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gao_HEHS-96-95	gao_HEHS-96-95_0	Controlling Costs and Improving Performance Are Leading Influences in Guideline Adoption Health plans we reviewed had three strong motives for adopting guidelines: pressure to moderate expenditures, to show a high performance level across key quality indicators when compared with other plans, and to comply with accreditation and regulatory requirements. These plans view practice guidelines as tools to achieve these ends by promoting greater uniformity within their own physician networks and by helping physicians increase their efficiency, improve clinical decision-making, and eliminate inappropriate procedures. Therefore, guidelines adopted by a consensus of local physicians are more likely to be accepted. Customization Also Driven by Local Organizational Constraints Plans have a number of other reasons for customizing clinical practice guidelines. Cost-Effectiveness Concerns Plans we visited noted that clinical practice guidelines often fail to provide needed information on what is cost-effective care. In its 1992 report, the Institute of Medicine recommended that a clinical practice guideline include information on both the health and cost implications of alternative treatment strategies. Format may also be an issue with practice guidelines developed by health plans. Finally, some changes could be considered substantial. Plan managers also told us that their needs for medical technology assessments and outcomes data remain unmet. Instead, they should publish and update summaries and evaluations of evidence on medical conditions and services so that plans could use this information to develop and update their own guideline recommendations. Other plans proposed that the federal government increase funding to develop useful practice guideline tools, such as methods to incorporate cost assessments and patient preferences into practice guidelines.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how managed health plans make use of existing clinical practice guidelines. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) clinical practice guidelines promote greater uniformity within physician networks, encourage improved efficiency and clinical decision-making, and eliminate unnecessary care; (2) several health plans have adopted clinical practice guidelines to control costs, improve performance on standardized measures, receive accreditation, and comply with regulatory requirements; (3) due to time and fiscal constraints, many health plans customize published clinical guidelines rather than generate original guidelines; (4) physicians are more likely to use a clinical practice guideline if it is developed by local health providers; (5) managed health plans customize existing clinical practice guidelines to suit alternative treatments, available resources, population needs, and format and currency concerns; (6) while health plans modify existing clinical practice guidelines to varying degrees, extensive changes could jeopardize the guidelines' effectiveness; and (7) some health plans would prefer that the federal government publish and update evidence on medical conditions and services, develop useful practice guideline tools, and perform outcomes research and medical technology assessments that would help them to develop, modify, and update their guidelines.
gao_HEHS-96-30	gao_HEHS-96-30_0	ORA’s Restructuring Plan—ORA 21 ORA refers to the plan for the proposed laboratory structure as ORA 21. Participants in the ORA senior staff meeting discussed and reviewed each option and reached a consensus to consolidate the laboratories by creating five multipurpose mega-labs and four special-purpose labs. However, we found that ORA made assumptions that may have inflated the projected costs of replacing several laboratories. ORA’s claims that its equipment and labs are obsolete are also questionable. Such inflated replacement cost figures raise questions about ORA’s estimated cost savings from ORA 21. Specifically, it believes that (1) ORA’s cost estimates (based on a space requirement of 650 square feet per analyst) are appropriate, (2) consolidation will result in efficient ORA operations, (3) the site selection for its mega-labs was based on reasonable criteria, and (4) its current equipment and facilities are obsolete. We found that ORA (1) has not demonstrated why existing space requirements in its newest facilities (which are significantly less than 650 square feet per analyst) are inadequate; (2) does not have adequate measurable data to support its claim that consolidation would achieve certain benefits and efficiencies; (3) appears to have based site selection mainly on the availability of construction funds or congressional indications that such funds would be available; and (4) has not demonstrated that its laboratories lack state-of-the-art equipment because of its current facility capability or that its schedule to replace equipment would differ if ORA consolidated its labs. We reviewed agency procedures and data governing its plan to restructure field laboratory facilities. 5. FDA provided us with documentation for obtaining such planned operational efficiencies. 18. 20. It does point out, however, that FDA may have overstated the projected monetary and efficiency gains of its proposed laboratory consolidations.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) plan to consolidate its Office of Regulatory Affairs' (ORA) 18 field laboratories for product testing, focusing on: (1) the validity of projected cost savings and operational efficiencies; and (2) site selection criteria. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the 20-year consolidation plan, known as ORA 21, proposes to create five mega-laboratories and four special-purpose laboratories; (2) ORA based its plan on the belief that its current facilities are old, need costly repairs, and do not meet the needs for conducting regulatory science in the future; (3) ORA may have overstated the consolidation plan's projected cost savings because ORA made several assumptions about replacement costs, construction costs, and space and staffing requirements; (4) the plan's claims for achieving greater operational efficiencies are also questionable, and ORA did not substantiate claims regarding obsolete equipment, supervisor/analyst ratios, laboratory efficiency, and staff relocation; and (5) ORA conducted limited analysis of the relative efficiency of proposed laboratory sites and based its site selections on areas where it believed that it would receive congressional funding approval.
gao_GAO-02-46T	gao_GAO-02-46T_0	When we refer to public- private partnerships, we are referring to partnerships in which the federal government contributes real property and a private entity contributes financial capital and borrowing ability to redevelop or renovate the real property. The net cash flow is then divided between the private partner and the federal government at an agreed-upon percentage. Multiple potential benefits to the federal government were identified. These potential benefits include the utilization of the untapped value of real property, conversion of buildings that are currently a net cost to GSA into net attainment of efficient and repaired federal space, reduction of costs incurred in functionally inefficient buildings, protection of public interests in historic properties, and creation of financial returns for the government. The properties that were strong candidates for partnerships were located in areas with a strong federal and nonfederal demand for space, and many had untapped value that the partnership could utilize, such as excess land on which a new or expanded building could be built.	What GAO Found This testimony describes the benefits to the federal government of public-private partnerships on real property. Under these partnerships, the private sector finances the renovation or redevelopment of real property contributed by the federal government. Each partner then shares in the net cash flow. Key factors typically considered in public-private partnerships are whether the properties are in areas with a strong real estate market or strong demand for office space. As a result of these partnerships, the federal government can potentially gain efficient, repaired space, and properties that were once a net cost to the government can become revenue producers. This testimony summarized a July report (GAO-01-906).
gao_GAO-12-117	gao_GAO-12-117_0	The NPG identifies required inspections and optional inspections. Pilot Schools’ Training Varies, and Although All Students Must Pass the Same Test, Concerns Exist Related to the Quality of the Testing and Other Training Requirements The roughly 3,400 U.S. pilot schools can be divided into three categories: (1) non-collegiate flight instructor-based schools, (2) non-collegiate vocational pilot schools, and (3) collegiate aviation schools. However, all student pilots have to successfully complete ground and flight training and pass the same knowledge and practical tests prior to receiving a pilot certificate from FAA. In addition, modern aircraft used by regional airlines have evolved and the operational demands have increased on pilots in high-altitude and complex airline operations; yet, U.S. pilot training requirements for certification of commercial pilots were last revised in 1997. Some stakeholders, including representatives of regional airlines, we interviewed said the current training regulations for commercial pilots should be revised to incorporate additional training that would improve the competency of entry-level first officer applicants. FAA has initiated several efforts to address issues related to pilot training and certification testing. 3). However, when pilots are hired by airlines, these types of training are provided by the airline to ensure that pilots are adequately competent in these and other advanced training areas—some required by FAA for airline operations. European Pilot Training Differs from the U.S. System, in Part Due to Varying Philosophies and Circumstances Similar to FAA, EASA provides the regulatory framework for oversight of European countries’ national aviation authorities, which carry out the requirements for pilot licensing and training. The United States and Europe also have differing approaches to the pilot certification knowledge and practical testing. FAA Completed Most Required Inspections of Pilot Schools, but Oversight of Examiners and Instructors Is Difficult to Assess The Majority of Required Inspections of Pilot Schools Were Completed from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 For fiscal year 2010, our analysis of FAA’s PTRS data found that FAA completed about 78 percent of the required inspections for the 545 pilot schools with a Part 141 certificate (vocational schools and most collegiate aviation schools). We were unable to determine whether the data were missing because they were entered incorrectly into PTRS, or because the inspections did not take place as required. As a result, we could not determine the identity and number of schools that needed to be inspected. Thus, FAA does not have the ability to measure FAA’s annual performance in meeting the NPG inspection requirements for pilot schools and pilot examiners based on PTRS inspection data, or to make risk-based, data- driven decisions about the scope of its discretionary, planned work activities that include flight instructors. FAA’s national office does not monitor the annual completion of the requirements outlined in the annual NPGs related to monitoring pilot schools and pilot examiners. Specifically, we reviewed a range of reports from GAO, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Congressional Research Service, International Civil Aviation Organization, National Transportation Safety Board, and Bureau of Labor Statistics that included general background information on a variety of related issues on U.S. pilot training, such as pilot certification and training issues in the U. S.; historical trends, current supply and demand, and forecasts for commercial airline pilots; types and requirements of pilot training schools; FAA regulatory training requirements for different levels of pilot certification; FAA oversight of U.S. pilot training system; and comparable international pilot training systems. The National Association of Flight Instructors reported that Sallie Mae took a $1 billion loss in 2009 for educational loans, which explains, in part, the reason it has become increasingly difficult to obtain funding.	Why GAO Did This Study Regional airlines have experienced the last six fatal commercial airline accidents, and pilot performance has been cited as a potential contributory factor in four of these accidents. As a result, Congress and others have raised questions about, among other issues, the initial pilot education and training required before pilots can be hired by airlines, at which time they receive further training. The initial training is provided by pilot schools overseen by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As requested, this report discusses (1) the various types of U.S. pilot schools, how they compare, and associated issues; (2) key similarities and differences between the U.S. and international approaches to pilot training; and (3) how and to what extent FAA carries out oversight of pilot training and certification. To address these issues, GAO reviewed literature, legislation, regulations, and FAA documents and inspection and enforcement data; interviewed agency and industry officials; and studied the training approach in Europe because of the different training model and visited four European countries. What GAO Found The approximately 3,400 pilot schools in the United States can be divided into three types: (1) flight instructor based, (2) vocational, and (3) collegiate. The school types vary in several ways, but all pilot students must pass the same knowledge and flight tests to obtain a pilot certificate from FAA. Airline operations have evolved operationally and technologically, but the pilot training requirements for certification of commercial pilots were last revised in 1997. FAA and some industry stakeholders have indicated that current requirements for commercial pilots should incorporate additional training to improve the competency of entry-level regional airline pilots. FAA has initiated or planned a number of efforts to address these issues and recently enacted legislation requires FAA to implement regulations to increase pilot requirements for airlines by August 2013. The U.S. and Europe both offer the same pilot certifications but the training models differ, in part, due to training philosophies and other circumstances. The U.S. training approach emphasizes proficiency on actual flight training, while Europe's approach tends to emphasize academic instruction with more knowledge training requirements and testing. European pilot schools have also developed more comprehensive student screening processes than in the U.S. FAA has an annual inspection program that includes the oversight of pilot schools, pilot examiners, and flight instructors, the gatekeepers for the initial pilot training process. GAO analysis of FAA inspection data showed a 78 percent completion rate of the required inspections for pilot schools in fiscal year 2010, but, due to insufficient information, GAO was unable to determine completion percentages for prior years. Similarly, GAO could not determine 1) whether FAA completed the required inspections for pilot examiners or 2) the reasons that the discretionary inspections of flight instructors--which are generally optional--were conducted. Furthermore, FAA's national office does not adequately monitor the completion of annual inspection activities due, in part, to an inability to aggregate inspection data from the local district offices that conduct the inspections. Thus, FAA does not have a comprehensive system in place to adequately measure its performance in meeting annual inspection requirements, which could make it difficult to ensure regulatory compliance and that safety standards are being met.
gao_GAO-11-480	gao_GAO-11-480_0	The Coast Guard Continues to Improve Its Acquisition Management Capabilities, but Many Programs Face Challenges Coast Guard Updates of Policies and Processes for Major Acquisition Programs Better Reflect Best Practices and Respond to Prior GAO Recommendations The Coast Guard updated its overarching acquisition policy since we last reported in July 2010 to better reflect best practices and respond to our prior recommendations, and to more closely align its policy with the DHS Acquisition Management Directive Number 102-01. In response to the Inspector General’s report, the Coast Guard has taken steps to prioritize its action items; however, it is too soon to tell the outcome of these actions. Acquisition workforce vacancies have decreased, but program managers have ongoing concerns about staffing program offices. Coast Guard Leverages DOD Contracts and Expertise to Support Programs, But Program Staff Could Benefit From Better Insight of Available Interagency Agreements Coast Guard Major Acquisition Programs Have Benefited from Leveraging DOD Expertise and Contracts According to the Coast Guard, it currently has 81 interagency agreements, memorandums of agreement, and other arrangements in place primarily with DOD agencies to support its major acquisition programs. According to Coast Guard officials, they rely on DOD experience and technical expertise because they both procure similar major equipment, including ships and aircraft. Examples range from acquiring products and services from established DOD contracts to using engineering and testing expertise from the Navy. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard also collaborated with Navy cost estimators and contracting staff to prepare for negotiations to award the November 2010 production contract for the fourth National Security Cutter. According to Coast Guard officials, examples include the following: The Coast Guard’s HC-130J program coordinated C-130J contracting efforts through the Air Force acquisition office’s contract rather than contracting directly with the aircraft manufacturer and benefited from discounts in ordering along with other DOD agencies. DOD Resources Available to Support Major Acquisition Programs May Not Be Transparent to Coast Guard Program Staff Coast Guard program managers largely rely on informal contacts to learn about the agreements in place with DOD to support program activities. However, due to limited attention devoted to this issue, Coast Guard officials noted that only 5 of the approximately 81 interagency agreements are in a data system accessible to program staff. Conclusions The Coast Guard has continued to make progress in strengthening its capabilities to manage its acquisition portfolio by updating acquisition policies and practices as well as reducing vacancies in the acquisition workforce. DHS provided oral comments stating that it concurred with the recommendation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology The Coast Guard Authorization Act of fiscal year 2010, as amended, specified that “Within 180 days after the date of enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, the Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—(1) contains an assessment of current Coast Guard acquisition and management capabilities to manage Level 1 and Level 2 acquisitions; (2) includes recommendations as to how the Coast Guard can improve its acquisition management, either through internal reforms or by seeking acquisition expertise from the Department of Defense (DOD); and (3) addresses specifically the question of whether the Coast Guard can better leverage Department of Defense or other agencies’ contracts that would meet the needs of Level 1 or Level 2 acquisitions in order to obtain the best possible price.” To determine the Coast Guard’s current management capabilities for its major acquisition programs, we evaluated the Coast Guard’s acquisition policies and processes, status of its acquisition workforce, and execution of its major programs since we last reported on the Coast Guard’s acquisitions and acquisition management in June and July 2010. To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard leverages DOD and other agency contracts or expertise to support its major acquisition programs, we examined the Coast Guard’s interagency agreements and identified the agencies the Coast Guard most commonly used to support major acquisition programs. Further, we reviewed relevant GAO and DHS Inspector General reports.	Why GAO Did This Study The Coast Guard manages a broad $27 billion major acquisition portfolio intended to modernize its ships, aircraft, command and control systems, and other capabilities. GAO has reported extensively on the Coast Guard's significant acquisition challenges, including project challenges in its Deepwater program. GAO's prior work on the Coast Guard acquisition programs identified problems in costs, management, and oversight, but it also recognized several steps the Coast Guard has taken to improve acquisition management. In response to the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, GAO (1) assessed Coast Guard capabilities to manage its major acquisition programs, and (2) determined the extent to which the Coast Guard leverages Department of Defense (DOD) and other agency contracts or expertise to support its major acquisition programs. GAO reviewed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard acquisition documents, GAO and DHS Inspector General reports, and selected DOD contracts; and interviewed Coast Guard, DHS, and DOD officials What GAO Found The Coast Guard continues to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities by updating acquisitions management policies and reducing acquisition workforce vacancies, but significant challenges remain. In November 2010, the Coast Guard updated its acquisition policy to further incorporate best practices and respond to prior GAO recommendations, such as aligning independent testing requirements with DHS policies and formalizing the Executive Oversight Council to review programs and provide oversight. Additionally, the Coast Guard reduced acquisition workforce vacancies from 20 to 13 percent from April to November 2010, but shortfalls persist in hiring staff for certain key areas such as systems engineers, and some programs continue to be affected by unfilled positions. While the Coast Guard has increased its acquisition management capabilities, most Coast Guard major acquisition programs have ongoing cost, schedule, or program execution risks. Additionally, unrealistic budget planning for the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio exacerbates these challenges and will likely lead to more program cost and schedule issues. The Coast Guard has several actions under way to further improve acquisition policies and workforce shortfalls, as well as address budget planning issues, but it is too soon to tell whether the actions will be effective. The Coast Guard leveraged DOD contracts to purchase products and services or to gain expertise in support of major acquisition programs. The Coast Guard has entered into approximately 81 memorandums of agreement and other arrangements primarily with DOD, which has experience and technical expertise in purchasing major equipment such as ships and aircraft, to support its major acquisition programs. Examples range from acquiring products and services from established DOD contracts to obtaining engineering and testing expertise from the Navy. According to the Coast Guard, leveraging DOD contracts has led to cost savings for Coast Guard acquisition programs. For instance, the Coast Guard received price discounts for C-130J aircraft by coordinating contracting efforts with the Air Force rather than contracting directly with the aircraft manufacturer. In another example, Coast Guard officials used Navy cost estimators and contracting staff in the November 2010 production contract for the National Security Cutter. At this point, Coast Guard program managers rely on informal contacts to learn about the agreements in place to support program activities, thus potentially limiting staff knowledge of DOD resources available. Coast Guard contracting officials only recently recognized the need to make DOD agreements available to program staff, but due to limited attention to this issue, only about 5 of the 81 agreements are currently accessible to program managers. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Coast Guard take steps to ensure program staff have access to interagency agreements with DOD. DHS concurred with the recommendation.
gao_GAO-10-183T	gao_GAO-10-183T_0	NTSB Has Made Progress in All Management Areas, but Further Actions Are Needed to Fully Implement Some Recommendations Overall, NTSB has fully implemented or made significant progress in following leading management practices in all eight areas that our recommendations addressed in 2006 and 2008—communication, strategic planning, IT, knowledge management, organizational structure, human capital management, training, and financial management. Figure 1 summarizes NTSB’s progress in implementing our management recommendations. In addition, NTSB has taken steps to implement all three of our IT-related recommendations: NTSB has fully implemented an IT strategic plan that addresses our comments. NTSB officials said that the first phase of the cost accounting system will be implemented late in fiscal year 2010. As we have previously reported, diversity management is a key aspect of strategic human capital management. As the table shows, the percentages of NTSB’s fiscal year 2008 workforce that were women and minorities were lower than those of the federal government. Furthermore, according to NTSB, none of NTSB’s current 15-member career Senior Executive Service (SES) staff were members of minority groups, and only 2 of them were women. NTSB Has Made Its Selection of Accident Investigations More Efficient, but Reporting Can Be Improved We previously made four recommendations to NTSB to improve the efficiency of its activities related to investigating accidents, such as selecting accidents to investigate and tracking the status of its recommendations, and increasing its use of safety studies (see fig. 3). Since our April 2008 report, NTSB has fully implemented our recommendation to develop transparent policies containing risk-based criteria for selecting which accidents to investigate. In April 2008, we reported that NTSB had also developed a transparent, risk-based policy explaining which aviation, rail, pipeline, and hazardous materials accidents to investigate. NTSB is deploying an agencywide electronic information system based on Microsoft SharePoint that will streamline and increase NTSB’s use of technology in closing out its recommendations and in developing reports. Although NTSB has not completed any safety studies since we made our recommendation in 2006, it has three studies in progress, one of which is in final draft, and it has established a goal of developing two safety study proposals and submitting them to its board for approval each year. NTSB officials told us they would like to broaden the term “safety studies” to include not only the current studies of multiple accidents, but the research done for the other smaller safety-related reports and data inquiries. NTSB also developed new guidelines to address its completion of safety studies. The agency increased use of the center’s classroom space from 10 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 80 percent in fiscal year 2009. The Training Center provides core training for NTSB investigators and trains others from the transportation community to improve their practice of accident investigation. The agency’s actions to increase the center’s use also helped increase total Training Center revenues from about $635,000 in fiscal year 2005 to about $1,771,000 in fiscal year 2009. For example in 2008, 49 of the 68 courses offered at the Training Center were solely for NTSB employees.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), whose reauthorization is the subject of today's hearing, plays a vital role in advancing transportation safety by investigating accidents, determining their causes, issuing safety recommendations, and conducting safety studies. To support the agency's mission, NTSB's Training Center provides training to NTSB investigators and others. From 2006 through 2008, GAO made 21 recommendations to NTSB that address management, information technology (IT), accident investigation criteria, safety studies, and Training Center use. This testimony addresses NTSB's progress in implementing recommendations that it (1) follow leading management practices, (2) conduct aspects of its accident investigations and safety studies more efficiently, and (3) increase the use of its Training Center. This testimony is based on GAO's assessment from July 2009 to October 2009 of plans and procedures NTSB developed to address these recommendations. NTSB provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found NTSB hasfully implemented or made significant progress in adopting leading management practices in all areas in which GAO made prior recommendations. For example, as GAO recommended in 2006, NTSB issued agencywide plans for human capital management and IT management, as well as a strategic plan. In 2008, GAO identified opportunities for improvement in those plans, and NTSB has since issued revised human capital and IT plans and drafted a revised agencywide strategic plan and a new strategic training plan. NTBS has taken steps to improve its diversity management. However, the percentages of NTSB's fiscal year 2008 workforce that were women and minorities were lower than those of the federal government. In addition, no members of a minority group are part of NTSB's 15-member career Senior Executive Service. Since GAO's 2008 report, NTSB has continued to improve information security by installing encryption software on agency laptops and appropriately restricting users' access privileges. NTSB has obligated money to implement a full cost accounting system consistent with a prior GAO recommendation, but NTSB officials said that the system will not be implemented until late in fiscal year 2010. In 2008, GAO reported that NTSB had made significant progress in articulating risk-based criteria for selecting which accidents to investigate. Specifically, NTSB had established such criteria for identifying which rail, pipeline, hazardous materials, and aviation accidents to investigate at the scene. Since then, NTSB has adopted the remaining highway and marine criteria, and NTSB is streamlining and increasing it use of technology in closing-out recommendations. NTSB has three safety studies in progress and would like to broaden the term "safety studies" to include not only its current studies of multiple accidents, but also the research it does for other smaller safety-related reports and data inquiries. NTSB has continued to increase the use of its Training Center--from 10 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 80 percent in fiscal year 2009. As a result, revenues have increased and the center's overall deficit has declined from about $3.9 million in fiscal year 2005 to about $1.9 million in fiscal year 2009.
gao_RCED-95-10	gao_RCED-95-10_0	Although DOE recently developed a Strategic Plan and processes intended to integrate the Department’s missions and programs in five major areas, questions remain about DOE’s overall capacity to lead the national laboratories into new mission areas. However, laboratory managers believed that DOE headquarters and operations offices have divergent views of the laboratories and their goals, and DOE has not been able to develop a consensus with the Congress on the future of the laboratories. A More Effective Management Approach Will Promote Mission Success Laboratory managers see DOE’s management of the multiprogram laboratories as costly and inefficient, creating tensions that impede the development of clear and coordinated missions for the laboratories and action steps that lead toward achieving these missions. DOE does Not Balance Research and Administrative Objectives In addition to meeting their research and technology objectives, laboratory managers are responsible for satisfying a wide variety of administrative requirements in areas such as procurement; travel; human resources; and environment, safety, and health. First, it has been costly. Second, it has raised research costs and reduced the laboratories’ ability to compete with universities for research sponsored by industry and other government agencies. Experts See Future Missions as Extensions of Current Missions Our panel of experts and other experts believe that, with proper mission focus and management direction, the multiprogram laboratories can make vital contributions in many areas important to DOE and the nation. Implementing a Commercial Technology Mission Poses Special Problems Working with industry on a commercial technology mission at the laboratories presents special challenges for DOE and laboratory management. Indeed, if the laboratories do not begin to function more as a system, it may be necessary to consider alternatives to the present DOE-laboratory relationship.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's nine multiprogram national laboratories, focusing on the: (1) laboratories' current and future missions; and (2) DOE approach to laboratory management. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the DOE laboratories do not have clearly defined missions and laboratory managers believe that the lack of DOE direction is compromising their ability to achieve national priorities; (2) DOE manages the laboratories on a program-by-program basis and has underutilized the laboratories' special multidisciplinary abilities to solve complex, cross-cutting scientific and technology problems; (3) although DOE has developed a strategic plan to integrate its missions and programs in five main areas, it still may not be able to effectively manage the laboratories in the future; (4) the costly and inefficient day-to-day management of the laboratories inhibits a productive working relationship between the laboratories and DOE; (5) DOE does not balance laboratory research and administrative objectives; (6) the laboratories fear that rising research costs due to costly administrative requirements will limit their ability to compete for research projects, which in turn will hamper their commercial technology mission; (7) DOE has instituted contract reforms which it believes will lead to a more productive management approach; and (8) the laboratories can make vital contributions in many important areas such as weapons systems, energy conservation, environmental cleanup, and commercialized technologies with proper mission focus and management direction.
gao_GAO-17-447	gao_GAO-17-447_0	1). Indian Affairs’ Funding for Building Replacement and Repair Indian Affairs distributes funding for the repair and replacement of school facilities through a variety of programs ranging from those focused on daily operations and maintenance to the replacement of entire school buildings and campuses. 3). Indian Affairs Does Not Have a Capital Asset Plan to Guide the Efficient Allocation of Construction Funds and Has Not Provided Detailed Information to Policymakers Indian Affairs Does Not Have a Comprehensive Capital Asset Plan to Allocate Funds to Maintain, Repair, and Replace Schools Indian Affairs does not have a comprehensive capital asset plan to maintain, repair, or replace all the BIE schools in its portfolio. While Indian Affairs has determined which 10 schools it plans to replace next, it does not have a long-term capital asset plan for the remaining 175 schools. About one-third of these schools are in poor condition, according to Indian Affairs data, resulting in thousands of students being educated or housed in unsafe facilities. Indian Affairs Has Not Consistently Ensured Accountability for Either Federally or Tribally Managed School Construction Projects For Federally Managed Projects, Indian Affairs Has Not Used All Available Accountability Measures to Ensure Projects Are on Time, Within Budget, and Meet Schools’ Needs Indian Affairs has not consistently used accountability measures included in its contracts for federally managed BIE school construction projects. Correspondingly, the 19 federally managed BIE school construction projects completed from fiscal year 2003 through 2016 often took longer than expected, and were sometimes over budget or had to be scaled back, such as by decreasing square footage, to remain within budget. Further, according to school officials, these projects did not always meet schools’ needs. One school we visited in Arizona took 14 years to complete, which was almost 10 years over schedule. For example, an official at a school in Oklahoma told us that when Indian Affairs managed a project to replace a high school building and dormitories, Indian Affairs planned a dormitory to house 400 students and a school that could only accommodate 368 students. In particular, in interviews with Indian Affairs and school officials and our review of contract files for recent school construction projects, we found Indian Affairs officials responsible for working with the contracting officer did not always understand how to use accountability measures. As a result, Indian Affairs could risk spending millions of dollars on new schools that do not meet the needs of students and staff in terms of their size, quality of construction, or sustainability over time. For Tribally Managed Projects, Indian Affairs Has Not Provided Sufficient Oversight and Technical Assistance to Ensure Projects Are on Time, Within Budget, and Meet Schools’ Needs For school construction projects managed by tribal organizations under grants or self-determination contracts, Indian Affairs also has not provided sufficient oversight and technical assistance to the tribal organizations. Eight of the 30 tribally managed school replacement projects completed since 2003 were completed three or more years after the estimated completion date. Three of the 30 projects were 20 percent or more over budget, and one was more than 60 percent over budget (see fig. 5). They said this does not always occur. This is particularly important now as Indian Affairs is in the process of building three BIE schools from its 2004 replacement list and will soon begin replacing 10 additional schools selected for replacement in April 2016. It is critical that Indian Affairs develop and implement clear, specific guidance for project managers and contracting officers on the effective use of accountability measures to ensure that federally managed projects are on time, within budget, and meet schools’ needs. 2. 3. Develop and implement guidance for its project managers and contracting officers regarding effective use of accountability measures. 4. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix I, Interior agreed with five of our recommendations and disagreed with one recommendation. In addition, Interior stated that Indian Affairs will develop a financial accountability workgroup with members from the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, BIA, BIE, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs to develop guidance and standards to ensure the effective use of accountability measures.	Why GAO Did This Study Indian Affairs is responsible for operating and maintaining 1,785 buildings at 185 K-12 BIE schools, including dormitory buildings for students, on or near reservations. These buildings had an estimated value of $4.5 billion in 2016. Many of these schools are in poor condition and have safety hazards. GAO was asked to review Indian Affairs' processes to fund and oversee the repair and replacement of schools. GAO examined the extent to which Indian Affairs (1) has a comprehensive plan to maintain, repair, or replace schools and ensure the efficient use of funds, and (2) ensures accountability throughout the school construction process. GAO assessed agency data on the cost and timeliness of 49 school replacement projects completed from fiscal year 2003 through 2016, and reviewed contract and grant files for 10 school construction projects selected from schools that had recent or ongoing projects. GAO also assessed Indian Affairs' practices against its policies, design standards, and federal laws and regulations and interviewed agency and school officials. What GAO Found The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs) does not have a comprehensive capital asset plan to guide the allocation of funding for school construction projects across its 185 Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools. Indian Affairs is in the process of replacing 3 schools and plans to replace 10 additional schools from a list of 54 schools that applied in 2015. However, Indian Affairs has not developed a comprehensive, long-term capital asset plan for the repair or replacement of the remaining schools in its portfolio, as required by Interior policy. Until Indian Affairs develops a capital asset plan, it risks using federal funds inefficiently and not prioritizing funds to schools with the most pressing needs. Indian Affairs has not consistently used accountability measures or conducted sufficient oversight to ensure that BIE school construction projects are completed on time, within budget, and meet schools' needs. For instance, Indian Affairs does not always use accountability measures, such as warranties, to have builders replace defective parts or repair poor workmanship. Project managers, who are responsible for helping to ensure accountability, do not always understand how to use accountability measures because Indian Affairs has not provided guidance on when and how to use them to ensure successful completion of construction projects. In addition, Indian Affairs has not adequately overseen school projects managed by tribal organizations. Officials interviewed by GAO at three schools said Indian Affairs was not timely in reviewing new school designs, which resulted in project delays. For 49 construction projects completed from 2003 through 2016, the inconsistent use of accountability measures and inadequate oversight led to projects that took longer than expected, were sometimes over budget, or had to be scaled back to remain within their allotted budgets. For example, of the 49 projects: 16 were 3 or more years behind schedule (see fig. 1). 1 was almost 10 years behind schedule. 10 were 20 percent or more over budget. Further, the new projects did not always meet schools' needs, according to school officials. In one instance, Indian Affairs planned a dormitory to house 400 students while the school it planned could only accommodate 368 students. Until Indian Affairs develops and implements guidance for ensuring accountability throughout the school construction process and improves its oversight of these projects, it will have little assurance they are completed satisfactorily and meet the needs of students and staff. Figure 1: Timeliness of Indian Affairs' School Replacement Projects Completed, Fiscal Years 2003-2016 What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that Indian Affairs develop a capital asset plan for school facility construction and repair, develop and implement guidance on how to use accountability measures, and improve oversight of projects. Interior agreed with five of the recommendations and disagreed with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendation is valid, as discussed further in this report.
gao_GAO-16-506T	gao_GAO-16-506T_0	In our February 2016 report, however, we found that although the data hub plays a key role in the eligibility and enrollment process, CMS officials said the agency does not track the extent to which the federal agencies deliver responsive information to a request, or, alternatively, whether they report that information was not available. In addition, according to agency officials, an unknown number of data hub applicant inquiries were duplicates, which we could not eliminate from our examination. In doing so, CMS foregoes information that could suggest potential program issues or potential vulnerabilities to fraud, as well as information that might be useful for enhancing program management. We recommended that HHS direct CMS to conduct a comprehensive feasibility study on actions CMS can take to monitor and analyze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the extent to which data hub queries provide requested or relevant applicant verification information, for the purpose of improving the data-matching process and reducing the number of applicant inconsistencies; and for those actions identified as feasible, create a written plan and schedule for implementing them. The Federal Marketplace Did Not Resolve About One- Third of Applicant Inconsistencies for Coverage Year 2014, Involving $1.7 Billion in Associated Subsidies For qualifying applicants, the act provides two forms of subsidies for consumers enrolling in individual health plans, both of which are paid directly to insurers on consumers’ behalf. One is a federal income tax credit, which enrollees may elect to receive in advance of filing tax returns, and which reduces a consumer’s monthly premium payment. This is known as the advance premium tax credit (APTC). Meanwhile, our analysis found that about 34 percent of inconsistencies, with about $1.7 billion in associated subsidies, remained open, as of April 2015—that is, inconsistencies still open several months following the close of the 2014 coverage year. We also found, based on our analysis of the 2014 data, that CMS did not terminate or adjust subsides for any applications with incarceration or Social Security number inconsistencies, plus other inconsistencies. In our analysis, we identified about 35,000 applications that had an unresolved Social Security number inconsistency, which were associated with about $154 million in combined subsidies. Social Security number inconsistencies also affect tax compliance. In our inconsistency analysis that we reported on in February 2016, we identified about 22,000 applications having an unresolved incarceration inconsistency, which were associated with about $68 million in combined subsidies. As part of the inconsistency resolution process, the Marketplace notifies applicants to send documentation to resolve the inconsistency. Overall, according to SSA officials, PUPS information can be used to identify individuals who require additional follow-up to determine eligibility. We further concluded that by not using PUPS data as a lead for further investigation, and by relying on applicant attestation in the alternative, CMS may be granting eligibility to, and making subsidy payments on behalf of, individuals who are ineligible to enroll in qualified health plans. We recommended that HHS direct CMS to reevaluate use of PUPS incarceration data and make a determination to either (1) use the PUPS data, among other things, as an indicator of further research required in individual cases, and to develop an effective process to clear incarceration inconsistencies or terminate coverage; or (2) if no suitable process can be identified to verify incarceration status, accept applicant attestation on status in all cases, unless the attestation is not reasonably compatible with other information that may indicate incarceration, and forego the inconsistency process.	Why GAO Did This Study This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's February 2016 report, entitled Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: CMS Should Act to Strengthen Enrollment Controls and Manage Fraud Risk , GAO-16-29 . What GAO Found The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires applicant information be verified to determine eligibility for enrollment or income-based subsidies. To implement this verification process, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) created an electronic system called the “data services hub” (data hub), which, among other things, provides a single link to federal sources, such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration, to verify consumer application information. Although the data hub plays a key role in the eligibility and enrollment process, CMS does not, according to agency officials, track or analyze aggregate outcomes of data hub queries—either the extent to which a responding agency delivers information responsive to a request, or whether an agency reports that information was not available. In not doing so, CMS foregoes information that could suggest potential program issues or potential vulnerabilities to fraud, as well as information that might be useful for enhancing program management. In addition, PPACA also establishes a process to resolve “inconsistencies”—instances where individual applicant information does not match information from marketplace data sources. GAO found CMS did not have an effective process for resolving inconsistencies for individual applicants for the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace). For example, according to GAO analysis of CMS data, about 431,000 applications from the 2014 enrollment period, with about $1.7 billion in associated subsidies for 2014, still had unresolved inconsistencies as of April 2015—several months after close of the coverage year. In addition, CMS did not resolve Social Security number inconsistencies for about 35,000 applications (with about $154 million in associated subsidies) or incarceration inconsistencies for about 22,000 applications (with about $68 million in associated subsidies). With unresolved inconsistencies, CMS is at risk of granting eligibility to, and making subsidy payments on behalf of, individuals who are ineligible to enroll in qualified health plans. In addition, according to the Internal Revenue Service, accurate Social Security numbers are vital for income tax compliance and reconciliation of advance premium tax credits that can lower enrollee costs. During undercover testing, the federal Marketplace approved subsidized coverage under the act for 11 of 12 fictitious GAO phone or online applicants for 2014. The GAO applicants obtained a total of about $30,000 in annual advance premium tax credits, plus eligibility for lower costs at time of service. The fictitious enrollees maintained subsidized coverage throughout 2014, even though GAO sent fictitious documents, or no documents, to resolve application inconsistencies. While the subsidies, including those granted to GAO's fictitious applicants, are paid to health-care insurers, and not directly to enrolled consumers, they nevertheless represent a benefit to consumers and a cost to the government. GAO found CMS relies upon a contractor charged with document processing to report possible instances of fraud, even though CMS does not require the contractor to have any fraud detection capabilities. CMS has not performed a comprehensive fraud risk assessment—a recommended best practice—of the PPACA enrollment and eligibility process. Until such an assessment is done, CMS is unlikely to know whether existing control activities are suitably designed and implemented to reduce inherent fraud risk to an acceptable level.
gao_PEMD-96-7	gao_PEMD-96-7_0	The National Cholesterol Education Program National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) education campaigns address several of the modifiable risk factors, including high blood cholesterol levels, smoking, obesity, and hypertension. Additional, more recent data have brought greater agreement that cholesterol treatment helps prevent deaths among persons who have a history of CHD. Principal Findings The Benefits and Risks of Lowering Cholesterol Nonfatal and Fatal CHD Outcomes The meta-analyses we reviewed consistently reported a statistically significant reduction in the rates of nonfatal heart attacks for the trial participants who were treated for high cholesterol compared to those who did not receive treatment. Types of Treatment Several of the trials tested various dietary treatments, but most of these used diets that differ from the ones that are now recommended and used to treat persons with high cholesterol. Many are being addressed by new trials that should help answer some of the questions about non-CHD deaths and total fatalities, CHD outcomes for persons whose short-term risk of heart disease is moderate, CHD outcomes for population groups other than middle-aged white men, and the long-term effects of the statin drugs. We judged 30 of these as inappropriate to our objectives for the following reasons: (1) individual trials were not quantitatively aggregated, (2) aggregated trials were not primarily cholesterol-lowering interventions, (3) analytic detail was insufficient (for example, we excluded a meta-analysis when we were unable to determine the number or identity of the studies it included), (4) the number of individual trials was insufficient (for example, we excluded meta-analyses that included no more than two randomized trials of a year or more in duration), (5) the study was not published or not published in English, and (6) the clinical CHD outcomes we focused on had not been examined. Greater reductions in serum cholesterol were associated with a reduction in deaths from all causes. The odds ratios show that compared to nontreatment groups, non-CHD fatality rates increased. A recently completed NHLBI-funded study of coronary heart disease among high-risk men who had never had a heart attack had found a significant reduction in combined CHD in the group whose cholesterol was lowered by means of drugs. Clinical Trials Unit Mt. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the evidence from clinical trials that the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) used to develop its National Cholesterol Education Program guidelines. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) meta-analyses of trial data consistently show that cholesterol treated persons, regardless of their medical history, have significantly fewer non-fatal heart attacks than untreated persons; (2) treated persons also showed a reduction in the number of fatal heart attacks compared to the nontreated group, but the difference was not statistically significant except among those who had a history of coronary heart disease (CHD); (3) according to one trial, cholesterol treatment has not led to a reduction in deaths from all causes; (4) the increase in deaths from other causes shown in the trials occurred primarily among persons whose risk for CHD was lower, whose cholesterol was reduced less, or who used certain drugs; (5) the two trials that used newer cholesterol-lowering drugs confirmed the finding that the more cholesterol levels were lowered, the fewer coronary events occurred; (6) previous trials were not representative of the population at large, since they focused mainly on middle-aged white men at high risk for CHD; (7) several clinical trials now under way are designed to provide additional information about treatment outcomes regarding total fatalities, persons with a moderate short-term risk for a coronary event, and the longer-term effects of the newer drugs; and (8) these trials are large and open to a broader range of participants, but whether they will provide broader information will depend on their actual enrollments.
gao_GAO-07-888	gao_GAO-07-888_0	DOE currently estimates that the WTP project will cost $12.2 billion, with a completion date of late 2019. Inadequate DOE Controls Heightened Risk of Improper WTP Contractor Payments DOE’s controls over payments to contractors were not effectively designed to adequately reduce the risk of improper payments, particularly given the inherent financial risks of the WTP project. Specifically, several factors combine to pose a significant inherent risk of improper payments to the government on this project, including the size and complexity of the project, escalating cost and schedule estimates, and the significant volume of transactions Bechtel bills to DOE each invoice. Instead, DOE relied primarily on DCAA’s review and approval of Bechtel’s financial systems and on Bechtel’s review and approval of subcontractor charges. DOE’s heavy reliance on others, with little oversight of its own, exposed the hundreds of millions of dollars it spent annually on the project to an unnecessarily high risk of improper payments. DOE Performed Little or No Review of Contractor Invoices Despite the project’s risks, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 DOE performed little review of contractor invoices or supporting documents for the millions of dollars in charges that Bechtel billed to DOE twice a month. DOE’s Oversight Controls for Project Assets Were Inadequate DOE did not perform adequate oversight to reasonably ensure that Bechtel had established proper accountability for assets purchased with WTP project funds. However, we found that DOE relied primarily on the contractor to manage WTP property without adequate oversight to help ensure that the contractor complied with these requirements. As a result, until recently DOE management was largely unaware of numerous internal control weaknesses in the contractor’s property management system, which exposed WTP assets to loss or misuse. Inaccurate property system data. Lost, damaged, or destroyed property items not promptly reported. For example, Bechtel did not report to DOE the loss of 3 laptop computers and 2 projectors until 2 years after it first identified them as missing. However, Bechtel did not adequately perform such reviews or follow up on subcontractors’ property management issues. Establish procedures to periodically assess the prime contractor’s oversight of its subcontractors in possession of government property to ensure that the prime contractor (1) audits applicable subcontractors’ property management programs as required, (2) reviews applicable subcontractors’ property management policies and procedures for completeness and consistency, and (3) follows up on and documents resolution of corrective actions in a timely manner. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology For this review, we considered internal controls in place during fiscal years 2005 and 2006 at the Department of Energy (DOE) and at Bechtel National, Inc. (Bechtel) related to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) project. Property Controls To determine whether DOE’s oversight controls reasonably ensured proper accountability over WTP property, we used our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government as a basis to assess the internal control structure—control environment, risk assessment procedures, control activities, information and communications, and monitoring efforts of DOE over contractor payments. Physical observations.	Why GAO Did This Study In December 2000, the Department of Energy (DOE) awarded Bechtel National, Inc. (Bechtel) a contract to design and construct the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP), one of the largest nuclear waste cleanup projects in the nation. Originally expected to cost $4.3 billion and be completed in 2011, DOE now estimates that WTP will cost over $12.2 billion and be completed in late 2019. Weaknesses in DOE's management and oversight of contractors led GAO to designate DOE contract management as a high-risk area since 1990. GAO was asked to determine whether (1) DOE's internal controls are designed to provide reasonable assurance against improper WTP payments and (2) DOE's controls reasonably ensure proper accountability for WTP assets. GAO reviewed fiscal year 2005 and 2006 internal controls by analyzing data and documents, interviewing DOE and contractor staff, and physically observing property items. What GAO Found DOE's internal controls over payments to contractors on its WTP project did not provide reasonable assurance against the risk of improper contractor payments, particularly given the project's substantial inherent risks. Several factors combined to pose a risk of improper payments on this project, including the size and complexity of this one-of-a-kind nuclear construction project, escalating cost and schedule estimates, and the thousands of charges Bechtel billed to DOE on each invoice. Despite the risks, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 DOE performed little or no review of contractor invoices or supporting documents for the $40 million to $60 million in charges that Bechtel billed to DOE each month to help ensure the validity of these charges. Instead, DOE officials relied primarily on the Defense Contract Audit Agency's reviews of Bechtel's corporate-wide financial systems and on Bechtel's reviews of subcontractor charges for assurance that the charges were proper. DOE's heavy reliance on others, with little oversight of its own, exposed the hundreds of millions of dollars it spent annually on the project to an unnecessarily high risk of improper payments. DOE also did not adequately oversee the contractor to ensure accountability for assets purchased with WTP contract funds, relying primarily on the contractor to manage such government property without ensuring the adequacy of the contractor's controls. We found numerous internal control weaknesses with Bechtel's property management program, including poor segregation of duties, property system errors, and inadequate property procedures. For example, Bechtel did not timely prepare and submit required reports of lost or damaged property, taking up to 2 years in some instances to report missing assets, such as computers, to DOE. Bechtel also did not always review subcontractors' property management policies and procedures as required or follow up on subcontractor weaknesses it identified to help ensure that its subcontractors adequately managed and safeguarded WTP property in their possession. These property control weaknesses coupled with the lack of DOE oversight created an environment in which property could be lost or stolen without detection.
gao_GAO-14-150	gao_GAO-14-150_0	DOD’s Policy Is Generally Consistent with OMB’s Requirements for Approving and Reporting Conference Costs DOD’s September 2012 policy and November 2013 update are generally consistent with the three key elements of OMB’s requirements for The key approving conferences and reporting associated costs.elements of OMB’s requirements for agencies are the prohibition of conferences with costs in excess of $500,000 unless the head of the respective agency signs a waiver, establishment of a Deputy Secretary- level review process for conferences with costs in excess of $100,000, and public reporting annually of the costs of agency-sponsored conferences with costs in excess of $100,000. OMB’s May 2012 memorandum requires that the waivers be signed by the head of an agency, which for DOD is the Secretary of Defense; however, the Secretary of Defense delegated this authority to 23 senior leaders across DOD. To address OMB’s requirements regarding the review and approval of conferences, DOD’s policy established a tiered approval structure. While DOD’s policy vests approval and waiver authority at a lower level than called for by OMB, DOD’s policy provides additional oversight by requiring senior-level review and pre-approval of all conference-related costs, regardless of the total, compared to OMB’s requirement for senior- level review of conferences only when the estimated cost is more than $100,000. DOD Components Vary in Their Approaches to Implementing DOD’s Conference Policy In implementing DOD’s policy for approving conference costs, the military departments have taken various approaches consistent with the policy regarding the delegation of approval authority. DOD’s policy permits specified senior leaders within the military departments to delegate their approval authority for DOD-hosted conferences costing less than $500,000 and for attendance at non-DOD hosted conferences costing less than $100,000. We found that the DOD components generally were consistent with DOD and component-level guidance in processing requests to host or attend conferences. DOD’s September 2012 policy and some of the implementing guidance issued by the components—including the military departments—reference the following four key elements that help approval authorities determine the merit of a particular conference: (1) a statement by the requester that the conference is necessary or fulfills a DOD mission; (2) a cost estimate; (3) an assessment of the conference request by a legal counsel; and (4) for DOD-hosted conferences, consideration of alternative means of delivering the information. In our review of 563 approved requests for conferences in the second and third quarters of fiscal year 2013, we found that a majority (311) of the requests addressed and documented all four key elements. Some Officials Expressed Concern over DOD’s Lengthy Approval Process, Especially for Conferences with Low or No Cost to DOD While we found that the components’ implementation of the conference review and approval process has generally been consistent with DOD’s policy, some officials within the components and military service commands have identified concerns about the approval process. Some officials raised specific concerns about the number of personnel required for conference reviews. As shown in figure 2, in nearly 94 percent of the 405 requests for personnel to attend non-DOD hosted conferences, the estimated cost of attendance was less than $20,000 for each conference. Similarly, for the 556 DOD-hosted and non-DOD hosted conference requests that we reviewed for which cost information was available,found that the aggregate cost to DOD for all low-cost conferences was significantly lower than the aggregate cost to DOD for more expensive conferences, even though the number of individual requests to attend conferences with low or no cost to DOD was much higher. According to DOD officials, individuals may also strive to keep conference costs below $20,000 to avoid having to report conference costs for DOD’s quarterly and annual reports. According to one DCMO official involved in writing the policy, even with the November 2013 update, the components still have the option to review conferences that incur no cost to DOD in accordance with their conference approval process to facilitate senior leaders’ visibility over conference attendance by personnel within their component. DOD noted that it remains committed to balancing the need for rigorous oversight of conference spending with the benefits of hosting and participating in conferences that are essential to DOD’s mission. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) conference policy is consistent with the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) requirements for conference approval and cost reporting, we reviewed an executive order and a series of memorandums issued by OMB in fiscal years 2011 through 2013 on promoting efficiency and eliminating excess spending within executive branch agencies. To that end, we developed, administered, and analyzed responses to a combination of structured interviews and questionnaires that referred to DOD’s September 2012 conference policy, which was the existing policy when we conducted the majority of our review.	Why GAO Did This Study DOD hosts conferences and sends its personnel to external conferences for training, professional development, and continuing education. However, concerns about executive agencies' spending on conferences prompted OMB in 2012 to direct agencies to establish policies and practices for conference hosting and attendance. DOD issued its policy in September 2012 to improve oversight of conference costs and updated it in November 2013, citing lessons learned from implementing the September 2012 policy, among other things. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO review DOD's oversight and management of conferences. This report assesses (1) the extent to which DOD's conference policy is consistent with OMB's conference requirements and (2) how DOD components have implemented DOD's conference policy. GAO assessed DOD's 2012 conference policy and 2013 update against OMB requirements and reviewed components' implementation of the policy. GAO analyzed responses to a questionnaire completed by officials from 72 components and military commands and reviewed 563 requests for conferences planned for the second and third quarters of fiscal year 2013. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In written comments, DOD concurred with GAO's findings and noted that it remains committed to balancing conference spending oversight with the benefits of hosting and allowing personnel to attend conferences. What GAO Found The Department of Defense's (DOD) September 2012 policy on conferences and its November 2013 update are generally consistent with the requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in May 2012. The key elements of OMB's May 2012 requirements for agencies are the prohibition of conferences with costs in excess of $500,000 unless the agency head signs a waiver, establishment of a Deputy Secretary-level review process for conferences with estimated costs in excess of $100,000, and public reporting annually on the costs of these conferences. DOD adopted a tiered approval structure for the senior-level approval of waivers and all conference-related costs. DOD's policy, which cites the department's size and complexity, places the approval authority for conference waivers and for conferences costing less than $500,000 at lower levels than called for by OMB. For example, OMB requires that waivers approving conferences with costs in excess of $500,000 be signed by the head of an agency, while DOD's policy delegates this authority to 23 senior leaders throughout the department. DOD's policy is more expansive as it requires senior-level review and pre-approval of all conference-related costs, compared to OMB's requirement for senior-level review of conferences only when the estimated costs exceed $100,000. DOD's policy also fully addresses OMB's requirement to publicly report conference costs annually and adds a requirement for quarterly internal reporting of conference costs. In implementing DOD's September 2012 policy (the existing policy when GAO conducted the majority of its review), DOD components--including the military departments--have taken various approaches to reviewing and approving conference requests, all of which are consistent with the policy. For example, DOD's policy allows senior officials within each component to delegate certain approval authority to lower-level officials for DOD-hosted conferences costing $500,000 or less and non-DOD hosted conferences costing $100,000 or less, but the components have delegated approval authority to different degrees. A majority of the 563 conference requests that GAO reviewed addressed and documented key elements consistent with DOD and component-level guidance. In requests that were missing documentation of one or more key elements, GAO found that a specific element was not missing from a significant number of requests. While the components' implementation of the conference review and approval process has generally been consistent with DOD's policy, some officials within the components and military service commands have identified concerns, particularly with the lengthy approval process. The officials explained that requests to attend conferences have to pass through multiple offices and individuals, sometimes taking several months to be approved. In particular, officials raised questions about the efficiency of reviews for requests to attend conferences that incurred no cost or a low cost (under $20,000) to DOD, which at the time of GAO's review went through the same process as higher-cost conferences. Almost 94 percent of the 405 requests to attend non-DOD hosted conferences that GAO reviewed were for conferences with no cost or a low cost to DOD. DOD in November 2013 updated its policy to state that approval is not required for conferences incurring no cost for DOD. However, a DOD official involved in writing DOD's conference policy stated that components still have the option to review conferences with no cost to DOD to facilitate senior leaders' visibility over conference attendance by personnel within their component.
gao_GAO-12-812T	gao_GAO-12-812T_0	Background The TANF block grant was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and was designed to give states the flexibility to provide both traditional welfare cash assistance benefits as well as a variety of other benefits and services to meet the needs of low-income families and children. States have responsibility for designing, implementing, and administering their welfare programs to comply with federal guidelines, as defined by federal law and HHS that oversees state TANF programs at the federal level. Factors that influenced states’ work participation rates included not only the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance who participated in work activities, but also: decreases in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance (not due to program eligibility changes) that provide a state credit toward meeting its rates , state spending on TANF-related services beyond what is required that also provides a state credit toward meeting its rates, state policies that allow working families to continue receiving TANF cash assistance, helping a state to increase its rate, and state policies that provide nonworking families cash assistance outside of the TANF program. States Rely on TANF Flexibility to Provide a Broad Array of Services While the focus is often on TANF’s role in cash assistance, it plays a significant role in states’ budgets for other programs and services for low- income families, as allowed under TANF. In fact, in fiscal year 2011, federal TANF and state expenditures for purposes other than cash assistance totaled 71 percent of all expenditures. Many states have used TANF to fund child welfare services because, although TANF funding is a capped block grant, it is a relatively flexible funding source. Concluding Observations The federal-state TANF partnership makes significant resources available to address poverty in the lives of families with children. With these resources, TANF has provided a basic safety net to many families, triggered a focus on work in the nation’s welfare offices while helping many parents step into jobs, and provided states flexibility to help families in ways they believe will help prevent dependence on public assistance and improve the lives of children. At the same time, it does raise questions about the strength and breadth of the TANF safety net. The emphasis on work participation rates as a measure of program performance has helped change the culture of state welfare programs to focus on moving families into employment, but weaknesses in the measure undercut its effectiveness. Are the work participation rates providing the right incentive to states to engage parents, including those difficult to serve, and help them achieve self-sufficiency? However, we do not have enough information about the use of these funds to determine whether this flexibility is resulting in the most efficient and effective strategies at this time of scarce government resources and great need among the nation’s low-income families.	Why GAO Did This Study This hearing is on combating poverty and understanding new challenges for families. The testimony focuses on the role of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant in helping low-income families with children. As you know, the federal government significantly changed federal welfare policy in 1996 when it created TANF, a $16.5 billion annual block grant provided to states to operate their own welfare programs within federal guidelines. States are also required to maintain a specified level of their own spending to receive TANF funds. Over the past 15 years, the federal government and states have spent a total of $406 billion for TANF, about 60 percent of which were federal funds. This federal-state partnership has undergone multiple program and fiscal changes, including a dramatic drop in the number of families receiving monthly cash assistance benefits, as well as two economic recessions. According to the Bureau of the Census, poverty among children fell from about 21 percent in 1995 to about 16 percent in 2000, rising again to 22 percent in 2010. Examining TANFs past performance can help shed light on the challenges facing low-income families and the role of the federal government in combating poverty. This testimonybased primarily on reports issued by GAO from 2010 to 2012 on TANF and related issueswill focus on TANFs performance in three areas: (1) as a cash safety net for families in need, (2) as a welfare-to-work program that promotes employment, and (3) as a funding source for various services that address families needs. What GAO Found The federal-state TANF partnership makes significant resources available to address poverty in the lives of families with children. With these resources, TANF has provided a basic safety net to many families and helped many parents step into jobs. At the same time, there are questions about the strength and breadth of the TANF safety net. Many eligible familiessome of whom have very low incomesare not receiving TANF cash assistance. Regarding TANF as a welfare-to-work program, the emphasis on work participation rates as a measure of state program performance has helped change the culture of state welfare programs to focus on moving families into employment. However, features of the work participation rates as currently implemented undercut their effectiveness as a way to encourage states to engage parents, including those difficult to serve, and help them achieve self-sufficiency. Finally, states have used TANF funds to support a variety of programs other than cash assistance as allowed by law. Yet, we do not know enough about this spending or whether this flexibility is resulting in the most efficient and effective use of funds at this time.
gao_GAO-13-550T	gao_GAO-13-550T_0	On the basis of their findings, the regulators issued the April 2011 consent orders against these servicers that required In the servicers to conduct the foreclosure review, among other things.January 2013, OCC and the Federal Reserve reached agreements with 11 of the 14 mortgage servicing companies subject to the April 2011 consent orders to discontinue the foreclosure reviews and to provide approximately $3.4 billion in direct payments to eligible borrowers. In addition, under the amended consent orders, the servicers also will provide approximately $5.4 billion in foreclosure prevention assistance to borrowers, such as loan modifications. Consultants for the servicers that did not reach agreements with the regulators continue their foreclosure review activities. Complexities of the Foreclosure Review Process and Limitations in Regulators’ Guidance and Monitoring May Have Hindered Achievement of Goals Complexity of the file reviews, overly broad guidance, and limited monitoring for consistency may have impeded the ability of OCC and the Federal Reserve to achieve the goals of the foreclosure review. Finally, the regulators’ sampling approach did not include key oversight mechanisms to facilitate assessment of whether consultants’ reviews were sufficient to realize the goal of identifying as many harmed borrowers as possible, except in those cases where there were few or no errors. In the absence of objective measures to compare review methods among consultants or assess sampling, regulators did not have an early warning mechanism to help identify problem areas that may have hindered achievement of the foreclosure review goals. Limited Communication Hindered Transparency for Individual Borrowers and the General Public OCC and the Federal Reserve acknowledged the importance of transparency in the foreclosure review process and publicly released more information than is typically disclosed in connection with a consent order. For example, regulators released redacted engagement letters between servicers and third-party consultants and the remediation framework for consultants to use that provided examples of situations in which compensation or other remediation is required for financial injury due to servicer errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies. However, the absence of useful and timely communications at certain stages of the process—for the general public as well as individual borrowers—hindered transparency and public confidence in the processes and results. Some stakeholders perceived gaps in key information about how the file reviews were being conducted. Borrowers received a letter acknowledging their request was received, but some did not receive updates until almost a year after the outreach program was first launched, when they received a letter informing them of the continuing nature of the review. In letters to OCC and the Federal Reserve, consumer groups indicated that these borrowers were frustrated by the lack of information on their particular file review. Regulators have acknowledged the importance of transparency, but after announcing the agreements that led to the amended consent orders, they had not yet determined what information to convey beyond that which was included in their press releases and public websites and whether additional information would be provided to borrowers who submitted a request-for-review. Prior to the announcement of the agreements that led to the amended consent orders and ended the foreclosure review for most servicers, OCC staff told us they had planned to release a final report on the results of the foreclosure review, and Federal Reserve staff indicated they expect to publish additional relevant information related to the foreclosure review and the agreements. The Foreclosure Review Experience Could Offer Lessons for the Amended Consent Order Activities and Continuing Reviews The foreclosure review revealed three key lessons related to planning, monitoring, and communication that could help inform regulators’ implementation of the amended consent orders and the continuing foreclosure reviews. Based on the foreclosure review experience, we found that (1) designing project features during the process’s initial stages influences the efficiency of file reviews, (2) monitoring progress helps ensure achievement of goals, and (3) promoting transparency enhances public confidence. Our prior work shows that assessing and using lessons learned from previous experiences can provide a powerful method of ensuring that beneficial information is factored into the planning and work processes of future activities. GAO’s internal control standards state that agencies should take steps to comprehensively identify and analyze program operations to determine if risks exist to achieving goals—such as risks to the regulators’ goal of providing similar results for similarly situated borrowers. Finally, lessons from the foreclosure review activities conducted to date suggest that developing and implementing an effective communication strategy that includes public reporting goals could enhance the transparency of the activities under the amended consent orders. Regulators announced the agreements that led to the amended consent orders without a clear communication strategy. In the absence of a clear communication strategy to direct external communications, including public reporting and direct communication with individual borrowers, regulators face risks to transparency and public confidence similar to those experienced in the foreclosure review process. In our March 2013 report, we recommended that OCC and the Federal Reserve improve oversight of sampling and identify and apply lessons from the foreclosure review process, such as enhancing planning and monitoring activities, to better ensure that the goals of the foreclosure review and amended consent orders are realized.	Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses the Independent Foreclosure Review process. In April 2011, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued consent orders against 14 mortgage servicers. These orders required the servicers to engage third-party consultants to review servicers' loan files to identify borrowers who had suffered financial harm due to errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies in foreclosure processing and recommend remediation for the harms these borrowers suffered. Roughly 4.3 million borrowers who were in some stage of foreclosure in 2009 and 2010 were eligible for the foreclosure review. As of December 2012, consultants had more than 800,000 loans slated for review. In January 2013, the regulators announced agreements that led to amended consent orders with 11 of the 14 servicers to discontinue foreclosure reviews and replace the reviews with a compensation framework that does not rely on determinations of whether borrowers suffered financial harm. The remaining 3 servicers, covering 450,000 borrowers (10 percent), are continuing with the foreclosure review work. The remarks are based on our March 2013 report on the implementation of the foreclosure review and lessons learned that can be applied to the activities required by the amended consent orders and ongoing foreclosure reviews. The statement addresses (1) challenges to the achievement of the goals of the foreclosure review, (2) the extent of transparency in the foreclosure review process, and (3) lessons that could be useful for the activities under the amended consent orders and continuing reviews. As noted in our report, we were in the process of reviewing other aspects of the foreclosure review when OCC and the Federal Reserve announced the agreements. Neither our report nor this statement assesses the regulators' rationale for accepting the agreements nor any trade-offs involved in the regulators' choice to amend the consent orders with the servicers. What GAO Found GAO found the following: Regulators' ability to achieve the goals of the foreclosure review was affected by the complexity of the reviews, as well as by overly broad regulator-issued guidance and limited monitoring for the consistency and sufficiency of consultants' review activities. For example, regulators' statistical sampling approach did not include mechanisms to allow the regulators to monitor consultants' progress toward finding as many harmed borrowers as possible. Our prior work has identified practices, such as assessing progress toward goals and designing monitoring during the planning stage of a project, as effective management practices. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has found that in planning data analysis activities, such as sampling, agencies should take necessary steps to ensure that they have collected the appropriate data from which to draw conclusions. Without using objective measures to compare review methods or assess sampling among consultants, regulators' ability to monitor progress toward achievement of foreclosure review goals was hindered. Although regulators publicly released more information on the foreclosure review process than is typically disclosed in connection with a consent order, the absence of timely and useful communication to the general public and individual borrowers at certain stages of the process impacted transparency and public confidence. To promote transparency, OCC and the Federal Reserve released redacted engagement letters between servicers and consultants, among other documents. However, some stakeholders felt there were gaps in the publicly released information, including the lack of detailed information on how the reviews were to be carried out. In addition, although borrowers who requested reviews under the foreclosure review process received an acknowledgement letter, some borrowers did not receive updates on their request for almost a year after the program was launched. The foreclosure review experience revealed lessons related to planning, monitoring, and communication that could help inform regulators' implementation of the amended consent orders and the remaining foreclosure reviews. In our prior work, we found that assessing lessons learned from previous experiences, such as through discussions with key participants and stakeholders, and applying these lessons can help strengthen future activities. Without assessing and applying relevant lessons learned, regulators might not address similar challenges in activities under the amended consent orders or in the continuing reviews. In particular, regulators announced the agreements that led to the amended consent orders without a clear communication strategy, including determining what information to provide to borrowers. GAO's internal control standards and our work related to best practices indicate that an effective communication strategy and timely reporting can enhance transparency and public confidence. Absent a clear strategy to guide regular communications with individual borrowers and the general public, regulators face risks to transparency and public confidence similar to those experienced in the foreclosure review. Based on our findings, we recommended that OCC and the Federal Reserve improve oversight of sampling and consistency in the continuing reviews; apply lessons in planning and monitoring, as appropriate, to the activities of the amended consent orders and continuing reviews; and implement a communication strategy to keep stakeholders informed. The regulators agreed to take steps to implement these recommendations.
gao_GAO-16-516	gao_GAO-16-516_0	For example, in the course of the federal criminal justice process, a U.S. attorney is involved in the process of investigating, charging and prosecuting an offender, among other responsibilities. Selected Stakeholders Reported Considering a Number of Factors When Using Alternatives at or before Sentencing, but DOJ Does Not Track the Use of Some Alternatives Selected Stakeholders Reported Considering Presence of Violence and Offender’s Role in the Crime, Among Other Factors, When Determining Use of Alternatives to Incarceration DOJ and court officials we interviewed told us they consider various factors when deciding whether to use an alternative to incarceration for certain federal offenders in the early stages of the federal criminal justice process. Use of Alternatives to Incarceration has Largely Remained Consistent, but DOJ Lacks Reliable Data on the Use of Pretrial Diversion As figure 2 shows, based on data from AOUSC, DOJ, and the USSC on the use of alternatives to incarceration at or before sentencing, the overall use of these alternatives nationally and across the subset of districts that have adopted court-involved pretrial diversion practices has been largely consistent during the respective time periods for which they are available—from fiscal years 2009 to fiscal years 2015 for alternatives at sentencing; from fiscal years 2012 to 201 for pretrial release; and from fiscal years 2014 to 2015 for referrals to another jurisdiction. However, in performing our analysis of the data on the use of alternatives over time, we found that DOJ’s data on pretrial diversions were unreliable for two reasons. By taking steps to revise its case management system to separately track the use of Title 9 diversion and court-involved pretrial diversion programs, and issuing guidance to USAOs as to how and when to use them—for instance, when the offender enters the program, completes the program, or both—-DOJ would have more reliable and complete data to determine what types of pretrial diversion are being used, in what districts, how frequently, and how successfully. BOP Considers Statutory Requirements and Inmate Risk Levels when Deciding Whether to Use Incarceration Alternatives and Has Increased Use of Such Alternatives for Minimum and Low Security Inmates BOP Guidance and Policy Identifies Key Statutory Requirements and Risk Levels when Deciding Whether to Place Inmates into Incarceration Alternatives According to BOP officials, when placing inmates into incarceration alternatives they consider factors that are in accordance with BOP policy and guidance which also provides for the overall process for identifying and placing eligible and appropriate inmates into the incarceration alternatives of RRCs and home confinement. Moreover, according to BOP guidance, in addition to considering the basic eligibility requirements, BOP staff must consider the appropriateness of placing inmates into RRCs and home confinement as well as evaluate each inmate for their individual reentry needs, risk for recidivism, and risks posed to the community for placing them in RRCs or home confinement. BOP Use of Incarceration Alternatives for Inmates Increased Overall from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015, Particularly in Home Confinement for Minimum and Low Security Inmates From fiscal years 2009 through 2015, BOP increasingly placed inmates into RRCs and home confinement, with inmates designated as minimum and low security making up the two largest groups of inmates in RRCs and home confinement. DOJ Has Tracked Some Data on the Cost Implications of Alternatives to Incarceration, but Could Better Measure Outcomes DOJ Has Not Measured the Outcomes and Cost Implications of Pretrial Diversion Programs, but the Judiciary Has Collected Some Data DOJ has not measured the outcomes or identified the cost implications of the Title 9 and court-involved pretrial diversion programs DOJ has decision-making power and expends resources on these incarceration alternatives, which are carried out at or before sentencing. The survey asked about their use of court-involved pretrial diversion practices, such as a presentence diversion court, and, if they used such a court, whether the court was evaluated or assessed. While BOP can measure the overall costs of RRCs and home confinement, it does not track the information needed to help measure their outcomes and does not have such measures in place. According to BOP officials, the contract was signed in April 2016 and the report is expected to be released during the summer of 2016. Conclusions To help reduce the overall size and costs of the federal prison population, DOJ components such as USAOs, in coordination with judicial branch stakeholders such as PPSO and federal judges, have utilized alternatives to incarceration for low-level offenders and minimum and low security inmates at various stages of the criminal justice process. However, DOJ’s data on the use of pretrial diversions is of limited usefulness and reliability because EOUSA’s case management system does not distinguish between the different types of diversion and DOJ has not provided guidance to USAOs as to when and how pretrial cases are to be entered into the system. Further, by taking steps to obtain and track data on the outcomes of the programs and developing performance measures for its use of pretrial diversion, DOJ would be better able to determine the extent to which the alternatives are contributing to the achievement of DOJ goals and objectives and what adjustments to policies and procedures, if necessary, may make them more effective.	Why GAO Did This Study Since 1980, the federal prison population increased from about 25,000 to almost 200,000, as of March 2016. In part to help reduce the size and related costs of the federal prison population, DOJ has taken steps to slow its growth by pursuing alternatives to incarceration at various stages of the criminal justice process for nonviolent, low-level offenders. Senate Report 113-78 included a provision for GAO to review DOJ's management of the federal prison population. This report (1) describes factors criminal justice stakeholders consider when using incarceration alternatives at or before sentencing and identifies the extent to which those alternatives are used, (2) describes factors BOP considers when using incarceration alternatives for inmates and the extent of their use, and (3) assesses the extent DOJ has measured the cost implications and outcomes of using the alternatives. GAO analyzed DOJ and federal judiciary branch data and documents from fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and interviewed DOJ and judiciary officials at headquarters and in 11 selected nongeneralizable judicial districts about the use of alternatives. GAO selected districts to provide geographic diversity and a mix of districts using and not using the alternatives. What GAO Found Department of Justice (DOJ) and federal judiciary officials reported considering numerous factors when using alternatives to incarceration at or before an offender's sentencing, but DOJ does not reliably track the use of some alternatives. A variety of alternatives can be used for offenders at or before sentencing, such as referral to state and local prosecutors, pretrial release, and probation. Other such alternatives include pretrial diversion programs which divert certain offenders from the traditional criminal justice process into a program of supervision and services or into court-involved pretrial diversion practices, such as drug courts, that provide offenders an opportunity to avoid incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. DOJ and judiciary officials most commonly reported considering the presence of violence and the offender's role in the crime when determining use of an alternative at or before sentencing. Based on DOJ and judiciary data on referrals to other jurisdictions, pretrial release, and alternatives at sentencing, the overall use of such alternatives across districts was largely consistent during the periods for which data were available from fiscal years 2009 to 2015. However, DOJ data on the use of pretrial diversion is unreliable because DOJ's database does not distinguish between the types of pretrial diversions. Further, when and whether the use of the pretrial diversion is recorded into the database varies across DOJ staff responsible for entering the data. By revising its system to track the different types of pretrial diversion programs, and issuing guidance as to when staff are to enter their use into its database, DOJ would have more reliable and complete data. DOJ's Bureau of Prisons (BOP) considers statutory requirements and risk levels when placing inmates into incarceration alternatives such as residential reentry centers (RRCs, also known as halfway houses) and home confinement, and has increased its use of alternatives, particularly home confinement, in the past seven years. In addition to the basic eligibility requirements, BOP evaluates inmates' needs for reentering society, risk for recidivism, and risks to the community if placed in RRCs or home confinement. For low-risk and low-need inmates, home confinement is the preferred alternative according to BOP and BOP increased its use by 67 percent for minimum security inmates and 58 percent for low security inmates from fiscal years 2009 through 2015. Relative to home confinement, use of RRCs grew at a slower pace for low security inmates and declined for minimum security inmates. DOJ has tracked some data on the cost implications of using incarceration alternatives, but could better measure their outcomes. For example, DOJ conducted a survey in 2014 and 2015 of U.S. Attorneys to obtain district-level information about the use of court-involved pretrial diversion practices. However, the data collected do not measure the outcomes or cost implications of the alternatives. For alternatives used at the end of inmates' sentences, BOP maintains data on the costs, such as average daily costs, of placing inmates in RRCs and home confinement. While BOP has measures in its strategic plan to monitor the use of RRCs and home confinement and has contracted for an analysis of its use of RRCs and home confinement that is expected to be completed during the summer of 2016, BOP, does not currently track the information needed to help measure the outcomes of these alternatives. By taking steps to obtain outcome data and developing performance measures for the alternatives used, DOJ and BOP would be better able to determine the extent to which the alternatives are achieving their goals and objectives and what adjustments may be necessary to make them more effective. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ enhance its tracking of data on use of pretrial diversions and that DOJ and BOP obtain outcome data and develop measures for the alternatives used. DOJ concurred.
gao_T-AIMD-98-312	gao_T-AIMD-98-312_0	Serious Weaknesses Continue to Be Identified As the importance of computer security has increased, so have the rigor and frequency of federal audits in this area. During the last 2 years, we and the agency inspectors general (IG) have evaluated computer-based controls on a wide variety of financial and nonfinancial systems supporting critical federal programs and operations. The most recent set of audit results that we evaluated—those published since March 1996—describe significant information security weakness in each of the 24 federal agencies covered by our analysis. These weaknesses cover a variety of areas, which we have grouped into six categories of general control weaknesses. In our report, we note significant problems related to the department’s control and oversight of access to its systems. VA did not adequately limit the access of authorized users or effectively manage user identifications (ID) and passwords. We also found that the department had not adequately protected its systems from unauthorized access from remote locations or through the VA network. A primary reason for VA’s continuing general computer control problems is that the department does not have a comprehensive computer security planning and management program in place to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained and that computer security receives adequate attention. The public depends on SSA to protect trust fund revenues and assets from fraud and to protect sensitive information on individuals from inappropriate disclosure. In addition, many current beneficiaries rely on the uninterrupted flow of monthly payments to meet their basic needs. In November 1997, the SSA IG reported serious weaknesses in controls over information resources, including access, continuity of service, and software program changes that unnecessarily place these assets and operations at risk. Internal control testing identified information protection-related weaknesses throughout SSA’s information systems environment. An underlying factor that contributes to SSA’s information security weaknesses is inadequate entitywide security program planning and management. Improvements Require Individual Agency Actions and Strengthened Central Oversight Substantively improving federal information security will require efforts at both the individual agency level and at the governmentwide level. Over the last 2 years, a number of efforts have been initiated, but additional actions are still needed.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the state of information security in the federal government, focusing on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) and the Social Security Administration's (SSA) efforts to develop and maintain an effective security management program. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) as the importance of computer security has increased, so have the rigor and frequency of federal audits in this area; (2) during the last 2 years, GAO and the agency inspectors general (IG) have evaluated computer-based controls on a wide variety of financial and nonfinancial systems supporting critical federal programs and operations; (3) the most recent set of audit results described significant information security weakness in each of the 24 federal agencies covered by GAO's analysis; (4) these weaknesses cover a variety of areas, which GAO has grouped into six categories of general control weaknesses; (5) in GAO's report, it noted significant problems related to VA's control and oversight of access to its systems; (6) VA did not adequately limit the access of authorized users or effectively manage user identifications and passwords; (7) GAO also found that the department had not adequately protected its systems from unauthorized access from remote locations or through the VA network; (8) a primary reason for VA's continuing general computer control problems is that the department does not have a comprehensive computer security planning and management program in place to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained and that computer security receives adequate attention; (9) the public depends on SSA to protect trust fund revenues and assets from fraud and to protect sensitive information on individuals from inappropriate disclosure; (10) in addition, many current beneficiaries rely on the uninterrupted flow of monthly payments to meet their basic needs; in November 1997, the SSA IG reported serious weaknesses in controls over information resources, including access, continuity of service, and software program changes that unnecessarily place these assets and operations at risk; (11) internal control testing identified information protection-related weaknesses throughout SSA's information systems environment; (12) an underlying factor that contributes to SSA's information security weaknesses is inadequate entitywide security program planning and management; (13) substantively improving federal information security will require efforts at both the individual agency level and at the governmentwide level; and (14) over the last 2 years, a number of efforts have been initiated, but additional actions are still needed.
gao_GAO-01-801	gao_GAO-01-801_0	Section 813 required DOD to review its profit guidelines to consider whether modifications to the guidelines—such as placing increased emphasis on technical risk as a factor for determining appropriate profit margins—would provide an incentive for contractors to develop and produce complex and innovative new technologies. After completing its review, DOD reported to Congress that it planned to make two changes to the guidelines. On December 13, 2000, DOD published a final rule in the Federal Register to implement the two changes. Contracting officers have available another contracting mechanism— award fees—to reward innovation in research and development. Conclusions The new profit policy may reward contractors for existing levels of innovation rather than incentivize additional innovation. Recommendations for Executive Action To assure that the technology incentive is appropriately interpreted and applied, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify the definition of innovation contained in the profit policy rule; define how long contractors should be rewarded for innovations introduced during research and development phases; and reconcile the relationship of the technology incentive with DOD’s new acquisition process, including the emphasis on technology maturation. Scope and Methodology To determine whether the new profit policy is likely to achieve its objective of stimulating increased innovation, we selected programs at some of DOD’s highest dollar buying commands to review how contracting and acquisition officials would apply the new policy to various programs. Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense	Why GAO Did This Study In negotiating profit on contracts, the Department of Defense (DOD) requires contracting officers to set negotiating objectives by relying on guidelines in defense regulations. Congress mandated that DOD review its profit guidelines and consider whether modifying them would provide more incentive for contractors to develop and produce complex and innovative new technologies for weapon systems. After completing its review, DOD issued a final rule in December 2000 that added a technology incentive to its guidelines for setting profit objectives on negotiated defense contracts. This report reviews whether the new policy is (1) likely to achieve its intended objective of stimulating increased innovation and (2) consistent with the revised policies for acquiring weapons systems. What GAO Found GAO found that the new profit policy may have limited effect on incentivizing additional innovation because the policy has limited reach during research and development and it does not provide adequate guidance on when to apply the incentive. The policy may not reinforce DOD's emphasis on technology maturity in its guidance on the system acquisition process.
gao_AIMD-99-35	gao_AIMD-99-35_0	Each business area is described below. Customs’ major information technology effort is its Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system. Our objectives were to determine (1) the maturity of Customs’ software development processes and (2) the effectiveness of Customs’ software process improvement program. Few processes are defined, and success depends on individual effort. While Customs showed some strengths in this KPA, its many weaknesses render its software project planning processes unrepeatable. According to the SW-CMM, effective software project tracking and oversight, among other things, includes (1) designating a project software manager to be responsible for the project’s software activities and results, (2) having a documented software development plan for tracking software activities and communicating status, (3) following a written organizational policy for managing the project, (4) conducting periodic internal reviews to track technical progress, plans, performance, and issues against the software development plan, (5) tracking the software risks associated with the cost, resource, schedule, and technical aspects of the project, (6) explicitly assigning responsibility for software work products and activities, (7) tracking the sizes of the software work products (or sizes of the changes to the software work products) and taking corrective actions as necessary, and (8) periodically reviewing the activities for software project tracking and oversight with senior management. Also, NCAP 0.1 had strengths in all but five of this KPA’s 24 key practices. Customs Lacks a Software Quality Assurance Process All of the projects evaluated had extensive and significant software quality assurance practice weaknesses. For example, all three projects had developed software configuration management plans according to a documented procedure. Currently, Customs has no software process improvement program. This model has five phases: Initiating, Diagnosing, Establishing, Acting, and Leveraging—IDEAL. Each of the phases is summarized below. Customs did not staff or fund any other KPA improvement activities at this time. Currently, Customs does not have a software development process improvement program, and it has not taken steps to initiate one. However, its software development processes are ad hoc and sometimes chaotic, and are not repeatable even on a project-by-project basis. Recommendations We recommend that, after ensuring that its mission-critical systems are Year 2000 compliant but before investing in major software development efforts like ACE, the Commissioner of Customs direct the Chief Information Officer to assign responsibility and authority for software development process develop and implement a formal plan for software development process improvement that is based on the software capability evaluation results contained in this report and specifies measurable goals and time frames, prioritizes initiatives, estimates resource requirements (trained staff and funding) and defines a process improvement management structure; ensure that every new software development effort in Customs adopts processes that satisfy at least SW-CMM level 2 requirements; and ensure that process improvement activities are initiated for all ongoing essential software maintenance projects.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Customs Service's software development maturity and improvement activities, focusing on: (1) the maturity of Customs' software development processes; and (2) whether Customs has an effective software process improvement program. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) because of the number and severity of Customs' software development process weaknesses, Customs did not fully satisfy any of the key process areas (KPA) necessary to achieve the repeatable level of process maturity; (2) as a result, its processes for developing software, a complex and expensive component of Customs' systems, are ad hoc, sometimes chaotic, and not repeatable across projects; (3) Customs had some practice strengths in all but one of the five KPAs evaluated (i.e., requirements management, software project planning, software project tracking and oversight, software quality assurance, and software configuration management); however, GAO also found extensive and significant weaknesses in each of these KPAs; (4) some of these weaknesses were systemic, recurring in each of the KPAs; (5) for example, Customs had no written policy for managing or implementing any of the KPAs; (6) none of the projects had: (a) an approved quality assurance plan; (b) documented procedures for determining the project cost, schedule, or effort; or (c) any outside group reviewing or reporting on the project's compliance with defined processes; (7) these weaknesses are some of the reasons for Customs' limited success, for example, in delivering promised Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) capabilities on time; (8) Customs does not have a software development process improvement program, and it has not taken the basic steps to initiate one; (9) these steps, many of which are described in Software Engineering Institute's initiating, diagnosing, establishing, acting, and leveraging model for process improvement, include assigning responsibility and authority for process improvement, establishing a process improvement management structure, defining a plan of action, and committing needed resources; and (10) until Customs establishes an effective process improvement program, its software processes will remain poorly defined and undisciplined, and its software projects are likely to suffer cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls.
gao_RCED-99-52	gao_RCED-99-52_0	After the peer reviews were completed, BLM reviewed and approved the appraisals, determined that they met federal appraisal standards, accepted the appraised values, and forwarded them to the Secretary of the Interior. Appraisal Standards and Results of the Headwaters and Elk River Property Appraisals In its instructions for the Headwaters and the Elk River property appraisals, BLM instructed the appraisers to follow federal appraisal standards in valuing the properties. These standards state that the government should appraise a property to be acquired at the fair market value. The income approach involves estimating the value of a resource on the basis of the present value of the anticipated future income from production. Therefore, BLM instructed the appraiser to assume specific timber harvest levels to avoid speculation on the amount of timber that could be harvested. For both approaches, the appraiser estimated the total amount of timber available for harvest and the costs of logging the timber, which include the costs for transportation. To this value, the appraiser added the present value for the remaining land and trees. The appraisal established a value of $78.4 million for the property. This document also summarized the results of the two appraisals and concluded that the authorized public expenditure of $380 million is within the range of appraised values; the values range from $135 million to $405 million for the Headwaters property and include an additional $26.6 million for the portion of the Elk River property to be retained by the government. The opinion also found the acquisition to be in the best interests of the United States because it represents an opportunity to set aside an irreplaceable resource for the public. The need to make key assumptions during the appraisal process tended to increase uncertainty about the appraised values. Although we note that using different assumptions would have resulted in different appraised values, we do not find the use of the assumptions unreasonable. Although we note that using different assumptions in each of these four cases would have resulted in different appraised values, we do not find the use of the assumptions unreasonable. Elk River Appraisal In estimating the fair market value of the Elk River property, the appraisal relied on one key assumption. Observations In our review of the Headwaters and the Elk River property appraisals, we did not identify areas in which the appraisals deviated from federal appraisal standards. The Secretary of the Interior recognized, in his opinion of value, the intrinsic worth of the irreplaceable natural resources of the Headwaters property, whereas the appraisals simply estimated the value of the properties on the basis of their use as timberlands.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the appraisals of Headwaters Forest that were required to be conducted prior to its acquisition, focusing on: (1) whether they complied with federal appraisal standards and how the values of the appraisals were derived; and (2) key assumptions used in the appraisals. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) it did not identify any areas in which the appraisals of the Headwaters and Elk River properties deviated from federal appraisal standards; (2) federal appraisal standards state that the government should appraise a property to be acquired at its fair market value; (3) the appraiser of the Headwaters property produced a limited appraisal with four market values--one value for each of four timber harvest assumptions provided by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM); (4) in calculating these four values, the appraiser relied on two approaches: (a) estimating the current cost of the land and the timber from revenue and logging-cost estimates; and (b) estimating the total net income from future timber operations and adjusting this amount to the present value of the standing trees; (5) the appraiser of the Elk River property relied on one approach to derive fair market value, the use of comparable sale information to estimate value, and verified the result using a second approach, estimating the total net income from future timber operations and adjusting this amount to the present value of the standing trees; (6) following these standards led the appraiser to estimate the value of the Headwaters property at $135 million, $250 million, $350 million or $405 million, depending on the assumed harvest level; (7) the Elk River property was appraised at $78.4 million; (8) the Secretary of the Interior, in his opinion of value, determined that the $380 million authorized for the combined properties falls within these appraised values; (9) the Secretary's opinion of value also found the acquisition to be in the best interests of the United States because it represents an opportunity to set aside an irreplaceable resource for the public; (10) GAO's work found that in both appraisals, the need to make key assumptions during the appraisal process tended to increase uncertainty about the appraised values; (11) GAO did not estimate the specific monetary impact of these assumptions; (12) however, using different assumptions would have changed the appraised values; (13) the Department of Justice and BLM officials noted that the appraisals could not have been completed by statutory deadlines without making assumptions to address these issues; and (14) although GAO noted that using different assumptions would have changed the appraisal values, GAO did not find the use of the assumptions unreasonable.
gao_GAO-10-536T	gao_GAO-10-536T_0	FISMA also requires OMB to report annually to Congress by March 1. Since the enactment of FISMA in 2002, federal agencies have generally reported increasing rates of implementation for key information security activities. However, in fiscal year 2009, agencies reported mixed progress in implementing these activities compared to fiscal year 2008. Until these agencies fully implement information security requirements, they may be at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction of information or disruption of mission critical operations. 2). Most of the 24 major federal agencies had reported deficiencies in the following major categories of information security controls, as defined by our Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual: access controls, which ensure that only authorized individuals can read, alter, or delete data; configuration management controls, which provide assurance that only authorized software programs are implemented; segregation of duties, which reduces the risk that one individual can independently perform inappropriate actions without detection; continuity of operations planning, which provides for the prevention of significant disruptions of computer-dependent operations; and an agencywide information security program, which provides the framework for ensuring that risks are understood and that effective controls are selected and properly implemented. An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements of an agencywide information security program, as required by FISMA. According to inspector general, agency, and our previous reports, 23 of the 24 major federal agencies had weaknesses in their agencywide information security programs. Reported Security Incidents Are on the Rise Consistent with the evolving and growing nature of the threats and persistent vulnerabilities to federal systems, agencies are reporting an increasing number of security incidents and events. Reported attacks and unintentional incidents involving critical infrastructure systems demonstrate that a serious attack could be devastating. Opportunities Exist for Enhancing Federal Cybersecurity A concerted response to safeguarding federal systems includes several components. Over the past several years, we and agency inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to resolve significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. Continue Efforts to Improve Reporting and Oversight FISMA specifies that OMB is to develop policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security. Continue to Enhance Federal Information Security through Governmentwide Initiatives The White House, OMB, and certain federal agencies have undertaken several governmentwide initiatives that are intended to enhance information security at federal agencies. Continue efforts to implement FDCC. In summary, while federal agencies continue to report increased compliance in implementing security training requirements, most federal agencies reported weaknesses in most types of information security controls. There are multiple opportunities for the federal government to enhance federal cybersecurity and address these continuing weaknesses.	Why GAO Did This Study Without proper safeguards, federal computer systems are vulnerable to intrusions by individuals who have malicious intentions and can obtain sensitive information. The need for a vigilant approach to information security has been demonstrated by the pervasive and sustained cyber attacks against the United States; these attacks continue to pose a potentially devastating impact to systems as well as the operations and critical infrastructures that they support. Concerned by reports of weaknesses in federal systems, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), which authorized and strengthened information security program, evaluation, and annual reporting requirements for federal agencies. GAO was asked to testify on federal information security and agency efforts to comply with FISMA. This testimony summarizes (1) federal agencies' efforts to secure information systems and (2) opportunities to enhance federal cybersecurity. To prepare for this testimony, GAO analyzed its prior reports and those from 24 major federal agencies, their inspectors general, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). What GAO Found Federal agencies have reported mixed progress in securing their systems and implementing key security activities. For example, in fiscal year 2009, agencies collectively reported an increasing percentage of personnel receiving security awareness training and specialized security training, but a decreasing rate of implementation for other key activities when compared to fiscal year 2008. In addition, federal systems continued to be afflicted by persistent control weaknesses. Almost all of the 24 major federal agencies had information security weaknesses in five key control categories, as illustrated in the figure below. An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements of an agencywide information security program, as required by FISMA. As a result, they may be at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction of information or disruption of mission critical operations. Such risks are illustrated, in part, by the increasing number of security incidents experienced by federal agencies. Opportunities exist to enhance federal cybersecurity through a concerted response to safeguarding systems that include several components. First, agencies can implement the hundreds of recommendations GAO and inspectors general have made to resolve control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. In addition, OMB's continued efforts to improve reporting and oversight as recommended by GAO could help assess agency programs. Finally, the White House, OMB, and certain federal agencies have undertaken several governmentwide initiatives that are intended to enhance information security at federal agencies.
gao_GAO-05-882	gao_GAO-05-882_0	Since September 11, 2001, DOD reports that it obligated $191 billion through May 2005 to conduct GWOT. Reliability of DOD’s Reported Costs Is Unknown We found numerous problems in DOD’s processes for recording and reporting costs for the Global War on Terrorism, raising significant concerns about the overall reliability of DOD’s reported cost data. As a result, neither DOD nor Congress (1) can reliably know how much the war is costing and details on how appropriated funds are being spent or (2) have historical data useful in considering future funding needs. On the basis of our work, DOD is taking steps to improve its cost reporting. However, as was the case in our 1996 report, because it was not feasible to examine all reported costs and significant data reliability problems existed, we were not able to determine the extent that total costs were misstated. The commander of coalition forces in Iraq has set a 10 percent cost reduction target in Iraq. DOD is generally using its existing contingency operations financial management regulation to guide GWOT budgeting, cost reporting, and spending, although this regulation was developed and structured to manage the costs of small-scale contingency operations. Specific provisions of the regulation conflict with the needs of GWOT. One such conflict concerns administrative limitations on the use of supplemental funds for base support activities at home stations. In response to our work, DOD revised its Financial Management Regulation. While certain individual commands have taken steps to control costs and DOD policy generally advises its officials of their financial management responsibilities with regard to the prudent use of contingency funding, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has not systematically called for all commands involved in GWOT to take steps to control costs and to keep the office informed of those steps and their success. With the growth in GWOT costs, there is a need to ensure that all commands seek to control costs. Until the department establishes guidelines on cost controls and is routinely informed about the types of controls and their impact on costs, it cannot be sure that all that can be done to control costs is being done. 3. Regarding our recommendations on improving the accuracy and reliability of reported costs of the Global War on Terrorism and to have the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) play a role in overseeing the efforts as well as to develop a systematic process to review and test the reliability of the overall GWOT cost reports, DOD stated that it has completed implementation of this recommendation through the execution of new guidance and procedures for collecting and reporting cost of war information and is actively overseeing the preparation of GWOT cost reports. In commenting on the report’s content, DOD disagreed with GAO’s position on the overstatement of the reported costs for mobilized Army reservists in fiscal year 2004. Finally, we believe that DOD’s reference in its comment letter to the $2.1 billion difference as an anomaly is a mischaracterization--particularly when viewed in the context of its explanation that “the Department’s use of estimates led to a difference.” As clearly stated in this report, we found that the reported cost data are not reliable, in part because of long-standing deficiencies in DOD’s financial and accounting systems, a lack of systematic processes to ensure that data are properly entered into those accounting systems, and the use of estimates rather than actual information. We focused our analysis primarily, but not exclusively, on reported costs for fiscal year 2004—the latest full year of data available at the time of our review—and specifically the military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts as they represent the largest amount of spending. To assess the extent to which DOD’s existing financial management policy is applicable to war spending, we focused our efforts on analyzing guidance provided by the fiscal year 2004 Defense Appropriation Act and DOD’s and the military services’ specific policy and procedures.	Why GAO Did This Study Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported spending $191 billion through May 2005 to conduct the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). On an ongoing basis, DOD compiles and reports information on the incremental costs of the war, and uses these data in preparing future funding requests. To assist Congress in its oversight of war spending, GAO assessed (1) whether DOD's reported war costs are based on reliable data, (2) the extent to which DOD's existing financial management policy is applicable to war spending, and (3) whether DOD has implemented cost controls as operations mature. GAO focused primarily, but not exclusively, on fiscal year 2004 reported costs--the latest full year of data available at the time of GAO's review. What GAO Found GAO found numerous problems in DOD's processes for recording and reporting costs for GWOT, raising significant concerns about the overall reliability of DOD's reported cost data. As a result, neither DOD nor Congress can reliably know how much the war is costing and details on how appropriated funds are being spent, or have historical data useful in considering future funding needs. On the basis of GAO's work, DOD is taking steps to improve its cost reporting. Factors affecting the reliability of DOD's reported costs include long-standing deficiencies in DOD's financial systems, the lack of a systematic process to ensure that data are correctly entered into those systems, inaccurately reported costs, and difficulties in properly categorizing costs. In at least one case, reported costs may be materially overstated. Specifically, DOD's reported obligations for mobilized Army reservists in fiscal year 2004 were based primarily on estimates rather than actual information and differed from related payroll information by as much as $2.1 billion, or 30 percent of the amount DOD reported in its cost report. In addition, GAO found inadvertent double counting in the Navy's and Marine Corps' portion of DOD's reported costs amounting to almost $1.8 billion from November 2004 through April 2005. Because it was not feasible to examine all reported costs and significant data reliability problems existed, GAO was not able to determine the extent that total costs were misstated. Further complicating the data reliability issue is the fact that DOD has not updated its policy to address GWOT spending. Instead, DOD is using its existing financial management regulation for funding contingency operations, although it was developed and structured to manage the costs of small-scale contingency operations. GAO has noted that specific provisions of the existing policy conflict with the needs of GWOT. One conflict concerns the use of supplemental funds for base support activities at home stations. DOD's financial management regulation administratively precludes such use, but military service officials have spent billions of dollars in supplemental funds on these activities. Some of this spending appears to directly support the war, but some does not. DOD is currently updating its regulation on the basis of GAO's work. While individual commands have taken steps to control costs and DOD policy generally advises its officials of their financial management responsibilities to ensure the prudent use of contingency funding, DOD has not established guidelines that would require all commands involved in GWOT to take steps to control costs and to keep DOD informed of those steps and their success. For example, the commander of coalition forces in Iraq has unilaterally set a 10 percent cost reduction target for fiscal year 2005 but the details are not widely known outside the command. With the growth in GWOT costs, there is a need to ensure that all commands seek to control costs, including the need to review and rationalize related requirements. Until the department establishes guidelines on cost controls and is routinely informed about the types of controls and their impact on costs, it cannot be sure that all that can be done to control costs is being done.
gao_GAO-06-815	gao_GAO-06-815_0	Accurately assessing the academic knowledge of these students in English is challenging. Students with Limited English Proficiency Performed below Progress Goals in 2004 in Two-Thirds of States, but States We Studied Are Working to Improve Student Academic Performance In school year 2003-2004, the percentage of students with limited English proficiency reported by states as scoring proficient on a state’s language arts and mathematics tests was lower than the state’s annual progress goals (established for all students) in nearly two-thirds of the 48 states for which we obtained data. However, factors other than student academic performance can influence whether a state meets its progress goals, such as which students a state includes in the limited English proficient group and how a state establishes its annual progress goals. North Carolina officials reported that they oversample for students with limited English proficiency to ensure that these students are adequately represented in the field tests. Both Education’s Peer Reviews and Our Group of Experts Raised Concerns Regarding State Efforts to Ensure Valid and Reliable Results Education’s recent NCLBA peer reviews of 38 states found that 25 did not provide sufficient evidence on the validity or reliability of results for students with limited English proficiency, although states have been required to include these students in their assessments since 1994. Members indicated that some states may need assistance to conduct appropriate analyses that will offer useful information about the validity of their academic assessments for these students. Our review of state Web sites found available documentation on accommodations for 42 states. According to our expert group and our review of the relevant literature, research is lacking on what specific accommodations are appropriate for students with limited English proficiency, as well as their effectiveness in improving the validity of assessment results. Our group of experts told us that this type of assessment is difficult and costly to develop. Development of a valid native language assessment involves more than a simple translation of the original test; in most situations, a process of test development and validation similar to that of the nontranslated test is recommended to ensure the validity of the test. Many States Are Still in the Process of Establishing the Validity and Reliability of English Language Proficiency Assessments Officials in our study states and test developers we interviewed reported that they commonly apply generally accepted test development procedures in the development of English language proficiency assessments, but some are still in the process of documenting the validity and reliability of these assessments. Education Has Provided Assistance, but States Reported Need for Additional Guidance and Flexibility Education has offered states a variety of technical assistance to help them appropriately assess students with limited English proficiency, such as providing training and expert reviews of their assessment systems, as well as flexibility in assessing these students. However, Education has issued little written guidance on how states are expected to assess and track the English proficiency of these students, leaving state officials unclear about Education’s expectations. To support states’ efforts to incorporate these students into their accountability systems, Education has offered states some flexibilities in how they track progress goals for these students. These officials indicated that additional flexibility is needed to ensure that the federal progress measures accurately track the academic progress of these students. However, officials in about one-third of the 33 states we visited or directly contacted expressed uncertainty about implementing these requirements. Further, Education noted that it is in the process of completing a regulation on flexibility for these students. Specifically, we asked the group to discuss the following questions: To meet the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), what steps should states take to ensure the validity and reliability of language arts and mathematics assessments for students with limited English proficiency? How can the U.S. Department of Education assist states in their efforts to meet NCLBA’s assessment and accountability requirements for students with limited English proficiency? Appendix V: Enhanced Assessment Consortia Participation World-Class Instructional Design and Assessment (WIDA) Consortium Mountain West Assessment Consortium (MWAC) Pennsylvania Enhanced Assessment Grant (PA EAG) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to-State for English Language Learners (ACCESS for ELLs) English Language Development Assessment (ELDA) Comprehensive English Language Learning Assessment (CELLA) Appendix VI: English Language Proficiency Assessments Used in the 2005-2006 School Year, by State Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) Stanford English Language Proficiency Test MAC II (Maculaitis Assessment of Competencies) Test of English Language Proficiency California English Language Development Test LAS (Language Assessment System) Links Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) LAS (Language Assessment System) Links Mountain West Assessment Consortium test items Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) LAS (Language Assessment System) Links English Language Development Assessment (SCASS) Kansas English Language Proficiency Assessment 2004 IDEA Proficiency Test or Language Assessment Scales (LAS) English Language Development Assessment (SCASS) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) LAS (Language Assessment System) Links English Language Proficiency Assessment(includes Mountain West Consortium test items) Test of Emerging Academic English, Minnesota Student Oral Language Observation Matrix, and checklist for reading and writing for K-2 students Stanford English Language Proficiency Test MAC II (Maculaitis Assessment of Competencies) Test of English Language Proficiency Iowa Test of Basic Skills, Woodcock-Muñoz Language Survey (English), or other state-approved test English Language Development Assessment (SCASS) LAS (Language Assessment System) Links Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) New Mexico English Language Proficiency Assessment (includes Mountain West Consortium test items) New York State English as a Second Language Achievement Test 2004 IDEA Proficiency Test, Woodcock-Muñoz Language Survey (English), and Language Assessment Scales (LAS) English Language Development Assessment (SCASS) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) Stanford English Language Proficiency Test Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) English Language Development Assessment (SCASS) Dakota English Language Proficiency assessment Comprehensive English Language Learning Assessment (PA EAG) Texas English Language Proficiency Assessment System; consists of Reading Proficiency Tests in English and Texas Observation Protocols Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) Stanford English Language Proficiency Test English Language Development Assessment (SCASS) Assessing Comprehension and Communication in English State-to- State for English Language Learners (WIDA) State allows school districts to individually choose tests. GAO-06-661. GAO-06-25.	Why GAO Did This Study For the Spanish translation of the highlights page for this document, see GAO-06-1111 . Ley para que ningun nino se quede atras: La ayuda del Departamento de Educacion puede contribuir a que los Estados midan mejor el progreso de los alumnos que no dominan bien el ingles. GAO-06-1111 , Julio de 2006. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) focused attention on the academic achievement of more than 5 million students with limited English proficiency. Obtaining valid test results for these students is challenging, given their language barriers. This report describes (1) the extent to which these students are meeting annual academic progress goals, (2) what states have done to ensure the validity of their academic assessments, (3) what states are doing to ensure the validity of their English language proficiency assessments, and (4) how the U.S. Department of Education (Education) is supporting states' efforts to meet NCLBA's assessment requirements for these students. To collect this information, we convened a group of experts and studied five states (California, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and Texas). We also conducted a state survey and reviewed state and Education documents. What GAO Found For the Spanish translation of the highlights page for this document, see GAO-06-1111 . Ley para que ningun nino se quede atras: La ayuda del Departamento de Educacion puede contribuir a que los Estados midan mejor el progreso de los alumnos que no dominan bien el ingles. GAO-06-1111 , Julio de 2006. In the 2003-2004 school year, state data showed that the percentage of students with limited English proficiency scoring proficient on a state's language arts and mathematics tests was lower than the state's annual progress goals in nearly two-thirds of the 48 states for which we obtained data. Further, our review of data 49 states submitted to Education showed that in most states, these students generally did not perform as well as other student groups on state mathematics tests. Factors other than student knowledge, such as how a state establishes its annual progress goals, can influence whether states meet their goals. For their academic assessments, officials in our five study states reported taking steps to follow generally accepted test development procedures and to ensure the validity and reliability of these tests for students with limited English proficiency, such as reviewing test questions for bias. However, our group of experts expressed concerns about whether all states are assessing these students in a valid manner, noting that some states lack the resources and technical expertise to take appropriate steps to ensure the validity of tests for these students. Further, Education's peer reviews of assessments in 38 states found that 25 states did not provide adequate evidence to ensure the validity or reliability of academic test results for these students. To improve the validity of these test results, most states offer accommodations, such as a bilingual dictionary. However, our experts reported that research is lacking on what accommodations are effective in mitigating language barriers. A minority of states used native language or alternate assessments for students with limited English proficiency, but these tests are costly to develop and are not appropriate for all students. Many states are implementing new English language proficiency assessments in 2006 to meet NCLBA requirements; as a result, complete information on their validity and reliability is not yet available. In 2006, 22 states used tests developed by one of four state consortia. Consortia and state officials reported taking steps to ensure the validity of these tests, such as conducting field tests. A 2005 Education-funded technical review of available documentation for 17 English language proficiency tests found insufficient documentation of the validity of these assessments' results. Education has offered a variety of technical assistance to help states assess students with limited English proficiency, such as peer reviews of states' academic assessments. However, Education has issued little written guidance to states on developing English language proficiency tests. Officials in one-third of the 33 states we visited or directly contacted told us they wanted more guidance about how to develop tests that meet NCLBA requirements. Education has offered states some flexibility in how they assess students with limited English proficiency, but officials in our study states told us that additional flexibility is needed to ensure that progress measures appropriately track the academic progress of these students.
gao_GAO-05-1051T	gao_GAO-05-1051T_0	The joint effort is expected to result in the secured sharing of health data between the new systems that each department is currently developing and beginning to implement—VA’s HealtheVet VistA and DOD’s CHCS II. According to the departments, they planned to be able to exchange selected health information through CHDR by October 2005. Accordingly, we recommended that the departments ● develop an architecture for the electronic interface between their health systems that includes system requirements, design specifications, and software descriptions; ● select a lead entity with final decision-making authority for the ● establish a project management structure to provide day-to-day guidance of and accountability for their investments in and implementation of the interface capability; and ● create and implement a comprehensive and coordinated project management plan for the electronic interface that defines the technical and managerial processes necessary to satisfy project requirements and includes (1) the authority and responsibility of each organizational unit; (2) a work breakdown structure for all of the tasks to be performed in developing, testing, and implementing the software, along with schedules associated with the tasks; and (3) a security policy. Besides pursuing their long-term goals for future systems through the HealthePeople (Federal) strategy, the departments are working on two demonstration projects that focus on exchanging information between existing systems: (1) Bidirectional Health Information Exchange, a project to exchange health information on shared patients, and (2) Laboratory Data Sharing Interface, an application used to transfer laboratory work orders and results. VA and DOD Are Exchanging Limited Medical Information between Existing Health Systems VA and DOD have begun to implement applications developed under two demonstration projects that focus on the exchange of electronic medical information. The first—the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange—has been implemented at five VA/DOD locations and the second—Laboratory Data Sharing Interface—has been implemented at six VA/DOD locations. Table 2 shows the locations at which it has been or is to be implemented. VA and DOD Are Taking Actions to Achieve a Virtual Medical Record, but Much Work Remains Besides the near-term initiatives just discussed, VA and DOD continue their efforts on the longer term goal: to achieve a virtual medical record based on the two-way exchange of computable data between the health information systems that each is currently developing. Also in response to our recommendations, the departments have established project accountability and implemented a joint project management structure. Without a plan of sufficient detail, VA and DOD increase the risk that the CHDR project will not deliver the planned capabilities in the time and at the cost expected. Second, at present, health information in systems other than CHCS (such as the Clinical Information System and the Integrated Clinical Database) is not yet being captured in the Clinical Data Repository. In summary, developing an electronic interface that will enable VA and DOD to exchange computable patient medical records is a highly complex undertaking that could lead to substantial benefits— improving the quality of health care and disability claims processing for the nation’s military members and veterans. VA and DOD have made progress in the electronic sharing of patient health data in their limited, near-term demonstration projects, and have taken an important step toward their long-term goals by improving the management of the CHDR program. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time.	Why GAO Did This Study For the past 7 years, the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD) have been working to exchange patient health information electronically and ultimately to have interoperable electronic medical records. Sharing medical information helps (1) promote the seamless transition of active duty personnel to veteran status and (2) ensure that active duty military personnel and veterans receive high-quality health care and assistance in adjudicating their disability claims. This is especially critical in the face of current military responses to national and foreign crises. In testimony before the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in March and May 2004, GAO discussed the progress being made by the departments in this endeavor. In June 2004, at the Subcommittee's request, GAO reported on its review of the departments' progress toward the goal of an electronic two-way exchange of patient health records. GAO is providing an update on the departments' efforts, focusing on (1) the status of ongoing, near-term initiatives to exchange data between the agencies' existing systems and (2) progress in achieving the longer term goal of exchanging data between the departments' new systems. What GAO Found In the past year, VA and DOD have begun to implement applications that exchange limited electronic medical information between the departments' existing health information systems. These applications are (1) Bidirectional Health Information Exchange, a project to achieve the two-way exchange of health information on patients who receive care from both VA and DOD, and (2) Laboratory Data Sharing Interface, an application used to electronically transfer laboratory work orders and results between the departments. The Bidirectional Health Information Exchange application has been implemented at five sites, at which it is being used to rapidly exchange information such as pharmacy and allergy data. Also, the Laboratory Data Sharing Interface application has been implemented at six sites, at which it is being used for real-time entry of laboratory orders and retrieval of results. According to the departments, these systems enable lower costs and improved service to patients by saving time and avoiding errors. VA and DOD are continuing with activities to support their longer term goal of sharing health information between their systems, but the goal of two-way electronic exchange of patient records remains far from being realized. Each department is developing its own modern health information system--VA's HealtheVet VistA and DOD's Composite Health Care System II--and they have taken steps to respond to GAO's June 2004 recommendations regarding the program to develop an electronic interface that will enable these systems to share information. That is, they have developed an architecture for the interface, established project accountability, and implemented a joint project management structure. However, they have not yet developed a clearly defined project management plan to guide their efforts, as GAO previously recommended. Further, they have not yet fully populated the repositories that will store the data for their future health systems, and they have experienced delays in their efforts to begin a limited data exchange. Lacking a detailed project management plan increases the risk that the departments will encounter further delays and be unable to deliver the planned capabilities on time and at the cost expected.
gao_GAO-10-957	gao_GAO-10-957_0	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) USAID Implements Wide Range of WASH Assistance, with Largest Numbers of Beneficiaries in Middle East and North Africa Region Largest Numbers of Beneficiaries Were Reported in USAID’s Middle East and North Africa Region In fiscal years 2006 through 2009, about 45 percent of reported beneficiaries of USAID water and sanitation assistance—almost 11 million of the more than 24 million beneficiaries worldwide—were in the agency’s Middle East and North Africa region (see fig. 6). Sub-Saharan Africa. Asia and the Pacific. (5.0%) (80.5%) Water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) Most USAID Obligations Attributed to Meet Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriations Directive Were for High- Priority Countries Of the approximately $495 million of fiscal year 2009 obligations that USAID attributed to meet the overall annual appropriations directive for WASH activities, about $397 million (80 percent) was obligated in the 31 countries designated as high priority. In June 2008, State announced a joint State-USAID strategic framework for water and sanitation that, according to State and USAID officials, represents the current U.S. water and sanitation strategy. Moreover, State has not developed an estimate of funding needed for the United States to achieve its overall foreign assistance policy objective. Fiscal years 2008 and 2009. State Began Designating High- Priority Countries in 2008, but Basis of Designations Is Unclear State’s Annual Reports to Congress Identify High- Priority Countries State’s annual reports to Congress in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 identify countries designated as high priority for water and sanitation assistance, as required by the Act. 10). In both years, nearly half of the countries identified as high priority were in USAID’s sub- Saharan Africa region; more than a quarter were in the Asia and the Pacific region; and one country, Haiti, was in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. A country’s level and type of need for water and sanitation (specified in the Act) Conditions in the country that would support long-term sustainable results (specified in the Act) The U.S. comparative advantage, such as level of expertise, relative to that Opportunities to leverage U.S. foreign assistance through partnerships and similar mechanisms with other donors and partners Consistency with U.S. foreign policy priorities Compliance with statutory directives that affect foreign assistance According to the joint strategic framework and State’s annual reports, USAID missions generally consider all of these factors, in consultation with host governments, in planning for water and sanitation activities as part of the missions’ overall development portfolios. In addition, State’s designations are not clearly linked to verifiable analysis. State officials said that they considered USAID mission plans in making high-priority designations. In addition, the framework and reports do not specify the basis for State’s designations of high-priority countries. High-Priority Designations Are Not Consistently Associated with Countries’ Need for Water and Sanitation The designations of high-priority countries in State’s 2008 report are not consistently associated with data on need for water and sanitation. However, although State has taken steps to develop the water and sanitation strategy required by the Act, the documents comprising the strategy—State’s annual reports to Congress and the 2008 joint State- USAID strategic framework—do not include specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, and timetables for U.S. water and sanitation assistance or an assessment of needed funding. Recommendations for Executive Action To enable State to fulfill requirements in the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, take the following two actions: Ensure that the U.S. water and sanitation strategy addresses all components required by the Act, including specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, and timetables for achieving the U.S. foreign assistance objective of providing affordable and equitable access to safe water and sanitation in developing countries. This report 1. describes USAID’s water and sanitation activities and reported 2. describes USAID obligations for water and sanitation activities in fiscal years 2006 through 2009, including obligations attributed to meet annual appropriations directives in fiscal years 2008 and 2009; 3. assesses State’s development of a U.S. water and sanitation strategy as required by the Act; and 4. examines State’s process for designating high-priority countries as required by the Act.	Why GAO Did This Study The Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 (the Act) made access to safe water and sanitation for developing countries a U.S. foreign assistance policy objective. The United States provides such assistance mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Act requires the Secretary of State to develop a water and sanitation assistance strategy with the Administrator of USAID; designate high-priority countries for assistance; and report annually to Congress on, among other things, implementation of the strategy and progress toward the U.S. policy objective. As requested, in this report GAO (1) describes USAID's accomplishments; (2) describes USAID's obligations of funds for water and sanitation assistance in fiscal years 2006-2009; (3) assesses the Department of State's (State) development of a U.S. water and sanitation strategy; and (4) examines State's designation of high-priority countries. GAO reviewed State and USAID documents and data and obtained the views of State and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and 15 countries. What GAO Found State reported that USAID provided a wide range of water and sanitation activities in 2006 through 2009, such as installing community water taps, building latrines, and constructing major water treatment plants. Nearly 11 million of more than 24 million reported water beneficiaries and nearly 6 million of more than 10 million reported sanitation beneficiaries were in USAID's Middle East and North Africa region. USAID obligations of funds for water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) activities increased by approximately 82 percent from fiscal year 2006 to 2009, with the majority of funding supporting WASH activities in three USAID regions--sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, about $337 million and $495 million, respectively, of USAID obligations for water and sanitation activities was attributed to meet annual congressional appropriations directives that no less than $300 million be obligated for those years. In fiscal year 2009, about 80 percent of the attributed funds were obligated in countries that State designated as high priority. State has taken steps to develop a water and sanitation strategy. In 2008, State and USAID issued a joint strategic framework that, according to State, largely comprises the broad current U.S. strategy. State also identified its annual water and sanitation reports to Congress in 2006 through 2009 as containing elements of this strategy. However, the strategic framework and annual reports do not include specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, and timetables, which the Act requires and which are needed to measure progress toward achieving the overall U.S. foreign assistance policy objective. Further, State has not provided an assessment--also required by the Act--of funding needed to achieve such goals, benchmarks, and timetables. In fiscal year 2008, State began to designate countries as high priority for water and sanitation assistance, designating 36 countries in 2008 and 31 countries in 2009. Nearly half of these countries were in sub-Saharan Africa and more than a quarter were in Asia and the Pacific. State said that in making the designations, it considered USAID mission plans for water and sanitation activities. In addition, State's annual reports to Congress identify factors that are reflected in the high-priority designations, including two criteria specified by the Act: need for improved access to water and sanitation and the existence of conditions that would support long-term sustainable results. Additional factors reflected in the designations include consistency with U.S. foreign policy priorities and compliance with statutory directives. However, GAO found that State's high-priority designations excluded several countries where USAID had provided water and sanitation assistance and included one country where USAID had not provided such assistance. Moreover, the designations for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 are not linked to verifiable analysis. As a result, the basis for State's designations of high-priority countries is unclear. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State (1) ensure that the strategy for U.S. water and sanitation assistance addresses all requirements, including goals and benchmarks, and (2) clearly identify, in its mandated reports, the basis for its designations of high-priority countries. State accepted GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-01-292	gao_GAO-01-292_0	Conclusions Although the Potomac Yard exchange helped to resolve years of dispute when it was completed in March 2000, the Park Service could have received more than $15 million from the developer—rather than owing the developer $14 million—if the exchanged interests had been appropriately valued. As a federal agency, the Park Service has a responsibility to protect federal taxpayers’ interests when it acquires or conveys land interests. However, the Park Service did not do so when it instructed the appraiser to derive a value for development on the Alexandria parcel that was not shown to be reasonably probable, or when it used an appraised value on the Arlington parcel that understated the worth of the Park Service’s interests. Consequently, the Park Service gave the developer credit for losses that might not have realistically occurred and did not receive enough credit for allowing the developer to develop the Arlington parcel. However, the transaction is now fully executed and—as in similar situations when a government agency pays too much for an item under a contract—it is unlikely that the Park Service can recover any funds.	What GAO Found Settling 30 years of sometimes acrimonious dispute, the National Park Service completed an exchange of land interests on two vacant parcels of land in Potomac Yard in March 2000. However, the Park Service could have received more than $15 million from the private developer--rather than owing the developer $14 million--if the exchanged interests had been appropriately valued. As a federal agency, the Park Service has a responsibility to protect federal taxpayers' interests when it acquires or conveys land interests. Yet, the Park Service did not do so when it instructed the appraiser to derive a value for development on the Alexandria parcel that was not shown to be reasonably probable, or when it used an appraised value on the Arlington parcel that understated the worth of the Park Service's interests. Consequently, the Park Service gave the developer credit for losses that might not have realistically occurred and did not receive enough credit for allowing the developer to develop the Arlington parcel. However, the transaction is now fully executed--as in similar situations when a government agency pays too much for an item under a contract--it is unlikely that the Park Service can recover any funds.
gao_AIMD-95-179	gao_AIMD-95-179_0	Overview of Observations Federal budget accounts are a product of the needs and goals of many users and reflect the many roles which they have been asked to address. The present budget account “structure” was not created as a single integrated framework but rather developed, for the most part, as separate budget accounts over time to respond to specific needs. Our review of fiscal year 1995 budget accounts revealed a structure characterized by a concentration of budgetary resources in a few large accounts and a scattering of remaining resources among hundreds of other accounts; a mix of account orientations with an emphasis on programs and processes, rather than objects of expense or organizations; over 70 percent of total budgetary resources available in fiscal year 1995 from sources which did not require congressional approval in the current year; and extensive use of general funds to provide most budgetary resources to most accounts, but with special and trust funds supporting about 30 percent of total resources and 20 percent of all accounts. Object, organization, process, and program orientations are found throughout the federal budget account structure.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided a descriptive overview of the federal budget account structure. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) federal budget accounts are a product of the needs and goals of many users and address many different roles; (2) the present budget account structure was not created as a single integrated framework, but was mainly developed as separate budget accounts to respond to specific needs; (3) the budget account structure is characterized by a concentration of budgetary resources in a few large accounts and a scattering of remaining resources among hundreds of other accounts, and a mix of account orientations with an emphasis on programs and processes, rather than objects of expense or organizations; (4) over 70 percent of the total budgetary resources available in fiscal year 1995 came from sources which did not require congressional approval in the current year; and (5) general funds are used to provide budgetary resources to most accounts, with special and trust funds supporting about 30 percent of total resources and 20 percent of all accounts.
gao_GAO-03-759T	gao_GAO-03-759T_0	FBI Efforts Part of Broader Transformation Efforts Last June, I highlighted the importance of the FBI’s success in transforming itself, noting several basic aspects of a successful transformation as well as the need for broader government transformation. Thus far, we are encouraged by the progress that the FBI has made in some areas in the year since the announcement of phase II of its reorganization. Specifically, the commitment of Director Mueller and senior level leadership to the FBI’s reorganization; the FBI’s communication of priorities; and the FBI’s efforts to realign its activities, processes, and resources warrant recognition. However, a comprehensive transformation plan with key milestones and assessment points to guide its overall transformation effort is still needed. At the same time, it has made some progress in its strategic planning efforts. These include (1) initiating several reengineering projects on human capital issues, such as succession planning, enhancing the FBI’s communication strategy and streamlining its hiring process; (2) initiating the staffing of the Office of Intelligence, a key component of building the FBI’s intelligence mission; (3) realigning agents and support staff to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime investigations to address priority areas; and (4) implementing plans to enhance recruitment and hiring for critical skill needs and training staff shifted to priority areas to address the change in the FBI’s priorities. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has permanently realigned some of its field agent workforce from criminal investigative programs to work counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber programs. However, despite these efforts, the FBI continues to face major challenges in critical staffing areas. Some of the more noteworthy challenges include (1) a continuing need to utilize special agent and staff resources from other criminal investigative programs to address counterterrorism workload, (2) lack of adequate analytical and technical assistance, and (3) lack of adequate administrative and clerical support personnel. These areas include (1) the FBI’s completion and implementation of a revised strategic plan; (2) the FBI’s progress in integrating a human capital approach consistent with its mission and goals; (3) the long term impact on state and local law enforcement agencies, and the public, of the FBI’s shift of staff resources away from drug enforcement and other criminal programs; and (4) FBI agents’ compliance with the new investigative authorities granted under the revised Attorney General’s Guidelines. Revisions to the FBI’s Training Programs in Priority Areas The FBI has taken steps to provide revised training to FBI personnel assigned to the priority areas. Appendix VII: Internal Controls to Protect Against Civil Liberties Abuses The following sections present more detail about (1) the extent to which internal controls have been incorporated into the Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, (2) other internal control mechanisms that are in place to ensure FBI compliance with the Guidelines, and (3) concerns about how the Guidelines may adversely affect the protection of civil liberties.	Why GAO Did This Study Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI needed to refocus its efforts to investigate those attacks and to detect and prevent possible future attacks. To do this the FBI has taken steps to change its priorities and sought to transform itself to more effectively address the potential terrorist threats. This testimony specifically addresses the FBI's (1) progress in updating its strategic plan; (2) development of a strategic human capital plan; (3) realignment of staff resources to priority areas; (4) reallocation of staff resources from its drug program; (5) efforts to recruit and hire new personnel to address critical staffing needs; (6) efforts to enhance its training program; and (7) implementation of new investigative authorities and internal controls to ensure compliance with the revised Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations and to help protect individual civil liberties. What GAO Found Last June, GAO highlighted the importance of the FBI's success in transforming itself, noting several basic aspects of a successful transformation. Thus far, GAO is encouraged by the progress that the FBI has made in some areas in the past year, but a number of major challenges remain. The commitment of Director Mueller and senior level leadership to the FBI's reorganization and the FBI's communication of priorities warrant recognition. However, a comprehensive transformation plan with key milestones and assessment points to guide its overall transformation efforts is still needed. The FBI has also not completed updating its strategic plan and has not developed a strategic human capital plan, although it has made some progress in both these areas. To better ensure focus on the highest priorities, over the last year, several actions were taken, including permanently redirecting a portion of the field agent workforce from criminal investigative programs to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. However, the FBI continues to face challenges in critical staffing areas including: (1) utilizing staff resources from other criminal investigative programs to address counterterrorism, and (2) a lack of adequate analytical and technical assistance and administrative support personnel. The FBI's efforts to address critical skill needs and revise its training program are commendable. GAO also found internal controls in place to help ensure compliance with the revised Attorney General's Guidelines and protect individual civil liberties.
gao_NSIAD-97-185	gao_NSIAD-97-185_0	The Navy’s remaining 15 auxiliary ships are crewed by military personnel. Navy’s Current and Planned Efforts to Turn Over the Operation of Auxiliary Ships to MSC for Civil Service and/or Commercial Crewing As of May 1997, the Navy had MSC operating 27 of its 42 auxiliary ships with civil service crews. This table also shows the size of the military detachment on these ships. The savings of over $17 million are also primarily attributable to differences in crew sizes. According to MSC unofficial estimates, these savings would be offset by a one-time cost of $45 million for an AOE-1 and $30 million for an AOE-6 to convert these ships to Coast Guard standards, which differ from Navy standards, that is, $180 million for all four AOE-1 ships and $120 million for all four AOE-6 ships, or $300 million for all eight ships. The study attributed the annual savings to much smaller crew sizes on MSC ships. It concluded that the Navy could save $4 million to $15 million a year per ship, depending on the type, by reducing the number of sea-going personnel positions on auxiliary ships and crewing them with civilians. A 1994 Naval Audit Service report also found that significant cost benefits could be achieved if Navy auxiliary ships were crewed by civil service mariners. Crewing With Civil Service Personnel Has Other Advantages Another advantage of turning over the Navy multiproduct ships to MSC is, as Navy and MSC officials pointed out, that MSC ships do not have the constraints on operating days per ship and on days at sea per crewmember that Navy ships do. Analysis of Costs Related to Civil Service and Commercial Crews Although the Navy’s current policy is not to use commercial crews, we compared the cost of crewing auxiliary ships with commercial and civil service crews. Based on our analysis, we found that crewing with commercial mariners costs more. We estimated that the annual labor cost to operate a Kaiser class oiler with a civil service crew would be $6.562 million and the cost with a commercial crew would be $6.883 million, a difference of about $321,000, or about 5 percent. Merchant Mariner Pool Would Increase We calculated that the pool of U.S. civil service mariners would increase by about 1,700 merchant mariners if the operation of the multiproduct ships were turned over to MSC (see table 6). We calculated that the commercial mariner pool to support shipboard positions would increase by about 2,700 to 3,400 mariners if commercial firms operated the multiproduct ships (see table 7). Recommendation Given the potential savings that could result if the Navy turned over the operation of the seven active multiproduct auxiliary ships and the one ship due for delivery in early 1998 to MSC for crewing with civil service mariners, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to devise a detailed plan for turning over, in a timely manner, the operation of the multiproduct auxiliary ships to MSC. Scope and Methodology To provide information on the Navy’s current and planned efforts to turn over the operation of military crewed auxiliary ships to MSC for civil service and/or commercial crewing, we analyzed data from and interviewed officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, MSC, the Center for Naval Analyses, commercial ship operating companies, and civilian maritime unions. To identify the potential cost savings that would be realized by turning over the operation of the Navy’s remaining military crewed auxiliary ships to MSC, we compared actual annual operating costs provided by the Navy to estimated annual operating costs provided by MSC for both classes of multiproduct ships.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's use of alternative crewing arrangements for Navy auxiliary ships, focusing on: (1) the Navy's plans for turning over the operation of military crewed auxiliary ships to its Military Sealift Command (MSC) for civil service or commercial crewing; (2) whether cost savings would be realized if the Navy turned over the operation of the remaining military crewed auxiliary ships to MSC; (3) the relative costs of operating a Navy auxiliary ship with a civil service crew and the costs of operating the same ship with a commercial crew; and (4) the increase in the merchant mariner pool if the operation of the multiproduct ships were turned over to MSC. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the Navy plans to turn over the operation of its remaining three ammunition ships to MSC for crewing with civil service mariners; (2) as of May 1997, the Navy had not decided on whether to turn over the operation of the remaining seven auxiliary ships as well as the single ship under construction to MSC; (3) all eight of these ships are multiproduct ships; (4) based on Navy cost data and MSC cost estimates, the Navy could save about $139.6 million annually by turning over the operation of these eight multiproduct ships to MSC for crewing with civil service mariners; (5) this savings is due primarily to a much smaller crew size than has been traditional on military crewed auxiliary ships; (6) these savings would be offset by a one-time conversion cost of $30 million to $45 million per ship, or about $300 million for all eight ships, to meet Coast Guard standards; (7) MSC might also need fewer ships to provide underway replenishment since unlike the Navy, it does not have the personnel and operating limitations on the number of operating days per ship and on days at sea per crewmember; (8) three other studies conducted since 1990 by the Center for Naval Analyses, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Naval Audit Service have also identified the potential for large cost savings if the Navy were to transfer additional ships to MSC; (9) these studies' projected savings were also primarily due to the smaller crew sizes on MSC ships; (10) the Navy does not intend to divert from its current policy of not using commercial mariners to crew auxiliary ships; (11) its position is that these ships must be crewed by military or civil service personnel due to their military mission; (12) however, if it were to change this policy, GAO's analysis shows that it would cost the Navy about $321,000, or about 5 percent more a year, to operate a commonly used MSC oiler ship with commercial crews than with civil service crews; (13) the difference in costs is primarily attributable to higher fringe benefit costs for commercial crews; (14) with respect to the size of the mariner pool under different crewing alternatives, GAO calculated that the pool of U.S. civil service mariners would increase by about 1,700 merchant mariners if the 8 remaining auxiliary ships were turned over to MSC and were crewed by civil service mariners; and (15) the pool of commercial merchant mariners would increase by about 2,700 to 3,400 mariners if these same ships were crewed by commercial mariners.
gao_GAO-16-699	gao_GAO-16-699_0	1). Federal Agencies Primarily Focus on Risk Assessment and Research but Also Conduct a Range of Other Activities Related to Critical Materials Supply Federal agencies are primarily focused on two areas of activity related to critical materials supply—assessing risk and supporting research—in addition to conducting a range of other activities. Agencies’ other critical materials activities include stockpiling or producing materials and reviewing and approving resource extraction projects, among other efforts. DOE. Commerce. Interior. Federal Approach to Addressing Critical Materials Supply Has Strengths but Is Not Consistent with Selected Collaboration Key Practices and Has Other Limitations The federal government’s approach to addressing critical materials supply issues has areas of strength, according to experts we surveyed, but is not consistent with selected key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration and has other limitations. As an interagency working group and according to its charter, the Subcommittee is to facilitate a strong, coordinated effort across its member agencies on critical minerals activities. These practices include agreeing on roles and responsibilities; establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; and developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. Relatedly, another expert noted that Commerce does not have a clearly defined role to support critical materials important to the economy. By taking steps to actively engage all member agencies in its efforts and clearly define roles and responsibilities, the Subcommittee will have more reasonable assurance that it can effectively marshal the potential contributions of all member agencies to take full advantage of their expertise and resources to help identify and mitigate critical materials supply risks. These include limitations in the federal government’s engagement with industry to identify U.S. critical material needs, with data to identify and assess risks and the Subcommittee’s focus on only a subset of critical materials, and in the Subcommittee’s focus on domestic production of critical materials. Commerce is responsible for soliciting information from a range of industry sectors to help identify and assess cases of materials needs. However, Commerce officials could not identify any recent assessments on critical materials by the department. Because Commerce is not engaging with industry stakeholders across a range of industrial sectors to identify materials of concern, it may not have the comprehensive, current information it needs to fulfill its responsibilities under the 1980 Act to continually identify and assess cases of materials needs. Finally, Commerce has not engaged with industry stakeholders to solicit information across a range of industrial sectors. Recommendations for Executive Action To enhance the ability of the Executive Office of the President to coordinate federal agencies to carry out the national materials policy outlined in the 1980 Act, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, working with the National Science and Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Critical and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains and agency leadership, as appropriate, take the following five actions: To strengthen the federal approach to addressing critical materials supply issues through enhanced interagency collaboration, the Subcommittee should agree on and clearly define the roles and responsibilities of member agencies and take steps to actively engage all relevant federal agencies in the Subcommittee’s efforts; develop joint strategies that articulate common outcomes and identify contributing agencies’ efforts; and develop a mechanism to monitor, evaluate, and periodically report on the progress of member agencies’ efforts. However, as we state in the report, there are a number of Subcommittee member agencies that do not have clear roles within the Subcommittee’s efforts and have had limited or no involvement in the Subcommittee’s work on critical materials. To evaluate the federal government’s approach to addressing critical materials supply issues, we developed and disseminated a two-stage, web-based survey to a nongeneralizable sample of 46 critical materials experts.	Why GAO Did This Study Certain metals, minerals, and other “critical” raw materials play an important role in the production of advanced technologies across a range of industrial sectors and defense applications. Recently, concentration of the supply of some critical materials under foreign control has renewed questions about the U.S. government's and industry's ability to address potential supply disruptions. GAO was asked to examine U.S. efforts to identify and strategically plan for critical materials supply issues. Among other objectives, this report (1) describes federal agencies' activities related to the supply of critical materials and (2) evaluates the federal government's approach to addressing critical materials supply issues. GAO reviewed relevant laws, agency documents, and academic studies; interviewed federal officials; and conducted a two-stage web-based survey of a nongeneralizable sample of critical materials experts selected to cover a range of subject matter areas. What GAO Found Federal agencies are primarily focused on two areas of activity related to critical materials supply—assessing risk and supporting research. For example, the Department of Energy (DOE) has conducted two criticality assessments on materials important to clean energy applications and manages the Critical Materials Institute—a 5-year, $120 million investment aimed at mitigating risks by diversifying supply, providing alternatives to existing materials, and improving recycling and reuse. In addition, agencies conduct a range of other critical materials related activities, including stockpiling or producing materials, and reviewing and approving resource extraction projects, among other efforts. The federal approach to addressing critical materials supply has areas of strength but is not consistent with selected key practices for interagency collaboration and faces other limitations, as shown below. According to its charter, the Subcommittee on Critical and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains (Subcommittee)—co-chaired by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), DOE, and the Department of the Interior—is to facilitate a strong, coordinated effort across its member agencies on critical materials activities. However, the Subcommittee's efforts have not been consistent with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, including agreeing on roles and responsibilities; establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; and developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. For example, some member agencies do not have a clear role in the Subcommittee's efforts and have had limited or no involvement in its work. By taking steps to actively engage all member agencies in its efforts and clearly define roles and responsibilities, the Subcommittee would have more reasonable assurance that it can effectively marshal the potential contributions of all member agencies to help identify and mitigate critical materials supply risks. Other limitations to the federal approach to addressing critical materials supply include limited engagement with industry and a limited focus on domestic production. For example, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) is required by law to identify and assess cases of materials needs. However, Commerce does not solicit information from stakeholders across a range of industrial sectors. As a result, Commerce may not have comprehensive, current information across a range of industrial sectors to help it identify and assess materials needs. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that OSTP take steps to improve interagency collaboration by, for example, defining Subcommittee member roles and responsibilities and that Commerce engage with stakeholders to continually identify and assess critical materials needs across industrial sectors. Commerce agreed. OSTP agreed with one and neither agreed nor disagreed with the other four recommendations but discussed how roles and responsibilities are defined, among other things. GAO continues to believe these steps are needed, as discussed in the report.
gao_GAO-15-330	gao_GAO-15-330_0	HFAs competitively award tax credits to developers or owners of qualified projects that reserve all or a portion of their units for low-income tenants. IRS Oversight of HFAs Has Been Minimal IRS oversight of HFAs has been minimal, particularly in terms of reviewing QAPs and conducting on-site or desk audits of HFAs. The other federal agencies conduct monitoring, report on performance, collect data, and have missions consistent with the purposes of the programs. HUD’s experience in affordable housing and working with HFAs may benefit the LIHTC program. More specifically, HUD’s rental housing programs rely on state and local housing agencies (including HFAs) to implement programs. Although we and HUD’s Office of Inspector General have identified weaknesses in evaluation and oversight of programs, HUD has taken steps to resolve some of these issues. Although joint administration of the program will involve dividing responsibilities for one program across two agencies, we have reported that mission fragmentation and program overlap sometimes may be necessary when the resources and expertise of more than one agency are required to address a complex public need—as in the case of the Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit and New Markets Tax Credit programs. IRS’s enforcement of tax laws has been on our high-risk list since 1990. Moreover, since 2010, the IRS budget has been reduced about 10 percent and IRS enforcement performance and staffing levels have declined. In our review of LIHTC and the other two tax credit programs, we found that each used different mechanisms to fund their administrative responsibilities. The level of resources that would be needed to perform an adequate level of oversight of HFAs is not known. Having an estimate on potential costs and funding options for financing federal oversight of the LIHTC program will help HUD and congressional decision makers in assessing potential changes to the administration of the program. Oversight responsibilities for the program include monitoring HFAs and taxpayer compliance. Without regular monitoring of HFAs, IRS is not able to determine the extent to which HFAs comply with program requirements. Although we and others have identified weakness in HUD’s evaluation and oversight of programs, HUD already has processes and procedures in place for evaluation and oversight of state and local agencies—they constitute a framework on which further changes and improvements in LIHTC could be effected. Under joint administration, IRS could continue to retain certain key responsibilities consistent with its tax administration mission. But assigning oversight responsibilities to HUD (such as reviewing QAPs, developing goals and performance measures, and collecting LIHTC data) could involve additional staff and other resources. Matter for Congressional Consideration To better align program goals with agency missions and improve program administration and oversight, Congress should consider designating the Department of Housing and Urban Development as a joint administrator of the program responsible for oversight. Federal internal control standards state that monitoring should occur in the course of normal operations, be performed continually, and be ingrained in the agency’s operations. IRS did not comment on the matter for congressional consideration (to designate HUD as a joint administrator of the program responsible for oversight). However, it supported consideration of a structure for enhanced interagency coordination on housing policy, including the LIHTC program. We examined other tax credit programs with joint administration and found that each used varying mechanisms to fund its activities, including user fees and appropriations, which could serve as examples of how an agency may fund new oversight of LIHTCs. The LIHTC program is the largest source of federal assistance for developing affordable rental housing and cost an estimated $8 billion in forgone revenue in 2014. In our review of other tax credit programs (similar in purpose and structure to LIHTC) that were jointly administered by IRS and other federal agencies, we found the other federal agencies provided key oversight and administrative support, such as monitoring, performance measurement, and data collection. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report discusses the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, which is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and state housing finance agencies (HFA). We selected this firm because of its role in the LIHTC working group—a forum for participants in the LIHTC program to work together to resolve technical and administrative issues relating to the LIHTC program—and because of the information on the firm’s website on HFAs and guidance for the LIHTC program. We focused on the Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit and New Markets Tax Credit programs because, similar to the LIHTC program, both are aimed at encouraging community development and each is jointly administered by IRS and another federal entity—the Department of Interior’s National Park Service (NPS) and Treasury’s Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, respectively.	Why GAO Did This Study The LIHTC program, established under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, is the largest source of federal assistance for developing affordable rental housing and cost an estimated $8 billion in forgone revenue in 2014. LIHTC encourages private equity investment in low-income housing through tax credits. HFAs receive an annual allocation of tax credits and competitively award the credits to owners of qualified projects. GAO was asked to review the administration and oversight of the program. This report addresses, among other things, (1) IRS oversight of LIHTC and (2) how LIHTC administration and oversight compare with that of other tax credit programs. GAO reviewed regulations and guidance for monitoring HFAs and taxpayers; analyzed information on IRS audits of HFAs; reviewed selected programs that award tax credits similarly to LIHTC; and interviewed IRS, HUD, and HFA officials. What GAO Found Internal Revenue Service (IRS) oversight of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program has been minimal. Specifically, since 1986 IRS conducted seven audits of 56 state housing finance agencies (HFA) on which IRS relies to administer and oversee the program. (HFAs are state-chartered authorities established to meet affordable housing needs.) Federal internal control standards call for monitoring to be performed continually in the course of normal operations and be ingrained in agency operations. Oversight of HFAs has been minimal, partly because LIHTC is viewed as a peripheral program in IRS in terms of its mission and priorities for resources and staffing. Without such reviews, IRS cannot determine the extent of noncompliance and other issues at HFAs. IRS jointly administers other programs: the Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit with the National Park Service and the New Markets Tax Credit with the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund in the Department of the Treasury. The federal agencies that work with IRS to oversee these programs have missions consistent with the purposes of these programs; they also conduct monitoring, report on performance, and collect data. For example, officials of both agencies told GAO that staff routinely conduct site visits and other project reviews. In these cases, IRS also is able to benefit from the other federal agencies' policy and subject-matter expertise. Likewise, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) experience in administering affordable housing programs and working with HFAs may benefit IRS in its administration and oversight of the LIHTC program. More specifically, HUD relies on state and local housing agencies (including HFAs) to implement its programs and already has processes and procedures in place to oversee them. Although GAO and others have identified weakness in HUD's program evaluation and oversight activities, HUD has taken steps to address some of these issues and its existing processes and procedures constitute a framework on which further changes and improvement can be made. Moreover, IRS is not well positioned to oversee LIHTC. Since 1990, IRS has been on GAO's high-risk list due to significant capacity challenges and incomplete monitoring of tax law enforcement. IRS's budget has been reduced by 10 percent and enforcement program performance and staffing levels have declined since 2010. Joint administration with HUD could better align program responsibilities with each agency's mission and more efficiently address existing oversight challenges. Under joint administration, IRS could retain responsibilities consistent with its mission (as it does in the other two tax credit programs). For example, IRS could continue to enforce taxpayer compliance. Assigning oversight responsibilities to HUD could involve additional resources for HUD. For LIHTC and the other two programs, GAO found that each used different mechanisms to fund administrative responsibilities. For instance, Historic Rehabilitation uses fees to fund its program, including oversight, while New Markets requests funding through annual appropriations. The level of resources that would be needed to perform an adequate level of oversight of HFAs is not known. An estimate of potential costs and funding options for financing enhanced federal oversight of the LIHTC program could benefit the agency involved and provide useful information to Congress. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider designating HUD as a joint administrator of the program. HUD's role should include oversight responsibilities (such as regular monitoring of HFAs) to help address deficiencies GAO identified. Treasury agreed HUD could be responsible for analyzing the effectiveness of LIHTC, with IRS continuing to enforce tax law. HUD and IRS did not comment on the matter for congressional consideration. HUD supported consideration of a structure for enhanced interagency coordination. The association representing HFAs disagreed with the matter. GAO maintains that joint administration would strengthen program oversight.
gao_NSIAD-96-144	gao_NSIAD-96-144_0	Essential Technology May Not Be Ready Although the Air Force plans to rely upon existing missile designs and off-the-shelf technology to speed JASSM development, essential guidance and automatic target recognition technologies are not mature. With this schedule, however, this system may not be available in time to meet JASSM’s June 1998 critical design freeze when the missile design is to be finalized. Later, as funds are available, separate programs are to complete integration with the remaining aircraft. Some Developmental Missiles May Not Be Needed The Air Force plans to buy 72 JASSMs during development and 75 during low-rate initial production. If the JASSM acquisition plan is revised to eliminate the 35 pilot production missiles, the Air Force could reduce some of the overlap between development and production, as well as the associated cost and schedule risk. We support the Air Force’s objective to acquire an affordable and capable replacement for TSSAM. The Air Force believes the price objective is achievable if (1) JASSM is derived from an existing missile in a competitive environment and (2) the Air Force and contractor are able to realize savings by implementing acquisition reforms and using best commercial practices. Navy Commitment Is Uncertain Although JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy program, the Navy has not provided development funding and, until March 1996, did not require carrier operability. In March 1996, the Chief of Naval Operations committed to providing funds for F/A-18 integration, but this is not expected to occur during JASSM development. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that (1) required autonomous guidance and automatic target recognition technologies are mature before finalizing the JASSM design, (2) the Air Force does not acquire the 35 pilot production missiles early in development without a demonstrated need for additional test missiles, (3) missiles used during planned initial operational test and evaluation are production-representative missiles, and (4) the Navy participates fully in the program so the final JASSM design meets both Air Force and Navy requirements.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO evaluated the Air Force's and Navy's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program, focusing on: (1) the acquisition process; (2) schedule and cost risks; (3) the Air Force's plan to acquire 35 pilot production missiles; and (4) the Navy's commitment to the program. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the Air Force is using an innovative acquisition process to procure JASSM; (2) the Air Force expects JASSM contractors to modify existing missile designs, use off-the-shelf technology, and apply best commercial practices to their design and production work; (3) some crucial JASSM technologies may not be mature in time for them to be integrated into JASSM; (4) JASSM may be vulnerable to jamming, and the Air Force is trying to identify a cost-effective countermeasure; (5) a JASSM automatic target recognition capability is still under development; (6) the Air Force will phase in integration of JASSM with combat aircraft, undertaking separate programs to integrate the missile with each type of aircraft as funds become available; (7) the Air Force plans to acquire 35 pilot production missiles, but those missiles may not be needed for testing, and may not represent the actual production configuration; (8) the Air Force's unit price goal for JASSM is optimistic when compared to similar missile procurement programs; (9) the Navy has not provided JASSM development funding, but carrier operability is a firm JASSM requirement, and the Navy expects to commit funds for JASSM integration with the F/A-18 aircraft after JASSM development; and (10) the need for JASSM may not be as urgent as the Air Force believes.
gao_GAO-15-328	gao_GAO-15-328_0	USAID Has Developed Processes for Awarding EFSP Funds, but It Lacks Guidance for Staff on Modifying Awards and for Partners on Responding to Changing Market Conditions USAID has developed processes for awarding cash-based food assistance grants; however, it lacks formal internal guidance for its process to approve award modifications and provides no guidance for partners on responding to changing market conditions that might warrant an award modification. USAID awards new cash-based food assistance grants through either a competitive proposal review or an expedited noncompetitive process. We reviewed 22 proposals for new cash-based food assistance projects that were awarded and active as of June 1, 2014; we found that USAID made 13 of these awards through its competitive process, 7 through an abbreviated noncompetitive review, and 2 under authorities allowing an expedited emergency response. According to USAID officials, USAID follows a similar process in reviewing requests to modify ongoing awards, which implementing partners may propose for a variety of reasons, such as an increase in the number of beneficiaries within areas covered by an award or a delay in completing cash distributions. According to USAID, its draft internal guidance for modifying awards is under review and will be incorporated into formal guidance in the future, but it could not provide a time frame for completing that process. In the absence of formal guidance on that process, USAID cannot hold its staff and its partners accountable for taking all necessary steps to justify and document the modification of awards. No-cost modifications. Cost modifications. Eight of the 13 grant agreements had a total of 20 cost modifications that increased funding for the 13 awards from an initial total of about $91 million to about $626 million, approximately a 591 percent increase. 8). We also found that USAID’s implementing partners responded differently to changing market conditions, and that USAID had not provided partners with clear guidance on when and how to modify cash-based food assistance projects in response to changing market conditions. USAID’s Partners Had Generally Implemented Financial Controls in Projects We Reviewed; We Found Weaknesses in Risk Planning, Implementation, and Guidance USAID relies on its implementing partners to implement financial oversight of EFSP projects, but it does not require them to conduct comprehensive risk assessments to plan financial oversight activities— two key components of an internal control framework (see sidebar)—and provides little or no guidance to partners and its own staff on these two components. For case study projects we reviewed in four countries, we found that neither USAID nor its implementing partners conducted comprehensive risk assessments that address financial vulnerabilities that may affect cash-based food assistance projects, such as counterfeiting, diversion, and losses. We also found that USAID’s partners had generally implemented financial controls over cash and voucher distributions but the partners’ financial oversight guidance had weaknesses. In addition, we found that USAID’s guidance to partners on financial control activities is limited. For example, USAID lacks guidance to aid implementing partners in estimating and reporting losses. However, the directive lacked guidance on how to estimate and report losses. When implementing partners for EFSP projects have gaps in financial guidance and limitations with regard to the oversight of cash-based food assistance projects, the partners may not put in place appropriate controls for areas that are most vulnerable to fraud, diversion, and misuse of EFSP funding. In its written comments, USAID concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) review the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) processes for awarding and modifying cash- based food assistance projects and (2) assess the extent to which USAID and its implementing partners have implemented financial controls to help ensure appropriate oversight of such projects. We also selected four case study countries that receive EFSP grants for review—Jordan for the Syria region, Kenya, Niger, and Somalia—and conducted fieldwork in three of these countries (Jordan, Kenya, and Niger) where we met with officials from the U.S. missions, implementing partners, vendors, financial institutions, and beneficiaries, among others.	Why GAO Did This Study For over 60 years, the United States has provided assistance to food-insecure countries primarily in the form of food commodities procured in the United States and transported overseas. In recent years, the United States has joined other major donors in increasingly providing food assistance in the form of cash or vouchers. In fiscal year 2014, U.S.-funded cash and voucher projects in 28 countries totaled about $410 million, the majority of which was for the Syria crisis, making the United States the largest single donor of cash-based food assistance. GAO was asked to review USAID's use of cash-based food assistance. In this report, GAO (1) reviews USAID's processes for awarding and modifying cash-based food assistance projects and (2) assesses the extent to which USAID and its implementing partners have implemented financial controls to help ensure appropriate oversight of such projects. GAO analyzed program data and documents for selected projects in Jordan, Kenya, Niger, and Somalia; interviewed relevant officials; and conducted fieldwork in Jordan, Kenya, and Niger. What GAO Found The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awards new cash-based food assistance grants under its Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) through a competitive proposal review or an expedited noncompetitive process; however, USAID lacks formal internal guidance for modifying awards. In its review of 22 grant awards, GAO found that USAID made 13 through its competitive process, 7 through an abbreviated noncompetitive review, and 2 under authorities allowing an expedited emergency response. According to USAID, the agency follows a similar process for cost modification requests. Partners may propose cost or no-cost modifications for a variety of reasons, such as an increase in the number of beneficiaries or changing market conditions affecting food prices. In a review of 13 grant awards that had been modified, GAO found that 8 had cost modifications resulting in funding for all 13 awards increasing from about $91 million to $626 million. According to USAID, draft procedures for modifying awards are under review and will be incorporated into its guidance, but it could not provide a time frame. Until USAID institutes formal guidance, it cannot hold its staff and implementing partners accountable for taking all necessary steps to justify and document the modification of awards. GAO also found that though USAID requires partners to monitor market conditions—a key factor that may trigger an award modification—it does not provide guidance on when and how to respond to changing market conditions. USAID relies on implementing partners for financial oversight of EFSP projects but does not require them to conduct comprehensive risk assessments to plan financial oversight activities, and it provides little related procedural guidance to partners and its own staff. For projects in four case study countries, GAO found that neither USAID nor its implementing partners conducted comprehensive risk assessments to identify and mitigate financial vulnerabilities. Additionally, although USAID's partners had generally implemented financial controls over cash and voucher distributions that GAO reviewed, some partners' guidance for financial oversight had weaknesses, such as a lack of information on how to estimate and report losses. In addition, GAO found that USAID had limited guidance on financial control activities and provided no information to aid partners in estimating and reporting losses. As a result, partners may neglect to implement appropriate financial controls in areas that are most vulnerable to fraud, diversion, and misuse of EFSP funding. What GAO Recommends GAO is making recommendations to strengthen USAID's guidance for staff on approving award modifications and its guidance for partners on responding to changing market conditions. GAO is also making recommendations to strengthen financial oversight of cash-based food assistance projects by addressing gaps in USAID's guidance on risk assessments and mitigation plans and on financial control activities. USAID concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-05-723T	gao_GAO-05-723T_0	Background Because DOD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, overhauling its business operations represents a huge management challenge. Transformation of DOD’s business systems and operations is critical to the department providing Congress and DOD management with accurate and timely information for use in the decision-making process. Pervasive Financial and Business Management Problems Affect DOD’s Efficiency and Effectiveness For several years, we have reported that DOD faces a range of financial management and related business process challenges that are complex, long-standing, pervasive, and deeply rooted in virtually all business operations throughout the department. Pervasive Weaknesses Impact DOD Operations Long-standing weaknesses in DOD’s financial management and related business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable information needed to make sound decisions and report on the status of DOD activities, including accountability of assets, through financial and other reports to Congress and DOD decision makers; (2) hindered its operational efficiency; (3) adversely affected mission performance; and (4) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse, as the following examples illustrate. Currently, DOD does not have the ability to provide timely or accurate information on the location, movement, status, or identity of its supplies. Ineffective Management Oversight and Control over Business System Investments Until DOD has complete, reliable information on the costs and number of business systems operating within the department, its ability to effectively control the money it spends on these systems will be limited. Since February 2003, the domains have been given the responsibility to oversee the department’s business systems investments, yet the billions of dollars spent each year continue to be spread among the military services and defense agencies, enabling the numerous DOD components to continue to develop stovepiped, parochial solutions to the department’s long-standing financial management and business operation challenges. The table shows the stovepiped, duplicative nature of DOD’s business systems. The department has acknowledged that DCD/DCW will not result in tangible savings to DOD. Congress Acts to Improve DOD’s Control and Accountability over Business Systems Investments The statutory requirements enacted as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 are aimed at improving the department’s business systems management practices. DOD has taken several steps to address provisions of the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act. The boards are responsible for reviewing and approving investments to develop, operate, maintain, and modernize business systems for their business-area portfolio, including ensuring that investments are consistent with DOD’s BEA. The position would divide and institutionalize the current functions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense into a Deputy Secretary who, as the alter ego of the Secretary, would focus on policy-related issues such as military transformation, and a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management, the CMO, who would be responsible and accountable for the overall business transformation effort and would serve full-time as the strategic integrator of DOD’s business transformation efforts by, for example, developing and implementing a strategic and integrated plan for business transformation efforts. However, DOD’s transformation efforts to date have not adequately addressed key underlying causes of past reform failures. Lessons learned from these previous reform attempts include the need for sustained and focused leadership at the highest level. Absent this leadership, authority, and control of funding, the current transformation efforts are likely to fail.	Why GAO Did This Study In July 2004, GAO testified before Congress on the impact and causes of financial and related business weaknesses on the Department of Defense's (DOD) operations and the status of DOD reform efforts. The report released today highlights that DOD still does not have management controls to ensure that its business systems investments are directed towards integrated corporate system solutions. GAO's reports continue to show that fundamental problems with DOD's financial management and related business operations result in substantial waste and inefficiency, adversely impact mission performance, and result in a lack of adequate accountability across all major business areas. Over the years, DOD leaders attempted to address these weaknesses and transform the department. For years, GAO has reported that DOD is challenged in its efforts to effect fundamental financial and business management reform and GAO's ongoing work continues to raise serious questions about DOD's chances of success. Congress asked GAO to provide information on the (1) pervasive long-standing financial and business management weaknesses that affect DOD's efficiency, (2) cost of and control over the department's business systems investments, and (3) legislative actions needed to enhance the success of DOD's business transformation efforts. What GAO Found Overhauling the financial management and business operations of one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world represents a daunting challenge. Eight DOD program areas, representing key business functions, are on GAO's high-risk list, and the department shares responsibility for six other governmentwide high-risk areas, meaning that DOD is fully or partially responsible for 14 of the 25 high-risk areas in the federal government. DOD's substantial financial and business management weaknesses adversely affect not only its ability to produce auditable financial information, but also to provide accurate, complete, and timely information for management and Congress to use in making informed decisions. Further, the lack of adequate accountability across all of DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars in annual wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint and has a negative impact on mission performance. The department has recently taken several steps to address provisions of the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act which are aimed at improving DOD's business systems management practices. For example, DOD has established the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to oversee its business systems modernization efforts. However, DOD's overall transformation efforts have not adequately addressed the key causes of past reform failures. Lessons learned from these previous reform attempts include the need for sustained leadership at the highest level and a strategic and integrated plan. The seriousness of DOD's weaknesses underscores the importance of no longer condoning the "status quo." To improve the likelihood that DOD's transformation efforts will succeed, GAO proposes that business systems funding be appropriated to the approval authorities responsible for business systems investments. Additionally, GAO suggests that a senior management position be established to provide sustained leadership for DOD's overall business transformation. Absent this unified responsibility, authority, accountability, and control of funding, DOD's transformation efforts are likely to fail.
gao_GAO-04-816T	gao_GAO-04-816T_0	Background Patch management is a critical process used to help alleviate many of the challenges involved with securing computing systems from attack. Flaws in software code that could cause a program to malfunction generally result from programming errors that occur during software development. And these are only the reported attacks. Specifically, not all agencies have established patch management policies and procedures. Additionally, most agencies are not testing all patches before deployment. Further, just under half of the 24 agencies said they perform a documented risk assessment of all major systems to determine whether to apply a patch or an alternative workaround. Without consistent implementation of patch management practices, agencies are at increased risk of attacks that exploit software vulnerabilities in their systems. More refined information on key aspects of agencies’ patch management practices—such as their documentation of patch management policies and procedures and the frequency with which systems are monitored to ensure that patches are installed—could provide OMB, Congress, and agencies themselves with data that could better enable an assessment of the effectiveness of an agency’s patch management processes. Automated Tools and Services Can Assist Agencies in Performing Patch Management Activities Several automated tools and services are available to assist agencies with patch management. Tools and services can make the patch management process more efficient by automating otherwise time-consuming tasks, such as keeping current on the continuous flow of new patches. Commercially available tools and services include, among others, methods to inventory computers and the software applications and patches installed; identify relevant patches and workarounds and gather them in one location; group systems by departments, machine types, or other logical manage patch deployment; scan a network to determine the status of patches and other corrections made to network machines (hosts and/or clients); assess machines against set criteria, including required system configurations; access a database of patches; report information to various levels of management about the status of the network. Significant Obstacles to Effective Patch Management Remain Security experts and agency officials have identified several obstacles to implementing effective patch management; these include the following: ● High volume and increasing frequency of patches. ● Patching heterogeneous systems. ● Ensuring that mobile systems receive the latest patches. ● Dedicating sufficient resources to patch management. Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Mitigate Risks As with the challenges to patch management identified by agencies, our report also identified a number of steps that can be taken to address the risks associated with software vulnerabilities. These include: ● Better software engineering. More rigorous engineering practices, including a formal development process, developer training on secure coding practice, and code reviews, can be employed when designing, implementing, and testing software products to reduce the number of potential vulnerabilities and thus minimize the need for patching. ● Implementing “defense-in-depth.” According to security experts, a best practice for protecting systems against cyber attacks is for agencies to build successive layers of defense mechanisms at strategic points in their IT infrastructures. ● Research and development of new technologies.	Why GAO Did This Study Flaws in software code can introduce vulnerabilities that may be exploited to cause significant damage to federal information systems. Such risks continue to grow with the increasing speed, sophistication, and volume of reported attacks, as well as the decreasing period of the time from vulnerability announcement to attempted exploits. The process of applying software patches to fix flaws--patch management--is critical to helping secure systems from attacks. At the request of the House Committee on Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, GAO reviewed the (1) reported status of 24 selected agencies in performing effective patch management practices, (2) tools and services available to federal agencies, (3) challenges to this endeavor, and (4) additional steps that can be taken to mitigate risks created by software vulnerabilities. This testimony highlights the findings of GAO's report, which is being released at this hearing. What GAO Found Agencies are generally implementing certain common patch management-related practices, such as inventorying their systems and providing information security training. However, they are not consistently implementing other common practices. Specifically, not all agencies have established patch management policies and procedures. Moreover, not all agencies are testing all patches before deployment, performing documented risk assessments of major systems to determine whether to apply patches, or monitoring the status of patches once they are deployed to ensure that they are properly installed. Commercial tools and services are available to assist agencies in performing patch management activities. These tools and services can make patch management processes more efficient by automating time-consuming tasks, such as scanning networks and keeping up-to-date on the continuous releases of new patches. Nevertheless, agencies face significant challenges to implementing effective patch management. These include, among others, (1) the high volume and increasing frequency of needed patches, (2) patching heterogeneous systems, (3) ensuring that mobile systems such as laptops receive the latest patches, and (4) dedicating sufficient resources to assessing vulnerabilities and deploying patches. Agency officials and computer security experts have identified several additional measures that vendors, the security community, and the federal government can take to address the risks associated with software vulnerabilities. These include, among others, adopting more rigorous software engineering practices to reduce the number of coding errors that create the need for patches, implementing successive layers of defense mechanisms at strategic points in agency information systems, and researching and developing new technologies to help uncover flaws during software development.
gao_GAO-15-346	gao_GAO-15-346_0	DOD’s Options for Granting the Use of Space to Non-DOD Entities Are Outlined in Guidance, and Several Factors Are Considered by Installations DOD and Military Department Guidance Identify the Real Estate Instruments and Support Agreements Used to Grant Space DOD and military department guidance identify the real estate instruments used to issue outgrants, and—depending on the type of non- DOD tenant and type of facility occupied—the appropriate instances in which to use each real estate instrument. Permits are licenses granted to non-DOD federal agencies generally in return for reimbursement of direct and indirect costs, as required by DOD guidance. Officials at all seven of the installations that we visited reported selecting the appropriate real estate instrument based on the type of non-DOD entity occupying space at the installation, the type of facility, and the proposed use of the asset. Prior to granting the use of space to a non-DOD entity, officials at the installations we visited reported considering several factors. If suitable space is identified, a second factor that officials at all seven installations reported considering was whether the installation had competing interests for real property assets that are available. Officials at all seven of the military installations we visited cited limitations in accommodating space requests from potential tenants due to a lack of vacant space that aligns with the tenant’s request, such as the amount of space or type of space needed, or vacant space that is not in suitable condition. Bringing Non-DOD Federal Agencies onto Military Installations Can Provide Benefits to the Installation and Tenant Agency While there are limitations to bringing tenants onto military installations, according to installation officials, both the installation and tenant agency can benefit when a match can be made between an installation’s available space and the tenant agency’s needs. DOD and GSA Do Not Routinely Share Information Concerning Opportunities to Use Unutilized or Underutilized Facilities Despite the benefits to DOD and non-DOD federal agencies, routine information sharing does not occur between DOD and GSA concerning opportunities to move non-DOD federal agencies onto military installations to make better use of unutilized and underutilized facilities, although GSA may have information on agencies near an installation needing space. We found that military installations do not routinely share information with GSA or other non-DOD federal agencies when space is available in part because, as stated before, military installations generally wait for non-DOD federal agencies to inquire about available space. Without actions to share information at the regional and local level, GSA offices working with non-DOD federal agencies may risk missing opportunities for clients to use available underutilized or unused federal space at lower cost than commercial leases. In addition, DOD may be missing opportunities to leverage resources with GSA to enhance utilization of its unutilized and underutilized facilities and reduce costs associated with maintaining these facilities. We agree that the actions outlined by DOD and GSA represent a positive step toward ensuring that government-owned assets are used to capacity. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To evaluate the potential for and obstacles to federal agencies other than Department of Defense (DOD) organizations relocating onto military installations to save costs and enhance security, this report identifies (1) what options, if any, are available for DOD to allow non-DOD entities, including federal government agencies, to use unutilized (vacant) and underutilized (partially vacant) space on military installations, and what factors DOD considers when considering exercising each option; (2) any limitations and benefits of bringing non-DOD federal agencies onto installations; and (3) the extent to which DOD and other federal agencies coordinate to do so. To determine what options are available and factors to consider for DOD to allow non-DOD entities, including federal government agencies, to use unutilized and underutilized space on military installations, we reviewed applicable DOD and military department guidance to identify the circumstances under which non-DOD tenants are allowed to utilize space on military installations, the order of priority for considering non-DOD tenants for use of space, the types of real estate instruments used to grant non-DOD entities use of space on military installations, and the documents used to record the terms and conditions associated with the use of space on military installations. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for GAO to consider the potential for and obstacles to consolidation of federal tenants on installations that support Arctic missions, focusing on federal entities with homeland security, defense, international trade, commerce, and other national security functions that are compatible with the missions of military installations, or can be used to protect national interests in the Arctic region.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO has designated DOD's Support Infrastructure Management as a high-risk area in part due to challenges in reducing excess infrastructure. DOD installations can establish agreements to allow entities such as non-DOD federal agencies and private entities to use property on DOD installations that are unutilized or underutilized. DOD reports that, as of the end of fiscal year 2013, its real property portfolio consisted of more than 562,000 facilities with an estimated value of $850 billion. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO review the potential for relocating federal government tenants onto military installations. This report identifies (1) available options for DOD to allow non-DOD entities to use unutilized and underutilized space on military installations, and what factors DOD considers for each option; (2) any limitations and benefits of bringing non-DOD federal tenants onto military installations, and (3) the extent to which DOD and other federal agencies coordinate to do so. GAO evaluated DOD and military service guidance; visited selected installations having non-DOD tenants, including two that support the Arctic mission; and interviewed cognizant officials. What GAO Found Department of Defense (DOD) guidance outlines options for granting the use of unutilized (vacant) and underutilized (partially vacant) space on military installations to non-DOD entities, such as other federal agencies, and installations consider several factors when contemplating such grants. For example, DOD and military department guidance identifies the real estate instruments, such as leases and licenses that are to be used to issue grants to non-DOD entities. All seven of the installations that GAO visited reported using this guidance to select the appropriate instrument based on the type of non-DOD entity, type of facility, and proposed use of the asset. For example, installations selected permits as the appropriate real estate instrument when issuing grants to a non-DOD federal agency as outlined in DOD and military department guidance. Prior to granting the use of space to a non-DOD entity, officials at installations reported considering several factors, including the availability of space, effect on the mission, and factors unique to the installation. In instances where there are competing interests for space, officials reported considering priorities set forth in DOD guidance for assigning available space on the installation. Officials also reported considering whether the tenant could potentially have a negative effect on the installation's ability to comply with any regulations, such as preserving protected habitats. DOD faces both limitations and benefits from moving non-DOD agencies onto installations. Limitations such as the availability of suitable space affect DOD's ability to bring non-DOD federal agencies onto military installations. For example, officials at all seven of the installations GAO visited reported a lack of vacant space or vacant space that is usable, which limited their ability to accommodate space requests. However, when a match can be made between an installation's available space and a potential tenant agency's needs, both parties can benefit. For example, installations can potentially benefit through the avoidance of direct and indirect costs, such as the cost for utilities and maintenance incurred for unused or underutilized space. Non-DOD federal agencies can save costs on commercial leases because DOD charges for use of space by other federal entities on a cost-recovery basis. Despite the potential benefits, routine information sharing does not occur between DOD and the General Services Administration (GSA) concerning opportunities to move non-DOD federal agencies onto military installations. Specifically, when GSA is working to satisfy the space needs of its clients, it does not routinely contact DOD installations to inquire whether space might be available. DOD, on the other hand, waits for non-DOD federal agencies to inquire whether space is available and does not generally reach out to GSA or agencies that may be interested in space. Without taking actions to share information, GSA offices working with non-DOD federal agencies to find them space may risk missing opportunities for their clients to reduce or avoid costs. In addition, both GSA and DOD may miss opportunities to leverage resources and enhance utilization of federal real property. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD and GSA collaborate to enhance routine information sharing concerning non-DOD federal agencies seeking workspace at military installations. DOD and GSA concurred and agreed to take action to help ensure that government-owned assets are used to capacity.
gao_RCED-96-13	gao_RCED-96-13_0	EPA’s Efforts to Encourage the Development and Use of Innovative Technologies EPA has established two offices to encourage the development and use of innovative technologies. Overall, in 1994, EPA selected innovative technologies in about 20 percent of its decisions on remedies for all Superfund sites. For PCB- and dioxin-contaminated sites, EPA selected innovative treatment technologies to a lesser extent than at other Superfund sites. None of these treated a PCB- or dioxin-contaminated site. These factors include (1) regulatory standards, (2) the technical limitations of technologies, (3) the lack of sufficient cost and performance data, (4) the lack of incentives for private industry to invest in innovative technologies, and (5) EPA’s general preference for technologies it believes to be effective. Scope and Methodology You asked us to identify (1) what EPA has done to encourage the development and use of alternative, or “innovative,” technologies at all contaminated sites, including those contaminated with PCBs and dioxin; (2) whether EPA has identified innovative technologies that can be used at PCB-and dioxin-contaminated sites; and (3) what factors have limited the use of innovative technologies at PCB- and dioxin-contaminated sites.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to encourage the development and use of innovative technologies at contaminated sites, focusing on: (1) whether EPA has identified innovative technologies that can be used at polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) and dioxin-contaminated sites; and (2) what factors have limited the use of innovative technologies at PCB and dioxin contaminated sites. What GAO Found GAO found that EPA has: (1) chosen innovative technologies in about 20 percent of its cleanup decisions and has used innovative treatment technologies at 10 percent of the PCB-contaminated sites and 3 percent of the dioxin-contaminated sites; (2) not identified any innovative technologies that it believes to be as effective as incineration for treating waste at PCB or dioxin contaminated Superfund sites; (3) recognized that some of its previous cleanup decisions should be reevaluated to take advantage of recent technological advancements; and (4) identified a number of barriers that inhibit the development and use of innovative technologies at Superfund sites, including the inability of innovative technologies to meet incineration performance standards, technical limitations, limited cost and performance data, and the lack of incentives to encourage technology development.
gao_T-HEHS-98-129	gao_T-HEHS-98-129_0	Among other reform efforts, the Congress has focused on the development of charter schools. Charter school operators and others at the hearings raised concerns about charter schools’ receiving the share of federal title I and IDEA grant funds they are eligible to receive. Under title I and IDEA, the Department allocates funds to state educational agencies (SEA), which then allocate funds to local educational agencies (LEA) or school districts. Title I Program Title I is the largest federal elementary and secondary education aid program. Charter Schools’ Experience With Federal Funds A majority of the charter school operators that we surveyed reported that they received fiscal year 1996 federal start-up grant funds. States awarded grants to these schools ranging from $7,000 to $84,000; the average grant amount was about $36,000 and the median was $32,500. The charter schools in our survey that received start-up grants used these funds most often to help pay for school equipment and curriculum materials, technology, and facilities renovation or leasing. About two-fifths of the charter schools we surveyed did not apply for title I funds. Regarding the IDEA program, slightly more than half of our survey respondents received funds or IDEA-funded services. Some Barriers Hinder Charter Schools in Accessing Title I and IDEA Funds Even though many charter school operators we surveyed believe that they received a fair share of federal funds, they reported, as did state officials and technical assistance providers, that several barriers hindered charter schools’ access to title I and IDEA funds. These barriers included (1) difficulties in establishing program eligibility, (2) workload demands that prohibited schools from pursuing program funds or made doing so too costly, and (3) charter school operators’ and district and state administrators’ lack of program and administrative experience. Charter school operators reported that outreach and technical assistance were critical to their ability to access federal funds. State and Federal Efforts to Help Charter Schools Access Federal Funds Several states and the Department have taken steps to help charter schools access federal funds. Some states, for example, are changing allocation procedures to better accommodate charter schools and providing training and technical assistance to school operators. Using these funds, the Department has sponsored national meetings for state officials and charter school operators. Conclusions Charter schools have used federal start-up funds for a variety of purposes, depending on the schools’ particular needs. Several states and the Department of Education have initiatives under way to facilitate such access.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed charter schools' experiences in accessing selected federal funds, focusing on: (1) start-up grants under title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); (2) factors that help and hinder charter schools in accessing title I and IDEA funds; (3) charter school operators' opinions about whether they are receiving a fair share of these funds; and (4) state and federal efforts intended to help charter schools gain access to title I and IDEA funds. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) slightly more than half of the schools GAO surveyed received fiscal year 1996 start-up grants ranging from $7,000 to $84,000; the average grant amount was $36,000; (2) the schools used the start-up grant funds for a variety of purposes, including curriculum materials and equipment, other technology, and facilities renovation or leasing; (3) about two-fifths of the charter schools GAO surveyed received title I funds, and slightly more than half of the schools received IDEA funds or IDEA-funded special education services; (4) most charter school operators GAO surveyed who expressed an opinion told GAO they believe they received a fair share of federal title I and IDEA funds; (5) nonetheless, charter school operators also cited a variety of barriers to accessing title I and IDEA funds, including: (a) difficulties in establishing program eligibility; (b) workload demands; and (c) a lack of program and administrative experience; (6) they reported that outreach and technical assistance were critical to helping them access federal funds; (7) several states and the Department of Education have begun initiatives to help charter schools access federal funds; (8) some states, for example, are revising or developing alternative allocation policies and procedures to better accommodate charter schools' access to federal funds and providing training and technical assistance to charter school operators; and (9) the Department has recently issued guidance to states and school districts on allocating title I funds to charter schools, and, among other things, has sponsored national meetings for state officials and charter school operators.
gao_GAO-06-834	gao_GAO-06-834_0	Background On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast region, causing human casualties and billions of dollars in damage. The Government Does Not Have a Framework in Place to Collect and Consolidate Information to Report on Hurricane-Related Funding The federal government is not adequately tracking and reporting on the use of the $88 billion in hurricane relief and recovery funds provided thus far to 23 federal agencies in the four emergency supplemental appropriations acts. As a result, FEMA’s required weekly reports to the Congress have limited usefulness from a governmentwide perspective. Therefore, it will be difficult for decision makers to determine how much federal funding has been spent and by whom, whether more may be needed, or whether too much was provided. FEMA’s Required Reports Do Not Provide Adequate Information from a Governmentwide Perspective FEMA is required to report weekly to the Appropriations Committees on the use of funds it received; however, these reports do not provide timely information from a governmentwide perspective because FEMA does not have a mechanism in place to collect and report on information from other agencies which perform work on its behalf. Specifically, when FEMA tasks another agency through a mission assignment, which is similar to an interagency agreement for goods and services, FEMA records the entire amount upfront as an obligation on its reports to the Congress. The agency performing the task for FEMA does not record an obligation until a later date when it has actually obligated funds to carry out its mission, thereby overstating reported governmentwide obligations. The opposite is true for expenditures. The agency expends the funds, but then has to bill FEMA for reimbursement. FEMA does not record the expenditure on its reports to the Congress until it has received the bill from the performing agency, reviewed it, and recorded the expenditure in its accounting system, thereby understating reported governmentwide expenditures. We found that no one agency or central collection point exists to compile and report on how these funds are being spent. The ability to separately track and report on these funds is important to help ensure better accountability and clearly identify the status of funding provided in direct response to these hurricanes at both the individual federal agency level as well as the governmentwide level and to provide additional transparency so that hurricane victims, affected states, as well as American taxpayers, know how the government is spending these funds. We also obtained the reports prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) in response to the second emergency supplemental appropriation act. Appendix II: Reporting Requirements Included in the Four Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Acts The four emergency supplemental appropriations acts enacted as of June 2006 provided funds to 23 federal agencies for the hurricane relief and recovery effort and included different reporting requirements.	Why GAO Did This Study Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast region of the United States and caused billions of dollars in damage. Hurricanes Rita and Wilma further exacerbated damage to the region. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was tasked with the primary role of managing the federal relief and recovery efforts. This review was performed under the Comptroller General's authority because of widespread congressional interest in the response to this disaster. GAO examined whether the federal government was adequately tracking and reporting on the use of the funding provided in the four emergency supplemental appropriations acts enacted as of June 2006. GAO analyzed the emergency supplemental appropriations acts and conference reports, reviewed FEMA's required weekly reports, and interviewed federal agency officials. What GAO Found FEMA's required weekly reports to the Appropriations Committees on the use of funds it received do not provide timely information from a governmentwide perspective because FEMA does not have a mechanism to report on the financial activity of the agencies performing work on its behalf. Specifically, when FEMA tasks another federal agency through a mission assignment, FEMA records the entire amount upfront as an obligation, whereas the performing agency does not record an obligation until a later date, thereby overstating reported governmentwide obligations. The opposite is true for expenditures. The performing agency expends the funds, but then bills FEMA for reimbursement. FEMA does not record the expenditure until it has received the bill and reviewed it, thereby understating reported governmentwide expenditures. As a result, while FEMA is reporting as required, from a governmentwide perspective, FEMA's reported obligations are overstated and expenditures are understated. The federal government also does not have a governmentwide framework or mechanisms in place to collect and consolidate information from the individual federal agencies that received emergency supplemental appropriations for hurricane relief and recovery efforts and report on this information. About $88 billion has been appropriated to 23 different federal agencies through four emergency supplemental appropriations acts; however, no one agency or central collection point exists to compile and report on how these funds are being spent. Decision makers need this consolidated information to determine how much federal funding has been spent and by whom, whether more may be needed, or whether too much has been provided. The ability to separately track and report on these funds is important to help ensure better accountability and clearly identify the status of funding provided in direct response to these hurricanes at both the individual federal agency level as well as the governmentwide level. Also, it is important to provide additional transparency so that hurricane victims, affected states, as well as American taxpayers, know how these funds are being spent.
gao_GAO-02-731	gao_GAO-02-731_0	The Congress enacted HIPAA, in part, to respond to the problem of health care fraud and abuse. Under the joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS (acting through the HHS/OIG), the HCFAC program goals are as follows: coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts to control fraud and abuse associated with health plans; conduct investigations, audits, and other studies of delivery and payment for health care for the United States; facilitate the enforcement of the civil, criminal, and administrative statutes applicable to health care; provide guidance to the health care industry, including the issuance of advisory opinions, safe harbor notices, and special fraud alerts; and establish a national database of adverse actions against health care providers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to identify and assess the propriety of amounts for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 reported as (1) deposits to the trust fund, (2) appropriations from the trust fund for HCFAC activities, (3) expenditures at DOJ for HCFAC activities, (4) expenditures at HHS for HCFAC activities, (5) expenditures for non-Medicare anti–fraud and abuse activities, and (6) savings to the trust fund. DOJ Made Errors in Reporting Collections; However, the Trust Fund Was Minimally Affected The joint HCFAC reports included deposits of about $210 million in fiscal year 2000 and $464 million in fiscal year 2001, pursuant to HIPAA. In testing at DOJ, we identified some errors in the recording of HCFAC collections that resulted in an estimated overstatement of $169,765 to the trust fund in fiscal year 2001. Based on our review, we found that the planned use of HCFAC appropriations was intended for purposes as stated in HIPAA statute. We found that over $480,000 in interest penalties not related to HCFAC activities were miscoded and inadvertently charged to the HCFAC appropriation. HHS and DOJ Do Not Separately Track Non- Medicare Expenditures We were not able to identify HCFAC program trust fund expenditures that were unrelated to Medicare because the HHS/OIG and DOJ do not separately account for or monitor such expenditures.	Why GAO Did This Study The Medicare program is the nation's largest health insurer with almost 40 million beneficiaries and outlays of over $219 billion annually. Because of the susceptibility of the program to fraud and abuse, Congress enacted the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) Program as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPAA) of 1996. HCFAC, which is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), established a national framework to coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and prosecute health care fraud and abuse in the public and private sectors. HIPPAA requires HHS and DOJ to issue a joint annual report no later than January 1 of each year to Congress for the proceeding fiscal year. The joint HCFAC reports included deposits of $210 million for fiscal year 2000 and $464 million for fiscal year 2001, pursuant to the act. In testing at DOJ, GAO found errors in the recording of criminal fines deposits to the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund in fiscal year 2001 that resulted in an estimated overstatement to the trust fund of $169,765. What GAO Found GAO found that the planned use of HCFAC appropriations was in keeping with the stated purpose in the act. Although GAO found expenditures from the trust fund were generally appropriate at HHS, at DOJ GAO found $480,000 in interest penalties not related to HCFAC activities that were charged to the HCFAC appropriation. GAO was unable to identify expenditures from the HCFAC trust fund for activities unrelated to Medicare because the HHS/OIG and DOJ do not separately account for or monitor these activities. Likewise, GAO was unable to identify savings specifically attributable to activities funded by the HCFAC program.
gao_GAO-07-282	gao_GAO-07-282_0	Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not Developed a Long- Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program’s inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as removing dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, many of the high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program’s scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. In addition, DOE’s program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. Finally, DOE has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them once installed. However, PNNL and Sandia National Laboratory officials told us that the measurement used by DOE does not demonstrate how the program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national security interests. Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE’s Program Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supply chain, DOE determined that source transport is generally outside the scope of the program. As a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE was unable to implement its program at all. DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing radiological sources and to install physical security upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance cameras. However, one-fourth of total expenditures—about $26.5 million—paid for program planning activities such as development of program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies. A majority of this money—$68 million—was spent to (1) physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2) locate, recover, and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. IAEA established the fund, which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek international contributions to secure radiological sources in other countries. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the agencies. However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent. DOE has improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries’ radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE’s ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts. An example of improved U.S. coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological source regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support of DOE and NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. We also recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to strengthen controls over sources in other countries. DOE’s Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and Program Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible for domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-origin radiological sources in other countries. The sources were no longer in use and were inadequately secured. Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between DOE and IAEA Have Impeded DOE’s Efforts to Target the Highest Priority Sites for Security Upgrades DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen controls over other countries’ radiological sources and has developed several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries around the world to support and share the agency’s international efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure that DOE’s program focuses on securing the highest priority radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the following two actions: Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive security upgrades to only those deemed as the highest-risk, and To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of those remaining until they can be removed from service. Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the following seven actions to improve program management: Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that includes, among other things, future resources required to implement such a plan; Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not directly contribute to securing the highest priority radiological sources in other countries; Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated with increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat protection criteria and limit the number sites to receive increased security upgrades until such an analysis has been completed; Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate real risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the number countries and sites that have received physical security upgrades; Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection to help reduce potential project delays in the future; Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place to maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by the United States; and Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient countries, including Russia and EU accession countries. To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other countries, we reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing program expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006.	Why GAO Did This Study Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the United States and the international community. Radioactive material is encapsulated or sealed in metal to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. However, the total number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous, weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty bombs. In response to the congressional requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources. In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program's mission is to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program. The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple national laboratories. The national laboratories' responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are properly installed. In 2003, we issued a report at Congress' request focusing on U.S. and international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources. We recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress the Department of Energy (DOE) has made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3) describes DOE's coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in other countries. What GAO Found DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's inception in 2002. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE and national laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the benefit of upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher priority sites--such as waste storage facilities and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)--remained unsecured. In addition, DOE's program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long term. From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 million--was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5 million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced limited results. DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) to secure radiological sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts efficiently. In addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.
gao_GAO-10-390	gao_GAO-10-390_0	Legislative Candidates’ Participation in Public Financing Programs in Maine and Arizona Increased from 2000 to 2008; Limited Data on Candidates Are Available In Maine and Arizona, legislative candidates’ participation in the public financing programs (measured by the percentage of candidates participating and the proportion of races with a participating candidate) increased from 2000 to 2008; although limited data on candidates’ characteristics are available. Similarly, the participation rate of legislative candidates in Maine’s general elections more than doubled from 33 percent in 2000 to 79 percent in 2004 and then remained over 80 percent for the 2006 and 2008 elections. Incumbent candidates’ participation in the public financing program in general elections in Maine generally increased from 2000 to 2008, with the majority of incumbent candidates participating in the program from 2002 through 2008. Similarly, the participation rate of legislative candidates in Arizona’s general elections almost doubled after 2000, when it was 26 percent, to 49 percent in 2002, and then steadily increased over the next three elections to 64 percent in 2008. Changes in One Measure of Electoral Competition Could Not Be Directly Attributed to Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing Programs; No Overall Changes in Voter Choice, Campaign Spending, and Interest Group Influence, While Data Limitations Hinder Analysis of Changes in Voter Participation We used a variety of statistical techniques to measure changes in five goals of public financing before and after the implementation of public financing and found some evidence of statistically significant changes in one measure of electoral competition. While there is no indication that the programs have decreased interest group influence, some candidates and interest group officials GAO interviewed said that campaign tactics have changed. Changes in One Measure of Electoral Competition— Winner’s Victory Margin— Could Not Be Directly Attributed to Public Financing Programs in Maine and Arizona, While No Significant Changes Were Observed in Two Other Measures of Electoral Competition Overall, the margin of victory in legislative races decreased significantly in both Maine and Arizona compared to their respective comparison states after the public financing programs were implemented; however, we could not attribute these decreases directly to the public financing programs due to factors such as candidate popularity and changing economic conditions, which affect electoral outcomes. Average candidate spending in Maine Senate races did not change significantly. In comparison, the difference in average spending by incumbents and challengers was not statistically significant in the five elections under the public financing program. In Arizona Senate races, there was not a statistically significant difference between average spending by participating and nonparticipating candidates in the five elections examined. State officials said that the amount spent on independent expenditures has increased since 2000. Candidates provided a number of reasons for the perceived increase in campaign spending. However, candidate and interest group representatives reported that campaign tactics, such as the role of political parties and the timing of expenditures, had changed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Objectives In accordance with the congressional direction specified in Senate Report 110-129 to revisit and update our 2003 report on the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona to account for data and experiences of the past two election cycles, this report provides data related to candidate program participation, including the number of legislative candidates who chose to use public funds to run for seats in the 2000 through 2008 elections in Maine and Arizona and the number of races in which at least one legislative candidate ran an election with public funds; and describes statistically measurable changes and perceptions of changes in the 2000 through 2008 state legislative elections in five goals of Maine’s and Arizona’s public financing programs—(1) increasing electoral competition by, among other means, reducing the number of uncontested races (i.e., races with only one candidate per seat in contention); (2) increasing voter choice by encouraging more candidates to run for office; (3) curbing increases in the cost of campaigns; (4) reducing the influence of interest groups and, thereby, enhance citizens’ confidence in government; and (5) increasing voter participation (e.g., voter turnout)—and the extent to which these changes could be attributed to the programs. We are issuing an electronic supplement concurrently with this report— GAO-10-391SP.	Why GAO Did This Study The 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first in the nation's history where candidates seeking state legislative seats had the option to fully fund their campaigns with public moneys. In 2003, GAO reviewed the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona and found the programs' goals were to (1) increase electoral competition; (2) increase voter choice; (3) curb increases in campaign costs; (4) reduce interest group influence; and (5) increase voter participation. GAO reported that while the number of candidates who participated in the programs increased from 2000 to 2002, it was too soon to determine the extent to which these five goals of the programs were being met. Senate Report 110-129 directed GAO to update its 2003 report. This report: (1) provides data on candidate participation and (2) describes changes in five goals of Maine's and Arizona's programs in the 2000 through 2008 elections and the extent to which changes could be attributed to the programs. To address its objectives, GAO analyzed available data about candidate participation, election outcomes, and campaign spending for the 1996 through 2008 legislative elections in both states, reviewed studies, and interviewed 22 candidates and 10 interest group officials selected to reflect a range of views. The interview results are not generalizable to all candidates or all interest groups. GAO is issuing an electronic supplement with this report--GAO-10-391SP--which provides data and summaries of statistical analyses conducted. What GAO Found In Maine and Arizona, legislative candidates' participation in the public financing programs, as measured by the percentage of candidates participating and the proportion of races with a participating candidate, increased from 2000 to 2008. Specifically, the participation rate of candidates in Maine's general elections increased from 33 percent in 2000 to over 80 percent in 2006 and 2008. Meanwhile, the participation rate of candidates in Arizona's general elections increased from 26 percent in 2000 to 64 percent in 2008. Also, the proportion of races with at least one candidate participating in the program generally increased from 2000 through 2008. While there was some evidence of statistically significant changes in one of the five goals of Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs, we could not directly attribute these changes to the programs, nor did we find significant changes in the remaining four goals after program implementation. Specifically, there were statistically significant decreases in one measure of electoral competition--the winner's margin of victory--in legislative races in both states. However, GAO could not directly attribute these decreases to the programs due to other factors, such as the popularity of candidates, which affect electoral outcomes. We found no change in two other measures of competition, and there were no observed changes in voter choice--the average number of legislative candidates per district race. In Maine, decreases in average candidate spending in House races were statistically significant, but a state official said this was likely due to reductions in the amounts given to participating candidates in 2008, while average spending in Maine Senate races did not change. In Arizona, average spending has increased in the five elections under the program. There is no indication the programs decreased perceived interest group influence, although some candidates and interest group officials GAO interviewed said campaign tactics changed, such as the timing of campaign spending. Data limitations, including a lack of comparable measures over time, hinder analysis of changes in voter participation.
gao_NSIAD-98-7	gao_NSIAD-98-7_0	Military Technology and Flight Safety Considerations Because of concerns about safeguarding military technology and maintaining flight safety, DOD has specific policies and procedures relating to the disposal of aircraft parts. For parts that could cause an aircraft to crash if the parts fail during a flight, DOD components have local policies requiring the destruction of certain used parts with flight safety implications to prevent the parts from reentering the DOD supply system or being made available to the civil aviation industry. Management of Surplus Aircraft Parts Can Be Improved DOD could have avoided destroying certain usable aircraft parts that were in the disposal process. The parts were destroyed because (1) the military services improperly coded parts without military technology as having military technology implications and (2) policies and practices intended to prevent an inadvertent sale of military technology or flight safety items did not adequately exclude parts without military technology or flight safety implications. Assigned Demilitarization Codes Are Not Accurate The three DRMOs we visited destroyed usable parts because the demilitarization codes the military services had assigned were inaccurate. For example, we evaluated 71 sample items at the Oklahoma City DRMO. The Inspector General reported that training was not adequate for personnel responsible for assigning and reviewing demilitarization codes and that documentation showing the rationale for their decisions did not exist. For the most part, this situation occurs because DOD labels containers of parts it does not want to repair for economic reasons as scrap. This review shows that DOD has not implemented similar procedures. The DRMO subsequently destroyed the parts and sold them as scrap. 2). DOD Components Needed Some Surplus Parts The military services’ inventory managers did not have adequate information on aircraft parts located in DRMOs. Air Force and Army officials said that, despite the requirements of the DOD regulation, they did not have adequate visibility over parts in DRMOs. They stated that interface problems between military service and DRMO computer systems precluded the services from knowing what parts were in DRMOs. Our report documents examples where DRMOs destroyed usable parts that did not have military technology or safety implications. DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation that it establish milestones for correcting the computer interface problems that preclude the military services from having visibility of parts located in DRMOs and, in the interim, institute alternative ways to obtain this information on a routine basis. To determine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) policies and practices for destroying aircraft parts during the disposal process, we held discussions and performed work at the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), Washington, D.C.; the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the DOD Inspector General, Washington, D.C. and Columbus, Ohio. We also reviewed the results of prior DOD internal studies. As a result, the DRMO destroyed parts that the private sector could have purchased. These parts originally cost $200,000.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the Department of Defense's (DOD) disposal process, focusing on whether: (1) DOD destroyed, during the disposal process, usable aircraft parts that did not have military technology and flight safety implications; and (2) the military services recalled aircraft parts from the disposal process to preclude unnecessary purchases or repairs. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) management of the aircraft parts disposal process can be improved; (2) DOD destroyed some usable aircraft parts and sold them as scrap; (3) these parts were in new or repairable condition and did not have military technology or flight safety implications; (4) the parts could possibly have been sold intact at higher than scrap prices; (5) this situation occurred for several reasons; (6) for example, disposal offices destroyed parts because the demilitarization codes the military services had assigned to the parts were inaccurate; (7) the codes indicated the parts contained military technology when they did not; (8) GAO work showed that the Oklahoma City disposal office destroyed 62 of 71 sample items, even though they did not have technology implications, because the assigned codes required their destruction; (9) personnel responsible for assigning and reviewing the codes had not been sufficiently trained and guidance was not adequate; (10) in addition, policies and practices designed to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized release of parts with military technology and flight safety implications did not distinguish between parts with or without such implications; (11) parts without military technology and flight safety concerns were destroyed along with parts that had these characteristics; (12) GAO work also showed that DOD could have purchased or repaired fewer aircraft parts if it would have recalled the needed parts from the disposal process; (13) for example, the Army could have reduced current and planned purchases by about $200,000 by using Cobra helicopter parts scheduled for destruction; (14) DOD regulations require the military services to know which parts they have placed in the disposal process; (15) however, interface problems between service and disposal office computer systems precluded the services from knowing what parts were at the disposal offices; (16) the military services had not instituted alternative ways to obtain this information on a routine basis; (17) problems with the disposal process are likely not unique to the three disposal yards GAO visited because DOD, military service, and Defense Logistics Agency policies and procedures generally apply to activities being performed at all locations; and (18) GAO past reviews and DOD internal studies have identified similar problems at these and other locations over the past 10 years or earlier.
gao_T-GGD-96-104	gao_T-GGD-96-104_0	Those concerns involved ATF’s (1) use of force, (2) effect on the number of licensed firearms dealers, and (3) compliance with legislative restrictions on maintaining certain firearms licensee data. Today, we are releasing reports that address the first two concerns—use of force and licensing of firearms dealers. Use of Force With regard to the use-of-force issue, you asked us to (1) identify and describe ATF’s policies for the use of deadly force, (2) determine how ATF conveys its policies to agents, (3) determine the reasons for and the extent to which ATF uses dynamic entry and the equipment used to accomplish these entries, and (4) determine whether ATF has complied with its procedures for investigating shooting and alleged excessive force incidents. Moreover, you asked us to compare these issues with the way that the Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) address them. To place ATF’s use-of-force incidents in perspective, from fiscal years 1990 through 1995, ATF, on average, arrested about 8,000 suspects but was involved in fewer than 10 reported shooting or alleged excessive force incidents annually. the new policy. Dynamic entry was a principal tactical procedure used by ATF, DEA, and FBI when serving high-risk warrants—those where ATF believes that suspects pose a threat of violence—and entry to premises was required. In none of the 1995 SRT dynamic entries did ATF agents fire their weapons at suspects. ATF Complied With Its Procedures for Investigating Shooting and Alleged Excessive Force Incidents ATF’s procedures for reporting, investigating, and reviewing shooting and excessive force incidents, as revised in October 1994, are consistent with guidelines and/or standards recommended by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. Agents found to have engaged in misconduct received written reprimands and/or suspensions. Restricted Firearms Licensee Data licensee data.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), focusing on its: (1) policy on the use of force; (2) licensing of firearms dealers; and (3) compliance with legislative restrictions on maintaining certain firearms licensee data. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) between fiscal year (FY) 1990 and FY 1995, ATF arrested an annual average of 8,000 suspects and had fewer than 10 reported shootings or alleged incidents of excessive force; (2) ATF deadly force and training policies are consistent with Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) policies; (3) when serving high-risk warrants, ATF, DEA, and FBI use dynamic entry, a tactic that may involve forced entry and is used to gain rapid entry to premises; (4) in none of the FY 1995 ATF Special Response Team deployments did agents fire their weapons and in about half, agents used dynamic entries; (5) ATF procedures for reporting, investigating, and reviewing shootings and alleged excessive force cases are consistent with DEA and FBI procedures; (6) ATF complied with its reporting, investigating, and reviewing procedures, determined that all ATF shootings were justified, determined that most excessive force allegations were unsubstantiated, and punished agents determined to have engaged in misconduct; (7) between 1993 and 1995, the number of licensed firearms dealers declined by about 35 percent due to increased ATF law enforcement and new licensing laws; and (8) the ATF firearms licensee data system complies with legislative restrictions.
gao_GAO-06-462T	gao_GAO-06-462T_0	Divisions and units within OI headquarters also develop and manage special programs that are implemented in multiple field offices. Carryover Organizational Structure and Investigative Activities from Legacy Agencies Affect OI’s Investigative Focus The headquarters and field organizational structures adopted by OI reflect the legacy functions of the customs and immigration services—e.g. drug investigations, human smuggling, and commercial fraud—and include activities to prevent terrorism within this structure. In April 2005, ICE completed an interim strategic plan that established as its mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism while ensuring all of its mandated trade, immigration, and federal protective functions are not diminished. When ICE was created, it retained responsibility for enforcing the customs and immigration laws that were the purview of its legacy agencies. In addition, ICE relied on the strategic priorities of the legacy agencies to determine the composition and locations of SAC offices—for example, high-volume smuggling corridors, proximity to state and federal prisons, and significant money laundering infrastructure. OI Investigative Resources Were Used for Investigations Related to Its Legacy Missions, but Most Were Not Considered to Have a National Security Nexus Between 10 and 15 percent of investigative hours were classified by OI as having a direct nexus to national security. According to OI, the majority of the national security-related investigative hours were charged in a few case categories related to munitions control, illegal exports, compliance enforcement of visa violations, and terrorism. Roughly half of OI investigative resources during fiscal year 2004 and the first half of fiscal year 2005 were used for cases related to drugs, financial crimes, and general alien violations. According to ICE’s interim strategic plan, ICE plans to shift this duty to ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO). OI Places Priority on National Security Investigations, but Key Management Practices Could Enhance OI’s Resource Allocation Decision-Making OI tries to ensure that its resources contribute to the prevention of the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems by making most investigative resource use decisions in OI’s major field offices, based on the judgment of the agents in charge, with priority on investigating national security-related cases that arise. Although we found no evidence that OI has failed to investigate any national security- related lead that came to its attention, applying a risk management approach to proactively determine what types of customs and immigration violations represent the greatest risks for exploitation by terrorists and other criminals could provide OI with greater assurance that it is focusing most intensely on preventing those violations with the greatest potential for harm while striking an appropriate balance among its various objectives. OI has taken some initial steps to introduce principles of risk management into its operations—for example, encouraging its field managers to think about violations in terms of vulnerabilities to the customs and immigration systems. However, it has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation or analyzed these data to provide information to evaluate alternative investigative strategies and allow OI to make risk-based resource allocation decisions. Finally, OI does not have sufficient systems to help ensure ongoing monitoring and communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations. 3). Lacking OI-wide outcome-based performance goals to assess its ability to prevent the exploitation of systematic vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems that allow terrorists and other criminals to endanger the United States makes it difficult for OI to evaluate the results of its efforts in light of that objective. DHS said that OI has established designated liaisons to both U.S.	Why GAO Did This Study Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism while ensuring its mandated customs, immigration, and federal protective enforcement functions are not diminished. The ICE Office of Investigations (OI) supports that mission by investigating customs and immigration violations. This testimony addresses the following key questions that were answered in GAO-06-48SU , a restricted report issued with the same title: (1) What structure and activities has OI adopted to address its mission? (2) In fiscal year 2004 and the first half of fiscal year 2005, how did OI use its investigative resources to achieve its goals? (3) How does OI ensure that its resource use contributes to its ability to prevent the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems? What GAO Found OI's organizational structure and investigative activities reflect those of its legacy agencies--the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service--and include activities to prevent terrorism. OI retained responsibility for enforcing customs and immigration laws, and its field structure was created by relying on the strategic priorities of its legacy agencies to determine the composition and locations of field offices. Senior OI officials said that OI seeks to accomplish its homeland security mission by focusing on cases that seem to have a connection to national security. Data from ICE's case management system indicate that its investigative activities generally relate to legacy missions, with about half of OI resources during fiscal year 2004 and the first half of 2005 used for cases related to drugs, financial crimes, and general alien investigations--investigations unlikely to contain a nexus to national security. Overall, between 10 and 15 percent of investigative resources were used for investigations considered to have a link to national security. OI's current method of tracking these cases captures data about the cases where a nexus to national security is assumed due to the nature of the violation, primarily investigations of munitions control, illegal exports, visa violations, and terrorism. Additionally, the equivalent of about 400 of its 5,600 special agents worked full time to identify incarcerated aliens who were eligible for removal from the United States, a function that does not require the skills and training of criminal investigators. ICE plans to free investigators for more appropriate duties by shifting these functions to other ICE units and to study whether other functions could be shifted to employees in a noninvestigatory job series. To make resource use decisions in pursuit of OI's goal to prevent the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems, OI primarily relies on the judgment of staff in its major field offices, in addition to national programs developed in headquarters that are implemented in multiple field offices. Although GAO found no evidence that OI has failed to investigate any national security-related lead that came to its attention, applying a risk management approach to determine what types of customs and immigration violations represent the greatest risks for exploitation by terrorists and other criminals could provide OI with greater assurance that it is focusing on preventing violations with the greatest potential for harm, while striking a balance among its various objectives. OI has taken some initial steps to introduce principles of risk management into its operations, but has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation, nor has OI analyzed all relevant data to inform the evaluation of alternatives and allow risk-based resource allocation decisions. OI also lacks outcome-based performance goals that relate to its objective of preventing the exploitation of these systemic vulnerabilities. Finally, OI does not have sufficient systems to help ensure ongoing monitoring and communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations.
gao_AIMD-96-94	gao_AIMD-96-94_0	Inadequate Visibility Over Excess Items for Navy’s DBOF Budget and Buy Decisions The Navy’s item managers do not have complete information on hundreds of millions of dollars of operating materials and supplies on ships and at redistribution sites that is needed for budget and purchase decisions. This occurs because the inventory systems on ships and at the redistribution sites do not provide the item managers complete and accurate data on operating level excess items. In addition, the Navy had 17 redistribution sites storing a total of $455 million worth of items, all of which were excess. Further, the lack of visibility over excess items that are free issued has resulted in the operating unit’s Operations and Maintenance budget requests being overstated. Navy Lacks an Integrated and Comprehensive Approach to Reporting on Operating Materials and Supplies The Navy has various initiatives underway to improve management and reporting of operating materials and supplies. However, some of these efforts are more directed at and concerned with providing visibility for redistribution of excesses among the operating activities sponsoring the initiative than providing item managers with all the data needed to perform their responsibilities from a Navy-wide perspective. Most of these costs could be avoided if excess items were promptly returned to the wholesale supply system. At the 15 shore activities—air stations, redistribution sites, and Trident Refit Facilities—and 12 ships we visited to assess the accuracy of Navy’s records on its operating materials and supplies, we found that 22 out of 27 met the Navy’s minimum inventory record accuracy rate goal of 95 percent. We believe that to ensure reliable financial reporting and maximum operational efficiency, all units should strive to exceed the minimum goal. GAO Comments 1. 2.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO examined the Navy's financial reporting on and management of operating materials and supplies that are not part of Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) inventories, focusing on the: (1) Navy's accountability and visibility over approximately $5.7 billion in operating materials and supplies on board vessels and at redistribution sites; (2) Navy's management of excess items; and (3) accuracy of operating unit records for operating materials and supplies. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) 261 Navy vessels and 17 redistribution sites are storing a total of about $883 million in excess items; (2) the inventory systems on ships and at redistribution sites do not provide Navy item managers with complete and accurate data on excess items at the operating level; (3) because item managers are not aware of excess items that may be available for redistribution free of charge, their operations and maintenance (O&M) budget requests are overstated; (4) initiatives for improving management and reporting of operating materials and supplies do not represent a coordinated, integrated approach for ensuring that item managers are provided with all of the information they need to perform all of their responsibilities; (5) the Navy could achieve cost savings and increase visibility of its excess items by closing its 17 redistribution sites and returning excess items to the wholesale supply system; and (6) while most of the activities tested met the Navy's minimum goal of 95-percent inventory record accuracy, all of the units should attempt to exceed the minimum goal.
gao_GAO-16-141	gao_GAO-16-141_0	In fiscal year 2012, Education began to invite SEAs to waive specific ESEA provisions, which require community learning centers to carry out their activities during non-school hours or periods when school is not in session. The waiver allows grantees to use 21st Century program funds to conduct authorized activities during an extended school day, week, or year in schools that provide extended learning time for all students in the school. Education Supports Extended Learning Time Primarily through the School Improvement Grants Program Education Promoted Extended Learning Time in K-12 Public Schools with Nearly 1,800 School Improvement Grants The School Improvement Grants (SIG) program is the only program administered by Education that provides funds specifically to establish extended learning time in a school, according to Education officials. Between school year 2010-2011, when changes were made to SIG to require extended learning time in certain instances, and 2014-2015, the last year SIG data are available, nearly 1,800 schools or approximately 94 percent of SIG schools had chosen either of two school improvement models that require extended learning time, out of the four available models (see fig. 1). According to an Education report on the 2012-2013 school year, the average 3-year grant was $2.6 million as of that year. Very Few Grantees Used 21st Century Grants to Support Extended Learning Time In contrast to SIG, where most SIG schools are implementing extended learning time, as of July 2015, Education officials reported that only a fraction of the 21st Century learning centers it funds—about 69 out of 10,000 nationwide—are supplementing local extended learning time initiatives by taking advantage of waivers of ESEA requirements that allow them to provide 21st Century program activities and services during an extended school day. The average subgrant per center was about $113,000 per school year. Schools May Use Other Education Funding During Extended Learning Time Education officials told us that most Education funding streams are designed for use during the school day–regardless of the length of the school day or year–and as such, schools may use these funds during extended learning time, consistent with other program requirements. Representatives from several organizations we interviewed also identified ways that Education programs can contribute to extended learning time. Schools with the Most Time in School Share Certain Characteristics and Use the Additional Time for Different Purposes Average Length of K-12 Public School Day Was Just Under 7 Hours, and Those with the Most Time Add Hours to the Day, Not Days to the School Year On average, we estimate that K-12 public schools nationwide have a 6.7- hour school day and a 179-day school year, according to our analysis of Education’s School and Staffing Survey (SASS) data for the 2011-2012 school year, the most recent data available (see fig. 2). Consequently, charter schools may have fewer barriers than traditional public schools to extending their hours. The average number of school hours also differs according to a school’s setting. Schools with the Most Hours in a School Year Serve Larger Proportions of Low-Income and African American and Hispanic Students Our analysis of SASS data for the 2011-2012 school year shows that K- 12 public schools with the most time have a larger proportion of students receiving free or reduced price lunch—an estimated 61 percent—than all other schools whose student body population comprises 51 percent of these students (see fig. Schools with the Most Hours Spend More Time on Instruction Public K-12 schools with the most hours in a school year use this additional time for different purposes, including more instruction in math and literacy, and more time for the arts and physical education. Agency Comments We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Education for comment. Education provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.	Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, a key strategy for improving student outcomes has been to extend learning time by lengthening the school day or year. In 2010, Education made significant changes to its SIG program, funded at about $506 million in fiscal year 2015, including requiring schools to extend learning time in certain instances. In 2012, Education began to invite waiver requests from states to use funds from its $1.2 billion 21st Century program to conduct authorized activities during extended learning time. Little is known about how much time public K-12 students spend in school. An explanatory statement accompanying Public Law 113-235 required GAO to report on learning time. In this report, GAO examines: (1) various Education programs that can be used to support extended learning time for K-12 students, and (2) learning time in public schools nationwide. In this report, GAO focuses on programs that require or may allow schools to lengthen the school day, week, or year. GAO analyzed the most recent available SIG and 21st Century grant data, as well as Education data on learning time from a nationally representative sample of schools. GAO also reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, and agency documents; and interviewed Education officials and stakeholders selected to obtain diverse perspectives of school districts, states, service providers, and teachers. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. Education provided technical comments, which are incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found The Department of Education (Education) primarily supports extended learning time for K-12 public schools through the School Improvement Grants program (SIG). The SIG program, with an average 3-year grant of $2.6 million, is the only Education program that provides funds specifically to establish extended learning time in schools, according to Education. Nearly 1,800 schools that received SIG funds (about 94 percent of SIG schools) were required to extend learning time under the SIG program for school years 2010-2011 through 2014-2015. In addition, under the 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st Century) grant program a small number of grantee schools—about 69 of the 10,000—have used program funds to support extended learning time. However, to do so, states need to obtain a waiver from Education to permit schools to use funds to conduct authorized program activities during an extended school day, week, or year. Education officials said that the average annual 21st Century grant was about $113,000. Although Education supports extended learning time with the SIG and, in rare cases, the 21st Century program, Education officials also pointed out that most of its K-12 programs are designed to be used during the school day, regardless of the length of the day. Regarding learning time, GAO estimates that the average length of the school day for K-12 public schools nationwide is just under 7 hours and the average school year is almost 180 days, according to GAO's analysis of Education's 2011-2012 data, the most recent available. In terms of hours per year, schools with the most time average almost 1,350 hours compared to about 1,200 hours, nationally. In addition, among all public schools, charter schools represent a larger proportion of schools with more time (about one-third of all charter schools) compared to approximately 9 percent of traditional public schools. Charter schools also represented a larger proportion of students who are low income, African American, or Hispanic. Regarding how schools use extended learning time, we found that schools with the most hours in a school year use it for different purposes. For example, GAO estimates that eighth-grade students in these schools spend, on average, one more hour per week on academic subjects such as English, math, and science, while third-graders spent more time in music, art, and physical education classes.
gao_GAO-08-344	gao_GAO-08-344_0	It also provided templates for the progress reports and additional statistics. Trends in FOIA Processing Appear Similar to Previous Years The data reported by 21 major agencies in annual FOIA reports from 2002 to 2006 reveal a number of general trends. However, the rate of increase in pending requests was less than in the previous year. Increases in Requests Received and Processed Are Generally Slowing The numbers of FOIA requests received and processed continue to rise, but the rate of increase has flattened in recent years. Increase in Pending Cases for 21 Agencies Is Mostly Associated with DHS In addition to the increase in numbers of requests processed at the 21 agencies, the number of pending cases—requests carried over from one year to the next—has increased. Since Implementing Improvement Plans, Several Agencies Reduced Backlogs of Overdue or Pending Requests, but the Governmentwide Picture Is Incomplete Following the emphasis on backlog reduction in Executive Order 13392 and agency improvement plans, many agencies have shown progress in decreasing their backlogs of overdue requests as of September 2007. Specifically, of 16 agencies we reviewed that were able to provide statistics, 9 decreased overdue or pending requests, 5 experienced increases, and 2 had no material change. However, the statistics provided by these agencies varied widely, representing a mix of overdue cases and total pending cases, as well as varying time frames. (The remaining agency reported no backlog before or after implementing its plan.) Tracking and reporting statistics on overdue cases is not a requirement of the annual FOIA reports or of the Executive Order. Although both the Executive Order and Justice’s implementing guidance put a major emphasis on backlog reduction, agencies were given flexibility in developing goals and metrics that they considered most appropriate in light of their current FOIA operations and individual circumstances. As a result, agencies’ goals and metrics vary widely, and progress could not be assessed against a common metric. Justice’s most recent guidance directs agencies to set goals for reducing backlogs of overdue requests in future fiscal years, which could lead to the development of a consistent metric; however, it does not direct agencies to monitor and report overdue requests or to develop plans for meeting the new goals. According to the department, it plans to address its backlog challenges by efforts to better track and control the FOIA workload. Further, 3 of the 21 agencies were unable to provide statistics supporting their backlog reduction efforts, and 1 provided statistics by component, which could not be aggregated to provide an agencywide result. A major reason for this variation in statistics is that agencies did not necessarily have systems or processes to record backlog in the sense of the Executive Order (requests for records that have not been responded to within the statutory time limit); instead, their systems or processes were based on recording statistics required for the annual reports, which include a count of open requests pending at the end of the reporting period but do not include backlog of overdue requests. Without such planning and tracking, agencies may face challenges in achieving the reductions envisioned. The progress that many agencies have made in reducing backlog suggests that the development and implementation of the FOIA improvement plans have had a positive effect. However, in the absence of consistent statistics on overdue cases, it is not possible to make a full assessment of governmentwide progress in this area. To determine to what extent agencies made progress in addressing backlogged FOIA requests since implementing their improvement plans, we analyzed the improvement plan progress reports included in the fiscal year 2006 annual reports of the 21 major agencies whose internal controls we evaluated as sufficient in order to determine whether the agencies met their 2006 backlog reduction milestones.	Why GAO Did This Study Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), federal agencies must generally provide access to their information, enabling the public to learn about government operations and decisions. To help ensure proper implementation, the act requires that agencies report annually to the Attorney General on their processing of FOIA requests. For fiscal year 2006, agencies were also to report on their progress in implementing plans to improve FOIA operations, as directed by a December 2005 Executive Order. A major goal of the order was reducing backlogs of overdue FOIA requests (the statute requires an agency to respond to requests within 20 or, in some cases, 30 working days with a determination on whether it will provide records). For this study, GAO was asked, among other things, to determine trends in FOIA processing and agencies' progress in addressing backlogs of overdue FOIA requests since implementing their improvement plans. To do so, GAO analyzed 21 agencies' annual reports and additional statistics. What GAO Found Based on data reported by major agencies in annual FOIA reports from fiscal years 2002 to 2006, the numbers of FOIA requests received and processed continue to rise, but the rate of increase has flattened in recent years. The number of pending requests carried over from year to year has also increased, although the rate of increase has declined. The increase in pending requests is primarily due to increases in requests directed to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In particular, increases have occurred at DHS's Citizenship and Immigration Services, which accounted for about 89 percent of DHS's total pending requests. However, the rate of increase is slightly less than it was in fiscal year 2005. Following the emphasis on backlog reduction in Executive Order 13392 and agency improvement plans, many agencies have shown progress in decreasing their backlogs of overdue requests as of September 2007. In response to GAO's request, 16 agencies provided information on their recent progress in addressing backlogs; results showed that 9 achieved decreases, 5 experienced increases, and 2 had no material change. Notably, according to this information, DHS was able to decrease its backlog of overdue requests by 29,972, or about 29 percent. However, the statistics provided by the 16 agencies varied widely, representing both overdue cases and all pending cases, as well as varying time frames. Further, 3 of 21 agencies reviewed were unable to provide statistics supporting their backlog reduction efforts, and 1 provided statistics by component, which could not be aggregated to provide an agencywide result. (The remaining agency reported no backlog before or after implementing its plan.) Tracking and reporting numbers of overdue cases is not a requirement of the annual FOIA reports or of the Executive Order. Although both the Executive Order and Justice's implementing guidance put a major emphasis on backlog reduction, agencies were given flexibility in developing goals and metrics that they considered most appropriate in light of their current FOIA operations and individual circumstances. As a result, agencies' goals and metrics vary widely, and progress could not be assessed against a common metric. The progress that many agencies made in reducing backlog suggests that the development and implementation of the FOIA improvement plans have had a positive effect. However, in the absence of consistent statistics on overdue cases, it is not possible to make a full assessment of governmentwide progress in this area. Justice's most recent guidance directs agencies to set goals for reducing backlogs of overdue requests in future fiscal years, which could lead to the development of a consistent metric; however, it does not direct agencies to monitor and report overdue requests or to develop plans for meeting the new goals. Without such planning and tracking, agencies may be challenged to achieve the reductions envisioned.
gao_GAO-15-410	gao_GAO-15-410_0	In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State awarded two contracts originally worth $625.4 million in total to meet growing facility requirements at the U.S. embassy in Kabul. In September 2011, State partially terminated the 2009 contract for the convenience of the government due to concerns, in part, about performance and schedule delays and reduced the contract value by $121.4 million. See table 1 for a summary of cost increases and decreases for the two contracts. However, State did not properly follow these cost containment and risk assessment policies, a fact that likely contributed to increased costs and extended schedules in the 2009 and 2010 contracts. The risk assessment identified over 30 risks to the project. Further, a senior State management official acknowledged that State did not fully follow its cost and risk policies, in part because of the urgency of the embassy’s facility needs, the security environment, and challenges in supporting the surge in embassy staffing that was occurring.to this official, had the cost containment and risk assessment study recommendations been more fully considered by senior management, there might have been a decision to delay award of the 2010 contract, which would have slowed efforts to provide facilities as quickly as possible. These factors contributed to increased construction cost and extended schedule. State to Continue Use of Temporary Facilities but Lacks Specific Security Standards for Them, Contributing to Increased Costs and Extended Schedules Since 2002, State has spent over $100 million to construct temporary facilities on-compound in Kabul, and the post will likely continue to use some of those temporary facilities. At that time, all temporary facilities on- compound will be nearly 5 years old or more, and a smaller subset on the west compound will be more than 10 years old. In the absence of minimal security standards (or guidance) to guide planning for temporary facility construction, State inconsistently applied alternative security measures, resulting in insufficient and different levels of security between temporary offices and housing. Lack of Strategic Facilities Planning and Policy Has Led to Coordination Challenges in Addressing Future Needs in Kabul State officials indicate that additional capital construction investments are needed to address interim and future facility needs of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, both on- and off-compound. Further Construction and Funding Needed to Address Unmet Post Facility Needs State has made or plans to make approximately $2.17 billion in infrastructure investments in Kabul. Lack of a Strategic Facilities Plan Impedes Efforts to Coordinate Construction in Kabul State Lacks a Strategic Facilities Plan in Kabul State does not have a strategic facilities plan for Kabul that documents current and future embassy needs, comprehensively outlines existing facilities, analyzes gaps, provides projected costs, and documents decisions made. State Assigns Responsibility for Planning, but OBO Lacks Policy Governing Strategic Facilities and Master Planning According to State policy, OBO’s Office of Master Planning and Evaluations (MPE) is responsible for directing and preparing both master plans and long-range facilities plans for posts abroad, not PDC, which is OBO’s project coordination and management office. Recommendations for Executive Action To maintain State’s adherence to construction risk management policy, guide future construction of temporary facilities, strengthen coordination efforts to address facility needs of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, and clarify strategic planning policy, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following four actions: Ensure existing cost containment and risk assessment policies are followed in future Kabul construction projects. State partially concurred with our recommendation to consider establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the construction of temporary structures, especially those used in conflict environments. In the report we examine (1) the extent to which construction cost and schedule have changed and why, (2) State’s use of temporary facilities on-compound, and (3) State’s planning for projected embassy facility needs.	Why GAO Did This Study Since re-opening in 2002, the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, has experienced a dramatic increase in staffing, followed by a gradual drawdown. State has invested or plans to invest a total of $2.17 billion in U.S. facilities to address current and projected space needs. State awarded two contracts in 2009 and 2010 to construct additional on-compound housing and office facilities. State partially terminated one contract for the convenience of the U.S. government, and expanded the construction requirements of the second, affecting cost and schedule. State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations is responsible for the planning, design, and construction of U.S. embassies. This report updates and expands upon GAO's previous work. This report examines (1) the extent to which construction cost and schedule have changed and why, (2) State's use of temporary facilities on-compound, and (3) State's planning for projected embassy facility needs. GAO evaluated construction planning and contract documents and interviewed State and contractor officials in Washington, D.C., and Kabul. What GAO Found Cost and schedule have increased for the Kabul embassy construction project, in part due to incomplete cost and risk assessment. Cost for the 2009 and 2010 contracts has increased by about 27 percent, from $625.4 million to $792.9 million, and is likely to increase further. Projected completion has been delayed over 3 years to fall 2017. The Department of State (State) did not follow its cost containment and risk assessment policies, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. These risks, such as delays in the sequencing of the two contracts, eventually materialized, increasing cost and extending schedule. Unless State follows its policy, it may be unable to avoid or mitigate risks to cost and schedule on future projects. Architect's Rendering of Embassy Compound upon Project Completion Since 2002, State has built over $100 million in temporary buildings (intended for no more than 5 years' use) to meet space needs on-compound but has no security standards tailored to those facilities. On completing the project in 2017, all temporary facilities will be 5 to 10 years old, and their continued use is likely. Without security standards or other guidance to guide temporary facility construction in conflict environments, State inconsistently applied alternative security measures that resulted in insufficient and different levels of security for temporary offices and housing, as well as increased cost and extended schedules. Without temporary facility security standards or guidance, future construction in conflict environments could encounter similar problems. State's lack of a strategic facilities plan and policies governing such planning has led to coordination challenges in addressing the embassy's future facility needs. Industry standards cite the value of plans that comprehensively assess existing facilities, identify needs, and document decisions on meeting those needs. In Kabul, however, State constructed a guard facility without proper design review or applying for a building permit, leading to fire safety deficiencies that State corrected at extra cost. Finally, State formally assigns responsibility for strategic facilities planning but lacks policy that governs implementation of such planning. State intends to make additional facility investments to address future facility needs. Without a strategic facilities plan and policy to guide its development, coordination to address these needs will continue to be difficult. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State (1) adhere to its cost containment and risk assessment policies, (2) consider establishing security standards or guidance for temporary buildings in conflict zones, (3) develop a strategic facilities plan for Kabul, and (4) clarify its strategic facilities and master planning policy. State concurred with the first, third, and fourth recommendations and partially concurred with the second.
gao_GAO-11-382T	gao_GAO-11-382T_0	Background The State OIG, as currently constituted, was established by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which expanded on the 1985 amendments to the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), as an independent office to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in the department’s programs and operations; conduct and supervise audits and investigations; and recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The State OIG is unique among federal inspectors general in its history and responsibilities due to a statutory requirement for the OIG to provide inspections of the department’s bureaus and posts worldwide. Importance of Auditor and IG Independence Independence is a fundamental principle to the auditing profession and the most critical element for IG effectiveness. Without independence, an audit organization cannot conduct independent audits in compliance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Likewise, Government Auditing Standards states: “in all matters relating to work, the audit organization and the individual auditor, whether government or public, must be free from personal, external, and organizational impairments to independence and must avoid the appearance of such impairments to independence. At the same time the IGs are part of their respective agencies and must also keep their agency heads, as well as the Congress, concurrently informed. Independence and Effectiveness Concerns We Reported in 2007 Concerns Regarding the State OIG’s Independence In March 2007, we reported on two areas of continuing concern regarding the independence of the State OIG. These concerns involved the appointment of management officials to head the State OIG in an acting capacity for extended periods of time and the use of Foreign Service staff to lead State OIG inspections. These Foreign Service officers frequently move through the OIG on rotational assignments. In these areas the State OIG was relying on inspections rather than audits for oversight. Inspections by the OIG’s Office of Information Technology Were Not Included in Quality Reviews In our 2007 report we also found that inspections by the OIG’s Office of Information Technology were not included in the internal quality reviews that the OIG conducts of its own work. The State Department’s OIG Has Actions Under Way or Completed to Address Most of Our Recommendations Recommendations from Our 2007 Report To address the concerns we raised in our March 2007 report we made five recommendations. To help ensure the independence of the IG Office, which also impacts the effectiveness of the office, we recommended that the IG work with the Secretary of State to (1) develop a succession-planning policy for the appointment of individuals to head the State IG office in an acting capacity that provides for independent coverage between IG appointments and also to prohibit career Foreign Service officers and other department managers from heading the State OIG in an acting capacity, and (2) develop options to ensure that State OIG inspections are not led by career Foreign Service officials or other staff who rotate to assignments within State Department management. We also made the following three recommendations to the State IG to address the effectiveness of the OIG: (1) help ensure that the State IG provides the appropriate breath and depth of oversight of the State Department’s high-risk areas and management challenges, reassess the proper mix of audit and inspection coverage for these areas; (2) provide for more complete internal quality reviews of inspections, include inspections performed by the State IG’s Office of Information Technology in the OIG’s internal quality review process; and (3) develop a formal written agreement with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to coordinate departmental investigations in order to provide for more independent investigations of State Department management and to prevent duplicative investigations. This use of temporarily assigned State Department management staff to head the State OIG can affect the perceived independence of the entire office in its oversight of the department’s operations, and the practice is questionable when compared to the independence requirements of Government Auditing Standards and other professional standards followed by the IGs. In addition, with the assistance of an independent public accountant, the State OIG has completed an audit of a major issue in coordinating foreign assistance, the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative related to the President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief. We continue to believe that the State OIG’s use of management staff who have the possibility of returning to management positions, even if they are rehired annuitants or currently report to civil service employees in the OIG, presents at least an appearance of impaired independence and is not fully consistent with professional standards. An IG who lacks independence cannot effectively fulfill the full range of requirements for this office. The State OIG has either implemented or is in the process of implementing the recommendations from our 2007 report, with the exception of our recommendation to discontinue the use of Foreign Service officers as team leaders for inspections.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2007 GAO reported on concerns with the independence and effectiveness of the Department of State Inspector General (State OIG). GAO was asked to provide testimony on the issues we raised and the status of recommendations made to the State OIG in that report. This testimony focuses on the importance of auditor and IG independence, GAO's prior concerns with the State OIG's independence and effectiveness, and the status of OIG actions to address GAO's recommendations. The testimony is primarily based on GAO's 2007 report conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, as well as the activities conducted to follow up on the status of our previous recommendations. What GAO Found The State Department Office of Inspector General (State OIG) has a critical responsibility in preventing and detecting fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement; and in providing independent audits and investigations of the department's programs and operations. In addition, the Foreign Service Act of 1980 requires the State OIG to perform inspections of the department's bureaus and posts, which is a unique requirement for an IG office. Independence is a critical element to the quality and credibility of an IG's work under the IG Act and is fundamental to professional auditing standards as well as an essential element of IG effectiveness. An IG must be independent and free from personal, external, and organizational impairments to independence in order to effectively fulfill the full range of requirements for the office. GAO's 2007 report identified areas of concern regarding the State OIG's independence and effectiveness. Specifically, the appointment of management and Foreign Service officials to head the State OIG in an acting capacity for extended periods of time is not consistent with professional standards for independence. In addition, GAO reported that the use of Foreign Service officers at the ambassador level to lead OIG inspections resulted in, at a minimum, the appearance of independence impairment. GAO also reported that inspections, by design, are conducted under less in-depth requirements and do not provide the same level of assurance as audits. However, the OIG relied on inspections rather than audits to provide oversight coverage, resulting in gaps to the audit oversight of the department. GAO also reported that inspections performed by the OIG's Office of Information Technology (IT) were not part of an internal quality review process, and that the State OIG and the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) lacked an agreement to coordinate their investigative activities. The State OIG implemented two of GAO's five recommendations and has actions under way related to the remaining three. Specifically, the OIG now includes IT-related inspections in its internal quality-review process and has completed an agreement to coordinate investigations with DS. Also, the OIG is implementing a change to the succession planning for acting IG positions to exclude Foreign Service officers and is in the process of increasing the level of audit coverage through the distribution of staff and audit planning. In addition, the State OIG continues to assign Foreign Service officers at the ambassador level as team leaders for inspections, however, four of the six officers are rehired annuitants unlikely to rotate to State Department Foreign Service positions. GAO remains concerned, however, about the OIG's use of Foreign Service officers and the State Department's need to rely on acting IGs for extended periods of time. GAO continues to reaffirm its recommendations, and encourages the State OIG, with the assistance of the Secretary, to fully address these recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the OIG's oversight of the State Department's programs and operations. In the 2007 report, GAO recommended that the IG work with the Secretary of State to address two recommendations regarding concerns about the State OIG's independence, and to reassess the mix of audits and inspections to help provide effective audit coverage of the department. In addition, GAO recommended that the IG include inspections performed by the OIG's Office of Information Technology in its internal quality review process and that it work with the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) on an agreement to coordinate their investigative efforts.
gao_GAO-05-806	gao_GAO-05-806_0	College Textbook Prices Have Grown at Twice the Rate of Inflation, Trailing Annual Tuition Increases College textbook prices have risen at double the rate of inflation for the last two decades but have followed the trend of tuition increases at postsecondary institutions. Meanwhile, tuition and fees have increased at an average of 7 percent per academic year during the same period, while overall price increases averaged 3 percent per academic year. Overall price inflation was 72 percent during the same time period. While increases in textbook prices have not followed far behind hikes in college tuition and fees, the cost of textbooks and supplies as a percentage of tuition and fees varies for degree-seeking students attending different types of institutions. According to data from Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, first-time, full-time students attending 4-year private, nonprofit colleges were estimated to spend $850 for books and supplies in their first year, or 8 percent of the cost of tuition and fees during academic year 2003-2004, as shown in figure 3. Publisher Investments in New Products Have Contributed to Increases in Textbook Prices While publishers, retailers, and wholesalers all play a role in textbook pricing, the primary factor contributing to increases in the price of textbooks has been the increased investment publishers have made in new products to enhance instruction and learning according to industry executives we interviewed. Wholesalers, Retailers, and Others Express Concern That Some Publisher Practices May Unnecessarily Increase Costs to Students Wholesalers, retailers, and some public interest groups acknowledge that publishers are making substantial investments to develop textbooks and supplementary materials, but they have expressed concern about the impact some publisher practices may have on student costs. The Price of U.S. Textbooks Sold in Other Countries Varies according to Local Market Conditions College textbook prices in the United States may exceed prices in other countries because textbook publishers assign prices that reflect the market conditions found in each country. Publishers Have Taken Recent Steps to Limit the Reentry of Their Textbooks into the U.S. Market Retailers and publishers have expressed concern about the reimportation of lower-priced textbooks from international locations. Agency Comments We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of Labor and the Department of Education for review and comment. NACS generally agreed with our findings, stating that the report accurately portrayed the textbook industry. AAP agreed with some findings in the report but expressed concern with respect to the data sources we used in our analyses and the tone and objectivity of the report. We use IPEDS data because they are the most complete data available on estimated student spending. On the basis of these reviews and tests, we found the data sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To determine what factors have contributed to the change in college textbook prices, we interviewed executives from five of the largest textbook publishers, representing more than 80 percent of new textbook sales; the three national used textbook wholesalers; three companies that operate over 1,300 college textbook retail stores, or 29 percent of stores nationwide; the National Association of College Stores; the Association of American Publishers; and various other industry experts.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal government strives to make postsecondary education accessible and affordable, primarily by providing financial aid to students and their families. Given that nearly half of undergraduates receive federal financial aid, Congress is interested in the overall cost of attendance, including the cost of textbooks. We were asked to determine (1) what has been the change in textbook prices, (2) what factors have contributed to changes in textbook prices, and (3) what factors explain why a given U.S. textbook may retail outside the United States for a different price. We received technical comments from the Department of Labor. The Department of Education had no comments. The National Association of College Stores generally agreed with the report's findings. The Association of American Publishers agreed with some findings but expressed concern about the data sources we used and the characterizations made by retailers and wholesalers regarding the impact of publisher practices on students. We carefully reviewed the data sources available on college textbook pricing and found the data we used to be the most complete and reliable data available for our purposes. Additionally, we sought perspectives from publishers, retailers, and used book wholesalers to ensure our characterization of the textbook industry was balanced and complete. What GAO Found In the last two decades, college textbook prices have increased at twice the rate of inflation but have followed close behind tuition increases. Increasing at an average of 6 percent per year, textbook prices nearly tripled from December 1986 to December 2004, while tuition and fees increased by 240 percent and overall inflation was 72 percent. The cost of textbooks as well as supplies as a percentage of tuition and fees varies for first-time, full-time, degree-seeking students by the type of institution attended--72 percent at 2-year public institutions, 26 percent at 4-year public institutions, and 8 percent for 4-year private institutions. While many factors affect textbook pricing, the increasing costs associated with developing products designed to accompany textbooks, such as CD-ROMs and other instructional supplements, best explain price increases in recent years. Publishers say they have increased investments in developing supplements in response to demand from instructors. Wholesalers, retailers, and others expressed concern that the proliferation of supplements and more frequent revisions might unnecessarily increase costs to students. U.S. college textbook prices may exceed prices in other countries because prices reflect market conditions found in each country, such as the willingness and ability of students to purchase the textbook. While geographical barriers have historically limited the reentry of textbooks intended for international distribution back into the United States, known as reimportation, recent advances in electronic commerce have broken down this barrier. In response to concerns that the international availability of less expensive textbooks might negatively affect textbook sales, publishers have taken steps to limit large-scale textbook reimportation.
gao_NSIAD-96-31	gao_NSIAD-96-31_0	The depot maintenance specification for the F/A-18 is called the Modification, Corrosion, and Paint Program (MCAPP) and consists of inspections to identify needed repairs, the actual repairs, and the incorporation of needed aircraft modifications. Fourth, there are differences in the amount of work required on each aircraft. The Navy made three adjustments to the Ogden average. Other Cost Considerations When F/A-18 Workload Is Dual-Cited Although the Navy’s decision to move F/A-18 MCAPP work from Ogden to North Island was based primarily on the cost and schedule differences discussed above, the Navy analysis also noted other costs associated with having MCAPP work performed at two locations. Comparison of Costs Using Current Information We performed a separate analysis comparing estimated costs for performing MCAPP work at Ogden and North Island using (1) the most current data available at the time of our review in March 1995, (2) actual labor hours expended by Ogden and North Island for completed MCAPPs for carrier-based F/A-18s, and (3) actual rates at Ogden and North Island based on actual costs for completed F/A-18 MCAPPs. Our review indicated that DOD has not developed guidance implementing the legislation that specifically defines the steps, processes, and analyses required for merit-based selection. Other Air Logistics Centers and Naval Aviation Depots routinely provide depot-level maintenance on several other types of fighter and attack aircraft.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's decision to move F/A-18 depot maintenance work from the Ogden Air Logistics Center to the North Island Naval Aviation Depot, focusing on the cost and performance indicators used to justify the move of F/A-18 repair activities from Ogden to North Island. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) it is difficult to compare F/A-18 modification, corrosion, and paint program cost and performance data at North Island and Ogden because the Navy does not use the most current information when making adjustments for the amount of work completed at each depot; (2) based on its analysis, Ogden's maintenance costs are slightly lower, but the Department of Defense's (DOD) decision to retain F/A-18 repair capability at North Island is more cost-effective for workload consolidation efforts; and (3) DOD needs to define the steps, processes, analyses, and validation procedures for its future depot-maintenance decisions.
gao_GAO-15-426	gao_GAO-15-426_0	FDIC Had Developed and Documented Many Controls to Secure Its Financial Information and Systems, but Improvements Are Still Needed Although FDIC developed and implemented elements of its information security program, the corporation did not always implement key program activities. Additionally, FDIC has designed and documented numerous information security controls intended to protect its key financial systems; however, shortcomings existed in the implementation of other information security controls. By mitigating known information security weaknesses and ensuring that information security controls are consistently applied, FDIC could continue to reduce risks and better protect its sensitive financial information and resources from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems. Specifically, during 2014, FDIC implemented 27 of the 36 recommendations pertaining to unaddressed security weaknesses that we previously reported, and actions to correct or mitigate the remaining 9 weaknesses were in progress. However, although FDIC had a policy on controlling physical access to its primary data center, the corporation did not recertify access to its backup data center because the policy did not apply to all FDIC data centers. The Office also reported that FDIC has taken steps to improve its remedial action processes by creating a strategy outlining planned actions to address weaknesses in the corporation’s plan of action and milestones processes. Although FDIC had implemented numerous controls in these areas, weaknesses continue to challenge the corporation in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems. In addition, FDIC did not always effectively monitor server security logs. Although we do not consider these weaknesses individually or collectively to be either a material weakness or a significant deficiency for financial reporting purposes, we are nevertheless making five recommendations in a separate product with limited distribution for FDIC to address new weaknesses we identified in this review. Until FDIC takes further steps to mitigate these weaknesses, the corporation’s sensitive financial information and resources will remain unnecessarily exposed to increased risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology The objective of this information security review was to determine the effectiveness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. The review was conducted as part of our audit of the FDIC financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund. To determine whether controls over key financial systems and information were effective, we considered the results FDIC’s actions to mitigate previously reported weaknesses that remained open as of December 31, 2013, and performed audit work at FDIC facilities in Arlington, Virginia.	Why GAO Did This Study FDIC has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. Because of the importance of FDIC's work, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the corporation's systems and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audits of the 2014 financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund administered by FDIC, GAO assessed the effectiveness of the corporation's controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. To do so, GAO examined security policies, procedures, reports, and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed FDIC personnel. What GAO Found The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has implemented numerous information security controls intended to protect its key financial systems; nevertheless, weaknesses remain that place the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial systems and information at risk. During 2014, the corporation implemented 27 of the 36 GAO recommendations pertaining to previously reported security weaknesses that were unaddressed as of December 31, 2013; actions to implement the remaining 9 recommendations were in progress. The table below details the status of these recommendations. Although FDIC developed and implemented elements of its information security program, shortcomings remain in key program activities. For example: FDIC had taken steps to improve its security policies and procedures, but important activities were not always required by its policies. For example, although FDIC had a policy on controlling physical access to its primary data center, the policy did not apply to all FDIC data centers. FDIC did not consistently remediate agency-identified weaknesses in a timely manner. However, to its credit, the corporation created a strategy outlining planned actions to address weaknesses in its remedial action processes. Additionally, FDIC has designed and documented numerous information security controls intended to protect its key financial systems; nevertheless, controls were not always consistently implemented. For example, the corporation had not always (1) ensured that passwords for a financial application complied with FDIC policy for password length or (2) centrally collected audit logs on certain servers. These weaknesses individually or collectively do not constitute either a material weakness or a significant deficiency for financial reporting purposes. Nonetheless, by mitigating known information security weaknesses and consistently applying information security controls, FDIC could continue to reduce risks and better protect its sensitive financial information and resources from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction. What GAO Recommends GAO is making two recommendations to FDIC to improve its implementation of its information security program. FDIC concurred with GAO's recommendations. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending that FDIC take five specific actions to address weaknesses in security controls.
gao_GAO-14-865T	gao_GAO-14-865T_0	DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D, but Has Taken Some Steps to Update Guidance In September 2012, we found that DHS did not know how much its components have invested in R&D, making it difficult to oversee R&D efforts across the department. According to DHS budget officials, S&T, DNDO, and the U.S. Coast Guard were the only components that conducted R&D, and we found that they were the only components that reported budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to OMB as part of the budget process. Specifically, for fiscal year 2011, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. We also reported in September 2012 that DHS did not have a department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report R&D activities. As of September 2014, DHS has updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D, but, as discussed in more detail below, efforts to develop a specific policy outlining R&D roles and responsibilities and a process for overseeing and coordinating R&D with other offices remain ongoing and have not yet been completed. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to implement these recommendations. S&T Has Taken Some Actions to Coordinate R&D across DHS, but R&D Activities Are Fragmented and Overlapping We reported in September 2012 that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides S&T with the responsibility for, among other things, coordinating and integrating all research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities within DHS and establishing and administering the primary R&D activities of the department. While we did not identify instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, in September 2012, we found that DHS had not developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication and did not have tracking mechanisms or policies to help ensure that overlap is avoided and efforts are better coordinated consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. According to S&T, the Office of National Laboratories’ ability to provide information on activities across the department is limited by components inconsistently operating within the defined process for working with the national laboratories. As a result, we recommended that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for overseeing R&D that includes, among other things, a description of the department’s process and roles and responsibilities for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and efforts, and a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated costs across the department. According to DHS officials, the department implemented an R&D portfolio review process, as directed by committee reports accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS appropriations act, which is aimed at better coordinating R&D activities by reviewing components’ individual R&D projects. Furthermore, to better define and manage R&D across the department, DHS should also establish a mechanism to track R&D projects and costs, as we recommended. Fully implementing our recommendation to develop a policy that defines roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and coordination processes, as well as a mechanism that tracks all DHS R&D projects, could better position DHS to mitigate the risk of overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative R&D projects. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to develop a policy to better coordinate and track R&D activities at the department. S&T Has Taken Steps to Obtain Feedback and Evaluate the Impact of Its Border and Maritime R&D Efforts Costs and Types of Completed Border and Maritime R&D Projects Varied In September 2013, we reported that DHS S&T, Coast Guard, and DNDO reported producing 97 R&D deliverables at an estimated cost of $177 million between fiscal years 2010 and 2012. The type of border and maritime R&D deliverables produced by these R&D entities were wide ranging in their cost and scale, and included knowledge products and reports, technology prototypes, and software. At the time of our report, S&T had not established time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers on the extent to which the deliverables it provides were meeting its customers’ needs. As a result, we recommended that S&T establish time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers to determine the usefulness and impact of both its R&D projects and project deliverables, and use it to make better-informed decisions regarding future work. S&T officials concurred with the recommendation at the time of our review, and reported that S&T was developing R&D strategies with DHS components that would include strategic assessments of components’ R&D needs and be updated annually on the basis of customer feedback. As of September 2014, S&T has completed strategic plans with Border Patrol, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Secret Service. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts in this area.	Why GAO Did This Study Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. Since its creation, DHS has spent billions of dollars researching and developing technologies used to support its missions. Within DHS, S&T conducts and is responsible for coordinating R&D across the department. Other components also conduct R&D to support their respective missions. This statement discusses (1) how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which DHS has policies and guidance for defining and overseeing its R&D efforts across the department, (2) the extent to which R&D is coordinated across DHS, and (3) the results of DHS border and maritime security R&D efforts and the extent to which DHS has obtained and evaluated feedback on these efforts. This statement is based on GAO's previously issued work from September 2012 to July 2014, and selected updates conducted in September 2014 on the status of GAO's prior recommendations. To conduct the updates, GAO reviewed agency documentation. What GAO Found In September 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not know the total amount its components had invested in research and development (R&D) and did not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the department. According to DHS, its Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Coast Guard were the only components that conducted R&D, and GAO found that these were the only components that reported budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations made by other DHS components. At the time of GAO's review, DHS did not have a department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report all R&D activities. GAO recommended that DHS develop policies and guidance to assist components in better understanding how to report R&D activities and better position DHS to determine R&D investments. DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of September 2014, had updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D but efforts to develop a process for coordinating R&D with other offices remain ongoing and have not yet been completed. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts to develop its approach for overseeing R&D at the department. GAO also reported in September 2012 that S&T had taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the department's R&D efforts were fragmented and overlapping, a fact that increased the risk of unnecessary duplication. GAO recommended that DHS develop a policy defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and establish a mechanism to track all R&D projects to help DHS mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication. DHS concurred with the recommendation. As of September 2014, S&T has not fully implemented new policy guidance but, according to S&T, is conducting portfolio reviews across the department, as directed by the fiscal year 2013 appropriations act, aimed at coordinating R&D activities. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts to develop a policy to better coordinate and track R&D activities at the department. In September 2013, GAO reported that DHS border and maritime R&D components reported producing 97 R&D deliverables from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 at an estimated cost of $177 million. GAO found that the type of border and maritime R&D deliverables produced by S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO varied, and R&D customers GAO met with had mixed views on the impact of the deliverables. These deliverables included knowledge products and reports, technology prototypes, and software. For example, S&T developed prototype radar and video systems for use by Border Patrol. However, GAO reported that S&T had not established time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback on the extent to which deliverables met customers' needs. GAO recommended that S&T establish time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating such feedback from its customers to better determine the usefulness and impact of its R&D projects and make better-informed decisions regarding future work. As of September 2014, DHS had taken steps to address this recommendation, including making plans to gather customer feedback on a more consistent basis. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in this area. What GAO Recommends In its prior reports, GAO recommended, among other things, that DHS develop policies and guidance for defining, overseeing, coordinating, and tracking R&D activities across the department, and that S&T establish time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and has actions underway to address them.
gao_RCED-95-59	gao_RCED-95-59_0	In reauthorizing the SBIR program, the Congress added a new feature to the program. We focused on the issue of duplicate funding of similar proposals because of several recent occurrences. These data provided additional evidence of the quality of research proposals and competitiveness of the program. Quality Research Proposals Kept Pace With Initial Program Expansion Although it is too early to make a conclusive judgment about the effect of funding increases on the quality of SBIR research proposals that received awards, the high level of competition and the large numbers of worthy but unfunded projects suggest that quality research proposals kept pace with the program’s initial expansion. Agencies Have Not Implemented the Provision for Discretionary Technical Assistance but Have Taken Other Steps to Foster Commercialization None of the five major agencies have implemented the 1992 discretionary technical assistance provision, and future implementation remains uncertain. Duplicate Funding of Research Has Become a Problem Duplicate funding of similar proposals submitted to more than one agency has become a problem. According to agency officials, a few companies received funding for the same proposals twice, three times, and even five times before agencies became aware of the duplication. Lack of Current Information Contributes to the Problem The lack of interagency access to and exchange of current information about SBIR awards contributes to the problem of duplicate funding.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, focusing on: (1) whether the quality of research proposals has kept pace with the program's expansion; (2) the implementation of a provision for technical assistance to agencies; and (3) the duplicate funding of similar research projects. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the quality of research proposals has kept pace with the program's expansion; (2) it is too early to make a conclusive judgment about the long-term quality of research proposals because major increases in program funding have not yet occurred; (3) none of the five major agencies taking part in the SBIR program have implemented the discretionary provision for technical assistance to agencies and future implementation remains uncertain; (4) these agencies have taken steps to provide assistance with the commercialization of research results; (5) duplicate funding of similar research projects has become a problem due to the increasing numbers of research proposals submitted to the SBIR program; (6) a few companies received funding for the same proposals on more than one occasion before the agencies became aware of the duplication; and (7) duplicate funding occurs due to the evasion of certification procedures, lack of consensus on what constitutes a duplicate proposal, and the general lack of current information on recent SBIR awards.
gao_GAO-16-468	gao_GAO-16-468_0	Cloud computing strategy. IT Shared Services Strategy. Three of the agencies agreed with our recommendations; two partially agreed; and two agencies had no comments. Specifically, data from the IT Dashboard shows that, in 2015, 5,233 of the government’s nearly 7,000 investments were spending all of their funds on O&M activities. Spending on O&M Has Increased over 7 Years Over the past 7 fiscal years, O&M spending has increased, while the amount invested in developing new systems has decreased by about $7.3 billion since fiscal year 2010. Additionally, OMB has not identified an associated goal with its non- provisioned IT measure that is part of PortfolioStat process. Until OMB develops a specific goal associated with measuring non- provisioned services, OMB and agencies will be limited in their ability to evaluate progress that has been made and whether or not they are achieving their goals to increase the amount spent on development activities and provisioned IT services. Several O&M investments were rated as moderate to high risk in fiscal year 2015. IT Investments Are Becoming Obsolete and Agencies Are Not Required to Identify Investments That Need Attention Legacy IT investments across the federal government are becoming increasingly obsolete. Specifically, many use outdated languages and old parts. In addition, some legacy systems may use parts that are obsolete and more difficult to find. For instance, Defense is still using 8-inch floppy disks in a legacy system that coordinates the operational functions of the United States’ nuclear forces. For example, Treasury reported systems that were about 56 years old. Agencies reported having plans to modernize or replace each of these investments and systems. Conclusions Of the more than $80 billion that the 26 agencies reported spending for federal IT in fiscal year 2015, the agencies spent about $61 billion on O&M. Further, agencies did not consistently perform required analysis on at-risk investments. Until agencies fully review at-risk O&M investments, the government’s oversight of such investments will be impaired and its spending could be wasteful. Several aging investments are using unsupported components, many of which did not have specific plans for modernization or replacement. This is contrary to OMB’s draft initiative, which calls for agencies to analyze and review O&M investments. Until this policy is finalized and implemented, the federal government runs the risk of continuing to maintain investments that have outlived their effectiveness and are consuming resources that outweigh their benefits. Further, to address obsolete IT investments in need of modernization or replacement, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, the Treasury, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Attorney General; and the Commissioner of Social Security direct their respective agency CIOs to identify and plan to modernize or replace legacy systems as needed and consistent with OMB’s draft guidance, including time frames, activities to be performed, and functions to be replaced or enhanced. Energy’s plan to consider OMB’s guidance when it is finalized is consistent with the intent of our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which federal agencies have invested in operating and maintaining existing information technology (IT), (2) evaluate the oversight of at-risk legacy investments, and (3) assess the age and obsolescence of federal IT. For our first objective, our review included the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 26 agencies that report to OMB’s IT Dashboard. For all three objectives, to identify specific reasons for changes in spending and specific information on individual systems or investments, we focused on the 12 agencies with the highest planned IT spending for fiscal year 2015, given that these agencies make up over 90 percent of reported federal IT spending: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Transportation, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Social Security Administration. To assess the extent to which federal agencies have invested in operating and maintaining existing IT, we reviewed data reported to OMB as part of the budget process to determine operations and maintenance (O&M) spending for fiscal years 2010 through 2017.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal government invests more than $80 billion on IT annually, with much of this amount reportedly spent on operating and maintaining existing (legacy) IT systems. Given the magnitude of these investments, it is important that agencies effectively manage their O&M. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess federal agencies' IT O&M spending, (2) evaluate the oversight of at-risk legacy investments, and (3) assess the age and obsolescence of federal IT. To do so, GAO reviewed OMB and 26 agencies' IT O&M spending for fiscal years 2010 through 2017. GAO further reviewed the 12 agencies that reported the highest planned IT spending for fiscal year 2015 to provide specifics on agency spending and individual investments. What GAO Found The federal government spent about 75 percent of the total amount budgeted for information technology (IT) for fiscal year 2015 on operations and maintenance (O&M) investments. Such spending has increased over the past 7 fiscal years, which has resulted in a $7.3 billion decline from fiscal years 2010 to 2017 in development, modernization, and enhancement activities. Specifically, 5,233 of the government's approximately 7,000 IT investments are spending all of their funds on O&M activities. Moreover, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has directed agencies to identify IT O&M expenditures known as non-provisioned services that do not use solutions often viewed as more efficient, such as cloud computing and shared services. Agencies reported planned spending of nearly $55 billion on such non-provisioned IT in fiscal year 2015. OMB has developed a metric for agencies to measure their spending on services such as cloud computing and shared services, but has not identified an associated goal. Thus, agencies may be limited in their ability to evaluate progress. Many O&M investments in GAO's review were identified as moderate to high risk by agency CIOs, and agencies did not consistently perform required analysis of these at-risk investments. Further, several of the at-risk investments did not have plans to be retired or modernized. Until agencies fully review their at-risk investments, the government's oversight of such investments will be limited and its spending could be wasteful. Federal legacy IT investments are becoming increasingly obsolete: many use outdated software languages and hardware parts that are unsupported. Agencies reported using several systems that have components that are, in some cases, at least 50 years old. For example, Department of Defense uses 8-inch floppy disks in a legacy system that coordinates the operational functions of the nation's nuclear forces. In addition, Department of the Treasury uses assembly language code—a computer language initially used in the 1950s and typically tied to the hardware for which it was developed. OMB recently began an initiative to modernize, retire, and replace the federal government's legacy IT systems. As part of this, OMB drafted guidance requiring agencies to identify, prioritize, and plan to modernize legacy systems. However, until this policy is finalized and fully executed, the government runs the risk of maintaining systems that have outlived their effectiveness. The following table provides examples of legacy systems across the federal government that agencies report are 30 years or older and use obsolete software or hardware, and identifies those that do not have specific plans with time frames to modernize or replace these investments. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 16 recommendations, one of which is for OMB to develop a goal for its spending measure and finalize draft guidance to identify and prioritize legacy IT needing to be modernized or replaced. GAO is also recommending that selected agencies address at-risk and obsolete legacy O&M investments. Nine agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations, two agencies partially agreed, and two agencies stated they had no comment. The two agencies that partially agreed, Defense and Energy, outlined plans that were consistent with the intent of our recommendations.
gao_GAO-12-38	gao_GAO-12-38_0	In August 2010, Congress extended the increased FMAP provided by the Recovery Act by providing states with an additional $16.1 billion in assistance from January through June 2011. The prototype formula we outlined in our March 2011 report provides a more targeted approach than the increased FMAP formula used in the Recovery Act. Prototype FMAP Formula Offers Automatic, Timely, and Targeted Assistance In response to the mandate, our prototype formula offers an automatic, timely, and targeted option for providing states temporary assistance during national economic downturns. Once a threshold number of states show a sustained decrease in their employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio, temporary increases to states’ FMAPs would be triggered automatically and targeted to each state’s Medicaid program. The prototype formula would end the temporary assistance once fewer than the threshold number of states shows a decline in their EPOP ratio over 2 consecutive months. Prototype Formula Automatically Triggers Targeted Assistance to States Our prototype formula uses the monthly EPOP ratio and a threshold number of states to identify the start of a national economic downturn, and to automatically trigger the start of the increased FMAP assistance. Once the increased FMAP is triggered, targeted state assistance would be calculated based on (1) increases in state unemployment, as a proxy for increased Medicaid enrollment; and (2) reductions in total wages and salaries, as a proxy for decreased revenues for maintaining state Medicaid programs. Because our prototype formula relies on readily available labor market data to automatically trigger the beginning and end of the increased FMAP, assistance would have begun earlier and extended longer than that provided by the Recovery Act during the most recent national recession. Similarly, targeting assistance based on each state’s level of need ensures that federal assistance is aligned with the magnitude of the economic downturn’s effects on individual states. Matter for Congressional Consideration To ensure that federal funding efficiently and effectively responds to the countercyclical nature of the Medicaid program, Congress could consider enacting an FMAP formula that is targeted for variable state Medicaid needs and provides automatic, timely, and temporary increased FMAP assistance in response to national economic downturns. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report for review to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS on behalf of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) provided written comments on the draft, which are reprinted in appendix V. CMS officials stated that they agreed with the analysis and goals of the report, and they emphasized the importance of aligning changes to the FMAP formula as closely as possible to individual state circumstances in order to avoid unintended consequences for beneficiaries and to provide budget planning stability for states. In their comments, ASPE officials also offered several considerations to guide policy choices regarding appropriate thresholds for timing and targeting of funds. Our prototype formula relies on changes in the employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio to identify the start of a national economic downturn, and to provide a trigger for a targeted temporary increase in states’ Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). Appendix III: The Recovery Act’s Across-the- board and Hold-harmless Provisions Were Not Targeted for States’ Medicaid Needs The across-the-board and hold-harmless provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) did not provide a needs-based method for targeting Medicaid assistance to states during an economic downturn.	Why GAO Did This Study In response to the recession of 2007, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Recovery Act funds provided states with fiscal relief and helped to maintain state Medicaid programs through a temporary increase to the federal share of Medicaid funding-the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP)-from October 2008 through December 2010. In March 2011, GAO reported that states' ability to fund Medicaid was hampered due to increased Medicaid enrollment and declines in states' revenues that typically occur during a national downturn. The Recovery Act mandated that GAO provide recommendations for modifying the increased FMAP formula to make it more responsive to state Medicaid program needs during future economic downturns. In this report, GAO presents a prototype formula for a temporary increased FMAP and evaluates its effects on the allocation of assistance to states. To evaluate the three components of the prototype formula--starting assistance, targeting assistance, and ending assistance-- GAO uses the 2007 recession. What GAO Found GAO's prototype formula offers a timely and targeted option for providing states temporary Medicaid assistance during a national economic downturn. Once a threshold number of states--26 in GAO's prototype formula--show a sustained decrease in their employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio, temporary increases to states' FMAPs would be triggered automatically. The EPOP ratio compares the number of employed persons in a state to the working age population aged 16 and older. This assistance would end when fewer than the threshold number of states shows a decline in their EPOP ratio. Because the prototype formula relies on labor market data as an automatic trigger rather than legislative action, assistance would have begun earlier and extended longer than the assistance provided by the Recovery Act. The prototype formula would have triggered assistance to begin in January 2008 and end in September 2011, compared with the Recovery Act which provided an increased FMAP from October 2008 through June 2011. Once the increased FMAP is triggered, targeted state assistance would be calculated based on two components: (1) increases in unemployment, as a proxy for changes in Medicaid enrollment; and (2) reductions in total wages and salaries, as a proxy for changes in states' revenues. GAO's prototype formula provides a baseline of funding for state Medicaid needs during an economic downturn by offering automatic, timely, and targeted assistance to states. Such assistance would facilitate state budget planning, provide states with greater fiscal stability, and better align federal assistance with the magnitude of the economic downturn's effects on individual states. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agreed with the analysis and goals of the report and emphasized the importance of aligning changes to the FMAP formula with individual state circumstances. HHS noted the complexity of the prototype formula and offered several considerations to guide policy choices regarding appropriate thresholds for timing and targeting of increased FMAP funds. To ensure that federal funding efficiently and effectively responds to the countercyclical nature of the Medicaid program, Congress could consider enacting an increased FMAP formula that targets variable state Medicaid needs and provides automatic, timely, and temporary assistance in response to national economic downturns.
gao_GAO-13-220	gao_GAO-13-220_0	After determining the amount of VA’s appropriations, Congress provides VA resources for health care through three accounts: Medical Services, which funds health care services provided to eligible veterans and beneficiaries in VA’s medical centers, outpatient clinic facilities, contract hospitals, state homes, and outpatient programs on a fee basis; Medical Facilities, which funds the operation and maintenance of the VA health care system’s capital infrastructure, including costs associated with NRM and non-NRM activities, such as utilities, facility repair, laundry services, and grounds keeping; and Medical Support and Compliance, which funds the management and administration of the VA health care system, including financial management, human resources, and logistics. VA allocates about 80 percent of the health care appropriations to its 21 health care networks through VERA. In June 2012, we reported that VA’s NRM spending has consistently exceeded the estimates reported in VA’s budget justifications from fiscal years 2006 to 2011. Availability of Higher Than Estimated Resources Accounted for NRM Spending That Exceeded Budget Estimates Our analysis of data for fiscal years 2006 through 2012 found that in each of these years VA had higher than estimated resources available in its Medical Facilities account, which VA used to increase NRM spending by about $4.9 billion. These resources derived from two sources: (1) lower than estimated non-NRM spending, which made more resources available for NRM, and (2) higher than estimated budget resources, which included annual appropriations, supplemental appropriations, reimbursements, transfers, and unobligated balances. As figure 2 shows, after fiscal year 2008, lower than estimated spending on non- NRM activities accounted for most of VA’s spending on NRM that exceeded VA’s budget estimates. VA spent fewer resources from the Medical Facilities account on non-NRM activities than it estimated, which allowed the agency to spend over $2.5 billion more on NRM than it originally estimated in fiscal years 2009 through 2012. Higher than estimated budget resources. For example, in fiscal year 2009 VA received $300 million more than it requested in annual appropriations as well as $1 billion in supplemental appropriations included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). VA Used VERA to Allocate Most NRM Resources at the Start of a Fiscal Year and Network Requests to Allocate Additional NRM Resources Later VA used VERA to perform an initial allocation of resources for NRM at the beginning of each fiscal year for fiscal years 2006 through 2012, allocating a total of about $4.6 billion over this time frame. In addition, for fiscal years 2009 through 2012, VA allocated $2.9 billion in total for NRM from higher than requested appropriations and its reserve account. In anticipation of the availability of such resources, networks typically identify in advance projects that can be implemented if additional funds become available, according to VA officials. Officials explained further that the networks do this to better address the NRM backlog. VA Relied on Networks to Prioritize NRM Spending before Centralizing Prioritization Recently for More Costly Projects, and Spending Was Generally Consistent with Priorities VA relied on its networks to prioritize all NRM spending until centralizing this process for more costly projects in fiscal year 2012. NRM projects VA funded were generally consistent with VA priorities. VA Relied on Networks to Prioritize NRM Spending before Centralizing This Process for More Costly Projects in Fiscal Year 2012 For fiscal years 2006 through 2011, VA relied on its networks to prioritize projects for NRM spending. Specifically, VA headquarters assumed responsibility for prioritizing these NRM projects as part of VA’s newly established Strategic Capital Investment Planning process, known as SCIP. Under SCIP, VA prioritizes NRM projects based on the extent to which they meet the following six criteria: For fiscal year 2012, the 1. improve the safety and security of VA facilities by mitigating potential damage to buildings facing the risk of damage from natural disaster, improving compliance with safety and security laws and regulations, and ensuring that VA can provide service in the wake of a catastrophic event; 2. address selected key major initiatives and supporting initiatives identified in VA’s strategic plan;3. address existing deficiencies in its facilities that negatively affect the delivery of services and benefits to veterans; 4. reduce the time and distance a veteran has to travel to receive services and benefits, increase the number of veterans utilizing VA’s services, and improve the services provided; 5. right-size VA’s inventory by building new space, converting underutilized space, or reducing excess space; and 6. ensure cost-effectiveness and the reduction of operating costs for new capital investments. Further, our work shows that spending for administrative functions, utilities, and rent accounted for most of the lower than estimated non-NRM spending in recent years. However, VA does not have reasonable assurance that spending on NRM will be consistent with criteria included in SCIP. Our work shows that while networks remain responsible for prioritizing below- threshold NRM projects, VA has not provided its networks with written policies for prioritizing these less costly NRM projects. Recommendations for Executive Action We recommend the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following actions: to improve the reliability of information presented in VA’s congressional budget justifications that support the President’s budget request for VA health care, determine why recent justifications have overestimated spending for non-NRM activities and incorporate the results to improve future budget estimates for such activities; and to provide reasonable assurance that VA’s networks prioritize NRM spending consistent with VA’s overall NRM priorities, establish written policies for its networks for applying SCIP criteria when prioritizing the funding of NRM projects that are below the threshold for inclusion in VA’s centralized prioritization process.	Why GAO Did This Study VA operates about 1,000 medical facilities--such as hospitals and outpatient clinics--that provide services to more than 6 million patients annually. The operation and maintenance of its facilities, including NRM, is funded from VA's Medical Facilities appropriations account, one of three accounts through which Congress provides resources for VA health care services. In prior work, GAO found that VA's spending on NRM has consistently exceeded its estimates. GAO recommended that VA ensure that its NRM estimates fully account for this long-standing pattern, and VA agreed to implement this recommendation. GAO was asked to conduct additional work on NRM spending. In this report, GAO examines, for fiscal years 2006 through 2012, (1) what accounted for the pattern of NRM spending exceeding VA's budget estimates; (2) VA's allocation of resources for NRM to its health care networks; and (3) VA's process for prioritizing NRM spending and the extent to which NRM spending was consistent with these priorities. GAO reviewed VA's budget justifications and VA data and interviewed officials from headquarters and selected networks. What GAO Found During fiscal years 2006 through 2012, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) had higher than estimated resources available for facility maintenance and improvement--referred to as non-recurring maintenance (NRM); these resources accounted for the $4.9 billion in VA's NRM spending that exceeded budget estimates. The additional resources came from two sources. First, VA spent less than it estimated on non-NRM, facility-related activities such as administrative functions, utilities, and rent, which allowed VA to spend over $2.5 billion more than originally estimated. Lower spending for administrative functions, utilities, and rent accounted for most of the resources estimated but not spent on non-NRM activities. Given that VA has consistently overestimated the costs of such activities in recent years, VA's budget estimates for its non-NRM activities may not be reliable. Second, more than $2.3 billion of the higher than estimated spending on NRM can be attributed to VA having higher than estimated budget resources available. In some years VA received higher appropriations from Congress than requested and supplemental appropriations for NRM--such as those included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The additional budget resources VA used for NRM also included transfers of funds from the agency's appropriations account that funds health care services. VA allocated about $7.5 billion in resources for NRM to its 21 health care networks from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2012. VA allocated about $4.6 billion of these resources at the beginning of each fiscal year through the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation--its national, formula-driven system. In addition, VA allocated $2.9 billion during this period from higher than requested annual appropriations and its national reserve account, which is maintained to address contingencies that may develop each fiscal year. In anticipation of such resources, networks typically identify projects that can be implemented if additional funds become available. VA officials told us that they do this to better address the backlog of identified building deficiencies most recently estimated to cost over $9 billion. To prioritize NRM spending more centrally, VA established a new process for projects above a minimum threshold, and from fiscal years 2006 through 2012 spending on NRM was generally consistent with VA priorities. Prior to fiscal year 2012, VA provided oral guidance to networks for prioritizing NRM spending and relied on its 21 health care networks to prioritize NRM projects to maintain medical facilities in good working condition and address deficiencies. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, as part of VA's Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) process, VA headquarters assumed responsibility for prioritizing more costly NRM projects using a set of weighted criteria. For fiscal year 2012, the threshold for NRM projects to be included in this centralized process was $1 million, while networks remain responsible for prioritizing "below-threshold" NRM projects. NRM spending during fiscal years 2006 through 2012 was generally consistent with VA priorities: at least 85 percent of the projects funded in each year were identified by networks as priorities. However, VA has not provided written policies for networks on how to apply SCIP criteria to below-threshold projects, which represented over 40 percent of VA's fiscal year 2012 NRM spending. Without such written policies, VA does not have reasonable assurance that network spending for below-threshold NRM projects will be consistent with SCIP criteria. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that VA determine why it has overestimated spending for non-NRM and use the results to improve future, non-NRM budget estimates. GAO also recommends that VA provide networks with written guidance for prioritizing below-threshold NRM projects. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-10-519	gao_GAO-10-519_0	Schools Provide Students with and without Disabilities Similar Opportunities in PE, but Face Challenges Serving Students in General PE Classes Schools Provide Similar Opportunities in PE to Students with and without Disabilities Students with disabilities generally attend PE class about the same amount of time as students without disabilities, according to national data and our site visits. Schools Cited Teacher Preparation and Budget Constraints as Key Challenges to Serving Students with Disabilities in General PE Classes A notable challenge to serving students with disabilities in general PE classes is the lack of sufficient training or experience among PE or classroom teachers, according to our interviews and other research. Many state, district, and school officials we interviewed said that PE teachers typically take one course on working with students with disabilities in their undergraduate training. Some state, district, and school officials we interviewed said teachers who teach general PE need more training opportunities regarding students with disabilities, yet resources for training are not always available. Some Students with Disabilities Participate in Extracurricular Athletics through Different Types of School Teams, but Schools Face Challenges Expanding These Opportunities Limited Data Suggest That Some Students with Disabilities Participate in School Extracurricular Athletics, but Various Factors May Affect Their Participation National data show that students with disabilities participate in extracurricular athletics but do not fully distinguish whether these athletic opportunities are offered through schools or out-of-school (i.e., through community-based) programs. Among the schools we visited, we found that IDEA students participated in school-based extracurricular athletics at varying rates, but at a lower rate than their peers without disabilities. Lack of Information and Budget Constraints May Prevent Schools from Providing More Athletic Opportunities to Students with Disabilities Officials from several districts and state athletic associations said they generally lacked information that would help them provide extracurricular athletic opportunities for students with disabilities. Further, some districts lacked information and clarity regarding their responsibilities to provide opportunities under Section 504 for students with disabilities who want to participate in extracurricular athletics equal to those provided to other students. Education Has Provided States and Schools Little Support Regarding PE or Athletics for Students with Disabilities, and Many Districts We Visited Said More Would Be Useful Education Has Provided Little Information or Guidance While OSEP monitors states’ implementation of IDEA and provides information, resources, and technical assistance to states and schools on teaching students with disabilities, very little of it is related to PE or extracurricular athletics, according to OSEP officials and our review of Education Web sites. They also noted that these areas have received more official complaints and persistent concerns from constituents such as parents and community groups. Some State and District Officials We Interviewed Said More Information and Guidance Would Be Useful Officials from several states and many districts we interviewed said that they could benefit from Education helping states and schools share relevant information, such as practices or resources regarding PE and extracurricular athletics for students with disabilities. While Education has not addressed these issues because it has targeted its limited resources to other areas, focusing some of its existing resources on helping schools provide opportunities in PE and extracurricular athletics could yield important benefits and enable students with disabilities to more fully experience the rewards of physical activity.	Why GAO Did This Study Research has established that physical activity and participation in athletics provides important health and social benefits for children. Certain federal laws help ensure that kindergarten-12th grade schools provide students with disabilities opportunities to participate in physical education (PE) and extracurricular athletics equal to those of their peers. However, national associations have questioned whether students with disabilities receive opportunities similar to their peers. Regarding students with disabilities, GAO was asked to examine (1) what is known about the PE opportunities that schools provide, and how do schools provide these; (2) what is known about the extracurricular athletic opportunities that schools provide, and how do schools provide these; and (3) how the Department of Education (Education) assists states and schools in these areas. GAO analyzed federal survey data; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and interviewed state, district, and school officials in selected states, as well as parents and disability association officials. What GAO Found Schools provide students with and without disabilities similar opportunities to participate in PE but face challenges when serving students with disabilities. Students with disabilities spend similar amounts of time in PE class and exercising in class as students without disabilities, according to national data and GAO site visits. Most students with disabilities take PE with other students in general PE classes. To facilitate their participation, teachers may make accommodations for some students, such as providing additional modeling or repetition. Many state, district, and school officials GAO interviewed cited teacher preparation and budget constraints as key challenges to serving students with disabilities in general PE classes. For example, they said general PE teachers need more training opportunities on working specifically with students with disabilities, yet resources for training are not always available. Limited national data suggest that students with disabilities participate in extracurricular athletics, but do not distinguish whether these opportunities are offered through schools or community programs. Among the schools GAO visited, students with disabilities participated in athletics at varying rates, but at consistently lower rates than students without disabilities. Several factors, such as a student's disability type or outreach to students, may affect participation. Some schools or districts GAO interviewed provided opportunities by partnering with community programs or offering athletics designed specifically for students with disabilities, such as wheelchair basketball. District and school officials GAO interviewed cited a lack of information on ways to expand athletic opportunities, lack of clarity regarding schools' responsibilities, and budget constraints as key challenges. Education has provided little information or guidance on PE or extracurricular athletics for students with disabilities, and some states and districts GAO interviewed said more would be useful. According to agency officials, Education has not provided much information or guidance because it has targeted its limited resources on other areas, such as monitoring priorities specified in federal law. Officials from several states and many districts said they could benefit from Education helping states and schools to share information on practices or resources regarding PE and athletics for students with disabilities. Officials from districts and disability groups also said more clarification from Education on schools' responsibilities under federal law on extracurricular athletics for students with disabilities would be useful.
gao_GAO-13-616	gao_GAO-13-616_0	PPD-21 directs DHS to, among other things, coordinate the overall federal effort to promote the security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. According to DHS officials, the current process for conducting a RRAP project can take from 18 to 24 months from start to finish. The process includes selecting and scoping RRAP projects from proposals; assembling and preparing a RRAP team of federal, state and local training the states via webinar (i.e., stakeholder awareness training); conducting an introductory kickoff (i.e., outreach) meeting; gathering preliminary data and selecting sites to be included in the scheduling meetings with asset owners or operators of the sites; conducting ongoing analyses using data derived from performing the aforementioned vulnerability and security assessments at facilities;conducting stakeholders’ meetings for training purposes and to discuss regional resilience issues; preparing a draft report for state review; incorporating the state’s feedback into a final report; and establishing a process to follow up with stakeholders to, among other things, periodically update their progress making RRAP-related enhancements. DHS Has Developed Criteria to Identify RRAP Project Candidates, but Does Not Fully Document Its Project Recommendation and Selection Process PSCD has developed criteria that consider various factors when selecting possible locations and sectors for RRAP projects. However, PSCD officials do not fully document why certain project candidates are or are not recommended for selection by the IP Assistant Secretary. Second, IP officials developed nine point selection criteria to identify lists of potential RRAP project candidates. The standards further call for all transactions and significant events to be clearly documented, and readily available for examination to inform decision making. DHS Has Taken Action to Work with States to Improve the RRAP Process, and Has Begun to Engage CI Partners to Ascertain Their Resilience Information Needs Since 2011, IP has worked with states to improve the RRAP process, and IP officials said these efforts are viewed favorably by primary stakeholders. For example, IP officials said they have had specific discussions with CI partners concerning state resilience information needs, and they are considering this input as they begin to develop a resilience product or products. IP gathers data from individual facilities, including those that participated in RRAP projects, with the intent of measuring the efforts of those facilities to make enhancements arising out of security surveys and vulnerability assessments performed during RRAP projects. DHS Faces Challenges Measuring the Effect of RRAP Projects IP has considered how it intends to measure results associated with RRAP projects—not just facilities within projects— but faces challenges doing so. The RRAP Findings Tracker is intended to cover, among other things: developments that demonstrate project relevance since the RRAP project was initiated, for instance, news reports, speeches, or studies that demonstrate the ongoing relevance of the project’s focus; partnership building and information sharing, to include developments that relate to how project stakeholders—whether state, regional, federal, or private sector—have enhanced interaction, awareness, communication, and information sharing; any action taken concerning the RRAP report’s key findings, particularly with regard to enhancement options specified in the RRAP report; and activities at specific individual assets assessed during the RRAP and their efforts to enhance resilience, including the percentage of assessed assets that have made an improvement or planned to make an improvement after 6 and 12 months. Therefore, the ability to develop measures that represent assets in a region could hinge on the willingness of CI stakeholders, including facility owners and operators, to participate. We recognize that developing performance measures among and across RRAP projects could be challenging moving forward. However, DHS could better position itself to gain insights into a project’s effects if it were to develop a mechanism to assess whether changes made at individual facilities are linked to or influenced by participation in a RRAP project. One approach for doing so could entail IP revising its security survey and vulnerability assessment follow-up process at individual facilities, including follow-ups at facilities that participated in RRAP projects to gather and analyze data on the extent to which participation in a RRAP project influenced owners and operators to make related resilience enhancements. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure that DHS is taking steps to strengthen the management of RRAP projects and the program in general, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security, take the following two actions: document decisions made with regard to recommendations about individual RRAP projects to provide insights into why one project was recommended over another and assurance that recommendations among equally feasible proposals are defensible, and develop a mechanism to assess the extent to which individual projects influenced participants to make RRAP related enhancements, such as revising the security and vulnerability assessment follow-up tool to query facilities that participated in RRAP projects on the extent to which any resilience improvements made are due to participation in the RRAP. DHS also raised two concerns with the report. As noted in the report, IP has taken important actions to (1) standardize the selection process for RRAP project locations, (2) work with state stakeholders to better communicate the scope of projects and consider how it can share resilience information with CI partners, and (3) gather information on CI partner actions to enhance resilience after the RRAP project is completed. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2012. GAO-10-296. Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Information.	Why GAO Did This Study In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy caused widespread damage across multiple states. Further, threats to CI are not limited to natural disasters, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2009, DHS initiated the RRAP, a voluntary program intended to assess regional resilience of CI. RRAP projects are to analyze a region's ability to adapt to changing conditions, and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruptions. GAO was asked to examine DHS's efforts to manage the program. GAO assessed the extent to which DHS (1) developed criteria for identifying RRAP project locations, (2) worked with states to conduct RRAP projects and share information with CI partners to promote resilience, and (3) is positioned to measure results associated with RRAP projects. GAO reviewed applicable laws, DHS policies and procedures, and all 17 RRAP reports completed since the program inception in 2009. GAO also interviewed officials from 10 states with issued RRAP reports, DHS officials who conducted 20 RRAP projects from 2009 through 2012, and other federal officials representing nine departments and agencies involved in RRAP projects. While the results of the interviews are not generalizable, they provided insight. What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed nine criteria that consider various factors--including the willingness of various stakeholders, such as asset owners and operators, to participate and concentrations of high-risk critical infrastructure--when identifying possible locations for Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) projects. According to DHS officials, final project selections are then made from a list of possible locations based on factors including geographic distribution and DHS priorities, among other considerations. However, it is unclear why some RRAP projects are recommended over others because DHS does not fully document why these decision are made. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to promptly record and clearly document transactions and significant events. Because DHS's selection process identifies a greater number of potential projects than DHS has the resources to perform, documenting why final selections are made would help ensure accountability, enabling DHS to provide evidence of its decision making. DHS has worked with states to improve the process for conducting RRAP projects and is considering an approach for sharing resilience information with its critical infrastructure (CI) partners, including federal, state, local, and tribal officials. Since 2011, DHS has worked with states to improve the process for conducting RRAP projects, including more clearly defining the scope of projects. According to DHS officials, these efforts have been viewed favorably by states. DHS is currently considering an approach to more widely share resilience lessons learned with its CI partners, including a possible resiliency product or products that draw from completed RRAP projects. DHS officials stated that they engage CI partners in meetings and conferences where partners' resilience information needs are discussed and have been incorporating this input into their efforts to develop a resilience information sharing approach. DHS has taken action to measure efforts to enhance security and resilience among facilities that participate in the RRAP, but faces challenges measuring results associated with RRAP projects. DHS performs security and vulnerability assessments at individual CI assets that participate in RRAPs projects as well as those that do not participate. Consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DHS also performs periodic follow-ups among asset owners and operators that participate in these assessments with the intent of measuring their efforts to make enhancements arising out of these surveys and assessments. However, DHS does not measure how enhancements made at individual assets that participate in a RRAP project contribute to the overall results of the project. DHS officials stated that they face challenges measuring performance within and across RRAP projects because of the unique characteristics of each, including geographic diversity and differences among assets within projects. GAO recognizes that measuring performance within and among RRAP projects could be challenging, but DHS could better position itself to gain insights into projects' effects if it were to develop a mechanism to compare facilities that have participated in a RRAP project with those that have not, thus establishing building blocks for measuring its efforts to conduct RRAP projects. One approach could entail using DHS's assessment follow-up process to gather and analyze data to assess whether participation in a RRAP project influenced owners and operators to make related resilience enhancements. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS document final RRAP selections and develop a mechanism to measure whether RRAP participation influences facilities to make RRAP-related enhancements. DHS concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-04-530T	gao_GAO-04-530T_0	The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs won considerable acceptance during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, respectively. They were used in these operations to observe, track, target, and in some cases strike enemy forces. These and similar successes have heightened interest in UAVs within DOD and the services. The majority of the funds—$1.8 billion (67 percent)—have been for UAV research, development, test, and evaluation. Progress Made, but Challenges Remain in UAV Planning DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the management of the UAV program by establishing a program focal point in the joint UAV Planning Task Force and trying to communicate a common vision for UAV development, the UAV Roadmap. The development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force’s primary product to communicate its vision and promote interoperability. The Task Force convinced the Air Force to continue with the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air Force wanted to terminate it, and the Task Force ultimately helped the then-separate Air Force and Navy programs merge into a joint program. However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its suggestions and consequently has not always succeeding in influencing service actions. DOD Has No Comprehensive Strategic Plan Neither the Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs that complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and avoid duplication. The approach then ties these requirements to forecasted trends in developing technologies as a means to try to develop a realistic assessment of the state of the technology in the future and the extent to which this technology will be sufficient to meet identified requirements. Others are to establish joint standards and control costs. These officials further stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 UAV Roadmap provided some useful guidance, but was not used to guide the development of the service’s UAV roadmaps. Moreover, they did not view the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Roadmap as either a DOD-wide strategic plan or an overarching architecture for integrating UAVs into the force structure. Success has been achieved as a result of intervention by leadership and the use of innovative processes. In 1988 we reported on a variety of management challenges related to UAV development. That success on the battlefield is leading to more and more demand for UAVs and innovative ways of using them, creating pressures such as a greater need for interoperability of systems and competition for limited resources like money, electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are successful today survived an environment characterized by a number of canceled programs, risky strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and uncertain funding. Taking these steps will give Congress confidence that its investments’ in the technology will produce optimum capabilities desired of UAVs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts.	Why GAO Did This Study The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to managing the growing number of UAV programs. GAO was asked to summarize (1) the results of its most current report on DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAVs1 and the extent to which the approach provides reasonable assurance that its investment will lead to effective integration of UAVs into the force structure, and (2) the major management issues GAO has identified in prior reports on UAV research and development. What GAO Found GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some positive steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide reasonable assurance that the significant Congressional investment in UAVs will result in their effective integration into the force structure. In 2001, DOD established the joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability, the task force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap. While the Roadmap provides some strategic guidance for the development of UAV technology, neither the Roadmap nor other documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force has only advisory authority and, as such, cannot compel the services to adopt its suggestions. GAO's prior work supports the need for effective oversight of individual UAV programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered from requirements growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within the services. Some programs have been terminated. Success has been achieved as a result of top-level intervention and innovative acquisition approaches. For example, in 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had to intervene to keep the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program viable. As UAV programs grow in the future, they will face challenges in the form of increased funding competition, greater demand for capabilities, and spectrum and airspace limitations. Moreover, UAVs are no longer an additional "nice-to-have" capability; they are becoming essential to the services' ability to conduct modern warfare. Meeting these challenges will require continued strong leadership, building on the UAV Roadmap and Planning Task Force as GAO has recommended.
gao_GAO-11-492	gao_GAO-11-492_0	Lack of Informed Fee Design Contributes to Expectation Gaps with Stakeholders and Unknown Cross- Subsidizations Among Payers FPS Does Not Have an Informed Fee Design When FPS was a part of GSA, GSA did not charge customer agencies security fees to recover the full cost of physical security services. Despite a number of security fee increases and cost-cutting efforts in the 7 years since transferring to DHS, FPS has not conducted a fee review to develop an informed, deliberate fee design. As shown in table 2, to cover its costs FPS has increased its fees four times from 2004 to 2009. We have previously reported that fee collections should be sufficient to cover the intended portion of program costs over time and that while regular, timely, and substantive fee reviews are critical for any agency, they are especially important for agencies—like FPS—that are mostly or solely fee funded in order to ensure that fee collections and operating costs remained aligned. FPS Describes an Alignment Between Specific Fees and Specific Activities That Does Not Exist FPS does not know the cost of providing specific security activities to its customer agencies, although in its Security Services and Pricing Provision document, FPS associates specific security activities with specific security fees—an alignment that does not exist (see table 3). By law FPS is required to charge fees that cover its total operating expenses, but it is not required to have specific fees match the cost of specific activities. First, FPS officials said their mission—to ensure safety at GSA-controlled federal facilities—is a national policy goal and therefore the basic security costs are intended to be shared evenly among the facilities. Second, FPS officials said the building-specific and SWA administrative fees are designed to reflect the increased risk inherent to facilities requiring or requesting additional countermeasures and therefore the administrative fees should subsidize the aggregate cost of basic security services. Alternate Fee Structures Could Address Concerns About Alignment and Cross-Subsidizations Other security fee structures may address the current equity and cross- subsidizations and improve transparency to customer agencies. However, without a full fee review it is difficult to understand fully the relative trade- offs in any particular proposal. In addition, revising the funding mechanisms alone would not address the variations in service levels reported by FPS’s customer agencies nor the overall level of services FPS provides at GSA-controlled facilities. Funding all or some of FPS’s activities with a direct appropriation may also increase demand for FPS services. FPS Cannot Finalize Its Fee Rates Until Its Appropriation Is Enacted While FPS can indicate a fee increase in its budget documents, it cannot finalize its fee rates for a given fiscal year until DHS’s appropriation is enacted. As a result, to respond timely to current threats, customer agencies must reallocate funds to countermeasures for which they did not and could not plan. Alternative Account Structures Could Provide Needed Flexibility to Help Mitigate Budgeting Challenges for FPS and Customer Agencies There is no obvious solution for the federal budget timing disconnects described above, but in our prior work reviewing fee-funded agencies, we have identified various budget account structures that could help mitigate budgeting and timing challenges for FPS and customer agencies without compromising accountability for federal funds. FPS’s customer agencies do not receive timely estimates of future costs, impairing agencies’ ability to budget for those costs. FPS has data that could help FPS’s customer agencies with this issue. Recommendations for Executive Action The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of the Federal Protective Service to take the following six actions: conduct regular reviews of FPS’s security fees and use this information to inform its fee setting; include systemwide capital investments when estimating costs and include them when setting basic security fee rates; make information on the estimated costs of key activities as well as the basis for these cost estimates readily available to affected parties to improve the transparency and credibility—and hence the acceptance by stakeholders—of the process for setting and using the fees; in implementing our previous recommendation to evaluate the current fee structure and determine a method for incorporating facility risk, assess and report to Congress on: the current and alternative fee structures, to include the options and trade-offs discussed in this report, and if appropriate, options to fund FPS through a combination of fees and direct appropriations, to include the options and trade-offs discussed in this report; evaluate and report to Congress on options to mitigate challenges agencies face in budgeting for FPS security costs, such as: an alternative account structure for FPS to increase flexibility, while retaining or improving accountability and transparency or an approved process for estimating fee rates; and work with customer agencies to collect and maintain an accurate list of points of contact of customer agency officials responsible for budget and billing activities as well as facility designated points of contact as we previously recommended. The General Services Administration had no comments on the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to (1) analyze the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) current fee design and proposed alternatives, and (2) examine how FPS’s security fees challenge FPS and customer agency budget formulation and execution.	Why GAO Did This Study The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is a fee-funded agency in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for providing physical security to over 9,000 federal facilities. In 2003 FPS transferred to DHS from the General Services Administration and for the first time was to fully recover its costs. GAO recently reported that stakeholders were concerned about FPS's ability to determine security costs, and the strategies used to address funding challenges had adverse effects on FPS. In this context, Congress directed GAO to evaluate FPS's resource levels. This report (1) analyzes FPS's fee design and proposed alternatives, and (2) examines how FPS's security fees challenge FPS and customer agency budget formulation and execution. GAO reviewed legislation and agency documentation and interviewed FPS and customer agency officials in headquarters and four FPS regions. What GAO Found FPS increased its basic security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100 percent). FPS has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate fee design. GAO has found that timely, substantive fee reviews are especially critical for fee-funded agencies to ensure that fee collections and operating costs remain aligned. FPS is legally required to charge fees that cover its total costs, but it is not required to align specific fees with specific activities. Nevertheless, in its pricing documents FPS describes an alignment between specific fees and specific activities that does not exist. FPS charges a basic security fee based on facility square footage. In addition, FPS charges facilities that have contractor-provided countermeasures, such as guards, the cost of the countermeasure plus an administrative fee that is a percentage of the countermeasure cost. Federal facilities vary in how much they cost to protect, but FPS does not know to what extent some facilities currently subsidize others. This contributes to expectation gaps with and unknown cross-subsidizations among payers. FPS officials said that basic security costs are meant to be "shared evenly" (i.e., based on square footage) among all payers while administrative fees for FPS-recommended or facility-requested countermeasures are meant to both (1) reflect the increased risk inherent to those facilities requiring or requesting additional countermeasures and (2) subsidize the aggregate cost of basic security services. Charging beneficiaries more or less than actual costs may help achieve policy goals, but FPS lacks data to determine whether this occurs as intended. Modifying the current fee structure or funding FPS through a combination of fees and direct appropriations may address equity and cross-subsidization issues and improve transparency to customers, but without detailed activity cost information and a full fee review the relative trade-offs in any particular proposal are unclear. Further, revising the fee structure alone will not address the variations in service levels reported by FPS's customer agencies or the overall level of services FPS is able to provide. The design and implementation of FPS's fees affect agencies' and FPS's ability to budget for and timely implement security measures in multiple ways. First, FPS lacks a method to propose security fee rates prior to submitting its budget request and cannot finalize its rates each year until it receives congressional instructions about its staffing levels in its appropriation act. As a result, agencies annually request security funding without accurate security cost estimates. Second, FPS makes security recommendations to customer agencies based on current threats, but agencies budget for security costs in advance and therefore must reallocate funds to pay for countermeasures for which they had not planned. Although there are no obvious solutions for these and other budget timing disconnects, alternative budget account structures like a reimbursable account or a revolving fund could help mitigate budgeting and timing challenges for FPS and customer agencies without compromising accountability for federal funds. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS to, among other things, conduct and make available regular fee reviews to improve its fee design, include capital investment costs in its rates, and evaluate its current and alternative funding and budget account structures to mitigate budget timing and other issues. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.
gao_NSIAD-98-6	gao_NSIAD-98-6_0	In the past, European governments made several attempts to integrate the European defense market using a variety of organizations. OCCAR’s impact on the European defense market will largely depend on the number of programs that it manages. European government and industry observers have noted that European defense industry is reacting to pressures from rapid U.S. defense industry consolidation, tighter defense budgets, and stronger competition in the global defense market. While economic pressures to consolidate exist, European defense companies face several obstacles, according to European government and industry officials. Complex ownership structures also make cross-border mergers difficult because many of the larger European defense companies are state-owned or part of larger conglomerates. Although most cross-border industry cooperation is project specific, European defense companies are also acquiring companies or establishing joint ventures or cross-share holdings that are not tied to a particular program. Key European Countries Vary in Their Willingness to Purchase Major U.S. Defense Items Despite attempts to develop a unified European armament policy, individual European governments still retain their own defense procurement policies. Key European countries, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, vary in their willingness to purchase major U.S. defense equipment. In the major defense competitions in which U.S. companies competed in the United Kingdom over the last 5 years, the U.K. government tended to chose a domestically developed product when one existed. The U.S. government is also seeking opportunities to form transatlantic partnerships with its European allies on defense equipment development and production, but some observers point to practical and cultural impediments that affect the extent of such cooperation. U.S. Companies Form Industrial Partnerships With European Industry to Sell Defense Equipment U.S. defense companies are forming industrial partnerships with European companies to sell defense equipment to Europe because of the need to increase international sales, satisfy offset obligations, and maintain market access. Changes to U.S. Policies Support Defense Trade and Transatlantic Cooperation DOD has taken a number of steps over the last few years to improve defense trade and transatlantic cooperation. Some observers indicated to us that there may be some impediments to pursuing U.S.-European defense cooperative programs on major weapon systems because (1) European procurement budgets are limited compared to the U.S. budget; (2) the potential that U.S. support for a program may change with each annual budget review may cause some European governments concerns; (3) despite changes in DOD guidance, many military service program managers may be reluctant to engage in international cooperative programs due to the significant additional work that may be required and potential barriers that may arise, such as licensing and technology sharing restrictions; (4) many U.S. program managers may not consider purchasing from a foreign source due to the perceived technological superiority of U.S. weapons; and (5) European and U.S. governments have shown a desire to maintain an independent ability to provide for their national defense. Conclusions Efforts have been made to develop a more unified European armament policy and defense industrial base. To maintain market access in Europe, U.S. defense companies have established transatlantic industrial partnerships. These industrial partnerships appear to be evolving more readily than transatlantic cooperative programs led by governments.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the changes that have taken place in the European defense market over the past 5 years, focusing on: (1) what actions European governments and industry have taken to unify the European defense market; (2) how key European countries' defense procurement practices have affected U.S. defense companies' ability to compete on major weapons competitions in Europe; and (3) how the U.S. government and industry have adapted their policies or practices to the changing European defense environment. GAO's review focused on the buying practices of five European countries--France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) pressure to develop a unified European armament procurement policy and related industrial base is increasing, as most nations can no longer afford to develop and procure defense items solely form their own domestic companies; (2) European governments have taken several initiatives to integrate the defense market, including the formation of two new organizations to improve armament cooperation; (3) European government officials remain committed to cooperative programs, which have long been the impetus for cross-border defense cooperation at the industry level; (4) some European defense companies are initiating cross-border mergers that are not tied to government cooperative programs; (5) although some progress toward regionalization is occurring, European government and industry officials told GAO that national sovereignty issues and complex ownership structures may inhibit European defense consolidation from occurring to the extent that is needed to be competitive; (6) until European governments agree on a unified armament policy, individual European countries will retain their own procurement policies; (7) like the United States, European countries tend to purchase major defense equipment from their domestic companies when such options exist; (8) when national options do not exist, key European countries vary in their willingness to buy major U.S. weapon systems; (9) trans-Atlantic industrial partnerships appear to be evolving more readily than trans-Atlantic cooperative programs that are led by governments; (10) U.S. defense companies have established these trans-Atlantic partnerships largely to maintain market access in Europe; (11) U.S. defense company officials say they cannot export major defense items to Europe without involving European defense companies in the production of those items; (12) some U.S. defense companies are seeking long-term partnerships with European companies to develop a defense product line that will meet requirements in Europe or other defense markets; (13) they believe such industrial interdependence can also help counter any efforts toward U.S. or European protectionism and may increase trans-Atlantic defense trade; and (14) the U.S. government has taken several steps over the last few years to improve defense trade and trans-Atlantic cooperation, but some observers point to practical and cultural impediments that affect U.S.-European cooperation on major weapon programs.
gao_GAO-06-953T	gao_GAO-06-953T_0	In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. According to this document, prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S. national interest because it will help win the war on terror and make America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. The six characteristics are (1) a clear purpose, scope, methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the desired goals and objectives, and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a clear delineation of the U.S. government’s roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy is integrated internally (that is, among U.S. agencies) and externally (in this case, with the Iraqi government and international organizations). National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and Supporting Documents Do Not Fully Address All Key Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the NSVI and supporting documents do not fully address all of the six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has identified through its prior work. Although the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail on recent U.S. and Iraqi actions, it does not address the key shortfalls we identified in the three areas. The NSVI and supporting documents generally address this characteristic by identifying U.S. government efforts to rebuild and stabilize Iraq in terms of these three overarching objectives and address the assumptions that guided the strategy’s development. Strategy Partially Addresses Agency Responsibilities, Integration, and Costs The NSVI and supporting documents only partially (1) delineate the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. government agencies; (2) describe how the strategy will be integrated among U.S. entities, the Iraqi government, international organizations and the mechanisms for coordination; and (3) identify what the strategy will cost and the sources of financing. The strategy does not identify other key related costs, including the costs of training, equipping, and supporting Iraq’s security forces; the costs of rebuilding, maintaining, and protecting critical oil and electricity infrastructure; or the costs of building management capacity in Iraq’s central ministries and 18 provincial governments. However, it does not redress identified shortfalls in the U.S. strategy such as the lack of information on costs. Other GAO-Related Work Shows that Security, Political, and Economic Factors Hamper U.S. Efforts to Achieve Strategic Goals Other GAO work shows that security, political, and economic factors have and will continue to hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners, growing sectarian violence, and the influence of militias have adversely affected U.S. and Iraqi efforts to secure Baghdad and other strategic cities. Iraq Faces Challenges in Delivering Government Services The U.S. government faces significant challenges in improving the capability of national and provincial governments to provide security and deliver services to the Iraqi people. Efforts to Restore Oil and Electricity Sectors Are Hindered by Security, Corruption, Fiscal, and Management Challenges The U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq’s economy and restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. However, these efforts have been hindered by security, corruption, fiscal, and management challenges. In addition, it is unclear whether the current capacity can be sustained. The formation of the new Iraqi government provides an opportunity for the United States government to re-examine its strategy and more closely align its efforts and objectives with those of the Iraqi people and other donors. Improving national and provincial governance.	Why GAO Did This Study In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S. goal is to establish a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. In addition, in June 2006, the administration issued a fact sheet at Camp David discussing current progress and goals in Iraq. This testimony (1) discusses the extent to which the NSVI and its supporting documents address the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) assesses how security, political, and economic factors will affect achieving the U.S. strategy for Iraq. In this testimony, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq. What GAO Found The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and supporting documents are incomplete as they do not fully address all the characteristics of an effective national strategy. Among its positive attributes, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear; it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a "vital national interest and the central front in the war on terror." Also, the strategy generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is limited. Moreover, the strategy falls short in at least three areas. First, it only partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it does not fully address how the U.S. will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it does not detail Iraq's anticipated contribution to its future needs. Third, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail but does not address these key shortfalls. Security, political, and economic factors will hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to stabilize Iraq by training and equipping additional Iraqi security forces and securing Baghdad and other strategic cities. However, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias will adversely affect U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to improve Iraq's capacity to govern by reconciling sectarian groups and building the capacity of national and provincial governments to provide security and services. However, sectarian conflicts, the lack of capacity in the ministries, and corruption serve to hinder these efforts. Third, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq's economy and restore the oil, electricity, and other key sectors. However, these efforts have been impeded by security, corruption, fiscal, and other challenges. The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the U.S. an opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and align its efforts with Iraq and the international community. As a first step, NSC should complete the strategy by defining and disseminating performance metrics, articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In addition, the United States, Iraq, and the international community should (1) enhance support capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (2) improve the capabilities of the national and provincial governments, and (3) develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.
gao_GAO-14-351	gao_GAO-14-351_0	BMDS Flight Tests Successfully Executed, but Development Challenges Continue In fiscal year 2013, MDA successfully executed several flight tests that demonstrated key BMDS capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior development issues, but continued to experience failures and delays resulting in less testing and production than planned. For the first time in September 2013, the Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) programs participated in an operational flight test that resulted in a near simultaneous engagement. Additionally, the Aegis BMD program also successfully conducted flight tests with the SM-3 Block IB missile. Lastly, GMD also successfully conducted a non-intercept test of its upgraded interceptor that is currently in development, but experienced an intercept test failure of the fielded interceptor, the cause of which is still unknown. This is a significant achievement because it is the first operational test that involved multiple elements working simultaneously. If design changes are necessary, program documentation indicates that they will not be flight tested until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015, just prior to the planned deployment of the SM-3 Block IB to support the regional defense of Europe and 6 months after its planned full production decision. MDA Made Its Resource and Schedule Baselines Clearer, but Further Actions Needed to Enhance Their Use for Oversight MDA has taken some steps to improve the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, but issues with the content and presentation of these baselines continue to limit the usefulness of the information available to decision makers for oversight of BMDS development efforts. Assessing MDA’s progress in achieving its schedule goals is also difficult because MDA’s schedule baselines are not presented in a way that allows decision makers to understand or easily monitor progress. Until MDA improves the quality and comprehensiveness of its cost estimates and the clarity of its schedule information, its baselines may not be useful for decision makers. Additionally, MDA has made little progress improving the comprehensiveness of the cost estimates that support its resource baselines. Because MDA already reports the estimated acquisition costs and some of the operation and support costs for the acquisitions in the annual BAR, we concluded that annual document to be the most appropriate way to report the full costs to Congress. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Congress took steps to address concerns over MDA’s cost estimates by requiring MDA to report to the congressional defense committees on its efforts to improve the quality of the cost estimates included in its acquisition For example, the act requires MDA to report on a description baselines.of and schedule for planned actions to improve its cost estimates, as well as an assessment of how the planned improvements align with GAO’s cost estimating best practices. MDA’s 2013 BAR schedule baselines include numerous events but provide very little information about them, making it difficult to understand what the events are and why they are important. In addition, MDA does not present any comparisons of event dates with previously reported dates. Until MDA improves the content of its schedule baselines, decision makers will not be able to assess how a program is performing over time. To demonstrate the CE-I’s effectiveness against a longer range target in more challenging conditions and to confirm the design changes implemented to improve performance, as well as any changes needed to resolve the July 2013 CE-I flight test failure work as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct MDA’s Director to conduct a flight test of the CE-I interceptor once the cause of the failure has been determined and any mitigations have been developed. DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation, non-concurred with our second recommendation and concurred with our third recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To assess the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) progress and any challenges associated with developing, testing, and producing the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) during fiscal year 2013, we examined the acquisition accomplishments of several missile defense elements and MDA’s targets program. Specifically, we reviewed the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB; Aegis Ashore; Aegis Modernized Weapon System Software; Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2); Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC); Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System; Targets and Countermeasures; and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) elements because, as reported in the 2013 BMDS Accountability Report (BAR), these elements or programs have entered MDA’s product development, initial production, or production acquisition phase, but are not yet mature enough to be transferred to a military service and enter the We formal DOD acquisition cycle for full-rate production and deployment.reviewed key management documents for fiscal year 2013 including Program and Baseline Execution Reviews, which detailed program accomplishments and areas of concerns, and interviewed program element officials.	Why GAO Did This Study Since 2002, MDA has spent approximately $98 billion and has requested $38 billion more through fiscal year 2018 to develop, test, and field a system to defend against enemy ballistic missiles. The BMDS is comprised of a command and control system, sensors that identify incoming threats, and intercepting missiles. GAO is mandated by law to assess the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, as reported to Congress through its acquisition baselines, and to report on other issues as appropriate. This report examines the agency's progress and any challenges in fiscal year 2013 associated with (1) developing, flight testing, and producing individual systems, which MDA refers to as BMDS elements; and (2) reporting resource and schedule baselines that support oversight. To support this effort, GAO examined MDA's acquisition and test reports, analyzed two of MDA's acquisition baselines—resource and schedule—to discern progress, and interviewed a wide range of DOD and contractor officials. What GAO Found In fiscal year 2013, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made mixed progress in achieving its acquisition goals to develop, test, and produce elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). For the first time, MDA conducted an operational flight test that involved warfighters from several combatant commands using multiple BMDS elements simultaneously. The agency also successfully conducted several developmental flight tests that demonstrated key capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior production issues. However, the Aegis BMD and Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) continued to experience testing and development challenges. Aegis BMD—while the program successfully conducted three intercept flight tests with the Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IB missile in support of a full production decision planned for fiscal year 2015, a missile failed during one of these tests. Although the cause of failure is not known, the program plans to move forward with missile production in 2014. The program is also determining whether a key component that is common with the already fielded SM-3 Block IA missile will need to be redesigned. GMD—although the program successfully conducted a non-intercept flight test of its upgraded interceptor, the program is nearing a seven year delay in completing its first successful intercept. Until this upgraded interceptor is demonstrated in an intercept test, expected to be conducted in the third quarter of fiscal year 2014, manufacturing and deliveries remain on hold. In July 2013, the GMD program also failed a flight test of its fielded interceptor. This flight test was designed to assess the fielded interceptor under more challenging conditions and to confirm design changes to resolve prior issues. MDA has not yet made a decision on how to proceed since the cause of failure has not been determined. MDA has improved the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines since it first submitted them to Congress in 2010. However, issues with the content and presentation of these baselines continue to limit the usefulness of the information available to decision makers for oversight. First, as the agency is still in the process of improving the quality and comprehensiveness of the cost estimates that support its resource baselines, for the fourth year, GAO has found that MDA's cost estimates are unreliable. For example, MDA's 2013 cost estimates still do not include operations and support costs for military services which may significantly understate total costs. Congress has recently required MDA to include these costs in future acquisition baselines which may improve transparency. Second, MDA's schedule baselines are presented in a way that makes it difficult to assess progress. Specifically, MDA's 2013 schedule baselines include numerous events but provide very little information about them, making it difficult to understand what the events are and why they are important. Additionally, the 2013 schedule baselines do not compare the current event dates with previously reported dates, so decision makers cannot easily assess how the program is performing over time. Until MDA improves the quality and comprehensiveness of its cost estimates and the content of its schedule information, its baselines will not be useful for decision makers to gauge progress. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends (1) any changes to the SM-3 Block IB be flight tested before DOD approves full production; (2) retest the fielded GMD interceptor to demonstrate performance; and (3) improve the content of its schedule baselines. DOD partially concurred with the first, non-concurred with the second, and concurred with the third, stating that the production and testing decisions will be made using the proper DOD processes. GAO believes both recommendations are valid as discussed in this report.
gao_GAO-06-1008T	gao_GAO-06-1008T_0	1.) Over time, Medicare’s spending target system has been revised and renamed. SGR System Designed to Limit or Reduce Physician Fee Updates in Response to Excess Growth in Volume and Intensity The SGR system establishes spending targets to moderate spending increases caused by excess growth in volume and intensity. The sustainable growth rate is the product of the estimated percentage change in (1) input prices for physician services and other SGR-covered services; (2) the average number of Medicare beneficiaries in the traditional fee-for- service program; (3) national economic output, as measured by real (inflation-adjusted) GDP per capita; and (4) expected expenditures for physician services and other SGR-covered services resulting from changes in laws or regulations. Under the SGR system, the volume and intensity of physician services and other SGR-covered services—that is, spending per beneficiary adjusted for the estimated underlying cost of providing those services—is allowed to grow at the same rate that the national economy grows over time on a per capita basis. If cumulative spending on SGR-covered services is in line with the SGR system’s target, the physician fee schedule update for the next calendar year is set equal to the estimated increase in the average cost of providing physician services as measured by the Medicare Economic Index (MEI). The SGR system places limits on the extent to which fee updates can deviate from MEI. Rapid Growth in Volume and Intensity and Legislated Minimum Updates Contribute to Projected Decline in Medicare Physician Fees under SGR System Recent growth in spending due to volume and intensity increases has been larger than SGR targets allow, resulting in excess spending that must be recouped by reducing fees to lower future spending. From 2000 through 2005, based on an analysis of physician services claims from April of each year, average annual growth in the volume and intensity of Medicare physician services exceeded 5 percent—more than double the approximately 2.2 percent growth rate permitted under the SGR system. Legislated minimum updates for 2004 through 2006 have also contributed to future physician fee cuts. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) and the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) averted fee reductions projected for 2004 through 2006 by specifying minimum updates to physician fees for those years. These legislated minimum fee updates have resulted in additional aggregate spending. Because neither MMA nor DRA made corresponding revisions to the SGR system’s spending targets, the SGR system must offset the additional spending by reducing fees beginning in 2007. Overall, the volume of services provided increased as well as the intensity (and thus costliness) of the services provided. Our analysis also found that the number of physicians billing Medicare and allowed charges per physician increased over the period as did the proportion of claims for which physicians accepted Medicare payment as payment in full. Growth in Spending for Physician Services Exceeded Growth in Medicare Fees From 2000 through 2005, while Medicare physician fees rose by 4.5 percent, program spending on physician services grew by nearly 60 percent. Because there were increases in both the proportion of beneficiaries obtaining services from physicians and the number of services provided to each beneficiary who obtained care, the overall volume of services increased from 2000 through 2005. 5.) Alternatives for Updating Physician Fees Would Eliminate Spending Targets or Revise Current SGR System The projected sustained period of declining physician fees and the potential for beneficiaries’ access to physician services to be disrupted have heightened interest in alternatives for the current SGR system. In 2005, we testified that potential alternatives cluster around two basic approaches. One approach would end the use of spending targets as a method for updating physician fees and encouraging fiscal discipline. The other would retain spending targets but modify the current SGR system to address its perceived shortcomings. If no other actions were taken, Medicare spending for physician services would rise relative to projected spending under the SGR system.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2002, the system Medicare uses to determine annual changes to physician fees--the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system--reduced fees by almost 5 percent. Subsequent administrative and legislative actions averted fee declines in 2003 through 2006. Absent additional actions, fee reductions are projected for 2007 through 2015. Consequently, the appropriateness of the SGR system has been questioned. At the same time, there are concerns about the impact of increased physician services spending on the long-term fiscal sustainability of Medicare. GAO was asked to discuss the SGR system and Medicare physician payments. This statement addresses (1) how the SGR system is designed to moderate the growth in spending for physician services, (2) why physician fees are projected to decline under the SGR system, (3) trends in the use of services provided by physicians and spending for those services from 2000 through 2005, and (4) options for revising or replacing the SGR system. This statement is based on two GAO reports: Medicare Physician Services: Use of Services Increasing Nationwide and Relatively Few Beneficiaries Report Major Access Problems ( GAO-06-704 , July 21, 2006), and Medicare Physician Payments: Concerns about Spending Target System Prompt Interest in Considering Reforms ( GAO-05-85 , Oct. 8, 2004). What GAO Found To moderate Medicare spending for physician services, the SGR system sets spending targets and adjusts physician fees based on the extent to which actual spending aligns with specified targets. If growth in the number of services provided to each beneficiary--referred to as volume--and in the average complexity and costliness of services--referred to as intensity--is high enough, spending will exceed the SGR target. While the SGR system allows for some volume and intensity spending growth, this allowance is limited. If such growth exceeds the average growth in the national economy, as measured by the gross domestic product per capita, fee updates are set lower than the estimated increase in the average cost of providing physician services. A large gap between spending and the target may result in fee reductions. There are two principal reasons why physician fees are projected to decline under the SGR system. Recent growth in spending due to volume and intensity increases has been more than double that allowed under the SGR system, resulting in excess spending that must be recouped through reduced fee updates. Legislative actions that specified minimum updates for 2004 through 2006 have also contributed to future physician fee cuts. These actions, which averted fee reductions, did not revise the spending targets. Therefore, the SGR system must offset the additional spending resulting from the excess volume and intensity and the minimum fee updates by reducing fees beginning in 2007. From 2000 through 2005, Medicare spending for services provided by physicians grew rapidly. Our analysis of Medicare claims submitted during the first 28 days of April in these years shows that an increasing proportion of beneficiaries obtained services and the volume and intensity of the services provided increased. While Medicare physician fees rose by 4.5 percent over the period, program spending on physician services per beneficiary grew by approximately 45 percent. The number of physicians billing Medicare and total allowed charges per billing physician also increased, as did the proportion of claims for which physicians accepted Medicare payment as payment in full. Potential alternatives to the SGR system cluster around two basic approaches: (1) ending the use of spending targets as a method for updating physician fees and encouraging fiscal discipline and (2) retaining spending targets but modifying the current SGR system to address perceived shortcomings. Either approach could be complemented by focused efforts to moderate volume and intensity growth directly. Because multiple years of projected 5 percent fee cuts are incorporated in Medicare's budgeting baseline, almost any change to the SGR system is likely to increase program spending above the baseline.
gao_T-AIMD-97-174	gao_T-AIMD-97-174_0	According to VA’s August 14, 1997, quarterly report to OMB, the Department has made progress in addressing the Year 2000 problem. As noted in the report, 1 of its 11 mission-critical systems—the one serving the National Cemetery System—is already fully compliant. Of the 10 remaining mission-critical systems and their applications, 85 percent have been assessed and 51 percent have been renovated. In addition, VA has updated its total Year 2000 cost estimate from $144 million (May 1997) to $162 million; VA’s stated reason for the increase is the need for upgrades to its commercial off-the-shelf software and hardware and more contractual support. Further, VA’s current estimate shows that it expects systems assessment to be completed by the end of next January, renovation of systems by November 1998, validation by January 1999, and implementation by October 1999—2 months earlier than VA reported in May. VBA has responded to this challenge by initiating a number of actions, including developing an agencywide plan and a Year 2000 strategy, and creating a program management organization. However, several substantial risks remain. If VBA is to avert serious disruption to its ability to disseminate benefits, it will need to strengthen its management and oversight of Year 2000-related activities. Our May 30, 1997, report contained 10 specific recommendations to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on actions that VBA needed to take to address the Year 2000 problem. Accordingly, it is essential that each of these 22 regional health care networks thoroughly assesses and plans for ensuring Year 2000 compliance so that service delivery is not interrupted. According to VA’s August 14, 1997, quarterly report to OMB, VHA is in the initial stages of assessing the compliance of its two mission-critical systems—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VISTA)—formerly known as the Decentralized Hospital Computer Program (DHCP)—and the VHA corporate systems. In order to effectively assess and renovate, it is necessary to understand how local facilities are using the national VISTA applications. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to stress that while our detailed review of the VHA area is just now underway, it is clear that for VA as a whole to have all of its mission-critical systems compliant by January 1, 2000, will entail a huge, well-coordinated effort.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed federal progress in addressing the Year 2000 problem, focusing on: (1) action taken by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a whole; (2) steps taken by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) in response to recommendations contained in a GAO report; and (3) results of its review of the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Year 2000 activities. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) according to VA's August 14, 1997, quarterly report to the Office of Management and Budget, the Department has made progress in addressing the Year 2000 problem; (2) as noted in the report, one of its 11 mission-critical systems--the one serving the National Cemetery System--is already fully compliant; (3) of the ten remaining mission critical systems and their applications, 85 percent have been assessed and 51 percent have been renovated; (4) in addition, VA has updated its total Year 2000 cost estimate from $144 million (May 1997) to $162 million; (5) VA's stated reason for the increase is the need for upgrades to its commercial off-the-shelf software and hardware, and more contractual support; (6) VA's current estimate shows that it expects systems assessment to be completed by the end of next January, renovation of systems by November 1998, validation by January 1999, and implementation by October 1999--2 months earlier than VA reported in May; (7) VBA has responded to the Year 2000 challenge by initiating a number of actions, including developing an agencywide plan and a Year 2000 strategy and creating a program management organization; (8) however, several substantial risks remain; (9) if VBA is to avert serious disruption of its ability to disseminate benefits, it will need to strengthen its management and oversight of Year 2000-related activities; (10) VHA is in the initial stages of assessing the compliance of its two mission-critical systems; (11) it is essential that each of VHA's 22 regional health care networks thoroughly assesses and plans for ensuring Year 2000 compliance so that service delivery is not interrupted; (12) in order to effectively assess and renovate, it is necessary to understand how local customizations, software add-ons, external interfaces, and physical facilities may affect Year 2000 compliance; (13) VHA is assessing Year 2000 impact on medical devices; and (14) while GAO's detailed review of the VHA area is just now under way, it is clear that for VA as a whole to have all of its mission-critical systems compliant by January 1, 2000, will entail a huge, well-coordinated effort.
gao_GAO-08-723	gao_GAO-08-723_0	HRSA’s New Access Point Grant Process HRSA uses a competitive process to award Health Center Program grants. HRSA’s Training and TA Cooperative Agreements For fiscal year 2007, HRSA funded 60 training and TA cooperative agreements with various national, regional, and state organizations to support the Health Center Program, in part, by providing training and technical assistance to health center grant applicants. Almost Half of MUAs Nationwide Lacked Health Center Sites in 2006, and the Percentage of MUAs Lacking Sites Varied Widely by Census Region and State Based on our analysis of HRSA data, we found that 47 percent of MUAs nationwide—1,600 of 3,421—lacked a health center site in 2006. 2.) The minimal impact of the 2007 awards on regional variation is due, in large part, to the fact that more than two-thirds of the nationwide decline in the number of MUAs that lacked a health center site—77 out of the 113 MUAs—occurred in the South census region. HRSA Oversees Cooperative Agreement Recipients but Oversight Is Limited in Key Respects, and Its Feedback to Unsuccessful Applicants Is Not Always Clear HRSA oversees cooperative agreement recipients, but the agency’s oversight is limited because it does not have standardized performance measures to assess the performance of the cooperative agreement recipients in assisting new access point applicants and the agency is unlikely to meet its policy timeline for conducting comprehensive on-site reviews. Moreover, more than a third of the summary statements sent to unsuccessful applicants for new access point competitions held in fiscal years 2005 and 2007 contained unclear feedback. HRSA’s stated purpose in providing summary statements to unsuccessful applicants is to improve the quality of future grant applications. However, if the feedback HRSA provides in these statements is unclear, it may undermine the usefulness of the feedback for applicants and their ability to successfully compete for new access point grants. However, in 2007, 43 percent of MUAs continue to lack a health center site, and the new access point awards made in 2007 had little impact on the wide variation among census regions and states in the percentage of MUAs lacking a health center site. However, HRSA’s ability to target these awards and place new health center sites in locations where they are most needed is limited because HRSA does not collect and maintain readily available information on the services provided at individual health center sites. Because HRSA does not have standardized performance measures for these recipients— either for their work plan activities or for the comprehensive on-site reviews—the agency cannot assess recipients’ performance using comparable measures and determine the extent to which they support the overall goals of the Health Center Program. These standardized performance measures should include a measure of the number of successful applicants a recipient assisted. Reevaluate its policy of requiring comprehensive on-site reviews of Health Center Program training and TA cooperative agreement recipients every 3 to 5 years and consider targeting its available resources at comprehensive on-site reviews for cooperative agreement recipients that would benefit most from such oversight.	Why GAO Did This Study Health centers funded through grants under the Health Center Program--managed by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--provide comprehensive primary care services for the medically underserved. HRSA provides funding for training and technical assistance (TA) cooperative agreement recipients to assist grant applicants. GAO was asked to examine (1) to what extent medically underserved areas (MUA) lacked health center sites in 2006 and 2007 and (2) HRSA's oversight of training and TA cooperative agreement recipients' assistance to grant applicants and its provision of written feedback provided to unsuccessful applicants. To do this, GAO obtained and analyzed HRSA data, grant applications, and the written feedback provided to unsuccessful grant applicants and interviewed HRSA officials. What GAO Found Grant awards for new health center sites in 2007 reduced the overall percentage of MUAs lacking a health center site from 47 percent in 2006 to 43 percent in 2007. In addition, GAO found wide geographic variation in the percentage of MUAs that lacked a health center site in both years. Most of the 2007 nationwide decline in the number of MUAs that lacked a site occurred in the South census region, in large part, because half of all awards made in 2007 for new health center sites were granted to the South census region. GAO also found that HRSA lacks readily available data on the services provided at individual health center sites. HRSA oversees training and TA cooperative agreement recipients, but its oversight is limited in key respects and it does not always provide clear feedback to unsuccessful grant applicants. HRSA oversees recipients using a number of methods, including regular communications, review of cooperative agreement applications, and comprehensive on-site reviews. However, the agency's oversight is limited because it lacks standardized performance measures to assess the performance of the cooperative agreement recipients and it is unlikely to meet its policy goal of conducting comprehensive on-site reviews of these recipients every 3 to 5 years. The lack of standardized performance measures limits HRSA's ability to effectively evaluate cooperative agreement recipients' activities that support the Health Center Program's goals with comparable measures. In addition, without timely comprehensive on-site reviews, HRSA does not have up-to-date comprehensive information on the performance of these recipients in supporting the Health Center Program. HRSA officials stated that they are in the process of developing standardized performance measures. Moreover, more than a third of the written feedback HRSA sent to unsuccessful Health Center Program grant applicants in fiscal years 2005 and 2007 contained unclear statements. The lack of clarity in this written feedback may undermine its usefulness rather than enhance the ability of applicants to successfully compete for grants in the future.
gao_GAO-02-95	gao_GAO-02-95_0	Military Departments Had Mixed Results Complying With 50-50 Prior-Years Requirement The Department had mixed results complying with the 50-50 prior-years requirement for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Future-Year Projections Are Not Reasonably Accurate or Useful The projections of the Army, Air Force, and Navy in DOD’s future-years’ report for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 are not reasonably accurate estimates of the future allocations of public and private sector workloads. The services’ management placed much less emphasis on the future-years data and reports. The reported projections are based in part on incorrect data, questionable assumptions, and some inconsistencies with existing budgets and management plans. As a result, DOD’s future-years report should be viewed with caution because it does not provide the best data available to DOD decisionmakers and congressional overseers, and the reported data is misleading with regard to how future workloads are likely to be allocated between the public and private sectors. Both public and private sector amounts can be affected. Reporting Processes Improved, but Some Problems Remain While DOD has greatly improved the 50-50 reporting guidance and implementation, opportunities for improvement still exist. With improved management oversight and direction and the implementation of the required corrective actions, the 50-50 report could become a more useful management tool for DOD and the Congress in managing the Department’s depot maintenance program to attain future compliance with the 50-50 requirement.	What GAO Found Federal law states that not more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding can be used for work by private sector contractors. In an earlier report, GAO could not determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had complied with the 50-percent limitation. More recent GAO testimony highlighted continuing and pervasive weaknesses in DOD's financial management systems, operations, and controls that impair its ability to accurately accumulate and report reliable budget execution and cost data. This report found that the military had mixed results complying with the 50-50 requirement for private sector workloads in fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The projections of the Army, Air Force, and Navy in DOD's report for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 are neither accurate nor reasonable estimates of the future allocations of public and private sector workloads. The services placed much less emphasis on the future-years data and reports. The reported projections use incorrect data and questionable assumptions and are inconsistent with existing budgets and management plans. DOD's report should be viewed with caution because it does not provide the best data available to DOD decisionmakers and congressional overseers, and the reported data are misleading about how future workloads are likely to be allocated between the public and private sectors. Although DOD has greatly improved the 50-50 reporting guidance and the implementation of the reporting process, further improvement could be made.
gao_NSIAD-95-9	gao_NSIAD-95-9_0	Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the Army’s plan for modernizing its aviation fleet is still valid, (2) there are alternative aircraft systems to the ones the Army plans to acquire, and (3) the Army’s funding plans include all of the helicopter systems that it says it needs. Validity of the Army’s Aviation Modernization Strategy Is Now Questionable The validity of the Army’s aviation modernization strategy is now questionable. In addition, the Army overstated expected benefits and understated technical risks associated with the Comanche and the Longbow Apache programs that represent the bulk of its modernization strategy. While the Army believes that it can accomplish its modernization objectives, some users are concerned that their needs may not have adequately been considered and that implementation of the current procurement plan could result in an inappropriate mix and quantity of helicopters and, therefore, adversely impact operational effectiveness. For its aviation modernization strategy, the Army has chosen to use most of its available resources to procure the Comanche helicopter and upgrade the Apache helicopter and defer or cancel funding of other Army helicopter programs. In addition to predicted future funding shortfalls, the Army is already faced with a funding shortfall in the Comanche program of about $540 million and, therefore, wants to “streamline” the Comanche acquisition program.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether: (1) the Army's plan for modernizing its aviation fleet is still valid; (2) there are alternative aircraft systems to the ones the Army plans to acquire; and (3) the Army's funding plans will meet all of its modernization requirements. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the validity of the Army's aviation modernization strategy is questionable; (2) the Army has overstated expected benefits and has understated the technical risks associated with the major systems that comprise its modernization strategy; (3) some Army personnel are concerned that the current procurement plan could result in an inappropriate mix of helicopters and adversely impact their operational effectiveness; (4) the Army has not fully considered alternative helicopters and weapon systems that could accomplish many of the planned roles and missions of the Comanche helicopter; (5) the Army plans to use most of its available resources to procure Comanche helicopters and upgrade Apache helicopters while deferring or cancelling funding of other Army helicopter modernization programs; (6) the Army's Comanche program will be short about $540 million through fiscal year 2004; and (7) to address the shortfall in Comanche funding, the Army plans to streamline the developmental stages of the Comanche program, thereby increasing the risks associated with entering production before the aircraft has been tested and shown to meet specifications.
gao_GAO-08-1177T	gao_GAO-08-1177T_0	In accordance with the Clean Water Act’s designation of CAFOs as point sources, EPA defined which poultry and livestock facilities constituted a CAFO and established permitting requirements for CAFOs. The Number of Large Farms Raising Animals Has Increased, but Specific Data on CAFOs Are Not Available Because no federal agency collects accurate and consistent data on the number, size, and location of CAFOs, it is difficult to determine precise trends in CAFOs. According to USDA officials, the data USDA collects for large farms raising animals can be used as a proxy for estimating trends in CAFOs nationwide. Using these data, we determined the following: Between 1982 and 2002, the number of large farms raising animals increased from about 3,600 to almost 12,000, or by about 234 percent. Growth rates varied dramatically by animal type. The number of animals raised on large farms increased from over 257 million in 1982 to over 890 million in 2002—an increase of 246 percent. Without a systematic and coordinated process for collecting and maintaining accurate and complete information on the number, size, and location of CAFOs nationwide, EPA does not have the information it needs to effectively monitor and regulate these operations. Large Farms That Raise Animals Can Produce Thousands of Tons of Manure Each Year, and Regional Clustering of Farms Can Exacerbate Manure Management Problems The amount of manure a large farm that raises animals can generate primarily depends on the types and numbers of animals raised on that farm, but can range from over 2,800 tons to more than 1.6 million tons a year. To further put this in perspective, the amount of manure produced by large farms that raise animals can exceed the amount of sanitary waste produced by some large U.S. cities. Studies Have Identified Impacts of Pollutants from Animal Waste, but EPA Has Not Assessed the Extent of Such Impacts Since 2002, at least 68 government-sponsored or peer-reviewed studies have been completed on air and water pollutants from animal feeding operations. Of these 68 studies, 15 directly linked pollutants from animal waste generated by animal feeding operations to specific health or environmental impacts. 12 made indirect linkages between air and water pollutants and health and environmental impacts. However, they also stated that EPA does not have data on the number and location of CAFOs nationwide and the amount of discharges from these operations. It Is Unclear if EPA’s Efforts to Develop Air Emissions Protocols for Animal Feeding Operations Will Be Effective and Whether EPA Intends to Regulate These Emissions in the Future The National Air Emissions Monitoring Study is intended to provide a scientific basis for estimating air emissions from animal feeding operations and to help EPA develop protocols that will allow it to determine which operations do not comply with applicable federal laws. Although EPA told us that the National Air Emissions Monitoring Study is the first step in developing comprehensive protocols for quantifying air emissions from animal feeding operations, we found that the study may not provide EPA with the data that it needs for the following three reasons. They stated that the study did not include a sufficient number of monitoring sites to establish a statistically valid sample. In addition, we recommended that EPA establish a strategy and timetable for developing a process-based model that will provide more sophisticated air emissions estimating methodologies for animal feeding operations. Two Federal Court Decisions Have Affected EPA’s and Some States’ Ability to Regulate Water Pollutants Discharged by CAFOs Two federal court decisions—Waterkeeper Alliance Inc. v. EPA and Rapanos v. United States—have affected EPA and some states’ abilities to regulate CAFOs for water pollutants. As a result, the decision has complicated the agency’s enforcement of CAFO regulations. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, EPA has regulated CAFOs under the Clean Water Act for more than 30 years, and during this time it has amassed a significant body of knowledge about the pollutants discharged by animal feeding operations and the potential impacts of these pollutants on human health and the environment.	Why GAO Did This Study Concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO) are large livestock and poultry operations that raise animals in a confined situation. CAFOs may improve the efficiency of animal production, but the large amounts of manure they produce can, if improperly managed, degrade air and water quality. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates CAFOs and requires CAFOs that discharge certain pollutants to obtain a permit. This testimony summarizes the findings of a September 4, 2008 GAO report (GAO-08-944) on (1) trends in CAFOs, (2) amounts of waste they generate, (3) findings of key research on CAFOs' health and environmental impacts, (4) progress made in developing CAFO air emissions protocols, and (5) the effect of recent court decisions on EPA's regulation of CAFO water pollutants. GAO analyzed U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) data from 1982 through 2002 for large farms as a proxy for CAFOs; reviewed studies, EPA documents, laws, and regulations, and obtained the views of federal and state officials. What GAO Found Because no federal agency collects accurate and consistent data on the number, size, and location of CAFOs, GAO could not determine the exact trends for these operations. However, using USDA data for large farms that raise animals as a proxy for CAFOs, it appears that the number of these operations increased by about 230 percent, from about 3,600 in 1982 to almost 12,000 in 2002. The number of animals raised on large farms also increased during this 20-year period, but the rate of increase varied by animal type. Moreover, EPA does not have comprehensive, accurate data on the number of permitted CAFOs nationwide. As a result, the agency does not have the information that it needs to effectively regulate these CAFOs. EPA is currently working with the states to establish a new national data base. The amount of manure generated by large farms that raise animals depends on the type and number of animals raised, but these operations can produce from 2,800 tons to 1.6 million tons of manure a year. Some large farms that raise animals can generate more manure annually than the sanitary waste produced by some U.S. cities. Manure can be used beneficially to fertilize crops; but according to some agricultural experts, when animal feeding operations are clustered in certain geographic areas, the manure they produce may not be effectively used as fertilizer on adjacent cropland and could increase the potential of pollutants reaching nearby waters and degrading water quality. Since 2002, at least 68 government-sponsored or peer-reviewed studies have been completed that examined air and water quality issues associated with animal feeding operations and 15 have directly linked air and water pollutants from animal waste to specific health or environmental impacts. EPA has not yet assessed the extent to which pollutants from animal feeding operations may be impairing human health and the environment because it lacks key data on the amount of pollutants being discharged by these operations. Considered a first step in developing air emission protocols for animal feeding operations, a 2-year nationwide air emission monitoring study, largely funded by the industry, was initiated in 2007. However, the study, as currently structured, may not provide the scientific and statistically valid data it was intended to provide and that EPA needs to develop these protocols. In addition, EPA has not yet established a strategy or timetable for developing a more sophisticated process-based model that considers the interaction and implications of all emission sources at an animal feeding operation. Two recent federal court decisions have affected EPA's ability to regulate water pollutants discharged by CAFOs. The 2005 Waterkeeper decision required EPA to abandon the approach that it had proposed for regulating CAFOs in 2003. Similarly, the Rapanos decision has complicated EPA's enforcement of CAFO discharges because EPA believes that it must now gather more evidence to establish which waters are subject to the Clean Water Act's permitting requirements.
gao_GAO-14-592	gao_GAO-14-592_0	States Allocated Nearly $400 Million in CZMP Funds during Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013 for a Wide Range of Coastal Management Activities During fiscal years 2008 through 2013, the 34 participating states allocated a total of nearly $400 million in CZMP funds for a variety of activities, generally related to the broad goals for state programs outlined in the Coastal Zone Management Act. Examples of activities for which participating states allocated CZMP funds during fiscal years 2008 through 2013 in each of the six focus areas include the following: Government coordination. Coastal habitat. Limitations Exist with NOAA’s Performance Assessment Tools, and NOAA Makes Limited Use of Performance Information NOAA’s two primary performance assessment tools, the CZMP performance measurement system and its state program evaluations, have limitations, even with changes NOAA has made since 2008, and NOAA uses the performance information it collects to a limited extent in managing the CZMP. We found that NOAA’s CZMP performance measurement system does not align with some key attributes of successful performance measures. Furthermore, NOAA makes limited use of the performance information it collects—for instance, NOAA does not use data from its performance measurement system or its evaluations of state programs to improve implementation of the CZMP at the national level—and, as a result, may not be realizing the full benefit of collecting such information. For instance, in 2011, NOAA eliminated its coastal water quality focus area— corresponding to one of the six focus areas based on goals of the CZMP outlined in the act. Balance, or having a set of measures that cover a program’s various goals, is a key attribute of successful performance measures. NOAA officials indicated that they eliminated the coastal water quality focus area based on a 2011 performance measurement system workgroup’s recommendation to streamline the measurement system. By requiring states to collect and submit financial data similar to data that they already provide in their cooperative agreements and making limited use of these data, NOAA may be unnecessarily burdening state programs with data collection requirements. Without a documented approach for how it plans to assess its CZMP performance measurement system—including the scope and criteria it will use, such as how it will ensure its measures align with key attributes of successful performance measures—NOAA cannot demonstrate that its intended effort will improve its CZMP performance measurement system. NOAA Cannot Ensure That Its Revised Process for Surveying Stakeholders to Inform State Program Evaluations Will Produce Complete and Unbiased Information In 2013, NOAA revised its process for conducting state program evaluations, which are required under the Coastal Zone Management Act to assess state programs’ adherence to the act’s requirements, but we identified a limitation in NOAA’s method for sampling stakeholders under the revised process. According to NOAA documents, the purpose of the revisions was to conduct evaluations more efficiently, at a reduced cost, while continuing to meet evaluation requirements outlined in the act. In the absence of additional criteria for selecting stakeholders to survey, NOAA may select a sample of stakeholders whose work with a state program does not span all of the act’s goals, potentially leaving NOAA without information to inform its evaluation of a state’s performance on one or more goals. However, NOAA has not published additional similar reports, and has not used performance measurement system data for other purposes. NOAA’s strategic plan for its merged coastal management office recognizes the importance of using and reporting performance information. As part of its intended review of the CZMP performance measurement system and in consideration of how it intends to use the performance information, document the approach it plans to take to analyze and revise, as appropriate, the performance measures, and in so doing ensure the analysis considers key attributes of successful performance measures, such as balance and limited overlap. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Focusing on National Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP) activities since our 2008 report, our objectives were to examine (1) how participating states allocated CZMP funds awarded in fiscal years 2008 through 2013 and (2) how the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) primary performance assessment tools have changed and the extent to which NOAA uses performance information to help manage the CZMP. We reviewed NOAA’s analysis of states’ allocations of CZMP funding for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, which was based on NOAA’s review of its cooperative agreements for federal funding with states. Measure provides new information beyond that provided by other data sources.	Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. coast is home to more than half the U.S. population and integral to the nation's economy. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, NOAA administers the CZMP, a federal-state partnership that encourages states to balance development with protection of coastal zones in exchange for federal financial assistance and other incentives. In 2008, GAO reviewed the CZMP and recommended improvements for CZMP performance assessment tools. A fiscal year 2013 appropriations committee report mandated GAO to review NOAA's implementation of the act. This report examines (1) how states allocated CZMP funds awarded in fiscal years 2008 through 2013 and (2) how NOAA's primary performance assessment tools have changed since GAO's 2008 report and the extent to which NOAA uses performance information in managing the CZMP. GAO reviewed laws, guidance, and performance-related reports; analyzed CZMP funding data for fiscal years 2008-2013; and interviewed NOAA officials and a nongeneralizeable sample of officials from seven states selected for receiving the most fiscal year 2012 funding in each of NOAA's regions. What GAO Found During fiscal years 2008 through 2013, the 34 states participating in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP) allocated nearly $400 million in CZMP funds for a variety of activities. States allocated this funding for activities spanning six broad focus areas based on goals outlined in the Coastal Zone Management Act. For example, states allocated about a quarter of their CZMP funding to the coastal habitat focus area, according to NOAA's analysis. Coastal habitat activities encompassed a variety of actions to protect, restore, or enhance coastal habitat areas, such as habitat mapping or restoration planning efforts of marsh habitats for fish and wildlife and enhanced recreational opportunities. NOAA's two primary performance assessment tools—its CZMP performance measurement system and state program evaluations—have limitations, even with changes NOAA made since 2008, and NOAA makes limited use of the performance information it collects. Regarding the performance measurement system, NOAA has made changes such as taking steps intended to improve the reliability of data it collects. However, its current measurement system does not align with some key attributes of successful performance measures, including the following: Balance: a balanced set of measures ensures that a program's various goals are covered. NOAA removed the coastal water quality focus area, one of six focus areas based on goals in the act, to streamline the performance measurement system. As a result, the system may not provide a complete picture of states' overall performance across all focus areas based on goals in the act. Limited overlap: measures should produce new information beyond what is provided by other data sources . NOAA's system includes measures that overlap with financial data provided in cooperative agreements. By requiring states to submit financial data available through other sources, NOAA may be unnecessarily burdening states with data collection requirements. NOAA plans to review and potentially revise its measurement system, but it has not documented the approach it plans to take, including how the measures will align with key attributes of successful performance measures. Regarding state program evaluations, in 2013, NOAA revised its process to conduct evaluations more efficiently, at a reduced cost. However, GAO identified a limitation in NOAA's method for sampling stakeholders to survey under its revised process that may result in the selection of stakeholders that do not span all six focus areas based on goals of the act. Finally, NOAA makes limited use of the performance information it collects from these tools. For example, since it began collecting performance measurement data in 2008, NOAA used the data once to report on accomplishments. NOAA recognizes the importance of using performance information to improve program implementation, but it has not documented a strategy for how it will use its performance information to manage the program. As a result, NOAA may not be realizing the full benefit of collecting performance information. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that NOAA document an approach to analyze and revise, as appropriate, its performance measures against key attributes, revise its process for selecting stakeholders to survey in its state program evaluations, and document a strategy for using the performance information it collects. NOAA concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GGD-95-5	gao_GGD-95-5_0	Objective, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to assess IRS’ performance during the 1994 filing season. Specifically, we focused on IRS’ ability to (1) process income tax returns and refunds accurately and efficiently and (2) provide taxpayers access to forms, information, and electronic filing methods. To achieve our objective, we validated the results of 1 service center’s test of the accuracy and timeliness of refunds by reviewing 853 randomly selected refunds; analyzed filing season-related data from IRS’ Management Information System for Top Level Executives and IRS data on processing errors, including those involving the EIC; reviewed IRS reports on refund fraud; reviewed computer system availability reports and attended weekly operational meetings held by IRS’ National Office Command Center; assessed the availability of tax materials by visiting 10 walk-in sites; tested taxpayers’ access to ordering forms and publications from IRS’ 3 tax material distribution centers by placing phone calls to those centers; analyzed IRS’ toll-free telephone system accessibility data, telephone activity data for area distribution centers, and telephone accessibility reports for the TeleFile system; compiled trend data for various indicators of IRS’ filing season performance; and interviewed IRS National Office officials and IRS officials in the Atlanta; Cincinnati; Fresno, CA; and Kansas City, MO, Service Centers responsible for the various activities we assessed. Use of Alternative Filing Methods Generally Increased Although the overall number of individual filers has not significantly increased, taxpayer use of the various alternative filing methods generally increased in 1994. In 1994, 13.5 million individual income tax returns were filed electronically—up from 12.3 million in 1993. What is unclear is (1) how much of this growth is due to increased fraudulent activity rather than an improvement in fraud detection and (2) how much additional fraud might be going undetected. Taxpayers Continue to Have Problems Reaching IRS by Telephone Taxpayers call IRS during the filing season for a variety of reasons. Toll-Free Accessibility Continued to Decline A key indicator of filing season performance is how well IRS serves taxpayers who call toll-free telephone assistance to ask questions about their account, the tax law, or IRS procedures. It is the source of many of the errors made by taxpayers and tax practitioners in preparing returns, and almost all of the refund fraud cases identified by IRS involve the EIC. That situation may only worsen in 1995 as more people become eligible to claim the credit.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) performance during the 1994 tax filing season, focusing on: (1) IRS individual income tax returns and refunds processing; and (2) taxpayer accessibility to IRS information. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) during the 1994 filing season, the number of filed tax returns increased and taxpayers increased their use of alternative filing methods; (2) tax refunds were accurately and timely issued at one IRS service center; (3) IRS reduced the amount of rework and downtime by improving the accuracy of its returns processing and computer operations; (4) IRS fulfilled most taxpayer requests for tax forms and publications and provided accurate toll-free telephone assistance to taxpayers with tax law questions; (5) during the 1994 filing season, IRS identified twice as many fraudulent claims as in 1993; (6) it is unclear whether the growth in tax fraud was due to increased fraudulent activity or improved IRS monitoring and detection; (7) taxpayers' ability to reach IRS by telephone continued to decline during the 1994 filing season; (8) at the peak of the 1994 filing period, IRS answered only about 20 percent of its toll-free telephone assistance calls, 50 percent of the calls to its forms distribution centers, and 13 percent of the calls to its Telefile system; (9) the Earned Income Credit (EIC) provision continued to cause problems for IRS and taxpayers; (10) EIC was the source of many tax preparation errors and almost all of the refund fraud cases identified by IRS; and (11) EIC fraud could increase significantly as more taxpayers become eligible to claim EIC.
gao_GAO-03-718T	gao_GAO-03-718T_0	In the 1960s, the number and dollar amount of federal assistance programs grew substantially. Growth in the both the numbers of new grant programs and the level of funding created greater complexity. Over the years, Congress at times has acted to improve the grant system through consolidation. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 consolidated a number of social service programs into nine block grants which allowed for greater state and local autonomy and flexibility in the fashioning of local strategies to address federal objectives. As far back as 1975, GAO reported that many of the fundamental problems in managing federal grants were the direct result of the proliferation of federal assistance programs and the fragmentation of responsibility among different federal departments and agencies. The fragmented delivery of federal assistance can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels. Some have observed that federal grant restrictions constrain the flexibility state and local officials need to tailor multiple grants to address state and local needs and priorities. Actions taken by federal agencies under the rubric of the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999 will help to streamline the process for obtaining aid across the myriad of programs and standardize administrative requirements. Several alternatives have been pursued in the past to overcome problems fostered by fragmentation in the federal aid structure. Block grants are one option that Congress has chosen to consolidate related programs. A third approach to overcoming fragmentation could be to provide in law for waivers of federal funding restrictions and program rules when requested and sufficiently justified by state or local governments. Improving the grant partnership among federal and nonfederal officials is vital to achieving important national goals. The Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999 offers promising opportunities to help those officials achieve their mutual goals through the use of federal assistance programs.	Why GAO Did This Study The Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999 is one of the most recent in a series of efforts to reform the federal grants management system. The act seeks to improve the effectiveness and performance of Federal financial assistance programs; simplify application and reporting requirements; improve delivery of services to the public; and facilitate greater coordination among those responsible for delivering such services. GAO has a responsibility to evaluate the implementation of this Act by 2005 and will soon begin developing an approach and methodology for the study. This testimony describes the problems fostered by proliferation and fragmentation, which the Act addresses indirectly. What GAO Found While the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999 (FFAMIA) offers promising opportunities to improve the federal grant system, there remain over 600 different federal financial assistance programs to implement domestic policy. Federal grant recipients must navigate through a myriad of federal grant programs in order to find the appropriate source of funds to finance projects that meet local needs and address local issues. Despite the process reforms initiated under FFAMIA, the federal grant system continues to be highly fragmented, potentially resulting in a high degree of duplication and overlap among federal programs. Since the 1960s the number and dollar amount of federal grant programs has grown substantially. Growth in both the number of grant programs and the level of funding have created a high level of complexity in the system. While the act seeks to improve the effectiveness and performance of federal assistance programs by simplifying grant administration and facilitating coordination among grant recipients, Congress could also consider consolidating grants that have duplicative objectives and missions. Consolidation can be achieved through a variety of ways including combining multiple programs into block grants, establishing performance partnerships, and providing for waiver authority of federal funding restrictions and program rules when requested and sufficiently justified by state or local governments. Each of these alternatives has implications for accountability that Congress will face as it considers improvements to the federal grant system.
gao_GAO-05-572T	gao_GAO-05-572T_0	Implementing Task Force Recommendations Should Improve VR&E Services We generally agree with the Task Force’s key findings, which broadly address three areas of VR&E’s operations. Many of the Task Force’s recommendations in this area are consistent with GAO’s governmentwide work reporting that agencies need to strengthen strategic planning and investment management in information technology. Finally, the Task Force recommended that VR&E strengthen coordination within VA between VR&E and the Veterans Health Administration, and between VR&E and the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Labor. VA Continues to Face Significant Challenges in Improving Its VR&E Program While VR&E responds to the Task Force recommendations, it faces immediate challenges associated with providing vocational rehabilitation and employment services to injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. VR&E also lacks the information technology systems needed to manage the provision of services to these servicemembers and to veterans. In addition, VR&E is only now beginning to use results-based criteria for measuring its success in assisting veterans achieve sustained employment. An inherent challenge is that individual differences and uncertainties in the recovery process make it difficult to determine when a seriously injured service member will be able to consider VR&E services. Additionally, as we reported in our January 2005 report, given that VA is conducting outreach to servicemembers whose discharge from military service is not yet certain, VA is challenged by DOD’s concerns that VA’s outreach about benefits, including early intervention with VR&E services, could adversely affect the military’s retention goals. Finally, VA is currently challenged by a lack of access to DOD data that would, at a minimum, allow the agency to readily identify and locate all seriously injured servicemembers. We also reported that VA had taken steps to expedite VR&E services for seriously injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the Task Force pointed out that the number of reports that VR&E’s automated case management system can generate is limited. The Task Force recommended that VR&E develop a new outcomes-based performance measurement system to complement the proposed 5-track employment-driven service delivery system. In its fiscal year 2004 performance and accountability report, VR&E included four employment-based performance measures: the percentage of participants employed during the first quarter (90 days) after leaving the program, the percentage still employed after the third quarter (270 days), the percentage change in earnings from pre-application to post-program, and the average cost of placing a participant in employment. However, as of February 2005, VR&E was still in the process of developing data for these measures and had not reported results. 15, 2004) Vocational Rehabilitation: Opportunities to Improve Program Effectiveness (GAO/T-HEHS-98-87, Feb. 4, 1998) Veterans Benefits Administration: Focusing on Results in Vocational Rehabilitation and Education Programs (GAO/T-HEHS-97-148, Jun.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Veterans Affairs' Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program has taken on heightened importance due, in large measure, to the number of servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq with serious injuries and their need for vocational rehabilitation and employment assistance. This statement draws on over 20 years of GAO's reporting on VA's provision of vocational rehabilitation and employment assistance to American veterans and focuses primarily on the results of two recent GAO reports. The first, issued in June 2004, commented on the report of the VA-sponsored VR&E Task Force, which performed a comprehensive review of VR&E activities and made extensive recommendations that, if implemented, would affect virtually every aspect of VR&E's operations. The second, issued in January 2005, focused on the steps VA has taken and the challenges it faces in providing services to seriously injured veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. What GAO Found The past year has presented the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with an unprecedented opportunity to begin strengthening its provision of vocational rehabilitation and employment services to veterans. The VR&E Task Force has developed a blueprint for the changes needed to improve numerous programmatic and managerial aspects of VR&E's operations. We generally agree with the Task Force's three key findings. We also generally agree with the Task Force's key recommendations to streamline eligibility and entitlement, institute a new employment-driven service delivery process, expand counseling benefits, reorganize and increase VR&E staffing, and improve information technology capabilities and intra- and inter-agency coordination. VR&E faces three overriding challenges as it responds to the Task Force recommendations. First, providing early intervention assistance to injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq is complicated by (1) differences and uncertainties in the recovery process, which make it difficult for VR&E to determine when a servicemember will be able to consider its services; (2) the Department of Defense's (DOD) concerns that VA's outreach could work at cross purposes to the military's retention goals; and (3) lack of access to DOD data that would allow VA to readily identify and locate all seriously injured servicemembers. Second, VR&E needs to upgrade its information technology system. The Task Force report pointed out that VR&E's IT system is limited in its ability to produce useful reports. Third, VR&E needs to use new results-based criteria to evaluate and improve performance. The Task Force recommended that VR&E develop a new employment-oriented performance measurement system, including measures of sustained employment longer than 60 days. In fiscal year 2004, VR&E included four employment-based performance criteria in its performance and accountability report. However, as of February 2005, VR&E had not yet reported results using these longer-term measures.
gao_GAO-15-335	gao_GAO-15-335_0	Lifeline Program—Provides support to telecommunications carriers that in turn offer discounts on telecommunications services to eligible low-income households. Carriers generally pass their USF contribution obligation on to their customers, typically in the form of a line item on their monthly telephone bill. In particular, FCC adopted the Lifeline Reform Order (the Order) in 2012 to strengthen internal controls, improve accountability, and explore the inclusion of broadband in the program through a pilot program. FCC Has Made Progress Implementing Lifeline Reforms, but It Has Not Evaluated the Program’s Effectiveness FCC Has Made Progress Implementing Lifeline Reforms, but Some Reform Efforts Remain Incomplete Although FCC has made progress implementing the reforms contained in the Order, four actions remain incomplete. In some cases, FCC needs to make a decision, such as determining the permanent rate for Lifeline reimbursement claims. In other cases, FCC needs additional time to fully implement the reform, such as defining performance measures. These goals were: (1) to ensure the availability of voice service for low-income Americans, (2) to ensure the availability of broadband for low-income Americans, and (3) to minimize the Universal Service Fund contribution burden on consumers and businesses. However, FCC officials noted that two academic studies have assessed the program, including the impact of the Lifeline program on household decisions to subscribe to telephone service. In 2014, Over 12 Million Households Participated in Lifeline, and Some Households Faced Challenges in Accessing and Retaining Benefits Lifeline Participation Was 18.1 Million Households in 2012 and Declined to 12.4 Million by 2014 Lifeline participation and disbursements increased rapidly from 2008 through mid-2012 and declined after FCC’s reform Order in 2012 (see fig. 2). In 2010, we found that growth in the program was primarily due to the introduction of prepaid wireless as an eligible service. Usefulness of Broadband Pilot Program May Be Limited by FCC’s Lack of Evaluation Plan and Other Challenges FCC Designed the Broadband Pilot Program to Test a Variety of Factors, but Did Not Conduct a Needs Assessment or Develop an Evaluation Plan FCC’s broadband pilot program includes 14 pilot projects that test an array of options and will generate information that FCC intends to use to decide whether and how to incorporate broadband into Lifeline. According to FCC, the projects are expected to provide high-quality data on how the Lifeline program could be structured to promote broadband adoption by low-income households. In particular, according to FCC officials, the pilot projects completed offering subsidized service in October 2014, but FCC has not announced when or how it would share the results of the projects. FCC officials said that the 74,000 consumers noted in the December 2012 order adopting the pilot program was an estimate of consumers who could be served through the program given the available funding and was not a reliable number and should not be interpreted as a goal for the program. FCC officials believe information on the number of consumers offered service can provide relevant information regarding the subsidy’s effect on broadband adoption. Without such planning, FCC now faces difficulties in evaluating the program without established benchmarks for success. Further, FCC does not know why large numbers of eligible households did not enroll in the pilot projects. FCC attributes the narrowing of the gap between low- income and higher-income households’ telephone penetration rates over the past 30 years to the Lifeline program. However, several factors could play a role in this change, such as a reduction in the price of service over time. Program evaluation is a critical strategy that can allow agencies to assess the value or effectiveness of a program, among other things. Recommendation for Executive Action We recommend that FCC conduct a program evaluation to determine the extent to which the Lifeline program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals of ensuring the availability of voice service for low- income Americans while minimizing the contribution burden on consumers and businesses. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, FCC agreed that it should evaluate the extent to which the program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals, and said that FCC staff will address our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the status of Lifeline reform efforts and the extent to which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has evaluated the effectiveness of the program; (2) how the Lifeline program verifies household eligibility and addresses associated privacy and data security; (3) the extent to which households participate in Lifeline and the challenges, if any, they face in accessing and retaining program benefits; and (4) how FCC plans to evaluate the broadband pilot program and the extent to which the pilot program will enable FCC to decide whether and how to include broadband in the Lifeline program.	Why GAO Did This Study Through FCC's Lifeline program, companies provide discounts to eligible low-income households for telephone service. Lifeline supports these companies through the Universal Service Fund (USF). Companies generally pass their USF contribution obligation on to their customers, typically in the form of a line item on their telephone bills. In 2012, FCC adopted reforms to address problems with duplicate and ineligible participants and to explore adding broadband through a pilot program. GAO was asked to review FCC's reforms. This report examines (1) the status of reform efforts and the extent to which FCC has evaluated program effectiveness, (2) the extent to which households participate and challenges they face in accessing and retaining benefits, and (3) FCC's plans to evaluate the broadband pilot program. GAO reviewed FCC orders and other relevant documentation; analyzed 2008–2012 Census Bureau data; and interviewed FCC officials, officials at four pilot projects selected based on features such as technology, and officials from 12 Lifeline providers and four states selected based on factors such as disbursements and participation. What GAO Found The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has made progress implementing reforms to the Lifeline Program (Lifeline), which reduces the cost of telephone service for eligible low-income households. In 2012, FCC adopted a Reform Order with 11 key reforms that aimed to increase accountability and strengthen internal controls, among other things. FCC has implemented seven of the reforms and partially implemented four. In some cases, FCC needs to make a decision, and in other cases, additional time is needed to fully implement the reform. However, FCC has not evaluated Lifeline's effectiveness in achieving its goals—to ensure the availability of voice service for low-income Americans and minimize the burden on consumers and businesses that fund the program. FCC attributes improvements in the level of low-income households' subscribing to telephone service over the past 30 years to Lifeline, but other factors, such as lower prices, may play a role. FCC officials stated that Lifeline's structure makes evaluation difficult, but referred GAO to academic studies that suggest that many low-income households would subscribe to telephone service without Lifeline. GAO has found that program evaluation can help agencies understand whether a program is addressing an intended problem. Without a program evaluation, FCC does not know whether Lifeline is effectively ensuring the availability of telephone service for low-income households while minimizing program costs. In 2014, over 12 million households participated in Lifeline, up from about 7 million in 2008. At its peak enrollment in 2012, Lifeline served about 18 million households. The introduction of prepaid wireless service contributed to this growth. After the Reform Order, program disbursements declined from $2.2 billion in 2012 to $1.7 billion in 2014, due in part to a reduction in the number of ineligible households receiving benefits. Based on interviews with stakeholders and providers, GAO identified challenges households may face in accessing and retaining benefits, including lack of awareness of the program and difficulty complying with new requirements, such as providing documentation of eligibility. Companies providing Lifeline service have taken steps, such as greater outreach and in-person enrollment, to mitigate these challenges. The usefulness of information FCC gathered through its broadband pilot program may be limited due to the lack of an evaluation plan and other challenges. The pilot program included 14 projects to test an array of options and provide data on how Lifeline could be structured to promote broadband. According to FCC officials, the 14 projects enrolled about one-tenth of the 74,000 customers anticipated before ending subsidized service in October 2014. Although GAO previously recommended in 2010 that FCC develop a needs assessment and implementation and evaluation plans for the pilot, FCC did not do so and now faces difficulties in evaluating the program without established benchmarks. Although enrollment was lower than anticipated, FCC officials believe information on the number of eligible consumers offered service can provide relevant information regarding the options' effects on broadband adoption. However, FCC did not survey these consumers and does not know why eligible households did not enroll. The pilot projects are substantially complete, and FCC officials noted that the pilot program is one of many factors FCC will consider when deciding whether and how to incorporate broadband into Lifeline. What GAO Recommends FCC should conduct a program evaluation to determine the extent to which the Lifeline program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals. FCC agreed that it should evaluate the extent to which the program is efficiently and effectively reaching its performance goals and said that FCC staff will address GAO's recommendation.
gao_GAO-04-670T	gao_GAO-04-670T_0	Army and Air National Guard Have Participated in Multiple Missions and Experienced High Activations for Overseas and Homeland Security Operations Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, nearly half of the National Guard’s members have been alerted or activated to meet the multiple federal requirements at home and abroad arising out of the Global War on Terrorism. Moreover, Army Guard units with high-demand specialties have faced extended and repeated deployments. High Use and Expanded Missions of Army Guard Signify Change from Strategic Reserve Force to Operational Force The high level of Army Guard forces needed for federal missions for the foreseeable future represents a fundamental change from the Guard’s planned role as a strategic reserve force that would have additional time to train following the onset of war to an operational force that has had to respond quickly. Army Guard forces that are frequently called on by state governors to respond to state needs such as natural disasters have also been affected by current operational demands—about 70 percent of the enhanced brigades and separate battalions and 75 percent of the Guard’s divisional combat battalions have been deployed at some point since September 11 and, when deployed, were not available for state needs. For example, to avoid critical shortages of military police units, 27 Army National Guard units, containing over 7,000 personnel, were converted from other specialties such as field artillery to military police units, some of which have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy security. In total, more than 34,000 soldiers deployed with new units that were tailored to provide specific capabilities needed as a result of the new security environment. Significant Use of Air Guard Occurred for Iraq Combat Operations and Homeland Defense Missions, but Number of Activated Personnel Has Decreased The Air National Guard has also faced expanded roles and high utilization since September 11, 2001. Since the terrorist attacks on the homeland, the Air National Guard has been called on to perform new missions such as flying combat air patrols and providing radar coverage for the continental United States. Readiness of Non- deployed National Guard Units Has Declined, but Decline Is Most Significant for the Army Guard Since September 11, 2001, the extensive use of both the Army and Air National Guard in recent operations has resulted in a steady decline in the warfighting readiness of non-deployed units. The effect of this readiness decline on the Guard’s ability to perform homeland security missions is unknown because DOD has not completed its efforts to define requirements and readiness standards and measures for the homeland defense missions it would lead or the civil missions is would support. Since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers of personnel from one unit to another to enhance the readiness of deploying units. Many Air Guard units use aging aircraft, and the high pace of operations has been a training and maintenance challenge. DOD Has Not Fully Defined Mission Requirements or Readiness Standards and Measures for All Its Homeland Security Missions, and Some States Have Concerns about Preparedness and Availability of Guard Units It is difficult to assess the Guard’s preparedness for the full range of homeland security missions because requirements for these missions are not yet well defined. Readying and Resourcing National Guard Units for Overseas and Domestic Missions Presents Significant Near- and Long- Term Challenges Our work has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face significant near- and long-term challenges to readying and resourcing National Guard units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism. These improvements may be difficult to realize because the Army National Guard is still operating at peacetime funding levels despite declining readiness. Second, in the longer term, the Guard’s ability to successfully organize for its missions in the new strategic environment will depend on whether adequate resources are identified for these efforts and whether DOD’s readiness and funding policies are consistent with the Army Guard’s expected high utilization for the foreseeable future. Finally, in addition to restructuring and funding to be ready for the Guard’s federal mission, DOD must consider how to balance homeland and overseas requirements. Conclusion In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the high pace of operations has caused some difficulties for the Air Guard and the Army Guard, the Army Guard’s efforts to ready units to deploy by taking trained personnel and critical equipment from other units has created urgent personnel and equipment shortages in units that have not yet been deployed.	Why GAO Did This Study As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. The Guard consists of 350,000 Army Guard soldiers and 107,000 Air Guard members. With its unique dual status, it performs state missions under the governor and federal missions at home and overseas under the President. Since September 11, the Guard's missions have expanded, raising concerns about its ability to simultaneously perform all of these functions. The Department of Defense (DOD) funds the Army Guard for partial readiness to accomplish mission requirements assuming that there will be time to supply additional personnel and equipment in an extended conflict. In contrast, the Air Guard is funded to be an operational reserve ready on short notice. Today's testimony addresses GAO's observations on (1) the extent and purpose of the National Guard's use since September 11, (2) the effects of that use on Guard forces' readiness for future missions, and (3) the challenges that DOD, the states, and Congress face in organizing and equipping the Guard to support both overseas and homeland missions. What GAO Found With the high pace of operations since September 11, more than 51 percent of Army Guard members and 31 percent of Air Guard members have been activated to meet new homeland and overseas demands. The Army Guard has experienced significant difficulties in responding to these extensive and ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for continued overseas deployments. Moreover, units with certain specialties--military police, transportation, and combat arms--have been in high demand, resulting in lengthy and repeated deployments. To ease critical shortages, 27 Army Guard units were retrained as military police from other specialties such as field artillery. The Air Guard, although less affected by the high pace because it is funded to deploy quickly, has also seen significant use for Iraq combat operations and homeland security missions. While the number of activated Air Guard personnel has decreased over the past year, some personnel were activated outside their normal rotational schedules and tour lengths have been extended. In addition, some units have been assigned new homeland missions such as flying combat air patrols and providing radar coverage over the United States. While the high use of the National Guard since September 11 has led to declining war-fighting readiness of non-deployed Army and Air Guard units, the decline is most significant for the Army Guard. To meet wartime needs, the Army Guard has had to take personnel and equipment from units that had not been activated to ready others for deployment. For example, the Army Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers to fill personnel shortages in deploying units and transferred about 22,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to ready units deploying to Iraq. The Air Guard's readiness has also declined because the high pace of operations created maintenance challenges for its aging aircraft and limited training opportunities. Because DOD has not fully defined requirements, readiness standards, and readiness measures for the homeland security missions it will lead or support, the Guard's preparedness specifically for homeland security missions is unknown. However, states are concerned that continuing deployments reduce the Guard's preparedness and availability for all its homeland security and natural disaster missions. DOD, the states, and Congress face near- and long-term challenges readying and funding National Guard units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism. Enhancing the near-term readiness of Army Guard units will be difficult because the Army Guard is still operating with peacetime funding. In the long term, the Army Guard's ability to restructure its forces to meet the requirements of the new security environment will depend on whether it is given adequate resources and funding priority. Finally, DOD will need to consider how to balance Army and Air Guard forces needed for both homeland and overseas security requirements.
gao_GAO-13-773T	gao_GAO-13-773T_0	Under the compacts of free association, citizens of the FAS are exempt from meeting the visa and labor certification requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended. The amended compacts’ enabling legislation provides for Interior to allocate the $30 million in grants to affected jurisdictions on the basis of their compact migrant population. Each affected jurisdiction is to receive its portion of the $30 million per year in proportion to the number of compact migrants living there, as determined by an enumeration to be undertaken by Interior and supervised by the U.S. Census Bureau (Census) or another organization at least every 5 years.the population to be enumerated as persons, or those persons’ children under the age of 18, who pursuant to the compacts are admitted to, or resident in, an affected jurisdiction. The combined data from Census’s 2005-2009 American Community Survey and the 2008 required enumerations in Guam and the CNMI estimated that approximately 56,000 compact migrants quarter of all FAS citizens—lived in U.S. areas, with the largest populations in Guam and Hawaii. On the basis of these combined data, we estimate that approximately 68 percent of compact migrants were from the FSM, 23 percent were from the Marshall Islands, and 9 percent were from Palau. Guam and Hawaii Report Rising Compact Costs, Primarily for Education and Health For 2004 through 2010, the affected jurisdictions’ reports to Interior show more than $1 billion in costs for services related to compact migrants. The affected jurisdictions reported impact costs for education, health, public safety, and social services. Education accounted for the largest share of reported expenses in all three jurisdictions, and health care costs accounted for the second-largest share overall (see table 1). Compact Impact Estimates Have a Number of Weaknesses We identified a number of weaknesses related to accuracy, adequacy of documentation, and comprehensiveness in affected jurisdictions’ reporting of compact impacts to Interior from 2004 through 2010. Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI, among other U.S. states and territories, receive federal funding for programs that compact migrants use; however, not all compact impact reports accounted for this stream of funding and included costs in compact impact estimates for programs that federal funding had partially addressed. Revenue. For example, Hawaii did not provide estimated costs to Interior in 2005 and 2006, although it included partial costs incurred in those years in its 2007 and 2008 reports. Existing Compact Impact Reporting Guidelines Have Gaps and Generally Are Not Used Guidelines that Interior developed in 1994 for compact impact reporting do not adequately address certain concepts key to reliable estimates of impact costs. However, the 1994 guidelines do not address certain concepts, such as calculating revenue received from providing services to compact migrants, including capital costs, and ensuring that data are reliable and reporting is consistent. Several Hawaii and CNMI officials from the reporting local government agencies we met with, as well as Interior officials, were not aware of the 1994 guidelines and had not used them. In order to strengthen Interior’s ability to collect, evaluate, and submit reliable information to Congress on compact impact, we recommended in our November 2011 report that Interior disseminate guidelines to the affected jurisdictions on producing reliable impact estimates, and call for the affected jurisdictions to apply these guidelines when developing compact impact reports. Interior agreed with our recommendation. We continue to believe that providing more rigorous guidelines to the affected jurisdictions and promoting their use for compact impact reports would increase the likelihood that Interior can provide reliable information on compact impacts to Congress. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.	Why GAO Did This Study U.S. compacts with the FAS permit those three countries' citizens to migrate to the United States and its territories (U.S. areas) without regard to visa and labor certification requirements. Thousands of FAS citizens have migrated to U.S. areas (compact migrants)—particularly to Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI. In fiscal year 2004, Congress appropriated $30 million annually for 20 years to help defray affected jurisdictions' costs for migrant services. Interior allocates the $30 million as compact impact grants in proportion to the number of compact migrants living in each affected jurisdiction. Although not required, affected jurisdictions may report impact costs to Interior, which submits any reports it receives to Congress. This statement draws from GAO's November 2011 report on compact migrants and discusses challenges in identifying the impact of compact migrants on U.S. areas. For this statement, GAO assessed progress made by Interior to address the recommendation that it disseminate cost guidelines. What GAO Found Data from the U.S. Census Bureau (Census) show that migrants from the freely associated states (FAS)—the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, and Palau—reside throughout U.S. areas. GAO's 2011 report found that Census estimates that roughly 56,000 compact migrants—nearly a quarter of all FAS citizens—were living in U.S. areas in 2005 to 2009. About 58 percent of compact migrants lived in areas that Congress defined in the amended compacts' enabling legislation as affected jurisdictions: American Samoa, Hawaii, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). For fiscal years 2004 through 2010, Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI reported more than $1 billion in costs associated with providing education, health, and social services to compact migrants—far in excess of the $210 million in compact impact grants over that time period. The affected jurisdictions reported impact costs for education, health, public safety, and social services to the Department of the Interior (Interior). Education accounted for the largest share of reported expenses in all three jurisdictions, and health care costs accounted for the second-largest share overall. However, assessed against best practices for cost estimation, these cost estimates contain a number of limitations with regard to accuracy, adequate documentation, and comprehensiveness, affecting the reported costs' credibility and preventing a precise calculation of total compact impact on the affected jurisdictions. For example, some jurisdictions did not accurately define compact migrants, account for federal funding that supplemented local expenditures, or include revenue received from compact migrants. Interior developed guidelines in 1994 for reporting compact impact. However, several officials from the reporting local government agencies, as well as Interior officials, were not aware of the guidelines and had not used them. Moreover, the 1994 guidelines do not address certain concepts that are essential for reliable estimates of impact costs, such as calculating revenue received from providing services. Providing more rigorous guidelines to the affected jurisdictions that address concepts essential to producing reliable impact cost estimates and promoting their use for compact impact reports would increase the likelihood that Interior can provide reliable information on compact impacts to Congress. Although Interior took initial steps to implement GAO's recommendation in 2012, it has not yet provided updated guidelines for estimating compact cost impacts. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. In its 2011 report, GAO recommended that Interior disseminate adequate guidance for estimating compact cost impacts and call for the affected jurisdictions to apply these guidelines, among other steps needed to assess and address the impact of the growing compact migration. Interior concurred with the recommendation on providing adequate guidance for estimating compact cost impacts.
gao_NSIAD-97-45	gao_NSIAD-97-45_0	DeCA is responsible for operating DOD’s worldwide commissary system. The active duty community has unlimited access privileges to the commissaries as do the other members of the customer base. Reservists, on the other hand, are (1) authorized 12 visits per year if they have earned a minimum number of points creditable for retirement and (2) access during any period of active duty service. Evolution of Commissary Access Policy for Reservists Prior to 1986, Selected Reservists were allowed commissary privileges only during periods of active duty—normally 14 days during each year—but not during weekend drills. The current reservist access policy was established in 1990. None of the proposals were adopted by Congress. For fiscal year 1996, DOD proposed that “Gray Area” retirees be granted permanent, unlimited commissary access and that the other reservists be provided unlimited access for a 1-year test period. No plans have been developed to conduct the field tests proposed in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. Commissary Funding Sources Commissary funding is obtained from two primary sources—an annual appropriation and a surcharge added to each sale. For fiscal years 1992 to 1996, DeCA’s total obligations have averaged about $1.31 billion annually, about $1 billion (over 70 percent) in appropriated funds and $315 million from the surcharge. Appropriated Funds The largest funding source is the annual congressional appropriation. DeCA has received an average of about $1 billion annually for the 5 years of its existence. Information Needed to Assess the Impact of Policy Change The actual financial impact, if any, of allowing reservists unlimited access would depend on the extent of additional commissary sales and increased costs generated as a result of programmatic changes DeCA might make to accommodate any increase in sales. We believe DOD and DeCA could develop reliable estimates of the potential impact of this policy change using a study and data analysis approach and that such an approach would be more appropriate than a field test. Key elements of such a study are discussed in the following sections. Commissary Locations, Reservist Populations, and Increased Usage To identify locations where increased patronage is most likely, DeCA needs to analyze the locations of commissaries in relation to concentrations of reservists and the distances to individual stores. For example, (1) reservists could be surveyed by interview at commissary stores determined to be most likely to experience increased patronage, (2) reservists could be surveyed on a nationwide basis to gain insight into any anticipated changes in buying patterns and commissary usage, and (3) commissary store managers could be interviewed for their views and estimates of potential increases (if their estimates were thought to be reliable). Such a methodology could be applied to the commissary system to develop a range of estimates of the impact on personnel and other costs generated from various percentages of projected increased patronage and sales from reservists, that is, 5, 10, 15, 20, etc. Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that any future legislative proposal to expand commissary access for military reservists be supported by a methodologically sound analysis that estimates the potential impact on appropriated fund support for the commissary system. Agency Comments DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that DeCA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) will jointly develop a survey targeted to ascertain the impact expansion of commissary access to military reservists will have on the commissary system. Scope and Methodology Our study of the Department of Defense (DOD) policy regarding access to the commissary system by military reservists and proposed changes to allow unlimited access was conducted primarily at offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon and at Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) headquarters at Fort Lee, Virginia.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed proposals to change the Department of Defense (DOD) policy that limits military reservists' access to commissary stores, focusing on the: (1) evolution of the policy on military reservists' access to the commissaries and proposals to change that policy; (2) sources of the Defense Commissary Agency's (DCA) funding; and (3) information needed to analyze the impact on appropriated funds of granting military reservists unlimited access to the commissary system. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) commissary access for military reservists before 1986 was limited to a maximum of 14 days and was authorized only during periods of active duty training; (2) since 1990, reservists have been authorized to earn 12 visits a year to the commissary system in addition to access during any period of active duty service; (3) DOD has submitted three proposals since 1990 to grant reservists unlimited access, but none have been adopted by Congress because of concerns about the impact such a change might have on the level of appropriated funds and the concerns expressed by civilian grocery providers about the impact on their businesses; (4) the commissary system is funded primarily from an annual appropriation that has averaged about $1 billion for fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1996; (5) the other funding source is the 5-percent surcharge that is added to each sale in all commissary stores, which has provided an average of about $315 million over the same period; (6) while DOD has proposed legislation to grant reservists unlimited commissary access, it has not developed estimates of the potential financial impacts of such a policy change; (7) potentially, any increase in the commissary customer base, such as granting unlimited access to reservists, could increase the sales and overall workload of the commissary system and increase personnel costs, which could, in turn, increase the level of appropriated funds needed for commissary operations or, at least, cause funding levels to be higher than they would otherwise be; (8) DOD's FY 1996 and 1997 proposals called for variations of a 1-year field test to identify the effects of increased access for reservists on commissary operations; (9) field tests would give specific individuals unlimited commissary access for 1 year to develop impact studies; (10) such a test runs the risk of appearing to withdraw a benefit following the test's conclusion; (11) GAO believes that a methodologically sound study, using data that could be developed by DOD and DCA, could provide reliable estimates of the financial impact of granting reservists unlimited commissary access; and (12) key elements of such a study would be to: (a) establish baseline data by determining the current level of reservist patronage of the commissary system; (b) correlate commissary locations in the United States with reservist population concentrations to identify locations with the potential to experience increased patronage; and (c) estimate the effects of increased commissary sales/workloads on operating costs and the level of appropriated fund support needed.
gao_GAO-04-569T	gao_GAO-04-569T_0	Background The US-VISIT program is a governmentwide endeavor intended to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border management community. It is to be implemented by December 31, 2005. Increment 4 is the yet-to-be-defined end vision of US-VISIT, which will likely consist of a series of capability releases. US-VISIT Is Inherently Risky By definition, US-VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to perform a critical mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. In these circumstances, preventing the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United States cannot be guaranteed, and the missed entry of just one can have severe consequences. Scope Is Large and Complex US-VISIT is to provide for the interfacing of a number of existing systems. This process involves the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers to and from the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. Status management process. Moreover, achievement of interim solutions is based on assumptions that, if changed, could significantly affect facility and staffing plans. Potential Cost Is Significant Despite DHS’s estimate in February 2003, that the total overall cost of the US-VISIT program would be about $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, the potential governmentwide cost of US-VISIT over just a 10-year period could be about twice as much. However, the estimate did not include the costs to design and construct interim facilities at land POEs. In this regard, some of the existing systems have had availability and reliability problems that could limit US-VISIT performance. Also, DHS did not identify the estimated cost of Increment 1. To the credit of the hard-working and dedicated staff working on the program, an initial US-VISIT operating capability was deployed to major air and selected sea POEs at the beginning of this year. To address these risk factors, our published reports presented several recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program, including ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered; determine whether proposed US-VISIT increments will produce mission value commensurate with costs and risks; define performance standards for each increment that are measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying on existing systems; develop a risk management plan and regularly report all high risks; develop and implement a plan for satisfying key acquisition management controls and implement these in accordance with Software Engineering Institute guidance; ensure that human capital and financial resources are provided to establish a fully functional and effective US-VISIT program office; define program office positions, roles, and responsibilities; and develop and implement a human capital strategy for the program office that provides for staffing positions with individuals who have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities. Unless DHS addresses the risk factors described in this testimony, successful deployment of US-VISIT increments is doubtful, because achieving success will depend too much on heroic efforts by the people involved, rather than being the predictable outcome of sound investment and acquisition management capabilities.	Why GAO Did This Study US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) is a governmentwide program to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by (1) collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; (2) identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; (3) detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and (4) facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border management community. GAO was asked to testify on its completed work on the nature, status, and management of the USVISIT program. What GAO Found The US-VISIT program is inherently risky, both because of the type of program it is and because of the way it is being managed. First, US-VISIT is inherently risky because it is to perform a critical, multifaceted mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. That is, one critical aspect of the program's mission is to prevent the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United States; failing in this mission could have serious consequences. To carry out this mission, the program aims to control the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of millions of travelers--a large and complex process. In addition, through legislative mandate, it has challenging milestones (such as the system being implemented at all U.S. ports of entry by December 31, 2005). Finally, DHS estimated that the program would cost $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, but this estimate did not include all costs and underestimated some others. All these factors add risk. Second, several factors related to the program's management increase the risk of not delivering mission valued commensurate with costs or not delivering defined program capabilities on time and within budget. For example, the program is to rely initially on integrating existing systems with reported problems that could limit US-VISIT performance. In addition, the requirements for interim facilities at high-volume land ports of entry are not only demanding, they are based on assumptions that, if altered, could significantly affect facility plans. Further, DHS did not define the benefits versus costs of near-term program increments (that is, the interim versions of the program that are being pursued while the final version is being defined). Addressing these issues is the responsibility of the program office, which however was not adequately staffed, had not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for its staff, and had not established key processes for managing the acquisition and deployment of US-VISIT. Despite the program management challenges confronting US-VISIT, the first increment was deployed at the beginning of this year. However, the program still faces a number of risks, including the ones described above. To address these, GAO has made a series of recommendations regarding the planned scope of US-VISIT and its management. Addressing the identified risks increases the likelihood that the deployment of US-VISIT will be successful--the predictable outcome of sound management of a welljustified and designed program.
gao_GAO-02-966	gao_GAO-02-966_0	In particular, they use performance agreements to align and cascade organizational goals to individual performance expectations through several levels in their organizations. To this end, BLM, FHWA, IRS, and VBA developed a set of expectations for senior executive performance that were intended to balance organizational results, customer satisfaction, and employee perspectives and offered a menu of expectations for senior executives to incorporate into their individual performance plans. In addition, the agencies appraised senior executives’ performance against their expectations for customer satisfaction and employee perspectives. Organizational Results OPM’s regulations emphasize holding senior executives accountable for their individual and organizational performance by linking individual performance management with results-oriented organizational goals. Initial Implementation Approaches to Manage Senior Executives’ Performance While the four agencies tailored their performance management systems to fit their organizational and operational needs, we identified an initial set of implementation approaches that BLM, FHWA, IRS, and VBA are taking that may be helpful to other agencies as they manage senior executive performance against balanced expectations. All of the senior executives received a pass rating in the 2000 and 2001 performance appraisal cycles. There are significant opportunities to strengthen these efforts as they move forward in holding senior executives accountable for results. In particular, more progress is needed in explicitly linking senior executive expectations for performance to results-oriented organizational goals, fostering the necessary collaboration both within and across organizational boundaries to achieve results, and demonstrating a commitment to lead and facilitate change. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To meet our objectives, we focused our review on federal agencies that have implemented a set of balanced expectations in their performance management systems for all or a significant portion of their senior executives prior to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) amending the regulations. Among the possible agencies with relevant experience, we selected the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) because they provided variation in mission, size, and organizational structures. Specific ways to address these areas were included.	Why GAO Did This Study Effective performance management systems link individual performance to organizational goals. In October 2000, the Office of Personnel Management amended regulations to require agencies to link senior executive performance with organizational goals; to appraise executive performance by balancing organizational results with customer satisfaction, employee perspective, and other areas; and to use performance results as a basis for pay, awards, and other personnel decisions. Agencies were to establish these performance management systems by their 2001 senior executive performance appraisal cycles. Because they implemented a set of balanced expectations prior to the Office of Personnel Management requirement, GAO studied the Bureau of Land Management's, Federal Highway Administration's, Internal Revenue Service's, and Veterans Benefits Administration's use of balanced expectations to manage senior executive performance in order to identify initial approaches that may be helpful to other agencies in holding senior executives accountable for results. What GAO Found The agencies GAO reviewed developed an initial set of balanced expectations for senior executives to address in their individual performance plans. GAO found that these agencies are in the early stages of using a set of balanced expectations to appraise senior executive performance and there are significant opportunities to strengthen their efforts as they move forward in holding executives accountable for results. Specifically, more progress is needed in explicitly linking executive expectations for performance to organizational goals. In addition, while these agencies address partnering with customers and other stakeholders, greater emphasis should be placed in fostering the collaboration within and across organizational boundaries to achieve results. Successful organizations understand that they must often change their culture to successfully transform themselves, and such change starts with top leadership. Senior executive performance expectations to lead and facilitate change could be a critical element as agencies transform themselves.
gao_GAO-09-357	gao_GAO-09-357_0	1.) Within each unit, the servicemember is assigned to a team of three key staff—the Triad of Care—who provide case management services to ensure continuity of care. 2.) When we last reported on the Army’s progress in staffing the WTUs in February 2008, the Army had established a goal of having at least 90 percent of Triad of Care staff positions filled to meet the staff-to-servicemember ratios that it had established for its WTUs. The Army Implemented a New WTU Staffing Model in Response to Study Findings, but Walter Reed Was Excluded from This Study On October 16, 2008, the Army implemented revisions to its WTU staffing model, including changes to two of its Triad of Care staff-to- servicemember ratios. Nonetheless, the Army had made considerable progress in meeting the new WTU staff-to-servicemember ratios for the Triad of Care positions. These revised criteria do not apply to Reserve and National Guard servicemembers, who comprise about one-third of the WTU population. The Army’s revised WTU entry criteria for active component servicemembers are intended to help ensure that only those who need complex case management are placed in the WTU. Along with its policies establishing the revised entry and exit criteria, the Army required the Warrior Care and Transition Office to assess the effectiveness of the revised entry and exit criteria in ensuring that only those servicemembers needing complex case management are in the WTUs and to monitor the effects of the revised criteria. For example, the number of servicemembers in WTUs decreased after implementation of the criteria, as the Army anticipated. The Army Uses Various Mechanisms to Monitor WTU Servicemembers’ Recovery, but Its Feedback Mechanisms May Not Provide Complete Information To monitor the recovery process of WTU servicemembers, the Army uses individual transition plans and various upward feedback mechanisms, but its feedback mechanisms may not provide complete information on the performance of WTUs. The Army’s feedback mechanisms, which include a telephone hotline and a satisfaction survey, provide a way for servicemembers and their families to raise concerns about WTU-related issues. The Army Is Implementing Plans for Monitoring the Recovery of Individual Servicemembers To facilitate servicemembers’ recovery, the Army has developed a process for coordinating and monitoring the care that servicemembers receive while in a WTU. In January 2008, the Army issued a policy establishing Comprehensive Transition Plans for WTU servicemembers. This survey is designed to assess servicemembers’ satisfaction with various aspects of WTUs, including the primary care manager and nurse case manager. An Army official told us that the Army does not plan to conduct nonresponse analyses because it is satisfied with the response rates that it has been receiving since it began following up with servicemembers by telephone in February 2008. As of January 2009, almost all of the Triad of Care positions in the WTUs were fully staffed. However, the Army has not finalized policy that would allow it to systematically determine whether WTUs are consistently developing these plans. Recommendations for Executive Action We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following three actions: To help ensure that the WTU at Walter Reed Army Medical Center is providing an appropriate level of care to servicemembers and help the Army make future staffing decisions for the WTUs that will be caring for this population once Walter Reed closes, the Army should examine Walter Reed’s WTU staffing model, including its Triad of Care staff-to- servicemember ratios, in light of the complexity of the health care needs of servicemembers placed in this WTU. To determine whether the results of the Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey can be used to assess the effectiveness of the WTUs, the Army should take steps to determine whether the results are representative of all servicemembers in WTUs, such as by conducting nonresponse analyses, and should take additional steps if necessary to obtain results that are representative. However, DOD did not indicate its most recent response rates. More specifically, to assess the Army’s ongoing efforts to staff its WTU Triad of Care positions—primary care managers, nurse case managers, and squad leaders—we obtained and reviewed the Army Warrior Care & Transition Program, which established policies for implementing the WTUs.	Why GAO Did This Study In February 2007, a series of Washington Post articles disclosed problems at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, particularly with the management of servicemembers receiving outpatient care. In response, the Army established Warrior Transition Units (WTU) for servicemembers requiring complex case management. Each servicemember in a WTU is assigned to a Triad of Care--a primary care manager, a nurse case manager, and a squad leader--who provide case management services to ensure continuity of care. The Army established staff-to-servicemember ratios for each Triad of Care position. This report examines (1) the Army's ongoing efforts to staff WTU Triad of Care positions and (2) how the Army monitors the recovery process of WTU servicemembers. GAO reviewed WTU policies, analyzed Army staffing and monitoring data, interviewed Army officials, and visited five selected WTUs. What GAO Found The Army has taken several steps to help ensure that WTUs are staffed appropriately. First, the Army developed policies aimed at reducing WTU staffing shortfalls, including a policy requiring the reassignment of other personnel on an installation to fill open WTU positions. Second, in October 2008, the Army revised its WTU staffing model, including the staff-to-servicemember ratios for two of its Triad of Care positions, because an Army study determined that the existing ratios were not adequate to provide an appropriate level of care to servicemembers in WTUs. The Army has made considerable progress in meeting the new ratios, and as of January 2009, the Triad of Care positions at most WTUs were fully staffed. However, staffing ratios for the WTU at Walter Reed Army Medical Center were not revised, even though the Army recognizes that servicemembers treated at this facility have more complex health care needs than servicemembers at other WTUs. Walter Reed might require a different staffing model, for example, one that decreases the number of servicemembers assigned to staff members, but the Army does not plan to conduct an assessment of Walter Reed's staffing model. Third, the Army modified its WTU placement and exit criteria for full-time servicemembers, excluding Army Reserve and National Guard servicemembers who comprise about one-third of the WTU population. These changes are intended to help ensure that only those who need complex case management are in WTUs. Those with less serious health care needs can be reassigned to other units on the installation to continue their recovery. As the Army expected, the WTU population of full-time servicemembers declined by about 1,500 in the 4 months after implementation of the new criteria. To monitor the recovery process of WTU servicemembers, the Army has implemented transition plans for individual servicemembers as well as various upward feedback mechanisms to identify concerns and gauge satisfaction. In January 2008, the Army issued a policy establishing Comprehensive Transition Plans, which can be used to monitor and coordinate servicemembers' care. To help ensure consistent implementation of these plans among its WTUs, the Army is developing a new policy that includes the systematic collection of performance measures across WTUs. However, despite Army officials' repeated assurances to GAO that this policy was forthcoming, it had not been finalized as of February 27, 2009. The Army's feedback mechanisms include its Warrior Transition Unit Program Satisfaction Survey, which collects information from servicemembers in WTUs on a number of issues, including the primary care manager and nurse case manager. However, the survey's response rates for the WTUs have been low (13 to 35 percent) and the Army has not determined whether the results obtained from the respondents are representative of all WTU servicemembers. An Army official told GAO that the Army does not plan to conduct analyses to determine whether the survey results are representative, because it is satisfied with the response rates. In GAO's view, the response rates are too low for the Army to reliably report satisfaction of servicemembers in WTUs.
gao_GAO-05-36	gao_GAO-05-36_0	These members represent numerous sectors across telecommunications including industry, academia, advocacy groups, private consulting, and government. Committee Members, FCC Officials, and Interest Group Representatives Generally Believe That Advisory Committees Function Effectively Advisory committee members who responded to our survey, as well as the FCC officials and trade and interest groups we contacted, said the committees generally operate and function effectively. FCC and Its Advisory Committees Adhere to FACA and Related Regulations, but Committee Members Are Not Always Clear About the Role FCC Expects Them to Provide When They Are Appointed to Committees FACA governs the establishment, operation, and termination of federal advisory committees. Balanced membership: FACA also requires that the membership of committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view represented. Agencies also have discretion to determine what type of advice the advisory committee members are to provide. Committee members appointed as special government employees who are not representative members are expected to be impartial and are subject to conflict-of-interest rules administered by the Office of Government Ethics. FCC has designated all current members of its federal advisory committees as representatives. However, for those members affiliated with universities, law firms, or consulting firms who are told to provide advice on behalf of such entities, the underlying viewpoint on telecommunications issues that the member is expected to represent is not clear because such institutions generally do not have an obvious viewpoint on telecommunications issues. While FCC is not required to implement the advice and recommendations of its advisory committees, in general, the FCC bureau chiefs and designated federal officers were more satisfied with how FCC uses the committees’ work than other stakeholders. However, only 54 percent of responding members were satisfied with the extent to which FCC takes the committees’ advice into account when developing policy. Three others stated that the committees’ advice and recommendations have little influence on FCC actions. As with the joint boards, the establishment and operations of the joint conferences are different from federal advisory committees that operate under FACA requirements. The advisory committees generally follow the rules and requirements prescribed by FACA, which ensures the committees’ activities are transparent and accessible to the public. Despite being designated as representatives, some members responded to our survey that they do not contribute the opinions of the organization, company, or institution they represent, but rather contribute their own expert advice—a role that appears closer to that which the Office of Government Ethics and GSA describe as the role of a member who would typically be appointed as a special government employee. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology As requested by the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, the objectives of this report are to provide information on (1) the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) current federal advisory committees and how they operate, (2) the extent to which FCC’s advisory committees follow applicable laws and regulations, (3) how FCC makes use of the advisory committees’ advice or recommendations, and (4) other advisory groups established at FCC that are not characterized as Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committees and how they operate. We obtained documentation from FCC’s Office of General Counsel concerning the formation of the joint boards, joint conferences, and the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee, and for their exemption from FACA requirements. Information on FCC’s Federal Advisory Committees and Advisory Groups Exempt from FACA This appendix provides information on FCC’s seven federal advisory committees and on FCC’s five advisory groups that FCC considers exempt from FACA, including two joint boards, two joint conferences, and the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee.	Why GAO Did This Study FCC has regulatory authority over many complex telecommunications issues. To obtain expert advice on these issues, FCC often calls upon its federal advisory committees, comprised mostly of members from industry, private consulting, advocacy groups, and government. These committees must follow the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which sets requirements on the formation and operation of such committees. Because of Congressional interest in how FCC receives advice from outside experts, this report provides information on (1) FCC's current advisory committees, (2) the extent to which the committees follow applicable laws, (3) how FCC makes use of the committees' advice, and (4) the non-FACA advisory groups that FCC has established. What GAO Found The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has seven federal advisory committees established at its discretion that address various telecommunications issues. FCC officials, committee members, and other stakeholders we contacted generally believed FCC's advisory committees operated effectively. In forming and operating advisory committees, FCC must follow FACA and related regulations, which require, among other things, that committee membership is balanced in terms of points of view represented and that committee activities are transparent to the public. While FCC follows applicable requirements, GAO found that committee members are not always clear about their expected role on the committees--that is, the type of advice that FCC expects them to provide. FCC designates all of its committee members as "representatives," meaning they are appointed with an expectation that they will provide advice reflecting the views of a company, organization, or other group. However, approximately 22 percent of responding committee members did not say they provided representative advice. Further, some committee members are affiliated with universities or consulting firms that may not have an obvious telecommunications viewpoint. If committee members are expected to primarily provide their own expert opinion, they are expected to be impartial and may be more appropriately appointed as special government employees. Such members are subject to ethics rules administered by the Office of Government Ethics, including conflict-of-interest reviews. While FCC is not required to implement the advice or recommendations of its advisory committees, FCC has taken actions based on these committees' recommendations. Overall, GAO found FCC officials tended to be more satisfied with how FCC implements the committees' recommendations than other stakeholders, including committee members themselves. For example, of the committee members who responded to a GAO survey, only 54 percent were satisfied with the extent to which FCC takes the committees' advice into account when developing policy. Further, three trade groups we contacted said that the advisory committees' advice and recommendations have little influence on FCC actions. In addition to its seven federal advisory committees, FCC considers five advisory groups as exempt from FACA requirements, including two "joint boards," two "joint conferences," and the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee. FCC was mandated to establish the joint boards and created the joint conferences at its discretion. Since the joint boards and joint conferences are considered exempt from FACA, they function differently from FCC's federal advisory committees. FCC created the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee, which it also considers exempt from FACA, to address telecommunications issues affecting state, local, and tribal governments.
gao_GAO-09-338	gao_GAO-09-338_0	Cost Tracking Deficiencies Hinder Assessment of Cost Performance MDA has not yet established baselines for total costs or unit costs, both fundamental markers that most programs use to measure progress. Similarly, MDA has not established unit costs for selected assets, such as GBIs. Consequently, for the sixth year, we have been unable to assess MDA’s overall progress on total or unit cost. While MDA plans to establish some total cost baselines in 2009, most efforts will not be captured in a baseline. However, the budgeted costs at completion, in some cases, have grown significantly over time. As a consequence of testing problems, none of the six MDA Director’s test knowledge points for 2008 were achieved. Shortfalls in testing have delayed validating the models and simulations that are used to assess the overall performance of the BMDS as a whole. MDA embarked on this major development without estimating the cost to develop the family of target missiles. Overall Performance of BMDS Can Not Yet Be Assessed MDA’s modeling and simulation program enables MDA to assess the capabilities and limitations of how BMDS performs under a wider variety of conditions than can be accomplished through the limited number of flight tests conducted. Production and Fielding of BMDS Systems Getting Ahead of Testing Despite developmental problems, test delays and MDA’s inability to complete all fiscal year 2008 Director’s test knowledge points, manufacturing, production, and fielding have proceeded close to schedule. Limited Progress Made in Improving Transparency and Accountability In March 2008, we reported that efforts were underway to improve BMDS management, transparency, accountability, and oversight including a new executive board outside of MDA and a new block structure along with other improvements within MDA. Missile Defense Executive Board’s Oversight Role More Active in 2008 During 2008, the MDEB appeared to act with an increased level of authority in providing oversight of MDA and the BMDS. This review covered production and the element’s contract schedule. This change allows the agency to continue the practice of moving work from one block to another, which thereby reduces the transparency of the new block structure and undermines any baselines that are established. Most of the annual revisions to the test baseline occur either because MDA has changed the substance of test, changed the timing of tests, or added tests to the baseline. At this point, a better balance must still be struck between the information Congress and DOD need to conduct oversight of the BMDS and the flexibility MDA needs to manage across the portfolio of elements that collectively constitute the system’s capability. At this point, the balance does not provide sufficient information for effective oversight. Less testing is conducted than planned, thus delaying the validation of the models and simulations needed to assess the overall performance of the BMDS. Consequently, fielding decisions and capability declarations are being made with limited understanding of system effectiveness. 2. In the area of testing and performance: 4. For example, in one case the budgeted cost at completion increased by approximately five times its original value. Since our assessment does not reveal, as cost growth, the difference between the original and current budgeted costs at completion it would be inappropriate to compare the underruns or overruns for MDA programs with cost growth on major defense acquisition programs since those major defense acquisition programs have established their full scope of work as well as developed total cost baselines, while these have not been developed for MDA programs. This task will culminate in a demonstration planned for fiscal year 2010. 3. Despite test reductions and effects on assessing system-level performance, production and fielding of assets continues as planned.	Why GAO Did This Study The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has spent about $56 billion and will spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). GAO was directed to assess the annual progress MDA made in developing the BMDS as well as improvements in accountability and transparency in agency operations, management processes, and the new block strategy. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed contractor cost, schedule, and performance; tests completed; and the assets fielded during 2008. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the activities of the new Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). An appendix on the effect the cancellation of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense flight test had on BMDS development is also included. What GAO Found Cost: MDA has not yet established baselines for total costs or unit costs, both fundamental markers most programs use to measure progress. Consequently, for the sixth year, GAO has not been able to assess MDA's actual costs against a baseline of either total costs or unit costs. MDA planned to establish such baselines in 2008 in response to past GAO recommendations, but has delayed this until 2009. GAO was able to assess the cost performance on individual contracts, and project an overrun at completion of between $2 billion and $3 billion. However, because in some cases the budgeted costs at completion--the basis for our projection--has changed significantly over time as adjustments were made, this projection does not capture as cost growth the difference between the original and current budgeted costs at completion. In one case, these costs increased by approximately five times its original value. Performance and Testing: While MDA completed several key tests that demonstrated enhanced performance of the BMDS, all elements of the system had test delays and shortfalls. Overall, testing achieved less than planned. For example, none of the six Director's test knowledge points established by MDA for 2008 were achieved. Poor performing target missiles have been a persistent problem. Testing shortfalls have slowed the validation of models and simulations, which are needed to assess the system's overall performance. Consequently, the performance of the BMDS as a whole can not yet be determined. Schedule: Although fewer tests have been conducted than planned, the production and fielding of assets has proceeded closer to schedule. Except for no ground-based interceptors being delivered, all other radars, standard missiles, and software were delivered as planned. However, some deliveries, such as enhanced Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles, will now precede test results. In most cases, MDA has also reduced the bases it planned to use to declare when capabilities are operational in the field. Thus, fielding decisions are being made with a reduced understanding of system effectiveness. Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight: Improvement in this area has been limited. The Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) has acted with increased authority in providing oversight of MDA and the BMDS. However, transparency and accountability into MDA's work is limited by the management fluidity afforded through the lack of cost baselines, an unstable test baseline, continued use of development funds to produce assets for fielding, and renewed potential for transferring work from one predefined block to another. A better balance must still be struck between the information Congress and the Department of Defense need to conduct oversight of the BMDS and the flexibility MDA needs to manage across the portfolio of assets that collectively constitute the system's capability. At this point, the balance does not provide sufficient information for effective oversight.
gao_GGD-99-110	gao_GGD-99-110_0	We reviewed 12 of the 70 fiscal year 1999 official recognition files, and, for 5 of the site qualification decisions, we identified inconsistencies among the external consultant recommendations, grant monitor recommendations, and EOWS management decisions. The available documentation was insufficient for us to determine how these inconsistencies were reconciled. For fiscal year 1999, EOWS management officials decided for the first time not to qualify for funding all existing sites that met grant requirements. However, from our review of the available documentation for the remaining 164 sites, this documentation was insufficient to determine the basis and rationale for these qualification decisions. EOWS Did Not Ensure That Weed and Seed Sites Met Grant Requirements EOWS did not always ensure that local Weed and Seed sites complied with critical grant requirements. According to EOWS officials, progress reports are an important tool to help EOWS management officials and grant monitors determine how sites are meeting program objectives and to assist them in making future grant qualification decisions. EOWS Has Not Determined When Sites Become Self- Sustaining While self-sustainment is an important goal of the Weed and Seed Program, EOWS has not developed specific criteria to determine when sites have become self-sustaining or determined the progress sites had made toward achieving this goal. EOWS and Weed and Seed Sites’ Performance Indicators Generally Did Not Measure Program Success EOWS has developed various performance indicators, in an attempt to respond to GPRA. However, these indicators still generally measure activities rather than results. Local Participants Reported Satisfaction With the Programs Even though the performance indicators were not sufficient to adequately measure program results, most of the local officials with whom we spoke during our site visits were very satisfied with the activities funded by the local Weed and Seed programs. These officials, such as mayors, city administrators, U.S. attorneys, and high-ranking police officers, noted that the key ingredient to the Weed and Seed programs’ success was the commitment of the mayors’ and U.S. Attorneys’ offices and civic and business leaders. Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General of the United States direct the Director of the Executive Office of Weed and Seed to develop an adequate internal control to ensure that the basis and rationale for new and existing site qualification for funding decisions are always fully documented; improve program monitoring to ensure that sites meet the grant requirement of submitting progress reports, and that EOWS site visits are documented; develop criteria for determining when sites are self-sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw program funding; and develop additional performance measures that track program outcomes. Our internal control review focused on EOWS’ decisions for qualifying new and existing sites for funding. They also commented that the draft report was incorrect in stating that no site’s funding had been reduced or withdrawn as a result of the site’s efforts to become self-sustaining, and that we used the terms “site” and “grantee” incorrectly. DEFY is a mentoring program adopted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for Weed and Seed in 1996. GAO Comments 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Weed and Seed Program, focusing on how: (1) the program is managed by DOJ's Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS); (2) EOWS monitors local Weed and Seed sites to ensure that grant requirements are met; (3) EOWS determines when sites have become self-sustaining; and (4) EOWS and selected sites are measuring program results. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) EOWS has not established an adequate internal control requiring that significant program management decisions be documented; (2) without this control, EOWS management has not always fully documented EOWS decisions; (3) for example, in reviewing 12 of the 70 fiscal year (FY) 1999 new site qualification funding decisions, GAO found that for 5 of these 12 decisions, documentation was insufficient for GAO to determine how inconsistencies among external consultants and grant monitor recommendations and EOWS management decisions were reconciled; (4) in FY 1999, EOWS made decisions to qualify 164 of the existing 177 sites for continued funding, although in some cases, EOWS grant monitors recommended against additional funding; (5) however, available documentation was insufficient for GAO to determine the basis and rationale for EOWS' deciding to qualify these sites for continued funding; (6) for the remaining 13 sites that EOWS decided not to qualify for continued funding, documentation was sufficient to determine the basis and rationale for these decisions; (7) EOWS also did not always ensure that local Weed and Seed sites met critical grant requirements; (8) progress reports are an important tool to help EOWS management and grant monitors determine how sites are meeting program objectives and to assist in making future grant qualification decisions; (9) EOWS has not developed criteria to determine when sites have become self-sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw Weed and Seed funds, even though the goal of sites' becoming self-sustaining is central to the program; (10) while GAO identified actions that selected sites had taken toward self-sustainment, at the time of GAO's review, no site's funding had been reduced or withdrawn as a result of its efforts to become self-sustaining during the 9 years of the program's existence; (11) EOWS' performance indicators generally did not measure program results; (12) while GAO's review was in progress, EOWS changed some of its performance indicators in an attempt to better measure how well sites were meeting program objectives; (13) however, the revised indicators still primarily tracked program activity rather than results; (14) despite the general lack of performance indicators, most local officials with whom GAO spoke commented favorably on the activities funded by the local Weed and Seed sites; and (15) they believed that a key ingredient to the Weed and Seed Program's success was the commitment of the mayors' and U.S. Attorneys' offices and civic and business leaders.
gao_GAO-03-710T	gao_GAO-03-710T_0	About One-Fourth of Public Employees Are Not Covered by Social Security About one-fourth of public employees do not pay Social Security taxes on the earnings from their government jobs. Even though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on which they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for Social Security benefits based on their spouses’ or their own earnings in covered employment. Provisions Seek Fairness but Pose Administrative Challenges To address the fairness issues that arise with noncovered public employees, Social Security has two provisions—GPO, which addresses spouse and survivor benefits and WEP, which addresses retired worker benefits. Both provisions depend on having complete and accurate information that has proven difficult to get. Also, both provisions are a source of confusion and frustration for public employees and retirees. As a result, proposals have been offered to revise or eliminate both provisions. Under the GPO provision, enacted in 1977, SSA must reduce Social Security benefits for those receiving noncovered government pensions when their entitlement to Social Security is based on another person’s (usually their spouse’s) Social Security coverage. Their Social Security benefits are to be reduced by two-thirds of the amount of their government pension. To administer these provisions, SSA needs to know whether beneficiaries receive such noncovered pensions. As a result, SSA cannot apply GPO and WEP for state and local government employees to the same degree that it does for federal employees. Critics of the measures contend that they are basically inaccurate and often unfair. First, repealing these provisions would be costly in an environment where the Social Security trust funds already face long-term solvency issues. Making coverage mandatory has been proposed in the past to help address the program’s financing problems. According to Social Security actuaries, doing so would reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by 10 percent. However, to provide for the same level of retirement income, mandatory coverage could increase costs for the state and local governments that would sponsor the plans. Moreover, if coverage were extended primarily to new state and local employees, GPO and WEP would continue to apply for many years to come for existing employees and beneficiaries even though they would become obsolete in the long run. Costs could increase by as much as 11 percent of payroll for those states and localities, depending on the benefit package of the new plans that would include Social Security coverage.	Why GAO Did This Study Social Security covers about 96 percent of all US workers; the vast majority of the rest are state, local, and federal government employees. While these noncovered workers do not pay Social Security taxes on their government earnings, they may still be eligible for Social Security benefits. This poses difficult issues of fairness, and Social Security has provisions that attempt to address those issues, but critics contend these provisions are themselves often unfair. Congress asked GAO to discuss these provisions as well as the implications of mandatory coverage for public employees. What GAO Found Social Security's provisions regarding public employees are rooted in the fact that about one-fourth of them do not pay Social Security taxes on the earnings from their government jobs, for various historical reasons. Even though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on which they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for Social Security benefits based on their spouses' or their own earnings in covered employment. To address the issues that arise with noncovered public employees, Social Security has two provisions--the Government Pension Offset (GPO), which affects spouse and survivor benefits, and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP), which affects retired worker benefits. Both provisions reduce Social Security benefits for those who receive noncovered pension benefits. Both provisions also depend on having complete and accurate information on receipt of such noncovered pension benefits. However, such information is not available for many state and local pension plans, even though it is for federal pension benefits. As a result, GPO and WEP are not applied consistently for all noncovered pension recipients. In addition to the administrative challenges, these provisions are viewed by some as confusing and unfair, and a number of proposals have been offered to either revise or eliminate GPO and WEP. Such actions, while they may reduce confusion among affected workers, would increase the long-range Social Security trust fund deficit and could create fairness issues for workers who have contributed to Social Security throughout their working lifetimes. Making coverage mandatory has been proposed to help address the program's financing problems, and doing so could ultimately eliminate the need for the GPO and the WEP. According to Social Security actuaries, mandatory coverage would reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by 10 percent. However, to provide for the same level of retirement income, mandating coverage would increase costs for the state and local governments that would sponsor the plans. Moreover, GPO and WEP would still be needed for many years to come even though they would become obsolete in the long run.
gao_GAO-08-105	gao_GAO-08-105_0	1.) A variety of proposals seeking to encourage more individuals to save have been introduced in the past several years. Women Have Less Retirement Income than Men Largely because of Differences in Labor Force Participation and Lifetime Earnings Generally, women have less retirement income than men, largely because, on average, women have lower labor force attachment and lower earnings than men. While about 90 percent of men and women aged 65 and older receive Social Security benefits, fewer women than men have income from most other major sources of retirement income, and they receive less than men from those sources, according to a Congressional Research Service analysis of Census Bureau data. Women also tend to earn less than men during their working years. The difference between men’s and women’s pension income is larger than for Social Security. Additionally, rates of poverty among those 65 and over are higher for women than for men. Women Have More Intermittent Work Histories and Lower Earnings than Men Women’s labor force participation increased substantially in the latter half of the 20th century, although women continue to work fewer total years than men and more often work part-time. Although women’s earnings have risen relative to men’s over time, women nevertheless continue to earn less than men. In fact, in prior work we found that work patterns are a key factor in explaining the differences in men’s and women’s earnings. However, even after accounting for these and other behavioral factors—such as educational attainment—unexplained differences remained. Certain Life Events May Reduce Women’s Retirement Resources More Than Men’s Certain life events— including changes in marital status, labor force interruptions, and long-term care needs— can significantly reduce the amount of pension income and Social Security benefits for both men and women. In addition, women are most often the family members who provide unpaid care, which can reduce their career earnings as well. In retirement, divorce has the potential to reduce Social Security benefits because Social Security’s eligibility rules require that the marriage last at least 10 years for a divorced spouse to claim benefits from an ex-spouse’s earnings record. Specific Changes to Social Security and Employer-Sponsored Pensions Will Affect Women Differently than Men Because of Differences in Lifetime Work Histories The specific changes to Social Security and pensions that we modeled had different effects on women and men, and among different subgroups of women, because of differences in lifetime work histories. On one hand, our model results showed that modifications that compensate for low earnings or time spent out of the workforce for caregiving tend to increase benefits for beneficiaries overall, and particularly those in lower income quintiles. On the other hand, our results showed that modifications that focus on changes in family structure, such as more two-earner couples and an increased incidence of divorce, tend to increase the benefits of groups targeted by the change, but produce mixed results for others. A number of pension modifications proposed in the last several years take into account changes in the labor force and the changing norms of employer-provided retirement plans; while these reforms are gender-neutral, they may provide important new opportunities for women to increase their retirement income. This assumes that those affected would not make any changes in their savings or spending behavior to offset the requirement. Consequently, despite elements of the Social Security and employer-sponsored pension systems that provide retirement income for low- or non-earning spouses, the remaining gaps between women’s and men’s labor force participation, earnings, and pension participation will continue to leave many women with fewer financial resources in retirement than men. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Labor and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administration. 2. 3.	Why GAO Did This Study Women aged 65 and over will account for a growing segment of the U.S. population over the next several decades. Despite increases in women's workforce behavior in the past 65 years, elderly women have persistently high rates of poverty. Thus, it is important to understand the differences between men's and women's retirement income, and how women may fare given future reforms to Social Security and pensions. GAO was asked to examine (1) how women's retirement income compares with men's and the reasons for differences; (2) how certain life events such as divorce, widowhood, and workforce interruptions affect women's retirement income; and (3) the possible effect on women's retirement income of certain changes to Social Security and pensions that seek to mitigate the effects of differences in workforce participation patterns. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the relevant literature, interviewed academics and other retirement experts, and used a microsimulation model to project future retirement income. GAO provided a draft of this report to the departments of Labor and Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administration. Cognizant agency officials provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. GAO is making no recommendations. What GAO Found In general, women have less retirement income than men, largely because of women's lower labor force attachment and lower earnings, on average. Fewer women than men have income from most major retirement sources, and women have less income from these sources. Women's median Social Security income is 70 percent of men's. Also, fewer women than men have pensions. Among the population age 65 and over who continue to work, women earn just over half of what men earn. Women also have somewhat smaller income than men from assets, such as interest and dividends. Accordingly, rates of poverty among those 65 and over are substantially higher for women than for men. Although their participation has increased substantially in the last century, women still spend fewer years in the labor force than men, and they more often work part-time. Also, women tend to earn less than men, despite increases in their wages over time relative to men. Although work patterns are key in earnings differences, in prior work, we found that even after accounting for behavioral differences such as education or labor force participation, women still earn less than men. Certain life events--including changes in marital status, labor force interruptions, and long-term care needs--can significantly reduce the amount of pension income and Social Security benefits women receive--and leave women with fewer financial resources at retirement than men. Social Security divorced spousal benefits are available only if the marriage lasted at least 10 years. Furthermore, pension benefits are available to a divorced spouse only under certain circumstances. Women's role as primary family caregiver for children and elderly relatives can reduce their career earnings, on which retirement income is based. Because women tend to live longer than men, widowhood and costly long-term care assistance may further reduce their retirement resources. GAO's simulations of some Social Security changes that would compensate for low earnings or time out of the workforce showed that those changes tend to increase benefits for beneficiaries overall, and particularly those in lower income quintiles. Alternatively, changes that focus on shifts in family structure, such as increases in two-earner couples and increased incidence of divorce, tend to increase the benefits of groups targeted by the change, but produce mixed results for others. Some pension changes that have been proposed in the past several years take into account the changing labor force and norms of employer-provided retirement plans; while these changes are gender-neutral, they may provide important new opportunities for women to increase their retirement income. For example, decreased vesting requirements may provide additional pension income to those with intermittent workforce participation who would not qualify for pension benefits under a longer vesting schedule.
gao_GAO-17-727	gao_GAO-17-727_0	FCC Has Taken Actions to Update Its Data Collection and Enforcement Processes FCC Implemented a New Enforcement Data System and Consumer Informal Complaint Portal FCC recently improved the collection of data for its enforcement program by implementing a new enforcement data system and consumer informal complaint portal. Regardless of whether a complaint initiates an enforcement case, FCC officials have access to the information in the consumer complaint portal and officials stated that they can use this data to help identify trends and determine whether to review a particular company or practice. As of January 2017, FCC had closed 11 of 24 field offices (see fig. FCC officials also told us that they are taking steps to use the anticipated cost savings from the field office reorganization to invest in training, equipment, and technology updates that will improve efficiency. Given the recent changes, it is too early to determine the impact these actions will have on enforcement efforts. Our review of FCC’s annual performance report found that it includes descriptions of enforcement actions taken against companies, but does not include quantified performance measures. FCC officials stated that narrative examples, rather than quantified goals and related measures, were the most appropriate way to report on FCC’s efforts to help consumers and protect the public through its enforcement program. However, the Enforcement Bureau’s new database—EBATS—described earlier in this report, has the data that FCC could use to help establish and report on objective, measurable, and quantifiable performance goals and related measures. Without developing meaningful, quantifiable goals and related measures for the enforcement program, FCC (1) lacks important tools for assessing and reporting on the progress of its enforcement program and determining whether changes should be made to improve performance, and (2) may be missing an opportunity to help promote transparency about its program and support congressional oversight. Selected Stakeholders Affirmed the Importance of FCC’s Enforcement but Cited Concerns about the Agency’s Enforcement Process and Communication Efforts Most Stakeholders Stated FCC’s Enforcement Is Important for Deterring Violations We interviewed stakeholders with a wide range of perspectives however most agreed that FCC’s enforcement is important for deterring violations of federal statutes and FCC regulations. Lack of Transparency: When asked about their perception regarding the transparency of the enforcement process 16 of the 22 stakeholders we interviewed expressed concern that the enforcement process was not transparent. When asked about the apparent increase in proposed fines, FCC officials acknowledged fines have increased. Instead, FCC tailors the extent of its communications to stakeholders on a case-by- case basis. For example, FCC does not publish an enforcement manual or similar overall policy document on its website outlining their enforcement policies and processes. Clear communication strategies are important to promoting transparency particularly in the case of enforcement activities. However, the extent to which FCC’s Enforcement Bureau is achieving its mission of protecting consumers, promoting competition, ensuring responsible use of the public airwaves, and addressing risks to public safety is difficult to determine because FCC has not developed performance indicators, targets, and timeframes that would enable a meaningful assessment of its enforcement program. (Recommendation 1) The Chairman of the FCC should establish, and make publically available, a communications strategy outlining the agency’s enforcement program for external stakeholders, to improve engagement with the telecommunications community on the purposes, objectives, and processes the Enforcement Bureau employs to achieve its mission. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report addresses (1) actions taken by FCC in the last 5 years to update its enforcement program; (2) performance goals and measures for FCC’s enforcement program; and (3) selected stakeholders’ views on FCC’s enforcement program and FCC’s communication with these stakeholders. To describe what actions FCC has taken in the last five years (calendar years 2012 through 2016) to update its enforcement program we reviewed FCC documentation, such as policies and reports related to internal improvement efforts. In addition, we interviewed FCC officials from the Enforcement Bureau, Consumer and Government Affairs Bureau, as well as the Office of Managing Director. To determine stakeholder views on FCC’s enforcement program we interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 22 stakeholders who were knowledgeable of the Enforcement Bureau and the communications industry.	Why GAO Did This Study FCC's Enforcement Bureau is primarily responsible for ensuring the telecommunications industry's compliance with federal statutes and the Commission rules and orders designed to protect consumers, ensure public safety, and encourage competition. Some industry stakeholders have raised questions about the transparency and fairness of the Enforcement Bureau. GAO was asked to review FCC's management of its enforcement program. In this report, GAO addresses: (1) actions FCC has taken in the last 5 years to update its enforcement program, (2) FCC's enforcement performance goals and measures, and (3) selected stakeholders' views on FCC's enforcement program and external communications. GAO reviewed FCC's enforcement policies and procedures; analyzed FCC's performance measures and spoke with officials of similarly sized independent agencies with enforcement missions; and interviewed FCC officials and 22 stakeholders from public and private organizations who were knowledgeable of the Enforcement Bureau and the communications industry. What GAO Found The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has taken actions in the last 5 years to update its enforcement data collection and processes. In 2012, FCC implemented a new enforcement data system, which combined five previously separate databases and contains pertinent information related to each enforcement case. In 2014, FCC launched a new consumer complaints portal that FCC officials can use to identify trends and determine whether to investigate a particular company or practice. FCC also updated its internal enforcement program guidance, which includes case prioritization policies as well as timeliness goals for case resolution. Lastly, FCC completed its reorganization of the Enforcement Bureau's field office division in January 2017, closing 11 of 24 field offices and decreasing personnel from 108 to 54. FCC officials stated they do not anticipate a decline in enforcement activity because FCC is taking steps to use the anticipated annual cost savings of $9 to $10 million from the reorganization to invest in training, equipment, and technology that will improve efficiency. Given the recent changes, it is too early to determine the impact these actions will have on enforcement efforts. FCC has not quantified most of its enforcement performance goals and measures. FCC officials told GAO that in 2009 the Chairman's Office decided that narrative examples, rather than quantifiable goals and related measures, were the most appropriate way to report on the enforcement program. For example, FCC's 2016 Annual Performance Report describes details of settlements or fines levied without reporting such goals or measures. Although such metrics can be difficult to develop, GAO found that other enforcement agencies report quantified performance goals and related measures and that FCC has the data it would need to develop such goals and measures. Without meaningful program performance goals and measures, FCC lacks important tools for assessing and reporting on the progress of its enforcement efforts and determining whether it should make changes to its program. FCC also may be missing an opportunity to help promote transparency and support congressional oversight by clearly communicating enforcement priorities. Most of the selected stakeholders GAO interviewed affirmed the importance of enforcement, but cited concerns about FCC's current enforcement process and communication efforts with stakeholders. Fourteen of 22 selected stakeholders said enforcement is important for deterring violations of federal statutes and FCC rules. However, 17 of 22 also expressed concerns regarding the transparency or fairness of the enforcement process or regarding FCC's emphasis on generating publicity by proposing high dollar fines for potential violators. FCC does not have a formal communications strategy that outlines its enforcement purposes and processes. Instead, FCC tailors the extent of its communications to stakeholders on a case-by-case basis. FCC officials told GAO that information about the enforcement process is sensitive and could undermine their cases. However, leading practices on enforcement highlight the importance of disclosing agency enforcement processes, including how to challenge and appeal conclusions, as a way to foster fair and consistent enforcement. Increased communication from FCC could improve transparency and stakeholder perceptions of FCC enforcement actions. What GAO Recommends FCC should establish and publish: (1) quantifiable performance goals and related measures for its enforcement program; and (2) a communications strategy outlining its enforcement program for external stakeholders. FCC concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-03-956	gao_GAO-03-956_0	In fiscal year 2003, the Congress appropriated $292 million for subpart 1 and $405 million for subpart 2. In fiscal year 2002, the Congress appropriated $70 million in discretionary funding for the program. The Primary Emphases of These Subparts Vary Somewhat, but the Range of Services and Types of Families Served Overlap Significantly On a national level, our survey showed that the primary emphases of subparts 1 and 2 vary somewhat, but the range of services offered and the types of families served overlap significantly. Subpart 2 funds, in comparison, were used primarily to fund programs within its required service categories—family support, family preservation, family reunification, and adoption promotion and support services. Services funded by each subpart predominantly targeted children at risk of abuse or neglect and their parents, as well as children in foster care and their parents. 2). HHS Focuses Oversight on Overall Child Welfare System, but Has Limited Knowledge about States’ Use of Subpart 1 Funds HHS’s oversight focuses primarily on states’ overall child welfare systems and outcomes, but the agency provides relatively little oversight specific to subpart 1. For example, HHS regional offices work with states to establish overall goals to improve the safety, permanency, and well-being of children and measure progress toward those goals. However, HHS has limited knowledge about how states use their subpart 1 funds. HHS does not collect data on subpart 1 expenditures and instead requires states to submit annual estimates about how they plan to use their subpart 1 funds in the upcoming year. As a result, HHS approved projected 2002 spending plans for 15 states that reported planned spending amounts that exceeded these spending limits. HHS Regional Offices Are Unaware of Subpart 1 Spending Limits or Do Not Enforce Them Given that HHS’s subpart 1 oversight focuses primarily on a state’s overall child welfare goals and outcomes, the regional offices pay little attention to the statutory limits on the use of federal subpart 1 funds for foster care maintenance and adoption assistance payments. Some Unique Subpart 1 Service Categories Exist at the State Level, but Little Research Exists on the Effectiveness of These Services Little research is available on the effectiveness of unique services funded by subpart 1 because few states have evaluated these services. While our survey data revealed no unique categories of services funded by subpart 1 on a national level, 37 states reported categories of services that were uniquely funded by subpart 1—that is, the individual state used subpart 1, but not subpart 2, to fund services in a particular category. The data were analyzed using states’ self-identified categories except in the following situations: (1) if a state clearly described a program as funding salaries for staff at the child welfare agency, we included these data under the staff category; (2) if a state used the “other” category for a service that clearly fell into one of the existing categories (writing in “foster care maintenance payments,” for example), we revised the survey response to reflect the actual category; (3) if it appeared that a state mistakenly checked the wrong box; for example, we changed the category from CPS to family reunification if the program was described as a family reunification service; (4) if a state checked multiple categories, we reported these programs separately under “multiple responses;” (5) if a state did not check any categories, we selected a service category that best fit the description of the program and used “other” if the description did not clearly fall into one of our categories; and finally (6) if a state clearly described the use of Title IV-B funds as administrative, but categorized it in another category, we revised the survey to indicate that the funds were used for administration and management.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2001, states determined that over 900,000 children were the victims of abuse or neglect. In fiscal year 2003, subparts 1 and 2 of Title IV-B of the Social Security Act provided $697 million in federal funding for services to help families address problems that lead to child abuse and neglect. This report describes (1) the services provided and populations served under subparts 1 and 2; (2) federal oversight of subpart 1; and (3) existing research on the effectiveness of services unique to subpart 1--that is, when states used subpart 1, but not subpart 2, to fund programs in a particular service category. The report focuses primarily on subpart 1 because little research exists on this subpart, while studies have been conducted on subpart 2. What GAO Found On a national level, GAO's survey showed that the primary emphases of subparts 1 and 2 vary somewhat, but the range of services offered and the types of families served overlap significantly. No single category of service was funded solely by either subpart. In fiscal year 2002, states used subpart 1 funds most frequently for the salaries of child welfare agency staff, administrative and managerial expenses, child protective services, and foster care maintenance payments. Subpart 2 primarily funded family support, family preservation, family reunification, and adoption support services. Programs funded by the two subparts served similar types of populations--predominantly children at risk of being abused or neglected and their parents, as well as children in foster care and their parents. HHS's oversight focuses primarily on states' overall child welfare systems and outcomes, but the agency provides relatively little oversight specific to subpart 1. For example, HHS works with states to establish goals to improve the safety and well-being of children and measure progress toward those goals. However, HHS has limited knowledge about how states spend subpart 1 funds. States submit an annual estimate about how they plan to use their subpart 1 funds in the upcoming year, but provide no data on actual expenditures. HHS reports that it reviews these estimates for relatively limited purposes. We also found that HHS regional offices pay little attention to statutory limits on the use of subpart 1 funds for foster care maintenance and adoption assistance payments. For example, 9 of the 10 HHS regional offices do not monitor states' compliance with these limits. As a result, HHS approved projected 2002 spending plans for 15 states that reported estimated spending amounts that exceeded the limits by over $30 million in total. While GAO's survey data revealed no unique service categories funded by subpart 1 on a national level, 37 states reported unique subpart 1 service categories within their state. Little research is available on the effectiveness of the services in these categories, such as hotlines to report child abuse and emergency shelter services. No states conducted rigorous evaluations of these services, although several states provided some information on outcomes.
gao_GAO-16-696T	gao_GAO-16-696T_0	GAO Has Reported on the Need to Improve Oversight of Legacy IT We have previously reported on legacy IT and the need for the federal government to improve its oversight of such investments. Three of the agencies agreed with our recommendations; two partially agreed; and two agencies had no comments. Specifically, data from the IT Dashboard shows that, in 2015, 5,233 of the government’s nearly 7,000 IT investments were spending all of their funds on O&M activities. According to agency data reported to OMB’s IT Dashboard, the 10 IT investments spending the most on O&M for fiscal year 2015 total $12.5 billion, 20 percent of the total O&M spending, and range from $4.4 billion on Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Medicaid Management Information System to $666.1 million on HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services IT Infrastructure investment (see table 1). Spending on O&M Has Increased over 7 Years Over the past 7 fiscal years, O&M spending has increased, while the amount invested in developing new systems has decreased by about $7.3 billion since fiscal year 2010. Specifically, in fiscal year 2010, O&M spending was 68 percent of the federal IT budget, while in fiscal year 2017, agencies plan to spend 77 percent of their IT funds on O&M. OMB staff in the Office of E-Government and Information Technology have recognized the upward trend of IT O&M spending and identified several contributing factors, including (1) the support of O&M activities requires maintaining legacy hardware, which costs more over time, and (2) costs are increased in maintaining applications and systems that use older programming languages, since programmers knowledgeable in these older languages are becoming increasingly rare and thus more expensive. Several O&M investments were rated as moderate to high risk in fiscal year 2015. While agencies generally conducted the required operational analyses, they did not consistently perform TechStat reviews on all of the at-risk investments. Until agencies ensure that their O&M investments are fully reviewed, the government’s oversight of old and vulnerable investments will be impaired and the associated spending could be wasteful. IT Investments Are Becoming Obsolete and Agencies Are Not Required to Identify Investments That Need Attention Legacy IT investments across the federal government are becoming increasingly obsolete. Specifically, many use outdated languages and old parts. For instance, Defense is still using 8-inch floppy disks in a legacy system that coordinates the operational functions of the United States’ nuclear forces. For example, Treasury reported systems that were about 56 years old. Agencies reported having plans to modernize or replace each of these investments and systems. However, the plans for 3 of those were general or tentative in that the agencies did not provide specificity on time frames, activities to be performed, or functions to be replaced or enhanced. Until this policy is finalized and carried out, the federal government runs the risk of continuing to maintain investments that have outlived their effectiveness and are consuming resources that outweigh their benefits. Among other things, we recommend that the Director of OMB commit to a firm date by which its draft guidance on legacy systems will be issued, and subsequently direct agencies to identify legacy systems and/or investments needing to be modernized or replaced and that the selected agency heads direct their respective agency CIOs to identify and plan to modernize or replace legacy systems as needed and consistent with OMB’s draft guidance. Defense and Energy partially agreed with our recommendation. Defense and Energy’s comments are consistent with the intent of our recommendation. Further, legacy federal IT investments are becoming obsolete and several aging investments are using unsupported components, many of which did not have specific plans for modernization or replacement.	Why GAO Did This Study The President's fiscal year 2017 budget request for IT was more than $89 billion, with much of this amount reportedly for operating and maintaining existing (legacy) IT systems. Given the magnitude of these investments, it is important that agencies effectively manage their IT O&M investments. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today that (1) assesses federal agencies' IT O&M spending, (2) evaluates the oversight of at-risk legacy investments, and (3) assesses the age and obsolescence of federal IT. In preparing the report on which this testimony is based, GAO reviewed 26 agencies' IT O&M spending plans for fiscal years 2010 through 2017 and OMB data. GAO further reviewed the 12 agencies that reported the highest planned IT spending for fiscal year 2015 to provide specifics on agency spending and individual investments. What GAO Found The federal government spent more than 75 percent of the total amount budgeted for information technology (IT) for fiscal year 2015 on operations and maintenance (O&M) investments. Specifically, 5,233 of the government's approximately 7,000 IT investments are spending all of their funds on O&M activities. Such spending has increased over the past 7 fiscal years, which has resulted in a $7.3 billion decline from fiscal years 2010 to 2017 in development, modernization, and enhancement activities. Many IT O&M investments in GAO's review were identified as moderate to high risk by agency CIOs and agencies did not consistently perform required analysis of these at-risk investments. Until agencies fully review their at-risk investments, the government's oversight of such investments will be limited and its spending could be wasteful. Federal legacy IT investments are becoming increasingly obsolete: many use outdated software languages and hardware parts that are unsupported. Agencies reported using several systems that have components that are, in some cases, at least 50 years old. For example, the Department of Defense uses 8-inch floppy disks in a legacy system that coordinates the operational functions of the nation's nuclear forces. In addition, the Department of the Treasury uses assembly language code—a computer language initially used in the 1950s and typically tied to the hardware for which it was developed. OMB recently began an initiative to modernize, retire, and replace the federal government's legacy IT systems. As part of this, OMB drafted guidance requiring agencies to identify, prioritize, and plan to modernize legacy systems. However, until this policy is finalized and fully executed, the government runs the risk of maintaining systems that have outlived their effectiveness. The following table provides examples of legacy systems across the federal government that agencies report are 30 years or older and use obsolete software or hardware, and identifies those that do not have specific plans with time frames to modernize or replace these investments. What GAO Recommends In the report being released today, GAO is making multiple recommendations, one of which is for OMB to finalize draft guidance to identify and prioritize legacy IT needing to be modernized or replaced. In the report, GAO is also recommending that selected agencies address obsolete legacy IT O&M investments. Nine agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations, two partially agreed, and two stated they had no comment. The two agencies that partially agreed, the Departments of Defense and Energy, outlined plans that were consistent with the intent of GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-15-715T	gao_GAO-15-715T_0	Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements and to allow costs that would not otherwise be eligible for federal matching funds—through “expenditure authorities”—for experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that, in the Secretary’s judgment, are likely to assist in promoting Medicaid objectives. HHS Approved Expenditure Authorities Allowing States to Fund State Programs and New Types of Funding Pools Without Clearly Showing How They Furthered Medicaid Objectives HHS approved expenditure authorities for a broad range of purposes beyond expanding Medicaid coverage to individuals, including state- operated programs and funding pools. However, how these programs and funding pools would further Medicaid objectives was not always apparent from HHS’s documentation. HHS Approved Expenditure Authorities Allowing States to Fund State Programs, but How Programs Would Promote Medicaid Objectives Was Not Always Clear In our April 2015 report examining recent demonstration approvals in 25 states, we found that HHS had approved expenditure authorities allowing 5 states to receive federal Medicaid matching funds for state expenditures for more than 150 state-operated programs. The 5 states were approved to spend up to $9.5 billion in Medicaid funds (federal and state) for these programs during their current demonstration approval periods, which ranged from 2.5 to 5 years. The state programs were operated or funded by a wide range of different state agencies, such as state departments of mental health, public health, corrections, youth services, developmental disabilities, aging, and state educational institutions. Further, we found that several state programs approved for federal Medicaid funds appeared, based on information in the approvals, to be only tangentially related to improving health coverage for low-income individuals and lacked documentation explaining how their approval was likely to promote Medicaid objectives. HHS Approved Expenditure Authorities Allowing States to Establish Funding Pools, but Links to Medicaid Purposes Were Not Always Transparent Another major type of non-coverage-related expenditure authority that HHS approved allowed states to make new kinds of supplemental payments—that is, payments in addition to base payments for covered services—to hospitals and other providers. HHS’s Recent Approvals Highlight the Need for Specific Criteria and Clear Documentation to Show How Expenditure Authorities Further Medicaid Objectives While section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides HHS with broad authority in approving expenditure authorities for demonstrations that, in the Secretary’s judgment, are likely to promote Medicaid objectives, as we reported in April 2015, according to HHS officials, the agency has not issued explicit criteria explaining how it assesses whether demonstration expenditures meet this broad statutory requirement. HHS’s Policy and Process for Approving Spending Limits Lack Transparency and Do Not Provide Assurances That Demonstrations Will Be Budget Neutral HHS’s policy and process for approving state spending on Medicaid demonstrations lack transparency and do not provide assurances that demonstrations will be budget neutral for the federal government. HHS’s Budget Neutrality Policy and Process Lack Transparency GAO’s prior work has found that HHS’s policy and process for determining state demonstration spending limits lack transparency related to the criteria and evidence used to support state spending limits, and the most recent written policy, issued in 2001, does not reflect HHS’s actual practices. Allowing questionable assumptions and methods increases projected spending and allows for significant increase in federal costs. We have found that had HHS developed demonstration spending limits based on levels suggested by its policy, spending limits would have been tens of billions of dollars lower. For example, for five states’ demonstrations we reviewed in our 2013 and 2014 reports, we estimate that had HHS used growth rates consistent with its policy and allowed only actual costs in base year spending, demonstration spending limits would have been almost $33 billion lower than what was actually approved.The federal share of the $33 billion reduction would constitute an estimated $22 billion. As section 1115 demonstrations have become a significant and growing proportion of Medicaid expenditures, ensuring that demonstration expenditures are linked to Medicaid purposes and are budget neutral is even more critical to ensuring the long-term sustainability of the program, upon which tens of millions of low-income beneficiaries depend to cover their medical costs. Appendix I: State Programs Funded by Expenditure Authorities in Section 1115 Demonstrations From June 2012 through mid-October 2013, five states received approval from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for section 1115 demonstrations that included expenditure authorities allowing funding for state programs. GAO-15-239.	Why GAO Did This Study The long-term sustainability of the $500 billion joint federal-state Medicaid program is important for the low-income and medically needy populations that depend on it. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides the Secretary of Health and Human Services with broad authority to waive certain Medicaid requirements and to authorize federal and state expenditures that would not otherwise be allowed under Medicaid, for experimental or pilot projects likely to promote Medicaid objectives. Spending under section 1115 demonstrations has increased rapidly from about one-fifth of Medicaid expenditures in fiscal year 2011 to close to one-third in fiscal year 2014. Expenditure authorities in approved demonstrations have been used by states to expand Medicaid coverage to individuals and for other purposes. HHS policy requires that demonstrations not increase federal costs for the Medicaid program. This testimony addresses (1) the types of expenditure authorities HHS has approved for non-coverage-related purposes and whether the approval documentation shows how they promote Medicaid objectives, and (2) HHS's policy and processes for ensuring demonstrations are not likely to raise federal costs. The testimony is based on GAO's April 2015 report on expenditure authorities in demonstrations approved from June 2012 through mid-October 2013 ( GAO 15 239 ) and several GAO reports issued from 2002 to 2014 addressing HHS's policies and practices for ensuring demonstrations are budget neutral. What GAO Found In April 2015, GAO found that under Medicaid section 1115 demonstrations—experimental or pilot projects to test new ways of providing services which account for nearly one-third of Medicaid expenditures—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had authorized expenditures not otherwise allowed under Medicaid for a broad range of purposes beyond expanding coverage. How these expenditure authorities promoted Medicaid objectives was not always apparent. In the 25 states' demonstrations GAO reviewed, two types of non-coverage-related expenditure authorities—state-operated programs and funding pools—were significant in the amounts of spending approved. GAO found that HHS allowed five states to spend up to $9.5 billion in Medicaid funds to support over 150 state-operated programs. The programs were wide-ranging in nature, such as workforce training, housing, and public health programs, and operated by a wide range of state agencies, such as educational institutions, corrections, aging, and public health agencies, and could have received funding from other sources. HHS allowed eight states to spend more than $26 billion to establish capped funding pools through which states could make payments to hospitals and other providers for a range of purposes, including payments to incentivize hospital infrastructure or other improvements. How the approved expenditures for the state-operated programs and funding pools would promote Medicaid objectives was not always clear in HHS's approval documentation. For example, some state programs approved for funding appeared to be only tangentially related to health coverage for low-income individuals. Although section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides HHS with broad authority in approving expenditure authorities that, in the Secretary's judgment, are likely to promote Medicaid objectives, GAO found that HHS has not issued specific criteria for making these determinations. In multiple reports, issued from 2002 to 2014, GAO also found that HHS's policy and process for approving state spending limits under demonstrations have lacked transparency and have not ensured that demonstrations will be budget neutral to the federal government. The criteria and methods used to set spending limits were not always clear or well supported, such that approved spending limits for some demonstrations were billions of dollars higher than what was supported. For example, for five demonstrations GAO reviewed in 2013 and 2014, using assumptions suggested by HHS's policy, GAO found that spending limits would have been $33 billion lower than what was actually approved. In its 2015 report and prior work, GAO has made multiple recommendations to HHS aimed at (1) improving the transparency of approved spending and how it furthers Medicaid purposes and (2) ensuring Medicaid demonstrations do not increase federal costs. HHS generally agreed to improve its expenditure authority approval documentation, but did not agree with several other recommendations aimed at improving its approval policies and processes and transparency. GAO maintains that, unless HHS takes the actions necessary to implement GAO's prior recommendations, tens of billions of dollars could be at risk.
gao_T-HEHS-98-110	gao_T-HEHS-98-110_0	Decline in Access to and Participation in Employer-Based Retiree Coverage Data from an annual survey conducted by Foster Higgins, a benefit consulting firm, suggest a significant decline between 1988 and 1996 in the availability of retiree coverage from large employers with over 500 workers. As shown by figure 1, early retirees are more likely than those who are Medicare-eligible to be offered health benefits by a former employer. The late 1980s was a period of double-digit health care inflation. There are several potential explanations for this disparity. Of the approximately 5.3 million retirees who discontinued employer-based benefits in 1994, an estimated 27 percent cited the expense as a factor—an increase from 21 percent in the earlier survey. Moreover, there was a 6-percentage-point increase over the same time period in the number of such retirees who indicated that they still had health insurance through a plan other than that of their former employer. Employers’ Decisions to Terminate Coverage Expose Retirees to New Costs and Risks If available, employer-based group health insurance provides two important advantages to retirees: (1) more affordable health benefits and (2) access to benefits for those retirees whose health status might otherwise impinge on their ability to obtain coverage in the individual insurance market. Although HIPAA guarantees access to the individual market, it does not address the cost of coverage. These 1996 rates may understate the actual cost of a HIPAA guaranteed access product purchased today. Thus, in September 1997 correspondence to the Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on early HIPAA implementation concerns, we reported that (1) premiums for some HIPAA products may be substantially higher than for standard products available to healthy individuals and (2) the way many carriers will determine future premium rates for portability products may lead to even higher rates. Limited Federal Protection of Employer-Based Retiree Health Benefits The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) protects both the pension and health benefits of workers. America’s voluntary, employer-based system of health insurance. However, if the language leaves some doubt as to the nature or duration of benefits, or if there are conflicts in the plan documents, the courts have examined significant written and oral representations made to employees to determine whether the employer has the right to modify retiree health benefits. For many individuals, the high cost of COBRA coverage is a shock because under employer-based coverage, large companies typically pay 70 to 80 percent of the premium. To address the coverage gap for such retirees, Members of the Congress as well as the President have proposed allowing affected retirees to purchase continuation coverage at a cost that reflects their higher utilization of services until they become eligible for Medicare. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996: Early Implementation Concerns (GAO/HEHS-97-200R, Sept. 2, 1997). Retiree Health Insurance: Erosion in Employer-Based Health Benefits for Early Retirees (GAO/HEHS-97-150, July 11, 1997).	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the erosion in employer-based health benefits for retirees, especially early retirees, focusing on: (1) trends in access to employer-sponsored retiree health benefits; (2) the impact on retirees of an employer's decision to terminate health benefits; and (3) federal safeguards that protect the rights of retirees who have health benefits. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) retiree access to and participation in private insurance through an employer has undergone a slow but persistent decline since the early 1990s; (2) there are several explanations for this erosion in coverage: (a) high and rising health care costs have spurred employers to look for ways to control their benefit expenditures, including eliminating retiree coverage and increasing cost sharing; and (b) a new financial accounting standard developed in the late 1980s has changed employers' perceptions of retiree health benefits and may have acted as a catalyst for reductions in retiree coverage; (3) the new rule makes employers much more aware of the future liability inherent in retiree health benefits by requiring them to account for its estimated value; (4) losing access to employer-based coverage poses major challenges for retirees; (5) the 1997 implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) has eliminated one potential obstacle for retirees who lose group coverage through their former employer--the possibility that coverage in the individual market will be denied or restricted by a preexisting medical condition; (6) because state laws governing the operation of the individual market differ, the premiums faced by early retirees vary substantially; (7) moreover, considering that large companies typically pay 70 to 80 percent of the premium, costs in the individual market may come as a rude awakening for early retirees; (8) early evidence from the implementation of HIPAA suggests that rates developed by insurance carriers for HIPAA guaranteed access products are substantially higher than the prices of standard products available in the individual market to those who are healthy; (9) as a result, these 1996 rates may understate the cost of a HIPAA product purchased in 1998; (10) a key characteristic of America's voluntary, employer-based system of health insurance is an employer's freedom to modify the conditions of coverage or to terminate benefits; (11) when an employer has terminated retiree health benefits, federal courts have turned to the nature of the written agreements and other pertinent evidence covering the provision of retiree benefits to determine the legitimacy of the action; and (12) to address the potential gap in coverage when a former employer unexpectedly terminates health insurance, Congress as well as the President have proposed allowing affected retirees to purchase continuation coverage at a cost that reflects their higher utilization of services until they become eligible for Medicare.
gao_GAO-11-188	gao_GAO-11-188_0	In its recently released Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan for Fiscal Year 2011, NNSA stated that the SSP’s mission is dependent upon the enterprise’s facilities and physical infrastructure and the critical skills of its workforce. NNSA has three categories of facilities and infrastructure that indicate the extent to which they are critical to the achievement of the SSP. For example, in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, Congress established the Commission of Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise (referred to as the Chiles Commission). NNSA Lacks Comprehensive Data Required to Make Informed, Enterprisewide Decisions We found that NNSA lacks complete data on (1) the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, (2) cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, (3) shared use facilities within the enterprise, and (4) critical human capital skills in its M&O contractor workforce needed to maintain the SSP. NNSA does not have accurate and reliable data on the condition and replacement value of its facilities and other infrastructure. This is in part because NNSA (1) has not ensured that contractors comply with a DOE directive that requires facility inspections at least once every 5 years, and (2) does not ensure consistency among the varying approaches and methodologies contractors use when determining replacement property value. While DOE requires periodic condition assessments, in our analysis of data in DOE’s agencywide infrastructure database, the Facilities Information Management System (FIMS), we found 765 of DOE’s 2,897 weapons activities facilities, or 26 percent, have not met this requirement—having either an inspection date outside of the 5-year period or no inspection date recorded (see table 1). NNSA officials stated that they are aware of the limitations of FIMS data and know that conditions change more rapidly than can be tracked by 5-year assessments. As a result, NNSA officials told us the agency also uses a variety of other methods to track site facility conditions, including budget requests, regularly updated planning documents, and daily dialogue with federal and contractor personnel at the sites. NNSA does not have estimated total costs or completion dates for all planned capital improvement projects. For example, an NNSA official said that the project to upgrade the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory had an initial cost estimate of $82 to $104 million, but site officials at Los Alamos reported to NNSA a need to change the building materials used in the original design estimate. NNSA has identified a need to effectively manage these assets enterprisewide to ensure that programmatic priorities are addressed and that users enterprisewide have well supported access to these facilities. However, we found that NNSA does not have information on which facilities are designated as shared use assets, and a NNSA official told us the agency has not reviewed individual management plans throughout the enterprise to ensure that each facilities’ submission and review process for use of the facility provides for adequate enterprisewide access. In October 2010, however, NNSA established the Office of Corporate Talent and Critical Skills to bring focused attention to meeting critical human capital skills and announced that the agency hired a director to develop and implement a critical skills sustainment strategy. NNSA Is Considering the Use of Computer Models That May Improve Its Enterprise Decision- Making Capability NNSA, recognizing that its ability to make informed enterprisewide decisions is hampered by the lack of comprehensive data and analytical tools, is considering the use of computer models—quantitative tools that couple data from each site with the functions of the enterprise—to integrate and analyze data to create an interconnected view of the enterprise, which may help to address some of the critical shortcomings we identified. These include the lack of (1) consistent, accurate, and complete data on the condition of its facilities; (2) assurance that contractors are in compliance with a DOE directive (DOE Order 430.1B) requiring facility inspections to ensure that sites’ varying approaches in determining deferred maintenance and real property values are valid and consistent; (3) information on shared use assets—although a NNSA directive (NNSA Supplemental Directive M 452.3) identifies the need for the federal and contractor officials to identify and ensure proper governance of these assets; and (4) comprehensive data on its M&O contractors’ workforce—to include identification of critical human capital skills, competencies, and staffing levels—as well as a plan with time frames and milestones for collecting this data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology In conducting our work, we reviewed National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) documents and directives, including the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan; met with Department of Energy (DOE), NNSA, and contractor officials; assessed the reliability of the data provided; and visited four of the eight enterprise sites.	Why GAO Did This Study The United States intends to invest about $80 billion to maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and infrastructure over the next decade. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), maintains the nation's nuclear weapons through its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). NNSA uses contractors to manage and operate eight separate sites, referred to as the nuclear security enterprise, to achieve the SSP's mission. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to review the SSP. This report focuses on the extent to which NNSA has the data necessary to make informed, enterprisewide decisions, particularly data on the condition of infrastructure, capital improvement projects, shared use of facilities, and critical human capital skills. GAO analyzed agency infrastructure data; reviewed agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and contractor officials. What GAO Found In its FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, NNSA outlines plans for substantial investments in important nuclear weapons capabilities and physical infrastructure. However, the agency lacks important enterprisewide infrastructure and workforce data needed for informed decision-making. In response to this shortcoming, which NNSA recognizes, the agency is considering the use of computer models that integrate data from across the enterprise, which, if fully realized, may give decision-makers a tool to take a broad and accurate assessment of the situation. Specifically, (1) NNSA does not have accurate, reliable, or complete data on the condition and replacement value of its almost 3,000 weapons activities facilities. This is, in part, because NNSA has not ensured contractor compliance with a DOE directive that requires facility inspections at least once every 5 years. For example, according to data in DOE's Facilities Information Management System (FIMS), as of April 2010, 26 percent of facilities have either an inspection date outside of the 5-year period or no inspection date recorded. NNSA officials stated that they are aware of the limitations of FIMS data and told us that they use a variety of other methods to track site facility conditions, such as budget requests and daily dialogue with federal and contractor personnel at the sites. (2) NNSA has identified 15 ongoing capital improvement projects as necessary to ensure future viability of the program, but the agency does not have estimated total costs or completion dates for all projects. For example, NNSA has not estimated total costs for the largest projects it is conducting--the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. DOE regulations do not require a total cost estimate until the initial design phase is complete, but without reliable cost and schedule data NNSA does not have a sound basis to justify decisions and planned budget increases. (3) NNSA has identified a need to effectively manage facilities used by more than one site--known as shared use assets--and issued a directive in 2009 requiring identification of these assets and a review of the governance plan developed for each designated facility to ensure that the plans align with programmatic priorities and that users enterprisewide have well supported access to these facilities. However, NNSA has not collected data on shared use assets and has not reviewed individual management plans. (4) NNSA lacks comprehensive data on the critical skills and levels needed to maintain the SSP's capabilities. NNSA primarily relies on its contractors to maintain the workforce and, while these efforts may be effective for a specific site, NNSA lacks assurance that the overall program is maintained. Without such data, NNSA cannot forecast the impact of programmatic actions or identify consequences of those actions. NNSA officials told GAO that the agency recently established an Office of Corporate Talent and Critical Skills to bring attention to these issues. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that NNSA take four actions to ensure that it is equipped with the information needed to effectively and efficiently manage the SSP. NNSA stated that it understood and can implement GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-11-352	gao_GAO-11-352_0	In the United States, responsibility for spectrum management is divided between NTIA and FCC. It is comprised of representatives from 19 federal agencies that use spectrum. For example, the plan does not identify or include quantitative governmentwide data on federal spectrum needs. Additionally, throughout these processes, there is heavy reliance on agencies to self-evaluate and report their current and future spectrum needs. NTIA’s Data Management System Lacks Transparency and Data Validation Processes, Making It Uncertain If Spectrum Management Decisions Are Based on Accurate and Complete Data NTIA’s data management system is antiquated and lacks transparency and internal controls. Federal Agencies Lack Specific Guidance and Requirements from NTIA for Recording and Maintaining Accurate Data NTIA has not established specific requirements for agencies to justify their needs and to validate and verify data used to evaluate their current and future spectrum needs. NTIA Has Taken Steps to Identify Spectrum for Future Wireless Broadband Use, yet NTIA and Federal Agencies Will Face Challenges in Analyzing and Repurposing This Spectrum NTIA Has Identified Federally Assigned Spectrum to Be Made Available for Future Wireless Broadband Use In response to the recent initiatives to make a total of 500 MHz of spectrum available for wireless broadband, NTIA has (1) identified 115 MHz of federally allocated spectrum to be made available for wireless broadband use within the next 5 years, referred to as the Fast Track Evaluation, and (2) developed an initial plan and timetable for repurposing additional spectrum for broadband, referred to as the 10-Year Plan. NTIA officials said that they will prioritize the bands identified for evaluation based on the factors in table 3, with the bands that best fulfill this criteria being evaluated for potential repurposing first. Agencies currently operating in this band have been notified of the pending evaluation, and NTIA and PPSG have identified comparable bands for agency operations. The evaluation required Navy, NOAA, and FAA to analyze and submit a significant amount of detailed impact analyses that were not readily available, according to officials with those agencies. NTIA’s spectrum management authority is broad in scope, but NTIA’s efforts do not align with its authorities. However, lacking an overall strategic vision, NTIA cannot ensure that spectrum is being used efficiently by federal agencies. However, federal agency officials face challenges—such as staff turnover and resource constraints—when coordinating with field program staff to obtain the information necessary for the frequency assignment applications and reviews. Given that verifying the information for each frequency assignment record could require significant spectrum management resources that federal agencies might not currently have, it would be beneficial for NTIA to consider options for a different approach to obtain critical assignment information from the agencies. Approaches may include efforts such as requiring agencies to conduct site surveys of their spectrum-dependent systems, attesting to the accuracy of the data provided to NTIA, or making changes to the structure of the 5-year review program. Although NTIA is developing its new FSMS, full implementation is still years away. In the meantime, without meaningful data validation requirements, NTIA has limited assurance that the agency- reported data it collects are accurate and complete. Recommendations for Executive Action To facilitate the effective governmentwide management of federal spectrum use, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information should take the following actions: To ensure NTIA’s previous efforts to develop a federal strategic plan are not diminished, develop an updated plan that includes key elements of a strategic plan, as well as information on how spectrum is being used across the federal government, opportunities to increase efficient use of federally allocated spectrum and infrastructure, an assessment of future spectrum needs, and plans to incorporate these needs in the frequency assignment, equipment certification, and review processes. To help ensure federal agencies are managing current and future spectrum assignments efficiently, in consultation with IRAC, examine the 5-year assignment review processes and consider best practices to determine if the current approach for collecting and validating data from federal agencies can be streamlined or improved. Contact information and major contributors to this report are listed on appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report focuses on the federal use of spectrum and examines (1) the extent to which the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) spectrum management oversight and policy addresses governmentwide spectrum needs, (2) how federal agencies are using assigned spectrum and the extent to which they manage their spectrum use, and (3) what steps NTIA and the federal agencies have taken to meet the requirements and expectations of the National Broadband Plan and presidential memorandum to repurpose spectrum for commercial broadband and what challenges these efforts face. Which Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) agency do you represent? 10.	Why GAO Did This Study Radio frequency spectrum enables vital wireless communications services used by the federal government, businesses, and consumers. Spectrum capacity is necessary for wireless broadband (high-speed Internet access) and broadband deployment will boost the nation's capabilities in many important areas. As the demand for spectrum continues to increase, there is concern about adequate access to meet future needs. This requested report examines (1) how the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is managing spectrum needs of federal agencies, (2) how federal agencies are using and managing assigned spectrum, and (3) what steps NTIA has taken to meet recent initiatives aimed at making spectrum available for broadband. GAO reviewed NTIA's spectrum management documents; surveyed the 19 federal agencies comprising the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee; and interviewed NTIA officials and industry and academic experts. What GAO Found NTIA is responsible for governmentwide federal spectrum management, but its efforts in this area have been limited. In 2003, the President directed NTIA to develop plans identifying federal and national (both federal and nonfederal) spectrum needs, and in 2008, NTIA issued the federal plan. GAO found this plan has several limitations, does not identify governmentwide spectrum needs, and does not contain key elements and best practices of strategic planning. NTIA has yet to issue the national plan. Furthermore, NTIA's primary spectrum management operations do not focus on governmentwide needs. Instead NTIA depends on agency self-evaluation of spectrum needs and focuses on interference mitigation, with limited emphasis on holistic spectrum management. Lacking a strategic vision, NTIA cannot ensure that spectrum is being used efficiently by federal agencies. Additionally, NTIA's data management system is antiquated and lacks internal controls to ensure the accuracy of agency-reported data, making it unclear if decisions about federal spectrum use are based on reliable data. NTIA is developing a new data management system, but full implementation of the system is years away. Federal agencies use spectrum for many purposes such as emergency communications and national defense, and NTIA requires the agencies to periodically evaluate their current and future spectrum needs. Agencies are supposed to ensure spectrum assignments fulfill established mission needs; however, NTIA does not have specific requirements for agencies to justify their spectrum assignments or validate data used for these evaluations. Consequently, NTIA has limited assurance that the data used to make spectrum management decisions are accurate. Federal agencies rely heavily on their program offices to obtain data for the required evaluations and often face challenges, such as resource constraints and staff turnover, when coordinating with field program staff. Given that validating spectrum assignments could require significant agency resources, it would be beneficial for NTIA to consider options for a different approach to obtain and validate critical spectrum assignment information from the agencies, such as requiring agencies to conduct site surveys or attest to the accuracy of data they submit. In response to recent initiatives, NTIA has taken steps to identify spectrum that could be made available for broadband use. First, NTIA evaluated various spectrum bands and identified 115 megahertz of spectrum that could be made available for broadband within the next 5 years based on criteria it developed. Second, NTIA developed an initial plan and timetable for evaluating and repurposing additional spectrum for broadband use in 10 years. Affected federal agencies--that is, those agencies operating devices in the spectrum bands being evaluated--encountered difficulties providing NTIA with the necessary data and analyses during the most recent evaluation. For example, according to the affected agencies, they were required to analyze and submit a significant amount of detailed impact analyses that were not readily available. Agencies will likely continue to face challenges providing such analyses to NTIA in the future as NTIA begins evaluating a larger number of spectrum bands for possible broadband use in the next 10 years. NTIA should develop an updated strategic plan, examine its assignment review processes to determine if the current approach can be improved, and establish internal controls to ensure the accuracy of agency-reported data. The Department of Commerce concurred with GAO's recommendation to examine the review processes and, citing competing priorities, partially concurred with the remaining two.
gao_GAO-09-802	gao_GAO-09-802_0	In July 2008, Congress passed MIPPA, which directed the Secretary of HHS to establish a program by January 1, 2009, to provide physicians confidential feedback on the Medicare resources used to provide care to beneficiaries. How to attribute resource use to physicians. Per Capita Profiling Method Shows Specialist Physicians’ Practice Patterns Relatively Stable Over 2 Years; Patients of High Resource Use Physicians Used More Institutional Services Than Other Patients Using a per capita profiling method, we found that from 2005 to 2006, specialist physicians showed considerable stability in their practice patterns, as measured by resource use—greater stability than their patients, despite high patient turnover. We also found that our per capita method can differentiate specialists’ patterns of resource use with respect to different types of services, such as institutional services, which were a major factor in beneficiaries’ resource use. In particular, patients of high resource use physicians used more institutional services than patients of low resource use physicians. This stability suggests that per capita resource use is a reasonable approach for profiling physicians, because it reflects distinct patterns of a physician’s resource use, not the particular population of beneficiaries seen by a physician in a given year. Research Literature, Health Insurers, and Specialists Identified Considerations in Developing Physician Feedback Reports on Resource Use Through our review of selected literature and interviews with officials of health insurance companies, specialty societies, and profiling experts, we identified several key considerations in developing reports to provide feedback to physicians on their performance, including their per capita resource use. We also drew on information from these sources to develop an example of how per capita measures could be presented in a physician feedback report. Methodology. Data. Per Capita Measures Can Be Presented in a Physician Feedback Report Drawing upon lessons culled from the literature and our interviews, we developed a mock report that illustrates how per capita measures could be included in a physician feedback report. 3.) Potential Influence of Feedback Regarding Medicare Costs on Physician Behavior Is Uncertain Our review of available literature on the effectiveness of physician feedback suggests that feedback alone generally has no more than a moderate influence on physician behavior. CMS broadly agreed with each of our three findings: CMS agreed that the per capita methodology is a useful approach to measuring physicians’ resource use and noted that per capita measurement is one of the cost of care measures included in CMS’s Physician Resource Use Management and Reporting Program. CMS found the attention in our report to considerations for developing a physician feedback system to be particularly helpful. Our results apply only to the four specialties in the four metropolitan areas we studied.	Why GAO Did This Study The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop a program to give physicians confidential feedback on the Medicare resources used to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries. GAO was asked to evaluate the per capita methodology for profiling physicians--a method which measures a patient's resource use over a fixed period of time and attributes that resource use to physicians--in order to assist the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) with the development of a physician feedback approach. In response, this report examines (1) the extent to which physicians in selected specialties show stable practice patterns and how beneficiary utilization of services varies by physician resource use level; (2) factors to consider in developing feedback reports on physicians' performance, including per capita resource use; and (3) the extent to which feedback reports may influence physician behavior. GAO focused on four medical specialties and four metropolitan areas chosen for their geographic diversity and range in average Medicare spending per beneficiary. To identify considerations for developing a physician feedback system, GAO reviewed the literature and interviewed officials from health plans and specialty societies. Further, GAO drew upon literature and interviews to develop an illustration of how per capita measures could be included in a physician feedback report. What GAO Found Using 2005 and 2006 Medicare claims data and a per capita methodology, GAO found that specialist physicians showed considerable stability in resource use despite high patient turnover. This stability suggests that per capita resource use is a reasonable approach for profiling specialist physicians because it reflects distinct patterns of a physician's resource use, not the particular population of beneficiaries seen by a physician in a given year. GAO also found that our per capita method can differentiate specialists' patterns of resource use with respect to different types of services, such as institutional services, which were a major factor in beneficiaries' resource use. In particular, patients of high resource use physicians used more institutional services than patients of low resource use physicians. GAO identified four key considerations in developing feedback reports on physician performance. To illustrate how per capita measures could be included in a physician feedback report, we developed a mock report containing three types of per capita measures. Although the literature suggested that feedback alone has no more than a moderate influence on physicians' behavior, the potential influence of feedback from CMS on Medicare costs may be greater, in part because of the relatively large share of physicians' practice revenues that Medicare typically represents. CMS reviewed a draft of this report and broadly agreed with our findings.
gao_NSIAD-97-8	gao_NSIAD-97-8_0	The Agreed Framework Can Be Properly Characterized as a Nonbinding Political Agreement The Agreed Framework can be properly described as a nonbinding political agreement. Officials at State said that the United States executed a nonbinding political document because it would not have been in the United States’ interest to accept an internationally binding legal obligation to provide the reactors and interim energy to North Korea. Without knowing the contents of these future protections, it is not possible to fully assess the adequacy of the liability protection that will be provided to KEDO and its members. Questions Remain About North Korea’s Obligation to Pay for Upgrading Its Electricity Power Grid North Korea’s existing electricity transmission and distribution system is inadequate to handle the electricity that would be generated by two new 1,000-MW(e) light-water reactors. State estimates that the cost of the upgrade could reach $750 million. The State Department and KEDO maintain that North Korea is responsible; however, North Korea has not yet legally obligated itself to pay. This leaves open the possibility that, in the future, North Korea could exert pressure on others to pay for the grid upgrade. The U.S. However, given the agreement’s political importance and the fact that most of its provisions have been incorporated into binding international agreements, the agreement’s broad pledges could have the effect of pressuring the Congress to appropriate moneys to implement an agreement with which the Congress had little involvement.Nevertheless, funding for the Agreed Framework is essentially a congressional matter, and disagreements about any of its particulars can be expressed through conditions and limitations on the activity’s appropriations. Our analysis of the existing nuclear liability protections confirms that the foundation of KEDO’s protection program is in place. KEDO is aware that additional steps need to be taken and, as a result, plans to build upon the foundation of its existing coverage to fully shield KEDO and its members from possible liability claims. Nevertheless, our assessment of the liability provisions in the KEDO and supply agreements and KEDO’s plan to secure additional protections, suggests that KEDO and its members—including the United States—will be adequately protected against nuclear damage claims from North Korea and third-party countries. Finally, according to KEDO, it will neither ship any fuel assemblies to North Korea nor allow the reactors to be commissioned “nless and until KEDO and its members consider that all aspects of the risk management program are in place.” Protections Against North Korean Nuclear Claims Appear Sufficient The supply and KEDO agreements contain a number of protections that are intended to preclude North Korea from making claims against KEDO or KEDO members for damages from a nuclear incident. It is too early to say whether the United States and North Korea will need to conclude an agreement for nuclear cooperation because the decisions about what, if anything, the United States will supply for the reactors have not yet been made. Nevertheless, an agreement appears likely because a U.S. firm currently supplies a major component for the reactors expected to be supplied to North Korea.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the agreement between the United States and North Korea that addresses the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation, focusing on whether: (1) the agreement is a non-binding political agreement; (2) the United States could be held financially liable for a nuclear accident at a North Korean reactor site; (3) North Korea is obligated to pay to upgrade its existing electric power distribution system; and (4) the agreement is being implemented consistent with the applicable laws governing the transfer of U.S. nuclear components, materials, and technology. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the Agreed Framework can be properly described as a nonbinding political agreement; (2) therefore, its pledges, including those involving financial outlays, are not legally enforceable; (3) agreements of this type do not require the Congress's prior involvement or approval and can have the effect of pressuring the Congress to appropriate money to implement an agreement with which it had little involvement; (4) according to the Department of State, the United States executed a nonbinding agreement because it would not have been in the country's interest to legally obligate itself to provide the reactors and interim energy to North Korea; (5) GAO's analysis of the existing nuclear liability protections confirms that the foundation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization's (KEDO) risk protection program is in place; (6) KEDO plans to obtain additional protections to ensure that KEDO and its members are fully shielded from possible liability claims; (7) without knowing the contents of these future protections, it is not possible to fully assess the adequacy of the liability protection that will be provided to KEDO and its members; (8) nevertheless, GAO's assessment of the liability provisions in the KEDO and supply agreements and KEDO's intention to secure additional protections, suggests that KEDO and its members will be adequately protected against nuclear damage claims from North Korea and third-party countries; (9) according to KEDO, it will not ship any fuel assemblies to North Korea or allow the reactors to be commissioned unless and until KEDO and its members consider that all aspects of the risk protection program are in place; (10) North Korea's existing electricity transmission and distribution system will need to be modernized to distribute the electricity generated by the two light-water reactors being provided; (11) upgrading the power grid could cost as much as $750 million; and thus far, no party has obligated itself to pay for the upgrade; (12) the United States and KEDO maintain that North Korea is responsible; however, North Korea has not yet legally obligated itself to pay; (13) this leaves open the possibility that, in the future, North Korea could exert pressure on others to pay for upgrading the grid; (14) it is too early to say whether the United States and North Korea will need to conclude an agreement for cooperation because decisions have not yet been made about what, if anything, the United States will supply for the reactors; and (15) nevertheless, an agreement appears likely because a U.S. firm currently supplies a major component for the reactors that are to be delivered.
gao_GAO-17-375T	gao_GAO-17-375T_0	High-Risk Areas Making Progress Since our last high-risk update, while progress has varied, many of the 32 high-risk areas on our 2015 list have shown solid progress. As shown in table 1, 23 high-risk areas, or two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria for removal from our High-Risk List; 15 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. In two other areas, enough progress was made that we removed a segment of the high-risk area—Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data and Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management. The other eight areas improved in at least one criterion rating by either moving from “not met” to “partially met” or from “partially met” to “met.” One High-Risk Designation Removed We removed the area of Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland from the High-Risk List because the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and key departments and agencies have made significant progress to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well as other information (collectively referred to in this section as terrorism-related information), is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners. Accordingly, there is sufficient progress to remove this segment from the high-risk area. The IRIS program has made some progress on the capacity, monitoring, and demonstrated progress criteria. Effective implementation of FITARA is central to making progress in the Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations government-wide area we added to the High-Risk List in 2015. High-Risk Areas Highlighted for Significant Attention In the 2 years since the last high-risk update, two areas—Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data and Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources—have expanded in scope because of emerging challenges related to these overall high-risk areas. DOD Financial Management. The effects of DOD’s financial management problems extend beyond financial reporting and negatively affect DOD’s ability to manage the department and make sound decisions on mission and operations. Resolving the role of the federal government in housing finance will require leadership commitment and action by Congress and the administration. Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information. New High-Risk Areas For 2017, we are adding three new areas to the High-Risk List. Improving Federal Management of Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members We, along with inspectors general, special commissions, and others, have reported that federal agencies have ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs, and inefficiently fulfilled their responsibilities for managing the development of Indian energy resources. In particular, we have found numerous challenges facing Interior’s Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS) in administering education and health care services, which put the health and safety of American Indians served by these programs at risk. For fiscal year 2016, the federal government’s estimated environmental liability was $447 billion—up from $212 billion for fiscal year 1997. Since 1994, we have made at least 28 recommendations related to addressing the federal government’s environmental liability. Of these, 13 recommendations remain unimplemented. Agencies spend billions each year on environmental cleanup efforts but the estimated environmental liability continues to rise. This recommendation has not been implemented. This recommendation has not been implemented. Over the past 3 years, we have made 30 recommendations to help the Bureau design and implement a more cost-effective census for 2020; however, only 6 of them had been fully implemented as of January 2017. The cost of the census, in terms of cost for counting each housing unit, has been escalating over the last several decennials. The 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the $9.4 billion cost of the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The Bureau plans to implement several new innovations in its design of the 2020 Census. What Needs to Be Done To help the Bureau mitigate the risks associated with its fundamentally new and complex innovations for the 2020 Census, the commitment of top leadership is needed to ensure the Bureau’s management, culture, and business practices align with a cost-effective enumeration.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities: about $3.9 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2016 funded a broad array of programs and operations. GAO's high-risk program identifies government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2015 and actions that are still needed to assure further progress, and identifies new high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems potentially save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen government performance and accountability. GAO uses five criteria to assess progress in addressing high-risk areas: (1) leadership commitment, (2) agency capacity, (3) an action plan, (4) monitoring efforts, and (5) demonstrated progress. What GAO Found Since GAO's last high-risk update, many of the 32 high-risk areas on the 2015 list have shown solid progress. Twenty-three high-risk areas, or two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List; 15 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. Progress has been possible through the concerted efforts of Congress and leadership and staff in agencies. For example, Congress enacted over a dozen laws since GAO's last report in February 2015 to help address high-risk issues. GAO removed 1 high-risk area on managing terrorism-related information, because significant progress had been made to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners. Sufficient progress was made to remove segments of 2 areas related to supply chain management at the Department of Defense (DOD) and gaps in geostationary weather satellite data. Two high-risk areas expanded—DOD's polar-orbiting weather satellites and the Department of the Interior's restructuring of offshore oil and gas oversight. Several other areas need substantive attention including VA health care, DOD financial management, ensuring the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure, resolving the federal role in housing finance, and improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations. GAO is adding 3 areas to the High-Risk List, bringing the total to 34: Management of Federal Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members. GAO has reported that federal agencies, including the Department of the Interior's Bureaus of Indian Education and Indian Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service, have ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs and inefficiently developed Indian energy resources. Thirty-nine of 41 GAO recommendations on this issue remain unimplemented. U.S. Government's Environmental Liabilities. In fiscal year 2016 this liability was estimated at $447 billion (up from $212 billion in 1997). The Department of Energy is responsible for 83 percent of these liabilities and DOD for 14 percent. Agencies spend billions each year on environmental cleanup efforts but the estimated environmental liability continues to rise. Since 1994, GAO has made at least 28 recommendations related to this area; 13 are unimplemented. The 2020 Decennial Census. The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several decennials; the 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, about 31 percent more than the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) plans to implement several innovations—including IT systems—for the 2020 Census. Successfully implementing these innovations, along with other challenges, risk the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective census. Since 2014, GAO has made 30 recommendations related to this area; however, only 6 have been fully implemented. GAO's 2017 High-Risk List What GAO Recommends This report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving greater progress.
gao_AIMD-99-25	gao_AIMD-99-25_0	Integration Costs Have Increased and Expected Completion Has Been Delayed While HUD revised its FSI plan in 1993 and again in 1997, its primary objective—implementing an integrated financial management system to meet the department’s program and financial management needs—remained unchanged. HUD’s strategy for achieving the FSI objectives was to replace about 100 separate financial and mixed systems with nine new fully integrated systems. The department estimated that it would cost about $103 million to develop and deploy the nine systems called for in the 1991 FSI plan by September 1998. Therefore, HUD had no assurance that it had selected the most cost-beneficial solution for FSI. In 1995, the department estimated that the development and deployment cost of the 1993 strategy would be about $209 million. FSI Revised Again in 1997 In 1997, HUD again revised its FSI strategy after concluding that (1) it could not fully deploy HUDCAPS—the core financial system—by September 1998 and (2) the systems integration effort had to conform to the HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan. Until HUD finalizes its plans and cost and schedule estimates to complete the 1997 strategy, the expected FSI cost will remain uncertain. HUD has been working to implement the 1997 FSI strategy. Further, HUD lacks an adequate process for monitoring and controlling its FSI investments and does not have a process for evaluating FSI information technology investments once they have been completed. As a result, HUD may continue to invest in a system without knowing whether costs or benefits have changed enough to warrant discontinuing further investment. Year 2000 Computing Crisis May Further Impact FSI FSI cost and schedule estimates may be impacted by HUD’s Year 2000 program, a priority effort that must be completed on time. HUD has not yet implemented a disciplined investment management process to select, control, and evaluate FSI projects in accordance with industry best practices and as required by the Clinger-Cohen Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act. In addition, HUD should finalize the detailed project plan for the core financial management system (HUDCAPS) to establish the milestones, tasks, task dependencies, a critical path, and staffing requirements and demonstrate that it is cost-effective to meet the October 1999 scheduled implementation date called for in HUD’s 2020 Management Reform Plan and finalize detailed project plans for individual FSI projects (mixed systems) that establish the milestones, tasks, task dependencies and critical paths, and staffing requirements to complete the 1997 FSI strategy. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to identify (1) the initial objectives, development, deployment and maintenance costs, and completion dates for HUD’s FSI effort and how they have changed, (2) the factors that have contributed to FSI cost increases and schedule delays, and (3) whether HUD is following industry best practices and has implemented provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 required to manage FSI projects as investments. 3. 4.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO identified: (1) the initial objectives, development, deployment and maintenance costs, and completion dates for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Financial Systems Integration (FSI) effort and how they have changed; (2) the factors that have contributed to FSI cost increases and schedule delays; (3) whether HUD is following industry best practices and has implemented provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 required to manage FSI projects as investments; and (4) whether HUD's Year 2000 program will impact its FSI activities. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) while HUD's primary FSI objective of implementing an integrated financial management system has remained the same, the underlying strategy for achieving this objective and completion dates have changed significantly; (2) in 1991, HUD approved a plan to replace about 100 financial and mixed systems with nine standard integrated systems, estimating that it would cost about $103 million to develop and deploy the systems by September 1998; (3) in 1993, HUD abandoned its plan to develop nine new systems and significantly revised its FSI strategy; (4) HUD estimated that it would cost about $209 million to develop and deploy the new system by December 1998; (5) in 1997, HUD revised its FSI strategy again, extending the date for fully deploying the core financial management system to October 1999 and incorporating the development and deployment of additional new systems required to meet the department's latest management reforms and organizational changes; (6) the department did not adequately assess the costs or benefits of the 1997 FSI strategy; (7) as a result, HUD has no assurance that it has selected the most cost-beneficial solution to accomplish its FSI objectives; (8) until HUD finalizes its plans and cost and schedule estimates to complete the 1997 strategy, the expected FSI cost will remain uncertain; (9) nine systems included in the 1997 FSI strategy are in various stages of development and deployment; (10) revisions to the systems integration strategy and management and oversight problems associated with individual projects are factors that have contributed to FSI cost increases and schedule delays to date; (11) HUD has not yet fully implemented a complete, disciplined information technology investment management process, which includes selecting, controlling, and evaluating FSI projects and conforms with best practices and related requirements in the Clinger-Cohen Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act; (12) in addition, HUD has not implemented: (a) an adequate process to control information technology products once they have been selected for implementation; or (b) a process to evaluate information technology projects and determine whether they have achieved expected benefits; and (13) HUD's Year 2000 program, a top priority effort that must be completed on time, may further impact the FSI effort.
gao_GAO-14-35	gao_GAO-14-35_0	1). When Congress approves a flood control project for construction, it typically authorizes a total cost for the project based on estimates prepared by the Corps. Maximum Project Cost When Congress authorizes a specific amount of money for a project, this authorized project cost provides the basis for the project’s maximum cost. A Majority of Projects Experienced Cost Increases Due to Various Factors The majority of the Corps flood control projects budgeted for construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced cost increases, including inflation. However, no projects had cost increases that exceeded their maximum allowable cost, or 902 limit, as defined by law. Various factors other than inflation contributed to cost increases among the eight projects we selected for further review. The Corps has some efforts under way intended to better manage costs. At Least Two-thirds of Flood Control Projects Experienced Cost Increases At least two-thirds of the 87 flood control projects budgeted for construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced increases, including inflation, from their original authorized cost to their current estimated project cost or their total expenditures at closeout, according to information provided by Corps officials. Design changes due primarily to unforeseen site conditions and changes in design criteria following Hurricane Katrina contributed to increased costs on six of the projects we reviewed. Less than optimal federal funding. Receiving less than optimal federal funding increased the costs of three of the eight projects we reviewed, according to Corps officials. Officials for two projects—Napa River and Turkey Creek—said their projects received less than optimal federal funding, so they had to break up the work into smaller segments than initially planned. Underestimated costs. Specifically, Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors told us that the Corps usually communicated changes in Corps policy as soon as they occurred. The Corps’ communication with the nonfederal sponsors on project scope and design changes was generally effective among the projects, according to Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors we spoke with. However, some sponsors told us the Corps was less timely in providing updated cost information. Communications Plans Called for by Guidance Were Not Always Developed, and Corps Officials and Nonfederal Sponsors Suggested Ways to Improve Communication Corps guidance directs project delivery teams to develop a communications plan for their projects, but three of the eight projects we selected for further review did not have a communications plan. Because the communications plan provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project delivery team, without such a plan, the Corps may be missing opportunities to assess their communication needs. For example, a communications plan may help Corps or sponsor staff understand the team’s communications needs when they join the project delivery team; for projects where there is significant turnover, understanding the team’s needs is especially important. Recommendation for Executive Action To improve communication between the Corps and nonfederal sponsors of flood control projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers take steps to ensure that flood control project delivery teams comply with agency guidance to develop communications plans for flood control projects. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred in flood control projects and the primary factors that contributed to the differences between estimated and actual costs; (2) the extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to its nonfederal sponsors on changes to Corps policies, project scope and design, and estimated versus actual costs; and (3) Corps guidance on communication with nonfederal sponsors and ways, if any, suggested by Corps officials and sponsors to improve such communication. The Corps identified 87 new or ongoing flood control projects that were budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012. To determine the extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors, we interviewed Corps district officials and representatives of the sponsors of the eight projects selected for further review to obtain information on the Corps’ communication with, and provision of updated information to, the sponsors regarding changes to Corps policies, project scope and design, and estimated and actual costs, and analyzed the supporting documents they provided.	Why GAO Did This Study For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated almost $1.7 billion to the Corps for its Civil Works program to construct a wide range of projects, including flood control projects. Flood control projects require congressional authorization and appropriations. Nonfederal sponsors, such as a state or local government, also provide funds. When Congress approves a project for construction, it authorizes a total cost for the project based on estimates prepared by the Corps, and this authorized cost provides the basis for the project's maximum cost. GAO was asked to review issues related to flood control projects. This report examines (1) the extent to which cost increases occurred and the primary factors that contributed to the differences between estimated and actual costs, (2) the extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors, and (3) Corps guidance on communication with such sponsors and ways, if any, to improve such communication. GAO surveyed Corps officials on all 87 flood control projects identified by the Corps as budgeted for construction in any fiscal year from 2004 to 2012, selected 8 for further review covering each Corps division, reviewed project documents and Corps communication guidance, and interviewed Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors. What GAO Found The majority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) flood control projects budgeted for construction from fiscal years 2004 to 2012 experienced cost increases, including inflation. Specifically, 59 of 87 flood control projects during this period experienced increases from their original authorized cost to their current estimated project cost or their total expenditures at closeout, according to information provided by Corps officials. However, according to a Corps official, as of September 2013, no projects had cost increases that exceeded their maximum allowable cost as defined by law. Various factors other than inflation contributed to cost increases among the 8 projects GAO selected for further review. Factors included design changes, less than optimal federal funding, underestimated costs, and contract cost changes. For example, 6 of the 8 projects had design changes due to unforeseen site conditions and changes in design criteria following Hurricane Katrina. According to Corps officials, receiving less than optimal federal funding increased the costs of 3 of the 8 projects GAO reviewed. Corps officials also said that receiving less than optimal federal funding meant that 2 projects had to break up their work into smaller segments, and 1 project had to extend its completion schedule. The Corps has some efforts under way intended to better manage costs. The extent to which the Corps communicated with and provided updated information to nonfederal sponsors varied among the 8 projects GAO selected for further review. Specifically, Corps officials and sponsors told GAO that the Corps usually communicated Corps policy changes affecting projects by telephone or email as soon as they occurred. In addition, the Corps' communication with the sponsors on project scope and design changes was generally effective among the projects, according to Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors with whom GAO spoke. However, some sponsors told GAO the Corps was less timely in providing updated cost information. For example, a representative of one sponsor told GAO that the sponsor had not received the required quarterly cost report on a regular basis. The Corps has guidance regarding communication between the Corps and its nonfederal sponsors. Specifically, Corps guidance directs project delivery teams to develop a project management plan that includes a communications plan. However, GAO found that 3 of the 8 projects GAO reviewed did not have a communications plan as called for by guidance. Because the communications plan provides a framework for the Corps and nonfederal sponsors to establish a communications strategy and determine the needs of the project delivery team, without such a plan, the Corps may be missing opportunities to assess their communication needs. Developing such a plan may help Corps or sponsor staff understand the team's communications needs when they join the project delivery team; for projects where there is significant turnover, understanding the team's needs is especially important. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Corps take steps to ensure compliance with its guidance calling for communications plans. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendation.
gao_GAO-02-25	gao_GAO-02-25_0	In fiscal year 2000, BJA awarded 99 Byrne discretionary grants worth about $69 million. In addition, grant managers are to review grantee program and financial progress reports. Byrne and VAWO grant files did not always contain monitoring plans, and grant managers were not consistently documenting their monitoring activities, according to the monitoring plans that we reviewed. Each grant may contain one or more individual grant awards,and for each award, OJP requires that grant managers prepare a monitoring plan containing information on, among other things, who will conduct the monitoring, how it will be done, and when and what type of monitoring activities and reports are planned. Our review of documentation on the awards in 46 Byrne grant files and 84 VAWO grant files showed that an estimated 29 percent of the Byrne awards and about 11 percent of the VAWO awards did not contain a grant manager’s monitoring plan. BJA and VAWO Are Not Positioned to Systematically Determine Staff Compliance With Monitoring Requirements and Assess Overall Performance BJA and VAWO are not positioned to systematically determine grant managers’ compliance with monitoring requirements because documentation about monitoring activities is not readily available. Instead, they rely on staff meetings and informal discussions with staff to oversee grant monitoring activities and identify potential grantee problems. OJP has begun to work with its bureaus and offices, such as BJA and VAWO, to address these problems, but it is too early to tell whether its efforts will be enough to resolve many of the issues that we and others, including OJP, have identified. Appendix I: Size and Growth of OJP, BJA, and VAWO Budgets and BJA and VAWO Discretionary Grant Programs The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and its bureaus and offices, including the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Violence Against Women Office (VAWO), experienced budget growth in the latter half of the 1990s, following the passage of the 1994 Crime Act. OJP formula grants are awarded directly to state governments, which then make subawards to state and local unites of government. A discussion of the development of VAWO’s management information system can be found on page 21 of the report. 12.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed grant monitoring and evaluation efforts by the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Justice Program (OJP). This report discusses the monitoring of discretionary grants awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA) Byrne Program and the Violence Against Women Office (VAWO) within OJP. What GAO Found In constant 2000 dollars, Byrne and VAWO discretionary grants grew about 85 percent--from $105 million to $194 million between fiscal years 1997 and 2000. These funds were awarded to state and local governments, either on a competitive basis or pursuant to legislation allocating funds through congressional earmarks. BJA and VAWO, together with OJP's Office of the Comptroller, are responsible for monitoring these grants to ensure they are implemented as intended, are responsive to grant goals and objectives, and comply with statutory regulations and policy guidelines. OJP's monitoring requirements include the development of monitoring plans that articulate who will conduct monitoring, the manner in which it will be done, and when and what type of monitoring activities are planned. Grant managers are to maintain documentation in grant files using such techniques as written reports of on-site reviews and telephone interview write-ups. GAO's review of 46 Byrne and 84 VAWO discretionary grants indicated that only 29 percent of Byrne and 11 percent of VAWO award files contained monitoring plans. In addition, for awards covering the most recent 12-month period, grant managers were not consistently documenting their monitoring activities. BJA and VAWO cannot systematically oversee grant managers' compliance with monitoring requirements because documentation is not readily available. Both BJA and VAWO rely on staff meetings and discussions to identify grant problems or monitoring issues, and neither have management information systems to compile and analyze data on monitoring activities. OJP has begun to work with its bureaus and offices to address grant management problems, but it is too early to tell whether OJP's efforts will be effective.
gao_NSIAD-95-20	gao_NSIAD-95-20_0	This initiative could help improve program execution. To build on those planned actions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require that the new DBOF policy statement on capital budget investment projects include requirements to (1) link capital investment projects to the DBOF activities long-range plans and missions and (2) rely on net present value as the primary investment decision criterion for rank ordering competing capital investment projects; develop plans and schedules for training the key people responsible for implementing the new guidance; develop mechanisms to track implementation of the new guidance and hold managers accountable for achieving the intent of the guidance; include capital asset justification program deficiencies as a material weakness in the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act report; and identify, in its annual DBOF capital budget update, (1) projects canceled or postponed since submission of the last budget and (2) projects selected as replacements for those canceled or postponed. Listing the program as a material weakness in the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act report provides an added level of management attention. We will make copies available to others on request. Comments From the Department of Defense The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated September 16, 1994. Here and several other times throughout the comments, DOD states that the problems with the capital asset budgeting process have been resolved. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. As we show in this report, the DBOF activities we visited canceled or postponed 86 percent and 65 percent of their budgeted projects during fiscal years 1993 and 1994, respectively. To assess the effectiveness of the budget preparation and review process and determine if capital projects are adequately justified and economically supported, we (1) reviewed the DOD policies, procedures, and guidance used to prepare and review capital budget projects and (2) identified internal controls in place to ensure that capital projects are selected in accordance with the procedures and guidance.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) capital budget, focusing on: (1) whether DOD carries out the projects identified in its capital budget; and (2) the effectiveness of the DOD capital budget preparation and review process. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) DOD continues to have problems managing its capital asset program and carrying out its capital budget; (2) defense activities cancelled or postponed 86 percent and 65 percent of their fiscal year (FY) 1993 and FY 1994 capital budget projects, respectively, due to weaknesses in the budget justification, preparation, and review processes; (3) uncertainties due to base closings and realignments, budget reductions, and DOD management initiatives also contributed to other project cancellations; (4) activity managers usually replace cancelled projects with other projects, so the projects actually carried out bear little resemblance to those in the capital budget submitted to Congress; (5) new DOD guidance for justifying capital projects, if implemented, will strengthen the Defense Business Operations Fund's (DBOF) capital budgeting process; (6) the new guidance could be improved by directly linking capital projects to long-range investment needs and using investment criteria that maximize benefits and a cultural change; (7) proper implementation of the new guidance requires high-level management attention, training, and appropriate oversight mechanisms; and (8) listing capital asset program deficiencies in DOD Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act reports would provide an added level of management attention.

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