CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DragTargetDragEnter(
const DropData& drop_data,
const gfx::PointF& client_pt,
const gfx::PointF& screen_pt,
WebDragOperationsMask operations_allowed,
int key_modifiers) {
DragTargetDragEnterWithMetaData(DropDataToMetaData(drop_data), client_pt,
screen_pt, operations_allowed, key_modifiers);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DragTargetDragEnter(
const DropData& drop_data,
const gfx::PointF& client_pt,
const gfx::PointF& screen_pt,
WebDragOperationsMask operations_allowed,
int key_modifiers) {
DragTargetDragEnterWithMetaData(DropDataToMetaData(drop_data), client_pt,
screen_pt, operations_allowed, key_modifiers);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7376/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/51e0cb2e5ec18eaf6fb331bc573ff27b743898f4
|
51e0cb2e5ec18eaf6fb331bc573ff27b743898f4
|
DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
|
xmlParse3986PathNoScheme(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur;
int ret;
cur = *str;
ret = xmlParse3986Segment(&cur, ':', 0);
if (ret != 0) return(ret);
while (*cur == '/') {
cur++;
ret = xmlParse3986Segment(&cur, 0, 1);
if (ret != 0) return(ret);
}
if (uri != NULL) {
if (uri->path != NULL) xmlFree(uri->path);
if (cur != *str) {
if (uri->cleanup & 2)
uri->path = STRNDUP(*str, cur - *str);
else
uri->path = xmlURIUnescapeString(*str, cur - *str, NULL);
} else {
uri->path = NULL;
}
}
*str = cur;
return (0);
}
|
xmlParse3986PathNoScheme(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur;
int ret;
cur = *str;
ret = xmlParse3986Segment(&cur, ':', 0);
if (ret != 0) return(ret);
while (*cur == '/') {
cur++;
ret = xmlParse3986Segment(&cur, 0, 1);
if (ret != 0) return(ret);
}
if (uri != NULL) {
if (uri->path != NULL) xmlFree(uri->path);
if (cur != *str) {
if (uri->cleanup & 2)
uri->path = STRNDUP(*str, cur - *str);
else
uri->path = xmlURIUnescapeString(*str, cur - *str, NULL);
} else {
uri->path = NULL;
}
}
*str = cur;
return (0);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5779
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5779/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18c5c5dcef9cfccff64f0c23f920ef22822271a9
|
18c5c5dcef9cfccff64f0c23f920ef22822271a9
|
service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetAdditionalMappedFilesForChildProcess(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
int child_process_id,
PosixFileDescriptorInfo* mappings) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::MemoryMappedFile::Region region;
int fd = ui::GetMainAndroidPackFd(®ion);
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidUIResourcesPakDescriptor, fd, region);
fd = ui::GetCommonResourcesPackFd(®ion);
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidChrome100PercentPakDescriptor, fd, region);
fd = ui::GetLocalePackFd(®ion);
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidLocalePakDescriptor, fd, region);
fd = ui::GetSecondaryLocalePackFd(®ion);
if (fd != -1) {
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidSecondaryLocalePakDescriptor, fd, region);
}
crash_reporter::ChildExitObserver::GetInstance()->BrowserChildProcessStarted(
child_process_id, mappings);
base::FilePath app_data_path;
base::PathService::Get(base::DIR_ANDROID_APP_DATA, &app_data_path);
DCHECK(!app_data_path.empty());
#else
int crash_signal_fd = GetCrashSignalFD(command_line);
if (crash_signal_fd >= 0) {
mappings->Share(service_manager::kCrashDumpSignal, crash_signal_fd);
}
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetAdditionalMappedFilesForChildProcess(
const base::CommandLine& command_line,
int child_process_id,
PosixFileDescriptorInfo* mappings) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::MemoryMappedFile::Region region;
int fd = ui::GetMainAndroidPackFd(®ion);
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidUIResourcesPakDescriptor, fd, region);
fd = ui::GetCommonResourcesPackFd(®ion);
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidChrome100PercentPakDescriptor, fd, region);
fd = ui::GetLocalePackFd(®ion);
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidLocalePakDescriptor, fd, region);
fd = ui::GetSecondaryLocalePackFd(®ion);
if (fd != -1) {
mappings->ShareWithRegion(kAndroidSecondaryLocalePakDescriptor, fd, region);
}
crash_reporter::ChildExitObserver::GetInstance()->BrowserChildProcessStarted(
child_process_id, mappings);
base::FilePath app_data_path;
base::PathService::Get(base::DIR_ANDROID_APP_DATA, &app_data_path);
DCHECK(!app_data_path.empty());
#else
int crash_signal_fd = GetCrashSignalFD(command_line);
if (crash_signal_fd >= 0) {
mappings->Share(service_manager::kCrashDumpSignal, crash_signal_fd);
}
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14058
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14058/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/7ec414892ddcad88313848494b6fc5f437c9ca4a
|
7ec414892ddcad88313848494b6fc5f437c9ca4a
|
avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static void free_rendition_list(HLSContext *c)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->n_renditions; i++)
av_freep(&c->renditions[i]);
av_freep(&c->renditions);
c->n_renditions = 0;
}
|
static void free_rendition_list(HLSContext *c)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->n_renditions; i++)
av_freep(&c->renditions[i]);
av_freep(&c->renditions);
c->n_renditions = 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static int crc32_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
u32 *crcp = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32p(crcp);
return 0;
}
|
static int crc32_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
u32 *crcp = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32p(crcp);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5838/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
|
const GURL& ExecuteCodeInTabFunction::GetWebViewSrc() const {
return GURL::EmptyGURL();
}
|
const GURL& ExecuteCodeInTabFunction::GetWebViewSrc() const {
return GURL::EmptyGURL();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
delete_file_recursively (GFile *file,
GCancellable *cancellable,
DeleteCallback callback,
gpointer callback_data)
{
gboolean success;
g_autoptr (GError) error = NULL;
do
{
g_autoptr (GFileEnumerator) enumerator = NULL;
success = g_file_delete (file, cancellable, &error);
if (success ||
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_EMPTY))
{
break;
}
g_clear_error (&error);
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NONE,
cancellable, &error);
if (enumerator)
{
GFileInfo *info;
success = TRUE;
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
while (info != NULL)
{
g_autoptr (GFile) child = NULL;
child = g_file_enumerator_get_child (enumerator, info);
success = success && delete_file_recursively (child,
cancellable,
callback,
callback_data);
g_object_unref (info);
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
}
}
if (error != NULL)
{
success = FALSE;
}
}
while (success);
if (callback)
{
callback (file, error, callback_data);
}
return success;
}
|
delete_file_recursively (GFile *file,
GCancellable *cancellable,
DeleteCallback callback,
gpointer callback_data)
{
gboolean success;
g_autoptr (GError) error = NULL;
do
{
g_autoptr (GFileEnumerator) enumerator = NULL;
success = g_file_delete (file, cancellable, &error);
if (success ||
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_EMPTY))
{
break;
}
g_clear_error (&error);
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NONE,
cancellable, &error);
if (enumerator)
{
GFileInfo *info;
success = TRUE;
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
while (info != NULL)
{
g_autoptr (GFile) child = NULL;
child = g_file_enumerator_get_child (enumerator, info);
success = success && delete_file_recursively (child,
cancellable,
callback,
callback_data);
g_object_unref (info);
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
}
}
if (error != NULL)
{
success = FALSE;
}
}
while (success);
if (callback)
{
callback (file, error, callback_data);
}
return success;
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000524
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000524/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/fatcerberus/minisphere/commit/252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
|
person_new(const char* name, spriteset_t* spriteset, bool is_persistent, script_t* create_script)
{
point3_t origin = map_origin();
person_t* person;
if (++s_num_persons > s_max_persons) {
s_max_persons = s_num_persons * 2;
s_persons = realloc(s_persons, s_max_persons * sizeof(person_t*));
}
person = s_persons[s_num_persons - 1] = calloc(1, sizeof(person_t));
person->id = s_next_person_id++;
person->sprite = spriteset_ref(spriteset);
set_person_name(person, name);
person_set_pose(person, spriteset_pose_name(spriteset, 0));
person->is_persistent = is_persistent;
person->is_visible = true;
person->x = origin.x;
person->y = origin.y;
person->layer = origin.z;
person->speed_x = 1.0;
person->speed_y = 1.0;
person->anim_frames = spriteset_frame_delay(person->sprite, person->direction, 0);
person->mask = mk_color(255, 255, 255, 255);
person->scale_x = person->scale_y = 1.0;
person->scripts[PERSON_SCRIPT_ON_CREATE] = create_script;
person_activate(person, PERSON_SCRIPT_ON_CREATE, NULL, true);
sort_persons();
return person;
}
|
person_new(const char* name, spriteset_t* spriteset, bool is_persistent, script_t* create_script)
{
point3_t origin = map_origin();
person_t* person;
if (++s_num_persons > s_max_persons) {
s_max_persons = s_num_persons * 2;
s_persons = realloc(s_persons, s_max_persons * sizeof(person_t*));
}
person = s_persons[s_num_persons - 1] = calloc(1, sizeof(person_t));
person->id = s_next_person_id++;
person->sprite = spriteset_ref(spriteset);
set_person_name(person, name);
person_set_pose(person, spriteset_pose_name(spriteset, 0));
person->is_persistent = is_persistent;
person->is_visible = true;
person->x = origin.x;
person->y = origin.y;
person->layer = origin.z;
person->speed_x = 1.0;
person->speed_y = 1.0;
person->anim_frames = spriteset_frame_delay(person->sprite, person->direction, 0);
person->mask = mk_color(255, 255, 255, 255);
person->scale_x = person->scale_y = 1.0;
person->scripts[PERSON_SCRIPT_ON_CREATE] = create_script;
person_activate(person, PERSON_SCRIPT_ON_CREATE, NULL, true);
sort_persons();
return person;
}
|
C
|
minisphere
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20856
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20856/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
|
54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
|
block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
void blk_rq_init(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq)
{
memset(rq, 0, sizeof(*rq));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->queuelist);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->timeout_list);
rq->cpu = -1;
rq->q = q;
rq->__sector = (sector_t) -1;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&rq->hash);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rq->rb_node);
rq->tag = -1;
rq->internal_tag = -1;
rq->start_time_ns = ktime_get_ns();
rq->part = NULL;
}
|
void blk_rq_init(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq)
{
memset(rq, 0, sizeof(*rq));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->queuelist);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->timeout_list);
rq->cpu = -1;
rq->q = q;
rq->__sector = (sector_t) -1;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&rq->hash);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rq->rb_node);
rq->tag = -1;
rq->internal_tag = -1;
rq->start_time_ns = ktime_get_ns();
rq->part = NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16790/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mongodb/mongo-c-driver/commit/0d9a4d98bfdf4acd2c0138d4aaeb4e2e0934bd84
|
0d9a4d98bfdf4acd2c0138d4aaeb4e2e0934bd84
|
Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
|
test_bson_append_binary_deprecated (void)
{
const static uint8_t binary[] = {'1', '2', '3', '4'};
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_binary (
b, "binary", -1, BSON_SUBTYPE_BINARY_DEPRECATED, binary, 4));
b2 = get_bson ("binary_deprecated.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
|
test_bson_append_binary_deprecated (void)
{
const static uint8_t binary[] = {'1', '2', '3', '4'};
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_binary (
b, "binary", -1, BSON_SUBTYPE_BINARY_DEPRECATED, binary, 4));
b2 = get_bson ("binary_deprecated.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
|
C
|
mongo-c-driver
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2870/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44
|
ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44
|
Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int SocketStream::DoResolveProxy() {
DCHECK(context_);
DCHECK(!pac_request_);
next_state_ = STATE_RESOLVE_PROXY_COMPLETE;
if (!proxy_url_.is_valid()) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
return context_->proxy_service()->ResolveProxy(
proxy_url_, &proxy_info_, io_callback_, &pac_request_, net_log_);
}
|
int SocketStream::DoResolveProxy() {
DCHECK(context_);
DCHECK(!pac_request_);
next_state_ = STATE_RESOLVE_PROXY_COMPLETE;
if (!proxy_url_.is_valid()) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
return context_->proxy_service()->ResolveProxy(
proxy_url_, &proxy_info_, io_callback_, &pac_request_, net_log_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4160
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4160/
| null |
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9
|
91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9
|
Non happy-path fixes
|
cmsBool GrowMLUpool(cmsMLU* mlu)
{
cmsUInt32Number size;
void *NewPtr;
if (mlu == NULL) return FALSE;
if (mlu ->PoolSize == 0)
size = 256;
else
size = mlu ->PoolSize * 2;
if (size < mlu ->PoolSize) return FALSE;
NewPtr = _cmsRealloc(mlu ->ContextID, mlu ->MemPool, size);
if (NewPtr == NULL) return FALSE;
mlu ->MemPool = NewPtr;
mlu ->PoolSize = size;
return TRUE;
}
|
cmsBool GrowMLUpool(cmsMLU* mlu)
{
cmsUInt32Number size;
void *NewPtr;
if (mlu == NULL) return FALSE;
if (mlu ->PoolSize == 0)
size = 256;
else
size = mlu ->PoolSize * 2;
if (size < mlu ->PoolSize) return FALSE;
NewPtr = _cmsRealloc(mlu ->ContextID, mlu ->MemPool, size);
if (NewPtr == NULL) return FALSE;
mlu ->MemPool = NewPtr;
mlu ->PoolSize = size;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static u16 aux_setup(struct airo_info *ai, u16 page,
u16 offset, u16 *len)
{
u16 next;
OUT4500(ai, AUXPAGE, page);
OUT4500(ai, AUXOFF, 0);
next = IN4500(ai, AUXDATA);
*len = IN4500(ai, AUXDATA)&0xff;
if (offset != 4) OUT4500(ai, AUXOFF, offset);
return next;
}
|
static u16 aux_setup(struct airo_info *ai, u16 page,
u16 offset, u16 *len)
{
u16 next;
OUT4500(ai, AUXPAGE, page);
OUT4500(ai, AUXOFF, 0);
next = IN4500(ai, AUXDATA);
*len = IN4500(ai, AUXDATA)&0xff;
if (offset != 4) OUT4500(ai, AUXOFF, offset);
return next;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0143
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0143/
|
CWE-190
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b
|
8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b
| null |
int path_is_absolute(const char *path)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/* specific case for names like: "\\.\d:" */
if (is_windows_drive(path) || is_windows_drive_prefix(path)) {
return 1;
}
return (*path == '/' || *path == '\\');
#else
return (*path == '/');
#endif
}
|
int path_is_absolute(const char *path)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/* specific case for names like: "\\.\d:" */
if (is_windows_drive(path) || is_windows_drive_prefix(path)) {
return 1;
}
return (*path == '/' || *path == '\\');
#else
return (*path == '/');
#endif
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10966
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10966/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206384d291
|
5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206384d291
|
Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
|
void nicklist_set_host(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick, const char *host)
{
g_return_if_fail(channel != NULL);
g_return_if_fail(nick != NULL);
g_return_if_fail(host != NULL);
g_free_not_null(nick->host);
nick->host = g_strdup(host);
signal_emit("nicklist host changed", 2, channel, nick);
}
|
void nicklist_set_host(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick, const char *host)
{
g_return_if_fail(channel != NULL);
g_return_if_fail(nick != NULL);
g_return_if_fail(host != NULL);
g_free_not_null(nick->host);
nick->host = g_strdup(host);
signal_emit("nicklist host changed", 2, channel, nick);
}
|
C
|
irssi
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2007
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2007/
|
CWE-264
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=c689b4f1bac352dcfd6ecb9a1d45337de0f1de67
|
c689b4f1bac352dcfd6ecb9a1d45337de0f1de67
| null |
static void ga_enable_non_blacklisted(GList *blacklist)
{
char **list_head, **list;
list_head = list = qmp_get_command_list();
while (*list != NULL) {
if (g_list_find_custom(blacklist, *list, ga_strcmp) == NULL &&
!qmp_command_is_enabled(*list)) {
g_debug("enabling command: %s", *list);
qmp_enable_command(*list);
}
g_free(*list);
list++;
}
g_free(list_head);
}
|
static void ga_enable_non_blacklisted(GList *blacklist)
{
char **list_head, **list;
list_head = list = qmp_get_command_list();
while (*list != NULL) {
if (g_list_find_custom(blacklist, *list, ga_strcmp) == NULL &&
!qmp_command_is_enabled(*list)) {
g_debug("enabling command: %s", *list);
qmp_enable_command(*list);
}
g_free(*list);
list++;
}
g_free(list_head);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
static struct object_entry *find_object(unsigned char *sha1)
{
unsigned int h = sha1[0] << 8 | sha1[1];
struct object_entry *e;
for (e = object_table[h]; e; e = e->next)
if (!hashcmp(sha1, e->idx.sha1))
return e;
return NULL;
}
|
static struct object_entry *find_object(unsigned char *sha1)
{
unsigned int h = sha1[0] << 8 | sha1[1];
struct object_entry *e;
for (e = object_table[h]; e; e = e->next)
if (!hashcmp(sha1, e->idx.sha1))
return e;
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6621/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PepperCaretPositionChanged(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
if (instance != render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin())
return;
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateSelectionBounds();
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PepperCaretPositionChanged(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
if (instance != render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin())
return;
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateSelectionBounds();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7913
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7913/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18
|
8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18
|
[media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
|
static int load_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe, unsigned int type,
v4l2_std_id *id)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
int pos, rc;
unsigned char *p, *endp, buf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (priv->ctrl.max_len > sizeof(buf))
priv->ctrl.max_len = sizeof(buf);
tuner_dbg("%s called\n", __func__);
pos = seek_firmware(fe, type, id);
if (pos < 0)
return pos;
tuner_info("Loading firmware for type=");
dump_firm_type(priv->firm[pos].type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", priv->firm[pos].type,
(unsigned long long)*id);
p = priv->firm[pos].ptr;
endp = p + priv->firm[pos].size;
while (p < endp) {
__u16 size;
/* Checks if there's enough bytes to read */
if (p + sizeof(size) > endp) {
tuner_err("Firmware chunk size is wrong\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
size = le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *) p);
p += sizeof(size);
if (size == 0xffff)
return 0;
if (!size) {
/* Special callback command received */
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_TUNER_RESET, 0);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("Error at RESET code %d\n",
(*p) & 0x7f);
return -EINVAL;
}
continue;
}
if (size >= 0xff00) {
switch (size) {
case 0xff00:
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_RESET_CLK, 0);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("Error at RESET code %d\n",
(*p) & 0x7f);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
default:
tuner_info("Invalid RESET code %d\n",
size & 0x7f);
return -EINVAL;
}
continue;
}
/* Checks for a sleep command */
if (size & 0x8000) {
msleep(size & 0x7fff);
continue;
}
if ((size + p > endp)) {
tuner_err("missing bytes: need %d, have %d\n",
size, (int)(endp - p));
return -EINVAL;
}
buf[0] = *p;
p++;
size--;
/* Sends message chunks */
while (size > 0) {
int len = (size < priv->ctrl.max_len - 1) ?
size : priv->ctrl.max_len - 1;
memcpy(buf + 1, p, len);
rc = i2c_send(priv, buf, len + 1);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("%d returned from send\n", rc);
return -EINVAL;
}
p += len;
size -= len;
}
/* silently fail if the frontend doesn't support I2C flush */
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_I2C_FLUSH, 0);
if ((rc < 0) && (rc != -EINVAL)) {
tuner_err("error executing flush: %d\n", rc);
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int load_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe, unsigned int type,
v4l2_std_id *id)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
int pos, rc;
unsigned char *p, *endp, buf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (priv->ctrl.max_len > sizeof(buf))
priv->ctrl.max_len = sizeof(buf);
tuner_dbg("%s called\n", __func__);
pos = seek_firmware(fe, type, id);
if (pos < 0)
return pos;
tuner_info("Loading firmware for type=");
dump_firm_type(priv->firm[pos].type);
printk("(%x), id %016llx.\n", priv->firm[pos].type,
(unsigned long long)*id);
p = priv->firm[pos].ptr;
endp = p + priv->firm[pos].size;
while (p < endp) {
__u16 size;
/* Checks if there's enough bytes to read */
if (p + sizeof(size) > endp) {
tuner_err("Firmware chunk size is wrong\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
size = le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *) p);
p += sizeof(size);
if (size == 0xffff)
return 0;
if (!size) {
/* Special callback command received */
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_TUNER_RESET, 0);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("Error at RESET code %d\n",
(*p) & 0x7f);
return -EINVAL;
}
continue;
}
if (size >= 0xff00) {
switch (size) {
case 0xff00:
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_RESET_CLK, 0);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("Error at RESET code %d\n",
(*p) & 0x7f);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
default:
tuner_info("Invalid RESET code %d\n",
size & 0x7f);
return -EINVAL;
}
continue;
}
/* Checks for a sleep command */
if (size & 0x8000) {
msleep(size & 0x7fff);
continue;
}
if ((size + p > endp)) {
tuner_err("missing bytes: need %d, have %d\n",
size, (int)(endp - p));
return -EINVAL;
}
buf[0] = *p;
p++;
size--;
/* Sends message chunks */
while (size > 0) {
int len = (size < priv->ctrl.max_len - 1) ?
size : priv->ctrl.max_len - 1;
memcpy(buf + 1, p, len);
rc = i2c_send(priv, buf, len + 1);
if (rc < 0) {
tuner_err("%d returned from send\n", rc);
return -EINVAL;
}
p += len;
size -= len;
}
/* silently fail if the frontend doesn't support I2C flush */
rc = do_tuner_callback(fe, XC2028_I2C_FLUSH, 0);
if ((rc < 0) && (rc != -EINVAL)) {
tuner_err("error executing flush: %d\n", rc);
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4131/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
xdr_terminate_string(struct xdr_buf *buf, const u32 len)
{
char *kaddr;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[0], KM_USER0);
kaddr[buf->page_base + len] = '\0';
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
}
|
xdr_terminate_string(struct xdr_buf *buf, const u32 len)
{
char *kaddr;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[0], KM_USER0);
kaddr[buf->page_base + len] = '\0';
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7799/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/a7bb158b7bedd1449a34432feb3a67c8f1873bfa
|
a7bb158b7bedd1449a34432feb3a67c8f1873bfa
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280
|
MagickExport char *GetNextImageProfile(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->profiles == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
return((char *) GetNextKeyInSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->profiles));
}
|
MagickExport char *GetNextImageProfile(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->profiles == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
return((char *) GetNextKeyInSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->profiles));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2Implementation::Finish() {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
flush_id_ = GenerateNextFlushId();
FinishHelper();
}
|
void GLES2Implementation::Finish() {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
flush_id_ = GenerateNextFlushId();
FinishHelper();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3835/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer_l(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header, OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, intptr_t debugAddr) {
header->nFlags = flags;
header->nTimeStamp = timestamp;
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mInputBuffersWithCodec.add(header);
if ((flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) != 0) {
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 0 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(emptyBuffer, WITH_STATS(FULL_BUFFER(debugAddr, header)));
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_EmptyThisBuffer(mHandle, header);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(emptyBuffer, err, FULL_BUFFER(debugAddr, header));
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
mInputBuffersWithCodec.remove(header);
} else if (!(flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
unbumpDebugLevel_l(kPortIndexInput);
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer_l(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header, OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, intptr_t debugAddr) {
header->nFlags = flags;
header->nTimeStamp = timestamp;
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mInputBuffersWithCodec.add(header);
if ((flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) != 0) {
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 0 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(emptyBuffer, WITH_STATS(FULL_BUFFER(debugAddr, header)));
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_EmptyThisBuffer(mHandle, header);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(emptyBuffer, err, FULL_BUFFER(debugAddr, header));
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
mInputBuffersWithCodec.remove(header);
} else if (!(flags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG)) {
unbumpDebugLevel_l(kPortIndexInput);
}
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2496/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/982134ba62618c2d69fbbbd166d0a11ee3b7e3d8
|
982134ba62618c2d69fbbbd166d0a11ee3b7e3d8
|
mm: avoid wrapping vm_pgoff in mremap()
The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow. However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.
Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code. A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <robert@swiecki.net>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_addr,
unsigned long new_len)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
unsigned long charged = 0;
unsigned long map_flags;
if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
goto out;
if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
goto out;
/* Check if the location we're moving into overlaps the
* old location at all, and fail if it does.
*/
if ((new_addr <= addr) && (new_addr+new_len) > addr)
goto out;
if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
goto out;
ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (old_len >= new_len) {
ret = do_munmap(mm, addr+new_len, old_len - new_len);
if (ret && old_len != new_len)
goto out;
old_len = new_len;
}
vma = vma_to_resize(addr, old_len, new_len, &charged);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
goto out;
}
map_flags = MAP_FIXED;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
ret = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, new_addr, new_len, vma->vm_pgoff +
((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT),
map_flags);
if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
goto out1;
ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK))
goto out;
out1:
vm_unacct_memory(charged);
out:
return ret;
}
|
static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_addr,
unsigned long new_len)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
unsigned long charged = 0;
unsigned long map_flags;
if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
goto out;
if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
goto out;
/* Check if the location we're moving into overlaps the
* old location at all, and fail if it does.
*/
if ((new_addr <= addr) && (new_addr+new_len) > addr)
goto out;
if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
goto out;
ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (old_len >= new_len) {
ret = do_munmap(mm, addr+new_len, old_len - new_len);
if (ret && old_len != new_len)
goto out;
old_len = new_len;
}
vma = vma_to_resize(addr, old_len, new_len, &charged);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
goto out;
}
map_flags = MAP_FIXED;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
ret = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, new_addr, new_len, vma->vm_pgoff +
((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT),
map_flags);
if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
goto out1;
ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK))
goto out;
out1:
vm_unacct_memory(charged);
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0635/
|
CWE-476
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/523f6b49c1a2289161f40cf9fe80b92e592e9441
|
523f6b49c1a2289161f40cf9fe80b92e592e9441
|
Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
|
size_t HevcParameterSets::getSize(size_t index) {
CHECK_LT(index, mNalUnits.size());
return mNalUnits[index]->size();
}
|
size_t HevcParameterSets::getSize(size_t index) {
CHECK_LT(index, mNalUnits.size());
return mNalUnits[index]->size();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2821
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2821/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6be59593779ed9954710589f00b0bc107d05c536
|
6be59593779ed9954710589f00b0bc107d05c536
|
Mark IndexedDBBrowserTest.ClearLocalState and IndexedDBBrowserTest.SaveSessionState as flaky.
BUG=115188
TEST=
TBR=dgrogan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9416079
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void SetUpOnMainThread() {
const int kInitialQuotaKilobytes = 5000;
const int kTemporaryStorageQuotaMaxSize = kInitialQuotaKilobytes
* 1024 * QuotaManager::kPerHostTemporaryPortion;
SetTempQuota(
kTemporaryStorageQuotaMaxSize,
content::BrowserContext::GetQuotaManager(browser()->profile()));
}
|
virtual void SetUpOnMainThread() {
const int kInitialQuotaKilobytes = 5000;
const int kTemporaryStorageQuotaMaxSize = kInitialQuotaKilobytes
* 1024 * QuotaManager::kPerHostTemporaryPortion;
SetTempQuota(
kTemporaryStorageQuotaMaxSize,
content::BrowserContext::GetQuotaManager(browser()->profile()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3364
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3364/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/67de956ff5dc1d4f321e16cfbd63f5be3b691b43
|
67de956ff5dc1d4f321e16cfbd63f5be3b691b43
|
NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
|
static void nci_core_conn_credits_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf *ntf = (void *) skb->data;
int i;
pr_debug("num_entries %d\n", ntf->num_entries);
if (ntf->num_entries > NCI_MAX_NUM_CONN)
ntf->num_entries = NCI_MAX_NUM_CONN;
/* update the credits */
for (i = 0; i < ntf->num_entries; i++) {
ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id =
nci_conn_id(&ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id);
pr_debug("entry[%d]: conn_id %d, credits %d\n",
i, ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id,
ntf->conn_entries[i].credits);
if (ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id == NCI_STATIC_RF_CONN_ID) {
/* found static rf connection */
atomic_add(ntf->conn_entries[i].credits,
&ndev->credits_cnt);
}
}
/* trigger the next tx */
if (!skb_queue_empty(&ndev->tx_q))
queue_work(ndev->tx_wq, &ndev->tx_work);
}
|
static void nci_core_conn_credits_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf *ntf = (void *) skb->data;
int i;
pr_debug("num_entries %d\n", ntf->num_entries);
if (ntf->num_entries > NCI_MAX_NUM_CONN)
ntf->num_entries = NCI_MAX_NUM_CONN;
/* update the credits */
for (i = 0; i < ntf->num_entries; i++) {
ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id =
nci_conn_id(&ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id);
pr_debug("entry[%d]: conn_id %d, credits %d\n",
i, ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id,
ntf->conn_entries[i].credits);
if (ntf->conn_entries[i].conn_id == NCI_STATIC_RF_CONN_ID) {
/* found static rf connection */
atomic_add(ntf->conn_entries[i].credits,
&ndev->credits_cnt);
}
}
/* trigger the next tx */
if (!skb_queue_empty(&ndev->tx_q))
queue_work(ndev->tx_wq, &ndev->tx_work);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1237
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1237/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4
|
999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4
|
nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
|
static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
{
/* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */
astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow;
}
|
static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask)
{
/* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */
astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, std::max(0, static_cast<int>(impl->FastGetAttribute(html_names::kReflectunsignedshortattributeAttr))));
}
|
static void ReflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, std::max(0, static_cast<int>(impl->FastGetAttribute(html_names::kReflectunsignedshortattributeAttr))));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathCompNodeTest(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathTestVal *test,
xmlXPathTypeVal *type, const xmlChar **prefix,
xmlChar *name) {
int blanks;
if ((test == NULL) || (type == NULL) || (prefix == NULL)) {
STRANGE;
return(NULL);
}
*type = (xmlXPathTypeVal) 0;
*test = (xmlXPathTestVal) 0;
*prefix = NULL;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((name == NULL) && (CUR == '*')) {
/*
* All elements
*/
NEXT;
*test = NODE_TEST_ALL;
return(NULL);
}
if (name == NULL)
name = xmlXPathParseNCName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
blanks = IS_BLANK_CH(CUR);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR == '(') {
NEXT;
/*
* NodeType or PI search
*/
if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "comment"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_COMMENT;
else if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "node"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_NODE;
else if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "processing-instruction"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_PI;
else if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "text"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_TEXT;
else {
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
*test = NODE_TEST_TYPE;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (*type == NODE_TYPE_PI) {
/*
* Specific case: search a PI by name.
*/
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
name = NULL;
if (CUR != ')') {
name = xmlXPathParseLiteral(ctxt);
CHECK_ERROR NULL;
*test = NODE_TEST_PI;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
if (CUR != ')') {
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_UNCLOSED_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
return(name);
}
*test = NODE_TEST_NAME;
if ((!blanks) && (CUR == ':')) {
NEXT;
/*
* Since currently the parser context don't have a
* namespace list associated:
* The namespace name for this prefix can be computed
* only at evaluation time. The compilation is done
* outside of any context.
*/
#if 0
*prefix = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, name);
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (*prefix == NULL) {
XP_ERROR0(XPATH_UNDEF_PREFIX_ERROR);
}
#else
*prefix = name;
#endif
if (CUR == '*') {
/*
* All elements
*/
NEXT;
*test = NODE_TEST_ALL;
return(NULL);
}
name = xmlXPathParseNCName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
}
return(name);
}
|
xmlXPathCompNodeTest(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathTestVal *test,
xmlXPathTypeVal *type, const xmlChar **prefix,
xmlChar *name) {
int blanks;
if ((test == NULL) || (type == NULL) || (prefix == NULL)) {
STRANGE;
return(NULL);
}
*type = (xmlXPathTypeVal) 0;
*test = (xmlXPathTestVal) 0;
*prefix = NULL;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((name == NULL) && (CUR == '*')) {
/*
* All elements
*/
NEXT;
*test = NODE_TEST_ALL;
return(NULL);
}
if (name == NULL)
name = xmlXPathParseNCName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
blanks = IS_BLANK_CH(CUR);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CUR == '(') {
NEXT;
/*
* NodeType or PI search
*/
if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "comment"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_COMMENT;
else if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "node"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_NODE;
else if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "processing-instruction"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_PI;
else if (xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "text"))
*type = NODE_TYPE_TEXT;
else {
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
*test = NODE_TEST_TYPE;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (*type == NODE_TYPE_PI) {
/*
* Specific case: search a PI by name.
*/
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
name = NULL;
if (CUR != ')') {
name = xmlXPathParseLiteral(ctxt);
CHECK_ERROR NULL;
*test = NODE_TEST_PI;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
if (CUR != ')') {
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_UNCLOSED_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
return(name);
}
*test = NODE_TEST_NAME;
if ((!blanks) && (CUR == ':')) {
NEXT;
/*
* Since currently the parser context don't have a
* namespace list associated:
* The namespace name for this prefix can be computed
* only at evaluation time. The compilation is done
* outside of any context.
*/
#if 0
*prefix = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, name);
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (*prefix == NULL) {
XP_ERROR0(XPATH_UNDEF_PREFIX_ERROR);
}
#else
*prefix = name;
#endif
if (CUR == '*') {
/*
* All elements
*/
NEXT;
*test = NODE_TEST_ALL;
return(NULL);
}
name = xmlXPathParseNCName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
XP_ERRORNULL(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
}
return(name);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[300];
u8 sbuf[4],*p;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* MSE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x01, 0xB8);
apdu.lc=0x04;
sbuf[0]=0x83;
sbuf[1]=0x02;
sbuf[2]=data->key_id;
sbuf[3]=0x2A;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen=4;
apdu.lc=4;
apdu.le=0;
r=entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu, 0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe set MSE failed");
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.le = 0;
sbuf[0] = (u8)(data->key_length >> 8);
sbuf[1] = (u8)(data->key_length);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
data->modulus = malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p=rbuf;
if (*p!='E')
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
p+=2+p[1];
/* N */
if (*p!='N')
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
++p;
if(*p++>0x80)
{
u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
size_t module_len=0;
while(len_bytes!=0)
{
module_len=module_len<<8;
module_len+=*p++;
--len_bytes;
}
}
entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
{
int r;
size_t len = data->key_length >> 3;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[300];
u8 sbuf[4],*p;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* MSE */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x22, 0x01, 0xB8);
apdu.lc=0x04;
sbuf[0]=0x83;
sbuf[1]=0x02;
sbuf[2]=data->key_id;
sbuf[3]=0x2A;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen=4;
apdu.lc=4;
apdu.le=0;
r=entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu, 0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe set MSE failed");
/* generate key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.le = 0;
sbuf[0] = (u8)(data->key_length >> 8);
sbuf[1] = (u8)(data->key_length);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe get pukey failed");
data->modulus = malloc(len);
if (!data->modulus)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p=rbuf;
assert(*p=='E');
p+=2+p[1];
/* N */
assert(*p=='N');
++p;
if(*p++>0x80)
{
u8 len_bytes=(*(p-1))&0x0f;
size_t module_len=0;
while(len_bytes!=0)
{
module_len=module_len<<8;
module_len+=*p++;
--len_bytes;
}
}
entersafe_reverse_buffer(p,len);
memcpy(data->modulus,p,len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dcd10462fb49c72544719c490238f3a35edf3fc6
|
dcd10462fb49c72544719c490238f3a35edf3fc6
|
Open distiller UI setting through JavaScript
This change adds support for opening the android view distiller
settings from JavaScript via "distiller.openSettings". To avoid
passing numerous objects into the DomDistillerViewerSource, the
ExternalFeedbackReporter has been refactored into a generic UI
handle that is responsible for any interaction between Chrome and
Android specific controls and the distiller component.
The actual UI in the page is not yet implemented.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1386043002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#354123}
|
std::string DomDistillerViewerSource::GetSource() const {
return scheme_ + "://";
}
|
std::string DomDistillerViewerSource::GetSource() const {
return scheme_ + "://";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1691
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1691/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
|
bool IsJavascriptEnabled(content::WebContents* contents) {
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> value =
content::ExecuteScriptAndGetValue(contents->GetMainFrame(), "123");
int result = 0;
if (!value->GetAsInteger(&result))
EXPECT_EQ(base::Value::Type::NONE, value->type());
return result == 123;
}
|
bool IsJavascriptEnabled(content::WebContents* contents) {
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> value =
content::ExecuteScriptAndGetValue(contents->GetMainFrame(), "123");
int result = 0;
if (!value->GetAsInteger(&result))
EXPECT_EQ(base::Value::Type::NONE, value->type());
return result == 123;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2806/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12
|
01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12
|
Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static PassRefPtr<CSSValue> valueForGridTrackList(const Vector<Length>& trackLengths, const RenderStyle* style)
{
ASSERT(trackLengths.size());
if (trackLengths.size() == 1 && trackLengths[0].isUndefined())
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueNone);
RefPtr<CSSValueList> list = CSSValueList::createSpaceSeparated();
for (size_t i = 0; i < trackLengths.size(); ++i)
list->append(valueForGridTrackBreadth(trackLengths[i], style));
return list.release();
}
|
static PassRefPtr<CSSValue> valueForGridTrackList(const Vector<Length>& trackLengths, const RenderStyle* style)
{
ASSERT(trackLengths.size());
if (trackLengths.size() == 1 && trackLengths[0].isUndefined())
return cssValuePool().createIdentifierValue(CSSValueNone);
RefPtr<CSSValueList> list = CSSValueList::createSpaceSeparated();
for (size_t i = 0; i < trackLengths.size(); ++i)
list->append(valueForGridTrackBreadth(trackLengths[i], style));
return list.release();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NavigationController::DiscardTransientEntry() {
if (transient_entry_index_ == -1)
return;
entries_.erase(entries_.begin() + transient_entry_index_);
transient_entry_index_ = -1;
}
|
void NavigationController::DiscardTransientEntry() {
if (transient_entry_index_ == -1)
return;
entries_.erase(entries_.begin() + transient_entry_index_);
transient_entry_index_ = -1;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static void ipa_draw_line(wmfAPI * API, wmfDrawLine_t * draw_line)
{
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
if (TO_DRAW(draw_line))
{
util_set_pen(API, draw_line->dc);
DrawLine(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(draw_line->from.x), YC(draw_line->from.y),
XC(draw_line->to.x), YC(draw_line->to.y));
}
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
|
static void ipa_draw_line(wmfAPI * API, wmfDrawLine_t * draw_line)
{
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
if (TO_DRAW(draw_line))
{
util_set_pen(API, draw_line->dc);
DrawLine(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(draw_line->from.x), YC(draw_line->from.y),
XC(draw_line->to.x), YC(draw_line->to.y));
}
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15386/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
ba3b1b344017bbf36283464b51014fad15c2f3f4
|
If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
|
void WebContentsImpl::CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs() {
if (dialog_manager_) {
dialog_manager_->CancelDialogs(this, /*reset_state=*/false);
}
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
browser_plugin_embedder_->CancelGuestDialogs();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HideValidationMessage(this);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs() {
if (dialog_manager_) {
dialog_manager_->CancelDialogs(this, /*reset_state=*/false);
}
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
browser_plugin_embedder_->CancelGuestDialogs();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HideValidationMessage(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4299
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4299/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e9c6a182649f4259db704ae15a91ac820e63b0ca
|
e9c6a182649f4259db704ae15a91ac820e63b0ca
|
dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
|
static void write_exception(struct pstore *ps,
uint32_t index, struct core_exception *e)
{
struct disk_exception *de = get_exception(ps, index);
/* copy it */
de->old_chunk = cpu_to_le64(e->old_chunk);
de->new_chunk = cpu_to_le64(e->new_chunk);
}
|
static void write_exception(struct pstore *ps,
uint32_t index, struct core_exception *e)
{
struct disk_exception *de = get_exception(ps, index);
/* copy it */
de->old_chunk = cpu_to_le64(e->old_chunk);
de->new_chunk = cpu_to_le64(e->new_chunk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
bool InputType::IsOutOfRange(const String& value) const {
if (!IsSteppable())
return false;
const Decimal numeric_value = ParseToNumberOrNaN(value);
if (!numeric_value.IsFinite())
return false;
StepRange step_range(CreateStepRange(kRejectAny));
return step_range.HasRangeLimitations() &&
(numeric_value < step_range.Minimum() ||
numeric_value > step_range.Maximum());
}
|
bool InputType::IsOutOfRange(const String& value) const {
if (!IsSteppable())
return false;
const Decimal numeric_value = ParseToNumberOrNaN(value);
if (!numeric_value.IsFinite())
return false;
StepRange step_range(CreateStepRange(kRejectAny));
return step_range.HasRangeLimitations() &&
(numeric_value < step_range.Minimum() ||
numeric_value > step_range.Maximum());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::string GDataRootDirectory::CacheEntry::ToString() const {
std::vector<std::string> cache_states;
if (GDataFile::IsCachePresent(cache_state))
cache_states.push_back("present");
if (GDataFile::IsCachePinned(cache_state))
cache_states.push_back("pinned");
if (GDataFile::IsCacheDirty(cache_state))
cache_states.push_back("dirty");
return base::StringPrintf("md5=%s, subdir=%s, cache_state=%s",
md5.c_str(),
CacheSubDirectoryTypeToString(sub_dir_type).c_str(),
JoinString(cache_states, ',').c_str());
}
|
std::string GDataRootDirectory::CacheEntry::ToString() const {
std::vector<std::string> cache_states;
if (GDataFile::IsCachePresent(cache_state))
cache_states.push_back("present");
if (GDataFile::IsCachePinned(cache_state))
cache_states.push_back("pinned");
if (GDataFile::IsCacheDirty(cache_state))
cache_states.push_back("dirty");
return base::StringPrintf("md5=%s, subdir=%s, cache_state=%s",
md5.c_str(),
CacheSubDirectoryTypeToString(sub_dir_type).c_str(),
JoinString(cache_states, ',').c_str());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3400
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3400/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/FransUrbo/zfs/commit/99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4
|
99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4
|
Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
|
sa_fini(sa_handle_t handle)
{
sa_handle_impl_t impl_handle = (sa_handle_impl_t)handle;
sa_share_impl_t impl_share, next;
sa_share_impl_t *pcurr;
if (impl_handle == NULL)
return;
/*
* clean up shares which don't have a non-NULL dataset property,
* which means they're in sharetab but we couldn't find their
* ZFS dataset.
*/
pcurr = &(impl_handle->shares);
impl_share = *pcurr;
while (impl_share != NULL) {
next = impl_share->next;
if (impl_share->dataset == NULL) {
/* remove item from the linked list */
*pcurr = next;
sa_disable_share(impl_share, NULL);
free_share(impl_share);
} else {
pcurr = &(impl_share->next);
}
impl_share = next;
}
update_sharetab(impl_handle);
if (impl_handle->zfs_libhandle != NULL)
libzfs_fini(impl_handle->zfs_libhandle);
impl_share = impl_handle->shares;
while (impl_share != NULL) {
next = impl_share->next;
free_share(impl_share);
impl_share = next;
}
free(impl_handle);
}
|
sa_fini(sa_handle_t handle)
{
sa_handle_impl_t impl_handle = (sa_handle_impl_t)handle;
sa_share_impl_t impl_share, next;
sa_share_impl_t *pcurr;
if (impl_handle == NULL)
return;
/*
* clean up shares which don't have a non-NULL dataset property,
* which means they're in sharetab but we couldn't find their
* ZFS dataset.
*/
pcurr = &(impl_handle->shares);
impl_share = *pcurr;
while (impl_share != NULL) {
next = impl_share->next;
if (impl_share->dataset == NULL) {
/* remove item from the linked list */
*pcurr = next;
sa_disable_share(impl_share, NULL);
free_share(impl_share);
} else {
pcurr = &(impl_share->next);
}
impl_share = next;
}
update_sharetab(impl_handle);
if (impl_handle->zfs_libhandle != NULL)
libzfs_fini(impl_handle->zfs_libhandle);
impl_share = impl_handle->shares;
while (impl_share != NULL) {
next = impl_share->next;
free_share(impl_share);
impl_share = next;
}
free(impl_handle);
}
|
C
|
zfs
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5202
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
79708b391b2e91d63b5d009ec6202c7d7ededf93
|
Ensure that OpenVR only adds placeholder buttons when needed.
The current implementation of the OpenVRGamepadHelper always adds the
optional grip and secondary axes buttons; however, if those buttons are
missing and no additional buttons need to be supported, they should not
be included. A prime example of this is the vive controller, which has
a trigger, a grip, and a touchpad, but no secondary axis button. This
is essentially the controller that the new TestGamepadOptionalData test
builds.
Bug: 964026
Change-Id: I1de93b5bd7bd0d9e75013cf33b8f333e5d70270f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1627914
Reviewed-by: Bill Orr <billorr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Cooper <alcooper@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#662843}
|
void TestHeadPosesUpdateImpl(WebXrVrBrowserTestBase* t) {
WebXrHeadPoseMock my_mock;
t->LoadUrlAndAwaitInitialization(
t->GetFileUrlForHtmlTestFile("webxr_test_head_poses"));
t->EnterSessionWithUserGestureOrFail();
auto pose = gfx::Transform();
my_mock.SetHeadPose(pose);
t->RunJavaScriptOrFail("stepWaitForMatchingPose(" +
TransformToColMajorString(pose) + ")");
t->WaitOnJavaScriptStep();
pose.RotateAboutXAxis(90);
pose.Translate3d(2, 3, 4);
my_mock.SetHeadPose(pose);
t->RunJavaScriptOrFail("stepWaitForMatchingPose(" +
TransformToColMajorString(pose) + ")");
t->WaitOnJavaScriptStep();
t->AssertNoJavaScriptErrors();
}
|
void TestHeadPosesUpdateImpl(WebXrVrBrowserTestBase* t) {
WebXrHeadPoseMock my_mock;
t->LoadUrlAndAwaitInitialization(
t->GetFileUrlForHtmlTestFile("webxr_test_head_poses"));
t->EnterSessionWithUserGestureOrFail();
auto pose = gfx::Transform();
my_mock.SetHeadPose(pose);
t->RunJavaScriptOrFail("stepWaitForMatchingPose(" +
TransformToColMajorString(pose) + ")");
t->WaitOnJavaScriptStep();
pose.RotateAboutXAxis(90);
pose.Translate3d(2, 3, 4);
my_mock.SetHeadPose(pose);
t->RunJavaScriptOrFail("stepWaitForMatchingPose(" +
TransformToColMajorString(pose) + ")");
t->WaitOnJavaScriptStep();
t->AssertNoJavaScriptErrors();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8816/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea
|
USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void hub_tt_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct usb_hub *hub =
container_of(work, struct usb_hub, tt.clear_work);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&hub->tt.clear_list)) {
struct list_head *next;
struct usb_tt_clear *clear;
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
const struct hc_driver *drv;
int status;
next = hub->tt.clear_list.next;
clear = list_entry(next, struct usb_tt_clear, clear_list);
list_del(&clear->clear_list);
/* drop lock so HCD can concurrently report other TT errors */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
status = hub_clear_tt_buffer(hdev, clear->devinfo, clear->tt);
if (status && status != -ENODEV)
dev_err(&hdev->dev,
"clear tt %d (%04x) error %d\n",
clear->tt, clear->devinfo, status);
/* Tell the HCD, even if the operation failed */
drv = clear->hcd->driver;
if (drv->clear_tt_buffer_complete)
(drv->clear_tt_buffer_complete)(clear->hcd, clear->ep);
kfree(clear);
spin_lock_irqsave(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
}
|
static void hub_tt_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct usb_hub *hub =
container_of(work, struct usb_hub, tt.clear_work);
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
while (!list_empty(&hub->tt.clear_list)) {
struct list_head *next;
struct usb_tt_clear *clear;
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
const struct hc_driver *drv;
int status;
next = hub->tt.clear_list.next;
clear = list_entry(next, struct usb_tt_clear, clear_list);
list_del(&clear->clear_list);
/* drop lock so HCD can concurrently report other TT errors */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
status = hub_clear_tt_buffer(hdev, clear->devinfo, clear->tt);
if (status && status != -ENODEV)
dev_err(&hdev->dev,
"clear tt %d (%04x) error %d\n",
clear->tt, clear->devinfo, status);
/* Tell the HCD, even if the operation failed */
drv = clear->hcd->driver;
if (drv->clear_tt_buffer_complete)
(drv->clear_tt_buffer_complete)(clear->hcd, clear->ep);
kfree(clear);
spin_lock_irqsave(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hub->tt.lock, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2862/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/92afc45a43336c468720a3143e7f2adfa882fa78
|
92afc45a43336c468720a3143e7f2adfa882fa78
|
Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BluetoothDiscoveryFailure() {
}
|
void BluetoothDiscoveryFailure() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int tg3_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
{
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = container_of(napi, struct tg3_napi, napi);
struct tg3 *tp = tnapi->tp;
int work_done = 0;
struct tg3_hw_status *sblk = tnapi->hw_status;
while (1) {
if (sblk->status & SD_STATUS_ERROR)
tg3_process_error(tp);
tg3_poll_link(tp);
work_done = tg3_poll_work(tnapi, work_done, budget);
if (unlikely(tg3_flag(tp, TX_RECOVERY_PENDING)))
goto tx_recovery;
if (unlikely(work_done >= budget))
break;
if (tg3_flag(tp, TAGGED_STATUS)) {
/* tp->last_tag is used in tg3_int_reenable() below
* to tell the hw how much work has been processed,
* so we must read it before checking for more work.
*/
tnapi->last_tag = sblk->status_tag;
tnapi->last_irq_tag = tnapi->last_tag;
rmb();
} else
sblk->status &= ~SD_STATUS_UPDATED;
if (likely(!tg3_has_work(tnapi))) {
napi_complete(napi);
tg3_int_reenable(tnapi);
break;
}
}
return work_done;
tx_recovery:
/* work_done is guaranteed to be less than budget. */
napi_complete(napi);
tg3_reset_task_schedule(tp);
return work_done;
}
|
static int tg3_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
{
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = container_of(napi, struct tg3_napi, napi);
struct tg3 *tp = tnapi->tp;
int work_done = 0;
struct tg3_hw_status *sblk = tnapi->hw_status;
while (1) {
if (sblk->status & SD_STATUS_ERROR)
tg3_process_error(tp);
tg3_poll_link(tp);
work_done = tg3_poll_work(tnapi, work_done, budget);
if (unlikely(tg3_flag(tp, TX_RECOVERY_PENDING)))
goto tx_recovery;
if (unlikely(work_done >= budget))
break;
if (tg3_flag(tp, TAGGED_STATUS)) {
/* tp->last_tag is used in tg3_int_reenable() below
* to tell the hw how much work has been processed,
* so we must read it before checking for more work.
*/
tnapi->last_tag = sblk->status_tag;
tnapi->last_irq_tag = tnapi->last_tag;
rmb();
} else
sblk->status &= ~SD_STATUS_UPDATED;
if (likely(!tg3_has_work(tnapi))) {
napi_complete(napi);
tg3_int_reenable(tnapi);
break;
}
}
return work_done;
tx_recovery:
/* work_done is guaranteed to be less than budget. */
napi_complete(napi);
tg3_reset_task_schedule(tp);
return work_done;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10150/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
|
void mark_page_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(memslot, gfn);
}
|
void mark_page_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(memslot, gfn);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6720
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6720/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0f177948ae2640bfe4d70f8e4248e106406b3b0a
|
0f177948ae2640bfe4d70f8e4248e106406b3b0a
|
DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (isProhibitedIndex_l(index)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return BAD_INDEX;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetConfig(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
|
status_t OMXNodeInstance::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetConfig(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-15128
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15128/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df
|
1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df
|
userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void resv_map_release(struct kref *ref)
{
struct resv_map *resv_map = container_of(ref, struct resv_map, refs);
struct list_head *head = &resv_map->region_cache;
struct file_region *rg, *trg;
/* Clear out any active regions before we release the map. */
region_del(resv_map, 0, LONG_MAX);
/* ... and any entries left in the cache */
list_for_each_entry_safe(rg, trg, head, link) {
list_del(&rg->link);
kfree(rg);
}
VM_BUG_ON(resv_map->adds_in_progress);
kfree(resv_map);
}
|
void resv_map_release(struct kref *ref)
{
struct resv_map *resv_map = container_of(ref, struct resv_map, refs);
struct list_head *head = &resv_map->region_cache;
struct file_region *rg, *trg;
/* Clear out any active regions before we release the map. */
region_del(resv_map, 0, LONG_MAX);
/* ... and any entries left in the cache */
list_for_each_entry_safe(rg, trg, head, link) {
list_del(&rg->link);
kfree(rg);
}
VM_BUG_ON(resv_map->adds_in_progress);
kfree(resv_map);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
Build fix following bug #30696.
Patch by Gavin Barraclough <barraclough@apple.com> on 2009-10-22
Reviewed by NOBODY (build fix).
* WebCoreSupport/FrameLoaderClientGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::FrameLoaderClient::windowObjectCleared):
* webkit/webkitwebframe.cpp:
(webkit_web_frame_get_global_context):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@49964 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
FrameLoaderClient::~FrameLoaderClient()
{
if (m_policyDecision)
g_object_unref(m_policyDecision);
}
|
FrameLoaderClient::~FrameLoaderClient()
{
if (m_policyDecision)
g_object_unref(m_policyDecision);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
long Track::GetNumber() const { return m_info.number; }
|
long Track::GetNumber() const { return m_info.number; }
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoClearBufferfv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
const char* func_name = "glClearBufferfv";
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(func_name))
return;
ApplyDirtyState();
if (buffer == GL_COLOR) {
if (drawbuffer < 0 ||
drawbuffer >= static_cast<GLint>(group_->max_draw_buffers())) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "invalid drawBuffer");
return;
}
GLenum internal_format =
GetBoundColorDrawBufferInternalFormat(drawbuffer);
if (GLES2Util::IsIntegerFormat(internal_format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"can only be called on float buffers");
return;
}
} else {
DCHECK(buffer == GL_DEPTH);
if (drawbuffer != 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "invalid drawBuffer");
return;
}
if (!BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment()) {
return;
}
}
MarkDrawBufferAsCleared(buffer, drawbuffer);
api()->glClearBufferfvFn(buffer, drawbuffer,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoClearBufferfv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
const char* func_name = "glClearBufferfv";
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(func_name))
return;
ApplyDirtyState();
if (buffer == GL_COLOR) {
if (drawbuffer < 0 ||
drawbuffer >= static_cast<GLint>(group_->max_draw_buffers())) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "invalid drawBuffer");
return;
}
GLenum internal_format =
GetBoundColorDrawBufferInternalFormat(drawbuffer);
if (GLES2Util::IsIntegerFormat(internal_format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"can only be called on float buffers");
return;
}
} else {
DCHECK(buffer == GL_DEPTH);
if (drawbuffer != 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "invalid drawBuffer");
return;
}
if (!BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment()) {
return;
}
}
MarkDrawBufferAsCleared(buffer, drawbuffer);
api()->glClearBufferfvFn(buffer, drawbuffer,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct crypto_sparc64_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
ctx->ops->encrypt(&ctx->key[0], (const u32 *) src, (u32 *) dst);
}
|
static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct crypto_sparc64_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
ctx->ops->encrypt(&ctx->key[0], (const u32 *) src, (u32 *) dst);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11381/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/3fcf41ed96ffa25b38029449520c8d0a198745f3
|
3fcf41ed96ffa25b38029449520c8d0a198745f3
|
Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range
|
R_API int r_bin_file_set_bytes(RBinFile *binfile, const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz, bool steal_ptr) {
if (!binfile) {
return false;
}
if (!bytes) {
return false;
}
r_buf_free (binfile->buf);
binfile->buf = r_buf_new ();
#if LIMIT_SIZE
if (sz > 1024 * 1024) {
eprintf ("Too big\n");
return NULL;
}
#else
if (steal_ptr) {
r_buf_set_bytes_steal (binfile->buf, bytes, sz);
} else {
r_buf_set_bytes (binfile->buf, bytes, sz);
}
#endif
return binfile->buf != NULL;
}
|
R_API int r_bin_file_set_bytes(RBinFile *binfile, const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz, bool steal_ptr) {
if (!binfile) {
return false;
}
if (!bytes) {
return false;
}
r_buf_free (binfile->buf);
binfile->buf = r_buf_new ();
#if LIMIT_SIZE
if (sz > 1024 * 1024) {
eprintf ("Too big\n");
return NULL;
}
#else
if (steal_ptr) {
r_buf_set_bytes_steal (binfile->buf, bytes, sz);
} else {
r_buf_set_bytes (binfile->buf, bytes, sz);
}
#endif
return binfile->buf != NULL;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7115
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7115/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/haakonnessjoen/MAC-Telnet/commit/b69d11727d4f0f8cf719c79e3fb700f55ca03e9a
|
b69d11727d4f0f8cf719c79e3fb700f55ca03e9a
|
Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
|
static void list_add_connection(struct mt_connection *conn) {
DL_APPEND(connections_head, conn);
}
|
static void list_add_connection(struct mt_connection *conn) {
DL_APPEND(connections_head, conn);
}
|
C
|
MAC-Telnet
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010295
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010295/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
|
d5c5b0b77b2b589666024d219a8007b3f5b6faeb
|
core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
TEE_Result syscall_get_property(unsigned long prop_set,
unsigned long index,
void *name, uint32_t *name_len,
void *buf, uint32_t *blen,
uint32_t *prop_type)
{
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
TEE_Result res;
TEE_Result res2;
const struct tee_props *prop;
uint32_t klen;
size_t klen_size;
uint32_t elen;
prop = get_prop_struct(prop_set, index);
if (!prop)
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Get the property type */
if (prop_type) {
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(prop_type, &prop->prop_type,
sizeof(*prop_type));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property */
if (buf && blen) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, blen, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (prop->get_prop_func) {
klen_size = klen;
res = prop->get_prop_func(sess, buf, &klen_size);
klen = klen_size;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &klen, sizeof(*blen));
} else {
if (klen < prop->len)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, prop->data,
prop->len);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &prop->len,
sizeof(*blen));
}
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property name */
if (name && name_len) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, name_len, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
elen = strlen(prop->name) + 1;
if (klen < elen)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name, prop->name, elen);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name_len, &elen, sizeof(*name_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
return res;
}
|
TEE_Result syscall_get_property(unsigned long prop_set,
unsigned long index,
void *name, uint32_t *name_len,
void *buf, uint32_t *blen,
uint32_t *prop_type)
{
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
TEE_Result res;
TEE_Result res2;
const struct tee_props *prop;
uint32_t klen;
size_t klen_size;
uint32_t elen;
prop = get_prop_struct(prop_set, index);
if (!prop)
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Get the property type */
if (prop_type) {
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(prop_type, &prop->prop_type,
sizeof(*prop_type));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property */
if (buf && blen) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, blen, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (prop->get_prop_func) {
klen_size = klen;
res = prop->get_prop_func(sess, buf, &klen_size);
klen = klen_size;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &klen, sizeof(*blen));
} else {
if (klen < prop->len)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, prop->data,
prop->len);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &prop->len,
sizeof(*blen));
}
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property name */
if (name && name_len) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, name_len, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
elen = strlen(prop->name) + 1;
if (klen < elen)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name, prop->name, elen);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name_len, &elen, sizeof(*name_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
return res;
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
|
void QDECL Com_DPrintf( const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list argptr;
char msg[MAXPRINTMSG];
if ( !com_developer || !com_developer->integer ) {
return; // don't confuse non-developers with techie stuff...
}
va_start (argptr,fmt);
Q_vsnprintf (msg, sizeof(msg), fmt, argptr);
va_end (argptr);
Com_Printf ("%s", msg);
}
|
void QDECL Com_DPrintf( const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list argptr;
char msg[MAXPRINTMSG];
if ( !com_developer || !com_developer->integer ) {
return; // don't confuse non-developers with techie stuff...
}
va_start (argptr,fmt);
Q_vsnprintf (msg, sizeof(msg), fmt, argptr);
va_end (argptr);
Com_Printf ("%s", msg);
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::GetBooleanParam(const std::string& name,
bool* is_value_cached,
bool* cached_value) {
if (!*is_value_cached) {
*is_value_cached = true;
std::string string_value = GetSwitch(name);
bool has_switch = HasSwitch(name);
if (has_switch && string_value.empty())
string_value = kAnyNonEmptyValue;
if (!has_switch)
string_value = GetParam(name);
*cached_value = !string_value.empty() && string_value != kFalseValue;
}
return *cached_value;
}
|
bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::GetBooleanParam(const std::string& name,
bool* is_value_cached,
bool* cached_value) {
if (!*is_value_cached) {
*is_value_cached = true;
std::string string_value = GetSwitch(name);
bool has_switch = HasSwitch(name);
if (has_switch && string_value.empty())
string_value = kAnyNonEmptyValue;
if (!has_switch)
string_value = GetParam(name);
*cached_value = !string_value.empty() && string_value != kFalseValue;
}
return *cached_value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
[GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::rangeForLine(int line)
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
|
JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::rangeForLine(int line)
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18340
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18340/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f5ef337d8fffd10ab327069467ccaedb843cf9db
|
f5ef337d8fffd10ab327069467ccaedb843cf9db
|
Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
|
void MediaRecorder::Pause() {
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_->Pause();
}
|
void MediaRecorder::Pause() {
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_->Pause();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2520/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=888cd1843e935fe675cf2ac303116d4ed5b9d54b
|
888cd1843e935fe675cf2ac303116d4ed5b9d54b
| null |
Read_CVT_Stretched( EXEC_OP_ FT_ULong idx )
{
return TT_MULFIX( CUR.cvt[idx], CURRENT_Ratio() );
}
|
Read_CVT_Stretched( EXEC_OP_ FT_ULong idx )
{
return TT_MULFIX( CUR.cvt[idx], CURRENT_Ratio() );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static int write_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
void *val, int bytes)
{
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[0];
memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int write_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
void *val, int bytes)
{
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[0];
memcpy(vcpu->run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6151/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cbb2c0940d4e3914ccd74f6466ff4cb9e50e0e86
|
cbb2c0940d4e3914ccd74f6466ff4cb9e50e0e86
|
Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
|
inline Matcher<const base::Callback<bool(const GURL&)>&> ProbablySameFilter(
const base::Callback<bool(const GURL&)>& filter) {
return MakeMatcher(new ProbablySameFilterMatcher(filter));
}
|
inline Matcher<const base::Callback<bool(const GURL&)>&> ProbablySameFilter(
const base::Callback<bool(const GURL&)>& filter) {
return MakeMatcher(new ProbablySameFilterMatcher(filter));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18386
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18386/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/966031f340185eddd05affcf72b740549f056348
|
966031f340185eddd05affcf72b740549f056348
|
n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
n_tty_receive_buf_closing(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
while (count--) {
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
if (likely(flag == TTY_NORMAL))
n_tty_receive_char_closing(tty, *cp++);
}
}
|
n_tty_receive_buf_closing(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp,
char *fp, int count)
{
char flag = TTY_NORMAL;
while (count--) {
if (fp)
flag = *fp++;
if (likely(flag == TTY_NORMAL))
n_tty_receive_char_closing(tty, *cp++);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
static int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
int depth;
int err = 0;
int ret = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* first mark the extent as initialized */
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
/*
* We have to see if it can be merged with the extent
* on the left.
*/
if (ex > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/*
* To merge left, pass "ex - 1" to try_to_merge(),
* since it merges towards right _only_.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex - 1);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex--;
}
}
/*
* Try to Merge towards right.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
}
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
}
|
static int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
int depth;
int err = 0;
int ret = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* first mark the extent as initialized */
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
/*
* We have to see if it can be merged with the extent
* on the left.
*/
if (ex > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/*
* To merge left, pass "ex - 1" to try_to_merge(),
* since it merges towards right _only_.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex - 1);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex--;
}
}
/*
* Try to Merge towards right.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
}
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20856
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20856/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
|
54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
|
block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
void blk_run_queue_async(struct request_queue *q)
{
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
if (likely(!blk_queue_stopped(q) && !blk_queue_dead(q)))
mod_delayed_work(kblockd_workqueue, &q->delay_work, 0);
}
|
void blk_run_queue_async(struct request_queue *q)
{
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
if (likely(!blk_queue_stopped(q) && !blk_queue_dead(q)))
mod_delayed_work(kblockd_workqueue, &q->delay_work, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9806/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520
|
92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520
|
netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void deferred_put_nlk_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = container_of(head, struct netlink_sock, rcu);
sock_put(&nlk->sk);
}
|
static void deferred_put_nlk_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = container_of(head, struct netlink_sock, rcu);
sock_put(&nlk->sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLInputElement::isTextButton() const
{
return m_inputType->isTextButton();
}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::isTextButton() const
{
return m_inputType->isTextButton();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionPrefs::SetLaunchType(const std::string& extension_id,
LaunchType launch_type) {
UpdateExtensionPref(extension_id, kPrefLaunchType,
Value::CreateIntegerValue(static_cast<int>(launch_type)));
}
|
void ExtensionPrefs::SetLaunchType(const std::string& extension_id,
LaunchType launch_type) {
UpdateExtensionPref(extension_id, kPrefLaunchType,
Value::CreateIntegerValue(static_cast<int>(launch_type)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
pick_next_task_fair(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
struct sched_entity *se;
struct task_struct *p;
int new_tasks;
again:
if (!cfs_rq->nr_running)
goto idle;
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
if (prev->sched_class != &fair_sched_class)
goto simple;
/*
* Because of the set_next_buddy() in dequeue_task_fair() it is rather
* likely that a next task is from the same cgroup as the current.
*
* Therefore attempt to avoid putting and setting the entire cgroup
* hierarchy, only change the part that actually changes.
*/
do {
struct sched_entity *curr = cfs_rq->curr;
/*
* Since we got here without doing put_prev_entity() we also
* have to consider cfs_rq->curr. If it is still a runnable
* entity, update_curr() will update its vruntime, otherwise
* forget we've ever seen it.
*/
if (curr) {
if (curr->on_rq)
update_curr(cfs_rq);
else
curr = NULL;
/*
* This call to check_cfs_rq_runtime() will do the
* throttle and dequeue its entity in the parent(s).
* Therefore the nr_running test will indeed
* be correct.
*/
if (unlikely(check_cfs_rq_runtime(cfs_rq))) {
cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
if (!cfs_rq->nr_running)
goto idle;
goto simple;
}
}
se = pick_next_entity(cfs_rq, curr);
cfs_rq = group_cfs_rq(se);
} while (cfs_rq);
p = task_of(se);
/*
* Since we haven't yet done put_prev_entity and if the selected task
* is a different task than we started out with, try and touch the
* least amount of cfs_rqs.
*/
if (prev != p) {
struct sched_entity *pse = &prev->se;
while (!(cfs_rq = is_same_group(se, pse))) {
int se_depth = se->depth;
int pse_depth = pse->depth;
if (se_depth <= pse_depth) {
put_prev_entity(cfs_rq_of(pse), pse);
pse = parent_entity(pse);
}
if (se_depth >= pse_depth) {
set_next_entity(cfs_rq_of(se), se);
se = parent_entity(se);
}
}
put_prev_entity(cfs_rq, pse);
set_next_entity(cfs_rq, se);
}
goto done;
simple:
#endif
put_prev_task(rq, prev);
do {
se = pick_next_entity(cfs_rq, NULL);
set_next_entity(cfs_rq, se);
cfs_rq = group_cfs_rq(se);
} while (cfs_rq);
p = task_of(se);
done: __maybe_unused;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Move the next running task to the front of
* the list, so our cfs_tasks list becomes MRU
* one.
*/
list_move(&p->se.group_node, &rq->cfs_tasks);
#endif
if (hrtick_enabled(rq))
hrtick_start_fair(rq, p);
update_misfit_status(p, rq);
return p;
idle:
update_misfit_status(NULL, rq);
new_tasks = idle_balance(rq, rf);
/*
* Because idle_balance() releases (and re-acquires) rq->lock, it is
* possible for any higher priority task to appear. In that case we
* must re-start the pick_next_entity() loop.
*/
if (new_tasks < 0)
return RETRY_TASK;
if (new_tasks > 0)
goto again;
return NULL;
}
|
pick_next_task_fair(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev, struct rq_flags *rf)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
struct sched_entity *se;
struct task_struct *p;
int new_tasks;
again:
if (!cfs_rq->nr_running)
goto idle;
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
if (prev->sched_class != &fair_sched_class)
goto simple;
/*
* Because of the set_next_buddy() in dequeue_task_fair() it is rather
* likely that a next task is from the same cgroup as the current.
*
* Therefore attempt to avoid putting and setting the entire cgroup
* hierarchy, only change the part that actually changes.
*/
do {
struct sched_entity *curr = cfs_rq->curr;
/*
* Since we got here without doing put_prev_entity() we also
* have to consider cfs_rq->curr. If it is still a runnable
* entity, update_curr() will update its vruntime, otherwise
* forget we've ever seen it.
*/
if (curr) {
if (curr->on_rq)
update_curr(cfs_rq);
else
curr = NULL;
/*
* This call to check_cfs_rq_runtime() will do the
* throttle and dequeue its entity in the parent(s).
* Therefore the nr_running test will indeed
* be correct.
*/
if (unlikely(check_cfs_rq_runtime(cfs_rq))) {
cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
if (!cfs_rq->nr_running)
goto idle;
goto simple;
}
}
se = pick_next_entity(cfs_rq, curr);
cfs_rq = group_cfs_rq(se);
} while (cfs_rq);
p = task_of(se);
/*
* Since we haven't yet done put_prev_entity and if the selected task
* is a different task than we started out with, try and touch the
* least amount of cfs_rqs.
*/
if (prev != p) {
struct sched_entity *pse = &prev->se;
while (!(cfs_rq = is_same_group(se, pse))) {
int se_depth = se->depth;
int pse_depth = pse->depth;
if (se_depth <= pse_depth) {
put_prev_entity(cfs_rq_of(pse), pse);
pse = parent_entity(pse);
}
if (se_depth >= pse_depth) {
set_next_entity(cfs_rq_of(se), se);
se = parent_entity(se);
}
}
put_prev_entity(cfs_rq, pse);
set_next_entity(cfs_rq, se);
}
goto done;
simple:
#endif
put_prev_task(rq, prev);
do {
se = pick_next_entity(cfs_rq, NULL);
set_next_entity(cfs_rq, se);
cfs_rq = group_cfs_rq(se);
} while (cfs_rq);
p = task_of(se);
done: __maybe_unused;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Move the next running task to the front of
* the list, so our cfs_tasks list becomes MRU
* one.
*/
list_move(&p->se.group_node, &rq->cfs_tasks);
#endif
if (hrtick_enabled(rq))
hrtick_start_fair(rq, p);
update_misfit_status(p, rq);
return p;
idle:
update_misfit_status(NULL, rq);
new_tasks = idle_balance(rq, rf);
/*
* Because idle_balance() releases (and re-acquires) rq->lock, it is
* possible for any higher priority task to appear. In that case we
* must re-start the pick_next_entity() loop.
*/
if (new_tasks < 0)
return RETRY_TASK;
if (new_tasks > 0)
goto again;
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GDataDirectory* GDataEntry::AsGDataDirectory() {
return NULL;
}
|
GDataDirectory* GDataEntry::AsGDataDirectory() {
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1679
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1679/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b5bdf3778209179111c9f865af00940e74aa20e7
|
b5bdf3778209179111c9f865af00940e74aa20e7
|
V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
|
void TestWeirdType(const V8ValueConverterImpl& converter,
v8::Local<v8::Value> val,
base::Value::Type expected_type,
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> expected_value) {
v8::Local<v8::Context> context =
v8::Local<v8::Context>::New(isolate_, context_);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> raw(converter.FromV8Value(val, context));
if (expected_value) {
ASSERT_TRUE(raw.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_value->Equals(raw.get()));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_type, raw->GetType());
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(raw.get());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> object(v8::Object::New(isolate_));
object->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate_, "test"), val);
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dictionary(
static_cast<base::DictionaryValue*>(
converter.FromV8Value(object, context)));
ASSERT_TRUE(dictionary.get());
if (expected_value) {
base::Value* temp = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(dictionary->Get("test", &temp));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_type, temp->GetType());
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_value->Equals(temp));
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(dictionary->HasKey("test"));
}
v8::Local<v8::Array> array(v8::Array::New(isolate_));
array->Set(0, val);
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> list(
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(converter.FromV8Value(array, context)));
ASSERT_TRUE(list.get());
if (expected_value) {
base::Value* temp = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(list->Get(0, &temp));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_type, temp->GetType());
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_value->Equals(temp));
} else {
base::Value* temp = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(list->Get(0, &temp));
EXPECT_EQ(base::Value::TYPE_NULL, temp->GetType());
}
}
|
void TestWeirdType(const V8ValueConverterImpl& converter,
v8::Local<v8::Value> val,
base::Value::Type expected_type,
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> expected_value) {
v8::Local<v8::Context> context =
v8::Local<v8::Context>::New(isolate_, context_);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> raw(converter.FromV8Value(val, context));
if (expected_value) {
ASSERT_TRUE(raw.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_value->Equals(raw.get()));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_type, raw->GetType());
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(raw.get());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> object(v8::Object::New(isolate_));
object->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate_, "test"), val);
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dictionary(
static_cast<base::DictionaryValue*>(
converter.FromV8Value(object, context)));
ASSERT_TRUE(dictionary.get());
if (expected_value) {
base::Value* temp = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(dictionary->Get("test", &temp));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_type, temp->GetType());
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_value->Equals(temp));
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(dictionary->HasKey("test"));
}
v8::Local<v8::Array> array(v8::Array::New(isolate_));
array->Set(0, val);
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> list(
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(converter.FromV8Value(array, context)));
ASSERT_TRUE(list.get());
if (expected_value) {
base::Value* temp = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(list->Get(0, &temp));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_type, temp->GetType());
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_value->Equals(temp));
} else {
base::Value* temp = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(list->Get(0, &temp));
EXPECT_EQ(base::Value::TYPE_NULL, temp->GetType());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18208
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18208/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ea8d958a2c95a1d514015d4e29ba21a8c0a1a91
|
6ea8d958a2c95a1d514015d4e29ba21a8c0a1a91
|
mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[mhocko@suse.com: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127115318.911-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static int madvise_free_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct mmu_gather *tlb = walk->private;
struct mm_struct *mm = tlb->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *orig_pte, *pte, ptent;
struct page *page;
int nr_swap = 0;
unsigned long next;
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
if (madvise_free_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr, next))
goto next;
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
return 0;
tlb_remove_check_page_size_change(tlb, PAGE_SIZE);
orig_pte = pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
flush_tlb_batched_pending(mm);
arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
ptent = *pte;
if (pte_none(ptent))
continue;
/*
* If the pte has swp_entry, just clear page table to
* prevent swap-in which is more expensive rather than
* (page allocation + zeroing).
*/
if (!pte_present(ptent)) {
swp_entry_t entry;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(ptent);
if (non_swap_entry(entry))
continue;
nr_swap--;
free_swap_and_cache(entry);
pte_clear_not_present_full(mm, addr, pte, tlb->fullmm);
continue;
}
page = _vm_normal_page(vma, addr, ptent, true);
if (!page)
continue;
/*
* If pmd isn't transhuge but the page is THP and
* is owned by only this process, split it and
* deactivate all pages.
*/
if (PageTransCompound(page)) {
if (page_mapcount(page) != 1)
goto out;
get_page(page);
if (!trylock_page(page)) {
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(orig_pte, ptl);
if (split_huge_page(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
goto out;
}
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
pte--;
addr -= PAGE_SIZE;
continue;
}
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTransCompound(page), page);
if (PageSwapCache(page) || PageDirty(page)) {
if (!trylock_page(page))
continue;
/*
* If page is shared with others, we couldn't clear
* PG_dirty of the page.
*/
if (page_mapcount(page) != 1) {
unlock_page(page);
continue;
}
if (PageSwapCache(page) && !try_to_free_swap(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
continue;
}
ClearPageDirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
}
if (pte_young(ptent) || pte_dirty(ptent)) {
/*
* Some of architecture(ex, PPC) don't update TLB
* with set_pte_at and tlb_remove_tlb_entry so for
* the portability, remap the pte with old|clean
* after pte clearing.
*/
ptent = ptep_get_and_clear_full(mm, addr, pte,
tlb->fullmm);
ptent = pte_mkold(ptent);
ptent = pte_mkclean(ptent);
set_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, ptent);
tlb_remove_tlb_entry(tlb, pte, addr);
}
mark_page_lazyfree(page);
}
out:
if (nr_swap) {
if (current->mm == mm)
sync_mm_rss(mm);
add_mm_counter(mm, MM_SWAPENTS, nr_swap);
}
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
pte_unmap_unlock(orig_pte, ptl);
cond_resched();
next:
return 0;
}
|
static int madvise_free_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct mmu_gather *tlb = walk->private;
struct mm_struct *mm = tlb->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *orig_pte, *pte, ptent;
struct page *page;
int nr_swap = 0;
unsigned long next;
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
if (madvise_free_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr, next))
goto next;
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmd))
return 0;
tlb_remove_check_page_size_change(tlb, PAGE_SIZE);
orig_pte = pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
flush_tlb_batched_pending(mm);
arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
ptent = *pte;
if (pte_none(ptent))
continue;
/*
* If the pte has swp_entry, just clear page table to
* prevent swap-in which is more expensive rather than
* (page allocation + zeroing).
*/
if (!pte_present(ptent)) {
swp_entry_t entry;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(ptent);
if (non_swap_entry(entry))
continue;
nr_swap--;
free_swap_and_cache(entry);
pte_clear_not_present_full(mm, addr, pte, tlb->fullmm);
continue;
}
page = _vm_normal_page(vma, addr, ptent, true);
if (!page)
continue;
/*
* If pmd isn't transhuge but the page is THP and
* is owned by only this process, split it and
* deactivate all pages.
*/
if (PageTransCompound(page)) {
if (page_mapcount(page) != 1)
goto out;
get_page(page);
if (!trylock_page(page)) {
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(orig_pte, ptl);
if (split_huge_page(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
goto out;
}
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
pte--;
addr -= PAGE_SIZE;
continue;
}
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTransCompound(page), page);
if (PageSwapCache(page) || PageDirty(page)) {
if (!trylock_page(page))
continue;
/*
* If page is shared with others, we couldn't clear
* PG_dirty of the page.
*/
if (page_mapcount(page) != 1) {
unlock_page(page);
continue;
}
if (PageSwapCache(page) && !try_to_free_swap(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
continue;
}
ClearPageDirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
}
if (pte_young(ptent) || pte_dirty(ptent)) {
/*
* Some of architecture(ex, PPC) don't update TLB
* with set_pte_at and tlb_remove_tlb_entry so for
* the portability, remap the pte with old|clean
* after pte clearing.
*/
ptent = ptep_get_and_clear_full(mm, addr, pte,
tlb->fullmm);
ptent = pte_mkold(ptent);
ptent = pte_mkclean(ptent);
set_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, ptent);
tlb_remove_tlb_entry(tlb, pte, addr);
}
mark_page_lazyfree(page);
}
out:
if (nr_swap) {
if (current->mm == mm)
sync_mm_rss(mm);
add_mm_counter(mm, MM_SWAPENTS, nr_swap);
}
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
pte_unmap_unlock(orig_pte, ptl);
cond_resched();
next:
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5314
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5314/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/391e77fcd217e78b2c51342ac3ddb7100ecacdd2
|
391e77fcd217e78b2c51342ac3ddb7100ecacdd2
|
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
|
horizontalDifference8(unsigned char *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From8)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) (From8[(v)])
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[6]); wp[6] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[7]); wp[7] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
}
} else {
wp += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
ip += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
|
horizontalDifference8(unsigned char *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From8)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) (From8[(v)])
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[6]); wp[6] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[7]); wp[7] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
}
} else {
wp += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
ip += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7024
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7024/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/fe448cd28d674c3eff3072552eae366d0b659ce9
|
fe448cd28d674c3eff3072552eae366d0b659ce9
|
avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
static int jpeg2000_read_bitstream_packets(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int ret = 0;
int tileno;
for (tileno = 0; tileno < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; tileno++) {
Jpeg2000Tile *tile = s->tile + tileno;
if (ret = init_tile(s, tileno))
return ret;
s->g = tile->tile_part[0].tpg;
if (ret = jpeg2000_decode_packets(s, tile))
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int jpeg2000_read_bitstream_packets(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int ret = 0;
int tileno;
for (tileno = 0; tileno < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; tileno++) {
Jpeg2000Tile *tile = s->tile + tileno;
if (ret = init_tile(s, tileno))
return ret;
s->g = tile->tile_part[0].tpg;
if (ret = jpeg2000_decode_packets(s, tile))
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Tab* TabStrip::FindTabForEvent(const gfx::Point& point) {
DCHECK(touch_layout_);
int active_tab_index = touch_layout_->active_index();
Tab* tab = FindTabForEventFrom(point, active_tab_index, -1);
return tab ? tab : FindTabForEventFrom(point, active_tab_index + 1, 1);
}
|
Tab* TabStrip::FindTabForEvent(const gfx::Point& point) {
DCHECK(touch_layout_);
int active_tab_index = touch_layout_->active_index();
Tab* tab = FindTabForEventFrom(point, active_tab_index, -1);
return tab ? tab : FindTabForEventFrom(point, active_tab_index + 1, 1);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7262
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7262/
|
CWE-89
|
https://github.com/mapserver/mapserver/commit/3a10f6b829297dae63492a8c63385044bc6953ed
|
3a10f6b829297dae63492a8c63385044bc6953ed
|
Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
|
wkbConvPolygonToShape(wkbObj *w, shapeObj *shape)
{
int type;
int i, nrings;
lineObj line;
/*endian = */wkbReadChar(w);
type = wkbTypeMap(w,wkbReadInt(w));
if( type != WKB_POLYGON ) return MS_FAILURE;
/* How many rings? */
nrings = wkbReadInt(w);
/* Add each ring to the shape */
for( i = 0; i < nrings; i++ ) {
wkbReadLine(w,&line);
msAddLineDirectly(shape, &line);
}
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
|
wkbConvPolygonToShape(wkbObj *w, shapeObj *shape)
{
int type;
int i, nrings;
lineObj line;
/*endian = */wkbReadChar(w);
type = wkbTypeMap(w,wkbReadInt(w));
if( type != WKB_POLYGON ) return MS_FAILURE;
/* How many rings? */
nrings = wkbReadInt(w);
/* Add each ring to the shape */
for( i = 0; i < nrings; i++ ) {
wkbReadLine(w,&line);
msAddLineDirectly(shape, &line);
}
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
mapserver
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5779
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5779/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18c5c5dcef9cfccff64f0c23f920ef22822271a9
|
18c5c5dcef9cfccff64f0c23f920ef22822271a9
|
service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
|
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service> CreatePrefService(
base::RepeatingCallback<prefs::InProcessPrefServiceFactory*()>
factory_callback) {
auto* factory = factory_callback.Run();
if (!factory)
return std::make_unique<service_manager::Service>();
return factory->CreatePrefService();
}
|
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service> CreatePrefService(
base::RepeatingCallback<prefs::InProcessPrefServiceFactory*()>
factory_callback) {
auto* factory = factory_callback.Run();
if (!factory)
return std::make_unique<service_manager::Service>();
return factory->CreatePrefService();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1174
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1174/
|
CWE-362
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/commit/?id=5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
|
5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
| null |
int getttyname_harder(int fd, char **r) {
int k;
char *s;
if ((k = getttyname_malloc(fd, &s)) < 0)
return k;
if (streq(s, "tty")) {
free(s);
return get_ctty(0, NULL, r);
}
*r = s;
return 0;
}
|
int getttyname_harder(int fd, char **r) {
int k;
char *s;
if ((k = getttyname_malloc(fd, &s)) < 0)
return k;
if (streq(s, "tty")) {
free(s);
return get_ctty(0, NULL, r);
}
*r = s;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
TestRenderFrame::TakeLastDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest() {
return mock_frame_host_->TakeLastDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest();
}
|
TestRenderFrame::TakeLastDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest() {
return mock_frame_host_->TakeLastDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool OSExchangeDataProviderAura::HasFile() const {
return (formats_ & OSExchangeData::FILE_NAME) != 0;
}
|
bool OSExchangeDataProviderAura::HasFile() const {
return (formats_ & OSExchangeData::FILE_NAME) != 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static inline u32 evmcs_read32(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
|
static inline u32 evmcs_read32(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
static void free_prog(struct event_filter *filter)
{
struct prog_entry *prog;
int i;
prog = rcu_access_pointer(filter->prog);
if (!prog)
return;
for (i = 0; prog[i].pred; i++)
kfree(prog[i].pred);
kfree(prog);
}
|
static void free_prog(struct event_filter *filter)
{
struct prog_entry *prog;
int i;
prog = rcu_access_pointer(filter->prog);
if (!prog)
return;
for (i = 0; prog[i].pred; i++)
kfree(prog[i].pred);
kfree(prog);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2498
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2498/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
|
8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
| null |
psh_glyph_init( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Outline* outline,
PS_Hints ps_hints,
PSH_Globals globals )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Memory memory;
/* clear all fields */
FT_MEM_ZERO( glyph, sizeof ( *glyph ) );
memory = glyph->memory = globals->memory;
/* allocate and setup points + contours arrays */
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->points, outline->n_points ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->contours, outline->n_contours ) )
goto Exit;
glyph->num_points = outline->n_points;
glyph->num_contours = outline->n_contours;
{
FT_UInt first = 0, next, n;
PSH_Point points = glyph->points;
PSH_Contour contour = glyph->contours;
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_contours; n++ )
{
FT_Int count;
PSH_Point point;
next = outline->contours[n] + 1;
count = next - first;
contour->start = points + first;
contour->count = (FT_UInt)count;
if ( count > 0 )
{
point = points + first;
point->prev = points + next - 1;
point->contour = contour;
for ( ; count > 1; count-- )
{
point[0].next = point + 1;
point[1].prev = point;
point++;
point->contour = contour;
}
point->next = points + first;
}
contour++;
first = next;
}
}
{
PSH_Point points = glyph->points;
PSH_Point point = points;
FT_Vector* vec = outline->points;
FT_UInt n;
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_points; n++, point++ )
{
FT_Int n_prev = (FT_Int)( point->prev - points );
FT_Int n_next = (FT_Int)( point->next - points );
FT_Pos dxi, dyi, dxo, dyo;
if ( !( outline->tags[n] & FT_CURVE_TAG_ON ) )
point->flags = PSH_POINT_OFF;
dxi = vec[n].x - vec[n_prev].x;
dyi = vec[n].y - vec[n_prev].y;
point->dir_in = (FT_Char)psh_compute_dir( dxi, dyi );
dxo = vec[n_next].x - vec[n].x;
dyo = vec[n_next].y - vec[n].y;
point->dir_out = (FT_Char)psh_compute_dir( dxo, dyo );
/* detect smooth points */
if ( point->flags & PSH_POINT_OFF )
point->flags |= PSH_POINT_SMOOTH;
else if ( point->dir_in == point->dir_out )
{
if ( point->dir_out != PSH_DIR_NONE ||
psh_corner_is_flat( dxi, dyi, dxo, dyo ) )
point->flags |= PSH_POINT_SMOOTH;
}
}
}
glyph->outline = outline;
glyph->globals = globals;
#ifdef COMPUTE_INFLEXS
psh_glyph_load_points( glyph, 0 );
psh_glyph_compute_inflections( glyph );
#endif /* COMPUTE_INFLEXS */
/* now deal with hints tables */
error = psh_hint_table_init( &glyph->hint_tables [0],
&ps_hints->dimension[0].hints,
&ps_hints->dimension[0].masks,
&ps_hints->dimension[0].counters,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
error = psh_hint_table_init( &glyph->hint_tables [1],
&ps_hints->dimension[1].hints,
&ps_hints->dimension[1].masks,
&ps_hints->dimension[1].counters,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
Exit:
return error;
}
|
psh_glyph_init( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Outline* outline,
PS_Hints ps_hints,
PSH_Globals globals )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Memory memory;
/* clear all fields */
FT_MEM_ZERO( glyph, sizeof ( *glyph ) );
memory = glyph->memory = globals->memory;
/* allocate and setup points + contours arrays */
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->points, outline->n_points ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( glyph->contours, outline->n_contours ) )
goto Exit;
glyph->num_points = outline->n_points;
glyph->num_contours = outline->n_contours;
{
FT_UInt first = 0, next, n;
PSH_Point points = glyph->points;
PSH_Contour contour = glyph->contours;
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_contours; n++ )
{
FT_Int count;
PSH_Point point;
next = outline->contours[n] + 1;
count = next - first;
contour->start = points + first;
contour->count = (FT_UInt)count;
if ( count > 0 )
{
point = points + first;
point->prev = points + next - 1;
point->contour = contour;
for ( ; count > 1; count-- )
{
point[0].next = point + 1;
point[1].prev = point;
point++;
point->contour = contour;
}
point->next = points + first;
}
contour++;
first = next;
}
}
{
PSH_Point points = glyph->points;
PSH_Point point = points;
FT_Vector* vec = outline->points;
FT_UInt n;
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_points; n++, point++ )
{
FT_Int n_prev = (FT_Int)( point->prev - points );
FT_Int n_next = (FT_Int)( point->next - points );
FT_Pos dxi, dyi, dxo, dyo;
if ( !( outline->tags[n] & FT_CURVE_TAG_ON ) )
point->flags = PSH_POINT_OFF;
dxi = vec[n].x - vec[n_prev].x;
dyi = vec[n].y - vec[n_prev].y;
point->dir_in = (FT_Char)psh_compute_dir( dxi, dyi );
dxo = vec[n_next].x - vec[n].x;
dyo = vec[n_next].y - vec[n].y;
point->dir_out = (FT_Char)psh_compute_dir( dxo, dyo );
/* detect smooth points */
if ( point->flags & PSH_POINT_OFF )
point->flags |= PSH_POINT_SMOOTH;
else if ( point->dir_in == point->dir_out )
{
if ( point->dir_out != PSH_DIR_NONE ||
psh_corner_is_flat( dxi, dyi, dxo, dyo ) )
point->flags |= PSH_POINT_SMOOTH;
}
}
}
glyph->outline = outline;
glyph->globals = globals;
#ifdef COMPUTE_INFLEXS
psh_glyph_load_points( glyph, 0 );
psh_glyph_compute_inflections( glyph );
#endif /* COMPUTE_INFLEXS */
/* now deal with hints tables */
error = psh_hint_table_init( &glyph->hint_tables [0],
&ps_hints->dimension[0].hints,
&ps_hints->dimension[0].masks,
&ps_hints->dimension[0].counters,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
error = psh_hint_table_init( &glyph->hint_tables [1],
&ps_hints->dimension[1].hints,
&ps_hints->dimension[1].masks,
&ps_hints->dimension[1].counters,
memory );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
Exit:
return error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7339/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0
|
c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0
|
rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void rds_ib_dev_shutdown(struct rds_ib_device *rds_ibdev)
{
struct rds_ib_connection *ic;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&rds_ibdev->spinlock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(ic, &rds_ibdev->conn_list, ib_node)
rds_conn_drop(ic->conn);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rds_ibdev->spinlock, flags);
}
|
static void rds_ib_dev_shutdown(struct rds_ib_device *rds_ibdev)
{
struct rds_ib_connection *ic;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&rds_ibdev->spinlock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(ic, &rds_ibdev->conn_list, ib_node)
rds_conn_drop(ic->conn);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rds_ibdev->spinlock, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
void CompositedLayerRasterInvalidator::FullyInvalidateOldChunk(
const PaintChunkInfo& info,
PaintInvalidationReason reason) {
String debug_name;
if (tracking_info_)
debug_name = tracking_info_->old_client_debug_names.at(&info.id.client);
AddRasterInvalidation(info.bounds_in_layer, &info.id.client, reason,
&debug_name);
}
|
void CompositedLayerRasterInvalidator::FullyInvalidateOldChunk(
const PaintChunkInfo& info,
PaintInvalidationReason reason) {
String debug_name;
if (tracking_info_)
debug_name = tracking_info_->old_client_debug_names.at(&info.id.client);
AddRasterInvalidation(info.bounds_in_layer, &info.id.client, reason,
&debug_name);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15419
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15419/
|
CWE-601
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fa17c9878dbeebf991b25ac0deb2b4635d85f1b6
|
fa17c9878dbeebf991b25ac0deb2b4635d85f1b6
|
Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
|
void HTMLIFrameElement::RemovedFrom(ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLFrameElementBase::RemovedFrom(insertion_point);
if (insertion_point->IsInDocumentTree() && GetDocument().IsHTMLDocument())
ToHTMLDocument(GetDocument()).RemoveNamedItem(name_);
}
|
void HTMLIFrameElement::RemovedFrom(ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLFrameElementBase::RemovedFrom(insertion_point);
if (insertion_point->IsInDocumentTree() && GetDocument().IsHTMLDocument())
ToHTMLDocument(GetDocument()).RemoveNamedItem(name_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0028
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0028/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
mm_need_new_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* If there are other users of the mm and the owner (us) is exiting
* we need to find a new owner to take on the responsibility.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) <= 1)
return 0;
if (mm->owner != p)
return 0;
return 1;
}
|
mm_need_new_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* If there are other users of the mm and the owner (us) is exiting
* we need to find a new owner to take on the responsibility.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) <= 1)
return 0;
if (mm->owner != p)
return 0;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12436
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12436/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/9b9568d500f31f964af26ba8d01e542e1f27e5ca
|
9b9568d500f31f964af26ba8d01e542e1f27e5ca
|
Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
|
int wc_ecc_get_curve_size_from_name(const char* curveName)
{
int curve_idx;
if (curveName == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
curve_idx = wc_ecc_get_curve_idx_from_name(curveName);
if (curve_idx < 0)
return curve_idx;
return ecc_sets[curve_idx].size;
}
|
int wc_ecc_get_curve_size_from_name(const char* curveName)
{
int curve_idx;
if (curveName == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
curve_idx = wc_ecc_get_curve_idx_from_name(curveName);
if (curve_idx < 0)
return curve_idx;
return ecc_sets[curve_idx].size;
}
|
C
|
wolfssl
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
static void stream_int_chk_snd(struct stream_interface *si)
{
struct channel *ob = si->ob;
DPRINTF(stderr, "%s: si=%p, si->state=%d ib->flags=%08x ob->flags=%08x\n",
__FUNCTION__,
si, si->state, si->ib->flags, si->ob->flags);
if (unlikely(si->state != SI_ST_EST || (si->ob->flags & CF_SHUTW)))
return;
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_WAIT_DATA) || /* not waiting for data */
channel_is_empty(ob)) /* called with nothing to send ! */
return;
/* Otherwise there are remaining data to be sent in the buffer,
* so we tell the handler.
*/
si->flags &= ~SI_FL_WAIT_DATA;
if (!tick_isset(ob->wex))
ob->wex = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, ob->wto);
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_DONT_WAKE) && si->owner)
task_wakeup(si->owner, TASK_WOKEN_IO);
}
|
static void stream_int_chk_snd(struct stream_interface *si)
{
struct channel *ob = si->ob;
DPRINTF(stderr, "%s: si=%p, si->state=%d ib->flags=%08x ob->flags=%08x\n",
__FUNCTION__,
si, si->state, si->ib->flags, si->ob->flags);
if (unlikely(si->state != SI_ST_EST || (si->ob->flags & CF_SHUTW)))
return;
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_WAIT_DATA) || /* not waiting for data */
channel_is_empty(ob)) /* called with nothing to send ! */
return;
/* Otherwise there are remaining data to be sent in the buffer,
* so we tell the handler.
*/
si->flags &= ~SI_FL_WAIT_DATA;
if (!tick_isset(ob->wex))
ob->wex = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, ob->wto);
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_DONT_WAKE) && si->owner)
task_wakeup(si->owner, TASK_WOKEN_IO);
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2010-3702
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-3702/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
|
e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
| null |
int Gfx::getPos() {
return parser ? parser->getPos() : -1;
}
|
int Gfx::getPos() {
return parser ? parser->getPos() : -1;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10030
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
|
_valid_sbcast_cred(file_bcast_msg_t *req, uid_t req_uid, uint16_t block_no,
uint32_t *job_id)
{
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
char *nodes = NULL;
hostset_t hset = NULL;
*job_id = NO_VAL;
rc = extract_sbcast_cred(conf->vctx, req->cred, block_no,
job_id, &nodes);
if (rc != 0) {
error("Security violation: Invalid sbcast_cred from uid %d",
req_uid);
return ESLURMD_INVALID_JOB_CREDENTIAL;
}
if (!(hset = hostset_create(nodes))) {
error("Unable to parse sbcast_cred hostlist %s", nodes);
rc = ESLURMD_INVALID_JOB_CREDENTIAL;
} else if (!hostset_within(hset, conf->node_name)) {
error("Security violation: sbcast_cred from %d has "
"bad hostset %s", req_uid, nodes);
rc = ESLURMD_INVALID_JOB_CREDENTIAL;
}
if (hset)
hostset_destroy(hset);
xfree(nodes);
/* print_sbcast_cred(req->cred); */
return rc;
}
|
_valid_sbcast_cred(file_bcast_msg_t *req, uid_t req_uid, uint16_t block_no,
uint32_t *job_id)
{
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
char *nodes = NULL;
hostset_t hset = NULL;
*job_id = NO_VAL;
rc = extract_sbcast_cred(conf->vctx, req->cred, block_no,
job_id, &nodes);
if (rc != 0) {
error("Security violation: Invalid sbcast_cred from uid %d",
req_uid);
return ESLURMD_INVALID_JOB_CREDENTIAL;
}
if (!(hset = hostset_create(nodes))) {
error("Unable to parse sbcast_cred hostlist %s", nodes);
rc = ESLURMD_INVALID_JOB_CREDENTIAL;
} else if (!hostset_within(hset, conf->node_name)) {
error("Security violation: sbcast_cred from %d has "
"bad hostset %s", req_uid, nodes);
rc = ESLURMD_INVALID_JOB_CREDENTIAL;
}
if (hset)
hostset_destroy(hset);
xfree(nodes);
/* print_sbcast_cred(req->cred); */
return rc;
}
|
C
|
slurm
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7908
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7908/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2006ac87cec58363090e7d5e10d5d9e3bbda9f9
|
b2006ac87cec58363090e7d5e10d5d9e3bbda9f9
|
Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
|
static uint64 ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64 value;
reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value);
return value;
}
|
static uint64 ReadBits(BitReader* reader, int num_bits) {
DCHECK_GE(reader->bits_available(), num_bits);
DCHECK((num_bits > 0) && (num_bits <= 64));
uint64 value;
reader->ReadBits(num_bits, &value);
return value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS;
if (enable_ept)
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits |= X86_CR4_PGE;
if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
~get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
}
|
static void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS;
if (enable_ept)
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits |= X86_CR4_PGE;
if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
~get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9777
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9777/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81cdb259fb6d8c1c4ecfeea389ff5a73c07f5755
|
81cdb259fb6d8c1c4ecfeea389ff5a73c07f5755
|
KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds accesses of rtc_eoi map
KVM was using arrays of size KVM_MAX_VCPUS with vcpu_id, but ID can be
bigger that the maximal number of VCPUs, resulting in out-of-bounds
access.
Found by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 at addr [...]
Write of size 1 by task a.out/27101
CPU: 1 PID: 27101 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:905
[...] kvm_apic_set_irq+0x10e/0x180 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:495
[...] kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0x732/0xc10 arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c:86
[...] ioapic_service+0x41d/0x760 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:360
[...] ioapic_set_irq+0x275/0x6c0 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:222
[...] kvm_ioapic_inject_all arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:235
[...] kvm_set_ioapic+0x223/0x310 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:670
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3668
[...] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x1a08/0x23c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3999
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x1fa/0x1a70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3099
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: af1bae5497b9 ("KVM: x86: bump KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID to 1023")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
|
int kvm_ioapic_set_irq(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq, int irq_source_id,
int level, bool line_status)
{
int ret, irq_level;
BUG_ON(irq < 0 || irq >= IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
irq_level = __kvm_irq_line_state(&ioapic->irq_states[irq],
irq_source_id, level);
ret = ioapic_set_irq(ioapic, irq, irq_level, line_status);
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
return ret;
}
|
int kvm_ioapic_set_irq(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic, int irq, int irq_source_id,
int level, bool line_status)
{
int ret, irq_level;
BUG_ON(irq < 0 || irq >= IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
irq_level = __kvm_irq_line_state(&ioapic->irq_states[irq],
irq_source_id, level);
ret = ioapic_set_irq(ioapic, irq, irq_level, line_status);
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5116
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5116/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/acf2f0799f6f732dd70f45ddd252d773be7afd11
|
acf2f0799f6f732dd70f45ddd252d773be7afd11
|
Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
|
void PageInfoBubbleView::SetCookieInfo(const CookieInfoList& cookie_info_list) {
if (cookie_dialog_link_ == nullptr) {
cookie_dialog_link_ = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetPluralStringFUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_NUM_COOKIES, 0));
cookie_dialog_link_->set_id(
PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_LINK_COOKIE_DIALOG);
cookie_dialog_link_->set_listener(this);
cookie_dialog_link_->SetUnderline(false);
PageInfoUI::PermissionInfo info;
info.type = CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES;
info.setting = CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW;
info.is_incognito =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents()->GetBrowserContext())
->IsOffTheRecord();
const gfx::ImageSkia icon =
PageInfoUI::GetPermissionIcon(info).AsImageSkia();
site_settings_view_->AddChildView(CreateInspectLinkSection(
icon, IDS_PAGE_INFO_COOKIES, cookie_dialog_link_));
}
DCHECK_EQ(cookie_info_list.size(), 2u);
int total_allowed = 0;
for (const auto& i : cookie_info_list) {
total_allowed += i.allowed;
}
base::string16 label_text = l10n_util::GetPluralStringFUTF16(
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NUM_COOKIES, total_allowed);
cookie_dialog_link_->SetText(label_text);
cookie_dialog_link_->SetTooltipText(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_COOKIES_TOOLTIP));
Layout();
SizeToContents();
}
|
void PageInfoBubbleView::SetCookieInfo(const CookieInfoList& cookie_info_list) {
if (cookie_dialog_link_ == nullptr) {
cookie_dialog_link_ = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetPluralStringFUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_NUM_COOKIES, 0));
cookie_dialog_link_->set_id(
PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_LINK_COOKIE_DIALOG);
cookie_dialog_link_->set_listener(this);
cookie_dialog_link_->SetUnderline(false);
PageInfoUI::PermissionInfo info;
info.type = CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES;
info.setting = CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW;
info.is_incognito =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents()->GetBrowserContext())
->IsOffTheRecord();
const gfx::ImageSkia icon =
PageInfoUI::GetPermissionIcon(info).AsImageSkia();
site_settings_view_->AddChildView(CreateInspectLinkSection(
icon, IDS_PAGE_INFO_COOKIES, cookie_dialog_link_));
}
DCHECK_EQ(cookie_info_list.size(), 2u);
int total_allowed = 0;
for (const auto& i : cookie_info_list) {
total_allowed += i.allowed;
}
base::string16 label_text = l10n_util::GetPluralStringFUTF16(
IDS_PAGE_INFO_NUM_COOKIES, total_allowed);
cookie_dialog_link_->SetText(label_text);
cookie_dialog_link_->SetTooltipText(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_COOKIES_TOOLTIP));
Layout();
SizeToContents();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15594
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15594/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5800dc5c19f34e6e03b5adab1282535cb102fafd
|
5800dc5c19f34e6e03b5adab1282535cb102fafd
|
x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
int paravirt_disable_iospace(void)
{
return request_resource(&ioport_resource, &reserve_ioports);
}
|
int paravirt_disable_iospace(void)
{
return request_resource(&ioport_resource, &reserve_ioports);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12182/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=1b1d4c04695dced2463404174b50b3581dbd857b
|
1b1d4c04695dced2463404174b50b3581dbd857b
| null |
DGAStealButtonEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int index, int button, int is_down)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv;
DGAEvent event;
if (!DGAScreenKeyRegistered) /* no DGA */
return FALSE;
pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
if (!pScreenPriv || !pScreenPriv->grabMouse)
return FALSE;
event = (DGAEvent) {
.header = ET_Internal,
.type = ET_DGAEvent,
.length = sizeof(event),
.time = GetTimeInMillis(),
.subtype = (is_down ? ET_ButtonPress : ET_ButtonRelease),
.detail = button,
.dx = 0,
.dy = 0
};
mieqEnqueue(dev, (InternalEvent *) &event);
return TRUE;
}
|
DGAStealButtonEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int index, int button, int is_down)
{
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv;
DGAEvent event;
if (!DGAScreenKeyRegistered) /* no DGA */
return FALSE;
pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(screenInfo.screens[index]);
if (!pScreenPriv || !pScreenPriv->grabMouse)
return FALSE;
event = (DGAEvent) {
.header = ET_Internal,
.type = ET_DGAEvent,
.length = sizeof(event),
.time = GetTimeInMillis(),
.subtype = (is_down ? ET_ButtonPress : ET_ButtonRelease),
.detail = button,
.dx = 0,
.dy = 0
};
mieqEnqueue(dev, (InternalEvent *) &event);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2891/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleManagePrinters(const ListValue* /*args*/) {
++manage_printers_dialog_request_count_;
printing::PrinterManagerDialog::ShowPrinterManagerDialog();
}
|
void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleManagePrinters(const ListValue* /*args*/) {
++manage_printers_dialog_request_count_;
printing::PrinterManagerDialog::ShowPrinterManagerDialog();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
bool WebMediaPlayerMS::CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* gl,
unsigned target,
unsigned int texture,
unsigned internal_format,
unsigned format,
unsigned type,
int level,
bool premultiply_alpha,
bool flip_y,
int already_uploaded_id,
VideoFrameUploadMetadata* out_metadata) {
TRACE_EVENT0("media", "copyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture");
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame> video_frame =
compositor_->GetCurrentFrameWithoutUpdatingStatistics();
if (!video_frame.get() || !video_frame->HasTextures())
return false;
media::Context3D context_3d;
auto* provider =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->SharedMainThreadContextProvider().get();
if (!provider)
return false;
context_3d = media::Context3D(provider->ContextGL(), provider->GrContext());
DCHECK(context_3d.gl);
return video_renderer_.CopyVideoFrameTexturesToGLTexture(
context_3d, provider->ContextSupport(), gl, video_frame.get(), target,
texture, internal_format, format, type, level, premultiply_alpha, flip_y);
}
|
bool WebMediaPlayerMS::CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* gl,
unsigned target,
unsigned int texture,
unsigned internal_format,
unsigned format,
unsigned type,
int level,
bool premultiply_alpha,
bool flip_y,
int already_uploaded_id,
VideoFrameUploadMetadata* out_metadata) {
TRACE_EVENT0("media", "copyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture");
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame> video_frame =
compositor_->GetCurrentFrameWithoutUpdatingStatistics();
if (!video_frame.get() || !video_frame->HasTextures())
return false;
media::Context3D context_3d;
auto* provider =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->SharedMainThreadContextProvider().get();
if (!provider)
return false;
context_3d = media::Context3D(provider->ContextGL(), provider->GrContext());
DCHECK(context_3d.gl);
return video_renderer_.CopyVideoFrameTexturesToGLTexture(
context_3d, provider->ContextSupport(), gl, video_frame.get(), target,
texture, internal_format, format, type, level, premultiply_alpha, flip_y);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6091
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6091/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/59ad2dcbe6dd5c5d846944258e6cd26a700ade83
|
59ad2dcbe6dd5c5d846944258e6cd26a700ade83
|
service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
|
void ImageLoader::UpdateLayoutObject() {
LayoutImageResource* image_resource = GetLayoutImageResource();
if (!image_resource)
return;
ImageResourceContent* cached_image_content = image_resource->CachedImage();
if (image_content_ != cached_image_content &&
(image_complete_ || !cached_image_content))
image_resource->SetImageResource(image_content_.Get());
}
|
void ImageLoader::UpdateLayoutObject() {
LayoutImageResource* image_resource = GetLayoutImageResource();
if (!image_resource)
return;
ImageResourceContent* cached_image_content = image_resource->CachedImage();
if (image_content_ != cached_image_content &&
(image_complete_ || !cached_image_content))
image_resource->SetImageResource(image_content_.Get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
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This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
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This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
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