medicaid were expected to grow more slowly. The Administration's July 2007 Mid-Session Review showed little change in the budget outlook for FY2008 through FY2012, although higher health outlays and war costs increased the expected FY2008 deficit slightly. The FY2008 budget also discussed long-term fiscal problems. According to the longer-term projections from the Administration, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the impending retirement of the baby boom generation and rising health care costs will substantially expand spending over the coming decades on federal programs serving the elderly, such as Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid. The long-term growth of outlays, if left unchanged or if not offset by new revenues, could overwhelm the government's ability to finance its obligations. In January 2007, the CBO released baseline projections of future budget outcomes under current law. CBO projected a FY2008 deficit of $98 billion, a $170 billion surplus in FY2012, and a $249 billion surplus in FY2017. The baseline assumes the large tax cuts enacted in the first half of the decade expire as scheduled, real discretionary spending is fixed, and the Alternative Minimum Tax is unchanged. The House and Senate adopted separate versions of the FY2008 budget resolution in March 2007, which would allow more domestic spending than the Administration request and extend some expiring tax cuts with conditions. The House and Senate adopted a conference agreement (H.Rept. 110-153) on May 17, with a projected FY2008 deficit of $252 billion. By mid-July, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations had approved most of the 12 regular appropriations bills. At the end of FY2007, the House had passed all 12 appropriations bills and the Senate had passed four. The Senate passed three more appropriations bills in October. The President had said he would veto other appropriations bills. At the end of FY2007, Congress passed the first (H.J.Res. 52) of four continuing resolutions (H.R. 3222, H.J.Res. 69, H.J.Res. 72), which in sequence, funded government operations until the end of the calendar year. On November 8, Congress approved the Labor-HHS-Education bill (H.R. 3043, S. 1710), which the President vetoed, and Defense bill (H.R. 3222, P.L. 110-116), which he signed. On December 19, Congress passed an omnibus bill (H.R. 2764) that incorporated the 11 remaining regular appropriations bills. On December 26, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2008 (P.L. 110-161), which provided $555 billion in discretionary budget authority. This report will not be updated.
crs_R45208	crs_R45208_0	Introduction Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in most parts of the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time. Congressional interest in the potential benefits and costs of DST has resulted in changes to DST observance since it was first adopted in the United States. The Calder Act or the Standard Time Act of 1918 In 1918, Congress passed an act to provide standard time for the United States (also known as the Calder Act and the Standard Time Act of 1918). If a state chose to observe DST, the time changes were required to begin and end on the established dates. 92-267) to allow states that were split between time zones to exempt either the entire state or that part of the state lying within a different time zone. In 2005, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). Section 110 of this act amended the Uniform Time Act, by further changing DST to begin the second Sunday in March and end the first Sunday in November; this DST period remains in effect today. Congress has required several agencies to evaluate the effects of DST. In terms of primary energy consumption, this represents approximately 0.02% of total U.S. energy consumption in 2007. Health Several studies have examined potential health effects related to the semiannual changing of the clock per DST. Harrison (2013) reviewed the effect of DST on sleep, and found that data from the spring and fall transition periods suggest a cumulative effect of sleep loss. These include efforts to establish permanent DST as well as efforts to establish permanent standard time. Several states have also introduced legislation to study the effects of DST or the effects of changing the observance of DST. Most of the legislative proposals in recent years have not passed. One exception is Florida's H.B. 1013, which would institute year-round DST in Florida "if the United States Congress amends 15 U.S.C. s. 260a to authorize states to observe daylight saving time year-round." Potential Issues for Congress Congress may consider whether to make additional changes to DST observance or standard time. In the 115 th Congress, four bills have been introduced that would make changes to standard time. On March 12, 2018, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce sent a letter to the Department of Transportation requesting updated information related to DST and standard time "to more fully appreciate the various policy factors associated with changing between Standard and [DST]."	Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in most parts of the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time. The time period for DST begins on the second Sunday in March and ends on the first Sunday in November. The beginning and ending dates are set in statute. Congressional interest in the potential benefits and costs of DST has resulted in changes to DST observance since it was first adopted in the United States. The United States established standard time zones and DST through the Calder Act, also known as the Standard Time Act of 1918. The issue of consistency in time observance was further clarified by the Uniform Time Act of 1966. These laws as amended allow a state to exempt itself—or parts of the state that lie within a different time zone—from DST observance. These laws as amended also authorize the Department of Transportation (DOT) to regulate standard time zone boundaries and DST. The time period for DST was changed most recently in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). Congress has required several agencies to study the effects of changes in DST observance. In 1974, DOT reported that the potential benefits to energy conservation, traffic safety, and reductions in violent crime were minimal. In 2008, the Department of Energy assessed the potential effects to national energy consumption of an extended DST, and found a reduction in total primary energy consumption of 0.02%. Other studies have examined potential health effects associated with the spring and fall transition to DST and found a cumulative effect of sleep loss and increased risk for incidence of acute myocardial infarction in specific subgroups. Only Congress can change the length of the DST observance period; however, several states have proposed legislation to change their observance of DST. These efforts include proposals to effectively establish permanent DST and proposals to establish permanent standard time. Most of the proposals have not passed. One exception is Florida's HB1013, which would institute year-round DST in Florida "if the United States Congress amends 15 U.S.C. s. 260a to authorize states to observe daylight saving time year-round." Congress may consider whether to make additional changes to DST observance or standard time. Several bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress that would make changes to standard time to effectively implement year-round DST. On March 12, 2018, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce sent a letter to DOT requesting updated information related to DST and standard time.
crs_R44818	crs_R44818_0	On March 16, 2017, the House passed H.R. Background Under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 1993 (Brady Act; P.L. 103-159 ), Congress required the Attorney General to establish a National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) within five years of enactment. Since 1998, the VA has been providing records to the FBI for inclusion in the NICS Index on beneficiaries for whom a fiduciary (a person selected to manage veteran's benefits) has been appointed by the VA on his or her behalf, because the appointment of a fiduciary is based on a VA determination that the beneficiary is "mentally incompetent" under veterans law. Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA; P.L. 110-180 ), the VA has been required to notify beneficiaries of the ramifications of mental incompetency determinations and a potential loss of their gun rights. The act also required the VA to provide those beneficiaries with an avenue of administrative relief, by which they could appeal such determinations and have their rights restored. 114-255 ), Congress included provisions that codified certain VA procedures related to mental incompetency determinations and potential loss of gun rights. Since 2008, however, the legislative history shows that some Members of Congress have viewed the VA procedures as inadequate. 1181 were reported from committee, passed either the House or Senate, or both. In the 114 th Congress, related amendments were considered, but not passed, on the Senate floor in the wake of mass shootings in December 2015 in San Bernardino, CA, and in June 2016 in Orlando, FL. In the 115 th Congress, a measure was passed that vacated a final rule issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA) that would have established parallel but different procedures for NICS referrals on Social Security disability programs beneficiaries ( P.L. 1181 , the VA would be prohibited from determining any beneficiary for whom a fiduciary is appointed as "adjudicated as a mental defective" for the purposes of gun control, because he or she lacks the mental capacity to contract or handle his or her own affairs, unless a magistrate or judicial authority also rules that the beneficiary is a danger to himself or herself or others. 1181 maintain that the existing VA benefit claims and disability rating procedures are not substantive enough on their own to justify the taking of a constitutionally enumerated right like the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. Opponents of H.R. 1181 counter that the VA has complied with the Brady Act and NIAA and that public safety is enhanced by its NICS referrals to the FBI. Opponents note that Congress seconded the VA procedures by codifying them in P.L. They contend that the VA procedures act to protect VA beneficiaries from the harm that might result if they acquired firearms and used them improperly due to reasons possibly related to their mental incompetency. Supporters of H.R. 1181 set for SSA and any other federal agencies that provide disability benefits? Federal agencies had contributed 171,083 such records to the NICS index, of which the VA had contributed 167,815 (98.1%), as of December 31, 2016. In addition, the VA is to refer the name of any beneficiary determined to be incompetent to the FBI for inclusion in the NICS. P.L. 114-255 Provision In December 2016, Congress included a provision in the 21 st Century Cures Act that codified elements of the VA's implementation of NIAA. 115-8 ). Legislative History 110th-113th Congresses Proposals similar to H.R. Under H.R.	On March 16, 2017, the House of Representatives passed the Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act (H.R. 1181) by a roll call vote (240-175). Under H.R. 1181, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) would be prohibited from determining any beneficiary for whom a fiduciary is appointed, because he or she "lacks the capacity to contract or handle his or her own affairs," as "adjudicated as a mental defective" for the purposes of gun control, unless a magistrate or judicial authority also rules that the beneficiary is a danger to himself or herself or others. Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 1993 (Brady Act; P.L. 103-159), since 1998, the VA has provided records on beneficiaries for whom a fiduciary has been appointed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for inclusion in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA; P.L. 110-180), the VA was required to notify beneficiaries of the ramifications of mental incompetency determinations and a potential loss of their gun rights, as well as provide those beneficiaries with an avenue of administrative relief, by which they could appeal such determinations and have their rights restored. In the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255), Congress included a provision that codified certain VA procedures related to mental incompetency determinations and potential loss of gun rights. Since 2008, however, the legislative history also shows that some Members of Congress have viewed those VA procedures, even after the implementation of NIAA provisions, as inadequate. From the 110th through the 113th Congresses, proposals similar to H.R. 1181 were reported from committee, passed either the House or Senate, or both. In the 114th Congress, related amendments were considered, but not passed, on the Senate floor in the wake of mass shooting incidents in December 2015 in San Bernardino, CA, and in June 2016 in Orlando, FL. In the 115th Congress, moreover, a measure was passed that vacated a final rule issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in December 2016 that would have established parallel but different procedures for Social Security disability programs and NICS referrals (P.L. 115-8). Under the vacated rule, SSA disability beneficiaries who were appointed a "representative payee" to handle their day-to-day affairs and whose disability could be tied to a mental impairment would have been referred to the FBI for inclusion in NICS. According to the FBI, as of December 31, 2016, federal departments and agencies had contributed 173,083 records in the NICS index "adjudicated mental health" file, of which the VA contributed 167,815 (98.1%). Supporters of H.R. 1181 view the existing VA procedures as an incongruity in the law. They ask why the VA is the only federal department or agency that has made substantial numbers of NICS referrals to the FBI based on mental incompetency determinations, even though other federal agencies that provide similar disability and income security benefits have not done so. In their opinion, this seeming incongruity calls into question whether the VA benefit claims and disability rating procedures are substantive enough on their own to justify the taking of a constitutionally enumerated right like the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. Opponents of H.R. 1181 contend that the VA has complied with the Brady Act and NIAA and that public safety is enhanced by its NICS referrals to the FBI. They contend further that the VA procedures act to protect VA beneficiaries from the harm that might result if they acquired firearms and used them improperly due to reasons possibly related to their mental incompetency. In their view, moreover, Congress seconded the VA procedures by codifying them in P.L. 114-255.
crs_R42048	crs_R42048_0	Nonimmigrants, who are admitted into the United States temporarily, are not admitted through this preference system. There are five preference categories for employment-based LPRs and each has its own eligibility requirements and numerical limitations, and at times different application processes. The Departments of State (DOS) and Homeland Security (DHS) each play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of migrants. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) in DHS must first approve immigrant petitions. The same analyses of approved pending employment-based petitions are performed on two different sets of data: approved pending petitions with the DOS National Visa Center; and approved pending petitions with USCIS, known by the petition number as the I-485 Inventory. In addition to preference category numerical limitations, the INA specifies that each year countries are held to a numerical limit of 7% of the worldwide level of U.S. immigrant admissions, known as per-country limits or country caps. Most foreign nationals who become LPRs were already living in the United States. Visas for 3 rd preference "professional, skilled, and unskilled workers" visas had a March 15, 2016, priority date, but China, India, and the Philippines had longer waits. There were 100,747 approved petitions for employment-based LPR visas pending with the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2015. In addition, there were 17,662 approved 5 th preference "immigrant investor" visas pending. There were also 3,474 approved 1 st preference "extraordinary" visas and 379 4 th preference "special immigrant" visas pending. Figure 5 shows that India's approved visas pending at the National Visa Center are mostly in the 3 rd preference "professional, skilled, and unskilled worker" category (21,590); however, India has a noteworthy portion of approved pending visas in the 2 nd preference category for those with advanced degrees (7,646). Adjustment of Status: Approved I-485 Petitions Pending Approved visa petitions that are pending at the NVC are not the only source of pending employment-based LPR petitions. There are 30,457 approved I-485 petitions pending in the 1 st preference category and 37,971 approved I-485 petitions pending in the 3 rd preference category. The data in Figure 9 , along with the previous analyses, suggest that the majority of Indians are waiting to adjust status in the United States, while the majority of Filipinos are waiting to immigrate from abroad. Even as the number of unemployed individuals outnumbers the number of open positions, some employers assert that they continue to need the "best and the brightest" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for the option of increasing employment-based immigration may be dampened by economic conditions, proponents argue it is an essential ingredient for economic growth. Those opposing increases in employment-based LPRs in particular assert that there is no compelling evidence of labor shortages and cite the rate of unemployment across various occupations and labor markets. Changing Per-country Limits42 With this economic and political backdrop, the option of lifting the per-country caps on employment-based LPRs has gained attention. Some observers contend that the elimination of the per-country caps would increase the flow of high-skilled immigrants without increasing the total annual admission of employment-based LPRs. The presumption is that many high-skilled people (proponents cite those from India and China, in particular) would then move closer to the head of the line to become LPRs. Legislative options that have been suggested include the following: a targeted lifting of the country caps on the top two preference categories of priority workers and those who are deemed exceptional, extraordinary, or outstanding individuals; a categorical lifting of the country caps on all employment-based preference categories, up to the 140,000 worldwide ceiling on employment-based LPRs; or a complete lifting of the country caps on all employment-based preference categories as well as excluding employment-based LPRs from the calculation of the family-based and worldwide per-country ceilings. Proponents of per-country ceilings maintain that the statutory per-country ceilings restrain the dominance of high-demand countries and preserve the diversity of the immigrant flows.	The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies a complex set of numerical limits and preference categories for admitting lawful permanent residents (LPRs) that include economic priorities among the criteria for admission. Employment-based immigrants are admitted into the United States through one of the five available employment-based preference categories. Each preference category has its own eligibility criteria and numerical limits, and at times different application processes. The INA allocates 140,000 visas annually for employment-based LPRs, which amount to roughly 14% of the total 1.0 million LPRs in FY2014. The INA further specifies that each year, countries are held to a numerical limit of 7% of the worldwide level of LPR admissions, known as per-country limits or country caps. Some employers assert that they continue to need the "best and the brightest" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for the option of increasing employment-based immigration may be dampened by economic conditions, proponents argue it is an essential ingredient for economic growth. Those opposing increases in employment-based LPRs assert that there is no compelling evidence of labor shortages and cite the rate of unemployment across various occupations and labor markets. With this economic and political backdrop, the option of lifting the per-country caps on employment-based LPRs has become increasingly popular. Some argue that the elimination of the per-country caps would increase the flow of high-skilled immigrants without increasing the total annual admission of employment-based LPRs. The presumption is that many high-skilled people (proponents cite those from India and China, in particular) would then move closer to the head of the line to become LPRs. To explore this policy option, analyses of approved pending employment-based petitions are performed on two different sets of data: approved pending petitions with the Department of State (DOS) National Visa Center (NVC), and approved pending petitions with U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS). Because DOS and USCIS play different roles in the visa application process, their datasets represent different populations. DOS's data from the NVC contains individuals who apply for a visa while residing outside of the United States. They are considered new arrivals once they are issued a visa and enter the United States. USCIS's data contains individuals who are already residing in the United States and are applying to change their immigration status from a temporary status to a permanent LPR visa. This process is referred to as an adjustment of status. As of November 2015, there were 100,747 approved employment-based LPR petitions pending at the National Visa Center. The 3rd preference category of "professional, skilled, and unskilled" workers had the highest number of pending approved petitions (67,792). The 5th preference category of "immigrant investors" had 17,662 approved petitions pending and the 2nd preference category of "advanced degree" workers had 11,400 approved petitions pending. There were also 3,747 approved petitions pending for the 1st preference category of "extraordinary" workers and 379 for the 4th preference category for "special immigrants." In terms of the USCIS data, there were a total of 117,731 approved I-485 petitions pending as of April 2016, and most were for the 2nd preference "advanced degree" workers (46,765). There were 37,971 approved I-485 petitions pending in the 3rd preference "professional, skilled, and unskilled" category and 30,457 pending in the 1st preference "extraordinary" category. In addition, there were 1,409 5th preference "immigrant investor" and 1,129 4th preference "special immigrant" approved I-485 petitions pending. The top four countries in the National Visa Center data set were (in descending rank order) India, the Philippines, China, and South Korea. The top four countries in the USCIS data sets were (in descending rank order) India, China, the Philippines, and Mexico. The data indicates that more Indians and Mexicans are waiting to adjust status in the United States, while more Filipinos and Chinese are waiting to immigrate from abroad. Some argue that the per-country ceilings are arbitrary and observe that employability has nothing to do with country of birth. Others maintain that the statutory per-country ceilings restrain the dominance of high-demand countries and preserve the diversity of immigrant flows.
crs_RS22920	crs_RS22920_0	Background Section 319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold law, establishes increased contribution limits for House candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns. Supreme Court Ruling Reversing the three-judge district court decision, in a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court in FEC v. Davis invalidated the Millionaire's Amendment as lacking a compelling governmental interest in violation of the First Amendment. As the Court held in Buckley, reliance on personal funds reduce s the threat of corruption, and therefore, the burden imposed by the Millionaire's Amendment cannot serve that governmental interest.	The "Millionaire's Amendment" is a shorthand description for a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold law, which established increased contribution limits for congressional candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns. In 2008, in a 5-to-4 decision, Davis v. Federal Election Commission , the Supreme Court invalidated this provision. The Court found that the burden imposed on expenditures of personal funds is not justified by the compelling governmental interest of lessening corruption or the appearance of corruption and therefore, held that the law is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.
crs_R44532	crs_R44532_0	5278 , the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which Representative Duffy introduced on May 18, 2016. This bill is a revised version of H.R. 4900 , which Representative Duffy had introduced on April 12, 2016. 4900 and H.R. 5278 on May 25, 2016. Most sections are similar or identical. Many changes clarified or modified existing provisions, although some new provisions were added and other provisions were dropped. The measure is organized into seven titles, which are summarized below. A brief description of Puerto Rico, its relationship with the federal government, and its fiscal challenges is presented below. A short overview of the bill, along with a comparison with previous legislation involving control boards, follows. The body of the report provides a section-by-section description of H.R. 5278 . Appendix A gives a background on Puerto Rico's fiscal situation and aspects relevant to H.R. Appendix B contains a summary of provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code cited in H.R. Brief Overview The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; H.R. 5278 ) would create a structure for exercising federal oversight over the fiscal affairs of territories. PROMESA would establish an Oversight Board with broad powers of budgetary and financial control over Puerto Rico. PROMESA also would create procedures for adjusting debts accumulated by the Puerto Rico government and its instrumentalities. PROMESA would also expedite approvals of key energy projects and other "critical projects" in Puerto Rico. 4900 The current version of PROMESA ( H.R. 5278 ) differs from the previous version ( H.R. 4900 ) in several ways. The structure and appointment process for the board was modified to allow the President to select one board member at his sole discretion. The powers of the board were also modified in some ways. 5278 specifies that the board could only begin to establish bylaws and take other major actions once all members were appointed. In H.R. 4900 , by contrast, the board could take certain actions, such as setting a schedule for formulation of Fiscal Plans, once four members were appointed (§201). Other changes include a new provision that empowers the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to appoint a presiding judge to conduct Title III debt adjustment cases in which the territory is a party. For cases involving only the instrumentalities of the territory, the chief judge of the applicable Court of Appeals would appoint the presiding judge (§308). The relationship between Title VI collective action procedures to reach debt modification agreements and the Title III debt adjustment process was also modified. A provision to allow a transfer of certain federally controlled parts of Vieques Island to Commonwealth control was dropped. The time limit on a provision to allow a training wage below the usual federal minimum wage was changed from five to four years, or until the Oversight Board terminated. H.R. An amendment offered by Representative Bishop, Chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources, made technical corrections; dropped a provision that would have allowed other territories to request establishment of an Oversight Board; accelerated deadlines for appointment of Oversight Board members; modified the provision of funding for the Oversight Board; modified treatment of certain preexisting agreements with creditors; and would empower the Oversight Board to rescind laws enacted by the Puerto Rico government from May 4, 2016, until all members of the board were appointed. Congressional leaders would then each submit lists of candidates. 5278 includes a new provision for a public comment period. In general, it would prevent the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding against the Government of Puerto Rico that was or could have been commenced before the enactment of PROMESA, or to recover a Liability Claim against the Government of Puerto Rico that arose before the enactment of PROMESA; enforcement of a judgment obtained before the enactment of PROMESA against the Government of Puerto Rico or its property; any act to obtain property of or from the Government of Puerto Rico or to exercise control over property of the Government of Puerto Rico; any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the Government of Puerto Rico; any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the Government of Puerto Rico any lien to the extent that the lien secures a Liability Claim that arose before the enactment of PROMESA; any act to collect, assess, or recover a Liability Claim that arose before PROMESA's enactment; and setoff of any debt owed to the Government of Puerto Rico that arose before PROMESA's enactment against any Liability Claim against the Government of Puerto Rico. H.R. The House Committee on Natural Resources marked up H.R. Amendments agreed to include technical corrections and extensions of certain studies on the Puerto Rico government and economy, among others. The major provisions of the bill, however, were unaffected. The House passed an amended version of H.R. 5278 on June 9, 2016, by a 297-127 vote. The Senate approved the measure ( S. 2328 ) on June 29, 2016, by a 68-30 vote. President Obama signed the measure into law on June 30, 2016.	Representative Duffy introduced H.R. 5278, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), on May 18, 2016. This bill is a revised version of H.R. 4900, introduced by Representative Duffy on April 12, 2016. The House Committee on Natural Resources marked up H.R. 5278 on May 25, 2016. Amendments include technical corrections and extensions of certain studies on the Puerto Rico government and economy. The major provisions of the bill were unaffected. The House passed an amended version of H.R. 5278, which is organized into seven titles, on June 9, 2016, (297-127). The Senate approved the measure (S. 2328) on June 29, 2016 (68-30). On June 30, 2016, President Obama signed the bill into law. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; H.R. 5278) would create a structure for exercising federal oversight over the fiscal affairs of territories. PROMESA would establish an Oversight Board with broad powers of budgetary and financial control over Puerto Rico. PROMESA also would create procedures for adjusting debts accumulated by the Puerto Rico government and its instrumentalities and potentially for debts of other territories. Finally, PROMESA would expedite approvals of key energy projects and other "critical projects" in Puerto Rico. The current version of PROMESA (H.R. 5278) differs from the previous version (H.R. 4900) in several ways, although most sections are similar or identical. Many changes clarified or modified existing provisions, although some provisions were added or altered and others were dropped. For instance, H.R. 4900 would have allowed other territories, through normal political processes, to request setup of an Oversight Board. The structure and appointment process for the board was modified to allow the President to select one board member at his sole discretion. The process by which congressional leaders would submit lists of potential board members was specified in more detail. H.R. 5278 also specifies that the board could only begin to establish bylaws and take other major actions once all members were appointed. In H.R. 4900, by contrast, the board could act in certain ways, such as setting a schedule for formulation of Fiscal Plans, once four members were appointed. The powers of the board were also modified in some ways and the independence of the board was strengthened. Other changes include a new provision that empowers the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to appoint a presiding judge for Title III debt adjustment cases in which the territory is a party, while the chief judge of the applicable Court of Appeals would appoint the presiding judge for cases involving only the instrumentalities of the territory. The relationship between Title VI collective action procedures to reach debt modification agreements and the Title III debt adjustment process was also modified. A provision to allow a transfer of certain federally controlled parts of Vieques Island to Commonwealth control was dropped. The time period that the Puerto Rico governor could propose, subject to board approval, to set a training wage below the usual federal minimum wage but above a $4.25/hour floor was shortened from five to four years, or when the Oversight Board terminates, if sooner. A public comment period provision was added to the Title V expedited approval process. Mandates for reports from a congressional task force and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) were also added. The report presents a brief description of Puerto Rico, its relationship with the federal government, and its fiscal challenges. A short overview of the bill, along with a comparison with previous legislation involving control boards, follows. The body of the report provides a section-by-section description of H.R. 5278. Appendix A gives a background on Puerto Rico's fiscal situation and aspects relevant to H.R. 4900. Appendix B contains a summary of provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code cited in H.R. 5278.
crs_R41372	crs_R41372_0	Insurance and the Financial Crisis Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, insurance regulation is generally left to the individual states. For several years prior to the recent financial crisis, some Members of Congress had introduced legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, although none of this legislation reached the committee markup stage. The recent financial crisis, particularly the involvement of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the debate around insurance regulation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. Federal Insurance Office Title V, Subtitle A of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside of the Department of the Treasury. 5840 in the 110 th Congress, and in H.R. 2609 in the 111 th Congress. FIO is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It has the authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. In addition to the language on annuities, Section 913 of the act may affect some insurance producers who also sell security products. Systemic Risk Provisions12 The Dodd-Frank Act provides for systemic risk provisions that affect the insurance industry primarily through oversight of firms deemed systemically significant and through specific financial resolution authority. Surplus Lines and Reinsurance15 Title V, Subtitle B of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 and includes essentially the same language as H.R. This language addresses a relatively narrow set of insurance regulatory issues pre-dating the financial crisis. In the area of nonadmitted (or "surplus lines") insurance, the act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of this insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. For reinsurance transactions, it vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer.	In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, broad financial regulatory reform legislation was advanced by the Obama Administration and by various Members of Congress. Ultimately Congress passed, and the President signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). The Dodd-Frank Act largely responded to the financial crisis that peaked in September 2008, but other efforts at revising the state-based system of insurance regulation also pre-date this crisis. Members of Congress previously introduced both broad legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the regulation of the banking sector, as well as more narrowly tailored bills addressing specific perceived flaws in the state-based system. The financial crisis, particularly the role of insurance giant American International Group (AIG) and the smaller bond insurers, changed the tenor of the existing debate around insurance regulation, with increased emphasis on the systemic importance of some insurance companies. Although it could be argued that insurer involvement in the financial crisis suggested a need for full-scale federal regulation of insurance, the Dodd-Frank Act did not implement such a federal regulatory system for insurance. Title V of the Dodd-Frank Act addressed specifically insurance, with a subtitle creating a Federal Insurance Office (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2609) and a subtitle streamlining the existing state regulation of surplus lines and reinsurance (similar to language originally contained in H.R. 2572/S. 1363). The Federal Insurance Office is to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and coordinate and develop policy relating to international agreements. It also has limited authority to preempt state laws and regulations when these conflict with international agreements. The act harmonizes, and in some cases reduces, regulation and taxation of surplus lines insurance by vesting the "home state" of the insured with the sole authority to regulate and collect the taxes on a surplus lines transaction. For reinsurance transactions, the act vests the home state of the insurer purchasing the reinsurance with the authority over the transaction while vesting the home state of the reinsurer with the sole authority to regulate the solvency of the reinsurer. In addition to Title V's specific insurance provisions, various other parts of the act may affect insurers and the insurance industry, including provisions addressing systemic risk, consumer protection, investor protection, and securities regulation. This report explains how insurance markets were affected by the financial crisis and summarizes the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that pertain to insurance. It will not be updated.
crs_R41599	crs_R41599_0	Introduction The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental corporation created by Congress in 1970. In 1970, to avoid a recurrence of these events and accompanying negative consequences for investor confidence in the securities markets, Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), and significantly changed it via the Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978. Under SIPA, any entity that is registered as a broker-dealer with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or who is a member of a national securities exchange must be a SIPC member. This report provides an overview of various issues related to SIPC, including policy issues highlighted by the Madoff fraud, SIPC reforms in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and pending legislation. It protects customer assets (securities and cash) against losses of up to $500,000 at the time of a firm's collapse. Under the Dodd-Frank Act ( P.L. 111-203 ) enacted on July 21, 2010, up to $250,000 may be for cash losses, in contrast to the historical amount of up to $100,000. Customer cash and securities collected by the SIPA trustee administering the liquidation become part of a fund of customer property that is shared on a prorated basis by customers. The SIPC Fund and Member Assessments The SIPC funds that are used to make advances for customers and to supplement the recovered assets to satisfy customer claims derive from what is known as the SIPC Fund, sometimes known as the SIPC reserves. The Fund's assets come from interest on investments in U.S. government securities and an annual assessment on SIPC-member firms. In the event that the SIPC reserves have become or threaten to become insufficient for carrying out SIPA's mission, SIPC has the authority to indirectly borrow up to $2.5 billion from the U.S. Treasury, an amount mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, which replaced the historical amount of $1 billion. Between 1996 and 2001, the size of the SIPC Fund ranged between $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion. In 2007, the SIPC Fund ranged from $1.4 billion to $1.52 billion. To reach the significantly higher target level, SIPC also increased its member assessments from a flat $150 annual rate for all members to a rate that is now 0.25% of each member's net operating revenue. 6531 , which Chairman Garrett introduced in the 111 th Congress and which could be reintroduced in the 112 th Congress, would have amended SIPA to determine a customer's net equity based on the customer's last statement. SIPA does not cover indirect investors. H.R. 5032 (Ackerman, 111 th Congress ), which could be reintroduced in the 112 th Congress, would have required SIPC to provide up to $100,000 worth of protection to indirect investors in "Ponzi schemes." Moreover, while the bill would apply to the indirect investors of all such feeder funds, some criticize such an indiscriminate payout policy, arguing that SIPC's funds are limited and that payments to indirect investors should prioritize investors in smaller pension funds and other investment vehicles, which are often said to be the kind of feeder funds that have failed to inform the applicable broker-dealers of all of the individual accounts that they hold. Under H.R. 1376) was signed into law on July 21, 2010. The highest amount that SIPC can impose as a minimum assessment is changed from $150 per annum to 0.02% of the gross revenues from the securities business of SIPC member. Section 929C increases the amount of money that SIPC can borrow from the Treasury Department (through the SEC) from $1 billion to $2.5 billion. Section 929H increases the amount of SIPC protection available for claims for cash from $100,000 to $250,000. Provision of SIPC Protection to Customers with Futures Contracts.	The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental corporation that was established in 1970 through the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) to protect securities investors in the event of a broker-dealer failure. Except as otherwise provided in SIPA, the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 act) apply as if SIPA were an amendment to, and included as a section of, the 1934 act. A court-appointed trustee generally presides over a SIPC member broker's liquidation and returns the remaining cash and securities to the firm's former customers. If the returned customer assets do not make customers whole, SIPC advances additional cash and securities to the customers. With the broad goal of helping to maintain investor confidence in the securities markets, SIPC has historically provided up to $500,000 per customer, of which up to $100,000 could be in satisfaction of claims for cash only (as opposed to claims for recovered securities). Signed into law on July 21, 2010, and in effect the next day, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) expanded SIPC protection available for cash claims up to $250,000 of the maximum customer protection of $500,000. The SIPC funds that are used for such customers derive from the SIPC Fund. The Fund's assets come largely from annual assessments on SIPC broker-dealer members, at a rate that has been adjusted by SIPC. From 1997 to 2009, SIPC charged a flat rate of $150 per member. In September 2008, immediately before the start of the Lehman Brothers liquidation, the size of the SIPC Fund was $1.5 billion. Beginning in April 2009, following the commencement of large liquidations of firms like Lehman Brothers and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, SIPC re-instituted assessments on a percentage basis. At that time, the Fund stood at $1.6 billion. SIPC increased the SIPC Fund level target from $1 billion to $2.5 billion, and increased annual member assessments from $150 to 0.25% of each member's net operating revenue. On January 31, 2010, the size of the Fund reached a low point of $1.07 billion. As of August 31, 2010, the Fund stood at $1.31 billion. The Dodd-Frank Act increases from $1 billion to $2.5 billion the amount that SIPC can borrow from the Treasury Department if the SIPC Fund is insufficient, and it imposes a minimum assessment on SIPC members not to exceed 0.02% of the gross revenues from the securities business of each SIPC member. The Madoff case drew public attention to a number of public policy concerns. One concern is that SIPA does not cover so-called indirect investors, individuals invested in investment pools such as family partnerships or pension plans (also known as "feeder funds"), who have SIPA coverage as single entities. Under SIPA, each feeder fund is treated as an individual investor whose maximum SIPC protection is $500,000. Investors in feeder funds are thus entitled to a prorated and hence diluted portion of the payment to such a fund. Various observers say this is unfair. H.R. 5032 (Ackerman, 111th Congress), which could be reintroduced in the 112th Congress, would have required SIPC to provide up to $100,000 worth of protection to indirect investors in Ponzi schemes, including those involving Madoff. In addition, under H.R. 6531 (Garrett, 111th Congress), which also could be reintroduced in the 112th Congress, a victim's losses would be determined by the last amount on the individual's account statement. Currently, trustees use the last statement minus any amounts that have already been withdrawn by a customer, which is another concern. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_RL34754	crs_RL34754_0	Introduction From April 20 to 24, 2009, United Nations (U.N.) member states will meet in Geneva, Switzerland, for the U.N. Durban Review Conference Against Racism (Review Conference). Some Members of Congress are concerned that the Review Conference will repeat the perceived mistakes of the U.N. World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), which was held in Durban, South Africa, from August 31 to September 7, 2001. At WCAR, participating governments, including the United States, sought to acknowledge and recommend ways for the international community to address racism and related intolerance. The Conference attracted a significant amount of national and international attention because of what many viewed as participating governments' disproportionate focus on Israel as a perpetrator of racism and intolerance in the Middle East. The Bush Administration opposed the Review Conference and did not participated in the preparatory process or voted for U.N. resolutions supporting or funding it. In February 2009, the Barack Obama Administration decided to participate in Review Conference consultations to observe the current status of negotiations related to the Review Conference outcome document. The Administration stated that it remained open to re-engaging in negotiations if a draft document appeared to take a "constructive approach" to addressing racism and discrimination. Other countries, including Canada, Israel, and Italy have announced that they will boycott the Conference, and some governments stated they will not participate unless it is clear that the Conference will not target Israel. Limiting U.S. contributions to the Review Conference in this manner would have no impact on the Review Conference because assessed contributions finance the U.N. regular budget in its entirety and not specific or separate parts of it. This report provides background information on previous U.N. efforts to address racism and the 2001 World Conference Against Racism. It examines charges of bias against Israel in the preparatory process for the Review Conference, potential implications for U.S. participation or non-participation, and the impact of withholding a proportionate share of U.S. contributions to the Conference from the U.N. regular budget. U.S. Some Members, for example, have introduced legislation stating the United States should not participate in the Conference because of WCAR's focus on Israel. Withholding funds in this manner would not affect the Conference because assessed contributions finance the U.N. regular budget in its entirety and not specific parts of it. Political and Diplomatic Impact of U.S. Engagement For some, the question of U.S. participation or non-participation in the Durban Review Conference touches on the broader issue of U.S. engagement in the U.N. system. Supporters contend that U.S. participation in U.N. efforts such as the Review Conference is important to the success and credibility of the United Nations as a whole. Opponents of U.S. participation in the Review Conference maintain that U.S. engagement would give undeserved legitimacy to U.N. mechanisms that provide a platform for member states to target Israel.	In April 2009, U.N. member states will convene in Geneva, Switzerland, for the U.N. Durban Review Conference Against Racism (Review Conference) to examine possible progress made since the 2001 U.N. World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), held in Durban, South Africa. At WCAR, participating governments, including the United States, sought to recommend ways for the international community to address racism. The United States withdrew from WCAR because of what it viewed as participating governments' disproportionate focus on Israel as a perpetrator of racism and intolerance in the Middle East. The George W. Bush Administration did not participate in Review Conference preparations and voted against U.N. resolutions supporting or funding the Conference because of concerns that it may repeat the perceived mistakes of WCAR. In February 2009, the Barack Obama Administration announced that it would send a delegation to the Review Conference consultations. Based on its observations, the Administration concluded that it would not participate in further negotiations due primarily to the draft outcome document's focus on Israel. It stated that it remained open to re-engaging in negotiations if a draft document appeared to take a "constructive approach" to addressing racism and discrimination. Canada, Israel, and Italy announced that they will boycott the Review Conference, and other governments announced they will not participate unless it is demonstrated that the Review Conference will not target Israel. Congressional perspectives on U.S. participation in the Review Conference vary. Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation supporting U.S. participation in the Conference, arguing that the United States should play an active role in combating international racism. Other Members contend that the United States should not participate or fund the Conference because of WCAR's focus on Israel. Specifically, they propose that the United States withhold a proportionate share of its U.N. assessed contributions that fund the Conference. Because assessed contributions finance the U.N. regular budget in its entirety and not specific parts of it, withholding funds in this manner would not affect the Review Conference. For many, U.S. participation or non-participation in the Review Conference touches on the broader issue of U.S. engagement in the U.N. system. Supporters contend that U.S. participation in U.N. efforts such as the Review Conference is important to the success and credibility of the United Nations as a whole. Opponents maintain that U.S. engagement in the Conference would give undeserved legitimacy to U.N. mechanisms that provide a platform for member states to target Israel. This report provides information on the 2001 World Conference Against Racism and the circumstances of U.S. withdrawal. It discusses preparations for the Durban Review Conference, including U.S. policy and reaction from other governments. It also highlights possible issues for the 111th Congress, including the Review Conference preparatory process, U.S. funding of the Conference, and the political and diplomatic impact of U.S. engagement. For related information, see CRS Report RL33611, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R43747	crs_R43747_0	Background On June 15, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that certain individuals without a lawful immigration status who were brought to the United States as children and meet other criteria would be considered for relief from removal from the country for two years, subject to renewal. DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) began accepting requests for consideration of DACA on August 15, 2012, and issued its first approvals in September 2012. Prior to that, from June 15, 2012, to August 15, 2012, DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) granted deferred action under the DACA process in some cases. More than 580,000 requests for consideration of DACA have been approved through June 2014. Individuals granted deferred action under the DACA process may request renewal of their deferral for another two years, in accordance with USCIS procedures. The eligibility criteria are under age 16 at time of entry into the United States; under age 31 on June 15, 2012; continuously resident in the United States for at least five years before June 15, 2012 (that is, since June 15, 2007); physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making the request for consideration of deferred action; not in lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012; not convicted of a felony, a significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors, and not otherwise a threat to national security or public safety; and in school, graduated from high school or obtained general education development certificate, or honorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces or the Coast Guard. USCIS's decision on a DACA request is discretionary. The agency makes determinations on a case-by-case basis. Both DACA and legislation known as the DREAM Act are targeted at the same general population—unauthorized individuals who entered the United States as children. To request a renewal of deferred action under DACA, an individual must file the following three forms with DHS/USCIS (the same forms as required for an initial DACA request): Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization Form I-765WS, Worksheet The forms are available on the USCIS website, http://www.uscis.gov . USCIS advises DACA recipients to request a renewal 120 days before the expiration date of their current period of deferred action. The decision on a request to renew DACA, like on an initial DACA request, is discretionary. An individual granted deferred action (an initial grant or a renewal) is not given a lawful immigration status and is not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. What happens if a DACA recipient's period of deferred action expires before his or her renewal request is approved?	On June 15, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that certain individuals who were brought to the United States as children and meet other criteria would be considered for relief from removal for two years, subject to renewal, under an initiative known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA. Among the eligibility requirements, an individual must have been under age 16 at the time of his or her entry into the United States; must have been continuously resident in the United States since June 15, 2007; and must not have been in lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012. To request consideration of DACA, an individual must file specified forms with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and pay associated fees. USCIS's decision on a DACA request is discretionary. The agency makes determinations on a case-by-case basis. Individuals granted DACA may receive employment authorization. DACA recipients are not granted a lawful immigration status and are not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. USCIS began accepting DACA requests on August 15, 2012, and issued its first approvals in September 2012. Prior to that, from June 15, 2012, to August 15, 2012, DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) granted deferred action under the DACA process in some cases. Cumulatively, through June 2014, more than 580,000 DACA requests have been approved. The period of deferred action under the DACA program expires after two years unless it is renewed. Individuals granted deferred action under the DACA initiative may request renewal of their deferral for another two years, in accordance with USCIS procedures. To be considered for a renewal, a DACA recipient must satisfy certain requirements concerning continuous U.S. residence, departures from the country, and criminal history. To request a renewal, an individual must file specified forms with USCIS and pay associated fees. The agency advises individuals to request a DACA renewal 120 days before the expiration date of their current period of deferred action. USCIS's decision on a DACA renewal request, like on an initial DACA request, is discretionary. For a discussion of related legislation, commonly referred to as the DREAM Act, that seeks to enable certain unauthorized aliens who entered the United States as children to obtain legal immigration status, see CRS Report RL33863, Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and "DREAM Act" Legislation.
crs_RL33320	crs_RL33320_0	Introduction Five statutory provisions vest government agencies responsible for certain foreign intelligence investigations (principally the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) with authority to issue written commands comparable to administrative subpoenas. USA PATRIOT Act The USA PATRIOT Act amended three of the four existing NSL statutes and added a fifth. Their amendments: created a judicial enforcement mechanism and a judicial review procedure for both the requests and accompanying nondisclosure requirements; established specific penalties for failure to comply or to observe the nondisclosure requirements; made it clear that the nondisclosure requirements did not preclude a recipient from consulting an attorney; provided a process to ease the nondisclosure requirement; expanded congressional oversight; called for an Inspector General's audit of use of the authority. More specifically, the report found that a "significant number of NSL-related possible violations were not being identified or reported" as required; the only FBI data collection system produced "inaccurate" results; the FBI issued over 700 exigent letters acquiring information in a manner that "circumvented the ECPA NSL statute and violated the Attorney General's Guidelines ... and internal FBI policy;" the FBI's Counterterrorism Division initiated over 300 NSLs in a manner that precluded effective review prior to approval; 60% of the individual files examined showed violations of FBI internal control policies; the FBI did not retain signed copies of the NSLs it issued; the FBI had not provided clear guidance on the application of the Attorney General's least-intrusive-feasible-investigative-technique standard in the case of NSLs; the precise interpretation of toll billing information as it appears in the ECPA NSL statute is unclear; SAC supervision of the attorneys responsible for review of the legal adequacy of proposed NSLs made some of the attorneys reluctant to question the adequacy of the underlying investigation previously approved by the SAC; there was no indication that the FBI's misuse of NSL authority constituted criminal conduct; personnel both at FBI headquarters and in the field considered NSL use indispensable; and information generated by NSLs was fed into a number of FBI systems. The Second IG Report The second IG Report reviewed the FBI's use of national security letter authority during calendar year 2006 and the corrective measures taken following the issuance of the IG's first report. A federal district court there agreed with the Second Circuit that the NSL confidentiality and judicial review provisions were constitutionally suspect. Recommendations of the President's Review Group In the wake of leaks relating to the National Security Agency's (NSA's) purported bulk meta-data collection program under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the President established a Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology (Group). Several of its recommendations addressed NSLs. NSL procedures, it said, should more closely resemble those of FISA "business record" court orders ("§215 orders"). Finally, it augments existing reporting requirements for greater transparency. The USA FREEDOM Act handles the judicial review of nondisclosure orders with complementary amendments to the NSL statutes and to Section 3511. The National Security Act NSL authority is available to conduct law enforcement investigations, counterintelligence inquiries, and security determinations. Moreover, Section 119 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act instructs the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to audit and to report to the judiciary and intelligence committees as to the Department's use of the authority in the years following expansion of the authority in the USA PATRIOT Act. It authorizes recipients to periodically disclose publicly the number of NSLs and requests they have received as well.	Five federal statutes authorize intelligence officials to request certain business record information in connection with national security investigations. The authority to issue these national security letters (NSL) is comparable to the authority to issue administrative subpoenas. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) expanded the authority under the original four NSL statutes and created a fifth. Thereafter, the authority was reported to have been widely used. Then, a report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General (IG) found that in its use of expanded USA PATRIOT Act authority the FBI had "used NSLs in violation of applicable NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies," although it concluded that no criminal laws had been broken. A year later, a second IG report confirmed the findings of the first, and noted the corrective measures taken in response. A third IG report, critical of the FBI's use of exigent letters and informal NSL alternatives, noted that the practice had been stopped and related problems addressed. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (P.L. 109-177, and its companion, P.L. 109-178) amended the five NSL statutes to expressly provide for judicial review of both the NSLs and the confidentiality requirements that attend them. The sections were made explicitly subject to judicial enforcement and to sanctions for failure to comply with an NSL request or to breach NSL confidentiality requirements. Prospects of its continued use dimmed, however, after two lower federal courts held that the absolute confidentiality requirements and the limitations on judicial review rendered one of the NSL statutes constitutionally suspect. The President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies recommended several NSL statutory adjustments designed to eliminate differences between NSLs and court orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("§215 orders"), including requiring pre-issuance judicial approval of NSLs. Instead in the USA FREEDOM Act, P.L. 114-23 (H.R. 2048), Congress opted to adjust the NSL judicial review provisions governing the nondisclosure requirements which may accompany NSLs. It also precludes the use of NSL authority for bulk collection of communications or financial records. Finally, it adjusts existing reporting requirements to permit recipients to publicly disclose the extent to which they have been compelled to comply with NSLs. The text of the five NSL statutory provisions has been appended. This report is available abridged—without footnotes, appendices, and most of the citations to authority—as CRS Report RS22406, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: A Glimpse at the Legal Background, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_RL34301	crs_RL34301_0	Mortgage Market Backdrop The U.S. housing market began to slow in early 2006 and has led to what many economists believe is the worst housing finance environment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a result, there has been a significant rise of late mortgage payments, foreclosures, and bankruptcies nationwide. High unemployment has exacerbated these problems. However, there are a number of obstacles that have operated to discourage mortgage servicers and creditors from performing loan modifications in advance of foreclosure or a petition for bankruptcy, even in situations in which a modification would be the most economically beneficial outcome for most interested parties. There are many barriers to a successful loan modification. One notable obstacle is the way in which mortgage servicers are paid. Thus, servicers often receive more in compensation through a foreclosure than they do through loss mitigation or loan modification. This is especially true where a servicer goes through the time and effort of offering a borrower a modification only to have the borrower redefault in the near future. At least four bills that would amend Section 1322 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. 200 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009); H.R. 1106 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009); and H.R. 225 (the Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act). Additionally, an amendment, S.Amdt. 1014 , to S. 896 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009; Senate companion bill to H.R. 1106 ) would allow for the judicial modification of certain mortgages in bankruptcy but was voted down 45-51 and withdrawn on April 30, 2009. 111-22 without making any changes to the Bankruptcy Code. More recently, during floor consideration of H.R. 4173 , the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, the House voted down an amendment that would have allowed strip down of certain mortgages in bankruptcy. 018 as printed in H.Rept. 111-370 ) failed by a vote of 188-241. This report provides an overview of the general Chapter 13 process and analyzes how these pieces of legislation seek to amend Chapter 13. Overview of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy provides an avenue by which debtors may get relief from their debts. The Code provides courts some leeway to adjust the value of certain debts. For many secured debts, the court has "strip down"—also, commonly referred to as "cram down"—authority. Strip down is the power to lower, over the creditor's objections, the amount the debtor must pay the creditor for the secured claim to as low as the collateral's fair market value. Bill Comparisons S. 61 S. 61 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009), as introduced, would allow for certain modifications of debts secured by the debtor's primary residence "that is the subject of a notice that a foreclosure may be commenced." H.Amdt. 534 to H.R. S. 896 was signed into law on May 20, 2009, as P.L.	The U.S. housing market began to slow in early 2006 and has led to what many economists believe is the worst housing finance environment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a result, there has been a significant rise in late mortgage payments, foreclosures, and bankruptcies nationwide. High unemployment has exacerbated these problems. Mortgage market participants may voluntarily agree to adjust mortgage terms in order to help troubled borrowers continue to stay in their homes. However, there are a number of obstacles that may discourage mortgage servicers and creditors from performing loan modifications in advance of a petition for bankruptcy, even in situations in which a modification would be the most economically beneficial outcome for the majority of interested parties. There are many barriers to a successful loan modification. One notable obstacle is the way in which mortgage servicers are paid. Servicers often receive more in compensation through a foreclosure than they do through loss mitigation or loan modification. This is especially true where a servicer goes through the time and effort of offering a borrower a modification only to have the borrower redefault in the near future. Bankruptcy provides an avenue by which debtors may get relief from their debts. Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code governs reorganizations for most individuals. The Code provides courts some leeway to adjust the value of certain debts. For many secured debts, the court has "strip down"—also, commonly referred to as "cram down"—authority. Strip down is the power to lower, over the creditor's objections, the secured claim to as low as the collateral's fair market value and treat the balance of the debt as an unsecured claim. However, Section 1322(b)(2) of the Code prohibits the strip down of debts secured by the debtor's primary residence. At least four bills that would amend Section 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code have been introduced in the 111th Congress. These bills are S. 61 and H.R. 200 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009), H.R. 1106 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009), and H.R. 225 (the Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act). Additionally, an amendment, S.Amdt. 1014, to S. 896 (the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009; Senate companion bill to H.R. 1106) would allow for the judicial modification of certain mortgages in bankruptcy but was voted down 45-51 and withdrawn on April 30, 2009. S. 896 was signed into law on May 20, 2009, as P.L. 111-22 without making any changes to the Bankruptcy Code. More recently, during floor consideration of H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, the House voted down an amendment that would have allowed strip down of certain mortgages in bankruptcy. H.Amdt. 534 (Amdt. 018 as printed in H.Rept. 111-370) failed by a vote of 188-241. This report provides an overview of the general Chapter 13 process and analyzes how these pieces of legislation would amend certain sections of Chapter 13.
crs_RL31970	crs_RL31970_0	Overview U.S. farmers are widely adopting biotechnology, growing genetically engineered (GE) crops-- mainly corn, soybean, and cotton varieties -- to lower production costs and reduce laborrequirements. (2) U.S. crops where GE varieties are common are highly dependent upon export markets. (3) The problem for U.S. agriculture is that many countries remain wary of agricultural biotechnology, including those in the European Union (EU), where consumer and environmentalorganizations have been vocal in expressing concerns about the safety of GE crops and animals. TheEU and other important U.S. trading partners have adopted widely divergent approaches toregulating biotechnology. As a result, U.S. exporters are encountering barriers to their products inthese markets. For example, since 1998, the EU, the fourth largest foreign market for U.S. agricultural products, has maintained a de facto moratorium on approvals of new GE crop varieties. In May2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina began a formal challenge of the EU policy in theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), contending that it violates international trade agreements and alsohas fueled unwarranted concerns about the safety of agricultural biotechnology throughout the world(see page 9 ). International Oversight of Agricultural Biotechnology National Regulation (5) Around the world, countries have taken widely divergent approaches to regulating the products of agricultural biotechnology. Multinational Oversight The wide range of national approaches to GMO regulation is in part due to the fact that an international consensus on how to regulate agricultural biotechnology is still evolving. Concerns U.S. officials say they are actively engaged multilaterally and bilaterally toensure that any national or international standards are consistent, transparent, basedon scientific principles, and compliant with international trade rules (e.g., thoseadministered through the WTO). For example, the Senate on May 23, 2003, passed, by unanimousconsent, a resolution ( S.Res. 154 ) supporting the U.S. action against theEU; a similar House measure ( H.Res. FAS programs include: (25) An Overseas Biotech Training/Education Program involving seminars, symposia, and educational materials on various biotechnology issues aimedat foreign educators, public officials, and others; Cochran Fellowship Program Biotechnology Training, offeringshort-term U.S. training for foreign scientists, regulators, journalists, andpolicymakers, to provide information about the technology's benefits and about U.S.regulation; Biotechnology Short Courses, a new series of quarterly,two-week programs in the United States for foreign participants intended primarilyto impart "biotechnology's relationship to market access and trade in agriculturalproducts, and the factors influencing that relationship"; Capacity Building for the Seed Trade Industry to expand seedtrade with Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia; Biotechnology Research Capacity Building, supporting thedevelopment of science-based research and regulatory programs and promotingglobal food security, particularly in developing and newly emergenteconomies; Biotechnology Activities With International Organizations,utilizing a variety of approaches like briefings staged at multinational meetings (e.g.,at Codex and at the Rome World Food Summit in 2002) and at regionalworkshops. An increasing share of APHIS harmonization work revolves around trade in GE products.	U.S. farmers have been rapidly adopting genetically engineered (GE) crops -- mainly corn, soybean, and cotton varieties -- to lower production costs and improve management. However, theU.S. agricultural economy is highly dependent upon exports, at a time when many foreign consumersare wary of the products of agricultural biotechnology. As a result, U.S. exporters often haveencountered barriers to trade in these markets. Among the most controversial barriers is in the European Union (EU). The EU, the fourth-largest foreign market for U.S. agricultural products, since 1998 has maintained a de factomoratorium on approvals of new GE crop varieties. In May 2003, the United States launched aformal challenge of the EU policy, contending that it both violates international trade agreementsand causes unwarranted concerns about the safety of agricultural biotechnology throughout theworld. The EU and other important U.S. trading partners around the world have adopted widely divergent approaches to regulating biotechnology. The wide range of approaches to GE productregulation is in part due to the fact that an international consensus on how to regulate agriculturalbiotechnology is still evolving. U.S. officials say they are active globally to ensure that national andinternational standards for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are consistent, transparent, basedon scientific principles, and compliant with international trade rules (e.g., those administered throughthe World Trade Organization). For example, they have been working to ensure that the so-calledCartagena Biosafety Protocol, a multilateral agreement on the safe handling, transfer, andtransboundary movement of living modified organisms, does not present new obstacles to U.S.exports of such products. Another issue involves recent difficulties in moving U.S. food aid to certain African countries due to what U.S. officials said were unwarranted, EU-provoked concerns that such aid's possible GEcontent could pose safety problems for recipients. Debate also revolves around the potential benefitsand problems of introducing GE crops to developing countries. Congress continues to follow these issues closely. For example, a number of leading lawmakers pressed hard for the Administration to aggressively challenge the EU moratorium. Following theAdministration's decision to do so, the Senate and House passed resolutions ( S.Res. 154 ; H.Res. 252 ) in support of the action. Several House hearings have been held toreview barriers to the adoption of, and trade in, GE agricultural products; and to review challengesand opportunities for plant biotechnology development in Africa. Additional hearings are possible. Whether the 108th Congress will consider other legislation affecting agricultural biotechnology wasuncertain in June 2003. This report will be updated if events warrant.
crs_RL34679	crs_RL34679_0	In contrast, a Member who is a committee chair serves in addition as the leader of a committee, with responsibility for setting the course and direction of the panel for other committee members and the House. A chair also has responsibility for overseeing a large professional and paraprofessional staff. Once a committee chair is selected during the postelection transition period, the chair, often in consultation with others, makes a series of decisions and takes a series of actions. Decisions may be related to the committee's policy calendar; the committee's administrative functions; the chair's responsibilities during committee sessions; the role of committee members; the relationship with the committee's ranking minority member, other chairs, and party leaders; subcommittee leaders; and other subjects. Administrative Matters A committee chair controls the selection of committee staff, authorizes expenditures from the committee budget, establishes operational and ethics policies, determines committee travel allocations, decides the content of the committee website, and assumes responsibility for administration of the committee's rooms, paperwork, and other operations. Most committees entrust this responsibility to the committee chair, although a committee's minority party members seek to ensure that they receive an appropriate allocation of resources. A committee chair normally proposes the number of subcommittees for the committee. Committee Procedure and the Role of a Chair A committee chair establishes the committee agenda, divides work between the subcommittees and the full committee, determines procedural strategy, calls hearings, selects witnesses and determines the order of their testimony, presides over hearings and markups, chooses the markup vehicle and pursues an amendment strategy, prepares the committee report accompanying legislation, and discusses, or might negotiate, any of these matters with the ranking minority member. Floor Consideration and the Role of a Chair When a measure is reported by a committee, it is the responsibility of the committee chair to consult the party leadership to determine floor scheduling for the measure. Dates and Deadlines of Interest to Chairs Transition (Early Organization to Swearing-in) Early organization, including possible party selections of chairs—possibly occurring the week of November 13, 2018 Activities report—to be submitted by January 2, 2019 Preparation of committee calendar; transfer of noncurrent records to the clerk of the House Adoption of the Rules of the House for the 116 th Congress—January 3, 2019, or later House adopts resolutions electing chairs and members to committees—after the Rules of the House have been adopted Administrative Matters Committees' approval of their expense resolutions in the form of a simple resolution—late January or February, pursuant to information from the Committee on House Administration House Administration Committee introduces primary committee expense resolution, which is agreed to by the House—March Monthly expenses report submitted by committees to Committee on House Administration—by the 18 th of each month Monthly payroll certification submitted by committees to CAO's Human Resources Office—by the 15 th of each month Quarterly consolidated foreign travel submitted by committees to clerk of the House Committee Organization Committees' adoption of their rules and publication in electronic form and in the Congressional Record —not later than 30 days after the committee chair is elected Plan for subcommittee structure and authority—no later than a committee meeting to adopt committee rules, but more likely during the transition beginning with early organization Election of subcommittee chairs and designation of committee and subcommittee vice chairs—following adoption of a committee's rules Committee Procedure and the Role of a Chair Announcement of date, place, and subject matter of a hearing and publication in electronic form and in the Congressional Record —at least one week prior to the hearing Notice of a committee's markup meeting is published in electronic form and in the Congressional Record —at least three days prior to the meeting Publication of the text to be marked up—not later than 24 hours prior to the meeting's commencement Electronic posting of a committee's recorded votes and of the text of amendments adopted—not later than 48 hours after a vote is taken and not later than 24 hours after an amendment has been adopted Preparation of a committee report on legislation and filing in the House—promptly, but, in general, not later than seven days after a measure has been approved by a committee Legislative Issues and Agenda President's State of the Union address to Congress—typically, the third or fourth week of January President's budget submitted to Congress—by law, no later than the first Monday in February, although the budget has been submitted later than that date Committees report their views and estimates to the Budget Committee—no later than six weeks after the President transmits his budget Committees submit oversight plans to Committees on Oversight and Government Reform, Appropriations, and House Administration—February 15 Congress completes its bicameral agreement to a concurrent resolution on the budget—April 15, although Congress in some years has not completed action or has completed action at a later date House may begin consideration of appropriations bills, even in the absence of final action on a concurrent resolution on the budget—May 15 Under the Congressional Budget Act, House Appropriations Committee is to report its last appropriations bill—June 10, although this date has not been predictive	A committee chair serves as the leader of a committee, with responsibility for setting the course and direction of the panel for committee members and the House and for managing a large professional and paraprofessional staff. The senior committee staff should ensure the chair's goals are carried out effectively. Once a committee chair is selected during the postelection transition period, he or she, often in consultation with others, makes a series of decisions and takes a series of actions. Some actions complete a committee's duties in the Congress just ending. Other actions are taken in anticipation of the new Congress and then in the new Congress. Decisions may be related to the committee's policy calendar; the committee's administrative functions; the chair's responsibilities during committee sessions; the role of committee members; the relationship with the committee's ranking minority member, other chairs, and party leaders; subcommittee leaders; and other subjects. Many decisions are made with a deadline imposed by House rules. Specifically, a committee chair controls the selection of committee staff, authorizes expenditures from the committee budget, establishes operational and ethics policies, determines committee travel allocations, decides the content of the committee website, and is responsible for administration of the committee's rooms, paperwork, and other operations. Most committees entrust the drafting of the budget to the committee chair, although a committee's minority party members seek to ensure that they receive an appropriate allocation of resources. Before the chair introduces a funding resolution, the committee approves the chair's draft budget. The House requires its committees to adopt committee rules in an open session and to publish those rules in both the Congressional Record and electronic form not later than 30 days after the committee chair is elected. A chair normally proposes adopting, with amendments he or she offers, the rules under which the committee operated in the previous Congress. A chair proposes the number and responsibilities of subcommittees for the committee. A chair is also responsible for other documents required of committees under House rules, such as a biennial authorization and oversight plan, a biennial activities report, and a views and estimates report related to the annual congressional budget process. A committee chair establishes the committee agenda; calls hearings; selects witnesses and determines the order of their testimony; presides over hearings and markups; chooses any markup vehicle and pursues an amendment strategy; prepares the committee report accompanying legislation; and discusses, or might negotiate, any of these matters with the ranking minority member. The chair maintains order and decorum during committee meetings and takes various steps to protect the committee's jurisdiction in the referral of legislation and other matters. When a measure is reported by a committee, it is the responsibility of the committee chair to consult the party leadership to determine floor scheduling for the measure. This report covers the period from the House's early organization meetings in November to approximately March or April following the convening of a new Congress.
crs_R44805	crs_R44805_0	What is the Hardest Hit Fund? The Hardest Hit Fund (HHF), created in 2010, is one of several temporary programs that were established to help prevent home mortgage foreclosures in the wake of housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007-2008. It provided funding to 19 states (including the District of Columbia) to design locally tailored initiatives to prevent home foreclosures. Participating states have until December 31, 2020 to use their HHF funds. The first four rounds of funding—a total of $7.6 billion—were allocated in 2010. However, in December 2015 the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) authorized Treasury to make up to an additional $2.0 billion in unused TARP funds available to the HHF. The HHF was intended to provide funding to certain states that were deemed to be the "hardest hit" by the turmoil in housing and financial markets that started in 2007-2008, based on features such as house price declines or high unemployment rates. Funding was allocated through five rounds using different criteria to identify eligible states and allocate funds among the eligible states. In early 2016, after Congress authorized Treasury to provide an additional $2 billion in TARP funds to the program, Treasury allocated this amount to participating states through two phases: Round 5, Phase 1: In February 2016, Treasury allocated $1 billion to participating states based on their population and utilization of previous HHF funds. (Every participating state was using funds for at least two types of programs, and many states were using funds for several different types of programs.) As of December 2016, participating states had drawn about $7 billion of the total $9.6 billion HHF allocation from their Treasury accounts. Of that amount, they had disbursed a total of about $5.8 billion.	The Hardest Hit Fund (HHF), administered by the Department of the Treasury, is one of several temporary programs that were created to help prevent home foreclosures in the aftermath of housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007-2008. It provided a total of $9.6 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds to 19 states (including the District of Columbia) that were deemed to be "hardest hit" by the housing market turmoil, as defined by factors such as house price declines or unemployment rates. In 2010, a total of $7.6 billion was allocated to selected states through four rounds of funding. Different funding rounds used different criteria to identify eligible states. In December 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) authorized Treasury to make up to an additional $2.0 billion in unused TARP funds available to the HHF, bringing total program funding to $9.6 billion. Treasury allocated this additional funding to the states that were already participating in the HHF through two phases in 2016. The Hardest Hit Fund is intended to provide funds to participating states to design foreclosure prevention programs that respond to local conditions. Participating states are using their funds for a variety of programs, including mortgage modifications, helping unemployed homeowners with mortgage payments, facilitating short sales and other foreclosure alternatives, and removing blighted homes, among other programs. Most participating states are using their funding for several different types of programs. As of December 2016, participating states had disbursed about $5.8 billion of the total $9.6 billion allocated to the HHF and assisted over 290,000 homeowners. States have until December 31, 2020, to use their HHF funds.
crs_R44984	crs_R44984_0	The report includes brief information on U.S. arms sales to the region since the end of the Cold War; data on current arms sales by country, with reference to specific cases, as they relate to regional and global geopolitical developments; and analysis of how arms sales shape and reflect U.S. policy in the region in light of actions by Congress and the executive branch. This report also uses the State Department's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) reports, as well as other official and unofficial open-source data. Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Policy While scholars debate the relative effects of arms transfers between nations and the relationship between arms transfers and interstate behavior, arms sales are recognized widely as an important instrument of state power. Therefore, arms sales in the region may become a significant way for the United States and other external actors to influence Middle Eastern partners and political-military outcomes. The Middle East has particular importance for the United States: arms from the United States made up 46.2% of all arms delivered to the Middle East from 2008 to 2011, and 45.8% between 2012 and 2015, outpacing those from the next largest supplier (Russia, whose deliveries totaled 19.1% and 17.5% of all deliveries to the Middle East, respectively). In the Middle East over the past several decades, the United States has sought to utilize arms sales to reinforce major U.S. regional security policy priorities, including the following: 1. the security of Israel and the maintenance of its peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994); 2. counterterrorism; 3. free access of the region's energy resources to global markets; 4. countering Iranian regional influence; and 5. Relative newcomer China may be testing waters in the region and making observations to inform its own industry and strategic goals, particularly with regard to the sale of advanced technologies (such as drones) that other suppliers are reluctant to share. U.S. arms exports, funded at least in part by large amounts of U.S. aid, help maintain Israel's military advantage over its neighbors (see " Israel's Qualitative Military Edge " below), a reflection of the depth and breadth of U.S.-Israel ties. Saudi Arabia has tried to diversify its arms sources, including through a concerted effort in recent years to expand its own defense industrial base. Turkey appears positioned to continue its focus on building up indigenous production and development capabilities, though it remains to be seen to what extent Turkey can become a major arms supplier in the region. The UAE has long had a reported interest in purchasing F-35s. As the U.S. role and presence in Iraq shifts from an active focus on supporting Iraqi operations to one more focused on training and equipping Iraqi forces, the structure and terms of U.S. security assistance may become an issue of greater prominence in the bilateral relationship. As with a number of other Middle East partners, Iraq's human rights record has been a subject of concern for some Members of Congress. In 2014, Qatar was the single largest customer of U.S. foreign military sales, purchasing over $10 billion worth of arms. U.S. Policy and Potential Issues for Congress The countries above and their respective approaches to arms sales affect U.S. foreign policy objectives and congressional interests in multiple ways. Countering Iran U.S. policy in the Middle East appears to be partly driven by a desire to constrain Iran's ability to threaten U.S. partners and/or assets in the region or to constrain the free flow of energy-related commerce through waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz. The U.N. and various nongovernmental organizations have criticized the Saudi-led coalition's bombing campaign. In addition, the legislation would require a briefing on Saudi operations in Yemen before the transfer or notification of proposed sale of such weapons. Although the United States has not provided Turkey with significant military or economic aid since the 1990s, and is not a key trading partner of Turkey, some Members of Congress have tried to limit or place conditions on arms transfers to Turkey.	This report analyzes state-to-state arms sales in the Middle East with a particular focus on U.S. transfers, as authorized and reviewed by Congress. The information in this report, including sales data, is drawn from a number of official and unofficial open sources. Arms sales are an important tool that states can use to exercise their influence. The Middle East has long been a key driver of the global trade in weapons, disproportionately so when accounting for population. Some states in this heavily-militarized and contested region are major arms purchasers, empowered by partnerships with outside supporters and wealth derived from vast energy reserves. In part due to external relationships, some Middle Eastern countries have developed and continue to develop military industrial bases that supply some of their own defense needs and/or generate profits through arms exports. Congress has constitutional powers and a number of legal prerogatives related to arms sales. In some cases, these powers and prerogatives allow Members to exert considerable influence over foreign sales. Because of the large quantity of U.S. arms sold to Middle Eastern states, a number of key historical episodes involving executive-legislative interaction on arms sales relate to the Middle East. Given that some U.S. policymakers across party lines have expressed support for a smaller military footprint in the Middle East, and that executive branch strategic documents have increasingly emphasized "building partner capacity" to advance U.S. strategic goals, arms sales could become increasingly important to U.S. foreign policy in the region. This shift would expand Congress's role in the formation and direction of that policy. The United States is the single largest arms supplier to the Middle East and has been for decades. However, other major producers like Russia, France, and China are also key players in the region. Their respective strategies and goals for arms sales appear to differ in some ways. This report focuses on recent arms sales, primarily from the United States, to seven Middle Eastern states: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, Turkey, and Qatar. These states, some of the region's largest arms purchasers, have taken a range of approaches as they assess various means of pursuing influence and security in an unstable region. Some appear to be increasing their commitment to the United States as their primary security guarantor, while others may be interested both in building up their own domestic arms production capabilities and in seeking out alternative suppliers. When considering domestic or non-U.S. procurement, these states may focus on indications of U.S. military or political commitment to the region or U.S. willingness to share technology relative to other potential suppliers. Still others may incorporate aspects of various approaches as they consider how arms purchases from the United States or others fit into their broader foreign and defense policies. This report concludes by considering a number of arms sales-related issues of congressional interest. Arms sales are often a key component in Congress's approach to advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as preserving Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors and countering Iran's regional influence. Arms transfer policy often figures prominently in the U.S. approach to specific ongoing crises, like the Saudi-led coalition's military effort in Yemen. In addition, arms sales can factor into broader policy issues, such as human rights and the content and balance of U.S. foreign assistance. The report discusses a number of options available to Members of Congress, including those related to oversight, reporting requirements, checks on executive action, and conditions on transfers or funding.
crs_RS21128	crs_RS21128_0	In 2011, the OECD celebrated its 50th anniversary. In many cases, these committees serve as conduits for providing information on work that is being conducted by officials among the OECD member countries on economic issues. The United States, which appropriated about $82.2 million in FY2012 (the Administration has asked Congress to appropriate $83.2 million in FY2014), contributed 21.58% of the OECD's budget. One directorate collects data, monitors trends, and analyzes and forecasts economic developments, while other directorates research social changes or evolving patterns in trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxation, and more. The OECD produces (1) semi-annual economic outlook reports that analyze economic conditions generally and provide forecasts of economic growth in member countries; (2) comprehensive reports on the individual members of the OECD; and (3) a vast amount of statistical information and data on the member countries that are made comparable to facilitate comparison and analysis regarding best policies and practices. In 2011, the OECD members adopted an updated version of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises that (1) includes a new chapter on human rights that is consistent with the United Nations' Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; (2) provides a new and comprehensive approach to due diligence and responsible supply chain management; (3) makes changes to such chapters as combating bribery, employment and industrial relations, bribe solicitation and extortion, environment, consumer interests, and disclosure and taxation; and (4) provides clearer and reinforced procedural guidance to strengthen the role of the National Contact Points, who hear complaints in each country. Assisting G - 20 countries in sharpening their social response to the crisis . At the G-20 St. Petersburg summit in June 2013, the OECD, in combination with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), delivered a report on the contribution global value chains can make to sustainable growth in advanced and developing countries. Tax Havens, Anti-Corruption, and the OECD The OECD also has addressed the issue of tax havens in various forms since it began in 1961. According to the OECD, standards on transparency and exchange of information developed by the OECD were endorsed by all of the key countries, including jurisdictions which had opposed exchanging bank information. A group of OECD members, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States, have adopted a gentleman's agreement on the use of export credits offered by official export credit agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank in the United States. Develop recommendations regarding best practices in the design of rules to limit base erosion through the use of interest expenses, transfer pricing, and other financial transactions. Others, concerned over the size of the U.S. government budget deficit, question the value of the U.S. contribution to the OECD. OECD members have also committed to make the benefits of free trade and open markets more accessible to developing economies. U.S. delegates actively participated in efforts to strengthen competition and antitrust policies within OECD countries, and to extend and strengthen the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention.	The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2011, a time when the global economy was struggling to recover from the financial crisis and slow economic growth. The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization in which the 34 member countries discuss and develop key policy recommendations that often serve as the basis for international standards and practices. In addition, the OECD members analyze economic and social policy and share expertise and exchanges with more than 70 developing and emerging economies. The 34 member countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. While all of the member countries are considered to be economically advanced and collectively produce 60% of the world's goods and services, membership is limited only by a country's commitment to a market economy and a pluralistic democracy. The OECD also has extended an invitation to the Russian Federation for membership, which includes meeting rigorous best practices relative to anti-bribery and anti-corruption standards. Furthermore, the OECD works with other potential partners such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa with a view toward possible membership. The member countries rely on the OECD Secretariat in Paris to collect data; monitor trends; analyze and forecast economic developments; and research social changes and patterns in trade, environment, agriculture, society, innovation, corporate and public governance, taxation, sustainable development, and other areas to inform their discussions and to assist them in pursuing their efforts to develop common policies and practices. Following the financial crisis, the OECD played a major role in providing cross-country analyses of market reforms and programs to stimulate growth. The United States has sparred periodically with other OECD member countries over various issues, including U.S. antidumping laws and the size of the U.S. financial contribution. Daniel W. Yohannes was appointed in 2013 by President Obama to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the OECD. Key issues for Congress include OECD work on coordinating national approaches to curtailing bribery and the illicit use of tax havens. Congress appropriated about $82.2 million to the OECD in FY2013; the budget request for FY2014 was $83.2 million.
crs_R44976	crs_R44976_0	R ecent tax reform discussions have included possibly changing the tax treatment of business net operating losses (NOLs). This report provides an overview of the current tax treatment of NOLs as well as a brief legislative history. The report also explains how losses can be used to smooth income and tax liabilities. The report concludes by reviewing several policy options and considerations that Congress may find useful as it continues to debate tax reform. Overview A business incurs an NOL when its taxable income is negative. Businesses have no tax liability in a loss year. In addition, under current law a business can use an NOL to obtain a refund for taxes paid in prior years or to reduce taxes owed in the future. Extend the Carryback Period The intent of allowing loss to be carried back and carried forward is to give taxpayers the ability to smooth out changes in business income, and therefore taxes, over the business cycle. Currently, if a business is unable to fully utilize its losses by offsetting income earned in the past two years, it may carry them forward for up to 20 years. Tax Refund for Losses As an alternative to a carryback and carryforward regime, Congress could allow taxpayers to receive a tax refund in the year losses were incurred.	Tax reform could result in any number of changes to current tax policy. One modification that could occur is the tax treatment of net operating losses (NOLs). An NOL is incurred when a business taxpayer has negative taxable income. A business has no tax liability in the year they incur a loss. Additionally, a loss can be "carried back" for a refund on taxes paid in the past two years or "carried forward" for up to 20 years to reduce future taxes. The intent of the NOL carryback and carryforward regime is to give taxpayers the ability to smooth out changes in business income, and therefore taxes, over the business cycle. Allowing losses to offset past or future income may also reduce the distorting effects of taxation, and promote investment and economic efficiency. This report provides an overview of the current tax treatment of NOLs as well as a brief legislative history. The report also explains the mechanics by which losses can be used to receive a refund for taxes paid in the past, or to reduce taxes owed in the future. The report concludes by reviewing several policy options and considerations that Congress may find useful as they continue to debate tax reform, including extending the carryback period, allowing an immediate tax refund for losses, and allowing interest to accrue on losses that are carried forward. Any of these changes could enhance the ability to smooth income and economic efficiency depending on their design, but would also reduce federal revenue. This report will be updated in the event of legislative changes.
crs_RL32139	crs_RL32139_0	Background and History of the Issue Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections originated at leastin part as a way to reduce election fraud such as tampering with ballots to change the vote count fora candidate or party. Australian Secret Ballot. Computer-assisted counting of document ballots can be done very rapidly, thus speedingthe reporting of election results. It makes some kinds of tampering more difficult than with manual counting, butit does not eliminate them, and it creates possibilities for tampering with the counting software andhardware. DREs (direct recording electronic systems) are the first completely computerized voting systems. They wereintroduced in the 1970s. Touchscreen and other DREs using computer-style displays are arguably the most versatile anduser-friendly of any current voting system. DREs and HAVA. The popularity of DREs, particularly the touchscreen variety, has grown in recent years, (8) and their use is expected to increasesubstantially under provisions of HAVA. (9) Third, the Act requires, also beginning in 2006,that each polling place used in a federal election have at least one voting machine that is fullyaccessible for persons with disabilities. Security Concerns about DREs. Threats Kinds of Attacks and Attackers. Computer Code. In the recent public debate about the security of DREs, much of the attention has focused on the computer code. (63) Some experts have proposed that such an approachbe used in the development of voting systems. Confidence in DREs There appears to be an emerging consensus among computer scientists that current DREs, and to a lesser extent other computer-assisted voting systems, do not adhere sufficiently to currentlyaccepted security principles for computer systems, especially given the central importance of votingsystems to the functioning of democratic government. 231(a)(1)). Use Open Source Software Some experts have proposed the use of open source software code for at least some voting system software. (2) The use of printerswould substantially increase both the cost of administering an election and the risk of mechanicalfailure of a voting machine. Inaddition, there are no proven cases of tampering with DREs or other computer-assisted votingsystems in public elections. States. However, this approach might also leadto a patchwork of responses, which could be challenging for vendors to meet and could lead to somestates being more vulnerable to tampering than others. The Election Assistance Commission created by HAVA will have some responsibilities to provide guidance and to perform studies andresearch specifically relating to the security of voting systems. They include using current procedures and security mechanisms, with improvements as necessary;improving standards for the development and certification of voting systems; using open-sourcesoftware for voting systems; and several methods to improve the transparency and verifiability ofelections, including voter-verified paper ballots and an electronic version of that approach, use ofmodular electronic voting architecture that physically separates the voter interface from the castingand counting functions; and a system that uses cryptographic protocols to permit voters to verify thattheir ballots were cast as intended and that no votes were improperly changed, omitted, or added.	In July 2003, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities released a security analysis of software purportedly from a direct recording electronic (DRE) touchscreen votingmachine of a major voting-system vendor. The study drew public attention to a long-simmeringcontroversy about whether current DREs are vulnerable to tampering that could influence theoutcome of an election. Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections, such as the secret ballot and mechanical lever voting machines, originated at least in part as a way to reduce electionfraud and abuse. Computer-assisted counting of ballots, first used in the 1960s, can be done veryrapidly and makes some kinds of tampering more difficult. However, it does not eliminate thepotential for fraud, and it has created new possibilities for tampering through manipulation of thecounting software and hardware. DREs, introduced in the 1970s, are the first voting systems to becompletely computerized. Touchscreen DREs are arguably the most versatile and user-friendly ofany current voting system. Their use is expected to increase substantially under provisions of TheHelp America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252 ), especially the requirement that, beginningin 2006, each polling place used in a federal election have at least one voting machine that is fullyaccessible for persons with disabilities. With DREs, unlike document-ballot systems, the voter sees only a representation of the ballot; votes are registered electronically. Some computer security experts believe that this and otherfeatures of DREs make them more vulnerable to tampering than other kinds of voting systems,especially through the use of malicious computer code. While there are some differences of opinionamong experts about the extent and seriousness of those security concerns, there appears to be anemerging consensus that in general, current DREs do not adhere sufficiently to currently acceptedsecurity principles for computer systems, especially given the central importance of voting systemsto the functioning of democratic government. Others caution, however, that there are nodemonstrated cases of computer tampering in public elections, and any major changes that might bemade to improve security could have unanticipated negative effects of their own. Several proposalshave been made to improve the security of DREs and other computer-assisted voting systems. Theyinclude (1) ensuring that accepted security protocols are followed appropriately, (2) improvingsecurity standards and certification of voting systems, (3) use of open-source computer code, and (4)improvements in verifiability and transparency. Much of the current debate has focused on which such proposals should be implemented and through what means -- in particular, whether federal involvement is necessary. Some states arealready addressing these issues. The Election Assistance Commission established by HAVA willhave some responsibilities relating to voting system security and could address this controversydirectly. Some observers have also proposed federal funding for research and development in thisarea, while others have proposed legislative solutions including enhancement of the auditrequirements under HAVA.
crs_R42465	crs_R42465_0	Introduction Oil is a critical resource for the U.S. economy. Net oil import volumes and share of consumption peaked in 2005 and then declined through 2011 as a result of economic and policy-driven changes in domestic supply and demand. It shows U.S. oil consumption and production as well as the resulting net imports, gross imports, and exports: In 2011, the United States consumed 18.8 million barrels a day (Mb/d) of petroleum products, down 2 Mb/d or 9% since 2005. Gross imports are at their lowest level since 2002. Imports by Source More than a third of U.S. gross imports came from Canada and Mexico in 2011. About 40% came from members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), though most of this is from OPEC countries outside the Persian Gulf, such as Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, and Angola. Region Regionally, the largest share of U.S. imports come into the Gulf Coast region, which also has about half of the refining capacity in the United States. All regions of the country import more crude than petroleum products except for the East Coast, which received petroleum products from Canada, St. Croix, Russia, Europe, and elsewhere in 2011. Oil Exports Almost all U.S. exports are petroleum products, not crude oil, due to both policy (discussed below in " Export Restrictions on Crude Oil and Petroleum Products ") and commercial factors, particularly that the U.S. needs more crude than it produces. Exports have increased from 1.2 Mb/d in 2005 to 2.9 Mb/d in 2011. Export of gasoline has also increased. In 2011, more than 60% of U.S. exports went to countries in the Western Hemisphere. Exports occur as a result of commercial decisions by oil market participants which reflect current oil market conditions as well as past investment in refining. Net Imports Fall by 33% Since 2005 Net oil imports—gross imports minus exports—fell from a peak of 12.5 Mb/d in 2005 to 8.4 Mb/d in 2011. Looking Forward: Falling Oil Import Dependence A consensus is emerging among energy analysts that U.S. oil imports may be past their peak, reached in 2005. This forecast would correspond to net oil imports declining from 60% of domestic consumption in 2005 to 45% in 2011 and to less than 40% after 2020. Oil, the Trade Balance, and U.S. Economy Despite the decline in net import volumes, the cost of net imports has generally increased due to rising oil prices. The aggregate national cost of oil imports is a function of the volume of oil imported and exported and the price of that oil. The United States spent about $327 billion on net oil imports in 2011 (see Table 7 ). Being a net importer of a particular good is not necessarily negative for an economy: The United States imports many products because they would be more costly to consumers, businesses, or taxpayers were they produced domestically. Greater national oil import dependence can also amplify the negative economic impacts of oil price increases. Why Are Oil Prices Rising? Policy Considerations Oil import and export developments pose a host of policy issues, some of which are considered below. Concerns about import dependence continue to generate interest in policy options to directly discourage imports or to reduce the need for imports by increasing domestic supply and decreasing demand. Rising exports at a time of rising prices have led to calls to restrict such trade. The debate around the Keystone XL pipeline involves concerns about both imports and exports. Also discussed is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, created to provide a short term policy option in case of supply disruptions at home or abroad.	Over the last six years, net oil imports have fallen by 33% to average 8.4 million barrels per day (Mb/d) in 2011. This represents 45% of domestic consumption, down from 60% in 2005. Oil is a critical resource for the U.S. economy, but despite policy makers' long-standing concern, U.S. oil imports had generally increased for decades until peaking in 2005. Since then, the economic downturn and higher oil prices were a drag on oil consumption, while price-driven private investment and policy helped increase domestic supply of oil and oil alternatives. Net imports are gross imports minus exports. The decline in net imports has manifested itself as a decrease in gross imports and an increase in exports of petroleum products. Gross U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products averaged 11.4 Mb/d in 2011, down 17% since 2005. More than a third of gross imports came from Canada and Mexico in 2011. About 40% came from members of the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), mostly from OPEC members outside the Persian Gulf. Regionally, the largest share of U.S. imports come into the Gulf Coast region, which holds about half of U.S. refining capacity and sends petroleum products to other parts of the country and abroad. All regions of the country import more crude than refined products except for the East Coast, where petroleum products imports may rise further due to refinery closures. U.S. oil exports, made up almost entirely of petroleum products, averaged 2.9 Mb/d in 2011. This is up from export of 1.2 Mb/d in 2005, led by growing export of distillates (diesel and related fuels) and gasoline. More than 60% of U.S. exports went to countries in the Western Hemisphere, particularly to countries such as Mexico and Canada from which the U.S. imports crude oil. Exports occur largely as a result of commercial decisions by oil market participants which reflect current oil market conditions as well as past investment in refining. As a result, net oil imports fell from a peak of 12.5 Mb/d in 2005 to 8.4 Mb/d in 2011, their lowest level since 1995. A consensus is generally emerging among energy analysts that U.S. oil imports may be past their peak, reached in 2005. Imports as a share of consumption are expected to fall further, to less than 40% after 2020 driven by tighter fuel economy standards and increased domestic supply. Despite the decline in net import volumes, the cost of net imports has increased due to rising oil prices. The aggregate national cost of oil imports is a function of the volume of oil imported and the price of that oil. The United States spent about $327 billion on net oil imports in 2011. Being a net importer of a particular good is not necessarily negative for an economy, but greater national oil import dependence can amplify the negative economic impacts of oil price increases. Oil import and export developments pose a host of policy issues. Concerns about import dependence continue to generate interest in policy options to directly discourage imports or to reduce the need for imports by increasing domestic supply and decreasing demand. Rising exports at a time of rising prices has led to calls for policies to restrict such trade. The debate around the Keystone XL pipeline involves concerns about imports, exports, and the environment. The rising cost for fuels has led to calls for release of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, meant to provide a short term policy option in case of supply disruptions. Policy options may entail various economic, fiscal, and environmental trade-offs.
crs_R44640	crs_R44640_0	In order to take advantage of these price disparities, at least six bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would allow individuals to import lower-cost prescription drugs from foreign jurisdictions. The bills differ on the jurisdictions from which imports would be permissible. Some bills restrict the sources of prescription drugs to Canadian pharmacies; some to a set of specifically named jurisdictions; while others potentially apply to any foreign country. None of these bills has been enacted. None of the bills introduced in the 114 th Congress addresses the intellectual property implications of this so-called "parallel importation" or "re-importation." Many prescription drugs are subject to patent rights in the United States. As a result, even if a foreign drug is judged safe and effective for domestic use, brand-name firms may nonetheless be able to block the unauthorized importation of prescription drugs through use of their patent rights. In this context, the term "parallel imports" refers to patented products that are legitimately distributed abroad, and then sold to consumers in the United States without the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer. Although these "grey market goods" are authentic products that were sold under the authorization of the brand-name drug company, they entered the U.S. market outside the usual distribution channels for that drug. As a result, brand-name drug companies may potentially block imports of patented medications into the United States even if the imported good is the patent owner's own product, legitimately sold to a customer in a foreign jurisdiction. Related Issues In addition to the issue of patent infringement, the parallel importation of patented pharmaceuticals potentially raises other issues. In some circumstances, however, the patent owner may attempt to restrict a customer's use of a good. Article 17:9, paragraph 4 of the United States–Australia FTA has a similar effect, stipulating: Each Party shall provide that the exclusive right of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a product that results from a patented process, without the consent of the patent owner shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory, at least where the patentee has placed restrictions on importation by contract or other means. If the possibility of an infringement action against unauthorized importers of patented pharmaceuticals is deemed sound, then no action need be taken. Alternatively, Congress could confirm the Federal Circuit's decision in Lexmark v. Impression Products , which rejects the doctrine of international exhaustion and confines the patent exhaustion principle to sales that occurred within the United States. Another statutory mechanism for promoting the importation of patented drugs is to immunize specific individuals from infringement liability.	Prescription drugs often cost far more in the United States than in other countries. Some consumers have attempted to import medications from abroad in order to realize cost savings. The practice of importing prescription drugs outside the distribution channels established by the brand-name drug company is commonly termed "parallel importation" or "re-importation." Parallel imports are authentic products that are legitimately distributed abroad and then sold to consumers in the United States, without the permission of the authorized U.S. dealer. Numerous bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would ease the ability of individuals to import lower-cost prescription drugs from foreign jurisdictions. None of these bills has been enacted. Each bill would allow individuals to import drugs from foreign jurisdictions, although the bills differ on the jurisdictions from which imports would be permissible. Some bills are restricted to Canada; some to a set of specifically named jurisdictions; while others potentially apply to any foreign country. None of these bills addresses intellectual property issues that may arise through parallel importation. However, many prescription drugs are subject to patent rights in the United States. In its 2016 decision in Lexmark International v. Impression Products, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed that the owner of a U.S. patent may prevent imports of patented goods, even in circumstances where the patent holder itself sold those goods outside the United States. The Lexmark opinion squarely declined to extend the "exhaustion" doctrine—under which patent rights in a product are spent upon the patent owner's first sale of the patented product—to sales that occurred in foreign countries. The court's ruling will in some cases allow brand-name pharmaceutical firms to block the unauthorized parallel importation of prescription drugs through use of their patent rights. In addition to any patent rights they possess, brand-name drug companies may place label licenses on their medications. A label license may be drafted in order to restrict use of a drug to the jurisdiction in which it was sold. As a result, in addition to a charge of patent infringement, an unauthorized parallel importer may potentially face liability for breach of contract. Introduction of an "international exhaustion" rule restricted to pharmaceuticals does not appear to be restricted by the provisions of the so-called TRIPS Agreement, which is the component of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements concerning intellectual property. Another possible legislative response is the immunization of specific individuals, such as pharmacies or importers, from patent infringement liability. Alternatively, no legislative action need be taken if the current possibility of an infringement action against unauthorized importers of patented pharmaceuticals is deemed satisfactory.

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