Split (3)

train · 17.5k rows

id stringlengths 9 18	pid stringlengths 11 20	input stringlengths 120 17k	output stringlengths 127 13.7k
gao_GAO-11-766	gao_GAO-11-766_0	 Tactical nonstandard equipment, which is commercially acquired or nondevelopmental equipment that is rapidly acquired and fielded outside the normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System and acquisition processes, in order to bridge capability gaps and meet urgent warfighter needs. According to Army officials, all equipment—standard and nonstandard— must be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. Army Has Policies for Disposition of Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment Army Has Plans and Processes for the Disposition of Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment As part of the Iraqi drawdown effort, excess nonstandard equipment that is no longer needed in Iraq is either redistributed in the CENTCOM theater, disposed of, provided to other nations through foreign military sales, or packaged for retrograde to a variety of Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Depots or Sierra Army Depot in the United States. As with Army units, excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped in “as is” condition. According to this message, the intent is to extend the use of that equipment where appropriate. Moreover, the April 2011 message calls for the establishment of an executive forum to review and determine the final disposition of excess nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army Depot for more than 180 days that has not been identified for reuse. In this way unnecessary transportation costs will be avoided. The CDRT process enables the Army to identify capabilities, most of which involve tactical nonstandard equipment that has been rapidly fielded, that are performing well in the CENTCOM theater and then to assess whether the capability should be retained in the Army’s current and future force. Lack of Oversight for Tactical Nonstandard Equipment Impairs Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Process and May Inhibit Future Funding Estimates The effectiveness of the Army’s CDRT process is also inhibited by the lack of a system to track, monitor, and manage this equipment, which, in turn, may be attributed to the absence of a single focal point with the appropriate authority to oversee the fielding and disposition of tactical nonstandard equipment. According to federal best practices reported in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management is responsible for developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. Army Has Finalized Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet, but Its Cost Estimates Are Incomplete and Do Not Follow Best Practices Army Has Finalized Detailed Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet The Army has recently transitioned MRAPs from nonstandard to standard items of equipment and published detailed disposition plans outlining how the vehicles will be integrated into the Army’s force structure. Recommendations for Executive Action To facilitate the Army’s ability to efficiently evaluate, integrate, and provide for the disposition of its nonstandard equipment being retrograded from Iraq, and supply DOD decision makers and Congress with accurate estimates of the future costs of these systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following three actions: finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard equipment, fund those items deemed as enduring capabilities in the Army base budget if applicable, and provide Congress with its plans for and estimates on future funding for or costs associated with any equipment the Army will continue to use in theater that will not become enduring capabilities;  designate a senior-level focal point within the Department of the Army with the appropriate authority and resources to manage the service’s effort in overseeing the disposition of its tactical nonstandard equipment to include the implementation of a servicewide means to track, monitor, and manage this equipment; and  undertake a thorough total life-cycle cost estimate for integrating MRAPs into its ground vehicle fleet in accordance with DOD, OMB, and GAO guidance and include costs for training, upgrades, standardization, and military construction and  use this estimate to assess the affordability of its current plans and make adjustments to those plans if warranted; and  provide the total life-cycle cost for integrating MRAPs into its ground vehicle fleet to Congress. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation, did not concur with our second recommendation, and concurred with our third recommendation. Army officials familiar with the CDRT process have stated that the Army has yet to make definitive and difficult decisions about the majority of the material capabilities considered by CDRT and it cannot afford to sustain this equipment without overseas contingency operations funds. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed in Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, including various Army messages that address the procedures for requisitioning retrograded nonstandard equipment from Iraq.	Why GAO Did This Study As of March 2011, the Army had over $4 billion worth of nonstandard equipment in Iraq--that is equipment not included on units' standard list of authorized equipment. Concurrently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired over $44 billion worth of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP), most of which have been allocated to the Army. This equipment must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011. GAO examined the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of (1) nontactical nonstandard equipment; (2) tactical nonstandard equipment; and (3) MRAPs that are no longer needed in Iraq. In performing this review, GAO analyzed relevant documents, interviewed Army officials, and visited Sierra Army Depot, where most nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped once it leaves Iraq. What GAO Found The Army has plans and processes for the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment (e.g., durable goods that are used to provide services for soldiers), and recently created a policy regarding the length of storage time. Excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is either redistributed in the U.S Central Command theater, disposed of, provided to other nations through foreign military sales or other means, or shipped to depots in the United States. In April 2011, the Army issued two messages that updated its procedures for requisitioning excess nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army Depot and created a forum to determine its final disposition instructions. The intent was also to extend use of this equipment by making it available to Army units; when an item is deemed not operational, to dispose of it in theater; and to enter these instructions in a disposition database so they will no longer be shipped back to the United States. The Army would then avoid unnecessary transportation costs. The Army has not made disposition decisions for most of its tactical nonstandard equipment (i.e., commercially acquired or non-developmental equipment rapidly acquired and fielded outside the normal budgeting and acquisition process), and its disposition process is impaired by a lack of visibility over this equipment and the absence of a focal point to manage this equipment. The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition process enables the Army to assess tactical nonstandard equipment already in use in the U.S. Central Command theater and determine whether it should be retained for the Army's current and future force and subsequently funded in the Army's base budget. However, the decision about most of the equipment considered by the process is to continue to fund it with overseas contingency operations funds. In addition, the Army has no system to track, monitor, and manage its inventory of tactical nonstandard equipment and has no single focal point to oversee this equipment. Best practices as cited in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for effective stewardship of resources by developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices. Although the Army has plans for the disposition of its MRAP fleet, its cost estimates are incomplete and do not follow cost-estimating best practices. The Army conducted a study to effectively guide its integration of MRAPs into its force structure. The selected option placed the majority of MRAPs in prepositioned stocks. However, this study did not incorporate analyses of future costs based on Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and GAO cost-estimating guidance providing best practices; nor did it delineate total costs for sustainment of its MRAP fleet or when those costs would be incurred. Without such information, decision makers lack the perspective necessary to make asset-management and budgetary decisions. Although Army officials stated that they are working toward providing an estimate of future MRAP costs, this has not yet been completed. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct Army authorities to (1) finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard equipment; (2) designate a focal point to oversee this equipment; and (3) undertake a thorough life-cycle cost estimate for its MRAPs. DOD concurred with our third recommendation, partially concurred with our first, and did not concur with the second. Given DOD's lack of visibility over tactical nonstandard equipment, GAO continues to believe a focal point is needed.
gao_GAO-17-437	gao_GAO-17-437_0	Changes in Application of Federal Minimum Wage and Immigration Laws Minimum Wage Changes In 2007, the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 were applied to the CNMI, requiring the minimum wage in the CNMI to rise incrementally to the federal level in a series of scheduled increases. CNMI’s Labor Market Has Begun to Grow While Continuing to Rely on Foreign and Minimum Wage Workers According to CNMI tax data, overall employment in the CNMI increased by about 8 percent from 2013 through 2015. On September 30, 2016, the CNMI’s minimum wage increased from $6.05 to $6.55 per hour. Demand for CW-1 workers in the CNMI exceeded the available number of CW-1 permits in 2016, while planned hotels, casinos, and other infrastructure projects estimate needing thousands of new employees. The existing CW-1 permits for foreign workers and the local supply of U.S. workers are insufficient to meet this estimated future demand. Economic Analysis and Recent Data Show That Ending the CW Program Could Have a Large Negative Effect on the Economy If all CW-1 workers, or 45 percent of the total workers in 2015, were removed from the CNMI’s labor market, we project a 26 to 62 percent reduction in the CNMI’s 2015 GDP, depending on the assumptions made. A key factor in the additional demand for labor in 2016 was the construction of a new casino in Saipan. When the CW program ends in 2019, available data show that the unemployed domestic workforce, estimated at 2,386 in 2016, will be well below the number of workers needed to replace currently employed CW-1 workers in nonconstruction-related occupations. Other U.S.-eligible workers. Workers could be recruited from U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the freely associated states (Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau). At least one employer in all four facilitated employer discussion groups and six of seven employers in semistructured interviews reported on efforts to recruit U.S. workers. At present, the CW-1 fees support job training programs at Northern Marianas College and Northern Marianas Trades Institute and in recent years also funded job training provided by CNMI’s Public School System. According to the report, Public Law 113-235 repealed the U.S. Secretary of Labor’s authority to extend the transition period beyond 2019. To evaluate changes in the CNMI’s labor market since the federally mandated minimum wage increases began, we (1) analyzed overall employment data for all domestic and foreign workers in the CNMI, (2) estimated inflation adjusted average earnings, (3) determined the industries and occupations with the highest numbers of CNMI workers affected by the current and scheduled minimum wage increases, and (4) obtained employers’ and employees’ opinions about the minimum wage increases. To evaluate the potential economic impact of reducing the number of foreign workers in the CNMI to zero and replacing them with domestic workers, we (1) developed an economic model that simulates how the CNMI’s GDP would change if the number of CNMI-Only transitional worker (CW-1) permits were reduced to zero, (2) evaluated the local supply and demand for labor, and (3) obtained local employers’ and employees’ opinions about the past and scheduled reduction in foreign workers. To evaluate federal and CNMI government efforts to address labor force challenges, we (1) collected information about the CNMI’s three job training programs supported by CW-1 vocational education fees, (2) assessed the results of the CNMI’s two scholarship programs, (3) examined employment programs offered by the CNMI’s Department of Labor, (4) reviewed a grant agreement between DOI and the CNMI government, and (5) summarized the results of the 902 consultative process (902 Consultations) that resulted in a report to Congress with several recommendations. Appendix VII: Descriptions and Numbers of Foreign Workers Approved in the CNMI, by Permit Type, Fiscal Years 2011–2016 Although the majority of foreign workers approved by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) have CNMI-Only transitional worker (CW-1) permits, DHS also approves other types of permits for foreign workers in the CNMI (see table 14). GAO-12-64.	Why GAO Did This Study A 2007 law required the minimum wage in the CNMI to rise incrementally to the federal level in a series of scheduled increases. GAO has been periodically required to report on the economic impact of the minimum wage increases in the territory. A 2008 law established federal control of CNMI immigration. It required the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to create a transitional work permit program for foreign workers in the CNMI and to decrease the number of permits issued annually, and presently requires that DHS reduce them to zero by December 31, 2019. To implement this aspect of the law, in 2011, DHS created a CW-1 permit program for foreign workers. In addition to the above statutory provisions, GAO was asked to review the implementation of federal immigration laws in the CNMI. Accordingly, this report examines (1) changes in the CNMI's labor market since the start of the federally mandated minimum wage increases, (2) the potential economic impact of reducing the number of foreign workers to zero, and (3) federal and CNMI efforts to address labor force challenges. GAO reviewed U.S. laws and regulations; analyzed government data; and conducted fieldwork in Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, CNMI. During fieldwork, GAO conducted semistructured interviews and discussion groups with businesses, CW-1 workers, U.S. workers, and current and former job training participants. What GAO Found The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' (CNMI) labor market has begun to grow after years of decline, while continuing to rely on foreign workers. By 2015, the number of employed CNMI workers was about 8 percent higher than in 2013, and inflation-adjusted average earnings had risen by 18 percent from 2007 levels. By 2016, about 62 percent of CNMI workers were directly affected by CNMI's minimum wage hike to $6.55 per hour. In 2015, foreign workers, who totaled 12,784, made up more than half of the CNMI workforce and filled 80 percent of all hospitality and construction jobs, according to GAO's analysis of CNMI tax data. If all workers with CNMI-Only transitional worker (CW-1) permits, or 45 percent of total workers in 2015, were removed from the CNMI's labor market, GAO projects a 26 to 62 percent reduction in CNMI's 2015 gross domestic product (GDP)—the most recent GDP available. Demand for foreign workers in the CNMI exceeded the available number of CW-1 permits in 2016—many approved for workers from China and workers in construction occupations. The construction of a new casino in Saipan is a key factor in this demand (see photos taken both before and during construction in 2016). Meanwhile, by 2019, plans for additional hotels, casinos, and other projects estimate needing thousands of new employees. When the CW-1 permit program ends in 2019, available data show that the unemployed domestic workforce, estimated at 2,386 in 2016, will be well below the CNMI's demand for labor. To meet this demand, CNMI employers may need to recruit U.S.-eligible workers from the U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the freely associated states (the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau). Federal and CNMI efforts to address labor force challenges include (1) job training programs offered by Northern Marianas College, Northern Marianas Trades Institute, and the CNMI's Public School System; (2) employment assistance funded by the U.S. Department of Labor and implemented by the CNMI's Department of Labor; and (3) technical assistance provided by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In 2016, a U.S.–CNMI consultative process resulted in a report to Congress with six recommendations, including one to raise the cap on CW-1 foreign worker permits and extend the permit program beyond 2019. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations.
gao_GAO-13-524	gao_GAO-13-524_0	Background If done correctly, investments in IT have the potential to make organizations more efficient in fulfilling their missions. In January 2010, OMB began conducting TechStats to enable the federal government to intervene to turnaround, halt, or terminate IT projects that are failing or are not producing results. OMB agreed with our recommendations to complete action items and provide deadlines, but disagreed with our recommendation to establish performance measures. OMB and Selected Agencies Have Held Multiple TechStats on a Diverse Set of IT Investments, but Other At-Risk Investments Have Not Yet Been Assessed OMB and the four selected agencies have held multiple TechStats on IT investments that varied in terms of function, significance, amount spent to date, and risk level. Specifically, from January 2010 through April 2013, OMB reported leading 79 TechStat sessions, which focused on 55 IT investments at 23 federal agencies. For the 21 major investments, about 76 percent of the agency-led TechStats were on investments that had a CIO rating of medium- to high-risk. Specifically, the number of TechStats held to date is relatively small compared to the total number of medium- and high-risk IT investments. Selected Agencies are Generally Conducting TechStats in Accordance with OMB Guidance, but Areas for Improvement Exist The four selected agencies are generally conducting TechStats in accordance with OMB guidance. These documents include 15 key requirements, including when TechStats should be implemented by the agencies, what participants should be included, how at-risk investments should be chosen, and how outcomes should be tracked and reported. Agency officials noted several reasons for not fully implementing OMB’s guidance. Fully implementing OMB’s TechStat guidance could better position the agencies to realize the benefits of the TechStat initiative—including strengthening overall IT governance and oversight, and proactively identifying and resolving problems before investments experience delays or cost overruns. OMB and the four agencies we reviewed have tracked and reported positive results from TechStats, with most resulting in improved governance or accelerated deliveries. Until OMB and agencies develop plans and schedules for addressing these at-risk investments, the investments will likely remain at risk. Until OMB requires agencies to report on what they did to validate cost savings data and shares this information, neither Congress nor the public can be assured that TechStats are as effective as reported. Specifically, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Federal Chief Information Officer to require agencies to conduct TechStats for each IT investment rated with a moderately high- or high-risk CIO rating on the IT Dashboard, unless there is a clear reason for not doing so; require agencies to report to OMB on efforts to validate the outcomes, cost savings, and cost avoidances resulting from TechStat sessions; this information should be summarized when OMB reports on governmentwide outcomes; and direct the Federal CIO Council to track the outcome of TechStat sessions and to support OMB’s efforts to validate the resulting cost savings it reports to Congress. DHS declined to provide comments. However, part of a sound process for ensuring validity involves documenting the procedures used to verify or validate the data; as such, we were unable to validate OMB’s reported outcomes and almost $4 billion in cost implications from 2010 and 2011 because OMB did not provide documentation on any steps that it or the agencies took to ensure the validity of the agencies’ outcome and cost data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) identify key characteristics of TechStat Accountability Sessions (TechStats) conducted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and selected agencies, (2) evaluate whether selected agencies are conducting TechStats in accordance with OMB guidance, and (3) analyze the extent to which reported results from TechStat review sessions are documented, tracked, and validated. We also interviewed OMB, Agriculture, Commerce, DHS, and HHS officials regarding the TechStat sessions.	Why GAO Did This Study While IT investments have the potential to make organizations more efficient, many federal IT projects experience cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. To help address these shortfalls, OMB established TechStats--face-to-face meetings to terminate or turnaround IT investments that are failing or are not producing results. GAO was asked to evaluate the implementation of TechStats. GAO's objectives were to (1) identify key characteristics of TechStats held to date; (2) evaluate whether selected agencies are conducting TechStats in accordance with OMB guidance, and (3) analyze the extent to which reported TechStat results are tracked and validated. To do so, GAO selected four agencies--Agriculture, Commerce, HHS, and DHS--because these were the agencies with the highest number of at-risk investments. GAO analyzed OMB and agency documentation, compared agency processes to TechStat guidance, compared efforts to validate reported outcomes to leading practices, and interviewed OMB and agency officials. What GAO Found Since January 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and selected agencies have held multiple TechStat Accountability Sessions (TechStats) on information technology (IT) investments that varied in terms of function, significance, and risk. As of April 2013, OMB reported conducting 79 TechStats, which focused on 55 investments at 23 federal agencies. The four agencies conducted 37 TechStats covering 28 investments. About 70 percent of the OMB- and 76 percent of agency-led TechStats on major investments were considered medium- to high-risk at the time of the TechStat. However, the number of at-risk TechStats held to date is relatively small compared to the current number of medium- and high-risk IT investments. Until OMB and agencies develop plans to address these investments, the investments will likely remain at risk. The selected agencies are generally conducting TechStats in accordance with OMB guidance. OMB's TechStat guidance includes 15 key requirements, such as when TechStats should be implemented, what participants should be included, and how outcomes should be tracked and reported. DHS implemented all of the TechStat requirements. Commerce, HHS, and Agriculture implemented a majority of the requirements, but each had shortcomings. For example, these agencies did not consistently create memorandums with responsible parties and due dates for action items. Fully implementing OMB's guidance could better position agencies to effectively manage and resolve problems on IT investments. OMB and selected agencies have tracked and reported positive results from TechStats, with most resulting in improved governance. OMB also reported in 2011 that federal agencies achieved almost $4 billion in life-cycle cost savings as a result of TechStat sessions. However, GAO was unable to validate OMB's reported results because OMB did not provide artifacts showing that it ensured the results were valid. From GAO's selected agencies, three investments had cost implications. Agencies provided supporting documentation for about $22.2 million in cost savings and avoidances. Until OMB obtains and shares information on the methods used to validate reported results, it will be difficult for the results to be independently validated and for OMB to provide assurance to Congress and the public that TechStats are achieving their intended impact. What GAO Recommends GAO is making recommendations to OMB to require agencies to address high-risk investments and to report on how they validated the outcomes. GAO is also making recommendations to selected agencies to address weaknesses in following OMB's TechStat guidance. OMB and Commerce officials generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. Agriculture partially agreed with GAO's assessment; neither it nor HHS commented on the recommendations.
gao_GAO-04-961	gao_GAO-04-961_0	Institutions eligible for funding under Titles III and V include Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Tribal Colleges, Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian Institutions, and other undergraduate postsecondary institutions that serve low-income students. Grantees Reported a Wide Range of Uses and Benefits for Title III and Title V Grants but Cited Some Implementation Challenges In their grant performance reports, grantees most commonly reported using Title III and Title V grant funds to strengthen academic quality and reported a wide range of benefits. Specifically, we estimate that 87 percent of the grantees reported using their grant funds to improve academic quality, and an estimated 77 percent reported using their funds to improve student services (e.g., tutoring) and student outcomes (e.g., course pass rates). We estimate that over half of the grantees reported using their funds for initiatives that focused on improving institutional management and fiscal stability. Increase in student retention was the most commonly reported benefit in the area of student outcomes. Education Has Developed Objectives and Strategies to Strengthen Institutions and Is Developing Corresponding Performance Information Education has developed objectives and strategies designed to strengthen Title III and Title V institutions by improving financial sustainability, technological capacity, academic quality, student services and outcomes, and institutional management. Education has developed five measures to assess its progress in achieving its objectives and is still in the process of developing data for one of these measures. Education Has Not Fully Implemented Its Initiatives to Improve Monitoring and Assistance, Resulting in Limited Monitoring and Assistance Education has taken steps to enhance its monitoring of and assistance to Title III and Title V grantees by developing monitoring plans; creating electronic monitoring (e-monitoring) tools, such as the performance reports submitted by grantees to document performance; and providing additional training to department staff to develop their monitoring skills. For example, we found that Education has yet to make full use of its risk-based plan to select grantees for its monitoring visits and technical assistance. We also found that only one-quarter of department staff completed two site visits in fiscal year 2003, as required. Finally, because the department has not yet implemented its new training curriculum, its staff were not aware of updated department guidance and as a result did not always follow department guidelines for monitoring grantees. On the basis of this review, Education concluded that there were questions surrounding the eligibility of more than three-quarters of the 220 grantees that have received funds through the program. Other contacts and acknowledgments are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology We reviewed Title III and Title V grant programs to determine (1) how Title III and Title V institutions are using the grants and the benefits they have derived, (2) what objectives and strategies the Department of Education (Education) has developed for Title III and Title V programs, and (3) to what extent Education monitors and provides assistance to Title III and Title V institutions.	Why GAO Did This Study Congress has expanded the number of low-income and minority serving institutions eligible for grants under Titles III and V of the Higher Education Act and nearly doubled funding for these grants in the last 5 years to about $432 million in fiscal year 2004. Institutions eligible for funding under Titles III and V include Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Tribal Colleges, Hispanic Serving Institutions, Alaska Native Serving Institutions, Native Hawaiian Serving Institutions, and other postsecondary institutions that serve low-income students. Given the recent expansion, we examined these programs to determine (1) how institutions used their Title III and Title V grants and the benefits they received from using these grant funds, (2) what objectives and strategies the Department of Education (Education) has developed for Title III and Title V programs, and (3) to what extent Education monitors and provides assistance to Title III and Title V institutions. What GAO Found Grantees most commonly reported using Title III and Title V grant funds to strengthen academics, and they reported a wide range of benefits. Most grantees reported using their grants to fund efforts designed to strengthen academics, and we estimate that over three-quarters of the grantees reported initiatives that focused on improving student services (e.g., tutoring) and outcomes for students (e.g., course pass rates). The most commonly reported benefits were related to improvements in academic quality and student services and outcomes. While grantees reported a wide range of benefits, most also reported challenges in implementing their projects that sometimes resulted in the need for additional time at the end of the grant to complete their efforts. Education has developed objectives and strategies designed to strengthen Title III and Title V institutions by improving financial sustainability, technological capacity, academic quality, student services and outcomes, and institutional management. While Education has developed data to determine its progress in four of these areas, it is still in the process of developing data for measuring increased technological capacity. Education has developed plans and tools to enhance its monitoring of and assistance to Title III and Title V grantees, but it has made limited progress in implementing these initiatives. Specifically, Education has not fully implemented its monitoring plan or completed its new electronic monitoring tools, and a new training curriculum to enhance the monitoring skills of staff. We found that only one-quarter of staff conducted two required site visits, and most visits that were conducted were not selected based on the requisite risk criteria. Also, staff were not aware of updated department guidance and, as a result, did not always properly monitor grantees. We also found that Education's ability to provide technical assistance was limited. For example, Education has acknowledged that its failure to provide information on eligibility criteria has resulted in uncertainty about the eligibility of over three-quarters of Title V grantees.
gao_GAO-03-677T	gao_GAO-03-677T_0	DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions Differ Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions on a variety of factors, as shown in table 1. DOD’s directive specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated against the following criteria: legality (compliance with laws), lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), risk (safety of DOD forces), cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget), appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of DOD to conduct), and readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission). The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment to: assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions (10 U.S.C. §831); assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (10 U.S.C. The Adequacy of New Management Organizations, Plans, and Forces for Domestic Missions It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management organizations or its plans, although forces may not be fully tailored to the current domestic missions. At the same time, DOD has used existing forces for these missions since September 11, 2001. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall supervision for domestic missions. The Nature of the Threat Was Still Under Discussion When the Campaign Plan Was Written DOD’s planning process requires the Department and the services to staff, train, and equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign plans and deliberate plans developed by the combatant commanders, including the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. DOD’s Forces Are Not Tailored to Conduct Long- Term Military Missions Domestically Based on our review, DOD’s forces are not tailored for some of the missions that they have been performing since September 11, 2001, and the result could be eventual erosion of military readiness. Increased Overseas and Domestic Missions Add to High Army and Air Force Personnel Tempo Current overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in personnel tempo data. The Air Force reported similar trends. Also, as with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had risen from about 1,600 to over 22,100. In September 2002, 1,900 had spent more than 401 days away from home over a 2-year period. Therefore, to prevent servicemembers with key skills from leaving the services, DOD issued orders to prevent degradation in combat capabilities, an action known as stop loss authority.	Why GAO Did This Study The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting its Cold War strategic focus (of defending against massed combat forces) to better encompass defense against the asymmetric threats that small terrorist cells represent to U.S. territory. GAO was asked to review DOD's participation in domestic missions. This testimony represents our preliminary work in response to the request. It addresses (1) the primary differences in military and nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. GAO is making no recommendations in this testimony. What GAO Found DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally employed. DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests on the basis of legality, lethality, risk to DOD forces, the cost, the appropriateness of the mission, and the impact on military readiness. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with drug interdiction or assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD's new management organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command plan and execute domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command's plan for domestic military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic missions, and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air patrols are unable to also perform required combat training. Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in personnel tempo data. In September 2001, about 1,600 Air Force personnel had spent 220 to 365 days away from their homes over the previous year, but by December 2002 almost 22,100 Air Force personnel had been away that long. The Army reported similar increases. To prevent erosion in combat capabilities, DOD issued orders, known as stop loss, to involuntarily retain critical personnel.
gao_GAO-15-300	gao_GAO-15-300_0	In addition, the act requires that an SSA country be eligible for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in order to be considered for AGOA benefits. The U.S. Government Uses the Eligibility Review Process and the AGOA Forum to Engage with SSA Countries and Encourage Reforms The U.S. government uses the annual eligibility review process and forum mandated by AGOA to engage with sub-Saharan African countries on their progress toward economic, political, and development reform objectives reflected in AGOA’s eligibility criteria. Over the lifetime of AGOA, 13 countries have lost their AGOA eligibility, although 7 countries eventually had their eligibility restored. The following example illustrates how the U.S. government uses the eligibility review process to engage with SSA countries on issues related to specific reform objectives: Swaziland was deemed eligible for AGOA in January 2001. U.S. government officials met several times with Swaziland officials to discuss steps to improve labor rights, including a USTR-led interagency trip in April 2014. Its purpose is to foster close economic ties between the United States and SSA countries; however, the forum also supports AGOA reform objectives by holding sessions that specifically address AGOA eligibility criteria. AGOA-Eligible Countries Have Fared Better than Ineligible Countries on Some Economic Development Indicators, but AGOA’s Impact on Economic Development Is Difficult to Isolate AGOA-eligible countries have fared better than ineligible countries on some economic development indicators since AGOA was enacted, according to our analysis of economic data for SSA countries that were eligible and ineligible for AGOA in 2012; however, AGOA’s impact on economic development is difficult to isolate when additional factors are taken into consideration. Other factors—such as the small share of AGOA exports in the overall exports of many AGOA-eligible countries, the role of petroleum exports in recent income growth, the quality of government institutions, and different levels of foreign aid and investment—make it difficult to isolate how much economic development can be attributed to AGOA. For example, AGOA exports are a small share of overall exports for the majority of AGOA-eligible countries, a fact that could limit AGOA’s impact on economic development in these countries. We found evidence that increasing energy prices may also have contributed to income growth within AGOA-eligible countries: from 2000 through 2012, the top three AGOA-eligible petroleum-exporting countries had a much higher growth rate for income per person than other AGOA-eligible countries. We also found that AGOA-eligible countries on average had higher governance scores and received more foreign aid and investment compared with ineligible countries. While these differences may have been facilitated by AGOA eligibility, they may also have contributed to economic development in AGOA-eligible countries, a possibility that makes it difficult to isolate AGOA’s impact on economic development. Agency Comments We are not making any recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to examine (1) how the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) eligibility review process has considered and the AGOA Forums have supported economic, political, and development reform objectives described in the act and (2) how sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have fared in certain economic development outcomes since the enactment of AGOA. To address both objectives, we interviewed officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, State, and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), all of which are the members of the Trade Policy Staff Committee’s AGOA Implementation Subcommittee that generally prepare the sub-Saharan Africa country reports for the annual eligibility review. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement.	Why GAO Did This Study Enacted in 2000 and set to expire in September 2015, AGOA is a trade preference program that seeks to promote economic development in 49 sub-Saharan African countries by allowing eligible countries to export qualifying goods to the United States without import duties. The act requires the U.S. government to conduct an annual eligibility review to assess each country's progress on economic, political, and development reform objectives in order to be eligible for AGOA benefits. AGOA also requires an annual forum to foster closer economic ties between the United States and sub-Saharan African countries. GAO was asked to review various issues related to AGOA's economic development benefits. In this report, GAO examines (1) how the AGOA eligibility review process has considered economic, political, and development reform objectives described in the act and (2) how sub-Saharan African countries have fared in certain economic development outcomes since the enactment of AGOA. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies to examine the relationship between the U.S. government's review process and AGOA reform criteria. GAO analyzed trends in economic development indicators for AGOA eligible and ineligible countries from 2001 to 2012, the latest year for which data were available for most countries. What GAO Found The U.S. government uses the annual eligibility review process required by the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to engage with sub-Saharan African countries on their progress toward economic, political, and development reform objectives reflected in AGOA's eligibility criteria. Managed by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the review process brings together officials from U.S. agencies each year to discuss the progress each country is making with regard to AGOA's eligibility criteria and to reach consensus as to which countries should be deemed eligible to receive AGOA benefits. Over the lifetime of AGOA, 13 countries have lost AGOA eligibility, although 7 eventually had it restored (see figure). To encourage reforms, the U.S. government will engage with countries experiencing difficulty meeting eligibility criteria and may specify measures a country can take. For example, U.S. officials met with Swaziland officials over several years to discuss steps to improve labor rights. However, Swaziland did not make the necessary reforms and lost eligibility effective in January 2015. GAO analyzed data on economic development indicators for sub-Saharan African countries that were eligible and ineligible for AGOA in 2012; the results showed that eligible countries fared better than ineligible countries on some economic measures since the enactment of AGOA. The extent to which this outcome is attributable to AGOA, however, is difficult to isolate after additional factors are taken into consideration. Other factors, such as the small share of AGOA exports in the overall exports of many AGOA-eligible countries, the role of petroleum exports in recent income growth, the quality of government institutions, and differences in levels of foreign aid and investment, make it difficult to isolate AGOA's contribution to overall economic development. For example, AGOA exports are a small share of overall exports for the majority of AGOA-eligible countries. GAO found evidence that increasing energy prices may also have contributed to income growth within AGOA-eligible petroleum-exporting countries. GAO also found that AGOA-eligible countries on average had higher governance scores and received more foreign aid and investment compared with ineligible countries. These differences may have contributed to economic development in AGOA-eligible countries, but they may also have been facilitated by AGOA, a possibility that makes it difficult to isolate AGOA's impact on economic development. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making any recommendations.
gao_HEHS-98-67	gao_HEHS-98-67_0	For example, HIPAA requires all products carriers offer in the small group market to be sold to any small employer that applies, but it does not extend the same requirement to the large group or individual markets.Similarly, HIPAA requires that certain individuals leaving group coverage be guaranteed access to coverage in the individual market—“group to individual guaranteed access.” However, no similar guarantees of access exist for people in the individual market who have coverage today but might lose it in the future. HIPAA Guarantees Access to Coverage for Individuals Leaving Group Plans, but Consumer Ability to Obtain This Coverage Is Compromised To ensure that individuals losing group coverage have guaranteed access—regardless of health status—to individual market coverage, HIPAA provides states with two different approaches. Some carriers initially attempted to discourage consumers from applying for products with guaranteed access rights, and some are charging premiums 140 to 600 percent of the standard rate. Carriers charge higher rates, in part, because they believe HIPAA-eligible individuals will, on average, be in poorer health and hence would likely have higher medical costs. Consumers who do not understand these rights may be disappointed or even be at risk of losing their group-to-individual portability rights. Among other restrictions, eligible individuals must have had at least 18 months of creditable coverage (the most recent of which must have been group coverage) with no break of more than 63 consecutive days; have exhausted any COBRA or other continuation coverage available; not be eligible for any other group coverage, or Medicare or Medicaid; and not have lost group coverage because of nonpayment of premiums or fraud. In addition to these restrictions, consumers need to be aware of other factors in order to exercise their rights. Issuers of Health Coverage Concerned About HIPAA’s Administrative Burden and Possible Unintended Consequences Issuers of health coverage have several concerns about the unintended consequences of certain HIPAA requirements. While issuers generally have complied with this requirement, some suggest that a more limited requirement, such as issuing the certificates only to consumers who request them, would serve the same purpose for less cost. State Insurance Regulators Cite Lack of Sufficient Clarity or Detail in Some HIPAA Regulations as Hindering Implementation Efforts State regulators have encountered difficulties implementing HIPAA provisions in instances where federal regulations lacked sufficient clarity or detail. Regulators believe that the HIPAA provision that allows issuers who cease offering coverage throughout the individual and group markets to not renew the coverage of an individual or a group creates uncertainties that may affect their ability to regulate insurance. HHS Given New Health Insurance Regulatory Role If States Decline to Implement and Enforce HIPAA Standards Unlike Labor and the Treasury, HHS was given a new regulatory role under HIPAA. Federal agencies issued further guidance at the end of 1997 and expect to continue issuing guidance in 1998. It requires three federal agencies, state legislatures and insurance regulators, and issuers of health coverage to coordinate their efforts. Agency Comments The Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury commented on a draft of this report. GAO Comments 1. GAO Comments 1. Consequently, we focused on the activities of those implementing the law—state and federal regulators and issuers—and emphasized areas where preliminary evidence signaled emerging challenges. 3. 4. 5. 6. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996: Early Implementation Concerns (GAO/HEHS-97-200R, Sept. 2, 1997).	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), focusing on issues affecting: (1) consumers; (2) issuers of health coverage, including employers and insurance carriers; (3) state insurance regulators; and (4) federal regulators. GAO also reviewed efforts undertaken by federal agencies to address some of the concerns and challenges that have arisen. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) although HIPAA provides people losing group coverage the right to guaranteed access to coverage in the individual market regardless of health status, consumers attempting to exercise their right have been hindered by carrier practices and pricing and by their own misunderstanding of this complex law; (2) among the 13 states where this provision first took effect, many consumers who had lost group coverage experienced difficulty obtaining individual market coverage with guaranteed access rights, or they paid significantly higher rates for coverage; (3) some carriers have discouraged individuals from applying for the coverage or charged them rates 140 to 600 percent of the standard premium; (4) carriers charge higher rates because they believe individuals who attempt to exercise HIPAA's individual market access guarantee will, on average, be in poorer health than others in the individual market; (5) many consumers do not realize that the access guarantee applies only to those leaving group coverage who meet other eligibility criteria; (6) individuals must have previously had at least 18 months of coverage, exhausted any residual employer coverage available, and applied for individual coverage within 63 days of group coverage termination; (7) consumers who misunderstand these restrictions are at risk of losing their right to coverage; (8) issuers of health coverage believe certain HIPAA regulatory provisions result in: (a) an excessive administrative burden; (b) unanticipated consequences; and (c) the potential for consumer abuse; (9) although issuers appear to be generally complying with the requirement to provide a certificate of coverage to all individuals terminating coverage, some issuers continue to suggest that the process is burdensome and costly and that many of these certificates may not be needed; (10) these issuers, as well as many state regulators, believe that issuing the certificates only to consumers who request them would serve the purpose of the law for less cost; (11) state insurance regulators have encountered difficulties in their attempts to implement and enforce HIPAA provisions where they found federal guidance to lack sufficient clarity or detail; (12) federal regulators face an unexpectedly large regulatory role under HIPAA that could strain the Department of Health and Human Services' resources and impair its oversight and effectiveness; and (13) partly in response to health insurance issuers' and state regulators' concerns, federal agencies issued further regulatory guidance intended to clarify current HIPAA regulations.
gao_HEHS-96-92	gao_HEHS-96-92_0	Characteristics of State and Local Youth Training Programs Differ From Those of Job Corps State and local entities have established a wide array of youth training programs using funds from various sources, including federal, state, and local governments and private contributors. However, we did identify two programs that had all four characteristics. Most state officials we surveyed told us their states had programs that provided disadvantaged youth with basic education. Residential programs operated by the states generally targeted specific populations—such as youths who have been involved with the court system, disabled individuals, or substance abusers. Youth Service and Conservation Corps Programs Resemble Job Corps We found that state and local youth corps programs most closely resembled Job Corps. We found two youth corps programs that most closely resembled the Job Corps program from among the youth programs we identified; that is, they operated residential sites; served disadvantaged youth; offered basic education; and, to an extent, provided vocational training. Several differences exist between the California Conservation Corps and Job Corps. Seaborne is a residential training program targeted to high school dropouts.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO identified state and local youth training programs that incorporate four basic characteristics of the Job Corps Program: (1) serving a severely disadvantaged population; (2) providing basic education instruction; (3) focusing on vocational training services; and (4) providing those services in a residential setting. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) while many state and local youth training programs feature, to some extent, some of the Job Corps' basic characteristics, most do not feature all four characteristics; (2) most youth training programs provide disadvantaged youth with basic education; (3) states' residential youth programs generally target specific populations such as youths involved in the court system, disabled youth, or substance abusers; (4) although state and local youth corps programs most closely resemble the Job Corps, few are residential; and (5) the California Conservation Corps and Seaborne Conservation Corps in Galveston, Texas, feature all four Job Corps characteristics, but differ from Job Corps in program operations.
gao_GAO-10-335	gao_GAO-10-335_0	Notification of Award Decisions: Each applicant is sent a letter that communicates the grant award decision. HHS awarded grants to about one-quarter of the applicants that applied in 2007 and 2008, as shown in table 2. Grant Announcements Have Not Always Provided Clear and Concise Information Based on the grant announcements we reviewed and our observation of the peer review process, the criteria upon which grant applications would be evaluated were not clearly defined in a single location in the announcement. Rather, we found that criteria were scattered throughout various sections of the announcement, had multiple labels, and were not presented in an orderly manner in a single location. First, applicants must address the “Program Requirements,” found in Section 1 of the announcement. ACF Provides Technical Assistance That Applicants Found Helpful ACF provides technical assistance to potential applicants for runaway and homeless youth grants, as required by statute. For example, 17 of the 20 applicants who sought technical assistance were satisfied with the help they received. For example, we found weaknesses in four out of six internal controls related to the grant award process, as shown in table 4. Our review of resumes of all the peer reviewers and chairs for 2009 Street Outreach Program grants found that many had professional and volunteer experiences that were not always directly related to runaway and homeless youth programs. Notification of Grant Award Decisions Have Not Always Been Timely, and Notices Are Not Always Clear Notification Time Frames Can Present Planning Challenges for Some Applicants Grant award decisions are not always communicated in a timely manner, which may present planning challenges for some applicants. Based on our review of grant documents for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, we found that for all but the 2008 Transitional Living Program grants, this was true, regardless of when the announcement closed or when the funding decisions were made. Recommendations To enhance transparency and fairness in the grant award process, and improve grantees ability to plan for services, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Assistant Secretary for the Administration for Children and Families to take the following seven actions: Clearly identify in grant announcements all the criteria that peer reviewers will use to evaluate and score applications, and ensure that peer reviewers use only those criteria during the peer review process. With regard to our recommendation to select peer reviewers with expertise in the program for which they are evaluating grant applications, HHS commented that the agency has elected to accept reviewers who are knowledgeable of the risk factors faced by runaway and homeless youth, and that many professional disciplines often intersect with runaway and homeless youth.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awards grants to provide shelter and services to runaway and homeless youth through the Basic Center, Transitional Living and Street Outreach Programs. In response to a mandate for a review of the grant award process for these programs in the Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-378), GAO examined (1) grant announcements and application requirements, (2) technical assistance for grant applicants, (3) how grant award decisions are made, and (4) notification of grant award decisions. GAO reviewed requirements, documents, and records associated with this process for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, observed the grant evaluation portion of this process, and interviewed applicants, peer reviewers, and agency officials. What GAO Found Based on GAO's review of past grant announcements for these programs, GAO found that the criteria upon which grant applications were evaluated were not clearly identified or presented in a single location in the announcement. Rather, GAO found that criteria were scattered throughout various sections of the announcement, had multiple labels, and were not presented in an orderly manner. As a result, applications that did not address the criteria from all sections were likely to receive lower evaluation scores, decreasing their chances of receiving a grant. HHS provides technical assistance to potential applicants for runaway and homeless youth grants, as required by statute. Of the 20 applicants GAO interviewed who sought technical assistance, 17 were satisfied with the help they received. Grant award decisions are primarily based on the results of the peer review process, and internal controls in place to ensure that applications are evaluated consistently were not always adequate. GAO found weaknesses in four out of the six procedures the agency relies on to ensure consistent evaluation of applications. For example, although HHS policy requires peer reviewers to be experts in the field of runaway and homeless youth programs, about one- quarter of the reviewers who evaluated applications for 2009 Street Outreach grants had little or no experience in this area. With regard to notification of grant award decisions, GAO found that they have not always been communicated to applicants in a timely manner, which can delay the start of new programs and present planning challenges for existing ones. GAO also found that the information in notification letters to applicants who were not awarded grants was not always clear or complete.
gao_GAO-04-421	gao_GAO-04-421_0	Intent of PVSA Was to Protect U.S. Maritime Transportation Industry, but Rulings and Decisions Have Expanded Itineraries for Foreign Cruise Ships In 1886, Congress passed the PVSA to protect the U.S. domestic maritime transportation industry from foreign competition. To provide this protection, it penalizes foreign vessels that transport passengers solely between U.S. ports. Many cruises provided by foreign vessels are to international destinations and, therefore, are not affected by the PVSA; however, several rulings and decisions interpreting the PVSA have expanded possible itineraries for foreign cruise vessels between U.S. ports that were once restricted. Interpretation and Enforcement of the Exemption Will Likely Have Little Impact on the Implementation of the PVSA and Other Related Laws The exemption granted to NCL to be able to operate in Hawaii will likely have little impact on how the PVSA, U.S. vessel documentation laws, or the Jones Act are implemented by CBP and the Coast Guard. In addition, the Coast Guard deals with vessels on a case-by-case basis; and this exemption is specific to NCL’s three vessels and cannot be applied to any other vessels in any other trades. However, prior to the exemption there were already substantial barriers to U.S.-flag entrants into domestic trade due not only to higher capital costs, but also to higher operating costs associated with the U.S. flag. Exemption Adds to Existing Barriers for Potential U.S.- Flag Market Entry NCL has a large capital cost advantage over potential competitors, who might attempt to build ships entirely in the United States for operation under the U.S. flag because the exemption permits NCL to complete construction of its U.S.-flag ships in a foreign shipyard at a lower cost than a comparable ship built in a U.S. shipyard. Figure 4 shows examples of cruise itineraries between U.S. ports that foreign-flag vessels can offer. The availability of foreign-flag service on U.S. itineraries that include a foreign port-of-call reduces the likelihood that potential U.S.-flag carriers can offer competitive prices because U.S.-flag ships have higher capital and operating costs than foreign-flag ships. In addition, if NCL is unable to operate successfully under the U.S. flag in Hawaii, possibly the most desirable market protected under the PVSA, there will be further disincentive for any other cruise line to attempt to operate under the U.S. flag, thus limiting the potential development of the U.S.-flag cruise vessel fleet. Unclear if Granting Other Cruise Lines Similar Exemptions Would Lead to Entry by Other Cruise Lines and Resulting Economic Benefits Granting similar exemption to ease entry into the domestic trade could lead to additional benefits for ports and port cities, the merchant marine and consumers; however, it is unclear how many cruise lines would choose to enter if they were permitted to operate foreign-built ships under the U.S. flag. Both departments generally agreed with the findings in the report and provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. To determine the potential effects of the exemption on competition in the passenger cruise industry, entry into the U.S. domestic market, the exemption’s broader economic effects, as well as the potential effects of granting similar exemptions, we reviewed studies on the economic impact of the cruise industry and competition in the industry and conducted interviews with officials from several cruise lines, industry associations, and a full range of cruise industry stakeholders, analysts, and experts. These U.S. laws do not usually apply to foreign-flag cruise lines because their itineraries are in international waters, either because they include a distant foreign port if they are traveling between U.S. ports, or a nearby foreign port if the voyage is a round trip from one U.S. port, and thus international rather than U.S. laws apply.	Why GAO Did This Study No large U.S.-flagged cruise ships (ships registered in the U.S. that are U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S. crewed) are in operation. Foreignflagged vessels cruising to foreign ports serve most of the U.S. demand for cruises. However, Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) recently obtained an exemption from U.S. maritime law to operate three foreign-built ships under the U.S. flag in Hawaii. Cruise lines and others have raised concerns over the advantage the exemption might confer to NCL, since foreign-flagged competitors are unable to offer the same itineraries due to the Passenger Vessel Services Act (PVSA), which prevents foreign vessels from transporting passengers solely between U.S. ports. Concerns have also been raised over the effect this exemption might have on future attempts to grow the U.S.-flag cruise vessel fleet, since potential U.S.-flag competitors would need to build ships in the United States, presumably at higher cost. GAO was asked to (1) review the original intent of the PVSA and rulings and decisions regarding it, (2) determine if the exemption will affect the implementation of the PVSA or other maritime laws, (3) assess the potential effects of the exemption on competition and entry into the U.S. domestic cruise market, and (4) assess the potential economic effects of granting other cruise lines similar exemptions. The Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation generally agreed with the findings in this report. What GAO Found The original intent of the PVSA, enacted in 1886, was to protect the U.S. maritime industry from foreign competition by penalizing foreign vessels that transport passengers solely between U.S. ports. However, several rulings and decisions interpreting the PVSA have allowed itineraries for foreign cruise vessels between U.S. ports that were previously restricted. For example, voyages by foreign vessels between two U.S. ports that include a distant foreign port, and round trip voyages from U.S. ports that include a nearby foreign port and other U.S. ports, do not violate the PVSA. NCL's exemption will likely have little impact on how the PVSA or other maritime laws are administered or interpreted because it is specific to three NCL vessels and cannot be applied to any other vessels in any other areas. The exemption effectively gives NCL a monopoly on interisland Hawaiian cruises--providing consumers with itineraries that were previously unavailable. However, NCL will likely have little power to raise prices on these itineraries because of competition from other vacation options. Because NCL is able to operate foreign-built ships in Hawaii, the exemption provides an additional obstacle for any potential U.S.-flag competitor to enter that market, since that competitor would need to build the ship in the United States at a higher cost. However, independent of the exemption, there were and still are other substantial obstacles for any potential U.S.-flag cruise vessel due to the higher capital and operating costs (e.g., labor costs) associated with the U.S. flag, as compared with existing foreign-flag cruise vessels offering itineraries through a foreign port. Granting additional exemptions to ease entry into the domestic trade could lead to benefits for port cities, U.S. seamen, and consumers; however, it is unclear how many cruise lines would choose to enter even if they were permitted to operate foreign-built ships under the U.S. flag, because of the higher operating costs associated with a U.S.-flag carrier operating in domestic itineraries and because of uncertain market conditions.
gao_NSIAD-97-76	gao_NSIAD-97-76_0	In general, these reports concluded that during the development stage: the United States was adequately controlling the release of F-16 related technical data to Japan, but U.S. government agencies were not adequately sharing licensing information; the value of technology transfers from Japan to the United States was uncertain; and the program had helped to enhance Japan’s aerospace industry. U.S. Workshare Is Expected to Be Approximately 40 Percent The F-2 production agreements specify that U.S. industry is to receive approximately 40-percent workshare. If the Japanese fully implement the program, the U.S. workshare will be an estimated $4.1 billion over the life of the program. The agreements identify the contents of U.S. workshare and provide for a 40-percent workshare based on estimates of production costs at the time the agreements were signed. However, the value of the contracts will not be tracked and a workshare percentage will not be calculated based on actual payments. As a result, the Air Force will not have the means to determine whether this approach in fact enabled U.S. companies to receive approximately 40 percent of the production work over the course of the program. Transfers of Technology From Japan Improve but Some Unresolved Issues Remain Transfers of technology from Japan to the United States have been in accordance with the development agreements but some issues remain unresolved. In 1993, Japan requested that 12 items be recategorized as Japanese indigenous technologies. The United States is to receive free and automatic flowback of F-2 technologies that are derived from U.S. technical data. In 1994, the United States agreed to reclassify 4 of the 12 items as non-derived or Japanese indigenous technologies. However, as our August 1995 report indicated, while this issue is unresolved, the United States is not receiving free and automatic access to these technologies. The production phase agreements contain similar provisions regarding flowback of derived technologies and access to non-derived technologies. At the time of this review, the United States and Japan had not resolved the classification status of the remaining eight technologies. The general consensus among industry participants and U.S. Air Force officials is that it is extremely costly to produce the wing structure by the co-curing process. Lockheed Martin, however, has stated that the use of tooling techniques from the F-2 program has contributed to reducing the cost of manufacturing the composite bulkhead materials for the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program. Although the F-2 program will enhance Japan’s military aircraft capability, exports of military technology continue to be constrained by the country’s long-standing restrictions on exports of military weapon systems and exclusively military technology. Japanese technologies transferred to the United States for the F-2 program are subject to this agreement.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request and a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the status of the F-2 fighter aircraft program, focusing on the: (1) proportion of production work that will be done in the United States and how the U.S. workshare will be calculated and monitored; (2) status of technology transfers from Japan to the United States and whether these technologies are of interest to the U.S. government and industry; and (3) program's potential contributions to Japan's future aerospace plans. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) under the F-2 production agreements, U.S. industry is expected to receive approximately a 40-percent workshare, currently estimated at $4.1 billion if the Japanese fully implement the planned production of 130 aircraft; (2) the agreements specify the items to be procured by Japan from U.S. industry, which provide for a 40-percent workshare based on estimates of the production costs at the time the agreements were signed; (3) the Air Force plans to verify that contracts for the items identified are awarded to U.S. companies; (4) the value of payment amounts will not be tracked and a workshare percentage will no longer be recalculated based on actual payment amounts as had occurred during the development phase; (5) as a result, the Air Force will not have the means to determine whether this approach enabled U.S. companies to receive approximately 40 percent of the production work over the course of the program; (6) technology transfers from Japan to the United States have generally been in accordance with the development phase agreements, but some issues remain unresolved; (7) in 1993, Japan requested that 12 items be recategorized as Japanese indigenous technologies, i.e., not essentially derived from F-16 technical data; (8) the United States is to receive free and automatic flowback of F-2 technologies that are derived from U.S. technical data while access to non-derived or indigenous technologies is more limited; (9) in 1994, the United States agreed to reclassify 4 of the 12 items as non-derived or Japanese indigenous technologies, however, at the time of this review, the United States and Japan had not resolved the classification issue; (10) while this issue is unresolved, the United States is not receiving free and automatic access to these technologies; (11) the United States conducted several visits to explore the potential benefits of F-2 technologies; (12) two technologies that were initially of interest to the U.S. Air Force and to Department of Defense contractors, the co-cured composite wing and the active phased array radar, are now generally considered too costly to produce; (13) however, Lockheed Martin officials indicated that tooling techniques from the F-2 program are being applied to the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program; (14) the F-2 program enhances Japan's military aircraft industry by improving its overall systems integration capability, according to experts; and (15) however, Japan's exports of military technology and equipment continue to be constrained by the country's policy prohibiting exports of weapons systems or exclusively military technology.
gao_GAO-05-257	gao_GAO-05-257_0	Since its introduction in 1994, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service has grown dramatically and is now the primary competitor to cable operators. Subscription to DBS Has Grown Rapidly Since 2001 From 2001 to 2004, the aggregate number of U.S. households that subscribe to DBS television service grew rapidly. As of January 2004, DBS penetration remained the highest in rural areas, growing to about 29 percent, while it grew to 18 percent of suburban households and 13 percent of urban households. Figure 3 displays the percentage growth in total DBS subscribers and the percentage growth in DBS penetration rates in urban, suburban, and rural areas. However, in these areas, the DBS penetration rate is about 53 percentage points greater than in areas where cable television service is available. In 2004, the DBS penetration rate was over 20 percentage points greater in areas where cable operators did not provide advanced services, compared with areas where these services were available. In 2004, the DBS penetration rate was over 36 percent in areas where cable operators did not provide advanced services, compared with approximately 16 percent in areas where cable operators provided one or more, but not all, advanced services, and only 14 percent in areas where cable operators provided all three advanced services. Regarding geographic factors, we found that (1) the DBS penetration rate is lower in areas with a high prevalence of multiple dwelling units, such as apartments and condominiums; (2) the DBS penetration rate is lower in areas where the angle at which the satellite dish must be installed is relatively low, such that the satellite points more toward the horizon than toward the sky; and (3) the DBS penetration rate is higher in nonmetropolitan areas. In terms of competitive factors, we found that (1) the DBS penetration rate is lower in areas where the cable operator’s system has greater system capacity; (2) the DBS penetration rate is lower in areas where there is more than one wire-based cable provider; and (3) the DBS penetration rate is higher in areas where DBS providers carry local broadcast stations, such as an ABC affiliate. With wire-based competition, additional companies are competing for customers. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for its review and comment. FCC staff provided technical comments that we incorporated, where appropriate. Scope and Methodology To respond to the first and second objectives—to provide information on how direct broadcast satellite (DBS) subscribership has changed since 2001 and how the DBS penetration rate differs across urban, suburban, and rural areas—we gathered data on DBS subscribers from the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association (SBCA). To respond to the fourth objective—to provide information on the factors that appear to influence the DBS penetration rate in cable franchise areas—we used an econometric model we previously developed that examines the effect of competition on cable rates and service and the DBS penetration rate.	Why GAO Did This Study Since its introduction in 1994, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service has grown dramatically, and this service is now the principal competitor to cable television service. Although DBS service has traditionally been a rural service, passage of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 enhanced the competitiveness of DBS service in suburban and urban markets. GAO agreed to examine (1) how DBS subscribership changed since 2001; (2) how DBS penetration rates differ across urban, suburban, and rural areas; (3) how DBS penetration rates differ across markets based on the degree and type of competition provided by cable operators; and (4) the factors that appear to influence DBS penetration rates across cable franchise areas. To complete this report, GAO prepared descriptive statistics and an econometric model using data from the Federal Communications Commission's annual Cable Price Survey and the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association's subscriber count database. What GAO Found Since 2001, the number of households subscribing to DBS service has grown rapidly; thus the percentage of households subscribing to DBS service, the DBS penetration rate, has grown to over 17 percent of American households. The DBS penetration rate is highest in rural areas, but growing most rapidly in suburban and urban areas. Between 2001 and 2004, the DBS penetration rate grew 15 percent in rural areas to 29 percent of rural households, 32 percent in suburban areas to 18 percent of suburban households, and 50 percent in urban areas to 13 percent of urban households. The degree and type of competition influences the DBS penetration rate. In areas with no cable service, the DBS penetration rate is about 53 percentage points greater than in areas where cable service is available. Where cable service is available, cable operators increasingly offer advanced services. The DBS penetration rate is approximately 20 percentage points greater in areas where cable operators are not providing advanced services, compared with areas where these services are available. While relatively few areas have more than one wire-based cable operator, in these areas the DBS penetration rate is 8 percentage points lower than in areas with only one cable operator. In addition to the differences in DBS penetration rates across rural, suburban, and urban areas, and differences associated with the degree and type of cable competition, additional geographic and competitive factors also influence the DBS penetration rate. For example, the DBS penetration rate is lower in areas with a high prevalence of multiple-dwelling units, such as apartments. Additionally, the DBS penetration rate is higher in areas where DBS providers offer local broadcast stations (such as ABC and NBC affiliates) directly to their subscribers. The Federal Communications Commission provided technical comments on a draft of this report that we incorporated where appropriate.
gao_HEHS-98-6	gao_HEHS-98-6_0	Within many states, local governments operate social service programs with considerable autonomy. Whether administered by a state or county government, the child welfare system is generally composed of the following service components: child protective services that entail responding to and investigating reports of child abuse and neglect, identifying services for the family, and determining whether to remove a child from the family’s home; family preservation and family support services that are designed to strengthen and support families who are at risk of abusing or neglecting their children or losing their children to foster care and that include family counseling, respite care for parents and caregivers, and services to improve parenting skills and support child development; foster care services that provide food and housing to meet the physical needs of children who are removed from their homes and placed with a foster family or in a group home or residential care facility until their family can be reunited, the child is adopted, or some other permanent placement is arranged; adoption services that include recruiting potential adoptive parents, placing children in adoptive homes, providing financial assistance to adoptive parents to assist in the support of special needs children, and initiating proceedings to relinquish or terminate parental rights for the care and custody of their children; and independent living services that are activities for older foster children—generally age 16 and older—to help them make the transition from foster care to living independently. The states can also receive incentive funds based on the cost-effectiveness of child support enforcement agencies in making collections. Since 1990, more than half of the state and local governments we contacted have increased their contracting for services, as indicated by the number and type of services privatized and the percentage of social service budgets paid to private contractors. Spurred by political leaders and top program managers, states and localities privatized social services in an attempt to reduce program costs and improve services by using the technology and management flexibility they believe private contractors offer. States and Localities Privatize for Various Reasons A variety of reasons have prompted states and localities to contract out social services. The growth in privatization has most often been prompted by strong support from top government officials, an increasing demand for public services, and the belief that private contractors are able to provide higher-quality services more cost-effectively because of their management flexibility. Competition, Contract Development, and Monitoring Issues Could Undermine Privatization Goals Federal, state, and local government officials, union representatives, national associations, advocacy groups, contractors, and other experts in social service privatization identified several challenges that state and local governments most often encountered when they privatized social services. HHS’ Oversight of States and Localities May Need to Change in a New Environment The increase in privatization combined with the difficulties states are having in developing methods to monitor program results raise questions about how HHS can ensure that broad program goals are achieved. It will be challenging for HHS to develop and implement approaches to help states assess results of federally funded programs and track them over time so that state and local governments are better prepared to hold contractors accountable for the services they provide. Currently, monitoring program results poses a challenge throughout the government. HHS’ current focus on compliance with statutes and regulations poses a challenge in monitoring the effectiveness of state programs and in identifying the effects of privatization on these programs. At the same time, the federal government, through the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, is focusing on achieving better program results. 1-18. 6, No. 14-17. Related GAO Products The Results Act: Observations on the Department of Health and Human Services’ April 1997 Draft Strategic Plan (GAO/HEHS-97-173R, July 11, 1997).	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined issues related to social service privatization, focusing on the: (1) recent history of state and local government efforts to privatize federally funded social services; (2) key issues surrounding state and local privatized social services; and (3) federal policy implications of state and local social service privatization. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) since 1990, more than half of the state and local governments GAO contacted have increased their contracting for services, as indicated by the number and type of services privatized and the percentage of social service budgets paid to private contractors; (2) many experts GAO consulted expect privatization to expand further; (3) GAO's research found that the recent increases in privatization were most often prompted by political leaders and top program managers, who were responding to an increasing demand for public services and a belief that contractors can provide higher-quality services more cost-effectively than can public agencies; (4) in attempts to provide more cost-effective services, more states are contracting out larger portions of their child support enforcement programs; (5) state and local governments are turning to contractors to provide some services and support activities in which they lack experience or technical expertise; (6) state and local governments face several key challenges as they plan and implement strategies to privatize their social services; (7) first is the challenge to obtain sufficient competition to realize the benefits of privatization; (8) second, state and local governments often have little experience in developing contracts that specify program results in sufficient detail to effectively hold contractors accountable; (9) third, it can be difficult for states to monitor performance in some social service programs; (10) increased privatization raises questions about how the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will fulfill its obligation to ensure that broad program goals are achieved; (11) assessing program results presents a significant challenge throughout the government, yet it is an important component of an effective system for holding service providers accountable; (12) the difficulties the states have in monitoring privatized social services focus attention on the need to improve accountability for results; (13) some of the state and local officials GAO interviewed believe that HHS should clarify its program goals and develop performance measures states can use to monitor and evaluate contractor efforts; (14) the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal agencies like HHS to focus their efforts on achieving better program results; (15) HHS' practice of holding states accountable primarily for compliance with statutes and regulations may make the transition particularly difficult; and (16) however, promising approaches are available within HHS in moving to a program results orientation.
gao_GAO-17-580	gao_GAO-17-580_0	Background DOD Biometric and Forensic Roles and Responsibilities In April 2011 DOD issued a directive establishing a “defense forensic enterprise” that, among other things, provided policy and assigned responsibilities within the department to develop and maintain an enduring and holistic forensic capability to support the full range of military operations. DOD Has Developed Materiel Biometric and Forensic Capabilities to Meet Several Enduring Requirements and Has Made Progress in Transitioning These Capabilities to Base Funding DOD has developed biometric and forensic capabilities to meet several validated enduring materiel requirements, and it has made progress in transitioning these capabilities from OCO to base funding. SOCOM Biometric Collection Device. DOD’s Efforts to Institutionalize Deployable Biometric and Forensic Capabilities Are Limited by Strategic Planning Gaps and Acquisition Management Challenges DOD’s efforts to institutionalize its enduring deployable biometric and forensic capabilities are limited by strategic planning gaps and acquisition management challenges. DOD Lacks Current Biometric Strategic Planning Documents While DOD has a current and approved forensic strategic plan, it does not have a current and approved biometric strategic plan. However, according to DOD officials, the biometric strategic plan has not been reviewed or updated since 2008, and a supporting implementation plan has not been issued. DOD’s mission-critical authoritative biometrics database (i.e., DOD ABIS) faces heightened operational risk because it does not have a geographically dispersed back-up capability. At that time the Army did not develop a geographically dispersed DOD ABIS back-up capability, and it has not subsequently developed such a capability because of anticipated costs and the assumption that the existing back-up system suffices, according to DOD officials. Conclusions DOD relies on its deployable biometric and forensic capabilities to support a range of military operations, including the identification and targeting of enemy combatants and terrorists. Since 2011 DOD has made considerable progress in institutionalizing these capabilities, the majority of which were developed through rapid acquisition processes and funded with OCO funds to meet urgent and emergent warfighter needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Addressing these strategic planning and acquisition management challenges will help DOD sustain the progress it has made toward establishing enduring deployable biometric and forensic capabilities. DOD also cited actions it plans to take to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report evaluates the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has since 2011 (1) validated enduring requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities; (2) taken actions to meet enduring requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities and overcome any related challenges; and (3) taken actions to address prior GAO recommendations regarding DOD’s biometric and forensic capabilities. This included reviewing and assessing the Army’s 2015 analysis of alternatives and 2016 draft capability production document for DOD’s authoritative biometric database to identify key performance requirements for the department’s follow-on biometric database.	Why GAO Did This Study Since 2008 DOD has used biometric and forensic capabilities to capture or kill 1,700 individuals and deny 92,000 individuals access to military bases. These capabilities were mainly developed through rapid acquisition processes and were resourced with Overseas Contingency Operations funds—funds that are provided outside of DOD's base budget process. As a result, concerns have been raised about DOD's long-term ability to fund these capabilities. The House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence included provisions in committee reports for GAO to review DOD's progress in institutionalizing deployable biometric and forensic capabilities. This report examines, among other issues, the extent to which DOD since 2011 has (1) validated long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities; and (2) taken actions to meet long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities and overcome any related challenges. GAO examined DOD directives, strategies, policies, plans, and requirements and met with cognizant DOD officials. What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) has validated its requirements for long-term deployable biometric capabilities (such as fingerprint collection devices) and forensic capabilities (such as expeditionary laboratories). Biometric capabilities are used to identify individuals based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics such as fingerprints, iris scans, and voice recognition. Forensic capabilities support the scientific analysis of evidence—such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and latent fingerprints—to link persons, places, things, and events. DOD utilizes deployable biometric and forensic capabilities to support a range of military operations, such as targeting, force protection, and humanitarian assistance. DOD has made significant progress in addressing its long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities, such as issuing new doctrine and establishing long-term funding for several capabilities, including DOD's authoritative biometric database that is used for identifying enemy combatants and terrorists. However, DOD's efforts to institutionalize these capabilities are limited by the following strategic planning gaps and acquisition management challenges: While DOD has a current and approved forensic strategic plan, it does not have one for its biometric capabilities, because no entity has been assigned responsibility for developing such a plan, according to DOD officials. The Army did not follow DOD's acquisition protocols in developing a recent key biometric capability, and it may have missed an opportunity to leverage existing, viable, and less costly alternatives. DOD's authoritative biometric database that is used for identifying enemy combatants and terrorists does not have a geographically dispersed back-up capability to protect against threats such as natural hazards. Having such a back-up could enhance the database's availability. Addressing these strategic planning and acquisition management challenges could help DOD sustain the progress it has made to establish enduring deployable biometric and forensic capabilities. The photographs above depict a warfighter obtaining a biometric iris image (left) and a forensic investigator collecting a latent fingerprint (right). What GAO Recommends GAO is making 6 recommendations, including that DOD update its biometric enterprise strategic plan; take steps to more effectively manage the acquisition of a recent biometric capability; and consider developing a geographically dispersed back-up capability for its authoritative biometric database. DOD concurred with all of the recommendations and cited actions it plans to take to address them.
gao_GAO-04-880T	gao_GAO-04-880T_0	From 1997 to 2003, the Oil for Food program was responsible for more than $67 billion of Iraq's oil revenue. Despite concerns that sanctions may have worsened the humanitarian situation, the Oil for Food program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. According to the United Nations, the average daily food intake increased from around 1,275 calories per person per day in 1996 to about 2,229 calories at the end of 2001. Former Iraqi Regime Acquired an Estimated $10.1 Billion in Illicit Revenue We estimate that, from 1997 through 2002, the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues—$5.7 billion through oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion through surcharges against oil sales and illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. We updated our estimate to include (1) oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, (2) updated letters of credit from prior years, and (3) newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. United Nations and Security Council Had Responsibility for Oversight of Program, but Iraq Contracted Directly with Purchasers and Suppliers Both OIP, as an office within the U.N. Secretariat, and the Security Council’s sanctions committee were responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food Program. While OIP was to examine each contract for price and value, it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee responded to illegal surcharges on oil purchases, but it is unclear what actions it took to respond to commissions on commodity contracts. Ongoing investigations of the Oil for Food program may wish to consider further examining how the structure of the program enabled the Iraqi government to obtain illegal revenues, the role of member states in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions, actions taken to reduce oil smuggling, and the responsibilities and procedures for assessing price reasonableness in commodity contracts. Iraqi control over contract negotiations was an important factor in allowing Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. The reports stated that OIP was generally responsive to external audit recommendations. U.N. external audit reports contained no findings of fraud during the program. The Sanctions Committee Had a Key Role in Enforcing Sanctions and Approving Contracts The sanctions committee was responsible for three key elements of the Oil for Food Program: (1) monitoring implementation of the sanctions, (2) screening contracts to prevent the purchase of items that could have military uses, and (3) approving Iraq’s oil and commodity contracts. Challenges in Addressing Iraq’s Food Security Evolving policy and implementation decisions on the food distribution system and the worsening security situation have affected the movement of food commodities within Iraq. As a result, warehouse stocks are low, and Iraq has less than a month’s supply of several food items, including staple grains, and no buffer stock. The government will have to decide whether to continue, reform, or eliminate the current system. In addition, inadequate oversight and corruption in the Oil for Food program raise concerns about the Iraqi government’s ability to manage the food distribution system and absorb donor reconstruction funds under existing structures. The CPA has taken steps, such as appointing inspectors general, to strengthen accountability measures in Iraq’s ministries. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology We used the following methodology to estimate the former Iraqi regime’s illicit revenues from oil smuggling, surcharges on oil, and commissions from commodity contracts from 1997 through 2002: To estimate the amount of oil the Iraqi regime smuggled, we used Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates of Iraqi oil production and subtracted oil sold under the Oil for Food program and domestic consumption. Signed a memorandum of understanding allowing Iraq’s export of oil to pay for food, medicine, and essential civilian supplies.	Why GAO Did This Study The Oil for Food program was established by the United Nations and Iraq in 1996 to address concerns about the humanitarian situation after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program allowed the Iraqi government to use the proceeds of its oil sales to pay for food, medicine, and infrastructure maintenance. The program appears to have helped the Iraqi people. From 1996 through 2001, the average daily food intake increased from 1,300 to 2,300 calories. From 1997-2002, Iraq sold more than $67 billion of oil through the program and issued $38 billion in letters of credit to purchase commodities. However, over the years numerous allegations have surfaced concerning potential fraud and program mismanagement. GAO (1) reports on its estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of U.N. sanctions, (2) provides observations on program administration; and (3) describes the current and future challenges in achieving food security. What GAO Found GAO estimates that from 1997- 2002, the former Iraqi regime acquired $10.1 billion in illegal revenues, including $5.7 billion in oil smuggled out of Iraq and $4.4 billion through surcharges on oil sales and illicit commissions from suppliers exporting goods to Iraq through the Oil for Food program. This estimate includes oil revenue and contract amounts for 2002, updated letters of credit from prior years, and newer estimates of illicit commissions from commodity suppliers. The United Nations, through the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) and the Security Council's Iraq sanctions committee, were both responsible for overseeing the Oil for Food Program. However, the Security Council allowed the Iraq government, as a sovereign entity, to negotiate contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities. This structure was an important factor in allowing Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. OIP was responsible for examining Iraqi contracts for price and value, but it is unclear how it performed this function. The sanctions committee was responsible for monitoring oil smuggling, screening contracts for items that could have military uses, and approving oil and commodity contracts. The sanctions committee took action to stop illegal oil surcharges, but it is unclear what actions it took on contract commissions. U.N. external audit reports contained no findings of program fraud. Summaries of internal audit reports pointed to some concerns regarding procurement, coordination, monitoring, and oversight and concluded that OIP had generally responded to audit recommendations. Ongoing investigations of the Oil for Food program may wish to further examine how the structure of the program enabled the Iraqi government to obtain illegal revenues, the role of member states in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions, actions taken to reduce oil smuggling, and the responsibilities and procedures for assessing price reasonableness in commodity contracts. Evolving policy and implementation decisions on the food distribution system and the worsening security situation have affected the movement of food commodities within Iraq. As a result, as of June 2004, food warehouse stocks are low and Iraq has less than a month's supply of essential food items, according to U.S. and World Food Program officials. In addition to these current food security challenges, the new government will have to balance the need to reform a costly food subsidy program with the need to maintain food stability and protect the poorest populations. Also, inadequate oversight and corruption in the Oil for Food program raise concerns about the Iraqi government's ability to manage the food distribution system and absorb $32 billion in expected donor funds for reconstruction. The coalition authority has taken steps, such as appointing inspectors general, to build internal controls and accountability measures in Iraq's ministries.
gao_GGD-97-40	gao_GGD-97-40_0	The Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) and the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) are the two largest retirement programs for federal civilian employees. We did not independently verify the accuracy of the Watson Wyatt database or the benefit amounts calculated. Comparative Benefit Levels Available From FERS, CSRS, and Private Sector Retirement Programs The comparative benefit amounts available to employees in FERS and CSRS and the average benefit amounts available from the retirement programs in the contractor’s private sector database can differ considerably, depending on a number of factors and how these factors interact with the retirement programs’ designs. These factors include (1) the ages at which employees retire and at which programs provide unreduced benefits, (2) the extent to which employees and employers contribute to the DC plans that are integral components of FERS and most private sector programs, and (3) the impact of inflation and cost-of-living adjustments provided through the retirement programs. 2.1.) Accordingly, to obtain the greatest available benefits from FERS, employees must contribute a total of 12 percent of their salaries. By contributing to their DC plan, FERS employees can obtain greater benefits than are available from CSRS at all ages, but they will pay more to receive the greater benefit amounts. All of the officials agreed with our conclusion that there is no definitive answer to the question of whether federal retirement programs offer greater or smaller benefits than private sector programs.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO reviewed federal and nonfederal retirement programs, focusing on: (1) an update of the reports on nonfederal retirement programs GAO completed for Congress when the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) was being designed; and (2) a comparison of current nonfederal programs with FERS and the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). GAO did not independently verify the accuracy of the Watson Wyatt Worldwide database or the benefit amounts calculated. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the results of GAO's review revealed that there is no clear, bottom-line answer to the question of whether FERS and CSRS offer greater benefits, or smaller benefits, than private sector retirement programs; (2) the benefits available from FERS and CSRS can be smaller, similar, or greater than the average of the programs in the contractor's private sector employer database, depending on a number of factors and how these factors interact with the retirement programs' designs; (3) chief among these factors are the: (a) ages at which employees retire and at which programs provide unreduced benefits; (b) extent to which employees and employers contribute to the defined contribution plans that are integral components of FERS and most private sector programs; and (c) impact of cost-of-living adjustment practices on benefit amounts over the long term; (4) in fact, FERS and CSRS can provide quite different benefit amounts because of their different designs; and (5) as a rule, greater benefits are available from FERS than from CSRS, but FERS employees must contribute higher percentages of their salaries to receive the greater benefit amounts.
gao_GAO-12-581T	gao_GAO-12-581T_0	Funding the Nation’s Transportation System Funding Highways and Transit The major source of federal surface transportation funding is the Highway Trust Fund, but the revenues that make up that fund are eroding. The federal motor fuel tax rate has not increased since 1993, meaning that the 18.4 cent per gallon tax on motor fuels enacted in 1993 is worth about 11.5 cents today. This trend will continue with the introduction of more fuel-efficient and alternative-fuel vehicles that have the potential through fuel savings to decrease motor fuel purchases and associated tax receipts. The Congressional Budget Office estimates, as of March 2012, that to maintain current spending levels plus inflation between 2013 and 2022, the Highway Trust Fund will require over $125 billion more than it is expected to take in over that period. For this and other reasons, funding surface transportation remains on GAO’s High-Risk List. Long-term reauthorization of surface transportation provides an opportunity for Congress to fund the program on a sustainable basis. The President’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposes increasing surface transportation funding levels, including a 34 percent increase over the next 6 years for highways and bridges—funded in part through general revenue transfers. Congress and the administration are considering various proposals to expand federal financing tools to help leverage investment in transportation infrastructure: Expanding the Transportation Infrastructure Financing Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. Creating a National Infrastructure Bank. Continuing and expanding federal bonding mechanisms. Funding Aviation The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) expenditures are budgeted to continue to exceed forecasted revenues from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund in future years. FAA operation expenditures not covered by trust-fund revenues are projected to be paid for by general revenues from the U.S. Treasury.roughly 20 percent of FAA’s total annual expenditures for about the next 10 years might have to be paid for by general revenues. As the federal budget continues to be constrained, Congress may face difficult choices regarding reducing FAA’s appropriations, which could increase FAA’s According to the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget, total costs and delay the benefits associated with investments such as NextGen. Funding High-Speed Rail The President’s budget for fiscal year 2013 requests $2.5 billion for high- speed and intercity passenger rail—part of a proposed $47 billion for passenger rail projects over the next 6 years. However, Congress has not provided funding for high-speed rail since appropriating over $10 billion through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) of 2009 and the fiscal year 2010 DOT Appropriations Act. We recently reported that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) essentially followed good grant making practices as it awarded Recovery Act funds, but we have also identified several challenges facing these projects as they move forward. For example, project sponsors find it difficult to secure the up-front investment for construction costs and indicated that they have or will need some federal funding to develop their projects. Refocusing and Restructuring Surface Transportation Policies and Programs Long-term reauthorization provides an opportunity for Congress to fundamentally re-examine surface transportation programs as we have recommended—another reason why funding surface transportation is on GAO’s High-Risk List—and to expand on recent efforts to reform the highway program. From the standpoint of state and local governments, re-examining surface transportation programs could reduce fragmentation and the administrative expenses states face complying with myriad federal statutory and regulatory requirements. This re-examination could include the following: Clearly define the federal role in relation to other levels of government and, thus, create a more targeted federal role focused around evident national interests. Ensure accountability for entities receiving federal funds, for example, by moving to a performance-based program. Employ the best approaches and analysis to direct federal funds to infrastructure with clear national interests. Improving Transportation Safety Another continuing challenge facing DOT pertains to improving transportation safety. In recent years, we have seen a remarkable decline in transportation-related fatalities and injuries, the vast majority of which occur on our nation’s roads. Traffic fatalities decreased more than 20 percent over the last decade, from nearly 42,000 in 2000 to less than 33,000 in 2010, the lowest level since 1949. Traffic injuries decreased approximately 30 percent, from about 3.2 million in 2000 to about 2.2 million in 2010. These encouraging trends are likely due in part to federal and state DOT efforts. However, even these reduced numbers of fatalities and injuries are still too many. Implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System An additional challenge that I would like to address pertains to the implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a complex multiagency undertaking intended to transform the current radar-based system into an aircraft-centered, satellite-based system by 2025. FAA has taken some steps to improve NextGen implementation and is continuing to address critical issues that we, stakeholders, and others have identified over the years. For example, FAA has made progress in streamlining its processes and improving its capacity to develop new flight procedures that have led to measurable benefits, such as fuel savings. FAA has also set NextGen performance goals through 2018. However, as our recent and ongoing work has shown, FAA faces several challenges in keeping key NextGen acquisitions within cost estimates and on schedule, delivering NextGen benefits, and addressing changes in management and governance, including vacancies in key leadership positions. Improving Information Security DOT relies on more than 400 computerized information systems to carry out its financial and mission-related operations. Effective information security controls are required to ensure that financial and sensitive information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse; fraudulent use; and improper disclosure, modification, or destruction. Ineffective controls can also impair the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of information used by management. The need for effective information security is further underscored by the evolving and growing cyber threats to federal systems and the dramatic increase in the number of security incidents reported by federal agencies, including DOT. From fiscal years 2007 to 2011, the number of incidents reported to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)increased by more than 140 percent.	Why GAO Did This Study The challenges facing DOT and Congress regarding transportation priorities and funding cannot be addressed by simply spending more money. Despite large increases in expenditures for transportation in recent years, system performance has not commensurately improved. Congestion continues to grow, particularly in urban areas, and looming problems from the anticipated growth in travel are not being adequately addressed. As performance degrades and the system grows increasingly unreliable, the economic and environmental implications are significant, including wasted fuel and lost time, as cars idle in traffic, airline passengers confront delays, and businesses incur increased costs. As always, safety remains a primary concern, and improving information security is critical to DOTs mission. Although our nations transportation system is owned and operated by multiple levels of government and the private sector, DOT is the principal federal agency responsible for implementing national transportation policy and administering most of the federal transportation programs. DOT has multiple missionsprimarily focusing on mobility and safetythat are carried out by its various operating administrations (such as aviation, highways, transit, railroads, and others). For fiscal year 2013, the Presidents budget has requested $74.5 billion to carry out its activities. This statement today focuses on five key issues and management challenges that DOT and Congress face. These areas are funding the nations transportation system, refocusing and restructuring surface transportation policies and programs, improving transportation safety, implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), and improving information security. This statement is based on a body of work that we have completed from March 2008 through March 2012, including recommendations we have made to both DOT and Congress. What GAO Found Funding the Nations Transportation System: Funding Highways and Transit : The major source of federal surface transportation funding is the Highway Trust Fund, but the revenues that make up that fund are eroding. The federal motor fuel tax rate has not increased since 1993, meaning that the 18.4 cent per gallon tax on motor fuels enacted in 1993 is worth about 11.5 cents today. This trend will continue with the introduction of more fuel-efficient and alternative-fuel vehicles that have the potential through fuel savings to decrease motor fuel purchases and associated tax receipts. The Congressional Budget Office estimates, as of March 2012, that to maintain current spending levels plus inflation between 2013 and 2022, the Highway Trust Fund will require over $125 billion more than it is expected to take in over that period. For this and other reasons, funding surface transportation remains on GAOs High-Risk List. Long-term reauthorization of surface transportation provides an opportunity for Congress to fund the program on a sustainable basis. The Presidents fiscal year 2013 budget proposes increasing surface transportation funding levels, including a 34 percent increase over the next 6 years for highways and bridgesfunded in part through general revenue transfers. Congress and the administration are considering various proposals to expand federal financing tools to help leverage investment in transportation infrastructure: Expanding the Transportation Infrastructure Financing Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. Creating a National Infrastructure Bank. Continuing and expanding federal bonding mechanisms. Funding Aviation : The Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) expenditures are budgeted to continue to exceed forecasted revenues from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund in future years. FAA operation expenditures not covered by trust-fund revenues are projected to be paid for by general revenues from the U.S. Treasury. According to the Presidents fiscal year 2013 budget, roughly 20 percent of FAAs total annual expenditures for about the next 10 years might have to be paid for by general revenues. As the federal budget continues to be constrained, Congress may face difficult choices regarding reducing FAAs appropriations, which could increase FAAs total costs and delay the benefits associated with investments such as NextGen. Funding High-Speed Rail : The Presidents budget for fiscal year 2013 requests $2.5 billion for highspeed and intercity passenger railpart of a proposed $47 billion for passenger rail projects over the next 6 years. However, Congress has not provided funding for high-speed rail since appropriating over $10 billion through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) of 2009 and the fiscal year 2010 DOT Appropriations Act. We recently reported that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) essentially followed good grant making practices as it awarded Recovery Act funds, but we have also identified several challenges facing these projects as they move forward. For example, project sponsors find it difficult to secure the up-front investment for construction costs and indicated that they have or will need some federal funding to develop their projects. Refocusing and Restructuring Surface Transportation Policies and Programs: Long-term reauthorization provides an opportunity for Congress to fundamentally re-examine surface transportation programs as we have recommendedanother reason why funding surface transportation is on GAOs High-Risk Listand to expand on recent efforts to reform the highway program. From the standpoint of state and local governments,re-examining surface transportation programs could reduce fragmentation and the administrative expenses states face complying with myriad federal statutory and regulatory requirements. This re-examination could include the following: Clearly define the federal role in relation to other levels of government and, thus, create a more targeted federal role focused around evident national interests. Ensure accountability for entities receiving federal funds, for example, by moving to a performance-based program. Employ the best approaches and analysis to direct federal funds to infrastructure with clear national interests. Improving Transportation Safety : Another continuing challenge facing DOT pertains to improving transportation safety. In recent years, we have seen a remarkable decline in transportation-related fatalities and injuries, the vast majority of which occur on our nations roads. Traffic fatalities decreased more than 20 percent over the last decade, from nearly 42,000 in 2000 to less than 33,000 in 2010, the lowest level since 1949. Traffic injuries decreased approximately 30 percent, from about 3.2 million in 2000 to about 2.2 million in 2010. These encouraging trends are likely due in part to federal and state DOT efforts. However, even these reduced numbers of fatalities and injuries are still too many. An additional challenge this testimony addresses pertains to the implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)a complex multiagency undertaking intended to transform the current radar-based system into an aircraft-centered, satellite-based system by 2025. FAA has taken some steps to improve NextGen implementation and is continuing to address critical issues that we, stakeholders, and others have identified over the years. For example, FAA has made progress in streamlining its processes and improving itscapacity to develop new flight procedures that have led to measurable benefits, such as fuel savings. FAA has also set NextGen performance goals through 2018. However, as our recent and ongoing work has shown, FAA faces several challenges in keeping key NextGen acquisitions within cost estimates and on schedule, delivering NextGen benefits, and addressing changes in management and governance, including vacancies in key leadership positions. Improving Information Security : DOT relies on more than 400 computerized information systems to carry out its financial and mission-related operations. Effective information security controls are required to ensure that financial and sensitive information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse; fraudulent use; and improper disclosure, modification, or destruction.Ineffective controls can also impair the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of information used by management. The need for effective information security is further underscored by the evolving and growing cyber threats to federal systems and the dramatic increase in the number of security incidents reported by federal agencies, including DOT. From fiscal years 2007 to 2011, the number of incidents reported to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) by DOTincreased by more than 140 percent.
gao_AIMD-99-21	gao_AIMD-99-21_0	104-134, which earmarked $15 million for the District of Columbia MPD from no year funds appropriated to the Department of Justice for “Violent Crime Reduction Programs, State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance.” The law stated that the $15 million was in lieu of funds that would have been available under the formula allocation of local law enforcement block grants. Contracts funded in full or in part by the $15 million have also been reviewed by the Authority for consistency with the spending plan and the availability of funds. Meanwhile, the Authority reimbursed the District’s General Fund $10.3 million from the MPD escrow account for payments made to carry out the spending plan. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) determine whether funds were spent according to the approved spending plan, (2) determine the time frame involved in spending the funds, and (3) verify whether items purchased with the funds were received and distributed to the appropriate offices. These revisions enabled MPD to purchase additional bulletproof vests in excess of the original budgeted number, as well as mountain bikes and associated equipment (project number 22) as part of the summer crime initiative. Because some of the items were available for less than originally estimated, the difference was available for other purposes. These three projects were deferred by the new Chief of Police to allow a new management team to assess CALEA requirements and decide on the best method or structure to satisfy these requirements. Between April and September 1996, MPD developed and refined its spending plan and consulted with congressional committees. MPD officials cited additional reasons for the delay in expending the funds. As of September 1998, GSA had completed the design phase, submitted it to MPD for review and concurrence, and was waiting for approval to proceed with contracting. MPD officials told us that these items were distributed to their final destinations at the police districts and division offices. However, we could not track MPD’s inventoried items such as patrol vehicles, motorcycles, and communication consoles, purchased with the $15 million beyond MPD’s receipt because inventory information was not completely documented or updated in either the District’s asset management system or MPD’s inventory records. MPD referred to its initiatives to improve its control over inventory, pointing out that it had obtained software upgrades to further develop and maintain a complete continuous asset management system. We are also sending a copy to the Chairman of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Chief of Metropolitan Police Department, the District Inspector General, and the Auditor of the District of Columbia. GAO Comments 1. GAO Comments 1. 2.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed expenditures made by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) using $15 million appropriated by the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1996, focusing on: (1) whether funds have been spent according to MPD's spending plan; (2) the timeframe involved in spending the funds; and (3) whether the items purchased with the funds were received and distributed to the appropriate offices. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) MPD used the funds consistent with their spending plan; (2) three planned and incomplete projects were deferred by the new Chief of Police in June 1998 to allow a new management team to assess law enforcement standards and accreditation requirements for these projects and decide the best method or structure to satisfy those requirements; (3) as a result of the deferrals and because certain items were obtained for less than the budgeted amounts, MPD was able, with the approval of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, to reprogram residual funds to purchase additional bulletproof vests, as well as mountain bikes and associated equipment to address the new Police Chief's summer crime initiative; (4) as of August 31, 1998, about $11.1 million had been disbursed from the District's General Fund, and contracts or purchase orders were in place for the remaining amount; (5) as of September 30, 1998, the Authority had reimbursed the District's General Fund $10.3 million from the MPD escrow account; (6) regarding the timeframe involved in spending the $15 million, the spending plan was finalized in September 1996 and the first contracts for supplies and services went to the Authority for approval in December 1996; (7) the General Services Administration provided MPD with contracting assistance for the remaining funds; (8) according to MPD officials, the loss of key management personnel delayed some of the initial expenditures; (9) in addition, the officials stated that the modernization of MPD's information technology required more time than originally anticipated--electrical problems and poor infrastructure conditions at the 57-year old headquarters building held up installation of some of the equipment ordered, resulting in further delays in spending; (10) MPD officials told GAO that the vehicles and property items purchased with the $15 million were received and distributed to the police districts and division offices; (11) however, GAO could not track MPD's inventoried items, such as patrol vehicles, motorcycles, and communication consoles, purchased with the $15 million beyond MPD's receipt because inventory information was not completely documented or updated in either the District's asset management system or MPD's inventory records; and (12) MPD stated that it was taking corrective actions to address these weaknesses in controls over inventory and asset management systems.
gao_OGC-99-176	gao_OGC-99-176_0	Reported Obligations for Fiscal Years 1996 Through 1998 DC Courts’ records indicated that total obligations in fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998 were $115.4, $119, and $126.3 million, respectively. Fiscal year 1998 obligations reflect our adjustments, as discussed later, and are not comparable to the prior years’ obligations. DC Courts’ Spending Plan Upon receipt of its fiscal year 1998 appropriation, DC Courts was responsible for developing a spending plan based on an appropriation that was about $15.5 million less than it requested. DC Courts did not develop a plan to ensure that its obligations did not exceed available resources. It obligated throughout the year based on its expectation of receiving additional funds. By the end of the fiscal year, DC Courts’ records showed that obligations exceeded available resources by about $350,000. Specifically, its records showed obligations of almost $122.2 million and funds received of about $121.8 million. However, as I will now discuss, we found that adjustments needed to be made to these amounts. The vouchers were approved by the presiding judges or hearing commissioners in fiscal year 1998, and the obligations should have been recorded in fiscal year 1998. However, DC Courts did not have authority to spend this interest. As adjusted, DC Courts’ recorded obligations and available funding for fiscal year 1998 would be $126.3 and $121 million, respectively, resulting in a potential over-obligation of more than $5 million. The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits federal and DC government officials from making expenditures or obligations in excess of amounts available in an appropriation or fund unless otherwise authorized by law. In May 1998, OMB officials advised DC Courts to reduce non-personnel costs instead of furloughing employees or closing the courts to avoid an Anti- Deficiency Act violation. DC Courts made the decision on July 24, 1998, to defer payments for court-appointed attorneys for the remainder of the fiscal year, and then used fiscal year 1999 appropriations to pay those amounts. Processing of Payments to Court- Appointed Attorneys Now I would like to discuss the payments that were made to court- appointed attorneys during fiscal year 1998 in terms of the process for making such payments, and whether they were made promptly. We found that DC Courts processed vouchers for court-appointed attorneys in accordance with its policies and procedures. However, its procedures did not include time frames for making payments to court- appointed attorneys. A District law established the Crime Victims Compensation Program under DC Courts jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the Revitalization Act.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the issues related to the District of Columbia (DC) Courts' financial operations for fiscal year (FY) 1998, focusing on: (1) identifying DC Courts' total obligations for fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998; (2) whether DC Courts had a spending plan for FY 1998, and whether it obligated funds consistent with available resources; (3) why payments to court-appointed attorneys were deferred between July and September 1998; and (4) whether DC Courts processed payments to court-appointed attorneys in accordance with policies and procedures. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) DC Courts experienced difficulties in planning and budgeting during this transition year; (2) DC Courts' records showed that it did not operate within its available resources, potentially in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act; (3) GAO also identified a legal issue regarding the Crime Victims Compensation Program; (4) DC Courts' records indicated that total obligations in fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998 were $115.4, $119, and $126.3 million, respectively; (5) FY 1998 obligations reflect GAO's adjustments, and are not comparable to the prior years' obligations; (6) upon receipt of its FY 1998 appropriations, DC Courts was responsible for developing a spending plan based on an appropriation that was about $15.5 million less than it requested as a result of funding changes under the Revitalization Act and the FY 1998 appropriation act; (7) DC Courts did not develop such a plan or properly monitor spending to ensure that its obligations did not exceed available resources; (8) it obligated throughout the year based on its expectation of receiving additional funds; (9) by the end of the fiscal year, DC Courts' records showed obligations of almost $122.2 million and funds received of about $121.8 million; (10) however, GAO found that adjustments needed to be made to these amounts; (11) as adjusted, DC Courts' recorded obligations and available funding for FY 1998 would be $126.3 and $121 million, respectively; (12) thus, DC Courts potentially over-obligated available funds by more than $5 million; (13) the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits federal and DC government officials from making expenditures or obligations in excess of amounts available in an appropriation or fund unless otherwise authorized by law; (14) to avoid an Anti-Deficiency Act violation, the DC Courts made the decision to defer payments for court-appointed attorneys for the remainder of the fiscal year, and then used FY 1999 appropriations to pay those amounts; (15) however, since the vouchers were approved by the presiding judges or hearing commissioners in FY 1998, the obligations should have been recorded in FY 1998; (16) DC Courts processed vouchers for court-appointed attorneys in accordance with its policies and procedures; and (17) however, its procedures did not include timeframes for making payments to court-appointed attorneys.
gao_GAO-09-835T	gao_GAO-09-835T_0	In this capacity, the department has multiple cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities. DHS is also responsible for securing its own computer networks, systems, and information. NIST Is Responsible for Establishing Federal Standards and Guidance for Information Security FISMA tasks NIST—a component within the Department of Commerce— with responsibility for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for (1) information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of the agency and (2) providing adequate information security for all agency operations and assets, except for national security systems. FISMA also requires NIST to take other actions that include: conducting research, as needed, to determine the nature and extent of information security vulnerabilities and techniques for providing cost- effective information security; developing and periodically revising performance indicators and measures for agency information security policies and practices; evaluating private sector information security policies and practices and commercially available information technologies, to assess potential application by agencies to strengthen information security; and assisting the private sector, in using and applying the results of its activities required by FISMA. Metrics Established to Evaluate Information Security Programs FISMA also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security and to report annually to Congress on agency compliance with the requirements of the act. DHS Has Yet to Fully Satisfy Its Cybersecurity Responsibilities We have reported since 2005 that DHS has yet to comprehensively satisfy its key responsibilities for protecting computer-reliant critical infrastructures. Our reports included about 90 recommendations that we summarized into key areas, including those listed in table 1, that are essential for DHS to address in order to fully implement its responsibilities. DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy aspects of its responsibilities, but the department still has not fully implemented our recommendations, and thus further action needs to be taken to address these areas. However, DHS had not established a strategy to coordinate the various control systems activities across federal agencies and the private sector, and it did not effectively share information on control system vulnerabilities with the public and private sectors. We testified in March 2009 regarding the need to bolster public/private partnerships associated with cyber CIP. This is the second of the mandatory security standards and specifies minimum security requirements for information and information systems supporting the executive agencies of the federal government and a risk-based process for selecting the security controls necessary to satisfy the minimum security requirements. Through NIST’s efforts, agencies have access to additional tools and guidance that can be applied to their information security programs. Opportunities for Improving Information Security Metrics Despite federal agencies reporting increased compliance in implementing key information security control activities for fiscal year 2008, opportunities exist to improve the metrics used in annual reporting. In summary, DHS has not fully satisfied aspects of its key cybersecurity responsibilities, one of which includes its efforts to protect our nation’s cyber critical infrastructure and still needs to take further action to address the key areas identified in our recent reports, including enhancing partnerships with the private sector. NIST has developed a significant number of standards and guidelines for information security and continues to assist organizations in implementing security controls over their systems and information.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal laws and policy have assigned important roles and responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for securing computer networks and systems. DHS is charged with coordinating the protection of computer-reliant critical infrastructure--much of which is owned by the private sector--and securing its own computer systems, while NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines for implementing security controls over information and information systems. GAO was asked to describe cybersecurity efforts at DHS and NIST--including partnership activities with the private sector--and the use of cybersecurity performance metrics in the federal government. To do so, GAO relied on its reports on federal information security and federal efforts to fulfill national cybersecurity responsibilities. What GAO Found Since 2005, GAO has reported that DHS has yet to comprehensively satisfy its key cybersecurity responsibilities, including those related to establishing effective partnerships with the private sector. Shortcomings exist in key areas that are essential for DHS to address in order to fully implement its cybersecurity responsibilities. DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities, but still has not fully satisfied aspects of these responsibilities and needs to take further action to enhance the public/private partnerships needed to adequately protect cyber critical infrastructure. GAO has also previously reported on significant security weaknesses in systems supporting two of the department's programs, one that tracks foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States, and one for matching airline passenger information against terrorist watch-list records. DHS has corrected information security weaknesses for systems supporting the terrorist watch-list, but needs to take additional actions to mitigate vulnerabilities associated with systems tracking foreign nationals. NIST plays a key role in providing important information security standards and guidance. Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), NIST has developed standards specifying minimum security requirements for federal information and information systems; and provided corresponding guidance that details the controls necessary for securing those systems. It has also been working with both public and private sector entities to enhance information security requirements. The resulting guidance and tools provided by NIST serve as important resources for federal agencies that can be applied to information security programs. As GAO recently testified in May, opportunities exist to improve the metrics used to assess agency information security programs. According to the performance metrics established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), agencies reported increased compliance in implementing key information security control activities. However, GAO and agency inspectors general continue to report significant weaknesses in controls. This dichotomy exists in part because the OMB-defined metrics generally do not measure how well controls are implemented. As a result, reported metrics may provide an incomplete picture of an agency's information security program.
gao_GAO-16-100	gao_GAO-16-100_0	SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan Are Likely to Fall from 2014 Levels, and Have Had Varied Effects on State’s and USAID’s Institutional Knowledge From 2010 to 2015, a total of 378 Afghan local staff resigned from their positions at State and USAID in Afghanistan after receiving SIVs (see fig. State and USAID had a high of 243 SIV-related resignations in 2014, but the number of resignations will likely be lower in 2015 than in 2014, based on both the number of such resignations as of August 2015 and the number of Afghan staff who have currently completed an initial step in the SIV application process. In addition, embassy officials said that local staff attrition has affected some program coordination with the Afghan government. Additionally, agency officials have noted that SIV processing was relatively slow during the early years of the program. Afghan Staff Attrition, Including SIV-Related Resignations, Has Had Varied Effects on Agencies’ Institutional Knowledge According to our assessment of changes to average tenure and grade level of Afghan staff, Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations, has had varied effects on State’s and USAID’s institutional knowledge. From 2010 to June 2015, average tenure among both agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly (see table 1). Agencies Reported That They Have Successfully Identified Qualified Afghan Staff to Fill Vacancies State and USAID reported they were successful in identifying qualified replacements to fill vacancies for local staff positions. Agencies Have Taken Steps to Mitigate Attrition among Afghan Local Staff, Including SIV-Related Resignations State and USAID have taken a number of actions to help mitigate the effects of attrition among Afghan local staff, including local staff who resigned their positions after receiving an SIV. Both agencies’ headquarters have provided additional administrative support to their missions in Afghanistan beyond what is generally provided to other overseas missions. State and USAID officials said they sometimes fill one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related resignation. Temporary Assignments of Other Personnel to Kabul State and USAID officials said they send U.S. direct hire employees to Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by Afghan staff attrition or to provide additional support to American personnel. Officials Said Agencies Have Not Evaluated Efforts to Mitigate Effects of Afghan Staff Attrition While State and USAID have made a number of efforts to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition, according to officials, agencies have not formally evaluated the extent to which these actions have addressed effects on the workforce or programs. Key principles of human capital management call for agencies to evaluate the success of human capital strategies, such as actions taken to mitigate attrition among staff, by using performance measures to assess the extent to which these activities contribute to achieving programmatic goals. Furthermore, without evaluation of mitigating actions that agencies have previously undertaken, agencies may be unable to weigh the costs and benefits of actions being implemented, and may be unable to identify the strategies that are most effective for handling future workforce-related needs in challenging environments. In its written comments, USAID agreed with the recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In this report, we evaluated (1) special immigrant visa (SIV)-related resignations, including how, if at all, the Department of State’s (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) workforces in Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to the attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients.	Why GAO Did This Study Congress established an SIV program in 2009 for Afghan nationals with at least 1 year of U.S. government service, given the risk these employees face. Local staff at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan are key to implementing U.S. policies and programs because of their institutional knowledge, language skills, and local relationships. A high rate of Afghan staff resigning after receiving an SIV could diminish the U.S. government's capacity to carry out its mission. GAO was asked to review State's and USAID's efforts to mitigate the loss of Afghan staff. GAO evaluated (1) SIV-related resignations, including how, if at all, State's and USAID's workforces in Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of Afghan local staff, including SIV recipients. GAO analyzed data from 2010 to 2015, reviewed documents regarding the Afghan workforce, and interviewed State and USAID officials. What GAO Found Resignations of Afghan local staff at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after receiving a special immigrant visa (SIV) reached their highest level in 2014, and have had varied effects on the agencies' institutional knowledge (fig.). Resignations increased as more Afghan staff began the SIV application process than in the initial years of the program, and as State addressed delays that had previously slowed visa issuances. Afghan staff resignations are likely to be lower in 2015 than in previous years based on the number of current staff that have initiated the SIV process. Based on GAO's assessment of changes to average tenure and grade level of Afghan staff from 2010 until June 2015, and insights from agency officials, the effects of SIV-related resignations on State's and USAID's institutional knowledge is varied. For example, average tenure among both agencies' Afghan workforces decreased slightly. In addition, embassy officials said that local staff attrition may affect some program coordination with the Afghan government. Nonetheless, despite this attrition, agency officials reported that they were successful in identifying qualified replacements to fill positions. Agencies have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations. For example, State and USAID temporarily transfer experienced local staff from other diplomatic missions to Afghanistan, and the agencies sometimes fill one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related resignation. In addition, the agencies provide additional administrative support from Washington, D.C., beyond what is generally provided to other U.S. missions, and send U.S. personnel to Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by attrition. State and USAID officials said that these agencies have not evaluated actions taken to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition. Officials said agencies have not conducted such assessments because of resource constraints and the reactive nature of operations in such an unpredictable environment. Key principles of human capital management that GAO identified call for agencies to evaluate the contribution that such activities make toward achieving programmatic goals, including those related to the workforce. Without these assessments, it will be difficult for agencies to have information to determine the costs and benefits of actions taken and handle workforce-related needs in challenging environments in the future. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State and USAID evaluate actions intended to mitigate the effects of Afghan local staff resignations. State and USAID agreed with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-15-585	gao_GAO-15-585_0	Most Agencies Did Not Follow the Government-wide Downward Trend and Maintained or Improved Engagement Levels The recent government-wide average decline in the EEI masks the fact that the majority of federal agencies sustained and a few increased EEI levels during the same period. From 2006 through 2014, government- wide EEI levels increased to an estimated high of 67 percent in 2011 and then declined to an estimated 63 percent in 2014, as shown in figure 1. Leadership Component of the EEI Consistently Scores the Lowest Of the three components that comprise the EEI, employees’ perceptions of leaders consistently received the lowest score, and at times was about 20 percentage points lower than the other components. For results of our analysis of employee population groups, see appendix II. We found that having constructive performance conversations was the strongest driver of the EEI. These quarterly performance conversations are guided by a set of specific topics that supervisors and employees developed together to ensure that employees receive consistent and regular constructive feedback and coaching. OPM Has Created Tools and Resources to Improve Engagement, but They Fall Short of Supporting a Holistic Approach to Improving Engagement and Linking to Performance Limitations in Data Analysis and Reporting Hinder Agencies’ Ability to Target Resources and Assess Progress OPM provides a number of tools and resources to support agencies’ efforts to use EEI data to identify areas that need improvement, as shown in table 2. However, by not determining which FEVS questions are associated with higher EEI levels, OPM is missing an opportunity to assist agencies in targeting their engagement resources. However, OPM does not report whether changes in agency EEI scores are statistically significant—that is, whether the change is meaningful and not due to random chance. OPM Has Efforts to Identify and Share Promising Practices Underway But Needs More Focus on Linking Engagement and Performance As agencies move from analyzing data to developing strategies to improving engagement and linking it to organizational performance, the specific strategies and lessons learned from the experiences of other agencies can be beneficial to those who may be seeking information related to improving employee engagement and performance. Recommendations for Executive Action In furtherance of its role to support agencies’ efforts to improve employee engagement and performance, we recommend that the Director of OPM take the following three actions: 1. 3. In written comments, which are reproduced in appendix V, OPM concurred with our first recommendation and partially concurred with our second and third recommendations. However, until such information is shared with the larger federal community and includes models for linking engagement to mission accomplishment, we continue to believe that OPM should take additional actions to assist agencies in leveraging their lessons learned, as we recommended. Appendix I: Data Preparation and Calculation of the Employee Engagement Index To determine the trends in employee engagement as measured by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) and identify key practices to improve employee engagement we analyzed (1) employee engagement index scores (EEI) from 2006 to 2014 and (2) the extent to which selected 2014 FEVS questions predicted EEI scores. The EEI consists of three components—leaders lead, supervisors, and intrinsic work experience.	Why GAO Did This Study Research on both private- and public-sector organizations has found that increased levels of engagement—generally defined as the sense of purpose and commitment employees feel toward their employer and its mission—can lead to better organizational performance. GAO was asked to review recent trends in federal employee engagement and steps OPM and agencies are taking to improve it. Among other things, this report: (1) describes trends in employee engagement from 2006 through 2014, (2) identifies practices in improving employee engagement, and (3) evaluates OPM's tools and resources to support employee engagement. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed responses to FEVS questions from 2006 through 2014, conducted a regression analysis, and reviewed OPM documents and interviewed OPM and other agency officials. What GAO Found From 2006 through 2014, government-wide engagement levels—as measured by the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Employee Engagement Index (EEI)—increased to an estimated high of 67 percent in 2011 and then declined to an estimated 63 percent in 2014. This decline is attributable to several large agencies—including the Department of Defense—bringing down the government-wide average. The government-wide decline masks the fact that the majority of federal agencies either sustained or increased EEI levels during the period. Of the three components that comprise the EEI—employees' perceptions of agency leaders, supervisors, and their intrinsic work experience—perceptions of leaders consistently received the lowest score. GAO's regression analysis of selected Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) questions identified six practices as key drivers of the EEI (see table), with constructive performance conversations being the strongest. For example, at one agency, supervisors and employees developed a set of topics for quarterly performance conversations to ensure that employees receive consistent and regular constructive feedback and coaching. OPM developed resources to help agencies use EEI data to strengthen employee engagement but fell short of supporting a holistic approach to improving engagement and linking to performance. For example, OPM does not report whether annual EEI changes are statistically significant—that is, whether the changes were meaningful or due to random chance. Likewise, OPM does not analyze which FEVS questions are associated with higher EEI scores. This information would help agencies better focus their efforts to improve engagement and target resources. Further, OPM has provided limited examples or lessons learned on linking engagement to agency performance, which agencies will need to inform their next survey cycle. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Director of OPM take the following three actions: (1) report annually on drivers of the EEI, (2) provide information on statistically significant changes in EEI scores, and (3) share examples and lessons learned to improve engagement and link engagement to performance in time to inform results of the next survey cycle. OPM concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the second and third recommendations. GAO continues to believe that additional action on these recommendations is needed as discussed in the report.
gao_GAO-03-823	gao_GAO-03-823_0	The Kennedy Center receives annual appropriations to fund operations and maintenance as well as construction. Garage Expansion and Site Improvement Project Estimates As of July 2003, Kennedy Center officials estimated the cost of the garage expansion and site improvement project at $88 million. The garage expansion is to include 525 new parking spaces. Kennedy Center officials estimated that the site improvements will be completed in the summer of 2004. The July 2003 estimates of the project’s costs, time frames, and scope vary substantially from estimates that the Kennedy Center provided to Congress in 1997 and 1998. At that time, Kennedy Center officials estimated that the garage expansion would cost $25 million and would include 900 to 1,000 parking spaces, and that the site improvements would cost $3 million and include construction of a new front-entry driveway. Kennedy Center officials estimated that the project would be completed by August 2000. Kennedy Center officials acknowledged that they should have better informed Congress of the preliminary nature of the 1997 and 1998 estimates and the subsequent events in the planning and bidding phases of the project that affected the project’s costs, time frames, and scope. As a result, these officials said that they now have monthly meetings with congressional stakeholders to discuss the status of ongoing construction projects. Kennedy Center Faces Challenges in Managing Its Construction Program In addition to problems associated with the planning and bidding phases of the project, we found that the Kennedy Center faces a number of challenges in managing large construction projects. The Kennedy Center lacks (1) adequate policies and procedures to guide the planning and management of the construction process, (2) some timely construction data on schedules and costs for effectively overseeing construction projects and measuring results, and (3) key human capital resources and expertise that would be highly beneficial in managing the construction process. Addressing these challenges will become increasingly important as the Kennedy Center undertakes the larger, more costly, and more complex plaza and buildings project. However, in the case of the Kennedy Center garage expansion and site improvement project, early estimates proved to be especially problematic and were based on unrealistic assumptions. Although making improvements in these areas is no guarantee of project success, such improvements would strengthen the construction program and reduce risk by providing greater effectiveness in managing and overseeing future projects and measuring results.	Why GAO Did This Study In the mid-1990s, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Kennedy Center) officials recognized a need for additional parking and better site access. As a precursor to a planned project to construct an 8-acre plaza and two additional buildings at the site, the Kennedy Center is currently in the process of constructing a garage expansion and site improvement project. GAO did this study because of congressional concerns over project delays and costs as well as challenges that the Kennedy Center faces as it pursues this major construction effort. GAO's objectives were to (1) compare the garage expansion and site improvement project's current costs, time frames, and scope with the estimates provided to congressional stakeholders in 1997 and 1998 and (2) identify what challenges the Kennedy Center faces in managing large construction projects. What GAO Found As of July 2003, Kennedy Center officials estimated that the garage expansion and site improvement project would cost $88 million, the garage expansion will be completed in December 2003, the site improvements will be completed in summer 2004, and the project will include 525 parking spaces and various traffic flow improvements. These estimates vary substantially from estimates that Kennedy Center officials provided to congressional stakeholders in 1997 and 1998. At that time, Kennedy Center officials estimated that the project would cost $28 million, would be completed by August 2000, and would include between 900 and 1,000 parking spaces. According to Kennedy Center officials, the initial estimates were preliminary in nature and were based on some unrealistic assumptions. They acknowledged that they should have done a better job of informing Congress of the preliminary nature of the estimates and the subsequent events in the project's planning and bidding phases that affected the costs, time frames, and scope. Kennedy Center officials said that they now hold monthly meetings with Congress about the status of ongoing projects. The Kennedy Center faces certain challenges in managing large construction projects. Specifically, the Kennedy Center lacks (1) adequate policies and procedures to guide the planning and management of the construction process, (2) some timely construction data on schedules and costs for effectively overseeing construction projects and measuring results, and (3) key human capital resources and expertise that would be highly beneficial in managing the construction process. Kennedy Center officials are now working to address these challenges. Although making improvements in these areas is no guarantee of project success, these types of improvements would strengthen the construction program and reduce risk by providing greater effectiveness in managing and overseeing projects and measuring results.
gao_GAO-05-616T	gao_GAO-05-616T_0	Effective performance management systems first align leadership’s performance expectations, appraisals, and pay with organizational goals and results achieved, then cascade this approach through all levels in the organization. Some Agencies May Face a Challenge in Meeting Criteria for Qualifying for the New Executive Pay Flexibilities The criteria that OPM has developed to assess agencies’ performance management systems are consistent with our research wherein we identified a set of key practices for effective performance management: aligning individual performance expectations with organizational goals, connecting performance expectations to crosscutting goals, providing and routinely using performance information to track requiring follow-up actions to address organizational priorities, using competencies to provide a fuller assessment of performance, linking pay to individual and organizational performance, making meaningful distinctions in performance, involving employees and stakeholders to gain ownership of performance management systems, and maintaining continuity during transitions. The Chief Human Capital Officers Have the Potential to More Strategically Implement Flexibilities and Leverage Best Practices among Agencies The success agencies have in implementing new human capital flexibilities will depend in large measure on their agency leadership, the existence of high quality Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs), and a strategic and effective CHCO Council. As just one illustration of the importance of their leadership and coordination roles, OPM agreed with our May 2003 recommendation to work with and through the Council to (1) more thoroughly research, compile, and analyze information on the effective and innovative use of human capital flexibilities and (2) more fully serve as a clearinghouse in sharing and distributing information about when, where, and how the broad range of flexibilities are being used, and should be used, to help agencies meet their human capital management needs. Strategic Human Capital Planning Can Help Agencies Take Advantage of Human Capital Flexibilities but Remains a Continuing Challenge An essential element in the institutional infrastructure that agencies need for their human capital management is a human capital planning process that ensures that an agency will capitalize on its workforce’s strengths and target the use of its flexibilities. We have continued to report opportunities for various agencies to improve the state of their human capital planning. While agencies’ approaches to workforce planning will vary, GAO identified five key principles that this planning should consistently address: Involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the strategic workforce plan. Figure 1 illustrates a model strategic human capital planning process that can help to inform agencies’ efforts to define their workforces of the future. Congress, OPM, and agencies have all undertaken efforts to help improve the process. Agencies cited a number of barriers to using these flexibilities, including a lack of policy and guidance on these tools. GAO’s Experiences with Human Capital Reform GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. We believe that the GAO Human Capital Reform Act is well reasoned with adequate safeguards for GAO employees. A Consistent Set of Principles, Criteria, and Processes Can Help Guide Future Reforms In the future, agencies most likely will continue to request some of the flexibilities and reforms granted to agencies such as GAO, DOD, and DHS, as they strive to become higher-performing and results-based organizations. To qualify for these reforms, agencies should be able to demonstrate that they have the necessary infrastructure in place before they are authorized to implement significant human capital flexibilities and authorities. Congress has provided agencies, including DOD and DHS, with broad human capital authorities to help them with their transformations. Agencies are taking advantage of these provided flexibilities but continue to face some barriers. Agencies will need to continue implementing these tools, evaluating the results achieved, and adjusting implementation, especially if they are to use their resources most wisely in a fiscally constrained environment. The Subcommittee’s and Congress’ interest in monitoring agencies’ progress with these new human capital tools and willingness to adjust and support them are a critical ingredient to success. Finally, in granting these, or more comprehensive governmentwide reforms, we have offered Congress a framework, a set of consistent principles, criteria, and processes to consider as it designs the federal human capital system for the 21st century.	Why GAO Did This Study Strategic human capital is the centerpiece of agencies' efforts to transform into high-performing organizations poised to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Congress, recognizing that the federal human capital management systems designed in the past are outmoded, has provided agencies with exemptions from the old rules and new flexibilities to more strategically manage their workforce. Congress has already granted statutory exemptions and new authorities affecting more than 1.2 million civilian federal employees. The momentum is building to continue to reform the policies, processes, and systems that govern federal human capital management. Congress is interested in taking stock of how agencies have implemented the new flexibilities they have been granted, especially as it considers the future steps to be taken to achieve human capital reform. At the request of Congress, this statement provides an update of GAO's work on the progress agencies have made in implementing these flexibilities to better accomplish their missions and achieve their goals. In addition, it provides information on GAO's experiences with human capital reform and also highlights a set of consistent principles, criteria, and processes that can help to guide future reforms, whether they are new flexibilities granted to individual agencies or applied governmentwide. What GAO Found To take full advantage of the flexibilities provided, agencies need leaders committed to taking a more strategic approach to managing their people in order to improve mission results, and must have the necessary infrastructure in place to make effective use of the flexibilities. This infrastructure includes a human capital planning process that integrates human capital policies, strategies, and programs with its program goals, mission, and desired outcomes; the capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital system; and importantly, the existence of a modern, effective, and credible performance management system that includes adequate safeguards to help ensure consistency. GAO's work shows that, to date, agencies are using the flexibilities to varying degrees but continue to face barriers. In the future, agencies should have to demonstrate they have the required infrastructure and safeguards in place before using any new human capital authorities. Accountable Leadership: Effective performance management systems first align leadership's performance expectations, appraisal systems, and compensation programs with organizational goals and results, then cascade this approach through all levels in the organization. Accordingly, agencies now have authority to increase senior executive pay levels, but only if they have an effective performance management system--one that links individual and organizational results and makes meaningful distinctions in performance. Recent data show, however, that agencies face a challenge in meeting the criteria for qualifying for the new executive pay flexibilities. GAO also continues to see opportunities for Chief Human Capital Officers and their Council to help agencies better implement various flexibilities and share best practices, while providing strategic leadership for reform. Strategic human capital planning: Identifying current and future workforce gaps and ways to use flexibilities to fill them would help agencies remain competitive and achieve their missions. Some agencies do not have all the components of a strategic human capital planning process in place to help them resolve workforce challenges. GAO identified five key principles that could help guide and inform agencies' efforts to build this process. Capabilities to use new tools: Agencies have not used some of the flexibilities designed to help them recruit and hire top talent as much as possible because of a lack of policy and guidance, among other things. OPM has since reported taking a number of initiatives to better educate agencies on the tools and encourage their use. Agencies need to continue implementing new tools, evaluating their impact, and making adjustments. Congress' interest in monitoring agency progress is a critical ingredient to the success of these reforms.
gao_GAO-16-240	gao_GAO-16-240_0	NMB Has Made Progress, but Has Not Yet Fully Implemented GAO’s 2013 Recommendations NMB has made some progress in implementing each of the seven recommendations we made in December 2013. NMB Has Not Established Procurement Policies and Processes That Reflect Its New Procurement Environment NMB is following key procurement practices in 2 of 3 areas that our prior work on assessing the acquisition function at federal agencies identified as promoting agencies’ efficient, effective, and accountable procurement functions—organizational alignment and leadership; and knowledge and information management. However, additional actions are needed to fully respond to those recommendations. Without fully implementing these recommendations, NMB cannot ensure that its limited resources are effectively targeted toward its highest priorities. Moreover, it may be missing opportunities to improve performance and mitigate risks in its program and management areas. NMB agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement policies and processes to reflect the agency’s current procurement environment and indicated it is taking steps to do so. However, because NMB’s interagency agreement with the Fiscal Service for performance of certain procurement functions does not absolve NMB of its responsibility to develop policies and processes as called for by internal control standards and best practice, NMB must develop its own set of complementary policies and processes to ensure the agency meets its needs through efficient, effective, and accountable procurement functions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 included a provision for us to evaluate and audit the programs, operations, and activities of the National Mediation Board (NMB) every 2 years. Our first report was issued in December 2013. This is the second review of NMB and this report examines the extent to which NMB: 1. has implemented each of our December 2013 recommendations, and 2. has incorporated key procurement practices. To address our research objectives, we reviewed key NMB documents and compared those documents with relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance, and related leading practices identified in our previous work (see table 3). We interviewed NMB officials and current board members.	Why GAO Did This Study NMB was established under the Railway Labor Act to facilitate labor relations for railroads and airlines by mediating and arbitrating labor disputes and overseeing union elections. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 included a provision for GAO to evaluate NMB programs and activities every 2 years. GAO's first report under this provision, issued in December 2013, included seven recommendations for NMB based on assessments of policies and processes in several management and program areas. This second report examines the extent to which NMB has 1) implemented recommendations made by GAO in December 2013, and 2) incorporated key procurement practices. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and NMB documents, such as its strategic and workforce plans; and contracting data for fiscal years 2014-2015; and interviewed NMB officials. What GAO Found The National Mediation Board (NMB) has made some progress in addressing the seven recommendations GAO made in December 2013; however, additional actions are needed to fully implement those recommendations and strengthen operations (see table). Without full implementation, NMB lacks reasonable assurance that its limited resources are effectively targeted and may be missing opportunities to improve performance and mitigate risks in program and management areas. Source: GAO analysis of NMB documents and interviews with officials. \| GAO-16-240 NMB is following some key procurement practices that GAO has identified in prior work. However, NMB has not developed and implemented written policies and processes—consistent with internal control standards and best practice—that reflect its new interagency agreement with the Department of the Treasury for the performance of certain procurement functions. Without this documentation NMB cannot ensure the use of consistent processes in its new procurement environment. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that NMB develop and implement written policies and processes to reflect its current procurement environment. NMB agreed with the recommendation and indicated it would take steps to implement it.
gao_GAO-01-354	gao_GAO-01-354_0	For fiscal years 1992 through 2000, the United States has obligated at least $216 million in assistance to help establish the rule of law in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. However, U.S. efforts we reviewed to help retool the judiciary have had limited impact so far. Limits on Impact and Sustainability Stem From Political, Economic, and Program Management Issues Three factors have constrained the impact and sustainability of U.S. rule of law assistance: (1) a limited political consensus on the need to reform law and institutions, (2) a shortage of domestic resources to finance many of the reforms on a large scale, and (3) a number of shortcomings in U.S. program management. Conclusions The U.S. government’s rule of law assistance program is a key element of the U.S. foreign policy objectives of fostering democratic and open market systems in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. After nearly a decade of effort and more than $200 million worth of assistance, the program has had difficulty fostering the sustainable institutions and traditions necessary to establish the rule of law in this region.	Why GAO Did This Study For fiscal years 1992 through 2000, the U.S. government provided assistance to help the 12 newly independent states of the former Soviet Union develop the sustainable institutions, traditions, and legal foundations that ensure a strong rule of law. This report (1) assesses the extent to which the program has had an impact on the development of the rule of law and whether the program results are sustainable and (2) analyzes the factors that may have affected the program's impact and sustainability. What GAO Found GAO found that the U.S. government's rule of law assistance program has had limited impact so far, and results may not be sustainable in many cases. The impact and sustainability of the U.S. rule of law assistance programs have been constrained by several factors, including limited political consensus on reforms, a shortage of domestic resources for many of the more expensive innovations, and weaknesses in the design and management of assistance programs by U.S. agencies.
gao_GAO-08-1176T	gao_GAO-08-1176T_0	Medicaid, a joint federal and state program that provides health care coverage for low-income individuals and families; pregnant women; and aged, blind, and disabled people, provided health coverage for an estimated 20.1 million children aged 2 through 18 in federal fiscal year 2005. Dental Disease and Inadequate Receipt of Dental Care Remain Significant Problems for Children in Medicaid Children in Medicaid aged 2 through 18 often experience dental disease and often do not receive needed dental care, and although receipt of dental care has improved somewhat in recent years, the extent of dental disease for most age groups has not. Information from NHANES surveys from 1999 through 2004 showed that about one in three children ages 2 through 18 in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay, and one in nine had untreated decay in three or more teeth. Compared to children with private health insurance, children in Medicaid were substantially more likely to have untreated tooth decay and to be in urgent need of dental care. Children in Medicaid also fared poorly when compared to national benchmarks, as the percentage of children in Medicaid ages 2 through 18 who received any dental care— 37 percent—was far below the Healthy People 2010 target of having 66 percent of low-income children under age 19 receive a preventive dental service. National Survey Data from 1999 through 2004 Show That One in Three Children in Medicaid Had Untreated Tooth Decay Dental disease is a common problem for children aged 2 through 18 enrolled in Medicaid, according to national survey data (see fig. Projecting these proportions to 2005 enrollment levels, we estimate that 12.6 million children in Medicaid have not seen a dentist in the previous year. Survey data also showed that about one in eight children (13 percent) in Medicaid reportedly never see a dentist. 5.) In contrast, about 40 percent of children with private insurance had a sealant. Comparison of Past and Recent Survey Data Suggests That the Rate of Dental Disease in Children in Medicaid Is Not Decreasing, although the Receipt of Dental Care Has Improved Somewhat in More Recent Years While comparisons of past and more recent survey data suggest that a larger proportion of children in Medicaid had received dental care in recent surveys, the extent that children in Medicaid experience dental disease has not decreased. This increase appears to be driven by younger children, as the 2 through 5 age group had substantially higher rates of dental disease in the more recent time period, 1999 through 2004. Data for adolescents, by contrast, suggest declining rates of tooth decay. Almost 82 percent of adolescents aged 16 through 18 in Medicaid had experienced tooth decay in the earlier time period, compared to 75 percent in the latter time period (although this change was not statistically significant). At the same time, indicators of receipt of dental care, including the proportion of children who had received dental care in the past year and use of sealants, have shown some improvement. This change was statistically significant. Concluding Observations The information provided by nationally representative surveys regarding the oral health of our nation’s low-income children in Medicaid raises serious concerns. Related GAO Products Medicaid: Extent of Dental Disease in Children Has Not Decreased, and Millions Are Estimated to Have Untreated Tooth Decay. GAO-08-1121.	Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, concerns have been raised about the adequacy of dental care for low-income children. Attention to this subject became more acute due to the widely publicized case of Deamonte Driver, a 12-year-old boy who died as a result of an untreated infected tooth that led to a fatal brain infection. Deamonte had health coverage through Medicaid, a joint federal and state program that provides health care coverage, including dental care, for millions of low-income children. Deamonte had extensive dental disease and his family was unable to find a dentist to treat him. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which children in Medicaid experience dental disease, the extent to which they receive dental care, and how these conditions have changed over time. To examine these indicators of oral health, GAO analyzed data, by insurance status, from two nationally representative surveys of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). This statement summarizes the resulting report being released today, Medicaid: Extent of Dental Disease in Children Has Not Decreased, and Millions Are Estimated to Have Untreated Tooth Decay (GAO-08-1121). In commenting on a draft of the report, HHS acknowledged the challenge of providing dental services to children in Medicaid, and cited the agency's related activities. What GAO Found Dental disease remains a significant problem for children aged 2 through 18 in Medicaid. Nationally representative data from the 1999 through 2004 NHANES surveys--which collected information about oral health through direct examinations--indicate that about one in three children in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay, and one in nine had untreated decay in three or more teeth. Projected to 2005 enrollment levels, GAO estimates that 6.5 million children aged 2 through 18 in Medicaid had untreated tooth decay. Children in Medicaid remain at higher risk of dental disease compared to children with private health insurance; children in Medicaid were almost twice as likely to have untreated tooth decay. Receipt of dental care also remains a concern for children aged 2 through 18 in Medicaid. Nationally representative data from the 2004 through 2005 MEPS survey--which asks participants about the receipt of dental care for household members--indicate that only one in three children in Medicaid ages 2 through 18 had received dental care in the year prior to the survey. Similarly, about one in eight children reportedly never sees a dentist. More than half of children with private health insurance, by contrast, had received dental care in the prior year. Children in Medicaid also fared poorly when compared to national benchmarks, as the percentage of children in Medicaid who received any dental care--37 percent--was far below the Healthy People 2010 target of having 66 percent of low-income children under age 19 receive a preventive dental service. Survey data on Medicaid children's receipt of dental care showed some improvement; for example, use of sealants went up significantly between the 1988 through 1994 and 1999 through 2004 time periods. Rates of dental disease, however, did not decrease, although the data suggest the trends vary somewhat among different age groups. Younger children in Medicaid--those aged 2 through 5--had statistically significant higher rates of dental disease in the more recent time period as compared to earlier surveys. By contrast, data for Medicaid adolescents aged 16 through 18 show declining rates of tooth decay, although the change was not statistically significant.
gao_GAO-11-355	gao_GAO-11-355_0	And while CENTCOM Contracting Command officials have stated that vetting additional prospective vendors would more fully address potential risks, they have expressed concern that available vetting cell capacity may not be able to accommodate a large increase should vendors below the threshold be included. As with the dollar threshold, CENTCOM officials stated that while the vendor vetting cell contract does not specifically preclude officials from submitting subcontractors to be vetted, the cell was not designed, in terms of its number of staff, to vet subcontractors. As of April 2011 CENTCOM Contracting Command has not determined how many of the remaining non-U.S. vendors that have already been awarded contracts valued above $100,000 will be vetted in the future, a timeline for when it will begin vetting vendors prior to award, or an estimate number of anticipated prospective vendors that will be vetted for the remainder of the fiscal year. Implementing Partners in Afghanistan, Though Details of the Process Have Not Been Finalized In January 2011, in order to counter potential risks of U.S. funds being diverted to support criminal or insurgent activity, USAID created a process for vetting prospective non-U.S. contract and assistance recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan, which is similar to a vetting process it has used in the West Bank and Gaza since 2006. However, USAID officials indicated that the agency’s vendor vetting process was still in the early stages, and it is expected to be an iterative implementation process—aspects of which could change, such as the vetting threshold and expanding vetting to other non-U.S. partners. While State does not have a vendor vetting program, in 2008 State issued a cable that applies to both State and USAID, requiring personnel to complete a terrorist financing risk assessment for any new program or activity prior to requesting or obligating program funds. Periodic updates to the risk assessment are also completed for ongoing programs and activities, though these do not examine vendors against the same information as the CENTCOM or USAID vetting cells. Further, according to USAID officials, sharing vendor vetting results would greatly assist the agency’s efforts to ensure that it is not conducting business with known malign actors in Afghanistan. Without documented, formalized procedures, DOD and USAID cannot ensure that their current information-sharing practices will endure. While State has not yet developed a specific vendor vetting process, given the number of non-U.S. vendors it currently uses, and as it goes forward with implementing Afghan First, the need to vet these vendors may become more acute in order to mitigate the risk of contracting with these vendors. Recommendations for Executive Action To safeguard U.S. personnel against security risks and help ensure that resources are not used to support insurgent or criminal groups, we recommend that the Commander of U.S. Central Command direct CENTCOM Contracting Command to consider formalizing a risk-based approach to enable the department to identify and vet the highest-risk vendors—including those vendors with contracts below the $100,000 threshold—as well as subcontractors and work with the vendor vetting cell to clearly identify the resources and personnel needed to meet the demand for vendor vetting in Afghanistan using a risk-based approach. State partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary direct the appropriate bureaus to assess the need and develop possible options to vet non-U.S. vendors. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States, we initiated a review to identify what efforts, if any, are under way to ensure that U.S. contracting funds or resources are not diverted to support corruption or insurgent organizations. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has established a process to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, both to ensure that resources are not used to support insurgent or criminal groups and to safeguard U.S. personnel and assets against security risks; (2) the extent to which the Department of State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have established processes to vet non-U.S. vendors and other assistance recipients in Afghanistan; and (3) the extent to which vetting information is shared among DOD, State, and USAID. To identify and examine the efforts DOD has taken to vet non-U.S vendors in Afghanistan and the extent to which State and USAID have established processes to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan and to share this vetting information, we reviewed recent DOD, State, and USAID policies and procedures, including fragmentary orders; the recently updated November 2010 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Contracting Command’s Acquisition Instruction as well as a previous version USAID’s Mission Order for Afghanistan 201.03; and an April 2010 memorandum of understanding between DOD, State, and USAID relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.	Why GAO Did This Study The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have collectively obligated billions of dollars for contracts and assistance to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. There are concerns that U.S. funds are being diverted to fund insurgent and criminal activity in Afghanistan. In light of these concerns, under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States, we initiated a review to identify DOD, State, and USAID efforts to vet non-U.S. contractors and assistance recipients in Afghanistan. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has established a process to vet non-U.S. vendors to ensure that resources are not used to support insurgents; (2) the extent to which State and USAID have established processes to vet vendors and assistance recipients; and (3) the extent to which vetting information is shared among DOD, State, and USAID. GAO reviewed documents and met with a variety of agency officials to address the report's objectives. What GAO Found While DOD's U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has established a vetting cell to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan to minimize the risk of insurgents or criminal groups using contracts to fund their operations, its current approach for selecting vendors to vet has gaps. For example, vendors with contracts below $100,000 are not routinely vetted. In fiscal year 2010 around three-quarters of the command's new contracts with non-U.S. vendors were below $100,000. Subcontractors are also not routinely vetted. Command officials stated that CENTCOM uses other risk factors to prioritize vendors to vet, such as contracts performed in Taliban strongholds, but these factors have not been documented. While officials stated that the vetting cell was created to vet vendors prior to award, CENTCOM is largely vetting vendors with existing contracts, which means it is likely that there are a large number of new vendors that have not been vetted prior to award and may have to be vetted in the future. Also, the vetting effort now includes some U.S. Army Corps of Engineers vendors. However, the vetting cell was not staffed to accommodate this workload, so it is uncertain how its existing resources will be able to vet vendors in a timely manner. Without accurately defining the universe of contracts that may need to be vetted, adopting a formal risk-based approach that incorporates other risk factors to identify non-U.S. vendors that pose the highest risk, and identifying the resources needed to accomplish this, it is uncertain how the vetting cell will be able to meet the additional workload and achieve its goals. In January 2011, USAID created a process intended to vet non-U.S. implementing partners in Afghanistan; however, this process may face similar limitations as CENTCOM's. According to USAID officials, this decision was based on the urgent need to mitigate the risks of USAID funds being diverted to insurgent groups. While USAID's process is in the early stages, it proposes to vet non-U.S. implementing partners and at least first-tier subcontractors with contracts valued at $150,000 or more. USAID officials said that they are considering changing the dollar threshold or vetting other potential assistance recipients based on risk; however, the available documentation does not include other risk factors. As of March 2011, State had not developed a process to vet contractor firms in Afghanistan. Since 2008, State has required that a terrorist financing risk assessment be completed for any new program or activity prior to a request for or obligation of funding. However, it does not use the same information as the CENTCOM or USAID vetting cells. Additionally, its use of Afghan vendors may increase under the Afghan First policy. Absent a way to consider the risk posed by non-U.S. vendors, State may not be well prepared to assess the potential for its funds to be diverted to criminal or insurgent groups. DOD and USAID share vetting information informally, but without a formal mechanism to share vetting results the two agencies cannot ensure that their current practices will endure. Further, as State expands its use of local contractors, it will become imperative that it is part of the data sharing with DOD and USAID. What GAO Recommends GAO is making recommendations related to improving DOD's and USAID's vetting processes and information sharing. GAO is also recommending that State assess the need for and possible options to vet non-U.S. vendors. DOD and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations. State generally concurred.
gao_GAO-13-310	gao_GAO-13-310_0	The primary agencies providing assistance to Yemen in support of the U.S. strategy are State, DOD, and USAID. The three U.S. assistance programs in Yemen receiving the largest amount of allocated funds over the last 6 fiscal years are USAID’s FFP program, which provides emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, which provide Yemeni security forces with training and equipment for counterterrorism operations. Progress toward U.S. Strategic Goals for Yemen Has Been Mixed Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed, according to agency officials, agency documents, and international organizations. However, the national dialogue conference—a key step in the transition process—has been delayed from November 2012 to March 2013. The security situation in Yemen has improved in some respects, but remains unstable. While USAID data indicate that, between fiscal years 2008 and 2011, FFP exceeded annual performance targets three times for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food donations, reports to Congress about the program have lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency.1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has cited security concerns in Yemen as preventing it from evaluating the programs’ progress in building With regard to Section Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. Consequently, limited information exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these assistance programs and making future funding decisions. In April 2010, we found that DOD had not evaluated the effectiveness of its global Section 1206 program and recommended that DOD develop a plan to monitor and evaluate Section 1206 project outcomes. Security Conditions and Political Divisions in Yemen Challenge U.S. Assistance Efforts U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen face two significant types of challenges.complicated U.S. efforts to train and assess the capability of Yemeni security forces, restricted oversight of civilian assistance projects, and endangered Yemeni staff who play a key role in providing assistance. Second, because of political divisions within the Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemen’s security. However, these officials stated that no DOD personnel have been embedded with Yemeni security forces since 2011. According to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government have addressed some of these challenges. Conclusions AQAP terrorists based in Yemen are a continuing national security threat to the United States—a threat exacerbated by Yemen’s fragile economic, social, and political situation. DOD concurred with our recommendations to collect and analyze available data on the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To determine the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, we reviewed relevant documents from the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), including strategy and planning documents, fact sheets, and progress reporting. To assess the extent of progress made by USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP) program and DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen, we analyzed funding data on all U.S. assistance activities in Yemen to determine allocations for these civilian and security assistance programs in Yemen since fiscal year 2007. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen, we also conducted fieldwork in Sana’a, Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with State, DOD, and USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and representatives of the Yemeni Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning and International Cooperation. 2.	Why GAO Did This Study The terrorist group AQAP, one of the top threats to U.S. national security, is based in Yemena country facing serious economic and social challenges and undergoing a difficult political transition following civil unrest in 2011. Since 2007, State, DOD, and USAID have allocated over $1 billion in assistance to help Yemen counter AQAP and address other challenges. The three largest U.S. assistance programs in Yemen are USAIDs Food for Peace program, which has provided emergency food aid, and DODs Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, which have provided training and equipment to Yemeni security forces. In response to a Senate report that directed GAO to review U.S. assistance to Yemen, and following up on GAOs February 2012 report on the types and amounts of such assistance, GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by the Food for Peace and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners in Washington, D.C., and Sanaa, Yemen. What GAO Found Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed. The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have conducted numerous civilian and security assistance activities in support of these strategic goals. Although some progress has been made since the civil unrest in 2011, obstacles remain to achieving each goal. For example, while there has been an orderly political transition to a new president, key milestonessuch as convening a national dialogue to promote reconciliationhave been delayed. In addition, while Yemeni security forces have retaken territory seized by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011, the security situation remains unstable. USAID data indicate that the Food for Peace program exceeded most of its annual targets between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food donations. However, reports to Congress about the program have lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency. With regard to the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has developed an evaluation process to assess the programs effectiveness but has not conducted an evaluation in Yemen, citing security concerns. Consequently, limited information exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these assistance programs and making future funding decisions. Security conditions and political divisions in Yemen pose key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. First, Yemens unstable security situation constrains U.S. training of Yemeni security forces, restricts oversight of civilian assistance projects, and endangers Yemeni nationals who work for the United States. For example, a Yemeni employee of the U.S. embassy was murdered in October 2012, and other Yemeni staff at the embassy, as well as their families, face threats. Second, because of leadership and coordination challenges within the Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemens security. However, according to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government to replace key leaders of security force units and reorganize security ministries have addressed some of these challenges. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that USAID improve performance reporting on Food for Peace efforts in Yemen and that DOD collect and analyze data on the effectiveness of the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen until security conditions permit an evaluation of these programs. USAID and DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations.
gao_GAO-16-42	gao_GAO-16-42_0	VA Identified Over $400 Million in Post-9/11 GI Bill Overpayments in Fiscal Year 2014 and Does Not Effectively Monitor These Debts One in Four Beneficiaries and 6,000 Schools Incurred Overpayments in Fiscal Year 2014, Caused Primarily by Veteran Enrollment Changes after VA’s Initial Payments VA made $416 million in Post-9/11 GI Bill overpayments in fiscal year 2014, or 4 percent of the over $10 billion in benefits paid during that period. The remaining high-dollar overpayments were caused by school reporting errors (e.g., submitting incorrect enrollment or tuition information) and VA processing errors (e.g., duplicate payments or data entry errors). VA Has $152 Million in Uncollected Overpayment Debt from Fiscal Year 2014 and an Additional $110 Million from Prior Years, Primarily Owed by Veterans VA had $262 million in outstanding Post-9/11 GI Bill overpayment debts, as of November 2014, primarily owed by veterans. Inadequate Guidance, Controls, and Training Have Limited VA’s Effectiveness in Reducing Overpayments from Enrollment Changes and School Errors VA Lacks Adequate Guidance and Controls That Could Reduce Overpayments from Enrollment Changes Despite enrollment changes being responsible for most overpayments, VA provides limited guidance to veterans about the possible consequences of enrollment changes. As a result, officials at two of the schools we interviewed said that the majority of overpayment issues arise among new student veterans who are not aware of the consequences of enrollment changes until after they have already incurred their first overpayment debt. By not providing guidance to schools about the benefits of using dual-certification, VA is missing an opportunity to reduce a potentially large number of overpayments as well as the burden placed on veterans and schools to repay those debts. In another case file review, a veteran’s enrollment changes were reported to VA 3 months after they happened. VA officials said they would like to require veterans using the Post-9/11 GI Bill to verify their monthly enrollment but would need to develop a new verification process. VA offers a variety of training opportunities for school officials, but VA officials said the agency lacks the authority to require that school certifying officials complete any of its training about how to correctly process enrollment information, despite the fact that the Post-9/11 GI Bill program is complex for schools to administer and that schools caused an estimated $28 million in high-dollar overpayments in fiscal year 2014. VA’s Notification Methods and Overpayment Calculations Hamper Its Collection Efforts VA’s Notification Methods Can Leave Veterans and Schools Unaware of Their Overpayment Debts VA relies on mailed letters to notify veterans and schools of overpayments, which can leave some veterans and schools unaware of their debts until VA begins collecting them. When veterans do not receive notification letters for their debts, they may not know they have a debt, causing them to miss key deadlines. Then, if VA begins collecting the debt by offsetting other benefits, such as monthly housing payments, veterans may be unprepared and unable to cover their expenses, potentially creating financial obstacles towards continuing their education, according to officials from veteran service organizations. This process can lead to confusion and cause delays in veterans and schools repaying their debts in a timely manner. Since VA’s overpayment calculation is crediting veterans for school days they did not attend, it is inappropriately increasing the cost of the program. For example, if VA provided more information to veterans about potential overpayment debts, veterans would better understand the financial consequences of dropping a class or withdrawing from school and could take steps to avoid some overpayments. Although VA offers online training that would address these issues, school officials are not required to take part in this minimum level of training, because VA officials believe the agency does not have the statutory authority to require them to do so. This can leave veterans unaware of their debts and create financial hardships for them when VA offsets other income sources to collect these debts. Matter for Congressional Consideration To address Post-9/11 GI Bill overpayments resulting from school errors, Congress should consider granting VA explicit authority to require a minimum level of training for appropriate school officials. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to examine: (1) what is known about the extent of Post-9/11 GI Bill overpayments and collections, and how effectively the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) monitors them, (2) the effectiveness of VA’s efforts to address the causes of overpayments, and (3) how effectively VA’s policies and procedures support the collection of overpayments. To identify the causes of overpayments, we reviewed VA’s Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment Reports and supporting documentation for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 because they are VA’s only source of generalizable data on overpayment causes.	Why GAO Did This Study VA provided $10.8 billion in Post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits to almost 800,000 veterans in fiscal year 2014. GAO was asked to review overpayments for the program, which can create financial hardships for veterans who are generally required to pay them back and which can result in a significant loss of taxpayer dollars if they are not collected. This report examines (1) the extent of overpayments, (2) how effectively VA has addressed their causes, and (3) the effectiveness of VA's collection efforts. GAO analyzed overpayment data for fiscal years 2013 and 2014, examined the causes from a generalizable sample of high-dollar overpayments (greater than $1,667), conducted a case file review of 20 overpayments (selected for a variety of causes), and reviewed VA's monitoring of overpayments. GAO also interviewed senior and frontline staff at two VA offices that process claims and collect debts, officials at nine schools (selected for variation in program length and their status as public, nonprofit, and for-profit), higher education associations, and veteran service organizations. What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) identified $416 million in Post-9/11 GI Bill overpayments in fiscal year 2014, affecting approximately one in four veteran beneficiaries and about 6,000 schools. Overpayments most often occur when VA pays benefits based on a student's enrollment at the beginning of the school term and the student later drops one or more classes (or withdraws from school altogether). Students therefore receive benefits for classes they did not complete, and the “overpayment” must be paid back to VA. A small percentage of overpayments occurred because of school reporting or VA processing errors. GAO found that most overpayments were collected quickly, but as of November 2014 (when VA provided these data to GAO), VA was still collecting $152 million in overpayments from fiscal year 2014, and an additional $110 million from prior years, primarily owed by veterans with the remainder owed by schools. Inadequate guidance, processes, and training have limited VA's efforts to reduce overpayments caused by enrollment changes and school errors. Guidance for veterans. Many veterans may not realize they can incur overpayments as a result of enrollment changes because VA provides limited guidance to veterans on its policies. As a result, veterans may be unaware of the consequences of enrollment changes until after they have already incurred their first overpayment debt, according to school officials. Because VA is not effectively communicating its program policies to veterans, some veterans may be incurring debts that they could have otherwise avoided. Enrollment verification process. While veterans using other VA education programs have to verify their enrollment each month, VA generally does not require those using the Post-9/11 GI Bill to do so. By not requiring veterans to verify their enrollment every month, which can cause significant time to lapse between when veterans drop courses and when this is reported, VA's process allows veterans to incur thousands of dollars in overpayments and also increases the program's costs associated with collecting these debts. Training for school officials. Overpayments also occur when schools make errors, such as reporting enrollment information incorrectly, which VA officials said is sometimes attributable to a lack of training. For example, some school officials routinely made systematic errors reporting enrollment information, creating thousands of dollars in overpayments. Not all school officials attend the different training opportunities VA offers and VA officials said the agency lacks the authority to require school officials to participate in any of them. VA officials said they would like school officials to take a minimum level of training, which could help reduce errors and related overpayments. The effectiveness of VA's collection efforts is hindered by its notification methods. VA relies solely on paper mail to notify schools and veterans of overpayments. VA generally sends veterans' notices to the addresses from veterans' initial benefit applications. However, these addresses can often be out-of-date, so some veterans do not receive the letters, leaving them unaware of their debts. This can cause veterans to unknowingly miss deadlines for disputing their debts and leave them unprepared to cover living expenses if VA begins withholding future benefit payments or offsetting tax returns for collection. This can also lead to delays in the collection of overpayments from veterans. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider granting VA explicit authority to require training for school officials. In addition, GAO is making a number of recommendations to improve VA's guidance and processes, including providing program guidance to veterans, verifying veterans' monthly enrollment, and developing additional debt notification methods. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations to the agency and plans to address these issues.
gao_GAO-01-306	gao_GAO-01-306_0	Conclusions A number of serious control weaknesses in IRS’ electronic filing systems placed personal taxpayer data in IRS’ electronic filing systems at significant risk of unauthorized disclosure, use, and modification during last year’s tax filing season. IRS recognized the importance of promptly addressing these weaknesses and stated that it has taken steps to correct them prior to the current tax filing season. Ensuring that ongoing controls over electronic filing are effective requires top-management support and leadership, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight. IRS’ efforts to achieve the goal that 80 percent of all tax and information returns be filed electronically by 2007 must be balanced with the need to adequately ensure the security, privacy, and reliability of taxpayer and other sensitive information. Failure to maintain adequate security over IRS’ electronic filing systems could erode public confidence in electronically filing tax returns, jeopardize IRS’ ability to meet the 80 percent goal, and deprive IRS of the many benefits that electronic filing offers.	What GAO Found A number of serious control weaknesses in the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) electronic filing systems placed personal taxpayer data in IRS' electronic filing system at significant risk of unauthorized disclosure, use, and modification during the 2000 tax filing season. IRS recognized the importance of promptly addressing these weaknesses and stated that it has taken steps to correct them prior to the current tax filing season. Ensuring that ongoing controls over electronic filing are effective requires top-management support and leadership, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight. IRS' efforts to achieve the goal that 80 percent of all tax and information returns be filed electronically by 2007 must be balanced with the need to adequately ensure the security, privacy, and reliability of taxpayer and other sensitive information. Failure to maintain adequate security over IRS' electronic filing systems could erode public confidence in electronically filing tax returns, jeopardize IRS' ability to meet the 80 percent goal, and deprive IRS of the many benefits that electronic filing offers.
gao_NSIAD-96-129	gao_NSIAD-96-129_0	As of September 30, 1994, the total stockpile of usable and unusable ammunition was worth about $80 billion. This excess amount includes about $22 billion worth of ammunition that was still usable. While there are shortages of some specific ammunition types, overall, the services generally have enough ammunition to meet their wartime and peacetime requirements. Moreover, in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, the services spent about $125 million for ammunition that exceeded fiscal year 1995 stated requirements. 2.1). Services Store Ammunition for Weapon Systems No Longer in Their Inventories Ammunition is being stored and managed for weapon systems that either have been purged or are no longer in the active inventory. Problems With Ammunition Stockpile Management Threaten Readiness, and the Single Manager’s Plan for Improvement Has Been Delayed Increases in the wholesale ammunition stockpile due to returns of massive amounts of munitions from Europe and Operation Desert Storm, combined with a decrease in the wholesale stockpile’s workforce, have created a situation that could, if allowed to continue, degrade the forces’ readiness to meet wartime and peacetime needs. Condition of the Stockpile Is Significantly Impaired Because of the vast influx of ammunition from overseas in recent years and decreases in storage space, funding, and staff, the ability of the single manager to manage the stockpile has been taxed. 3.1). 3.5). 3.6). 3.7). 3.8). This $31 billion of usable and unusable ammunition, as well as $2.9 billion of excess ammunition that was on the single manager’s inventory records but not the services’ inventory records, was being treated by the single manager as necessary to meet requirements. Possible changes in ammunition management, include requiring the services to pay the single manager a fee for storing their ammunition; using excess ammunition in training; authorizing the single manager to own, manage, and control the wholesale stockpile and/or have visibility of the services’ retail stocks and total requirements so the manager can identify ammunition excess to stated requirements and coordinate redistribution of it to services that need the ammunition or dispose of it; and requiring the services to include the cost to dispose of excess ammunition in their budgets for new ammunition.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Department of Defense's (DOD) ammunition stockpile, focusing on: (1) the amount of excess ammunition in the stockpile; and (2) problems related to the stockpile's management. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) of the $80 billion in usable and unusable ammunition as of September 1994, about $31 billion was excess ammunition and about $22 billion was ammunition that was still usable; (2) the excess in usable ammunition is primarily due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and reduced U.S. military requirements; (3) while shortages of some specific ammunition types exist, the services generally have inventories that exceed their wartime and peacetime requirements; (4) in 1993 and 1994, the services spent about $125 million for ammunition that exceeded their fiscal year 1995 requirements; (5) the services have stored and continue to manage significant amounts of ammunition for weapons that are no longer in the active inventory; (6) increases in the ammunition stockpile and decreases in budget, workforce, and storage space could degrade the forces' readiness to meet wartime and peacetime needs; (7) DOD has not been able to conduct adequate ammunition testing and inspections to ensure the stockpile's usability and readiness; (8) DOD does not know the extent of excess ammunition stored at the services facilities; and (9) the ammunition stockpile will continue to grow until the services are given incentives to relinquish ownership of the ammunition and the single manager is provided with the funding and information necessary to expedite ammunition disposal.
gao_HEHS-96-21	gao_HEHS-96-21_0	HMO enrollment is further concentrated in urban areas. Although the HMO share nationwide is small, recent HMO enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries has grown rapidly. 2.) 3.) HMO Rate-Setting Methodology Thwarts Medicare’s Efforts to Realize Savings Our work suggests that Medicare’s HMO rate-setting methodology does not maximize the potential of managed care to yield cost savings and, in some cases, can even discourage HMO participation in the program. By linking HMO payments to Medicare costs in the fee-for-service sector, the current methodology causes three problems. This risk adjustment is inadequate, however, because it does not specifically adjust for the health status of enrollees. In our view, HCFA could generate the most Medicare savings if it would pursue strategies in all three categories concurrently. Competitive bidding, rate negotiation, and beneficiary incentive approaches have been used successfully in other public health insurance programs. HCFA Plans Tests of HMO Payment Reforms HCFA is planning to conduct demonstration projects to examine several proposals for modifying or replacing the current method of determining payment rates to HMOs. A sensible approach would be to pursue three promising strategies concurrently—foster price competition among HMOs, improve risk adjusters’ accuracy, and allow for adjustments in the current formula to reflect market competition and HMOs’ local health care costs. Matters for Consideration In light of the increasingly urgent need to realize savings from the Medicare HMO program and to develop viable new methods of paying HMOs, Congress may wish to consider giving the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services authority to selectively reduce Medicare HMO payment rates (the AAPCC rate) in areas where market data indicate that the Medicare rates are too high and expand HCFA’s authority to mandate HMO participation in demonstration projects in order to conduct more meaningful studies of alternative payment methods. Medicare: Increase in HMO Reimbursement Would Eliminate Potential Savings (GAO/HRD-90-38, Nov. 1, 1989). Medicare: Reasonableness of Health Maintenance Organization Payments Not Assured (GAO/HRD-89-41, Mar.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicare payments to health maintenance organizations (HMO), focusing on: (1) current trends in Medicare beneficiary enrollment in HMO; (2) flaws in Medicare's rate-setting method that prevent it from realizing potential savings from HMO; and (3) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) efforts to test HMO payment reforms. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) since 1993, the annual increase in Medicare beneficiary HMO enrollment has exceeded 20 percent; (2) HMO enrollment increases have been concentrated in 15 states; (3) Medicare links HMO payment rates to the average cost of fee-for-service care and fails to adjust HMO payment rates to reflect beneficiaries' health status or local differences in utilization rates; (4) strategies to improve Medicare HMO payments include giving HCFA new authority to use competitive bidding or to negotiate with HMO, modifying the HMO rate-setting formula to include a health status risk adjuster, and requiring larger discounts from HMO in areas where HMO payment rates are too high; (5) HCFA could generate the most savings if it combines all three cost-reduction strategies and tailors the strategy to local conditions; and (6) although HCFA is planning demonstration projects using competitive bidding and improved risk adjustments, HCFA needs to gather and use available data to adjust HMO payments.
gao_GAO-08-401	gao_GAO-08-401_0	Background One of the functions of the Reserve Banks is to fulfill the coin demand of the nation’s depository institutions—which include commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions—by distributing coin inventories stored in the Reserve Banks’ vaults and at coin terminals, including circulated coins and new coins ordered from the U.S. Mint. The Reserve Banks’ Process for Ordering and Distributing Coins Uses New Coins, Coin Inventories, and Coin Transfers to Meet Demand The Reserve Banks’ process for ordering and distributing coins uses orders of new coins from the U.S. Mint, the Reserve Bank offices’ coin inventories, and transfers of circulated coins between Reserve Bank offices to meet estimates of depository institutions’ demand. These estimates are based on coin demand forecasts generated by a forecasting tool. Postal Service’s and local transit authorities’ use of coins also affect coin demand. CPO officials noted that using circulated inventory rather than purchasing new coins reduces the number of new coins that the U.S. Mint produces and the Mint’s costs of production. Our analysis of Reserve Banks’ order data shows that CPO reduced orders by about 10 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 by fulfilling Reserve Bank offices’ coin requests with circulated inventory. To increase the efficiency of the distribution process, CPO has received approval from the Reserve Banks to centralize the development and placement of coin orders, and CPO will be responsible for ensuring that the offices maintain appropriate inventory levels. The Reserve Banks’ Ordering and Distribution Process Has Met Demand for Coins The Reserve Banks’ process has ensured that enough coins are available through orders of new coins and the Reserve Banks’ inventories of circulated coins to meet the depository institutions’ demand for coins. In fiscal year 2001, inventory levels for all denominations increased. According to the U.S. Mint’s 2001 annual report, the economy, which is directly related to the demand for coins, took a downturn in the middle of fiscal year 2000, resulting in a decrease in coin demand and a buildup of coin inventories. Because each Reserve Bank sets its own inventory levels, the districts manage to different inventory levels and hold varying levels of inventory relative to demand. CPO and Reserve Bank officials noted that the risk of not meeting depository institutions’ demand for coins far exceeds the risk of having too many coins in inventory, as long as storage capacity exists. Producing new pennies and nickels when circulated coins could be used instead is particularly inefficient, since these denominations cost more to produce than they are worth. The Federal Reserve also provided technical comments, which we have addressed in this report as appropriate. We interviewed officials from the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors (Board), each of the 12 Reserve Bank districts, and the national Cash Product Office (CPO) to determine how coin orders are developed and submitted to the U.S. Mint. To determine the extent to which the Reserve Banks’ coin distribution process meets the depository institutions’ demand for coins throughout the country, we obtained data on the Reserve Banks coin payments to depository institutions, receipts for coins deposited by the depository institutions, orders for new coins, and inventory levels for fiscal years 1993 through 2007 for each coin denomination and for each Reserve Bank.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal Reserve Banks fulfill the coin demand of the nation's depository institutions--which include commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions--by ordering new coins from the U.S. Mint and managing coins held in inventory at the Reserve Banks and in coin terminals. Reliably estimating the demand for coins and efficiently managing the inventory of circulated coins is important to ensure that depository institutions have enough coins to meet the public's demand and to avoid unnecessary coin production costs. Since late 2006, rising metal prices have driven the costs of producing pennies and nickels above the face values of the coins. This report addresses (1) the Reserve Banks' process for ordering and distributing coins to the nation's depository institutions and (2) the extent to which this process meets depository institutions' demand for coins. GAO interviewed officials responsible for coin distribution at each of the 12 Reserve Banks and met with representatives of 4 large operators of Federal Reserve coin terminals, 2 banking associations, the U.S. Mint, and the nation's largest coin recycling company. GAO also analyzed Reserve Bank data for fiscal years 1993 through 2007. Federal Reserve and U.S. Mint officials generally agreed with GAO's findings in the report and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found The Reserve Banks' process for ordering and distributing coins uses new coins ordered from the U.S. Mint, circulated coins in inventory, and transfers of circulated coins to meet depository institutions' demand for coins. New coin orders begin each month with a recommendation generated by a forecasting tool. Each Reserve Bank office then refines this recommendation in light of its current inventory holdings and its knowledge of local factors that may affect demand, such as changes in a transit authority's use of coins. Each office next submits a request for coins to the Reserve Banks' national Cash Product Office (CPO). CPO seeks to fill the request with transfers of circulated coins from other offices before it consolidates the requests and submits a monthly order for new coins to the U.S. Mint. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, CPO used transfers to reduce its new coin orders by approximately 10 percent. The Reserve Banks' process for ordering and distributing coins has met depository institutions' demand since fiscal year 2000, but the process does not define optimal coin inventory ranges. Currently, each Reserve Bank office sets and manages its own inventory levels, resulting in varying levels of inventory held relative to demand. Overall, inventory levels for most denominations have generally been decreasing since fiscal year 2001, yet inventory levels are more likely to be high than low relative to demand, because, for the Reserve Banks, the risk of not meeting depository institutions' demand for coins far exceeds the risk of holding too many coins in inventory. However, holding coins in inventory that could be used to fulfill demand elsewhere can be inefficient, resulting in new coin production costs that could have been avoided if coins held in inventory had been used instead. To increase the efficiency of the Reserve Banks' process, CPO plans this year to begin implementing a new approach to inventory management that it piloted in 2006 and found effective. Under this approach, CPO will determine the number of circulated and new coins each district will receive monthly and will be responsible for ensuring that the Reserve Bank offices maintain appropriate inventory levels.
gao_GAO-10-361	gao_GAO-10-361_0	However, the Privacy Rule permits the use or disclosure of personal health information for treatment, payment, and other health care operations. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act The HITECH Act includes a series of privacy and security provisions that expand certain provisions under HIPAA. HIEs and Providers Describe Various Methods of Implementing Disclosure Practices The four exchanges in our case studies reported that they implement various practices to ensure appropriate disclosure of electronic personal health information for treatment purposes. Some of the providers reported that they inform patients that their electronic personal health information may be shared through a health information exchange. Additionally, providers stated that they implement practices to facilitate patients’ ability to access and request corrections to personal health information, and all the HIEs and providers described practices intended to limit the disclosure and use of information to specific purposes. By allowing access to the electronic information about patients that they have stored in their health information systems, the HIEs support the providers’ ability to provide care to new patients and to patients in emergency situations. Providers reported that they implement similar security mechanisms to protect the electronic personal health information that they store. HIEs, Providers Other Entities Reported Examples o Ways the Electroni Sharing of Health Information Has a n Positive Effect o Quality of Care Although the exchanges stated that they had not conducted formal studie of the effects of electronic sharing of personal health information on the quality of care their providers deliver, three of the HIEs repo of positive effects resulting from the services they provide. Two of these three exchanges provide a direct connection from participating hospitals to the state’s Department of Public Health for re time reporting of conditions and for supporting the early detection of disease outbreaks. According to an official with one of these exchanges, this service facilitated the state’s ability t f H1N1 more quickly than other states. A medium-sized hospital stated that information obtained through the HIE helped their emergency department physician ascertain that a patient who was requesting medication for pain had been in five area hospitals in seven nights seeking pain medication. The physician did not prescribe any pain medication for the patient. elped to eliminate duplication of exams by the health department or A large hospital from one of the exchanges reported that their cardio was able to obtain an abnormal laboratory result electronically exchange one day before they would have without using it, allowing earlier intervention for a potentially life-threatening condition. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to describe (1) the practices implemented for disclosing personal health information for purposes of treatment, including the use of electronic means for obtaining consent, as reported by selected health information exchanges, their participating providers, and other entities; and (2) the effects of the electronic sharing of health information on the quality of care for patients as reported by these organizations. To address both objectives, we conducted case studies of selected health information exchanges and their participating providers. To select the case study health information exchanges, we compiled a list of 68 health information exchanges that were reported to be operational and actively sharing data among providers. For each of the four case studies, we gathered documentation and conducted interviews with the exchanges to determine the practices they implemented for disclosing personal health information, including electronic means of obtaining consent, practices they required for participating providers, and reported effects of sharing health information electronically on the quality of care; and gathered documentation and conducted interviews with officials from selected participating providers to determine the practices they implemented as part of the health information exchange and the practices they had implemented in their own organization for disclosing personal health information.	Why GAO Did This Study To promote the use of information technology for the electronic exchange of personal health information among providers and other health care entities, Congress passed the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. It provides incentives intended to promote the widespread adoption of technology that supports the electronic sharing of data among hospitals, physicians, and other health care entities. Pursuant to a requirement in the HITECH Act, GAO is reporting on practices implemented by health information exchange organizations, providers, and other health care entities that disclose electronic personal health information. GAO's specific objectives were to describe (1) the practices implemented for disclosing personal health information for purposes of treatment, including the use of electronic means for obtaining consent, as reported by selected health information exchange organizations, their participating providers, and other entities; and (2) the effects of the electronic sharing of health information on the quality of care for patients as reported by these organizations. To address both objectives, GAO conducted case studies of 4 of more than 60 operational health information exchanges and a selection of each of the exchanges' participating providers. What GAO Found The health care entities GAO studied reported that they implement disclosure practices that reflect widely accepted practices for safeguarding personal information-the Fair Information Practices-to help ensure the appropriate use and disclosure of electronic personal health information for treatment purposes. For example, providers in the study described various implementations of practices that require direct interaction with patients, such as informing patients of the use and disclosure of personal health information and providing patients access to their own records. Some of them inform patients that their electronic personal health information may be shared through health information exchanges-entities that were formed to facilitate the electronic sharing of patients' health information among providers. Both the providers and exchanges in the study described practices that limit disclosure of information, secure electronic information that they store and transmit, and help ensure accountability for safeguarding electronic personal health information. Although the health information exchanges reported that they have not conducted formal studies or evaluations of the overall effect of electronically sharing personal health information, both the exchanges and providers reported examples of ways that sharing electronic personal health information about patients has had a positive effect on the quality of care that providers deliver to patients. (1) Officials from two exchanges stated that they provide a direct connection from participating hospitals to their state's Department of Public Health for real-time reporting of conditions and for supporting the early detection of disease outbreaks. According to one of these officials, this service facilitated the state's ability to obtain information about cases of H1N1 more quickly than other states. (2) A large hospital that participated in one of the exchanges reported that a cardiologist was able to obtain an abnormal laboratory result electronically from the exchange one day earlier than they would have otherwise. This timely access to the patients' electronic health information allowed the provider to perform earlier intervention for a potentially life-threatening condition. (3) Another hospital reported that information obtained through its health information exchange helped its emergency department physician ascertain that a patient who was requesting medication for pain had been in five area hospitals in seven nights seeking pain medication. As a result, the physician did not prescribe any additional pain medication.
gao_GAO-08-516	gao_GAO-08-516_0	The initiative aims to quickly deliver low cost, short-term tactical capabilities to address unmet needs of the warfighter. DOD Has Made Progress to Develop a Management Structure and Build a Technological Foundation for ORS Since we last reported on DOD’s ORS efforts in 2006, the department has taken several steps toward establishing a program management structure for ORS and executing research and development efforts. Despite this progress, it is too early to determine the overall success of these efforts because most are still in their initial phases. Program Management Structure Congress directed that DOD submit a report that sets forth a plan for the quick acquisition of low cost space capabilities and establish a Joint ORS Office to coordinate and manage the ORS initiative. Research and Development Efforts DOD is continuing to make progress in developing TacSats—its small experimental satellite projects. Development of Small-Sized Satellites The TacSat experiments aim to quickly provide the warfighter with a capability that meets an identified need within available resources—time, funding, and technology. Efforts to Develop and Test Satellite Interface and Bus Standards DOD is also working to establish standards for the “bus”—the platform that provides power, attitude, temperature control, and other support to the satellite in space. Both DOD and private industry are working to develop small, low cost, on-demand launch vehicles. With relatively modest resources, the Joint ORS Office must quickly respond to the warfighter’s urgent needs, including gaps in capabilities, as well as continue its longer-term research and development efforts that are necessary to help reduce the cost and time of future space acquisitions. As the office negotiates these priorities, it will need to coordinate its efforts with a broad array of programs and agencies in the science and technology, acquisition, and operational communities. Historically it has been difficult to transition programs initiated in the science and technology environment to the acquisition and operational environment. At this time, DOD lacks tools which would help the program office navigate within this environment—primarily, a plan that lays out how the office will direct its investments to meet current operational needs while at the same time pursuing innovative approaches and new technologies. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. We will send copies of the letter to the Department of Defense and other interested congressional committees.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) invests heavily in space assets to provide the warfighter with intelligence, navigation, and other information critical to conducting military operations. In fiscal year 2008 alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion dollars on space systems. Despite this investment, senior military commanders have reported shortfalls in tactical space capabilities in each recent major conflict over the past decade. To provide short-term tactical capabilities as well as identify and implement long-term solutions to developing low cost satellites, DOD initiated operationally responsive space (ORS). Following a 2006 GAO review of ORS, the Congress directed DOD to submit a report that sets forth a plan for providing quick acquisition of low cost space capabilities. This report focuses on the status of DOD's progress in responding to the Congress and is based on GAO's review and analyses of ORS documentation and interviews with DOD and industry officials. What GAO Found Since GAO last reported on DOD's ORS efforts in 2006, the department has taken several steps toward establishing a program management structure for ORS and executing research and development efforts. On the programmatic side, DOD provided Congress with a plan that lays out an organizational structure and defines the responsibilities of the newly created Joint ORS Office, and describes an approach for satisfying warfighters' needs. DOD has also begun staffing the office. On the research and development side, DOD has launched one of its TacSat satellites--small experimental satellites intended to quickly provide a capability that meets an identified need within available resources--and has begun developing several others. It has also made progress in developing interface standards for satellite buses--the platform that provides power, altitude, temperature control, and other support to the satellite in space--and continued its sponsorship of efforts aimed at acquiring low cost launch vehicles. Despite this progress, it is too early to determine the overall success of these efforts because most are still in their initial phases. Achieving success in ORS will be challenging. With relatively modest resources, the Joint ORS Office must quickly respond to the warfighter's urgent needs, while continuing research and development efforts that are necessary to help reduce the cost and time of future space acquisitions. As it negotiates these priorities, the office will need to coordinate its efforts with a broad array of programs and agencies in the science and technology, acquisition, and operational communities. Historically, it has been difficult to transition programs from the science and technology environment to the acquisition and operational environment. At this time, DOD lacks a plan that lays out how it will direct its investments to meet current operational needs while pursuing innovative approaches and new technologies.
gao_GAO-05-820	gao_GAO-05-820_0	Such cost attribution is critical because USPS personnel costs represent more than three-quarters of USPS costs. USPS generally agreed with the Study’s findings. Over the past decade, Congress has debated comprehensive proposals to reform the nation’s postal laws that would, among other things, transform the ratemaking structure and mechanisms for oversight of ratemaking data quality. USPS Took Action to Improve the Quality of Ratemaking Data USPS took several key actions that it reported were responsive to the Study’s findings. USPS reported that these actions increased the accuracy and precision of ratemaking data. Fourth, USPS revised and expanded its documentation of TRACS, which the Study had criticized as inadequate. Therefore, USPS designed CCSTS as a single study to collect more complete and consistent data on all city carrier street activities. 22 and S. 662, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.) would create new oversight mechanisms and enhanced regulatory authority over the quality of ratemaking data. The postal regulator would be required to prescribe what ratemaking data USPS must annually report and review that data in order to determine whether USPS had complied with the requirements of the new ratemaking structure. The postal regulator would be provided with the authority to initiate proceedings to improve the quality of ratemaking data; the authority to subpoena USPS documents and officials; the authority to order USPS to take appropriate actions to comply with laws and its regulations; and the authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance, including fines for deliberate noncompliance. However, if postal reform legislation is enacted, the outcome would likely depend on how the postal regulator would use its discretion to define and implement the new ratemaking structure. Key implementation questions would remain, including what regulatory criteria and requirements would apply to ratemaking data. Under the existing statute the Commission does not have the authority to compel USPS to collect specific data or perform needed studies.” Possible Implications of Proposed Postal Reform Legislation for the Quality of Ratemaking Data The proposed legislative changes previously described would address persistent problems under the existing statutory structure, which, as we have reported, has enabled long-standing deficiencies in ratemaking data quality and unresolved methodological issues to persist. Under the current structure, regulatory oversight is conducted during rate cases that only USPS can initiate, which has limited the frequency, scope, and depth of oversight of USPS ratemaking data and its data collection systems that generate these data. The legislation would eliminate key disincentives for ratemaking data quality, including the litigious ratemaking process (which provides incentives for USPS and others to gain an advantage through the collection and analysis of ratemaking data), the break-even requirement that creates incentives to shift costs from one subclass of mail to another, and the lack of adequate oversight mechanisms to address data quality issues. The legislation also would enhance regulatory authority so that the necessary transparency, oversight, and accountability can take place regarding ratemaking data quality. Thus, the proposed legislative changes would likely lead to improvements in the quality of ratemaking data over time and at some cost. Indeed, some foreign countries that are implementing postal reform are grappling with the need to improve ratemaking data quality. Third, regarding USPS’s views about achieving “breakthrough improvements” in ratemaking data quality, in our view, the proposed legislative changes would likely lead to improvements in the quality of ratemaking data over time and at some cost. Postal Service (USPS) actions that were responsive to the 1999 Data Quality Study (the Study) to improve the quality of ratemaking data and (2) discuss possible implications of postal reform legislation for ratemaking data quality. The three systems include the In-Office Cost System (IOCS), which produces data on the time that postal employees spend handling each subclass of mail in postal facilities; the Revenue, Pieces, and Weight (RPW) system, which produces data on the revenue, volume, and weight of each subclass of mail; and the Transportation Cost System (TRACS), which produces data on long- distance transportation of mail subclasses using trucks, airplanes, and freight trains. We did not assess the extent to which USPS’s actions affected the quality of these ratemaking data. Worksharing discounts: The Commission shall establish rules for worksharing discounts as part of its regulations for regulating market-dominant products that shall ensure that discounts do not exceed the cost that USPS avoids as a result of worksharing activity, unless the discount is (1) associated with a new postal service, a change to an existing postal service, or a new workshare initiative related to an existing postal service and (2) necessary to induce mailer behavior that furthers the economically efficient operation of the Postal Service and the portion of the discount in excess of the cost that the Postal Service avoids as a result of the workshare activity will be phased out over a limited period of time; a reduction in the discount would (1) lead to a loss of volume in the affected category or subclass of mail and reduce the aggregate contribution to the institutional costs of the Postal Service from the category or subclass subject to the discount below what it otherwise would have been if the discount had not been reduced to costs avoided, (2) result in a further increase in the rates paid by mailers not able to take advantage of the discount, or (3) impede the efficient operation of the Postal Service; the amount of the discount above costs avoided (1) is necessary to mitigate rate shock and (2) will be phased out over time; or the discount is provided in connection with subclasses of mail consisting exclusively of mail matter of educational, cultural, scientific, or informational value.	Why GAO Did This Study In 1999, the congressionally requested Data Quality Study (the Study) found opportunities to improve ratemaking data quality. The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) agreed to make improvements, but concerns remained that it is still unclear, from an overall perspective, what actions USPS has taken to improve data quality. Ratemaking data quality has also factored into congressional deliberations to reform postal laws. Thus, questions remain about USPS's actions to improve ratemaking data quality and how proposed legislation will address long-standing issues in this area. GAO was asked to (1) describe key USPS actions that were responsive to the Study to improve the quality of ratemaking data and (2) discuss possible implications of postal reform legislation for ratemaking data quality. GAO did not assess the extent to which USPS's actions affected data quality. In its comments, USPS disagreed with GAO's finding on the need to reform the ratemaking structure. USPS also differed on GAO's finding that the legislation would likely lead to improving ratemaking data quality. It said "breakthrough improvements" would be unlikely without a significant increase in costs. GAO believes reform of the ratemaking structure is needed, but the outcome would depend on its implementation. Further, the legislative changes would likely lead to data quality improvements over time and at some cost. What GAO Found USPS took several key actions that it reported were responsive to the Study's findings. USPS reported that these actions increased the accuracy and precision of ratemaking data. First, USPS changed the In-Office Cost System to improve the quality of data on mail handled by postal employees and the activities they are performing. Personnel costs represent more than three-quarters of USPS costs; therefore, information on postal employees' handling of mail is necessary for ratemaking purposes. USPS made similar changes to the Revenue, Pieces, and Weight System, which produces data on the revenue, volume, and weight of each type of mail. Second, replacing ratemaking data that had been collected in the 1980s, USPS conducted the City Carrier Street Time Study to gather more complete and consistent data on letter carrier activities. Third, to increase the precision of ratemaking data, USPS collected a larger quantity of data. Fourth, USPS revised documentation of the Transportation Cost System, which the Study had criticized as inadequate. Proposed postal reform legislation (H.R. 22 and S. 662) would create new oversight mechanisms and enhanced regulatory authority over the quality of ratemaking data. The legislation would transform the Postal Rate Commission into a new postal regulator that would prescribe what ratemaking data USPS must report annually, review these data, and determine whether USPS had complied with ratemaking requirements. The regulator could initiate proceedings to improve the quality of ratemaking data. To carry out its expanded duties, the regulator would have enhanced authority, including the authority to subpoena; the authority to order USPS to take actions to comply with laws and regulations; and the authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance. The legislation would address persistent problems under the existing ratemaking structure, which has enabled long-standing deficiencies in ratemaking data quality and unresolved methodological issues to persist. The legislation would eliminate key disincentives for ratemaking data quality, including the litigious ratemaking process, the break-even requirement that creates incentives to shift costs from one type of mail to another, and the lack of adequate oversight mechanisms to address data quality issues. Under the current structure, regulatory oversight is generally conducted during rate cases that only USPS can initiate. The legislation would provide mechanisms for regular oversight of ratemaking data and enhance the regulator's authority so that the necessary transparency, oversight, and accountability could take place. Thus, the legislation would likely lead to improvements in the quality of ratemaking data over time and at some cost. However, if the legislation is enacted, the outcome would likely depend on how the regulator would use its discretion to define and implement the new ratemaking structure. Key implementation questions would remain, including what regulatory criteria and requirements would apply to ratemaking data.
gao_GAO-01-460	gao_GAO-01-460_0	The Fund's Estimated Economic Value Exceeds 3 Percent of Insurance-in-Force On the basis of our economic model of FHA's home loan program and forecasts of several key economic factors, we estimate that at the end of fiscal year 1999, the Fund had an economic value of about $15.8 billion. As a result of the inherent uncertainty and the need for professional judgment in this type of analysis, we believe that our estimates and Deloitte's estimates of the Fund's economic value and capital ratio are comparable. A 2-percent Capital Ratio Appears Sufficient to Withstand Some Worse-Than- Expected Loan Performance According to our estimates, worse-than-expected loan performance that could be brought on by moderately severe economic conditions would not cause the estimated value of the fund at the end of fiscal year 1999 to decline by more than 2 percent of insurance-in-force. Reliably measuring the impacts of these options on the Fund's capital ratio and FHA borrowers is difficult without using tools designed to estimate the multiple impacts that policy changes often have. However, any option that results in a reduction in the Fund’s reserve, if not accompanied by a similar reduction in other government spending or by an increase in receipts, would result in either a reduction in the surplus or an increase in any existing deficit. HUD agreed with the report's findings regarding the estimated value of the fund, and the ability of the fund to withstand moderately severe economic downturns that could lead to worse-than- expected loan performance.	What GAO Found The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund has maintained an economic value of at least two percent of the Fund's insurance-in-force, as required by law. GAO's and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) analysis show that the Fund had an economic value of $15.8 billion (3.20 percent) and $16.6 billion (3.66 percent), respectively. Given the economic value of the Fund and the state of the economy at the end of fiscal year 1999, a two-percent capital ratio appears sufficient to withstand moderately severe economic downturns that could lead to worse-than-expected loan performance. However, under more severe economic conditions, the economic value of two percent of insurance-in-force would not be adequate. Because of the uncertainty and professional judgment associated with this type of economic analysis, GAO cautions against relying on one estimate or even a group of estimates to determine the adequacy of the Fund's reserves over the longer term. HUD could exercise several options under current legislative authority to reduce the capital ratio for the Fund. It is difficult, however, to reliably measure the impact of policy changes on the Fund's capital ratio and Federal Housing Administration borrowers without using tools designed to estimate the multiple impacts that policy changes often have. Nonetheless, any option that reduces the Fund's reserve, if not accompanied by a similar reduction in other government spending, would result in a budget surplus reduction or a deficit increase.
gao_GAO-08-705	gao_GAO-08-705_0	For example, modernized business systems are integral to the department’s efforts to address its financial, supply chain, and information security management high-risk areas. Most notably, the BEA did not yet include well-defined architectures for DOD’s components, and DOD’s strategy for “federating” or extending its architecture to the military departments and defense agencies was still evolving and had yet to be implemented. DOD Is Continuing to Improve Its Approach to Modernizing Business Systems DOD continues to take steps to comply with the requirements of the act and to satisfy relevant systems modernization management guidance. However, additional steps are needed to fully comply with the act and relevant guidance. According to these officials, DOD leadership is committed to fully addressing these areas and efforts are planned and under way to do so. Notwithstanding these additions and deletions, BEA 5.0 still does not provide business rules for all business processes. For example, the strategies now provide high-level roles and responsibilities for federating the architecture and additional definition around the tasks needed to achieve alignment among DOD and component architectures. However, its latest annual report does not include this information. To address these limitations, we have made recommendations aimed at improving the management and content of these architectures. On March 15, 2008, DOD released the latest version of its ETP, which provides required information on 102 programs (systems and initiatives) that are linked to key transformational objectives. The latest version contains the results of analyses of gaps between its “As Is” and “To Be” architectural environments, in which capability and performance shortfalls are described and investments (such as transformation initiatives and systems) that are to address these shortfalls are identified. Until the ETP, or a federated family of such plans, either directly or by reference includes relevant information on the full inventory of investments across the department (and does so in a manner that reflects consideration of the range of variables associated with a well- defined transition plan, such as timing dependencies among investments and the department’s capability to manage them), it will not have a sufficient basis for informed investment decision making regarding disposition of the department’s existing inventory of systems or for sequencing the introduction of modernized systems. DOD and Military Departments Have Partially Established Key Investment Management Structures, but Have Yet to Fully Define Related Policies and Procedures The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires DOD to establish business system investment review structures, such as the previously mentioned DBSMC and five IRBs, and processes that are consistent with the investment management provisions of the Clinger- Cohen Act. We have yet to receive comparable information from the Army. Conclusions Over the last year, DOD has continued to make important progress in defining and implementing key institutional modernization management controls, but much remains to be accomplished. In particular, the corporate BEA, while continuing to improve, is still missing important content, and it has yet to be federated through development of aligned subordinate architectures for each of the department’s component organizations. In its most recent annual report to congressional defense committees pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the department missed an opportunity to do this by not including the results of its IV&V contractor’s assessments of the completeness, consistency, understandability, and usability of the federated family of business mission area architectures, including associated transition plans, as we previously recommended. To determine whether the enterprise transition plan (ETP) addressed the requirements specified in the act, we reviewed the updated version of the ETP, which was released on March 15, 2008, relative to the act’s specific transition plan requirements and related guidance that our last annual report under the act identified as not being met.	Why GAO Did This Study In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high risk," and GAO continues to do so today. To assist in addressing this high-risk area, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 contains provisions that are consistent with prior GAO investment management and enterprise architecture-related recommendations, and requires the department to submit annual reports to its congressional committees on its compliance with these provisions. The act also directs GAO to review each annual report. In response, GAO assessed the actions taken by DOD to comply with requirements of the act. To do so, GAO leveraged its recent reports on various aspects of the department's modernization management controls, and it reviewed, for example, the latest version of its business enterprise architecture and the associated transition plan and architecture federation strategy. GAO also interviewed key officials. What GAO Found As part of DOD's continuing efforts to strengthen management of its business systems modernization program, it has taken steps over the last year to build on past efforts and further comply with the National Defense Authorization Act's requirements and related federal guidance. Notwithstanding this progress, aspects of these requirements and relevant guidance have yet to be fully satisfied. In particular, the military departments, under DOD's "federated" and "tiered" approach to establishing institutional modernization management controls, have lagged well behind DOD's corporate efforts, and the corporate efforts are still not yet where they need to be. For example, the latest version of DOD's corporate business enterprise architecture continues to add content needed to improve its completeness, consistency, understandability, and usability. Moreover, its latest architecture federation strategy is more detailed and explicit than the prior version. However, the corporate architecture is still missing important content, such as business rules for, and information flows among, certain business activities. Moreover, the architecture has yet to be federated. Specifically, the military departments, which are the largest members of the federation, do not yet have mature enterprise architecture programs, and the federation strategy aimed at accomplishing this is still evolving. GAO has existing recommendations to address these and other architecture issues. The updated enterprise transition plan, which provides a temporal investment roadmap for transitioning from the current architectural environment to the target environment, continues to identify systems and initiatives that are to fill business capability gaps and address the DOD-wide and component business priorities that are contained in the business enterprise architecture. However, the plan still does not include investments for all components and does not reflect key factors associated with properly sequencing planned investments, such as dependencies among investments and the capability to execute the plan. Furthermore, the military departments, which are the largest members of the business federation, have yet to fully develop their own architecturally-based transition plans. GAO has existing recommendations to address these and other transition plan issues. DOD and the military departments have yet to fully establish key investment review structures and have yet to define related policies and procedures for effectively performing both project-level and portfolio-based investment management. GAO has existing recommendations to address these and other investment issues. Until DOD fully implements GAO's existing recommendations relative to the act and related guidance, its business systems modernization will likely remain a high-risk program.
gao_GGD-99-170	gao_GGD-99-170_0	Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives in this review were to describe (1) the extent and variety of certification activities in the federal government; (2) the extent to which there are policies, procedures, or guidance governing those activities, either governmentwide or within selected agencies; and (3) an agency certification procedure that could serve as an example or “best practice” for other agencies. Agencies Engage in a Wide Variety of Certification-Related Activities Federal agencies engage in both a large number and a wide variety of certification-related activities. The certifications differ across several dimensions, including the origins of the requirements, their targets, which entity or entities do the certifying, whether the certifications are mandatory or voluntary, and the extent to which there is reciprocity with or recognition of other certifications or other organizations’ requirements. For example, NIST publishes directories that list more than 200 federal procurement and regulatory programs in which agencies provide or require some form of certification. The NIST directories provide only a partial inventory of agencies’ activities, though, because they primarily focus on certification of products and services. Also, the directories do not cover individual procurement opportunities in which agencies require a vendor or contractor to have a particular certification, accreditation, or registration in order to participate. Little Guidance Exists on Agency Certification Requirements Federal procurement law establishes some legal boundaries on the certification requirements used in federal procurement. NIST has prepared draft guidance for federal agencies on conformity assessment activities, including certification. Related Policies and Procedures Also Affect Certification Requirements Although there is currently no governmentwide guidance specifically on certification requirements, agency officials noted several related policies and procedures that can affect those requirements. Transparency of Certification Decisionmaking Is a “Best Practice” As noted previously, agency certification actions are numerous and vary substantially. Transparency of Agency Certification Requirements Varies The transparency of the agency certification actions that we reviewed varied dramatically. In some instances, the agencies clearly documented the criteria that they used or planned to use to select particular requirements or certifying organizations. However, agency officials were able to provide us with justifications for their actions in these instances during our review. These specific cases involved the selection of particular certification bodies, and organizations that were not selected raised questions about the criteria that the agencies used. To compile this appendix, we relied primarily on examples identified by officials within the agencies that we contacted during this review and information provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Directory of Federal Government Certification and Related Programs.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal agencies' certification requirements for goods and services, focusing on: (1) the extent and variety of certification activities in the federal government; (2) the extent to which there are policies, procedures, or guidance governing those activities, either governmentwide or within selected agencies; and (3) an agency certification procedure that could serve as an example or best practice for other agencies. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) federal agencies engage in a large number and wide variety of certification-related activities; (2) the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes directories listing more than 200 federal government procurement and regulatory programs in which agencies provide or require certification, accreditation, listing, or registration; (3) these directories provide only a partial inventory of agencies' activities because they focus primarily on certifications of products and services and they do not cover individual procurement actions in which agencies require particular certifications; (4) certification activities also vary across multiple dimensions, including the origin of the requirements, their targets, which entities do the certifying, whether the certifications are mandatory or voluntary, and the extent to which there is reciprocity with or recognition of other certifications or requirements; (5) specific guidance regarding the selection of specific requirements or certifying organizations is limited; (6) federal procurement law imposes some limits on agencies' use of certification requirements, restricting the use of certification requirements to instances in which the requirements are specifically imposed by law or the agencies show a particular need and, if possible, allow for alternatives; (7) some agencies have established certification procedures and criteria for individual programs, and agency officials identified some related policies, procedures and guidance that can affect their certification activities; (8) there is no governmentwide guidance, or agencywide guidance in the five agencies that GAO reviewed, regarding all types of certification requirements; (9) NIST has prepared draft guidance on conformity assessment activities, including certification, which it plans to issue for public comment; (10) one best practice that GAO has supported in the regulatory arena, transparency of decisionmaking, also appears applicable to certification requirements, particularly given the complexity and diversity of certification activities and organizations; (11) in the certification actions that GAO examined, the criteria that the agencies used to establish a particular requirement or select a particular certifying organization were very clear in some instances but not clear in others; (12) other agencies' certification actions were not as transparent and certification bodies that were not selected raised questions about the criteria that agencies used; and (13) in each of those cases, agency officials were able to provide the rationale for their actions.
gao_GAO-04-452	gao_GAO-04-452_0	Congress responded in the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide administrative services and support to those liaison officers of countries involved in a coalition with the United States and to pay the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses of those liaison officers from developing countries. DOD Has Not Issued Guidance to Implement This Legislation Although it is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to formulate general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to DOD, we could find no evidence of guidance issued by DOD to combatant commanders on how to implement the legislation allowing DOD to provide support to coalition liaison officers. Also, we could not identify any office within DOD that has responsibility for implementing the legislation and, therefore, may have promulgated guidance on the legislation. To determine what guidance has been provided to the commands, we contacted offices within DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to determine which office has responsibility for implementing this legislation. Awareness and Use of the Legislation by Combatant Commands Vary Widely Although the legislation was inspired by the needs of the coalition assembled for the Global War on Terrorism, its authority is available through the Secretary of Defense to all combatant commanders. However, according to the results of our research, the awareness of and need to use the legislation by combatant commands vary widely. CENTCOM and one of its subordinate commands were the only commands both aware of and using the legislation. CENTCOM is providing administrative services and support to more than 300 foreign coalition liaison officers from over 60 countries fighting the Global War on Terrorism with the United States. In addition, CENTCOM is paying travel, subsistence, and personal expenses to over 70 liaison officers from more than 30 developing countries that are included in the larger number. They also stated that without the presence of the liaison officers at CENTCOM, they could not accomplish the coalition integration planning and coordination important to the Global War on Terrorism as effectively or efficiently as they are doing.	Why GAO Did This Study In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide administrative services and support to foreign coalition liaison officers temporarily assigned to the headquarters of a combatant command or any of its subordinate commands. Congress required GAO to assess the implementation of this legislation. Specifically, GAO's objectives were to determine (1) what guidance the Department of Defense (DOD) has provided on the implementation of this legislation, (2) the extent to which the commands are aware of and are using this legislation, and (3) the level of support being provided by commands using this legislation and the benefits derived from it. What GAO Found GAO could find no evidence that DOD had issued any guidance to combatant commanders on how to implement this legislation. In addition, GAO was unable to identify an office within DOD that has responsibility for implementing this legislation. The DOD Office of the Inspector General, as GAO's focal point within DOD, was also unable to identify a responsible office. Although the legislation was inspired by the needs of the coalition assembled for the Global War on Terrorism, its authority is available through the Secretary of Defense to all combatant commanders. According to the results of GAO's research, the combatant commands' awareness of and need to use the legislation varied widely with Central Command being the only command using the authority to support liaison officers. Central Command, spent $17 million in fiscal year 2003 to provide administrative services and support to more than 300 coalition liaison officers from over 60 countries. As allowed by the legislation, the command also paid the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses of over 70 of these officers from more than 30 developing countries. Central Command officials stated that they could not accomplish the coalition integration planning and coordination important to the Global War on Terrorism as effectively or efficiently as they are doing without the liaison officers. They also commented that the legislation helps facilitate the participation of a developing country in the coalition if the command can pay for travel and subsistence.
gao_NSIAD-96-71	gao_NSIAD-96-71_0	The CGS acquisition strategy provides for 2 years of LRIP, during which the Army anticipated buying 22 CGS systems at an estimated cost of about $138 million, though it received approval from DOD to procure up to an additional 16 CGS systems to accommodate other service and allied requirements. The Army now plans to evaluate the Medium and Light GSMs during that deployment and follow-on tests, if needed. While there is an operational need for Joint STARS, and despite the desire of operational commanders to have more capable systems as soon as possible, the fact remains that the Army has not adequately justified the urgency or benefits to be derived from accelerated fielding of the CGS in 1998 versus the originally planned fielding in fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, a program official stated and our review of the contract indicates that the Army needs to commit to only one CGS system in the second LRIP year to maintain the contract. Recommendation The Army lacks an analysis justifying a need to accelerate the fielding of the CGS system and can save millions of dollars by minimizing production in its second year of CGS production. They receive data from the Mohawk Side Looking Airborne Radar and do not receive/process data from Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) E8 aircraft. Interim Ground Station Module (GSM). The Army plans to acquire a total of 10 Light GSMs. Common Ground Station (CGS). GAO Comments 1. 3.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the Department of the Army's test and acquisition plans for the Common Ground Station (CGS), the fifth version of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) ground station modules (GSM). What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the Army planned to purchase 22 CGS in two years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) at a cost of $138 million, but it now plans to procure 34 CGS systems; (2) the Army has neither demonstrated an urgent need for CGS nor proved that the expected benefits from accelerated procurement outweigh its risks; (3) by 1998, the Army will need at least four CGS to complete operational test and evaluation; (4) since earlier versions of CGS have not tested well or completed an operational test and evaluation, the Army's acceleration of CGS LRIP increases the risk of procuring a costly and ineffective system; and (5) because the Army is only required to purchase one CGS in the second year of LRIP, it could significantly reduce system costs by procuring fewer systems in the early stages of the contract.
gao_GAO-12-809	gao_GAO-12-809_0	The board has identified information-sharing gaps and developed a list of key initiatives to help address those gaps, but additional steps could help DHS sustain these efforts. DHS has also made progress in developing and implementing DHS’s Information Sharing Segment Architecture, but has not yet fully developed this architecture. DHS Has Advanced Key Information-Sharing Initiatives, but Progress Has Slowed for Half of Them in Part because of Funding Constraints Since DHS developed its list of key information-sharing initiatives, many of those initiatives have proceeded and met interim program milestones. However, DHS officials stated that the board’s involvement has kept some of these initiatives from experiencing funding cuts. As a result, DHS is taking steps to institutionalize some of its policies and practices, including developing key strategies and plans, that will be important in planning and managing its information-sharing efforts. DHS Has Taken Steps to Track Information- Sharing Efforts, but Has Not Yet Fully Assessed How They Have Improved Sharing DHS is tracking the progress key information-sharing initiatives are making toward interim milestones but the department generally does not track when the initiatives will be completed, so as to make course corrections if completion dates are delayed, or assess what impact they are having on achieving needed sharing. DHS has not yet developed measures that determine the impact of sharing on its homeland security efforts, but plans to develop more meaningful ways to assess information-sharing results and progress toward achieving its vision. DHS is tracking the implementation progress of key information-sharing initiatives, but the department does not track how close the initiatives are to completion and could better assess how the initiatives are improving information sharing or helping DHS achieve its 2015 vision, which includes ensuring that the right information gets to the right people at the right time. However, determining and documenting initiative completion dates and assessing how initiatives affect sharing, where feasible, would help the board better track progress in implementing the initiatives, make any necessary course corrections if completion dates are delayed, and demonstrate how initiatives enhance information sharing and homeland security. First, DHS has begun to assess the extent to which its technology programs have implemented critical information-sharing capabilities. However, this plan does not detail— and DHS officials said that they have not determined—the specific capabilities each particular program must implement for DHS to conclude that it has improved information sharing enough to achieve the 2015 information-sharing vision. Conclusions Ensuring that terrorism-related information is shared in an efficient manner with stakeholders across all levels of government, the private sector, and foreign countries is a challenging and critical task. For example, in its Roadmap Implementation Guide or other policies and procedures, documenting processes for identifying information-sharing gaps and the results; documenting and implementing a process for analyzing the root causes of those gaps; and establishing and documenting a process for potential future use for identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risk of removing an incomplete initiative from the list would provide DHS with an institutional record to better replicate, and therefore sustain, its information-sharing efforts. To improve DHS’s ability to track and assess key information-sharing initiatives, direct the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to incorporate into the board’s existing tracking process milestones with time frames that initiatives must achieve to be considered complete, where feasible, and information to show the impact initiatives are having on information sharing, and direct the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board and the Office of the CIO to include in the mechanism the board is developing to track programs’ achievement of key capabilities the specific capabilities certain programs must implement in order to achieve the department’s 2015 information- sharing vision. In commenting on the report, DHS stated that it concurred with all five recommendations and identified actions taken or planned to implement them. To determine the extent to which DHS has made progress in achieving its information-sharing mission, we analyzed relevant strategic planning documents, such as DHS’s January 2011 Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, the DHS Information Sharing Strategy, the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing, and the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) Strategic Plan 2011-2018. To determine the extent to which DHS has developed information-sharing plans and identified key efforts, we analyzed documents related to DHS’s plans and initiatives for sharing, such as DHS’s list of key information- sharing initiatives, and analyzed documents from one initiative—the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative (LEISI)—which is led by DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).	Why GAO Did This Study Recent planned and attempted acts of terrorism on U.S. soil underscore the importance of the need to ensure that terrorism-related information is shared with stakeholders across all levels of government in an effective and timely manner. DHS, through its Office of Intelligence and Analysis, has responsibility for sharing this information and has established an information-sharing vision for 2015which includes ensuring that the right information gets to the right people at the right time. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DHS (1) has made progress in achieving its information-sharing mission, and (2) tracks and assesses information-sharing improvements. GAO analyzed relevant DHS documents, such as strategic planning documents and those related to DHSs governance structure, among others, and interviewed DHS officials. What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in achieving its information-sharing mission, but could take additional steps to improve its efforts. Specifically, DHS has demonstrated leadership commitment by establishing a governance board to serve as the decision-making body for DHS information-sharing issues. The board has enhanced collaboration among DHS components and identified a list of key information-sharing initiatives. The board has also developed and documented a process to prioritize some of the initiatives for additional oversight and support. However, because DHS has not revised its policies and guidance to include processes for identifying information-sharing gaps and the results; analyzing root causes of those gaps; and identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks of removing incomplete initiatives from its list, it does not have an institutional record that would help it replicate and sustain those information-sharing efforts. Overall, DHSs key information-sharing initiatives have progressed, and most have met interim milestones. However, progress has slowed for half of the 18 key initiatives, in part because of funding constraints. For example, 5 of DHSs top 8 priority information-sharing initiatives currently face funding shortfalls. The board has not been able to secure additional funds for these initiatives because they ultimately compete for funding within the budgets of individual components, but DHS officials noted that the boards involvement has kept some initiatives from experiencing funding cuts. DHS is also developing plans that will be important in managing its information-sharing efforts, such as a revised strategy for information sharing and a related implementation plan. DHS has taken steps to track its information-sharing efforts, but has not yet fully assessed how they have improved sharing. Specifically, DHS is tracking the implementation progress of key information-sharing initiatives, but the department does not maintain completion dates and does not fully assess the impact initiatives are having on sharing. Determining and documenting initiative completion dates and how initiatives affect sharing, where feasible, would help the board better track progress in implementing the initiatives and make any necessary course corrections if completion dates are delayed. Further, DHS has begun to assess the extent to which its technology programs, systems, and initiativeswhich include the key information-sharing initiativeshave implemented critical information-sharing capabilities, such as secure user access authorization. However, DHS has not yet determined the specific capabilities each particular program must implement for DHS to conclude that it has improved information sharing enough to achieve its information-sharing vision for 2015. Establishing the level of capabilities programs must implement could help DHS prioritize programs, and track and assess progress toward its vision. In addition, DHS is in the process of implementing customer feedback measures on the usefulness of information provided and has taken steps to assess customers information needs. DHS has not yet developed measures that determine the impact of its information-sharing efforts on homeland security, but plans to develop ways to assess information-sharing results toward achieving its 2015 vision. DHSs time frames for completing this effort are to be included in forthcoming plans currently being developed. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS revise its policies and guidance to include processes for identifying information-sharing gaps, analyzing root causes of those gaps, and identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks of removing incomplete initiatives from its list; better track and assess the progress of key information-sharing initiatives; and establish the level of capabilities programs must implement to meet its vision for 2015. DHS agreed with these recommendations and identified actions taken or planned to implement them.
gao_GAO-08-539	gao_GAO-08-539_0	However, all 50 states, territories, and the District of Columbia now have influenza pandemic plans according to CDC officials. HHS Has Found Major Gaps in States’ Influenza Pandemic Plans Since we visited these states and localities, HHS provided feedback to the states in November 2007 on whether their influenza pandemic plans addressed certain priority areas, such as fatality management, and found that there were major gaps nationally in the plans in these priority areas. These updated plans are due in July 2008. According to CDC officials, all states and localities that received this funding have met the requirement to conduct a discussions-based or operations-based exercise to test their influenza pandemic plans and to prepare an after-action report. Officials told us that the changes made as a result of an exercise included buying additional medical equipment and providing training. In addition, officials at the Dallas County Department of Health and Human Services (Texas) reported that they identified the need for, and subsequently developed, an appendix to their influenza pandemic plan on school closures during a pandemic that included factors for schools to consider in deciding when to close schools and for how long. State and Local Officials Reported That They Wanted Additional Federal Influenza Pandemic Guidance Despite these efforts, state and local officials from all of the states and localities we interviewed told us that they would like additional federal influenza pandemic guidance from the federal government on specific topics to help them to better plan and exercise for an influenza pandemic. A senior DHS official in the Office of Health Affairs reported that there are no plans to conduct further regional state workshops on influenza pandemic. The meetings could also provide a forum for states to build networks with one another and federal officials. Although all states have developed influenza pandemic plans, the HHS-led review of states’ influenza pandemic plans in coordination with other federal agencies found “many major gaps” in planning nationally in 16 out of 22 priority areas. While the federal government has provided influenza pandemic guidance on a variety of topics, state and local officials told us they would welcome additional guidance. Recommendation for Executive Action To help maintain a continuity of focus on state pandemic planning efforts and to further assist states in their pandemic planning, we recommend that the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security, in coordination with other federal agencies, convene additional meetings of the states in the five federal influenza pandemic regions to help them address identified gaps in their planning. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this study were to (1) describe how selected states and localities are planning for an influenza pandemic and how their efforts are involving the federal government, other state and local agencies, tribal nations, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector, (2) describe the extent to which selected states and localities have conducted exercises to test their influenza pandemic planning and incorporated lessons learned into their planning, and (3) identify how the federal government can facilitate or help improve state and local efforts to plan and exercise for an influenza pandemic. Recognizing that we would be limited in our ability to report on all states in detail, we selected these five states for a number of reasons, including that these states comprised over one-third of the United States population; received over one-third of the total funding from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that could be used for planning or exercising for an influenza pandemic, and each state received the highest amount of total HHS and DHS funding that could be used for planning and exercising for an influenza pandemic respectively within each of the five regions established by DHS for influenza pandemic preparedness and emergency response; and were likely entry points for individuals coming from another country given that the states bordered either Mexico or Canada or contained major ports, or both, and accounted for over one-third of the total number of passengers traveling within the United States, and over half of both inbound and outbound international air passenger traffic to and from the United States. We also interviewed HHS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and DHS officials about how they are working with states and localities in planning and exercising for an influenza pandemic and reviewed documentation that they provided, including the HHS-led feedback to states on their influenza pandemic plans and the March 2008 planning guidance to assist them in updating their influenza pandemic plans.	Why GAO Did This Study The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza states that in an influenza pandemic, the primary response will come from states and localities. To assist them with pandemic planning and exercising, Congress has provided $600 million to states and certain localities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established five federal influenza pandemic regions to work with states to coordinate planning and response efforts. GAO was asked to (1) describe how selected states and localities are planning for an influenza pandemic and who they involved, (2) describe the extent to which selected states and localities conducted exercises to test their influenza pandemic planning and incorporated lessons learned as a result, and (3) identify how the federal government can facilitate or help improve state and local efforts to plan and exercise for an influenza pandemic. GAO conducted site visits to five states and 10 localities. What GAO Found All of the five states and 10 localities reviewed by GAO had developed influenza pandemic plans. In fact, according to officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which administers the federal pandemic funds, all 50 states have developed an influenza pandemic plan, in accordance with federal pandemic funding requirements. At the time of GAO's site visits, officials from the selected states and localities reviewed said that they involved the federal government, other state and local agencies, tribal nations, and nonprofit and private sector organizations in their influenza pandemic planning. Since GAO's site visits, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided feedback to the states, territories, and the District of Columbia (hereafter referred to as states) on whether their plans addressed 22 priority areas, such as policy process for school closure and communication. On average the department found that states' plans had "many major gaps" in 16 of the 22 priority areas. In March 2008, HHS, DHS, and other federal agencies issued guidance to states to help them update their pandemic plans, which are due by July 2008, in preparation for another HHS-led review. According to CDC officials, all states and localities that received the federal pandemic funds have met the requirement to conduct an exercise to test their plans. Officials from all of the states and localities reviewed by GAO reported that they had incorporated lessons learned from influenza pandemic exercises into their influenza pandemic planning, such as buying additional medical equipment, providing training, and modifying influenza pandemic plans. For example, as a result of an exercise, officials at the Dallas County Department of Health and Human Services (Texas) reported that they developed an appendix to their influenza pandemic plan on school closures during a pandemic. The federal government has provided influenza pandemic guidance on a variety of topics including an influenza pandemic planning checklist for states and localities and draft guidance on allocating an influenza pandemic vaccine. However, officials of the states and localities reviewed by GAO told GAO that they would welcome additional guidance from the federal government in a number of areas to help them to better plan and exercise for an influenza pandemic, in areas such as community containment (community-level interventions designed to reduce the transmission of a pandemic virus). Three of these areas were also identified as having "many major gaps" in states' plans nationally in the HHS-led review. In January 2008, HHS and DHS, in coordination with other federal agencies, hosted a series of meetings of states in the five federal influenza pandemic regions to discuss the draft guidance on updating their pandemic plans. Although a senior DHS official reported that there are no plans to conduct further workshops, additional regional meetings could provide a forum for state and federal officials to address gaps in states' planning identified by the HHS-led review and to maintain the momentum of states' pandemic preparedness through this next governmental transition.
gao_GAO-13-491	gao_GAO-13-491_0	AT&L and P&R officials estimate that the new system will be available in fiscal year 2014, with DOD components reporting on most of their contracted services by fiscal year 2016. For the fiscal year 2011 inventory, DOD components generally used the same compilation processes used in the previous year. As such, with the exception of the Army, which already collects contractor manpower data and other key information using its CMRA data collection system, the remaining components obtained most of their inventory information from FPDS-NG, a system that does not collect contractor FTE information and has other limitations, which limit its utility for purposes of compiling a complete and accurate inventory. Over the past year and a half, DOD took a number of actions to implement its November 2011 plan. Further, the Navy and Air Force have each taken steps to develop their own interim system to collect and store contractor manpower data based on the Army’s CMRA system. Doing so in a timely fashion, as well as developing a plan of action with anticipated time frames and necessary resources, as we have previously recommended, would help facilitate the department’s stated intent of collecting contractor manpower data. As of April 2013, 29 of the 31 components certified that they had completed a review of their inventory. AT&L and P&R officials stated that the requirement to submit certification letters represented a significant improvement over prior years’ reviews when DOD could not determine whether or not the required reviews were conducted and believed that the letters provided useful insights into the components’ processes and methodologies for conducting the reviews. In addition, heads of components were required to provide a letter to P&R by November 25, 2012, certifying completion of the inventory review and at a minimum include a discussion on the following six elements: an explanation of the methodology used to conduct the reviews and criteria for selection of contracts to review; delineation of the results in accordance with all applicable title 10 provisions and the December 2011 guidance; the identification of any inherently governmental functions or unauthorized personal services contracts, with a plan of action to either divest or realign such functions to government performance; the identification of contracts under which closely associated with inherently governmental functions are being performed and an explanation of steps taken to ensure appropriate government control and oversight of such functions, or if necessary, a plan to either divest or realign such functions to government performance; the identification of contracted services that are exempt from private sector performance in accordance with DOD Instruction 1100.22, which establishes policies and procedures for determining the appropriate manpower mix; require special consideration under 10 U.S.C. Components Provided Limited Information in Certification Letters Our analysis of the 29 component certification letters found that none discussed all six elements required in guidance. Two components—the Army and Air Force—identified contractors performing inherently government functions or unauthorized personal services. The agency did not identify the number of contractor FTEs, but noted that they had contractors performing these functions. For example, while DOD indicates that it remains on track to have a departmentwide data collection system in place in fiscal year 2014, the working group DOD established in January 2013 is still working on key decisions related to security, funding, and other technological issues and has not developed an implementation plan with anticipated time frames and necessary resources to help ensure DOD remains on track to meet its goals, as we recommended in 2011. For example, the Army identified over 44,000 contractor FTEs performing work closely associated with inherently government functions, while 13 components did not identify any instances where contractors were performing these functions. Having the ability to identify and report instances of contractors performing inherently governmental functions, unauthorized personal services, or those closely associated with inherently governmental functions is one of the key benefits that the inventory is to provide to DOD, as it allows DOD to ensure contractors are performing appropriate work and to decide on the appropriate course of action should the reviews find that not to be the case. However, that value is significantly reduced if decision-makers have no assurance on whether corrective action was taken. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that the inventory of contracted services reviews provide greater context and value to DOD leadership, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct component heads to take the following two actions: Comply with DOD’s February 2013 guidance, by ensuring that all required inventory review data elements, including a comprehensive description of their inventory review methodology, are addressed in their certification letters; and Provide updated information in certification letters on how they resolved the instances of contractors performing inherently governmental functions or unauthorized personal services in prior inventory reviews. To satisfy the mandate for 2012, we assessed (1) the progress DOD has made in compiling the inventory of contracted services and the status of efforts to collect contractor manpower data, and (2) the extent to which the defense components complied with DOD’s December 2011 guidance for reporting on the review of the fiscal year 2011 inventories. However, our previous work identified data limitations with DOD components using data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) as the basis for their inventories.	Why GAO Did This Study DOD is the government's largest purchaser of contractor-provided services. In fiscal year 2011, DOD reported $199 billion in obligations for service contracts, which include services as varied as medical services and intelligence support. In 2008, Congress required DOD to compile and review an annual inventory of its contracted services to include the number of contractors providing services to DOD and the functions these contractors were performing. The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report for 3 years on these inventories. For this third report, GAO assessed (1) the progress DOD has made in compiling the fiscal year 2011 inventory of contracted services and efforts to collect contractor manpower data, and (2) the extent to which defense components complied with DOD's guidance for reporting on their inventory reviews. GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, analyzed inventory submissions from 31 components, reviewed component certification letters, and interviewed DOD acquisition and manpower officials. What GAO Found Over the past year and a half, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to implement its plan to collect contractor manpower data directly from contractors and to develop and implement a department-wide system, based on the Army's existing system, to collect and store these and other inventory data. DOD officials estimate that the data system will be available in fiscal year 2014, with DOD components reporting on most of their service contracts by fiscal year 2016. DOD, however, is still working on key decisions related to security, funding, and other technological issues and has not developed a plan of action with anticipated time frames and necessary resources to help ensure DOD remains on track to meet its goals. Making timely decisions and developing a plan of action with anticipated timeframes and necessary resources, as GAO has previously recommended, would facilitate DOD's stated intent of implementing a DOD-wide system to collect required inventory information. For the fiscal year 2011 inventory, DOD components generally used the same compilation processes used in the previous year. As such, with the exception of the Army, which already has an inventory data collection system, the remaining components relied primarily on the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG). GAO previously reported that FPDS-NG has several limitations, including the inability to identify more than one type of service in a contract or the number of contractor full-time equivalents (FTE), which limit its utility for purposes of compiling a complete and accurate inventory. Consistent with DOD's December 2011 guidance, 29 of the 31 components submitted letters certifying that they had conducted an inventory review as of April 2013. DOD officials stated that the requirement to submit certification letters represented a significant improvement over prior years' reviews, when DOD could not determine whether the required reviews were conducted. These officials also stated that the letters provided useful insights into the components' efforts. GAO's analysis, however, indicates that none of the components' certification letters discussed all six elements required by DOD's guidance. For example, GAO's analysis found that the letters generally provided only limited information on their review methodologies or the results of their review efforts. In addition, it is unclear based on the information provided in the certification letters the extent to which the differences in the methodologies components used to conduct the reviews contributed to the variation in the identification of contractors performing inherently governmental functions, unauthorized personal services, or closely associated with inherently governmental functions. For example, the Army, using its review process, identified over 44,000 contractor FTEs performing closely associated with inherently governmental functions, while the Air Force identified about 1,400 contractor FTEs and 13 components reported they had no contractors performing these functions. Further, the Army and the Air Force did not provide complete information on actions taken to resolve instances where they had identified contractors performing inherently governmental functions as part of their reviews, such as by transferring performance of these functions to DOD personnel or modifying the contract's statement of work. The ability to identify contractors performing these functions is valuable as it allows actions to be taken, but that value is significantly reduced if decision-makers have no assurance as to whether corrective actions were taken. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct component heads to discuss in their certification letters all required inventory review elements, as well as how instances where contractors are performing inherently governmental functions were resolved. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations, but indicated that the Secretarys involvement was not necessary. GAO believes it is, as discussed in the report.
gao_GAO-04-450	gao_GAO-04-450_0	From 1991 through 2001, the total number of individuals with ESRD increased from about 201,000 to 406,000, with an average annual growth rate of 7 percent. In 2001, about 90 percent of all dialysis patients underwent in-facility hemodialysis, and less than 1 percent underwent hemodialysis at home. Dialysis Facilities Increased at Same Rate as Beneficiary Population, but Supply Varied Geographically and by Treatment Method From 1998 through 2001, the total number of hospital-based and freestanding dialysis facilities increased at about the same rate as the Medicare dialysis population, and the total number of dialysis stations, or treatment areas devoted to providing dialysis to patients, increased at a greater rate than the Medicare dialysis population. The dialysis industry opened facilities in more counties across the country, although the number of facilities available to beneficiaries living in urban counties was greater than in rural counties. In addition, while almost all facilities provided hemodialysis, fewer facilities provided home dialysis. From December 31, 1998, through December 31, 2001, we estimate that the number of stations increased by over 24 percent, from about 53,100 to about 66,100, exceeding the growth rate of the dialysis population. Although payments were higher than costs overall, payments to small facilities were lower than costs. Because of this imbalance in the payment structure, providers have an incentive to maximize the use of profitable separately billed drugs to compensate for inadequate payments under the composite rate. Current Payment Methodology Is Not Appropriate The Medicare payment methodology for dialysis services is not appropriate. In 2001, composite rate payments to freestanding facilities, intended to cover the costs of a variety of services associated with a dialysis treatment, such as nursing, supplies, social services, and certain laboratory tests, were well below the costs of those services. On average, Medicare payments to freestanding dialysis facilities for composite rate and separately billed services combined exceeded providers’ estimated allowable costs by 3 percent in 2001. MMA requires the Secretary of HHS to issue a second report by October 1, 2005, that details the elements and features for the design and implementation of a bundled system, and then implement a 3-year demonstration project beginning January 1, 2006, that is based on that system. CMS also noted that MMA requires the Secretary of HHS to report to the Congress by October 1, 2005, on the elements and features necessary in the design and implementation of a broader payment system. The Secretary is also required to conduct a 3-year demonstration project, beginning January 1, 2006, using a payment system incorporating patient characteristics identified in the report. Given the increase in health care costs over time, we did not believe it was appropriate to assess the adequacy of Medicare payment using only 1996 cost reports. These issues included whether Medicaid and physician payments are adequate and the Medicare definition of allowable costs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology In conducting this study, we analyzed the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Facility Survey files, Medicare cost reports, and Medicare outpatient claims. In order to calculate 2001 payment-to-cost ratios for overall costs, that is, composite rate services and separately billed drugs, we used 2001 cost reports for freestanding renal dialysis facilities and 2000 and 2001 Medicare outpatient claims data. We excluded laboratory services because these are typically billed directly to Medicare by the laboratory, not by the dialysis facility.	Why GAO Did This Study Medicare covers about 90 percent of patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), the permanent loss of kidney function. Most ESRD patients receive regular hemodialysis treatments, a process that removes toxins from the blood, at a dialysis facility. A small percentage dialyzes-at home. From 1991 through 2001, the ESRD patient population more than doubled, from about 201,000 to 406,000. As the need for services grows, so do concerns about beneficiary access to and Medicare payment for dialysis services. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 directed GAO to study beneficiaries' access to dialysis services. In this report, GAO (1) assessed the supply of dialysis facilities and the services they provide, overall and relative to beneficiary residence, and (2) assessed the extent to which Medicare payments for dialysis services are adequate and the methodology is appropriate. In order to assess the supply of dialysis facilities, GAO used Facility Surveys collected by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and outpatient claims, the bills submitted to Medicare by providers of certain outpatient services from 1998 through 2001. To assess the adequacy of Medicare payment and the appropriateness of the payment methodology, GAO used 2001 Medicare cost reports and outpatient claims submitted by freestanding dialysis facilities. What GAO Found GAO found that from December 31, 1998, through December 31, 2001, the total number of dialysis facilities nationwide increased at about the same rate as the Medicare dialysis population, 16 and 15 percent, respectively, and the total number of stations (that is, treatment areas and equipment, including dialysis machines, needed to dialyze the patient) increased by over 24 percent, a rate greater than the growth in the Medicare dialysis population. The dialysis industry opened facilities in more counties across the country, although facilities were more likely to be available to beneficiaries in urban counties than in rural counties. In addition, while almost all facilities provided in-facility hemodialysis, fewer facilities provided home dialysis. GAO estimates that total payments to freestanding dialysis facilities exceeded providers' allowable costs by 3 percent in 2001. Although payments were higher than costs overall, payments did not meet costs for small facilities. In addition, composite rate payments, intended to cover the costs of dialysis services associated with a treatment, including nursing, supplies, social services, and certain laboratory tests, were 11 percent less than the costs of providing those services, while payments for separately billed drugs, drugs not included in the composite rate, exceeded the costs of those services by 16 percent. Because of this imbalance, providers have an incentive to maximize the use of profitable separately billed drugs to compensate for inadequate payments under the composite rate. CMS generally agreed with GAO's findings. The agency noted that it has been working to redesign the payment system since 2000. Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), the Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to develop a report by October 1, 2005 detailing the elements and features necessary in the design and implementation of a broader payment system that includes separately billed drugs. MMA also requires the Secretary to conduct a 3-year demonstration project, beginning January 1, 2006, that uses a broader payment system incorporating patient characteristics identified in the report.
gao_GAO-12-119	gao_GAO-12-119_0	To avoid toll payment, drivers may choose to share rides, use transit, travel at less congested (generally off-peak) times, or travel on less congested routes. HOT lanes have been created by constructing new lanes or converting existing carpool or High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes, some of which had been previously underused, and allowing solo drivers to use these lanes if they pay a toll. Since the first U.S. congestion pricing project was implemented in Orange County, California, in 1995, 19 project sponsors have initiated 41 pricing projects on highways, bridges, and tunnels. The 30 opened projects include 12 HOT lane projects and 18 peak-period priced facilities, covering about 400 miles of priced lanes. Projects range in length from 4.1 miles on the State Route (SR) 133 in Orange County, California, to nearly 150 miles on the New Jersey Turnpike, and charge tolls varying from 25 cents to $14. Eleven HOT lane projects are under construction; in addition, 2 of the 12 HOT lane projects in operation are extending the length of their tolled lanes. Income equity refers to whether the costs of congestion pricing that users incur are proportional to their incomes, or whether low-income drivers are disproportionately affected. DOT Helps Facilitate Congestion Pricing through Project Approvals and Funding for Implementation, Monitoring, and Evaluation DOT approves all congestion pricing projects on any roadway that receives federal funds. According to project sponsors that we interviewed, pricing projects that have not changed a facility’s “footprint,” such as HOV to HOT lane conversions or peak-period pricing on already tolled highways, bridges, and tunnels, have received categorical exclusions. Nearly all congestion pricing projects in operation have received VPPP funds at one time or another for these purposes. Project Evaluations Have Generally Shown Reduced Congestion, but Other Effects Have Not Been Consistently Assessed Evaluations of 14 congestion pricing projects in the United States have generally shown reduced congestion, although other results are mixed, and not all possible relevant effects have been assessed. In addition, although the number of cars using HOT lanes has risen, there were fewer people in the cars—a fact attributed to an increase in the share of toll-paying solo drivers or a decrease in carpooling on HOT lanes. Peak-period pricing projects that aim to reduce congestion by encouraging drivers to travel at off-peak times have shifted some drivers to travel during those times. Other effects of congestion pricing projects, such as equity income impacts, have not always been evaluated. Evaluating these impacts is important to address public and elected officials’ concerns about the effects of pricing on travelers and communities. Of the project sponsors that have operational congestion pricing, 8 have a current and completed evaluation of at least one of their projects, for a total of 14 evaluated projects. Many efforts have been made to assess the effects of congestion pricing projects on equity, including income equity (the distribution of costs and benefits of congestion pricing between low- and high-income drivers) and geographic equity (the relative effects of congestion pricing on two geographic areas, including the effects of any traffic diversion). Greater Equity and Safety Issues Might Develop as New Projects Are Implemented Expanded Use of Pricing Could Raise Equity Concerns Income and geographic equity concerns may become more prevalent as congestion pricing becomes more widespread. These concerns may be particularly acute in the future for projects designed to use pricing not only to manage congestion but also to meet toll revenue targets. Raising revenue could be at odds with managing congestion (e.g., increasing passenger throughput) if higher tolls can produce more revenue from fewer paying vehicles. Agency Comments DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We examined (1) the federal role in supporting congestion pricing, (2) results of congestion pricing projects in the United States, and (3) emerging issues in congestion pricing projects. We also discussed the Urban Partnership Agreement (UPA) and Congestion Reduction Demonstration (CRD) programs—one-time initiatives that were established with 10 separate federal grant programs. Performance and monitoring requirement Annual reporting to U.S. DOT required. DOT. Multi-year project-specific and national evaluations which U.S. Percent change in route/corridor travel time by time of day Percent change in the travel time index for comparisons across sites (having corridors of differing lengths) Percent change in number of hours of the day with congested conditions and the number of congested travel links per day Percent change in average travel speeds by hour of the day Percent change in travel time reliability and planning time index Percent change in vehicle and person trips by time of day and person and vehicle throughput Change in traveler perceptions about congestion after deployment of strategies Level of service in tolled lanes Travel-time reliability in tolled lanes Average occupants per vehicle of tolled lanes versus general purpose lanes Use of tolling options Traffic density in tolled lanes Travel-time reliability (seasonally controlled) Days exceeding reliability and performance thresholds End-to-end travel time Service reliability User ratings of service performance Corridor ridership Corridor mode split (%) Federal program Performance measure Equity Analysis Socio-economic and geographic distribution of benefits including: tolls paid and adaptation costs; change in travel time and distance by group; total transportation cost; environmental impacts Public perception of the individualized equity impacts of pricing Spatial distribution of revenue reinvestment Reduction in criteria pollutants Reduction in noise Reduction in vehicle miles traveled Qualitative assessment of perceived benefits of the Reductions in estimated fuel use Use and impact of alternative fuel vehicles for transit improvements Percentage change in crash rate by type and severity Percentage change in time to clear accidents Change in the perception of safety by service patrol operators, state patrol officers, medical first responders, and bus operators Change in the perception of safety by travelers This is a sample of UPA and CRD performance analyses that include measures and metrics related to the effects of congestion pricing.	Why GAO Did This Study Many Americans spend frustrating hours each year stuck in traffic. While estimates vary, the Department of Transportation (DOT) estimates that traffic congestion costs the United States $200 billion each year, and that more than one-quarter of total annual travel time in metropolitan areas occurs in congested conditions. Road pricing or congestion pricingassessing tolls that vary with the level of congestion or time of dayaims to motivate drivers to share rides, use transit, travel at less congested times, or pay to use tolled lanes. Since the first U.S. congestion pricing project opened in 1995, 19 project sponsors have 41 pricing projects in operation or under construction. About 400 miles of priced highway lanes including nearly 150 miles on the New Jersey Turnpike are in operation today with current tolls varying from 25 cents to $14. All U.S. projects in operation are either High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes, which charge solo drivers to use newly constructed lanes or carpool lanes, or peak-period pricing projects, which charge a lower toll on already tolled roads, bridges and tunnels during offpeak periods. GAO examined (1) the federal role in supporting congestion pricing, (2) results of U.S. congestion pricing projects, and (3) emerging issues in congestion pricing. Eight project sponsors have current and completed evaluations on at least 1 project, for a total of 14 evaluated projects, all of which GAO reviewed. GAO interviewed officials about the performance of their pricing projects and effects. DOT provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found DOT approves all congestion pricing projects on roadways that receive federal funds and provides grants for project studies, implementation, and evaluation. Nearly all HOT lane projects and most peak-period pricing projects in operation today received federal funds at one time or another. DOTs largest programs for congestion relief, the Urban Partnership Agreement and Congestion Reduction Demonstration programs, have provided grant funds totaling nearly $800 million since 2006 to six metropolitan areas to implement pricing and other strategies. DOT requires sponsors of congestion pricing projects to monitor and evaluate performance and, for HOT lanes when applicable, ensure that a federal standard for minimum traffic speeds is met. The 14 congestion pricing projects that have current and complete evaluations generally show that pricing can help reduce congestion, although other results are mixed, and not all possible relevant impacts have been assessed. HOT lane projects, which aim to reduce congestion by decreasing travel time and increasing speed and the number of vehicles using the lane, have reduced congestion, but some HOT lane projects also added new lanes, and studies did not distinguish the extent to which performance improvements were due to added lanes or pricing. In addition, although the number of cars using HOT lanes has risen, there were fewer people in those cars because of an increase in the proportion of toll-paying solo drivers or a decrease in carpools. Peak-period pricing projects, which aim to reduce congestion by encouraging drivers to travel at off-peak times, have shifted some travel to those times. Other congestion pricing effectssuch as equity income impactshave not always been evaluated. Potential concerns include income equity (whether low-income drivers are disproportionately affected by congestion pricing) and geographic equity (whether one geographic area is more negatively affected than another, such as when traffic diversion occurs). These impacts are important to assess as they address the public and elected officials concerns about the effects of pricing on travelers and communities. Ongoing multi-year evaluations across six metropolitan areas will assess the performance and effects of congestion pricing projects using a specific set of measures to assess the effectiveness of congestion reduction strategies. Concerns about equity may grow as pricing projects become more widespread. New projects are under construction, and several metropolitan areas have networks of HOT lanes planned that will expand the relatively limited use of pricing today. Equity concerns may become more acute where sponsors are using pricing not only to manage congestion, but also to raise revenue to build new projects. Raising revenue can be at odds with managing congestion (e.g., increasing passenger throughput) if higher tolls can produce more revenue from fewer paying vehicles. Options to address equity issues include using a portion of toll revenues to finance public transit service.
gao_GAO-10-666T	gao_GAO-10-666T_0	CBO, RAND, and CNA have assessed military compensation using varying approaches. For example, in order to value health care, CNA estimated the difference in value between military and civilian health benefits, because servicemembers receive more comprehensive health care than most civilians. Nevertheless, we note that CNA’s study and other studies of military compensation illustrate that valuing total military compensation from a servicemember’s perspective is challenging, given the variability across the large number of pays and benefits, the need to make certain assumptions to estimate the value of various benefits, and the utilization of benefits by servicemembers or their dependents, among other reasons. We do not believe that such comparisons demonstrate the existence of a pay gap or facilitate accurate comparisons between military and civilian compensation because they assume that military basic pay is the only component of compensation that should be compared to changes in civilian pay and exclude other important components of military compensation, such as the housing and subsistence allowances. In general, when comparing military and civilian compensation, a more complete or appropriate measure of compensation should include cash and benefits. Prior to issuing our report earlier this month the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy provided us with oral comments on a draft of the report. Given that (1) the ability to recruit and retain is a key indicator of the adequacy of compensation and (2) DOD has generally met its overall recruiting and retention goals for the past several years, it appears that regular military compensation is adequate at the 70th percentile of comparable civilian pay as well as at the 80th percentile when additional benefits are included. Concluding Observations In closing, we note that comparisons between military and civilian compensation are important management tools—or measures—for the department to use to assess the adequacy and appropriateness of its compensation. However, such comparisons present both limitations and challenges. For example, data limitations and difficulties valuing nonmonetary benefits prevent exact comparisons between military and civilian personnel. Moreover, these comparisons represent points in time and are affected by other factors, such as the health of the economy. To illustrate, it is not clear the degree to which changes in the provision of civilian health care or retirement benefits affect the outcome of comparing military and civilian compensation. In addition, valuing military service is complicated. While serving in the military offers personal and professional rewards, such service also requires many sacrifices—for example, frequent moves and jobs that are arduous and sometimes dangerous. Ultimately, DOD’s ability to recruit and retain personnel is an important indicator of the adequacy—or effectiveness—of its compensation.	Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses our most recent report on military and civilian pay comparisons and the challenges associated with those types of comparisons. The Department of Defense's (DOD) military compensation package, which is a myriad of pays and benefits, is an important tool for attracting and retaining the number and quality of active duty servicemembers DOD needs to fulfill its mission. Since DOD transitioned to an all-volunteer force in 1973, the amount of pay and benefits that servicemembers receive has progressively increased. When it is competitive with civilian compensation, military compensation can be appropriate and adequate to attract and retain servicemembers. However, comparisons between the two involve both challenges and limitations. Specifically, as we have previously reported, no data exist that would allow an exact comparison between military and civilian personnel with the same levels of work experience. Also, nonmonetary considerations complicate such comparisons, because their value cannot be quantified. For example, military service is unique in that the working conditions for active duty service carry the risk of death and injury during wartime and the potential for frequent, long deployments, unlike most civilian jobs. In addition, there is variability among past studies in how compensation is defined (for example, either pay or pay and benefits) and what is being compared. Most studies, including those done by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and RAND Corporation, have compared military and civilian compensation but limit such comparisons to cash compensation--using what DOD calls regular military compensation--and do not include benefits. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required that we conduct a study comparing the pay and benefits provided by law to members of the Armed Forces with those of comparably situated private-sector employees, to assess how the differences in pay and benefits affect recruiting and retention of members of the Armed Forces. Earlier this month, we issued our report. This testimony today summarizes the findings of that report. What GAO Found Comparisons between military and civilian compensation are important management tools--or measures--for the department to use to assess the adequacy and appropriateness of its compensation. However, such comparisons present both limitations and challenges. For example, data limitations and difficulties valuing nonmonetary benefits prevent exact comparisons between military and civilian personnel. Moreover, these comparisons represent points in time and are affected by other factors, such as the health of the economy. To illustrate, it is not clear the degree to which changes in the provision of civilian health care or retirement benefits affect the outcome of comparing military and civilian compensation. In addition, valuing military service is complicated. While serving in the military offers personal and professional rewards, such service also requires many sacrifices--for example, frequent moves and jobs that are arduous and sometimes dangerous. Ultimately, DOD's ability to recruit and retain personnel is an important indicator of the adequacy--or effectiveness--of its compensation.
gao_GAO-08-616T	gao_GAO-08-616T_0	In fiscal year 2007, GAO received over 1,200 requests for studies. GAO is requesting budget authority of $545.5 million to support a staff level of 3,251 FTEs needed to serve the Congress. This is a fiscally prudent request of 7.5 percent over our fiscal year 2008 funding level, as illustrated in table 2. Financial Benefits GAO’s work in fiscal year 2007 generated $45.9 billion in financial benefits. These financial benefits, which resulted primarily from actions agencies and the Congress took in response to our recommendations, included about $21.1 billion resulting from changes to laws or regulations, $16.3 billion resulting from improvements to core business processes, and $8.5 billion resulting from agency actions based on our recommendations to improve public services. During fiscal year 2007, we recorded a total of 1,354 other improvements in government resulting from GAO work. These actions spanned the full spectrum of national issues, from strengthened screening procedures for all VA health care practitioners to improved information security at the Securities and Exchange Commission. Provide Timely, Quality Service to the Congress and the Federal Government to . . . . . .	Why GAO Did This Study The budget authority GAO is requesting for fiscal year 2009--$545.5 million--represents a prudent request of 7.5 percent to support the Congress as it confronts a growing array of difficult challenges. GAO will continue to reward the confidence you place in us by providing a strong return on this investment. In fiscal year 2007 for example, in addition to delivering hundreds of reports and briefings to aid congressional oversight and decisionmaking, our work yielded: financial benefits, such as increased collection of delinquent taxes and civil fines, totaling $45.9 billion--a return of $94 for every dollar invested in GAO; over 1,300 other improvements in government operations spanning the full spectrum of national issues, ranging from helping Congress create a center to better locate children after disasters to strengthening computer security over sensitive government records and assets to encouraging more transparency over nursing home fire safety to strengthening screening procedures for VA health care practitioners; and expert testimony at 276 congressional hearings to help Congress address a variety of issues of broad national concern, such as the conflict in Iraq and efforts to ensure drug and food safety. What GAO Found GAO's work in fiscal year 2007 generated $45.9 billion in financial benefits. These financial benefits, which resulted primarily from actions agencies and the Congress took in response to our recommendations, included about $21.1 billion resulting from changes to laws or regulations, $16.3 billion resulting from improvements to core business processes, and $8.5 billion resulting from agency actions based on our recommendations to improve public services.
gao_GAO-01-272	gao_GAO-01-272_0	Further, 80 percent of the states took each of five actions: (1) case file reviews by supervisors or special teams to verify the accuracy of food stamp benefit payments, (2) special training for caseworkers, (3) analyses of quality control data to identify causes of payment errors, (4) electronic database matching to identify ineligible participants and verify income and assets, and (5) use of computer software programs to assist caseworkers in determining benefits. Some states had automated case management systems that integrated Food Stamp Program records with their Medicaid and other assistance programs, which facilitated the administration of these programs. FNS Has Encouraged States to Reduce Payment Error Rates, but Simplifying Food Stamp Rules May Reduce Errors Further To encourage the states to reduce error rates, FNS has employed financial sanctions and incentives, approved waivers of reporting requirements for certain households, and promoted initiatives to improve payment accuracy through the exchange of information among the states. FNS officials and advocates for food stamp participants, however, have expressed concern about some possible options for simplifying the rules for determining eligibility and calculating benefits. We selected the 28 states to include states with the lowest payment error rates, states with the highest error rates, and the 10 states with the most food stamp participants in fiscal year 1999. To examine what the Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) has done and could do to help states reduce food stamp payment errors, we relied in part on information obtained from our telephone interviews, as well as with information obtained from discussions with officials at FNS’ headquarters and each of its seven regional offices.	Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2000, the Department of Agriculture's Food Stamp Program, administered jointly by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and the states, provided $15 billion in benefits to an average of 17.2 million low-income persons each month. FNS, which pays the full cost of food stamp benefits and half of the states' administrative costs, promulgates program regulations and oversees program implementation. The states run the program, determining whether households meet eligibility requirements, calculating monthly benefits the households should receive, and issuing benefits to participants. FNS assesses the accuracy of states' efforts to determine eligibility and benefits levels. Because of concerns about the integrity of Food Stamp Program payments, GAO examined the states' efforts to minimize food stamp payment errors and what FNS has done and could do to encourage and assist the states reduce such errors. What GAO Found GAO found that all 28 states it examined had taken steps to reduce payment errors. These steps included verifying the accuracy of benefit payments calculated through supervisory and other types of casefile reviews, providing specialized training for food stamp workers, analyzing quality control data to determine causes of errors and developing corrective actions, matching food stamp rolls with other federal and state computer databases to identify ineligible participants, and using computer software to assist caseworkers in determining benefits. To reduce payment errors, FNS has imposed financial sanctions on states with high error rates and has waived some reporting requirements.
gao_HEHS-99-4	gao_HEHS-99-4_0	Generally, state health departments lead state TPP efforts. States’ Teen Pregnancy Prevention Strategies Target Different Groups and Are Implemented at the Local Level In their efforts to address the problem of teen pregnancy, the states that we visited developed prevention strategies with multiple components that included a variety of programs and services. Although each state generally had all of these components in their TPP strategies, the emphasis placed on the components and the types of services and programs included in their strategies varied. Program Implementation Varied at the Local Level While TPP strategies were applicable statewide, the states we visited typically gave communities flexibility in selecting and implementing programs to meet local needs and preferences. Although not a part of the states’ strategies, all eight states received federal funding from CDC to support school HIV prevention education programs. States Began Requiring Teen Parents to Stay in School and Live at Home Before Federal Welfare Reform The eight states in our review had already begun requiring teen parents receiving welfare to live at home or in supervised living arrangements and stay in school or job training to receive assistance—requirements that were subsequently included in federal welfare reform. Not All Study States Plan to Seek Bonus for Reducing Out-of-Wedlock Births Federal welfare reform legislation provides a financial incentive for reducing the ratio of out-of-wedlock births to all births within the state. Some say they will likely not be competitive for the bonus because they are focusing their prevention efforts on teens rather than adult women, who have most out-of-wedlock births; other states say they may not be eligible to compete because they do not have available the abortion data needed to compete. Some States Concerned About the Prescriptive Nature of Abstinence-Only Education Programs Welfare reform also included a provision to enhance efforts to provide sexual abstinence education and authorized $50 million annually for 5 years in grants to states that choose to develop programs for this purpose. Despite these concerns, all the states we visited applied for and received the federal funding to either initiate new programs or expand existing abstinence efforts. As of June 1998, six of the eight states we visited had begun to implement their abstinence-only initiatives. Although HHS could not isolate all of the funding specifically for TPP efforts, it was able to identify at least $164 million in fiscal year 1997. HHS recently began program evaluation efforts for two of its TPP programs—the multisite Community Coalition Partnership Program and the new Abstinence Education Program—that will measure the programs’ effects on behavior outcomes closely related to teen pregnancy. Because block grants—a source of funding used by the eight states to support their TPP strategies—give states flexibility in using funds, specific program evaluations are not typically required. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In response to congressional concern about teen pregnancy, we were asked to identify the strategies states have been implementing to prevent teen pregnancy and how states fund these strategies, determine if federal welfare reform had an effect on these strategies, identify these states’ efforts to evaluate their pregnancy prevention efforts, and describe the federal government role in supporting state efforts to prevent teen pregnancy.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) state strategies to reduce teen pregnancy and how states fund these efforts; (2) how welfare reform affected states' strategies; (3) the extent to which programs that are part of states' prevention strategies are evaluated; and (4) what teen pregnancy prevention activities the federal government supports. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the eight states in GAO's review have, over time, developed teenage pregnancy prevention (TPP) strategies involving numerous programs that fall into six areas; (2) in general, these states targeted high-risk populations and communities and tailored programs to three different groups of teens; (3) while strategies were applicable statewide, states typically relied on local communities to select and implement specific programs from an array of alternatives; (4) states generally gave localities the flexibility to choose the type and mix of programs they wanted to put in place; (5) some communities chose not to implement programs that the state strategy encouraged; (6) all of the states GAO visited relied on federal funding to support their strategies and in many of the states, federal funding exceeded state funding for TPP; (7) the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation had a limited effect overall on these states' TPP strategies, in part, because the states in GAO's review already required that teen parents live at home and stay in school to receive assistance--two key provisions now mandatory under federal welfare reform; (8) only two of the eight states plan to compete for the bonus provided by the law to states that show the greatest success in reducing out-of-wedlock births; (9) the other states are unlikely to compete because they lack the data needed to show reductions or because their prevention efforts focus on teens who account for a relatively small proportion of out-of-wedlock births; (10) although the eight states initially had concerns about the prescriptive nature and administrative requirements of the new law's grant program for sexual abstinence education, the eight states applied for the grants, received funding, and plan to either initiate new abstinence education programs or expand programs that they had already included as part of their strategies to prevent teen pregnancy; (11) although all eight states are tracking changes in teen births, few are evaluating the effect of their TPP programs on teen pregnancy; (12) only four states are attempting to link some of their TPP efforts to changes in teen pregnancies, births, or other closely related outcomes; (13) for fiscal year 1997, the Department of Health and Human Services identified at least $164 million for TPP programs or services; and (14) however, funding specifically for TPP activities could not be isolated at the federal level, primarily because of the flexibility on spending decisions given to states.
gao_GAO-17-416	gao_GAO-17-416_0	Required Labeling Elements. Dietary supplement labeling under FDA’s primary jurisdiction includes, among other things, packaging, inserts, and information at the point of sale. Enforcement. We identified 490 memory supplement products associated with 1,590 total examples of memory supplement marketing through a review of five media channels over a 2- month period. Specifically, as table 2 below indicates, about 96 percent of marketing we identified appeared on the Internet. After reviewing these potential disease-related claim examples, FDA preliminarily determined that 27 of the 28 examples appeared to be disease claims—claims to treat, cure, or prevent a disease—which are generally prohibited in the labeling of dietary supplements and cause the product to be regulated as a drug. FDA officials also reported that they would continue monitoring all of the examples that were identified. Similar Types of Enforcement and Outreach for Memory Supplements Taken by FDA and FTC Align with Their Agency Priorities FDA and FTC have taken similar types of enforcement actions for memory supplements as for other dietary supplements between 2006 and 2015—with FDA taking mostly advisory actions and a few regulatory actions (administrative and judicial court actions), and FTC taking a mix of administrative and judicial actions. In prioritizing what enforcement actions to take and how to conduct outreach related to memory supplements, the agencies focus on safety and the egregiousness of deception or impact of the supplement’s marketing, as they do with all dietary supplements. FDA and FTC Have Conducted Some Outreach on Dietary Supplement Use by Older Adults, as Well as Some Specific Outreach about Memory Supplement Enforcement Actions FDA and FTC have conducted some outreach aimed at industry and consumers on dietary supplements generally, including dietary supplement use by older adults, as well as some outreach accompanying enforcement actions specifically involving memory supplements. Limited Market Information Poses Oversight Challenge for FDA, While Consumer Groups Reported Uncertainty about FDA and FTC Roles Overseeing Internet Marketing FDA faces oversight challenges related to limited information about the dietary supplement market, including memory supplements, and limited information on NDIs to inform oversight efforts. FDA officials said the agency is exploring ways to improve information available for oversight by obtaining additional market information. Also, while dietary supplement marketing on the Internet was said to be a concern for agencies and consumer and industry groups, we found that consumer groups were unclear about how FDA and FTC share oversight of Internet marketing. Few documents explicitly delineate their differing roles and coordination in oversight, or communicate the differing roles to industry and consumers. As a result, consumers may be unclear on which agency to report concerns to involving Internet marketing of dietary supplements. Consumer complaints are an important tool for both agencies to learn about potential dietary supplement problems, according to agency officials. FTC officials feel their existing tools and information to identify supplement issues—such as consumer tips, and proactive media monitoring—are sufficient to identify issues. FDA and FTC Have Provided Limited Guidance Delineating Their Shared Oversight of Memory Supplement Marketing on the Internet FDA and FTC share oversight of dietary supplement Internet marketing, including memory supplements, but consumer groups told us the delineation of their differing roles was unclear—particularly with regard to FDA’s role—and we found that few documents explain the agencies’ differing roles and coordination in overseeing Internet marketing. Such actions would be in line with federal internal control standards that state that agencies should communicate quality information with external parties to achieve objectives. We have also previously reported that delineating roles and responsibilities, as well as developing ways to continually update and monitor written agreements, are issues agencies should consider when collaborating. Recommendations for Executive Action To enhance consumer understanding of agency oversight roles and to strengthen agency oversight of Internet marketing, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Chair of the FTC develop and provide additional guidance to consumers delineating the agencies’ differing roles in their shared oversight of memory supplement and other dietary supplement marketing on the Internet. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines: (1) how memory supplements are marketed, and the extent to which the marketing targets older adults and is potentially deceptive or inconsistent with federal requirements; (2) what enforcement and outreach actions the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have undertaken in overseeing memory supplements and their marketing; and (3) what challenges FDA and FTC face in overseeing memory supplements. Internet: We identified pertinent sources for memory supplement marketing on the Internet using relevant demographic survey data.	Why GAO Did This Study Memory supplements—dietary supplements claiming to improve memory—are a growing market, with sales estimated at $643 million in 2015, almost double 2006 sales. FDA and FTC share oversight of memory supplement marketing—labeling and advertising claims—but generally do not approve claims before products are marketed. GAO was asked to review memory supplement marketing and oversight. This report examines (1) how memory supplements are marketed and the extent marketing targets older adults and may violate federal requirements; (2) related enforcement and outreach actions taken by FDA and FTC; and (3) challenges to agency oversight. GAO reviewed five types of media (Internet, television, among others) to identify examples of memory supplement marketing practices and potential violations of federal requirements. GAO selected these channels using demographic and survey data relevant to older adults. GAO analyzed FDA and FTC data on enforcement actions for fiscal years 2006 through 2015—the most recent data available. GAO also reviewed relevant agency oversight policies, interviewed agency officials, and interviewed selected consumer and industry groups. What GAO Found GAO's market review during a 2-month period found most examples of memory supplement marketing on the Internet. About 96 percent of marketing identified appeared on the Internet, and a total of 490 memory supplement products were identified by the market review. GAO found 28 examples of advertisements that linked supplement use to treatment or prevention of memory-related diseases, which is generally prohibited by federal law. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officials subsequently determined that 27 of these examples appeared to violate federal requirements. Officials reported that they had issued two advisory letters to two firms and would continue monitoring all of the examples that were identified. Oversight of memory supplements falls under FDA's general authority to regulate dietary supplements and their labeling, and the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) general authority to enforce the prohibitions against deceptive advertising. Between 2006 and 2015, FDA and FTC have taken similar types of enforcement actions for memory supplements as for other dietary supplements—with most FDA actions being warning letters and FTC actions being a mix of administrative and federal court actions. Nineteen of 551enforcement actions involved memory supplements. The agencies coordinate enforcement actions in the same way for all dietary supplements. FDA and FTC have done some outreach to industry and consumers on dietary supplement use by older adults as well as some specific outreach related to memory supplement enforcement actions. In prioritizing enforcement and outreach efforts, the agencies focus on safety, egregiousness of deception, and impact of marketing. FDA faces challenges related to limited information about the dietary supplement market, including memory supplements, to inform its oversight efforts. FDA officials said the agency is exploring ways to obtain additional market information to improve its oversight. FTC officials believe their existing tools and information are sufficient to inform its oversight efforts. While Internet marketing of dietary supplements was a concern for agencies, consumers, and industry groups, GAO found that consumer groups were unclear about FDA's and FTC's roles for overseeing supplement marketing found on the Internet. FDA and FTC share oversight of marketing on the Internet, with FTC exercising primary jurisdiction over advertising on the Internet and FDA exercising primary jurisdiction over aspects considered to fall under labeling, including information provided at the point of sale. However, few documents explicitly delineate their differing roles and coordination in oversight, or communicate the roles to industry and consumers. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate quality information with external parties to achieve objectives, and GAO has also previously reported that delineating roles and responsibilities are issues agencies should consider when collaborating. Absent clarification of FDA and FTC roles, consumers may not understand which agency to report concerns to involving Internet marketing, and there is a risk that agencies may not receive consumer complaints directly, which may delay agencies taking action to address a problem. Consumer complaints are an important tool for both agencies to learn about potential dietary supplement issues, according to agency officials. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FDA and FTC provide additional guidance to consumers clarifying the agencies' differing roles in their shared oversight of memory supplement and other dietary supplement marketing on the Internet. The two agencies concurred with GAO's recommendation.
gao_GAO-14-355	gao_GAO-14-355_0	Just prior to publication of this report, USAID published fiscal year 2013 data for this indicator on its website. However, depending on which funds are counted toward the principal Local Solutions indicator, USAID’s progress toward its 30 percent target ranged from the 14 percent reported in its 2013 progress report to as high as 24 percent of mission program funds obligated to local organizations, as noted in data published on the agency’s website. USAID Funding to Local Organizations Increased in Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012, but Indicator Reporting Lacks Clarity USAID has reported on its principal Local Solutions indicator with and without cash transfers and before and after the addition of qualifying trust funds in two missions. Differences in USAID’s reporting on cash transfers and qualifying trust funds make it difficult to compare the indicator from year to year and quantify the progress needed to achieve its 30 percent target. If Afghanistan and Pakistan are excluded from the agency-wide indicator, the percentage of mission program funds obligated to local organizations in fiscal year 2012, including qualifying trust funds and cash transfers, drops from about 24 percent to about 14 percent. 2). USAID Cannot Demonstrate Progress toward Local Solutions Goals Based on Its Principal Indicator Alone and Without Tracking Relevant Evaluations USAID’s principal Local Solutions indicator does not fully reflect activities the agency carries out to achieve the initiative’s goals of strengthening partner-country capacity, enhancing and promoting country ownership, and increasing program sustainability. Principal Indicator Does Not Fully Capture Efforts to Implement the Local Solutions Initiative USAID’s principal indicator of progress under the Local Solutions initiative—the percentage of mission program funds obligated to local organizations—does not fully capture the activities the agency undertakes to achieve the goals of the initiative. Steps Taken by USAID to Evaluate the Local Solutions Initiative Do Not Include the Means to Track Relevant Evaluations USAID has laid some groundwork for evaluating the Local Solutions initiative but cannot currently determine the extent to which missions are planning or conducting evaluations the agency deems appropriate for understanding the long-term effectiveness of the initiative. Without a means to track evaluations of programs or projects that use a Local Solutions approach, USAID headquarters officials and stakeholders are not able to easily obtain evidence needed to demonstrate Local Solutions’ progress in achieving USAID’s Local Solutions goals related to country capacity, country ownership, and program sustainability. Recommendations for Executive Action We recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following three actions to improve the agency’s tracking and reporting on progress of its Local Solutions initiative: Clarify in future reporting the types of funding included in the percentage of USAID funds obligated to partner-country local organizations. Identify additional indicators to better capture Local Solutions progress toward the initiative’s goals. Provide a means to identify evaluations of programs that are implemented by partner-country local organizations. With regard to our third recommendation that USAID provide a means to identify evaluations of programs implemented by partner-country local organizations, USAID stated that it is introducing a tag in its evaluation registry to track the evaluation of projects that are directly implemented through local partners. The objectives of this report were to assess the extent to which USAID (1) has demonstrated progress toward achieving its 30 percent target, and (2) is tracking progress in achieving the Local Solutions goals of strengthening partner-country capacity to implement programs, enhancing and promoting country ownership, and increasing sustainability. To address these objectives, we reviewed USAID Local Solutions initiative documents, including the March 2013 USAID Forward progress report and agency documents published at the launch of the initiative that explain the rationale, baseline figures, and targets for the initiative. See figure 3 for the complete distribution of the funding amounts USAID missions obligated to local organizations in fiscal year 2012. In fiscal year 2010, USAID missions obligated 71 percent of local mission program funds to partner-country governments and 29 percent to local nonprofit and for-profit organizations and educational institutions.	Why GAO Did This Study Since 2010, USAID has undertaken a series of reforms, collectively called USAID Forward. One key reform, the Local Solutions initiative, aims to shift program implementation from U.S.- based and international organizations to partner-country organizations, including governments and for-profit and nonprofit organizations. The three overarching goals of the initiative are to strengthen the capacity of partner countries, to enhance and promote country ownership, and to increase the sustainability of development efforts. GAO was asked to review the implementation of this initiative. GAO assessed the extent to which USAID (1) has demonstrated progress toward achieving its fiscal year 2015 target for the principal Local Solutions indicator, and (2) is tracking progress in achieving the initiative's goals related to local partners' capacity, country ownership, and program sustainability. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed funding data and documents and interviewed USAID officials. What GAO Found The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) reporting on its principal Local Solutions indicator—the percentage of mission program funds obligated to local organizations in partner countries—lacks clarity, complicating the assessment of the agency's progress toward its fiscal year 2015 target of 30 percent. The March 2013 USAID Forward progress report states that these obligations increased from about 10 percent of mission program funds in fiscal year 2010 to about 14 percent in fiscal year 2012—a $465 million increase. However, the agency also has reported progress on the principal Local Solutions indicator in three other ways, depending on whether two key types of funding—cash transfers and certain qualifying trust funds—are included (see figure). These reporting differences make it difficult to compare the indicator from year to year and to quantify the progress needed to achieve the 30 percent target by fiscal year 2015. Moreover, USAID's approach to tracking the Local Solutions indicator has evolved since the launch of the initiative. For example, USAID included funds in Afghanistan and Pakistan, missions the agency previously had planned to exclude. If these missions are excluded, the percentage of mission program funds obligated to local organizations in fiscal year 2012, including qualifying trust funds and cash transfers, decreases by 10 percentage points. USAID's principal Local Solutions indicator does not fully reflect activities the agency has undertaken to implement the initiative, and USAID does not have a means to track relevant mission-led evaluations of programs implemented by partner-country organizations. USAID relied primarily on its principal Local Solutions indicator to demonstrate progress. While this principal indicator reflects, to some degree, the steps missions are required to take before obligating funds to local organizations, it provides no information about the status of activities both prior to and following obligation of funds, such as assessing risk and monitoring programs. Furthermore, although USAID has laid some groundwork for evaluating the Local Solutions initiative, the agency does not currently have the means to determine the extent to which missions are conducting performance evaluations to assess the effectiveness of programs implemented through local organizations. Such evaluations can provide evidence needed to demonstrate progress toward the initiative's goals related to local partners' capacity, country ownership, and program sustainability. What GAO Recommends USAID should (1) clarify in future reporting the types of funding included in the percentage of USAID funds obligated to partner-country local organizations, (2) identify additional indicators to better capture progress toward the initiative's goals, and (3) provide a means to identify evaluations of programs that used the initiative's approach. USAID neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations but identified actions it has ongoing to address these issues, and just prior to publication of this report released fiscal year 2013 data on its website that includes some clarifying information.
gao_GAO-16-681	gao_GAO-16-681_0	DHS developed the guidance to align with the first NECP and it now reflects the most recent NECP. Implementation of PKEMRA Provisions Has Enhanced Federal Support for State and Local Emergency Communications Efforts, but Federal Coordination Could Be Improved Enhanced Federal Support for State and Local Emergency Communications Efforts Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) OEC has enhanced support of state and local planning and other emergency communications activities. OEC has taken a number of steps aimed at ensuring that federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies have the plans, resources, and training they need to support interoperable emergency communications. The ECPC works to improve coordination and information sharing among federal emergency communications programs. In a 2012 report, we examined interagency collaborative mechanisms, such as interagency groups, and identified certain key features and issues to consider when implementing these mechanisms. State Emergency Communications Planning Has Improved Since PKEMRA, but States Face Funding and Other Challenges States’ Planning and Governance Structures have Improved since PKEMRA States, the District of Columbia, and territories (hereafter, states) responding to our survey reported that to better prepare for emergency communications during disasters, they have: (1) developed emergency communications plans, (2) established the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) positions, and (3) implemented governance structures to oversee emergency communications planning. Based on survey responses, prior to the enactment of PKEMRA in 2006, only a few states had emergency communications plans in place. The NECP encourages states to align their plans with the emergency communications goals in the NECP to establish a link between national communications priorities and state emergency communications planning. The NECP considers the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum as the essential foundation for achieving the NECP goals. Governance Structures Since PKEMRA, the NECP identified the need for formal governance structures to manage the systems of people, organizations, and technologies that need to collaborate to effectively plan for emergency communications during disasters, and most states responding to our survey reported that they have governance structures in place. As a collaborative entity, we found that while the ECPC’s efforts were consistent with most of the key features for effective collaboration, its efforts were not completely consistent with key features related to outcomes and accountability and clarity of roles and responsibilities. Lacking clearly defined strategic goals, the ECPC’s member agencies might not understand the ECPC’s goals or have a chance to ensure that the goals align with their own agencies’ purposes and goals. Furthermore, the ECPC’s focus groups have spent time and resources to make recommendations for improving emergency communications, but we found the focus groups’ recommendations, such as those related to federal grant programs and research and development efforts, are implemented at the discretion of the member agencies. Without a mechanism to track the recommendations, it is unclear the extent to which the recommendations are being implemented by the member agencies, and the ECPC is missing an opportunity to monitor its efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of the ECPC’s efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, as the administrative leader of the ECPC, take the following actions: clearly document the ECPC’s strategic goals; establish a mechanism to track progress by the ECPC’s member agencies in implementing the ECPC’s recommendations; and clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the ECPC’s member agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report focuses on three Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) emergency communications provisions related to planning and federal coordination: the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), and the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC). Specifically, we examined (1) federal efforts to implement these PKEMRA emergency communications provisions and (2) how states’ emergency communications planning has changed since PKEMRA and what challenges remain for the states. Are you likely to use the emergency communications plan in response to disasters in the future? (Written responses not included) Planning and Standard Operating Procedures 9.	Why GAO Did This Study During emergency situations, reliable communications are critical to ensure a rapid and sufficient response. PKEMRA was enacted in 2006 to improve the federal government's preparation for and response to disasters, including emergency communications. Since that time, natural and man-made disasters continue to test the nation's emergency communications capabilities. Given that states and localities are the first line of response following a disaster, states' emergency communications planning is very important. GAO was asked to review the implementation of PKEMRA. This report examines (1) federal efforts to implement PKEMRA emergency communications provisions related to planning and federal coordination, and (2) how states' emergency communications planning has changed since PKEMRA. GAO reviewed relevant reports and documentation from DHS and other agencies; surveyed SWICs from 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 5 territories, receiving 52 responses; assessed the ECPC's collaborative efforts; and interviewed federal and state officials selected for their emergency communications experience. GAO plans to review the implementation of other PKEMRA emergency communications provisions in future work. What GAO Found Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) provisions related to emergency communications planning and federal coordination has enhanced federal support for state and local efforts; however, federal coordination could be improved. PKEMRA created within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the Office of Emergency Communications, which has taken a number of steps aimed at ensuring that state and local agencies have the plans, resources, and training they need to support reliable emergency communications. PKEMRA also directed DHS to develop the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). The NECP includes goals for improving emergency communications and encourages states to align their plans with these emergency communications goals. PKEMRA further established the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC), comprising 14 member agencies, to improve coordination and information sharing among federal emergency communications programs. GAO previously identified key features and issues to consider when implementing collaborative mechanisms, including interagency groups like the ECPC. GAO found that the ECPC's collaborative efforts were consistent with most of these features, such as those related to leadership and resources, but were not fully consistent with others. For example, one of the key features calls for interagency groups to clearly define goals and track progress, yet the ECPC has not done so. As a result, the ECPC's member agencies might not understand the ECPC's goals or have a chance to ensure that the goals align with their own agencies' purposes and goals. Furthermore, the ECPC puts forth recommendations that could improve emergency communications. But the recommendations are implemented at the discretion of the ECPC's member agencies and are not tracked. Without a mechanism to track the ECPC's recommendations, it is unclear the extent to which the recommendations are being implemented and the ECPC is missing an opportunity to monitor its progress. Almost all of the Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (SWIC) responding to GAO's survey reported that to better plan for emergency communications during disasters, their states have taken the following steps since PKEMRA: (1) developed comprehensive strategic plans for emergency communications that align with the NECP; (2) established SWIC positions to support state emergency communications initiatives, such as developing high-level policy and coordinating training and exercises; and (3) implemented governance structures to manage the systems of people, organizations, and technologies that need to collaborate to effectively plan for emergencies. GAO did not independently verify state responses. In responding to GAO's survey, most SWICs reported not having a comprehensive emergency communications plans in place prior to PKEMRA's 2006 enactment. In particular, prior to the enactment of PKEMRA, only a few states had comprehensive emergency communications plans in place, but now all but one have such a plan. Most of the SWICs also reported that their statewide plans cover key elements, such as governance, standard operating procedures, and training and exercises, which are considered by DHS as the essential foundation for achieving the NECP goals. What GAO Recommends GAO is making recommendations to DHS aimed at improving the ECPC's collaborative efforts, including defining its goals and tracking its recommendations. DHS concurred with the recommendations.
gao_NSIAD-98-213	gao_NSIAD-98-213_0	Specifically, we determined (1) the rate and timing of attrition, (2) the extent of DOD’s investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees, (3) reasons for attrition after training, (4) servicemembers’ perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition, and (5) actions DOD and the services are taking to reduce enlistees’ attrition. High First-Term Attrition Results in a Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting and Training Investment About one-third of all enlistees who entered the services between fiscal year 1982 and 1993 did not complete their first contract terms. DOD’s attrition rates throughout this period are somewhat higher than reported because they do not include some enlistees who were allowed to separate early for various reasons, such as to attend a civilian school or to allow the services to meet mandated end strengths. Using these earlier costs, we estimate that the services spent $1.3 billion on recruiting and training the enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 but did not complete their first terms. In fact, these rates were higher than they had been in over a decade. A Large Portion of Attrition Occurs Between Enlistees’ 7th and 48th Month of Service An analysis of the 35.8-percent attrition rate for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 indicates that 13.6 percent of all enlistees were separated before they had completed 6 months of service or less. For the 72,670 enlistees who did not complete their first terms, 27,624 were separated in this initial period. The services’ sometimes extreme variations in the percentages of their separations for a given official reason suggest that the services interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of these explanations. 3.1 through 3.4 show each service’s major reasons for separation by gender.) Our recommendations were incorporated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. All four services take drug use very seriously. The Air Force and the Army have set specific numeric targets for reducing attrition, and the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps report that they have been successful in reducing attrition in some areas. As a result, any success these efforts experience in lowering attrition may be either coincidental or have the unintended effect of retaining enlistees who really should be separated. It has also set numerical targets for reducing attrition rates. In our 1997 report on attrition from basic training, we made recommendations to DOD and the services on ways to improve the use of separation codes to build a database for DOD to manage attrition. In concurring with our recommendations, DOD agreed to direct the services to (1) review their 90-day release policies and the exceptions granted to those policies, (2) prepare a report on quality-of-life issues that could be addressed to reduce attrition, (3) provide local commanders with guidance and formal policy changes related to specific types of attrition the services target for remedial action, (4) reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharges to enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation to ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete their first terms, and (5) prepare a report by October 1999 documenting service initiatives related to our recommendations.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed historical attrition rates for enlisted personnel who serve at least 6 months but leave military service before completing their first contract terms, focusing on: (1) the rate and timing of attrition during enlistees' first terms; (2) the extent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees; (3) reasons for first-term attrition after training; (4) service members' perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition; and (5) actions DOD and the armed services are taking to reduce enlistees' attrition. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) first-term attrition has been a long-standing and complex problem for the services; (2) while all four services are concerned about attrition, they have made few formal policy changes aimed at reducing attrition in specific target populations; (3) although the services collect survey data to assess attitudes about military service and quality of life, they do not use this data to analyze why separations are occurring or to formulate policy changes or actions aimed at reducing early attrition; (4) between fiscal year (FY) 1982 through FY 1993, 31.7 percent of all enlistees did not complete their first terms of service; (5) for Army, Navy, and Air Force enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993, attrition rates were higher than they had been in over a decade; (6) DOD's data on attrition does not include all enlistees allowed to separate early from the military; (7) using the FY 1993 cost estimates, GAO calculates that the services spent $1.3 billion on the 72,670 enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993 and departed prematurely; (8) because these enlistees were separated early, the services did not get a full return on their investment; (9) official reasons for the separation of enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993 varied by gender and service; (10) variances in the types of separations among the services indicate that the services interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of these explanations; (11) in its 1997 report on attrition from basic training, GAO recommended ways for DOD to improve the use of these separation codes to build a more complete database on reasons for servicewide attrition; (12) GAO's recommendations have been incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998, and DOD has begun to comply with these legislative requirements; (13) all four services are concerned about attrition, and the Army and the Air Force have set numerical targets for reducing it; (14) GAO found that the services did not always have adequate data on the exact reasons for separation; (15) without such data and formal policy changes, numerical targets will be arbitrary, and success in reducing attrition may either be coincidental or result in the failure to discharge enlistees who really should be separated; and (16) allowing many enlistees to easily separate with honorable discharges may inadvertently serve as a disincentive for them to persevere.
gao_GAO-01-616	gao_GAO-01-616_0	Background Traditionally, HCFA’s claims administration contractors performed most of Medicare’s program safeguard functions. In May 1999, HCFA selected 12 entities to act as PSCs, using a competitive bidding process. Also, HCFA has not yet developed clear, measurable criteria to evaluate PSCs’ performance on the individual task orders. HCFA’s Implementation of the PSC Task Orders Lacks a Strategic Direction HCFA lacks a strategy for determining how best to use the PSCs in the long term. While an incremental, experimental approach for implementing its new contracting authority may be prudent in the short term, a long term strategy would help HCFA to better target its PSC resources and provide a basis for deciding where and how to use the PSCs to promote program integrity. This ad hoc approach has provided HCFA significant flexibility in targeting its task orders on known problem areas and in using the PSCs in different ways. However, it does not represent a strategy for systematically testing different PSC options and for building upon the results of one task order to issue future task orders—a strategy we believe would provide HCFA with a sound basis for deciding how best to use its PSC resources. We believe it is important for HCFA to now define its goals for the PSCs and determine how it will evaluate different options for PSC integration into Medicare’s program safeguard efforts. Appendix I: Comments From the Health Care Financing Administration Appendix II: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgments	Why GAO Did This Study The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) chose 12 claims administration contractors in 1999 to act as program safeguard contractors (PSC) for Medicare. This report examines (1) HCFA's progress in implementing its PSC contracting authority and (2) whether HCFA could better manage the PSCs to ensure their most effective use. What GAO Found GAO found that HCFA is experimenting with different options for integrating the PSCs into Medicare's program safeguard activities. Between September 1999 and March 2001, HCFA issued 15 task orders that include different ways of using PSC services. HCFA lacks a long-term strategy to determine how best to use the PSCs. Instead, it has issued task orders in an ad-hoc manner, which has afforded HCFA certain flexibilities, such as targeting its task orders on known problem areas. Although this experimental approach may be prudent in the short-term, it does not represent a process for systematically testing different options for using PSC services in the long-term. Also, HCFA has not set formal criteria and timeframes for determining how the PSCs should be integrated into Medicare's existing program integrity efforts. Finally, HCFA has not established clear, measurable performance criteria to assess the PSCs' performance on individual task orders.
gao_GAO-06-86	gao_GAO-06-86_0	Accountability. SEC Has Made Progress on Strategic Human Capital Initiatives and Is Developing a Strategic Human Capital Plan SEC has shown progress on a number of strategic human capital management initiatives that could help strengthen SEC’s efforts in workforce planning and is developing its strategic human capital plan. These initiatives include splitting its Office of Administrative and Personnel Management into the Office of Administrative Services and OHR in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in both and creating a more structured and institutionalized human capital council by expanding the role of the ERB, now called the HCRB. Furthermore, SEC is in the process of creating its first strategic human capital plan. According to SEC, this plan is to be based on OPM’s HCAAF. One outcome of the 2003 review was the decision to split SEC’s Office of Administrative and Personnel Management into two offices—the Office of Administrative Services and OHR. In addition, the split created an opportunity for SEC to hire an Associate Executive Director for OHR, who is tasked with assessing, developing, and implementing human resources programs. OHR also stated that it plans to conduct an annual review to ensure that the human capital plan remains linked to the agency’s strategic plan and to correct any gaps between the plan’s human capital initiatives and the ability to meet the agency’s strategic goals. Components of SEC Workforce Planning Efforts Are Consistent with Established Principles, but Some Efforts Could Be Improved We found that many of SEC’s efforts related to workforce planning were consistent with our five key principles for effective strategic workforce planning; however, some of these efforts are still being developed or could be improved. As discussed previously, biweekly HCRB meetings are chaired by the Executive Director. Although OHR has communicated with SEC staff on some human capital matters, it has not sought feedback from all employees in the development of SEC’s strategic human capital plan. Principle 2: SEC Has Been Taking Steps to Track and Identify Critical Skills and Competencies; However, It Currently Lacks a Formal Process for Identifying and Linking These Skills to Strategic Goals SEC has been developing tools to measure needed skills and training for its employees, but currently relies on management’s informal knowledge of the skills and competencies possessed and needed within agency divisions. This is particularly important to SEC as it responds to changes in legislation affecting its responsibilities and substantial growth in the size of its workforce. However, because many of the human capital strategies have only recently been implemented, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of these strategies. Principle 4: SEC Is Addressing Administrative, Educational, and Other Requirements Important to Supporting Workforce Strategies Overall, SEC has been addressing many of the administrative, educational, and other requirements to support human capital programs and workforce strategies, including (1) educating managers and employees on the use of flexibilities, (2) streamlining and improving administrative processes, and (3) building transparency and accountability into its human capital system. Principle 5: SEC Is Developing Additional Human Capital Measures and a Formal Process by Which to Link the Achievement of Its Human Capital and Strategic Goals Our prior agencywide work found that agencies should develop appropriate performance measures to link human capital measures with strategic goals.	Why GAO Did This Study Corporate failures and accounting scandals led to changes in legislation governing U.S. securities markets, which resulted in increased workload demands on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, Congress provided SEC with substantial budgetary increases to obtain more resources to help fulfill the agency's mission. GAO was asked to review SEC's strategic workforce planning efforts to efficiently and effectively utilize its resources. This report discusses (1) the progress SEC has made toward developing a strategic human capital plan and (2) whether SEC uses effective strategic workforce planning principles for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff. What GAO Found SEC has taken steps to implement a number of strategic human capital management initiatives, including developing its strategic human capital plan. In 2004, SEC split its Office of Administrative and Personnel Management into the Office of Administrative Services and the Office of Human Resources (OHR), allowing the agency to separate its administrative and personnel functions and hire an associate executive director to focus on assessing, developing, and implementing human capital programs. In April 2005, SEC created a more structured human capital council by expanding the role of the Executive Resources Board (ERB), now called the Human Capital Review Board (HCRB). The HCRB includes senior management from all major divisions and offices, the Chairman's office, the Executive Director, and OHR and follows a more formalized and regular process for reviewing and approving human capital decisions. According to SEC, as of November 2005, the agency was in the process of creating its first strategic human capital plan, which will be based on the Office of Personnel Management's Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework, but it has not set a completion date. GAO also found that many of SEC's efforts related to workforce planning to date have been consistent with five key principles for effective strategic workforce planning; however, some of these efforts were still being developed or could be improved. Specifically: SEC has involved top management and a variety of stakeholders during the development of its strategic human capital plan, but only some employees will have the opportunity to provide feedback before the plan is finalized; SEC has been taking steps to identify needed critical skills and competencies, but it lacks a formal process for identifying existing skills among staff and linking them to SEC's strategic goals; SEC has been using human capital strategies to address workforce needs and skill gaps, but some of these strategies have not been in place long enough to assess results; SEC is developing or changing many of the administrative, educational, and other requirements to support workforce strategies, particularly pertaining to the use of human capital flexibilities; and SEC is developing additional human capital indicators and a more formal process by which to measure the achievement of its human capital goals. However, SEC currently does not formally evaluate the effectiveness of its human capital strategies in fulfilling SEC's strategic goals.
gao_AIMD-95-22	gao_AIMD-95-22_0	System Outages Due to Software and Hardware Malfunctions The system outages experienced by NASD in July and August were due to malfunctioning software and hardware. For example, individual investors were not significantly affected and did not report complaints regarding the outages. Conversely, market makers were impacted because they did not have the benefit of NASD’s automated quotation and trading system to conduct business. While NASD Prepares for Contingencies, Management and System Control Weaknesses Exist NASD has taken significant steps to prepare its systems for contingencies and disasters. It operates a backup computer facility to be used if there are problems or outages at the primary computer site. For example, the Commission established an Office of Automation and International Markets and issued an automation review policy that encourages the securities markets to perform independent reviews of their automated systems and operations in such areas as contingency and disaster planning. While SEC has made progress in strengthening oversight of market automation, gaps still exist in its oversight program. Recommendations We recommend that the Chairman, SEC, ensure that NASD expands testing processes for its market systems to better detect performs a thorough assessment of its existing systems environment to avoids implementing software changes on potentially volatile trading days; corrects weaknesses in its contingency and disaster recovery plan and backup data processing facility; and regularly schedules and conducts audits of its market systems. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Association of Securities Dealers, and to other interested parties.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed recent computer outages experienced by the National Association of Securities Dealers' (NASD) automated quotation and trading systems (NASDAQ), focusing on: (1) the nature and causes of the outages; (2) the outages' impact on market participants; (3) NASD planned responses to contingencies and disasters; (4) NASD oversight of its automated systems and facilities; and (5) how well the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is ensuring that the securities markets are prepared for contingencies and disasters. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) unrelated software and hardware malfunctions caused the NASDAQ outages; (2) although NASD has seriously sought to make its systems more reliable, there are areas where it needs to make further improvements, such as testing new software; (3) although the outages did not significantly affect individual investors, they severely hampered broker-dealers's ability to perform best and efficient securities trades; (4) control weaknesses at the NASD backup computer facility and in NASD contingency and disaster plans could make it difficult for NASD to recover quickly from disasters; (5) NASD failure to include market systems reviews in its internal audits limits its systems oversight; and (6) although SEC has strengthened oversight of market automation in some areas, weaknesses still exist in its oversight program.
gao_GAO-08-291	gao_GAO-08-291_0	1). Bison, as well as wildlife such as elk, may carry the bacterial disease brucellosis, which is also contagious to humans and domestic animals. 3). In 2004, the National Research Council defined adaptive management as a process that promotes flexible decision making in the face of uncertainties, as outcomes from management actions and other events become better understood. Agencies Have Made Less Progress Than Anticipated in Implementing the Interagency Bison Management Plan The partner federal and state agencies have made less progress in implementing the interagency bison management plan than they originally anticipated. Specifically, the agencies have not yet met two significant conditions for moving into step two: first, that no cattle graze on the Royal Teton Ranch north of Yellowstone National Park and, second, that a safe and effective remote vaccine-delivery mechanism be available. The agencies have, however, completed a number of other tasks called for in the plan, including management actions to keep bison and cattle separate in space and time; some scientific research, such as investigating the persistence of the Brucella abortus bacterium in the environment; and additional measures to prevent the spread of the disease to livestock. The agencies have spent in excess of $2 million annually on plan implementation since 2002, with the federal government funding at least 95 percent of these costs and the state agencies funding the remainder. Agencies Remain in Step One of a Three-Step Plan Although the federal and state partner agencies had anticipated progressing to step two on the north and west sides of the park by winter 2002–2003, they have not yet met the following two significant conditions necessary for doing so: On the park’s north side, the remaining condition for moving to step two is that cattle no longer graze on the Royal Teton Ranch north of the park. 5). National Park Service and APHIS expenditures make up most of the federal spending. Agencies Have Not Revised Plan Timeline Estimates The agencies have no estimate for how long it will take to complete the remaining two conditions for moving to step two, nor do they have plans to revise their estimated dates for moving to step three, which they had expected to reach by winter 2005–2006. Key Deficiencies in the Plan, and the Agencies’ Implementation of It, Limit Their Effectiveness with Regard to Managing Bison-Related Issues Key deficiencies in the bison management plan, and the agencies’ implementation of it, limit their effectiveness with regard to managing bison-related issues. But their efforts to implement an adaptive management approach have been undermined because all components of adaptive management—from collecting information about their management actions through a systematic monitoring program to adjusting their management actions—should flow from clearly defined objectives, which are absent from the plan. In addition, while adaptive management principles emphasize effectively managed partnerships and active involvement of stakeholders, the agencies have acted more as individual entities than as a cohesive interagency group, and they have not adequately communicated with or involved stakeholders. Consequently, the agencies’ decision making lacks accountability and transparency, more often resembling trial and error or crisis management, rather than adaptive management. Absent explicitly stated, clearly defined, measurable objectives, the agencies share no common view regarding how they are assessing the effectiveness of the bison management plan. For example: Most of the agency officials referred to the overarching dual-purpose statement—“to maintain a wild, free-ranging population of bison and address the risk of brucellosis transmission to protect the economic interests and viability of the livestock industry in Montana”—as their guide for measuring the plan’s effectiveness. The agencies have conducted research on some critical uncertainties related to bison and brucellosis. Agency Comments We provided the federal departments of Agriculture and the Interior; Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks; and the Montana Department of Livestock a draft of this report for review and comment. Key contributors are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine (1) the progress made in implementing the interagency bison management plan and (2) the soundness of the plan and the effectiveness of the agencies’ implementation of it with regard to managing bison-related issues in the Greater Yellowstone Area. We also interviewed officials from the Park Service; the Forest Service; APHIS; Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks; and the Montana Department of Livestock. 2.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal and Montana state agencies have long been entangled in controversy over bison leaving Yellowstone National Park. Some of these bison, as well as elk and other wildlife, have a contagious disease called brucellosis, which can cause pregnant animals to abort. Montana livestock owners and government officials fear that if bison are allowed to leave the park, the disease could spread to cattle, potentially threatening the economic health of the state's livestock industry. To help manage this issue, three federal and two state agencies have been implementing a bison management plan that they agreed to in 2000. This report discusses (1) the progress made in implementing the bison management plan and (2) the plan's soundness and the effectiveness of the agencies' implementation of it for managing bison-related issues in and near Yellowstone National Park. GAO reviewed documentation and research on bison and brucellosis and interviewed federal and state officials and key stakeholders. What GAO Found The federal and state agencies implementing the interagency bison management plan have made less progress than they originally anticipated. These agencies--the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Forest Service; the Department of the Interior's National Park Service; Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks; and the Montana Department of Livestock--had expected to progress to step two of the three-step plan by winter 2002-2003. Each of the plan's three successive steps for managing bison is intended to incrementally increase tolerance of bison roaming outside the park. As of late 2007, however, the agencies remained in step one because they have yet to meet two important conditions for moving to step two--first, that no cattle graze on a ranch north of the park, and second, that a safe and effective remote brucellosis vaccine-delivery system be available for bison. Nevertheless, the agencies have completed a number of other tasks called for in the plan, including maintaining the separation of bison and cattle in space and time and conducting some scientific research. Combined, the agencies have spent more than $2 million annually implementing the plan, with the federal government and state agencies funding about 95 percent and 5 percent of these expenditures, respectively. The agencies have no estimate regarding how long it will take to meet the conditions for starting step two, nor have they revised their estimated dates for reaching step three, which was expected by winter 2005-2006. Key deficiencies in the plan, and the agencies' implementation of it, limit their effectiveness with regard to managing bison-related issues. The plan has two broadly stated goals: to "maintain a wild, free-ranging population of bison and address the risk of brucellosis transmission." The plan, however, contains no clearly defined, measurable objectives as to how these goals will be achieved, and the partner agencies have no common view of the objectives. As a result, the agencies have no way to determine the effectiveness of the plan or of their management efforts. Also, in developing the plan, the agencies adopted an adaptive management approach that promotes flexible decision making in the face of uncertainties as outcomes from management actions and other events become better understood. But the agencies have not adequately implemented adaptive management, in that they (1) have not established critical linkages among clearly defined objectives (which are absent from the plan), information about the impacts of their management actions obtained through systematic monitoring, and decisions regarding adjustments they make to the plan and their management actions; (2) have continued to act more as individual entities, rather than as a cohesive interagency group; and (3) have not adequately communicated with or involved key stakeholders, such as conservation groups, livestock industry groups, and private landowners. Consequently, their decision making more often resembles trial and error than adaptive management and also lacks accountability and transparency.
gao_GAO-01-489	gao_GAO-01-489_0	The District is now in its fourth year of implementing its new financial management system. Major Components of the District’s System of Accounting and Reporting Are Not Operational Financial management requires that financial and program managers be accountable for financial results of actions taken, control over the government’s financial resources, and protection of assets. In addition, the District has not yet implemented the fixed asset module of SOAR. Status of District Efforts to Improve Its Budget Process As discussed earlier, the District has placed the implementation of the Performance Budgeting system module on hold. District officials need to take time now to assess the current status of the city’s financial management system, to identify problems, and to establish a disciplined process to address these problems through the completion of its financial systems implementation. Further, the implementation of systems that feed into SOAR— personnel and payroll, procurement, and tax —is incomplete and the systems lack electronic interfaces with SOAR. Both of these modules are key components of the SOAR system. Study the accounting and financial management information needs of the District of Columbia government.	Why GAO Did This Study The District of Columbia is acquiring a new financial management system to improve its accountability over government expenditures. This report assesses the status of the District of Columbia's implementation of important components of this system, including its new core general ledger System of Accounting and Reporting (SOAR). What GAO Found GAO found that although the District is in its fourth year of implementing its new financial management system, essential elements of the system are not yet operational. Two components of SOAR have not been fully implemented: the budget module is on hold, and the fixed assets module is incomplete. The implementation of the systems that feed into SOAR--personnel and payroll, procurement, and tax--is incomplete and the systems lack electronic interfaces with SOAR. Because the financial management system is incomplete, much of the District's financial management and budget information is produced through cumbersome, manual processes and the extraordinary efforts of a few key staff. District officials need to take time to assess the current status of the city's financial system, to identify problems, and to establish a disciplined process to address these problems through the completion of its financial systems implementation.
gao_GAO-12-437	gao_GAO-12-437_0	Restructuring continued throughout 2011 and into 2012, adding to costs and extending the schedules for achieving key activities. The new JSF baseline projects a total acquisition cost of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior 2007 baseline. Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline. Unit cost estimates continue to increase and have now doubled since the start of development. Over the long haul, affordability is a key challenge. Projected annual acquisition funding needs average more than $12.5 billion through 2037 and life-cycle operating and support costs are estimated at $1.1 trillion. About 6 percent of this total funding requirement has been appropriated through fiscal year 2011. Since the department still plans to eventually acquire the full complement of U.S. aircraft—2,443 production jets—the procurement costs, fielding schedules, and support requirements for the deferred aircraft will be incurred in future years beyond 2017. With the latest reduction, the program now plans to procure a total of 365 aircraft through 2017, about one-fourth of the 1,591 aircraft expected in the 2002 plan. If future funding is not available at these projected levels, the impacts on unit costs and program viability are unclear. Comparative data for the Navy’s CV and Marine Corps’ STOVL with the legacy aircraft to be replaced was not available. Mixed Performance in 2011 Affected by Concurrency and Technical Risks Much of the instability in the JSF program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities. During 2011, overall performance was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 primary objectives for the year. Developmental flight testing gained momentum and had tangible success, but it has a long road ahead with testing of the most complex software and advanced capabilities still in the future. Even with the progress in 2011, most development flight testing, including the most challenging, still lies ahead. Late releases of software have delayed testing and training and added costs. For example, only 4 percent of mission systems requirements planned in system development and demonstration have been verified. The program has experienced significant challenges developing and integrating mission systems software. and logistics systems are critical to realizing the The helmet mounted display in particular continues to have significant technical deficiencies that make it less functional than legacy equipment. Contract Overruns and Concurrency Costs Indicate the Program Has Not Yet Stabilized Design and Manufacturing The program has not yet demonstrated a stable design and manufacturing process capable of efficient production. Engineering changes are persisting at relatively high rates and additional changes will be needed as testing continues. Until manufacturing processes are in control and engineering design changes resulting from information gained during developmental testing are reduced, there is risk of further cost growth. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term procurement quantities, DOD is still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while flight testing has years to go. Cost overruns on each of the first four annual procurement contracts are currently projected to total about $1 billion (see table 3). Each was delivered more than 1 year late. This is in addition to the $672 million for the government’s share of contract cost overruns. Conclusions The JSF remains the critical centerpiece of DOD’s long-term tactical aircraft portfolio. Substantial concurrency costs are expected to continue for several more years. If funding demands cannot be fully met, it would be important for congressional and defense decisionmakers to understand the programmatic and cost impacts from lower levels of funding; however, DOD officials have not thoroughly analyzed JSF impacts should funding expectations be unmet. Effectively managing the expanding network of global suppliers and improving the supply chain will be key to improving cost and schedule outcomes, increasing manufacturing throughput, and enabling higher production rates. Finally, because of the complexity and criticality of the global supply chain that has already experienced some problems, we recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics direct the JSF program office to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the supply chain and transportation network to ensure it is organized, secure, and capable of producing and delivering parts in the quantities and times needed to effectively and efficiently build and sustain over 3,000 aircraft for the U.S. and international partners. We also discussed related software development, test, and integration with Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Director, Operational Test, and Evaluation (DOT&E) officials and reviewed DOT&E annual assessments of the JSF program, the Joint Strike Fighter Operational Test Team Report, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review. The program undergoes re-plan to address higher than expected design weight, which added $7 billion and 18 months to development schedule. DOD concurred with all three of the recommendations. Appendix IV: Budgeted Funding and Procurement Quantities, FY 2011-2017 Procurement funding Air Force (CTOL) Appendix V: Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing Aircraft Probation Period and Progress In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense placed the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft on “probation” for 2 years, citing technical issues unique to the variant that would add to the aircraft’s cost and weight. GAO-11-323R.	Why GAO Did This Study The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defenses (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical to DODs long-term recapitalization plans to replace hundreds of legacy aircraft. Total U.S. investment is now projected at nearly $400 billion to develop and acquire 2,457 aircraft through 2037 and will require a long-term, sustained funding commitment. The JSF has been extensively restructured over the last 2 years to address relatively poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. This report, prepared in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, addresses (1) JSF program cost and schedule changes and affordability issues; (2) performance objectives, testing results, and technical risks; and (3) contract costs, concurrency impacts, and manufacturing. GAOs work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials. What GAO Found Joint Strike Fighter restructuring continued throughout 2011 and into 2012, adding to cost and schedule. The new program baseline projects total acquisition costs of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior 2007 baseline. Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline. Unit costs per aircraft have doubled since start of development in 2001. Critical dates for delivering warfighter requirements remain unsettled because of program uncertainties. While the total number of aircraft DOD plans to buy has not changed, it has for 3 straight years reduced near-term procurement quantities, deferring aircraft and costs to future years. Since 2002, the total quantity through 2017 has been reduced by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365. Affordability is a key challengeannual acquisition funding needs average about $12.5 billion through 2037 and life-cycle operating and support costs are estimated at $1.1 trillion. DOD has not thoroughly analyzed program impacts should funding expectations be unmet. Overall performance in 2011 was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 important objectives. Developmental flight testing gained momentum and is now about 21 percent complete with the most challenging tasks still ahead. Performance of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant improved this year and its probation period to fix deficiencies was ended after 1 year with several fixes temporary and untested. Developing and integrating the more than 24 million lines of software code continues to be of concern. Late software releases and concurrent work on multiple software blocks have delayed testing and training. Development of critical mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky. To date, only 4 percent of the mission systems required for full capability have been verified. Deficiencies with the helmet mounted display, integral to mission systems functionality and concepts of operation, are most problematic. The autonomic logistics information system, integral technology for improving aircraft availability and lowering support costs, is not fully developed. Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities. Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts total more than $1 billion and aircraft deliveries are on average more than 1 year late. Program officials said the governments share of the cost growth is $672 million; this adds about $11 million to the price of each of the 63 aircraft under those contracts. Effectively managing the expanding network of global suppliers will be key to improving program outcomes, increasing manufacturing throughput, and enabling higher production rates. In addition to contract overruns, concurrency costs of at least $373 million have been incurred on production aircraft to correct deficiencies found in testing. The manufacturing process is still absorbing higher than expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, changes which are expected to persist at elevated levels into 2019, making it difficult to achieve efficient production rates. More design and manufacturing changes are expected as testing continues, bringing risks for more contract overruns and concurrency costs. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term production quantities, DOD still plans to procure 365 aircraft for $69 billion before developmental flight tests are completed. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that (1) DOD analyze cost and program impacts from potentially reduced future funding levels and (2) assess the capability and challenges facing the JSFs global supply chain. DOD concurred with the second recommendation and agreed with the value of the first, but believed its annual budget efforts are sufficient. GAO maintains that more robust data is needed and could be useful to congressional deliberations.
gao_GAO-15-68	gao_GAO-15-68_0	Change in SBIR Program Eligibility Has Had Little Impact In 2013, HHS and DOE each provided a written determination to SBA and Congress prior to making SBIR awards to majority-owned portfolio companies. DOE’s written determination covered one of its two subunits that participate in SBIR, the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), which according to agency officials accounted for about 4 percent of the DOE SBIR awards in fiscal year 2013.officials told us that by opening their SBIR programs to majority-owned NIH and ARPA-E portfolio companies, they would help ensure that they received the highest quality applications with the best scientific research, regardless of whether a small business has venture capital support. awards made comprise less than 1 percent of NIH’s and ARPA-E’s SBIR applications and awards. ARPA-E and NIH collectively received a total of 20 applications from majority-owned portfolio companies in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, compared to 11,906 applications from applicants that were not majority-owned portfolio companies. The representatives said they did not encounter any significant problems applying for SBIR awards or receiving SBIR funds. Most Participating Agencies Have Not Exercised Their Authority to Open Their SBIR Programs to Majority-Owned Portfolio Companies Nine agencies have chosen not to open their SBIR programs to majority- owned portfolio companies, and therefore have not submitted a written determination to do so. All but one of the agencies told us they may reevaluate their decisions in the future, but generally did not have any specific plans for doing so. Officials at the Departments of Commerce and Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency said they are waiting to see how the change in eligibility affected ARPA-E and NIH before they reconsider implementing the change at their own agency. Some Agencies Are Interpreting the Written Determination as a Potentially Stringent Requirement In our discussions with the nine participating agencies that did not open their SBIR programs to majority-owned portfolio companies, we found that six agencies viewed the written determination as a potentially stringent requirement. The NDAA requires agencies to submit a written determination to SBA and Congress at least 30 days before making SBIR awards to majority-owned portfolio companies. SBA reviews these determinations, but it does not approve or deny them. Officials at the National Science Foundation told us that they did not have the evidence to support the written determination outcomes, while a program manager at the Department of Agriculture said that the requirement is an administrative burden, and if the barrier was lower, the agency might allow majority-owned portfolio companies to participate in its SBIR program. The policy directive essentially uses the same language as the NDAA and does not provide any specific guidance on what evidence participating agencies may need to consider to comply with the written determination requirement. According to the SBA officials, SBA meets routinely with SBIR program managers, and no agency has raised concerns about the written determination requirement. In its proposed and final rules implementing the NDAA provisions, SBA stated one potential benefit of the rule is to provide more businesses with access to the SBIR program, which would increase competition and the quality of proposals and spur innovation. Nonetheless, by providing additional guidance on the requirement, SBA could better inform the agencies about the evidence that they may consider in the written determination to explain how making SBIR awards to majority-owned portfolio companies will, among other things, induce additional venture capital or similar funding of small business innovation and substantially contribute to the agency’s mission. SBA is not responsible for encouraging or discouraging agencies to use the new authority and expand eligibility to include majority-owned portfolio companies, but SBA, as the program administrator, could be missing an opportunity to help agencies better understand the evidence required for the written determination, which could inform agencies’ decisions about whether to expand their program. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure that participating agencies understand the requirements of the NDAA provisions applicable to allowing majority-owned portfolio companies to apply for SBIR awards, we recommend that the Administrator of the Small Business Administration discuss the evidence required for the written determination with the participating agencies, such as at their monthly meeting or as part of another outreach effort, and, if needed, and in consultation with the participating agencies, amend its SBIR Policy Directive to provide additional guidance. SBA, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Transportation, and the National Science Foundation provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. Our recommendation addresses this issue, and SBA’s plan to discuss the written determination with SBIR program managers at a future meeting is consistent with our recommendation.	Why GAO Did This Study The SBIR program provides grants and contracts to small businesses to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. The 2011 SBIR reauthorization included a provision that gave agencies the option to allow majority-owned portfolio companies to participate in SBIR. SBA issued a rule to implement the statutory provision, which became effective in January 2013. The reauthorization act requires agencies to submit a written determination to SBA and Congress, explaining how such awards will, among other things, significantly contribute to the agency's mission, before making SBIR awards to majority-owned portfolio companies. The reauthorization mandated GAO to review the impact of this provision every 3 years. This is the first report under the mandate, and it examines (1) the impact of allowing majority-owned portfolio companies to participate in agency SBIR programs and (2) the extent to which agencies have elected to expand their SBIR programs to include majority-owned portfolio companies. GAO reviewed agency rules, policies, and other documents; analyzed SBIR data; and interviewed program officials from SBA and the 11 participating agencies, industry associations, and majority-owned portfolio companies. What GAO Found Two of the 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE)—opted to open part of their SBIR programs to small businesses that are majority-owned by multiple venture capital or similar firms (majority-owned portfolio companies), allowing such companies to apply for and receive SBIR awards. Specifically, HHS's National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Energy's Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) opted to allow such companies to participate. For fiscal years 2013 and 2014, NIH and ARPA-E collectively received 20 applications from majority-owned portfolio companies and made 12 SBIR awards to them, totaling about $7.9 million. SBIR applications received and awards made to these companies comprise less than 1 percent of NIH and ARPA-E's SBIR applications and awards. NIH and ARPA-E officials said the change to allow majority-owned portfolio companies to apply for SBIR awards helps ensure that their SBIR programs receive the best research proposals. For various reasons, the remaining nine agencies participating in SBIR have not submitted a written determination to allow them to make SBIR awards to majority-owned portfolio companies. According to officials from these agencies, they did not conduct any formal analysis but considered various factors, such as whether the change would significantly increase the number of applications, what administrative resources would be required to implement the change, and whether they had the evidence needed to prepare a written determination. All but one of the agencies told GAO that they may reevaluate their decision in the future, but did not have any specific plans for doing so. Officials from several agencies said that they wanted to see how the change in eligibility affected NIH and ARPA-E before implementing the change at their agencies. GAO also found that some agencies viewed the written determination as a potentially stringent requirement. For their written determinations, NIH and ARPA-E did not conduct any independent research on majority-owned portfolio companies (nor were they specifically required to do so), but NIH cited related research. In contrast, six agencies viewed the written determination as potentially requiring independent analysis. Five agencies told GAO that they did not have the evidence or research needed to support a written determination, and another agency said it might consider opting in if it were easier to do so. According to SBA, the written determination is a notification letter that SBA reviews but does not approve or deny. SBA officials said they meet routinely with SBIR program managers, and this issue has not been raised. SBA updated its SBIR Policy Directive to include the written determination requirement but essentially used the same language as the reauthorization act without providing any specific guidance. In SBA's rule implementing the reauthorization act, SBA stated the rule's potential benefit is to provide more businesses with access to the SBIR program, which could increase competition and the quality of proposals and spur innovation. SBA is not responsible for encouraging or discouraging agencies to expand eligibility to include such companies, but SBA also has not discussed the issue with them. SBA could be missing an opportunity to help agencies better understand the evidence required for the written determination, which could inform the agencies' decisions whether to expand their program. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that SBA discuss the written determination requirement with participating agencies and, if needed, provide additional guidance. SBA generally agrees with the recommendation and plans to discuss the written determination requirement at a future program managers meeting.
gao_GAO-10-638	gao_GAO-10-638_0	Because U.S. Customs and Immigration Laws Generally Do Not Apply in American Samoa, There Is Little, If Any, Interaction between American Samoa and U.S. Customs and Immigration Agencies Because U.S. customs and immigration laws generally do not apply in American Samoa, and because of the resulting separate authorities for American Samoa and U.S. customs and immigration programs, American Samoa customs and immigration agencies and officials have little, if any, interaction with the customs or immigration programs and officials in the United States. American Samoa Operates Its Own Customs and Immigration Programs American Samoa operates its own customs and immigration programs, which have separate organizational structures and functions and are based on American Samoa laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. American Samoa’s Customs Division, within the Department of Treasury, inspects passengers, baggage, and cargo, and collects excise taxes. American Samoa’s immigration program is managed by the Immigration Office and the Immigration Board, both of which report to the Attorney General of American Samoa. The Immigration Office is responsible for alien ID issuance, daily immigration operations, and enforcement; while the Immigration Board holds weekly hearings and makes decisions on issues, such as aliens’ work authorizations and transfers of aliens’ sponsorships. American Samoa’s Immigration Office and Immigration Board Administer the Immigration Program and the Attorney General Approves the Issuance of Certificates of Identity American Samoa’s immigration program is responsible for, among other things, managing aliens arriving in American Samoa. U.S. and American Samoan Officials Report Concerns about American Samoa’s Operations of Its Customs and Immigration Programs, but No U.S. Agency Has Performed a Risk Assessment U.S. and American Samoa agencies report that American Samoa’s operations of its customs and immigration programs may pose risks to American Samoa and the rest of the United States, but no U.S. agency has performed a risk assessment. According to these officials, potential risks to the government of American Samoa from its customs operations include lost revenues and the possible aiding of criminal activities based on allegations of inadequate enforcement. human trafficking). While these legislative efforts would appear to address some of the concerns identified by American Samoan and U.S. law enforcement officials, the legislation is not final and so it is too soon to tell what impact the legislation, if passed, will have on addressing the identified concerns. U.S. Government Officials Report a Potential Risk Is Aliens Unlawfully Gaining Entry to the Rest of the United States via American Samoa U.S. government officials we met with representing DHS, the Department of State, and the FBI stated that a potential risk to the United States associated with American Samoa administering its own customs and immigration programs is illegal immigration into the rest of the United States as a result of travelers obtaining false documentation in American Samoa. According to State Department officials, while this investigation will serve to enhance the security of the process for obtaining U.S. passports, it will not address the reported vulnerabilities in the process for issuing CIs. Such a risk assessment could better position relevant U.S. agencies to understand the extent of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with the use of CIs, and better inform decisions on which documents should continue to be used for those wishing to travel to the rest of the United States from American Samoa. Recommendation for Executive Action To better understand the extent and significance of the possible risks associated with aliens in American Samoa fraudulently obtaining documents to travel to the rest of the United States and potentially pursue U.S. citizenship, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Secretary of the Departments of State and the Interior, perform a risk assessment to (1) determine the extent of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with aliens fraudulently obtaining CIs and using them to travel to the rest of the United States from American Samoa: and (2) make a determination as to whether CIs should continue to be an acceptable identification document that establishes nationality for U.S. nationals wishing to travel to the rest of the United States from American Samoa.	Why GAO Did This Study American Samoa is a U.S. insular area that operates its customs and immigration programs according to its own laws and independent of the United States. As such, U.S. agencies, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, have no roles in operating the customs or immigration programs in American Samoa. U.S. officials have raised questions about how American Samoa operates its customs and immigration programs, and if this introduces any risks to the security of American Samoa or the rest of the United States. GAO was asked to review American Samoa's customs and immigration programs and this report discusses (1) the operations of American Samoa's customs and immigration programs, and (2) the extent to which U.S. and American Samoa agencies have identified potential risks in American Samoa's customs and immigration programs. GAO reviewed available statutes, regulations, policies, and procedures governing American Samoa and U.S. customs and immigration programs. GAO also visited American Samoa and interviewed U.S. and American Samoan officials to obtain insights. What GAO Found American Samoa operates its own customs and immigration programs, which have separate organizational structures and functions and are based on local laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. Its Customs Division, within the American Samoa Department of Treasury, inspects passengers, baggage, and cargo, and collects excise taxes. The immigration program is administered by the Immigration Office and the Immigration Board, which both report to the American Samoa Attorney General. The Immigration Office is responsible for document issuance, operations, and enforcement, while the Immigration Board holds hearings to decide on issues such as alien work authorization. The Office of the Attorney General is responsible for, among other things, issuing Certificates of Identity (CI), which American Samoans may use to demonstrate their nationality when traveling to the rest of the United States. American Samoa and U.S. government agencies report that American Samoa's operations of its customs and immigration programs may pose risks to American Samoa and the rest of the United States, but U.S. agencies have not conducted a risk assessment. Regarding customs, potential risks to American Samoa are lost revenues and the possible aiding of criminal activities. While the Customs Division has written policies and procedures to govern duties and responsibilities, American Samoa and U.S. law enforcement officials are concerned that American Samoa Customs officials have accepted bribes for improperly inspecting containers, which could result in lost tax revenues. American Samoan and U.S. officials have identified no concerns to the rest of the United States from American Samoa's operations of its customs program. Regarding immigration, the principal concern to American Samoa is that current enforcement practices of immigration laws have led to the potential for alien exploitation and human trafficking. The American Samoa legislature is proposing changes that may address these issues, but it is too soon to tell what impact these changes, if passed, will have. U.S. officials state that the potential risk to the rest of the United States from American Samoa's current immigration operations is illegal immigration into the rest of the United States as a result of travelers obtaining false documentation, such as a CI, in American Samoa. While Department of State officials are aware of allegations of illegal immigration from aliens fraudulently obtaining CIs, and are working with law enforcement officials in American Samoa on an ongoing investigation into such allegations, this investigation will address the security of the process for obtaining U.S. passports and will not address the reported vulnerabilities in the process for issuing CIs. U.S. agencies have not performeda risk assessment to determine the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with aliens using false documents to travel to the rest of the United States from American Samoa. Performing a risk assessment could better position U.S. agencies to understand the extent of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with the use of CIs, and better inform decisions on which documents would be considered acceptable for those wishing to travel to the rest of the United States from American Samoa.
gao_GAO-02-406	gao_GAO-02-406_0	Education used various payment methods for these expenses, including third party drafts and government purchase cards. In April 2002, Education plans to implement a new grant and loan disbursement system designed to improve controls and reduce the risk of future improper grant payments. Controls Over Third Party Draft Process Were Ineffective Significant internal control weaknesses over Education’s process for third party drafts, which were used to pay expenses totaling $55 million from May 1998 through September 2000, increased the department’s vulnerability to improper payments. We found that some individuals at Education could control the entire payment process for third party drafts. We found that Education’s inconsistent and inadequate authorization and review processes, combined with a lack of monitoring, created an environment in which improper purchases could be made with little risk of detection. Inadequate control over these expenditures, combined with the inherent risk of fraud and abuse associated with purchase cards, resulted in fraudulent, improper, and questionable purchases by some Education employees. We found that Education lacked adequate physical controls over its computers, which contributed to 241 missing personal computers and computer-related equipment with an acquisition cost of about $261,500. In the area of Pell Grants and loans, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Chief Operating Officer of student financial assistance programs to conduct on-site investigations, including interviews of school personnel and students, at the 28 schools with characteristics similar to those we found that improperly disbursed Pell Grants to determine whether the grants were properly disbursed; follow up with the schools that had high concentrations of the $12 million in potential improper payments for which the department did not provide adequate supporting documentation; and implement a process to verify borrowers’ SSNs and dates of birth submitted by schools to LOS.	Why GAO Did This Study Because of internal control weaknesses, the Department of Education's student financial assistance programs are at high risk for fraud or erroneous payments. GAO discovered fraud in the grant and loan areas and pervasive control breakdowns and improper payments in other areas. Controls over grant and loan disbursements lacked a key edit check or follow-up process that would identify schools improperly disbursing Pell Grants. Significant internal control weaknesses over Education's third party drafts also increased the department's vulnerability. What GAO Found GAO found that individual Education employees could control the entire payment process for third party drafts. Education employees also circumvented a key computerized control designed to prevent duplicate payments. Education eliminated third party drafts in May 2001. Inconsistent and inadequate authorization and review processes for purchase cards, combined with a lack of monitoring, meant that improper purchases were unlikely to be detected. Inadequate control over these expenditures, combined with the inherent risk of fraud and abuse associated with purchase cards, led to fraudulent, improper, and questionable purchases totaling $686,000. Poor internal controls over computers acquired with purchase cards and third party drafts led to 241 missing personal computers and other equipment valued at $261,500. Although Education changed policies and procedures over disbursements to improve internal controls and program integrity, many of these changes have not been effectively implemented.
gao_GAO-12-875	gao_GAO-12-875_0	TSA and Industry Efforts to Enhance General Aviation Security As shown in table 1, TSA and other industry stakeholders have taken a number of actions to enhance general aviation security. In addition to the survey, TSA also gathers information on security measures implemented by operators through outreach activities its inspectors conduct at general aviation airports, designed to establish a cooperative relationship with general aviation airport stakeholders and encourage voluntary adoption of security enhancements. As previously mentioned, TSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking for a Large Aircraft Security Program in October 2008, which would have resulted in all general aviation aircraft larger than 12,500 pounds, including those not currently covered under existing security programs, being subject to TSA security requirements and inspections. Further, officials from all six of the industry associations we interviewed stated that TSA has reached out to industry in developing its new rule and three of the six associations stated that TSA has performed a better job of reaching out to industry in its ongoing development of the new rule than it did with the rule it proposed in 2008. To determine whether foreign nationals applying for FAA airman certificates had previously applied to AFSP and been vetted by TSA, we obtained data from FAA’s airmen registry on foreign nationals who had applied for airman certificates and provided these data to TSA so that the agency could conduct a matching process to determine whether the foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were in TSA’s AFSP database and the extent to which they had been successfully vetted through the AFSP database. However, TSA officials acknowledged that it is possible for a foreign national to be approved by TSA through AFSP and to complete flight training after entering the country illegally or overstaying his or her allotted time to be in the country legally. Having a road map, with appropriate steps and time frames, and individuals assigned with responsibility and accountability for fully instituting a pilot program, as well as instituting that pilot program if it was found to help identify foreign nationals taking flight training who may be in violation of their immigration status or who may have entered the country illegally, could help TSA and ICE account for flight students with potential immigration violations, and thus better position TSA to identify and prevent a potential risk. Conclusions Since our 2004 report on general aviation security, TSA has taken steps to enhance communications and interactions with general aviation industry stakeholders as well as improve the vetting of foreign nationals enrolling in U.S. flight schools. AFSP was implemented to help prevent future occurrences of foreign nationals obtaining flight training to commit terrorist attacks, as they did for the September 11, 2001, attacks. To better ensure that TSA is able to identify foreign nationals with immigration violations who may be applying to the Alien Flight Student Program, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of TSA and the Director of ICE to collaborate to take the following action: Develop a plan, with time frames, and assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for assessing the results of a pilot program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status to help detect and identify violations, such as overstays and entries without inspection, by foreign flight students, and institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective. In its comments, DHS also referred to additional recommendations related to TSA’s vetting of foreign nationals. Because DHS deemed the details of these recommendations and its response as sensitive security information, they are not included in the public version of this report. (2) To what extent has TSA ensured that foreign flight students seeking flight training in the United States do not pose a security threat? To identify actions TSA and general aviation aircraft operators have taken to enhance security and how TSA has obtained information on the implementation of the operators’ actions, we examined documentation on TSA’s inspection processes for monitoring aircraft operators’ implementation of security programs, including the Transportation Security Inspector Inspections Handbook, the National Investigations and Enforcement Manual, and the Compliance Work Plan for Transportation Security Inspectors. To assess the extent to which TSA has ensured that foreign flight students seeking flight training in the United States do not pose a security threat, we reviewed our recent reports related to DHS security threat assessment processes, and TSA guidance related to procedures for conducting security threat assessments of several agency programs, including AFSP.	Why GAO Did This Study U.S. government threat assessments have discussed plans by terrorists to use general aviation aircraftgenerally, aircraft not available to the public for transportto conduct attacks. Also, the September 11, 2001, terrorists learned to fly at flight schools, which are within the general aviation community. TSA, within DHS, has responsibilities for general aviation security, and developed AFSP to ensure that foreign students enrolling at flight schools do not pose a security threat. GAO was asked to assess (1) TSA and general aviation industry actions to enhance security and TSA efforts to obtain information on these actions and (2) TSA efforts to ensure foreign flight students do not pose a security threat. GAO reviewed TSA analysis comparing FAA data from January 2006 to September 2011 on foreign nationals applying for airman certificates with AFSP data, and interviewed 22 general aviation operators at eight airports selected to reflect geographic diversity and variations in types of operators. This is a public version of a sensitive security report GAO issued in June 2012. Information TSA deemed sensitive has been omitted, including two recommendations on TSAs vetting of foreign nationals. What GAO Found The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and aircraft operators have taken several important actions to enhance general aviation security, and TSA is gathering input from operators to develop additional requirements. For example, TSA requires that certain general aviation aircraft operators implement security programs. Aircraft operators under these programs must, among other things, develop and maintain TSA-approved security programs. TSA has also conducted outreach to the general aviation community to establish a cooperative relationship with general aviation stakeholders. In 2008, TSA developed a proposed rule that would have imposed security requirements on all aircraft over 12,500 pounds, including large aircraft that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) analysis has shown could cause significant damage in an attack. In response to industry concerns about the proposed rules costs and security benefits, TSA is developing a new proposed rule. Officials from all six industry associations GAO spoke with stated that TSA has reached out to gather industrys input, and three of the six associations stated that TSA has improved its efforts to gather input since the 2008 notice of proposed rulemaking. TSA vets foreign flight student applicants through its Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP), but weaknesses exist in the vetting process and in DHSs process for identifying flight students who may be in the country illegally. From January 2006 through September 2011, more than 25,000 foreign nationals had applied for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman certificates (pilots licenses), indicating they had completed flight training. However, TSA computerized matching of FAA data determined that some known number of foreign nationals did not match with those in TSAs database, raising questions as to whether they had been vetted. In addition, AFSP is not designed to determine whether a foreign flight student entered the country legally; thus, a foreign national can be approved for training through AFSP after entering the country illegally. A March 2010 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) flight school investigation led to the arrest of six such foreign nationals, including one who had a commercial pilots license. As a result, TSA and ICE jointly worked on vetting names of foreign students against immigration databases, but have not specified desired outcomes and time frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the program. Having a road map, with steps and time frames, and assigning individuals the responsibility for fully instituting a pilot program could help TSA and ICE better identify and prevent potential risk. The sensitive security version of this report discussed additional information related to TSAs vetting process for foreign nationals seeking flight training. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that TSA identify how often and why foreign nationals are not vetted under AFSP and develop a plan for assessing the results of efforts to identify AFSP-approved foreign flight students who entered the country illegally. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations and indicated actions it is taking in response.
gao_GAO-11-12	gao_GAO-11-12_0	In addition, FS R&D’s mission includes the nation’s forests and rangelands, both public and private. Accomplishments Forest Inventory and Analysis program. Invasive species. Trends in spending varied across the research stations, with some experiencing increases and others, decreases. Overall FS R&D Spending Remained Relatively Flat over the Last Decade, with an Increasing Proportion of Spending Coming from External Sources Overall, the amount spent by FS R&D—using both Forest Service- appropriated funds as well as resources from external sources such as cooperating agencies and organizations—remained relatively flat during fiscal years 2000 through 2009, with funding from external sources representing a small but growing percentage of total spending. Consistent with FS R&D’s fiscal year 2012 goal (also contained in its 2008- 2012 strategic plan) to obtain a portion of its funding from external sources, resources spent using external sources increased from $15 million in fiscal year 2000 to $31.3 million in fiscal year 2009—an average annual increase of 8.5 percent, or 6.0 percent after adjusting for inflation (see fig. FS R&D Has Recently Taken a Number of Steps to Improve Its Ability to Fulfill Its Mission, but Challenges Remain, Particularly in Science Delivery FS R&D has recently taken steps to improve its ability to fulfill its mission in a number of areas, including science delivery, research relevance, organizational structure, research funding allocation, research agenda setting, and coordination with other federal research agencies. Modifications to Science Delivery FS R&D has worked to create a more formal system for delivering the results of its research, known as science delivery, at multiple levels within the agency. Likewise, the Rocky Mountain Research Station created the Science Application and Integration program, which is dedicated to making scientific information and research applicable to natural resource management and planning. Without effective delivery of FS R&D’s research results, land managers, policymakers, and others may be unable to promptly and effectively use the knowledge, data, and tools FS R&D produces, and FS R&D cannot ensure that its research is being used to its greatest potential. The need for greater clarity about FS R&D’s science delivery role in relation to State and Private Forestry is consistent with the results of the Forest Service’s own 2009 assessment of science delivery within the agency, which highlights deficiencies in this area, such as a lack of coordination among those conducting research and those delivering research information and tools, and provides suggestions for improvement, including greater coordination of efforts between FS R&D and State and Private Forestry. For example, it is difficult to fully evaluate how well Water, Air, and Soils is performing when areas of science relevant to that program area, such as the effects of smoke on air quality, may be evaluated under Wildland Fire. Other Challenges in Carrying Out Day-to-Day Activities FS R&D officials also reported several challenges that impede their ability to conduct their day-to-day research, including computing and information technology, human capital, and other administrative issues. Recommendations for Executive Action To maintain and strengthen the science delivery role of FS R&D and help the agency capitalize on the steps it has taken in this area, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to take the following two actions: Assess the effectiveness of recent steps FS R&D has taken to improve science delivery from FS R&D to land managers and other stakeholders, including the extent to which these steps have helped ensure that FS R&D’s work is disseminated beyond the agency and communicated to its broad range of potential stakeholders. Take steps to ensure that individual performance assessments better balance the various types of science delivery activities. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to the Forest Service for comment. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to identify (1) the scope of research and development carried out by Forest Service Research and Development (FS R&D) and some of its resulting accomplishments; (2) trends in resources used in performing FS R&D work and the effects of those trends on its research efforts and priorities; and (3) recent steps FS R&D has taken to improve its ability to fulfill its mission, and challenges it faces in doing so. Table 2 shows yearly spending by the research stations.	Why GAO Did This Study In recent decades, managing the nation's public and private forests and rangelands has become increasingly complex, requiring a sound understanding of science and science-based tools to address these complexities. The Department of Agriculture's Forest Service maintains a research and development program (FS R&D) to help provide scientific information and tools. GAO was asked to examine (1) the scope of research and development carried out by FS R&D and some of its resulting accomplishments, (2) trends in resources used in performing FS R&D work and the effects of those trends on its research efforts and priorities, and (3) recent steps FS R&D has taken to improve its ability to fulfill its mission and challenges it faces in doing so. In conducting this review, GAO analyzed FS R&D funding data for fiscal years 2000 to 2009 and staffing data for fiscal years 2006 to 2009 and interviewed officials from FS R&D, other federal agencies, and nonfederal entities. What GAO Found The scope of FS R&D's work spans a range of research organized into seven strategic program areas: invasive species; inventory and monitoring; outdoor recreation; resource management and use; water, air, and soils; wildland fire; and wildlife and fish. Using funds appropriated to it, as well as funds from authorized external sources such as universities and other federal agencies, FS R&D operates a system of research stations, which in turn oversee laboratories, experimental forests, and other research locations nationwide. According to end users of FS R&D's work, its accomplishments are many and varied, including the Forest Inventory and Analysis program, which provides long-term data on the nation's forests; efforts to identify and control invasive pests; and software applications to quantify the environmental benefits of urban forests. Nevertheless, end users also identified areas requiring additional attention by FS R&D, such as social science research to better understand human interaction with natural resources. Overall, spending by FS R&D--using both its own appropriated funds and resources from external sources--remained relatively flat during fiscal years 2000 through 2009, with an average annual increase of 3.2 percent, or 0.8 percent when adjusted for inflation; funding from external sources represented a small but growing portion of the total. Trends in spending varied across research stations, with some experiencing increases and others decreases. In response to these trends, many stations reduced their staffing levels and increasingly sought support from external sources. While doing so has had advantages, it has changed the way FS R&D carries out its work and sets research priorities. For example, because external funding is often short term in nature, reliance on this funding may lead FS R&D to address more short-term research issues. FS R&D has taken steps to improve its ability to fulfill its mission in several areas, including increasing its efforts to deliver knowledge and tools to end users and involving end users in setting research agendas; improving funding allocation processes; and increasing coordination with other federal research agencies. Despite these efforts, challenges persist, particularly in the area of science delivery--that is, how research results are communicated. While FS R&D has created a more formal system for science delivery at multiple levels within the agency, and several research stations have specific programs dedicated to science delivery, numerous officials and end users told GAO that FS R&D places greater emphasis on peer-reviewed journals as a means of science delivery than on other types of science delivery efforts, such as workshops, that are often more useful to end users. According to these officials, the performance assessment system for FS R&D researchers often reinforces this bias. Without improved delivery of research results, land managers and others may be unable to fully benefit from the agency's work. FS R&D officials also reported several challenges that impede their ability to conduct their day-to-day research, including computing and information technology, human capital, and other administrative issues. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Forest Service assess the effectiveness of recent steps FS R&D has taken to improve science delivery and take steps to ensure that individual performance assessments better balance the various types of science delivery activities. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations.
gao_GAO-16-833	gao_GAO-16-833_0	Medications for Opioid Addiction and Their Role in MAT Three medications are currently approved by the FDA for use in MAT for opioid addiction—methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone. Methadone also carries risk of abuse. Schedule I contains substances that have no currently accepted medical use and may not be manufactured, distributed, or dispensed under federal law. Methadone and Buprenorphine are Regulated Like Other Controlled Substances When Used to Treat Pain and Have Additional Requirements When Used to Treat Addiction Methadone and Buprenorphine are Regulated Like Other Controlled Substances When Used to Treat Pain When used for pain management, methadone and buprenorphine are regulated under federal laws and regulations that apply to controlled substances generally and do not impose requirements unique to methadone or buprenorphine. Buprenorphine is a Schedule III controlled substance, which has currently accepted medical uses and a lower potential for abuse. In contrast, buprenorphine and other Schedule III controlled substances may be dispensed based on a written, electronic, or oral prescription (i.e., a practitioner calls a pharmacist with the prescription). Additional Requirements Apply to Methadone and Buprenorphine When Used for Opioid Addiction Treatment When used for opioid addiction treatment, the CSA and implementing regulations issued by DEA and SAMHSA impose requirements in addition to those that generally apply when methadone and buprenorphine are used to treat pain. Prescriptions cannot be issued for methadone when used for opioid addiction treatment. Therefore, when used for that purpose, methadone may generally only be administered or dispensed within an OTP. In addition, qualifying practitioners who receive a Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000) waiver may dispense or prescribe buprenorphine for opioid addiction treatment to a limited number of patients in an outpatient setting, such as a doctor’s office. Practitioner Capacity, Perceived Value, and Insurance Coverage Can Affect Patients’ Access to MAT for Opioid Addiction In addition to laws and regulations, several key factors can affect patients’ access to MAT for opioid addiction, according to articles and documents we reviewed and our interviews with stakeholders and agency officials. These factors include (1) the availability of qualified practitioners and their capacity to meet patient demand for MAT; (2) perceptions of MAT and its value among patients, practitioners, and in institutions; and (3) financing issues related to the availability and limits of insurance coverage for MAT. Further, some of these practitioners may be operating at full capacity, leading to wait lists that can affect patients’ access to MAT. For example, in March 2016, SAMHSA reported that there were approximately 1,400 OTPs. For example, some articles and a 2014 SAMHSA report found that despite science-based evidence regarding the effective use of MAT, some practitioners do not believe there is a role for medications in the treatment of addiction disorders. Several documents and the literature we reviewed examined the reasons why MAT is not used more frequently within the criminal justice system. For example, patients with no insurance coverage for MAT may face prohibitive out-of-pocket costs that may limit their access to it. In some cases, state Medicaid programs also limit the length of time that the medications can be used. Although Medicaid expansion allowed under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act could increase the number of individuals with coverage for substance abuse treatment, including MAT, the specific coverage can vary by state. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, HHS, and the Department of Justice. The Office of National Drug Control Policy agreed with the report’s findings, and the office’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. The Office of National Drug Control Policy and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Justice had no comments. Appendix I: Literature Review Methodology To identify and describe published research on key factors that affect access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid addiction, we conducted a literature search for relevant articles published in peer- reviewed and scholarly journals from January 2011 through April 2016. “Challenges and Opportunities for the Use of Medications to Treat Opioid Addiction in the United States and Other Nations of the World.” Journal of Addictive Diseases, vol. “Where is Buprenorphine Dispensed to Treat Opioid Use Disorders?	Why GAO Did This Study The abuse of prescription opioid pain relievers and illicit opioids, such as heroin, have contributed to increasing numbers of overdose deaths in the United States, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data show more than 28,000 opioid overdose deaths in 2014. Research has shown that MAT can more effectively reduce opioid use and increase treatment retention compared to treatment without medication. GAO was asked to review issues related to patient and provider use of MAT for opioid addiction. GAO examined (1) how federal laws and regulations apply when using medications to treat opioid addiction compared to using the same medications for pain management and (2) key factors that can affect access to MAT for opioid addiction. GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations pertaining to MAT medications and reviewed key documents from HHS and other sources. GAO also identified 53 articles from peer-reviewed and scholarly journals related to MAT for opioid addiction for further examination. GAO interviewed stakeholders from patient and provider groups; experts on the issue of addiction treatment; and officials at relevant federal agencies. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, HHS, and the Department of Justice. The Office of National Drug Control Policy agreed with the report's findings. The Office of National Drug Control Policy and HHS provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Justice had no comments. What GAO Found The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has stated that addressing opioid abuse is a high priority and is promoting access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT)--an approach that combines behavioral therapy and the use of medications--to combat the problem. Three medications are currently approved for use in MAT for opioid addiction--methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone. Methadone and buprenorphine are regulated like other controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) when used to treat pain and have additional requirements that apply when used to treat opioid addiction. The third medication--naltrexone--is not a controlled substance and is therefore not subject to the CSA. Methadone is a Schedule II controlled substance, which indicates a higher risk of abuse. Buprenorphine is a Schedule III controlled substance, with lower risk, and so generally has fewer requirements. For example, when used to treat pain, methadone generally may not be dispensed without a written or electronic prescription. In contrast, buprenorphine may be dispensed based on a written, electronic, or oral (phone) prescription. When used for opioid addiction treatment, the CSA and implementing regulations impose additional requirements for methadone and buprenorphine: Methadone may generally only be administered or dispensed within an opioid treatment program (OTP), as prescriptions for methadone cannot be issued when used for opioid addiction treatment. Buprenorphine may be administered or dispensed within an OTP and may also be prescribed by a qualifying practitioner who has received a waiver from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Practitioners who received this waiver are limited in the number of patients they may treat for opioid addiction. In addition to laws and regulations, several key factors can affect patients' access to MAT for opioid addiction, according to articles from peer-reviewed and scholarly journals, documents GAO reviewed, and interviews with agency officials and experts. Specifically, through these sources GAO identified the following key factors: The availability of qualified practitioners and their capacity to meet patient demand for MAT . For example, there were approximately 1,400 OTPs in 2016. However, sources GAO reviewed stated that they are lacking in certain locations. Furthermore, some MAT practitioners may be operating at full capacity, leading to wait lists that can affect patients' access to MAT. The perceptions of MAT and its value among patients, practitioners, and institutions . Some practitioners do not believe that MAT is more effective than abstinence-based treatment--when patients are treated without medication--despite science-based evidence, and there are concerns that the medications will be misused. The availability and limits of insurance coverage for MAT . Patients with no insurance coverage for MAT may face prohibitive out-of-pocket costs that may limit their access to it, and coverage for MAT varies for those individuals with insurance. In some cases, state Medicaid programs limit the length of time that patients can use MAT medications.
gao_GAO-05-729T	gao_GAO-05-729T_0	Analysis of Reutilization Program Identifies Billions of Dollars in Waste and Inefficiency Overall, our analysis of the $33 billion in reported excess commodity disposals in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 showed that $4 billion related to items in new, unused, and excellent condition. Of the $4 billion, we determined that $3.5 billion (88 percent) included substantial waste and inefficiency because new, unused, and excellent condition items were being transferred or donated outside of DOD, sold on the Internet for pennies on the dollar, or destroyed rather than being reutilized. However, of the $4 billion, DOD units reutilized only $495 million (12 percent) of these items during the 3-year period. Unnecessary Commodity Purchases Our analysis of fiscal year 2002 and 2003 DLA commodity purchases and DRMS excess property inventory data identified numerous instances in which the military services ordered and purchased items from DLA at the same time identical items—items with the same NSN—that were reported to be in new, unused, and excellent condition were available for reutilization. We based our case study selections on new, unused items that DOD continued to purchase. Although these items had a total reported acquisition cost of $11,522, we paid a total of $1,427 for these items, including tax, buyer’s premium, and shipping cost. Further, DOD is continuing to purchase and use most of these items. New, unused excess DOD tires. Key factors in the overall DRMS management control environment that contributed to waste and inefficiency in the reutilization program included (1) unreliable excess property inventory data; (2) inadequate DRMS oversight, accountability, physical control, and safeguarding of property; and (3) outdated, nonintegrated excess inventory and supply systems. Weaknesses in Reutilization Program Oversight and Physical Inventory Control We found hundreds of millions of dollars in potential waste and inefficiency associated with the failure to safeguard excess property inventory from loss, theft, and damage. Excess Property Losses Weaknesses in accountability that resulted in lost and stolen property contributed to waste and inefficiency in the excess property reutilization program. For example, excess DOD property sent to the Huntsville, Alabama, liquidation sales location was stored outside unprotected from weather, including sun, wind, rain, and hurricanes during the summer and fall of 2004. Outdated, Nonintegrated Systems Impair Economy and Efficiency Inefficient, nonintegrated excess inventory and supply management systems lack controls necessary to prevent waste and inefficiency in the reutilization program. Improved management of DOD’s excess property and a strong reutilization program would help save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars annually.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to assess the overall economy and efficiency of the Department of Defense (DOD) program for excess property reutilization (reuse). Specifically, GAO was asked to determine (1) whether and to what extent the program included waste and inefficiency and (2) root causes of any waste and inefficiency. GAO was also asked to provide detailed examples of waste and inefficiency and the related causes. GAO's methodology included an assessment of controls, analysis of DOD excess inventory data, statistical sampling at selected sites, and detailed case studies of many items. What GAO Found DOD does not have management controls in place to assure that excess inventory is reutilized to the maximum extent possible. Of $33 billion in excess commodity disposals in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, $4 billion were reported to be in new, unused, and excellent condition. DOD units reutilized only $495 million (12 percent) of these items. The remaining $3.5 billion (88 percent) includes significant waste and inefficiency because new, unused, and excellent condition items were transferred and donated outside of DOD, sold for pennies on the dollar, or destroyed. DOD units continued to buy many of these same items. GAO identified at least $400 million of fiscal year 2002 and 2003 commodity purchases when identical new, unused, and excellent condition items were available for reutilization. GAO also identified hundreds of millions of dollars in reported lost, damaged, or stolen excess property, including sensitive military technology items, which contributed to reutilization program waste and inefficiency. Further, excess property improperly stored outdoors for several months was damaged by wind, rain, and hurricanes. GAO ordered and purchased at little or no cost several new and unused excess commodities that DOD continued to buy and utilize, including tents, boots, power supplies, circuit cards, and medical supplies. GAO paid a total of $2,898, including tax and shipping cost, for these items, which had an original DOD acquisition cost of $79,649. Root causes for reutilization program waste and inefficiency included (1) unreliable excess property inventory data; (2) inadequate oversight and physical inventory control; and (3) outdated, nonintegrated excess inventory and supply management systems. Procurement of inventory in excess of requirements also was a significant contributing factor. Improved management of DOD's excess property could save taxpayers at least hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
gao_GAO-13-35	gao_GAO-13-35_0	Additionally, property declared excess to the federal government’s need may be sold. Also, we found that GSA, NPS, and VA were implementing projects in some historic buildings to improve their sustainable performance. Portfolio-Wide Management Efforts All three agencies have undertaken efforts in recent years to identify the historic buildings across their real property portfolios, nominate those buildings to the National Register, and are working to manage those buildings in an effort to comply with the requirements of NHPA and the executive orders. When historic buildings were either excess or unsuited for mission needs, we found several instances in which agencies leased part or all of a building to a non-federal entity that could use the building while preserving its historic character. Sustainable Performance of Historic Buildings In addition to efforts to preserve and use historic buildings, we found that GSA, NPS, and VA were implementing projects in some of the historic buildings we reviewed to improve the sustainable performance of the buildings and begin meeting the Guiding Principles, as required by Executive Order 13514. Sustainable projects we observed at some of the buildings we visited included improved energy-efficient heating and cooling systems, “green” vegetated and “white” reflective roofs, and window retrofits or replacements, among others. GSA, NPS, and VA Face Challenges in Managing Historic Buildings The three agencies we reviewed face challenges related to the functionality of historic buildings, the amount of funding available for preservation projects, and federal requirements to consult stakeholders on historic preservation. Also, competing stakeholder interests can arise when agencies consult with stakeholders. The three selected agencies, however, did not report consistent information on their historic properties. According to GSA and VA officials, the data in the National Register are not complete. GSA and NPS historic building officials also stated that FRPP data on the number of historic buildings they hold are inconsistent with data maintained within their internal historic buildings databases. Recommendation for Executive Action We recommend that the Acting Administrator of GSA—in collaboration and consultation with ACHP, NPS, VA, and FRPC member agencies— ensure that the action plan being developed to improve FRPP data includes actions to improve historic-building data by addressing the following areas, at a minimum:  determining whether changes are needed—to historic data elements or guidance—to ensure that data are consistently and accurately reported;  developing, in FRPP fiscal-year summary reports, data that will better convey to the public and stakeholders—including OMB and Congress—a sense of the extent of historic buildings held by agencies, such as total numbers or percentages; and, facilitating ACHP’s access to FRPP data, as appropriate, so that ACHP can better fulfill its historic-building advisory role to Congress and the President. GSA agreed with our recommendation and further reported that it has, in part, already taken action to rectify inconsistencies we found between GSA’s FRPP data and its internal data sources used for NHPA compliance and reporting required by Executive Order 13287. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to identify (1) actions selected nondefense agencies have taken to manage historic federal buildings, and (2) any challenges they have faced. We identified three agencies for our review: (1) the General Services Administration (GSA); (2) the National Park Service (NPS) within the Department of the Interior; and (3) the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In addition, GSA was selected because it also maintains the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) database that is used to identify and report on federal real property, to include the historic status of federal buildings, held by executive branch agencies. To understand the challenges faced by agencies in managing their historic buildings and to identify agencies’ portfolio-wide efforts to preserve their historic buildings, we interviewed our selected agencies’ real property and preservation officials about their agencies’ preservation programs. We also interviewed agency officials about data and reviewed FRPP guidance and other documents related to the agencies’ real property data and FRPP database.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal government has made some progress addressing previously identified issues with managing federal real property. This includes establishing the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) and creating the FRPP database to identify and report agencies' real property, including attributes such as historic status. GAO was asked to assess issues related to historic preservation at nondefense agencies. GAO's review focused on-- GSA, NPS, and VA--three nondefense agencies that hold significant numbers of historic buildings. This report identifies (1) actions these agencies have taken to manage historic federal buildings, and (2) any challenges they have faced. GAO selected and visited a sample of 31 historic buildings managed by the three agencies. The results of these site visits cannot be generalized but provide important insights. GAO interviewed agency officials and reviewed agencies' efforts to preserve, use or lease, and improve the sustainable performance of those buildings. GAO also interviewed officials from the selected agencies about their agencies' preservation programs, including actions to identify and report on their historic buildings. What GAO Found The General Services Administration (GSA), the National Park Service (NPS), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have undertaken portfolio-wide efforts in recent years to identify historic buildings they hold, nominate some of those buildings to the National Register of Historic Places, and manage their historic buildings in an effort to comply with the requirements in the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and relevant executive orders. While these agencies use and preserve some of their historic buildings to meet mission needs, others are excess or unsuited for current mission needs. GAO found several instances in which these agencies leased part or all of some historic buildings to non-federal entities that could use and preserve the buildings. GAO also found that these agencies had implemented projects in some of their historic buildings to improve their sustainable performance, such as installing green roofs and energy-efficient heating and cooling systems. GSA, NPS, and VA face an array of challenges in managing historic buildings, including functional limitations of older buildings in relation to contemporary mission needs and current building codes, budgetary limitations, and competing stakeholder interests. Competing stakeholder interest can become apparent during the required consultation with stakeholders, such as the state historic preservation officers, prior to implementing projects that may affect a historic building. Compounding these property management challenges, the selected agencies' data on historic buildings in the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) are not complete. GSA and VA are still working to evaluate many buildings that are over 50 years old. Also, GSA and NPS have not reported complete and consistent historic-building data to the FRPP--in comparison to data they track within their agencies' historic-building databases. GAO reported its concerns with the reliability of FRPP data in 2012. This review emphasizes the relevance of these concerns to the historic-building data included in the database. In June 2012, GAO recommended improvements to the FRPP database to enhance its consistency, completeness, and usefulness in federal decision making. Such improvements are also necessary to increase the consistency and completeness of historic-building data in the FRPP. What GAO Recommends GSA--in collaboration and consultation with NPS, VA, and FRPC member agencies, and others--should ensure that the action plan being developed to improve FRPP also addresses the need for improved data on historic buildings. GSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and further reported that it has, in part, already taken action to rectify inconsistencies GAO found between GSA's FRPP data and its internal data sources.
gao_HEHS-98-17	gao_HEHS-98-17_0	After adding a 30-percent adjustment to VA payments to account for the higher costs associated with servicing Medicare patients, the average VA monthly payment was $200, or almost 38 percent less than Medicare’s allowance of $320. Access to Portable Equipment and Refills Warrants HCFA Monitoring The upcoming reductions in the modality-neutral Medicare payment rates have raised concerns that Medicare patients will have less access to (1) stationary liquid systems, from which patients can refill portables; (2) refills of gas or liquid portable units for patients that have concentrators; and (3) new lightweight, but more expensive, portable systems. The upcoming reduction in Medicare payment rates, however, could lead some suppliers to shore up their profits by offering only oxygen concentrators for stationary systems, which would also reduce access to liquid portable refills from stationary units. Access to Portable Units and Refills Our study included an analysis of the number of Medicare and VA patients that were provided portable units. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allows HHS to establish separate payment rates and categories for different types of home oxygen equipment, as long as the adjustments are budget neutral. HCFA Has Not Developed Service Standards for Home Oxygen Suppliers Although Medicare payments for home oxygen include reimbursement for services, HCFA has not specified the type or frequency of services it expects home oxygen suppliers to provide. In contrast, VA encourages its medical centers to contract with suppliers that are accredited by JCAHO or comply with its standards. Even though VA’s reimbursements are less generous than Medicare’s, VA patients received more frequent service visits than the Medicare patients whose records we reviewed. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 includes provisions that will bring Medicare’s reimbursement rates more into line with the competitive marketplace rates paid by VA. Recommendations We recommend that the Administrator of HCFA do the following: monitor trends in Medicare beneficiaries’ use of and access to stationary liquid oxygen systems and liquid and gas portables; monitor the availability and costs of new and evolving oxygen delivery systems, including lightweight portable systems and oxygen conserving devices, and work with the medical community to (1) evaluate the clinical benefits associated with the use of such equipment, (2) identify the patient populations most likely to benefit from the use of such equipment, and (3) educate prescribing physicians about existing options in oxygen delivery systems and their right to prescribe the system that best meets their patients’ needs; advise the Secretary of HHS whether a budget-neutral restructuring of the Medicare reimbursement system for home oxygen is needed to provide patient access to the more expensive home oxygen systems, and whether Medicare controls can be implemented to ensure that the use of such systems is limited to patients that can benefit from their use; and work with the medical community, the oxygen industry, patient advocacy groups, accreditation organizations, and VA officials to promptly finalize service standards for Medicare home oxygen suppliers. Basis for Comparison of Medicare and VA Reimbursement Rates To evaluate the appropriateness of Medicare’s reimbursement rates for home oxygen, we considered comparing Medicare’s rates to those paid by Medicaid, private insurance companies, managed care plans, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). VA central office policy encourages the medical centers to contract with a supplier that is either accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) or complies with its standards.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the appropriateness of Medicare's reimbursement rates for home oxygen, focusing on: (1) its comparison of Medicare and Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) payment rates; (2) concerns about access to liquid oxygen systems and lightweight portable equipment for patients who are highly active; and (3) standards for the services associated with meeting patients' home oxygen needs. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) Medicare's fee schedule allowances for home oxygen exceeded GAO's adjusted estimate for the competitive marketplace rates paid by VA by almost 38 percent; (2) the rate reductions mandated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 will bring Medicare's fee schedule more into line with the competitive marketplace costs for home oxygen; (3) concerns have been raised that these reductions could reduce Medicare beneficiaries' access to portable units; (4) under Medicare's modality-neutral payment system, home-based liquid oxygen systems, which patients can use to refill portable units, do not offer suppliers the attractive profit margins associated with lower-cost oxygen concentrators; (5) lightweight, less cumbersome portable systems, which may increase patient mobility, are more expensive than traditional portable gas cylinders; (6) GAO's analysis shows that VA patients were receiving more portable units and refills than Medicare patients were, even though VA's payment rate, adjusted for comparability, was lower than Medicare's; (7) the upcoming reductions in Medicare allowances may lead some suppliers to provide Medicare patients with the least costly systems available, regardless of their patients' needs; (8) the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) could use its authority under the recently enacted legislation to establish separate reimbursement rates for oxygen concentrators, liquid systems, regular portable units, and lightweight portable units, as long as the impact on overall Medicare costs is budget neutral; (9) the evolution in technology and costs of oxygen delivery systems--and the clinical indications for initiating and terminating the use of more expensive, lightweight portable units--warrant further examination by HHS and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) before deciding whether Medicare's reimbursement system should be restructured; (10) HCFA has not established standards to ensure that home oxygen suppliers provide Medicare patients even basic support services; (11) oxygen suppliers who serve Medicare patients need only comply with basic registration and business requirements associated with obtaining a Medicare supplier number; (12) in contrast, VA encourages its medical centers to contract with suppliers who are accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations or comply with its standards; (13) VA patients typically received more frequent service visits than Medicare patients; and (14) the Balanced Budget Act requires HHS to establish service standards for Medicare home oxygen suppliers.
gao_GAO-06-978	gao_GAO-06-978_0	KPCS’s key provisions require participants to: enact or amend appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the certification scheme, and maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions; designate importing and exporting authorities; establish control systems designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from the rough diamond trade, such as systems for physically inspecting rough diamond import and export parcels; ensure that a Kimberley Process certificate accompanies each import and export shipment of rough diamonds; acknowledge the receipt of rough diamond import parcels to the foreign ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper-resistant collect and maintain rough diamond data on production, imports, and exports; and collate and exchange such data with KPCS. Agencies and USKPA Have Implemented CDTA Consistent with the provisions of CDTA, the United States has used several U.S. agencies and USKPA to implement the domestic and international provisions of the act. U.S. State and the Treasury have led these U.S. implementation efforts. U.S. U.S. The United States Has Helped to Strengthen KPCS Internationally, but Assistance- Related Efforts Face Challenges Internationally, the United States has helped to strengthen KPCS by participating in KPCS activities and providing assistance to help Sierra Leone and Liberia comply with KPCS, but this assistance faces challenges. The United States Has Helped Two Countries in Their Efforts to Implement KPCS and Is Considering a Regional Approach to Enhance the Impact of Its Diamond-Related Assistance The United States has provided about $7.57 million in assistance to help Sierra Leone ($6.13 million) and Liberia ($1.44 million) implement KPCS, but the limited capacity and resources of these two recipient countries and the need to harmonize diamond policies with other countries in the region have restricted the effectiveness of this assistance. Donors and diamond producers are considering a regional approach to help enhance the effectiveness of donor assistance because this assistance is constrained by the limited capacity and resources of these countries and the need to harmonize diamond policies among countries vulnerable to illicit cross border diamond trading. Conclusions A system for controlling the trade in rough diamonds will be effective only if it has control mechanisms designed to curtail or deter the trade in conflict diamonds. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology As mandated by the Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA), this report focused on (1) describing the institutional framework the U.S. government has created to implement CDTA, (2) examining how the United States has implemented the provisions of CDTA domestically and what principal challenges it faces, and (3) examining how the United States has helped to strengthen the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and what principal challenges it faces. The agencies we interviewed included: the Department of State (Bureau of Economic Affairs and United States Mission to the United Nations), the Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control), the Department of Homeland Security (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement), the Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), the Department of Interior (U.S. Geological Survey), the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2003, the United States and other countries began implementing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to curtail the trade of rough diamonds that had fueled severe conflicts in Africa, known as conflict diamonds. CDTA provides the statutory framework for U.S. implementation of the KPCS. As mandated in CDTA, this report (1) describes the institutional framework established to implement the act, (2) examines implementation of the domestic provisions of the act and challenges it faces, and (3) examines how the United States has helped to strengthen the KPCS and challenges it faces. What GAO Found The United States has used multiple U.S. agencies and a private, not-for-profit entity to implement the domestic and international provisions of the Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA). The Departments of State and the Treasury have led U.S. efforts to implement the domestic provisions of the act; State has led the U.S. efforts to curtail trade in conflict diamonds abroad. Domestically, the Departments of State, the Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce, and the private entity, called the U.S. Kimberley Process Authority (USKPA), have been responsible for controlling U.S. imports and exports of rough diamonds. Internationally, State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Geological Survey have helped to strengthen KPCS. Domestically, the U.S. systems for reporting rough diamond statistics and for controlling imports and exports of these diamonds are vulnerable to illicit trade. The United States has enhanced the quality of its rough diamond trade data by improving its collection processes, but work remains to be done. Also, the United States does not periodically inspect rough diamond imports or exports to ensure that the contents of the rough diamond parcels match the Kimberley Process certificates. In addition, the United States lacks an effective system for confirming receipt of imports--a Kimberley Process requirement for avoiding possible diversions of rough diamond imports. Finally, the United States has not had a plan for monitoring USKPA, but is developing and testing one. Internationally, the United States has helped to strengthen KPCS by participating in KPCS activities and providing assistance to Sierra Leone and Liberia in their efforts to comply with KPCS, but donor assistance to these countries faces challenges. Donors and diamond producing countries are considering a regional approach to help enhance the effectiveness of donor diamond-related assistance because this assistance is constrained by the limited capacity and resources of these countries and the need to harmonize diamond policies among countries vulnerable to illicit cross border diamond trading.
gao_GAO-12-640	gao_GAO-12-640_0	Cumulatively, USDA paid $10.6 billion—almost one-fourth of total direct payments from 2003 through 2011—to producers who did not, in a given year, plant any of the crop for which they had base acres. For the complete results of our analysis on the extent to which producers did not grow any of a crop for which they had base acreage in a given year, by crop, see appendix V. About 2,300 Farms for Which Direct Payments Were Made Did Not Plant Any Crop of Any Type Each Year From 2007 through 2011 Also according to our analysis of USDA data, about 2,300 farms, or about 0.15 percent of the 1.6 million farms receiving direct payments in 2011, reported all their land as “fallow,” that is, producers did not plant any crops of any type on this land, for each year of the last 5 years (i.e., 2007 through 2011), as allowed under the farm bill. Direct Payments Do Not Align with Certain Principles Direct payments generally do not align with the principles significant to integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency in farm bill programs, identified in our April 2012 report, which could be used to guide implementation of the 2012 Farm Bill. These payments align with the principle of being “distinctive,” in that they do not overlap or duplicate other farm programs. However, they do not align with the five other principles. Direct Payments May No Longer Be Relevant Direct payments were expected to be transitional when first authorized and may no longer be relevant. Subsequent farm bills, however, including those passed in 2002 and 2008, have continued these payments as “direct payments.” In a press statement released in February 2012, the Chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, referred to direct payments as “an indefensible program of the past.” In April 2012, this committee’s website posted draft legislation on the reauthorization of agricultural programs through 2017 that proposed eliminating direct payments. Direct Payments Do Not Appropriately Target Benefits Direct payments do not appropriately target benefits (i.e., distribute benefits consistently with contemporary assessments of need) in three key ways. According to our review of FSA direct payment data, in 2011, the top 10 percent of payment recipients received 51 percent of direct payments, and the top 25 percent of payment recipients received 73 percent of direct payments. During the course of our work, we identified cases where direct payments support recipients who FSA officials said own farmland that would not be economically viable in the absence of these payments. Direct payments may have less potential than other farm programs to distort prices and production, but economic distortions can nonetheless result from these payments. Oversight of Direct Payments Is Weak During the course of our work, we identified several concerns with regard to FSA’s oversight of direct payments: FSA has not developed a systematic process to report on acreage that may no longer be usable for agriculture and therefore ineligible for direct payments; FSA conducts relatively few end-of-year reviews and generally does not complete these reviews within expected time frames; and FSA has not kept data on enforcement. FSA has not systematically reported or corroborated the extent to which land may no longer be eligible for direct payments because it has been converted to nonfarm uses. Maintaining a safety net for farmers is worthwhile, but during times of record-high crop prices and farm incomes, providing payments that do not align with principles significant to integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency in farm bill programs raises questions about the continued need for direct payments. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure that direct payments, while they remain in effect, and other farm programs, including ACRE and counter-cyclical payments, are made in a manner consistent with farm bill provisions and related implementing regulations, and to minimize the potential for improper payments, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of the Farm Service Agency to take the following four actions: Develop and implement a systematic process to report on land that may no longer be usable for agriculture, as required for annual reporting to Congress. In written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VII, USDA generally agreed with two of our recommendations and disagreed with two others. USDA stated that it concurs that timely, high-quality end-of-year reviews are important; however, it also stated that its current practices already meet this standard. Given this very small sample and the lack of timeliness associated with many of these reviews, we continue to believe that USDA should consider options to increase the number and improve the timeliness of these reviews. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to: (1) provide information regarding the geographic distribution and ownership characteristics of payment recipients, as well as the dollar amount of direct payments made for land with qualifying acreage and amount and types of crops grown on qualifying acreage from 2003 through 2011 and (2) examine whether direct payments are aligned with principles significant to integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency in farm bill programs. 3.	Why GAO Did This Study Through one facet of the farm safety net, USDA provides farmers and other producers with fixed annual payments, called direct payments, based on their farms historical crop production. Direct payments do not vary with crop prices or crop yields. In March 2011, GAO reported on observations and options regarding direct payments and suggested to Congress that they be eliminated or reduced. GAO was asked (1) to provide information regarding the geographic distribution and ownership characteristics of payment recipients, as well as the dollar amount of direct payments made for farms with acreage that qualified, and the amount and types of crops grown on such acreage for years 2003 to 2011, and (2) to examine whether direct payments are aligned with principles significant to integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency in farm bill programs. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed USDA data and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Found From 2003 through 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) made more than $46 billion in direct payments to farmers and other producers. These producers planted varying percentages of acres that qualified for payments based on their historical planting yields and designated payment rates (qualifying acres). Cumulatively, USDA paid $10.6 billionalmost one-fourth of total direct payments made from 2003 through 2011to producers who did not, in a given year, grow the crop associated with their qualifying acres, which they are allowed to do. About 2,300 farms (0.15 percent of farms receiving direct payments) reported all their land as fallow, and producers did not plant any crops on this land for each year for the last 5 years, from 2007 through 2011; in 2011, these producers received almost $3 million in direct payments. Direct payments generally do not align with the principles significant to integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency in farm bill programs that GAO identified in an April 2012 report. These payments align with the principle of being distinctive, in that they do not overlap or duplicate other farm programs. However, direct payments do not align with five other principles. Specifically, they do not align with the following principles: Relevance : When the precursors to direct payments were first authorized in 1996 legislation, they were expected to be transitional, but subsequent legislation passed in 2002 and 2008 has continued these payments as direct payments. However, in April 2012, draft legislation for reauthorizing agricultural programs through 2017 proposed eliminating direct payments. Targeting : Direct payments do not appropriately distribute benefits consistent with contemporary assessments of need. For example, they are concentrated among the largest recipients based on farm size and income; in 2011, the top 25 percent of payment recipients received 73 percent of direct payments. Affordability : Direct payments may no longer be affordable given the United States current deficit and debt levels. Effectiveness : Direct payments may have unintended consequences. Direct payments may have less potential than other farm programs to distort prices and production, but economic distortions can result from these payments. For example, GAO identified cases where direct payments support recipients who USDA officials said own farmland that is not economically viable in the absence of these payments. Oversight : Oversight of direct payments is weak. With regard to oversight, USDA has not systematically reported on land that may no longer be eligible for direct payments because it has been converted to nonfarm uses, as required for annual reporting to Congress. In addition, GAO identified weaknesses in USDAs end-of-year compliance review process. For example, USDA conducts relatively few reviews and generally does not complete these reviews within expected time frames. Continuing to provide payments that generally do not align with principles significant to integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency in farm bill programs raises questions about the purpose and need for direct payments. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider eliminating or reducing direct payments. GAO also recommends that USDA take four actions to improve its oversight of direct payments including developing a systematic process to report on land that may no longer be usable for agriculture, and considering ways to increase the number of cases selected for end-of-year reviews and completing these reviews in a timely manner. USDA generally agreed with two of GAOs recommendations and disagreed with two others, stating that it believes its current processes or practices are adequate. GAO continues to believe that it is important for USDA to take the recommended actions.
gao_GAO-15-79	gao_GAO-15-79_0	Agencies have the discretion to grant paid administrative leave for brief periods of time and have exercised this discretion through setting policies governing the use of this type of leave. For example, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DOD) officials said that they grant paid administrative leave to employees serving 6 months or more in Afghanistan for rest and recuperation breaks, while other selected agencies did not. Differences in Agency Leave Recording Practices and in Payroll Providers’ Interpretation of Guidance Contributed to Large Variations in Reporting of Paid Administrative Leave A Lack of Detailed Guidance Related to Recording and Reporting Paid Administrative Leave Activities Makes Data Comparison Challenging Because agencies’ policies on paid administrative leave differ, OPM data on administrative leave is expected to vary across agencies, even when controlling for agency size. OPM has not provided guidance to agencies on how to record time for paid administrative leave activities, and while OPM has provided guidance to payroll providers for reporting paid administrative leave hours, this guidance is limited. Agency practices for recording activities as paid administrative leave in time and attendance systems vary from what OPM officials told us that they expected. In addition, among the four primary payroll providers, three report other legislatively authorized leave activities such as court leave, official time, military leave, and bone marrow and organ donation as paid administrative leave.reporting differences result in inaccurate data on the total amount of paid administrative leave, and since OPM guidance does not define paid administrative leave by specifying what should and should not be reported in this category, these payroll providers include time for activities that OPM does not consider to be paid administrative leave. The Total Amount and Estimated Salary Cost of Paid Administrative Leave is Difficult to Estimate Categorical differences—the reasons for which agencies grant paid administrative leave—and reporting differences—such as including official time activities or federal holidays—contribute to variations in the total amount of paid administrative leave reported to OPM. Separating federal holidays from the data, the total amount of paid administrative leave falls to more than 9.9 million days across the 3 years reviewed (less than 1 percent of total employee paid days), or about 5 days per employee. OPM has collected these data for several years, but has not ensured that the data are valid. VA stated it agreed with the conclusions and concurred with the recommendations. For example, VA indicated that it is reviewing how the agency approves and charges paid administrative leave. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In this report, we had three objectives including (1) describe policies for paid administrative leave at selected federal agencies; (2) review agencies’ and payroll providers’ practices in recording and reporting paid administrative leave, and describe the number of federal employees granted such leave, the total number of days granted, and the associated salary costs; and (3) describe categories of reasons for which large amounts of paid administrative leave have been charged by individual employees at selected federal agencies. To obtain an understanding of the reasons why agencies authorize paid administrative leave for federal employees, we used OPM’s EHRI payroll data (described below) to select five federal agencies—the Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs; General Services Administration; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—based upon two factors: (1) the percentage of employees with amounts of paid administrative leave that was relatively higher than each agency’s average, and (2) the agency’s average amount of administrative leave per employee. To determine the extent of use, the total amount, and salary costs of paid administrative leave, we analyzed payroll data from OPM’s EHRI system for each agency between fiscal years 2011 and 2013.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies have the discretion to grant paid administrative leave for a variety of reasons, such as weather closures and blood donations. While paid administrative leave costs taxpayers, it has not been reviewed or reported on extensively. GAO was asked to examine the use of paid administrative leave. This report (1) describes paid administrative leave policies at selected federal agencies; (2) reviews practices in recording and reporting paid administrative leave and describes the number of federal employees granted such leave, and the amount and associated salary costs of such leave; and (3) describes categories for which large amounts of paid administrative leave have been charged by individual employees at selected federal agencies. To determine the total amount of paid administrative leave, GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 through 2013 payroll data from OPM's Enterprise Human Resources Integration system. To review agency policies and reasons for using large amounts of administrative leave, GAO selected five agencies based in part on the percentage of employees with higher-than-average amounts of such leave. What GAO Found Policies. Agencies have the authority to grant paid administrative leave—an excused absence without loss of pay or charge to individual leave—and to set policies governing its use. Among the five agencies GAO reviewed—the Departments of Defense (DOD), the Interior, and Veterans Affairs (VA); the General Services Administration; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—agency policies and guidance contained several common activities for granting paid administrative leave (such as voting and blood donations). However, variations exist, depending on agency mission and how leave is categorized in agency policy. For example, USAID and DOD officials said that they grant paid administrative leave for rest and recuperation to employees serving 6 months or more in Afghanistan, while the other selected agencies did not. Recording and Reporting Practices. GAO found inaccuracies in Office of Personnel Management (OPM) data due to (1) differences between agencies' leave recording practices and what OPM officials consider paid administrative leave; and (2) differences in what payroll providers report to OPM as paid administrative leave. For example, VA employees record all authorized official time for union activities as paid administrative leave in the agency's time and attendance system. In addition, one payroll provider includes federal holidays as administrative leave when reporting the data to OPM. OPM officials said that, in both instances, they would not expect such absences to be recorded as administrative leave. These variations occur because OPM has not provided guidance on what agencies should record and has provided limited guidance on what payroll providers should report as paid administrative leave. Such guidance could help agencies better manage the federal workforce. Amounts and Costs. After separating federal holidays from the payroll data, OPM-reported data showed that from fiscal year 2011 through 2013, paid administrative leave accounted for less than 1 percent of total paid work days and estimated salary cost. Over these 3 years, about 97 percent of employees charged 20 days or less (see figure). For the same time period, 263 employees charged between 1 and 3 years of paid administrative leave, with an estimated salary cost of $31 million. Large Amounts. Agency officials stated that the most common reason for which selected employees charged amounts relatively higher than the agency average, was for personnel matters, such as investigations into alleged misconduct. Employees Charging Paid Administrative Leave Government-wide Fiscal Years 2011-2013 Note: Reflects workdays (5 days per week, about 21 days per month, and 260 days per year). What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that OPM develop agency and payroll provider guidance regarding the recording and reporting of paid administrative leave. OPM partially concurred agreeing to clarify guidance to agencies and payroll providers, but said it could not direct agencies on how to collect such data. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid.
gao_GAO-13-455	gao_GAO-13-455_0	HUD relies on five main organizational components to carry out its mission. HUD Has Begun Applying Key Practices for Its Modernization Efforts but Has Been Hindered by Inadequacies in Its Project Management Framework and Governance For its FHA Transformation and NGMS modernization efforts, HUD has taken initial steps toward applying key project management practices in the areas of project planning, requirements management, and acquisition planning. However, the department has not yet fully implemented any of these practices in managing the 14 projects in our review. In this regard, none of the documentation included all of the critical information that could facilitate effective project management, such as full descriptions of the work necessary to complete the projects, cost and schedule baselines, or prioritized requirements. In addition, appendix III provides our more detailed assessment against best practices. However, guidance discussed in the framework did not always include essential information called for by best practices. Compounding the issue of inadequate development and use of the framework was the lack of evidence that the department’s governance bodies had provided adequate oversight to ensure compliance with project management practices. Until HUD has a PPM framework for managing its projects that incorporates the abovementioned details, including clarifying the role of the Technical Review Subcommittee, and is appropriately used in managing its modernization efforts, the department increases the risk of continuing to inadequately apply project management practices and will not be positioned to effectively manage or report progress of its modernization efforts. Contributing to these deficiencies is that the department has not developed and used its project management framework in a manner that ensured the quality or completeness of project management documentation. Moreover, fully implementing effective project management practices is critical not only for the success of these modernization efforts, but also for that of the other five IT Transformation Initiatives or any other projects under way or undertaken in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that HUD effectively and efficiently manages its modernization efforts aimed at improving its IT environment to support mission needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development direct the Deputy Secretary to establish a plan of action that identifies specific time frames for correcting the deficiencies highlighted in this report for both its ongoing projects, as applicable, and its planned projects, to include developing charters that define what constitutes project success and establish accountability, finalizing deliverable-oriented work breakdown structures and associated dictionaries that define the detailed work needed to accomplish project objectives, completing comprehensive project management plans that reflect cost and schedule baselines and fully incorporate subsidiary management plans, establishing requirements management plans that include prioritization methods to be applied and metrics for determining how products address requirements, completing matrixes to include requirements traceability from mission needs through implementation, and establishing strategies to guide how acquisitions are managed in accordance with other processes and that performance metrics are established. Further, to improve development and use of the department’s project management framework, we recommend that the Secretary direct the FHA Transformation and NGMS steering committees to ensure that project management expertise needed to apply the guidance outlined in the framework is provided to execute and manage their respective projects; the Chief Information Officer to ensure that revisions to the framework incorporate specific information to address the areas of deficiency in project planning, requirements management, and acquisition planning identified in this report; and the Customer Care Committee to review the role and responsibilities of the Technical Review Subcommittee and ensure that the department’s governance structure operates as intended and adequately oversees the management of all of its modernization efforts. In commenting on our recommendations, the department discussed actions it was taking on various aspects of the first recommendation, but did not state whether or not it concurred with the entirety of the recommendation; stated that our conclusion leading to the second recommendation did not follow from the premises established in the draft report; and concurred with our third and fourth recommendations. As such, this report did not evaluate all of the department’s IT investments. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to identify the extent to which the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has implemented key project management practices for the Federal Housing Administration Transformation Initiative (FHA Transformation) and the Next Generation Management System (NGMS) modernization efforts.	Why GAO Did This Study HUD relies extensively on IT to carry out its mission of strengthening communities and ensuring affordable housing and has reported that efforts are under way to modernize its aging, duplicative, and poorly integrated systems. Committee report language mandated GAO to evaluate the implementation of project management practices for HUDs IT modernization efforts. The objective was to identify the extent to which the department implemented key project management practices for the FHA Transformation and NGMS modernization efforts. GAO assessed project management artifacts for 9 FHA Transformation and 5 NGMS projects in the areas of project planning (charters, work breakdown structures, and project management plans), requirements management (requirements management plans and traceability matrixes), and acquisition planning (acquisition strategies) against best practices. GAO also interviewed officials. What GAO Found The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has taken initial steps toward applying key project management practices in the areas of project planning, requirements management, and acquisition planning for its Federal Housing Administration Transformation (FHA Transformation) Initiative to address performance gaps in housing insurance programs and its Next Generation Management System (NGMS) to improve management of its affordable housing programs. However, HUD has not yet fully implemented any of these practices in executing and managing the information technology (IT) projects associated with these efforts. Specifically, while the department had developed project management artifacts such as charters and requirements management plans, none of these documents included all of the key details that could facilitate effective management of its projects such as full descriptions of the work necessary to complete the projects, cost and schedule baselines, or prioritized requirements, among other things. Department officials attributed these deficiencies to a lack of project management expertise. Because HUD has not taken these foundational steps to fully define its modernization efforts, the department is not well positioned to successfully manage or execute the associated projects. These incomplete documents limit the department's ability to fully understand the work to be completed or accurately report project progress. A major reason for these information deficiencies is HUD's inadequate development and use of its project management framework, which did not ensure the quality or completeness of artifacts developed. Specifically, the framework did not always include essential guidance and, in other cases, the projects did not always implement the guidance provided. Further, the governance structure did not consistently operate as intended to provide adequate oversight to ensure compliance with key project management practices. As a result, the department increases the risk of continuing to inadequately apply project management practices and may not be positioned to effectively manage or report progress of its key modernization efforts. Fully implementing effective project management practices is critical for the success of these two modernization efforts and others under way or planned. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that HUD establish a plan of action to fully implement best practices, provide needed project management expertise, and improve the development and use of its project management framework and governance structure. In written comments, HUD concurred with the recommendations to improve its framework and governance, but did not concur with the entirety of the recommendation to develop a plan of action, and contended that the need for project management expertise did not follow from the premises established in the draft report. GAO maintains that these actions are necessary as discussed in this report.
gao_GAO-03-753	gao_GAO-03-753_0	Develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of the Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the act. Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services, current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion has a substantial effect on military equipment and infrastructure. Corrosion Costs Appear to Be Enormous Corrosion’s impact on military costs appears to be enormous, representing one of the largest life-cycle cost components of military weapon systems. In a 2001 government-sponsored study, corrosion is estimated to cost the Department of Defense at least $20 billion a year. For example, a 2001 study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army’s approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. Just 2 years earlier, the Navy had identified corrosion as the cause of a landing gear failure on a F-18 that occurred during carrier operations. For example, during the 1980s, uncommanded fuel valve closures caused several F-16 aircraft crashes. Full Impact of Corrosion Unknown Due to Incomplete Cost, Readiness, and Safety Data For more than a decade, a number of DOD, military service, and private-sector studies have cited the lack of reliable data to adequately assess the overall impact of the corrosion problem. DOD and Services’ Approach to Corrosion Control Is Not Effective but Has Achieved Some Successes While the military services have achieved some successes on individual corrosion prevention projects, significant weaknesses in their overall approach to corrosion control have decreased the effectiveness of their efforts. Limited Coordination Within and Among the Services DOD has multiple corrosion control efforts—with different policies, procedures, and funding channels—that are not well coordinated with each other; as a result, opportunities for cost savings have been lost. DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion control office in response to the authorization act, but no single office exists within each of the military services to provide leadership and oversight for corrosion control of equipment and infrastructure. The Navy and Air Force also have multiple corrosion prevention and mitigation offices. These priorities and incentives are very different from and sometimes conflict with those held by the operational or installation commands and their subordinate units. As a result, many proposed corrosion control projects—even those with large cost saving potential and other benefits, such as increased readiness and enhanced safety—often remain underfunded because they are a low priority to the commands compared to operational and repair projects that offer more immediate results. In its technical comments, DOD did not concur with our finding that the department does not have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion is causing military assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful life. The resulting increase in required repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. GAO was asked to review military activities related to corrosion control. Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of corrosion on DOD and the military services and the extent of the effectiveness of DOD's and the services' approach to preventing and mitigating corrosion. What GAO Found Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services, current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion has a substantial impact on military equipment and infrastructure. In 2001, a government-sponsored study estimated the costs of corrosion for military systems and infrastructure at about $20 billion annually and found corrosion to be one of the largest components of life-cycle costs for weapon systems. Corrosion also reduces readiness because the need to repair or replace corrosion damage increases the downtime of critical military assets. For example, a recent study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army's approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. Finally, a number of serious safety concerns have also been associated with corrosion, including Navy F-14 and F-18 landing gear failures during carrier operations and crashes of several Air Force F-16 aircraft due to the corrosion of electrical contacts that control fuel valves. DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. They have had some successes in addressing corrosion problems on individual programs, but several weaknesses are preventing DOD and the military services from achieving much greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars in additional net savings annually. Each service has multiple corrosion offices, and their different policies, procedures, and funding channels limit coordination. Also, the goals and incentives that guide these offices sometimes conflict with those of the operational commands that they rely on to fund project implementation. As a result, proposed projects are often assigned a lower priority compared to efforts offering more immediate results. Together, these problems reduce the effectiveness of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion control activity and strategy, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will effectively address these weaknesses.
gao_GAO-03-716T	gao_GAO-03-716T_0	These reports show that spending on services acquisitions is increasing at a time when the acquisition workforce is decreasing. Since 1997, spending on services has grown 11 percent. 1). Agencies have to address governmentwide reductions in the acquisition workforce. Section 201 of SARA would create a Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) within each civilian executive agency. By granting the CAO clear lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility for acquisition decision-making, SARA takes a similar approach as leading companies in terms of the responsibility and decision-making authority of these individuals. The program established by section 103 would allow federal agencies to gain from the knowledge and expertise of private- sector professionals and entities. While we support the intent of this proposal—to make payments to government contractors more timely—implementation of this provision could result in increased improper payments and stress already weak systems and related internal controls. This change would make it clear that such contracts are specifically authorized for commercial services. Conclusion The growth in spending on service contracts, combined with decreases in the acquisition workforce and an increase in the number of high-dollar procurement actions, create a challenging acquisition environment. It is important that agencies have the authorities and tools they need to maximize their performance in this new environment. The initiatives contained in SARA address a number of longstanding issues in contracting for services, and should enable agencies to improve their performance in this area.	Why GAO Did This Study Since 1997, federal spending on services has grown 11 percent and now represents more than 60 percent of contract spending governmentwide. Several significant changes in the government--including funding for homeland security--are expected to further increase spending on services. Adjusting to this new environment has proven difficult. Agencies need to improve in a number of areas: sustaining executive leadership, strengthening the acquisition workforce, and encouraging innovative contracting approaches. Improving these areas is a key goal of the proposed Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA). What GAO Found The growth in spending on service contracts, combined with decreases in the acquisition workforce and an increase in the number of high-dollar procurement actions, create a challenging acquisition environment. It is important that agencies have the authorities and tools they need to maximize their performance in this new environment. The initiatives contained in SARA address a number of longstanding issues in contracting for services, and should enable agencies to improve their performance in this area. For example: (1) Section 201: Chief Acquisition Officers: Appointing a Chief Acquisition Officer would establish a clear line of authority, accountability, and responsibility for acquisition decisionmaking; and (2) Section 103: Government-Industry Exchange Program: A professional exchange program would allow federal agencies to gain from the knowledge and expertise of the commercial acquisition workforce. At the same time, GAO is concerned about some provisions in SARA. For example: (1) Section 211: Ensuring Efficient Payment: While GAO supports the intent of this proposal to make payments to government contractors more timely, GAO has reservations concerning its implementation. GAO's work shows that agencies have been hampered by problems such as high payment volume, inadequate payment systems, and weak controls.
gao_GAO-05-476T	gao_GAO-05-476T_0	Fiscal Year 2004 Performance and Results In fiscal year 2004, much of our work examined the effectiveness of the federal government’s day-to-day operations, such as administering benefits to the elderly and other needy populations, providing grants and loans to college students, and collecting taxes from businesses and individuals. For example, we continued to closely monitor developments affecting the Iraq war, defense transformation, homeland security, social security, health care, the U.S. See appendix I for our Strategic Plan Framework for serving the Congress and the nation. Outcomes of Our Work In fiscal year 2004, our work generated $44 billion in financial benefits, primarily from recommendations we made to agencies and the Congress (see fig. 1). Many of the benefits that result from our work cannot be measured in dollar terms. During fiscal year 2004, we recorded a total of 1,197 other benefits (see fig. 4). Putting these recommendations into practice is generating tangible benefits for the American people. Testimonies That Serve the Congress During fiscal year 2004, experts from our staff testified at 217 congressional hearings (see fig. 9) covering a wide range of complex issues. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the American public, strengthen public confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of our national government, and ensure the ability of government to deliver on its promises. Streamlining and Management Improvement Efforts Shortly after I was appointed in November 1998, I determined that GAO should undertake a major transformation effort to better enable it to “lead by example” and better support the Congress in the 21st century. This effort is consistent with the House Report 108-577 on the fiscal year 2005 legislative branch appropriation that focuses on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at legislative branch agencies. H.Rpt. On the basis of the strategic plan, we streamlined and realigned the agency to eliminate a management layer, consolidated 35 issue areas into 13 teams, and reduced our field offices from 16 to 11. This has resulted in a 14 percent reduction in our support staff since 1998. Currently, as shown in figure 12, over 50 percent of our staff resources in the support area are contractors, allowing us to devote more of our staff resources to our mission work. We recently surveyed managers of agency mission support operations and identified additional activities that potentially could be filled through alternative sourcing strategies. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we will assess the feasibility of alternative sourcing for these activities using an acquisition sourcing maturity model and cost- benefit analyses. GAO’s Fiscal Year 2006 Request to Support the Congress We are requesting budget authority of $493.5 million for fiscal year 2006. This budget request will allow us to continue to maximize productivity, operate more effectively and efficiently, and maintain the progress we have made in technology and other areas. However, it does not allow us sufficient funding to support a staffing level of 3,269—the staffing level that we requested in previous years. However, with about 80 percent of our budget composed of human capital costs, we needed to constrain hiring to keep our fiscal year 2006 budget request modest. There are increasingly greater demands on GAO’s resources. In addition, the number of congressional mandates for GAO studies, such as our reviews of executive branch and legislative branch operations, has increased more than 15 percent since fiscal year 2000. While we have reduced our planned staffing level for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we believe that the staffing level we requested in previous years is a more optimal staffing level for GAO and would allow us to successfully meet the future needs of the Congress and provide the return on investment that the Congress and the American people expect. We will be seeking your commitment and support to provide the funding needed to rebuild our staffing levels over the next few fiscal years, especially as we approach a point where we may be able to express an opinion on the federal government’s consolidated financial statements. Given current and projected deficits and the demands associated with managing a growing national debt, as well as challenges facing the Congress to restructure federal programs, reevaluate the role of government, and ensure accountability of federal agencies, a strong GAO will result in substantially greater benefits to the Congress and the American people. Table 2 summarizes the changes we are requesting in our fiscal year 2006 budget. We promote a workforce that continually improves its skills and knowledge. We also will continue to modernize or develop systems focusing on how analysts do their work. Due to recent budget constraints, we have curtailed some efforts related to archiving paper records. Concluding Remarks We appreciate your consideration of our budget request for fiscal year 2006 to support the Congress. GAO is uniquely positioned to help provide the Congress the timely, objective information it needs to discharge its constitutional responsibilities, especially in connection with oversight matters. GAO’s work covers virtually every area in which the federal government is or may become involved anywhere in the world. In the years ahead, GAO’s support will prove even more critical because of the pressures created by our nation’s large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance.	Why GAO Did This Study This testimony is in support of the fiscal year 2006 budget request for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). This request is necessary to help us continue to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. We are grateful to the Congress for providing us with the support and resources that have helped us in our quest to be a world-class professional services organization. We believe that investing in GAO produces a sound return and results in substantial benefits to the Congress and the American people. In the years ahead, our support to the Congress will likely prove even more critical because of the pressures created by our nation's current and projected budget deficit and long-term fiscal imbalance. These fiscal pressures will require the Congress to make tough choices regarding what the government should do, how it will do its work, who will help carry out its work in the future, and how government will be financed in the future. We summarized the larger challenges facing the federal government in our recently issued 21st Century Challenges report. In this report, we emphasize the critical need to bring the federal government's programs and policies into line with 21st century realities. Continuing on our current unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. We, therefore, must fundamentally reexamine major spending and tax policies and priorities in an effort to recapture our fiscal flexibility and ensure that our programs and priorities respond to emerging security, social, economic, and environmental changes and challenges in the years ahead. This testimony focuses on GAO's (1) performance and results with the funding Congress provided in fiscal year 2004, (2) streamlining and management improvement efforts under way, and (3) budget request for fiscal year 2006 to support the Congress and serve the American people. What GAO Found In summary, the funding we received in fiscal year 2004 allowed us to audit and evaluate a number of major topics of concern to the nation and, in some cases, the world. We also continued to raise concerns about the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance, summarized key health care statistics and published a proposed framework for related reforms, and provided staff support for the 9/11 Commission. In fiscal year 2004, we exceeded or equaled our all-time record for six of our seven key performance indicators while continuing to improve our client and employee feedback results. We documented $44 billion in financial benefits--a return of $95 for every dollar spent, or $13.7 million per employee. In fiscal year 2004, we also recorded 1,197 other benefits that could not be measured in dollar terms including benefits that helped to change laws, to improve services to the public and to promote sound agency and governmentwide management. Also, experts from our staff testified at 217 congressional hearings covering a wide range of important public policy issues during fiscal year 2004. Shortly after the Comptroller General was appointed, he determined that our agency would undertake a transformation effort. This effort is consistent with the elements of House Report (H.Rpt.) 108-577 that focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at legislative branch agencies. Our transformation effort has enabled us to eliminate a management layer, streamline our organization, reduce our overall footprint, and centralize many of our support functions. Currently, over 50 percent of our support staff are contractors, allowing us to devote more of our staff resources to our mission work. We recently surveyed managers of agency support operations and identified additional activities that potentially could be filled through alternative sourcing strategies. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we will further assess the feasibility of using alternative sourcing for these activities. In developing our fiscal year 2006 budget, we have taken into consideration the overall federal budget constraints and the committee's desire to lead by example. Accordingly, we are requesting $493.5 million which represents a modest increase of 4 percent over fiscal year 2005. This increase is primarily for mandatory pay costs and price level changes. This budget request will allow us to continue to maximize productivity, operate more effectively and efficiently, and maintain the progress we have made in technology and other areas, but it does not allow us sufficient funding to support a staffing level of 3,269--the staffing level that we requested in previous years. Even as we are tempering our budget request, it needs to be acknowledged that there are increasing demands on GAO's resources. For example, the number of congressional mandates for GAO studies, such as GAO reviews of executive branch and legislative branch operations, has increased more than 15 percent since fiscal year 2000. While we have reduced our planned staffing level for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 in order to keep our request modest, we believe that the staffing level we requested in previous years is a more optimal staffing level for GAO and would allow us to better meet the needs of the Congress and provide the return on investment that both the Congress and the American people expect. We will be seeking Congressional commitment and support to provide the funding needed to rebuild our staffing levels over the next few fiscal years, especially as we approach a point where we may be able to express an opinion on the federal government's consolidated financial statements.
gao_GAO-17-559	gao_GAO-17-559_0	Reclamation. Corps. Federal and Selected State Agencies Collect Information on Water Infrastructure Needs through Surveys, Program Administration, and Studies The eight federal agencies and the six selected states identify drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs through surveys, the administration of programs, and studies. For the six states we selected to review, EPA estimated a total of approximately $123 billion in drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs. Corps. FEMA. Four of the six states we selected for review—New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Tennessee—have collected data on drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects or needs through their own surveys of communities or statewide studies, in addition to participating in EPA’s assessments. Federal Agencies Provide Technical Assistance and Funding to Support State and Local Planning for Future Drinking Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Needs Of the eight federal agencies we reviewed, three—the Corps, Reclamation, and FEMA—provide technical assistance and funding to support planning efforts in the selected states for future conditions that may affect drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs. The remaining five federal agencies have at times been involved in long-term planning for such conditions and may provide grant funding to help support such work, but they do not have established programs that offer technical assistance or funding for such purposes. Agencies Have Taken Certain Actions to Coordinate Project Funding While Facing Some Challenges Federal and state agencies in the six selected states have taken certain actions to coordinate funding for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects. In three of the selected states—California, New York, and North Dakota—federal and state agencies developed written agreements for their coordinating groups. For example, agencies in Alaska shared information on projects for small Alaska villages, and in California agencies shared information on jointly funded projects. Several Challenges to Funding Projects Make It Difficult for Agencies to Provide All Available Federal Funds in Selected States In the selected states, four key challenges can make it difficult for federal and state agencies to provide all federal funds available for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects: limited community demand for loan funding, limited technical or financial capacity of some communities, differing requirements among federal and state funding programs, and difficulty developing a set of projects ready for funding. For example, USDA state offices in the selected states did not have enough applicants with projects that were ready to fund, and the offices did not lend a total of about $193 million in loan funding available for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 to communities in those states. Finally, agencies have shared information and conducted joint outreach to help address difficulties with developing a set of projects ready for funding. Most recently, to help improve state-level coordination between state SRF programs and USDA state offices on drinking water and wastewater infrastructure project funding, EPA and USDA issued a joint memorandum in February 2017 that outlined five coordination practices that states’ SRF programs and USDA state offices are encouraged to use. These practices include participating in a statewide coordinating group, conducting joint marketing or outreach, adopting common application materials, adopting a common environmental review process, and periodically reexamining internal processes to identify opportunities for streamlining and increasing coordination. New Mexico had technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to describe (1) how federal agencies and selected states identify drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs; (2) how federal agencies have supported selected states in planning for future conditions that may affect such needs; and (3) the extent to which federal and state agencies have coordinated in funding drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects, and any challenges they face in funding these projects. We reviewed our previous reports to identify the agencies that provide funding or planning assistance to states or communities for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure and identified eight agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Rural Utilities Service, the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration, the Department of Defense’s Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Indian Health Service, the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation. North Dakota.	Why GAO Did This Study Events such as the discovery of lead in drinking water in Flint, Michigan, and the overflow and damage to the spillway at the Oroville Dam in California have drawn attention to the condition of the nation's drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. Conditions such as population growth or drought may further affect a community's needs and plans for such infrastructure. GAO was asked to review federal programs that provide funding for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. This report describes (1) how federal agencies and selected states identify drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs; (2) how federal agencies have supported selected states' planning for future conditions that may affect needs; and (3) the extent to which federal and state agencies have coordinated in funding projects, and any challenges they faced. GAO reviewed eight federal agencies that provide assistance for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure and selected a nongeneralizable sample of six states—Alaska, California, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Tennessee—on the basis of federal infrastructure funding amounts and geography. For the six states, GAO reviewed infrastructure planning and program documents and interviewed federal and state officials. What GAO Found The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal and selected state agencies collect information to identify drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs through surveys, the administration of agency programs, and studies. EPA's most recent surveys estimated approximately $655 billion of drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs nationwide over the next 20 years. The seven other agencies GAO reviewed—the departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Economic Development Administration, Indian Health Service, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—collect information on these needs by administering their programs. For example, the Corps collects information on congressionally authorized water projects. Of the six states GAO selected for review, all but Alaska and California had collected data on their needs such as through surveys of communities. For example, North Dakota biennially collects information on drinking water projects from its communities. The Corps, Reclamation, and FEMA provide technical assistance and funding to support efforts in the six selected states to plan for future conditions that may affect drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs. For example, the Corps helped Minnewaukan, North Dakota, identify alternatives for reducing flood risks to the city's drinking water and wastewater infrastructure, and Reclamation worked with Santa Fe, New Mexico, to study its projected water supply and demand. The remaining five agencies have at times been involved in long-term planning but do not have established programs for such purposes. Federal and state agencies in the six selected states have taken actions to coordinate funding for projects while facing several challenges. For example, agencies in most of the selected states had established interagency coordinating groups that reached out to communities needing funding for projects. In some cases, agencies developed written agreements for their coordinating groups, with such goals as simplifying the application process and encouraging agencies to fund projects together. However, agencies in the selected states faced challenges, such as difficulty in developing a set of specific projects that were ready for funding, despite having infrastructure needs. For example, in the six selected states, USDA did not have enough applicants with projects that were developed to the extent needed to receive funding; therefore, USDA did not loan a total of about $193 million in available loan funds for fiscal years 2012 through 2016 to communities in those states. GAO found that federal and state agencies within selected states had taken some actions to help address challenges they faced in funding projects; these actions included conducting joint outreach to develop a set of projects ready for funding. EPA and USDA also have taken actions. For example, in February 2017 in response to a GAO recommendation in a prior report, EPA and USDA issued a joint memorandum outlining five practices to help improve interagency collaboration at the state level on drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects; these practices include using common application materials and conducting joint marketing or outreach. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Federal agencies and states provided technical comments on a draft of this report that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
gao_GAO-03-666	gao_GAO-03-666_0	However, according to District officials, this assistance is inadequate. In September 2002, we published an interim report that concluded that the District had not provided sufficient data and analysis for us to determine whether, or to what extent, the District is, in fact, facing a fiscal structural imbalance. To help inform this debate about the proper level of federal assistance, this report (1) assesses whether, or to what extent, the District faces a structural imbalance between its revenue capacity and the cost of providing residents and visitors with average levels of public services, (2) identifies significant constraints on the District’s revenue capacity, (3) examines cost conditions and management problems in key program areas, and (4) studies the effects of the District’s fiscal situation on its ability to fund infrastructure projects and repay related debt. Reports on the District’s Unique Circumstances, Fiscal Health, and Management Problems Several recent reports address some of the unique challenges the District faces as the nation’s capital, the status of its fiscal health, and the management inefficiencies that continue to affect its programs, costs, and service delivery. However, since other states may tax nonresidents’ incomes, those incomes are included in their tax bases. We reviewed the data that the District had available in its annual budget and financial plans and CAFRs, and other documents. The District’s Cost of Meeting Its Public Service Responsibilities Exceeds Its Revenue Capacity, Resulting in a Structural Deficit To determine if a jurisdiction has a structural deficit, we estimated, for the District of Columbia and the 50 state fiscal systems, the spending needed to provide an average level of public services, the revenues that could be raised with average tax rates and the amount of grant funding the jurisdiction can expect to receive. Our analysis indicated that the District’s cost of delivering an average level of services per capita is the highest in the nation due to factors such as high poverty, crime, and a high cost of living. Our analysis also indicated that the District’s total revenue capacity (own- source revenues plus grants) is higher than all state fiscal systems, but not to the same extent that its costs are higher. The primary reason for the structural deficit is high costs due to conditions beyond District officials’ direct control. The Spending Necessary to Fund an Average Basket of Public Services Exceeds That of All State Fiscal Systems Using an average of the 50 state fiscal systems as a benchmark, our analysis indicates that the per capita cost of funding an average level of services in the District exceeds that of the average state fiscal system by approximately 75 percent (and is over a third more than the second highest cost fiscal system, New York). The District’s High Tax Burden Yields Revenues That Could Only Support an Average Level of Services The District’s tax burden (actual revenues collected from local resources relative to their own-source revenue capacity) is among the highest of all fiscal systems, but that burden yields revenues that are only sufficient to fund an average level of services. However, when the District’s high cost circumstances are taken into account, this high spending level would only be sufficient to provide an average level of services if those services were delivered with average efficiency. Nevertheless, even if the District were to provide its public services as efficiently as a typical state fiscal system, it would still face a structural deficit of $470 million or more. The District’s Revenue Capacity Would Be Even Higher in the Absence of Several Constraints on Its Taxing Authority Although the District of Columbia’s (District) own-source revenue capacity per capita appears to be large relative to those of most state fiscal systems, it would be even larger in the absence of several existing constraints on the District’s taxing authority. The District’s Property Tax Base Is Relatively Large despite the Disproportionate Presence of Properties Owned by the Federal and Foreign Governments Like all state and local governments, the District is unable to tax property owned by the federal government and foreign governments. In addition, in each of the three key program areas we identified significant management problems, such as inadequate financial management, billing systems and internal controls that result in unnecessary spending, which draw scarce resources away from program services. Steps to Address Management Problems District officials have acknowledged the severity of the District’s Medicaid management problems and have taken steps to remedy them. It also makes it difficult to plan or budget for federally related expenses. District Infrastructure Continues to Be Deferred The District is deferring significant amounts of capital projects by not funding or taking action on specific repairs and improvements to the District’s infrastructure.	Why GAO Did This Study District officials have recently reported both a budget gap and a more permanent structural imbalance between costs and revenue raising capacity. They maintain that the structural imbalance largely stems from the federal government's presence and restrictions on the District's tax base. Accordingly, at various times District officials have asked the Congress for additional funds and other measures to enhance revenues. In a preliminary September 2002 report, GAO concluded that the District had not provided sufficient data and analysis to discern whether, or to what extent, it is facing a structural imbalance. At that time, GAO also agreed to perform a more comprehensive analysis and was asked to (1) determine whether, or to what extent, the District faces a structural imbalance between its revenue capacity and its public service responsibilities, (2) identify any significant constraints on the District's revenue capacity, (3) discuss factors beyond the control of District officials that influence the District's spending in key program areas as well as factors within its control, such as management problems, and (4) report on the District's deferred infrastructure projects and outstanding debt service and related expenses that might be affected by a structural imbalance. The District concurred with our key findings. What GAO Found GAO used a multifaceted approach to measure structural imbalance that GAO defines as a fiscal system's inability to fund an average level of public services with revenues that it could raise with an average level of taxation, plus the federal aid it receives. This approach compared the District's circumstances to a benchmark based on the average spending and tax policies of the 50 state fiscal systems (each state and its local governments). However, the benchmark is adjusted by taking into account circumstances that are beyond the control of state and local government officials (e.g., number of school-age children and value of tax bases). GAO supplemented this analysis with reviews of the District's key programs to provide insights on factors influencing spending, and reviewed deferred infrastructure and outstanding debt. The cost of delivering an average level of services per capita in the District far exceeds that of the average state fiscal system due to factors such as high poverty, crime, and a high cost of living. The District's per capita total revenue capacity is higher than all state fiscal systems but not to the same extent that its costs are higher. In addition, its revenue capacity would be larger without constraints on its taxing authority, such as its inability to tax federal property or the income of nonresidents. The District faces a substantial structural deficit in that the cost of providing an average level of public services exceeds the amount of revenue it could raise by applying average tax rates. Data limitations and uncertainties surrounding key assumptions in our analysis made it difficult to determine the exact size of the District's structural deficit, though it likely exceeds $470 million annually. Consequently, even though the District's tax burden is among the highest in the nation, the resulting revenues plus federal grants are only sufficient to fund an average level of public services, if those services were delivered with average efficiency. The District's significant management problems in key programs waste resources and make it difficult to provide even an average level of services. Examples include inadequate financial management, billing systems, and internal controls, resulting in tens of millions of dollars being wasted, and hindering its ability to receive federal funding. Addressing management problems would not offset the District's underlying structural imbalance because this imbalance is determined by factors beyond the District's direct control. However, addressing these management problems would help offset its current budget gap or increase service levels. The District continues to defer major infrastructure projects and capital investment because of its structural imbalance and its high debt level. These two factors make it difficult for the District to raise taxes, cut services, or assume additional debt. Although difficult, District officials could address a budget gap by taking actions such as cutting spending, raising taxes, and improving management efficiencies. In contrast, a structural imbalance is largely beyond District officials' direct control. If this imbalance is to be addressed, in the near term, it may be necessary to change federal policies to expand the District's tax base or to provide additional financial support. However, given the existence of structural imbalances in other jurisdictions and the District's significant management problems, federal policymakers face difficult choices regarding what changes, if any, they should make in their financial relationship with the District.
gao_GAO-10-818	gao_GAO-10-818_0	1). Accurate. Finally, experts identified several barriers to improving inventory comparability and quality. Recent Reviews Found That Selected Annex I Nations’ Inventories Were Comparable and of High Quality, but Some Estimates Have Substantial Uncertainty All of the inventories submitted in 2009 by the seven selected Annex I nations were generally comparable and of high quality, according to the most recent inventory reviews conducted by expert review teams under the Convention. review to developing nations. In addition, experts and the national communications of selected non- Annex I nations identified several other barriers to improving the quality and comparability of inventories from non-Annex I nations, including: Less stringent reporting guidelines and lack of review. The Inventory Review Process for Annex I Nations Has Several Strengths and Some Limitations, and No Comparable Process Exists for Non-Annex I Nations Experts said that the process for reviewing inventories from Annex I nations has several notable strengths. They also identified three limitations, which may present challenges in the future. Two experts said that the inventory reviews provide constructive feedback to improve inventories from Annex I nations. Experts Said the Inventory System Is Generally Sufficient for Monitoring Compliance with Current Agreements, but Future Agreements with Non- Annex I Nations Could Pose Challenges Most experts we interviewed said that the inventory system for Annex I and non-Annex I nations is generally sufficient for monitoring compliance with current agreements. In international negotiations, State has emphasized the need for better information on emissions from all high-emitting nations, including non-Annex I nations. However, the current inventory system does not request high quality emissions information from non-Annex I nations, which account for the largest and fastest growing share of global emissions. For example, some experts and nations have reported concerns about inconsistent reviews and that resources may not be sufficient in the future. Recognizing the importance of high quality and comparable data on emissions from Annex I and non-Annex I Parties to the Convention in developing and monitoring international climate change agreements, we recommend that the Secretary of State continue to work with other Parties to the Convention in international negotiations to encourage non-Annex I Parties, especially high-emitting nations, to enhance their inventories, including by reporting in a more timely, comprehensive, and comparable manner, and possibly establishing a process for reviewing their inventories. 2. To provide greater assurance that the review process has an adequate supply of reviewers and provides consistent reviews, we recommend that the Secretary of State, as the U.S. representative to the Framework Convention, work with other Parties to the Convention to explore strengthening the quality assurance framework for the inventory review process. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Our review provides information on: (1) the comparability, quality, and barriers to improving inventories submitted by developed and developing nations to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Convention); (2) the strengths and limitations of the Convention’s inventory review process; and (3) the views of experts on the implications for agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, to address the first objective, we selected a nonprobability sample of 14 nations, seven Annex I nations—Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and seven non- Annex I nations—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Korea—based on the size of their emissions (including emissions from land-use and land-use change and forestry). Climate Change: Expert Opinion on the Economics of Policy Options to Address Climate Change.	Why GAO Did This Study Nations that are Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change periodically submit inventories estimating their greenhouse gas emissions. The Convention Secretariat runs a review process to evaluate inventories from 41 "Annex I" nations, which are mostly economically developed nations. The 153 "non-Annex I" nations are generally less economically developed and have less stringent inventory reporting guidelines. The Department of State (State) represents the United States in international climate change negotiations. GAO was asked to report on (1) what is known about the comparability and quality of inventories and barriers, if any, to improvement; (2) what is known about the strengths and limits of the inventory review process; and (3) views of experts on implications for current and future international agreements to reduce emissions. GAO analyzed inventory reviews and inventories from the seven highest-emitting Annex I nations and seven of the highest emitting non-Annex I nations. GAO also selected and interviewed experts. What GAO Found Recent reviews by expert teams convened by the Secretariat found that the 2009 inventories from the selected Annex I nations--Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States--were generally comparable and of high quality. For selected non-Annex I nations--Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Korea--GAO found most inventories were dated and of lower comparability and quality. Experts GAO interviewed said data availability, scientific uncertainties, limited incentives, and different guidelines for non-Annex I nations were barriers to improving their inventories. The lack of comparable, high quality inventories from non-Annex I nations is important because they are the largest and fastest growing source of emissions, and information about their emissions is important to efforts to address climate change. There are no inventory reviews for non-Annex I nations. Experts said the inventory review process has notable strengths for Annex I nations as well as some limitations. The review process, which aims to ensure nations have accurate information on inventories, is rigorous, involves well-qualified reviewers, and provides feedback to improve inventories, according to experts. Among the limitations experts identified is a lack of independent verification of estimates due to the limited availability of independent statistics against which to compare inventories' data. Also, GAO found that the review process's quality assurance framework does not independently assess concerns about a limited supply of reviewers and inconsistent reviews, which could pose challenges in the future. Experts said Annex I nations' inventories and the inventory review process are generally sufficient for monitoring compliance with current agreements to reduce emissions. For non-Annex I nations, however, experts said the current system may be insufficient for monitoring compliance with future agreements, which may require more reporting. As part of ongoing negotiations to develop a new climate change agreement, State has emphasized the need for better information on emissions from high-emitting non-Annex I nations. While improving the inventory system is important to negotiations, some experts said disagreements about emissions limits for developed and developing nations pose a greater challenge. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State work with other Parties to the Convention to (1) continue encouraging non-Annex I Parties to improve their inventories and (2) strengthen the inventory review process's quality assurance framework. State agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations.
gao_GAO-06-59	gao_GAO-06-59_0	To control rising costs and improper payments, Congress established therapy caps for all nonhospital providers in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. In December 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 placed the most recent moratorium on the caps, extending from December 8, 2003, through December 31, 2005. Medicare Claims Data Do Not Always Capture Clinical Diagnoses or Show Consistent Patterns That Would Justify Waiving Therapy Caps Although Medicare claims data constitute the most comprehensive available information for Medicare beneficiaries who have received outpatient therapy, they do not always capture the clinical diagnosis for which beneficiaries receive therapy. Moreover, current Medicare guidelines for processing claims permit institutional providers, such as outpatient rehabilitation facilities and skilled nursing facilities, to submit services from all three therapy types on the same claim form, with one principal diagnosis for the claim; a claim seeking payment for occupational therapy and for speech-language pathology might therefore be filed under “other physical therapy.” Analysis of 2002 claims data does not show any particular conditions or diseases that are more likely than others to be associated with payments exceeding the therapy caps for physical therapy and speech-language pathology combined or for occupational therapy. Available Research Does Not Define Amount or Mix of Outpatient Therapy Needed for Medicare Beneficiaries with Specific Diseases or Conditions Available research on the efficacy of outpatient therapy for people aged 65 and older with specific conditions and diseases also appears insufficient to justify a waiver of particular conditions or diseases from the therapy caps. Further, because of the complexity of patient factors involved, these studies cannot be generalized to all patients with similar diseases or conditions. Provider groups we spoke with were concerned that a sizable number of beneficiaries with legitimate medical needs whose payments would exceed the caps could be harmed. HHS Has Made Little Progress toward a Payment System Based on Patients’ Needs Statutory mandates since 1997 have required HHS to take certain actions toward developing a payment system for outpatient therapy that considers patients’ individual needs for care, but the agency has made little progress toward such a system. In particular, HHS has not determined how to standardize and collect information on the health and functioning of patients receiving outpatient therapy services—a key part of developing a system based on patients’ actual needs for therapy. Circumstances That Led to Therapy Caps Remain Recent assessments of Medicare claims data have shown that the circumstances that initially led to therapy caps—rising Medicare payments for outpatient therapy and a high rate of improper payments—remain. HHS does not, however, currently have the authority to implement a process, or to conduct a demonstration or pilot project, to provide exceptions to the therapy caps. Recommendations for Executive Action To expedite development of a process for assessing patients’ needs for outpatient therapy services and to limit improper payments, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS take the following two actions: ensure that outpatient therapy services are added to the effort already under way to develop standard terminology for existing patient assessment instruments, with a goal of developing a means by which to collect such information for outpatient therapy, and implement improvements to CMS’s automated system for identifying outpatient therapy claims that are likely to be improper.	Why GAO Did This Study For years, Congress has wrestled with rising Medicare costs and improper payments for outpatient therapy services--physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech-language pathology. In 1997 Congress established per-person spending limits, or "therapy caps," for nonhospital outpatient therapy but, responding to concerns that some beneficiaries need extensive services, has since placed temporary moratoriums on the caps. The current moratorium is set to expire at the end of 2005. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 required GAO to report on whether available information justifies waiving the caps for particular conditions or diseases. As agreed with the committees of jurisdiction, GAO also assessed the status of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) efforts to develop a needs-based payment policy and whether circumstances leading to the caps have changed. What GAO Found Data and research available are, for three reasons, insufficient to identify particular conditions or diseases to justify waiving Medicare's outpatient therapy caps. First, Medicare claims data--the most comprehensive data for beneficiaries whose payments would exceed the caps--often do not capture the clinical diagnosis for which therapy is received. Nor do they show particular conditions or diseases as more likely than others to be associated with payments exceeding the caps. Second, even for diagnoses clearly linked to a condition or disease, such as stroke, the length of treatment for patients with the same diagnosis varies widely. Third, because of the complexity of patient factors involved, most studies do not define the amount or mix of therapy services needed for Medicare beneficiaries with specific conditions or diseases. Provider groups remain concerned about adverse effects on beneficiaries needing extensive therapy if the caps are enforced. HHS does not, however, have the authority to provide exceptions to the therapy caps. Despite several related statutory requirements, HHS has made little progress toward developing a payment system for outpatient therapy that considers individual beneficiaries' needs. In particular, HHS has not determined how to standardize and collect information on the health and functioning of patients receiving outpatient therapy services--a key part of developing a system based on individual needs for therapy. The circumstances that led to the therapy caps remain a concern. Medicare payments for outpatient therapy are still rising significantly, and increases in improper payments for outpatient therapy continue. HHS could reduce improper payments and Medicare costs by improving its system of automated processes for rejecting claims likely to be improper.
gao_GAO-09-33	gao_GAO-09-33_0	HUD also provides funds to modernize and develop public housing units through the Capital Fund. HUD’s Primary Oversight Processes Could Be Better Focused to Detect Housing Agencies at Risk of Inappropriate Uses or Mismanagement of Public Housing Funds Persistent Problems with Audit Quality and Gaps in What Audits Cover Can Limit HUD’s Ability to Detect Misuse or Mismanagement of Public Housing Funds Single audits, HUD’s primary tool for overseeing the use of public housing funds, are intended to, among other things, promote sound financial management by serving as a key accountability mechanism in the oversight and monitoring of recipients’ use of federal funds. Understanding commonly occurring audit findings could be useful for identifying housing agencies that are at greater risk of inappropriate use or mismanagement of public housing funds and assessing vulnerabilities in HUD’s oversight processes. Specifically, HUD uses its ARCATS to track the resolution of the HUD Inspector General’s audit findings. PHAS and HUD’s Internal Analyses of Financial Data Could Be Better Focused to Identify Housing Agencies at Risk for Misuse and Mismanagement of Public Housing Funds PHAS and HUD’s internal analyses of data from housing agencies’ financial data could be better focused to identify housing agencies that are at greater risk of potential inappropriate uses or mismanagement of public housing funds. HUD has stated that it would primarily rely on single audits to identify such problems. However, we analyzed housing agencies’ financial data and found that many of these agencies showed signs that they may be at greater risk of inappropriately using or mismanaging public housing funds, even though the agencies in question received passing PHAS scores. 2.) 3). Only 1 had a PHAS score indicating that the agency was troubled. As shown in figure 4, when we looked at the 200 housing agencies reporting an average bank overdraft of $25,000 or more from 2002 through 2006, we found that nearly 75 percent of these housing agencies received passing PHAS and FASS scores. HUD currently uses PHAS to monitor housing agencies, but this system has not always identified housing agencies at risk of problems such as cash management issues and was not intended to identify inappropriate use of public housing funds. Although HUD has developed automated checks of housing agencies’ financial information to help ensure its completeness and accuracy for PHAS, the department has not used these checks as a mechanism to identify housing agencies at greater risk for potential misuse and mismanagement of public housing funds. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to strengthen its oversight of housing agencies administering the public housing program and better leverage information that it already collects, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development: Regularly summarize and systematically evaluate the results of OIG and single audits of public housing agencies to allow program managers to identify and understand problems of potential inappropriate use and mismanagement of public housing funds, identify emerging issues, and evaluate overall monitoring and oversight processes.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided over $6.7 billion in fiscal year 2008 to housing agencies to operate, modernize, and develop about 1.2 million public housing units. It is important that HUD exercise sufficient oversight of housing agencies to help ensure that public housing funds are being used as intended and properly managed. In this report, GAO examines HUD's oversight processes for detecting housing agencies at risk of inappropriate use and mismanagement of public housing funds. GAO analyzed HUD financial data on about 3,300 housing agencies, compared HUD's oversight policies with program and agency objectives, and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Found Key HUD oversight processes could be more focused on identifying potential inappropriate use or mismanagement of public housing funds. HUD primarily relies on single audits to identify such problems, although HUD, its Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (now known as the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency) have identified weaknesses with some audits. Further, even when these audits do identify issues, HUD does not systematically summarize audit findings to identify and understand emerging and persistent issues to better monitor housing agencies for inappropriate use and mismanagement of public housing funds. Understanding these problems could be useful for identifying housing agencies that are at greater risk of inappropriately using or mismanaging public housing funds. HUD uses the Public Housing Assessment System (PHAS) to monitor and rate the overall condition and financial health of public housing agencies. However, PHAS is not intended to identify inappropriate uses of public housing funds and is limited in its ability to detect potential mismanagement. HUD also analyzes the financial data of public housing agencies, but its review focuses on the accuracy and completeness of the information used to calculate PHAS scores. GAO analyzed financial data from the housing agencies and found many housing agencies showed indicators that they were at risk of potential inappropriate use and mismanagement of public housing funds--while most received passing PHAS scores. For example, GAO found that from 2002 to 2006, 200 housing agencies had written checks for more than the funds available in their bank accounts (bank overdrafts) on average of $25,000 or more. However, 75 percent of these agencies received passing PHAS scores. Such overdrafts raise questions about these agencies' cash management. But HUD does not use these and similar measures to identify housing agencies at greater risk of inappropriately using or mismanaging public housing funds. Without fully leveraging the audit and financial information it collects, the department limits its ability to identify housing agencies that are at greater risk of inappropriately using or mismanaging program funds.
gao_GAO-13-67	gao_GAO-13-67_0	For example, most state charter school laws generally require that charter schools be open to all students within a specified boundary (commonly referred to as “open enrollment” requirements). Charter Schools on Military Bases Enrolled Military- Connected Students to Varying Degrees and Were Started in Response to Family, Military, and Private Interests While most schools located on military bases were traditional public schools or DOD schools, eight were charter schools at the time of our review. The military base charter schools differed among themselves in their academic focuses and in the number of military-connected children they served. Both of these schools—Sigsbee and Flightline—are located behind the security gate on their respective military bases. Table 1 provides information on the characteristics of the eight charter schools. Family and Military Needs and Private Interests Were Among Key Reasons for Establishing Charter Schools While all of the charter schools on military bases serve a large percentage of military-connected students, they were started for various reasons, including family perceptions about the quality of education available for their children in local school districts and military officials’ need to attract and retain military families to bases. Moreover, in some instances the impetus for establishing a charter school on a military base originated with private housing developers on military bases and charter management organizations. The housing developers worked with Imagine Schools, the CMO, to develop a charter school that would make living on base more attractive. Charter Schools on Military Bases Faced Challenges with Enrollment Preferences, Civilian Access to Schools, and Facilities Enrollment Preferences for Military-Connected Students Posed Hurdles for School Planners While charter schools on military bases encountered some of the same challenges as other charter schools around the nation—such as acquiring facilities and startup funding—they also experienced challenges unique to starting up and operating a charter school on a military base. However, Maryland law requires charter schools to be open to all students. Created prior to recent changes in Florida state law that now permit charter schools to give enrollment preference to children of an active duty member of any branch of the United States Armed Forces, the school utilized a provision in state law that allows a charter school to give enrollment preference to children of workplace employees. The statute authorizing CSP grants requires charter schools, as a condition of receiving funding, to admit students on the basis of a lottery if more students apply than can be accommodated, and to provide a description of how students in the community will be given an equal opportunity to attend the charter school. The official also stated concern about enrollment preferences that would significantly limit civilian enrollment access to a school. Obtaining Facilities on Bases Can Be Challenging and Complex for Charter School Planners Like charter schools generally, military base charter schools encountered difficulties obtaining facilities for school use, and they may face additional challenges because of their location on military bases (see table 4). According to a school official, there are no funds to complete the remaining renovation work. The official noted that more information sharing in this area would be useful. Recommendations for Executive Action Education To ensure that Charter Schools Program grants are provided only to schools that meet eligibility criteria, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct the Charter Schools Program office to revise the Charter Schools Program guidance to  Clarify CSP grant requirements regarding charter school enrollment preferences, including preferences for military-connected students, such as whether schools can hold separate lotteries for military- connected and civilian students and the extent to which schools can enroll military-connected students under work-site exemptions, and  Require applicants for CSP grants and subgrants to describe any enrollment preferences in their applications. At a minimum, this guidance should address the following areas:  The appropriate role of military base command and other DOD offices and agencies in supporting the creation and operation of charter schools;  Reasonable base access and security arrangements for civilian children, parents, and others involved in a military base charter school; and  Military lease arrangements and other property-related issues for a charter school on a base. DOD and Education To serve as a resource for military base communities exploring educational options, as stated in their 2008 Memorandum of Understanding, we also recommend that the Secretaries of DOD and Education facilitate the sharing of information among interested parties— such as base commanders and school planners and officials—on how military base charter schools have addressed startup and operational challenges. Education has asked the states to conduct reviews of these instances and report back to the Department.	Why GAO Did This Study Many families struggle to balance their job demands with ensuring that their children have access to a high-quality education, and for military families this struggle can be exacerbated by the highly mobile nature of their service. Family concerns about education affect readiness and retention of military personnel, according to the Department of Defense (DOD). The majority of children of military families in the United States attend public schools. A 2008 DOD study recommended offering military families a public charter school option in areas with poorly-performing local schools. In response to a directive in a House Appropriations Committee report, GAO examined: (1) the characteristics and origins of charter schools on military installations, and (2) the challenges charter schools on military installations have faced in starting up and continuing their operations. To conduct this review, GAO interviewed officials in the eight charter schools on domestic military bases and one school being planned; visited two schools; interviewed Education and DOD officials; and reviewed relevant federal and state laws, federal regulations and guidance, and school, federal agency, and other documents. What GAO Found Eight charter schools were located on domestic military bases and one charter school was being developed on a base at the time of GAO's review. The military base charter schools differed in their academic focuses and served militaryconnected students to different degrees. For example, one school focused on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics while another used the arts to teach all subjects. Enrollment of military-connected students at these base charter schools ranged from 42 percent to 90 percent, and three schools used preferences to ensure a higher proportion of these students. For example, one charter school with a stated mission of educating military-connected children gave first preference to children of active-duty personnel, who represented the preponderance of enrolled students. The schools were established to address different interests, including family perceptions about the quality of education in local school districts and military officials' need to attract and retain military families to bases. In some instances the impetus for establishing a charter school on a military base originated with private entities. For example, a private developer hired to build housing on the base worked with a charter management organization to develop a charter school they thought would make living on the base more attractive to military families. Charter school officials cited several challenges to starting up and operating on military bases, such as using enrollment preferences for military-connected students, providing civilian access to schools, and obtaining facilities. Most states require schools to be open to all students, and when organizers of one school sought to enroll solely military-connected students, state law prohibited this because of the state's open enrollment requirements. Some states have changed or interpreted their charter school laws to enable schools to give enrollment preference to military-connected students. Furthermore, two charter schools that have enrollment preferences for military-connected students have received Department of Education (Education) Charter Schools Program (CSP) grants, which require charter schools to provide all students an equal opportunity to attend the school and admit students by lottery if there are more applicants than spaces available. Although these military base charter schools have received these grants, Education has expressed concern that the use of such enrollment preferences would violate CSP program requirements. Charter schools have also encountered operational challenges. For example, access for civilians can be difficult. Nearly all the military base charter schools were located behind the base's security gate, requiring civilians to complete a background check and show a pass. Several school officials reported difficulties conducting school activities such as open houses and sporting events because each base had a limit on the number of security passes for civilians. Like other charter schools, military base charter school officials also reported obstacles to obtaining facilities, such as financing. However, they also encountered unique challenges, such as complex military facility and land leases. Several school and military base officials said that having guidance and more information sharing could help with startup and operational challenges charter schools on military bases face. However, there is currently little guidance or information sharing about military base charter schools. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that Education clarify whether military base charter schools that use enrollment preferences are eligible for charter school grants and that DOD and Education take actions to help address startup and operational challenges for these schools. In their responses, DOD and Education agreed with GAOs recommendations.
gao_GAO-04-938	gao_GAO-04-938_0	VA uses third-party collections to satisfy veterans’ first-party debt. The law and the relevant legislative history are not clear on whether third-party collections can be used for this purpose. Lack of Guidance Results in Inaccurate Reporting of Costs VA has not provided guidance to the Chief Business Office or VISNs for accounting for the costs associated with collecting payments from veterans and private health insurers. As a result, we found that VA’s Chief Business Office and VISNs did not allocate certain costs associated with activities related to collecting first- and third-party payments to the two cost centers used in the calculation of cost to collect. In addition, we found inconsistencies in the way VISNs allocated these costs to the field office cost center. Satisfying First-Party Debt with Third-Party Payments Limits Overall Collections VA’s practice of satisfying veterans’ copayment debt with collections from third-party insurers has reduced overall collections and increased administrative expenses. Consequently, VA’s reported cost-to-collect measure is inaccurate. Furthermore, VA has determined that it should use collections from private health insurers to satisfy veteran copayment debt. Recommendation for Executive Action To accurately determine and report the cost to collect first- and third-party payments, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to provide guidance for standardizing and consistently applying across VA the accounting of costs associated with collecting payments from veterans and private health insurers. 1. 2. Continued Stay Reviews: Reviewing clinical information and obtaining payment authorization from third-party insurer for continuation of care.	Why GAO Did This Study During a May 2003 congressional hearing, questions were raised about the accuracy of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) reported costs for collecting payments from veterans and private health insurers for its Medical Care Collections Fund (MCCF). Congress also had questions about VA's practice of using third-party collections to satisfy veterans' first-party debt. GAO's objectives were to determine: (1) the accuracy of VA's reported cost for collecting first- and third-party payments from veterans and private health insurers, and (2) how VA's practice of satisfying first-party debt with third-party payments affects the collections process. What GAO Found VA has not provided guidance to its Chief Business Office and Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) for accounting for the costs associated with collecting payments from veterans and private health insurers. As a result, GAO found that the Chief Business Office and VISNs excluded some costs associated with collecting first- and third-party payments. In addition, GAO found inconsistencies in the way VISNs allocate these costs. Consequently, VA's reported costs to collect are inaccurate. VA's practice of satisfying--or paying for--first-party, or veterans' copayment debt, with collections from third-party insurers has resulted in a reduction in overall collections and increased administrative expenses due to the reconciliation process. VA has taken the position that payments made from third-party insurers should be used to satisfy veterans' first-party debt. The law and legislative history are not clear on whether third-party collections can be used for this purpose.
gao_GAO-06-781	gao_GAO-06-781_0	1.) In 1980, Interior established a regulatory process intended to provide a uniform approach for taking land in trust. BIA Generally Followed the Regulations for Taking Land in Trust, and These Regulations Provide BIA with Wide Discretion BIA generally followed its regulations for processing the 87 land in trust applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005, such as properly notifying affected state and local governments and providing time for comments and appeals. The criteria in the regulations for taking land in trust are not specific and do not include guidelines for how BIA should apply them. Eight of the 87 decisions in fiscal year 2005 had been appealed as of September 30, 2005. The remaining five appeals were pending as of September 30, 2005. For example, one criterion requires BIA to consider the impact of lost tax revenues on state and local governments. In commenting on applications prior to decisions made in fiscal year 2005, state and local governments opposed 12 of 87 applications, or about 14 percent, mainly citing concerns about lost tax revenues and jurisdictional issues. As of the end of fiscal year 2005, a total of 45 decisions were pending review on appeal, including 5 decisions from fiscal year 2005. Although we found little opposition to the applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005, some state and local governments we contacted said (1) they did not have access to sufficient information about the land in trust applications and (2) the 30-day comment period was not sufficient time in which to comment. Citing Primarily Taxes and Jurisdictional Issues, State and Local Governments Opposed Only a Small Percentage of the Applications with Decisions in Fiscal Year 2005 For the 87 land in trust applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005, state and local governments opposed or raised concerns—primarily involving taxes and jurisdictional issues—on 12 applications prior to BIA’s decision. BIA’s Land in Trust Database Is Incomplete and Inaccurate, and BIA is Planning to Redesign It During the course of our review, we found the data in BIA’s land in trust database, which was implemented agencywide in August 2004, were frequently incomplete and inaccurate. BIA has already recognized some shortcomings and initiated an effort to re-evaluate and redesign the database, as necessary. The database was hastily developed and deployed without defining and documenting user requirements throughout the agency and clearly defining data fields. We found that not all of the applications had been entered into the database, and the status of an application, as either approved, denied, or pending, was frequently incorrect in the database. A properly designed and implemented database with accurate data would provide BIA with important information to help better manage the land in trust process. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve timeliness and transparency and ensure better management of BIA’s land in trust process, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to take the following three actions: reinforce the requirement that all decisions be fully documented; move forward with adopting revisions to the land in trust regulations that include (1) specific time frames for BIA to make a decision once an application is complete and (2) guidelines for providing state and local governments more information on the applications and a longer period of time to provide meaningful comments on the applications; and institute internal controls to help ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data in the land in trust database, as part of the redesign of the existing system. In response to this direction and subsequent discussions with congressional staff, we (1) assessed the extent to which BIA’s processing of land in trust applications followed its regulations, (2) determined the extent to which applications were processed in a timely manner, and (3) identified any state and local government concerns about land in trust applications and how they were addressed in BIA’s decision-making process. To determine whether applications were processed in a timely manner, we compared the processing times for (1) 87 applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005 and (2) 28 complete off-reservation applications awaiting comments from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to the 120-business days, or about 6 months, time frame BIA is considering imposing for making decisions on on- and off-reservation land in trust applications. In addition, we compared the length of time that 34 appealed decisions had been awaiting resolution by BIA regional directors with the current 60-day time frame set forth in the regulations on appeals.	Why GAO Did This Study In 1980, the Department of the Interior (Interior) established regulations to provide a uniform approach for taking land in trust. Trust status means the government holds title to the land in trust for tribes and individual Indians. Trust land is exempt from state and local taxes. The Secretary of the Interior has delegated primary responsibility for processing, reviewing, and deciding on applications to take land in trust to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). As part of this process, BIA must seek comments from affected state and local governments. Congress directed GAO to study BIA's processing of land in trust applications to determine the extent to which (1) BIA followed its regulations, (2) applications were processed in a timely manner, and to (3) identify any concerns raised by state and local governments about land in trust applications. GAO is also providing information on problems with BIA's data on the processing of land in trust applications. What GAO Found BIA generally followed its regulations for processing land in trust applications, although most of the criteria in the regulations are not specific and thus do not offer clear guidance for how BIA should apply them. For example, there are no guidelines on how to weigh the impact of lost tax revenues on local governments. As a result, the BIA decision maker has wide discretion. Generally, all of the 87 applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005 were approved, except for 1 denial and 6 that were closed because the applications were incomplete. BIA is considering revisions to the regulations that would clarify that applications will generally be approved unless there is clear evidence of significant negative impacts. These revisions would make BIA's decision-making process more transparent. Currently, BIA has no deadlines for making decisions on land in trust applications, but BIA is considering imposing about a 6-month time frame. In addition, there is also a 60-day time frame for BIA regional directors to rule on appeals. Based on these time frames, it appears that many land in trust applications have not been processed in a timely manner. First, the median processing time for the 87 applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005 was 1.2 years--ranging from 58 days to almost 19 years. Second, 28 complete off-reservation applications had been waiting an average of 1.4 years for a decision as of September 30, 2005. Third, 34 appeals had been waiting an average of about 3 years for resolution by a BIA regional director as of September 30, 2005. When opposing land in trust applications or appealing decisions, state and local governments principally cited concerns about lost tax revenues and jurisdictional issues. In commenting on applications prior to decisions made in fiscal year 2005, state and local governments opposed 12 of 87 applications, or about 14 percent. Also, as of September 30, 2005, 45 decisions were on administrative appeal to either a BIA regional director or Interior's Board of Indian Appeals, including 5 appealed decisions from fiscal year 2005. Although GAO found little opposition to applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005, some state and local governments we contacted said (1) they did not have access to sufficient information about the land in trust applications and (2) the 30-day comment period was not sufficient time in which to comment. GAO found the data in BIA's land in trust database, which was implemented in August 2004, were frequently incomplete and inaccurate. The database was hastily developed without defining user requirements and data fields. Specifically, (1) not all of the applications had been entered into the database and (2) the status of an application, as either approved or denied, was frequently incorrect. A properly designed and implemented database with accurate data would provide BIA with important information to help better manage the land in trust process. BIA has already recognized the shortcomings and initiated an effort to redesign the database as necessary.
gao_GAO-12-792	gao_GAO-12-792_0	Most of the agencies required to appoint a CAO spend a substantial amount of funding each year through contracts to acquire goods and services in support of their missions, as shown below in table 1. However, very few agency CAOs have acquisition management as their primary duty, the third key requirement of the SARA legislation. The CAO noted that this structure gave him the ability to integrate planning, budgeting, risk management, human resources, as well as acquisition to achieve the agency’s mission. Generally, CAOs saw their role as providing high-level oversight of the acquisition function as opposed to day-to-day management, for which they typically relied on the Senior Procurement Executive and other senior procurement officials. Many CAOs told us that the amount of their involvement is related to several factors, such as the nature of goods and services that the agency buys and the extent the agency has a centralized or decentralized acquisition function. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder in the acquisition process is a key element of an effective acquisition function, as outlined in GAO’s framework for assessing the acquisition function within federal agencies. CAOs Reported Few Significant Challenges and Generally Did Not Identify Changes Needed to Improve Their Effectiveness CAOs at the 16 agencies generally did not report facing significant challenges related to the CAO position, such as the level of influence they have in their agency’s acquisition process, amount of control over acquisition budget resources, and access to agency leadership. However, most CAOs reported that not having enough staff to manage acquisitions was moderately to extremely challenging. Not all agencies have these, however, and may be missing an opportunity to ensure that the CAO position is fully institutionalized within agencies’ acquisition management and senior leadership structures. Recommendation for Executive Action To strengthen the functions of CAOs in acquisition management, we recommend that the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, working with the CAO Council, issue guidance to agencies directing them to ensure that CAO roles and responsibilities are more clearly defined in accordance with law and regulations, tailored to suit the agency’s acquisition activities, and documented as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to assess: (1) how agencies have filled the Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) position; (2) the extent to which CAOs are involved in performing the acquisition management functions set forth in the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 (SARA) legislation and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and (3) what challenges, if any, agency CAOs report in fulfilling their responsibilities for acquisition management. To provide additional information on CAOs’ characteristics, involvement in acquisition management functions and challenges faced, as well as to corroborate information provided in the questionnaire responses, we collected and reviewed agencies’ organizational charts that showed the CAO’s position relative to the head of the agency and other senior officials; letters of delegation or other documents that formally designate the appointment of the CAO, the CAO’s resume or curriculum vitae describing their qualifications and experience related to the CAO position; applicable policies, guidance, position descriptions or functional statements for both the CAO and Senior Procurement Executive positions; applicable policies or orders that delegate the CAO’s responsibilities to other acquisition officials; agency acquisition function assessments performed under OMB Circular A-123; Acquisition Human Capital Plans or similar documents; agency strategic plans and performance reports; agency-specific acquisition regulations and acquisition manuals; and descriptions of acquisition metrics or performance measures the agency tracks.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies spent more than half a trillion dollars in fiscal year 2011 through contracts to acquire goods and services in support of their missions, but have historically faced significant acquisition management challenges preventing them from getting the best return on their investments. The SARA legislation requires 16 federal civilian agencies to appoint a Chief Acquisition Officer to advise and assist agency leadership to help ensure that the agencys mission is achieved through the management of its acquisition activities. GAO was asked to examine: (1) how agencies have filled the CAO position; (2) the extent to which CAOs are involved in performing the acquisition management functions set forth in the SARA legislation and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance; and (3) what challenges, if any, agency CAOs report in fulfilling their responsibilities. GAO administered a questionnaire to 16 CAOs, reviewed documentation on CAOs roles and responsibilities, organizational placement, and backgrounds, and interviewed a number of CAOs and other acquisition officials. What GAO Found Most agencies have appointed Chief Acquisition Officers (CAO) in accordancewith two of the three key requirements in the Services Acquisition Reform Act of2003 (SARA): that the CAOs be political appointees and have agency SeniorProcurement Executives report directly to them. However, few CAOs haveacquisition management as their primary duty; other areas of responsibilityincluded financial, information, and human capital management. Several CAOs noted that their additional responsibilities were not a detriment. Rather, they believe that performing multiple roles helps them positively influence acquisition management across their agencies. For example, the CAO at the Department of Commerce stated that his additional responsibilities gave him the ability to integrate planning, budgeting, risk management, human resources, and acquisition to achieve the agencys mission. CAOs reported varying levels of involvement in the acquisition management functions for which they are responsible. Generally, CAOs see their role as providing high-level oversight of the acquisition function as opposed to day-today management, which they typically delegated to the Senior Procurement Executive or other officials as permitted by the legislation. Many CAOs said that the amount of their involvement is related to several factors, such as the nature of goods and services that the agency buys and whether the agency has a centralized or decentralized acquisition function. Having clearly defined roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the acquisition process is a key element of an effective acquisition function. Yet at many agencies, the statutory roles and responsibilities of the CAO position are not described in detail in acquisition regulations, policies, or other documentation. These agencies may be missing an opportunity to fully institutionalize the CAO position within their senior leadership structures. CAOs at the 16 agencies generally did not report facing significant challenges related to the CAO position, such as the level of influence they have in their agencys acquisition process, amount of control over acquisition budget resources, and access to agency leadership. Consistent with our prior work on the acquisition workforce, however, most CAOs reported that not having enough staff to manage acquisitions was moderately to extremely challenging. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Administrator of OMBs Office of Federal Procurement Policy work with the CAO Council to issue guidance directing agencies to more clearly define CAOs roles and responsibilities. The Administrator agreed with the recommendation.
gao_GAO-06-696T	gao_GAO-06-696T_0	Background The UI program was established by Title III of the Social Security Act in 1935 and is a key component in ensuring the financial security of America’s workforce. In fiscal year 2004, these programs covered about 129 million wage and salary workers and paid benefits totaling $41.3 billion to about 8.8 million workers. More than $3.4 Billion in Overpayments Estimated in 2004, but Labor is Taking Some Actions to Enhance Program Integrity Labor estimates that about $3.4 billion in UI benefits was overpaid nationwide in calendar year 2004, but is taking actions to help states improve their ability to detect and prevent overpayments. According to Labor’s Benefit Accuracy Measurement program, in 2004 (the most recent year for which we could obtain specific data) claimants were responsible for a majority of the overpayments. Claimants may fail to report their work as required, or may use Social Security numbers (SSN) that did not exist or that belonged to other individuals to fraudulently obtain UI benefits, resulting in overpayments. State agencies may also contribute to overpayments if they fail to properly record eligibility information. Labor has introduced a number of initiatives to help states improve their ability to detect and prevent overpayments, including new computer matches with federal databases, a new core performance measure intended to provide states with added incentives for detecting and preventing overpayments, and additional funding for states’ overpayment detection efforts. Labor’s budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes funding to continue some of these efforts. 1). States Make Use of Federal Requirements to Help Speed Reemployment of UI Claimants, but Knowing More about Outcomes Could Enhance Program Performance In our review of states’ efforts to help UI claimants quickly return to work, we found that states most often make use of federal UI program requirements to help connect claimants with reemployment services at various points in their claims, usually beginning at the time their initial claim is filed. All federally approved state UI programs must include able- to-work and available-for-work requirements that claimants must meet in order to receive benefits. In many states, these requirements also serve to link claimants to reemployment opportunities and services. In addition, states provide targeted reemployment services to particular groups of UI claimants. Despite states’ efforts to design systems that link UI claimants to reemployment services, few data are available to gauge the extent to which their efforts are having the intended result. Moreover, Labor’s fiscal year 2007 budget request does not include funding specifically designated for conducting evaluations of federally required efforts to target reemployment services. Labor has some initiatives that may begin to shed light on claimant outcomes, but these efforts may not go far enough. Last year, we recommended that Labor work with states to explore the feasibility of collecting more comprehensive information on UI claimants’ services and outcomes. Labor’s current and planned initiatives may help fill the information gap, but they fall short of providing a comprehensive understanding of services and outcomes for UI claimants. Related GAO Products Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report National Improper Payment Estimates on Federal Programs. Unemployment Insurance: Information on Benefit Receipt.	Why GAO Did This Study Unemployment Insurance (UI) has been a key component in ensuring the financial security of America's workforce for over 70 years. In fiscal year 2004, UI covered about 129 million wage and salary workers and paid about $41 billion in benefits to nearly 9 million workers who lost their jobs. The Department of Labor (Labor) and states have a shared responsibility to enhance UI program performance by ensuring that only eligible individuals receive benefits while on the UI rolls and fostering reemployment. Labor's Office of Inspector General and others have found that aspects of UI may be vulnerable to fraud and improper payments, and despite the size and scope of UI, there has been little national information to fully assess states' efforts to foster reemployment. This testimony draws upon results of several GAO reports on (1) Labor's efforts to identify, estimate, and prevent improper benefit payments and (2) federal and state efforts to help speed UI claimants' return to work. We are not making new recommendations at this time. Labor generally agreed with the UI findings in our referenced reports, but took issue with our recommendation that the Secretary work with states to consider collecting more comprehensive information on UI claimants' services and outcomes. We continue to believe this information is needed. What GAO Found Labor estimates that about $3.4 billion in UI benefits was overpaid nationwide in calendar year 2004, but is taking actions to help states improve their ability to detect and prevent overpayments. According to Labor's Benefit Accuracy Measurement program, in 2004 claimants were responsible for a majority of the overpayments. Claimants may fail to report their work as required, or may use Social Security numbers that did not exist or belonged to other individuals to fraudulently obtain UI benefits, resulting in overpayments. Actions by state agencies and employers may also contribute to overpayments. Labor has introduced a number of initiatives to help states improve their ability to detect and prevent overpayments, including new computer matches with federal databases, a new core performance measure intended to provide states with added incentives for detecting and preventing overpayments, and additional funding for states' overpayment detection efforts. Labor's budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes funding to continue some of these efforts. In our review of states' efforts to help UI claimants quickly return to work, we found that states most often made use of federal UI program requirements to help connect claimants with reemployment. All federally approved state UI programs must include able-to-work and available-for-work requirements that claimants must meet in order to receive benefits. In many states, these requirements also serve to link claimants to reemployment opportunities and services. In addition, states provide targeted reemployment services to particular groups of UI claimants, most often through federally required claimant profiling. However, despite states' efforts to design systems that link UI claimants to reemployment services, few data are available to gauge whether or not their efforts are having the intended result. Labor has some initiatives that may begin to shed light on claimant outcomes, but they fall short of providing a comprehensive understanding of services and outcomes for UI claimants. Labor's fiscal year 2007 budget request does not include funding for additional evaluations on federally required efforts to target reemployment services.
gao_HEHS-95-153	gao_HEHS-95-153_0	The act’s largest program is the Adult Education State-Administered Basic Grant Program (State Grant Program). Specifically, we examined the goals of the AEA and its largest program (the State Grant Program), the population served by the program, program services, and its coordination with federal employment training programs and the extent to which the State Grant Program ensures accountability for program quality and results, including how states have implemented quality indicators. To obtain nationwide information on the State Grant Program, we interviewed federal officials from the Department of Education. A 45-year-old unemployed mother of four with a third grade education was enrolled in an English as a Second Language (ESL) class. These proposals may also make the coordination among adult education, welfare, and employment training programs even more critical. Most providers offer the three most common types of instruction—ABE, ASE, and ESL. Efforts to Improve Program Quality and Accountability Federal efforts to improve quality and accountability have focused on (1) developing model indicators; (2) providing technical assistance to states and local programs on data collection, assessment, and developing performance standards and measures; and (3) requiring states to set aside funds for training and demonstration projects. The program has had difficulty ensuring accountability for results—that is, being able to clearly or accurately say what program funds have accomplished.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Adult Education Act's (AEA) State Grant Program, focusing on: (1) its coordination with federal employment training programs; and (2) the extent to which the program ensures accountability for program quality and results. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) AEA goals are broad so that people with diverse backgrounds can have access to various types of educational instruction; (2) the most common programs funded under the State Grant Program include basic education, secondary education, and english as a second language programs; (3) the State Grant Program has had difficulty ensuring accountability for program results due to a lack of clearly defined program objectives, questionable adult student assessments, and poor student data; (4) coordination among the State Grant Program and federal employment training programs is essential, since many individuals need instruction provided by both of these programs; and (5) some experts disagree whether developing model indicators of program quality will help states define measurable program objectives, evaluate local programs, and collect more accurate data.
gao_GAO-15-201	gao_GAO-15-201_0	Background CBP and ICE Roles and Responsibilities DHS is responsible for securing U.S. borders, in collaboration with other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. Overview of DHS Border Security and Immigration TACCOM Programs CBP and ICE have separate modernization efforts under each component’s respective TACCOM program. DHS Components Have Taken Steps to Upgrade Tactical Communications Equipment and Infrastructure, but Could Benefit by Developing Performance and Program Plans CBP Has Completed Most TACCOM Modernization Projects in Southwest Border Locations, but Could Benefit from Developing a Performance Monitoring Plan From 2009 through 2013, CBP completed full modernization projects in 4 of the 9 sectors that constitute the southwest border. ICE Has Taken Some Actions to Modernize Technology on the Southwest Border but Does Not Have Complete Information to Effectively Manage Its Program ICE has 58 completed, ongoing, or planned projects under its TACCOM modernization program and has taken some actions to modernize its TACCOM radio systems, including along the southwest border. By developing a program plan to guide ICE’s overall TACCOM modernization program, ICE could more clearly articulate radio user needs, resource needs, and the goals of the program, as well as allow officials to identify any corrective actions needed to ensure that ICE radio systems are meeting ICE user needs. Additional Efforts Are Needed to Ensure That CBP and ICE Agents and Officers Receive Necessary Training CBP Training CBP provided training to Border Patrol, OAM, and OFO agents and officers on its upgraded digital systems in each southwest border location that received modernization upgrades, but could do more to ensure it is meeting the training needs of all CBP radio users. Specifically, 8 of 14 CBP radio user groups we met with suggested that radio users be provided with additional radio training to enhance their proficiency in using radio systems. ICE Training ICE provided training on the upgraded digital system in one location, but has not assessed radio user training needs to identify radio user skills gaps, developed a plan to ensure training needs are met, or tracked the training that it provided. According to ICE officials, training was provided to radio users in only one location along the southwest border—Rio Grande Valley—because of a lack of resources. Moreover, three of the four groups of ICE radio user groups we met with in field locations stated that additional training would help address challenges experienced by radio users. DHS Is Taking Actions Aimed at Improving Tactical Communications Interoperability, but It Is Too Soon to Determine Whether These Actions Will Address Persistent Challenges DHS is taking actions to improve tactical communications interoperability among DHS components and with other federal, state, and local agencies, but it is too soon to assess whether these actions will address the various challenges CBP and ICE face in achieving interoperability. In an effort to more fully understand and address the department’s underlying interoperability challenges, DHS has developed a draft DHS Communications Interoperability Plan. Specifically, this draft plan outlines goals and initiatives aimed at addressing various types of interoperability challenges faced by DHS components. Achieving interoperability among DHS components and state and local agencies presents unique challenges because many state and local agency radio systems operate on different frequency bands that are incompatible with federal radio systems. However, since the DHS Communications Interoperability Plan has not yet been finalized, it is too soon to assess the extent to which this guidance will effectively address the interoperability challenges discussed above. According to DHS officials, the department intends to finalize the plan and aims to accomplish the goals outlined in the DHS Communications Interoperability Plan within 3 to 5 years. Without a program plan to guide ICE’s TACCOM modernization program efforts, ICE does not have the ability to determine whether its technology investments are meeting user needs and contributing to achieving the agency’s mission. Developing and implementing a plan to address radio user skills gaps, and developing a mechanism to verify that all ICE radio users receive radio training, would help ensure that the agency can better monitor and address ICE radio user training needs. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that CBP’s land mobile radio systems are functioning as intended in each location and are meeting user needs, we recommend that the CBP Commissioner develop a plan to monitor the performance of its deployed radio systems. In response to our recommendation that CBP develop and implement a plan to address any skills gaps for CBP agents and officers related to understanding the new digital radio systems and interagency radio use protocols, DHS stated that CBP will work to develop and implement an action plan to address skills gaps for CBP agents and officers related to understanding the new digital radio systems and interagency radio use protocols.	Why GAO Did This Study The lack of communications interoperability—the capability of different electronic communications systems (e.g., radios) to readily connect with one another to enable timely communications—can affect mission operations and the overall effectiveness of agencies responsible for securing the border. DHS continues to face challenges in achieving interoperable radio communications within and among federal, state, and local agencies despite investment by these agencies to improve their radio systems. GAO was asked to evaluate DHS border security and immigration tactical communications (TACCOM) programs and operational impacts resulting from interoperability challenges. This report addresses the extent to which (1) CBP and ICE have upgraded tactical communications equipment and infrastructure along the U.S. southwest border, (2) CBP and ICE have provided tactical communications training to radio users, and (3) DHS has taken actions to improve the interoperability of tactical communications along the U.S. southwest border and what challenges, if any, remain. GAO analyzed DHS documentation; visited four locations, selected for DHS prioritization of technology upgrade projects; and interviewed DHS officials. What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have taken steps to upgrade tactical communications equipment and infrastructure, but could benefit by developing performance and program plans. Specifically, CBP has completed modernization projects in four of the nine sectors that compose the southwest border. Since rolling out upgrades—which include replacing and updating equipment and expanding infrastructure—CBP has not established an ongoing performance monitoring plan to determine whether the systems are working as intended. Without such a plan, CBP is not well positioned to assess whether its radio systems are functioning as intended in each location and are meeting user needs. In addition, ICE has taken some actions to modernize its tactical communications radio systems. However, ICE does not have a program plan to manage its portfolio of projects. By developing a program plan to guide ICE's overall tactical communications modernization program, ICE could better manage its program and achieve its program goals. Additional efforts are needed to ensure that CBP and ICE agents and officers receive necessary training. CBP provided training to its agents and officers on upgraded radio systems in each southwest border location that received upgrades; however, 8 of 14 CBP radio user groups GAO met with suggested that radio users be provided with additional radio training to enhance their proficiency in using radio systems. Further, CBP does not know how many radio users are in need of training. Developing and implementing a plan to address any skills gaps related to the upgraded radio systems would help ensure more CBP radio users are able to effectively use their radios to accomplish the agency's mission. Further, developing a mechanism to identify CBP radio users in need of training would help CBP improve its ability to monitor radio user training needs. ICE provided training on the upgraded radio systems in one location, but 3 of the 4 ICE radio user groups GAO met with in field locations stated that additional training would help address challenges experienced by radio users. Further, ICE officials stated that they did not track the training that the agency provided. Developing and implementing a plan to address any skills gaps for ICE radio users related to understanding the upgraded radio systems would help ensure more ICE radio users are able to effectively use their radios to accomplish the agency's mission. Further, developing a mechanism to track training provided to ICE radio users would help ensure that the agency can address ICE radio user training needs. DHS is taking actions to improve tactical communications interoperability among DHS components and with other federal, state, and local agencies, but it is too soon to assess whether these actions will address the various challenges CBP and ICE face in achieving interoperability. Specifically, among other actions, DHS developed a draft DHS Communications Interoperability Plan to more fully understand and address the department's underlying interoperability challenges. This draft plan outlines goals and initiatives aimed at addressing various types of interoperability challenges faced by DHS components, but since the plan has not been implemented, it is too soon to assess the extent to which this guidance will effectively address the interoperability challenges faced by DHS components. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CBP and ICE develop performance and program plans for their modernization programs, mechanisms to track training, and plans to address skills gaps in understanding radio systems. CBP and ICE concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-13-681	gao_GAO-13-681_0	Background DHS’s Strategic Framework and Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism DHS conducts four main types of efforts abroad that can help to combat terrorism by thwarting terrorists and their plots before they reach the homeland: deploying programs and activities abroad—especially screening and targeting programs, along with select immigration benefit processing—to help interdict people who present a threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas sooner in the trade, travel, and immigration cycles; working with and sharing information with international and federal partners to help counter terrorism and other international crime; working alongside foreign officials to support them in assessing their own security vulnerabilities and implementing mitigating actions; and helping other nations strengthen their security infrastructure by providing training and consultations, conducting assessments, or providing equipment. DHS Conducts Mission Activities and Capacity Building Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism The DHS components within our review carry out programs and activities abroad within their areas of expertise—border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement, among others—that are designed to limit the movement of people and goods that could pose a threat to the homeland before they reach the United States. They also deliver training and technical assistance designed to enhance partner nations’ ability to limit such movement globally. According to our analysis of expenditure data and FTE data provided to us by DHS, DHS OIA and the components within our review spent approximately $451 million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012 and had about 1,800 FTEs stationed abroad in almost 80 countries as of May 2013. DHS and State Identified Five Key DHS Contributions to U.S. We also identified a variety of challenges DHS and other personnel in the U.S. missions have faced. As shown in figure 4, according to our survey results, the majority of the 41 DCM respondents indicated that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions we identified. The 12 factors we identified generally fall into two categories: (1) efforts to foster a collaborative climate, and (2) mechanisms to leverage resources and clarify roles and responsibilities. Fewer than half of respondents identified any of the challenges as moderate or significant challenges. Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which U.S. mission understanding of DHS’s role is a challenge. DHS Has Acted to Enhance Department- wide Alignment, but Could Have Better Assurance That Resources Abroad Support Highest Priorities DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment for its resource use abroad—including establishing an intradepartmental governance board, reviewing the department’s international footprint, and creating a department-wide international engagement plan. However, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad—which are made at the individual component level—effectively, efficiently, and consistently align with department-wide strategic priorities. DHS Has Not Established Mechanisms to Help Ensure Department-wide Organizational and Programmatic Alignment in Its Resource Use Abroad Although a stated goal of DHS’s QHSR is to strengthen the homeland security enterprise and mature the department through improved organizational alignment across the components and programmatic alignment to homeland security missions, DHS has not established mechanisms to help provide assurance of alignment of its resource use abroad with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, it (1) has not established specific department-wide strategic priorities to guide organizational and programmatic alignment; (2) does not have an institutionalized mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring of alignment between resource use and strategic priorities; and (3) does not have the means to produce reliable, comparable cost data to support analysis of organizational and programmatic alignment in its department- wide resource use abroad. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms to enforce management’s directives—for example, to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. Although DHS has a broad mission set and decision making about resource use abroad is decentralized, it has not established specific department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for resource use abroad to help promote organizational alignment in resource decision making. DHS does not have comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data to help inform resource decision making and to achieve management efficiencies when addressing issues that are common across the department. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to help ensure that DHS’s resource use abroad aligns with the highest department-wide and U.S. government-wide priorities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions: establish specific department-wide priorities for resource use abroad; establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department’s resource use abroad with the highest department- wide and government-wide strategic priorities; and establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department-wide cost data for resource use abroad. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat terrorism and what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those contributions? To examine how DHS has contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat terrorism and the factors that have facilitated or hampered those contributions, we reviewed documentation about DHS’s component activities abroad and State programs and activities on which DHS collaborates. We analyzed the responses to our interviews about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities with State and DHS officials at headquarters and with federal officials in the first 3 of the 10 site visits, to identify types of knowledge and skill contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions and any challenges and impacts DHS and its federal partners have encountered. Fiscal year 2008 data are unavailable.	Why GAO Did This Study Combating terrorism is a governmentwide effort, to which DHS contributes. In such efforts abroad, DHS partners with the Department of State (State)-- the lead agency at U.S. missions. DHS deploys resources abroad to carry out programs and build capacity within its areas of expertise--border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement. GAO was asked to examine DHS's efforts abroad to combat terrorism. This report answers the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions and what, if any, factors have affected contributions? (3) To what extent has DHS aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities? GAO analyzed DHS expenditures for fiscal years 2008-2012, personnel data for May 2013 and documents, such as national strategies and management directives. GAO also interviewed DHS and State officials in headquarters and 10 countries, selected on the basis of factors such as the size of DHS's presence. The results from site visits cannot be generalized but provided insights. GAO also surveyed DHS and State personnel in all 57 U.S. missions where DHS has a presence. What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carries out a variety of programs and activities abroad within its areas of expertise that could have the effect of thwarting terrorists and their plots while also combating other categories of transnational crime, and DHS expended approximately $451 million on programs and activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. For example, through the Visa Security Program, DHS has deployed personnel abroad to help prevent the issuance of visas to people who might pose a threat. As of May 2013, DHS has stationed about 1,800 employees in almost 80 countries to conduct these and other activities. In addition, DHS has delivered training and technical assistance in areas such as border and aviation security to officials from about 180 countries to enhance partner nations' security capacities. GAO identified five types of contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates), 12 factors that support DHS's ability to contribute, and a range of challenges and impacts related to DHS contributions. On the basis of surveys of DHS and State officials abroad, GAO found that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions GAO identified, including building relationships, identifying threats, and sharing information. The factors GAO identified that facilitated DHS's ability to contribute fell into two general categories: (1) facilitating a collaborative climate and (2) leveraging resources and clarifying roles and responsibilities. GAO also identified a variety of challenges, including DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with personnel abroad and partners at U.S. missions understanding of DHS's role. Fewer than half of respondents identified any challenge as moderate or significant. For impacts arising from these challenges, less than one-third of respondents identified them as causing a significant or moderate impact. DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment, but has not established mechanisms to ensure that resource use abroad aligns with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. DHS has a stated objective to improve alignment across the department, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement mechanisms to help ensure achievement of their objectives. Although DHS conducted a onetime review of the department's international footprint and created a departmentwide international engagement plan, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad--which are made at the individual component level--align with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, DHS (1) has not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) does not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) does not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data. Strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data could provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions and help achieve its objective to improve organizational alignment across components. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS establish (1) department-wide strategic priorities, (2) an institutionalized mechanism to review resource alignment abroad, and (3) a method to collect reliable and comparable cost data for resources abroad. DHS concurred with these recommendations.
gao_GAO-11-410	gao_GAO-11-410_0	In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw more than 209,000 inmates, housing more than 170,000 of these inmates in its 116 institutions. Since fiscal year 2000, BOP’s inmate population has grown by 45 percent, as shown in figure 1. BOP and Selected States Provide a Variety of Protective Equipment to Officers, but Opinions on Impact of Equipment on Officer Safety Are Mixed BOP and the selected states with whom we spoke provide their officers with a variety of equipment to protect them. BOP also provides officers with the option to carry flashlights and wear stab-resistant vests. States have discretion over the equipment they make available to their officers, and officials in the 14 states with whom we spoke provided examples of three types of equipment they allow their officers to carry while on duty that BOP generally does not, including pepper spray and batons. Most BOP officers and union officials with whom we spoke reported that carrying additional equipment while on duty and while commuting to and from work would better protect officers, while BOP management largely reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment in order to better ensure their safety. BOP’s policy prohibiting officers from storing personal firearms on BOP property is largely consistent across its institutions; however, there are limited exceptions to this policy. Specifically, officers most frequently cited concerns that the equipment could be taken from the officer and used against him or her by an inmate. As shown in figure 7, most officers and all union officials reported that being permitted to store personal firearms on BOP property would enhance officer safety, while most BOP management officials reported that doing so would not enhance officer safety. BOP Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Equipment in Ensuring Officer Safety and Correctional Equipment Experts Suggest Several Factors to Consider in Making Equipment Acquisition Decisions BOP and states provide a variety of equipment to their officers to ensure their safety; however, none of the BOP officials, state correctional officials, and correctional experts with whom we spoke reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety. Correctional Equipment Experts Report Equipment Costs Such as Training, Maintenance, and Liability, among Other Factors, to Be Important Considerations in Purchasing New Equipment Officials from the NLECTC, NIST, and NIJ reported that BOP would need to consider factors such as training, replacement, and maintenance costs; potential liability issues; and whether the equipment met technical performance standards if it acquired new equipment, as well as the price of new equipment. Additionally, these organizations suggested that any decision must first be based on a close examination of the benefits and risks of using certain types of equipment. Correctional Accrediting Experts Cited Inmate Management and Officer Training among the Institutional Factors Most Impacting Officer Safety, and BOP Has Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts in Ensuring Officer Safety Equipment available to officers is one important part of officer safety; however, there are other factors—such as those related to the movement of inmates throughout the facility and the skills and training of prison personnel—that impact both officers’ safety and the overall safety of the institution. These experts most frequently reported that the existence of ineffective inmate management, insufficient officer training, inmate gangs, correctional officer understaffing, and inmate overcrowding in an institution would most affect officers’ safety. To address overcrowding, officials from one of the BOP institutions and 3 of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported converting community space, such as television rooms, into inmate cells to accommodate a larger inmate population. For instance, in 2001, ORE conducted a study empirically evaluating BOP’s substance abuse treatment program’s effectiveness in reducing prisoner misconduct, which is closely related to officer safety. The study found that treatment program graduates were 74 percent less likely to engage in misconduct between program graduation and release from prison than a comparison group. Recommendation for Executive Action To capitalize on the data BOP already collects and to further DOJ’s evaluation efforts, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the Director of BOP to leverage existing BOP data systems, such as TRUINTEL and SENTRY, as well as the institutional expertise available through NIJ and NIC, as appropriate, to assess the impact of the equipment BOP has provided or could provide to its officers to better protect them in a range of scenarios and settings. Specifically, this report addresses the following questions: What equipment do the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and selected states provide to protect officers and what are the opinions of BOP officers and other correctional practitioners regarding this equipment? What institutional factors do correctional accrediting experts report as most impacting officer safety, and to what extent has BOP evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken to address these factors? However, this information provided useful insight into state correctional practices. 2.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) manages more than 209,000 inmates, up 45 percent between fiscal years 2000 and 2010. As the prison population grows, so do concerns about correctional officer safety. As requested, GAO examined the (1) equipment that BOP and selected state departments of corrections (DOC) provide to protect officers, and the officers' and other correctional practitioners' opinions of this equipment; (2) extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of this equipment, and factors correctional equipment experts consider important to the acquisition of new equipment; and (3) institutional factors correctional accrediting experts reported as impacting officer safety, and the extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken in response. GAO reviewed BOP policies and procedures; interviewed BOP officials and officers within BOP's six regions, selected based on such factors as the level of facility overcrowding; interviewed officials at 14 of the 15 largest state DOCs; and surveyed 21 individuals selected for their expertise in corrections. The results of the interviews cannot be generalized, but provide insight into issues affecting officer safety. What GAO Found BOP and 14 state DOCs included in GAO's review provide a variety of protective equipment to officers, but BOP officers and management have different views on equipment. BOP generally provides officers with radios, body alarms, keys, flashlights, handcuffs, gloves, and stab-resistant vests while on duty, but prohibits them from storing personal firearms on BOP property, with limited exceptions. DOC officials in 14 states GAO interviewed provided examples of equipment they allow officers to carry while on duty that BOP does not--such as pepper spray--and officials in 9 of the 14 states reported allowing officers to store personal firearms on state DOC property. BOP and states provide similar equipment to protect officers in an emergency, such as an inmate riot or attack. Most BOP officers with whom GAO spoke reported that carrying additional equipment while on duty and commuting would better protect officers, while BOP management largely reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment to better protect them. BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of equipment it provides in ensuring officer safety, and correctional equipment experts report that BOP needs to consider a variety of factors in acquisition decisions. Neither the officials nor the experts with whom GAO spoke reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, although BOP tracks information necessary to do so in its data systems. By using information in these existing systems, BOP could analyze the effectiveness of the equipment it distributes in ensuring officer safety, thus helping it determine additional actions, if any, to further officer safety and better target limited resources. All of the correctional equipment experts GAO spoke with reported that BOP would need to consider factors such as training, replacement, maintenance, and liability, as well as whether the equipment met performance standards, if it acquired new equipment. These experts suggested that any decision must first be based upon a close examination of the benefits and risk of using certain types of equipment. For example, while state officials reported that pepper spray is inexpensive and effective, a majority of the BOP management officials we spoke with stated that it could be taken by inmates and used against officers. Correctional accrediting experts most frequently cited control over the inmate population, officer training, inmate gangs, correctional staffing and inmate overcrowding as the institutional factors--beyond equipment--most impacting officer safety. These experts suggested various strategies to address these factors, and BOP reported taking steps to do so, such as conducting annual training on BOP policies, identifying and separating gang members, and converting community space into inmate cells. BOP has assessed the effectiveness of steps it has taken in improving officer safety. For instance, a 2001 BOP study found that inmates who participated in BOP's substance abuse treatment program were less likely than a comparison group to engage in misconduct for the remainder of their sentence following program completion. BOP utilizes such studies to inform its decisions, such as eliminating programs found to be ineffective. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that BOP's Director assess whether the equipment intended to improve officer safety has been effective. BOP concurred with this recommendation.
gao_GAO-02-892	gao_GAO-02-892_0	1). Exports of computers above a specific performance level to tier-3 countries such as China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia require a license. Report Did Not Assess All Potential Uses of Military Significance As in previous reports used to justify changes in the control threshold, the December 2001 report did not meet the second criterion of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998: to address all potential uses of military significance to which computers with performance capabilities between the old control threshold and the new threshold could be applied. The report did not address the difficulty that the U.S. government has had in effectively monitoring the high performance computers that are exported to countries of concern. Given the level of high performance computing power that the United States approves for export, such studies of the cumulative effect of computer and related technology exports will be increasingly important in determining the impact of such exports on U.S. national security and in making future decisions about adjusting export control thresholds. Scope and Methodology To assess the President’s justifications for raising the export control threshold from 85,000 MTOPS to 190,000 MTOPS, we reviewed the statutory requirements related to the President’s justification and the regulations that pertain to the export of high performance computers. 2.	What GAO Found For national security and foreign policy reasons, U.S. export control policy seeks to balance economic interests in promoting high technology exports with national security interests to maintain a military advantage in high performance computers over potential adversaries. In January 2002, the President announced that the control threshold--above which computers exported to countries such as China, India, and Russia--would increase from 85,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to 190,000 MTOPS. The report justifying the changes in control thresholds for high performance computers focused on the availability of such computers. However, the justification did not fully address the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998. The December 2001 report did not address several key issues related to the decision to raise the threshold: (1) the unrestricted export of computers with performance capabilities between the old and new thresholds will allow countries of concern to obtain computers that they have had difficulty constructing on their own, (2) the United States is unable to monitor the end-uses of many of the computers it exports, and (3) the report does not acknowledge the multilateral process used to make prior changes in high performance computer thresholds.
gao_GAO-13-473	gao_GAO-13-473_0	2. SSA Has Taken Some Steps to Address the Current Challenges It Faces in Identifying, Selecting, and Monitoring Representative Payees SSA has faced challenges identifying, selecting, and monitoring representative payees. For example, field office managers said that some field offices have been struggling to keep up with payee program workloads due to staff attrition and that managers themselves sometimes have to perform payee program duties that claims representatives typically handle, such as processing payee applications. In addition, SSA has experienced an increasing number of beneficiaries, such as persons suffering from mental health conditions or the elderly, who may not have a suitable payee readily available. However, as of April 4, 2013, SSA officials said this effort did not result in the addition of any new payees. SSA has also taken steps to address challenges it has had with ensuring that payees who are assigned are suitable for the task. For instance, in June 2012, SSA initiated a pilot in its Philadelphia region to screen and block payee applicants who have been convicted of any 1 of 12 types of felonies. SSA said that the pilot primarily relies on self-reported information from payee applicants. Although the database could help SSA staff in the Philadelphia region better screen payee applicants, it is limited because it does not contain data from every state. It is not clear how, if at all, SSA is going to address these limitations. process that allows payees to submit reports online, which saves SSA time on handling the reports and scanning paper reports. However, it does not lessen the need for SSA staff to review some of these reports. Nonetheless, the OIG continues to identify the program as a major management challenge facing SSA. SSA Has Done Little to Position Itself to Address the Program’s Long-Term Challenges Changing Demographics and Resource Constraints Pose Long-Term Challenges for the Representative Payee Program Changing demographics will challenge SSA’s ability to effectively administer its Representative Payee Program in the future. Given the projected growth in the aged population, SSA will likely be challenged to locate more payees as well as monitor a greater number of them in the future. Staff and resource constraints also present challenges for the future administration of the Representative Payee Program. While SSA plans to assess how easily the pilot can be implemented, it has no plans to determine whether the pilot actually reduces the incidence of benefit misuse by payees in the long-run. SSA acknowledged the need to better understand the future needs of the program, but it has not determined how many beneficiaries will likely need payees in the future and their characteristics. each of the options, mostly related to balancing SSA’s efforts to streamline and simplify the program while adequately protecting beneficiaries from fraud and abuse. With both of these options, SSA would still have to devote some level of staff and resources to addressing any findings identified during the reviews. For example, SSA could use information from state courts to determine whether or not to appoint a guardian as a payee or to better target its monitoring practices. For example, SSA has recognized the potential benefits of some of these options, such as limiting parental accounting requirements and developing a pool of payees for hard to serve beneficiaries, and has taken steps toward implementing them. Over the years, SSA has taken important steps to improve the program in an effort to prevent misuse of benefits by payees. Recommendations for Executive Action To better position itself to address its growing challenges with administering the program while protecting individuals’ benefits from misuse, we recommend that the Commissioner of SSA direct the Deputy Commissioner, Retirement and Disability Policy, to work with relevant SSA offices to 1. systematically evaluate the effectiveness of SSA’s criminal bar pilot to help ensure that it meets its intended purpose of preventing misuse; 2. estimate the long-term increase in the number of individuals who will need a payee and their demographic characteristics, as well as the resources that will be needed to meet this increase in demand; and 3. develop a long-term strategy for addressing these challenges that includes developing and testing a range of alternatives that could streamline program processing to determine and compare their feasibility and their potential impact on processing times and risk of benefit misuse. Appendix I: Methodology for Identifying Options and Their Strengths and Weaknesses We identified options that the Social Security Administration (SSA) could consider to address the Representative Payee Program’s long-term challenges by reviewing prior reports on the program such as the National Research Council’s 2007 review of the program; Social Security Advisory Board reports, SSA Office of the Inspector General, and GAO reports; and other reports.	Why GAO Did This Study Representative Payeespersons who SSA staff appoint to manage Social Security benefits for those unable to do so for themselvesplay an important role in ensuring that beneficiary needs are met. In fiscal year 2012, about 5.9 million payees managed $72 billion in annual benefits for nearly 8.4 million beneficiaries, a number that is likely to grow as the population ages. Congress and others have expressed concerns that SSA may not be well positioned to administer the Representative Payee Program, as currently structured, in the future. This report examines (1) administrative challenges facing the program and steps SSA has taken to address them and (2) long-term challenges and actions SSA has taken or could take to address them. To answer these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant research, policies, federal laws and regulations, and other documents. GAO interviewed SSA officials and other parties, and visited the Philadelphia Regional Office. GAO also reviewed program trend data and studies on challenges associated with an aging population. GAO reviewed options SSA could consider to address program challenges and conducted interviews to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these options. What GAO Found The Social Security Administration (SSA) struggles to effectively administer its Representative Payee Program, despite steps taken to address its challenges in identifying, selecting, and monitoring representative payees. For example, due to increasing workloads and staff attrition, SSA field office managers in some offices said they sometimes have to perform payee program duties that lower level staff typically handle. SSA has also experienced an increasing number of beneficiaries who may not have a suitable payee available. In an effort to address this challenge, SSA hosted a webinar to recruit additional payees. However, SSA officials said this effort did not result in the addition of any new payees. SSA also faces challenges ensuring that payees who are selected are suitable for the task. To help address this challenge, SSA implemented a pilot program in its Philadelphia region to screen and bar payee applicants who have been convicted of certain crimes. The pilot relies on self-reported information from payee applicants, but SSA plans to screen applicants by accessing a commercial database that contains state-level criminal information. This database, however, does not contain information from every state and it is not clear how SSA will address this limitation. SSA also faces challenges monitoring payees' use of beneficiaries' SSA funds--a time-consuming process. SSA developed an electronic accounting process that allows payees to submit reports online, which saves SSA time on handling the reports and scanning paper reports. However, it does not lessen the need for SSA staff to review some of these reports. SSA has also taken other steps to improve the administration of the program, but the SSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) nonetheless continues to identify the program as a major SSA management challenge. Although changing demographics and resource constraints will challenge the future administration of the Representative Payee Program, SSA has done little to position itself for the long term. The projected growth in the aged population, as well as the incidence of individuals with dementia, will have implications for the program, as SSA will have to spend more resources finding and monitoring payees. These challenges are exacerbated by staff and resource constraints, which could make SSA less able to identify and address payee benefit misuse. Some of the steps SSA has taken align with goals in the agency's Strategic Plan. For example, SSA's piloting of a new payee screening and selection process is an effort to better protect the program from fraud, waste, and abuse--one of the objectives included in the plan. Nonetheless, SSA does not plan to assess whether the pilot actually reduces the incidence of benefit misuse in the long run. Further, SSA has not projected the future need for payees, the likely characteristics of beneficiaries, or the resources needed to administer the program. Others have identified a range of options that could help SSA address its long-term challenges by increasing its pool of payees and better targeting its monitoring practices. Experts and stakeholders we interviewed identified trade-offs for each of these options, citing the need to balance the potential benefit of reducing SSA's workloads with the possible increased risk of benefit misuse by payees. SSA has considered some options, but it has not fully assessed and compared the potential benefits and feasibility of implementing these options. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that SSA (1) evaluate the effectiveness of its criminal bar pilot, (2) estimate long-term program needs, and (3) develop a long-term strategy for addressing challenges that includes assessing options to streamline the program. SSA agreed with all three recommendations.
gao_GAO-01-64	gao_GAO-01-64_0	Conclusions VA has opportunities to save millions of dollars by systematically considering consolidating food production, employing VCS workers to provide inpatient food services, and competitive sourcing. VA already has experience in implementing these options at a number of locations, although VA’s experience with food service contractors is limited. Using a systematic approach to assess available options at each location would allow VA to provide food service at the lowest cost consistent with maintaining quality.	What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) could save millions of dollars by systematically consolidating food production, employing Veterans Canteen Service workers to provide inpatient food services, and using competitive sourcing. VA already has experience in implementing these options at several locations, although VA's experience with food service contractors is limited. Using a systematic approach to assess available options at each location would allow VA to provide food service at the lowest cost while maintaining quality.
gao_GAO-08-621T	gao_GAO-08-621T_0	The government is relying on contractors to perform many tasks that closely support inherently governmental functions, such as contracting support, intelligence analysis, security services, program management, and engineering and technical support for program offices. The closer contractor services come to supporting inherently governmental functions, the greater the risk of contractors influencing the government’s control over and accountability for decisions that may be based, in part, on the contractor’s work. Potential Risks Associated with Use of Contractors When the decision is made to use contractors in roles closely supporting inherently governmental functions, additional risks are present. Defense contractor employees are not subject to the same laws and regulations that are designed to prevent personal conflicts of interests among federal employees. When contractors work side by side with government employees and perform the same mission-related duties, the risk associated with such contracts can be increased. Contingency Situations Reveal Acquisition Workforce Shortfalls In July 2006, we reported that DOD’s acquisition workforce is subject to certain conditions that increase DOD’s vulnerabilities to contracting fraud, waste, and abuse, including growth in overall contracting workload, pending retirement of experienced government contracting personnel, and a greater demand for contract surveillance because of DOD’s increasing reliance on contractors for services. Government waste is growing and far exceeds the cost of fraud and abuse. These vulnerabilities are more dramatically revealed in contingency situations, such as the conflicts in Iraq and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when large amounts of money are quickly made available and actions are hurried. We have long noted that DOD’s acquisition workforce needs to be made a priority. We have reported that DOD needs to have the right skills in its acquisition workforce to effectively implement best practices and properly manage the acquisition of goods and services. Monitoring Contractor Performance The role of the acquisition function does not end with the award of a contract. It requires continued involvement throughout contract implementation and closeout to ensure that contracted services are delivered according to the schedule, cost, quality, and quantity specified in the contract. We have reported wide discrepancies in the rigor with which CORs perform their duties, particularly in unstable environments. It stated that the inability to monitor contractor performance and enforce contracts are critical problems in an expeditionary environment and cited an example: “When the critical need is to get a power station running, and there are no resources to monitor contractor performance, only the contractor knows whether the completed work is being sabotaged nightly.” In December 2006, we reported that while DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems we have raised since the mid-1990s, it continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Cost of Contractors A key assumption of many of the federal management reforms of the 1990s was that the cost-efficiency of government operations would be improved. We recently reported that sufficient data are not available to determine whether increased service contracting has caused DOD’s costs to be higher than they would have been had the contracted activities been performed by uniformed or DOD civilian personnel. We compared the costs of the government employees at the GS-12 and GS- 13 levels to their equivalent contractor counterparts (referred to as contract specialists II and III) and found that, on average, the Army is paying up to 26 percent more for the contractors, as depicted in table 2. We will continue to do work in this area. Appendix I: Systemic Acquisition Challenges at the Department of Defense 1. 3.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense's (DOD) spending on goods and services has grown significantly since fiscal year 2000, to well over $314 billion annually. GAO has identified DOD contract management as a high-risk area for more than decade. With awards to contractors large and growing, DOD will continue to be vulnerable to contracting fraud, waste, or misuse of taxpayer dollars, and abuse. Prudence with taxpayer funds, widening deficits, and growing long-range fiscal challenges demand that DOD maximize its return on investment, while providing warfighters with the needed capabilities at the best value for the taxpayer. This statement discusses (1) the implications of DOD's increasing reliance on contractors to fill roles previously held by government employees, (2) the importance of the acquisition workforce in DOD's mission and the need to strengthen its capabilities and accountability, and (3) assumptions about cost savings related to the use of contractors versus federal employees. This statement is based on work GAO has ongoing or has completed over the past several years covering a range of DOD contracting issues. What GAO Found DOD has increasingly turned to contractors to fill roles previously held by government employees and to perform many functions that closely support inherently governmental functions, such as contracting support, intelligence analysis, program management, and engineering and technical support for program offices. This trend has raised concerns about what the proper balance is between public and private employees in performing agency missions and the potential risk of contractors influencing the government's control over and accountability for decisions that may be based, in part, on contractor work. Further, when the decision is made to use contractors in roles closely supporting inherently governmental functions, additional risks are present. Contractors are not subject to the same ethics rules as government even when doing the same job, and the government risks entering into an improper personal services contract if an employer/employee relationship exists between the government and the contractor employee. DOD's increasing reliance on contractors exacerbates long-standing problems with its acquisition workforce. GAO has long reported that DOD's acquisition workforce needs to have the right skills to effectively implement best practices and properly manage the acquisition of goods and services. Weaknesses in this area have been revealed in recent contingency situations, but they are present in nonemergency circumstances as well, with the potential to expose DOD to fraud, waste, and abuse. It is important to note that the role of the acquisition function does not end with the award of a contract. Continued involvement of the workforce throughout contract implementation and closeout is needed to ensure that contracted services are delivered according to the schedule, cost, quality, and quantity specified in the contract. GAO has in the past several years reported wide discrepancies in the rigor with which contracting officer's representatives perform these duties, particularly in unstable environments such as the conflict in Iraq and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. A key assumption of many of the federal management reforms of the 1990s was that the cost-efficiency of government operations could be improved through the use of contractors. GAO recently reported that sufficient data are not available to determine whether increased service contracting has caused DOD's costs to be higher than they would have been had the contracted activities been performed by uniformed or DOD civilian personnel. GAO recently probed, in-depth, the cost of contractor versus government contract specialists at the Army's Contracting Center for Excellence and found that the Army is paying up to 26 percent more for the contractors as compared to their government counterparts.
gao_GAO-06-167	gao_GAO-06-167_0	Through an interagency structure, USTR coordinates trade policy, resolves disagreements, and frames issues for presidential decision. USTR Could Benefit from Greater Commitment to Strategic Human Capital Principles in Its Human Capital Leadership and Planning USTR does not follow key strategic human capital principles in its human capital leadership and planning. Second, while USTR performs an interagency leadership and coordination mission that it cannot achieve without the participation and support of other trade agencies, it has not undertaken formal strategic human capital planning to mitigate the risks inherent in its dependency on interagency resources. Third, USTR’s human capital planning efforts have been primarily focused on short-term responses to trade negotiating needs identified in its 2-year budget planning process; it has not conducted ongoing parallel efforts to analyze the organization’s longer term workforce needs to ensure its continued capacity to achieve its mission. In fact, the senior human capital management post has not been filled for over 1½ years. One result of USTR’s lack of strategic planning for these critical interagency resources is that it does not have a systematic method to account for potential changes in other agencies’ resources that might impact its ability to achieve its mission. USTR managers have stressed the importance of certain individual skills needed to advance USTR’s mission, such as the ability to effectively interact within the interagency trade policy framework. However, USTR employees not subject to agencywide standards are instead held accountable for a range of expectations that vary among USTR offices according to specific assignments. The system should include the following elements, tailored to its small size and unique role: filling its senior human capital management positions with human capital professionals who will significantly contribute to strategic planning and decision making, developing an interagency resource planning method with appropriate participation from key agency stakeholders, undertaking strategic workforce planning in order to optimize its workforce’s continued capacity to achieve its mission, improving its ability to utilize data for measuring the effectiveness of human capital approaches in support of its mission and goals, determining if additional use of available pay and hiring flexibilities would better position USTR to hire and retain experts, and developing agencywide performance criteria for staff to align management expectations with critical organizational goals. Specifically, we (1) reviewed USTR’s commitment to strategic human capital leadership and planning and (2) analyzed to what extent USTR has used human capital tools to address its workforce challenges. Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative The following are GAO’s comments on USTR’s letter dated November 10, 2005.	Why GAO Did This Study The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has a unique role in coordinating trade policy, resolving disagreements, and framing issues for presidential decision through an interagency trade policy process. In recent years, USTR's increased workload from numerous new regional and bilateral free trade agreement negotiations and a new round of multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization has raised concerns about its human capital strategy. GAO examined whether USTR is pursuing an effective human capital strategy that supports the ability of its workforce to accomplish its mission. Specifically, GAO (1) reviewed USTR's commitment to strategic human capital leadership and planning and (2) analyzed to what extent USTR has used human capital tools to address its workforce challenges. What GAO Found USTR could benefit from greater use of strategic human capital management principles in leadership and planning, considering that its small size and interagency trade leadership and coordination role give it a unique responsibility to lead the trade agenda. First, USTR has not sustained the leadership resources for human capital; for example, the top human capital management post has not been filled for over 1 1/2 years. Second, USTR has not undertaken formal strategic human capital planning to mitigate the risks inherent in its dependency--as a "networked organization"--on interagency resources to achieve its mission. Therefore, it does not have a method to account for changes in other agencies' resources that might impact its ability to achieve its mission. Third, USTR has focused its human capital planning efforts primarily on short-term responses to trade negotiating needs identified in its 2-year budget planning process; it has not conducted ongoing parallel efforts to analyze longer-term workforce needs. USTR's efforts to address its specific workforce challenges could benefit from greater use of human capital tools. First, USTR could use more of the existing federal human capital flexibilities to better tailor its human capital approaches to organizational needs. Although the agency has used and benefited from some special hiring and pay authorities, such as the use of higher-than-minimum salary offers, it has yet to take advantage of others, such as retention bonuses. Second, while USTR prides itself on being a results-oriented agency, most USTR staff are not subject to agencywide performance expectations linked to organizational goals. While managers have stressed the importance of certain individual skills needed to advance USTR's mission, most staff are held accountable to a range of expectations that vary among offices.
gao_GAO-09-794	gao_GAO-09-794_0	To achieve its mission, TFI components often work with the following: Other U.S. government agencies. Private sector. Foreign governments and international organizations. Officials from TFI and its interagency partners cited strong collaboration with TFI in several areas, but differ about the quality of collaboration regarding U.S. participation in some international forums. TFI Performs Five Functions to Fulfill Its Mission According to TFI, it undertakes five functions to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and to combat rogue nations, terrorist supporters, WMD proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. Analyzing Financial Intelligence TFI officials cite OIA’s analysis of financial intelligence as a critical part of TFI’s efforts because it underlies TFI’s ability to utilize many of its tools. They said that the creation of OIA was critical to TFI’s ability to effectively identify these illicit financial networks. TFI officials also stated that interagency collaboration runs smoothly and that they were unaware of any significant concerns regarding the quality of interagency collaboration. TFI Has Not Clearly Aligned Its Resources with Priorities or Performed Comprehensive Workforce Planning While TFI has conducted strategic planning activities at different levels within the organization, TFI as a unit has not fully adopted certain key practices. OFAC officials characterized this situation as a resource burden. In particular, they cited the need to conduct an overall workforce analysis and succession planning. Without the benefit of comprehensive strategic workforce planning to assist in identifying solutions, it is unclear whether TFI will be able to effectively address persistent workforce challenges. Objectivity. Seven TFI measures do not sufficiently cover core program activities. TFI Is Working to Replace Its Performance Measures, but Some Concerns Remain Treasury officials acknowledge the limits of TFI’s current performance measurement and have been working to enhance its measures, by replacing them with a single new TFI-wide measure. In addition, TFI and its components have taken some steps toward more effective management of TFI as an organization. For instance, TFI and some components have developed strategic plans and have performed workforce planning activities. As a result, additional opportunities for improvement exist. Without clear, consistent objectives and an understanding of how resources are aligned with them, it may be unclear to Congress, TFI’s interagency partners, or even TFI staff what TFI’s priorities are and whether TFI has sufficient resources to address them. Without a set of effective performance measures, it is difficult to judge how well TFI is achieving its mission. Recommendations for Executive Action To help strengthen Treasury’s ability to achieve its strategic goal of preventing terrorism and promoting the nation’s security through strengthened international financial systems, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence to take the following four actions: 1. develop and implement, in consultation with interagency partners participating in international forums related to anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing issues, (a) compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries and (b) a mechanism for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on interagency collaboration; 2. develop and implement policies and procedures for aligning resources with TFI’s strategic priorities; 3. develop and implement a TFI-wide process, including written guidance, that addresses the key principles of strategic workforce planning; and 4. ensure that TFI’s performance measures exhibit the key attributes of successful performance measures. Justice and State declined to provide comments. For example, we reviewed all of Treasury’s performance and accountability reports and FinCEN’s annual reports since TFI was formed. We then interviewed officials from Treasury and its key interagency partners (the Departments of State and Justice) to understand TFI’s processes for interagency collaboration.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2004, Congress combined preexisting and newly created units to form the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). TFI's mission is to integrate intelligence and enforcement functions to (1) safeguard the financial system against illicit use and (2) combat rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, and other national security threats. In the 5 years since TFI's creation, questioned have been raised about how TFI is managed and allocates its resources. As a result, GAO was asked to analyze how TFI (1) implements its functions, particularly in collaboration with interagency partners, (2) conducts strategic resource planning, and (3) measures its performance. To conduct this analysis, GAO reviewed Treasury and TFI planning documents, performance reports, and workforce data, and interviewed officials from Treasury and its key interagency partners. What GAO Found TFI undertakes five functions, each implemented by a TFI component, in order to achieve its mission. TFI officials cite the analysis of financial intelligence as a critical part of TFI's efforts because it underlies TFI's ability to utilize many of its tools. They said that the creation of OIA was critical to Treasury's ability to effectively identify illicit financial networks. To achieve its mission, TFI's five components often work with each other, other U.S. government agencies, the private sector, or foreign governments. Officials from TFI and its interagency partners cited strong collaboration in many areas, such as effective information sharing between FinCEN and the Justice Department (Justice). Officials differed, however, about the quality of interagency collaboration involving international forums. Treasury officials who led this collaboration stated that it runs smoothly and that they were unaware of any significant concerns, while Justice and State officials reported declining collaboration and unclear mechanisms to enhance or sustain it. While TFI and some of its components have conducted selected strategic resource planning activities, TFI as a unit has not fully adopted key practices that enhance such efforts. For example, TFI and its components have produced multiple strategic planning documents in recent years, but the objectives in some of these documents are not clearly aligned with resources needed to achieve them. As a result, it may be unclear whether TFI has sufficient resources to address its objectives. Also, though TFI has undertaken some workforce planning activities, it lacks a process for performing comprehensive strategic workforce planning. Thus, it is unclear whether TFI is able to effectively address persistent workforce challenges. Also, TFI has not yet developed appropriate performance measures, changing their number and substance each year. Though TFI's current measures fully address many attributes of effective performance measures, they do not cover all TFI core program activities. TFI officials acknowledge the need for improvement and have worked since 2007 to develop one overall performance measure to assess TFI. Yet questions remain about when TFI will implement its new measure and whether it will effectively gauge TFI's performance.
gao_GAO-03-813	gao_GAO-03-813_0	Many Agencies Are Responsible for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Agencies under the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security are to coordinate with each other and with financial regulators in combating money laundering. Early Benefit of the NMLS Was Affected by Certain Factors and Events The Treasury, Justice, and regulatory agency officials we interviewed said that the NMLS was initially beneficial but, over time, certain factors and events affected its development and implementation. After September 11, combating terrorist financing became a major element of the federal government’s anti-money laundering efforts, but it was not part of the 2001 NMLS. They also said that issuance of the 2003 NMLS has been delayed by the same disruptions. NMLS Generally Has Not Been as Useful as Envisioned for Guiding the Coordination of Law Enforcement Efforts As a mechanism for guiding the coordination of federal law enforcement agencies’ efforts to combat money laundering and related financial crimes, the NMLS has had mixed results and—according to the evidence we reviewed and the officials we contacted—generally has not been as useful as envisioned by the Strategy Act. Further, while Treasury and Justice made progress on some NMLS initiatives designed to enhance interagency coordination of money laundering investigations, most had not achieved the expectations called for in the annual strategies. As of July 2003, this initiative had not yet been completed, but efforts were still ongoing. Because the issue was not addressed in the 2002 NMLS, the problem remained, thus leaving unresolved possible duplication of efforts and disagreements over which agency should lead investigations. Financial Regulators Said Factors Other Than the NMLS Exerted a Greater Influence on Their Anti- Money Laundering Efforts Most financial regulators we interviewed said that the NMLS had some influence on their anti-money laundering efforts because it has provided a forum for enhanced coordination, particularly with law enforcement agencies, but that it has had less influence than other factors. They did not, however, attribute this to the strategy but, rather, to legal requirements. They said they would do so with or without the strategy. The Annual NMLS Has Not Reflected Critical Components Identified by GAO as Key to Developing and Implementing National Strategies In recent years, our work in reviewing national strategies for various crosscutting issues has identified several critical components needed for their development and implementation; however, key components have not been well reflected in the NMLS. These components include clearly defined leadership, with the ability to marshal necessary resources; setting clear priorities and focusing resources on the greatest areas of need, as identified by threat and risk assessments; and established accountability mechanisms to provide a basis for monitoring and assessing program performance. This has resulted in an inability to reach agreement on the appropriate scope of the strategy and ensure that target dates for completing strategy initiatives were met. Recommendations for Executive Action If Congress reauthorizes the requirement for an annual NMLS, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, working with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, take appropriate steps to strengthen the leadership structure responsible for strategy development and implementation by establishing a mechanism that would have the ability to marshal resources to ensure that the strategy’s vision is achieved, resolve disputes between agencies, and ensure accountability for strategy implementation; link the strategy to periodic assessments of threats and risks, which would provide a basis for ensuring that clear priorities are established and focused on the areas of greatest need; and establish accountability mechanisms, such as (1) requiring the principal agencies to develop outcome-oriented performance measures that must be linked to the NMLS’s goals and objectives and that also must be reflected in the agencies’ annual performance plans and (2) providing Congress with periodic reports on the strategy’s results. To determine whether the NMLS has served as a useful mechanism for guiding law enforcement agencies’ efforts, we (1) compared the structure and operation of High Intensity Money Laundering and Related Financial Crime Area (HIFCA) task forces to guidance provided in the strategies, (2) assessed whether the implementation of NMLS initiatives to enhance interagency coordination has met strategic goals, and (3) assessed the extent to which the 2002 NMLS addressed agency roles in combating terrorist financing. 4. 5. Money Laundering: FinCEN Needs to Better Manage Bank Secrecy Act Civil Penalties. Money Laundering: U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering Overseas. Money Laundering: State Efforts to Fight It Are Increasing but More Federal Help Is Needed.	Why GAO Did This Study Money laundering is a serious crime, with hundreds of billions of dollars laundered annually. Congress passed the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998 to better coordinate the efforts of law enforcement agencies and financial regulators in combating money laundering. This act required the issuance of an annual National Money Laundering Strategy for 5 years, ending with the issuance of the 2003 strategy. To help with deliberations on reauthorization, GAO determined (1) agency perspectives on the benefit of the strategy and factors that affected its development and implementation, (2) whether the strategy has served as a useful mechanism for guiding the coordination of federal law enforcement agencies' efforts, (3) the role of the strategy in influencing the activities of federal financial regulators, and (4) whether the strategy has reflected key critical components. What GAO Found Treasury, Justice, and financial regulatory officials with whom GAO spoke said that the National Money Laundering Strategy was initially beneficial but that, over time, certain factors and events affected its development and implementation. They endorsed the concept of a strategy to coordinate the federal government's efforts to combat money laundering and related financial crimes. They also said that the strategy initially had a positive effect on promoting interagency planning and communication, but different agency views emerged over the scope and commitment required, and other events affected the strategy, such as the September 11 terrorist attacks and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The strategy generally has not served as a useful mechanism for guiding the coordination of federal law enforcement agencies' efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. While Treasury and Justice made progress on some strategy initiatives designed to enhance interagency coordination of money laundering investigations, most have not achieved the expectations called for in the annual strategies. Also, the 2002 strategy did not address agency roles in investigating terrorist financing, thus, it did not help resolve potential duplication of efforts and disagreements over which agency should lead investigations. In May 2003, Justice and Homeland Security reached an agreement aimed at resolving these problems. Most financial regulators GAO interviewed said that the strategy had some influence on their anti-money laundering efforts because it provided a forum for enhanced coordination, particularly with law enforcement agencies. However, they said that it has had less influence than other factors. They described several other influences on their efforts, particularly their ongoing oversight responsibilities in ensuring compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and, more recently, the USA PATRIOT Act, which was passed in October 2001 to fight terrorist financing and increase anti-money laundering efforts. GAO's work reviewing national strategies has identified several critical components needed for development and implementation; however, key components have not been well reflected in the strategy. The first is clearly defined leadership, with the ability to marshal necessary resources. However, the leadership for the strategy has not agreed on the strategy's scope or ensured that target dates for completing initiatives were met. The second is clear priorities, as identified by threat and risk assessments, to help focus resources on the greatest needs. Each strategy contained more priorities than could be realistically achieved and none of the strategies was linked to a threat and risk assessment. The third is that established accountability mechanisms provide a basis for monitoring and assessing program performance. While later strategies contained several initiatives designed to establish performance measures, as of July 2003, none had yet been completed. Officials attributed this to the difficulty in establishing such measures for combating money laundering.
gao_GAO-02-338	gao_GAO-02-338_0	VERA has shifted substantial resources from networks located primarily in the northeast and midwest to networks located in the south and west (see fig. VERA’s implementation resulted in 10 of VA’s 22 networks receiving a smaller share of VA’s medical care appropriation in fiscal year 2001 than in fiscal year 1996. Because VERA allocates resources based on workload, it provides incentives for networks to increase the number of veterans treated. Each network receives an allocation based on a predetermined dollar amount per veteran served. VERA makes this adjustment by applying a price adjustment factor to each network’s allocation. Second, the process for providing supplemental resources through the National Reserve Fund process does not provide adequate information to determine the extent to which networks need supplemental funding as a result of potential problems in VERA, network inefficiency, or other factors. In addition, VERA does not account for variation in patients’ health care needs and related costs among networks as accurately as it could. 8). Agency Comments and Our Evaluation In comments on a draft of this report, VA agreed with our conclusions that VERA’s design is a reasonable approach to allocate resources commensurate with workloads and that VERA, in concert with other VA initiatives, has provided an incentive for VA to serve more veterans. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology We reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) resource allocation for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 to (1) describe the effect the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) system has had on network resource allocations and workloads, (2) assess whether VERA’s design is a reasonable approach to resource allocation, and (3) identify weaknesses in VERA that may limit VA’s ability to allocate comparable resources for comparable workloads.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spent $21 billion in fiscal year 2001 to treat 3.8 million veterans--most of whom had service-connected disabilities or low incomes. Since 1997, VA has used the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) system to allocate most of its medical care appropriation. What GAO Found GAO found that VERA has had a substantial impact on network resource allocations and workloads. First, VERA shifted $921 million from networks located primarily in the northeast and midwest to networks located in the south and west in fiscal year 2001. In addition, VERA, along with other VA initiatives, has provided an incentive for networks to serve more veterans. VERA's overall design is a reasonable approach to allocate resources commensurate with workloads. It provides a predetermined dollar amount per veteran served to each of VA's 22 health care networks. This amount varies depending upon the health care needs of the veteran served and local cost differences. This approach is designed to allocate resources commensurate with each network's workload in terms of veterans served and their health care needs. GAO identified weaknesses in VERA's implementation. First, VERA excludes about one fifth of VA's workload in determining each network's allocation. Second, VERA does not account well for cost differences among networks resulting from variation in their patients' health care needs. Third, the process for providing supplemental resources to networks through VA's National Reserve Fund has not been used to analyze how the need for such resources is caused by potential problems in VERA's allocation, network inefficiency, or other factors.
gao_GAO-17-679	gao_GAO-17-679_0	Background The National Mall in Washington, D.C., is one of the most recognizable landscapes in the United States and serves as both the public setting for our nation’s Capital as well as home to some of the most visited museums in the world. Along the National Mall are numerous monuments and memorials to our nation’s history and heritage. As with the Smithsonian, the National Gallery also has an Office of Protection Services that serves as its primary security and risk-management office responsible for protecting the National Gallery’s assets, employees, and the visiting public. ISC, an interagency organization chaired by DHS, has developed physical security standards for nonmilitary federal facilities in the United States. The RMP was not written with the application to the Washington Monument and the Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials in mind. Federal Entities Are Assessing Security Risks to the Icons, Museums, and Galleries on the National Mall Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery are assessing the physical security risks to the icons, museums, and galleries on the National Mall. By assessing the risk to the National Mall’s assets, Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery are demonstrating that they are taking a risk management approach to meet the demands of a complex security environment. Interior’s Risk Assessments Reflect Strategic Security Requirements for National Critical Infrastructure Interior assesses the physical security risks to the icons on the National Mall using a departmental policy that reflects government-wide homeland- security objectives for critical infrastructure. Among other things, Interior’s policy establishes minimum security requirements for safeguarding critical infrastructure such as the icons and includes requirements for the following: Security personnel: assignments, coverage, locations, and available equipment, such as having an armed security force on site 24 hours a day. While the National Gallery is taking steps to assess its security risks, we found that it does not have complete documentation of its risk management decisions. Documenting risk management decisions is important for several reasons. The RMP states that the threat to federal facilities is significant and that decisions to accept risk could have serious consequences. National Mall Entities Vary in Their Use of Goals, Performance Measures, and Testing to Assess Their Security Programs Federal Entities Have Identified Goals and Related Performance Measures to Varying Degrees Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery each collect information on various aspects of the performance of their physical security programs; however, each is at a different stage of developing goals and linking performance measures to these goals. As discussed above, documenting activities is also part of an effective internal control system and helps to ensure that goals are met. Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery have taken steps to incorporate aspects of performance measurement into their physical security programs, and each plans to improve how it measures performance, specifically: The Park Police uses information it collects to manage its physical security program and has identified goals and performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts; however, its efforts align with a strategic plan that has not been updated in more than 10 years and does not specifically document how performance measures are linked to goals. Linking performance measures and goals could help these entities monitor and evaluate their efforts, which is an essential part of risk management. National Mall Entities Vary in Their Use of Security Testing and Could Benefit from Seeking Assistance to Enhance Efforts Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery each test aspects of their physical security programs, and although they have reached out to other entities to help improve their overall programs, they have not made testing a focus of their outreach efforts. Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery recognize these limitations and are taking steps to assess physical-security risks. Drawing on the knowledge and practices of other federal entities could help Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery enhance their testing programs. We recommend that the Director of the National Gallery of Art direct the Office of Protection Services to take the following three actions: develop a process for documenting risk management decisions; ensure that program goals and performance measures linked to those goals are included as part of the master security plan and develop a timeline for completion of this plan; and seek additional input from federal entities with expertise regarding ways to enhance testing of the physical security program. We also received an e-mail from the Smithsonian’s Office of Government Relations stating that the Smithsonian was not providing written comments, but that it agreed with our recommendations and will take steps to address them.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Mall is one of the most recognizable landscapes in the United States. It is home to memorials to our nation's history and some of the most visited museums in the world. Threats to these assets—whether acts of terrorism, violence, or vandalism or theft of artifacts or art—could result not only in the loss of life but also the loss of iconic monuments or irreplaceable items from the Smithsonian's or National Gallery's collections. GAO was asked to review the steps Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery are taking to protect U.S. assets, employees, and the visiting public. This report examines: (1) the extent to which these entities assess physical security risks and (2) the extent to which the entities use goals, measures, and testing to assess their physical security programs. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2017. GAO reviewed applicable federal requirements; Interior-, Smithsonian-, and National Gallery-specific policies and related documents; and interviewed officials. What GAO Found Federal entities on the National Mall are assessing the physical security risks to their respective U.S. assets. In doing so, they are demonstrating that they are taking a risk management approach to meet the demands of a complex security environment, specifically: To assess the risks to the icons—the Washington Monument and the Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials—the Department of the Interior (Interior) follows a departmental policy that reflects government-wide homeland security objectives for critical infrastructure. Among other things, Interior's policy establishes minimum security requirements for safeguarding critical infrastructure such as the icons. To assess the risks to the museums and galleries on the National Mall, the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) and the National Gallery of Art (National Gallery) voluntarily follow government-wide standards set forth by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC)—an interagency organization chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These standards are designed to minimize risk to federal facilities and help nonmilitary federal entities meet recommended levels of protection. Interior's, the Smithsonian's, and the National Gallery's adherence to these policies and standards, and the related steps that the entities follow, shows the considerable extent to which these entities use risk assessments as an analytical tool in their physical security programs. Nonetheless, the threat to federal facilities is significant, and ISC standards require the documentation of risk management decisions—such as decisions to defer actions to mitigate risk due to cost or other factors. Documenting risk management decisions is also a necessary part of an effective internal-control system and important in order to retain institutional knowledge and inform decision-making. GAO found that the National Gallery, which follows ISC standards voluntarily, lacked such documentation. Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery collect information on various aspects of the performance of their physical security programs and are making efforts to use goals, measures, and testing to assess the performance of their physical security programs; however, each could benefit from taking additional steps. ISC and GAO have reported that it is necessary to establish goals and link performance measures to those goals to assess progress. While Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery intend to link performance measures to goals, they have not done so yet or established firm time frames for completing these efforts. Ensuring that plans include both goals and performance measures linked to those goals, as well as developing timelines for completion, could help these entities develop a more strategic view of their physical security programs and better position them to prioritize their needs. These entities also test aspects of their physical security programs, such as to ensure that security systems are operational and that guards are attending to their duties. While the entities have reached out to others to improve their overall programs, they did not focus on testing as part of that outreach. Seeking input from others with expertise is consistent with key practices GAO has identified for physical security and could help these entities target where their testing efforts need improvement. What GAO Recommends In the sensitive report, GAO recommended that (1) the National Gallery document its risk management decisions and that (2) Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery link performance measures with security goals and seek input to enhance their testing programs. Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery agreed with GAO's recommendations and indicated they will begin taking steps to address them.

Subsets and Splits

No community queries yet

The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.