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gao_GAO-03-12	gao_GAO-03-12_0	HUD Administers 20 Technical Assistance Programs at an Annual Total Cost of between $108 Million and $181 Million Between fiscal years 1998 and 2002, five HUD program offices administered a total of 20 technical assistance programs. As shown in figure 1, between fiscal years 1998 and 2002, the annual funding for all of HUD’s technical assistance programs ranged from $108 million to $181 million. Not surprisingly, the two offices that administer the largest number of programs have the largest share of the overall technical assistance budget. The providers of technical assistance can be HUD officials, but typically they are entities or organizations that receive funding from HUD to deliver such assistance. Providers, which also vary by program, include state and local governments; community-based, for-profit, and nonprofit organizations; and resident service organizations. The following cases detail the recipients, providers, and purposes of the technical assistance provided. Yet, HUD does not require its program offices to measure the impact of this technical assistance, has not developed guidance for its program offices to measure the impact of the assistance, and has no plans to require its program offices to develop such guidance. Although such measures may not be practicable for every program, HUD cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of its technical assistance without some indication of its impact. Finally, since technical assistance is an important means through which HUD oversees and influences expenditures of program funds—which are about 100 times greater than expenditures of technical assistance funds—it would seem logical for each of its program offices to develop guidance to ensure that the technical assistance programs are producing the intended results. Recommendations for Executive Action To determine whether HUD’s technical assistance programs are helping HUD programs to meet their goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development require the program offices that provide technical assistance programs to determine the practicability of measuring the impact of these services and, where appropriate, establish objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals.	Why GAO Did This Study Technical Assistance is an important means through which the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) can influence how its program funds are spent; this assistance can range from training workshops to one-on-one assistance. GAO was asked to determine how many HUD technical assistance programs Congress has authorized and their cost; why HUD offers technical assistance programs and who provides and receives the services; and whether HUD program offices are overseeing and measuring the impact of their technical assistance programs as required. What GAO Found HUD administers 20 technical assistance programs through five program offices. Between fiscal years 1998 and 2002, the annual funding for HUD technical assistance ranged between $108 million and $181 million. The two offices that administer the largest number of programs have the largest share of the overall technical assistance budget. The following figure lists HUD's five program office's number of technical assistance programs or initiatives administered, each program office's definition of technical assistance, their 5-year average total technical assistance funding for fiscal years 1998 through 2002, and the percentage of overall technical assistance funding. The general purpose of HUD's technical assistance is to help program participants carry out HUD program goals. Technical assistance providers could be HUD officials; state or local governments; community-based, for-profit, and nonprofit organizations; or resident service organizations. Recipients of technical assistance could be states and units of local governments, public or Indian housing agencies, community- or faith-based organizations, or the public. Although all five HUD program offices are overseeing technical assistance, HUD does not require them to measure the impact of technical assistance, has not developed guidance for its program offices to measure the impact of the assistance, and has no plans to develop such guidance. HUD cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of the assistance without some indication of its impact.
gao_GAO-05-274	gao_GAO-05-274_0	DOD spending on services has been increasing significantly over the last several years—about 66 percent since fiscal year 1999—to a level of $118 billion in fiscal year 2003 (see fig. Our review also found that 64 contracts had sufficient, documented surveillance and in some of these instances, surveillance was extensive. Surveillance Personnel Not Always Assigned and Surveillance Documentation Insufficient For the 90 DOD service contracts we reviewed, 26 of the contracts (29 percent) had insufficient surveillance in that they lacked assigned surveillance personnel or complete documentation of surveillance. On the contracts we reviewed, 13 surveillance personnel had not received the required training. Some tasks the government expected to be performed were not in the contract, and the contractor was providing poor service on other tasks. The Army, unlike the Air Force and Navy organizations we visited, does not require surveillance personnel to be assigned to contracts prior to the contract award date. Surveillance Personnel Not Rated on Surveillance Responsibilities A further indication that surveillance is not always given a high priority is that almost all personnel involved in our review are not rated on performance of their surveillance responsibilities. Five NAVSEA surveillance personnel out of 17 we talked to told us they felt they did not have enough time, in a normal workday, to fully perform their surveillance duties. DOD also recently established additional guidance on contract surveillance for cost-reimbursable and time and materials service contracts that states that surveillance personnel should be appointed to these types of service contracts during the early contract planning phase to help improve oversight. DOD Efforts to Improve Service Contract Management and Oversight DOD has taken some steps to implement provisions in section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, which was intended to improve DOD management and oversight of services procurement and reinforce compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, directives, and other requirements, regardless of whether the services are procured through a DOD contract or other agencies’ contracts. Recommendations for Executive Action To help improve service contract surveillance and further mitigate risk, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the proper surveillance training of personnel and their assignment to service contracts occurs no later than the date of contract award; develop practices to help ensure accountability for personnel carrying out surveillance responsibilities; ensure that DOD’s service contract review process and associated data collection requirements provide information that will provide more management visibility over contract surveillance; and revise the October 2004 policy on proper use of other agencies’ contracts to include guidance on conducting surveillance of services procured from other agencies’ contracts. We also discussed DOD’s efforts with senior OSD acquisition officials.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) is the federal government's largest purchaser of contractor services, spending $118 billion in fiscal year 2003 alone--an increase of 66 percent since fiscal year 1999. DOD is expected to rely increasingly on contractors to carry out its mission. In recent reports, DOD has identified inadequate surveillance on service contracts. This report examines how DOD manages service contract surveillance. It looks at the extent of DOD's surveillance on a selection of service contracts, reasons why insufficient surveillance occurred, and efforts to improve surveillance. What GAO Found Surveillance varied on the 90 contracts we reviewed. Surveillance was insufficient on 26 of the contracts we reviewed but was sufficient on 64 contracts. Fifteen had no surveillance because no personnel were assigned such responsibilities; the other 11 had assigned personnel but could not provide evidence of surveillance due to incomplete documentation. Also, some surveillance personnel did not receive required training before beginning their assignments. According to DOD officials, insufficient surveillance occurred because surveillance is not as important to contracting officials as awarding contracts and therefore, does not receive the priority needed to ensure that surveillance occurs. The Army, unlike the Air Force and Navy organizations we visited, does not require surveillance personnel to be assigned responsibility prior to contract award. We also found that surveillance personnel involved in our review were not evaluated on how well they perform their surveillance duties. Further, surveillance was usually a part-time responsibility and some personnel felt that they did not have enough time in a normal workday to perform their surveillance duties. DOD has taken steps to implement provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 intended to improve the general management and oversight of service contract procurement and, in October 2004, DOD issued a policy that emphasized the proper use of other agencies' contracts. However, these efforts did little to improve service contract surveillance. On a more specific item, DOD did issue guidance that now requires appointment of surveillance personnel during the early planning phases of cost-reimbursable and time and materials service contracts. At the military service level, in April 2004, the Army revised its acquisition instructions and began requiring surveillance on some professional support service contracts; but, the revision did not apply to those contracts awarded before the enactment date that were still in effect.
gao_GAO-02-68	gao_GAO-02-68_0	The Subvention Demonstration Under the Medicare subvention demonstration, DOD established and operated Medicare+Choice managed care plans, called TRICARE Senior Prime, at six sites. Senior Prime Enrollees Got More Care While Some Nonenrollees Were Crowded Out of MTFs Compared with their access to care before the demonstration, many enrollees reported that their access to care overall—their ability to get care when they needed it—had improved. They reported better access to MTFs as well as to doctors. Enrollees Obtained More Health Care Than Before the Demonstration Most enrollees reported that their ability to get care when they needed it was not changed by the demonstration, but those who did report a change were more likely to say that their access to care—whether at MTFs or from the civilian network—had improved. Many enrollees in Senior Prime reported that they were more satisfied with nearly all aspects of their care. However, enrollees’ heavy use of health services resulted in high per-person costs for DOD compared to costs of other Medicare beneficiaries. Demonstration Did Not Affect Health Outcomes Senior Prime did not appear to influence three key measures of health outcomes—the mortality rate, self-reported health status, and preventable hospitalizations. Mortality rate. Preventable hospitalizations. We defined our population as all Medicare- eligible military retirees living in the demonstration sites and eligible for Senior Prime. Enrollment in Senior Prime did not have a significant effect on mortality.	What GAO Found In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress established a three-year demonstration, called Medicare subvention, to improve the access of Medicare-eligible military retirees to care at military treatment facilities (MTF). The demonstration allowed Medicare-eligible retirees to get their health care largely at MTFs by enrolling in a Department of Defense (DOD) Medicare managed care organization known as TRICARE Senior Prime. During the subvention demonstration, access to health care for many retirees who enrolled in Senior Prime improved, while access to MTF care for some of those who did not enroll declined. Many enrollees in Senior Prime said they were better able to get care when they needed it. They also reported better access to doctors in general as well as care at MTFs. Enrollees generally were more satisfied with their care than before the demonstration. However, the demonstration did not improve enrollees' self-reported health status. In addition, compared to nonenrollees, enrollees did not have better health outcomes, as measured by their mortality rates and rates of "preventable" hospitalizations. Moreover, DOD's costs were high, reflecting enrollees' heavy use of hospitals and doctors.
gao_GAO-08-21	gao_GAO-08-21_0	United States Supported Several Multilateral Efforts to Address Nuclear Networks, but Some Proposals Have Not Been Adopted The United States has initiated a range of multilateral efforts and proposals to counter nuclear proliferation networks. Although multilateral organizations have adopted some U.S. proposals that would help address illicit nuclear proliferation networks, they have not adopted others. Third, with U.S. support, IAEA has taken several actions to address proliferation networks, such as establishing a unit intended to analyze covert nuclear trade activities. The United States Negotiated Passage of UN Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Proliferation The United States negotiated the passage of a UN Security Council resolution that obligated all member states to adopt laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of WMD. NSG periodically updates and strengthens its guidelines on how member states should control and license sensitive technologies and maintain lists of the technologies to be controlled. NSG has not adopted two U.S. proposals announced by the President in 2004. However, IAEA has not yet adopted a recommendation that calls for member states to provide it with export data that would allow the agency to better detect covert nuclear activities. Impact of U.S. However, the impact of this assistance is difficult to determine because State did not evaluate either the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or the results of its assistance efforts. From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the U.S. government provided about $9 million, or 4 percent of the overall total, to seven countries in which A.Q. Agencies Do Not Consistently Assess Their Programs Despite U.S. government efforts to provide bilateral assistance to countries to help them improve their export control systems, it is difficult to determine the impact of these programs because State did not consistently conduct or document risk analyses as a basis for countries to receive assistance and has not assessed the program performance. State’s Risk Analyses Are Undocumented and Incomplete While both State’s and Energy’s assistance programs conduct risk analyses on a country-by-country basis to prioritize assistance efforts, State did not conduct one such analysis for each country in its program and did not document the ones it conducted. EXBS program assessments characterize features of a country’s export control system but do not evaluate the impact of U.S. training on the country. Agencies Cannot Identify Information to Assess Whether Their Ability to Combat Nuclear Proliferation Networks Has Improved U.S. agencies engaged in export control enforcement activities are impaired from judging their progress in preventing nuclear proliferation networks because they cannot readily identify basic information on the number, nature, or details of all their enforcement activities involving nuclear proliferation. State disagreed with our finding that it did not conduct program assessments for about 60 percent of its participating countries, asserting that it conducted program assessments for all six of the countries in the scope of our review that received EXBS funding. To identify the status of U.S. efforts to strengthen multilateral controls to counter nuclear proliferation networks, we reviewed program documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials from key U.S. agencies: DOD, Energy, and State. To assess the impact of U.S. bilateral assistance to help other countries improve their legal and regulatory controls against nuclear proliferation networks, we reviewed program documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials from key U.S. agencies: DOD, Energy, and State. As we stated in our report, the EXBS strategic plan did not identify a risk level for 11 of the 56 countries to which it provided assistance between fiscal years 2003 and 2006.	Why GAO Did This Study For decades, the United States has tried to impede nuclear proliferation networks that provide equipment to nuclear weapons development programs in countries such as Pakistan and Iran. GAO was asked to examine U.S. efforts to counter nuclear proliferation networks, specifically the (1) status of U.S. efforts to strengthen multilateral controls, (2) impact of U.S. assistance to help other countries improve their legal and regulatory controls, and (3) impact of U.S. efforts to strengthen its enforcement activities. GAO's findings focused on seven countries where network activities reportedly occurred. What GAO Found The United States has advocated several multilateral actions to counter nuclear proliferation networks. Although multilateral bodies have adopted some U.S. proposals, they have not adopted others. For example, the United States negotiated passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution that obligated all member states to adopt laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also led the development of watch lists of nuclear technologies that are not formally controlled by states and formation of a multilateral unit intended to analyze covert nuclear trade activities. However, one multilateral body has not adopted two key U.S. proposals made in 2004 to commit its members to add new restrictions on exporting sensitive nuclear technologies. Also, one multilateral organization has not adopted a recommendation for member states to provide it with more export data that would allow it to better detect covert nuclear activities. The impact of U.S. bilateral assistance to strengthen countries' abilities to counter nuclear networks is uncertain because U.S. agencies do not consistently assess the results of this assistance. The impact of this assistance is difficult to determine because the Department of State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. Between 2003 and 2006, State and the Department of Energy provided about $9 million to improve the export controls of seven countries in which nuclear proliferation network activities reportedly occurred. State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. State did not perform risk analyses for 11 of the 56 countries in its program for those years and did not document the basis for each country's proliferation threat level or explain how the risk analyses were done. Of the six countries in our study to which State provided assistance, State performed risk analyses for five. Also, State did not conduct program assessments for about 60 percent of its participating countries and for two of the six countries in our study that received assistance. Moreover, while State's program assessments characterize a country's export control system and its weaknesses, they do not assess how U.S. training efforts contributed to correcting weaknesses. Relevant U.S. agencies are impaired from judging their progress in preventing nuclear networks because they cannot readily identify basic information on the number, nature, or details of all their enforcement activities involving nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government identified the prevention of nuclear proliferation as a high priority. U.S. agencies collect information, maintain lists of companies and individuals that they sanction, and maintain case files on investigations of suspected violations of U.S. law. However, most of these agencies cannot readily identify which enforcement activities involve nuclear proliferation as they cannot ensure that searching their case file databases for words, such as nuclear, would reveal all relevant cases.
gao_GAO-17-137	gao_GAO-17-137_0	These include 280 high-level requirements related to the design, manufacturing, testing, qualification, production, and operation of crew transportation systems that deliver NASA astronauts to the ISS. Current Program Contracts In September 2014, NASA awarded firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX, valued at up to $4.2 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively, for the Commercial Crew Transportation Capability phase. During this phase, the contractors will complete development of crew transportation systems that meet NASA requirements, provide NASA with the evidence it needs to certify that those systems meet its requirements, and fly initial crewed missions to the ISS. Other elements of the reviews are similar though. Neither Contractor Expects to Achieve Certification before 2018 and NASA Has Not Yet Determined How It Will Ensure ISS Access in Case of Further Delays Since September 2014, both Boeing and SpaceX have made progress developing their crew transportation systems, but neither contractor will be able to meet their original 2017 certification dates and both expect certification to be delayed until 2018. The schedule pressures are amplified by NASA’s need to provide a viable crew transportation option to the ISS before its current contract with Russia’s space agency runs out in 2019. If NASA does not develop a viable contingency plan for ensuring access to the ISS in the event of further Commercial Crew delays, it risks not being able to maximize the return on its multibillion dollar investment in the space station. This includes the contractors’ ability to meet the agency’s requirements related to the safety of their systems. The program is also tracking a risk about having adequate information on the parachute system. Program officials told us that they have informed SpaceX that the cracks are an unacceptable risk for human spaceflight. The visibility that the Commercial Crew Program gains through the use of these contract mechanisms is designed to assist in its oversight and final certification of the contractors’ crew transportation systems, as shown in figure 4. Sustaining Program’s Level of Visibility Might Be Difficult as Schedule Pressure Builds The Commercial Crew Program has developed productive working relationships with both contractors, but the level of visibility that the program has required thus far has also taken more time than the program or contractors anticipated. As the Commercial Crew Program progresses, the program office could also face difficult choices about how to maintain the level of visibility into contractor efforts it feels it needs without adding to the program’s schedule pressures. In addition, while the Commercial Crew Program should be mindful about placing undue burdens on its contractors, it ultimately has the responsibility for ensuring the safety of U.S. astronauts, and its contracts with Boeing and SpaceX give it deference to determine the level of insight required to do so. Recommendation for Executive Action In order to ensure that the United States has continued access to the ISS if the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors experience additional schedule delays, we recommend the NASA Administrator develop a contingency plan for maintaining a presence on the ISS beyond 2018, including options to purchase additional Russian Soyuz seats, and report to Congress on the results. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification and the potential effects of any certification delays on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) access to the International Space Station (ISS); (2) the major programmatic and safety risks facing the program and the contractors; and (3) the extent to which the program has visibility into the contractors’ efforts.	Why GAO Did This Study Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. The purpose of NASA's Commercial Crew Program is to facilitate the development of a domestic transport capability. In 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX with a combined total value up to $6.8 billion for the development of crew transportation systems that meet NASA requirements and initial missions to the ISS. The contractors were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 2017. A house report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to review the progress of NASA's human exploration programs. This report examines the Commercial Crew Program including (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification, (2) the risks facing the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has visibility into the contractors' efforts. To do this work, GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation; and spoke with officials from NASA, the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, SpaceX, and independent review bodies. What GAO Found Both of the Commercial Crew Program's contractors have made progress developing their crew transportation systems, but both also have aggressive development schedules that are increasingly under pressure. The two contractors—Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies, Corp. (SpaceX)—are developing transportation systems that must meet the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) standards for human spaceflight—a process called certification. Both Boeing and SpaceX have determined that they will not be able to meet their original 2017 certification dates and both expect certification to be delayed until 2018, as shown in the figure below. The schedule pressures are amplified by NASA's need to provide a viable crew transportation option to the International Space Station (ISS) before its current contract with Russia's space agency runs out in 2019. If NASA needs to purchase additional seats from Russia, the contracting process typically takes 3 years. Without a viable contingency option for ensuring uninterrupted access to the ISS in the event of further Commercial Crew delays, NASA risks not being able to maximize the return on its multibillion dollar investment in the space station. Both contractors are also dealing with a variety of risks that could further delay certification, including program concerns about the adequacy of information on certain key systems to support certification. Another top program risk is the ability of NASA and its contractors to meet crew safety requirements. The Commercial Crew Program is using mechanisms laid out in its contracts to gain a high level of visibility into the contractors' crew transportation systems. The program is using a different model than every other spacecraft NASA has built for humans. For example, NASA personnel are less involved in the testing, launching, and operation of the crew transportation system. The program has developed productive working relationships with both contractors, but the level of visibility that the program has required thus far has also taken more time than the program or contractors anticipated. Ultimately, the program has the responsibility for ensuring the safety of U.S. astronauts and its contracts give it deference to determine the level of visibility required to do so. Moving forward though, the program office could face difficult choices about how to maintain the level of visibility it feels it needs without adding to the program's schedule pressures. What GAO Recommends Given the delays in the Commercial Crew Program, GAO recommends that NASA develop and report to Congress on its contingency plans for maintaining a U.S. presence on the ISS beyond 2018. NASA concurred with the recommendation and intends to develop a contingency plan.
gao_GAO-10-252T	gao_GAO-10-252T_0	Improved Testing Rigor Discussed in Our May 2009 Report Demonstrates Limitations of ASPs Our May 2009 report on the then-current round of ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor of ASP testing over that of previous tests, and that a particular area of improvement was in the performance testing at the Nevada Test Site, where DNDO compared the capability of ASP and current-generation equipment to detect and identify nuclear and radiological materials. Nevertheless, based on the following factors, in our report we questioned whether the benefits of the new portal monitors justify the high cost: The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness. Our chief concern with the criteria is that they require only a marginal improvement over current-generation portal monitors in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials during primary screening. DNDO considers detection of such materials to be a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. DNDO officials expect they can achieve small improvements in sensitivity through energy windowing, but DNDO has not yet completed efforts to fine-tune the PVTs’ software. The results of performance testing at the Nevada Test Site showed that the new portal monitors detected certain nuclear materials better than PVTs when shielding approximated DOE threat guidance, which is based on light shielding. DNDO’s plans for computer simulations. As of May 2009, DNDO did not plan to complete injection studies—computer simulations for testing the response of ASPs and PVTs to simulated threat objects concealed in cargo containers—prior to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision on certification even though delays to the ASP test schedule have allowed more time to conduct the studies. DNDO had not updated its cost- benefit analysis to take into account the results of ASP testing. An updated analysis that takes into account the testing results, including injection studies, might show that DNDO’s plan to replace existing equipment with ASPs is not justified, particularly given the marginal improvement in detection of certain nuclear materials required of ASPs and the potential to improve the current-generation portal monitors’ sensitivity to nuclear materials, most likely at a lower cost. Our May report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct DNDO to (1) assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness based on a valid comparison with PVTs’ full performance potential and (2) revise the schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and completion of all tests, including injection studies. We further recommended that, if ASPs are certified, the Secretary direct DNDO to develop an initial deployment plan that allows CBP to uncover and resolve any additional problems not identified through testing before proceeding to full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with GAO’s other recommendations, which we continue to believe remain valid. Results from July 2009 Testing Raise Continuing Issues The results of DNDO’s most recent round of field validation testing, which it undertook in July 2009, after our May report was released, raise new issues. In July 2009, DNDO resumed the field testing of ASPs at four CBP ports of entry that it initiated in January 2009 but suspended because of serious performance problems. However, the July tests also revealed ASP performance problems, including two critical performance deficiencies. First, the ASP monitors had an unacceptably high number of false positive alarms for the detection of certain high-risk nuclear materials. According to CBP officials, these false alarms are very disruptive in a port environment in that any alarm for this type of nuclear material would cause CBP to take enhanced security precautions because such materials (1) could be used in producing an improvised nuclear device and (2) are rarely part of legitimate or routine cargo. In addition to these key performance problems, the ASP was not able to reduce referrals to secondary inspection by 80 percent as required by the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness. Specifically, to address the problem of false positive alarms indicating the presence of certain nuclear materials, according to DNDO officials, DNDO has modified the ASP to make this equipment less sensitive to these nuclear materials. As we reported earlier this year, the results of the testing at the Nevada Test Site demonstrated that the ASPs represented a marginal improvement in detecting certain nuclear materials. By reducing the sensitivity to these materials and not retesting the modified ASPs against actual nuclear materials, it is uncertain exactly what improvement in detecting certain nuclear materials these costly portal monitors are providing. In our view, ASPs being modified to diminish their capabilities to detect certain nuclear materials raises questions about whether energy windowing might be able to achieve a similar level of performance against these same materials from the PVTs that are already in place.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation's defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment being used at ports of entry. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as well as detect radioactive material and thereby to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. However, ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors. Due to concerns about ASPs' cost and performance, Congress has required that the Secretary of Homeland Security certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale ASP procurement. In May 2009, GAO issued a report (GAO-09-655) on the status of the ongoing ASP testing round. This testimony (1) discusses the principal findings and recommendations from GAO's May report on ASP testing and (2) updates those findings based on information from DNDO and CBP officials on the results of testing conducted since the report's issuance. DHS, DNDO, and CBP's oral comments on GAO's new findings were included as appropriate. What GAO Found GAO's May 2009 report on ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests and thereby added credibility to the test results. However, GAO's report also questioned whether the benefits of the ASPs justify its high cost. In particular, the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require only a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, which DNDO considers a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The marginal improvement required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed efforts to fine-tune current-generation equipment to provide greater sensitivity. Moreover, the test results showed that ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but that differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Finally, DNDO had not yet updated its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of ASP testing and did not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though test delays have allowed more time to conduct the simulations. DNDO officials believed the other tests were sufficient for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness. GAO recommended that DHS assess ASPs against the full potential of current-generation equipment and revise the program schedule to allow time to conduct computer simulations and to uncover and resolve problems with ASPs before full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with the other recommendations, which GAO believes remain valid. The results of DNDO's most recent round of field testing raise continuing issues. In July 2009, DNDO resumed the field testing of ASPs that it initiated in January 2009 but suspended because of serious performance problems. However, the July tests also revealed critical performance deficiencies. For example, the ASP had a high number of false positive alarms for the detection of certain nuclear materials. According to CBP, these false alarms are very disruptive in a port environment because any alarm for this type of nuclear material causes CBP to take enhanced security precautions. To address these false alarms, DNDO plans to modify the ASP to make these monitors less sensitive to these nuclear materials and thereby diminishing the ASPs' capability. As GAO reported earlier this year, previous testing results demonstrated that the ASPs represented a marginal improvement in detecting these materials. By reducing the sensitivity to nuclear materials even further, it is uncertain exactly what improvement in detecting these materials the ASPs are providing or whether DNDO might be able to achieve a similar level of performance as the modified ASPs by improving the current-generation portal monitors that are already in place. In addition, the July 2009 testing also identified a critical equipment failure, including an alert malfunction, which DNDO is taking steps to resolve for future testing.
gao_GAO-16-425	gao_GAO-16-425_0	Rule development. Rule implementation. FDA Took Steps to Meet Its Regulatory Consultation Responsibilities but Did Not Consult Early with Tribes FDA took numerous steps to meet its responsibilities under UMRA and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 to ensure meaningful and timely input from the public and stakeholders during development of the FSMA- mandated rules on produce, human food, and animal food. Among other things, as reflected in table 1, FDA held 13 public meetings from April 2011 through October 2015 related to these three rules. We also interviewed officials from two associations that represent state departments of agriculture. FDA Did Not Fully Meet Its Tribal Consultation Responsibilities FDA did not fully meet its tribal consultation responsibilities. Under the HHS tribal consultation policy, each agency within HHS must establish its own tribal consultation policy, which should include an accountable process—one that among other things, measures and reports on the results and outcomes of the agency’s tribal consultation performance—to ensure meaningful and timely input by Indian tribes. FDA therefore risks continued delays in establishing a process to ensure meaningful and timely tribal consultation. Consultation is a critical ingredient of a sound and productive Federal-tribal relationship.” FDA Has Begun to Develop Plans for Coordinated Rule Implementation and Is Working to Overcome Challenges FDA has begun to develop plans to ensure compliance with the FSMA- mandated rules on produce, human food, and animal food through coordinated implementation with nonfederal agencies. FDA charged these work groups with, among other things, developing strategies to coordinate implementation with nonfederal agencies. FDA is taking various steps to overcome these challenges. According to FDA officials, the agency is currently developing a new system, called the Observation Corrective Action Reporting system (OCAR), that will serve as a platform through which users can access information housed in existing FDA information systems related to industry compliance. FDA Has Begun to Develop and Administer Plans for Regulator Training and Is Working to Overcome Challenges FDA has developed a plan for training regulators on the FSMA-mandated human and animal food rules and has begun to administer that plan. FDA Has Begun to Develop a Regulator Training Plan on the Produce Rule As of February 2016, FDA had begun to develop, but not to administer, a plan for training regulators on the FSMA-mandated produce rule. Number of Regulators to Be Trained Officials from FDA and several of the associations we interviewed discussed challenges related to the thousands of regulators who must be trained. Specifically, FDA officials stated that they plan to administer training in 2016 to regulators in areas with the highest concentrations of large businesses, for which compliance is due first. FDA then plans to administer training in 2017 to regulators in areas with the highest concentrations of small businesses, for which compliance is due later. Finally, FDA plans to administer training in 2018 to regulators in areas with the highest concentrations of very small businesses, for which compliance is due last. For example, just as most nonfederal agencies lack legal authority to conduct on-farm inspections related to produce, according to some association representatives, most nonfederal agencies have no regulatory structure for overseeing produce. Conclusions The safety and quality of the U.S. food supply are governed by a highly complex system involving more than 3,000 nonfederal agencies at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. FSMA mandated, among other things, that FDA take steps that once taken, would better integrate its food safety oversight with that of nonfederal agencies. FDA has begun to develop such a policy and issued a draft in late February 2016. Without early consultation, tribes are unable to provide input at a time when it is most likely to have a meaningful impact on the agency’s decision making. Moreover, FDA has not established a timetable to guide the policy’s finalization. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure meaningful and timely consultation with Indian tribes on future rulemaking, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of the FDA to take the following two actions: make certain that FDA’s tribal consultation policy explicitly provides for early consultation with tribes on all rules with tribal implications where the federal government does not provide the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by tribes, including before promulgation of proposed regulations, and develop a timetable, with milestones and interim steps, for finalizing FDA’s tribal consultation policy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our review provides information regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) coordination with nonfederal agencies in relation to the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA)-mandated rules on produce, human food, and animal food. In particular, the review examines the extent to which FDA has (1) met its regulatory consultation requirements in developing the rules, (2) developed plans to coordinate implementation of the rules, and (3) developed and administered plans for training regulators on the rules. Review of public comments on FDA rulemaking. Interviews with associations of nonfederal officials.	Why GAO Did This Study The safety and quality of the U.S. food supply are governed by a complex system involving more than 3,000 federal as well as nonfederal agencies at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. In 2011, FSMA mandated that FDA take steps that would better integrate its food safety oversight with that of nonfederal agencies. These steps relate to three new FSMA-mandated rules on produce, human food, and animal food. Among other things, FSMA required FDA to coordinate with nonfederal agencies in the areas of rule development, rule implementation, and regulator training. GAO was asked to review FDA's coordination with nonfederal agencies on food safety, particularly in relation to FSMA. This report examines—for the rules on produce, human food, and animal food—the extent to which FDA has (1) met its regulatory consultation responsibilities in developing the rules, (2) developed plans to coordinate implementation of the rules, and (3) developed and administered plans for training regulators on the rules. GAO reviewed documentation; analyzed comments from nonfederal agencies on FDA rulemaking; and interviewed officials from FDA, associations of nonfederal officials, and industry, public interest, and other groups. What GAO Found The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took numerous steps to ensure meaningful and timely input from nonfederal officials during development of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA)-mandated rules on produce, human food, and animal food but did not fully meet its tribal consultation responsibilities. Among other things, FDA—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—held 13 public meetings and offered extended comment periods on the rules. However, FDA did not consult with Indian tribes before publication of the proposed rules, as directed by the HHS tribal consultation policy. Under that policy, each HHS agency is to establish its own tribal consultation policy, which should include an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials. FDA has begun to develop such a policy and issued a draft in late February 2016. FDA's draft policy, however, does not explicitly provide for early consultation on all rules with tribal implications. Without early consultation, tribes are unable to provide input at a time when it is most likely to have a meaningful impact on FDA's decision making. Moreover, FDA has not established a timetable to guide the policy's finalization, without which FDA risks continued delays. FDA has begun to develop plans to ensure compliance with the FSMA-mandated rules through coordinated implementation with nonfederal agencies and is working to overcome related challenges. For example, according to FDA, insufficient data exist on businesses subject to the rules, making it difficult to assign inspection responsibilities, among other things. In response, FDA is taking steps, such as exploring new data sources. In addition, associations of nonfederal officials that GAO interviewed stated that nonfederal agencies have varying legal authorities and regulatory structures. For example, they stated that most nonfederal agencies lack authority to oversee produce, which is needed for coordinated implementation. In response, FDA is taking steps such as funding the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture's development of a model produce rule that states can adopt. Associations suggested that FDA consider opportunities to improve coordinated implementation, including establishing a system to share information on industry compliance and a process to answer questions from regulators on the rules. According to FDA, it is taking steps to implement these and other suggestions. For example, FDA is developing a new system to allow regulators to access information housed in existing FDA information systems before, during, and after an inspection. FDA has developed, and begun to administer, a plan for training regulators on the human and animal food rules. As of February 2016, FDA had begun to develop, but not to administer, a plan for training regulators on the produce rule. FDA is working to overcome challenges related to regulator training. For example, one challenge relates to the thousands of regulators who must be trained. FDA plans to, among other things, use a phased training strategy, administering training in 2016 to regulators in areas with the highest concentrations of large businesses, for which compliance is due first; in 2017 to regulators in areas with the highest concentrations of small businesses, for which compliance is due later; and in 2018 to regulators in areas with the highest concentrations of very small businesses, for which compliance is due last. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FDA (1) make certain that its tribal consultation policy explicitly provides for early tribal consultation and (2) develop a timetable for finalizing the policy. GAO provided a draft of this report to FDA. FDA agreed with these recommendations.
gao_GAO-10-938	gao_GAO-10-938_0	Social Security Coverage Agreements with States The extent to which public employees are covered by Social Security varies greatly from state to state. SSA is required by law to maintain accurate earnings records for all workers. SSA Has a Process to Approve Coverage, but Faces Challenges in Ensuring Accurate Coverage SSA Works with States to Approve Social Security Coverage, but It Is Unclear If Public Employers Always Know When to Seek Approval SSA has an established process for working with states to approve coverage. The SSA regional office reviews the modification to ensure that it complies with all relevant laws and procedures. However SSA’s guidance is broad and does not specify how a state administrator should fulfill these responsibilities. SSA Has Limited Management Oversight of Public Employee Wage Reporting SSA relies primarily on public employers to correctly interpret their coverage and accurately report covered wages of public employees, according to SSA officials. For example, a small fire district in one state reported Social Security wages for more than a decade without approved coverage to do so, not realizing coverage under an agreement between SSA and the state was required. 6) to report Social Security covered wages. Given its responsibility, SSA conducted compliance reviews and collected data on public employers, such as lists of which public employers were part of the coverage agreement. However, SSA does not track the number of public employers that are under a state’s approved coverage agreement or various activities that could expose public employers to greater risk of committing coverage errors. SSA officials told us that the agency does not use existing information to assess the extent to which coverage errors are occurring and the risk that these errors pose to the accuracy of public employer wage reporting. A list of the 11 committees and their objectives is in appendix V. IRS’s Compliance Efforts Are Limited by a Lack of Social Security Coverage Information IRS Is Responsible For Ensuring Public Employers Pay Social Security Taxes but Determining Coverage Is Challenging Since 1987, IRS has been the primary agency responsible for ensuring that public employers are accurately paying Social Security and Medicare taxes, and its level of enforcement has increased over the years. For each examination, the IRS examiner is supposed to obtain information about the applicable Social Security coverage agreement and determine the employees that are covered. However, IRS does not know what percent of the employers did not comply with their state’s Social Security coverage agreement. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve SSA’s management oversight of retirement benefits for public employees, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security, in consultation with IRS, state administrators, and public employers, develop procedures for monitoring the accuracy of Social Security earnings records. To improve the process for identifying and correcting errors, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue track errors found through its compliance efforts on Social Security and Medicare taxes and share results with SSA, to the extent permitted by federal law. IRS Identification of Incorrect Social Security Taxes To understand how IRS identifies incorrect Social Security taxes for public employees, we held interviews with IRS managers in the Federal, State and Local Governments office (FSLG), which is responsible for the tax compliance of federal, state, and local government employers, including their Social Security coverage. Appendix IV: SSA’s Guidance Related to the Responsibilities of State Social Security Administrators Serve as a bridge between state and local public employers and federal agencies, including SSA and IRS.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2007, 73 percent of state and local government employees were covered by Social Security. Unlike the private sector where most employees are covered by Social Security, federal law generally permits each public employer to decide which employees to cover. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for facilitating Social Security coverage for these employers through agreements with states. SSA is also responsible for maintaining accurate earnings records, while IRS is responsible for ensuring Social Security taxes are paid. Because of the need to ensure Social Security coverage is administered accurately, GAO was asked to review (1) how SSA works with states to approve Social Security coverage and ensure accurate coverage of public employees, and (2) how IRS identifies incorrect Social Security taxes for public employees. GAO reviewed procedures of federal agencies and selected states; surveyed all state administrators; and reviewed IRS case files. What GAO Found Although SSA approves Social Security coverage on behalf of state and local government employers, it faces challenges in ensuring accurate reporting of Social Security earnings. SSA works with states to establish and amend Social Security coverage agreements, but public employers do not always know that SSA's approval is required. For example, a small fire district in one state reported Social Security wages for more than a decade without approved coverage to do so, not realizing a coverage agreement between SSA and the state was required. While state administrators are responsible for managing the approved coverage agreements for public employers, SSA's guidance does not specify how states should go about fulfilling this responsibility, leading to variation in the extent to which states meet their responsibility. SSA lacks basic data on which public employers have approved coverage and relies on public employers to comply with coverage agreements voluntarily. SSA officials told us that the agency does not use existing information, such as lessons learned from prior coverage errors, to assess the risks that these errors pose to the accuracy of public employer wage reporting. IRS conducts compliance checks and examinations of public employers; however, examining Social Security coverage for employees is challenging due to limited data and the difficulties of determining whether employees are covered. To obtain needed data, one IRS field office sent its examiners to the SSA regional office to make copies of Social Security coverage agreements. Some other IRS field offices do not have copies of all their respective agreements. IRS tracks the results of its examinations to identify the number of public employers that need tax adjustments; however, IRS does not track whether the tax adjustments relate to Social Security coverage agreement errors even though this information is available during examinations. SSA could benefit from such information so that it could help public employers identify and correct errors. As a result, IRS's and SSA's ability to fully understand problems related to Social Security coverage is limited. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that SSA work with IRS, state administrators, and public employers to improve management oversight and monitoring of public employer reporting of Social Security wages and that SSA clarify its guidance on state administrator responsibilities. GAO also recommends that IRS track errors found through compliance efforts and share results with SSA to the extent permitted by law. SSA and IRS reviewed the report and agreed with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-08-66	gao_GAO-08-66_0	Key Components of End-of-Life Care The IOM and AHRQ studies identified the following key components in providing care to individuals nearing the end of life: care management; supportive services for individuals; pain and symptom management; family and caregiver support; communication among the individuals, families, and program staff; and assistance with advance care planning. Pain and symptom management is pharmacological and nonpharmacological therapies, such as massage therapy, to treat pain and other symptoms of an individual who is seriously ill. Family and caregiver support are services that provide assistance to those caring for an individual nearing the end of life in his or her home and can include respite care and bereavement counseling. The IOM report also identified advance care planning as a key component of end-of-life care. The AHRQ report identified continuity of health care, such as that provided through care management; supportive services, such as home care services; pain and symptom management; support for families and caregivers; and effective communication among program staff, which could include improved medical record documentation, as core components of end-of-life care. Programs Incorporate Key Components of End-of-Life Care The programs we identified in four states that incorporate key components of end-of-life care described in the IOM and AHRQ reports are PACE, WPP, ALTCS, and palliative care programs. These programs use care management to ensure continuity of care and supportive services, such as personal care services, to assist individuals nearing the end of life. In the ALTCS program, each Medicaid beneficiary is assigned a case manager. Programs Use Supportive Services The programs we identified provide a variety of supportive services to assist individuals near the end of life. In addition, the adult day centers operated by the PACE providers we visited offer respite opportunities for the caregivers of the individuals who attend the day care programs. For example, a representative of a PACE provider described how the interdisciplinary care team fosters communication with the individual about what type of care he or she wants to receive at the end of life, including pain and symptom management. Programs Initiate and Encourage Advance Care Planning The WPP, PACE, and palliative care providers initiate or encourage advance care planning to assist individuals with planning for the end of life, making decisions about future medical care, and sharing information with family members. Representatives of all the PACE providers stated that they assist individuals with advance care planning tasks, such as completing advance directives and identifying health care proxies, that is, those who can make health care decisions on behalf of the individuals. Providers Find Challenges to Delivering Certain Key Components of End-of-Life Care Representatives of providers we interviewed described challenges they encounter to delivering some of the key components of end-of-life care. Representatives of providers also stated that they believe physician training and practices can inhibit the provision of pain and symptom management and advance care planning to individuals nearing the end of life. Providers Encounter Challenges Delivering Supportive Services and Family and Caregiver Support to Rural Residents Representatives of providers we interviewed described difficulties delivering supportive services and family and caregiver support to rural residents because of travel distances, lack of community-based services, and insufficient numbers of nursing and personal care staff in rural areas. Furthermore, ALTCS officials stated that, in their experience, physicians often do not inform individuals about advance directives. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS stated that the report is a useful description of a diverse set of provider types in very different settings, each of which provides useful services to persons coming to the end of life. CMS noted that the report is especially helpful as a time approaches when more Americans will be living with serious and eventually fatal chronic conditions.	Why GAO Did This Study Approximately 28 percent of all Medicare spending in 1999 was used to provide care for beneficiaries in the last year of their lives. The Medicare hospice benefit is specifically designed for end-of-life care but is an elected benefit for individuals who have a terminal diagnosis with a prognosis of 6 months or less if the disease runs its normal course. GAO was asked to identify examples of programs that provide key components of end-of-life care. Specifically, GAO (1) identified key components of end-of-life care, (2) identified and described how certain programs incorporate key components of end-of-life care, and (3) described the challenges program providers have identified to delivering the key components of end-of-life care. To identify the key components of end-of-life care, GAO relied on studies by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). To identify and describe programs that implement these key components and describe the challenges providers of these programs face, GAO conducted site visits to four states, Arizona, Florida, Oregon, and Wisconsin, that, in addition to other criteria, demonstrated a high use of end-of-life services. We interviewed officials of federal, state, and private programs in these four states that provide care to individuals nearing the end of life. What GAO Found The IOM and AHRQ studies identified the following key components in providing care to individuals nearing the end of life: care management to coordinate and facilitate service delivery; supportive services, such as transportation, provided to individuals residing in noninstitutional settings; pain and symptom management; family and caregiver support such as respite care; communication among the individuals, families, and program staff; and assistance with advance care planning to aid individuals with making decisions about their future care. The programs GAO identified in the four states incorporate key components of end-of-life care when delivering services to individuals nearing the end of life. These programs use care management, either through a case manager or an interdisciplinary care team of health care professionals, to ensure continuity of care and the delivery of appropriate services. The programs also provide supportive services, such as personal care services or meal delivery, to assist individuals in their homes. Pain and symptom management is provided by these programs to treat pain and other symptoms of an individual who is seriously ill. These programs provide family and caregiver support through services that alleviate demands on the caregiver and by providing bereavement support for family members. The programs foster communication with individuals and family members to plan care that reflects each individual's choices. In addition, these programs use tools such as electronic medical records to facilitate communication among staff members. The programs GAO identified initiate and encourage advance care planning for the end of life and assist individuals with making decisions about future medical care, such as completing advance directives and identifying health care proxies, that is, those who can make health care decisions on behalf of the individual. Providers of the programs GAO identified described challenges they encounter to delivering some of the key components of end-of-life care. Providers described difficulties delivering supportive services and family and caregiver supports to rural residents because of travel distances, fewer community-based service options, and an inability to hire adequate numbers of staff in rural areas. Providers also stated that, in their experience, physician training and practices can inhibit the provision of pain and symptom management and advance care planning to individuals nearing the end of life. A recent article published in a medical journal GAO reviewed identified similar issues with physician training and practices. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare and Medicaid, commented that the report is a useful description of diverse provider types that deliver services to persons coming to the end of life. CMS noted that the report is especially helpful as a time approaches when more Americans will be living with serious and eventually fatal chronic conditions.
gao_GAO-15-370	gao_GAO-15-370_0	2). FAA’s Shift to NextGen Implementation Raises Cybersecurity Challenges That FAA Has Taken Some Steps to Address FAA faces cybersecurity challenges in at least three areas: (1) protecting its air traffic control (ATC) information systems, (2) securing aircraft avionics used to operate and guide aircraft, and (3) clarifying cybersecurity roles and responsibilities among multiple FAA offices. We reported in January 2015 that FAA has taken steps to protect its ATC systems from cyber-based threats. However, we stated that significant security-control weaknesses remain that threaten the agency’s ability to ensure the safe and uninterrupted operation of the national airspace system. GAO-15-221. FAA officials said that FAA has not produced a plan to develop an enterprise-wide threat model but has made some initial steps toward developing such a model. FAA officials told us that they have not determined the funding or time that would be needed to develop such a model or identified the resources needed to implement it. FAA officials and experts we interviewed said that modern aircraft are also increasingly connected to the Internet, which also uses IP- networking technology and can potentially provide an attacker with remote access to aircraft information systems. FAA’s Office of Safety (AVS) is responsible for certifying the airworthiness of new aircraft and aviation equipment, including software components for avionics systems. For instance, AVS issues cybersecurity- related rules for aircraft and has begun reviewing rulemaking on cybersecurity, but AVS is not included in developing the agency-wide approach for information systems security and has no representative on the Cybersecurity Steering Committee. We selected these because of their importance to NextGen, cost, and deployment status. Although FAA adhered to aspects of federal guidance on control selection, assessment, and weakness remediation, its implementation of these risk management activities could be or could have been improved. Systems with weaknesses that could be exploited by these adversaries may be at increased risk if relevant controls in the new NIST guidelines are not implemented. FAA is making strides to address these risks, including implementing an enterprise approach for protecting its systems from cyber attack by both internal and external threats in accordance with NIST and other cybersecurity leading practices; however, FAA has not developed a holistic threat model that would describe the landscape of security risks to FAA’s information systems. Such a model would inform the ongoing implementation of FAA’s cybersecurity efforts to protect the National Airspace System. FAA’s acquisition management system is evolving to stay up-to-date on federal cybersecurity guidance as FAA designs and develops NextGen systems; and FAA has made significant strides in incorporating requirements for security controls recommended by NIST guidelines into its acquisition of these systems. Specifically, FAA concurred with the recommendation that it assess the potential cost and timetable for developing an agency-wide threat model, and the recommendation that it develop a plan to fund and implement NIST revisions within OMB timeframes. Because aircraft aviation systems are becoming increasingly connected to systems outside the aircraft, the Office of Safety, which is responsible for certifying aircraft systems, should be involved in agency-wide cybersecurity efforts, including cybersecurity planning and vulnerability identification, since such efforts may be crucial in conducting its certification activities. As we state in the report, not including the Office of Safety as a full member of the Committee could hinder FAA’s efforts to develop a coordinated, holistic, agency-wide approach to cybersecurity. According to the Department, FAA is initiating a comprehensive program to improve the cybersecurity defenses of the NAS infrastructure, as well as other mission critical systems. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to (1) identify the key challenges facing FAA as it shifts to the NextGen ATC system and how FAA is addressing those challenges and (2) assess the extent FAA and its contractors followed federal guidelines for incorporating cybersecurity requirements in its acquisition of NextGen programs. To assess the extent to which FAA and its contractors, in the acquisition of NextGen programs, have followed federal guidelines for incorporating cybersecurity controls, we compared pertinent FAA policies, procedures, and practices with selected federal information security laws and federal guidance, including standards and guidelines from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).	Why GAO Did This Study FAA is responsible for overseeing the national airspace system, which comprises ATC systems, procedures, facilities, and aircraft, and the people who operate them. FAA is implementing NextGen to move the current radar-based ATC system to one that is based on satellite navigation and automation. It is essential that FAA ensures effective information-security controls are incorporated in the design of NextGen programs to protect them from threats. GAO was asked to review FAA's cybersecurity efforts. This report (1) identifies the cybersecurity challenges facing FAA as it shifts to the NextGen ATC system and how FAA has begun addressing those challenges, and (2) assesses the extent to which FAA and its contractors, in the acquisition of NextGen programs, have followed federal guidelines for incorporating cybersecurity controls. GAO reviewed FAA cybersecurity policies and procedures and federal guidelines, and interviewed FAA officials, aviation industry stakeholders, and 15 select cybersecurity experts based on their work and recommendations by other experts. What GAO Found As the agency transitions to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) faces cybersecurity challenges in at least three areas: (1) protecting air-traffic control (ATC) information systems, (2) protecting aircraft avionics used to operate and guide aircraft, and (3) clarifying cybersecurity roles and responsibilities among multiple FAA offices. As GAO reported in January 2015, FAA has taken steps to protect its ATC systems from cyber-based threats; however, significant security-control weaknesses remain that threaten the agency's ability to ensure the safe and uninterrupted operation of the national airspace system. FAA has agreed to address these weaknesses. Nevertheless, FAA will continue to be challenged in protecting ATC systems because it has not developed a cybersecurity threat model. NIST guidance, as well as experts GAO consulted, recommend such modeling to identify potential threats to information systems, and as a basis for aligning cybersecurity efforts and limited resources. While FAA has taken some steps toward developing such a model, it has no plans to produce one and has not assessed the funding or time that would be needed to do so. Without such a model, FAA may not be allocating resources properly to guard against the most significant cybersecurity threats. Modern aircraft are increasingly connected to the Internet. This interconnectedness can potentially provide unauthorized remote access to aircraft avionics systems. As part of the aircraft certification process, FAA's Office of Safety (AVS) currently certifies new interconnected systems through rules for specific aircraft and has started reviewing rules for certifying the cybersecurity of all new aircraft systems. FAA is making strides to address the challenge of clarifying cybersecurity roles and responsibilities among multiple FAA offices, such as creating a Cyber Security Steering Committee (the Committee) to oversee information security. However, AVS is not represented on the Committee but can be included on an ad-hoc advisory basis. Not including AVS as a full member could hinder FAA's efforts to develop a coordinated, holistic, agency-wide approach to cybersecurity. FAA's acquisition management process generally aligned with federal guidelines for incorporating requirements for cybersecurity controls in its acquisition of NextGen programs. For example, the process included the six major information-technology and risk-management activities as described by NIST. Timely implementation of some of these activities could have been improved based on their importance to NextGen, cost, and deployment status. The Surveillance and Broadcast Services Subsystem (SBSS)—which enables satellite guidance of aircraft and is currently deployed in parts of the nation—has not adopted all of the April 2013 changes to NIST security controls, such as intrusion detection improvements, although the Office of Management and Budget guidance states that deployed systems must adopt changes within one year. Systems with weaknesses that could be exploited by adversaries may be at increased risk if relevant controls are not implemented. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FAA: 1) assess developing a cybersecurity threat model, 2) include AVS as a full member of the Committee, and 3) develop a plan to implement NIST revisions within OMB's time frames. FAA concurred with recommendations one and three, but believes that AVS is sufficiently involved in cybersecurity. GAO maintains that AVS should be a member of the Committee.
gao_GAO-14-125	gao_GAO-14-125_0	Identified Federal Agencies Have Had Limited Coordination with State and Local Governments Regarding Cybersecurity at Public Safety Entities The five identified federal agencies have, to varying degrees, coordinated cybersecurity-related activities with state and local governments. However, except for supporting critical infrastructure planning, federal activities were generally not targeted towards or focused on public safety entities. However, federal agencies performed some coordination-related activities directed to public safety entities, including issuing alerts about cyber-based attacks to public safety entities, performing risk assessments, providing technical assistance through education and awareness efforts, and administering grants that allowed for expenditures for IT equipment and cybersecurity tools. The plan is intended to serve as a guide for the sector, including the public safety entities, to set protective program goals and objectives, identify assets, assess risks, prioritize infrastructure components and programs to enhance risk mitigation, implement protective programs, measure program effectiveness, and incorporate research and development of technology initiatives into sector planning efforts. While DHS and the Emergency Services Sector Coordinating Council addressed in the 2010 Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan aspects of cybersecurity of the current environment, they did not address the development and implementation of NG 911 and the FirstNet network in public safety entities. According to DHS officials, the process for updating the sector-specific plans will begin after the revised NIPP has been released. A revised NIPP was released in December 2013, and, according to DHS, a new sector-specific plan is estimated to be completed in December 2014. Until DHS, in collaboration with stakeholders, develops the next iteration of the sector-specific plan, it is unclear if the cybersecurity implications of implementing these technologies will be considered. Without such planning, information systems are at an increased risk of failure or being unavailable at critical moments. Although Identified Federal Agencies Provided Grants to State and Local Governments, These Grants Did Not Specifically Target Cybersecurity of Public Safety Entities Federal grant programs have been used to fund technology enhancements so that public safety entities could address the evolution in communications technology and for technology enhancements at state and local public safety entities to include allocations for cybersecurity enhancements at the grantee’s option. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the NTIA allocated $43.5 million in grants to states over a 3-year period, starting in September 2009, to help implement enhancements to 911 system functionality to address the increase in 911 calls from cell phones and the future plans for PSAPs to handle text and other message formats. While cybersecurity was not specified as a requirement in a grant program’s eligible use of funds, it was not precluded from the allowed use of the funds. Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with emergency service sector stakeholders, address the cybersecurity implications of implementing NG 911 and the FirstNet network in the next iteration of sector plans. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendation. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to determine the extent to which federal agencies coordinated with state and local governments regarding cybersecurity efforts at emergency operations centers, public safety answering points, and first responder agencies involved in handling emergency calls. To identify the roles of federal agencies and select the organizations responsible for coordinating cybersecurity efforts with state and local government for public safety entities, we reviewed relevant federal law, policy, regulation, and critical infrastructure protection-related strategies, including the following: Homeland Security Act of 2002; Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007; 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan; 2010 Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan; 2012 Emergency Services Sector Cyber Risk Assessment; 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace; Department of Homeland Security’s Information Sharing Strategy, Presidential Policy Directive 21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12, 2013; Executive Order 13618—Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions, July 6, 2012; Executive Order 13636—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, February 19, 2013; and Title 47, Code of Federal Regulations sections 4.5, 4.9, 12.3, and Part 400. Based on our analysis, we determined that the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Justice, and Transportation and the Federal Communications Commission were key federal entities relevant to our objective and identified five key activities related to cybersecurity coordination, to evaluate the federal entities against: (1) supporting critical infrastructure protection-related planning, (2) issuing grants, (3) sharing information, (4) providing technical assistance, and (5) regulating and overseeing essential functions.	Why GAO Did This Study Individuals can contact fire, medical, and police first responders in an emergency by dialing 911. To provide effective emergency services, public safety entities such as 911 call centers use technology including databases that identifies phone number and location data of callers. Because these critical systems are becoming more interconnected, they are also increasingly susceptible to cyber-based threats that accompany the use of Internet-based services. This, in turn, could impact the availability of 911 services. GAO was asked to review federal coordination with state and local governments regarding cybersecurity at public safety entities. The objective was to determine the extent to which federal agencies coordinated with state and local governments regarding cybersecurity efforts at emergency operations centers, public safety answering points, and first responder organizations involved in handling 911 emergency calls. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant plans and reports and interviewed officials at (1) five agencies that were identified based on their roles and responsibilities established in federal law, policy, and plans and (2) selected industry associations and state and local governments. What GAO Found The five identified federal agencies (Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Justice, and Transportation and Federal Communications Commission (FCC)) have to varying degrees, coordinated cybersecurity-related activities with state and local governments. These activities included (1) supporting critical infrastructure protection-related planning, (2) issuing grants, (3) sharing information, (4) providing technical assistance, and (5) regulating and overseeing essential functions. However, except for supporting critical infrastructure planning, federal coordination of these activities was generally not targeted towards or focused on the cybersecurity of state and local public safety entities involved in handling 911 emergency calls. Under the critical infrastructure protection planning activity, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinated with state and local governments and other federal stakeholders to complete the Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan. The plan is to guide the sector, including the public safety entities, in setting protective program goals and objectives, identifying assets, assessing risks, prioritizing infrastructure components and programs to enhance risk mitigation, implementing protective programs, measuring program effectiveness, and incorporating research and development of technology initiatives into sector planning efforts. It also addressed aspects of cybersecurity of the current environment. However, the plan did not address the development and implementation of more interconnected, Internet-based planned information technologies, such as the next generation of 911 services. According to DHS officials, the plan did not address these technologies, in part, because the process for updating the sector-specific plan will begin after the release of the revised National Infrastructure Protection Plan--a unifying framework to enhance the safety of the nation's critical infrastructure. A revised plan was released in December 2013, and, according to DHS, a new sector-specific plan is estimated to be completed in December 2014. Until DHS, in collaboration with stakeholders, addresses the cybersecurity implications of the emerging technologies in planning activities, information systems are at an increased risk of failure or being unavailable at critical moments. Under the other four activities, federal agencies performed some coordination related activities for public safety entities including administering grants for information technology enhancements, sharing information about cyber-based attacks, and providing technical assistance through education and awareness efforts. For example, the Departments of Transportation and Commerce allocated $43.5 million in grants to states over a 3-year period, starting in September 2009, to help implement enhancements to 911 system functionality. While these grants were not targeted towards the cybersecurity of these systems, cybersecurity was not precluded from the allowed use of the funds. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security collaborate with emergency services sector stakeholders to address the cybersecurity implications of implementing technology initiatives in related plans. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.
gao_GAO-08-547	gao_GAO-08-547_0	WIA and Community Colleges Community colleges can play important roles in the federal workforce programs under WIA. In addition, as a key provider of both education and career and technical training programs in their communities, community colleges can meet the education and training needs of one-stop clients by working closely with their local one-stop centers to understand these needs and meeting WIA requirements to become eligible training providers. Community Colleges Tailor Career and Technical Training Courses to Meet the Workforce Development Needs of Businesses, Workers, and Students To meet businesses’ current and future workforce needs, the community colleges that we visited keep their career and technical education programs up to date through a variety of data collection and outreach efforts. They also provide training directly to local employers through contract or customized training programs; work with small businesses; and offer programs to help specific groups of students and workers, such as those receiving TANF. Community Colleges Integrate with the One-Stop System in Many Ways, Including Operating and Colocating with One- Stops and Participating on WIBs The community colleges that we visited integrate with their one-stop centers through various activities. Examples of these activities include operating the one-stop; participating on the local WIBs; or partnering with the one-stop on workforce activities, such as strategic planning or data sharing. According to several community college and workforce officials at the sites that we visited, colocation of community college staff at the one-stop was another way that the college was integrated with the one-stop system. Based on our survey, we estimated that about 11 percent of the one-stops are operated solely or jointly by a community college, while 34 percent of the one-stops have community college staff colocated at the one-stop center. To accomplish this, they conduct cross-training. State Funding and Leadership Help Community Colleges’ Workforce Efforts, While WIA Performance System Measures and WIA Funding Issues Present Challenges State funding and leadership are some of the factors that community colleges and other workforce officials identified as supporting their workforce efforts and integration with one-stops. For example, WIA holds state and local workforce areas accountable for meeting performance levels in their Adult, Dislocated Workers, and Youth programs on measures such as job placement, retention, and earnings. We recommended that Labor develop a systematic model for all states to use that could take into account the type of population served or the economic conditions of the state. To date, Labor has not implemented this recommendation. In addition, these officials stated that Labor works to ensure consistency in the negotiation process for establishing state performance levels between the department’s regional offices, which conduct the negotiations, and the states, through guidance to the regions as well as discussions between the Assistant Secretary and Labor’s regional office administrators. Labor and Education Have Focused on Community Colleges’ Workforce Development Efforts through Targeted Grant Programs and a Strategic Partnerships Initiative, but Their Impact Is Not Fully Known In addition to other activities, Education and Labor have undertaken and supported two key initiatives that focus on building linkages between community colleges and the workforce system: the WIRED, Community Based, and High Growth grants and the Strategic Partnerships for a Competitive Workforce Initiative, a joint initiative with Education. It is unclear whether these initiatives will be successful in building such linkages or encouraging more community colleges to focus on workforce development, due to the agencies’ inability to measure the full impact of these collaborative efforts. In addition, Labor and Education jointly funded and organized a $1.5 million initiative—the Strategic Partnerships for a Competitive Workforce—to help build linkages between community colleges and the workforce system. Labor and Education are planning to issue a report in 2008 highlighting the lessons learned from the initiative. Labor and Education have taken some important first steps that address aspects of the community colleges’ role in the workforce system through Labor’s WIRED, High Growth, and Community Based grants and the jointly sponsored Strategic Partnerships initiative. Continued efforts by Labor and Education to build on past successes in aligning their respective workforce programs will help ensure that the nation will benefit from the full potential of community colleges that are already actively engaged in workforce development and the one-stop system and will encourage more community colleges to follow their examples. III); Education did not. Workforce Investment Act: Additional Actions Would Further Improve the Workforce System. GAO-05-4.	Why GAO Did This Study In the future, businesses will demand workers with higher-level skills and more education. Community colleges are key providers of career and technical training as well as traditional academic education. These colleges can also play important roles in the one-stop system created by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), through which a variety of federally funded employment and training programs provide services. Given the importance of community colleges to workforce development, GAO was asked to examine (1) how community colleges meet the workforce training needs of their communities; (2) what community colleges do to integrate with the nation's one-stop system; (3) the conditions or practices that enhance or impede these efforts; and (4) the actions the Departments of Labor and Education have taken to encourage linkages between community colleges and the workforce investment system, including one-stops. To address these objectives, GAO visited 20 community colleges, surveyed one-stop centers and their associated workforce investment boards, and talked to Labor and Education officials. Labor and Education generally agreed with GAO's findings. What GAO Found The community colleges that GAO visited developed various approaches and programs for career and technical training to meet the needs of industry sectors, individual employers, and certain types of students and workers. Through a variety of outreach, relationship building, and data collection efforts, community colleges have come to understand the specific training needs of key industries in their regions and use this information to keep programs current or develop new programs to address these needs. Community college activities include providing contract or customized training to the employees of specific employers; working with small businesses; and targeting training and education programs to specific populations, such as disadvantaged adults, high-school students transitioning to college, and one-stop clients. Many of the community colleges that GAO visited integrate with their one-stops by operating the one-stop centers, colocating college staff at the one-stop, and participating on workforce investment boards. Nationwide, GAO estimated that about 11 percent of one-stops are operated solely or jointly by a community college, while 34 percent have community college staff colocated at the center. Similarly, GAO estimated that, nationwide, 49 percent of local workforce investment boards have community college presidents represented on their boards. Some of the benefits of these arrangements include cost sharing and improved communication among participating programs. Officials at the colleges and one-stops that GAO visited reported also conducting other joint activities, such as strategic planning and data sharing. Community college and workforce officials cited state funding and leadership as factors that help integration between community colleges and the workforce system but identified WIA performance system measures and WIA funding issues as impediments. Under WIA, states and local workforce areas must meet performance levels in their Adult, Dislocated Worker, and Youth programs that can be difficult to obtain when serving some populations, such as those on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or youth, causing disincentives for the one-stops to serve them. In a 2004 report, GAO recommended that Labor develop a systematic way to account for differences in the population groups served by states' one-stop centers and apply it to all states when establishing their performance levels. Labor has not taken action on this recommendation; however, Labor officials stated that states may use their own adjustment models and that the department has worked to ensure consistency in the process. It is uncertain whether Labor and Education's efforts to build linkages between community colleges and the workforce system will be successful in encouraging community colleges to focus on workforce development. Labor's WIRED, High Growth, and Community Based grants aim, in part, to help community colleges and other workforce entities collaborate. As discussed in GAO's recent report on these grants, Labor's evaluations do not fully measure their effectiveness, and GAO recommends that Labor take steps to do so. Labor and Education jointly funded a $1.5 million initiative in 2006 to help build linkages between community colleges and the workforce system. The agencies did not conduct an evaluation, but plan to issue a report in 2008 about the participants' challenges and successes.
gao_GAO-01-312	gao_GAO-01-312_0	Conclusion DOE is improving the security of 192 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia by installing modern security systems that detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material. These systems, while not as stringent as those installed in the United States, are designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material theft at Russian sites. While Russia and the United States have worked cooperatively to reduce the risk of theft in Russia, Russian officials’ concerns about divulging national security information continue to impede DOE’s efforts to install systems for several hundred metric tons of nuclear material at sensitive Russian sites. Continued progress in reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia hinges on DOE’s ability to gain access to Russia’s sensitive sites and reach agreement with MINATOM to reduce the number of sites and buildings where nuclear material is located. Regarding the systems that are already installed, DOE currently does not have a means to periodically monitor the systems to ensure that they are operating properly on a continuing basis. Such a mechanism would provide DOE officials with increased confidence that the security systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to assist DOE in its mission of promoting nuclear nonproliferation and reducing the danger from weapons of mass destruction, we recommend that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration develop a system, in cooperation with the Russian government, to monitor, on a long-term basis, the security systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure that they continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material and include in the strategic plan being developed by DOE (1) an estimate of how much sustainability assistance is required on the basis of an analysis of the costs to operate and maintain the systems and the sites’ ability to cover these costs and (2) options for completing the program on the basis of the progress made in gaining access to sensitive sites and on the closure of buildings and sites.	What GAO Found The Department of Energy (DOE) is improving security of 192 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia by installing modern security systems that detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material. These systems, while not as stringent as those installed in the United States, are designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material theft at Russian sites. While Russia and the United States have worked cooperatively to reduce the risk of theft in Russia, Russian officials' concerns about divulging national security information continue to impede DOE's efforts to install systems for several hundred metric tons of nuclear material at sensitive Russian sites. Continued progress in reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia hinges on DOE's ability to gain access to Russia's sensitive sites and reach agreement with the Ministry of Atomic Energy to reduce the number of sites and buildings where nuclear material is located. DOE currently does not have a means to periodically monitor the systems to ensure that they are operating properly on a continued basis. Such as mechanism would provide DOE officials with increased confidence that the security systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft. The strategic plan developed by DOE should provide an estimate of how much sustainability assistance is required on the basis of an analysis of the costs to operate and maintain the systems and the sites' ability to cover these costs. In addition, the plan should provide options for completing the program on the basis of the progress made on gaining access to sensitive sites and the closure of buildings and sites.
gao_GGD-95-222	gao_GGD-95-222_0	To describe any obstacles U.S. firms may face when competing for MDB projects and the services that the U.S. government provides for them, we interviewed officials from the Treasury and Commerce, TDA, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Small Business Administration, and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. To describe Treasury’s efforts to help ensure fair and open MDB procurement processes, we obtained and analyzed information on MDB procurement guidelines and proposed revisions, Treasury’s review of MDB procurement policies, and MDBs’ internal management studies that highlighted procurement concerns. U.S. Firms’ Share of MDB Procurement Varied by Bank As shown in figure 1, the market share of U.S. firms relative to other industrialized countries varied by MDB. The relative ranking of U.S. firms in each MDB appears similar to their ranking in overall exports to World Bank developing countries.Compared to their major competitors, U.S. firms appeared to be as competitive in the MDB market as they were in traditional world exports. Increases in developing countries’ share of the MDB market may reduce the share of the MDB market for U.S. firms and other industrialized countries. Other obstacles U.S. government officials noted were businesses’ unfamiliarity with the process for competing for MDB contracts and the perception that the MDB procurement process is not open and competitive. To promote the export of U.S. goods and services, Commerce staff conduct a variety of activities, such as organizing and participating in outreach programs in the United States and overseas to increase U.S. firms’ awareness of the MDB market; hosting seminars at MDBs for U.S. firms to discuss their products with MDB staff; disseminating information on MDB projects and the procurement process electronically on the National Trade Data Bank (NTDB) and the Economic Bulletin Board; counseling U.S. firms on how to bid on MDB projects; and assisting, in cooperation with the U.S. executive directors’ offices and the Treasury, as appropriate, U.S. firms in addressing procurement problems and bid evaluation disputes. Commerce has not formally evaluated how its services affect U.S. participation rates at MDBs. It has required borrowers to use standard bidding documents for international competitive bidding.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed business opportunities for U.S. firms at multilateral development banks (MDB), focusing on: (1) the MDB market share held by U.S. firms and their major competitors; (2) obstacles U.S. businesses may face in competing for MDB projects; (3) services the U.S. government provides to help U.S. firms overcome competition obstacles; (4) the Department of the Treasury's efforts to ensure fair and open procurement processes for MDB-financed projects. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) from 1989 to 1994, U.S. firms were the largest single source of goods and services for MDB-financed projects; (2) the U.S. share of MDB procurements cannot be precisely determined due to data limitations; (3) U.S. MDB market shares vary by bank and by procurement categories and appear to parallel U.S. firms' ranking in overall exports to World Bank developing countries; (4) U.S. firms may have decreased MDB market shares in the future as developing countries become more competitive; (5) U.S. firms competing for MDB projects face certain obstacles including the lack of timely and specific project information, the cost of marketing products in the borrowing countries, their unfamiliarity with MDB competition processes, and the perception that MDB procurement processes are noncompetitive; (6) the Department of Commerce helps U.S. firms by providing information on MDB projects and outreach seminars on MDB opportunities and the process for bidding on MDB contracts; (7) the effect of Commerce's services on U.S. firms' bidding rates in the MDB market is unclear because Commerce has not formally evaluated its MDB services; and (8) Treasury has encouraged MDB to strengthen their procurement processes for MDB-funded projects and improve bank compliance with MDB procurement guidelines to ensure fair and more open competition, and to promote borrowing countries' use of standard bidding documents and wider dissemination of bidding opportunities.
gao_GAO-16-330	gao_GAO-16-330_0	NRC has relinquished regulatory authority for licensing and regulating certain radioactive material to 37 states that have entered into an agreement with NRC (agreement states). NRC and Agreement States Have Taken Several Steps to Better Control Radioactive Materials, but Not Requiring Tracking and Agency License Verification for Category 3 Quantities Leaves Vulnerabilities NRC and agreement states have taken several steps since 2007 to help ensure that radioactive materials licenses are granted only to legitimate organizations and that licensees can only obtain such materials in quantities allowed by their licenses, but have not taken some measures for better controlling category 3 quantities of radioactive materials. Further, including all category 3 materials in these systems could help address the risk that paper licenses issued by NRC and agreement states could be altered or counterfeited or that a licensee could obtain radioactive materials in quantities greater than what is allowed by their license. NRC also established a 14-point checklist to guide prelicensing site visits and developed a list of questions and activities related to the applicant’s business operations, facility, radiation safety operations, and personnel qualifications, to scrutinize the applicant and provide a basis for confidence that the applicant will use the radioactive material as specified in the license. (On-site security reviews are not conducted for applicants for category 3-5 licenses.) NRC Developed and Deployed Tracking, Licensing, and Verification Systems to Better Control Category 1 and 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material To help ensure that licensees can obtain radioactive materials only in quantities allowed by their licenses, NRC developed and deployed NSTS and WBL to track category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive materials and record specific license information, respectively. Our Testing of NRC and Agreement State Programs Showed Them to Be Effective in Some Cases but Not Others, Allowing Us to Obtain Commitments to Purchase a Dangerous Quantity of Radioactive Materials Our testing of NRC and agreement state programs showed guidance— including the suspension of the good faith presumption, screening criteria, and checklists, as well as inspectors’ application of scrutiny during prelicensing site visits—to be effective in two out of our three cases. In a third case, we were able to obtain a license for a category 3 quantity of radioactive materials and secure commitments to purchase a category 2 quantity of radioactive materials by aggregation by altering a paper license. In order to test the effectiveness of NRC’s revised guidance, screening criteria, checklists, and the prelicensing site visit, we established three fictitious companies; leased vacant space in an industrial or office park for each company (two in agreement states, one in an NRC state); and submitted an application to the appropriate NRC regional office or agreement state for a specific radioactive materials license to possess a high-level category 3 quantity source that was only slightly below the threshold for a category 2 quantity source. According to NRC officials, while the NRC prelicensing checklist does not require that a site have implemented all the requirements that apply to licensees, its purpose, among other things, is to establish a basis for confidence that radioactive material will be used as specified on the license being sought, and we made no attempt to improve or outfit the site to make it appear as if a legitimate business was operating there. However, notwithstanding NRC’s guidance to suspend the presumption of good faith, the official from the regulatory body accepted our assurances without scrutinizing key aspects of our fictitious business to the extent that the other regulatory bodies had. GAO Used License to Obtain Vendor Commitments to Sell a Dangerous Quantity of Radioactive Material Considered Attractive for Use in a Dirty Bomb Once we obtained a license, we were able to exploit the absence of a requirement to verify the legitimacy of category 3 licenses with the appropriate regulatory body and obtained commitments to acquire, by accumulating multiple category 3 sources, a category 2 quantity of radioactive material. Finally, according to NRC officials, NRC and agreement state working groups are currently developing and evaluating enhancements to (1) current prelicensing guidance overall, and (2) license verification and transfer requirements and prelicensing guidance for category 3 licenses in particular. NRC also developed revised guidance, screening criteria, and checklists covering all five IAEA categories of radioactive materials, and now directs regions and agreement states to conduct prelicensing site visits for all unknown applicants. Specifically, we recommend that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take the following three actions: Take the steps needed to include category 3 sources in the National Source Tracking System and add agreement state category 3 licenses to the Web-based Licensing System as quickly as reasonably possible. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix I, NRC neither explicitly agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but noted that the agency has formal evaluations underway considering all three recommendations.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2007, GAO reported weaknesses in NRC's licensing program as GAO investigators, after setting up fictitious companies, were able to obtain an NRC license and then alter it to obtain agreements to purchase devices containing, in aggregate, a dangerous quantity of radioactive materials. GAO was asked to review and assess the steps NRC and agreement states have taken to strengthen their licensing processes. This report examines (1) the steps NRC and agreement states have taken to ensure that radioactive materials licenses are granted only to legitimate organizations and licensees can obtain materials only in quantities allowed by their licenses; and (2) the results of covert vulnerability testing designed to test the effectiveness of these controls. GAO reviewed relevant guidance documents, regulations, and analyses of orders, and interviewed NRC and state officials. GAO also established three fictitious businesses and applied for a radioactive materials license for each. What GAO Found The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the 37 states it permits to grant licenses for radioactive materials—called agreement states—have taken several steps since 2007 to help ensure that licenses are granted only to legitimate organizations and that licensees can only obtain such materials in quantities allowed by their licenses. However, NRC and agreement states have not taken some measures to better control some dangerous quantities of radioactive materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency established a system ranking quantities of certain radioactive materials into five categories based on their potential to harm human health, with, in descending order of danger, categories 1, 2, and 3 all considered dangerous. NRC developed revised guidance, screening criteria, and a checklist, among other things, and now directs NRC regions and agreement states to conduct prelicensing site visits—focusing on questions related to the applicant's business operations, facility, radiation safety operations, and personnel qualifications for all unknown applicants. NRC, however, has not strengthened controls for all categories of radioactive material considered dangerous. Unlike its process for applicants for category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive materials, for category 3 applicants NRC does not review specific security measures before a license is issued. NRC has also developed and deployed the National Source Tracking System (NSTS), the Web-based Licensing System (WBL), and the License Verification System to better control some materials. However, these systems focus on more dangerous category 1 and 2 quantities but not category 3 quantities. Further, NRC does not specifically require that the validity of category 3 licenses be verified by the seller with NRC or the agreement states—creating risks that licenses could be counterfeited or that licensees could obtain radioactive materials in quantities greater than what is allowed by their licenses. GAO's covert testing of NRC requirements showed them to be effective in two out of our three cases; in a third case, GAO was able to obtain a license and secure commitments to purchase, by accumulating multiple category 3 quantities of materials, a category 2 quantity of a radioactive material considered attractive for use in a “dirty bomb”—which uses explosives to disperse radioactive material. To test NRC's prelicensing processes, GAO established three fictitious companies, leased vacant space for each company (two in agreement states, one in an NRC state), and submitted an application to the appropriate agreement state or NRC office for a license to possess a category 3 source only slightly below the threshold for category 2. GAO made no attempt to outfit the site to make it appear as if a legitimate business was operating there. In the two cases where GAO was unable to obtain a license, the scrutiny provided by NRC or agreement state (regulatory body) officials during the prelicensing site visit led to the license not being granted. In the third case, the official from the regulatory body accepted GAO's assurances without scrutinizing key aspects of the fictitious business, which led to a license being obtained. NRC is currently taking corrective actions to provide training to NRC and agreement state officials to emphasize greater scrutiny in conducting prelicensing site visits. According to NRC officials, NRC and agreement state working groups are currently developing and evaluating enhancements to (1) prelicensing guidance overall and (2) license verification and transfer requirements for category 3 licenses. What GAO Recommends GAO is making three recommendations to NRC, including that NRC (1) take steps to include category 3 quantities of radioactive materials in NSTS and WBL, and (2) require that transferors of category 3 quantities of radioactive materials confirm the validity of licenses with regulators before selling or transferring these materials. GAO provided a draft of this report to NRC for comment. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, but noted that the agency has formal evaluations underway considering all three recommendations.
gao_GAO-01-724	gao_GAO-01-724_0	Because invasive species encompass plants, animals, and microbes, the problems they cause vary. Federal Rapid Response to Invasive Species That Threaten Natural Areas Has Been Minimal Invasive species that threaten agricultural crops or livestock are far more likely to elicit a rapid response than those affecting mainly natural areas. The need to deal with invasive species was succinctly summarized by a Bureau of Land Management official, who said “you can pay now or later, but you will eventually pay sometime.” Lack of a National System Is a Major Obstacle to Rapid Response A major obstacle to rapid response is that there is no national system that addresses all types of invasive species infestations—those affecting aquatic areas, rangelands, and forests as well as crops and livestock. Other obstacles that we identified in this report include the need for (1) additional detection systems; (2) improved partnerships among federal, state, and local agencies; and (3) enhanced technologies for eradicating invasive species. It recommends that by July 2003, the Council develop a program of coordinated rapid response to new invasions of natural and agricultural areas and pursue increases in discretionary efforts to support the program. We believe that if the recommendations are properly implemented, they will go a long way toward developing a systematic national approach toward rapid response. Management Plan’s Recommendations on Rapid Response The Invasive Species Council’s management plan contains three recommendations that specifically address rapid response.	What GAO Found Invasive species--harmful, nonnative plants, animals, and microorganisms--are widespread throughout the United States, causing billions of dollars of damage annually to crops, rangelands, and waterways. An important part of pest control is quick action to eradicate or contain a potentially damaging invasive species. Federal rapid response to invasive species varies: species that threaten agricultural crops or livestock are far more likely to elicit a rapid response than those primarily affecting forestry or other natural areas, including rangelands and water areas. A major obstacle to rapid response is the lack of a national system to address invasive species. Other obstacles to rapid response include the need for additional detection systems to identify new species; improved partnerships among federal, state, and local agencies; and better technologies to eradicate invasive species. The Invasive Species Council's Management Plan makes several recommendations for improving rapid response, including developing a program of coordinated rapid response and pursuing increases in discretionary spending to support the program. A concerted effort to improve the rapid response is clearly needed. If properly implemented, the Council's recommendations will go a long way toward developing a national system to address this pressing need.
gao_GAO-14-836	gao_GAO-14-836_0	For example, the federal government may produce and sell electricity generated at federally- owned facilities and produce reports and information on energy markets, among other things. For example, as one of the largest research agencies in the federal government, DOE spends billions of dollars every year on R&D to support its diverse missions, including advancing scientific research and technology development and ensuring efficient and secure energy, among other things. Major Factors Influencing U.S. Production and Consumption of Fossil Energy According to the studies and reports we reviewed, several major factors influenced U.S. production and consumption of fossil energy from 2000 through 2013: Advances in drilling technologies enabled economic production of natural gas from shale and other tight formations. These advances led to increases in domestic production of natural gas starting around 2008 and contributed to declines in domestic prices of natural gas starting around 2009. Due in part to lower prices of natural gas, the use of coal for electricity generation decreased in recent years as utilities switched to natural gas. Domestic coal production decreased in recent years; however, coal exports increased as domestic consumption declined faster than domestic production. Federal activities also may have influenced this trend, generally by providing incentives or disincentives for the production and consumption of nuclear energy. Major Factors Influencing U.S. Production and Consumption of Renewable Energy According to the studies and reports we reviewed, several major factors influenced U.S. production and consumption of renewable energy— particularly from ethanol, wind energy, and solar energy—from 2000 through 2013: Federal tax credits for ethanol and federal policies requiring the use of ethanol in transportation fuels were major factors influencing an 8-fold increase in the production and consumption of ethanol from 2000 through 2013. State policies requiring the use of renewable energy in electricity production, as well as federal activities such as outlays and tax credits for renewable energy producers, were major factors influencing production and consumption of electricity from wind and solar energy. These factors supported a 30-fold increase in production and consumption of wind energy from 2000 through 2013 and a 19-fold increase in the production and consumption of solar energy. Other Federal Activities Influencing Aspects of U.S. Energy Production and Consumption According to the studies and reports we reviewed, other federal activities were not targeted specifically at fossil, nuclear, or renewable energy production and consumption but may have influenced aspects of U.S. energy production and consumption from 2000 through 2013. DOE, Treasury, and USDA provided technical or clarifying comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. It also provides information on other federal activities that may have influenced aspects of U.S. energy production and consumption from 2000 through 2013 but were not targeted at a specific energy source, as well as information on federal support for research and development (R&D). To provide information on the major factors, including federal activities, that influenced energy production and consumption levels from 2000 through 2013; to provide information on other federal activities that may have influenced U.S. energy production and consumption from 2000 through 2013 but were not targeted at a specific energy source; and to provide information on federal R&D, we performed the following steps: We reviewed information from our prior work related to the production and consumption of crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, coal, nuclear energy, ethanol, wind energy, solar energy, energy efficiency, electricity transmission, and federal R&D. In addition, we did not examine permitting issues on federal lands, including issues related to infrastructure and oil and gas development. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) report revenue loss estimates for energy- related tax expenditures. For example, the federal government assumed financial risks associated with potential cleanup costs for some oil spills, and the federal government acquired billions of dollars worth of crude oil to hold in reserve in case of supply disruptions, as discussed below: Cleanup costs for oil spills. Stockpiling crude oil. Some of these activities provided an incentive to produce and consume nuclear energy, while others provided a disincentive for its production and consumption. This uncertainty may have provided a disincentive for some nuclear plant operators to stay in the market or expand capacity because storing nuclear waste is expensive. In addition, since the 1970s, the federal government has established minimum efficiency standards requiring that certain products, such as residential appliances, commercial equipment, and lighting products, meet specified energy efficiency standards before they can be sold in the United States. Five federal utilities—four power marketing administrations and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)— provide electricity and transmission services to customers in their regions.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal energy policy since the 1970s has focused primarily on ensuring a secure supply of energy while protecting the environment. The federal government supports and intervenes in U.S. energy production and consumption in various ways, such as providing tax incentives, grants, and other support to promote domestic production of energy, as well as setting standards and requirements. GAO was asked to provide information on federal activities and their influence on U.S. energy production and consumption over the past decade. This report provides information on U.S. production and consumption of fossil, nuclear, and renewable energy from 2000 through 2013 and major factors, including federal activities, that influenced energy production and consumption levels. It also provides information on other federal activities that may have influenced aspects of U.S. energy production and consumption from 2000 through 2013 but were not targeted at a specific energy source, as well as information on federal research and development. GAO analyzed DOE historical data on energy production and consumption, reviewed studies and reports from federal agencies and governmental organizations on federal energy-related activities, and analyzed data on federal spending programs and tax incentives, among other things. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOE, the Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. What GAO Found According to the studies and reports GAO reviewed, several major factors, including federal activities, influenced U.S. production and consumption of fossil, nuclear, and renewable energy from 2000 through 2013. Examples of these factors include the following: Fossil energy. Advances in drilling technologies enabled economic production of natural gas and crude oil from shale and similar geological formations. These advances led to increases in domestic production of natural gas and crude oil beginning around 2008 and contributed to declines in domestic prices of natural gas, as well as lower prices for crude oil in some regions of the United States. Some federal activities also may have influenced these trends. For example, the federal government limited oil producers' liability associated with some oil spills, lowering the producers' costs for liability insurance. In addition, the federal government provided tax incentives encouraging production for oil and gas producers, resulting in billions of dollars in estimated federal revenue losses. Moreover, partly because of lower natural gas prices, domestic coal production decreased in recent years as utilities switched from coal to natural gas for electricity generation. Nuclear energy. Declining prices for a competing energy source—natural gas—may have led to decreases in the production and consumption of nuclear energy in recent years. Federal activities may have also influenced this trend. For example, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced plans to terminate its work to license a disposal facility for certain nuclear power plant waste in 2009, creating uncertainty about how this waste would be managed. This uncertainty may have provided a disincentive for some nuclear power operators to stay in the market or expand capacity because of the cost of storing nuclear waste. Renewable energy. Federal tax credits for ethanol and federal policies requiring the use of ethanol in transportation fuels were major factors influencing an 8-fold increase in the production and consumption of ethanol from 2000 to 2013. In addition, state policies requiring the use of renewable energy in electricity production, as well as federal outlays and tax credits for renewable energy producers, were major factors influencing a 30-fold increase and a 19-fold increase in production and consumption of electricity from wind and solar energy, respectively, from 2000 to 2013. According to the studies and reports GAO reviewed, other federal activities may have influenced aspects of U.S. energy production and consumption from 2000 through 2013 but were not targeted at a specific energy source. For example, the federal government strengthened energy efficiency standards for vehicle fuel economy and consumer products such as appliances and lighting, provided electricity and transmission services to customers through its power marketing administrations and the Tennessee Valley Authority, and spent billions of dollars helping low-income households cover heating and cooling costs. In addition, the federal government supported research and development targeting a wide range of energy-related technologies at government-owned laboratories and through funding to universities and other research entities.
gao_GAO-02-98	gao_GAO-02-98_0	The manning initiative directed all Army units to be staffed at 100 percent of their authorized personnel by numbers, grades, and skills—and thereafter to maintain those staffing levels—so that they have the personnel needed for wartime missions. Although the personnel levels for all five divisions are at or near 100 percent of the enlisted personnel that they are authorized, each has some shortages in grades and skills. 4) by May 2001. Division's Reported Equipment Readiness High, but Some Shortages and Maintenance Problems Exist On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001, the five divisions reported the amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that equipment was in a high state of readiness, indicating that the five divisions expected to be able to perform their combat missions. His brigade commander, however, maintained that the brigade, as a whole, would be able to carry out its mission with the equipment on hand and equipment prepositioned in-theater. In March 1998 we testified that sustained increases in peacekeeping operations for three of the five divisions exacerbated personnel shortfalls and degraded unit readiness and training within those divisions.However, during this review, Army officials found it difficult to quantify the effects of peacekeeping operations, but they did offer several observations.	What GAO Found In recent years, GAO has testified that personnel shortages, assignment priorities, and frequent peacekeeping deployments were undermining the combat readiness of the Army's five later-deploying divisions. In 2001, GAO reported on the Army Chief of Staff's manning initiative of October 1999, which seeks to ensure that all active Army units are assigned the numbers, grades, and skills needed to carry out wartime missions. Since then, terrorists have attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the Bush administration has formulated a new military strategy. These developments may change how, when, and where these divisions will be used--as seen in the deployment of soldiers from the 40th Infantry Division in Operation Enduring Freedom. As of June 2001 the five divisions reported they were ready and able to perform all or most of their combat missions. Enlisted personnel levels were at or near 100 percent of their authorization compared with 93 percent in March 1998. However, staffing imbalances persist for some combat support skills. Each division met its training requirements for combat missions. The amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that equipment indicated that the five divisions would be able to perform their combat missions. Army officials found it difficult to quantify the varied effects of peacekeeping operations on the five divisions' readiness.
gao_GAO-09-800T	gao_GAO-09-800T_0	According to Our National Survey, Most Consumers Are Satisfied with Their Wireless Phone Service, but Some Have Experienced Problems According to our survey results, overall, wireless phone service consumers are satisfied with the service they receive. Stakeholders we interviewed identified a number of areas in which consumers have reported problems with their wireless phone service in recent years. Based on our survey results, we estimate that most wireless phone users are satisfied with these five specific aspects of service; however, the percentages of those very or somewhat dissatisfied range from about 9 to 14 percent, depending on the specific aspect of service (see table 2). We also estimate that 85 percent of wireless phone users are very or somewhat satisfied with call quality, while the percentages of those very or somewhat satisfied with billing, contract terms, carrier’s explanation of key aspects of service at the point of sale, and customer service range from about 70 to 76 percent. Other results of the survey suggest that some wireless phone consumers have recently experienced problems with billing, certain contract terms, and customer service since the beginning of 2008. For example, we estimate that during this time about 34 percent of wireless phone users responsible for paying for their service received unexpected charges, and about 31 percent had difficulty understanding their bill at least some of the time. Further, among wireless users who wanted to switch carriers during this time but did not do so, we estimate that 42 percent did not switch because they did not want to pay an early termination fee. In response to the areas of consumer concern noted above, wireless carriers have taken a number of actions in recent years. FCC Assists Consumers with Wireless Complaints but Lacks Clear Goals and Outcome Measures for These Efforts FCC assists wireless consumers by handling thousands of their informal complaints each year, but consumers may lack awareness of this process and its intended outcomes. FCC has a process to receive consumers’ complaints and forward them to carriers for a response. As a consequence, FCC’s effectiveness in assisting wireless consumers with complaints is unclear and consumers may not understand what to expect from FCC’s complaint process. According to FCC officials, the agency informs consumers they may complain to FCC about problems with their wireless service or other telecommunications services by providing information on how to complain to the agency on its Web site and in fact sheets that are distributed to consumers through its Web site and other methods. Once FCC receives a response from the carrier, the agency reviews the response, and if FCC determines the response has addressed the consumer’s complaint, marks the complaint as closed. Since, based on our survey results, we estimate that about 21 percent of wireless phone users who contacted their carriers’ customer service were dissatisfied with how their carriers addressed their concerns, FCC’s efforts to handle complaints are an important means by which consumers may be able to get assistance in resolving their problems. FCC Lacks Clear Goals and Measures for Its Complaint Handling Efforts FCC has not articulated goals that clearly identify intended outcomes for its efforts to address wireless consumer complaints and lacks measures to demonstrate how well it is achieving intended outcomes. FCC officials told us that they do not measure customer experience with the agency’s call centers and Web sites, but sometimes receive anecdotal information from customers about their experiences. Thus, it is not clear if the intended outcome of FCC’s complaint handling efforts is resolving consumer problems, fostering communication between consumers and carriers, or both. We also expect to make recommendations at that time. Our aim was to produce nationally representative estimates of adult wireless phone service users’ (1) satisfaction with wireless service overall and with specific aspects of service, including billing, terms of service, carriers’ explanation of key aspects of service, call quality and coverage, and customer service; (2) frequency of problems with call quality and billing; (3) desire to switch carriers and barriers to switching; and (4) knowledge of where to complain about problems. To identify the type and nature of problems consumers have experienced in recent years with their wireless phone service, we interviewed officials from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), consumer organizations, national organizations that represent state agency officials, and state agency officials from three selected states—California, Nebraska, and West Virginia—representing utility commissions, offices of consumer advocates, and offices of attorneys general.	Why GAO Did This Study The use of wireless phone service in the United States has risen dramatically over the last 20 years, with an estimated 270 million subscribers as of December 2008. Americans increasingly rely on wireless phones as their primary or sole means of telephone communication. Concerns have been raised in recent years about the quality of this service, including specific concerns about billing and carriers' contract terms, such as fees charged for terminating service before the end of a contract period. Under federal law, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has flexibility in regulating wireless phone service carriers. FCC's rules include procedures for addressing consumer complaints. This testimony provides preliminary information on (1) consumers' current satisfaction with wireless phone service and problems consumers have experienced with this service (2) FCC's efforts to assist wireless consumers with complaints. The statement is based on related ongoing work that GAO is conducting for this committee and plans to report on later this year. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed 1,143 adult wireless phone users from a nationally representative, randomly selected sample and interviewed and analyzed documents obtained from FCC and various stakeholder organizations representing consumers, state agencies and officials, and industry. What GAO Found On the basisof its national survey of adult wireless phone users, GAO estimates that overall, 84 percent of users are very or somewhat satisfied with their wireless phone service. Stakeholders GAO interviewed cited billing, terms of the service contract, carriers' explanation of their service at the point of sale, call quality, and customer service as key aspects of service in which consumers have experienced problems with wireless phone service in recent years. GAO's survey results indicate that while most wireless phone users are very or somewhat satisfied with each of these key aspects of wireless phone service, the percentages of those very or somewhat dissatisfied with these specific aspects ranged from about 9 to 14 percent. GAO's survey results also indicate that some wireless phone service consumers have experienced problems with billing, certain contract terms, and customer service. For example, GAO estimates that about a third of users responsible for paying their bills had problems understanding their bills or had unexpected charges at least some of the time. Additionally, GAO estimates fees for the early termination of a contract were a problem for about 42 percent of users who wanted to switch services but did not, and that about 21 percent of users who contacted customer service with a specific problem were dissatisfied with their carriers' efforts to address the problem. In response to the types of consumer problems noted above, wireless carriers have taken some actions, such as prorating early termination fees, offering noncontract service options, and spending billions of dollars each year on wireless infrastructure, which can improve call quality. FCC assists wireless consumers by handling thousands of their complaints about carriers' service each year, but consumers may lack awareness of this process and its intended outcomes. FCC reviews consumer complaints submitted through its call centers and Web site, forwards complaints to carriers for response, reviews the carriers' responses, and closes complaints when it finds the responses sufficient. While FCC informs consumers through its Web site and fact sheets that they may submit complaints to it, GAO's survey results suggest that most consumers do not know they can do so and many do not know where they could complain. FCC has not articulated goals that clearly identify intended outcomes of its efforts to address consumer complaints and lacks measures to demonstrate how well it is achieving intended outcomes. For example, FCC has a goal to "improve customer experience" with its call centers and Web site, through which consumers submit complaints, but lacks measures of customer experience. Further, it is not clear if the intended outcome of FCC's complaint handling efforts is resolving consumer problems or fostering communication between consumers and carriers. Consequently, consumers may not understand what to expect from FCC's complaint process, and the effectiveness of FCC's efforts to assist consumers with complaints is unclear. GAO plans to complete its ongoing work in the fall, and expects to make recommendations at that time.
gao_GAO-10-418	gao_GAO-10-418_0	They have large, low-pressure tires; straddle seats; and handlebars for steering control. ATVs Have Recreational, Occupational, and Transportation Uses ATVs are primarily used for recreational purposes; however, ATVs are used for occupations such as farming; for government functions, such as policing and patrolling public lands; and for transportation in remote areas. Although we found little information that quantified the uses of ATVs and the advantages of their use, a survey of owners conducted by the Motorcycle Industry Council in 2008—according to Commission staff, the only recent national survey of ATV owners—indicated that 79 percent use their ATVs recreationally and that the most common recreational activities were pleasure riding and trail riding. 7.) 7.) ATV Fatalities and Injuries Have Increased Substantially during the Last Decade When the Number in Use Nearly Tripled ATV fatalities and injuries have increased substantially since 1999, but not as rapidly as the number of four-wheeled ATVs in use, which nearly tripled. In 2007, the most recent year for which the Commission staff estimated the number of fatalities, an estimated 816 fatalities occurred, compared with 534 in 1999, an increase of 53 percent (an average of about 6 percent per year). According to Commission staff estimates, from 1999 through 2005—the most recent period for which fatality estimates are complete—the risk decreased from 1.4 deaths per 10,000 four-wheeled ATVs in use to 1.1 deaths per 10,000 ATVs in use, or 21 percent. In 2008, an estimated 134,900 nonfatal ATV-related injuries were treated in emergency rooms, compared with 81,800 in 1999, an increase of 65 percent. According to the staff, the decrease could have been influenced by one or more of the following factors: (1) exposure, as evidenced by the number of people who rode ATVs and the amount of time that was spent riding, considering that recreational activities often are reduced in times of recession; (2) the state of the ATV market in particular (i.e., sales decreased dramatically in 2008, likely because of the economic recession); (3) legislative and regulatory activities (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, for example, may have led to a reduction in the availability of imported and youth-sized ATVs beginning in late 2008 and in a relative increase in the availability of mechanically safer vehicles); and (4) information and education activities at both national and local levels (i.e., increased safety awareness may have led to increased safety practices while riding ATVs). Although the absolute number of injuries increased from 1999 through 2007, as the number of ATVs in use increased, the estimated risk of an emergency room-treated injury per 10,000 four-wheeled ATVs in use decreased from 193 injuries per 10,000 four-wheeled ATVs in use in 1999 to 129.7 injuries in 2008, or 33 percent. However, an industry association official said that crashes involving children occur mainly when they are riding adult-sized models at higher speeds without parental supervision. Commission Staff Estimated Economic Costs of ATV Crashes over $22 Billion in 2007 Commission staff estimated that the costs of ATV crashes have doubled in the last decade. Various Organizations Offer Training and Promote Safe Riding Practices Safety stakeholders said that the number and severity of ATV injuries could be reduced through training and by wearing proper equipment such as helmets. State governments are also involved in promoting ATV safety. Sales of ATVs for use by children are covered by provisions in the plans under which manufacturers and distributors agree to (1) refrain from recommending, marketing, or selling adult-sized ATVs for use by children younger than 16 years old and (2) monitor their dealers to check, using independent investigators, whether dealers are willing to sell adult- sized ATVs for use by children and take action against dealers who disregard the standard’s operator age recommendations. Moreover, details about how manufacturers and distributors will use their “best efforts” to prevent the sale of adult-sized ATVs by their dealers vary from company to company. Fatalities and injuries involving children have been a significant problem over the last decade, with children accounting for about one-fifth of fatalities and one-third of injuries. To identify how ATVs are used and the advantages of their use, we interviewed industry officials, manufacturers, a dealer, and users, such as advocacy groups, trail managers, and industry groups and government agencies that use ATVs at work.	Why GAO Did This Study All-terrain vehicles (ATV), which are off-road motorized vehicles, usually with four tires, a straddle seat for the operator, and handlebars for steering control, have become increasingly popular. However, ATV fatalities and injuries have increased over the last decade and are a matter of concern to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (Commission), which oversees ATV safety, and to others. Many ATV crashes involving children occur when they are riding adult-sized ATVs. Manufacturers and distributors have agreed to use their best efforts to prevent their dealers from selling adult-sized ATVs for use by children under the age of 16. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act requires GAO to report on (1) how ATVs are used and the advantages of their use and (2) the nature, extent, and costs of ATV crashes. GAO addressed these topics by reviewing ATV use and crash data and by discussing these issues with Commission staff, industry officials, user groups, and safety stakeholders. What GAO Found ATVs are mainly used for recreation, but are also used in occupations such as farming and policing. According to a 2008 industry survey of ATV owners, 79 percent use them for recreation and 21 percent use them for work or chores. ATVs are also used as primary transportation in some remote communities, such as in parts of Alaska. GAO found little information that quantified the advantages of ATV use. However, users surveyed in 2008 said that riding provides them with personal enjoyment, allowing them, for example, to view nature and spend time with their families. In addition, trail managers and local business officials in areas of the country where trails have been established, such as West Virginia, said the surrounding communities have benefited economically from spending by ATV riders. Injuries and fatalities increased substantially during the last decade, but not as rapidly as the number of ATVs in use, which nearly tripled. According to Commission staff, an estimated 816 fatalities occurred in 2007-- the agency's most recent annual estimate--compared with 534 in 1999, a 53 percent increase. However, from 1999 through 2005--the most recent period for which fatality estimates are complete--the risk decreased from 1.4 deaths per 10,000 four-wheeled ATVs in use to 1.1 deaths per 10,000 ATVs in use, or 21 percent. Regarding injuries, an estimated 134,900 people were treated in emergency rooms for ATV-related injuries in 2008, compared with about 81,800 in 1999, a 65 percent increase. However, the estimated risk of an emergency room-treated injury per 10,000 four-wheeled ATVs in use decreased from 193 injuries per 10,000 four-wheeled ATVs in use to 129.7 injuries in 2008, or 33 percent. About one-fifth of the deaths and about one-third of the injuries involved children. Crashes involving children frequently occurred when they rode adult-sized ATVs, which are more difficult for them to handle. Manufacturers and distributors have agreed to use their best efforts to prevent their dealers from selling adult-sized ATVs for use by children, but recent GAO undercover checks of selected dealers in four states indicated that 7 of 10 were willing to sell an adult-sized ATV for use by children. Commission staff suspended similar checks in early 2008 because of higher priorities. Commission staff have estimated that the costs of ATV injuries and fatalities more than doubled during the last decade from about $10.7 billion in 1999 to $22.3 billion in 2007 (in 2009 dollars). Safety stakeholders, including industry officials, said that ATV injuries could be reduced through training and wearing proper equipment such as helmets.
gao_HEHS-97-202	gao_HEHS-97-202_0	Laboratory Test Rates Vary Markedly for Patients in Different Dialysis Facilities Our examination of 766 freestanding facilities showed that, despite the similarity of their patient populations, patients of some facilities received on average many more laboratory tests per year than others. Test Rate Disparities Indicate Inappropriate Levels of Test Ordering The large differences in the rates of tests ordered suggest that there may be both excessive use, with some patients receiving tests too often or receiving tests that may not be necessary at all, and underuse, with patients receiving too few tests to ensure appropriate monitoring of their condition. The experts reviewed usage rates for 34 individual laboratory tests from two data samples and questioned the usage rates for 20 tests. In our data samples, one of these tests was provided to 5 percent of the patients in the top 100 facilities about 8 times a year, and the other test was provided to 3 percent of the patients about 10 times a year. Financial Incentives and Other Physician-Related Factors May Explain Wide Variation in Test Rates Financial incentives as well as lack of knowledge and differences in medical practices may help explain the wide variation we found in the rates of laboratory tests provided. As a result, neither knows if Medicare is paying for unnecessary tests for patients who receive numerous tests or if patients who receive few tests are receiving high-quality treatment. To replicate such an analysis, HCFA could examine contractor data for laboratory claims. These claims identify the ordering (or referring) physician. In addition, if the laboratory actually performs the tests a physician orders, Medicare will pay for unnecessary tests because the laboratory is only complying with the physicians’ orders. Although the data are available, HCFA does not examine them in a way that would reveal relative test usage rates. Matter for Congressional Consideration The Congress may wish to consider making the ordering physician liable for the recovery of payments made to laboratories when the physician continues to order tests that are not medically necessary or are provided too frequently, after having been notified of a pattern of such inappropriately high testing rates. Recommendation to the Administrator of HCFA We recommend that, to assist contractors in their efforts to determine the appropriateness of laboratory tests ordered for Medicare dialysis patients, the HCFA Administrator profile physicians ordering laboratory tests for dialysis patients and notify the contractors of the providers whose test order rates are aberrant. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to determine whether patients of some dialysis facilities receive many more than the average number of laboratory tests and, if so, to determine what the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) should do to help ensure that dialysis patients receive only necessary tests. Medicare paid $35.9 million for laboratory tests for these patients in 1994 and $40.6 million in 1995. Because 12 of these tests are included in the bundle, it was ordered for an unlikely number of patients. No value for dialysis patients. Provided to an implausibly large proportion of patient population.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the anomalous patterns of test rates among dialysis patients, focusing on: (1) the extent to which the rates for providing laboratory tests to Medicare patients varied among dialysis facilities; (2) the appropriateness of these rates; (3) reasons for the variation; and (4) the adequacy of the reviews that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the agency administering Medicare, performs to examine laboratory test claims. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) despite the large volume of laboratory services provided to end stage renal disease (ESRD) patients, HCFA does not scrutinize the level of laboratory tests ordered for patients receiving dialysis; (2) GAO's study in 1994 showed that clinically similar patients received laboratory tests at widely disparate rates; (3) this variation suggests that Medicare may be paying for an excessive number of tests or that patients may not be receiving the tests needed to adequately monitor their condition; (4) renal disease experts GAO consulted found questionable usage rates for 20 of 34 individual laboratory tests identified in two data samples; (5) they determined that many of these tests provided to patients at 100 facilities with the highest average number of tests ordered per patient were either provided too often or ordered for an implausibly large proportion of patients; (6) low rates of laboratory tests for patients of some facilities were also found; (7) the nature of fee-for-service reimbursement does not give physicians adequate incentives to be judicious in ordering tests; (8) the likelihood of excessive testing may increase when a company owns both a dialysis facility and a laboratory and includes unnecessary tests in standing orders; (9) these and other physician-related factors, such as the physician's knowledge of the latest testing techniques and medical practice differences, help explain the wide variation in laboratory test rates; (10) neither HCFA nor its claims-processing contractors analyze claims data that would reveal the dramatic variation in test rates found in GAO's study; (11) neither knows if Medicare is paying for unnecessary tests for some patients or if other patients receive too few tests to ensure high-quality treatment; (12) because claims for tests are submitted by the laboratories performing the tests, contractors' reviews of claims data would likely identify the laboratories and not the test rate patterns found when the data are arrayed by the patient's ordering physician or dialysis facility; (13) without knowledge of these patterns, HCFA has no indication of whether laboratory claims made on behalf of ESRD patients receiving dialysis are for an appropriate level of tests; and (14) without a process for identifying the physicians who order tests for dialysis patients and for notifying contractors of providers whose test order rates are aberrant, HCFA is unable to identify physicians who order unneeded or inadequate numbers of tests.
gao_GAO-07-1259T	gao_GAO-07-1259T_0	The regulations also state that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for overseeing and directing the operations of all of the FEBs consistent with the law and with the directives of the President. We selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinated the greatest number of federal employees or had recent emergency management experience. We also interviewed OPM and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C., and two FEMA regional directors based in Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas. FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and Responsibilities Are Being Developed as a Core Function of the Boards To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system, OPM and the boards are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will include a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety. According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also includes coordination activities. Despite the varying perspectives on an expanded emergency support role for the FEBs, many of the executive directors or chairs from the boards cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. FEBs’ Unique Role in the Local Federal Community Can Aid in Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response As mentioned previously, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents different concerns than localized natural disasters, may make the FEBs a valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. The distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each community it affects. Many of the FEBs have cultivated relationships within their federal, state, and local governments and their metropolitan area community organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. Through activities such as hosting emergency preparedness training or through participation in certain committees, some of the FEBs have established relationships with emergency management officials, first responders, and health officials in their communities. In terms of current pandemic planning, some of the FEBs are already building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza training and exercises. The communications function of the boards is also a key part of their emergency support activities and could be an important asset for pandemic preparedness and response. The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support Services The FEBs face key challenges in carrying out their emergency support role. Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and response. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. In addition, varying FEB capabilities test the boards’ ability to provide consistent levels of emergency support services across the country. This has resulted in inconsistent funding for the FEBs nationwide, and the levels of support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses, personnel, and equipment vary considerably. The FEBs’ dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for their resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and committing to provide emergency support services. To address these challenges, our report recommended that OPM work with FEMA to develop a memorandum of understanding, or some similar mechanism, that formally defines the FEB role in emergency planning and response. Finally, we recommended that OPM continue its efforts to establish measures and accountability for the FEBs’ emergency support responsibilities and develop a proposal for an alternative to the current voluntary contribution mechanism that would address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. OPM said it is building a business case through which to address the resources FEBs need to continue operations and that institutionalized relationships with partners such as FEMA can help address funding issues.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal executive boards (FEB) bring together federal agency and community leaders in major metropolitan areas outside Washington, D.C., to discuss issues of common interest, including pandemic influenza. This testimony addresses the FEBs' emergency support roles and responsibilities, their potential role in pandemic influenza preparedness, and some of the key challenges they face in providing emergency support services. The issues discussed in the testimony are based on the GAO report, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to Emergency Operations (GAO-07- 515, May 2007). GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for review because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or had recent emergency management experience. In this report, GAO recommended that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to formally define the FEBs' role in emergency planning and response. In completing the FEB strategic plan, OPM should also establish accountability for the boards' emergency support activities and develop a proposal to address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. While not commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM said it is building a business case through which to address the resources FEBs need to continue operations. What GAO Found Located in 28 cities with a large federal presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to strengthen federal management practices and improve intergovernmental relations. The FEBs bring together the federal agency leaders in their service areas and have a long history of establishing and maintaining communications links, coordinating intergovernmental activities, identifying common ground, and building cooperative relationships. The boards also partner with community organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. OPM, which provides direction to the FEBs, and the boards have designated emergency preparedness, security, and safety as an FEB core function and are continuing to work on a strategic plan that will include a common set of performance standards for their emergency support activities. Although not all FEB representatives agreed that the boards should play an expanded role in emergency service support, many of the FEB representatives cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. As one of their emergency support activities, the FEBs and FEMA, often working with the General Services Administration, host emergency planning exercises and training for federal agencies in the field. The FEBs' emergency support role with its regional focus may make the boards a valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. The distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each community it affects. As a natural outgrowth of their general civic activities and through activities such as hosting emergency preparedness training, some of the boards have established relationships with, for example, federal, state, and local governments; emergency management officials; first responders; and health officials in their communities. Some of the FEBs are already building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza training and exercises. The communications function of the FEBs is also a key part of their emergency support activities and could be an important asset for pandemic preparedness and response. The FEBs, however, face key challenges in providing emergency support, and these interrelated issues limit the capacity of the FEBs to provide a consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and response. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans, which may contribute to federal agency officials being unfamiliar with their capabilities. In addition, with no congressional appropriations, the FEBs depend on host agencies and other member agencies for their resources. This has resulted in inconsistent funding for the FEBs nationwide and creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and committing to provide emergency support services.
gao_GAO-15-182	gao_GAO-15-182_0	TWF Construction Project The TWF project is to replace NNSA’s existing capabilities that reside at Area G for storage, characterization, and certification of newly generated TRU waste at LANL. GAO’s Cost Guide Drawing from federal cost-estimating organizations and industry, the Cost Guide provides best practices about the processes, procedures, and practices needed for ensuring development of high-quality—that is, reliable cost estimates.characteristics of a high-quality, reliable cost estimate: The Cost Guide identifies the following four Comprehensive when it accounts for all life-cycle costs associated with a project, is based on a completely defined and technically reasonable plan, and it contains a cost estimating structure in sufficient detail to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double- counted; Well-documented when supporting documentation explains the process, sources, and methods used to create the estimate and contains the underlying data used to develop the estimate; Accurate when it is not overly conservative or too optimistic and is based on an assessment of the costs most likely to be incurred; and Credible when a sensitivity analysis has been conducted, the level of confidence associated with the point estimate has been identified through the use of risk and uncertainty analysis, and the point estimate has been cross-checked with an independent cost estimate (ICE). NNSA Has Not Met Its Cost Estimates to Complete the TRU Waste Removal Project at LANL NNSA’s TRU waste removal project at LANL did not meet its 2006 cost estimate and is not expected to meet the 2009 cost estimate established for the completion of the project. As of the end of fiscal year 2014, NNSA had spent about $931 million on the project, which exceeded the 2006 cost estimate of $729 million by $202 million (see fig. According to NNSA officials, they could not formally approve the 2009 estimate because it included a 2018 estimated completion date for the TRU waste removal project, which conflicted with the required 2015 closure date established in the Consent Order. For example, the funding assumptions in the new estimate may already be invalid. More specifically, NNSA’s cost estimate—which consisted of separate cost estimates for completing construction and for operations and maintenance, as the TWF’s life-cycle costs—partially reflected each of the four characteristics of a reliable estimate (comprehensive, well- documented, accurate, and credible) as established by best practices. In contrast, NNSA did not document the approach (data sources and methodologies) used to develop the operations and maintenance estimate, even though the operations and maintenance costs represented about 74 percent of the TWF’s life-cycle costs. Because NNSA did not document the approach used, we could not determine whether it was appropriate for developing the operations and maintenance estimate; whether NNSA management reviewed the estimate, including its risks and uncertainties, or whether NNSA management approved the estimate. However, because DOE’s project management order does not define the operations and maintenance costs as project costs, NNSA was not required to include these costs in the ICE. Moreover, because DOE’s project management order does not require it, NNSA’s contractor did not follow the best practice to complete a sensitivity analysis to quantify the extent to which either the construction or operations and maintenance cost estimates could vary because of changes in key assumptions and ground rules. According to cost-estimating best practices, doing a sensitivity analysis increases the chance that decisions that influence the design, production, and operation of the TWF will be made with a focus on the elements that have the greatest effect on cost. By revising the estimate to include the current understanding of project conditions, including the uncertainty at WIPP, NNSA program managers can more accurately identify cost overruns consistent with best practices. Updating the TWF’s cost estimate to include all life-cycle costs, as well as needed analyses, would provide NNSA more reliable information for better managing the TWF as it prepares for the start of operations, which NNSA expects could be as early as April 2016. Recommendations for Executive Action To develop reliable cost estimates for the TRU waste removal project and for the TWF construction project at LANL, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following two actions: Direct NNSA and EM to revise the cost estimate for the TRU waste removal project to ensure that it uses updated assumptions based on the current understanding of project conditions, such as the status of WIPP. As we noted in the report, however, NNSA expects the TWF to provide TRU waste capabilities at LANL to support NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission for the next 50 years. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has met its cost targets for the transuranic (TRU) waste removal project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and (2) the extent to which NNSA’s cost estimate for the TRU Waste Facility (TWF) project at LANL met best practices for a reliable cost estimate.	Why GAO Did This Study Nuclear weapons activities at LANL have generated large quantities of TRU waste that must be disposed of properly. To address a 2005 cleanup agreement with the state of New Mexico requiring DOE to close LANL's TRU waste site, NNSA is to oversee two TRU waste projects. The first is to remove the waste stored at LANL and ship it to WIPP for permanent disposal. The second is to construct a facility—the TWF—to provide new capabilities for managing newly generated TRU waste at LANL. NNSA has developed cost estimates for both projects. GAO was asked to review cost estimates for the TRU waste projects at LANL. This report examines (1) the extent to which NNSA's TRU waste removal project at LANL has met its cost estimates and (2) the extent to which NNSA's cost estimate for the TWF met best practices for a reliable estimate. GAO reviewed spending data for the TRU waste removal project for fiscal years 2006 through 2014 and the cost estimates for both projects, compared the cost estimate for the TWF with best practices, and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) project to remove transuranic (TRU) waste—primarily discarded equipment and soils contaminated with certain radioactive material—at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) did not meet its cost estimates. At the end of fiscal year 2014, NNSA had spent about $931 million on the project, exceeding its 2006 estimate of $729 million by $202 million. Under current plans, the project is also expected to exceed its 2009 estimate. NNSA did not meet its cost estimates, in part, because they were based on aggressive funding assumptions designed to meet the completion dates agreed to in a 2005 cleanup agreement, which the Department of Energy (DOE) did not fully fund. At the time of GAO's review, NNSA was developing a new project completion cost estimate of about $1.6 billion, with completion projected for October 2022. NNSA had not revised the project's cost estimate since 2009 because the agency was reluctant to approve an estimate with a completion date that conflicted with the 2005 cleanup agreement. However, according to an NNSA official, NNSA's new estimate may not reflect current conditions—partly because of uncertainty created by funding and the indefinite suspension of shipments of TRU waste to the permanent repository at DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) after a radioactive release closed WIPP in February 2014. By revising the estimate to include the current understanding of project conditions, including the uncertainty at WIPP, NNSA program managers can, for example, more accurately identify cost overruns. NNSA's cost estimate for the TRU Waste Facility (TWF), which consisted of separate cost estimates for completing construction and for operations and maintenance, partially reflected each of the four characteristics of a reliable estimate (comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible) as established by best practices. For example, NNSA's estimate was partially well-documented by clearly documenting the data sources and methodology used to develop the construction estimate. However, NNSA did not sufficiently document the approach used to develop the operations and maintenance estimate, which represented about 74 percent of the TWF's life-cycle costs, because DOE's project management order does not require these costs to be documented when a project is approved to request funding from Congress for construction. As a result, GAO could not determine whether the cost-estimating approach was appropriate. In addition, NNSA's estimate was partially credible because NNSA completed an independent cost estimate (ICE) that provided an unbiased cross-check of the construction estimate consistent with best practices, but it did not include the operations and maintenance costs in the ICE because it was not required by DOE's project management order. Moreover, NNSA did not conduct a sensitivity analysis to quantify variations in the TWF's cost estimates due to changes in key assumptions because it was not required by DOE, which also affected the estimate's credibility. Doing a sensitivity analysis increases the chance that decisions for the TWF will focus on the elements that have the greatest effect on cost, according to best practices. Updating the TWF's cost estimate to include all life-cycle costs and needed analyses, would provide NNSA more reliable information for better managing the TWF as it prepares for the start of operations, which NNSA expects could be as early as April 2016. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOE revise the cost estimate for the TRU waste removal project to reflect the current understanding of project conditions and update the TWF's cost estimate to allow better management of the project's life-cycle costs going forward. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-03-742T	gao_GAO-03-742T_0	FCC’s Cable Rate Survey Does Not Appear to Provide a Reliable Source of Information on the Cost Factors Underlying Cable Rate Increases FCC’s annual cable rate survey seeks information on cable franchises’ cost changes that may underlie changes in cable rates during the preceding year. Our preliminary observations indicate that there are two causes for the resulting variation: (1) there were insufficient instructions or examples on how the form was supposed to be completed, leading to confusion among cable operators regarding what to include for the different cost factors and how to calculate each of them; and (2) the requirement that the cost and non-cost factors sum to the reported annual rate increase caused many cable operators to adjust one or more of the cost factors, thereby resulting in data that might not provide an accurate assessment of the cost factors underlying cable rate increases. Table 1 provides information on the approaches cable franchises used to complete the portion of the survey pertaining to cost and non-cost factors underlying rate changes. However, based on our findings, it appears that this may not have been clearly communicated to cable franchises. FCC’s Process for Updating and Revising its Classification of the Competitive Status of Cable Franchises May Lead to Classifications that are No Longer Accurate The 1992 Cable Act established three conditions for a finding of effective competition, and a fourth was added in the 1996 Act. Specifically, a finding of effective competition in a franchise area requires that FCC has found one of the following conditions to exist: Fewer than 30 percent of the households in the franchise area subscribe to cable service (low-penetration test). It is possible that such an inconsistency could occur because cable companies incorrectly completed FCC’s survey in some fashion. Although the survey form asks the cable franchise whether they face effective competition in the franchise area, those responses are not always consistent with information maintained by FCC regarding whether there has been an official finding of effective competition. We found that FCC staff overrode the survey responses on effective competition for 24 percent of all franchises in its 2002 survey. Some franchises that face competition may not have filed a petition, and therefore are not classified as facing effective competition.	Why GAO Did This Study Over 65 percent of American households currently subscribe to cable television service. There has been increasing concern that cable television rates have been rising aster than the rate of inflation for the last few years. As required, on a yearly basis, FCC prepares a report on cable rates in areas that face and those that do not face effective competition--a term defined by statute. For information used in this report, FCC maintains information on the competitive status of cable franchises and annually surveys a sample of cable franchises. GAO examined (1) the reliability of information that cable companies provided to FCC in its annual survey regarding cost factors underlying cable rate increases and (2) FCC's process for updating and revising cable franchise classifications as to whether they face effective competition. What GAO Found Based on interviews with 100 randomly sampled cable franchises that completed FCC's 2002 survey, GAO's preliminary analysis indicates that FCC's survey may not be a reliable source of information on the cost factors underlying cable rate increases. Because of the following problems, GAO found that there are inconsistencies in how companies completed the survey. FCC provided minimal instructions or examples on how the portion of the survey covering the cost factors underlying rate increases should be completed. It appears that cable companies made varying assumptions on how to complete the survey. FCC's survey required that cable companies fully allocate their reported annual rate increase to various cost and non-cost factors. Our preliminary findings indicate that there was inadequate guidance on how to achieve this requisite balance, and cable companies approached the question in varying ways. Based on preliminary work, GAO found that FCC's classification of cable franchises as to whether they face effective competition might not accurately reflect current conditions. GAO found instances where information in the survey responses of some franchises would suggest that the criteria for an effective competition finding that was made in the past might no longer be present. However, a finding of effective competition is only changed if a formal process is instituted. GAO found only two instances where a petition was filed that resulted in a reversal of an effective competition finding.
gao_GAO-12-768	gao_GAO-12-768_0	These provisions include an “individual mandate,” or the requirement that individuals—subject to certain exceptions—obtain minimum essential health coverage or pay a tax penalty starting in 2014; the establishment of health insurance exchanges in 2014— essentially, health insurance marketplaces in which individuals and small businesses can compare, select, and purchase health coverage from among participating carriers; health insurance market reforms including a requirement that prevents health plans and insurers in the individual and small group markets from denying coverage or charging higher premiums because of pre- existing conditions or medical history, and that limits the extent to which premiums may vary; premium subsidies—which provide sliding scale tax credits starting in 2014 to limit premium costs for individuals and families with incomes up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level—for purchasing individual coverage through an exchange; penalties for certain large employers that do not offer qualified health coverage and have at least one full-time employee receiving a subsidy (in the form of a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction) in a plan offered through an exchange starting in 2014, or for certain large employers that provide access to coverage but do not meet certain requirements for affordability; tax credits for certain small businesses toward a share of their employee health coverage beginning in 2010; a 40 percent excise tax on certain employer-sponsored health plans whose costs exceed a certain threshold in 2018; a state Medicaid expansion effective in 2014 for individuals who are under 65 years old, have incomes at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty level, and meet other specified criteria. The models systematically estimate the combined effect of multiple provisions in legislation, such as PPACA, based on this previous research and empirical data. However, they have limitations as a predictive tool. Microsimulation Studies Predicted Small Near-Term Changes to Employer- Sponsored Coverage Among the five microsimulation studies we reviewed, estimates of PPACA’s net effect on changes in the rates of employer-sponsored coverage ranged in the near term from a decrease of 2.5 percent to an In increase of 2.7 percent in the number of individuals with coverage.particular, three projected an increase in the number of individuals with coverage. 1.) Two of the studies also indicated that the majority of individuals who lose employer-sponsored coverage would transition to other sources of coverage. Employer Surveys Varied Widely in Their Estimates of PPACA’s Effect on Employer-Sponsored Coverage Employer surveys varied widely in their estimates of employers’ responses to PPACA. Among these 16 surveys, 11 indicated that 10 percent or fewer of employers were likely to drop coverage in the near term, and 5 indicated that from 11 to 20 percent were likely to drop coverage in the near term. The estimates ranged from 2 to 20 percent across these 16 surveys. Because these surveys were typically of employers currently offering coverage, most did not reflect the number of employers that may be likely to begin offering coverage under PPACA. In addition, two surveys asked respondents how their decisions to drop or offer coverage may be affected by other employers’ actions. The estimates ranged from about 2 million to 6 million fewer people covered without the mandate compared to with the mandate. 2.) Differences in Assumptions, Time Frames of Projections, and Assessment of the Individual Mandate Likely Contributed to Small Variation in Estimates from Microsimulation Studies Certain differences in factors, such as underlying assumptions about employer and employee decision making, may have contributed to some variation in the estimates, although the five microsimulation studies we reviewed shared methodological similarities and therefore generated relatively similar estimates of changes to employer-sponsored coverage. For example, the EPI study, which predicted a net increase of 4 million in the number of individuals with employer-sponsored coverage, incorporated some of the statistical modeling techniques and underlying theory of employer and employee behavior used by the microsimulation models, and was therefore able to more systematically examine the combined effects of PPACA’s provisions. Certain researchers have noted key limitations of the study, including that it did not take into account the impact of PPACA’s individual mandate, the nonfederal tax advantage of employer-sponsored coverage, the cost of single health coverage plans, and the nondiscrimination rules that may prevent employers from dropping coverage for some, but not all, employees.measure the net effect of PPACA on employer health coverage, thus Additionally, unlike the other two studies, this study did not addressing only those that may drop coverage but not those that may newly offer it. Variation in Estimates from Employer Surveys Was Likely Due to Differences in Survey Methods and Assumptions about Respondent Knowledge of PPACA Provisions Varying estimates from the 16 employer surveys of the extent to which employers were likely to drop health coverage may have stemmed from differences in sampling techniques, the response rates and number of respondents, the types of employers surveyed, the framing of survey questions, and the manner in which PPACA provisions were referenced throughout the survey. Employer Surveys Suggest That PPACA May Have a Larger Effect on Small Employers and Certain Employee Populations and Prompt Some Employers to Change Benefit Designs PPACA may affect certain types of employers or employers with certain employee populations more than all employers or employees. PPACA May Also Prompt Employers to Change Health Plan Benefit Design Several of the 19 employer surveys that we reviewed also indicated that PPACA may prompt employers to consider key changes to benefit designs that will generally result in greater employee cost for health insurance. External Comments We provided a draft of this report to two researchers with expertise in employee health benefits issues. They agreed with our report and provided suggestions and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Studies Reviewed by GAO We reviewed the 27 studies listed below that contained original numerical estimates of the effect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) on the prevalence of employer-sponsored coverage—5 based on microsimulation models, 3 based on other analytic approaches, and 19 based on employer surveys. Microsimulation Models 1. 2. 3. 4. 19.	Why GAO Did This Study The share of employers offering health coverage has generally declined in the last decade. Researchers believe that certain provisions of PPACA could affect employers future willingness to offer health coverage, such as the availability of subsidized coverage through new health insurance marketplaces called exchanges and an individual mandate, which will require most people to obtain health coverage or pay a tax penalty. Certain PPACA provisions are scheduled to take effect in 2014. Researchers have provided various estimates of the effect PPACA may have on employer-sponsored coverage. GAO was asked to review the research on this topic. GAO examined (1) estimates of the effect of PPACA on the extent of employer-sponsored coverage; (2) factors that may contribute to the variation in estimates; and (3) how estimates of coverage vary by the types of employers and employees that may be affected, as well as other changes employers may be considering to the health benefits they offer. GAO reviewed studies published from January 1, 2009, through March 30, 2012 containing an original numerical estimate of the prevalence of employer-sponsored coverage at the national level. These included 5 microsimulation models and 19 employer surveys. Microsimulation models can systematically estimate the combined effects of multiple PPACA provisions in terms of both gains and losses of coverage; their results are based on multiple data sets and assumptions. Surveys reflect employer perspectives; they have limits as a predictive tool in part based on varied survey methodologies and respondent knowledge of PPACA. What GAO Found The five studies GAO reviewed that used microsimulation models to estimate the effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) on employer-sponsored coverage generally predicted little change in prevalence in the near term, while results of employer surveys varied more widely. The five microsimulation study estimates ranged from a net decrease of 2.5 percent to a net increase of 2.7 percent in the total number of individuals with employer-sponsored coverage within the first 2 years of implementation of key PPACA provisions, affecting up to about 4 million individuals. Two of these studies also indicated that the majority of individuals losing employer-sponsored coverage would transition to other sources of coverage. In contrast to the microsimulation studies, which estimate the net effect on individuals, most employer surveys measure the percentage of employers that may drop coverage in response to PPACA. Among the 19 surveys, 16 reported estimates of employers dropping coverage for all employee types. Among these 16, 11 indicated that 10 percent or fewer employers were likely to drop coverage in the near term, but estimates ranged from 2 to 20 percent. Most surveys were of employers currently offering coverage and therefore did not also address whether other employers may begin to offer coverage in response to PPACA; however, 3 that did found that between 1 and 28 percent would begin offering coverage as a result of PPACA. Longer-term predictions of prevalence of employer-sponsored coverage were fewer and more uncertain, and four microsimulation studies estimated that from about 2 million to 6 million fewer individuals would have employer-sponsored coverage in the absence of the individual mandate compared to with the mandate. Differences in key assumptions and consideration of PPACA provisions likely contributed to some variation among estimates from the five microsimulation studies and the 16 employer surveys. Variation among the microsimulation studies may have stemmed from differences in assumptions about employer and employee decision making, the time frames of the estimates, and assessments of potential compliance with the individual mandate. Variation among the employer surveys may be related to differences in survey sampling techniques, the number and types of employer respondents, and the framing of survey questions. For example, some surveys used a random sampling methodology, allowing their results to be generalized across all employers, while others did not. Also, some referred to specific PPACA provisions or provided specific information about provisions to respondents, while others did not. Some of the 19 employer surveys indicated that PPACA may have a larger effect on small employers and certain populations and may prompt some employers to change benefit designs. For example, 4 surveys found that smaller employers were more likely than other employers to stop offering health coverage in response to PPACA, and 5 found that employers in general were more likely to drop coverage for retirees than for all employees. Nine surveys also indicated that employers are considering key changes to benefit design, some of which may result in greater employee cost for health coverage. GAO provided a draft of this report to two researchers with expertise in employee health benefits issues. The experts agreed with GAOs report and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
gao_GAO-13-759	gao_GAO-13-759_0	Defaulted Loans to Franchisees of the Franchise Organization Resulted in $11 Million in Guarantee Payments, and Four Lenders Accounted for about 74 Percent of Defaulted Loans Our analysis of SBA-guaranteed loans to franchisees of the franchise organization approved from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2011, showed that SBA approved a total of about $38.4 million for 170 loans made by 54 lenders. SBA’s guaranteed portion on these loans amounted to around $28.8 million. SBA made guarantee payments of around $11 million on the defaulted loans, including about $8.5 million in guarantee payments on the 55 defaulted loans from these four lenders. Of the 88 loans we reviewed from the four lenders, 55 (about 63 percent) defaulted. In comparison, 19 of the 82 loans (23 percent) that originated at the other 50 lenders to the franchisees defaulted. In addition, as part of our investigative work, we interviewed the owners of 22 franchisees of the franchise organization to obtain background information on the SBA loan process and efforts to start their businesses. In addition, franchisees we interviewed noted difficulties meeting anticipated revenue estimates, as well as limited access to information that would aid in business planning. Alleged Loan Agent Fraud Could Not Be Conclusively Determined, and SBA Has Taken Initial Steps to Enhance Oversight of Loan Agents and Improve Loan Data Quality We were unable to conclusively determine whether the loan agent referred to us for investigation intentionally provided exaggerated revenue projections to franchisees to help them qualify for SBA loans; however, we found that first-year projected revenues on loan applications involving the agent or her employer were, on average, more than twice the amount of actual revenue for 19 of the 24 franchisees we reviewed in the first year of operations. Results of Investigation of Alleged Fraud Were Inconclusive As part of our investigative work, we examined an allegation that a specific loan agent provided exaggerated revenue projections to some franchisees of the franchise organization in our review to assist them in qualifying for SBA-guaranteed loans. In an interview in February 2012, the loan agent told us she obtained the revenue projections from her employer and former clients, one of which she identified. The loan agent told us she provided these revenue projections to clients. The employer and former client she identified denied providing the revenue projections to the loan agent. SBA’s Office of Credit Risk Management debarred both the loan agent and her employer, and they are ineligible to work with the federal government for a period of 3 years beginning in January 2012. While the franchise organization can choose to include earnings statements in the FDD, federal regulations do not require franchise organizations to provide actual first-year average revenues for start-up businesses in the disclosure document. Franchisees should include first-year revenue estimates in an SBA loan application; however, this information is not necessarily available to potential franchisees in the FDD and they may have to conduct due diligence to identify this information from other sources, if available. Officials further stated that SBA has taken, and is considering, other steps to enhance oversight of loan agents. In addition, officials noted SBA assesses the accuracy of certain data fields when the lender submits a monthly loan status report or loan files to request a guarantee payment, and an external auditor reviews a sample of loans in LAS to validate that the financial data for the loans are accurate.vendor to improve the consistency of franchise information in its database by replacing SBA’s current franchise codes with publicly available identifiers used in the franchise industry, and to verify the accuracy of franchise information in LAS that lenders previously entered. However, we disagree with the representatives’ comments that our comparison is potentially misleading and inaccurate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report describes (1) the magnitude of Small Business Administration (SBA)-guaranteed loans to franchisees of the franchise organization, and (2) the results of our investigation into the allegation, and aspects of SBA’s oversight of its 7(a) loan program with respect to loans made to franchisees of the franchise organization. We also used the franchise organization’s revenue data to calculate average first- year revenues for a broader population of franchisees, and compared it to average revenues reported in the franchise organization’s disclosure documents. To better understand the franchisees’ experience with the 7(a) loan program, we interviewed 14 additional franchisees of the select franchise organization who received 19 SBA-guaranteed loans from one of the four lenders with the highest loan volume and default rates. In addition, on the basis of the 88 loan packages we reviewed for the four lenders, we identified 24 franchisees that used the loan agent connected to the allegation, or her employer, 19 of whom had data available to compare the first-year revenue projections on their SBA loan applications with the franchisees’ actual first-year revenue.	Why GAO Did This Study From fiscal years 2003 to 2012, SBA guaranteed franchise loans under its 7(a) program totaling around $10.6 billion. SBA made guarantee payments on approximately 28 percent of these franchise loans, representing about $1.5 billion, according to SBA. GAO was asked to examine SBAguaranteed loans to franchisees, and to investigate an allegation that a loan agent provided exaggerated revenue projections to franchisees of the same franchise organization to help them qualify for SBA loans. This report describes (1) the magnitude of SBA-guaranteed loans to franchisees of the franchise organization, and (2) the results of GAO's investigation into the allegation, and aspects of SBA's oversight of its 7(a) loan program with respect to loans made to franchisees of the franchise organization. GAO examined SBA's loan data and files of loans made to franchisees. GAO used the franchise organization's revenue data to compare to revenue projections in SBA applications, as well as revenue reported in the organization's disclosure documents. As part of the investigative work, GAO interviewed the franchisor, loan agents, and select borrowers to better understand the franchising experience. GAO is not making any recommendations. In their comments, representatives of the franchise organization state that GAO's comparison of average revenue in the disclosure document and the first-year average revenue calculation is potentially misleading and inaccurate. GAO disagrees, as discussed in more detail in this report. What GAO Found Analysis of guaranteed loans to franchisees of a select franchise organization reviewed by GAO, approved from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2011, showed the Small Business Administration (SBA) approved a total of about $38.4 million for 170 loans made by 54 lenders. SBA's guaranteed portion on these loans was approximately $28.8 million. Of the total population of 170 loans, 74 loans defaulted, 55 of which (74 percent) originated from four lenders that had the highest loan volume and default rates on loans to the franchisees. SBA made guarantee payments of around $11 million on the defaulted loans to franchisees, including about $8.5 million in guarantee payments on the 55 defaulted loans from these four lenders. Of the 88 loans reviewed from the four lenders, 55 (63 percent) defaulted. In comparison, 19 of the 82 loans (23 percent) that originated at the other 50 lenders to the franchisees defaulted. As part of GAO's investigative work, GAO interviewed the owners of 22 franchisees of the franchise organization in GAO's review, of which 16 defaulted on their loans and 10 filed for bankruptcy protection. Interviewed franchisees noted difficulties meeting anticipated revenue estimates and limited access to information that would aid in business planning. GAO was unable to conclusively determine whether the loan agent referred to GAO for investigation intentionally provided exaggerated revenue projections to franchisees to help them qualify for SBA loans, and SBA has taken initial steps to enhance program oversight. The loan agent stated that she obtained the revenue projections from her employer and former clients, one of which she identified. She then provided these revenue projections to clients. The employer and former client she identified denied providing the revenue projections to the loan agent. SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management debarred the loan agent and her employer for encouraging false statements, among other things, making them ineligible to work with the federal government for a period of 3 years beginning in January 2012. According to GAO's analysis, the first-year projected revenues on loan applications involving the loan agent or her employer were, on average, more than twice the amount of actual first-year revenue for 19 of the 24 franchisees reviewed. Potential franchisees should include first-year revenue estimates in their SBA loan applications. However, this information is not necessarily available to potential franchisees in the franchise organization's disclosure document, which provides information about the organization's financial performance representations and franchisees' estimated initial investment, among other things. Further, federal regulations do not require franchise organizations to provide actual first-year average revenues for start-up businesses in their disclosure document. Thus, potential franchisees may have to conduct due diligence to identify this information from other sources, if available. GAO also identified discrepancies and other issues in SBA's franchise loan data with respect to fields used for risk-based oversight of its loans portfolio, such as default status, number of loans, and loan agent information. SBA has taken, or is considering steps, to address these issues and enhance oversight of loan agents. For instance, SBA is working with a third-party vendor to replace SBA's current franchise codes with publicly available identifiers used in the franchise industry. At the time of GAO's review, it was too early in the process to assess the effectiveness of these actions.
gao_GAO-15-477	gao_GAO-15-477_0	3. DOD Did Not Always Meet Statutory Notification and Internal Timeliness Requirements for Completing Military Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations DOD did not meet statutory notification requirements to inform servicemembers about delays in investigations for about half of military whistleblower reprisal investigations in fiscal year 2013. However, DOD officials told us they have not developed a tool, such as an automated alert, to proactively ensure that they are in compliance with the statutory 180-day notification requirement. However, we estimate that about 47 percent of the files for cases that DOD took longer than 180 days to close in fiscal year 2013 did not contain evidence that the investigating IG sent the required letters to servicemembers. We found that the average investigation time for all cases that DOD (that is, both DODIG and the service IGs) investigated and closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was 526 days. According to DOD Directive 7050.06, when the service IGs receive reprisal complaints from servicemembers, those offices are required to notify DODIG within 10 days; however, based on our file review, we estimate that there was no evidence of this required notification in 30 percent of cases closed in fiscal year 2013 where the servicemember In response, DODIG officials filed the complaint with the service IG.noted that one of their oversight investigators was assigned to reconcile DODIG’s open military reprisal investigations with the service’s open reprisal investigations in fall 2013. However, DODIG does not have an implementation plan for the expansion and has not yet taken steps to develop one. Given DOD’s stated plans to expand the case management system to the service IGs by the end of fiscal year 2016, doing so without developing an implementation plan that addresses the needs of DODIG and the service IGs, and defines project goals, schedules, costs, stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and stakeholder communication techniques, puts DODIG at risk of creating a system that will not improve its visibility over total workload or investigation timeliness. DODIG Established an Oversight Team to Review Service-Investigated Reprisal Complaints, but the Oversight Process Is Not Formalized In September 2011, DODIG took steps to improve its oversight of service IG investigations by establishing an investigator team that is solely dedicated to the oversight review of service IG-conducted military reprisal investigations, according to officials, but it has not formalized its process by providing detailed guidance to its oversight team. DODIG Oversight Guidance and Instruction DODIG provided the oversight team with limited instructions on how to review service IG cases. Specifically, from the results of our case file review, we estimate that for about 45 percent of service investigations closed in fiscal year 2013, DODIG oversight worksheets were missing narrative that indicated the investigator had thoroughly documented all case deficiencies or inconsistencies, as required on the oversight worksheet. We also found that the files in these cases lacked documentation of the oversight investigators’ analysis of the effect of noted deficiencies on the outcome of the investigation. Conclusions Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse, and their willingness to come forward can contribute to improvements in government operations. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the military whistleblower reprisal investigation process and oversight of such investigations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense work in coordination with the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) to take the following seven actions: develop an automated tool to help ensure compliance with the statutory 180-day notification requirement by providing servicemembers with accurate information regarding the status of their reprisal investigations within 180 days of receipt of an allegation of reprisal; issue additional guidance to investigators on how to use the case management system as a real-time management tool, and update and finalize the draft internal user guidance from 2012 as necessary until the case management system is complete; working in coordination with the service IGs, develop an implementation plan that addresses the needs of DODIG and the service IGs, and defines project goals, schedules, costs, stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and stakeholder communication techniques for expansion of the case management system; issue additional guidance to formalize the DODIG oversight process; direct the services to follow standardized investigation stages and issue guidance clarifying how the stages are defined; ensure that the mechanism it uses for feedback to service investigators includes the criteria against which the investigation was assessed and any deficiencies, and work with the service IG headquarters to ensure that feedback is shared with the service investigators; and develop and implement a process for investigators to document whether the investigation was independent and outside of the chain of command and direct the service IGs to provide such documentation for review during the oversight process. Specifically, we estimated that DOD’s median notification time was on average 353 days after the servicemember filed the complaint, almost twice as long as the 180-day requirement. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has met statutory notification requirements and internal timeliness requirements for completing military whistleblower reprisal investigations, we calculated the timeliness of cases using case data from DODIG’s case management system for military whistleblower reprisal cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and compared the average timeliness to the regulatory 180-day requirement. To determine the extent to which DOD has processes to ensure oversight of military whistleblower reprisal investigations conducted by the service IGs, we used our stratified random sample of 124 case files retained by DODIG for military whistleblower reprisal cases that DODIG closed from October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013. 2. Further, we found that DODIG’s system did not have record of at least 22 percent of service investigations both open as of September 30, 2014, and closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.	Why GAO Did This Study Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse. However, reporting wrongdoing outside the chain of command conflicts with military guidance, which emphasizes using the chain of command to resolve problems. Whistleblowers who make a report risk reprisal from their unit, such as being demoted or separated. DODIG is responsible for conducting and overseeing military whistleblower reprisal investigations. GAO was asked to examine DOD's oversight of military whistleblower reprisal investigations. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD met statutory notification and internal timeliness requirements for completing military whistleblower reprisal investigations, (2) DODIG's whistleblower case management system supports oversight of reprisal investigations, and (3) DOD has processes to ensure oversight of service IG-conducted reprisal investigations. GAO analyzed DODIG and service IG data for cases closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and cases open as of September 30, 2014, and reviewed a generalizable random sample of 124 military reprisal cases closed in fiscal year 2013. What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) did not meet statutory military whistleblower reprisal 180-day notification requirements in about half of reprisal investigations closed in fiscal year 2013, and DOD's average investigation time for closed cases in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was 526 days, almost three times DOD's internal 180-day requirement. In 2012, GAO made recommendations to improve investigation timeliness, and DOD has taken some actions to address those recommendations. However, based on a random sample of 124 cases, GAO estimated that there was no evidence that DOD sent the required notification letters in about 47 percent of the cases that DOD took longer than 180 days to close in fiscal year 2013. For cases in which DOD sent the required letter, GAO estimated that the median notification time was about 353 days after the servicemember filed the complaint, and on average the letters significantly underestimated the expected investigation completion date. DOD does not have a tool, such as an automated alert, to help ensure compliance with the statutory notification requirement to provide letters by 180 days informing servicemembers about delays in investigations. Without a tool for DOD to ensure that servicemembers receive reliable, accurate, and timely information about their investigations, servicemembers may be discouraged from reporting wrongdoing. DOD's Office of Inspector General's (DODIG) newly developed case management system, which it established to improve monitoring, is separate from the service IGs' systems, limiting DODIG's ability to provide oversight of all military reprisal investigations. GAO found that DODIG's system did not have a record of at least 22 percent of service-conducted reprisal investigations that were closed in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and investigations open as of September 30, 2014. DODIG officials stated that they plan to expand DODIG's case management system to the service IGs by the end of fiscal year 2016 to improve DODIG's visibility over investigations. However, DODIG does not have an implementation plan for the expansion, and service IG officials stated that they have unique requirements that they would like to have incorporated into the system prior to expansion. Expanding the case management system to the service IGs without developing an implementation plan that, among other things, addresses the needs of both DODIG and the service IGs, puts DOD at risk of creating a system that will not strengthen its oversight of reprisal investigations. DOD does not have formalized processes to help ensure effective oversight of military whistleblower reprisal investigations conducted by service IGs. DODIG established an oversight investigator team to review service IG investigations, but it has provided oversight investigators with limited guidance on how to review or document service IG investigations. Specifically, GAO estimated that for about 45 percent of service investigations closed in fiscal year 2013, the oversight worksheets were missing narrative to demonstrate that the oversight investigator had thoroughly documented all case deficiencies or inconsistencies. GAO also found that these files did not include documentation of DOD's analysis of the effect of noted deficiencies on the investigation's outcome because DOD has provided limited instruction on how to review service IG cases. Without additional guidance on oversight review procedures and documentation requirements to formalize the oversight process, it will be difficult for DOD to ensure that reprisal complaints are investigated and documented consistently. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD develop a tool to help ensure compliance with the statutory notification requirement, develop an implementation plan for expanding DODIG's case management system, and issue guidance governing the oversight process, among other things. DOD concurred, but raised issues with GAO's presentation of its findings. GAO disagrees and addresses these issues in this report.
gao_GAO-10-1030	gao_GAO-10-1030_0	The war continued into the regime of Joseph Kabila, and it is estimated that by 2004, about 4 million people had died as a result of the conflict. For example, it is very common for small-scale traders and porters to be prefinanced by trading houses. Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten Transit DRC’s Neighboring Countries, Are Processed Mostly in Asia, and Are Used in Technology Products From trading houses in eastern DRC, tin, tantalum, and tungsten are transported by road, boat, or airplane to neighboring countries, such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The minerals are used in the production of technology products, such as mobile telephones and laptops. Most DRC-Origin Gold Is Smuggled Out of the Country and Used by the Jewelry Industry DRC-origin gold follows more informal and clandestine supply chains out of the country than tin, tantalum, and tungsten, according to an NGO report. Illegal Armed Groups and Parts of the Congolese National Military Commit Human Rights Abuses and Are Involved in the Minerals Trade Illegal Armed Groups and Some Congolese National Military Units Commit Serious Human Rights Abuses in Eastern DRC According to UN, U.S., and foreign officials and NGO representatives, illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units are consistently and directly involved in human rights abuses against the civilian population in eastern DRC. According to a UN official in the DRC, based on information gathered in eastern DRC, approximately 50 percent of the reported human rights violations are committed by Congolese national army units. Members of the International Community Are Working to Help Control the Minerals Trade, but the Illicit Trade Continues and Many Efforts Are in Preliminary or Proposal Stage International Community Has Made Efforts to Help Control the Minerals Trade through UN Activities and the Contact Group on the Great Lakes Region With U.S. support, the UN has made efforts to help monitor, regulate, and control the minerals trade by imposing UN Security Council sanctions, deploying UN Group of Experts’ teams to eastern DRC, and developing MONUSCO training centers. Phase 1 has been completed. Lack of Security, Weak Governance, and Lack of Infrastructure Are Significant Challenges That, Unless Addressed, Will Likely Hamper Efforts to Monitor, Regulate, or Control the Minerals Trade Lack of Security, Weak Governance, and Lack of Infrastructure Are Significant Challenges Unless they are effectively addressed, U.S. agency officials, foreign government officials, and others have identified lack of security, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure as significant challenges that will likely hamper efforts to monitor, regulate, or control the minerals trade. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress with a strategy and to produce a map of mineral-rich zones, underscores the importance of the United States taking further action, in collaboration with other stakeholders, to help address the trade of DRC conflict minerals. Recommendations for Executive Action To respond to the urgent humanitarian crises and reinforce U.S. commitment to work for peace and security in eastern DRC, in collaboration with the DRC government and international partners, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant U.S. agencies, take the following action: Provide Congress and other international stakeholders with concrete, actionable steps that the United States could take to help monitor, regulate, and control the minerals trade in eastern DRC, including steps to help address the challenges of lack of security, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure in eastern DRC. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To examine the minerals trade in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), its connection to human rights violations; and national and international efforts to monitor, regulate, or control the trade, we assessed (1) the key minerals mined in eastern DRC and how these minerals are mined, transported, and processed; (2) the extent to which there are links between minerals extraction, armed conflicts, and human rights abuses in eastern DRC; (3) the measures that the DRC, the United States, and the international community have taken to monitor, regulate, or control the minerals trade and their effectiveness; and (4) the challenges and limitations that the DRC, the United States, and the international community face in monitoring, regulating, or controlling the trade, and how these challenges are being addressed. To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed various reports, memorandums, and other documents from relevant U.S. agencies; foreign governments; multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations (UN); nongovernmental organizations; and industry organizations.	Why GAO Did This Study Rich in minerals, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has long been the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Since 1998, an estimated 5 million have died as a result of the conflict. GAO was asked to examine the connection between minerals trade and human rights abuses, and the efforts to help control the trade. This report assesses (1) how the key minerals are mined, transported, and processed; (2) the links between the minerals trade, armed conflicts, and human rights abuses; (3) measures the United States and the international community have taken to control the trade and; (4) challenges faced in controlling the trade. GAO reviewed and analyzed reports, memorandums, and other documents and interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), other United States agencies, the United Nations (UN), and foreign governments as well as representatives from nongovernmental organizations and industry. What GAO Found Tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold are the key minerals mined in eastern DRC. Tin, tantalum, and tungsten follow a similar supply chain; they are mined by hand, sold to small-scale traders, carried by porters, transported by truck or airplane to the border, and sold to trading houses for export. The minerals transit DRC's neighbors, such as Rwanda, and most are processed in Asia and used in technology products, such as mobile telephones. In contrast, according to U.S. officials and others, most gold is smuggled out of the DRC and is ultimately used by the jewelry industry. Illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units commit human rights abuses and are involved in the minerals trade. A UN official stated that approximately 50 percent of the reported human rights abuses are committed by Congolese army units; many soldiers in these units have committed violations in the past as rebels, are poorly integrated into the Congolese military, and are consistently unpaid. To varying degrees, illegal armed groups and some military units illicitly tax minerals at mines and mineral transport routes, but they also make money illicitly taxing other trades, such as trade in charcoal and timber. The minerals trade is not the root cause but one of many factors perpetuating the conflict. The United States and the international community, particularly the UN, are working to help control the illicit minerals trade, but many efforts are in the preliminary stage. State issued a "white paper" and produced a map of mines and armed groups, but both should be improved. The white paper lacks concrete, actionable steps regarding U.S. contribution to help control the trade, and the map presents data that need updating to enhance its usefulness. Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-203) underscore the importance of U.S. agencies taking action to help address the trade. The UN has made efforts to help control the trade by imposing sanctions, deploying expert teams, and developing mineral training centers. Others, such as a global tin industry association and the DRC government, have also made efforts, but these efforts are in the early stage. Significant challenges, which are yet to be addressed, exist to monitoring and controlling the minerals trade, including tracking the mine of origin. For example, many mines are in remote areas, lack road access, and are occupied by armed groups, making it challenging to monitor mine activities. Tracking the origin of minerals will rely on DRC mining officials, but these officials suffer from a lack of skills and from corruption. U.S. and foreign officials and others said that lack of security, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure in eastern DRC are significant challenges that, unless addressed, will likely impede efforts to control the minerals trade. Addressing these challenges requires measures to reform the security sector, improve governance, and invest in infrastructure, but little progress has been made in these areas. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in consultation with relevant agencies, (1) provide concrete, actionable steps to help control the minerals trade, including addressing lack of security, governance, and infrastructure, and (2) work with relevant stakeholders to periodically update information on mines and armed groups. State concurred with GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-12-12	gao_GAO-12-12_0	More Than 2 Million Unique Veterans Received Mental Health Care from VA over the 5-Year Period from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010 Over the 5-year period from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, about 2.1 million unique veterans received mental health care from VA. Each year the number of veterans receiving care increased—from about 900,000 in fiscal year 2006 to about 1.2 million in fiscal year 2010. VA provided this mental health care to veterans in both specialty mental health care and other settings, such as primary care clinics staffed with mental health providers. Although the number of veterans receiving mental health care from VA increased for both OEF/OIF veterans and veterans of other eras of service, as shown in figure 1, OEF/OIF veterans accounted for an increasing proportion of the veterans receiving care. 2.) Stigma, Lack of Understanding of Mental Health, Logistical Challenges, and Concerns about VA May Hinder Veterans from Accessing Care The key barriers we identified from the literature that may hinder veterans from accessing mental health care from VA, which were corroborated through interviews with VA and VSO officials, are stigma, lack of understanding or awareness of mental health care, logistical challenges to accessing mental health care, and concerns about VA’s care. Many of these barriers are not necessarily unique to veterans accessing mental health care from VA, but may affect anyone accessing mental health care from any provider. For example, veterans may be affected by barriers differently based on age, gender, Reservist or National Guard status, or rural location.  Age: OEF/OIF veterans, who are generally younger than other veterans, may have concerns about VA’s health care system because they perceive that primarily older veterans, such as those who served in Vietnam, go to VA for care.  Gender: Female veterans may perceive some barriers to accessing mental health care differently than male veterans. VA Has Implemented Several Efforts to Increase Veterans’ Access to Mental Health Care VA has expanded options to increase veterans’ access to mental health care and implemented education efforts to help connect veterans with care, according to VA officials. VA Has Implemented Education Efforts to Help Connect Veterans with Mental Health Care To help connect veterans with mental health care, VA has implemented various efforts to educate veterans, veterans’ families, health care providers, and other community stakeholders about mental health conditions and care. In its response, which is reprinted in appendix IV, VA provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine how many veterans received mental health care from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, we obtained data from VA’s Northeast Program Evaluation Center (NEPEC). Additionally, the number of veterans represents a unique count of veterans; veterans were counted only once, even if they received care multiple times during a fiscal year or across the 5-year period.	Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provided health care to about 5.2 million veterans. Recent legislation has increased many Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) veterans' priority for accessing VA's health care, and concerns have been raised about the extent to which VA is providing mental health care to eligible veterans of all eras. There also are concerns that barriers may hinder some veterans from accessing needed mental health care. GAO was asked to provide information on veterans who receive mental health care from VA. In this report, GAO provides information on (1) how many veterans received mental health care from VA from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, (2) key barriers that may hinder veterans from accessing mental health care from VA, and (3) VA efforts to increase veterans' access to VA mental health care. GAO obtained data from VA's Northeast Program Evaluation Center (NEPEC) on the number of veterans who received mental health care from VA. The number of veterans represents a unique count of veterans; veterans were counted only once, even if they received care multiple times during a fiscal year or across the 5-year period. GAO also reviewed literature published from 2006 to 2011, reviewed VA documents, and interviewed officials from VA and veterans service organizations (VSO). What GAO Found Over the 5-year period from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, about 2.1 million unique veterans received mental health care from VA. Each year the number of veterans receiving mental health care increased, from about 900,000 in fiscal year 2006 to about 1.2 million in fiscal year 2010. OEF/OIF veterans accounted for an increasing proportion of veterans receiving care during this period. The key barriers identified from the literature that may hinder veterans from accessing mental health care from VA, which were corroborated through interviews, are stigma, lack of understanding or awareness of mental health care, logistical challenges to accessing mental health care, and concerns about VA's care, such as concerns that VA's services are primarily for older veterans. Many of these barriers are not necessarily unique to veterans accessing mental health care from VA, but may affect anyone accessing mental health care from any provider. Veterans may be affected by barriers differently based on demographic factors, such as age and gender. For example, younger OEF/OIF veterans and female veterans may perceive that VA's services are primarily for someone else, such as older veterans or male veterans. VA has implemented several efforts to increase veterans' access to mental health care, including integrating mental health care into primary care. VA also has implemented efforts to educate veterans, their families, health care providers, and other community stakeholders about mental health conditions and VA's mental health care. According to VA officials, these efforts help get veterans into care by reducing, and in some cases eliminating, the barriers that may hinder them from accessing care. GAO provided a draft of this report to VA for comment. In its response, VA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
gao_GAO-02-720	gao_GAO-02-720_0	Appendix II presents more information about the categories of persons ineligible to purchase firearms and the extent to which criminal history records are used to determine an individual’s eligibility to purchase firearms. The states’ criteria for restoration typically required a certain waiting period before being eligible to apply for relief. Of these, 1 person was subsequently convicted of a felony. Handgun concealed carry permits, including the extent to which concealed carry permits exempt permit holders from a National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) check when purchasing firearms, differences among the states in how they issue permits and monitor permit holders, and what actions the states take to revoke permits if the permit holders subsequently commit new crimes. Persons convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor. Each of these four methods can have a different effect on a prohibited person’s underlying criminal conviction and the extent to which firearms rights are restored. Differences in Domestic Violence Laws and Procedures in Selected States In the six states we visited, we looked for various approaches used by the states that could make it easier to identify domestic violence convictions in state criminal history records for purposes of NICS background checks.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) searches state criminal history records to prevent gun sales to ineligible persons. What GAO Found GAO found that state firearm laws and procedures may affect how these records are used by NICS. Each of the six states GAO surveyed had some mechanism by which persons with criminal convictions could have their rights to own a firearm restored. The six states typically require a waiting period before someone can apply for relief, and some criminal convictions make a person ineligible for restoration. In 26 states, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has determined that a concealed carry permit may exempt permit holders from an NICS background check when they are buying a firearm. This situation underscores the need to carefully screen applications and monitor permit holders to ensure their eligibility to own firearms. The six states used various approaches to make it easier to identify individuals convicted of domestic violence. Despite these efforts, NICS failed to detect more than 2,800 persons convicted of domestic violence who bought firearms during the first three years the system was in operation.
gao_T-NSIAD-98-50	gao_T-NSIAD-98-50_0	For fiscal year 1997, the U.S. contribution for the three common budgets was about $470 million: $172 million for the NSIP, $252 million for NATO’s military budget, and $44.5 million for NATO’s civil budget. Any increases to the U.S. budget accounts would be reflected primarily through increased funding requests for the DOD military construction budget from which the NSIP is funded, the Army operations and maintenance budget from which the military budget is funded (both part of the National Defense 050 budget function), and the State Department’s contributions to international organizations from which the civil budget is funded (part of the International Affairs 150 budget function). However, as we indicated, NATO has yet to make decisions on these matters. In addition, the United States could choose to help new members in their efforts to meet their NATO membership obligations through continued Foreign Military Financing grants and/or loans, International Military Education and Training grants, and assistance for training activities. The three candidate countries and other PFP countries have been receiving assistance through these accounts since the inception of the PFP program, and this has enabled some of these countries to be more prepared for NATO membership. In fiscal year 1997, over $120 million was programmed for these activities, and about $60 million of this amount went to the three candidates for NATO membership. NATO’s Defense Planning Process It is through NATO’s defense planning process that decisions are made on how the defense burden will be shared, what military requirements will be satisfied, and what shortfalls will exist. Using these assumptions, DOD estimated the cost of enlarging NATO would range from about $27 billion to $35 billion from 1997 to 2009. DOD’s Key Assumptions Were Reasonable, but Cost Estimates Are Speculative In our review of DOD’s study of NATO enlargement, we (1) assessed the reasonableness of DOD’s key assumptions, (2) attempted to verify pricing information used as the basis for estimating enlargement costs, (3) looked into whether certain cost categories were actually linked to enlargement, and (4) identified factors excluded from the study that could affect enlargement costs. Most of the infrastructure upgrade and refurbishment cost estimates were based on judgments. DOD’s estimated costs for training and modernization were notional, and actual costs may vary substantially. Potential Additional Costs of Enlargement NATO enlargement could entail costs in addition to those included in DOD’s estimates, including costs for assistance to enhance the PFP or other bilateral assistance for countries not invited to join NATO in July 1997. Comparison of the DOD, CBO, and Rand Estimates CBO and Rand estimated the cost of incorporating the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia into NATO. However, they also noted that the current lack of a major threat in Europe could allow NATO to spend as little as it chose in enlarging the alliance. Because of the uncertainties of future threats, and the many possible ways to defend an enlarged NATO, CBO examined five illustrative options to provide such a defense. Of that total, CBO estimated that the United States might be expected to pay between $5 billion and $19 billion. NATO prepares several reports: additional military capability requirements for existing alliance members that will result from the alliance’s enlargement; requirements for commonly funded items in the new member nations, including infrastructure that will enable the new allies to receive NATO reinforcements in times of crisis, communication systems between NATO and their national headquarters, and a tie-in to NATO’s air defense system; cost estimates for items eligible for common funding presented by NATO officials; and the capabilities and shortfalls in the military forces of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on issues related to the cost and financial obligations of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), focusing on: (1) current U.S. costs to support NATO's common budgets and other funding that supports relations with central and east European nations and promotes NATO enlargement; (2) NATO's defense planning process, which will form the basis for more definitive cost estimates for an enlarged alliance; and (3) GAO's evaluation of the recent Department of Defense (DOD) study of NATO expansion and a comparison of DOD's study with studies of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Rand Corporation. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the ultimate cost of NATO enlargement will be contingent on several factors that have not yet been determined; (2) NATO has yet to formally define its future: (a) strategy for defending the expanded alliance; (b) force and facility requirements of the newly invited states; and (c) how costs of expanding the alliance will be financed; (3) also unknown is the long-term security threat environment in Europe; (4) NATO's process for determining the cost of enlargement is under way and expected to be completed by June 1998; (5) in fiscal year 1997, the United States contributed about $470 million directly to NATO to support its three commonly funded budgets, the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the military budget, and the civil budget; (6) this is about 25 percent of the total funding for these budgets; (7) it is through proposed increased to these budgets, primarily the NSIP and to a lesser extent the civil budget, that most of the direct cost of NATO enlargement will be reflected and therefore where the United States is likely to incur additional costs; (8) over $120 million was programmed in fiscal year 1997 for Warsaw Initiative activities in the three countries that are candidates for NATO membership and other Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries; (9) this money was provided to help pay for Foreign Military Financing grants and loans, exercises, and other PFP-related activities; (10) funding for these activities will continue, but the allocation between the candidates for NATO membership and all other PFP participants may change over time; (11) this funding is strictly bilateral assistance that may assist the candidate countries and other countries participating in PFP to meet certain NATO standards, but it is not directly related to NATO decisions concerning military requirements or enlargement; (12) GAO's analysis of DOD's cost estimate to enlarge NATO indicates that its key assumptions were generally reasonable and were largely consistent with the views of U.S., and NATO, and foreign government officials; (13) the assumption that large-scale conventional security threats will remain low significantly influenced the estimate; (14) DOD's lack of supporting cost documentation and its decision to include cost elements that were not directly related to enlargement call into question its overall estimate; (15) because of the uncertainties associated with enlargement and DOD's estimating procedures, the actual cost of NATO enlargement could be substantially different from DOD's estimated cost of about $27 billion to $35 billion; and (16) Rand and CBO cost estimates are no more reliable than DOD's.
gao_GAO-16-76	gao_GAO-16-76_0	After selecting beneficiaries for review, CMS requests supporting medical record documentation for all diagnoses submitted to adjust risk in the payment year. Beginning with the contract-level RADV audits of 2011 payments, CMS will collect extrapolated overpayments from MA organizations once all appeals are final. Recovery Audit Contractors Recovery auditors have been used in various industries, including health care, to identify and collect overpayments. CMS Does Not Focus MA RADV Audits on Contracts with the Highest Potential for Improper Payments CMS’s Estimate of MA Improper Payment Risk Has Shortcomings While coding intensity scores can be helpful in assessing the likelihood of improper payments for MA contracts, results from the CMS contract-level RADV audits of 2007 payments indicate that the coding intensity scores CMS calculated were not strongly correlated with the percentage of unsupported diagnoses within a contract. The fact that this correlation is not strong reduces the likelihood that contracts selected for audit would be those most likely to yield large amounts of improper payments and hampers CMS’s goal of using the audits to recover improper payments. MA organizations may receive diagnoses from providers that are related to services rendered to MA beneficiaries. For future years, CMS has an available method to distinguish between diagnoses likely submitted by providers to MA organizations and diagnoses that were likely later added by MA organizations. These shortcomings are impediments to CMS’s goal of recovering improper payments and are counter to federal internal control standards, which require that agencies use quality information to achieve their program goals. For that audit, CMS officials stated that 20 of the 30 contracts were chosen because they were among the top third of all contracts in coding intensity, but we found that many of the 20 contracts were not at the highest risk for improper payments according to CMS’s estimate of coding intensity. 2). CMS’s RADV Process Has Experienced Substantial Delays in Completing Contract- Level RADV Audits and Appeals Prior Contract-Level RADV Audits Have Been Ongoing for Years, and CMS Lacks a Timetable to Annually Conduct and Complete Audits CMS officials reported that current contract-level RADV audits have been ongoing for several years, including the appeals associated with the 2007 contract-level RADV audits. 3.) CMS has not followed established project management principles in this regard, which call for developing an overall plan to meet strategic goals and to complete projects in a timely manner. Both the selection of contracts and beneficiaries currently require risk score and beneficiary enrollment data. CMS Has Made Little Progress toward Incorporating a Recovery Audit Contractor in MA CMS has not expanded the RAC program to MA, as it was required to do by the end of 2010 by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. In December 2015, CMS issued a request for information seeking industry comment regarding how an MA RAC could be incorporated into CMS’s existing contract-level RADV audit framework. Despite its recent request for information, CMS does not have specific plans or a timetable for including RACs in the contract-level RADV audit process. Once the requirement is implemented, CMS could leverage the MA RAC in order to increase the number of MA organization contracts audited. CMS’s recovery of improper payments has been restricted because it has not established an MA RAC. For example, CMS currently plans to include 30 MA contracts in contract-level RADV audits for each payment year, about 5 percent of all contracts. Conclusions Limitations in CMS’s processes for selecting contracts for audit, in the timeliness of CMS’s audit and appeal processes, and in the agency’s plans for using MA RACs to assist in identifying improper payments hinder the accomplishment of its contract-level RADV audit goals: to conduct annual contract-level audits and recover improper payments. Third, the Administrator should enhance the timeliness of CMS’s contract- level RADV process by taking actions such as the following: closely aligning the time frames in CMS’s contract-level RADV audits with those of the national RADV audits the agency uses to estimate the MA improper payment rate; reducing the time between notifying MA organizations of contract audit selection and notifying them about the beneficiaries and diagnoses that will be audited; improving the reliability and performance of the agency’s process for transferring medical records from MA organizations, including assessing the feasibility of updating ESMD for use in transferring medical records in contract-level RADV audits; and requiring that CMS contract-level RADV auditors complete their medical record reviews within a specific number of days comparable to other medical record review time frames in the Medicare program. In its comment letter, HHS also reaffirmed its commitment to identifying and correcting improper payments in the MA program.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2014, Medicare paid about $160 billion to MA organizations to provide health care services for approximately 16 million beneficiaries. CMS, which administers Medicare, estimates that about 9.5 percent of its payments to MA organizations were improper, according to the most recent data—primarily stemming from unsupported diagnoses submitted by MA organizations. CMS currently uses RADV audits to recover improper payments in the MA program. GAO was asked to review the extent to which CMS is addressing improper payments in the MA program. This report examines the extent to which (1) CMS's contract selection methodology for RADV audits facilitates the recovery of improper payments, (2) CMS has completed RADV audits and appeals in a timely manner, and (3) CMS has made progress toward incorporating RACs into the MA program to identify and assist with improper payment recovery. In addition to reviewing research literature and agency documents, GAO analyzed data from ongoing RADV audits of 2007 and 2011 payments—CMS's two initial contract-level RADV audits. GAO also interviewed CMS officials. What GAO Found Medicare Advantage (MA) organizations contract with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to offer beneficiaries a private plan alternative to the original program and are paid a predetermined monthly amount by Medicare for each enrolled beneficiary. These payments are risk adjusted to reflect each enrolled beneficiary's health status and projected spending for Medicare-covered services. CMS conducts risk adjustment data validation (RADV) audits of MA contracts which facilitate the recovery of improper payments from MA organizations that submitted beneficiary diagnoses for payment adjustment purposes that were unsupported by medical records. With a separate national audit, CMS estimated that it improperly paid $14.1 billion in 2013 to MA organizations, primarily because of these unsupported diagnoses. GAO found that CMS's methodology does not result in the selection of contracts for audit that have the greatest potential for recovery of improper payments. First, CMS's estimate of improper payment risk for each contract, which is based on the diagnoses reported for the beneficiaries in that contract, is not strongly correlated with unsupported diagnoses. Second, CMS does not use other available information to select the contracts at the highest risk of improper payments. As a result, 4 of the 30 contracts CMS selected for its RADV audit of 2011 payments were among the 10 percent of contracts estimated by CMS to be at the highest risk for improper payments. These limitations are impediments to CMS's goal of recovering improper payments and do not align with federal internal control standards, which require that agencies use quality information to achieve their program goals. CMS's goal of eventually conducting annual RADV audits is in jeopardy because its two RADV audits to date have experienced substantial delays in identifying and recovering improper payments. RADV audits of 2007 and 2011 payments have taken multiple years and are still ongoing for several reasons. First, CMS's RADV audits rely on a system for transferring medical records from MA organizations that has often been inoperable. Second, CMS audit procedures have lacked specified time requirements for completing medical record reviews and for other steps in the RADV audit process. In addition, CMS has not established timeframes for appeal decisions at the first-level of the MA appeal process, as it has done in other contexts. CMS has not expanded the recovery audit program to MA by the end of 2010, as it was required to do by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. RACs have been used in other Medicare programs to recover improper payments for a contingency fee. In December 2015, CMS issued a request for information seeking industry comment on how an MA RAC could be incorporated into the RADV audit framework. CMS noted in its request that incorporating a RAC into the RADV framework would increase the number of MA contracts audited each year. CMS currently includes 30 MA contracts in each RADV audit, about 5 percent of all MA contracts. Despite the importance of increasing the number of contracts audited, CMS does not have specific plans or a timetable for incorporating RACs into the RADV audit framework, contrary to established project management principles, which stress the importance of developing an overall plan to meet strategic goals. What GAO Recommends GAO is making five recommendations to CMS to improve its processes for selecting contracts to include in the RADV audits, enhance the timeliness of the audits, and incorporate RACs into the RADV audits. HHS concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-01-587	gao_GAO-01-587_0	Spare Parts Shortages Adversely Affect Mission Performance, Economy and Efficiency of Operations, and Retention of Military Personnel The shortages of spare parts for the three aircraft systems we reviewed have not only affected readiness but also have created inefficiencies in maintenance processes and procedures and may adversely affect the retention of military personnel. The number of usable spare F-100-220 engines that the Air Force had on hand fell short of its goal by as few as 6 and as many as 104 engines during the same period. Spare Parts Shortages Contributed to Three Systems’ Failure to Meet Mission Performance Goals The Air Force did not achieve its mission-capable goals during fiscal years 1996-2000 for any of the three Air Force aircraft systems we reviewed, in part, due to spare parts shortages. The majority of factors were associated with work circumstances such as the lack of parts and materials needed to successfully complete daily job requirements. Contracting Issues Both the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have encountered a variety of problems in contracting for spare parts needed for repairs. We did not review these plans or the specific initiatives.	What GAO Found Spare parts shortages on the three Air Force systems GAO reviewed have undermined the performance of assigned missions and the economy and efficiency of maintenance activities. Specifically, the Air Force did not meet its mission-capable goals for the E-3 or C-5 aircrafts during fiscal years 1996-2000, nor did it have enough F-100-220 engines to meet peacetime and wartime goals during that period. These shortages may also affect personnel retention. GAO recently reported that the lack of parts and materials to successfully complete daily job requirements was one of six major factors causing job dissatisfaction among military personnel. Item managers at the maintenance facilities often indicated that spare parts shortages were caused by the inventory management system underestimating the need for spare parts and by delays in the Air Force's repair process as a result of the consolidation of repair facilities. Other reasons included difficulties with producing or repairing parts, reliability of spare parts, and contracting issues. The Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency have planned or begun many initiatives to alleviate shortages of the spare parts for the three systems GAO reviewed.
gao_GAO-15-597T	gao_GAO-15-597T_0	BIE’s mission is to provide Indian students with quality education opportunities. Organizational Fragmentation and Poor Communication Undermine Indian Affairs’ Administration of BIE Schools Indian Affairs’ administration of BIE schools—which has undergone multiple realignments over the past 10 years—is fragmented. Notably, when the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs was asked at a February 2015 hearing to clarify the responsibilities that various offices have over BIE schools, he responded that the current structure is “a big part of the problem” and that the agency is currently in the process of realigning the responsibilities various entities have with regard to Indian education, adding that it is a challenging and evolving process. Currently, Indian Affairs’ restructuring of BIE is ongoing. We previously found that key practices for organizational change suggest that effective implementation of a results- oriented framework, such as a strategic plan, requires agencies to clearly establish and communicate performance goals, measure progress toward those goals, determine strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals, and use performance information to make the decisions necessary to improve performance.BIE officials said that developing a strategic plan would help its leadership and staff pursue goals and collaborate effectively to achieve them. However, the plan has yet to be finalized. For example, our previous work found that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management’s lack of knowledge about the schools’ needs and expertise in relevant education laws and regulations resulted in critical delays in procuring and delivering school materials and supplies, such as textbooks. In our 2013 report, we also found that poor communication among Indian Affairs offices and with schools about educational services and facilities undermines administration of BIE schools. In 2013, we recommended that Interior develop a communication strategy for BIE to update its schools and key stakeholders of critical developments. Staff Capacity to Support Schools Is Limited Limited staff capacity poses another challenge to addressing BIE school needs. According to key principles of strategic workforce planning, the appropriate geographic and organizational deployment of employees can further support organizational goals and strategies and enable an organization to have the right people with the right skills in the right place. Consequently, in 2013 we recommended that Indian Affairs revise its strategic workforce plan to ensure that its employees providing administrative support to BIE have the requisite knowledge and skills to help BIE achieve its mission and are placed in the appropriate offices to ensure that regions with a large number of schools have sufficient support. Indian Affairs agreed to implement the recommendation but has not yet done so. For example, our preliminary analysis of Indian Affairs data shows that about 40 percent of BIA regional facility positions are currently vacant, including regional facility managers, architects, and engineers who typically serve as project managers for school construction and provide technical expertise. These officials had many additional responsibilities for BIE schools similar to school district superintendents of public schools, such as providing academic guidance. Without adequate staff and training, we reported that BIE will continue struggling to adequately monitor school expenses. Indian Affairs agreed with our recommendation but has not yet taken any action. Inconsistent Accountability Hampers Management of School Construction and Monitoring of School Spending Our work has shown that another management challenge, inconsistent accountability, hinders Indian Affairs in the areas of (1) managing school construction and (2) monitoring overall school expenditures. At one BIE-operated school we visited, Indian Affairs managed a project in which a contractor completed a $3.5 million project to replace roofs in 2010, but the roofs have leaked since their installation, according to agency documents. Uneven Accountability for School Spending In our 2014 report on BIE school spending, we found that BIE’s oversight did not ensure that school funds were spent appropriately on educational services, although external auditors had determined that there were serious financial management issues at some schools. While Indian Affairs agreed, it has not yet implemented this recommendation. In 2014 we recommended that Indian Affairs develop written procedures, including for Interior’s Indian School Equalization Program, to consistently document their monitoring activities and actions they have taken to resolve financial weaknesses identified at schools. Without a risk- based approach and written procedures to overseeing school spending— both integral to federal internal control standards—there is little assurance that federal funds are being used for their intended purpose to provide BIE students with needed instructional and other educational services. While Indian Affairs has generally agreed with these recommendations and reported taking some steps to address them, it has not yet fully implemented them.	Why GAO Did This Study BIE is responsible for providing quality education opportunities to Indian students. It currently oversees 185 schools, serving about 41,000 students on or near Indian reservations. Poor student outcomes raise questions about how well BIE is achieving its mission. In September 2013, GAO reported that BIE student performance has been consistently below that of Indian students in public schools. This testimony discusses Indian Affairs' management challenges in improving Indian education, including (1) its administration of schools, (2) staff capacity to address schools' needs, and (3) accountability for managing school construction and monitoring school spending. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in September 2013 and November 2014, as well as GAO's February 2015 testimony, which presents preliminary results from its ongoing review of BIE school facilities. A full report on school facilities will be issued later this year. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; analyzed agency data; and conducted site visits to schools, which were selected based on their geographic diversity and other factors. GAO has made several recommendations in its earlier reports; it is not making any new recommendations in this statement. What GAO Found GAO has reported for several years on how systemic management challenges within the Department of the Interior's Office of the Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs) continue to hamper efforts to improve Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools. Over the past 10 years, Indian Affairs has undergone several organizational realignments, resulting in multiple offices across different units being responsible for BIE schools' education and administrative functions. Indian Affairs' fragmented organization has been compounded by frequent turnover in its leadership over a 13-year period and its lack of a strategic plan for BIE. Further, fragmentation and poor communication among Indian Affairs offices has led to confusion among schools about whom to contact about problems, as well as delays in the delivery of key educational services and supplies, such as textbooks. Key practices for organizational change suggest that agencies develop a results-oriented framework, such as a strategic plan, to clearly establish and communicate performance goals and measure their progress toward them. In 2013, GAO recommended that Interior develop a strategic plan for BIE and a strategy for communicating with schools, among other recommendations. Indian Affairs agreed with and reported taking some steps to address the two recommendations. However, it has not fully implemented them. Limited staff capacity poses another challenge to addressing BIE school needs. According to key principles for effective workforce planning, the appropriate deployment of employees enables organizations to have the right people, with the right skills, in the right places. However, Indian Affairs data indicate that about 40 percent of its regional facility positions, such as architects and engineers, are vacant. Similarly, in 2014 GAO reported that BIE had many vacancies in positions to oversee school spending. Further, remaining staff had limited financial expertise and training. Without adequate staff and training, Indian Affairs will continue to struggle in monitoring and supporting schools. GAO recommended that Interior revise its workforce plan so that employees are placed in the appropriate offices and have the requisite knowledge and skills to better support schools. Although Indian Affairs agreed with this recommendation, it has not yet implemented it. Inconsistent accountability hampers management of BIE school construction and monitoring of school spending. Specifically, GAO has found that Indian Affairs did not consistently oversee some construction projects. For example, at one school GAO visited, Indian Affairs spent $3.5 million to replace multiple roofs in 2010. The new roofs have leaked since their installation, causing mold and ceiling damage, and Indian Affairs has not yet adequately addressed the problems, resulting in continued leaks and damage to the structure. Inconsistent accountability also impairs BIE's monitoring of school spending. In 2014 GAO found that BIE does not adequately monitor school expenditures using written procedures or a risk-based monitoring approach, contrary to federal internal control standards. As a result, BIE failed to provide effective oversight of schools when they misspent millions of dollars in federal funds. GAO recommended that the agency develop written procedures and a risk-based approach to improve its monitoring. Indian Affairs agreed but has yet to implement these recommendations.
gao_GAO-04-544	gao_GAO-04-544_0	Assessment Summary Since its inception, TSA has been focused on meeting an urgent mandate to deploy more than 55,000 airport passenger and baggage screening personnel and equipment to secure the nation’s airways. To do so, it created basic organizational and acquisition infrastructures. Specifically, our review of TSA’s acquisition function and inspector general reports identified a number of challenges in each of the four areas we assessed. Organizational alignment and leadership: TSA’s Office of Acquisition is at an organizational level too low to oversee the acquisition process, coordinate acquisition activities, and enforce acquisition policies effectively. The position of the office hinders its ability to help ensure that TSA follows the acquisition processes that enable the agency to get the best value on goods and services. Policies and processes: Because TSA’s acquisition policies and processes emphasize personal accountability, good judgment, justifiable business decisions, and integrated acquisition teams, effective implementation of TSA’s policies and processes depends on clear communication, measures to evaluate performance, and incentives to reward good acquisition practices. Effective implementation of TSA’s policies and processes has been hindered, however, by several factors: (1) TSA has not effectively communicated its acquisition policies throughout the agency; (2) TSA lacks internal controls to identify and address implementation issues and performance measures to determine whether TSA’s acquisition policies achieve desired outcomes; and (3) TSA’s deadline-driven culture fails to reinforce the importance of complying with policies. Human capital: TSA risks an imbalance in the size and capabilities of its acquisition workforce that could diminish the performance of the acquisition function throughout the agency. TSA’s Office of Acquisition worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security to develop and begin implementing an acquisition workforce plan. However, TSA’s Human Resource Office, which is responsible for recruiting and hiring the acquisition workforce agencywide, did not participate in developing the acquisition workforce plan. Without input from the Human Resources Office, it is not clear that the workforce plan can be effectively implemented throughout the agency. In addition, the Office of Acquisition reports that it is having difficulty attracting, developing, and retaining a workforce with the acquisition knowledge and skills required to accomplish TSA’s mission. Knowledge and information management: While TSA is participating in the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to develop functional requirements for an enterprisewide solution that supports the department’s resource management functions—including procurement and finance—TSA does not currently have the strategic information needed to support effective acquisition management decisions. To manage on a day-to-day basis, program and acquisition managers are relying on data derived from informal, ad hoc systems—which are often out-of-date, incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise unreliable. TSA is in the process of adopting the Coast Guard’s procurement and financial systems as interim solutions until the Department of Homeland Security implements departmentwide systems. These contracts represent about 48 percent of TSA’s fiscal year 2003 budget. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To review how well TSA is positioned to carry out its acquisition function, we used GAO’s previous best practices work as our criteria.	Why GAO Did This Study The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security, was established to secure the nation's transportation systems, beginning with commercial airports. To meet its mission, TSA has awarded over $8.5 billion in contracts since its creation in 2001. Spending on contracts accounted for 48 percent of TSA's fiscal year 2003 budget. Because of TSA's reliance on contracts to carry out its mission, its acquisition infrastructure-- including oversight, policies and processes, acquisition workforce, and information about its acquisitions--is critical. GAO was asked to review TSA's acquisition infrastructure to assess how well TSA is positioned to carry out its acquisition function. What GAO Found Since its inception, TSA has been focused on meeting an urgent mandate to deploy more than 55,000 airport passenger and baggage screening personnel and equipment to secure the nation's airways. To do so, it created basic organizational and acquisition infrastructures. However, our review of TSA's acquisition function and inspector general reports identified a number of challenges in each of the four areas we assessed. Organizational alignment and leadership: TSA's Office of Acquisition is at an organizational level too low to oversee the acquisition process, coordinate acquisition activities, and enforce acquisition policies effectively. The position of the office hinders its ability to help ensure that TSA follows acquisition processes that enable the agency to get the best value on goods and services. Policies and processes: TSA's acquisition policies and processes emphasize personal accountability, good judgment, justifiable business decisions, and integrated acquisition teams. However, effective implementation of TSA's policies and processes has been hindered by several factors. For example, TSA has not effectively communicated its acquisition policies throughout the agency. TSA also lacks internal controls to identify and address implementation issues and performance measures to determine whether acquisition policies are achieving desired results. Human capital: TSA risks an imbalance in the size and capabilities of its acquisition workforce that could diminish the performance of the acquisition function throughout the agency. TSA's Office of Acquisition worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security to develop and begin implementing an acquisition workforce plan. However, TSA's Human Resource Office, which is responsible for recruiting and hiring the acquisition workforce agencywide, did not participate in developing the acquisition workforce plan. Without input from the Human Resources Office, it is not clear that the workforce plan can be effectively implemented throughout the agency. In addition, the Office of Acquisition reports that it is having difficulty attracting, developing, and retaining a workforce with the acquisition knowledge and skills required to accomplish TSA's mission. Knowledge and information management: while TSA is participating in the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to develop requirements for an enterprisewide solution, TSA does not currently have the strategic information needed to support effective acquisition management decisions. To manage on a day-to-day basis, program and acquisition managers are relying on data derived from informal, ad-hoc systems. TSA is in the process of adopting the Coast Guard's procurement and financial systems as interim solutions until the Department of Homeland Security implements a departmentwide system. However, near-term improvement in acquisition outcomes will be difficult because TSA does not have the data needed to analyze and improve its acquisition processes.
gao_GGD-96-147	gao_GGD-96-147_0	Background Title V of the 1992 reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 authorizes OJJDP to award incentive grant funds to the states, which in turn are to award subgrants to units of general local government to support local juvenile delinquency prevention projects. During calendar years 1994 and 1995, 45 jurisdictions reported awarding about $18.9 million of Title V funds to units of general local government. This represents 64 percent of the $29.6 million in Title V funds awarded to jurisdictions for fiscal years 1994 and 1995. In addition, OJJDP awarded $1 million for six grants under its Safe Futures Program. Juvenile justice officials reported that 197 of the 277 local prevention projects (about 71 percent) were active and had spent about $3.6 million (or about 19 percent) of the Title V funds awarded in subgrants as of December 31, 1995. About two-thirds of the 51 jurisdictions reported that the requirement to comply with Title II core requirements to be eligible to receive Title V funding was not a barrier to local government participation in Title V program activities. This number (23) represents about 3 percent of the 796 local governments that applied for local delinquency prevention subgrants under Title V. Other Funding in Support of Delinquency Prevention Activities Officials in 19 jurisdictions reported that $319 million in state funds were devoted to support delinquency prevention activities in 1995, in addition to that allocated and committed as matching funds in support of Title V projects. A summary of preliminary information OJJDP received from nine other federal agencies indicates that approximately $4.3 billion was spent to support juvenile delinquency related prevention, juvenile justice, or youth-related programs and activities in fiscal year 1995. Specifically, we agreed to determine (1) which states and how many units of local government applied for and received Title V incentive grant funds; (2) how much fiscal years 1994 and 1995 grant money had been awarded and how much had been spent as of December 31, 1995; (3) the sources and amounts of matching funds committed to local delinquency prevention projects; (4) what Title V funds were used for; (5) whether Title II eligibility requirements have affected Title V participation; and (6) what funding, other than Title V, was provided to support local delinquency prevention activities. Intervention Strategy: Community/media mobilization and parent training. The program offered two components; the Saturday School program and AVBP.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Amendments Act's Title V incentive grant program for local delinquency prevention, focusing on: (1) the program's status and what types of projects are being funded; (2) the number of states and local governments that applied for Title V funds; (3) the amount of 1994 and 1995 grants that have been awarded as of December 31, 1995; (4) the sources and amounts of matching funds committed to local delinquency prevention projects; (5) whether eligibility requirements have affected Title V participation; and (6) other types of funding that has supported local delinquency prevention activities. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) as of March 1996, $29.6 of the $33 million in 1994 and 1995 Title V grants had been awarded to 54 jurisdictions and an additional $1 million was awarded for 6 grants to local jurisdictions under the Safe Futures Program; (2) of the 51 jurisdictions reviewed, 45 awarded $18.9 million in Title V subgrants to local governments to support 277 delinquency prevention projects; (3) these subgrantees spent about $3.6 million of their funds as of December 1995; (4) 44 jurisdictions received $17.2 million in Title V matching funds for 1994 and 1995; (5) 7 jurisdictions did not award subgrants; (6) the 2-year total funding for the 277 local delinquency prevention projects was about $36 million; (7) most of these projects addressed delinquency affecting youth in early or middle adolescence; (8) over 75 percent of the projects emphasized the prevention of delinquent activity, attempted to reduce delinquent behavior and recidivism, and addressed multiple risk factors; (9) most projects used community-based outreach intervention programs and services as well as some sort of parent training in conflict resolution and after-school program; (10) local governments generally reported that act's core requirements were not a barrier to local government participation in Title V program activities; (11) while 19 jurisdictions devoted $319 million in funds to support delinquency prevention activities in 1995, 31 jurisdictions did not know how much local or private funding was devoted to these activities; and (12) in 1995, nine other federal agencies reportedly spent $4.3 billion to support juvenile delinquency prevention, juvenile justice, or youth-related programs.
gao_GAO-04-824T	gao_GAO-04-824T_0	Many federal departments and agencies use GIS technology to help carry out their primary missions. Finally, significant governmentwide geospatial efforts—including the Geospatial One-Stop and National Map projects— did not exist in 1997, and are therefore not reflected in the strategic plan. In addition to being out of date, the 1997 document lacks important elements that should be included in an effective strategic plan. However, despite specific examples of coordination such as this, agencies have not consistently complied with OMB’s broader geospatial coordination requirements. OMB’s Oversight of Federal Geospatial Assets and Activities Has Not Yet Identified Redundancies OMB has recognized that potentially redundant geospatial assets need to be identified and that federal geospatial systems and information activities need to be coordinated. However, additional information that is critical to identifying redundancies was not required. Federal Agencies Continue to Collect and Maintain Duplicative Data and Systems Without a complete and up-to-date strategy for coordination or effective investment oversight by OMB, federal agencies continue to acquire and maintain duplicative data and systems. In summary, although various cross-government committees and initiatives, individual federal agencies, and OMB have each taken actions to coordinate the government’s geospatial investments across agencies and with state and local governments, agencies continue to purchase and maintain uncoordinated and duplicative geospatial investments. Without better coordination, such duplication is likely to continue. In order to improve the coordination of federal geospatial investments, our report recommends that the Director of OMB and the Secretary of the Interior direct the development of a national geospatial data strategy with outcome-related goals and objectives; a plan for how the goals and objectives are to be achieved; identification of key risk factors; and performance measures.	Why GAO Did This Study The collection, maintenance, and use of location-based (geospatial) information are essential to federal agencies carrying out their missions. Geographic information systems (GIS) are critical elements used in the areas of homeland security, healthcare, natural resources conservation, and countless other applications. GAO was asked to review the extent to which the federal government is coordinating the efficient sharing of geospatial assets, including through Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversight. GAO's report on this matter, Geospatial Information: Better Coordination Needed to Identify and Reduce Duplicative Investments (GAO-04-703), is being released today. GAO's testimony focuses on the extent to which the federal government is coordinating the sharing of geospatial assets, including through oversight measures in place at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in order to identify and reduce redundancies in geospatial data and systems. What GAO Found OMB, cross-government committees, and individual federal agencies have taken actions to coordinate geospatial investments across agencies and with state and local governments. However, these efforts have not been fully successful due to (1) a complete and up-to-date strategic plan is missing. The existing strategic plan for coordinating national geospatial resources and activities is out of date and lacks specific measures for identifying and reducing redundancies, (2) federal agencies are not consistently complying with OMB direction to coordinate their investments, and (3) OMB's oversight methods have not been effective in identifying or eliminating instances of duplication. This has resulted from OMB not collecting consistent, key investment information from all agencies. Consequently, agencies continue to independently acquire and maintain potentially duplicative systems. This costly practice is likely to continue unless coordination is significantly improved.
gao_RCED-98-98	gao_RCED-98-98_0	For farm programs other than the commodity programs, we found no substantial change in the amount of time farmers spend on paperwork and the number of visits they make to county offices. FSA Could Use Alternative Delivery Methods, but Such Changes Would Require Fundamental Shifts in Its Relationship With Farmers FSA could use alternative methods—such as mail and telecommunications—to enroll farmers in programs and deliver program benefits more efficiently. We found no statutory or regulatory requirements that direct farmers to visit a county office in order to meet paperwork requirements. Using alternative delivery methods should allow USDA to operate with fewer staff and offices, which could reduce personnel expenses by millions of dollars. FSA county offices have long provided a high level of personal service to farmers. We met with departmental officials, including the Associate Administrator of the Farm Service Agency. In addition, the Department noted that while alternative delivery methods may reduce government expenses, such changes could increase costs and administrative requirements for the farmers themselves. Scope and Methodology To determine the extent to which the changes in the farm programs resulting from the 1996 act have reduced farmers’ administrative requirements, we discussed the administrative requirements for major farm programs prior to and after the 1996 act with USDA headquarters, state, and county officials. We reviewed the documentation that USDA submitted to the Office of Management and Budget to justify the need for the paperwork requirements for these programs, as well as the time associated with completing the forms.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the administrative requirements placed on farmers participating in the revamped farm programs, as well as the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efficiency in delivering program services to farmers, focusing on the: (1) extent to which the changes to the farm programs resulting from the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 have reduced farmers' administrative requirements; and (2) possibility of having USDA use alternative delivery methods to more efficiently administer farm programs. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) farmers are now generally spending less time on administrative requirements than they did before the 1996 act; (2) the number of required visits to county offices has declined, as has the amount of time spent completing paperwork for the farm programs; (3) the Farm Service Agency (FSA) could transact more with business farmers through the mail and by telephone and computer, thus increasing the efficiency of its operations; (4) using alternative delivery methods should allow USDA to operate with fewer staff and offices, which could reduce expenses by millions of dollars; (5) while GAO found no statutory or regulatory requirements that direct farmers to visit county offices, changing delivery methods to rely more on such approaches will require fundamental changes in the FSA's long-standing practices and relationships with farmers; and (6) in particular, such methods would reduce farmers' personal contact with county office staff and place greater administrative responsibility on farmers to ensure that required paperwork is completed and submitted in a timely fashion.
gao_GAO-10-27	gao_GAO-10-27_0	In 2007, Medicare spent a total of $430.3 billion. On July 15, 2008, MIPPA was enacted, which terminated the CBP contracts awarded during round 1. However, MIPPA, which was enacted on July 15, 2008, terminated the CBP round 1 contracts. Of the 6,374 bids submitted by 1,010 suppliers, half were disqualified before competing on price—most often for missing financial documentation or noncompliance with accreditation requirements. About One-Quarter of the Submitted Bids Resulted in Contracts, but Almost Half Were Disqualified for Missing Financial Documentation Once the contract award process was completed, 22 percent of the bids submitted (1,372 of 6,374) resulted in contracts between CMS and suppliers to provide DME and other items to Medicare beneficiaries. CMS Estimated a 26 Percent Reduction in CBP Single Payment Amounts Compared to the Medicare Fee Schedule CMS estimated that, compared to the 2008 Medicare fee schedule, the volume-weighted reduction in Medicare’s payment amounts for items acquired under CBP round 1 would have averaged 26 percent. CMS Had Difficulty Providing Bidders with Clear, Timely Information, and Its Electronic Bid Submission System Was Problematic CMS’s implementation of CBP round 1 presented several challenges to suppliers. Some bid submission information was poorly timed and unclear, confusing suppliers about bidding requirements and compelling some to revise and resubmit their bids. CMS did not notify all suppliers of its postbidding review process, which reinstated some bids that CMS found to have been incorrectly disqualified. Though the PAOC provided input to CMS to address potential supplier challenges during the development and implementation of CBP round 1, some issues raised were not fully resolved, such as concerns about missing or lost financial documentation, the absence of a formal CMS bid review process, the concern that small suppliers would be disadvantaged, and that the supplier quality standards were not finalized before the CBP round 1 bid window opened. CMS Has Taken Several Steps to Improve Future Rounds of the CBP, Including Implementing MIPPA Provisions and Addressing IT Operational Problems CMS has taken several steps to improve future rounds of the CBP. Notification of missing financial documentation. CBP ombudsman. Second, CMS announced the timeline for the round 1 rebid bid window in advance, and to improve the quality and availability of information to bidding suppliers, CMS launched an intensive bidder education campaign to provide suppliers with all the information necessary to submit a complete bid during the round 1 rebid bid window. According to CMS, the request-for-bid instructions has been made clearer and more understandable. Some challenges may be expected for a new program, but problems occurred, in part because of poor communication by CMS and an inadequate electronic bid submission system. Because CMS did not effectively notify suppliers of the postbidding review conducted in round 1, some suppliers missed the opportunity to have their disqualified bids reviewed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To assess the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’s (CMS) implementation of round 1 of the competitive bidding program (CBP), we reviewed federal laws and regulations. We also interviewed officials from CMS and Palmetto GBA—the contractor CMS selected to implement the CBP bidding and contract award process—about the results of the bid submission and review processes, CMS’s major challenges in implementing CBP round 1, and the actions taken to improve future CBP rounds. In addition, we interviewed Maricom officials and reviewed available documentation related to the development, testing, and proposed implementation of the new electronic bid submission system—Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies bidding system (DBidS)—that will be used during the CBP round 1 rebid. Appendix II: Change in Numbers of Suppliers by CBP Product Category and CBA: 2006- 2008 Appendix II: Change in Numbers of Suppliers by CBP Product Category and CBA: 2006-2008 Competitive bidding area (CBA) Competitive bidding area (CBA) Competitive bidding area (CBA) Support Surfaces (group 2 mattresses and overlays) This table identifies the total number of suppliers that provided services in each competitive bidding area (CBA) for each product category in CY 2006 with allowed charges for items in the product category greater than $10,000 and the number of suppliers awarded CBP contracts in round 1 as of June 11, 2008. uipment, and supplies are used to provide food through a tube placed in the nose, the stomach, or the small intestine. Medicare: Competitive Bidding for Medical Equipment and Supplies Could Reduce Program Payments, but Adequate Oversight Is Critical.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2007, Medicare spent $8.3 billion for durable medical equipment (DME) and related supplies. To reduce spending, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) phase in, with several rounds of bidding, a large-scale competitive bidding program (CBP) for certain DME and other items. DME suppliers began bidding in round 1 of the CBP on May 15, 2007. After contracts were awarded, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), was enacted on July 15, 2008. Because of numerous concerns MIPPA delayed the program, terminated supplier contracts, and required CMS to begin the CBP round 1 rebid in 2009. GAO was asked to report on (1) the results of CBP round 1, (2) the major challenges CMS had in conducting CBP round 1, and (3) the steps CMS has taken to improve future CBP rounds. GAO reviewed CMS data and relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed officials from CMS and its contractors, and DME suppliers and professional associations. What GAO Found About a quarter of the bids submitted during CBP round 1 resulted in awarded contracts. The contracts were in effect until terminated by MIPPA on July 15, 2008. Of the 6,374 bids submitted by 1,010 suppliers, half were disqualified before competing on price. Bids were most often disqualified for missing financial documentation or noncompliance with accreditation requirements. In nearly two-thirds of CBP round 1's price competitions--in which suppliers submitted bids to deliver items for a specific product category within a specific competitive bidding area (CBA)--the number of suppliers decreased by at least half. The largest decreases in suppliers were in the Miami CBA. CMS estimated that the reduction in Medicare payments for items acquired as a result of CBP round 1 would have averaged 26 percent when compared to payments under the Medicare fee schedule. CBP's round 1 presented several challenges to suppliers, including poor timing and lack of clarity in bid submission information, a failure to inform all suppliers that losing bids could be reviewed, and an inadequate electronic bid submission system. CMS provided some clarifying information about bidding after the bid window opened, repeatedly extended the bid window deadlines, and provided updated guidance to bidders throughout the bid window. The information CMS provided to suppliers about bidding requirements was sometimes unclear and inconsistent, particularly regarding financial documentation. CMS did not effectively notify suppliers of its postbidding review process. Because some suppliers were not aware of the review process, they missed the opportunity to have their disqualified bids reviewed. CMS found that some bids had been incorrectly disqualified. Finally, several problems with the electronic bid submission system, including data losses from automated logouts and unscheduled downtimes, made it difficult for some suppliers to submit bids. CMS has taken several steps to improve the bidding process for the round 1 rebid and subsequent rounds of the CBP. CMS is implementing MIPPA provisions to notify suppliers of missing financial documentation and create a CBP ombudsman. It has reduced financial documentation requirements and revised the request for bid instructions to make it clearer and more understandable. It is also developing a new electronic bidding submission system, the Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies bidding system (DBidS), which the agency claims will address the deficiencies of the system used for round 1. Bidding for the round 1 rebid began in late October 2009. The CBP has the potential to produce considerable benefits, including reducing overall Medicare spending for DME and limiting potential fraud through increased scrutiny of suppliers. Although challenges may be expected for any new program, problems occurred in round 1 because of poor communication by CMS and an inadequate bid submission system.
gao_GAO-08-722T	gao_GAO-08-722T_0	More than 10,000 Marines and their dependents will remain stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. II shows current U.S. military bases on Guam). The Senate report also directed GAO to review DOD’s master planning effort for Guam as part of its annual review of DOD’s overseas master plans. DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam, but the Planning Process Is Ongoing The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has established the framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan, including the realignments on Okinawa and Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the U.S.- Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to create the conditions to reduce the burden of American military presence on local Japanese communities and to create a continuing presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including Guam. According to DOD officials, the results of the environmental statement, currently expected to be issued in 2010, can affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development. DOD will submit its fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first phase of military construction projects prior to the completion of the environmental impact statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to fund the military construction projects without the benefit of a completed environmental impact statement or a final decision on the full extent of its facility and funding requirements. JGPO officials told us that immediately after the environmental impact statement and record of decision are completed, the department will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United States and Japan to support military construction projects. Several DOD and Government of Guam Challenges Have Yet to Be Addressed DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges associated with the military buildup, including addressing funding and operational challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which could affect the development and implementation of their planning efforts. Third, the increase in military personnel and their dependents on Guam and the large number of the construction workers needed to build military facilities will create challenges for Guam’s community and civilian infrastructure. In addition, the costs associated with the development of training ranges and facilities on nearby islands are not included in the current estimate for the military buildup. DOD Faces Operational Challenges Operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility support and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, have not been fully addressed. In addition, DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the increased demand due to the military buildup. The system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military buildup. Guam’s water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution lines. Guam’s solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life. Government of Guam’s Planning Efforts Are in Their Initial Stages The government of Guam’s planning efforts to address infrastructure challenges associated with the buildup of military forces are in the initial stages, and several uncertainties further contribute to the difficulties the government of Guam faces in developing precise plans to address the effects of the military buildup on the local community and infrastructure. In addition, funding sources to address infrastructure challenges are uncertain. The uncertainties associated with exact size, makeup, and timing of the forces to be moved to Guam make it difficult for the government of Guam to develop comprehensive plans to address the effects of the proposed military buildup. However, the extent to which the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands from the federal government is unclear. In our September 2007 report on U.S. communities experiencing civilian and military population growth at Army installations, we found that communities will likely incur costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure improvements. Because of limited local funding, some of these communities are seeking federal and state assistance. 1).	Why GAO Did This Study To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to move 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this testimony addresses (1) DOD's planning process for the military buildup on Guam, (2) potential challenges for DOD and the government of Guam associated with the buildup, and (3) the status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup. This testimony is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO report on DOD's overseas master plans and prior work on issues related to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part, on preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DOD's planning effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of DOD-related growth on surrounding communities in the continental United States. GAO is not making recommendations at this time. What GAO Found DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; however, many key decisions remain, such as the final size of the military population, which units will be stationed there, and what military facilities will be constructed. This part of the planning process is ongoing, along with the development of a required environmental impact statement, currently expected to be issued in 2010. However, DOD will submit budget requests for fiscal year 2010 prior to that date, and thus may not know the full extent of its facility requirements before asking Congress to provide the associated funding. Officials of the Navy's Joint Guam Program Office told us that immediately after the environmental impact statement is completed, DOD will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal discussed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this is an optimistic schedule considering the possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient funding from the governments of United States and Japan to support the move. DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD's challenges include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on Guam's community and civilian infrastructure. For example, according to DOD and government of Guam officials, Guam's highways may be unable to bear the increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its electrical system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy needed, its water and wastewater treatment systems are already near capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated with the projected increase in U.S. forces and their dependents. The government of Guam's efforts to plan to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities are in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated with the military buildup contribute to the difficulties Guam officials face in developing precise plans. These challenges are somewhat analogous to challenges communities around continental U.S. growth bases face. Government of Guam officials recognize that the island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand; however, funding sources are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as to whether and to what extent the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to the military buildup. In September 2007, GAO reported that most communities experiencing civilian and military population growth at Army installations in the continental United States will likely incur costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure improvements, and many of these communities are also seeking federal and state assistance.
gao_GAO-13-256	gao_GAO-13-256_0	The performance tests determined the probability of detection and identification of radiation sources, including special nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. CBP made three attempts to complete this testing—in January and February 2009, July and August 2009, and October and November 2010. Test Results Show That ASP Did Not Meet Criteria to Pass Field Validation Testing, Leading DHS to Cancel the Program Because of unsatisfactory test results, ASP did not pass field validation testing, which led DHS to cancel the program. The Acting Director also stated that the cost to replace current RPMs with ASP for secondary screening was relatively low—approximately $350 million—compared with the original total program cost of $2 billion to $3 billion to use ASP for primary and secondary screening. ASP did not meet these criteria in part because of its inability to turn on at the beginning of each day and to continue operating long enough to complete a full day of testing. In addition, when ASP was operating, it produced an excessive number of alarms that incorrectly indicated naturally occurring radioactive material in the cargo might be masking special nuclear material. Accordingly, it is unclear why such speeds cannot be achieved at CBP land border crossings and seaports but can be achieved at truck weigh stations. Lessons Learned Reviews Improve Future Acquisition Efforts, but DHS Does Not Have Processes Ensuring Such Reviews Conducting lessons learned reviews when programs are cancelled benefits organizations by identifying things that worked well and did not work well in order to improve future acquisitions programs, according to experts we consulted; however, DHS does not have processes in place to ensure such reviews are conducted and reports documenting the results of the review are disseminated. When we asked these experts for their views on lessons learned reviews and reports for cancelled acquisition programs, they generally agreed on the following observations: Lessons learned reviews help to determine the reasons why programs were cancelled including problems with the technology, management, or setting requirements. Similar to the views of the experts identified by the National Academies, the DHS acquisition guidance states that (1) the objective of the reviews is to share lessons learned throughout the department to increase the probability of success for future acquisition programs and (2) the reviews are to take place immediately after programs are cancelled. In the case of the ASP program, a lessons learned review was conducted, and a lessons learned report was submitted to PARM and disseminated within CBP and DNDO in November 2012 at the explicit direction of DHS’s Under Secretary for Management. However, before the Under Secretary’s directive, there was confusion about whether such a review should be conducted for cancelled programs, as well as uncertainty about whether the program had been cancelled. DNDO officials told us in March 2012 that, even though they considered the program to have been cancelled by the Secretary in October 2011, they did not intend to conduct a lessons learned review because such reviews were not needed for cancelled programs. Another lesson learned from the ASP program is that the acquisition officials and the end users must work closely together to ensure the needed capability meets operational requirements. However, DNDO prepared the lessons learned report and disseminated it 2 years after the final ASP testing, and about a year after the Secretary of Homeland Security notified Congress of her decision to cancel the program. The amount of time between the final field validation testing of the ASP, the program’s cancellation, and the conducting of a lessons learned review and dissemination of a lessons learned report suggests that timely identification of lessons learned was not a DHS priority. DHS’s comments also refer to additional guidance called the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) Guide. These experts were identified on the basis on their knowledge of leading practices in large-scale engineering and acquisition programs. Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program.	Why GAO Did This Study Preventing terrorists from smuggling radiological or nuclear material into the United States to carry out an attack is a national priority. DHS's DNDO develops and deploys radiation detection equipment to assist other federal agencies, such as CBP, in intercepting illicit radiological or nuclear materials that could be used to make a radiological dispersive device (dirty bomb) or a crude nuclear bomb. CBP uses RPMs at nearly all land border crossings and seaports to detect radiation in trucks and cargo. DHS recently cancelled acquisition of ASPs, which was originally envisioned as costing from $2 billion to $3 billion. GAO was asked to provide updated information on the ASP program. This report examines, among other things, (1) the results of ASP testing conducted in 2009 and 2010 that led to DHS's decision to cancel the ASP program and (2) the benefits of lessons learned reviews and how DHS captures any lessons learned when programs are cancelled. GAO reviewed testing and acquisition documents and interviewed key agency officials, as well as seven experts the National Academies identified for their knowledge of leading practices in large-scale engineering and acquisition programs. What GAO Found The advanced spectroscopic portal monitor (ASP)--a next-generation radiation portal monitor (RPM) for screening trucks and cargo containers--did not pass field validation tests conducted in 2009 and 2010. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) intended to replace many currently deployed RPMs and handheld radiation detectors used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with ASPs. However, in the tests, ASP did not meet key requirements to detect radiation and identify its source. For example, ASP triggered too many false alarms from benign, naturally occurring radioactive material in common items such as kitty litter and granite, and it sometimes would not turn on or continue operating long enough to complete a day of testing. In addition, GAO's review identified analytical weaknesses related to the testing and program cancellation, including inconsistencies in DNDO's analysis of the settings used for testing the ASP. The final field validation test was conducted in November 2010, and the Secretary of Homeland Security notified Congress of her decision to cancel the program in October 2011. Conducting lessons learned reviews when programs are cancelled benefits organizations by identifying things that worked well and did not work well in order to improve future acquisitions programs, according to experts GAO consulted. However, DHS does not have processes in place to ensure such reviews are conducted or that the results are disseminated. Experts identified by the National Academies told GAO that lessons learned reviews help identify reasons why programs were cancelled. The experts also said lessons learned reviews should be required and conducted promptly, and the results should be disseminated. At the direction of DHS management, DNDO reviewed the ASP program and submitted and disseminated a lessons learned report in November 2012. This report cited 32 lessons learned including having program officials work closely with end users to ensure equipment meets operational requirements. DHS guidance calls for lessons learned reviews immediately after programs are cancelled and states that the lessons learned are to be shared throughout the department, but this guidance is not a requirement. Before DHS's directive, there was confusion about whether a lessons learned review was needed for the ASP program, and DNDO officials did not intend to conduct such a review. Moreover, DHS officials were unable to provide examples of previous lessons learned reports from other cancelled programs. DHS officials also said they have no process for disseminating such reports but are planning one. What GAO Recommends DHS should require lessons learned reviews and develop processes to ensure such reviews are done in a timely manner and the results disseminated throughout the department. DHS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations and has planned and taken some actions to address them.
gao_GAO-04-33	gao_GAO-04-33_0	Regulatory Actions Have Been Taken and Additional Advancements Are Under Way to Improve Cabin Occupants’ Safety and Health Over the past several decades, FAA has taken a number of regulatory actions designed to improve the safety and health of airline passengers and flight attendants by (1) minimizing injuries from the impact of a crash, (2) preventing fire or mitigating its effects, (3) improving the chances and speed of evacuation, or (4) improving the safety and health of cabin occupants. Specifically, we identified 18 completed regulatory actions that FAA has taken since 1984. U.S. commercial airliners are required to carry these enhanced emergency medical kits by 2004. For example, some airlines have elected to use inflatable lap seat belts and exit doors over the wings that swing out instead of requiring manual removal, and others are using photo-luminescent floor lighting in lieu of or in combination with traditional electrical lighting. The remaining 14 advancements are in various stages of research, engineering, and development in the United States, Canada, or Europe. Several Factors Have Slowed the Implementation of Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Advancements Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin occupant safety and health advancements in the United States. When advancements are available for commercial use but not yet implemented or installed, their use may be slowed by the time it takes (1) for FAA to complete the rule- making process, which may be required for an advancement to be approved for use but may take many years; (2) for U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve differences between their respective cabin occupant safety and health requirements; and (3) for the airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has approved their use, including the time required to schedule an advancement’s installation to coincide with major maintenance cycles and thereby minimize the costs associated with taking an airplane out of service. As a result, FAA may not be identifying and funding the most critical or cost-effective research projects. However, FAA’s processes for setting research priorities and selecting projects for further research are hampered by data limitations. In particular, FAA lacks certain autopsy and survivor information from aircraft crashes that could help it identify and target research to the most important causes of death and injury in an airliner crash. This information would help the researchers analyze factors that might have an impact on survival. To identify key advancements that are available or are being developed by FAA and others to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins, we consulted experts (1) to help ensure that we had included the advancements holding the most promise for improving safety and health; and (2) to help us structure an evaluation of selected advancements (i.e., confirm that we had included the critical benefits and drawbacks of the potential advancements) and develop a descriptive analysis for them, where appropriate, including their benefits, costs, technology readiness levels, and regulatory status. The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada is similar to NTSB in the United States. fires. emergency. Status Multisenor detectors are not currently available because additional research is needed.	Why GAO Did This Study Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in the United States. Furthermore, there are survivors in the majority of airliner crashes, according to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Additionally, more passengers might have survived if they had been better protected from the impact of the crash, smoke, or fire or better able to evacuate the airliner. As requested, GAO addressed (1) the regulatory actions that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken and the technological and operational improvements, called advancements, that are available or are being developed to address common safety and health issues in large commercial airliner cabins and (2) the barriers, if any, that the United States faces in implementing such advancements. What GAO Found FAA has taken a number of regulatory actions over the past several decades to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins. GAO identified 18 completed actions, including those that require safer seats, cushions with better fire-blocking properties, better floor emergency lighting, and emergency medical kits. GAO also identified 28 advancements that show potential to further improve cabin safety and health. These advancements vary in their readiness for deployment. Fourteen are mature, currently available, and used in some airliners. Among these are inflatable lap seat belts, exit doors over the wings that swing out on hinges instead of requiring manual removal, and photoluminescent floor lighting. The other 14 advancements are in various stages of research, engineering, and development in the United States, Canada, or Europe. Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin safety and health advancements. For example, when advancements are ready for commercial use, factors that may hinder their implementation include the time it takes for (1) FAA to complete the rule-making process, (2) U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve differences between their respective requirements, and (3) the airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has approved their use. When advancements are not ready for commercial use because they require further research, FAA's processes for setting research priorities and selecting research projects may not ensure that the limited federal funding for cabin safety and health research is allocated to the most critical and cost-effective projects. In particular, FAA does not obtain autopsy and survivor information from NTSB after it investigates a crash. This information could help FAA identify and target research to the primary causes of death and injury. In addition, FAA does not typically perform detailed analyses of the costs and effectiveness of potential cabin occupant safety and health advancements, which could help it identify and target research to the most cost-effective projects.
gao_GAO-06-992T	gao_GAO-06-992T_0	In January 2006, EPA prepared a regulatory impact analysis for one such rule—particulate matter—that presented limited estimates of the costs and benefits expected to result from the proposed particulate matter rule. The National Academies’ 2002 report examined how EPA estimates the health benefits of its proposed air regulations and emphasized the need for EPA to account for uncertainties and maintain transparency in the course of conducting benefit analyses. EPA Applied Some, but Not All, of the National Academies’ Recommendations to the Particulate Matter Regulatory Impact Analysis EPA applied—either wholly or in part—approximately two-thirds of the Academies’ recommendations in preparing its January 2006 particulate matter regulatory impact analysis and continues to address the recommendations through ongoing research and development. Recommendations EPA Applied or Partially Applied to Its Particulate Matter Health Benefit Analysis The January 2006 regulatory impact analysis on particulate matter represents a snapshot of an ongoing EPA effort to respond to the National Academies’ recommendations on developing estimates of health benefits for air pollution regulations. Specifically, the agency applied, at least in part, approximately two-thirds of the recommendations—8 were applied and 14 were partially applied—by taking steps toward conducting a more rigorous assessment of uncertainty by, for example, evaluating the different assumptions about the link between human exposure to particulate matter and health effects and discussing sources of uncertainty not included in the benefit estimates. Moreover, the Academies recommended that EPA’s benefit analysis reflect how the benefit estimates would vary in light of multiple uncertainties. In addition to the uncertainty underlying the causal link between exposure and premature death, other key uncertainties can influence the estimates. For these reasons, EPA’s responses reflect a partial application of the Academies’ recommendation. Recommendations EPA Did Not Apply to the Particulate Matter Analysis EPA did not apply the remaining 12 recommendations to the analysis for various reasons. Agency officials viewed most of these recommendations as relevant to its health benefit analyses and, citing the need for additional research and development, emphasized the agency’s commitment to continue to respond to the recommendations. EPA did not believe the state of scientific knowledge on relative toxicity was sufficiently developed at the time it prepared the draft regulatory impact analysis to include this kind of analysis. We found that EPA is sponsoring research on the relative toxicity of particulate matter components. Specifically, the National Academies recommended that EPA clearly summarize the key elements of the benefit analysis in an executive summary that includes a table that lists and briefly describes the regulatory options for which EPA estimated the benefits, the assumptions that had a substantial impact on the benefit estimates, and the health benefits evaluated. Concluding Observations While EPA officials said that the final regulatory impact analysis on particulate matter will reflect further responsiveness to the Academies’ recommendations, continued commitment and dedication of resources will be needed if EPA is to fully implement the improvements recommended by the National Academies. In particular, the agency will need to ensure that it allocates resources to needed research on emerging issues, such as the relative toxicity of particulate matter components, and to assessing which sources of uncertainty have the greatest influence on benefit estimates. While EPA officials said they expect to reduce the uncertainties associated with the health benefit estimates in the final particulate matter analysis, a robust uncertainty analysis of the remaining uncertainties will nonetheless be important for decision makers and the public to understand the likelihood of attaining the estimated health benefits.	Why GAO Did This Study Scientific evidence links exposure to particulate matter--a widespread form of air pollution--to serious health problems, including asthma and premature death. Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) periodically reviews the appropriate air quality level at which to set national standards to protect the public against the health effects of six pollutants, including particulate matter. EPA proposed revisions to the particulate matter standards in January 2006 and issued a regulatory impact analysis of the revisions' expected costs and benefits. The estimated benefits of air pollution regulations have been controversial in the past, and a 2002 National Academies report to EPA made recommendations aimed at improving the estimates for particulate matter and other air pollution regulations. This testimony is based on GAO's July 2006 report Particulate Matter: EPA Has Started to Address the National Academies' Recommendations on Estimating Health Benefits, but More Progress Is Needed (GAO-06-780). GAO determined whether and how EPA applied the National Academies' recommendations in its estimates of the health benefits expected from the January 2006 proposed revisions to the particulate matter standards. What GAO Found While the National Academies' report generally supported EPA's approach to estimating the health benefits of its proposed air pollution regulations, it included 34 recommendations for improvements. EPA has begun to change the way it conducts and presents its analyses of health benefits in response to the National Academies' recommendations. For its particulate matter health benefit analysis, EPA applied, at least in part, about two-thirds of the Academies' recommendations. Specifically, EPA applied 8 and partially applied 14. For example, in response to the Academies' recommendations, EPA evaluated how benefits might change given alternative assumptions and discussed sources of uncertainty not included in the benefit estimates. Although EPA applied an alternative technique for evaluating one key uncertainty--the causal link between exposure to particulate matter and premature death--the health benefit analysis did not assess how the benefit estimates would vary in light of other key uncertainties, as the Academies had recommended. Consequently, EPA's response represents a partial application of the recommendation. Agency officials said that ongoing research and development efforts will allow EPA to gradually make more progress in applying this and other recommendations to future analyses. EPA did not apply the remaining 12 recommendations to the analysis, such as the recommendation to evaluate the impact of using the assumption that the components of particulate matter are equally toxic. EPA officials viewed most of these 12 recommendations as relevant to the health benefit analyses but noted that the agency was not ready to apply specific recommendations because of, among other things, the need to overcome technical challenges stemming from limitations in the state of available science. For example, EPA did not believe that the state of scientific knowledge on the relative toxicity of particulate matter components was sufficiently developed to include it in the January 2006 regulatory impact analysis. The agency is sponsoring research on this issue. We note that continued commitment and dedication of resources will be needed if EPA is to fully implement the improvements recommended by the National Academies. In particular, the agency will need to ensure that it allocates resources to needed research on emerging issues, such as the relative toxicity of particulate matter components, and to assessing which sources of uncertainty have the greatest influence on benefit estimates. While EPA officials said they expect to reduce the uncertainties associated with the health benefit estimates in the final particulate matter analysis, a robust uncertainty analysis of the remaining uncertainties will nonetheless be important for decision makers and the public to understand the likelihood of attaining the estimated health benefits.
gao_T-AIMD-96-129	gao_T-AIMD-96-129_0	Its recommendations led directly to what later became the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. In that act, the Congress declared “that it is essential— (1) to assure effective congressional control over the budgetary process; (2) to provide for congressional determination each year of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures; (3) to provide a system of impoundment control; (4) to establish national budget priorities; and (5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the executive branch in a manner that will assist the Congress in discharging its duties.” We all often forget that the 1974 act did not seek a specific result in terms of the deficit. Rather, it sought to assert the Congress’ role in setting overall federal fiscal policy and establishing spending priorities and to impose a structure and a timetable on the budget debate. The 1974 act also eliminated the Congress’ dependence on OMB for numbers and analysis by giving the Congress an independent source of budget numbers—the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). It settled the fight about impoundments by setting up a process for the President to report rescissions and deferrals. Gramm-Rudman- Hollings and the Budget Enforcement Act It was not until the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985—commonly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings or GRH—that the focus of the process changed from increasing Congressional control over the budget to reducing the deficit. It did not seek to control economic, price- or demographic-driven growth in existing direct spending programs or tax expenditures, and these are the areas of greatest growth today. provide information about the long-term impact of decisions while recognizing the differences between short-term forecasts, medium-term projections, and a long-term perspective; provide information and be structured to focus on the important macro trade-offs, e.g., between consumption and investment; provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs on a variety of levels, e.g., between mission areas and between different tools; and be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent. If, however, annual budget resolutions are to be replaced with biennial budget resolutions, then something like the “lookback” procedure described above could become very important. A 2-year appropriations cycle would change the nature of that control. It is also unclear how much time it would save. The budget process serves a wider purpose.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the evolution of the budget process and challenges to changing the budget process. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) conflicts over who controlled the budget led to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and Congress' role in setting federal fiscal policies and establishing spending priorities; (2) the act also established the Congressional Budget Office as an independent source of budget numbers and set up a process for the President to report budget rescissions and deferrals; (3) in 1985, the focus of the budget process shifted from increasing congressional control over the budget to reducing the deficit; (4) later legislation held Congress accountable for the part of the budget under its direct control, but did not seek to control growth in direct spending programs or tax expenditures, which are the main reasons for continued budget growth; (5) the budget process should provide a long-term perspective, focus on macro trade-offs between consumption and investment expenditures, provide necessary information to make informed trade-off decisions between missions areas, be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent; (6) streamlining parts of the budget process may cause problems in other budget processes; (7) if the use of multiyear fiscal policy agreements continues, then annual budget resolutions could be eliminated, but a lookback procedure would become very important; and (8) a 2-year appropriation cycle would change the nature of the budget process, but how much time would be saved is unclear.
gao_GAO-13-59	gao_GAO-13-59_0	The Majority of Arrests against CBP Employees Are Related to Misconduct; Majority of Allegations Occurred at Locations along the Southwest Border According to CBP’s data, incidents of arrests of CBP employees from fiscal years 2005 through 2012 represent less than 1 percent of the entire CBP workforce per fiscal year. During this time period, 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption—the majority of which were stationed along the southwest border. The majority of allegations made against OFO and USBP employees during this time period were against officers and agents stationed on the southwest U.S. border. In addition, there were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. Examples include domestic violence and driving under the influence while off duty. Although the total number of corruption convictions (125) is less than 1 percent when compared with CBP’s workforce population by fiscal year, CBP officials stated that they are concerned about the negative impact employee corruption cases have on agencywide integrity. CBP Has Implemented Integrity-Related Controls, but Could Better Assess Screening Tools for Applicants and Incumbent Employees CBP employs integrity-related controls to mitigate the risk of corruption and misconduct for both applicants and incumbent officers and agents, such as polygraph examinations and random drug testing, respectively. However, CBP IA does not have a mechanism to track and maintain data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background information or polygraph examination) provided the information that PSD used to determine that applicants were not suitable for hire, making it difficult for CBP IA to assess the relative effectiveness of its various screening tools. CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of Expanding Its Polygraph Program to Incumbent Officers and Agents CBP IA officials stated that they are considering implementing a polygraph requirement for incumbent employees; however, CBP has not yet assessed the feasibility of expanding the program beyond applicants. However, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs and benefits of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, as well as other factors that may affect the agency’s efforts to expand the program. For example: Costs. Assessing the feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs early on in its planning efforts, consistent with standard practices, could help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. PSD officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008. Without a quality review program that is implemented and documented on a consistent basis, it is difficult to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the investigation and adjudication process and whether individuals that are unsuitable for employment are attempting to find employment with CBP. CBP Is Developing an Integrity Strategy, but Does Not Have Target Timelines for Its Completion and Implementation CBP has not completed an integrity strategy that encompasses the activities of CBP components that have integrity initiatives under way, including CBP IA, OFO, and USBP, as called for in the CBP Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. See Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Workforce Integrity Study. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting an integrity strategy for approval by the components and CBP’s senior management, in accordance with CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. He indicated that that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP component entities in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority and responsibility for overseeing the implementation of all CBP integrity- related activities. Without target timelines, it will be difficult for CBP to monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy. Recommendations for Executive Action To enhance CBP’s efforts to mitigate the risk of corruption and misconduct among CBPOs and BPAs, we recommend that the CBP commissioner take the following seven actions: develop a mechanism to maintain and track data on the sources of information (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination admissions) that PSD uses to determine what applicants are not suitable for hire to help CBP IA assess the effectiveness of its applicant screening tools; assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to incumbent CBPOs and BPAs, including the associated costs and benefits, options for how the agency will use the results of the examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies; conduct quality assurance reviews of CBP IA’s adjudications of background investigations and periodic reinvestigations, as required in PSD’s quality assurance program; establish a process to fully document, as required, any deficiencies identified through PSD’s quality assurance reviews; develop detailed guidance within OFO on the roles and responsibilities for integrity officers, in consultation with appropriate stakeholders such as CBP IA; set target timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive integrity strategy; and, complete OFO and USBP postcorruption analysis reports for all CBPOs and BPAs who have been convicted of corruption-related activities, to the extent that information is available. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To examine data on arrests of and allegations against U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees accused of corruption or misconduct issues, we analyzed data on 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012 for corruption activities.	Why GAO Did This Study CBPa component within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel and trade. Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations are seeking to target CBP employees with bribes to facilitate the illicit transport of drugs, aliens, and other contraband across the southwest U.S. border, in particular. CBP IA is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBPs workforce, programs, and operations; and CBP components implement integrity initiatives. GAO was asked to review CBPs efforts to ensure the integrity of its workforce. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and allegations against CBP employees for corruption or misconduct, (2) CBPs implementation of integrity-related controls, and (3) CBPs strategy for its integrity programs. GAO analyzed arrest and allegation data since fiscal year 2005 and 2006, respectively, reviewed integrity-related policies and procedures, and interviewed CBP officials in headquarters and at four locations along the southwest border selected for geographic location, among other factors. What GAO Found U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBPs entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity. CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBPs Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process. CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IAs Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IAs authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, track and maintain data on sources of information used to determine which applicants are unsuitable for hire, assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to incumbent officers and agents, consistently conduct quality assurance reviews, and set timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive integrity strategy. DHS concurred and reported taking steps to address the recommendations.
gao_HEHS-97-28	gao_HEHS-97-28_0	STDP’s Backlog Goal Will Not Be Reached SSA acknowledges that it will not reach STDP’s goal of reducing the backlog of appealed cases to 375,000 by December 1996. In fact, OHA’s backlog of about 515,000 appealed cases as of August 1996—about 22 months into STDP—was 3 percent higher than the backlog of about 500,000 that existed at the plan’s inception. OHA is relying on increased productivity from its ALJs and attorneys to increase its ability to dispose of cases and facilitate reaching this revised target. During fiscal year 1995, OHA received approximately 37,500 more appealed cases than it had initially projected for the year. OHA’s Allowance Rate Has Decreased Under STDP Some SSA and OHA officials had expressed concern to us that STDP’s aggressive processing goals could result in inappropriate benefit awards for some disability claimants and that STDP’s initiatives could cause OHA’s allowance rate to increase. However, the percent of appealed cases allowed by OHA since STDP’s inception has notably decreased. The allowance rate has decreased from about 75 percent in fiscal year 1994— the fiscal year preceding STDP’s implementation—to about 69 percent through the third quarter of fiscal year 1996. SSA has not completed any analyses of factors contributing to this decrease, however. Recommendation to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration SSA is evaluating the accuracy of the decisions made under STDP to help determine the advisability of continuing with the plan.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Short-Term Disability Plan (STDP), focusing on: (1) progress made by SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) in meeting STDP backlog reduction and case processing goals; (2) the current OHA allowance rate for appealed cases compared with pre-STDP levels; and (3) the accuracy of OHA decisions made under STDP. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) OHA has made progress in reducing its inventory of appealed cases, but SSA will not reach its goal of reducing this backlog to 375,000 by December 1996; (2) activities under the plan's key initiatives allowed OHA to dispose of about 66,500 more cases than it would have had STDP not been implemented, but despite OHA's increased productivity, as of August 1996 its backlog of appealed cases was about 3 percent higher than in November 1994; (3) since STDP was initiated, the allowance rate has decreased from about 75 percent in fiscal year (FY) 1994 to about 69 percent through the third quarter of (FY) 1996; and (4) SSA has not completed any analysis of the accuracy of STDP decisions or clearly established to what extent, if any, STDP has affected OHA's allowance rate.
gao_GAO-13-833	gao_GAO-13-833_0	Figure 1 aligns the knowledge points with key decision points in DOD’s acquisition process. The Navy’s UCLASS Acquisition Strategy Defers Key Oversight Mechanisms In fiscal year 2014, the Navy plans to commit to investing an estimated $3.7 billion to develop, produce, and field from 6 to 24 aircraft and modify 1 to 4 aircraft carriers as an initial increment of UCLASS capability— referred to as an early operational capability. Accordingly, it is not planning to hold a Milestone B review to formally initiate a system development program— which would trigger key oversight mechanisms—until after the initial capability is fielded in fiscal year 2020. This strategy will likely limit Congress’s ability to oversee this 6- year multibillion dollar program. Navy officials believe that their approach effectively utilizes the flexibility in DOD’s acquisition policy to ensure that UCLASS requirements and concept of operations are well understood and achievable before formally beginning a system development program. The following year, the Navy plans to review those preliminary designs, conduct a full and open competition, and award a contract to develop and deliver the UCLASS air vehicles, effectively ending competition within the air vehicle segment. DOD policy and best practices indicate that around this review point a program would typically be expected to hold a Milestone B review and transition from technology development to system development. UCLASS Faces Cost, Schedule, and Program Management Risks The UCLASS system faces several risks related to cost, schedule, and program management that, if not addressed, could lead to additional cost and significant schedule delays for the system. The Navy recognizes that many of these risks exist and has mitigation plans in place to address them. UCLASS cost estimates are uncertain and could exceed available funding: Preliminary cost estimates completed by the Navy indicate that the development and fielding of the initial UCLASS system through fiscal year 2020 could cost between $3.7 and $5.9 billion, all of which is expected to be development funding. However, the Navy has only projected funding of $3.2 billion for the system through fiscal year 2020. The Navy’s strategy allows for about 8 months between the time that it issues its request for air vehicle proposals and the time it awards the contract. UCLASS is dependent on development and delivery of other systems: The Navy identifies the delivery of the Common Control System software as a risk and notes that if it is delayed, alternative control system software would be needed to achieve the established deployment timeline. The Navy will have three separate but interrelated segments to manage, the timing and alignment of which are crucial to success of the overall system. The system is reliant on 22 existing government systems, such as JPALS. UCLASS Acquisition Strategy Contains Aspects of a Knowledge-Based Approach While the Navy has not yet established a business case or acquisition program baseline, the UCLASS strategy reflects aspects of a knowledge- based approach. Conclusions The Navy plans to manage UCLASS as a technology development program, although its strategy encompasses activities commensurate with system development and early production. Without a program baseline and regular reporting on progress, it will be difficult for Congress to hold the Navy accountable for achieving UCLASS cost, schedule, and performance goals. For example, the Navy is leveraging knowledge gained from prior technology development programs, incorporating an open systems design, matching resources with requirements, and utilizing competition. Matters for Congressional Consideration To enhance program oversight and accountability given that the Navy does not plan to modify its acquisition strategy and hold a Milestone B decision review for the UCLASS system following the system level preliminary design review in fiscal year 2015, Congress should consider directing the Navy to hold a Milestone B review for the system after the system level preliminary design review is complete. If the Navy does not comply, Congress should consider limiting the amount of funding available for the UCLASS system until the Navy provides the basic elements of an acquisition program baseline, such as development and production cost estimates, unit costs, quantities, schedules, annual funding profiles, and key performance parameters needed for such a large investment. Recommendation for Executive Action In order to provide for increased congressional oversight and program accountability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to hold a Milestone B decision review for the UCLASS system following the system level preliminary design review— which is currently scheduled in fiscal year 2015. The Navy pointed out that DOD’s policy defines the technology development phase as an “iterative process designed to assess the viability of technologies while simultaneously refining user requirements.” The Navy went on to state that the UCLASS user requirements and Concept of Operations will be refined during the early operational capability fleet exercises currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2020 and that, at that time, the Navy plans to request approval to hold a Milestone B review to continue development of the UCLASS capability. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that GAO evaluate the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system acquisition strategy. This report (1) assesses the Navy’s UCLASS acquisition strategy, (2) identifies key areas of risk facing the UCLASS system, and (3) notes areas where the Navy’s strategy contains good practices. Additionally we compared the Navy’s strategy against DOD acquisition policy.	Why GAO Did This Study The Navy estimates that it will need $3.7 billion from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2020 to develop and field an initial UCLASS system. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that GAO evaluate the UCLASS system acquisition strategy. This report (1) assesses the UCLASS acquisition strategy, (2) identifies key areas of risk facing the system, and (3) notes areas where the Navy's strategy contains good practices. To do this work, GAO reviewed the Navy's acquisition strategy and compared it to DOD's acquisition policy, among other criteria; and reviewed Navy acquisition documents and spoke with Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials. What GAO Found In fiscal year 2014, the Navy plans to commit to investing an estimated $3.7 billion to develop, build, and field from 6 to 24 aircraft as an initial increment of Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) capability. However, it is not planning to hold a Milestone B review--a key decision that formally initiates a system development program and triggers key oversight mechanisms--until after the initial UCLASS capability has been developed and fielded in fiscal year 2020. The Navy views UCLASS as a technology development program, although it encompasses activities commensurate with system development, including system integration and demonstration. Because the initial UCLASS system is to be developed, produced, and fielded before a Milestone B decision, Congress's ability to oversee the program and hold it accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals will likely be limited. Specifically, the program will operate outside the basic oversight framework provided by mechanisms like a formal cost and schedule baseline, statutory unit cost tracking, and regular reports to Congress on cost, schedule, and performance progress. The Navy believes its approach effectively utilizes the flexibility in the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition policy to gain knowledge needed to ensure a successful UCLASS system development program starting in fiscal year 2020. Yet the Navy expects to review preliminary designs, conduct a full and open competition, and award a contract for UCLASS development in fiscal year 2014, a point at which DOD policy and best practices indicate that a program would be expected to hold a Milestone B review to initiate a system development program. Apart from deferring Milestone B, the Navy's plan would be consistent with the knowledge-based acquisition process reflected in DOD policy. UCLASS faces several programmatic risks going forward. First, the UCLASS cost estimate of $3.7 billion exceeds the level of funding that the Navy expects to budget for the system through fiscal year 2020. Second, the Navy has scheduled 8 months between the time it issues its request for air vehicle design proposals and the time it awards the air vehicle contract, a process that DOD officials note typically takes 12 months to complete. Third, the UCLASS system is heavily reliant on the successful development and delivery of other systems and software, which creates additional schedule risk. Fourth, the Navy will be challenged to effectively manage and act as the lead integrator for three separate but interrelated segments--air vehicle, carrier, and control system--and 22 other government systems, such as the aircraft landing system, the timing and alignment of which are crucial to achieving the desired UCLASS capability. While the Navy recognizes many of these risks and has mitigation plans in place, they could lead to cost increases and schedule delays if not effectively addressed. The Navy's UCLASS acquisition strategy includes some good acquisition practices that reflect aspects of a knowledge-based approach. For example, the Navy is leveraging significant knowledge gained from prior technology development efforts, incorporating an open systems design approach, working to match the system's requirements with available resources, and reviewing preliminary designs for the air vehicle before conducting a competition to select a single contractor to develop and deliver the air vehicle segment. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider directing the Navy to hold a Milestone B review for the UCLASS system after the system level preliminary design review is complete.If the Navy does not comply, Congress should consider limiting the amount of funding available for the UCLASS system until an acquisition program baseline is provided. GAO included these matters for consideration because the Navy does not plan to make changes as a result of GAOs recommendation to hold a Milestone B review following the system level preliminary design reviewwhich is currently scheduled in fiscal year 2015. The Navy did not concur with the recommendation, and believes that its approved strategy is compliant with acquisition regulations and laws. GAO continues to believe that its recommendation is valid as discussed in this report.
gao_GAO-08-1137	gao_GAO-08-1137_0	Under the direction of the Senior Oversight Committee, DOD and VA are piloting a joint disability evaluation system to improve the timeliness and resource use of DOD’s and VA’s separate disability evaluation systems. Begun in November 2007, the pilot involves cases at three Washington, D.C.-area military treatment facilities, including Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Army Has Taken Steps to Help Servicemembers Undergoing Disability Evaluation, but Faces Challenges The Army has taken a number of steps to help servicemembers navigate the disability evaluation process through additional supports and streamlining efforts, such as expanding support to servicemembers by hiring more board liaisons and legal personnel. The Army faces challenges in demonstrating an impact on servicemember satisfaction, in part because the Army has not yet implemented a satisfaction survey that adequately targets and queries servicemembers who are undergoing disability evaluation. Army Has Increased Staffing for Servicemembers Undergoing Disability Evaluation, but Struggles to Meet Its Internal Goals As part of the AMAP, the Army established staffing goals for staff who are key to helping servicemembers navigate the disability evaluation process. Although the Army generally meets DOD’s timeliness goal for the PEBs to process cases, it has had less success in meeting timeliness goals for the MEBs. The Army faces particular challenges in meeting timeliness goals for completing reservists’ MEBs and PEBs. According to Army officials, disability case processing for reservists is treated the same as that for active component servicemembers, but reservist cases may take longer due, in part, to the challenge of obtaining complete personnel and medical documents. The Army has taken steps to streamline processes to help servicemembers better navigate the disability evaluation system. Servicemembers we spoke with at each facility we visited said they found the medical language in the written summary of their medical conditions confusing. Despite its potential benefits, in part due to staffing and resource constraints, the Army has not adopted this practice at all locations. Furthermore, DOD and VA have yet to resolve several challenges to expanding the joint process on a large scale if the pilot is deemed successful. One set of metrics to be used for evaluating the pilot is servicemember and stakeholder satisfaction, and DOD and VA are in the process of developing and administering several surveys to measure their satisfaction; however, much work remains. DOD and VA Are Identifying, but Have Yet to Resolve, Key Challenges Associated with Expanding the Joint Process As the pilot progresses, DOD and VA are collecting information that could be used to identify resource needs and implementation challenges if they decide to implement the pilot process on a large scale. To further reduce servicemember confusion about and distrust of the disability evaluation process, the Army should explore more widespread implementation of promising practices for: ensuring that servicemembers understand their rights to and are aware of the availability of legal counsel during the disability evaluation process, such as having legal counsel present at in-briefings where feasible; and improving each servicemember’s understanding and acceptance of the written summary of medical conditions that underlies his or her disability evaluation, such as affording servicemembers an opportunity to review the summary with the physician who prepared it before the summary is finalized. Such plans should include criteria for determining how much improvement should be achieved under the pilot on various performance measures—such as decision timeliness and servicemember satisfaction—to merit implementing the joint process throughout DOD and VA. To ensure that pilot evaluation and any large-scale implementation of the joint disability process is done successfully, DOD and VA should sustain collaborative executive focus on the pilot and retain knowledgeable staff by, for example, continuing the agencies’ joint Senior Oversight Committee or transferring the responsibilities to an equally staffed structure with the same level of executive commitment. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to examine (1) recent actions taken by the Department of the Army to help ill and injured servicemembers navigate its disability evaluation process and (2) the status, plans, and challenges of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) efforts to pilot and implement a joint disability evaluation system.	Why GAO Did This Study In February 2007, a series of articles in The Washington Post about conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center highlighted problems in the military's disability evaluation system. Subsequently, the Department of the Army, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) undertook initiatives to address concerns with the disability evaluation process. In 2007, the Army took steps to streamline its process, and DOD and VA began piloting a joint evaluation system to address systemic concerns about timeliness and the potential inefficiency of having separate disability evaluation systems. GAO was asked to examine (1) recent actions by the Army to help servicemembers navigate its disability evaluation process and (2) the status, plans, and challenges of DOD and VA's efforts to pilot and implement a joint disability evaluation system. GAO interviewed Army, DOD, and VA officials; visited Army treatment facilities; and reviewed data from these sources. What GAO Found The Army has taken a number of steps to help servicemembers navigate the disability evaluation process through additional support mechanisms and streamlining efforts, but faces challenges in meeting internal goals and demonstrating impact. Most significantly, the Army has begun hiring more staff to facilitate the process for servicemembers, such as legal personnel, and setting staffing goals for key positions, such as for board liaisons and physicians. However, the Army has not met its internal staffing goals for board liaisons and physicians, and continues to face shortages in legal personnel. The Army has also struggled to meet timeliness goals for case processing and has even experienced negative trends over the last year, despite streamlining initiatives. Furthermore, the Army faces particular challenges in meeting timeliness goals for completing reservists' evaluations, due in part to the challenge of obtaining complete personnel and medical documents from nonmilitary sources. Besides staffing initiatives, the Army has also taken steps to help servicemembers better understand and navigate the process. However, we found that these efforts varied by location, and that many servicemembers we spoke with were unaware of the availability of expert legal counsel. To increase transparency of the disability process, one location we visited afforded servicemembers the opportunity to have the written summary of their medical conditions explained to them, but not all Army locations have adopted this practice. In general, the Army faces challenges in demonstrating that its efforts to date have had an overall positive impact on servicemembers' satisfaction, because it has not implemented a survey that adequately targets and queries servicemembers who are undergoing disability evaluations. Under direction from the agencies' joint Senior Oversight Committee, DOD and VA moved quickly to design and pilot a joint disability evaluation process, but gaps remain in their plans to evaluate the pilot and potentially implement a joint process on a larger scale. DOD and VA have established a comprehensive mechanism for measuring key aspects of the pilot. However, they have not yet decided on criteria for determining whether the joint process is worthy of widespread implementation. In addition, although DOD and VA are in the process of developing surveys to measure servicemember and stakeholder satisfaction, sufficient comparative data on servicemember satisfaction may not be available when the pilot is scheduled to end. DOD and VA are also in the process of tracking challenges that have arisen in implementing the pilot, but they have not yet resolved several challenges associated with expanding the joint process if the pilot is deemed successful. Such challenges include determining who will perform the single physical examination when a VA medical center is not nearby. Beyond these concerns, DOD and VA may ultimately need to prepare for challenges that come with implementing large-scale system changes--such as those envisioned by the pilot. These challenges include sustaining management attention to ensure that the changes are implemented well and are producing the intended results. However, the Senior Oversight Committee's planned January 2009 end raises questions about whether management attention will be maintained over the long term.
gao_GAO-09-803	gao_GAO-09-803_0	The Consumer Product Safety Act established CPSC as an independent regulatory commission. CPSC’s Authorities Have the Potential to Be Effective, but Implementation Is Limited by Incomplete Information on Imported Products and Resource and Practical Constraints Consensus exists that CPSC’s authorities have the potential to be effective in preventing the entry of unsafe products into the United States. Consensus Exists That CPSC Has Broad Authority over Imported Products, but CPSC’s Assessment of Effectiveness Has Been Limited There is consensus among those we interviewed that CPSC has broad authority to prevent the entry of unsafe consumer products into the United States, particularly in light of new authorities that strengthen its ability to enforce mandatory standards and protect consumers from unsafe products subject to voluntary standards at ports of entry. Despite this broad authority, CPSC has made limited progress in measuring the effectiveness of its authorities to prevent the entry of unsafe consumer products. However, CPSC has not developed formal systems for assessing risks and focusing inspection activities with CBP. As a result, CPSC’s efforts to access more complete import data to help it better target incoming shipments have also been delayed. CPSC has not completed this plan, and it is unlikely to do so until it updates information-sharing agreements with CBP. According to CPSC, the agency cannot establish a greater presence at U.S. ports without having the requisite analytical support. Authorities of Select Agencies Are Comparable to CPSC’s, but FDA and USDA’s Border Surveillance Activities and Overseas Presence Provide Useful Information for Strengthening CPSC’s Implementation of Its Authorities CPSC’s regulatory authority to prevent the entry of unsafe imports is generally comparable to that of certain other federal agencies with substantial responsibility over the safety of products entering the United States. These capabilities enable these agencies to screen incoming shipments for a greater number of risks than CPSC does. Without advance shipment data, CPSC lacks information that other agencies have found useful in screening incoming shipments for potential safety violations. FDA, FSIS, and APHIS invest significant resources in information technology systems that support border surveillance efforts. U.S. and other officials believe that continued cooperation and coordination among governments and regulators can improve policy consistency and enforcement and, ultimately, the effectiveness of consumer product safety frameworks, particularly since consumer safety enforcement challenges are shared by most nations. Without a long-term plan, CPSC is not fully prepared to use new authorities granted in CPSIA, nor is it able to effectively address the safety of imported products through international means or to appropriately allocate any potential increases in agency resources. CPSC’s Strategic Plan does not reflect its import safety work, its plans for international education and outreach activities, its plans to use new authorities granted in CPSIA to prevent the entry of unsafe products, or its plans to respond to mandates in CPSIA to improve its risk assessment and coordination with CBP. In addition, CPSC’s agreements with CBP are outdated, which hinders CPSC and CBP’s ability to target imports under CPSC’s jurisdiction. These joint efforts are a key element for improving CPSC’s ability to target shipments for screening and review at the ports and to ensuring consistent enforcement of CPSC’s authorities across the United States. FDA and USDA officials have found that their efforts to educate overseas industry and governments on U.S. safety standards and the particular risks being screened for at the border could reduce the number of unsafe products that reach U.S. consumers. To ensure that it has appropriate data and procedures to prevent entry of unsafe products into the United States, we recommend that CPSC update agreements with CBP to clarify each agency’s roles and to resolve issues for obtaining access to advance shipment data; and 2. Furthermore, we recommend that CPSC’s Strategic Plan include a comprehensive plan for the Office of International Programs and Intergovernmental Affairs to work with foreign governments in bilateral and multilateral environments to 1. educate foreign manufacturers about U.S. product safety standards and best practices, and 2. coordinate on development of effective international frameworks for consumer product safety. CNCA has similar arrangements with other countries.	Why GAO Did This Study The growing volume of consumer products imported into the United States has strained the resources of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), challenging the agency to find new ways to ensure the safety of these products. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) mandated that GAO assess the effectiveness of CPSC's authorities over imported products. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine what is known about CPSC's effectiveness in using these authorities, (2) compare CPSC's authorities with those of selected U.S. agencies and international entities, and (3) evaluate CPSC's plans to prevent the entry of unsafe consumer products. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed CPSC and other agencies' and entities' authorities, reviewed literature on consumer product safety, and compared CPSC's planning efforts with criteria for effective planning practices. What GAO Found GAO found broad consensus that CPSC's authorities over imported consumer products have the potential to be effective. However, CPSC has made limited progress in measuring the effectiveness of its authorities, and CPSC's ability to implement these authorities has been constrained by competing priorities and limited resources, as well as by delays in implementing key provisions of CPSIA. CPSC's presence at U.S. ports is limited and, in order to identify potentially unsafe products, it must work closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which faces pressure to quickly move shipments into commerce. CPSC does not have access to key CBP import data it could use to target incoming shipments for inspection, and it has not updated its agreements with CBP to clarify each agency's roles and responsibilities. CPSC's activities at U.S. ports could be strengthened by better targeting incoming shipments for inspection and by improving CPSC's coordination with CBP. Otherwise, CPSC may not be able to carry out key inspection activities efficiently or to effectively leverage its enforcement priorities with CBP. Select federal agencies and foreign governments provide lessons for strengthening CPSC's implementation of its authorities, particularly with respect to border surveillance and information sharing among countries. Both USDA and FDA have more robust border surveillance activities than CPSC because they obtain more data on incoming shipments, have more staff working at U.S. ports, use more developed programs to target risks, and use information technology systems that are integrated with other agency-based and CBP systems to effectively leverage their enforcement priorities with CBP. Other agencies have found that timely CBP import data integrated with other agency surveillance data is useful in screening incoming shipments for potential safety violations. In addition, officials at FDA and USDA have found that efforts to educate overseas industries and governments on U.S. safety standards could reduce the number of unsafe products that reach U.S. consumers. GAO also found broad consensus that continued coordination and information sharing among governments and multilateral organizations can improve the effectiveness of product safety frameworks. CPSC has increased its efforts to coordinate with these other entities, particularly China, but lacks a comprehensive plan for international engagement. CPSC has established annual plans, but lacks a long-term plan with key goals to prevent the entry of unsafe products. CPSC has not yet updated its agencywide Strategic Plan to reflect new authorities granted in CPSIA. This may inhibit CPSC's ability to appropriately allocate any potential increases in agency resources or to address the safety of imported products through international means. An updated Strategic Plan may also help to ensure that CPSC has the requisite compliance and analytical staff to support the full range of CPSC's international efforts.
gao_GAO-07-808	gao_GAO-07-808_0	2). Board Structure Provides Limited Attention and Mechanisms for Overseeing PBGC PBGC’s board has limited time and resources to provide policy direction and oversight and has not established procedures and mechanisms to monitor PBGC operations. Although PBGC’s board members have met more frequently since 2003, the three cabinet secretaries composing the board have numerous other responsibilities, and have been unable to dedicate consistent and comprehensive attention to PBGC. In fact, we found that between 1980 and May 2007, a span of 27 years, there were only 18 board meetings, 10 of which were since 2003. Further, the board has not established important mechanisms, such as the use of standing committees, to monitor and review PBGC operations and programs. Instead, the board mostly relies on the Inspector General and PBGC’s management oversight committees to ensure that PBGC is operating effectively. However, there are no formal protocols requiring the Inspector General to routinely meet with the board or its representatives and staff, and PBGC’s management committees are neither independent of PBGC, nor are they required to routinely report all matters to the board. As a result, the effectiveness of the board’s oversight may be limited, because it cannot be certain that it is receiving high-quality and timely information about all significant matters facing the corporation, even though PBGC officials report that they informally communicate with the board representatives weekly. While officials believe that this process has generally worked well, in some cases board members have not received information in a timely manner. Lack of Protocols for Administering PBGC Can Result in Confusion and Inefficiencies While ERISA provides the board, the Secretary of Labor as Chair, and PBGC’s Director the authority to oversee and administer PBGC, no formal guidelines articulate the different roles and responsibilities of the board and PBGC management. As a result, DOL and PBGC disagree over the extent to which PBGC is a separate and distinct executive agency. The uncertainty of PBGC’s status has resulted in confusion over the extent to which DOL has the authority to manage PBGC’s operations. However, neither the board, DOL, nor PBGC has developed formal policies and procedures to define its authorities and responsibilities. Instead, PBGC officials typically react to DOL’s periodic written and oral communications, which PBGC officials said sometimes become a part of PBGC’s operational framework. For example: During the fiscal year 2007 budget process, DOL and PBGC officials disagreed over the amount of money included in PBGC’s budget for the development of a new system for pension plan sponsors to file their required annual reports to DOL electronically. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve overall accountability and oversight of PBGC, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce, as PBGC’s board of directors, establish policies, procedures, and mechanisms for providing oversight of PBGC that are consistent with corporate governance guidelines and establish formal guidelines that articulate the authorities of the Board Chair and the Department of Labor, the other board members and their respective departments, and PBGC’s Director. To identify the extent to which PBGC’s governance structure provides policy direction and oversight, we reviewed previous GAO work on the governance of private sector and government corporations and PBGC’s single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs and management challenges. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Statutory Limitation on Administrative Expenses Does Not Provide Meaningful Control.	Why GAO Did This Study The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the pensions of millions of private sector workers and retirees in certain employer-sponsored pension plans. It is governed by a board of directors consisting of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce, who are charged with providing PBGC with policy direction and oversight. This report assesses (1) the extent to which PBGC's governance structure provides PBGC with policy direction and oversight, and (2) whether administrative responsibilities among the PBGC board, Department of Labor (DOL), and PBGC management are clearly defined. We examined corporate governance practices, select federal government corporations, and reviewed documents on PBGC's structure. We interviewed officials from all board member agencies and PBGC, among others. What GAO Found Although PBGC's board has provided greater attention to PBGC since 2003, the board has limited time and resources to provide policy direction and oversight and has not established comprehensive written procedures and mechanisms to monitor PBGC operations. Because PBGC's board is composed of three cabinet secretaries, who have numerous other responsibilities, the board structure does not guarantee that PBGC's board is active and diverse. For example, since 1980, a span of 27 years, there were only 18 official board meetings. Further, the board has not established formal procedures to ensure that PBGC management provides it information on all policy matters nor has it developed standing committees to oversee operations. Instead, the board relies on PBGC's Inspector General and management's oversight committees to ensure that PBGC is operating effectively. However, there are no formal protocols concerning the Inspector General's interaction with the board, and PBGC internal management are not independent and are not required to routinely report all matters to the board. Even though PBGC uses informal channels of communication to inform its board members, the board's oversight may be limited, because it cannot be certain that it is receiving high quality and timely information about all significant matters facing the corporation. PBGC's lack of formal guidelines to articulate the administrative roles and responsibilities among the board, the Secretary of Labor as the board chair, board members' agencies, and the PBGC Director has led, at times, to confusion and inefficiencies. The board has not addressed uncertainty over the extent to which PBGC is a separate and distinct executive agency, a fact that has resulted in confusion over when DOL has the authority to manage PBGC's operations. Further, neither DOL nor PBGC has developed formal policies and procedures to define the board's authorities and responsibilities. Instead, PBGC officials typically react to DOL's periodic written and oral communications, which PBGC officials said sometimes become a part of PBGC's operational framework. For example, PBGC is required to incorporate its budget request with DOL's budget request, and over the years, DOL has taken a more active role in reviewing PBGC's budget. However, PBGC officials believe that DOL has in some cases overstepped its role. For instance, DOL and PBGC officials disagreed over the inclusion of a funding request in PBGC's fiscal year 2007 budget.
gao_GAO-04-20	gao_GAO-04-20_0	About One-Fifth of HUD’s Mortgages Are Scheduled to Mature through 2013 Nationwide, 21 percent (2,328) of the 11,267 subsidized properties with HUD mortgages are scheduled to mature through 2013. The percentage varies significantly by state: from 7 percent in Alabama, to 53 percent in South Dakota. Nearly all of these 2,328 properties were financed under the Section 236, Section 221(d)(3) BMIR, and Section 221(d)(3) programs, and about three-quarters of these mortgages are scheduled to mature in the last 3 years of the 10-year period. Tenant Impacts Depend on Protections and Property Owners’ Decisions Over the next 10 years, low-income tenants in over 101,000 units may have to pay higher rents or move to more affordable housing when HUD- subsidized mortgages reach maturity. This is because no statutory requirement exists to protect tenants from increases in rent when HUD mortgages mature and rent restrictions are lifted. A number of factors may affect owners’ decisions regarding the continued affordability of their properties after mortgages mature, including neighborhood incomes, physical condition of the property, and owners’ missions. Additionally, at least 10 of the remaining properties that reached mortgage maturity over the past 10 years are still serving low-income tenants. Tenants in units covered by a rental assistance program—there are 134,087 units in the properties with HUD mortgages scheduled to mature through 2013—will continue to benefit from affordable rents, regardless of when the mortgage matures, as long as the rental assistance contract is in force. Property owners are not required to notify tenants when they pay off their mortgage at mortgage maturity. Tools and Incentives Are Available to Help Keep Properties Affordable, but Are Not Specifically Designed to Deal with HUD Mortgage Maturity HUD does not offer any tools or incentives to keep properties affordable after HUD mortgages mature, although it does offer incentives to maintain affordability for properties that also have expiring rental assistance contracts. This Web site contains detailed property-level data on active HUD-insured mortgages and expiring rental assistance contracts. However, according to our survey, some state and local agencies perceive that the information is not readily available. A CD-ROM (GAO- 04-210SP), which includes property-level data for subsidized properties with mortgages scheduled to mature or expiring rental assistance contracts, will accompany this report and can be ordered at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ordtab.pl. We reviewed HUD regulations to determine the potential impact on tenants when HUD mortgages mature. We found that all 10 (none of which have project-based rental assistance contracts) are still primarily serving low-income tenants and that the current rents are affordable to tenants with incomes below 50 percent of area median income. Therefore, to help state and local housing agencies track HUD-subsidized properties that may leave HUD’s programs upon mortgage maturity or for other reasons, we are recommending that the Secretary of HUD solicit the views of state and local agencies to determine (1) the specific information concerning HUD-subsidized properties that would be most useful to their affordability preservation efforts and (2) the most effective format for making this information available, and then use the results to modify the current means of conveying the data on these properties to make the data more readily available.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has subsidized the development of over 23,000 properties by offering owners favorable long-term mortgage financing or rental assistance payments in exchange for owners' commitment to house low-income tenants. When owners pay off mortgages--the mortgages "mature"--the subsidized financing ends, raising the possibility of rent increases. GAO was asked to determine the number of HUD mortgages that are scheduled to mature in the next 10 years, the potential impact on tenants, and what HUD and others can do to keep these properties affordable. What GAO Found Nationwide, the HUD mortgages on 2,328 properties--21 percent of the 11,267 subsidized properties with HUD mortgages--are scheduled to mature in the next 10 years, but among states this percentage varies significantly: from 7 percent in Alabama, to 53 percent in South Dakota. About three-quarters of these mortgages are scheduled to mature in the last 3 years of the 10-year period. A CD-ROM (GAO-04-210SP) that accompanies this report provides property-level data for subsidized properties with mortgages scheduled to mature. Impacts on tenants depend on tenant protections available under program statutes and regulations, as well as on property owners' decisions about their properties. While about 134,000, or 57 percent, of the rental units in the 2,328 properties are protected by rental assistance contracts, tenants in over 101,000 units without rental assistance are at risk of paying higher rents after mortgage maturity because no requirement exists to protect tenants when HUD mortgages mature. Absent specific requirements, property owners' decisions on whether to continue serving low-income tenants after their HUD mortgages mature depend on many factors, including neighborhood incomes, property conditions, and owners' missions. Of the 32 properties with HUD mortgages that matured during the past 10 years, 16 have rental assistance contracts that continue to subsidize at least some units, and 10 of the remaining 16 that GAO was able to contact offer rents that are affordable to tenants with incomes below 50 percent of area median income. HUD does not offer incentives to owners to keep properties affordable upon mortgage maturity. While many state and local agencies GAO surveyed offer incentives to preserve affordable housing, they have not directed them specifically at properties where HUD mortgages mature. Most of the agencies do not track HUD mortgage maturity dates for subsidized properties. In addition, although HUD's Web site contains detailed property-level data, some state and local agencies perceive that the information is not readily available. Refer to GAO-04-211SP for survey details.
gao_GAO-05-1050T	gao_GAO-05-1050T_0	The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area continues to be from hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. The hurricane surge that can inundate coastal lowlands is the most destructive characteristic of hurricanes and accounts for most of the lives lost from hurricanes. Because of such threats, a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and levees, was proposed for the area along Lake Pontchartrain in the 1960s. Purpose and History of Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Flood Control Project Congress first authorized construction of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965 to provide hurricane protection to areas around the lake in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and St. Charles. Although federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with the federal government paying 70 percent of the costs and the state and local interests paying 30 percent. The original project designs were developed to combat a hurricane that might strike the coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. The model projected a storm roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane. During the first 17 years of construction on the barrier plan, the Corps continued to face project delays and cost increases due to design changes caused by technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to various aspects of the project. By 1981, cost estimates had grown to $757 million for the barrier plan, not including the cost of any needed work along the drainage canals, and project completion had slipped to 2008. These changes are not believed to have had any role in the levee breaches recently experienced as the high-level design selected was expected to provide the same level of protection as the original barrier design. In fact, Corps staff believe that flooding would have been worse if the original proposed design had been built because the storm surge would likely have gone over the top of the barrier and floodgates, flooded Lake Pontchartain, and gone over the original lower levees planned for the lakefront area as part of the barrier plan. The current estimated cost of construction for the completed project is $738 million with the federal share being $528 million and the local share $210 million. The project was estimated to be from 60-90 percent complete in different areas. Recent Funding History for the Project Federal allocations for the project totaled $458 million as of the enactment of the fiscal year 2005 federal appropriation. This represents 87 percent of the Federal government’s responsibility of $528 million with about $70 million remaining to complete the project in 2015. Over the last 10 fiscal years (1996-2005), federal appropriations have totaled about $128.6 million and Corps reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 million being made available to the project. During that time, appropriations have generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the earlier years to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal years. While this may not be unusual given the state of completion of the project, the Corps’ project fact sheet from May 2005 noted that the President’s Budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and the appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient to fund new construction contracts. The Corps had also stated that it could spend $20 million in fiscal year 2006 on the project if the funds were available. The Corps noted that several levees had settled and needed to be raised to provide the design- level of protection. A full feasibility study was estimated to take at least five years to complete and cost about $8 million.	Why GAO Did This Study The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area is from hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. A hurricane surge that can inundate coastal lowlands is the most destructive characteristic of hurricanes and accounts for most of the lives lost from hurricanes. Hurricane surge heights along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts can exceed 20 feet. The effects of Hurricane Katrina flooded a large part of New Orleans and breached the levees that are part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project. This project, first authorized in 1965, was designed to protect the lowlands in the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin from flooding by hurricane-induced sea surges and rainfall. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the purpose and history of the Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project and (2) funding of the project. GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony. What GAO Found Congress first authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965. The project was to construct a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and levees to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain. The project, when designed, was expected to take about 13 years to complete and cost about $85 million. Although federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort. The original project designs were developed based on the equivalent of what is now called a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane that might strike the coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. As GAO reported in 1976 and 1982, since the beginning of the project, the Corps has encountered project delays and cost increases due to design changes caused by technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to portions of the project. As a result, in 1982, project costs had grown to $757 million and the expected completion date had slipped to 2008. None of the changes made to the project, however, are believed to have had any role in the levee breaches recently experienced as the alternative design selected was expected to provide the same level of protection. In fact, Corps officials believe that flooding would have been worse if the original proposed design had been built. When Hurricane Katrina struck, the project, including about 125 miles of levees, was estimated to be from 60-90 percent complete in different areas with an estimated completion date for the whole project of 2015. The floodwalls along the drainage canals that were breached were complete when the hurricane hit. The current estimated cost of construction for the completed project is $738 million with the federal share being $528 million and the local share $210 million. Federal allocations for the project were $458 million as of the enactment of the fiscal year 2005 federal appropriation. This represents 87 percent of the federal government's responsibility of $528 million with about $70 million remaining to complete the project. Over the last 10 fiscal years (1996-2005), federal appropriations have totaled about $128.6 million and Corps reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 million being made available to the project. During that time, appropriations have generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the earlier years to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal years. While this may not be unusual given the state of completion of the project, the Corps' project fact sheet from May 2005 noted that the President's budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and the appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient to fund new construction contracts. The Corps had also stated that it could spend $20 million in fiscal year 2006 on the project if the funds were available. The Corps noted that several levees had settled and needed to be raised to provide the level of protection intended by the design.
gao_AIMD-98-72	gao_AIMD-98-72_0	Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine (1) the overall status of Defense’s effort to identify and correct its date sensitive systems and (2) the appropriateness of Defense’s strategy and actions to correct these systems. Identify and secure the necessary resources. In conducting the individual component reviews and assessing oversight efforts from Defense headquarters, we reviewed and analyzed official memoranda and other documents discussing Defense and component Year 2000 policy and procedures; the June 1996 and February 1997 Defense and component responses to Year 2000 questions from the House Government Operations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight; the January 1997 Action Plan for Year 2000 Information Technology Compliance; Defense’s May 1997, August 1997, November 1997, and February 1998 component quarterly reports on Year 2000 program status to ASD C3I, and Defense’s subsequent department-level reports to the Office of Management and Budget; Year 2000 status briefings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DISA, DFAS, and DLA; early drafts and the final April 1997 versions of the Defense Year 2000 Management Plan; and Year 2000 inventory data compiled by ASD C3I, Defense components, and their subcomponents. Should Defense fail to successfully address the Year 2000 problem in time, its mission-critical operations could be severely degraded or disrupted. Defense has taken a long time in the early phases of its Year 2000 program and its progress in fixing systems has been slow. Our reviews have shown that individual components have also taken positive actions to increase awareness. Furthermore, Defense has not promulgated and enforced good management practices for Year 2000 corrective efforts. Defense, however, does not yet have a complete and accurate inventory of its systems and other equipment needing repair. Once Defense decides the relative priority of its mission-critical systems, it will still need to ensure that its mission-critical rather than nonmission-critical systems receive focused management attention and resources. As a result, Defense runs the risk that all systems and interfaces will not be thoroughly and carefully tested. Contingency plans are important because they identify the manual or other fallback procedures to be employed should systems miss their Year 2000 deadline or fail unexpectedly in operation. Conclusions Defense operations hinge on the department’s ability to successfully fix its mission-critical computer systems before the Year 2000 deadline. As a result, Defense lacks complete and reliable information on systems, interfaces, and costs. It is allowing nonmission-critical systems to be corrected even though only a small percentage of mission-critical systems have been completed. GAO Comment 1. Additional copies are $2 each.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) program for solving the year 2000 computer systems problem, focusing on the: (1) overall status of DOD's effort to identify and correct its date-sensitive systems; and (2) appropriateness of DOD's strategy and actions to correct its year 2000 problems. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) DOD relies on computer systems for some aspect of all of its operations, including strategic and tactical operations, sophisticated weaponry, intelligence, surveillance and security efforts, and routine business functions, such as financial management, personnel, logistics, and contract management; (2) failure to successfully address the year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disrupt any of DOD's mission-critical operations; (3) DOD has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote sharing of information, and encourage components to make year 2000 remediation efforts a high priority; (4) however, its progress in fixing systems has been slow; (5) in addition, DOD lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce good management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture of its progress in fixing systems; (6) as a result, DOD lacks complete and reliable information on systems, interfaces, other equipment needing repair, and the cost of its correction efforts; (7) it is spending limited resources fixing nonmission-critical systems even though most mission-critical systems have not been corrected; (8) it has also increased the risk that: (a) year 2000 errors will be propagated from one organization's systems to another's; (b) all systems and interfaces will not be thoroughly and carefully tested; and (c) components will not be prepared should their systems miss the year 2000 deadline or fail unexpectedly in operation; (9) each one of these problems seriously endangers DOD chances of successfully meeting the year 2000 deadline for mission-critical systems; and (10) together, they make failure of at least some mission-critical systems and the operations they support almost certain unless corrective actions are taken.
gao_GAO-04-129	gao_GAO-04-129_0	In order to follow up on FEMA’s corrective actions to address our prior year recommendations, as well as determine whether FEMA properly reported claim payment information to the Congress, we reviewed OCGFC’s reconciliations of claimed amounts that were approved by OCGFC for payment from its payment approval system and the actual claim payments made by FEMA’s Disaster Finance Center (DFC) and reported in FEMA’s accounting system. Policies and Procedures for Claim Processing Were Followed Based on the results of our statistical testing, FEMA processed, approved, and paid its claims in accordance with its guidelines that were established and in place at the time the claims were reviewed and processed. For the period from August 29, 2002, through June 30, 2003, FEMA approved claims in the amount of $40 million for payment, including the partial payment of approved subrogation claims filed by insurance companies. FEMA reconciled the total amounts approved for payment to the amounts actually paid as of June 30, 2003, which was the cutoff date for its annual report, and as of August 31, 2003. In our prior report, we noted that FEMA improperly reported unreconciled amounts that were approved for payment in its prior annual reports to the Congress as amounts actually paid. In its 2003 annual report to the Congress, FEMA continued to include claimed amounts approved for payment in a detailed schedule of claim information, but it properly identified the amounts as such instead of as paid or expended amounts. In addition, FEMA did not include any information on claims paid as is required under CGFAA. Without this information, FEMA’s annual report is less useful to the Congress and other stakeholders. Agency Comments FEMA, in a letter from the Director of the Recovery Division of the Department of Homeland Security’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, agreed with our recommendation to include summary-level claim information on amounts claimed, approved, and paid and remaining estimated program liabilities, if any, in its next annual report to the Congress.	Why GAO Did This Study The Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act (CGFAA) mandated that GAO annually audit all claim payments made to compensate the victims of the Cerro Grande Fire in northern New Mexico. For this third report on this topic, GAO determined whether the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now a part of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security, (1) paid fire claims in accordance with applicable guidance and (2) implemented corrective actions to address prior GAO recommendations, including determining if FEMA properly reported claim payments to the Congress. What GAO Found FEMA processed and paid its claims in accordance with its policies and procedures that were established and in place at the time the claims were reviewed and processed. For the period from August 29, 2002, to June 30, 2003, FEMA approved $40 million in claims for payment, including the initial payment of most of the subrogation claims made by insurance companies. In response to GAO's May 2003 report, FEMA established processes to address GAO's recommendations related to reconciling claimed amounts approved with actual amounts paid. These processes included comparing the individual amounts approved for payment to the amounts actually paid from inception through June 30, 2003, by claim, as well as performing complete reconciliations of total amounts that were approved and paid for the same period and as of August 31, 2003. In addition, in our prior report, we noted that FEMA improperly reported unreconciled claim amounts approved for payment as amounts actually paid. In its 2003 annual report, FEMA properly identified claimed amounts as approved amounts for payment rather than actual amounts paid in a schedule that was included in its annual report to the Congress. However, FEMA no longer provided summary information on amounts claimed, amounts approved, and its remaining estimated liabilities in its report to the Congress and did not include any information on claims paid as is required by CGFAA. Without this information, the report is less useful to the Congress and other stakeholders.
gao_GAO-12-798T	gao_GAO-12-798T_0	The U.S. and Palau governments concluded a Compact of Free Association in 1986; the compact entered into force on October 1, 1994. In addition to the U.S. assistance provided under the compact, U.S. agencies—the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Interior, among others—provide discretionary federal programs in Palau as authorized by U.S. legislation and with appropriations from Congress. In our 2008 report, we projected that U.S. assistance to Palau from 1995 through 2009 would exceed $852 million. Assistance to Palau Would Decline through 2024 Key provisions of the Agreement would include, among others, extending direct economic assistance to Palau, providing infrastructure project grants and contributions to an infrastructure maintenance fund, establishing a fiscal consolidation fund, and making changes to the trust fund. U.S. assistance to Palau under the Agreement would total approximately $215 million through 2024.  Direct economic assistance ($107.5 million). Infrastructure projects ($40 million). Infrastructure maintenance fund ($28 million).  Fiscal consolidation fund ($10 million). Under the Agreement, the U.S. government would provide grants of $5 million each in 2011 and 2012, respectively, to help the Palau government reduce its debts. Under the Agreement, the U.S. government would contribute $30.25 million to the fund from 2013 through 2023.  Federal services. Agreement’s Provisions Would Significantly Improve Prospects for Palau Trust Fund The addition of $30.25 million in U.S. contributions and the delay of $89 million in Palau withdrawals through 2023, as provided by the Agreement, would improve the fund’s prospects for sustaining scheduled payments through 2044. With these changes, the trust fund would have an approximately 90 percent probability of sustaining payments through 2044. Estimates Prepared for Palau Project Declining Reliance on U.S. Assistance under the Agreement Estimates prepared for the government of Palau project that Palau’s reliance on U.S. assistance provided under the Agreement will decline, while its reliance on trust fund withdrawals and domestic revenue will increase. The estimates also show Palau’s trust fund withdrawals growing from 5 percent of government revenue in 2011 to 12 percent in 2024. In addition, the estimates indicate that Palau’s domestic revenue will rise from 40 percent of all government revenue in 2011 to 59 percent in 2024. The estimates prepared for the government of Palau project that U.S. assistance to Palau from 2011 through 2024, including discretionary federal programs, will total approximately $427 million. Pending Legislation Would Approve and Implement the Agreement Legislation has been introduced in both the Senate and the House that would approve and implement the September 2010 agreement between the U.S. and Palau governments. As of September 2012, the Senate has not acted on this bill. Specifically, the pending House bill:  Shifts the timing of the provision of some specified Agreement assistance to account for the fact that fiscal year 2011 has passed.  Applies an inflation adjustment to the Agreement assistance for direct economic assistance and infrastructure project grants, and payments to the trust fund, infrastructure maintenance fund, and fiscal consolidation fund. The proposed Senate and House legislation would authorize annual appropriations for weather and aviation services.	Why GAO Did This Study The Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of Palau, which entered into force in 1994, provided for several types of assistance aimed at promoting Palaus self-sufficiency and economic advancement. Included were 15 years of direct assistance to the Palau government; contributions to a trust fund meant to provide Palau $15 million each year in fiscal years 2010 through 2044; construction of a road system, known as the Compact Road; and federal services such as postal, weather, and aviation. U.S. agencies also provided discretionary federal programs related to health, education, and infrastructure. In 2008, GAO projected that total assistance in fiscal years 1994 through 2009 would exceed $852 million. In September 2010, the United States and Palau signed an agreement (the Agreement) that would, among other things, provide for additional assistance to Palau beginning in fiscal year 2011 and modify its trust fund. Currently, there are two bills pending before Congress to implement the Agreement. In this testimony, GAO updates a November 2011 testimony on (1) the Agreements provisions for economic assistance to Palau, (2) its impact on the trust funds likelihood of sustaining scheduled payments through fiscal year 2044, (3) the projected role of U.S. assistance in Palau government revenues, and (4) the pending legislation to implement the Agreement. GAO reviewed current trust fund data and new pending legislation for this testimony. What GAO Found The Agreement would provide decreasing assistance, totaling approximately $215 million through fiscal year 2024 and includes the following: direct economic assistance ($107.5 million) for Palau government operations; infrastructure project grants ($40 million) to build mutually agreed projects; infrastructure maintenance fund ($28 million) for maintaining the Compact Road, Palaus primary airport, and certain other major U.S.-funded projects; fiscal consolidation fund ($10 million) to assist Palau in debt reduction; and trust fund contributions ($30.25 million) in addition to the $70 million contributed under the compact Under the Agreement, the United States would contribute to the trust fund in fiscal years 2013 through 2023, and Palau would reduce its withdrawals by $89 million in fiscal years 2010 through 2023. GAO projects that the fund would have a 90 percent likelihood of sustaining payments through fiscal year 2044 with these changes, versus 40 percent without these changes. Estimates prepared for the Palau government project declining reliance on U.S. assistance under the Agreementfrom 28 percent of government revenue in fiscal year 2011 to 2 percent in fiscal year 2024and growing reliance on trust fund withdrawals and domestic revenues. The estimates show trust fund withdrawals rising from 5 percent to 24 percent and domestic revenues rising from 40 to 59 percent, of total government revenue. According to the estimates, U.S. assistance in fiscal years 2011 through 2024 would total $427 million, with discretionary federal programs accounting for about half of that amount. Congress has not approved legislation to implement the Agreement as of September 2012. Pending Senate legislation would implement the Agreement and appropriate funds to do so. Pending House legislation would implement the agreement, apply an inflation adjustment to assistance payments, and shift the timing of certain assistance payments to reflect the fact that 2011 has passed.
gao_GAO-08-617	gao_GAO-08-617_0	Our review of IRS tax records showed that over 1.6 million businesses owed over $58 billion in unpaid payroll taxes to the federal government as of September 30, 2007. For example, 70 percent of all unpaid payroll taxes are owed by businesses with more than a year (4 tax quarters) of unpaid payroll taxes, and over a quarter of unpaid payroll taxes are owed by businesses that have tax debt for more than 3 years (12 tax quarters). IRS’s Collection Approach Does Not Always Prevent the Accumulation of Unpaid Payroll Taxes Our audit of payroll tax cases identified several issues that adversely affect IRS’s ability to prevent the accumulation of unpaid payroll taxes and to collect these taxes. IRS’s Approach Focuses On Voluntary Compliance, Even for Egregious Payroll Tax Offenders As discussed previously, IRS has a number of powerful tools at its disposal to help prevent the accumulation of unpaid taxes and to collect the taxes that are owed. We have previously reported that IRS subordinates the use of some of its collection tools in order to seek voluntary compliance, and that IRS’s repeated attempts to gain voluntary compliance often results in minimal or no actual collections. IRS’s Approach Can Result in Delayed Enforcement Actions In reviewing specific collection actions taken by IRS, we found that revenue officers often did not timely take basic steps to protect the government’s interest in a tax debtor’s property by filing a lien or to hold the business’s owners and officers personally responsible for willfully failing to remit withheld payroll taxes. Businesses Engaged in Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System Our analysis of unpaid payroll tax debt found substantial evidence of abusive and potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system by businesses and their owners or officers. While much of the tax debt may be owed by those with little ability to pay, some abuse the tax system, willfully diverting amounts withheld from their employees’ salaries to fund their business operations or their own personal lifestyles. In total, IRS records indicate over 1,500 owners/officers had been found by IRS to be responsible for non-payment of payroll taxes at 3 or more businesses, and 18 business owners/officers had been found by IRS to be responsible for not paying the payroll taxes for over 12 separate businesses. IRS found three officers of the business to be willful and responsible for not remitting payroll taxes. To determine whether businesses with unpaid payroll taxes were engaged in abusive or potentially criminal activities with regard to the federal tax system, we used data mining techniques to identify 50 businesses as illustrative case studies based on criteria such as businesses with large dollar amounts of unpaid payroll taxes accumulated over multiple tax quarters.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO previously reported that federal contractors abuse the tax system with little consequence. While performing those audits, GAO noted that much of the tax abuse involved contractors not remitting to the government payroll taxes that were withheld from salaries. As a result, GAO was asked to review the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) processes and procedures to prevent and collect unpaid payroll taxes. Specifically, GAO was asked to determine (1) the magnitude of unpaid federal payroll tax debt, (2) the factors affecting IRS's ability to enforce compliance or pursue collections, and (3) whether some businesses with unpaid payroll taxes are engaged in abusive or potentially criminal activities with regard to the federal tax system. To address these objectives GAO analyzed IRS's tax database, performed case study analyses of payroll tax offenders, and interviewed collection officials from IRS and several states. What GAO Found IRS records show that, as of September 30, 2007, over 1.6 million businesses owed over $58 billion in unpaid federal payroll taxes, including interest and penalties. Some of these businesses took advantage of the existing tax enforcement and administration system to avoid fulfilling or paying federal tax obligations--thus abusing the federal tax system. Over a quarter of payroll taxes are owed by businesses with more than 3 years (12 tax quarters) of unpaid payroll taxes. Some of these business owners repeatedly accumulated tax debt from multiple businesses. For example, IRS found over 1,500 individuals to be responsible for nonpayment of payroll taxes at three or more businesses, and 18 were responsible for not remitting payroll taxes for a dozen different businesses. Although IRS has powerful tools at its disposal to prevent the further accumulation of unpaid payroll taxes and to collect the taxes that are owed, IRS's current approach does not provide for their full, effective use. IRS's overall approach to collection focuses primarily on gaining voluntary compliance--even for egregious payroll tax offenders--a practice that can result in minimal or no actual collections for these offenders. Additionally, IRS has not always promptly filed liens against businesses to protect the government's interests and has not always taken timely action to hold responsible parties personally liable for unpaid payroll taxes. GAO selected 50 businesses with payroll tax debt as case studies and found extensive evidence of abuse and potential criminal activity in relation to the federal tax system. The business owners or officers in our case studies diverted payroll tax funds for their own benefit or to help fund business operations.
gao_GAO-10-332	gao_GAO-10-332_0	DOD and VA Identified Interoperability Objectives and Formed an Interagency Program Office As previously noted, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 called for DOD and VA to jointly develop and implement, by September 30, 2009, electronic health record systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability of personal health care information that are compliant with applicable federal interoperability standards. Among the specific responsibilities identified in the charter was the development of a plan, schedule, and performance measures to guide the departments’ electronic health record interoperability efforts. Subsequent to an April 2009 Presidential announcement, the departments approved a new version of the interagency program office’s charter in September to expand the office’s responsibilities to include coordination and oversight of the development of a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER). Moreover, our report and testimony also noted that the departments’ interagency program office was not effectively positioned to function as a single point of accountability for achievement of full interoperability because it did not yet have fundamental IT management capabilities and was not fulfilling key responsibilities, including establishment of performance measures, a project plan, or a detailed schedule. Although DOD and VA Have Met Their Six Interoperability Objectives, Additional Work Remains to Meet Clinicians’ Evolving Needs DOD and VA have achieved planned capabilities for the three remaining objectives (expand questionnaires and self-assessment tools, expand Essentris in DOD, and demonstrate initial document scanning). Having now met all six of their interoperability objectives, the departments’ officials, including the co-chairs of the group responsible for representing the clinician user community, believe they have satisfied the September 30, 2009, requirement for developing and implementing systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability. Nevertheless, the departments are planning additional actions to further increase their interoperable capabilities, recognizing that clinicians’ needs for interoperable electronic health records are evolving. Clinicians have identified additional needs with respect to social history and physical exam data that have emerged since existing capabilities were made available in those areas. DOD plans to further expand the implementation of Essentris to sites beyond those achieved as of September 2009. DOD/VA Interagency Program Office Has Made Progress toward Filling Positions, but Has Not Fully Implemented Recommended Management Improvements The interagency program office is not yet positioned to function as a single point of accountability for the implementation of interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities. Since we last reported, the departments have made progress in setting up the office by hiring additional staff, including a permanent director. In addition, consistent with our prior recommendations, the office has begun to demonstrate responsibilities outlined in its charter in the areas of scheduling, planning, and performance measurement. However, the office’s efforts to develop its capabilities in these areas are incomplete. However, the schedule does not include information about the tasks, resource needs, or relationships between tasks for the testing activity. Specifically, the office has been focused on verifying achievement of the six interoperability objectives. Furthermore, implementation of our recommendations will also better position the office to function as a single point of accountability for the delivery of interoperable electronic health records, which are intended to improve service members’ and veterans’ health care. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) developed and implemented electronic health record systems or capabilities that allowed for full interoperability by the September 30, 2009, deadline, we reviewed our previous work on DOD and VA efforts to develop health information systems, interoperable health records, and interoperability standards to be implemented in federal health care programs.	Why GAO Did This Study The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to accelerate their exchange of health information and to develop capabilities that allow for interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data) by September 30, 2009. It also required compliance with federal standards and the establishment of a joint interagency program office to function as a single point of accountability for the effort. Further, the act directed GAO to semiannually report on the progress made in achieving these requirements. For this fourth report, GAO determined the extent to which (1) DOD and VA developed and implemented electronic health record systems or capabilities that allowed for full interoperability by September 30, 2009, and (2) the interagency program office established by the act is functioning as a single point of accountability. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documentation on project status and conducted interviews with agency officials. What GAO Found DOD and VA previously established six objectives that they identified as necessary for achieving full interoperability; they have now met the remaining three interoperability objectives that GAO previously reported as being partially achieved--expand questionnaires and self-assessment tools, expand DOD's inpatient medical records system, and demonstrate initial document scanning. As a result of meeting the six objectives, the departments' officials, including the co-chairs of the group responsible for representing the clinician user community, believe they have satisfied the September 30, 2009, requirement for full interoperability. Nevertheless, DOD and VA are planning additional actions to further increase their interoperable capabilities and address clinicians' evolving needs for interoperable electronic health records. Specifically, (1) DOD and VA plan to meet additional needs that have emerged with respect to social history and physical exam data; (2) DOD plans to further expand the implementation of its inpatient medical records system to sites beyond those achieved as of September 2009; and (3) DOD and VA plan to test the capability to scan documents, in follow-up to their demonstration of an initial document scanning capability. Additionally, in response to a Presidential announcement, the departments are beginning to plan for the development and implementation of a virtual lifetime electronic record, which is intended to further increase their interoperable capabilities. The interagency program office is not yet positioned to function as a single point of accountability for the implementation of interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities. The departments have made progress in setting up their interagency program office by hiring additional staff, including a permanent director. In addition, consistent with GAO's previous recommendations, the office has begun to demonstrate responsibilities outlined in its charter in the areas of scheduling, planning, and performance measurement. However, the office's effort in these areas does not fully satisfy the recommendations and are incomplete. Specifically, the office does not yet have a schedule that includes information about tasks, resource needs, or relationships between tasks associated with ongoing activities to increase interoperability. Also, key IT management responsibilities in the areas of planning and performance measurement remain incomplete. Among the reasons officials cited for not yet completing a schedule, plan, or performance measures were the office's need to focus on verifying achievement of the six interoperability objectives and participating in the departments' efforts to define the virtual lifetime electronic record. Nonetheless, if the program office does not fulfill key management responsibilities as GAO previously recommended, it may not be positioned to function as a single point of accountability for the delivery of future interoperable capabilities, including the development of the virtual lifetime electronic record.
gao_GAO-07-272	gao_GAO-07-272_0	First, Medicare beneficiaries can subsequently qualify for Medicaid. This group represents approximately one-third of the new dual-eligible beneficiaries enrolled by CMS in PDPs. It also provides data to other CMS systems, SSA, state Medicaid agencies, PDPs, and pharmacies. This system is used to enroll beneficiaries in PDPs. The key information systems (see fig. 2. 3. Enrollment Processes and Coverage Policy Generate Challenges for Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries, Pharmacies, and the Medicare Program CMS’s enrollment processes and implementation of its Part D coverage policy generate challenges for some dual-eligible beneficiaries, pharmacies, and the Medicare program. Because the interval between notification of Medicaid eligibility and completion of the Part D enrollment process can extend at least 5 weeks, some dual-eligible beneficiaries— those previously on Medicare who subsequently become eligible for Medicaid—may be unable to smoothly access their Part D benefits during this interval. However, until March 2007, CMS did not inform these beneficiaries of their right to seek reimbursement for costs incurred during the retroactive period that can last several months. GAO found that Medicare paid PDPs millions of dollars in 2006 for coverage during periods for which dual-eligible beneficiaries may not have sought reimbursement for their drug costs. CMS Has Taken Actions to Address Challenges Faced by New Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries and Pharmacies Given the experience of early 2006, CMS has taken several actions to improve the transition of dual-eligible beneficiaries to Part D. First, the agency has taken steps to facilitate the change in drug coverage for Medicaid beneficiaries whose date of Medicare eligibility can be predicted—about one-third of new dual-eligible beneficiaries enrolled by CMS. In August 2006, CMS implemented a new prospective enrollment process that state Medicaid agencies may use to eliminate breaks in prescription drug coverage for these beneficiaries. While CMS does not monitor the amount of time it takes for PDPs to submit billing information, the agency has begun monitoring Medicare’s eligibility database to identify PDPs that have a large number of enrollees for whom billing information is missing. CMS Is Attempting to Address Information Systems Issues, but without Adequate Testing, Problems May Continue CMS is now making changes to improve the efficiency of key information systems involved in the enrollment process. However, state Medicaid officials and others assert that dual-eligible beneficiaries assigned to PDPs by CMS are often enrolled in PDPs that do not meet their drug needs. When Enrolling Dual- Eligible Beneficiaries, CMS Considers PDP Premiums and Geographic Location CMS assists in the enrollment of dual-eligible beneficiaries who have not enrolled in a Part D plan on their own by randomly assigning them in approximately equal numbers among eligible PDP sponsors in each region. Dual-eligible beneficiaries may change PDPs at any time during the enrollment year. Using Additional Criteria, Maine Switched PDP Assignments to Accommodate Drugs Used by Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries The SPAP in Maine is one example of an organization that took steps to reassign noninstitutionalized, dual-eligible beneficiaries, with CMS approval, by aligning their drug needs with PDP formularies, ultimately reassigning nearly half of its dual-eligible population to PDPs other than those assigned by CMS. Thus, after CMS had randomly assigned dual-eligible beneficiaries to PDPs, Maine reassigned certain noninstitutionalized, dual- eligible beneficiaries to different PDPs prior to January 1, 2006. CMS monitoring of retroactive payments to PDPs and subsequent PDP reimbursements to beneficiaries is also lacking. However, continued use of these methods is contingent on access to beneficiary drug utilization and formulary information from PDPs. CMS’s main concern regarding the draft report for comment centered on our characterization of the interval between the effective date of Part D eligibility and the completed enrollment process as a “disconnect.” Also, CMS officials noted that “it is not new or unusual for individuals to pay out of pocket for their prescription drug or other healthcare services, and then subsequently be reimbursed.” The agency explained that its policy of tying the effective Medicare Part D enrollment date to the first day of Medicaid eligibility is intended to ensure that dual-eligible individuals receive Part D benefits for the period that they were determined by their state to be eligible for this coverage. 1.	Why GAO Did This Study Since January 1, 2006, all dual-eligible beneficiaries--individuals with both Medicare and Medicaid coverage--must receive their drug benefit through Medicare's new Part D prescription drug plans (PDP) rather than from state Medicaid programs. GAO analyzed (1) current challenges in identifying and enrolling new dual-eligible beneficiaries in PDPs, (2) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) efforts to address challenges, and (3) federal and state approaches to assigning dual-eligible beneficiaries to PDPs. GAO reviewed federal law, CMS regulations and guidance and interviewed CMS and PDP officials, among others. GAO also made site visits to six states to learn about the enrollment of dual-eligible beneficiaries from the state perspective. What GAO Found CMS's enrollment procedures and implementation of its Part D coverage policy generate challenges for some dual-eligible beneficiaries, pharmacies, and the Medicare program. A majority of new dual-eligible beneficiaries--generally those on Medicare who have not yet signed up for a PDP and who become eligible for Medicaid--may be unable to smoothly access their drug benefit for at least 5 weeks given the time it takes to enroll them in PDPs and communicate information to beneficiaries and pharmacies. Pharmacies also may be affected adversely when key information about a beneficiary's dual eligibility is not yet processed and available. When dispensing drugs during this interval, pharmacies may have difficulty submitting claims to PDPs and accurately charging copayments. In addition, Medicare pays PDPs to provide these beneficiaries with several months of retroactive coverage but, until March 2007, CMS did not inform beneficiaries of their right to be reimbursed for drug costs incurred during these periods. CMS does not monitor its payments to PDPs for retroactive coverage or the amounts PDPs have reimbursed dual-eligible beneficiaries. Medicare paid PDPs millions of dollars in 2006 for coverage during periods for which dual-eligible beneficiaries may not have sought reimbursement for their drug costs. CMS has taken steps to address challenges associated with enrolling dual-eligible beneficiaries in PDPs. CMS has implemented a policy to prevent a gap in prescription drug coverage for those new dual-eligible beneficiaries whose Part D eligibility is predictable--Medicaid beneficiaries who subsequently qualify for Medicare. We estimate this group represents about one-third of new dual-eligible beneficiaries. In August 2006, CMS began operating a prospective enrollment process that should allow the agency and its Part D partners time to complete the enrollment processes and notify these beneficiaries before their effective enrollment date. Also, CMS is making changes to improve the efficiency of key information systems involved in the enrollment process. While the agency is performing some information systems testing, it is not planning to perform testing of the interactions of key information systems collectively, which is crucial to mitigating the inherent risks of system changes. Under federal law, CMS is required to assign dual-eligible beneficiaries to PDPs based on PDP premiums and geographic area. State Medicaid agency officials and others assert that this assignment method often places dual-eligible beneficiaries in PDPs that do not meet their drug needs. With CMS approval, Maine officials considered beneficiary-specific data to reassign nearly half of their dual-eligible beneficiaries to PDPs that better met their drug needs in late 2005. After the reassignment, the number of these dual-eligible beneficiaries whose PDP covered nearly all of their prescription drugs increased significantly. States choosing to make such reassignments in the future would need ready access to key information from PDPs. CMS contends that reassignments are not needed because beneficiaries may switch to drugs of equivalent therapeutic value or change plans at any time.
gao_NSIAD-96-225	gao_NSIAD-96-225_0	Based on a synthesis of the published views of current and former senior intelligence officials, the reports of three independent commissions, and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication that addressed the issue of national intelligence estimating, an objective NIE should meet the following standards: quantify the certainty level of its key judgments by using percentages or “bettors’ odds,” where feasible, and avoid overstating the certainty of judgments; identify explicitly its assumptions and judgments; develop and explore “alternative futures:” less likely (but not impossible) scenarios that would dramatically change the estimate if they occurred; allow dissenting views on predictions or interpretations; and note explicitly what the IC does not know when the information gaps could have significant consequences for the issues under consideration. NIE 95-19 Overstated Certainty of Its Main Judgment The main judgment of NIE 95-19 was worded with clear (100 percent) certainty. We believe this level of certainty was overstated, based on the caveats and intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19. NIE 95-19 Had Additional Analytic Shortcomings NIE 95-19 did not (1) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments, (2) identify explicitly its critical assumptions, and (3) develop alternative futures. However, in accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly noted what information the IC does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat. Differences and Similarities Between NIE 95-19 and 1993 NIEs NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were not inconsistent with each other. That is, while the judgments were not synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other. However, whereas NIE 95-19’s main judgment was that there will be no new missile threats to the contiguous 48 states during the next 15 years, two studies estimated some possibility—“low” and “quite low”—of such missile threats. We did not attempt to independently evaluate foreign missile threats to the United States.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO analyzed the soundness of certain national intelligence estimates (NIE) on the threat to the United States from foreign missile systems, focusing on comparing the content and conclusions of NIE 95-19, which analyzed emerging threats to North America during the next 15 years, with the content and conclusions of two previous NIEs prepared in 1993. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the main judgment of NIE 95-19, that no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada, was worded with clear, 100-percent certainty; (2) GAO believes this level was overstated, based on the caveats and the intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19; (3) NIE 95-19 had additional analytic shortcomings, since it did not: (a) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments; (b) identify explicitly its critical assumptions; and (c) develop alternative futures; (4) however, in accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly noted what information the U.S. intelligence community does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat; (5) the 1993 NIEs met more of the standards than NIE 95-19 did; and (6) NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were not inconsistent with each other, that is, while the judgments were not synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other.
gao_GAO-01-886	gao_GAO-01-886_0	An individual with a disability eligible to be paid special minimum wages is defined in the regulations as someone “whose earning or productive capacity is impaired by a physical or mental disability, including those relating to age or injury, for the work to be performed.” Determining the impact of the legislation on the employment opportunities of individuals with disabilities severe enough to be eligible to be paid special minimum wages, including whether the purpose of the legislation to not curtail employment opportunities for these individuals is achieved, however, is difficult. Most Employers Are Work Centers That Provide Employment and Support Services to Individuals With Disabilities The majority of 14(c) employers are nonprofit work centers established to provide support services and employment to individuals with disabilities. About 4,700 (84 percent) of these employers were work centers. Businesses accounted for 9 percent of the employers, hospitals or other residential care facilities accounted for 5 percent, and less than 2 percent were schools. Most 14(c) Workers Have Mental Retardation and Earn Very Low Wages From the survey, we estimate that most 14(c) workers have mental retardation or another developmental disability as their primary impairment and earn very low wages. About 46 percent of the workers had more than one disability. In the survey, work center managers also reported that most of their 14(c) workers (70 percent) had a productivity level of less than half of that of workers without disabilities performing the same jobs. Labor Does Not Effectively Manage the Special Minimum Wage Program Labor’s management of the special minimum wage program is ineffective. Until Recently, Labor Placed a Low Priority on the Program Labor officials told us that they have given low priority to the special minimum wage program in past years because WHD’s resources were focused on other enforcement responsibilities, such as detecting violations of child labor laws and protecting low-wage workers in the garment industry.	What GAO Found To prevent the curtailment of employment opportunities for disabled persons, the Fair Labor Standards Act allows employers to pay individuals less than the minimum wage if they have a physical or mental disability that impairs their earning or productive capacity. The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) administers the special minimum wage program. More than 5,600 employers nationwide pay special wages to workers with disabilities; about 84 percent are work centers established to provide employment opportunities and support services to individuals with disabilities. Businesses comprise about 9 percent of these employers; the remaining 7 percent are hospitals or other residential care facilities and schools. Seventy-four percent of the workers paid special minimum wages by work centers have mental retardation or another developmental disability as their primary impairment, and 46 percent have multiple disabilities. From the data received by employers on the productivity of their disabled workers, it is estimated that 70 percent of the workers are less than half as productive as workers without disabilities performing the same jobs. Labor has not effectively managed the special minimum wage program to ensure that disabled workers receive the correct wages because, according to WHD officials, the agency placed a low priority on the program in past years.
gao_GAO-17-360	gao_GAO-17-360_0	Poultry producers may implement biosecurity measures to reduce the risk that diseases such as avian influenza will be transmitted to their flocks. Avian Influenza Has Harmed Human Health, Animal Health, and the U.S. Economy Avian influenza viruses have harmed global human and animal health and the U.S. economy. Avian Influenza Rarely Infects Humans, but the Mortality Rate for Those Infected Has Been Relatively High As of March 2017, two lineages of avian influenza—Asian H5N1, which emerged in 1997, and a new strain of H7N9, which emerged in 2013— have together infected more than 2,100 humans and killed more than 900, primarily in Asia and Africa. For example, the World Health Organization has expressed concern that the Asian lineage H5N1 and H7N9 viruses that have sporadically infected humans in Asia, Northern Africa, and the Middle East could evolve to become more easily transmissible to or between humans and lead to serious disease or another pandemic. Outbreaks of Avian Influenza Have Killed Millions of Poultry Worldwide but Caused Few Fatalities in Other Species Avian influenza outbreaks—both highly pathogenic and low pathogenic— have led to the deaths of hundreds of millions of domesticated poultry in dozens of countries, either directly or through depopulation to prevent spread of the disease. 2 for a map showing the 15 states and the approximate number of birds killed or depopulated as a result of the outbreak that began in 2014.) Avian influenza is an extremely infectious and, in some circumstances, fatal disease in poultry, including chickens and turkeys. The effect of avian influenza on the health of other animal species varies. Infections in waterfowl and swine are of concern because they can spread the virus to poultry and humans, according to the World Organisation for Animal Health. Recent Outbreaks Have Cost the Federal Government and the U.S. Economy Billions of Dollars Outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry in the United States in 2014 and 2016 cost the federal government about $930 million, according to USDA documents, and the 2014 outbreak cost the economy from $1 billion to $3.3 billion, according to two studies by USDA and a private firm. USDA Has Identified Lessons Learned from the 2014 and 2016 Outbreaks and Taken Numerous Corrective Actions After the outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2014 and 2016, USDA identified lessons learned related to its response activities and has taken numerous corrective actions to address those lessons learned. USDA Does Not Have Plans to Evaluate the Effectiveness of its Corrective Actions USDA has taken steps to implement corrective actions, but it does not have plans to evaluate the extent to which completed corrective actions have effectively helped to resolve the problems the agency identified in its responses to the recent outbreaks. We have previously found that agencies may use evaluations to ascertain the success of corrective actions, and that a well-developed plan for conducting evaluations can help ensure that agencies obtain the information necessary to make effective program and policy decisions. For example, these experts questioned whether a sufficient number of federal employees and contracted responders have been trained in using depopulation equipment to address a lesson learned that there were not enough skilled personnel available for depopulation during recent outbreaks. Federal Agencies Face Ongoing Challenges and Associated Issues in Their Efforts to Mitigate the Potential Harmful Effects of Avian Influenza On the basis of stakeholders’ views and our analysis of federal efforts to respond to outbreaks, we identified ongoing challenges and associated issues that federal agencies face in mitigating the potential harmful effects of avian influenza. Reliance on Voluntary Actions by a Wide Range of Poultry Producers to Prevent Flocks from Avian Influenza Infections Is a Challenge Federal efforts to ensure routine biosecurity and prevent poultry flocks from becoming infected with avian influenza face an ongoing challenge because these efforts depend on voluntary actions by a wide range of poultry producers. Instead, USDA relies on producers to take voluntary action to prevent the introduction of avian influenza and other diseases. Poultry Used to Produce Critical Human Vaccine Are Susceptible to Influenza Outbreaks Protecting the chickens that lay the eggs needed to produce human pandemic influenza vaccines is an issue for federal agencies because these birds, like others, are susceptible to avian influenza. USDA has marked as completed about 70 percent of these actions, but it does not have plans for evaluating the extent to which its completed corrective actions have effectively helped to resolve the problems the agency identified in its responses to the 2014 and 2016 outbreaks. USDA agreed with our recommendation. GAO-15-793.	Why GAO Did This Study Avian influenza is an extremely infectious and potentially fatal disease in poultry. In 2014 and 2016, two outbreaks of avian influenza led to the deaths of millions of poultry in 15 states and prompted emergency spending to control the disease. While the health risk to humans is low, humans have been infected with these viruses, sometimes fatally. A spike in fatal human infections in Asia began in late 2016. GAO was asked to review several issues related to avian influenza. This report examines (1) how outbreaks of avian influenza have affected human health, animal health, and the U.S. economy, (2) the extent to which USDA has taken actions to address any lessons learned from its responses to the outbreaks in 2014 and 2016, and how it plans to evaluate the actions' effectiveness, and (3) ongoing challenges and associated issues, if any, federal agencies face in their efforts to mitigate the potential harmful effects of avian influenza. GAO reviewed global and domestic data on the effects of avian influenza and USDA reports and corrective action data associated with its responses to the recent outbreaks, and interviewed federal officials and stakeholders from state agencies and the poultry industry. What GAO Found When avian influenza outbreaks occur, they can have significant effects on human and animal health and the U.S. economy. With regard to human health, avian influenza rarely affects humans, but the World Health Organization estimates that two particular types of the virus have caused more than 2,100 human infections and more than 800 deaths since 1997, primarily in Asia and the Middle East. With regard to animal health, avian influenza outbreaks can lead to large numbers of poultry deaths as a result of efforts to control and prevent the spread of the disease. For example, from December 2014 to June 2015, more than 50 million birds were destroyed in the largest outbreak in U.S. history. The effect of avian influenza on the health of other animal species varies. Swine are susceptible to both avian and human influenza viruses that, if mixed, could create a new virus to which humans are vulnerable. An outbreak can also have significant economic consequences; for example, the economic impacts of the 2014 outbreak in the United States have been estimated to range from $1.0 to $3.3 billion. USDA identified 15 areas with lessons learned from its responses to the 2014 and 2016 outbreaks of avian influenza and 308 associated corrective actions. For example, one lesson learned in the area of depopulation (mass culling of flocks) is that there were not enough skilled personnel available for depopulating infected poultry, leading to delays and possibly increasing the spread of disease. USDA has identified as completed about 70 percent of the 308 corrective actions to address all of the lessons learned. However, the agency has not evaluated the extent to which completed corrective actions—such as encouraging states to form depopulation teams—have helped resolve the problems identified, and it does not have plans for doing so. GAO has previously found that agencies may use evaluations to ascertain the success of corrective actions, and that a well-developed plan for conducting evaluations can help ensure that agencies obtain the information necessary to make effective program and policy decisions. Such a plan would help USDA ascertain the effectiveness of the actions it took to resolve problems identified during recent outbreaks. On the basis of GAO's analysis of federal efforts to respond to outbreaks and of stakeholders' views, GAO identified ongoing challenges and associated issues that federal agencies face in mitigating the potential harmful effects of avian influenza. For example: One challenge is that federal efforts to protect poultry from avian influenza rely on voluntary actions by a wide range of poultry producers to take routine preventative measures—known as biosecurity— to protect their flocks from disease. USDA has two major initiatives under way to encourage improvements to biosecurity. An associated issue that federal agencies face is that the chickens used to produce the eggs needed to manufacture critical human influenza vaccine are susceptible to influenza outbreaks. The Department of Health and Human Services is supporting the development of new vaccine manufacturing technologies to reduce reliance on eggs. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that USDA develop a plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective actions it has taken. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendation.
gao_GAO-06-940T	gao_GAO-06-940T_0	We subsequently used commercial, off-the-shelf computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC documents authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported Radioactive Sources Across Both Borders Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of radioactive sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making their recent, simultaneous border crossings. For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company, stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detectors. Suppliers are not required to exercise any due diligence in determining whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources our investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. The company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington, D.C. Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.- Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border Northern Border Crossing On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our investigators – acting in an undercover capacity – drove to an official port of entry between Canada and the United States. At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at the booth for their primary inspection. The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they were transporting in their vehicle. Our investigators were then directed to park in a secondary inspection zone, while the CBP inspector conducted further inspections of the vehicle. Our investigators drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also had in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document. The instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources. At no time did the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document. Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were able to transport into the United States during our operation would be sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons of mass disruption. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.	Why GAO Did This Study Given today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment and the resulting widespread congressional and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, GAO conducted an investigation testing whether radioactive sources could be smuggled across U.S. borders. Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land border ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. GAO's testimony provides the results of undercover tests made by its investigators to determine whether monitors at U.S. ports of entry detect radioactive sources in vehicles attempting to enter the United States. GAO also provides observations regarding the procedures that CBP inspectors followed during its investigation. GAO has also issued a report on the results of this investigation (GAO-06-545R). What GAO Found For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of GAO's investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO's investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. Subsequently, the company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington D.C. The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, GAO's investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
gao_GAO-15-727T	gao_GAO-15-727T_0	Physical disaster loans are for permanent rebuilding and replacement of uninsured or underinsured disaster-damaged property. Economic injury disaster loans provide small businesses that are not able to obtain credit elsewhere with necessary working capital until normal operations resume after a disaster declaration. Immediate Disaster Assistance Program (IDAP) would provide small businesses with guaranteed bridge loans of up to $25,000 from private-sector lenders, with an SBA decision within 36 hours of a lender’s application on behalf of a borrower. Timeliness of Disaster Assistance and Challenges to Address The following section discusses the extent to which SBA met goals for timely processing of business loan applications and factors affecting timeliness; changes SBA made to address processing issues; and challenges that business organizations identified to timely receipt of assistance. SBA Did Not Meet Its Timeliness Goal for Application Processing and Backlog Grew Rapidly Following Hurricane Sandy, SBA did not meet its goal to process business loan applications within 21 days from receipt to loan decision. SBA took an average of 45 days for physical disaster loan applications and 38 days for economic injury applications. At the time of our report, SBA had not updated its key disaster planning documents—the Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan and the Disaster Playbook—to adjust for the effects that a Sandy-like surge in early applications could have on staffing, resources, and forecasting models for future disasters. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify risk (with methods that can include forecasting and strategic planning) and then analyze the risks for their possible effect. Without taking its experience with early application submissions after Hurricane Sandy into account, SBA risked being unprepared for such a situation in future disaster responses, potentially resulting in delays in disbursing loan funds to disaster victims. We therefore recommended that SBA revise its disaster planning documents to anticipate the potential impact of early application submissions on staffing and resources for future disasters, as well as the risk this impact might pose for timely disaster response. In response to our recommendation, SBA has updated its Disaster Playbook. However, as we stated in 2014, because SBA has not received a large volume of applications since Hurricane Sandy, it is too early to determine whether these changes will improve the timeliness of SBA’s response for future disasters similar in magnitude to Sandy. Loan Approval, Withdrawal, and Cancellation Rates in Selected Disasters As explained previously, for our 2014 report we compared SBA’s approval, withdrawal, and cancellation rates for business loans after selected disasters. In comparison with the other disasters, the approval rate after Sandy was not consistently higher or lower, but withdrawal and cancellation rates were consistently higher. The approval rate for business loan applications for Hurricane Sandy (42 percent) was lower than for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, higher than for Hurricane Ike, and comparable to the rate for Hurricane Irene. The primary reasons for which SBA declined business loan applications after each of the disasters remained the same: lack of repayment ability and unsatisfactory credit history. SBA Has Not Implemented Three Guaranteed Disaster Loan Programs Required by Law In 2014 we reported that 6 years after Congress passed the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008, SBA had not piloted or implemented three guaranteed disaster loan programs, which therefore had not been available after Hurricane Sandy. Second, SBA told us that it received feedback from lenders on challenges that could discourage lenders from participating in the program, but documentation of the feedback was limited. Congressional action would be required to revise statutory requirements, but SBA officials said they had not discussed the lender feedback with Congress. As a result of not documenting, analyzing, or communicating lender feedback, SBA might have lacked reliable information to guide its own actions and to share with Congress about what requirements should be revised to encourage lender participation. Therefore, in September 2014, we recommended that SBA conduct a formal documented evaluation of lenders’ feedback to inform both itself and Congress about implementation challenges and about statutory changes that might be necessary to encourage lenders’ participation in IDAP, and then report to Congress on the challenges SBA faced in implementing IDAP and on statutory changes that might be necessary to facilitate implementation. While SBA thus has taken one step to solicit and document lender feedback, it has not adopted a plan for the steps the agency will take to implement IDAP (and by implication, the other two loan programs) or to reach a determination on whether IDAP or the other loan programs should be implemented.	Why GAO Did This Study With an estimated $67 billion in damage, Hurricane Sandy (October 2012) was the costliest Atlantic storm since Katrina in 2005. SBA administers the Disaster Loan Program, which provides physical disaster loans (to rebuild or replace damaged property) and economic injury loans (for working capital until normal operations resume) to help businesses and homeowners recover from disasters. This testimony discusses (1) the timeliness of SBA's disaster loans, (2) loan approval, withdrawal, and cancellation rates for selected previous disasters; and (3) the extent to which SBA implemented loan programs mandated by the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008. This testimony is based on GAO's September 2014 report ( GAO-14-760 ) on SBA assistance to small businesses after Sandy. For that report, GAO analyzed SBA data on application processing, reviewed documentation related to SBA's planning, reviewed relevant legislation and regulations, and interviewed SBA officials. GAO provides updates on steps SBA has taken to implement GAO's recommendations. What GAO Found Following Hurricane Sandy, the Small Business Administration (SBA) did not meet its timeliness goal (21 days) for processing business loan applications. From receipt to loan decision, SBA averaged 45 days to process physical disaster loans and 38 days for economic injury loans. SBA did not expect early receipt of a high volume of loan applications, and delayed increasing staffing—which in turn increased processing times. As of September 2014, SBA had not revised its disaster planning documents to reflect the effects that application volume and timing could have on staffing, resources, and forecasting models for future disasters. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify risks and take action to manage them. Without taking its post-Sandy experience with application submissions into account in its disaster planning documents and analyzing the potential risks posed for timely response, SBA might be unprepared for similar situations in future disasters, which could delay getting loan funds to disaster victims. In June 2015, SBA provided GAO with an updated version of one disaster planning document—the Disaster Playbook—which includes discussion of early application volume and references to updated staffing models. GAO's review of these changes is ongoing. In comparison with the five disasters that generated the most SBA disaster loan applications since 2005, the loan approval rate after Sandy was not consistently higher or lower, but the application withdrawal and loan cancellation rates (32 percent and 38 percent, respectively) were consistently higher than other disasters. SBA approved 42 percent of business loan applications after Sandy, a rate lower than for Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, higher than for Ike, and comparable with that for Irene. For Hurricane Sandy and for previous disasters, SBA primarily declined business loan applications because of applicants' lack of repayment ability and credit history. As of June 2015, SBA had not implemented the guaranteed disaster loan programs Congress mandated in 2008, including the Immediate Disaster Assistance Program (IDAP)—a bridge loan program in which private-sector lenders would provide disaster victims with up to $25,000 and an SBA decision within 36 hours of a lender's application on behalf of a borrower. In 2014, SBA officials told GAO they were trying to implement IDAP but had received some feedback from lenders that some program requirements—such as a statutory minimum 10-year loan term under certain circumstances—might discourage lender participation. SBA had not conducted a formal documented evaluation of lender feedback to establish what implementation challenges the agency might face and to determine what, if any, statutory changes Congress could consider. Without an appropriately documented evaluation of lender feedback, SBA might not have reliable information with which to inform its own actions and its reporting to Congress about challenges with implementing the programs. In June 2015, SBA provided GAO with documentation of additional outreach performed in October 2014, where lenders provided specific feedback regarding current statutory requirements and proposed program requirements. SBA has yet to adopt a plan for how and whether it will proceed with IDAP implementation or document the challenges it would face in implementing the program. Therefore, SBA has not reported to Congress on these issues. What GAO Recommends In September 2014, GAO recommended that SBA revise its disaster planning documents, conduct a formal documented evaluation of lenders' feedback on IDAP, and report to Congress on challenges to implementing the program. SBA has since taken steps to revise its planning documents and received and documented some lender feedback, but has not reported to Congress.
gao_GAO-16-521	gao_GAO-16-521_0	Agencies Relied on 20 Authorities for Over 90 Percent of New Hires in Fiscal Year 2014 Our analysis of OPM data found that overall, agencies used a relatively small number of hiring authorities to fill nearly all of the vacancies in 2014, and a large number of hiring authorities to fill the small proportion of positions that remained. Specifically, we found that agencies used 105 hiring authority codes for 196,226 new appointments in fiscal year 2014. 1). While the Title 5 competitive examining hiring authority—has been the traditional method for federal hiring—was the single most used hiring authority in fiscal year 2014, it accounted for less than a quarter of all new appointments government- wide. These authorities are to be used as a supplement to, not a substitute for, the competitive hiring process. Three Selected Agencies and OPM Need to Better Assess the Effectiveness of Hiring Authorities to Strengthen Hiring Efforts Selected Agencies and OPM Do Not Measure the Effectiveness of Individual Hiring Authorities in Meeting Agencies’ Needs In our 2002 report, we found that to address their human capital challenges, it is important for agencies to assess and determine which human capital flexibilities, including hiring authorities, are the most appropriate and effective for managing their workforces. Indeed, OPM officials said they do not know if agencies rely on a small number of authorities because agencies are unfamiliar with other authorities, or if they have found other authorities to be less effective in meeting their needs. By analyzing the effectiveness of hiring authorities, OPM and agencies could identify improvements that could be used to refine those procedures. Second, Congress and OPM could provide more agencies access to specific authorities found to be highly effective. Officials said the campaign will feature a series of multi-agency, in-person discussions about hiring and assessment policies and corresponding guidance led by OPM and OMB officials. OPM’s Hiring Excellence Campaign is designed to bring together agency hiring specialists and hiring managers to discuss hiring tools and opportunities for improving the hiring process, and therefore could help agencies make better use of available hiring authorities. Given the similarities between the Hiring Excellence Campaign and OPM’s prior efforts to improve federal hiring, it will also be important for OPM to ensure that the campaign leverages these prior initiatives, incorporates relevant lessons learned, if any, and ensures there is no unnecessary overlap or duplication with other efforts to improve federal hiring. A critical first step in understanding if and which authorities are meeting agency needs is for OPM and agencies to analyze if and how specific authorities contribute to the effectiveness of the hiring process. 2. 3. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines: (1) the hiring authorities agencies used in fiscal year 2014 (the most recent year for available data when we began our review), (2) the extent to which selected agencies and OPM assessed the effectiveness of hiring authorities used for selected occupations in helping meet hiring needs, and (3) how OPM ensured that agencies have the assistance and information needed to use the hiring authorities effectively. For example, we reviewed OPM time-to-hire data government-wide and by agency.	Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies face human capital challenges as a large percentage of employees become eligible to retire and agencies compete with the private sector for critical skills. To acquire needed talent, agencies need a hiring process that is applicant friendly, flexible, and meets policy requirements, such as hiring on the basis of merit. GAO was asked to review the extent to which federal hiring authorities were meeting agency needs. This report examines (1) the hiring authorities agencies used in fiscal year 2014 (the most recent data at the time of the review), (2) the extent to which case study agencies and OPM assessed the effectiveness of hiring authorities, and (3) how OPM ensured that agencies understood how to use hiring authorities effectively. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed OPM data and documents, and interviewed OPM and officials from three agencies selected on the basis of recent high hiring levels in critical skill occupations. What GAO Found A hiring authority is the law, executive order, or regulation that allows an agency to hire a person into the federal civil service. Of the 105 hiring authorities used in fiscal year 2014, agencies relied on 20 for 91 percent of the 196,226 new appointments made that year. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) officials said they do not know if agencies rely on a small number of authorities because agencies are unfamiliar with other authorities, or if they have found other authorities to be less effective. The competitive examining hiring authority, generally seen as the traditional method for federal hiring, was the single most used authority in fiscal year 2014, but accounted for less than 25 percent of all new appointments. Agencies Relied on 20 Hiring Authorities for Nearly All New Hires in Fiscal Year 2014 While OPM—the agency responsible for overseeing the delegated hiring authority and managing federal civilian personnel data—tracks data on agency time-to-hire, manager and applicant survey results, and compliance audits to assess the hiring process, this information is not used by OPM or agencies to analyze the effectiveness of hiring authorities. As a result, OPM and agencies do not know if authorities are meeting their intended purposes. By analyzing hiring authorities, OPM and agencies could identify improvements that could be used to refine authorities, expand access to specific authorities found to be highly efficient and effective, and eliminate those found to be less effective. OPM's Hiring Excellence Campaign consists of a number of multi-agency, in-person events and is OPM's latest initiative designed to address long-standing challenges with federal hiring. OPM officials described the objectives, strategies, and measures by which the campaign will be measured and sustained. Going forward it will be important for OPM to sustain the campaign's efforts and incorporate lessons learned, if any, from similar prior or existing efforts to improve federal hiring. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Director of OPM, working with agencies, strengthen hiring efforts by (1) analyzing the extent to which federal hiring authorities are meeting agencies' needs; (2) using this information to explore opportunities to refine, eliminate, or expand authorities as needed, and (3) sustain the Hiring Excellence Campaign's efforts to improve agency hiring and leverage prior initiatives, as appropriate. OPM generally concurred with these recommendations.
gao_GAO-09-64	gao_GAO-09-64_0	Medicaid. Non-Medicaid state funding. CMS Took Modest Steps to Address Recent Funding Trends and Manage Survey Funding Allocations Federal funding for state surveys increased from fiscal years 2000 through 2002 but was nearly flat from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. In inflation- adjusted terms, funding fell 9 percent from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. CMS has used the budget analysis tool five times: (1) twice to distribute annual increases in Medicare funds to states (after allocating a small across-the-board inflation increase), and (2) three times to redistribute Medicare funds at the end of the fiscal year to states that spent more than their initial allocations by using state funds and had requested supplemental funding. Almost All States Were Unable to Complete Their Survey Workload, and Pinpointing the Cause Is Difficult Only one state, Arkansas, was able to complete all surveys in tiers 1 through 3 in fiscal year 2006, but pinpointing the cause is difficult because (1) several factors such as workload, funding, staffing, and management could have had an impact and (2) distinguishing the extent to which each factor contributed to state completion rates and the quality of each states’ surveys is challenging. This decrease was due to a decline in the number of the most frequently surveyed facilities that also require more time to survey compared to other facilities. Although complaint investigations represent a significant portion of state workload, CMS officials told us that the agency lacks complete and reliable data on complaints received and investigated. The workforce instability arises mostly from noncompetitive salaries, which result in the hiring of less qualified candidates, and hiring freezes. However, officials from 13 states are concerned that any increase in surveyor salaries may not be sustainable in the long-term without increases in state Medicare allocations. In one of these states, CMS told us that performance issues raised concerns about the management of survey activities. CMS Oversight of States’ Use of Funds Is Limited CMS oversight of states’ use of funds for survey activities is limited. Most told us that these rates have not been reviewed in recent years, even though federal survey and state licensure requirements may have changed over time. Regional officials told us that they do not verify that states actually contributed funds in a manner consistent with their shares, noting limits on their authority to require state data and states’ refusal to provide it voluntarily. As a result, CMS does not know if states are contributing their own funds appropriately (see fig. 6). CMS has made limited progress in ensuring that federal Medicare allocations reflect state workloads. The budget analysis tool that CMS developed to align survey funding with state workloads has been used only incrementally to address state funding inequities, rather than adjusting the mismatch between federal allocations and states’ current survey workloads. For example, seven states completed their nursing home surveys in fiscal year 2006, but CMS found that they missed serious deficiencies on more than a quarter of federal comparative surveys. Non- Medicaid state shares for nursing homes vary widely across states, state contribution rates are not determined consistently, and CMS officials do not collect information on such state expenditures. The evidence is mixed on whether federal funding has kept pace with the changes in states’ required survey workload—the workload that states would have to complete to meet statutory and CMS survey frequency requirements. On the other hand, most states told us that survey frequencies of 6 to 10 years for many facilities could adversely affect beneficiaries. We believe that these and other limitations of the current funding approach will continue to frustrate CMS’s efforts to support and oversee state survey activities. Differentiating between Medicare and Medicaid. CMS oversight of states’ use of federal funds. Appendix III: Federal Funding for Survey Activities in Actual and Inflation-Adjusted Dollars, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007 Appendix III: Federal Funding for Survey Activities in Actual and Inflation-Adjusted Dollars, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007 Change from 2000 to 2007 Change from 2000 to 2007 (9.0%) Appendix IV: Number of and Percentage Change in Facilities Subject to State Standard and Validation Surveys, 2000 to 2007 Appendix IV: Number of and Percentage Change in Facilities Subject to State Standard and Validation Surveys, 2000 to 2007 (percentage change) Facilities subject to state standard surveys 906 (31) 1,099 (28) 577 (27) 1,340 (20) 447 (13) 17 (3) Outpatient physical therapy or outpatient speech pathology services 42 (1) 101 (5) Intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded -324 (-5) -1,119 (-7) -125 (-19) 254 (N/A) 87 (N/A) 3,302 (7) Facilities subject to state validation surveys 769 (138) 405 (614) 903 (534) 185 (N/A) -173 (-4) 2,089 (39) 5,391 (10) The total number of organ transplant centers is as of January 2008; collectively these centers operated 844 organ transplant programs. Appendix V: Change in States’ Required Survey Workload from Fiscal Year 2000 to Fiscal Year 2007 In order to determine how states’ required survey workload—the workload that states would have to complete to meet statutory and CMS survey frequency requirements—has changed from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2007, we analyzed OSCAR and CMS data for fiscal years 2000 and 2007. Nursing Home Deaths: Arkansas Coroner Referrals Confirm Weaknesses in State and Federal Oversight of Quality of Care.	Why GAO Did This Study Americans receive care from tens of thousands of health care facilities participating in Medicare and Medicaid. To ensure the quality of care, CMS contracts with states to conduct periodic surveys and complaint investigations. Federal spending on such activities totaled about $444 million in fiscal year 2007; states are expected to contribute their own funds both through the Medicaid program and apart from that program. GAO evaluated survey funding, state workloads, and federal oversight of states' use of funds since fiscal year 2000 to determine if federal funding had kept pace with the changing workload. GAO analyzed (1) federal funding trends from fiscal years 2000 through 2007 and CMS's methodology for determining states' allocations and spending, (2) CMS data on the number of participating facilities and completed state surveys, and (3) CMS oversight of state spending. GAO interviewed state officials and collected data from 28 states. What GAO Found Federal funding for state surveys increased from fiscal years 2000 through 2002 but was nearly flat from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. In inflation-adjusted terms, funding fell 9 percent from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. CMS has made incremental adjustments to improve its management of state allocations. It shifted federal funding from support contracts to surveys, increasing state allocations about 1 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. For some facilities without statutory survey frequencies, CMS increased the time between surveys from 6 years to 10 years--a schedule that may further increase the chance of undetected quality problems. CMS also developed a budget analysis tool to help address the mismatch between federal allocations and states' current survey workloads, but use of the tool has been limited. Most states, including those that spent more than their initial federal allocations, did not complete CMS's survey workload priorities in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, though the required survey workload--the workload that states would have to complete to meet statutory and CMS survey frequency requirements--decreased about 4 percent nationwide from fiscal years 2000 to 2007. A decrease in the number of the most time-consuming and frequently surveyed facilities, such as nursing homes, offset the increase in other facilities. CMS lacked consistent and reliable data to measure workload changes in other areas such as complaint investigations. States reported that workforce instability due to noncompetitive surveyor salaries and hiring freezes hindered their workload completion but CMS has little influence over state hiring. Among seven states that completed their nursing home surveys, CMS found that 25 percent or more of some of their surveys missed serious deficiencies. According to CMS, the performance of one of these states raised concerns about the state's management of survey activities. There is little oversight of state non-Medicaid contributions intended in part to reflect the benefit states derive from participating in federally sponsored oversight of facilities. State contribution rates have not been reviewed in recent years. CMS officials told GAO that the agency does not collect information on state expenditures to help ensure that states are contributing funds consistent with those rates, noting limits on their authority to require submission of such data. CMS believes, however, that federal funding may not be sufficient and that state spending above the initial Medicare allocation represents state funds in addition to the non-Medicaid share. The evidence is mixed on whether federal funding has kept pace with the changing workload. The required survey workload decreased nationwide but most states told GAO that survey frequencies of 6 to 10 years for many facilities could adversely affect beneficiaries. Moreover, distinguishing the impact of funding, staffing, and management on state workloads is difficult. GAO believes that these and other weaknesses in CMS's current funding approach will continue to frustrate the agency's efforts to support and oversee state survey activities.
gao_GAO-08-638T	gao_GAO-08-638T_0	The FCS program is recognized as being high risk and needing special oversight. Definition, Development, and Demonstration of Capabilities Will Finish Late in the FCS Schedule Ideally, the Army should have entered development in 2003 with firm requirements and mature technologies. It will be years before demonstrations validate that the FCS will provide needed capabilities. Requirements, Technologies, and Designs Are Not Yet Mature While the Army should have firmed requirements at the outset of its development program, it now faces a daunting task in completing this work by the preliminary design review and subsequent milestone review in 2009—6 years into a 10-year development schedule. Significant Challenges in Developing And Demonstrating FCS Network and Software It is not yet clear if or when the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built, and demonstrated by the Army and lead system integrator (LSI). The Army does not plan to demonstrate that the FCS system of systems performs as required until after the production decision for the core program in 2013. Significant Commitments to Production Will Be Made Before FCS Capabilities Are Demonstrated While the FCS production decision for the core FCS program is to be held in fiscal year 2013, production commitments will begin in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 with production for the first of a series of three planned spin out efforts and the early versions of the NLOS-C vehicle. When development funds are included, $39 billion will have been appropriated and another $8 billion requested. Army Commitment to LSI for Production Heightens Oversight Challenges The Army’s April 2007 decision to contract with the LSI for FCS production makes an already close relationship closer, represents a change from the Army’s original rationale for using an LSI, and may further complicate oversight. As we have previously reported, this is a burden that will need to be increasingly borne by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. FCS Costs Likely to Grow beyond Army Estimates The Army’s $160.9 billion cost estimate for the FCS program is largely unchanged from last year’s estimate despite a program adjustment that reduced the number of systems from 18 to 14. This may mean a reduction in capabilities of the FCS program and thus represents a reduction in the Army’s buying power on FCS. Further, two independent cost estimates— from DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) and the other from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a federally funded research and development center—are significantly higher than the Army’s estimate. It is reasonable to include such growth factors, based on our own analysis of weapon systems and the low level of knowledge attained on the FCS program at this time. At a minimum, the criteria should include, among other things, the completion of the definition of all FCS requirements including those for the information network and the synchronization of FCS with all essential complementary programs. We further recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) closely examine the oversight implications of the Army’s decision to contract with the LSI for early production of FCS spin outs, NLOS-C, and low rate production for the core FCS program; (2) take steps to mitigate the risks of the Army’s decisions, including the consideration of the full range of alternatives for contracting for production; and (3) evaluate alternatives to the LSI for long-term sustainment support of the FCS system of systems. Finally, regarding the FCS network and software development and demonstration efforts, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) direct the FCS program to stabilize network and software requirements on each software build to enable software developers to follow disciplined software practices; (2) establish a clear set of criteria for acceptable network performance at each of the key program events; and (3) in setting expectations for the 2009 milestone review, include a thorough analysis of network technical feasibility and risks, synchronization of network development and demonstration with that of other FCS elements, and a reconciliation of the differences between independent and Army estimates of network and software development scope and cost.	Why GAO Did This Study The Future Combat System (FCS) program--which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network--is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. The substantial technical challenges, the Army's acquisition strategy, and the cost of the program are among the reasons why the program is recognized as needing special oversight and review. This testimony is based on GAO's two March 2008 reports on FCS and addresses (1) how the definition, development, and demonstration of FCS capabilities are proceeding, particularly in light of the go/no-go decision scheduled for 2009; (2) the Army's plans for making production commitments for FCS and any risks related to the completion of development; and (3) the estimated costs for developing and producing FCS. What GAO Found Today, the FCS program is about halfway through its development phase, yet it is, in many respects, a program closer to the beginning of development. This portends additional cost increases and delays as FCS begins what is traditionally the most expensive and problematic phase of development. In the key areas of defining and developing FCS capabilities, requirements definition is still fluid, critical technologies are immature, software development is in its early stages, the information network is still years from being demonstrated, and complementary programs are at risk for not meeting the FCS schedule. It is not yet clear if or when the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built, and demonstrated. Yet, the time frame for completing FCS development is ambitious; even if all goes as planned, the program will not test production-representative prototypes or fully demonstrate the system of systems until after low rate production begins. Even though the development of FCS will finish late in its schedule, commitments to production will come early. Production funding for the first spinout of FCS technologies and the early version of the FCS cannon begin in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Production money for the core FCS systems will be requested beginning in February 2010, with the DOD fiscal year 2011 budget request--just months after the go/no-go review and before the stability of the design is determined at the critical design review. In fact, by the time of the FCS production decision in 2013, a total of about $39 billion, which comprises research and development and production costs, will already have been appropriated for the program, with another $8 billion requested. Also, the Army plans to contract with its lead system integrator for the initial FCS production, a change from the Army's original rationale for using an integrator. This increases the burden of oversight faced by the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While the Army's cost estimates for the FCS program remain about the same as last year--$160.9 billion--the content of the program has been reduced, representing a reduction in buying power for the Army. The level of knowledge for the program does not support a confident estimate, and cost estimates made by two independent organizations are significantly higher. Competing demands from within the Army and DOD limits the ability to fund higher FCS costs. Thus, the Army will likely continue to reduce FCS capabilities in order to stay within available funding limits. Accordingly, FCS's demonstrated performance, the reasonableness of its remaining work, and the resources it will need and can reasonably expect will be of paramount importance at the 2009 milestone review for the FCS program.
gao_GAO-16-241	gao_GAO-16-241_0	EPA, FDA, and USDA Have Taken Steps to Regulate GE Crops, but USDA Has Not Updated Its Regulations to Oversee GE Crops Derived from Alternative Technologies EPA, FDA, and USDA, generally have taken steps to regulate GE crops, including those derived from alternative technologies, but USDA has not updated its regulations to oversee all GE crops. EPA and FDA officials said that they apply the same legal authorities and oversight processes to regulate GE crops from alternative technologies that they do for other GE and non-GE crops, regardless of how they are derived. Conversely, USDA’s regulations pertaining to GE crops address only GE crops for which the donor, vector, or recipient of genetic material is a plant pest. In 1995, FDA established a voluntary premarket consultation process, through which companies are encouraged to notify the agency before marketing a food produced from a GE crop and voluntarily submit a summary of the developer-performed safety assessment that, among other things, (1) identifies distinguishing attributes of new genetic traits, such as the source and function of the genetic material, the purpose of the modification, and the estimated concentration of the new material in food derived from the GE crop; (2) provides information regarding whether any new material in food made from the GE crop is known or suspected to be a toxin or allergenic, and the basis for concluding that the GE-derived food can be safely consumed; and (3) compares the composition or characteristics of GE-derived food to that of its non-GE counterpart with special emphasis on important nutrients and toxins that occur naturally in the food. However, USDA officials said that they do not have a timeline for finalizing a new rule. Nonetheless, USDA has taken some steps to address unintended mixing of GE and non-GE crops. USDA Has Limited Data on the Unintended Mixing of GE and Non-GE Crops, Making It Difficult to Know the Extent and Economic Impact of Such Mixing According to USDA officials and several stakeholders, USDA has limited data on the unintended mixing of GE and non-GE crops from production to market, making it difficult to know the extent of such mixing and the associated economic losses experienced by farmers. USDA officials said that the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and the Economic Research Service (ERS) have generally not collected information on unintended mixing between GE and non-GE crops in past farmer surveys because no specific request had been made by other USDA agencies to obtain this information. In 2014, USDA’s Organic Survey, administered by NASS, and partly in response to the AC21 recommendation to fund or conduct research on the quantification of economic losses incurred by farmers as a result of unintended GE presence, included a question asking organic farmers if they had experienced an economic loss because of unintended GE presence in their crops offered for sale, and if so, to quantify their three most recent losses. Further, these officials said that while they lack information on the number of nonorganic producers seeking to market their non-GE crop as identity- preserved (i.e., crops of a specific genetic variety, which might bring a higher price), the acreage planted with identity-preserved corn and soybeans is significantly greater than the acreage planted with organic versions of these crops. However, USDA currently has no efforts under way to survey these identity-preserved producers on this issue. Without including producers growing identity-preserved crops, in addition to producers growing organic crops, in its survey efforts, USDA lacks statistically-valid data needed to understand the full scope of the potential economic impacts from unintended GE presence. USDA, EPA, and FDA Provide Varying Degrees of Information to the Public about Oversight of GE Crops USDA, EPA, and FDA provide varying degrees of information to the public about their oversight of GE crops. In addition, USDA regularly provides information and updates on actions and meetings on its website relating to its oversight of GE crops and other GE organisms, and offers opportunities for public input. On its website, EPA provides updates on actions related to oversight of GE crops, including pesticide registrations such as those intended for use with GE crops. Publishing a notice of intent, programmatic environmental impact statement, and proposed rule in the coming months are good first steps, but without setting a timeline, with milestones and interim steps, for updating its GE crop regulations, it will be difficult for the agency to set priorities, use resources efficiently, measure progress, and provide management a means to monitor the agency’s progress in promulgating a new rule. In addition, until a rule is finalized, USDA will continue to lack regulatory authority to fully assess the potential risks, if any, to plant and environmental health posed by GE crops created with alternative technologies, in particular those that either do not use plant pests or use plant pests but do not result in plant pest DNA in the crop developed. Our objectives were to examine (1) the steps the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have taken to regulate GE crops, including those derived from alternative technologies; (2) what data USDA has on the extent of unintended mixing of GE and non-GE crops, and what steps, if any, have been taken to prevent such mixing; and (3) the extent to which USDA, EPA, and FDA provide information to the public on GE crops they oversee.	Why GAO Did This Study Three agencies have primary responsibility for regulating GE crops and food in the United States: USDA, EPA, and FDA. USDA and industry groups estimate that at least 90 percent of many major commercial crops, such as corn and soybeans, are GE varieties. Proponents say GE crops offer greater pest resistance, use less labor-intensive processes to control weeds, and result in increased productivity to feed growing populations. Opponents cite a lack of consensus on impacts to agriculture, the environment, and human health. GAO was asked to review oversight and information on GE crops. This report examines (1) steps EPA, FDA, and USDA have taken to regulate GE crops; (2) the data USDA has on the extent and impact of unintended mixing of GE and non-GE crops, and what steps have been taken to prevent such mixing; and (3) the extent to which USDA, EPA, and FDA provide information to the public on GE crops. GAO analyzed legislation, regulations, and agency policies and reports and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, including representatives from the biotechnology and food industries and consumer, farm, environmental, and commodity groups. What GAO Found The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), have taken steps to regulate genetically-engineered (GE) crops (i.e., crops whose genetic makeup has been modified), but USDA has not updated its regulations to oversee GE crops derived from alternative technologies in which the GE crop developed contains no plant pest DNA. EPA regulates certain GE crops as part of its pesticide registration process. FDA, through its voluntary consultation process, works with companies that develop GE crops to consider food safety issues. EPA and FDA apply the same legal authorities and oversight processes to regulate GE and non-GE crops, regardless of how a GE crop was developed. Conversely, USDA's GE crop regulations pertain only to crops for which the donor, vector, or recipient of genetic material is a plant pest. In 2008, USDA took steps to update its regulations to capture GE crops developed with alternative technologies. However, in February 2015, USDA withdrew its proposed rule because, in part, the scope of this rule was not clear. USDA still intends to update its regulations, but has not established a timeline for doing so. GAO's body of work has shown that without milestones and interim steps it can be difficult for an agency to set priorities, measure progress, and provide management a means to monitor the agency's progress in promulgating a new rule. In addition, until a rule is finalized USDA will continue to lack regulatory authority to assess the potential risks, if any, posed by GE crops created with alternative technologies. USDA has limited data on the extent and impact of unintended mixing of GE and non-GE crops, according to USDA officials and stakeholders. USDA officials said that the agency has generally not collected information on unintended mixing in past farmer surveys because no specific request had been made to obtain this information. In a 2012 report, the USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century Agriculture (AC21) recommended that the agency fund or conduct research, including quantifying actual economic losses (e.g., loss of a premium price for an organic crop), incurred by farmers as a result of unintended mixing. In its 2014 Organic Survey, USDA surveyed organic farmers on economic losses from unintended GE presence in their crops offered for sale. The survey results indicated that economic losses caused by unintended GE material in organic crops offered for sale exist, although at very small levels. However, USDA does not have similar data for farmers using non-GE seed and marketing their crops as identity-preserved (i.e., a specific genetic variety of a crop). USDA officials said identity-preserved crop acreage is significantly greater than organic crop acreage. Without including farmers growing identity-preserved crops in addition to those growing organic crops in its survey efforts, USDA is missing key information on the potential economic impacts of unintended mixing. Nonetheless, USDA has taken some steps to address unintended mixing, such as reviving AC21, as have farmers and the agribusiness industry. USDA, EPA, and FDA provide varying degrees of information about their oversight of GE crops to the public. USDA and EPA regularly provide information and updates on actions relating to their oversight of GE crops on their websites and use a number of mechanisms to obtain public input on their actions. FDA provides information on GE crops relating to its consultation process. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends, among other things, that USDA set a timeline for updating its regulations and include farmers growing identity-preserved crops in its survey efforts to better understand the impacts of unintended mixing. USDA generally agreed with these recommendations.
gao_GAO-10-670	gao_GAO-10-670_0	BLM Maintains and Makes Publicly Available Incomplete and Inconsistent Information Related to Protests to Its Lease Sales Although BLM has taken steps to collect information related to protests to its lease sales, we found that the information it maintained and made available publicly was incomplete and inconsistent across the four state offices we reviewed. In May 2010, the Secretary of the Interior announced several agencywide leasing reforms that are to take place at BLM, some of which may address concerns raised by protester groups, by providing the public with earlier and more consistent data on which parcels may become available for leasing, thereby giving these groups longer to consider or prepare protests. To better track protests, BLM in 2007 required its staff to begin using a new module, which it had added as a component of its LR2000 lease record-keeping system specifically to capture, among other things, information related to lease sale protests. Protest-Related Information Varies across BLM State Offices, and Protester Groups Have Raised Concerns about This Information We found that the amount of protest-related information BLM makes publicly available varies across the four state offices in our review. Most Parcels Identified for Lease Were Protested by a Diverse Group of Entities for a Variety of Reasons Most parcels identified in BLM lease sale notices from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2009 in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming were protested; protests came from a diverse group of entities, including nongovernmental organizations representing environmental and hunting interests, state and local governments, businesses, and private individuals. BLM officials provided anecdotal accounts in which protests influenced their decisions, and they acknowledged that the protest process can serve as a check on agency decisions to offer parcels for lease sale. Leases on Protested Parcels Were Often Delayed We found that a majority of leases for protested parcels in the four state offices from fiscal year 2007 through 2009 were issued after the 60-day window specified in the Mineral Leasing Act. Despite Concerns, Protest Activity and Delayed Leasing Have Not Significantly Affected Bid Prices, and Near-Term Effects on Nationwide Oil and Gas Production Are Not Likely to Be Significant We found that protest activity did not systematically decrease bid prices for leases during the period we reviewed and that overall effects on near- term nationwide oil and gas production are not likely to be significant, despite industry concerns over protests and delays in issuing leases. At the national level, the near-term effect of protests on U.S. oil and gas production is likely to be relatively modest because federal lands account for a small fraction of the total onshore and offshore nationwide oil and gas output. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the efficiency and transparency of BLM’s process with regard to protests of its lease sale decisions and to strengthen how BLM carries out its responsibilities under the Mineral Leasing Act, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to take the following two actions: revisit the agency’s use of the module for tracking protest information and, in so doing, determine and implement an approach for collecting protest information agencywide that is complete, consistent, and available to the public and in implementing the Secretary of the Interior’s leasing policy reform issued in May 2010, take steps to improve (1) the transparency of leasing information provided to the public, including information to explain the basis of agency decisions to include or exclude particular parcels in a lease sale and, to the extent feasible, documentation of the role, if any, that protests played in final lease decisions, and (2) the timeliness of lease issuance, without compromising the thoroughness of review. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines (1) the extent to which the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) maintains and makes publicly available information related to protests, (2) the extent to which parcels were protested and the nature of protests, and (3) the effects of protests on BLM’s lease sale decisions and on oil and gas development activities. To determine the extent to which parcels were protested and the nature of protests, we compared BLM’s lease sale records with the data available in BLM’s public challenge module. Appendix II: Protest Information from a Sample of Lease Sales in Four Selected State Offices, Fiscal Years 2007-2009 The following tables present information based on our review of a sample of 12 lease sales held in the state offices of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2009.	Why GAO Did This Study The development of oil and natural gas resources on federal lands contributes to domestic energy production but also results in concerns over potential impacts on those lands. Numerous public protests about oil and gas lease sales have been filed with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages these federal resources. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which BLM maintains and makes publicly available information related to protests, (2) the extent to which parcels were protested and the nature of protests, and (3) the effects of protests on BLM's lease sale decisions and on oil and gas development activities. To address these questions, GAO examined laws, regulations, and guidance; BLM's agencywide lease record-keeping system; lease sale records for the 53 lease sales held in the four BLM state offices of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming during fiscal years 2007-2009; and protest data from a random sample of 12 of the 53 lease sales. GAO also interviewed BLM officials and industry and protester groups. What GAO Found While BLM has taken steps to collect agency-wide protest data, the data it maintains and makes publicly available are limited. Although in 2007 BLM required its staff to begin using a module, added to its lease record-keeping system, to capture information related to lease sale protests, GAO found that the information BLM collected was incomplete and inconsistent across the four reviewed BLM state offices and, thus, of limited utility. Moreover, in the absence of a written BLM policy on protest-related information the agency is to make publicly available during the leasing process, each state office developed its own practices, resulting in state-by-state variation in what protest-related information was made available. As a result, protester groups expressed frustration with both the extent and timing of protest-related information provided by BLM. In May 2010, the Secretary of the Interior announced several agency-wide leasing reforms that are to take place at BLM. Some of these reforms may address concerns raised by protester groups, by providing earlier opportunities for public input in the lease sale process, thereby potentially giving stakeholders more time to assess parcels and decide whether to file a protest. A diverse group of entities protested the majority of parcels BLM identified in its lease sale notices during fiscal years 2007 through 2009 in the four states, for a variety of reasons. GAO found that 74 percent of parcels whose leases were sold competitively during this period by BLM state offices in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming were protested. In examining a random sample of lease sales, GAO found that protests came from various entities, including nongovernmental organizations representing environmental and hunting interests, state and local governments, businesses, and private individuals. Their reasons for protesting ranged from concerns over wildlife habitat to air or water quality to loss of recreational or agricultural land uses. The extent to which protests influenced BLM's leasing decisions could not be measured because BLM's information does not include the role protests played in its decisions to withdraw parcels from lease sale. Regardless, BLM officials stated that the protest process can serve as a check on agency decisions to offer parcels for lease. In reviewing BLM's lease sale data in the four selected states during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, GAO found that 91 percent of the time, BLM was unable to issue leases on protested parcels within the 60-day window specified in the Mineral Leasing Act. Industry groups expressed concern that these delays increased the cost and risk associated with leasing federal lands. GAO found that, despite industry concerns, protest activity and delayed leasing have not significantly affected bid prices for leases; if protests or subsequent delays added significantly to industry cost or risk, it would be expected that the value of, and therefore bids for, protested parcels would be reduced. In addition, because federal lands account for a small fraction of the total onshore and offshore nationwide oil and gas output, the effects of protests to BLM leasing decisions on U.S. oil and gas production are likely to be relatively modest. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that BLM (1) revisit the way it tracks protest information and in so doing ensure that complete and consistent information is collected and made publicly available and (2) improve the transparency of leasing decisions and the timeliness of lease issuance. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations.
gao_GAO-05-407	gao_GAO-05-407_0	In our report, which is included in the fiscal year 2004 Financial Report of the United States Government, we reported material deficiencies relating to Treasury’s preparation of the CFS. This report provides the details of the additional weaknesses we identified in performing our fiscal year 2004 audit procedures and our recommendations to correct those weaknesses, as well as the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address open recommendations contained in our prior years’ reports. As discussed in our fiscal year 2004 audit report, Treasury made progress in laying the foundation to address certain long-standing material deficiencies in preparing the CFS. The goal of the new system is to be able to directly link information from federal agencies’ audited financial statements to amounts reported in the CFS, a concept that we strongly support. Recommendations for Executive Action In connection with Treasury’s development of its new compilation system and process, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary to segregate the duties of individuals performing key functions in Treasury’s processes for preparing governmentwide adjustments to the financial statements, making changes to Excel spreadsheets that contain audited agency financial information, and accessing federal agencies’ closing package data in Treasury’s new system; require and maintain appropriate supporting documentation for all journal vouchers recorded in the CFS; require that Treasury employees contact and document communications with agencies before recording journal vouchers to change agency audited closing package data; require and document management reviews of all procedures that result in data changes to the CFS; configure the GFRS database to prevent Treasury personnel from altering data submitted by federal agencies and to use separate GFRS databases for testing and production; and assess the infrastructure associated with the compilation process and modify it as necessary to achieve a sound internal control environment. Conformity with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles As we have reported in previous years, and noted again during our fiscal year 2004 audit, Treasury lacks an adequate process to ensure that the financial statements, related notes, stewardship information, and supplemental information in the CFS are presented in conformity with GAAP. However, during fiscal year 2004, Treasury did not implement our recommendations. As a result of our prior audits, recommendations related to 86 specific disclosures that may not have been in conformity with applicable standards remain open. As a result of this and certain of the material deficiencies identified during the fiscal year 2004 audit, we were unable to determine if the missing information was material to the CFS. Also, Treasury asked that we reconsider or modify our recommendations in three areas: (1) controls over the compilation process, (2) consistency of Justice’s and agencies’ opinions on legal cases, and (3) directly linking audited federal agency financial statements to the CFS. Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS This appendix includes open recommendations from two prior GAO reports: Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Improvement, GAO-04-45 (Oct. 30, 2003), and Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Further Improvement, GAO-04-866 (Sept. 10, 2004). Open. The Statement of Changes in Cash Balance reported only the changes in the “operating” cash of the U.S. government of $19.8 billion rather than the change in all cash reported on the U.S. government’s Balance Sheet of $22.6 billion, as of September 30, 2004.	Why GAO Did This Study For the past 8 years, since the first audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and financial reporting practices have resulted in conditions that prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS. Specifically, GAO has reported that the U.S. government did not have adequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare the CFS. In December 2004, GAO reported on weaknesses identified during its fiscal year 2004 audit of the CFS, including weaknesses relating to the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) preparation of the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) discuss the details of the weaknesses relating to Treasury's preparation of the CFS, (2) recommend improvements to address those weaknesses, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions to address the 142 open recommendations GAO previously reported. What GAO Found GAO identified weaknesses during its tests of Treasury's process for preparing the fiscal year 2004 CFS. Such weaknesses in the CFS preparation process impair the U.S. government's ability to ensure that the CFS is consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. The weaknesses GAO identified during the fiscal year 2004 CFS audit involved directly linking audited federal agency financial statements to the CFS, controls over the compilation process, consolidated reporting guidance to agencies, intragovernmental activity and balances--explanations for material unreconciled transactions, consistency of the Department of Justice's and agencies' opinions on legal cases, and conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. During fiscal year 2004, Treasury made progress in laying the foundation to address certain long-standing material deficiencies in preparing the CFS. Foremost is the ongoing development of a new system, which is intended to directly link information from federal agencies' audited financial statements to amounts reported in the CFS. Additional actions are under way and planned. Of the 142 open recommendations that GAO reported in September 2004 regarding the process for preparing the CFS, 135 remained open as of December 6, 2004, the end of GAO's fieldwork for the fiscal year 2004 CFS audit. However, 86 of these 135 recommendations relate to specific disclosures required under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Treasury has taken action to begin addressing the conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles issue. GAO plans to determine the status of corrective actions to address its open recommendations during its fiscal year 2005 audit of the CFS.
gao_GAO-08-44	gao_GAO-08-44_0	Highway Public-Private Partnerships Have Been Used to Provide New Infrastructure and Funding for Transportation and Other Needs and Have the Potential to Provide Other Benefits Highway public-private partnerships have resulted in advantages from the perspective of state and local governments, such as the construction of new facilities without the use of public funding and extracting value—in the form of up-front payments—from existing facilities for reinvestment in transportation and other public programs. Tolling can also potentially lead to targeted, rational, and efficient investment decisions. Finally, the private sector can potentially benefit through gains achieved in refinancing their investments. Potential Financial Costs and Trade-offs Although highway public-private partnerships can be used to obtain financing for highway infrastructure without the use of public sector funding, there is no “free money” in highway public-private partnerships. Though concession agreements can limit the extent to which a concessionaire can raise tolls, it is likely that tolls will increase on a privately operated highway to a greater extent than they would on a publicly run toll road. However, also as discussed earlier, there are costs and trade-offs involved, including loss of public-sector control of toll setting and potentially more expensive project costs than publicly procured projects. Highway Public-Private Partnerships We Reviewed Have Used Concession Terms to Protect the Public Interest The highway public-private partnerships we reviewed have used various mechanisms to protect the public interest by holding concessionaires to requirements related to such things as performance of an asset, financial aspects of agreements, the public sector’s ability to remain accountable as a provider of public goods and services, workforce protections, and concession oversight. Evolution of tools has occurred in other countries as well. Change in public interest evaluation tools has also occurred elsewhere. Use of Formal Public Interest Processes and Tools in the United States Are More Limited We found a more limited use of systematic, formal processes and approaches to the identification and assessment of public interest issues in the United States. This lack of consideration of local and regional interests and concerns led to opposition by local and regional governments. As a result, given the minimal federal funding in highway public-private partnerships we reviewed, little consideration has been given to potential national public interests in these partnerships. A fundamental reexamination of federal surface transportation programs, including the highway program, presents the opportunity to address emerging needs, test the relevance of existing policies, and modernize programs for the twenty-first century. DOT stated that many federal and state laws govern how transportation projects are selected and delivered, including highway public-private partnerships, and that the draft report did not explain why highway projects delivered through public-private partnerships pose additional challenges to protecting the public interest, or why there should be a greater interest in such projects than in highways built and operated by state and local governments. In particular, we focused on (1) the benefits, costs, and trade-offs associated with highway public- private partnerships; (2) how public officials have identified, evaluated, and acted to protect the public interest in public-private partnership arrangements; and (3) the federal role in highway public-private partnerships and potential changes needed in this role. Discussions with FHWA included clarifying how it determines such things as reasonable rates of return on highway projects where there is private investment and the use of proceeds when there is federal investment in a highway facility that is leased to the private sector.	Why GAO Did This Study The United States is at a critical juncture in addressing the demands on its transportation system, including highway infrastructure. State and local governments are looking for alternatives, including increased private sector participation. GAO was asked to review (1) the benefits, costs, and trade-offs of public-private partnerships; (2) how public officials have identified and acted to protect the public interest in these arrangements; and (3) the federal role in public-private partnerships and potential changes in this role. GAO reviewed federal legislation, interviewed federal, state, and other officials, and reviewed the experience of Australia, Canada, and Spain. GAO's work focused on highway-related public-private partnerships and did not review all forms of public-private partnerships. What GAO Found Highway public-private partnerships have resulted in advantages for state and local governments, such as obtaining new facilities and value from existing facilities without using public funding. The public can potentially obtain other benefits, such as sharing risks with the private sector, more efficient operations and management of facilities, and, through the use of tolling, increased mobility and more cost effective investment decisions. There are also potential costs and trade-offs--there is no "free" money in public-private partnerships and it is likely that tolls on a privately operated highway will increase to a greater extent than they would on a publicly operated toll road. There is also the risk of tolls being set that exceed the costs of the facility, including a reasonable rate of return, should a private concessionaire gain market power because of the lack of viable travel alternatives. Highway public-private partnerships are also potentially more costly to the public than traditional procurement methods and the public sector gives up a measure of control, such as the ability to influence toll rates. Finally, as with any highway project, there are multiple stakeholders and trade-offs in protecting the public interest. Highway public-private partnerships we reviewed protected the public interest largely through concession agreement terms prescribing performance and other standards. Governments in other countries, such as Australia, have developed systematic approaches to identifying and evaluating public interest and require their use when considering private investments in public infrastructure. While similar tools have been used to some extent in the United States, their use has been more limited. Using up-front public interest evaluation tools can assist in determining expected benefits and costs of projects; not using such tools may lead to aspects of protecting the public interest being overlooked. For example, while projects in Australia require consideration of local and regional interests, concerns by local governments in Texas that they were being excluded resulted in state legislation requiring their involvement. While direct federal involvement has been limited to where federal investment exists, and while the Department of Transportation has actively promoted them, highway public-private partnerships may pose national public interest implications such as interstate commerce that transcend whether there is direct federal investment in a project. However, given the minimal federal funding in highway public-private partnerships to date, little consideration has been given to potential national public interests in them. GAO has called for a fundamental reexamination of federal programs to address emerging needs and test the relevance of existing policies. This reexamination provides an opportunity to identify and protect potential national public interests in highway public-private partnerships.
gao_GAO-13-29	gao_GAO-13-29_0	Veterans’ Programs Provide Similar Services and Largely Serve Different Populations, but It Is Unclear If the Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program Is Appropriately Serving Its Targeted Population Six Federal Programs Provide Similar Types of Employment Services but Largely Serve Different Populations As shown in figure 1, the six federal employment and training programs targeted to veterans offer similar types of employment and training services. Labor and VA have provided staff with training on the handbook and formed a group to monitor coordination. Some Coordination Issues Have Arisen across Veterans’ Employment and Training Programs Our interviews with Labor and VA officials identified certain challenges with meeting desired program outcomes resulting, in part, from sections of the handbook that are subject to misunderstanding or provide insufficient guidance. The second challenge with referrals as outlined in the handbook involved ensuring that job-ready participants are directed to “suitable employment.” When veterans are referred to the Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program at the job-ready stage, Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program and VA staff are supposed to coordinate to find “suitable employment,” or employment that will not aggravate the participant’s disability and follows the participant’s rehabilitation plan. While the handbook says agencies are to coordinate to achieve “suitable employment,” it does not explicitly say how Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program and VA staff should deal with situations where a veteran’s financial need or preferences do not align with the goal of suitable employment. Absent guidance about how to navigate such situations, program staff may be working at cross purposes and program participants may be taking employment they cannot retain in the long run. DOD Is Expanding Its Employment Initiatives, Which Are Not Included in the Labor-VA Coordination Framework DOD is expanding its employment assistance to National Guard and Reserve members, but does not have employment service agreements with Labor or VA beyond an agreement for TAP. While Most Programs’ Outcomes Are Below Pre-Recession Levels, Labor Has Not Reported the Extent to Which Programs Are Achieving Their Performance Goals Most Programs’ Outcomes Are Below Pre-Recession Levels, and Outcomes for Veterans Are Lower Than They Are for the General Population Employment outcomes for veterans’ programs have generally not regained levels attained prior to the recent recession. Labor Has Not Consistently Reported the Extent to Which Veterans’ Programs Are Meeting Performance Goals While Labor reports some data on veterans’ program outcomes, it does not report the extent to which each of these programs is achieving its established performance goals. Labor provides Congress an annual veterans’ program report that provides certain performance information, such as the number of disabled and recently separated veterans who received intensive services. In contrast, Labor’s website on general employment programs—WIA Adult and ES— includes both performance goals and outcomes. Without information on how the outcomes for each veterans’ program compare against their annual performance goals, Congress and other key stakeholders lack essential information needed to assess the performance of the program. VA officials said that this is the first fiscal year this goal has been used. While Labor has not conducted impact evaluations, it has conducted research that examines veterans’ outcomes in relation to their characteristics and has other studies planned or under way (see table 2). For example, Labor’s 2007 study of veterans’ outcomes covered five states, and its findings cannot be generalized to all states. Conclusions Given that the number of service members transitioning to civilian employment is expected to increase and the number of veterans with service-connected disabilities is on the rise, Labor’s Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program is likely to see an increased demand for its services. However, Labor and VA’s agreement does not govern their coordination with DOD’s programs. In addition, while the federal government makes a substantial investment in Labor and VA programs to achieve employment outcomes for veterans, neither agency has conducted studies to see if these outcomes can be attributed to the programs’ services, instead of other factors. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Defense for review and comment. Both Labor and VA said they would work to enhance coordination with each other with respect to the guidance in their interagency handbook. Our 2011 report identified services, eligibility For this report, we focused on the six programs identified in our January 2011 report in more detail and examined (1) the extent to which federal veterans’ employment and training programs vary in terms of the services they deliver and the veterans who receive them; (2) the extent to which federal agencies coordinate these programs; and (3) what is known about the performance of these programs. To determine what is known about program performance, we analyzed relevant federal laws and regulations, and agency documents, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders.	Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2011, the federal government spent an estimated $1.2 billion on six veterans' employment and training programs, serving about 880,000 participants. Labor administers five of these programs and VA administers one. Despite these efforts, the unemployment rate for veterans who have recently separated from the military is higher than that for the civilian population. The number of service members transitioning to the civilian workforce is expected to increase. In response to a request, this report examines (1) the extent to which federal veterans' employment and training programs vary in services they deliver and veterans who receive them; (2) the extent to which federal agencies coordinate programs; and (3) what is known about the performance of these programs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency data, policy documents, and relevant federal laws and regulations, reports, and studies, and interviewed federal and regional officials and state officials in six states selected to achieve geographic and demographic diversity. In examining coordination, GAO included in its review employment assistance DOD provides to Guard and Reserve members. What GAO Found The six federal veterans' employment and training programs offer similar employment services, but largely target different groups. Among these programs, the Department of Labor's (Labor) Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program has the greatest potential for overlap with other veterans' programs and Labor's employment programs for the general population. Federal law governing the Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program makes all veterans who meet the broad definition of "eligible veteran" eligible for its services, but gives disabled veterans and economically and educationally disadvantaged veterans the highest priority for services. However, Labor's guidance does not provide states--who administer the program using federal funds--criteria for prioritizing services. The law also generally requires that program staff provide participants with intensive services (e.g., individual employment plans), but Labor's data indicate that nationally 28 percent of participants received such services in 2011. In explaining this statistic, Labor officials said one possible explanation was that staff are enrolling people who do not need intensive services. Labor said it plans to develop guidance on prioritizing services, and it also has a six-state pilot to improve monitoring, but neither of these efforts has been completed. In 2008, Labor and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) compiled a handbook intended to guide the roles of their respective staff in coordinating services to disabled veterans; however, they have not updated the handbook nor included related Department of Defense (DOD) employment initiatives in their interagency agreements. GAO's interviews with VA and Labor officials identified certain challenges with meeting desired program outcomes resulting, in part, from sections of the handbook that provide insufficient guidance or are subject to misunderstanding. For example, the handbook says Labor and VA are to coordinate to achieve "suitable employment"--employment that follows the veteran's rehabilitation plan and does not aggravate the disability. However, it does not explicitly say how staff should navigate situations where a veteran's financial need or preferences do not align with this goal. In such instances, program staff may work at cross purposes and veterans may accept jobs that do not count as suitable employment. Further, DOD is expanding its employment assistance, but does not have an interagency agreement to coordinate with Labor and VA efforts. Absent an updated handbook and integration of DOD into the coordination framework, there is increased risk for poor coordination and program overlap. While available performance information shows that most programs' outcomes are below pre-2007 levels, the information Labor reports and the research it has conducted make it difficult to know the extent to which each program is achieving its annual performance goals. Veterans' employment outcomes for programs administered by both Labor and VA have generally not regained levels seen before the recession that began in 2007, which is similar to employment programs for the general population. In reporting performance, Labor does not relate employment outcomes to individual program goals. In contrast, Labor reports outcomes and goals for its other workforce programs aimed at the general population. Moreover, while both agencies have studies completed or under way, neither has conducted impact evaluations that assess program effectiveness to determine whether outcomes are attributable to program participation and not other factors. As a result, Congress and other key stakeholders lack essential information needed to assess each program's performance. GAO is making four recommendations aimed at improving the guidance provided to staff in the coordination handbook, integrating DOD into the interagency coordination framework, improving agency reporting on achievement of program performance goals, and assessing program effectiveness. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations aimed at improving the guidance provided to staff in the coordination handbook, integrating DOD into the interagency coordination framework, improving agency reporting on achievement of program performance goals, and assessing program effectiveness.
gao_GAO-15-116	gao_GAO-15-116_0	The Electronic Subcontract Reporting System (eSRS). It Is Not Feasible to Link Small Business Subcontractors to Prime Contracts Using Existing Contract Reporting Systems Contract reporting systems we reviewed contain relevant information on subcontracting plans, subcontracts, and subcontractors, but no one system was designed to link small business subcontractors to prime contracts. Linking small business subcontractors to prime contracts under comprehensive or commercial reporting plans is especially difficult because these plans do not specify the particular contracts to which they apply. Despite the limited data available in existing contract reporting systems, we were able to link a few small business subcontractors to prime contracts, including those with comprehensive plans, but multiple steps were required. Linking Small Business Subcontractors to Prime Contracts Is Possible for Some Contracts but Involves Multiple Steps We found that it is possible to link small business subcontractors to prime contracts for a limited number of contracts, but our attempts involved multiple steps using several systems. We queried these systems using contract numbers for 199 contracts and found that 37 reported subcontract data, including contracts with individual and comprehensive plans. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of these 37 contracts and entered their subcontractors’ information into SAM and were able to identify a number of small businesses. This allowed us to associate a contract with a subcontracting plan that pertains to multiple contracts. Executive Agencies Have Actions Under Way That Could Facilitate Linking Subcontractors to Prime Contracts There are multiple actions currently under way, or called for by legislation, that may result in a single system that can link small business subcontractors to prime contracts. Agencies Are Currently Redesigning Contract Reporting Systems GSA is currently involved in an effort to consolidate the functions and information of several existing contract reporting systems, including eSRS, FPDS-NG, and FSRS. In 2014, OMB designated Treasury as the agency responsible for operating and maintaining USASpending.gov. Treasury plans to improve the usability of the website, presentation of data, and search functionality. Additional Actions Could Improve Reliability of Data In addition to the actions under way to improve the retrieval or presentation of data, there are a number of actions required by legislation or proposed in new regulations that could improve the reliability of data. Specifically, the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) requires that agencies disclose additional data relevant to contracts and subcontracts; establish common, government-wide standards to provide consistency in such data; make reporting of these data simpler; and periodically review the completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy of the data. Agency Comments We are not making any recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology We had two objectives for this review: (1) to assess the feasibility of using data in contract reporting systems to link small business subcontractors to particular prime contracts and (2) to identify actions executive agencies are taking that might help facilitate linking small business subcontractors to prime contracts.	Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2013 the federal government awarded about $460 billion on contracts, many of which involve subcontracts. Federal regulations require prime contractors to report on their subcontracting with small businesses. The Joint Explanatory Statement for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO review the feasibility of linking small business subcontractors to particular prime contracts when there is a subcontracting plan that pertains to multiple contracts. This report (1) assesses the feasibility of using contract reporting systems to link small business subcontractors to particular contracts and (2) identifies actions executive agencies are taking that might help facilitate linking small business subcontractors to prime contracts. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed four government-wide contract reporting systems and extracted data using contract information from previously reviewed defense programs to attempt to link small business subcontractors to prime contracts. In addition, GAO met with officials who are responsible for the management of, or are users of, the contract systems to validate the methodologies used and determine actions being taken to facilitate linking small business subcontractors to prime contracts. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. What GAO Found The contract reporting systems GAO reviewed contain relevant information on subcontracting plans, subcontracts, and subcontractors, but no single system was designed to link small business subcontractors to prime contracts. Linking small business subcontractors to prime contracts when there is a subcontracting plan that pertains to multiple contracts is especially difficult because these plans do not specify the particular contracts to which they apply. Despite the limited data, GAO was able to link a few small business subcontractors to prime contracts, but multiple steps were required. GAO queried subcontract reporting systems regarding 199 contracts and found that 37 reported subcontract data, including contracts with a subcontracting plan that pertains to multiple contracts. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of these 37 contracts and was able to identify a number of small business subcontractors. There are multiple actions currently under way, or called for by legislation, that may result in a single system that can link small business subcontractors to prime contracts. The General Services Administration is currently involved in an effort to consolidate the functions and information of several existing contract reporting systems, and the Department of the Treasury was recently given responsibility to operate and maintain USASpending.gov and plans to make changes to improve the search function of that website, which could help facilitate linking subcontractors to prime contracts. In addition to the actions under way to improve the retrieval or presentation of data, the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act, enacted May 2014, requires that agencies disclose additional data relevant to subcontracting; improve the consistency and reporting of these data; and periodically review their completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy.
gao_NSIAD-00-222	gao_NSIAD-00-222_0	In line with congressional expectations, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reduced its budget from $208 million in fiscal year 1994 to approximately $71 million in fiscal year 1996 by taking the following actions. This is a potentially important duplication issue that the Board has not reviewed. The Board intends to use this information to strategically reallocate approximately $4.5 million in language service funds from emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to several African countries and selected countries in other regions. The Board’s fiscal year 2001 Results Act performance plan is deficient because of missing or imprecise performance goals and indicators and a lack of key implementation strategies and related resource requirements. Finally, the Board has developed a strategic planning and performance management system that consists of Results Act planning, the annual language service review, and the program reviews of individual language services. This system is intended to help ensure that U.S. international broadcasting resources are used in the most effective manner possible. Improved program quality measures would also benefit the annual language service review process and the Board’s Results Act planning, each of which incorporate program quality as a performance measure. Recommendations To strengthen the Board’s management oversight and provide greater assurance that international broadcasting funds are being effectively expended, we recommend that the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors include in the Board’s performance plan a clearer indication of how its broadcast missions, strategic objectives, performance goals, and performance indicators relate to each other; and establish audience and other goals, as appropriate, at the individual language service level; include implementation strategies and related resource requirements in its performance plan; analyze overseas news-gathering networks across its broadcast entities to determine if resources could be more effectively deployed; and institute a standardized approach to conducting program quality assessments and require that program reviews produce a detailed action plan that responds to specific audience size and composition targets established at the Results Act and annual language service review level. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget requested that we examine whether the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (1) responded to the specific mandates regarding Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s operations, (2) implemented an annual language service review process, and (3) instituted a strategic planning and performance management system. To assess whether the Board has responded to the specific cost-cutting mandates and expectations established in the 1994 International Broadcasting Act, we examined the Board’s transmission consolidation efforts, the history of consolidation activities in connection with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s move from Munich to Prague, the Board’s efforts to privatize Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s operations by fiscal year 1999, and the Board’s efforts to adopt digital production technology for each broadcast entity. 2. 3. 4.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether the Broadcasting Board of Governors: broadcasters (1) responded to the specific limitations and cost-cutting expectations regarding Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's operations; (2) implemented an annual language service review process; and (3) instituted a strategic planning and performance management system. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the Board met its mandates under the 1994 U.S. International Broadcasting Act to reduce Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's annual budget by lowering its budget from $208 million in fiscal year (FY) 1994 to approximately $71 million in FY 1996; (2) it did this by taking several actions including relocating its operation from Munich, Germany, to Prague, Czech Republic and significantly reducing staff; (3) additional savings were made by: (a) eliminating several hundred hours of broadcast overlap; (b) eliminating and modifying a limited number of language services; (c) consolidating transmission operations under the International Broadcasting Bureau; and (d) deploying digital sound recording and editing technology, which has increased Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's staff efficiency and effectiveness; (4) the Board completed a comprehensive language service review in January 2000 that sought to systematically evaluate U.S. international broadcast priorities and program impact; (5) the Board intends to use this information to strategically reallocate approximately $4.5 million in language service funds from emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to several African countries and selected countries in other regions; (6) according to the Board, it intends to continue to use the annual language service review process to strategically analyze broadcast priorities, program funding, and resource allocations; (7) the Board has not yet established an effective strategic planning and performance management system that incorporates Government Performance and Results Act planning, the annual language service review process, and the program reviews of individual language services conducted by the International Broadcasting Bureau and the surrogate broadcasters; (8) the Board's FY 2001 performance plan is deficient because of missing or imprecise performance goals or indicators and a lack of key implementation strategies and related resource requirements that detail the key issues facing the Board; (9) the Board has not established a standard program review approach, which would help ensure that consistent and meaningful measures of program quality are developed across broadcast entities; and (10) it has also not incorporated specific audience size and composition targets into the program review process, which would help ensure that program reviews culminate in a written report that identifies the specific actions needed to achieve agreed-upon performance goals.
gao_GAO-04-262T	gao_GAO-04-262T_0	Competition Leads to Lower Cable Rates and Improved Quality and Service among Cable Operators Competition from a wire-based provider—that is, a competitor using a wire technology—is limited to very few markets, but where available, has a downward impact on cable rates. We found that cable rates were generally lower in the 6 markets we examined with a BSP present than in the 6 markets that did not have BSP competition. Cable franchises responding to FCC’s 2002 survey did not complete in a consistent manner the section pertaining to the factors underlying cable rate increases primarily because of a lack of clear guidance. FCC’s cable rate report also does not appear to provide a reliable source of information on the effect of competition. Because the Congress and FCC use this information in their monitoring and oversight of the cable industry, the lack of reliable information in FCC’s report on these two issues—factors underlying cable rate increases and the effect of competition—may compromise the ability of the Congress and FCC to fulfill these roles. As a result, we recommended that the Chairman of FCC improve the reliability, consistency, and relevance of information on cable rates and competition in the subscription video industry by (1) taking immediate steps to improve its cable rate survey and (2) reviewing the commission’s process for maintaining the classification of effective competition. In commenting on our report, FCC agreed to make changes to its annual cable rate survey in an attempt to obtain more accurate information, but questioned, on a cost/benefit basis, the utility of revising its process to keep the classification of effective competition in franchises up to date. We recognize that there are costs associated with FCC’s cable rate survey, and we recommend that FCC examine whether cost-effective alternative processes exist that would enhance the accuracy of its effective competition designations. Programming expenses and infrastructure investment appear to be the primary cost factors that have been increasing in recent years. We found that cable networks that have an ownership affiliation with a broadcaster did not have, on average, higher license fees (i.e., the fee the cable operator pays to the cable network) than cable networks that were not majority-owned by broadcasters or cable operators. Industry representatives we interviewed also told us that cable networks owned by cable operators or broadcasters are more likely to be carried by cable operators than other cable networks. 3). The manner in which an à la carte approach might impact advertising revenues, and ultimately the cost of cable service, rests on assumptions regarding customer choice and pricing mechanisms. Industry Participants Have Cited Certain Options That May Address Factors Contributing to Rising Cable Rates Industry participants have suggested the following options for addressing the cable rate issue. However, any modifications to the DBS carry one, carry all rules would need to be examined in the context of why those rules were put into place—that is, to ensure that all broadcast stations are available in markets where DBS providers choose to provide local stations. Using data from the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2001 cable rate survey, the model considers the effect of various factors on cable rates, the number of cable subscribers, the number of channels that cable operators provide to subscribers, and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) penetration rates for areas throughout the United States. To address the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues (examine reasons for recent rate increases, examine whether ownership relationships between cable networks and cable operators and/or broadcasters influence the level of license fees for the cable networks or the likelihood that a cable network will be carried, examine why cable operators group networks into tiers rather than sell networks individually, and discuss options to address factors that could be contributing to cable rate increases), we took several steps, as follows: We conducted semistructured interviews with a variety of industry participants.	Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, rates for cable service have increased at a faster pace than the general rate of inflation. GAO agreed to (1) examine the impact of competition on cable rates and service, (2) assess the reliability of information contained in the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) annual cable rate report, (3) examine the causes of recent cable rate increases, (4) assess the impact of ownership affiliations in the cable industry, (5) discuss why cable operators group networks into tiers, and (6) discuss options to address factors that could be contributing to cable rate increases. GAO issued its findings and recommendations in a report entitled Telecommunications: Issues Related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry (GAO-04-8). In that report, GAO recommended that the Chairman of FCC take steps to improve the reliability, consistency, and relevance of information on cable rates and competition in the subscription video industry. In commenting on GAO's report, FCC agreed to make changes to its annual cable rate survey, but FCC questioned, on a cost/benefit basis, the utility of revising its process to keep the classification of effective competition up to date. GAO believes that FCC should examine whether cost-effective alternative processes could help provide more accurate information. This testimony is based on that report. What GAO Found Competition leads to lower cable rates and improved quality. Competition from a wire-based company is limited to very few markets. However, where available, cable rates are substantially lower (by 15 percent) than in markets without this competition. Competition from direct broadcast satellite (DBS) companies is available nationwide, and the recent ability of these companies to provide local broadcast stations has enabled them to gain more customers. In markets where DBS companies provide local broadcast stations, cable operators improve the quality of their service. FCC's cable rate report does not appear to provide a reliable source of information on the cost factors underlying cable rate increases or on the effects of competition. GAO found that cable operators did not complete FCC's survey in a consistent manner, primarily because the survey lacked clear guidance. Also, GAO found that FCC does not initiate updates or revisions to its classification of competitive and noncompetitive areas. Thus, FCC's classifications might not reflect current conditions. A variety of factors contribute to increasing cable rates. During the past 3 years, the cost of programming has increased considerably (at least 34 percent), driven by the high cost of original programming, among other things. Additionally, cable operators have invested large sums in upgraded infrastructures, which generally permit additional channels, digital service, and broadband Internet access. Some concerns exist that ownership affiliations might indirectly influence cable rates. Broadcasters and cable operators own many cable networks. GAO found that cable networks affiliated with these companies are more likely to be carried by cable operators than nonaffiliated networks. However, cable networks affiliated with broadcasters or cable operators do not receive higher license fees, which are payments from cable operators to networks, than nonaffiliated networks. Technological, economic, and contractual factors explain the practice of grouping networks into tiers, thereby limiting the flexibility that subscribers have to choose only the networks that they want to receive. An ` la carte approach would facilitate more subscriber choice but require additional technology and customer service. Additionally, cable networks could lose advertising revenue. As a result, some subscribers' bills might decline but others might increase. Certain options for addressing cable rates have been put forth. Although reregulation of cable rates is one option, promoting competition could influence cable rates through the market process. While industry participants have suggested several options for addressing increasing cable rates, these options could have other unintended effects that would need to be considered in conjunction with the benefits of lower rates.
gao_GAO-02-282	gao_GAO-02-282_0	PHAS and PIC Establish Criteria for Identifying Performance Problems HUD uses PHAS and PIC to assess public housing authorities’ performance. PHAS includes four performance indicators, which HUD scores and plans to use for designating housing authorities as troubled. The physical condition indicator is used to determine whether the housing authority is providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing to its residents. The resident service and satisfaction indicator measures residents’ satisfaction with their living conditions. At Some Nontroubled Housing Authorities, Unsatisfactory Living Conditions Stemmed from Management Deficiencies The five public housing authorities we visited, which have not been designated as troubled under PHAS but have been classified as moderate to high risk under PIC, exhibited a wide range of problems. However, many developments at these authorities were well or adequately maintained. In some instances, HUD may enter into special agreements with housing authorities, giving them the flexibility to address unique problems. HUD May Provide Technical Assistance to Address Problems HUD may provide technical assistance to address chronic problems at housing authorities even when the authorities have not been designated as troubled under PHAS. HUD May Apply Sanctions or Intervene in a Housing Authority’s Operations to Correct Problems When HUD is unable to address the problems at a housing authority cooperatively, it has the authority to intervene or apply several different sanctions at varying levels of severity as follows: HUD may review a housing authority’s expenditures and place restrictions and conditions on them. In e- mails dated January 31, February 1, and February 4, 2002, incorporating comments from the deputy assistant secretary for the Office of Troubled Agency Recovery, the deputy assistant secretary for the Office of Administration and Budget, and the acting director of field operations, Office of Public and Indian Housing, and a REAC official, HUD provided background information on the PIC risk assessment process and indicated that it planned to revise the PIC rating scheme to ensure that all troubled public housing authorities are designated as high risk. Under the approach HUD plans to use in fiscal year 2002, we used the total PHAS score and the scores for all four indicators, classifying housing authorities as troubled if they scored less than 60 percent overall or less than 60 percent on more than one of the major indicators (physical condition, financial condition, and management operations). These risk assessments use the total PHAS score and information about funding and compliance issues to classify housing authorities as high, moderate, or low risk. The database does not define what is in the “other problems” category. Problems at Nontroubled High-Risk Public Housing Authorities To identify the kinds of problems found at public housing authorities that HUD has not designated as troubled but has classified as high risk, we applied HUD’s criteria for determining housing authorities’ status (troubled or nontroubled) and risk level (high, moderate, or low) to the nation’s 3,166 public housing authorities. According to the recovery center’s team leader for SFHA, since the center began servicing the authority, 50 to 70 positions have been terminated in an effort to cut costs and alleviate the overstaffing.	What GAO Found The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) spends $7 billion annually to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing for low-income households in about 14,000 rental properties nationwide. Yet, many public housing properties have been unsafe and unsanitary for several decades. To identify and correct these problems, HUD began a Public Housing Assessment System (PHAS) to evaluate the performance of public housing authorities. Although HUD is still testing and revising PHAS, it has begun to designate certain housing authorities as troubled and to assign them to recovery centers, where they receive technical and other assistance. HUD also created the Public and Indian Housing Information Center (PIC) database to collect information on funding, compliance, and other problems that fall outside the scope of PHAS. PHAS includes four performance indicators: (1) the physical condition of the properties, (2) the financial condition of the housing authority, (3) the authority's management operations, and (4) residents' satisfaction with their living conditions. HUD develops a score for each indicator and, starting in this fiscal year, plans to use the scores for all four indicators to determine whether housing authorities are troubled. So far, HUD has used only the management operations score to designate housing authorities as troubled. The PIC risk assessment uses the total PHAS score and information about funding and compliance issues to classify troubled and nontroubled housing authorities as high, moderate, or low risk. According to HUD, the field offices focus their monitoring resources on the nontroubled high-risk authorities in an effort to correct their problems before the authorities are designated as troubled. GAO found inconsistencies between the PHAS and PIC assessment. The five public housing authorities GAO visited, which had not been designated as troubled under PHAS but had been classified as moderate to high risk under PIC, had various problems. However, even under the same authority, some developments were well or adequately maintained, while others had cosmetic, structural, or health and safety problems. HUD may provide technical assistance at a housing authority through either a field office team or a troubled agency recovery center. HUD may also impose sanctions on a housing authority or intervene in its operations to compel the authority to correct problems. For more serious, long-standing problems, HUD may put a housing authority into receivership. In some instances, HUD may enter into special agreements with housing authorities, giving them the flexibility to address unique problems. Although these options have the potential for solving problems at public housing authorities, it is still to early to evaluate their effectiveness. Moreover, in the past, the options have not always fully addressed the problems or the housing authorities have not sustained the improvements. Refer to the accompanying video, Public Housing Today (GAO-02-1040SP).
gao_T-AIMD-96-56	gao_T-AIMD-96-56_0	As a result, IRS relied on alternative sources, such as Treasury schedules, to obtain the summary total by type of tax needed for its financial statement presentation. In addition to the difference in total revenues collected, we also found large discrepancies between information in IRS’ master files and the Treasury data used for the various types of taxes reported in IRS’ financial statements. In some cases, IRS did not maintain documentation to support reported balances. In other cases, it did not perform adequate analysis, such as reconciling taxpayer transactions to the general ledger, to ensure that reported information was reliable. For example, IRS has successfully implemented a financial management system for its appropriated funds to account for its day-to-day operations, which should help IRS to correct some of its past transaction processing problems that diminished the accuracy and reliability of its cost information, and successfully transferred its payroll processing to the Department of Agriculture’s National Finance Center and, as a result, properly accounted for and reported its $5.1 billion of payroll expenses for fiscal year 1994. In the area of receipt and acceptance, IRS stated that it is more fully integrating its budgetary and management control systems. IRS’ software development capability was immature and weak in key process areas. Finally, IRS had not established an effective organizational structure to consistently manage and control system modernization organizationwide.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed its: (1) fiscal year 1994 financial audit of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and (2) evaluation of the IRS Tax System Modernization (TSM) effort. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) IRS did not use its revenue general ledger accounting system or its master files for its revenue reports, but relied on alternative sources such as Treasury schedules; (2) there were large discrepancies between information in IRS master files and Treasury data; (3) IRS did not properly document transactions or perform adequate analysis to ensure the reliability of the information it reported; (4) IRS was unable to reconcile its accounts and could not substantiate some of its expenses; (5) IRS has initiated actions to correct some previously identified problems concerning computer security, payroll processing, funds reconciliation and monitoring, its budgetary and management control systems, and receipt balance accuracy; and (6) in spite of those actions, IRS lacks the strategic information management practices, software development capability, systems architecture, and effective organization structure to manage and control system modernization.
gao_GAO-06-1028T	gao_GAO-06-1028T_0	The United States Faces a Large and Growing Structural Budget Deficit Over the long term, the United States faces a large and growing structural budget deficit primarily caused by known demographic trends and rising health care costs, and this deficit is exacerbated over time by growing interest on the ever larger federal debt. Individual income tax policy, tax expenditures, and enforcement need to be key elements of the overall tax review. The Individual Income Tax Is the Largest Single Source of Federal Revenues The individual income tax has long been the single largest source of federal tax revenue. Revenue from the individual income tax has historically accounted for between 40 percent and 50 percent of total federal tax revenue. Individual Income Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Efficiency Costs and Equity Concerns Contribute to Calls for Reform Concerns about the complexity, efficiency, and equity of the individual income tax have motivated calls for a substantial restructuring of the tax or its replacement with some form of consumption tax. The widely recognized complexity of the tax results in (1) significant compliance costs, frustration, and anxiety for taxpayers; (2) decreased voluntary compliance; (3) increased difficulties for IRS in administering the tax laws; and (4) reduced confidence in the fairness of the tax. The individual income tax also causes taxpayers to change their work, savings, investment, and consumption behavior in ways that reduce their well- being. The tax exclusion for the exclusion of employer- provided health insurance from individuals’ taxable income, discussed in text box 1, is another example of an income tax provision that clearly reduces economic efficiency. Likewise, concerns have been expressed about the equity of many specific features of the tax, such as: marriage penalties (and bonuses) built into the tax under which the combined tax liabilities of two individuals differ, depending on whether or not those individuals are married; the inconsistent treatment between taxable wages and salaries and other components of total employee compensation, such as employer-provided health benefits that are not taxed; the fact that many low-income individuals face high effective marginal tax rates over certain income ranges as the benefits of tax preferences, such as the earned income tax credit, phase out; the provision of certain tax benefits in the form of deductions, which are more valuable to taxpayers in higher income brackets, rather than as tax credits; the requirement that a taxpayer must own a home in order to receive the significant advantage of tax-preferred borrowing; and the greater ease with which self-employed individuals can underreport income, compared to employees whose incomes are subject to withholding and third-party reporting. The difficulty in ensuring compliance is underscored by the tax gap—the difference between the taxes that should be paid voluntarily and on time and what is actually paid—that arises every year when taxpayers fail to comply fully with the tax laws. About 70 percent of the gross tax gap for tax year 2001, or an estimated $244 billion, was attributed to the individual income tax. Improving compliance and reducing the tax gap would help improve the nation’s fiscal stability. Even modest progress would yield significant revenue; each 1 percent reduction would likely yield nearly $3 billion annually. Comparing Proposals on Common Dimensions In moving forward on tax reform, policymakers may find it useful to compare proposals on common dimensions. First, is the tax base as broad as possible? Does the proposed system raise sufficient revenue over time to fund our expected expenditures? The economic efficiency costs of our current tax system likely will become an even more important issue as we grapple with the nation’s long-term fiscal challenges. Because any tax system can be subject to tax gaps, the administrability of reformed systems should be considered as part of the debate for change. Our publication, Understanding the Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria, and Questions, may be useful in guiding policymakers as they consider tax reform proposals.	Why GAO Did This Study The federal government currently relies heavily on the individual income tax and payroll taxes for about 80 percent of its total annual revenue. Long-range projections show that without some form of policy change, the gap between revenues and spending will increasingly widen. The debate about the future tax system is partly about whether the goals for the nation's tax system can be best achieved by reforming the current income tax so that it has a broader base and flatter rate schedule, or switching to some form of consumption tax. This testimony reviews the revenue contribution of the current individual income tax as well as its complexity, economic efficiency, equity, and taxpayer compliance issues; discusses some common dimensions to compare tax proposals; and draws some conclusions for tax reform. This statement is based on previously published GAO work and reviews of relevant literature. What GAO Found The United States faces a large and growing structural budget deficit as current projected revenues are not sufficient to fund projected spending. The individual income tax has long been the largest source of federal revenue--amounting to $927 billion (7.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) in 2005. (Total revenues that year amounted to 17.5 percent of GDP.) Income tax policy, including existing tax expenditures, such as the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance from individual income, and enforcement approaches, need to be key elements of a multipronged approach that reexamines federal policies and approaches to address our nation's large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance. Concerns regarding the complexity, efficiency, and equity of the individual income tax have contributed to calls for a substantial restructuring of the individual income tax or its full or partial replacement with some form of consumption tax. The widely recognized complexity of the tax results in (1) significant compliance costs, frustration, and anxiety for taxpayers; (2) decreased voluntary compliance; (3) increased difficulties for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in administering the tax laws; and (4) reduced confidence in the fairness of the tax. The tax also causes taxpayers to change their work, savings, investment, and consumption behavior in ways that reduce economic efficiency and, thereby, taxpayers' well-being. Taxpayer noncompliance with the current individual income tax is another factor that could motivate reform. For tax year 2001, IRS estimated that noncompliance with the individual income tax accounted for about 70 percent of the $345 billion gross tax gap, which is the difference between the taxes that should have been paid voluntarily and on time and what was actually paid. Reducing this gap can improve the nation's fiscal stability, as each 1 percent reduction in the tax gap would likely yield about $3 billion annually. Reducing the tax gap within the current income tax structure will require exploring new and innovative administrative and legislative approaches. In moving forward on tax reform, policymakers may find it useful to compare alternative proposals along some common dimensions. These include, in part, whether proposed tax systems over time will generate enough revenue to fund expected expenditures, whether the base is as broad as possible so rates can be as low as possible, whether the system meets our future needs, and whether it has attributes that promote compliance. Our publication, Understanding the Tax Reform Debate (GAO-05-1009SP), provides background, criteria, and questions that policymakers may find useful.
gao_GAO-02-113T	gao_GAO-02-113T_0	Rapid Changes in Information Technology Require a Skilled and Well- Managed Workforce As agencies wrestle with human capital management, they face a significant challenge in the information management and technology areas. These practices fall in four key areas: Requirements—assessing the knowledge and skills needed to effectively perform IT operations to support agency mission and goals Inventory—determining the knowledge and skills of current IT staff so that gaps in needed capabilities can be identified Workforce strategies and plans—developing strategies and implementing plans for hiring, training, and professional development to fill the gap between requirements and current staffing Progress evaluation—evaluating progress made in improving IT human capital capability, and using the results of these evaluations to continuously improve the organization’s human capital strategies In July, we reported that agencies’ progress in addressing IT human capital strategies had been sluggish. Also, agencies appear to be at risk of not having enough of the right people with the right skills to manage service procurements. performance shortfalls. In a performance management environment where federal agencies are held accountable for delivering improvements in program performance, the “people dimension” is of paramount importance.	What GAO Found Federal agencies face few tasks more critical than attracting, retaining, and motivating people. As our society has moved from the industrial age to the knowledge age, the success or failure of federal agencies can depend on having the right number of people with the right mix of knowledge and skills. This is especially true in the information technology (IT) area, where widespread shortfalls in human capital have undermined agency and program performance. This report discusses strategic human capital management as a high-risk area, summarizes agencies progress in addressing IT human capital needs, compares suggestions GAO made in earlier testimonies and those made in a recent report by the National Academy of Public Administration, and highlights important challenges to implementing IT human capital reform proposals.
gao_GAO-03-428	gao_GAO-03-428_0	OPM has the authority to reassess and make changes to its existing regulations and guidance to supply agencies with additional flexibilities. OPM sees that it has an important leadership role in identifying, developing, and applying human capital flexibilities across the federal government. OPM has also committed the assistance of its various experts to help agencies with human capital issues and challenges, including use of the various flexibilities available to agencies. In addition, OPM has realigned its own organizational structure and workforce. OPM Also Has Some Initiatives to Assist in Identifying Additional Flexibilities OPM has furthermore initiated some efforts to assist agencies in identifying additional flexibilities that might be effective in helping the agencies manage their workforces. OPM has taken other actions to assist agencies in identifying additional flexibilities that they could use to manage their workforces. Agencies’ Human Resources Directors Gave Mixed Views on OPM’s Role Related to Flexibilities Although federal agencies have the primary responsibility to maximize their use of human capital flexibilities, OPM also plays a key role in facilitating agencies’ use of existing flexibilities as well as identifying new personnel authorities that agencies might need in managing their workforces. The views of agencies’ human resources directors can help to provide indications of the progress that OPM has made in its important role related to human capital flexibilities. Directors’ Views Varied on OPM’s Role Related to Using Available Flexibilities In the surveys we conducted in the fall of 2001 and again in the fall of 2002, the human resources directors for the largest departments and agencies gave mixed views on their satisfaction with OPM’s role in assisting their agencies in using available human capital flexibilities. However, the directors’ extent of satisfaction on this issue, as measured in our survey, was greater in 2002 than in 2001. Additional OPM Actions Could Further Facilitate Agencies’ Use of Flexibilities Assisting federal agencies in using available flexibilities and in identifying additional flexibilities is an important part of OPM’s overall goal of aiding agencies in adopting human resources management systems that improve their ability to build successful, high-performance organizations. The first was in reviewing existing OPM regulations and guidance to determine their continued relevance and utility by asking whether they provide agencies with the flexibilities they need while incorporating protections for employees. Greater attention to these areas could allow OPM to more fully fulfill its leadership role to assist agencies in identifying, developing, and applying human capital flexibilities across the federal government. OPM has not, however, fully maximized its efforts to make human capital flexibilities and effective practices more widely known to agencies. OPM could continue to support such legislation and identify additional personnel flexibilities that are needed. Work with and through the new Chief Human Capital Officers Council to more thoroughly research, compile, and analyze information on the effective and innovative use of human capital flexibilities and more fully serve as a clearinghouse in sharing and distributing information about when, where, and how the broad range of flexibilities are being used, and should be used, to help agencies meet their human capital management needs. The objectives of this report were to provide information on actions that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has taken to facilitate the effective use of human capital flexibilities throughout the federal government as well as what additional actions OPM might take in this regard.	Why GAO Did This Study Congressional requesters asked GAO to provide information on actions that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has taken to facilitate the effective use of human capital flexibilities throughout the federal government and what additional actions OPM might take in this regard. These flexibilities represent the policies and practices that an agency has the authority to implement in managing its workforce. What GAO Found OPM Has Taken Several Actions to Assist Agencies: OPM has an important leadership role in identifying, developing, applying, and overseeing human capital flexibilities across the federal government. OPM has taken several actions to assist federal agencies in effectively using the human capital flexibilities that are currently available to agencies. For example, OPM has issued a handbook for agencies that identifies the various flexibilities available to help manage their human capital. Also, OPM has initiated some efforts to assist agencies in identifying additional flexibilities that might be helpful to agencies in managing their workforces. Human Resources Directors Gave Mixed Views on OPM's Role: To yield indications of the progress that OPM has made in its important role related to assisting agencies in the use of human capital flexibilities, GAO surveyed the human resources directors of the federal government's 24 largest departments and agencies in fall of 2001 and again in the fall of 2002. There was little change in the directors' level of satisfaction with OPM's role in assisting agencies in using available flexibilities, which remained mixed. For example, one director said OPM had effectively facilitated the use of work-life flexibilities, but others thought that OPM had placed its own restrictive interpretation on the use of other personnel flexibilities. The level of satisfaction with OPM's role in identifying additional flexibilities was greater in 2002 than in 2001, but still remained below the satisfaction level for assistance with existing flexibilities. Several directors said that OPM had not worked diligently enough in supporting authorization of governmentwide use of new flexibilities that have been sufficiently tested and deemed successful. Additional OPM Actions Could Further Facilitate Use of Flexibilities: Although OPM has recently taken numerous actions, OPM could more fully meet its leadership role to assist agencies in identifying, developing, and applying human capital flexibilities across the federal government. In its ongoing internal review of its existing regulations and guidance, OPM could more directly focus on determining the continued relevance and utility of its regulations and guidance by asking whether they provide the flexibility that agencies need in managing their workforces while also incorporating protections for employees. In addition, OPM can maximize its efforts to make human capital flexibilities and effective practices more widely known to agencies by compiling, analyzing, and sharing information about when, where, and how the broad range of flexibilities are being used, and should be used, to help agencies meet their human capital management needs. OPM also needs to more vigorously identify new flexibilities that would help agencies better manage their human capital and then work to build consensus for the legislative action needed.
gao_GAO-15-271	gao_GAO-15-271_0	FPS also has about 13,500 contract security guards deployed at approximately 5,650 of the almost 9,000 federal facilities it protects. To make this determination, GSA required agencies to maintain program and financial data, which GSA reviewed to determine whether to grant a delegation. FPS lacks reliable data, as called for by federal Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, for accurately identifying the total delegations it is responsible for managing. In addition, FPS’s model for estimating the costs associated with a delegation does not fully align with the relevant leading practices outlined in GAO’s Cost Guide. The federal Standards for Internal Control state that federal agencies should have relevant, reliable, and timely information for decision-making and external-reporting purposes. Without reliable data on existing delegations of authority, FPS will face challenges effectively managing its delegations of authority program. FPS’s Cost Model for Estimating Cost of Security Services Does Not Fully Align with Leading Practices FPS’s cost estimation model that it is using to analyze the costs of providing law enforcement or security services does not fully align with leading practice identified in GAO’s Cost Guide. We found that FPS’s cost estimation model partially aligned with practices for producing comprehensive estimates and minimally aligned with those for producing well- documented and accurate estimates. Furthermore, the model does not align with practices for producing credible cost estimates. In addition, the model did not include a sensitivity analysis that identifies a range of possible costs based on varying major assumptions. FPS Has Not Fully Followed Its Interim Plan in Reviewing Select Delegations of Authority We analyzed the six requests for new or renewed delegations of authority FPS reviewed from June 2012 through May 2014, and found that FPS did not fully follow its Interim Plan when it reviewed five of the requests. Without conducting these analyses, FPS does not have a sound basis to determine whether cost or security considerations support its delegation of authority recommendations. Specifically, FPS conducted the required cost analysis but did not conduct the required capabilities analysis. FPS Did Not Fully Follow Its Interim Plan When It Renewed and Granted Delegations of Authority to Commerce, the Interior, State, and FTC Regarding the other 4 requests for new or renewed delegations of authority we reviewed, based on FPS’s recommendations, the Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary of NPPD renewed the delegations of authority for the Department of Commerce’s NIST facilities for 5 years, the Department of the Interior’s Hoover Dam for 2 years, and the State Department’s Enterprise Service Operations Center facility for 2 years, and granted FTC a new contract guard delegation for 3 years; but FPS did not conduct cost or capabilities analyses prior to making these recommendations as required by the Interim Plan. FPS officials explained that FPS did not conduct these analyses, in part, because it was not able to obtain comparable cost data or limited staff prevented it from conducting the analyses before the delegations expired. FPS officials also told us that the program is evolving and that it has yet to establish management controls to ensure that the analyses are conducted. FPS officials stated that the delegations program was being managed from FPS headquarters. Recommendations To improve the management of FPS’s delegations of authority program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS take the following three actions: develop and implement procedures to improve the accuracy of its delegation of authority data; update FPS’s cost estimation model to align with leading practices to ensure it produces comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible cost estimates; and establish management controls to ensure that FPS’s headquarters and regional office staff conduct required cost and capability analyses before FPS grants, renews, or rescinds a delegation of authority to a federal agency. To determine the extent to which FPS’s delegations of authority program meets select federal standards for effective program management, we analyzed FPS’s 2012 Interim Plan and 2014 draft delegations of authority directive—which outline the processes FPS is currently using to identify delegations of authority granted when FPS was part of GSA and how FPS is supposed to review delegations of authority to determine if they should be granted, renewed or rescinded—against leading practices identified in applicable federal standards.	Why GAO Did This Study FPS's primary mission is to protect the almost 9,000 federal facilities that are held or leased by the General Services Administration. FPS also manages the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) delegations of authority (delegations) program, which involves, among other things, reviewing requests by agencies to protect their own facilities instead of FPS and making recommendations to DHS about whether to grant, renew, or rescind such delegations. In response to direction in the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, FPS prepared its Interim Plan that outlines FPS's process for reviewing existing and newly requested delegations. GAO was asked to review FPS's management of this program. This report covers (1) the extent to which FPS's delegations program meets select federal standards and (2) whether FPS has followed its Interim Plan in reviewing delegations. GAO reviewed FPS's 2012 Interim Plan and data on delegations; compared FPS's Interim Plan to federal standards; and analyzed the six requests for new or renewed delegations FPS reviewed from June 2012 through March 2014. What GAO Found The Federal Protective Service's (FPS) delegations of authority program does not fully meet applicable federal standards GAO identified for effective program management. FPS lacks reliable data, as called for by federal Standards for Internal Control, to accurately identify all the delegations FPS is responsible for managing and overseeing to ensure the protection of federal facilities. Specifically, of the 62 delegations of authority that FPS officials said were verified as active, GAO found that 12 had either expired or been rescinded. Standards for Internal Control state that federal agencies should have relevant, reliable, and timely information for decision-making and external- reporting purposes. FPS officials stated that poor recordkeeping contributed to the data's unreliability, but FPS has not established procedures to ensure data reliability. Without reliable data on delegations of authority, FPS will face challenges effectively managing this program. FPS's model for estimating the costs associated with a delegation—set forth in its 2012 Interim Plan —does not fully align with the relevant leading practices outlined in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide . These leading practices help ensure reliable cost estimates that are comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible. GAO found that FPS's cost estimation model partially aligned with practices for producing comprehensive estimates and minimally aligned with those for producing well-documented and accurate estimates. Furthermore, the model does not align with practices for producing credible cost estimates because, among other things, it does not include a sensitivity analysis, which identifies a range of possible costs based on varying assumptions. Without fully aligning the cost model with leading practices, FPS faces limitations developing reliable cost estimates that support its delegations of authority recommendations. For five of the six agency requests for new or renewed delegations of authority that GAO analyzed, FPS did not conduct the required cost and security- capabilities analyses before making its recommendation to grant, renew, or rescind the delegation. The Interim Plan calls for these analyses to form the basis of FPS's recommendations. Specifically, FPS conducted the required analyses for only the delegation involving the Social Security Administration and did not conduct these analyses for the other five delegations involving facilities of the Departments of Commerce, Interior, and State; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Federal Trade Commission. According to FPS officials, they were not always able to obtain, from the agency requesting a delegation, comparable cost data to complete the cost model. FPS officials also acknowledged that FPS has yet to establish management controls to ensure that required analyses are conducted. Without these analyses, FPS does not have a sound basis to determine whether cost or security considerations support its delegations of authority recommendations. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS (1) to improve the accuracy of its delegation data, (2) update its cost estimation model to align with leading practices, and (3) establish management controls to ensure that its staff conducts the required cost and capability analyses. DHS concurred with the recommendations.
gao_GAO-07-594	gao_GAO-07-594_0	In July 2005, Labor implemented new performance measures, which provide information on some outcomes for veterans. However, not all performance measures have been fully implemented. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess outcomes over time or across states because of frequent changes in states’ reporting requirements that prevent establishing reliable trend data. However, states are not yet held accountable for an additional common measure—veterans’ average earnings—in either the DVOP or the LVER programs. Available Data Paint an Unclear Picture of Veterans’ Use of One- Stop Services Labor’s data on veteran job seekers paint an unclear picture of their use of employment and training services in the one-stop system, despite the shared use of common performance measures across programs. Although many veterans use employment services other than those provided by the DVOP and LVER programs, key employment programs vary in how well their data on veteran participants are integrated or shared with other programs. In addition, statutory differences in the way veterans are defined for purposes of program eligibility make it difficult to standardize data across employment programs. Moreover, Labor has no means of assessing whether priority of service for veterans has been implemented in various employment programs. Historically, some states have collected information on these job seekers, while others have not. Labor Has Taken Steps to Better Understand Veterans’ Outcomes, but the Programs’ Impact Remains Unknown Labor has taken some steps to improve the quality of performance data and better understand veterans’ services and outcomes, but the overall impact of employment services for veterans is unknown. Labor has sponsored research on services to veterans. However, it has not conducted an impact evaluation, as required under WIA, to assess the effectiveness of one-stop services. Recommendations for Executive Action To provide a better picture of services and outcomes for veteran job seekers, improve program reporting, and facilitate priority of service, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor ensure that states are given adequate direction and sufficient time to implement ETA’s planned integrated data reporting system and make necessary changes; consolidate all performance measures for the DVOP and LVER programs, including those for disabled and recently separated veterans; comply with JVA’s requirement to implement a weighting system for the DVOP and LVER performance measures that takes into account the difficulty of serving veterans with particular barriers to employment; develop legislative proposals for appropriate changes to the definitions of veterans across employment and training programs to ensure consistency; and ensure that Labor moves forward with an impact evaluation for the one-stop system under WIA as we recommended in 2004, and that the evaluation’s sampling methodology includes veterans in sufficient numbers to allow analysis of the impact of services to veterans in the one-stop system, including those served by the DVOP and LVER programs. Other contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the extent to which DVOP and LVER performance information reflects services and outcomes for veterans served by these programs, (2) the extent to which performance information on veterans served by other key programs is comprehensive and well integrated across programs in the one-stop system, and (3) what Labor is doing to improve the quality of performance data and better understand outcomes for veteran job seekers.	Why GAO Did This Study In 2002, Congress enacted the Jobs for Veterans Act (JVA), which modified two Department of Labor (Labor) programs that specifically target veteran job seekers: the Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program (DVOP) and the Local Veterans' Employment Representative (LVER) program. However, questions have been raised about the adequacy of performance information on services to veterans by these and other employment programs. In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent to which DVOP and LVER performance information reflects services and outcomes for veterans; (2) the extent to which performance information on veterans paints a clear picture of their use of one-stop services; and (3) what Labor is doing to improve the quality of performance data and better understand program impact and outcomes for veterans. What GAO Found Performance information for the DVOP and LVER programs provides some sense of services and outcomes for veterans, but is weakened by several factors. In July 2005, Labor adopted new performance measures for the programs, but not all have been fully implemented. For example, states are held accountable for helping veterans get and keep jobs, but are not yet held accountable for their average earnings once employed, as they are for other programs. Additionally, having separate performance measures for the DVOP and LVER programs fails to acknowledge the similarity of the populations they serve and duties they perform. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess outcomes over time or across states because of frequent changes in reporting requirements that prevent establishing reliable trend data. Labor's data on veteran job seekers paint an unclear picture of their use of other employment and training services in the one-stop system, despite the use of common performance measures across programs. Although many veterans use services other than those provided by the DVOP and LVER programs, key employment programs vary in how well their data on veteran job seekers are shared across programs, making it difficult to know how many veterans are served. In addition, statutory differences in the definitions of veterans hinder efforts to standardize data across employment programs. Moreover, Labor has no means of assessing whether priority of service for veterans has been implemented in various employment programs. Labor has taken some steps to improve the quality of performance data and better understand outcomes for veterans. For example, Labor requires states to validate key performance data. Labor has also planned an integrated data reporting system that would track individual veterans' progress through the one-stop system. However, states have raised concerns about the timelines and its current implementation date is unclear. Furthermore, while outcome information on veterans is helpful, it cannot measure whether the outcomes are due to the program or other factors. While Labor has sponsored research on services to veterans, it has not yet conducted the impact evaluation required by law to assess the effectiveness of one-stop services.
gao_GAO-05-157	gao_GAO-05-157_0	DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S. Programs Worldwide DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or with those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. Furthermore, these programs are expanding beyond the FSU and may potentially involve the response of multiple U.S. agencies. DOD and DOE Strategies for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Generally Meet Criteria Established by the Government Performance and Results Act DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We found that this strategy generally contains the elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria. Each project has a plan that details its broad mission, specific objectives, external factors that could affect the achievement of these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of the project, and cost estimates. In accordance with GPRA criteria, DNN plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years. To comply with the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended, the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure nuclear weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies’ Roles, Information Sharing, and Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with DOD and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that share similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each agency’s roles and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is formalized, and procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, three program areas perform similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2) employing former biological weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the ability of countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. In September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing the coordination of the biological weapons scientist employment programs, which addressed these three elements. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State documents regarding their border security programs. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union.	Why GAO Did This Study Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions. What GAO Found GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of agencies' strategies is important. The agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.
gao_GAO-03-769T	gao_GAO-03-769T_0	The federal government also has a role in preparedness for and response to major public health threats. State and Local Officials Reported Varying Levels of Public Health Preparedness for Infectious Disease Outbreaks In the cities we visited, state and local officials reported varying levels of public health preparedness to respond to outbreaks of diseases such as SARS. In addition, we found that the level of preparedness varied across the cities. Jurisdictions that had multiple prior experiences with public health emergencies were generally more prepared than those with little or no such experience prior to our site visits. In addition, states were working on plans for receiving and distributing the Strategic National Stockpile and for administering mass vaccinations. Progress Has Been Made in Elements of Public Health Preparedness, But Gaps Remain States and local areas were addressing gaps in public health preparedness elements, such as communication, but weaknesses remained in other preparedness elements, including the disease surveillance and laboratory systems and the response capacity of the workforce. However, the state did not have written agreements with its neighboring states for responding to a public health emergency. Planning for Regional Coordination Was Lacking between States Response organization officials were concerned about a lack of planning for regional coordination between states of the public health response to an infectious disease outbreak. Most Hospitals Lack Response Capacity for Large-Scale Infectious Disease Outbreaks We found that most hospitals lack the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. Most emergency departments across the country have experienced some degree of crowding and therefore in some cases may not be able to handle a large influx of patients during a potential SARS outbreak. In addition, although most hospitals across the country reported participating in basic planning activities for large-scale infectious disease outbreaks, few have acquired the medical equipment resources, such as ventilators, to handle large increases in the number of patients that may result from outbreaks of diseases such as SARS. Key Federal Decisions for Influenza Pandemic Planning Could Facilitate Response to Emerging Infectious Diseases The completion of final federal influenza pandemic response plans that address the problems related to the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic could facilitate the public health response to emerging infectious disease outbreaks. CDC has provided interim draft guidance to facilitate state plans but has not made the final decisions on plan provisions necessary to mitigate the effects of potential shortages of vaccines and antiviral drugs. Federal and state plans for the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of vaccines and drugs in response to an influenza pandemic have still not been finalized. Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions. GAO-03-373. Hospital Emergency Departments: Crowded Conditions Vary among Hospitals and Communities. GAO-03-460. Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in Public Health Protection. GAO-01- 915.	Why GAO Did This Study SARS has infected relatively few people nationwide, but it has raised concerns about preparedness for large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. The initial response to an outbreak occurs in local agencies and hospitals, with support from state and federal agencies, and can involve disease surveillance, epidemiologic investigation, health care delivery, and quarantine management. Officials have learned lessons applicable to preparedness for such outbreaks from experiences with other major public health threats. GAO was asked to examine the preparedness of state and local public health agencies and hospitals for responding to a large-scale infectious disease outbreak and the relationship of federal and state planning for an influenza pandemic to preparedness for emerging infectious diseases. This testimony is based on Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions, GAO-03-373 (Apr. 7, 2003); findings from a GAO survey on hospital emergency room capacity (in Hospital Emergency Departments: Crowded Conditions Vary among Hospitals and Communities, GAO-03-460 (Mar. 14, 2003)) and on hospital emergency preparedness; and information updating Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State Response, GAO-01-4 (Oct. 27, 2000). What GAO Found The efforts of public health agencies and health care organizations to increase their preparedness for major public health threats such as bioterrorism and the worldwide influenza outbreaks known as pandemics have improved the nation's capacity to respond to SARS and other emerging infectious disease outbreaks, but gaps in preparedness remain. Specifically, GAO found that there are gaps in disease surveillance systems and laboratory facilities and that there are workforce shortages. The level of preparedness varied across seven cities GAO visited, with jurisdictions that have had multiple prior experiences with public health emergencies being generally more prepared than others. GAO found that planning for regional coordination was lacking between states. GAO also found that states were developing plans for receiving and distributing medical supplies for emergencies and for mass vaccinations in the event of a public health emergency. GAO found that most hospitals lack the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious disease outbreaks. Most emergency departments have experienced some degree of crowding and therefore in some cases may not be able to handle a large influx of patients during a potential SARS or other infectious disease outbreak. Most hospitals across the country reported participating in basic planning activities for such outbreaks. However, few hospitals have adequate medical equipment, such as the ventilators that are often needed for respiratory infections such as SARS, to handle the large increases in the number of patients that may result. The public health response to outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases such as SARS could be improved by the completion of federal and state influenza pandemic response plans that address problems related to the purchase, distribution, and administration of supplies of vaccines and antiviral drugs during an outbreak. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has provided interim draft guidance to facilitate state plans but has not made the final decisions on plan provisions necessary to mitigate the effects of potential shortages of vaccines and antiviral drugs in the event of an influenza pandemic.
gao_GAO-07-370T	gao_GAO-07-370T_0	NRCS’s Process for Allocating EQIP Funds to the States Does Not Link to the Program’s Purpose of Optimizing Environmental Benefits NRCS’s process for providing EQIP funds to the states is not clearly linked to the program’s purpose of optimizing environmental benefits. In particular, NRCS’s general financial assistance formula, which accounts for approximately two-thirds of funding provided to the states, does not have a documented rationale for each of the formula’s factors and weights, which are used to determine the allocation of funds to the states to address environmental issues. As a result, NRCS may not be directing EQIP funds to states with the most significant environmental concerns arising from agricultural production. Financial Assistance Formula Relies on Some Questionable and Outdated Data Weaknesses in the financial assistance formula are compounded by NRCS’s use of questionable and outdated data as they apply to the formula. In addition to providing information to better gauge program performance, these measures could also help NRCS refine its funding allocation process to the states by directing funds to areas of the country that need the most improvement. However, at the time of our report, NRCS did not yet have any plans to link these performance measures to the EQIP funding allocation process. In 2002, NRCS established annual performance measures for EQIP. Legislative and Regulatory Measures Reduce the Potential for Duplication between CSP and Other Programs, but the Potential Remains for Duplicate Payments, and Such Payments Have Occurred A number of legislative and regulatory actions have been taken that reduce the potential for duplication between CSP and other USDA conservation programs, such as EQIP. For these reasons, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of NRCS to (1) develop a comprehensive process, such as an automated system, to review CSP contract applications to ensure that CSP payments, if awarded, would not duplicate payments made by other USDA conservation programs; and (2) develop a process to efficiently review existing CSP contracts to identify cases where CSP payments duplicate payments made under other programs and take action to recover appropriate amounts and to ensure that these duplicate payments are not repeated in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. In conclusion, EQIP and CSP are key agricultural conservation programs that can play an invaluable role in encouraging farmers and ranchers to act as stewards of the nation’s natural resources. However, the weaknesses we identified in the management of EQIP and CSP funds may lessen these programs’ effectiveness. Furthermore, oversight of these programs, such as today’s hearing, helps ensure funds are spent as economically, efficiently and effectively as possible and benefit the agricultural sector as intended. Such oversight is especially critical in light of the nation’s current deficit and growing long-term fiscal challenges. Unlike other USDA conservation programs that provide assistance to take new actions aimed at addressing identified conservation problems, CSP rewards farmers and ranchers who already meet very high standards of conservation and environmental management in their operations.	Why GAO Did This Study The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Security Program (CSP), administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), are designed to promote conservation goals. In recently issued reports on these programs, GAO assessed (1) NRCS's process for allocating EQIP funds to the states to optimize environmental benefits, (2) NRCS's measures to monitor EQIP's performance, and (3) the legislative and regulatory measures available to prevent duplication between CSP and other conservation programs, such as EQIP. What GAO Found Because farmers and ranchers own and manage about 940 million acres, or about half of the continental United States' land area, they are among the most important stewards of our soil, water, and wildlife habitat. EQIP provides assistance to farmers and ranchers to take new actions aimed at addressing identified conservation problems, whereas CSP rewards farmers and ranchers who already meet very high standards of conservation and environmental management on their operations. In fiscal year 2006, EQIP and CSP provided about $1 billion and $260 million, respectively, in financial and technical assistance to farmers and ranchers. Efficient and effective management of these programs by NRCS is especially important in light of the nation's current deficit and growing long-term fiscal challenges. GAO found the following weaknesses in the management of EQIP and CSP. NRCS's process for providing EQIP funds to states is not clearly linked to the program's purpose of optimizing environmental benefits; as such, NRCS may not be directing funds to states with the most significant environmental concerns arising from agricultural production. To allocate most EQIP funds, NRCS uses a general financial assistance formula that consists of 31 factors and weights. However, NRCS does not have a documented rationale for how each factor contributes to accomplishing the program's purpose. In addition, some data that NRCS uses in applying the formula are questionable or outdated. NRCS has begun to develop long-term, outcome-oriented performance measures for EQIP. Such measures can provide information to better gauge program performance and also help NRCS refine its process for allocating funds to the states by directing funds to areas of the country that need the most improvement. However, NRCS did not have plans to link these measures to the EQIP funding allocation process. Despite legislative and regulatory provisions, it is still possible for producers to receive duplicate payments through CSP and other USDA conservation programs because of similarities in the conservation actions financed through these programs. However, NRCS did not have a comprehensive process to preclude or identify such duplicate payments. In reviewing NRCS's payments data, GAO found a number of examples of duplicate payments. Ensuring the integrity and equity of existing farm programs is a key area needing enhanced congressional oversight. Such oversight can help ensure that conservation programs, such as EQIP and CSP, benefit the agricultural sector as intended and protect rural areas from land degradation, diminished water and air quality, and loss of wildlife habitat.
gao_NSIAD-96-99	gao_NSIAD-96-99_0	Background Since 1987, State has recognized that the lack of adequate controls over visa processing is a material weakness that increases U.S. vulnerability to illegal immigration and diminishes the integrity of the U.S. visa. Specific problems have included (1) inadequate management controls, (2) lax security over visas, (3) unreliable equipment, and (4) unsupervised staff. Technical Problems Reduce Effectiveness of Visa Automation In 1989, State began the machine-readable visa program as its primary initiative for eliminating fraudulent nonimmigrant visas. Lack of Cooperation Limits Usefulness of Terrorist Lookout Committees In the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing, State directed all diplomatic and consular posts to form committees with representatives from consular, political, and other appropriate agencies to meet regularly to ensure that the names of suspected terrorists and others ineligible for a visa are identified and put into the lookout system. Upgrades and Enhancements to Automated Passport Systems Are Behind Schedule Automation upgrades and enhancements are the cornerstone of State’s strategy to reduce the vulnerability of passport systems to fraud. Planned efforts involve (1) installing a computer network to connect all domestic passport agencies and serve as a platform to allow State to verify the multiple issuance of passports, (2) enhancing its travel document issuance system so that the passport photo can be printed digitally, and (3) completing the upgrade of its travel document issuance system at all passport agencies. State had planned to have most of the improvements completed by December 1995. However, only one major improvement, installation of a wide-area network, had been completed by that date. The other improvements, in addition to being dependent on the wide-area network for telecommunications, are also dependent on the completion of the upgrades to the passport production system. State’s current goal is for full completion of these enhancements and upgrades by the end of 1996. State indicated that completion of these upgrades was dependent upon the availability of funds. State is also developing a system to print a digitized passport photograph. According to a Bureau official, depending on the availability of the funds, the Bureau plans to have all systems upgraded and enhanced by the end of calendar year 1996.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the Department of State's plan to make its visa and passport operations more efficient and less vulnerable to fraud, focusing on: (1) the status of the plan's key initiatives; and (2) compliance with internal management controls by consular staff at selected posts overseas. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) State's efforts to overcome the material weaknesses in visa and passport processing have had mixed results; (2) after initial delays, State has made steady progress in installing its machine-readable system (the primary initiative for eliminating visa fraud) and provided all visa-issuing posts with automated access to its global database containing names of individuals ineligible for a visa; (3) operational problems have diminished the effectiveness of these efforts including technical problems that have limited the availability and usefulness of the visa improvements, limited usefulness of embassy lookout committees because of the reluctance of some agencies to share information and the lack of representation of key agencies, and lack of compliance with management control procedures designed to decrease the vulnerability of consular operations to fraud; (4) State is behind schedule in its modernization and enhancement efforts to reduce passport fraud; (5) State originally planned to have installed a new wide-area network, developed a system to print a digitized passport photograph, and completed installation of a system to verify multiple issuance of passports by December 1995, however, only the installation of the wide-area network, upon which the other two projects depend, has been completed; (6) full implementation also depends on the completion of the modernization of the passport production system which State indicates is dependent on the availability of funding; and (7) State's current goal is for full implementation by the end of calendar year 1996.
gao_GAO-07-66	gao_GAO-07-66_0	Mental health services are provided for a range of conditions such as depression, PTSD, and substance abuse disorders. Such strategies include, for example, the use of RFPs solicited from networks for specific initiatives to be carried out at their individual medical centers. VA Allocated about $88 Million of the $100 Million Planned for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives in Fiscal Year 2005, but Officials Reported That Not All Allocated Funds Were Used for Plan Initiatives VA headquarters allocated about $88 million of the $100 million that VA officials said would be allocated for VA mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005 by using several approaches. Officials we interviewed at seven medical centers in four networks reported using allocated funds to provide new mental health services and to provide more of existing services. However, some medical center officials reported that they did not use all allocated funds for plan initiatives by the end of fiscal year, due in part to the length of time it took to hire new staff. VA Allocated Approximately $53 Million Directly to Medical Centers and Certain Offices VA headquarters allocated about $53 million directly to medical centers and certain offices based on proposals submitted for funding and other approaches targeted to specific initiatives related to the mental health strategic plan in fiscal year 2005. VA Allocated $35 Million through Its General Resource Allocation System to Its Health Care Networks on a Retrospective Basis VA allocated $35 million for mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005 through its general resource allocation system to its health care networks, according to VA headquarters officials. However, because network and medical center officials we interviewed did not know that funds had been allocated for mental health strategic plan initiatives through VA’s general resource allocation system, nor did VA headquarters notify networks and medical centers throughout VA of this retrospective allocation, it is likely that some of these funds were not used for plan initiatives. VA Did Not Allocate about $12 Million Planned for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives VA did not allocate approximately $12 million remaining of the $100 million planned for mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005 because, according to VA headquarters officials, there was not enough time during the fiscal year to allocate the funds through the RFP process or other approaches targeted to specific initiatives. Medical Center Officials Reported Using Allocated Funds for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives, but Not Using All Funds Allocated for Plan Initiatives Officials we interviewed from seven medical centers in four networks reported using the funds allocated to them for mental health strategic plan initiatives through RFPs and other targeted approaches, but some officials said that some of these funds were not used for plan initiatives in fiscal year 2005. VA Allocated about $158 Million of the $200 Million Planned for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives in Fiscal Year 2006, but Some Officials Were Uncertain If All Funds Would Be Used for Plan Initiatives VA headquarters allocated about $158 million of the $200 million to be used for VA mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal year 2006 directly to medical centers and certain offices by using several approaches. About $92 million of these funds was allocated to support new mental health strategic plan initiatives for fiscal year 2006. VA also allocated about $66 million to support the recurring costs of the continuing mental health strategic plan initiatives that were funded in fiscal year 2005. Officials at two medical centers reported that they did not anticipate problems using all of the funds they had received in fiscal year 2006. In addition, officials at the Bay Pines and Phoenix medical centers noted that they had not yet learned whether proposals they submitted in response to fiscal year 2006 RFPs would be funded; as a result, officials at those medical centers were uncertain whether they would be able to use all of their fiscal year 2006 funds for plan initiatives by the end of the fiscal year. VA Tracking of Funds Spent for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives Was Inadequate, but Available Information Indicates That Spending for These Initiatives Was Substantially Less Than Planned VA tracking of spending for mental health strategic plan initiatives was inadequate for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Moreover, VA did not track specifically how these funds were spent. As a consequence, VA cannot determine how much of the approximately $112 million that was allocated for plan initiatives and not returned to headquarters was spent on plan initiatives. The extent of spending is unknown because VA did not track spending of these funds. CBOCs are affiliated with a VA medical center. Department of Veterans Affairs: Key Management Challenges in Health and Disability Programs.	Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides mental health services to veterans with conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse disorders. To address gaps in services needed by veterans, VA approved a mental health strategic plan in 2004. VA planned to increase its fiscal year 2005 allocations for plan initiatives by $100 million above fiscal year 2004 levels and its fiscal year 2006 allocations for plan initiatives by $200 million above fiscal year 2004 levels. GAO was asked to provide information on VA's allocation and use of funding for mental health strategic plan initiatives in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and to examine the adequacy of how VA tracked spending and the extent of spending for plan initiatives. GAO reviewed VA reports and documents on plan initiatives and conducted interviews with VA officials at headquarters, 4 of 21 health care networks, and seven medical centers. VA networks provide oversight of medical center operations and most medical center resources. What GAO Found In fiscal year 2005, VA headquarters allocated about $88 million of the $100 million above fiscal year 2004 levels that VA officials intended for mental health strategic plan initiatives. VA allocated about $53 million directly to medical centers and certain offices based on proposals submitted for funding and other approaches targeted to specific initiatives. VA solicited proposals from networks for initiatives to be carried out at medical centers through requests for proposals (RFP). In addition, VA headquarters officials said that VA allocated $35 million for plan initiatives through VA's general resource allocation system to its 21 health care networks on a retrospective basis, several months after resources had been provided to the networks though the general resource allocation system. VA did not notify network and medical center officials that these funds were to be used for plan initiatives. Network and medical center officials interviewed told GAO that they were not aware these allocations had been made. As a result, it is likely that some of these funds were not used for plan initiatives. VA did not allocate the approximately $12 million remaining of the $100 million for fiscal year 2005 because, according to VA officials, there was not enough time during the fiscal year to do so. Medical center officials said they used funds allocated for plan initiatives for new services and for enhancement of existing services. For example, two medical centers increased the number of mental health providers at community-based outpatient clinics. However, some medical center officials reported they did not use all funds allocated by the end of the fiscal year, due in part to the time it took to hire staff. In fiscal year 2006, VA headquarters allocated about $158 million of the $200 million above fiscal year 2004 levels intended for mental health strategic plan initiatives directly to medical centers and certain offices. VA allocated about $92 million of these funds to support new initiatives, using RFPs and other targeted funding approaches. VA also allocated about $66 million to support recurring costs of continuing initiatives from the prior fiscal year. About $42 million of the $200 million for fiscal year 2006 was not allocated. Officials from seven medical centers GAO interviewed reported they had used funds for plan initiatives, such as the creation of a new case management program. Officials at some medical centers reported they did not anticipate problems using all of the funds allocated within the fiscal year; however, officials at other medical centers were less certain they would be able to do so. VA tracking of spending for plan initiatives was inadequate. In fiscal year 2005, VA did not track such spending. In fiscal year 2006, VA tracked aspects of plan initiatives but not dollars spent. However, available information indicates that VA spending for plan initiatives was substantially less than planned. In fiscal year 2006, VA medical centers returned to headquarters about $46 million of about $158 million allocated for plan initiatives because they could not spend the funds that year. However, VA cannot determine to what extent the approximately $112 million remaining was spent on plan initiatives because it did not track specifically how these funds were spent.
gao_T-AIMD-98-305	gao_T-AIMD-98-305_0	In addition, financial institutions depend on public infrastructure, such as telecommunications and power networks, to carry out critical business operations, such as making electronic fund transfers, verifying credit card transactions, and making ATM transactions. Regulators Have Taken Positive Actions to Mitigate Year 2000 Risks Since June 1996, when their Year 2000 oversight efforts began, the five financial institution regulators have taken a number of important steps to alert financial institutions of the risks associated with the Year 2000 problem and to assess what these institutions are doing to mitigate the risks. In addition, the regulators provided extensive guidance to assist financial institutions in critical Year 2000 tasks, including guidance on (1) contingency planning, (2) mitigating risks associated with critical bank customers (e.g., large borrowers and capital providers), (3) mitigating risks of using data processing servicers and software vendors to perform financial institution operations, (4) testing to demonstrate Year 2000 compliance, (5) establishing effective Year 2000 customer awareness programs, and (6) addressing Year 2000 risks associated with fiduciary services. To assess what institutions are doing to mitigate Year 2000 risks, the regulators performed a high-level and detailed assessment of bank, thrift, and credit union efforts. Significant Year 2000 Challenges Ahead for Financial Institutions and Regulators Despite the regulators’ strong efforts to assess industrywide compliance and remediate their own systems, several complex and difficult challenges remain in achieving Year 2000 compliance. Regardless of good practices and good progress, less than 16 months remain to the century date change. Because of the limited number of technical examiners and the large number of entities to be examined, we have recommended to the regulators that they (1) determine how many technical examiners are needed to adequately oversee the Year 2000 efforts of the institutions, data processing servicers, and software vendors and (2) develop a strategy for obtaining these resources and maintaining their availability. Developing these plans promptly is paramount to minimizing the risk of not having enough time to implement a viable plan for dealing with institutions that cannot successfully complete their efforts. Given the fact that many countries are behind schedule in addressing the Year 2000 problem, it will be essential for regulators to (1) ensure that financial institutions have adequately identified and mitigated their international risks and (2) prepare contingency plans for handling disruptions caused by problems abroad. The carriers are working to test their networks but until the tests are completed and the results made public, it is not clear to what degree—if any—financial institutions and the public will be subject to telecommunications disruptions. Looking forward, the challenge is for the regulators to make the best use of limited resources in the time remaining and to ensure that they are ready to take swift actions to address those institutions that falter in the later phases of correction and to address disruptions caused by international and public infrastructure Year 2000 failures. In addition, they have undertaken efforts to determine what conditions will constitute Year 2000 failures and what actions can be taken to quickly address failures.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the year 2000 risks facing financial institutions and the federal regulators, focusing on the: (1) actions taken to date to mitigate these risks; and (2) challenges that lay ahead as institutions and regulators face the more complex and difficult activities of their year 2000 programs. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the regulators have made good progress in assisting banks, thrifts, and credit unions in their year 2000 efforts as well as identifying which institutions are at a high risk of not remediating their systems on time; (2) they have also recognized the risk and potential impact of year 2000-induced system failures on their own core business processes and have implemented rigorous efforts to mitigate these risks; (3) nevertheless, there are still serious challenges ahead that could threaten the financial institution industry's ability to successfully meet the year 2000 deadline; (4) with less than 16 months remaining before the year 2000 deadline, the regulators are faced with the daunting task of overseeing the efforts of more than 22,000 financial institutions, service providers, and software vendors with a relatively finite number of examination personnel; (5) in the next few months, many of these entities will be undertaking the most complex and difficult stage of correction--testing; (6) it will be necessary for regulators to ensure that they have enough technical resources to review institution efforts during this crucial phase; (7) beginning in early 1999, regulators will be pressed to take quick actions against institutions that cannot successfully complete their year 2000 efforts; (8) but before they can do so, they need to determine what will constitute financial institution year 2000 failures, what regulatory options can be effectively used, and when they would be implemented; (9) the U.S. economy is intrinsically linked to the international banking and financial services sector, yet many countries and their financial institutions are reported to be behind schedule in addressing their year 2000 problem; (10) working with their foreign counterparts, the regulators will need to identify and define global year 2000 risks and work cooperatively to mitigate those risks; (11) the regulators will also need to develop contingency plans in case there are unforeseen problems; (12) financial institution credit, deposit, and payment flows are critically dependent on public infrastructure such as telecommunications and electric power networks; (13) however, until critical readiness assessments and tests are completed and made available to the public, it is not clear whether there will be uninterrupted telecommunications and power service; and (14) regulators will need to develop contingency plans that anticipate year 2000-related disruptions in the public infrastructure.
gao_GAO-01-769T	gao_GAO-01-769T_0	Three factors have hindered the NIPC’s ability to develop strategic analytical capabilities. Specifically, evaluating the NIPC’s progress in developing analysis and warning capabilities is difficult because the federal government’s strategy and related plans for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures from computer-based attacks, including the NIPC’s role, are still evolving. Our report recommends that, as the administration proceeds, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in coordination with pertinent executive agencies, establish a capability for strategic analysis of computer-based threats, including developing related methodology, acquiring staff expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data; require development of a comprehensive data collection and analysis framework and ensure that national watch and warning operations for computer-based attacks are supported by sufficient staff and resources; and clearly define the role of the NIPC in relation to other government and private-sector entities. NIPC Coordination and Technical Support Have Benefited Investigative and Response Capabilities PDD 63 directed the NIPC to provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the federal government’s response to computer-based incidents. Progress in Establishing Information-Sharing Relationships Has Been Mixed Information sharing and coordination among private-sector and government organizations are essential to thoroughly understanding cyber threats and quickly identifying and mitigating attacks. The NIPC has been more successful in providing training on investigating computer crime to government entities, which is an effort that it considers an important component of its outreach efforts.	Why GAO Did This Study To better protect the nation's critical computer-dependent infrastructures from computer-based attacks and disruption, the President issued a directive in 1998 that established the National Infrastructure Protection Center as a national focal point for gathering information on threats and facilitating the federal government's response to computer-based incidents. This testimony discusses the center's progress in (1) developing national capabilities for analyzing cyber threat and vulnerability data and issuing warnings, (2) enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks, and (3) developing outreach and information-sharing initiatives with government and private-sector entities. What GAO Found GAO found that although the center has taken some steps to develop analysis and warning capabilities, the strategic capabilities described in the presidential directive have not been achieved. By coordinating investigations and providing technical assistance the center has provided important support that has improved the Federal Bureau of Investigations' ability to investigate computer crimes. The center has also developed crisis management procedures and drafted an emergency law enforcement sector plan, which is now being reviewed by sector members. The center's information-sharing relationships are still evolving and will probably have limited effectiveness until reporting procedures and thresholds are defined and trust relationships are established. This testimony summarized an April 2001 report (GAO-01-323).
gao_GAO-15-125	gao_GAO-15-125_0	As we have previously reported, program consolidations may help address these problems. We identified a total of 15 consolidations from fiscal year 1990 through 2012, (see figure 3 and appendix I). Most of these consolidations either combined a number of grant programs used for specific activities (such as Shelter Plus Care), known as categorical grants, into a broader categorical grant, such as the CoC program, or established a Performance Partnership, which offers additional flexibility in using funds across multiple programs but is held accountable for meeting certain performance measures. One grant program consolidation enacted in 2009–HUD’s CoC program— was created by consolidating multiple categorical grant programs. Hybrid approaches can improve the efficiency of grant administration and may reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. In general, the actions taken are similar to the 1980s era of block grant actions because in both instances, state and local governments in the three case study consolidations relied on existing grant management structures and established relationships to facilitate implementation of the selected grant program consolidations. In addition to these actions, state officials reported to us that the TA program and NEPPS case study grant program consolidations provided them with flexibility in administering the programs. Existence of carry-over funds from predecessor grant program: States reported to us that the budget impact of the TA program consolidation was delayed because they relied on carry over funds from predecessor grant programs while these funds were still available. These performance accountability challenges identified by federal, state, and local officials include lack of central oversight in the states, lack of or inaccurate performance data, and conflicting reporting requirements, as illustrated in table 3. Lessons Learned Can Inform Both the Design and Review of Grant Program Consolidations Ambiguity of Consolidations’ Goals May Create Grant Management Challenges The key to any consolidation initiative is identifying and agreeing on the goals of the consolidation, regarding grant administration and changed programmatic outcomes (if any) and designing and planning for successful implementation, according to findings from the case studies and our prior GAO work. Grant consolidations offer the opportunity to improve administration by enlarging the limits of narrowly targeted grants and by reducing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. What opportunities will be addressed through the consolidation and what problems will be solved? However, as our prior work found few executive branch agencies regularly conduct in-depth program evaluations to assess their programs’ impacts or to learn how to improve results. OMB, as the focal point for overall management in the executive branch, plays a key role in improving the performance of federal grant programs and has developed or contributed many tools to encourage improvements to federal grants and program performance. OMB staff stated there is a need for improved guidance relative to grant program consolidation opportunities. Agencies and, the Congress—as well as grantees—can benefit from guidance, which currently does not exist, to assist with identifying consolidation opportunities, particularly those requiring statutory changes and developing consolidation proposals. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretaries of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Transportation, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Describe approaches taken to grant programs that have been consolidated from fiscal year 1990 through 2012. Examine federal, state, and local actions taken to administer the selected case study consolidated grant programs. The selected locations and grant program consolidations are not generalizable, but they provided important insights about grant consolidations. The four states we selected were Colorado, Delaware, Florida, and Massachusetts. For objective 3, to analyze lessons learned for future consideration of grant program consolidations, we reviewed existing literature pertaining to grants management and identified key questions to consider when evaluating grant program consolidations, and attributes for conducting a program consolidation evaluation.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO has previously reported that consolidations may help increase the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs. GAO was asked to review grant program consolidations in regard to reducing overlap and duplication. This report: (1) describes approaches taken to grant programs that have been consolidated from fiscal year 1990 through 2012, (2) examines federal, state and local actions taken to administer the programs, and (3) analyzes lessons learned for future consideration of grant program consolidations. GAO reviewed literature on grant program consolidations. For this review GAO selected three case study grant program consolidations, the TA and CoC programs, and the National Environmental Performance Partnership System. GAO conducted interviews with state and local officials in Colorado, Delaware, Florida, and Massachusetts. GAO selected these states and localities based on several selection criteria, such as state participation and funding. The selected locations and grant program consolidations are not generalizable, but they provided important insights about grant consolidations. What GAO Found Consolidations from fiscal years 1990 through 2012. There is no authoritative, accurate tally of enacted grant program consolidations. In addition, there is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a grant program consolidation. From a variety of sources, GAO identified 15 grant program consolidations during this period. Most of these consolidations either combined a number of grant programs used for specific activities (such as Shelter Plus Care), known as categorical grants, into a broader categorical grant, such as the Continuum of Care (CoC) program or established a Performance Partnership, which offers additional flexibility in using funds across multiple programs but maintains accountability for meeting certain performance measures. Block grant approaches to consolidation prior to 1990 combined programs for broad purposes, such as work assistance. The more recent approaches, referred to as hybrid, often combine categorical grant programs and emphasize strong performance standards and accountability. Hybrid approaches can improve the efficiency of grant administration and may reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. State and local government actions. State and local officials in the three case study consolidations GAO selected for review relied on existing grant management structures and established relationships to facilitate implementation of the grant program consolidations. In the Transportation Alternatives (TA) program the impact of the consolidation was delayed by states and local officials' reliance on carryover funds from predecessor grant programs while these funds were still available. Officials reported both benefits and challenges ranging from administrative flexibility such as lack of central oversight by states, lack of or inaccurate performance data, and conflicting reporting requirements. Lessons to consider. The key to any grant program consolidation initiative is identifying and agreeing on goals—such as improved grant administration and changed programmatic outcomes—and to design and plan for successful implementation, according to findings from the case studies and prior GAO reports. Grant consolidations offer the opportunity to improve grant administration by expanding the opportunities of narrowly targeted grants and by reducing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. Consolidation initiatives that answer key questions can provide a data-driven consolidation rationale and show stakeholders that a range of alternatives has been considered. These evaluations should include responses to key questions such as the following: What are the goals of the consolidation? What opportunities will be addressed through the consolidation and what problems will be solved? GAO's prior work found that few executive branch agencies regularly conduct in-depth program evaluations to assess their programs' impact. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as the focal point for overall management in the executive branch, plays a key role in improving the performance of federal grant programs and has developed or contributed many tools to encourage improvements to federal grants and program performance. Agencies, the Congress—as well as grantees—can benefit from guidance, which currently does not exist, to assist with identifying consolidation opportunities, particularly those requiring statutory changes, and developing consolidation proposals. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends OMB develop guidance on identifying grant program consolidation opportunities and the analysis to improve their outcomes. GAO incorporated technical comments from the Environmental Protection Agency, Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Transportation, and OMB.
gao_GAO-04-894T	gao_GAO-04-894T_0	Background Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I special nuclear material. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance supports the department by, among other things, independently evaluating the effectiveness of contractors’ performance in safeguards and security. The key component of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A Number of Issues May Affect the Ability of ESE Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT in a Timely Fashion When we testified before this Subcommittee in April 2004, we stated that while DOE had issued the final DBT in May 2003, it had only recently begun to resolve a number of significant issues that could affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, we stated, full DBT implementation could occur anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008, well beyond the department’s goal of the end of fiscal year 2006. Specifically, while ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear material have developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy, we believe there are four issues that will make it difficult to implement these plans in a timely fashion. First, ESE sites approved their implementation plans in February 2004 before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his guidance on which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result, some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. Consequently, because ESE sites developed their plans well before this guidance was issued, the assumptions in their plans may no longer be valid and the plans may need to be revised. Second, the ESE site implementation plans are based on the May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way that increases security requirements, some ESE offices may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to provide for a more stringent defense. NE security officials told us that for one site no DBT implementation funding had been requested for fiscal year 2005, even though the site recognized that it needed to substantially increase its protective forces to meet the new DBT. Because of the importance of successfully integrating multiple program activities with security requirements, we continue to believe, as we recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the May 2003 DBT requirements that includes important programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear materials.	Why GAO Did This Study A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing the material used in nuclear weapons, called special nuclear material, could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO examined the issues that could impede the ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to fully meet the threat contained in the May 2003 DBT by the department's fiscal year 2006 deadline. What GAO Found Five Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites contain substantial quantities of Category I special nuclear material, which consists of specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These sites have all developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT. However, there are several issues that could make it difficult to implement these plans by DOE's deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites approved their DBT implementations plans in February 2004 before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his April 2004 guidance on which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result, some sites may be required to shift to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. Consequently, the assumptions in the Office of Energy, Science and Environment DBT implementation plans may no longer be valid, and the plans may need to be revised. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment site plans are based on the May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way that increases security requirements, some Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to provide for a more stringent defense. The plan for one Office of Energy, Science and Environment site was under funded. Specifically, officials in the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, which is part of the Office of Energy, Science and Environment, told GAO that, for one site, no DBT implementation funding had been requested for fiscal year 2005. Finally, full implementation of these plans will require the successful resolution of complex organizational arrangements between various program and security offices. Consequently, GAO continues to believe, as it recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the new DBT requirements that includes important programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear materials.
gao_GAO-06-666	gao_GAO-06-666_0	CCIC2S Program Has Experienced Cost and Schedule Overruns and Performance Shortfalls Like its predecessor, the CMU program, the CCIC2S program is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely. This deferral could pose risks to performing some future operations. The Air Force’s current program cost estimates through fiscal year 2006 represent about a 51 percent increase over its initial estimate. Additionally, while the Air Force initially estimated CCIC2S upgrades to be completed in fiscal year 2006, most critical mission capabilities will not be delivered by this time, and for some of these capabilities, the Air Force has yet to estimate a completion date. Deferral of Capabilities and Performance Shortfalls Have Implications for Future Missions The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls that have resulted from cost and schedule overruns in the CCIC2S program could significantly impact future missions—especially if program dollars are needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. USSTRATCOM—responsible for protecting U.S. space assets—could be particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S’s critical space mission capabilities has been completed and that estimated completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. The unreliable cost and schedule estimates that resulted have forced the program to frequently defer work to later years to control cost growth. The Air Force has yet to determine when and at what cost development is to be completed. Additionally, the Air Force’s contract management approach limited the program office’s ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of the contractor’s cost and schedule performance information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Furthermore, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) did not independently monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are being taken to implement better controls. However, DOD did not designate the program as a major automated information system acquisition. Designating the CCIC2S program as a major automated information system acquisition would put in place the high-level oversight and rigorous analyses needed to help ensure (1) the program has top-level accountability and support for the program, (2) DOD has the knowledge necessary for making trade-offs in program requirements so that they match available resources, and (3) DOD has the ability to prioritize and commit to the program within the context of its other acquisition programs and long-range investment plans. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine the status of the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Command and Control System, or CCIC2S, in terms of meeting its cost, schedule, and performance goals, we reviewed our past work to determine whether the CCIC2S program has continued to experience the problems previous Cheyenne Mountain upgrade efforts had experienced. To assess DOD’s oversight and control mechanisms for Cheyenne Mountain systems modernization and integration efforts underway and planned, we reviewed DOD and Air Force acquisition guidance and interviewed officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Defense Contract Management Agency’s CCIC2S Program Support Team; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Space Command; Office of the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Command and Control and Combat Support; Air Force Electronic Systems Center; Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center; United States Strategic Command; United States Northern Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; and Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & Solutions.	Why GAO Did This Study The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center houses numerous complex computer systems for tracking air, missile, and space events that could threaten homeland security or undermine military operations in theater. To ensure this mission can be met, the systems require ongoing upgrades. The most recent upgrade program--the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System (CCIC2S)--was initiated in 2000. Given the critical missions supported by Cheyenne Mountain systems, GAO initiated a review to (1) determine the status of the CCIC2S program in terms of meeting its cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) gauge the extent to which DOD has followed best practices in managing program requirements; and (3) assess DOD's control and oversight mechanisms for CCIC2S. What GAO Found Like its predecessor, the Department of Defense's (DOD) CCIC2S program is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely which could pose risks to performing some future operations. The Air Force, which has overall responsibility for the program, currently estimates program costs will total about $707 million through fiscal year 2006--about a 51 percent increase over initial estimates. Schedules have also expanded significantly, and most critical mission capabilities will not be delivered in fiscal year 2006, as initially planned. The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls has significant implications for future missions--especially if program dollars are needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. The tracking of space objects could be particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S's critical space mission capabilities has been completed, and estimated completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. Unstable program requirements and the failure to match requirements to available resources have contributed to the program's cost and schedule overruns. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has added, deleted, and modified requirements without adequately determining the effect of these changes on resources. To control cost growth, the Air Force has frequently deferred work to later years and has yet to determine when and at what cost development is to be completed. Several key controls needed to mitigate the CCIC2S program's cost and schedule problems are not in place. First, DOD did not designate the CCIC2S program as a major automated information system acquisition--a designation that would have required high-level oversight other than that provided by the Air Force, which has been ineffective. In addition, the Air Force's contracting approach has limited the program's ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of the contractor's cost and schedule performance information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Despite this risky approach, the Defense Contract Management Agency did not independently monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are being taken to implement better controls and to determine whether the CCIC2S program should be categorized as a major automated information system acquisition.
gao_GAO-03-300	gao_GAO-03-300_0	Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change to their goals—and 7 of these changes were to raise the goals. Less Than One-Half of the Aircraft Models Met Goals DOD’s key, high-demand aircraft have experienced widespread difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals since at least 1998. For example, during fiscal years 1998- 2002, the percentage of aircraft models meeting their MC goals never exceeded 35 percent. As previously shown in table 1, the level at which the goals were set showed little consistency, varying widely even among the same type of aircraft. Mission Capable Problems Caused by a Combination of Factors According to DOD officials, difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals are caused by a complex combination of interrelated logistical and operational factors, with no dominating single problem. DOD’S Goal-Setting Process Is Largely Undefined and Undocumented Despite the importance of MC and FMC goals as measures of readiness and logistical funding needs, we found widespread uncertainty over how the services’ MC and FMC goals were established and who is responsible for establishing them, as well as basic questions about the adequacy of those goals as measures of aircraft availability. DOD officials told us that the instruction has not been updated to reflect the current environment of increased deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War. In comparison, MC and FMC goals represent the expected percentage of time that an aircraft will be able to perform at least one or all of its missions, respectively. Furthermore, it does not require the services to document the basis for the goals chosen or outline any of the basic historical documentation that should be maintained for goal-setting and other key activities during the process. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that aircraft availability goals and their performance measures are appropriate to the new defense strategy and based on a clear and defined process, we recommend that (1) DOD and the services determine whether different types of aircraft availability goals are needed, (2) as appropriate, DOD and the services validate the basis for the existing MC and FMC goals, and (3) the Secretary of Defense revise DOD Instruction 3110.5 to clearly define the specific aircraft availability goals required to be established by the military services and their accompanying performance measures; establish a standard methodology identifying objective principles of analysis to be used by all services in setting the goals, including an identification of the readiness and cost implications of setting the goals at different levels; and require each service to identify one office to act as a focal point for coordinating the development of the goals and for maintaining a documentary record of the basis for the goals chosen and other key decisions in the goal-setting process.	Why GAO Did This Study The attacks on September 11, 2001, show that threats to U.S. security can now come from any number of terrorist groups, at any number of locations, and in wholly unexpected ways. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) is shifting to a new defense strategy focused on dealing with uncertainty by acting quickly across a wide range of combat conditions. One key ingredient of the new strategy is the availability of aircraft to carry out their missions. Key measures of availability include the percentage of time an aircraft can perform at least one or all of its assigned missions, termed the "mission capable" (MC) and "full mission capable" (FMC) rates, respectively. GAO examined whether key DOD aircraft have been able to meet MC and FMC goals in recent years, and DOD's process for setting aircraft availability goals. What GAO Found Less than one-half of the 49 key active-duty aircraft models that GAO reviewed met their MC or FMC goals during fiscal years 1998-2002. The levels of mission capability varied by military service and type of aircraft, and the levels at which the goals were set also varied widely, even among the same type of aircraft. However, the MC and FMC goals for each model changed little over time. Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change to their goals. Seven of the changes were to raise the goals to higher levels. Difficulties in meeting the goals are caused by a complex combination of logistical and operational factors. Despite their importance, DOD does not have a clear and defined process for setting aircraft availability goals. The goal-setting process is largely undefined and undocumented, and there is widespread uncertainty among the military services over how the goals were established, who is responsible for setting them, and the continuing adequacy of MC and FMC goals as measures of aircraft availability. Uncertainty and the lack of documentation in setting the goals ultimately obscures basic perceptions of readiness and operational effectiveness, undermines congressional confidence in the basis for DOD's funding requests, and brings into question the appropriateness of those goals to the new defense strategy. DOD guidance does not define the availability goals that the services must establish or require any objective methodology for setting them. Nor does it require the services to identify one office as the coordinating agent for goal setting or to document the basis for the goals chosen. DOD officials told GAO that the guidance has not been updated since 1990 to reflect the new security environment of increased deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War.
gao_GAO-03-287	gao_GAO-03-287_0	The quality of the coverage measurement data improved for the 1990 Census, and the Bureau recommended statistically adjusting the results. Coverage Measurement Programs for the 2000 Census Did Not Meet Bureau Objectives In planning the 2000 Census, the Bureau developed a new coverage measurement program, I.C.M., that was designed to address the major shortcomings of the 1990 coverage measurement program. As the Bureau’s current approach for the 2010 Census includes coverage measurement to assess the accuracy of the census (but not necessarily to adjust the numbers themselves), it will be important for the Bureau to consider these lessons as its planning efforts continue. The lessons include (1) developing a coverage measurement methodology that is both technically and operationally feasible, (2) determining the level of geography at which coverage measurement is intended, (3) keeping stakeholders, particularly Congress, informed of the Bureau’s plans, and (4) adequately testing the eventual coverage measurement program. According to Bureau officials, an important result of the A.C.E. Contractor Costs Are Not Complete From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2001, the Bureau obligated about $207 million for I.C.M./A.C.E. As shown in table 2, of that $207 million, we identified about $22.3 million (11 percent) in obligated amounts for contracts involving more than 170 vendors. Therefore, the Bureau considered contractor costs from earlier years as part of its general research and development programs, and the Bureau did not assign unique project codes to identify I.C.M./A.C.E. programs and related costs in its financial management system. special test, the Bureau did not consider these costs as part of the I.C.M./A.C.E. evaluations, and did not have a separate code identifying A.C.E. Second, it would be important to set up project codes to capture coverage measurement activities as early in the planning process as possible. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure that any future coverage measurement efforts achieve their intended objectives and costs can be properly tracked, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to in conjunction with Congress and other stakeholders, come to a decision soon on whether and how coverage measurement will be used in the 2010 Census; consider incorporating lessons learned from its coverage measurement experience during the 2000 Census, such as (1) demonstrating both the operational and technical feasibility of its coverage measurement methods, (2) determining the level of geography at which coverage can be reliably measured, (3) keeping Congress and other stakeholders informed of its plans, and (4) adequately testing coverage measurement prior to full implementation; and ensure that the Bureau’s financial management systems can capture and report program activities early in the decennial process and ensure that project costs are monitored for accuracy and completeness. Because the A.C.E.	Why GAO Did This Study To help measure the quality of the 2000 Census and to possibly adjust for any errors, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) conducted the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) program. However, after obligating around $207 million for A.C.E. and its predecessor program, Integrated Coverage Measurement (I.C.M.), from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, the Bureau did not use either program to adjust the census numbers. Concerned about the amount of money the Bureau spent on I.C.M. and A.C.E. programs and what was produced in return, the subcommittee asked us to review the objectives and results of the programs, the costs of consultants, and how best to track future coverage measurement activities. What GAO Found The two programs the Bureau employed to measure the quality of the 2000 Census population data did not meet their objectives. The A.C.E. program achieved results other than those laid out in the Bureau's formal objectives that highlight important lessons learned. They include (1) developing a coverage measurement methodology that is both operationally and technically feasible, (2) determining the level of geography at which coverage measurement is intended, (3) keeping stakeholders, particularly Congress, informed of the Bureau's plans, and (4) adequately testing coverage measurement methodologies. It will be important for the Bureau to consider these as its current plans for the 2010 Census include coverage evaluation to measure the accuracy of the census but not necessarily to adjust the results. Of the roughly $207 million the Bureau obligated for I.C.M./A.C.E. programs from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, we identified about $22.3 million that was obligated for contracts involving over 170 vendors. We could not identify any obligations prior to 1996 in part because the Bureau included them with its general research and development efforts and did not assign the I.C.M./A.C.E. operations unique project codes in its financial management system. To track these costs in the future, it will be important for the Bureau to (1) have a financial management system that has specific project codes to capture coverage measurement costs, (2) establish the project codes as early in the planning process as possible, and (3) monitor the usage of the codes to ensure that they are properly charged.
gao_GAO-14-196T	gao_GAO-14-196T_0	Several Factors Are Important to Secure Maritime Borders and DHS Has Made Progress to Address Them, but Challenges Remain Our prior work has identified several key factors important to securing the maritime borders, which include (1) maintaining robust maritime domain awareness, (2) assessing risks coming from foreign ports, (3) leveraging international partnerships, (4) conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations, (5) coordinating with partners along the coast and in ports, and (6) measuring performance. Our prior work has also shown that DHS and its components have made progress, and in some cases experienced challenges, with their programs to address these factors. Maintaining Robust Maritime Domain Awareness To ensure the security of our maritime borders, it is critical that federal agencies maintain robust maritime domain awareness. To enhance maritime domain awareness, the Coast Guard works with its maritime partners to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of a wide array of information and intelligence to better secure the nation’s maritime transportation system against potential threats. For example, in July 2011, we reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a single, fully interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program system intended to enable the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. We recommended, and the Coast Guard concurred, that it take actions to address these challenges. DHS stated that it planned to take actions to address these recommendations, such as developing necessary acquisition documentation. Assessing Risks Coming from Foreign Ports The security of maritime borders also depends, in part, upon security at foreign ports where cargo and vessels bound for the United States may originate. CBP and the Coast Guard have developed models to assess the risks of cargo carried by these vessels, foreign ports, and foreign vessels entering U.S. ports. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported that by December 2014 it plans to develop a process for conducting periodic assessments of the supply chain security risks from all ports that ship cargo to the United States and use information from the assessments to determine if future expansion or adjustments to CSI locations are appropriate. While CBP is focused on the security of the cargo shipped to the United States from foreign ports, the Coast Guard is focused on the security of ports and the vessels arriving in the United States. Conducting Maritime Surveillance, Interdiction, and Security Operations along the Coast and in Ports Along the coast and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations are conducted to ensure the security of maritime borders. For example, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine provides maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. Further, our analysis of the Office of Air and Marine’s fiscal year 2010 performance results indicate that they did not meet its national performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high priority based on threats. We made recommendations to help ensure that the Office of Air and Marine’s assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address threats, and to help DHS better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. DHS concurred with these recommendations, and described actions it was taking, or planned to take to address them, including making strategic and technological changes in its assessment of the mix and placement of its resources by the end of March 2014. The following are some of the performance measurement challenges we have reported on: Lack of reliable and accurate data: DHS and its component agencies have experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data. For example, in January 2011, we reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably between the two component agencies and between the agencies’ field and headquarters units. DHS concurred and has made progress in addressing the recommendation. The Coast Guard agreed and has reported taking actions to address the recommendation. We made separate but related recommendations in July 2003, March 2005, and April 2008 that CBP develop outcome- based performance measures for this program.	Why GAO Did This Study Maritime borders are gateways to our nation's maritime transportation system of ports, waterways, and vessels--which handle billions of dollars of cargo annually. An attack on this system could have dire consequences and affect the global economy. In addition, criminals could use small vessels to smuggle narcotics, aliens, and other contraband across U.S. maritime borders. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for many homeland security efforts in the maritime domain, including conducting port facility and commercial vessel inspections and coordinating maritime information-sharing efforts, among other things. In addition, CBP is responsible for screening incoming vessels' crews and cargo to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and passengers. This testimony identifies key factors important to secure the maritime borders, and discusses progress and challenges in related DHS programs. This statement is based on products GAO issued from July 2003 through October 2013. What GAO Found GAO's prior work has identified several key factors important to secure the maritime borders. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components have made progress (e.g., coordinating with partners), and in some cases also experienced challenges with their related maritime security programs. Maintaining robust maritime domain awareness. It is critical that federal agencies maintain maritime domain awareness--the understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard has developed systems--including information-sharing and vessel-tracking systems--to enhance maritime domain awareness. GAO's prior work has found that the Coast Guard has made progress in developing its systems, but that it also experienced some challenges. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a system intended to enable the sharing of information among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. GAO recommended that the agency take actions to address this challenge. DHS concurred and stated it planned to take actions. Assessing risks coming from foreign ports . The security of maritime borders also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargo bound for the United States originates. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Coast Guard have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports, foreign vessels entering U.S. ports, and the cargo carried by these vessels from these ports. In September 2013, GAO found that CBP has taken steps to enhance the security of U.S.-bound cargo, but CBP does not periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States. GAO recommended that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from these ports. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation and reported that it planned to take actions to address it. Conducting maritime surveillance, interdiction, and security operations . Along the coasts and in ports, maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operations are conducted to ensure the security of the maritime borders. For example, CBP's Office of Air and Marine is to provide maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities. In March 2012, GAO found that the office did not meet its national performance goal and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high priority. GAO made recommendations to help ensure that the office's assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address threats, among other things. DHS concurred and reported that it planned to take action to address the recommendations by the end of March 2014. Measuring performance. In securing our maritime borders, DHS and its component agencies have faced challenges in developing meaningful performance measures . For example, GAO's prior work found that they have experienced challenges collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data; among other things. In January 2011, GAO reported that both CBP and the Coast Guard tracked the frequency of illegal seafarer incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably between the two component agencies and between the agencies' field and headquarters units. GAO made a recommendation to improve the accuracy of DHS data, and DHS concurred and has made progress in addressing the recommendation. What GAO Recommends GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports to strengthen its maritime security programs. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions under way, to address them.
gao_GAO-09-805T	gao_GAO-09-805T_0	Highlights of Major Issues Related to the U.S. Government’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2007 As has been the case for the previous 11 fiscal years, the federal government did not maintain adequate systems or have sufficient, reliable evidence to support certain material information reported in the U.S. government’s accrual basis consolidated financial statements. In summary, the material weaknesses that contributed to our disclaimer of opinion on the accrual basis consolidated financial statements were the federal government’s inability to: satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the DOD, were properly reported in the accrual basis consolidated financial statements; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain agencies; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances ensure that the federal government’s accrual basis consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); and identify and either resolve or explain material differences that exist between certain components of the budget deficit reported in Treasury’s records, which are used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and related amounts reported in federal agencies’ financial statements and underlying financial information and records. In addition to the material weaknesses that contributed to our disclaimer of opinion, which are discussed above, we found three other material weaknesses in internal control as of September 30, 2008. Addressing Major Impediments to an Opinion on the Accrual Basis Consolidated Financial Statements Three major impediments to our ability to render an opinion on the U.S. government’s accrual basis consolidated financial statements continued to be: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. A-127, Financial Management Systems, which redefines federal financial management systems requirements. Such challenges will require utmost attention to ensure (1) that sufficient internal controls and transparency are established and maintained for all stabilization and recovery initiatives; (2) that all related financial transactions are reported on time, accurately, and completely; and (3) these initiatives are effectively and efficiently financed. While policymakers have been understandably focused on dealing with these financial market and economic growth challenges, attention also needs to be given to the long- term challenges of addressing the federal government’s large and growing structural deficits and debt. Accounting and financial reporting standards have continued to evolve to provide greater transparency and accountability over the federal government’s operations, financial condition, and fiscal outlook. However, it is appropriate to consider the need for further revisions to the current federal financial reporting model, which could affect both consolidated and agency reporting. While the current reporting model recognizes some of the unique needs of the federal government, a broad reconsideration of the federal financial reporting model could address the following types of questions: Do traditional financial statements convey information transparently? What kind of information is most relevant and useful for a sovereign nation? Ultimately, the goal of such a reevaluation would be reporting enhancements that can help the Congress deliberate on strategies to address the federal government’s challenges, including its long-term fiscal challenge. However, the federal government still has a long way to go before realizing strong federal financial management. The nature and magnitude of actions the federal government has taken to stabilize the financial markets and promote economic recovery have created new challenges involving accountability, financial reporting, and debt management. Given the federal government’s current financial condition and the nation’s serious long-term fiscal challenge, the need for the Congress and federal policymakers and management to have reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information is greater than ever. Sound decisions on the current and future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are more difficult without such information.	Why GAO Did This Study GAO annually audits the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS). The Congress and the President need reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information to make sound decisions and conduct effective oversight of federal government programs and policies. Except for the 2008 and 2007 Statements of Social Insurance, GAO has been unable to provide assurance on the reliability of the CFS due primarily to inadequate systems and lack of sufficient, reliable evidence to support certain material information in the CFS. Unless these weaknesses are adequately addressed, they will, among other things, (1) hamper the federal government's ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; and (2) affect the federal government's ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities. This testimony presents the results of GAO's audit of the CFS for fiscal year 2008 and discusses federal financial management challenges and the long-term fiscal outloo What GAO Found For the second consecutive year, GAO rendered an unqualified opinion on the Statement of Social Insurance; however, three major impediments continued to prevent GAO from rendering an opinion on the federal government's accrual basis consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal agencies, and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. In addition, as of September 30, 2008, the federal government did not maintain effective internal controls over financial reporting and compliance with significant laws and regulations due to numerous material weaknesses. Moreover, financial management system problems continue to hinder federal agency accountability. The federal government still has a long way to go, but over the years, progress has been made in improving federal financial management. For example, audit results for many federal agencies have improved; federal financial system requirements have been developed; and accounting and reporting standards have continued to evolve to provide greater transparency and accountability over the federal government's operations, financial condition, and fiscal outlook. In addition, the federal government issued a summary financial report which is intended to make the information in the Financial Report of the U.S. Government more understandable and accessible to a broader audience. The federal government's response to the financial markets crisis and economic downturn has created new federal accountability, financial reporting, and debt management challenges. Such challenges will require utmost attention to ensure (1) that sufficient internal controls and transparency are established and maintained for all market stabilization and economic recovery initiatives; (2) that all related financial transactions are reported on time, accurately, and completely; and (3) these initiatives are effectively and efficiently financed. Moreover, while policymakers are currently understandably focused on efforts directed toward market stabilization and economic growth, once stability in financial markets and the economic downturn are addressed, attention will have to be turned with the same level of intensity to the serious longer-term challenges of addressing the federal government's large and growing structural deficits and debt. Finally, the federal government should consider the need for further revisions to the current federal financial reporting model to recognize its unique needs. A broad reconsideration of issues, such as the kind of information that may be relevant and useful for a sovereign nation, could lead to reporting enhancements that might help provide the Congress and the President with more useful financial information to deliberate and monitor strategies to address the nation's long-term fiscal challenges.
gao_GAO-02-160T	gao_GAO-02-160T_0	The Nature of the Threat Facing the United States The United States and other nations face increasingly diffuse threats in the post-Cold War era. The December 2000 national security strategy states that porous borders, rapid technological change, greater information flow, and the destructive power of weapons now within the reach of small states, groups, and individuals make such threats more viable and endanger our values, way of life, and the personal security of our citizens. Hostile nations, terrorist groups, transnational criminals, and individuals may target American people, institutions, and infrastructure with cyber attacks, weapons of mass destruction, or bioterrorism. Although this was a good first step, a number of important questions related to institutionalizing and sustaining the effort over the long term remain, including: What will be included in the definition of homeland security? This effort coordinated all federal, state, and local activities, and established public-private partnerships. In addressing these issues, we will also need to keep in mind that our homeland security priorities will have to be accomplished against the backdrop of the long-term fiscal challenges that loom just over the 10-year budget window. The summaries describe recommendations made before the President established the Office of Homeland Security. Public Health The spread of infectious diseases is a growing concern. 11, 1999).	What GAO Found The United States now confronts a range of diffuse threats that put increased destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals. These threats include terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure and computer systems, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of infectious diseases. Addressing these challenges will require leadership to develop and implement a homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant partners, and to marshal and direct the necessary resources. The recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security is a good first step, but questions remain about how this office will be structured, what authority its Director will have, and how this effort can be institutionalized and sustained over time. Although homeland security is an urgent and vital national priority, the United States still must address short-term and long-term fiscal challenges that were present before September 11.
gao_RCED-96-190	gao_RCED-96-190_0	This is because (1) PTO’s pendency computation method considers both issued patents and abandoned applications but does not consider applications still in-process; (2) pendency can vary widely for individual applications, depending on the type of invention and factors such as whether the application is subject to a secrecy order; (3) pendency is higher when the filing date used is that of the original, rather than the most recent, application for the particular invention; and (4) the applicants themselves are partly responsible for the time taken to examine applications. PTO’s Calculation of Pendency Considers Abandoned Applications but Not Applications In-Process Pendency is an important factor in any consideration of the patent examination process because it provides (1) the inventor with an estimate of how long PTO is likely to take to issue a patent, (2) PTO with information on how it is managing its workload, and (3) decisionmakers such as the Congress and the administration with a method to measure results. Overall, the average pendency for foreign applications—which accounted for 36.8 percent of all patents issued or applications abandoned—was 20.9 months, compared with 20.2 months for all applications. In fiscal year 1995, PTO committed about three-fourths of its funding and staff to the patent process. Table III.2 compares the full-time equivalent (FTE) staff assigned to the patent process, the trademark process, executive direction and administration, and information dissemination over the same 10-year period. Overall, PTO’s published reports indicate that the agency reduced pendency by 2.9 months from fiscal year 1986 through fiscal 1995. Rather, the applicant must make a separate request for examination, which may come at any time up to 7 years after the application is filed. PTO’s funding and staffing have increased in recent years, and PTO has consistently committed the majority of these resources to the patent process. Also, there appear to be differences in the methods for computing and reporting pendency. These issues include an analysis of patent pendency; a comparative summary of recent resource allocations within PTO, particularly in regard to the patent process; and a comparison of patent examination processes and pendency between PTO and the patent offices in Japan and Europe. We did not independently verify the statistics. 5. 6.	Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO) operations, focusing on: (1) patent pendency; (2) PTO allocation of resources among its patent and trademark processes, dissemination of information, and executive direction and administration; and (3) a comparison of PTO workload and examination processes with those of other industrialized nations. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) PTO computation and reporting of patent pendency is inadequate; (2) PTO does not provide separate statistics on patents issued, abandoned applications, or applications still in process in its pendency calculations; (3) PTO does not report variations in pendency among individual applications or measure pendency from the original filing date in accordance with patent law; (4) PTO does not determine how much of pendency is due to the patent examination process or applicant delays; (5) applicant delays may constitute as much as 36 percent of the average pendency period; (6) PTO has consistently committed most of its resources to its patent process, which in fiscal year (FY) 1995 constituted three-quarters of its funds and staff; (7) funding and staffing for the trademark process, executive direction and administration, and information dissemination also increased from FY 1986 through FY 1995; (8) during the same period, the PTO patent workload increased significantly while average pendency decreased by about 2.9 months; (9) it is difficult to compare the PTO patent examination process and pendency with those of Japan and Europe, which are the other two primary patent-granting entities; (10) Japan and Europe require an additional request for examination before starting the examination process, which may delay examination for months or years after an applicant's initial filing; and (11) Japan and Europe include applications in-process in their pendency computations.
gao_GAO-04-926T	gao_GAO-04-926T_0	In the United States, the Congress and FCC provided television stations with additional spectrum to transmit both an analog and digital signal, and set a deadline for the shutoff of the analog signal at the end of 2006, or when 85 percent of households can receive the digital signal, whichever is later. German Television Market Is Characterized by Central Role of Public Broadcasting and Is Regulated Largely at the State Level We were told that regulation of the German television market is primarily the responsibility of state government, with the federal government exercising only limited authority to regulate this market. Although terrestrial broadcasting was once the only means by which German households received television program signals, today only 5 to 7 percent of these households rely on terrestrial broadcasting, with the remainder using cable or satellite service for the reception of television signals. In the context of the DTV transition, the Ministry led the effort in Germany to develop and recommend a strategy for the transition from analog to digital radio and television broadcasting. We were told that this amounts to about 6 billion Euro ($7.38 billion) annually. Typical cable systems in Germany were constructed for the provision of analog service, provide about 30 to 33 channels of analog programming, and cost subscribers less than 15 Euro ($18.45) per month. Berlin Officials and Industry Participants Engaged in Extensive Planning for the Rapid DTV Transition in the Berlin Test Market In Germany, government officials and industry participants are implementing the DTV transition to improve the viability of terrestrial television in the face of a low and declining share of households that rely solely on terrestrial television. Several elements of the DTV transition will apply throughout Germany, including an island based approach, where the DTV transition will occur separately in different metropolitan areas, and the adoption of standard-definition digital television. In Berlin, extensive planning facilitated the rapid DTV transition. Important elements of the Berlin DTV transition included a short simulcast period, financial and nonfinancial support provided to private broadcasters, subsidies provided to eligible low-income households for set-top boxes, and an extensive consumer education effort. We were told that Germany adopted this approach because the DTV transition could not be achieved throughout the entire country simultaneously; officials thought that a nationwide DTV transition would be too big to manage at one time. Finally, German officials did not plan for the return of spectrum following the DTV transition. mabb and Industry Participants Engaged in Extensive Planning for the Berlin DTV Transition mabb, the Media Authority that regulates radio and television in the states of Berlin and Brandenburg, made several key decisions about how the DTV transition would occur in the area under its authority. mabb and industry participants implemented the DTV transition in the Berlin area with a short simulcast period. German federal officials and other Media Authorities are generally encouraged by the success of the short simulcast period in Berlin. Public broadcasters were able to finance their transition costs through the radio and television license fee they receive. Because the DTV transition only affected households relying solely on terrestrial television, the consumer education effort focused on means that would target only these households, and not households subscribing to cable and satellite service. Need for Set-Top Box Deployment Is Key Challenge in Germany and in the United States Based on our examination of the DTV transition in Berlin and other areas of Germany, it is clear that the manner in which DTV is to be rolled out is considerably different than in the United States. Nevertheless, we found that much of the focus in Berlin leading up to and during the simulcast period was on making sure that consumers who receive television solely through terrestrial means obtain the necessary set-top boxes so that they would be able to view DTV signals once the analog signals were turned off. To summarize my statement, Mr. Chairman, although the context of the transition differs considerably in Germany as compared with the United States, there may be interesting and helpful lessons for the Congress and FCC from the DTV transition in Berlin and other areas of Germany.	Why GAO Did This Study In Berlin, Germany, the transition from analog to digital television (DTV), the DTV transition, culminated in the shutoff of analog television signals in August 2003. As GAO previously reported, the December 2006 deadline for the culmination of the DTV transition in the United States seems unlikely to be met. Failure to meet this deadline will delay the return of valuable spectrum for public safety and other commercial purposes. Thus, the rapid completion of the DTV transition in Berlin has sparked interest among policymakers and industry participants in the United States. At the request of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, GAO examined (1) the structure and regulation of the German television market, (2) how the Berlin DTV transition was achieved, and (3) whether there are critical components of how the DTV transition was achieved in Berlin and other areas of Germany that have relevance to the ongoing DTV transition in the United States. What GAO Found The German television market is characterized by a central role of public broadcasting and is regulated largely at the state level. Although the federal government establishes general objectives for the telecommunications sector and manages allocations of the German radiofrequency spectrum, 15 media authorities organize and regulate broadcasting services within their areas of authority. The two public broadcasters are largely financed through a mandatory radio and television license fee of 16 Euro ($19.68) per household, per month, or about 6 billion Euro ($7.38 billion) in aggregate per year. Today, only 5 to 7 percent of German households rely on terrestrial television. Most households receive television through cable service, which typically costs less than 15 Euro ($18.45) per month, or satellite service, which is free once the household installs the necessary satellite equipment. Berlin officials and industry participants engaged in extensive planning for the rapid DTV transition in the Berlin test market. In Germany, government officials and industry participants are implementing the DTV transition largely for the purpose of improving the viability of terrestrial television; officials do not expect to recapture radio spectrum after the transition. Several elements of the DTV transition apply throughout Germany. For example, Germany is implementing the transition within specified "islands," which are typically larger metropolitan areas, because officials thought that a nationwide DTV transition would be too big to manage at one time. Also, the German DTV transition focuses exclusively on terrestrial television, not cable and satellite television. The Media Authority in Berlin specified other components of the DTV transition for the Berlin area, including a short (10 month) simulcast period, financial and nonfinancial support provided to private broadcasters, subsidies provided to low-income households, and an extensive consumer education effort. Certain aspects of the DTV transition in Berlin and other regions of Germany are relevant to the ongoing transition in the United States because, even though the television market and the transition are structured differently in the two countries, government officials face similar key challenges. We found that much of the focus of government officials leading up to and during the brief simulcast in Berlin was on ensuring households who rely on terrestrial television received the necessary consumer equipment. In the United States, most television stations are providing a digital signal--that is, the United States is in the simulcast phase. Thus, the challenge facing the Congress and the Federal Communications Commission, as was the case in Berlin, is encouraging households to purchase set-top boxes or digital televisions. The key components of the Berlin DTV transition that enabled the rapid deployment of set-top boxes included (1) implementing an extensive consumer education effort; (2) providing subsidies to low-income households for set-top boxes; and (3) setting a relatively near-term, date certain that all stakeholders understood would be the shutoff date for analog television.
gao_GAO-17-100	gao_GAO-17-100_0	At the same time, some launch companies are developing hybrid launch systems, which contain elements of both aircraft and rocket-powered vehicles. FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety (AVS) oversees civil aviation activities in the United States. Stakeholders Identified Potential Uses for Space Support Vehicles, but the Size of the Market Is Unclear Industry Stakeholders Discussed Uses for Space Support Vehicles— Spaceflight Participant Training and Research Spaceflight Participant Training Stakeholders identified spaceflight participant training as one potential use for space support vehicles. Stakeholders explained that factors that can be simulated in high performance jets but not through other means include the stress of a confined environment and exposure to the physiological and psychological effects of spaceflight. See figure 2 for examples of space support vehicles, including high- performance jets (on left) and the modified Boeing 727 (on right). Microgravity research uses reduced gravity to understand how objects or people will react in reduced gravity environments (such as orbit). Data on the Size of the Space Support Market Is Virtually Non Existent Spaceflight Participant Training It is difficult to determine the size of the market for the use of space support vehicles for training because we have found no publicly available studies on the size of the spaceflight participant training market, and companies we interviewed told us they have not conducted their own market analysis. FAA’s Current Statutory and Regulatory Framework Limits Market Development FAA’s Standard Aircraft Certification Process Is Intended to Ensure Passenger Safety; However, Companies Said They Face Challenges Because the Process is Lengthy and Costly Two of the companies that we interviewed obtained standard aircraft certification from FAA for aircraft that could be classified as space support vehicles. In addition, FAA’s standard aircraft-certification process is not well suited for the types of aircraft that space support companies would like to use. The process is not designed for single-production aircraft like those launch companies are developing or retired military jets that companies would like to use for spaceflight participant training. Companies Are Prohibited from Receiving Compensation under Experimental Certificates AVS allows certain aircraft to fly under an experimental certificate, but companies are prohibited from operating these aircraft for carrying persons or property for compensation and hire—meaning companies cannot receive money for carrying passengers or cargo. In addition, some of the companies we interviewed have training operations in other countries because they are not allowed to operate specific aircraft in the United States under current laws and regulations. When issuing experimental permits, AST’s process focuses on minimizing risks to ensure the safety of third parties. Stakeholders Have Mixed Views on the Appropriate Approach for Regulating Space Support Vehicles; FAA Has Taken Some Steps to Assess Its Regulatory Framework Some Options for Regulating Space Support Vehicles Would Require Statutory or Regulatory Changes Through our discussions with FAA and interviews with stakeholders, we identified potential options for regulating space support vehicles (see table 1). Further, the Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) has been discussing with its membership how space support vehicles should be regulated. FAA has taken steps to assess the licensing and permitting process for hybrid launch vehicles; however, it has not assessed whether space support vehicles are needed to meet the potential research, training, and other needs of the commercial space transportation industry, and if it should propose changes that would accommodate all aircraft that could be used as space support vehicles. FAA officials said that their views on non-launch and non-reentry operations of hybrid launch vehicles will be expressed in their report that was mandated under the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. While some companies are using certified aircraft to provide space support services such as spaceflight participant training, other companies would like to use vehicles such as retired military jets and hybrid launch vehicles to provide such services. FAA’s current regulatory framework applies to aircraft; however, the aircraft that some companies would like to use to provide space support services do not fit into this framework. Since FAA has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of how space support activities fit under its aviation or commercial space transportation regulatory regimes, officials from some U.S. companies told us they are delaying investments in space support vehicles. As a result, it is uncertain if companies will be able to use space support vehicles for potentially useful spaceflight participant training and research services to meet the future needs of the commercial space-transportation industry. Recommendation To respond to changes in the aviation and commercial space- transportation industries, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to fully examine and document whether the current regulatory framework is appropriate for aircraft that could be considered space support vehicles, and if not, suggest legislation or develop regulatory changes, or both, as applicable. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for review and comment.	Why GAO Did This Study As the commercial space transportation industry has grown significantly in the last decade, a related industry has emerged that plans to complement the commercial space industry by using vehicles called space support vehicles to conduct space-related activities, but not launch into space. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to review the uses for space support vehicles and services and any barriers to their use. This report addresses stakeholder views on (1) potential uses for space support vehicles, (2) challenges that companies may face when attempting to use these vehicles, and (3) how these vehicles should be regulated. GAO reviewed prior GAO and industry reports, relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed officials on two proposals for regulating space support vehicles. GAO interviewed officials at FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 37 legal experts and stakeholders from industry organizations, launch companies, space support companies, and spaceports—identified by agency and industry officials. What GAO Found Company officials GAO interviewed identified potential uses for “space support vehicles”—which include a variety of aircraft from high-performance jets to balloons and the aircraft portion of a hybrid launch systems (a vehicle that contains elements of both an aircraft and a rocket-powered launch vehicle)—but the size of the market for these uses is unclear. Company officials said they plan to use space support vehicles to train spaceflight participants and to conduct research in reduced gravity environments. For example, some company officials said they would like to use high-performance jets to train future spaceflight participants by exposing them to physiological and psychological effects encountered in spaceflight. Other company officials said they would like to use space support vehicles to research how objects or people react in reduced gravity environments. It is difficult to know the size of the market for spaceflight training and research as GAO found no studies on these markets. However, stakeholders said they expect interest in research to increase. Some company officials said the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) regulatory framework presents a market challenge because companies cannot get FAA approval to use the aircraft they would like to use to carry passengers or cargo for compensation, thus limiting their ability to operate in the market. FAA's Office of Aviation Safety (AVS) regulates aircraft that companies would like to use as space support vehicles by issuing standard and experimental certificates that help ensure safety. While officials from two companies GAO interviewed have received standard aircraft certification for their space support vehicle, others said the standard certification process is lengthy and not designed for the type of vehicles they would like to use, such as unique, single-production aircraft or retired military jets. In addition, FAA regulations do not allow companies to receive compensation for carrying people or property on an aircraft operating under an experimental certificate. As a result, some of the companies we interviewed have training operations in other countries where they can receive payment for the activity. Further, FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST)—the office that regulates commercial space activities—is only authorized to regulate commercial space activities, such as launches, focusing on the safety of third parties. According to FAA officials, a statutory or regulatory change would be needed to allow companies to use space support vehicles that do not meet AVS's standard certification requirements for compensation. Stakeholders GAO interviewed have mixed views on how FAA should regulate space support vehicles; some companies believe the current regulatory approach is appropriate, while others believe the system should be changed in the face of new technology and commercial space development. While FAA has taken steps to assess the licensing and permitting process for hybrid launch vehicles, it has not assessed whether space support vehicles are needed and if it should propose changes that would accommodate all aircraft that could be used as space support vehicles. Thus, some U.S. company officials said they are delaying investments in space support vehicles, and therefore, it is uncertain if they will be able to use them to meet the future needs of the commercial space transportation industry. What GAO Recommends The Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) should direct the FAA Administrator to fully examine and document whether the FAA's current regulatory framework is appropriate for space support vehicles and, if not, suggest legislative or regulatory changes, or both, as applicable. DOT provided technical comments; however, it did not comment on the recommendation at this time.
gao_GAO-09-625	gao_GAO-09-625_0	DOD depends on the charter passenger industry to move more than 90 percent of its peacetime requirements, as well as all contingency surges. While the charter passenger capability has, historically, satisfied DOD’s requirements, there has been a 60 percent decline in this capability since 2003 due mainly to a declining demand for charter airlines in the commercial sector. Figure I shows this decline in CRAF participants’ charter passenger aircraft from a high of 66 aircraft in 2004 to 29 in 2008. Because there are no U.S. commercial cargo aircraft capable of moving outsized cargo such as MRAP vehicles into Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is using foreign-owned carriers to support such movements to supplement its military airlift capability. We found and DOD confirmed that in the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study, DOD planned for U.S. commercial cargo carriers participating in the CRAF program to move only bulk cargo, and did not identify a need for these carriers to move outsized cargo; however, without some supplemental capability—such as the use of foreign-owned carriers—the need for DOD to move outsized cargo into areas of crisis, and have that cargo arrive in a timely manner, could limit DOD’s ability to meet future airlift requirements. DOD Is Not Fully Aware of How Changes in Its Charter Passenger Airlift Capabilities and DOD’s Outsized Cargo Needs Affected CRAF Because It Has Not Conducted Risk Assessments DOD is not fully aware of the extent to which these changes may have affected the CRAF program’s ability to meet DOD’s future transportation requirements because DOD has not conducted risk assessments as described in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. The study also did not quantify the risk associated with the passenger charter capability decline that has already occurred. DOD Has Not Issued Policies That Would Strengthen Management of the CRAF Program DOD’s management of the CRAF program has not provided CRAF air carrier participants with a clear understanding of some critical areas of the program, which could strengthen the program’s effectiveness and the ability to support its objectives. DOD Has Not Developed Policies Related to Four CRAF Program Objectives DOD Has Not Developed Policy Concerning 60/40 Rule Enforcement DOD has not developed policy regarding the enforcement of its business rules, such as the 60/40 rule, that would help strengthen the CRAF mobilization base. Carriers that earn more than 40 percent of their revenue from DOD may be penalized by reductions in their entitlement to DOD business. Without policy that clearly states the guidelines and objectives of the 60/40 rule, CRAF carriers may not be able to properly size their fleets to meet DOD demands, and have the capacity for DOD to draw on to meet demands, which may decrease the mobilization base of the CRAF program. DOD Has Not Developed Policy Concerning CRAF Fleet Modernization DOD has not developed policies that promote CRAF fleet modernization, although DOD officials have recognized the need for a more modern CRAF fleet. Until risk assessments are conducted and actions are taken to mitigate any risks that are identified, DOD and industry decision makers will not be fully informed about risks in the CRAF charter passenger segment and in outsized cargo capability that could prevent CRAF from meeting DOD’s airlift requirements. Until DOD develops policies that provide commercial air carriers with a clear understanding of critical aspects of the CRAF program, such as enforcement of business rules (such as the 60/40 rule), specific modernization guidelines, distribution of peacetime business, and a framework for communication, thus strengthening its management of the program, DOD cannot provide reasonable assurance that the CRAF program will meet its primary objective of providing critical airlift to support DOD operations. Second, to strengthen the effectiveness of the critical partnership between DOD and the U.S. commercial air carrier industry and the management of the CRAF program to achieve its objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Transportation Policy) to develop policy that establishes enforcement guidelines for the basic CRAF business rules, to include intent, objectives, and measures of effectiveness mechanisms; establishes incentives, objectives and measures of effectiveness required to ensure modernization of the CRAF fleets; establishes and describes oversight mechanisms by which DOD will monitor how peacetime airlift business is distributed to ensure that its CRAF incentive program is working as intended; and establishes and describes the mechanisms by which DOD includes CRAF participants to provide comments on pending program decisions and in information sharing, and that includes objectives and measures of effectiveness of these activities. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Study Report, Council for Logistics Research, July 13, 2008. Related GAO Products MRAP Rapid Acquisition: Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles.	Why GAO Did This Study To move passengers and cargo, the Department of Defense (DOD) must supplement its military aircraft with cargo and passenger aircraft from commercial carriers participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Carriers participating in CRAF commit their aircraft to DOD to support a range of military operations. In the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required DOD to sponsor an assessment of CRAF and required GAO to review that assessment. GAO briefed congressional staff on its observations. As discussed with the staff, GAO further analyzed some of the issues identified in its review. This report assesses (1) the extent to which DOD has assessed potential risks to the CRAF program, and (2) the extent to which DOD's management of CRAF supports program objectives. For this engagement, GAO reviewed DOD-sponsored CRAF study reports and interviewed study leadership. GAO also interviewed over 20 of 35 CRAF participating carriers that responded to a request for a meeting, DOD officials, and industry officials. What GAO Found DOD needs to establish the level of risk associated with declining charter passenger capabilities and DOD's increased need to move very large cargo. Although DOD depends on CRAF charter passenger aircraft to move more than 90 percent of its peacetime needs, there has been nearly a 55 percent decline in this CRAF capacity since 2003. In addition, since 2003, DOD's large cargo movement needs have increased with the acquisition of over 15,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Since there are no U.S. commercial cargo aircraft capable of moving cargo this size into Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is using foreign-owned carriers to assist its military aircraft in such movements. However, there are scenarios where foreign-owned carriers may be unwilling or not allowed to fly. As a result, the lack of a commercial U.S. outsized cargo capability might restrict DOD's ability to meet its large cargo airlift needs in a timely manner. DOD has not quantified the risks these challenges pose to the CRAF program's ability to meet DOD's future transportation requirements because DOD has not completed risk assessments as described in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Until risk assessments are conducted, DOD will not be sufficiently informed about potential risks in the CRAF charter passenger segment and in very large cargo airlift capability that could prevent DOD from managing its future airlift needs and the CRAF program effectively. DOD's management of CRAF has not provided CRAF participants with a clear understanding, which could strengthen the program's ability to support its objectives, in some critical areas of the program. Although internal controls such as policies can help meet program objectives, CRAF business partners do not have a clear understanding of DOD's expectations concerning four CRAF objectives--an enhanced mobilization base, modernization, increased air carrier participation, and communication--because DOD has not developed policies in these four areas. First, DOD has not developed policies regarding the enforcement of its business rules, such as the 60/40 rule that states that participants should fly only 40 percent of their total business for DOD. DOD does not consistently enforce this rule and this may decrease the mobilization base since it is difficult for carriers to size their fleets to meet DOD demands. Second, DOD has not developed policies or economic incentives that promote CRAF modernization and this may hinder CRAF carriers from modernizing their aircraft. Third, DOD has not developed policies regarding oversight of the distribution of its peacetime airlift business, the primary incentive to carriers for participating in CRAF. DOD has no involvement in this distribution, and the perceptions of some carriers that this process is unfair could ultimately reduce carrier participation in CRAF. Fourth, DOD has not developed policy concerning communication with the carriers on CRAF studies or proposed changes to the CRAF program. DOD has not always communicated with carriers prior to implementing changes or completing studies. Until DOD develops policies that provide carriers with a clear understanding of CRAF, DOD cannot provide reasonable assurance that CRAF will meet its primary objective of providing critical airlift.

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