CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_decode_layoutcommit(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
struct nfsd4_layoutcommit *lcp)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
u32 timechange;
READ_BUF(20);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lcp->lc_seg.offset);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lcp->lc_seg.length);
lcp->lc_reclaim = be32_to_cpup(p++);
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &lcp->lc_sid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
lcp->lc_newoffset = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (lcp->lc_newoffset) {
READ_BUF(8);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lcp->lc_last_wr);
} else
lcp->lc_last_wr = 0;
READ_BUF(4);
timechange = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (timechange) {
status = nfsd4_decode_time(argp, &lcp->lc_mtime);
if (status)
return status;
} else {
lcp->lc_mtime.tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
READ_BUF(8);
lcp->lc_layout_type = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/*
* Save the layout update in XDR format and let the layout driver deal
* with it later.
*/
lcp->lc_up_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (lcp->lc_up_len > 0) {
READ_BUF(lcp->lc_up_len);
READMEM(lcp->lc_up_layout, lcp->lc_up_len);
}
DECODE_TAIL;
}
|
nfsd4_decode_layoutcommit(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
struct nfsd4_layoutcommit *lcp)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
u32 timechange;
READ_BUF(20);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lcp->lc_seg.offset);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lcp->lc_seg.length);
lcp->lc_reclaim = be32_to_cpup(p++);
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &lcp->lc_sid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
lcp->lc_newoffset = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (lcp->lc_newoffset) {
READ_BUF(8);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &lcp->lc_last_wr);
} else
lcp->lc_last_wr = 0;
READ_BUF(4);
timechange = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (timechange) {
status = nfsd4_decode_time(argp, &lcp->lc_mtime);
if (status)
return status;
} else {
lcp->lc_mtime.tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
READ_BUF(8);
lcp->lc_layout_type = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/*
* Save the layout update in XDR format and let the layout driver deal
* with it later.
*/
lcp->lc_up_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (lcp->lc_up_len > 0) {
READ_BUF(lcp->lc_up_len);
READMEM(lcp->lc_up_layout, lcp->lc_up_len);
}
DECODE_TAIL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6712
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6712/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4
|
2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4
|
iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
|
int iwl_sta_rx_agg_start(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
int tid, u16 ssn)
{
unsigned long flags;
int sta_id;
struct iwl_addsta_cmd sta_cmd;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
sta_id = iwl_sta_id(sta);
if (sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION)
return -ENXIO;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.station_flags_msk = 0;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.modify_mask = STA_MODIFY_ADDBA_TID_MSK;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.add_immediate_ba_tid = (u8)tid;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.add_immediate_ba_ssn = cpu_to_le16(ssn);
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode = STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK;
memcpy(&sta_cmd, &priv->stations[sta_id].sta, sizeof(struct iwl_addsta_cmd));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return iwl_send_add_sta(priv, &sta_cmd, CMD_SYNC);
}
|
int iwl_sta_rx_agg_start(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
int tid, u16 ssn)
{
unsigned long flags;
int sta_id;
struct iwl_addsta_cmd sta_cmd;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
sta_id = iwl_sta_id(sta);
if (sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION)
return -ENXIO;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.station_flags_msk = 0;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.modify_mask = STA_MODIFY_ADDBA_TID_MSK;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.add_immediate_ba_tid = (u8)tid;
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.add_immediate_ba_ssn = cpu_to_le16(ssn);
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode = STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK;
memcpy(&sta_cmd, &priv->stations[sta_id].sta, sizeof(struct iwl_addsta_cmd));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return iwl_send_add_sta(priv, &sta_cmd, CMD_SYNC);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5147/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11
|
5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11
|
Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
|
PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollingBackgroundDisplayItemClient::VisualRect()
const {
const auto* box = scrollable_area_->GetLayoutBox();
const auto& paint_offset = box->FirstFragment().PaintOffset();
auto overflow_clip_rect =
PixelSnappedIntRect(box->OverflowClipRect(paint_offset));
auto scroll_size = scrollable_area_->PixelSnappedContentsSize(paint_offset);
scroll_size = scroll_size.ExpandedTo(overflow_clip_rect.Size());
LayoutRect result(overflow_clip_rect.Location(), scroll_size);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CompositeAfterPaintEnabled()) {
DCHECK_EQ(result,
scrollable_area_->layer_->GraphicsLayerBacking()->VisualRect());
}
#endif
return result;
}
|
PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollingBackgroundDisplayItemClient::VisualRect()
const {
const auto* box = scrollable_area_->GetLayoutBox();
const auto& paint_offset = box->FirstFragment().PaintOffset();
auto overflow_clip_rect =
PixelSnappedIntRect(box->OverflowClipRect(paint_offset));
auto scroll_size = scrollable_area_->PixelSnappedContentsSize(paint_offset);
scroll_size = scroll_size.ExpandedTo(overflow_clip_rect.Size());
LayoutRect result(overflow_clip_rect.Location(), scroll_size);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CompositeAfterPaintEnabled()) {
DCHECK_EQ(result,
scrollable_area_->layer_->GraphicsLayerBacking()->VisualRect());
}
#endif
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
int i;
destroy_cfs_bandwidth(tg_cfs_bandwidth(tg));
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
if (tg->cfs_rq)
kfree(tg->cfs_rq[i]);
if (tg->se)
kfree(tg->se[i]);
}
kfree(tg->cfs_rq);
kfree(tg->se);
}
|
void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
int i;
destroy_cfs_bandwidth(tg_cfs_bandwidth(tg));
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
if (tg->cfs_rq)
kfree(tg->cfs_rq[i]);
if (tg->se)
kfree(tg->se[i]);
}
kfree(tg->cfs_rq);
kfree(tg->se);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::ShouldOverrideUserAgentInNewTabs() {
return should_override_user_agent_in_new_tabs_;
}
|
bool WebContentsImpl::ShouldOverrideUserAgentInNewTabs() {
return should_override_user_agent_in_new_tabs_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3870/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1e9801783770917728b7edbdeff3d0ec09c621ac
|
1e9801783770917728b7edbdeff3d0ec09c621ac
|
omx: prevent input port enable/disable for software codecs
Bug: 29421804
Change-Id: Iba1011e9af942a6dff7f659af769a51e3f5ba66f
|
void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onChangeState(OMX_STATETYPE state) {
CHECK_EQ((int)mState, (int)mTargetState);
switch (mState) {
case OMX_StateLoaded:
CHECK_EQ((int)state, (int)OMX_StateIdle);
break;
case OMX_StateIdle:
CHECK(state == OMX_StateLoaded || state == OMX_StateExecuting);
break;
case OMX_StateExecuting:
{
CHECK_EQ((int)state, (int)OMX_StateIdle);
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPorts.size(); ++i) {
onPortFlush(i, false /* sendFlushComplete */);
}
mState = OMX_StateIdle;
notify(OMX_EventCmdComplete, OMX_CommandStateSet, state, NULL);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
mTargetState = state;
checkTransitions();
}
|
void SimpleSoftOMXComponent::onChangeState(OMX_STATETYPE state) {
CHECK_EQ((int)mState, (int)mTargetState);
switch (mState) {
case OMX_StateLoaded:
CHECK_EQ((int)state, (int)OMX_StateIdle);
break;
case OMX_StateIdle:
CHECK(state == OMX_StateLoaded || state == OMX_StateExecuting);
break;
case OMX_StateExecuting:
{
CHECK_EQ((int)state, (int)OMX_StateIdle);
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPorts.size(); ++i) {
onPortFlush(i, false /* sendFlushComplete */);
}
mState = OMX_StateIdle;
notify(OMX_EventCmdComplete, OMX_CommandStateSet, state, NULL);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
mTargetState = state;
checkTransitions();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThreadImpl::AddEmbeddedWorkerRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Listener* listener) {
AddRoute(routing_id, listener);
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
devtools_agent_message_filter_->AddEmbeddedWorkerRouteOnMainThread(
routing_id);
}
}
|
void RenderThreadImpl::AddEmbeddedWorkerRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Listener* listener) {
AddRoute(routing_id, listener);
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
devtools_agent_message_filter_->AddEmbeddedWorkerRouteOnMainThread(
routing_id);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9150/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0d0e57697f162da4aa218b5feafe614fb666db07
|
0d0e57697f162da4aa218b5feafe614fb666db07
|
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
kfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
cur_stack = 1;
peek_stack:
if (cur_stack == 0)
goto check_state;
t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
goto mark_explored;
} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
* after every call and jump
*/
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
} else {
/* conditional jump with two edges */
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else {
/* all other non-branch instructions with single
* fall-through edge
*/
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
mark_explored:
insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_free;
}
goto peek_stack;
check_state:
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
kfree(insn_state);
kfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
|
static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
kfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
cur_stack = 1;
peek_stack:
if (cur_stack == 0)
goto check_state;
t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
goto mark_explored;
} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
* after every call and jump
*/
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
} else {
/* conditional jump with two edges */
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else {
/* all other non-branch instructions with single
* fall-through edge
*/
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
mark_explored:
insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_free;
}
goto peek_stack;
check_state:
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
kfree(insn_state);
kfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5220/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c6f0d22d508a551a40fc8bd7418941b77435aac3
|
c6f0d22d508a551a40fc8bd7418941b77435aac3
|
omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
|
bool OmniboxViewViews::MaybeUnfocusTabButton() {
if (SelectedSuggestionHasTabMatch() &&
model()->popup_model()->selected_line_state() ==
OmniboxPopupModel::BUTTON_FOCUSED) {
model()->popup_model()->SetSelectedLineState(OmniboxPopupModel::NORMAL);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
bool OmniboxViewViews::MaybeUnfocusTabButton() {
if (SelectedSuggestionHasTabMatch() &&
model()->popup_model()->selected_line_state() ==
OmniboxPopupModel::BUTTON_FOCUSED) {
model()->popup_model()->SetSelectedLineState(OmniboxPopupModel::NORMAL);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
ModuleExport void UnregisterRAWImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("R");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("C");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("G");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("M");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("B");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("Y");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("A");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("O");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("K");
}
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterRAWImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("R");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("C");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("G");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("M");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("B");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("Y");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("A");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("O");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("K");
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13693
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13693/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/acpica/acpica/pull/295/commits/987a3b5cf7175916e2a4b6ea5b8e70f830dfe732
|
987a3b5cf7175916e2a4b6ea5b8e70f830dfe732
|
acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
|
AcpiDsCreateOperands (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *FirstArg)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arg;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arguments[ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS];
UINT32 ArgCount = 0;
UINT32 Index = WalkState->NumOperands;
UINT32 PrevNumOperands = WalkState->NumOperands;
UINT32 NewNumOperands;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsCreateOperands, FirstArg);
/* Get all arguments in the list */
Arg = FirstArg;
while (Arg)
{
if (Index >= ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_DATA);
}
Arguments[Index] = Arg;
WalkState->Operands [Index] = NULL;
/* Move on to next argument, if any */
Arg = Arg->Common.Next;
ArgCount++;
Index++;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"NumOperands %d, ArgCount %d, Index %d\n",
WalkState->NumOperands, ArgCount, Index));
/* Create the interpreter arguments, in reverse order */
NewNumOperands = Index;
Index--;
for (i = 0; i < ArgCount; i++)
{
Arg = Arguments[Index];
WalkState->OperandIndex = (UINT8) Index;
Status = AcpiDsCreateOperand (WalkState, Arg, Index);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Created Arg #%u (%p) %u args total\n",
Index, Arg, ArgCount));
Index--;
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
Cleanup:
/*
* We must undo everything done above; meaning that we must
* pop everything off of the operand stack and delete those
* objects
*/
WalkState->NumOperands = i;
AcpiDsObjStackPopAndDelete (NewNumOperands, WalkState);
/* Restore operand count */
WalkState->NumOperands = PrevNumOperands;
ACPI_EXCEPTION ((AE_INFO, Status, "While creating Arg %u", Index));
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
|
AcpiDsCreateOperands (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *FirstArg)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arg;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arguments[ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS];
UINT32 ArgCount = 0;
UINT32 Index = WalkState->NumOperands;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsCreateOperands, FirstArg);
/* Get all arguments in the list */
Arg = FirstArg;
while (Arg)
{
if (Index >= ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_DATA);
}
Arguments[Index] = Arg;
WalkState->Operands [Index] = NULL;
/* Move on to next argument, if any */
Arg = Arg->Common.Next;
ArgCount++;
Index++;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"NumOperands %d, ArgCount %d, Index %d\n",
WalkState->NumOperands, ArgCount, Index));
/* Create the interpreter arguments, in reverse order */
Index--;
for (i = 0; i < ArgCount; i++)
{
Arg = Arguments[Index];
WalkState->OperandIndex = (UINT8) Index;
Status = AcpiDsCreateOperand (WalkState, Arg, Index);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Created Arg #%u (%p) %u args total\n",
Index, Arg, ArgCount));
Index--;
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
Cleanup:
/*
* We must undo everything done above; meaning that we must
* pop everything off of the operand stack and delete those
* objects
*/
AcpiDsObjStackPopAndDelete (ArgCount, WalkState);
ACPI_EXCEPTION ((AE_INFO, Status, "While creating Arg %u", Index));
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
|
C
|
acpica
| 1 |
CVE-2015-6761
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6761/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
|
const KURL& DocumentLoader::Url() const {
return request_.Url();
}
|
const KURL& DocumentLoader::Url() const {
return request_.Url();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18341
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18341/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dae5b388b44dae4dc11668dba210bbb92d72d969
|
dae5b388b44dae4dc11668dba210bbb92d72d969
|
Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
|
std::unique_ptr<TextCodec> TextCodecUTF8::Create(const TextEncoding&,
const void*) {
return base::WrapUnique(new TextCodecUTF8());
}
|
std::unique_ptr<TextCodec> TextCodecUTF8::Create(const TextEncoding&,
const void*) {
return base::WrapUnique(new TextCodecUTF8());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10270
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10270/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/9a72a69e035ee70ff5c41541c8c61cd97990d018
|
9a72a69e035ee70ff5c41541c8c61cd97990d018
|
* libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
|
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Slong(int32 value)
{
if (value < 0)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
|
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLong8Slong(int32 value)
{
if (value < 0)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2906/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
[SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
|
static int pmcraid_eh_host_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
unsigned long interval = 10000; /* 10 seconds interval */
int waits = jiffies_to_msecs(PMCRAID_RESET_HOST_TIMEOUT) / interval;
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance =
(struct pmcraid_instance *)(scmd->device->host->hostdata);
/* wait for an additional 150 seconds just in case firmware could come
* up and if it could complete all the pending commands excluding the
* two HCAM (CCN and LDN).
*/
while (waits--) {
if (atomic_read(&pinstance->outstanding_cmds) <=
PMCRAID_MAX_HCAM_CMD)
return SUCCESS;
msleep(interval);
}
dev_err(&pinstance->pdev->dev,
"Adapter being reset due to an I/O command timeout.\n");
return pmcraid_reset_bringup(pinstance) == 0 ? SUCCESS : FAILED;
}
|
static int pmcraid_eh_host_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
unsigned long interval = 10000; /* 10 seconds interval */
int waits = jiffies_to_msecs(PMCRAID_RESET_HOST_TIMEOUT) / interval;
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance =
(struct pmcraid_instance *)(scmd->device->host->hostdata);
/* wait for an additional 150 seconds just in case firmware could come
* up and if it could complete all the pending commands excluding the
* two HCAM (CCN and LDN).
*/
while (waits--) {
if (atomic_read(&pinstance->outstanding_cmds) <=
PMCRAID_MAX_HCAM_CMD)
return SUCCESS;
msleep(interval);
}
dev_err(&pinstance->pdev->dev,
"Adapter being reset due to an I/O command timeout.\n");
return pmcraid_reset_bringup(pinstance) == 0 ? SUCCESS : FAILED;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5354
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5354/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/2cb5985bf47bdc8bea78d28483ed224abdd33dc6
|
2cb5985bf47bdc8bea78d28483ed224abdd33dc6
|
Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
|
dissect_u3v_stream_leader(proto_tree *u3v_telegram_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info _U_)
{
guint32 offset = 0;
guint32 payload_type = 0;
guint64 block_id = 0;
proto_item *item = NULL;
/* Subtree initialization for Stream Leader */
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_leader, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_telegram_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_stream_leader);
/* Add the prefix code: */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_prefix, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* reserved field */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
offset += 2;
/* leader size */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_leader_size, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* block id */
block_id = tvb_get_letoh64(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_block_id, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 8;
/* reserved field */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
offset += 2;
/* payload type */
payload_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_payload_type, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* Add payload type to information string */
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Stream Leader [ Block ID: %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u , Type %s]",
block_id,
val_to_str(payload_type, payload_type_names, "Unknown Payload Type"));
if (payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE ||
payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE_EXT_CHUNK ||
payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_CHUNK) {
/* timestamp */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 8;
}
if (payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE ||
payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE_EXT_CHUNK ) {
/* pixel format */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_pixel_format, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* size_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_size_x, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* size_y */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_size_y, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* offset_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_offset_x, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* offset_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_offset_y, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* padding_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_padding_x, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
/* offset += 2; */
/* reserved field */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
/* offset += 2; */
}
}
|
dissect_u3v_stream_leader(proto_tree *u3v_telegram_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info _U_)
{
guint32 offset = 0;
guint32 payload_type = 0;
guint64 block_id = 0;
proto_item *item = NULL;
/* Subtree initialization for Stream Leader */
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_leader, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_telegram_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_stream_leader);
/* Add the prefix code: */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_prefix, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* reserved field */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
offset += 2;
/* leader size */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_leader_size, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* block id */
block_id = tvb_get_letoh64(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_block_id, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 8;
/* reserved field */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
offset += 2;
/* payload type */
payload_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_payload_type, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* Add payload type to information string */
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Stream Leader [ Block ID: %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u , Type %s]",
block_id,
val_to_str(payload_type, payload_type_names, "Unknown Payload Type"));
if (payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE ||
payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE_EXT_CHUNK ||
payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_CHUNK) {
/* timestamp */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 8;
}
if (payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE ||
payload_type == U3V_STREAM_PAYLOAD_IMAGE_EXT_CHUNK ) {
/* pixel format */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_pixel_format, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* size_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_size_x, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* size_y */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_size_y, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* offset_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_offset_x, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* offset_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_offset_y, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* padding_x */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_padding_x, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
/* offset += 2; */
/* reserved field */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_reserved, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA);
/* offset += 2; */
}
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16066/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bf635c28effa427a270f4fc45df84ed344f411c
|
2bf635c28effa427a270f4fc45df84ed344f411c
|
Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
|
Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLStyleElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
if (isConnected()) {
if (StyleElement::ProcessStyleSheet(GetDocument(), *this) ==
StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError) {
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
}
return kInsertionDone;
}
|
Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLStyleElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
HTMLElement::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
return kInsertionShouldCallDidNotifySubtreeInsertions;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static int xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct twofish_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
return glue_xts_crypt_128bit(&twofish_enc_xts, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
XTS_TWEAK_CAST(twofish_enc_blk),
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx);
}
|
static int xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct twofish_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
return glue_xts_crypt_128bit(&twofish_enc_xts, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
XTS_TWEAK_CAST(twofish_enc_blk),
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5302/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/abrt/libreport/commit/257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
|
static void wrap_all_labels(GtkWidget *widget)
{
label_wrapper(widget, NULL);
}
|
static void wrap_all_labels(GtkWidget *widget)
{
label_wrapper(widget, NULL);
}
|
C
|
libreport
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10192
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10192/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156
|
a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156
|
ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static void update_datarate(DataRateData *drd, int64_t count)
{
if (!drd->time1 && !drd->count1) {
drd->time1 = drd->time2 = cur_time;
drd->count1 = drd->count2 = count;
} else if (cur_time - drd->time2 > 5000) {
drd->time1 = drd->time2;
drd->count1 = drd->count2;
drd->time2 = cur_time;
drd->count2 = count;
}
}
|
static void update_datarate(DataRateData *drd, int64_t count)
{
if (!drd->time1 && !drd->count1) {
drd->time1 = drd->time2 = cur_time;
drd->count1 = drd->count2 = count;
} else if (cur_time - drd->time2 > 5000) {
drd->time1 = drd->time2;
drd->count1 = drd->count2;
drd->time2 = cur_time;
drd->count2 = count;
}
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11171/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/gnome-session/commit/b0dc999e0b45355314616321dbb6cb71e729fc9d
|
b0dc999e0b45355314616321dbb6cb71e729fc9d
|
[gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
|
gsm_xsmp_client_new (IceConn ice_conn)
{
GsmXSMPClient *xsmp;
xsmp = g_object_new (GSM_TYPE_XSMP_CLIENT,
"ice-connection", ice_conn,
NULL);
return GSM_CLIENT (xsmp);
}
|
gsm_xsmp_client_new (IceConn ice_conn)
{
GsmXSMPClient *xsmp;
xsmp = g_object_new (GSM_TYPE_XSMP_CLIENT,
"ice-connection", ice_conn,
NULL);
return GSM_CLIENT (xsmp);
}
|
C
|
gnome-session
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
|
decode_NXAST_RAW_MULTIPATH(const struct nx_action_multipath *nam,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *tlv_bitmap, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint32_t n_links = ntohs(nam->max_link) + 1;
size_t min_n_bits = log_2_ceil(n_links);
struct ofpact_multipath *mp;
enum ofperr error;
mp = ofpact_put_MULTIPATH(out);
mp->fields = ntohs(nam->fields);
mp->basis = ntohs(nam->basis);
mp->algorithm = ntohs(nam->algorithm);
mp->max_link = ntohs(nam->max_link);
mp->arg = ntohl(nam->arg);
mp->dst.ofs = nxm_decode_ofs(nam->ofs_nbits);
mp->dst.n_bits = nxm_decode_n_bits(nam->ofs_nbits);
error = mf_vl_mff_mf_from_nxm_header(ntohl(nam->dst), vl_mff_map,
&mp->dst.field, tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (!flow_hash_fields_valid(mp->fields)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported fields %d", (int) mp->fields);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else if (mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_MODULO_N
&& mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_HASH_THRESHOLD
&& mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_HRW
&& mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_ITER_HASH) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported algorithm %d", (int) mp->algorithm);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else if (mp->dst.n_bits < min_n_bits) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "multipath action requires at least %"PRIuSIZE" bits for "
"%"PRIu32" links", min_n_bits, n_links);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
return multipath_check(mp, NULL);
}
|
decode_NXAST_RAW_MULTIPATH(const struct nx_action_multipath *nam,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *tlv_bitmap, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint32_t n_links = ntohs(nam->max_link) + 1;
size_t min_n_bits = log_2_ceil(n_links);
struct ofpact_multipath *mp;
enum ofperr error;
mp = ofpact_put_MULTIPATH(out);
mp->fields = ntohs(nam->fields);
mp->basis = ntohs(nam->basis);
mp->algorithm = ntohs(nam->algorithm);
mp->max_link = ntohs(nam->max_link);
mp->arg = ntohl(nam->arg);
mp->dst.ofs = nxm_decode_ofs(nam->ofs_nbits);
mp->dst.n_bits = nxm_decode_n_bits(nam->ofs_nbits);
error = mf_vl_mff_mf_from_nxm_header(ntohl(nam->dst), vl_mff_map,
&mp->dst.field, tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (!flow_hash_fields_valid(mp->fields)) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported fields %d", (int) mp->fields);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else if (mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_MODULO_N
&& mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_HASH_THRESHOLD
&& mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_HRW
&& mp->algorithm != NX_MP_ALG_ITER_HASH) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "unsupported algorithm %d", (int) mp->algorithm);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else if (mp->dst.n_bits < min_n_bits) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "multipath action requires at least %"PRIuSIZE" bits for "
"%"PRIu32" links", min_n_bits, n_links);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
return multipath_check(mp, NULL);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
MockOverscrollControllerImpl()
: content_scrolling_(false),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
|
MockOverscrollControllerImpl()
: content_scrolling_(false),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15903/
|
CWE-611
|
https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
setContext(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *context) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *s = context;
while (*context != XML_T('\0')) {
if (*s == CONTEXT_SEP || *s == XML_T('\0')) {
ENTITY *e;
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
e = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities,
poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), 0);
if (e)
e->open = XML_TRUE;
if (*s != XML_T('\0'))
s++;
context = s;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
} else if (*s == XML_T(ASCII_EQUALS)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
if (poolLength(&parser->m_tempPool) == 0)
prefix = &dtd->defaultPrefix;
else {
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
prefix
= (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes,
poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), sizeof(PREFIX));
if (! prefix)
return XML_FALSE;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool)) {
prefix->name = poolCopyString(&dtd->pool, prefix->name);
if (! prefix->name)
return XML_FALSE;
}
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
for (context = s + 1; *context != CONTEXT_SEP && *context != XML_T('\0');
context++)
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *context))
return XML_FALSE;
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
if (addBinding(parser, prefix, NULL, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool),
&parser->m_inheritedBindings)
!= XML_ERROR_NONE)
return XML_FALSE;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (*context != XML_T('\0'))
++context;
s = context;
} else {
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return XML_FALSE;
s++;
}
}
return XML_TRUE;
}
|
setContext(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *context) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *s = context;
while (*context != XML_T('\0')) {
if (*s == CONTEXT_SEP || *s == XML_T('\0')) {
ENTITY *e;
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
e = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities,
poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), 0);
if (e)
e->open = XML_TRUE;
if (*s != XML_T('\0'))
s++;
context = s;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
} else if (*s == XML_T(ASCII_EQUALS)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
if (poolLength(&parser->m_tempPool) == 0)
prefix = &dtd->defaultPrefix;
else {
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
prefix
= (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes,
poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), sizeof(PREFIX));
if (! prefix)
return XML_FALSE;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool)) {
prefix->name = poolCopyString(&dtd->pool, prefix->name);
if (! prefix->name)
return XML_FALSE;
}
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
for (context = s + 1; *context != CONTEXT_SEP && *context != XML_T('\0');
context++)
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *context))
return XML_FALSE;
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
if (addBinding(parser, prefix, NULL, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool),
&parser->m_inheritedBindings)
!= XML_ERROR_NONE)
return XML_FALSE;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (*context != XML_T('\0'))
++context;
s = context;
} else {
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return XML_FALSE;
s++;
}
}
return XML_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
libexpat
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
image_transform_png_set_strip_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_strip_16_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
if (that->bit_depth == 16)
{
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->red_sBIT > 8) that->red_sBIT = 8;
if (that->green_sBIT > 8) that->green_sBIT = 8;
if (that->blue_sBIT > 8) that->blue_sBIT = 8;
if (that->alpha_sBIT > 8) that->alpha_sBIT = 8;
/* Prior to 1.5.4 png_set_strip_16 would use an 'accurate' method if this
* configuration option is set. From 1.5.4 the flag is never set and the
* 'scale' API (above) must be used.
*/
# ifdef PNG_READ_ACCURATE_SCALE_SUPPORTED
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10504
# error PNG_READ_ACCURATE_SCALE should not be set
# endif
/* The strip 16 algorithm drops the low 8 bits rather than calculating
* 1/257, so we need to adjust the permitted errors appropriately:
* Notice that this is only relevant prior to the addition of the
* png_set_scale_16 API in 1.5.4 (but 1.5.4+ always defines the above!)
*/
{
const double d = (255-128.5)/65535;
that->rede += d;
that->greene += d;
that->bluee += d;
that->alphae += d;
}
# endif
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
|
image_transform_png_set_strip_16_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if (that->bit_depth == 16)
{
that->sample_depth = that->bit_depth = 8;
if (that->red_sBIT > 8) that->red_sBIT = 8;
if (that->green_sBIT > 8) that->green_sBIT = 8;
if (that->blue_sBIT > 8) that->blue_sBIT = 8;
if (that->alpha_sBIT > 8) that->alpha_sBIT = 8;
/* Prior to 1.5.4 png_set_strip_16 would use an 'accurate' method if this
* configuration option is set. From 1.5.4 the flag is never set and the
* 'scale' API (above) must be used.
*/
# ifdef PNG_READ_ACCURATE_SCALE_SUPPORTED
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10504
# error PNG_READ_ACCURATE_SCALE should not be set
# endif
/* The strip 16 algorithm drops the low 8 bits rather than calculating
* 1/257, so we need to adjust the permitted errors appropriately:
* Notice that this is only relevant prior to the addition of the
* png_set_scale_16 API in 1.5.4 (but 1.5.4+ always defines the above!)
*/
{
PNG_CONST double d = (255-128.5)/65535;
that->rede += d;
that->greene += d;
that->bluee += d;
that->alphae += d;
}
# endif
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static void btreeReleaseAllCursorPages(BtCursor *pCur){
int i;
if( pCur->iPage>=0 ){
for(i=0; i<pCur->iPage; i++){
releasePageNotNull(pCur->apPage[i]);
}
releasePageNotNull(pCur->pPage);
pCur->iPage = -1;
}
}
|
static void btreeReleaseAllCursorPages(BtCursor *pCur){
int i;
if( pCur->iPage>=0 ){
for(i=0; i<pCur->iPage; i++){
releasePageNotNull(pCur->apPage[i]);
}
releasePageNotNull(pCur->pPage);
pCur->iPage = -1;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isBuffer(WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!buffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!buffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (buffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsBuffer(buffer->Object());
}
|
GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isBuffer(WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!buffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!buffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (buffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsBuffer(buffer->Object());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5838/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
|
void GrantActiveTab(const GURL& url) {
void GrantActiveTab(const Extension& extension, const GURL& url) {
APIPermissionSet tab_api_permissions;
tab_api_permissions.insert(APIPermission::kTab);
URLPatternSet tab_hosts;
tab_hosts.AddOrigin(UserScript::ValidUserScriptSchemes(),
url::Origin::Create(url).GetURL());
PermissionSet tab_permissions(std::move(tab_api_permissions),
ManifestPermissionSet(), tab_hosts,
tab_hosts);
extension.permissions_data()->UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(kTabId,
tab_permissions);
}
|
void GrantActiveTab(const GURL& url) {
APIPermissionSet tab_api_permissions;
tab_api_permissions.insert(APIPermission::kTab);
URLPatternSet tab_hosts;
tab_hosts.AddOrigin(UserScript::ValidUserScriptSchemes(),
url::Origin::Create(url).GetURL());
PermissionSet tab_permissions(std::move(tab_api_permissions),
ManifestPermissionSet(), tab_hosts,
tab_hosts);
active_tab_->permissions_data()->UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(
kTabId, tab_permissions);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-7916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7916/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3
|
proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static int proc_cwd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
task_lock(task);
if (task->fs) {
get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path);
result = 0;
}
task_unlock(task);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return result;
}
|
static int proc_cwd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry));
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
task_lock(task);
if (task->fs) {
get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path);
result = 0;
}
task_unlock(task);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2891
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2891/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
116d0963cadfbf55ef2ec3d13781987c4d80517a
|
Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TabContents* PrintPreviewHandler::GetInitiatorTab() const {
printing::PrintPreviewTabController* tab_controller =
printing::PrintPreviewTabController::GetInstance();
if (!tab_controller)
return NULL;
return tab_controller->GetInitiatorTab(preview_tab_contents());
}
|
TabContents* PrintPreviewHandler::GetInitiatorTab() const {
printing::PrintPreviewTabController* tab_controller =
printing::PrintPreviewTabController::GetInstance();
if (!tab_controller)
return NULL;
return tab_controller->GetInitiatorTab(preview_tab_contents());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
const auto& authenticator_id = dialog_model()->selected_authenticator_id();
DCHECK(authenticator_id);
const auto* ble_authenticator =
dialog_model()->saved_authenticators().GetAuthenticator(
*authenticator_id);
DCHECK(ble_authenticator);
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLE_PIN_ENTRY_TITLE,
ble_authenticator->authenticator_display_name());
}
|
base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
const auto& authenticator_id = dialog_model()->selected_authenticator_id();
DCHECK(authenticator_id);
const auto* ble_authenticator =
dialog_model()->saved_authenticators().GetAuthenticator(
*authenticator_id);
DCHECK(ble_authenticator);
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLE_PIN_ENTRY_TITLE,
ble_authenticator->authenticator_display_name());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::pixelStorei(GLenum pname, GLint param) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (param < 0) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "pixelStorei", "negative value");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH:
pack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
pack_skip_pixels_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_ROWS:
pack_skip_rows_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH:
unpack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
unpack_image_height_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
unpack_skip_pixels_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS:
unpack_skip_rows_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_IMAGES:
unpack_skip_images_ = param;
break;
default:
WebGLRenderingContextBase::pixelStorei(pname, param);
return;
}
ContextGL()->PixelStorei(pname, param);
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::pixelStorei(GLenum pname, GLint param) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (param < 0) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "pixelStorei", "negative value");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH:
pack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
pack_skip_pixels_ = param;
break;
case GL_PACK_SKIP_ROWS:
pack_skip_rows_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH:
unpack_row_length_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
unpack_image_height_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
unpack_skip_pixels_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS:
unpack_skip_rows_ = param;
break;
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_IMAGES:
unpack_skip_images_ = param;
break;
default:
WebGLRenderingContextBase::pixelStorei(pname, param);
return;
}
ContextGL()->PixelStorei(pname, param);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5828/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/761d65ebcac0cdb730fd27b87e207201ac38e3b4
|
761d65ebcac0cdb730fd27b87e207201ac38e3b4
|
[Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
|
void ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument::OnCanMakePaymentEventSkipped(
ValidateCanMakePaymentCallback callback) {
can_make_payment_result_ = true;
has_enrolled_instrument_result_ = false;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(std::move(callback), this, can_make_payment_result_));
}
|
void ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument::OnCanMakePaymentEventSkipped(
ValidateCanMakePaymentCallback callback) {
can_make_payment_result_ = true;
has_enrolled_instrument_result_ = false;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(std::move(callback), this, can_make_payment_result_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6630
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6630/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/805eabb91d386c86bd64336c7643f6dfa864151d
|
805eabb91d386c86bd64336c7643f6dfa864151d
|
Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
|
~SandboxSymbolizeHelper() {
UnregisterCallback();
CloseObjectFiles();
}
|
~SandboxSymbolizeHelper() {
UnregisterCallback();
CloseObjectFiles();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const FilePath& DownloadItemImpl::GetFullPath() const {
return current_path_;
}
|
const FilePath& DownloadItemImpl::GetFullPath() const {
return current_path_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/21d4d15a81b030f522fef29a0429f08a70220f68
|
21d4d15a81b030f522fef29a0429f08a70220f68
|
Moved guest_view_registry to GuestViewManager and made it an instance map
This change allows for the change towards moving GuestViewManager to components
and implementing an extensions specific GuestViewManager that installs extensions-specific
guest types.
BUG=444869
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1096623002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#325919}
|
void GuestViewBase::RegisterGuestViewTypes() {
|
void GuestViewBase::RegisterGuestViewTypes() {
AppViewGuest::Register();
ExtensionOptionsGuest::Register();
ExtensionViewGuest::Register();
MimeHandlerViewGuest::Register();
SurfaceWorkerGuest::Register();
WebViewGuest::Register();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-6187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6187/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/30a46a4647fd1df9cf52e43bf467f0d9265096ca
|
30a46a4647fd1df9cf52e43bf467f0d9265096ca
|
apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
return 0;
/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
* Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
* actually execute the image.
*/
if (current->in_execve) {
fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return 0;
}
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
}
return error;
}
|
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
return 0;
/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
* Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
* actually execute the image.
*/
if (current->in_execve) {
fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
return 0;
}
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5517/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1
|
08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1
|
mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void __online_page_free(struct page *page)
{
ClearPageReserved(page);
init_page_count(page);
__free_page(page);
}
|
void __online_page_free(struct page *page)
{
ClearPageReserved(page);
init_page_count(page);
__free_page(page);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10208
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10208/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe
|
3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe
|
ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
|
static struct inode *ext4_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_raw_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_prealloc_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_prealloc_lock);
ext4_es_init_tree(&ei->i_es_tree);
rwlock_init(&ei->i_es_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_es_list);
ei->i_es_all_nr = 0;
ei->i_es_shk_nr = 0;
ei->i_es_shrink_lblk = 0;
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks = 0;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_allocated_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_last_lblock = 0;
spin_lock_init(&(ei->i_block_reservation_lock));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
memset(&ei->i_dquot, 0, sizeof(ei->i_dquot));
#endif
ei->jinode = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_completed_io_lock);
ei->i_sync_tid = 0;
ei->i_datasync_tid = 0;
atomic_set(&ei->i_unwritten, 0);
INIT_WORK(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_work, ext4_end_io_rsv_work);
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
|
static struct inode *ext4_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_raw_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_prealloc_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_prealloc_lock);
ext4_es_init_tree(&ei->i_es_tree);
rwlock_init(&ei->i_es_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_es_list);
ei->i_es_all_nr = 0;
ei->i_es_shk_nr = 0;
ei->i_es_shrink_lblk = 0;
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks = 0;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_allocated_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_last_lblock = 0;
spin_lock_init(&(ei->i_block_reservation_lock));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
memset(&ei->i_dquot, 0, sizeof(ei->i_dquot));
#endif
ei->jinode = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_completed_io_lock);
ei->i_sync_tid = 0;
ei->i_datasync_tid = 0;
atomic_set(&ei->i_unwritten, 0);
INIT_WORK(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_work, ext4_end_io_rsv_work);
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2487/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/918eeaa29d99d257282fafec931b4bda0e3bae12
|
918eeaa29d99d257282fafec931b4bda0e3bae12
|
codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
|
status_t SoftAVC::resetPlugin() {
mIsInFlush = false;
mReceivedEOS = false;
memset(mTimeStamps, 0, sizeof(mTimeStamps));
memset(mTimeStampsValid, 0, sizeof(mTimeStampsValid));
/* Initialize both start and end times */
gettimeofday(&mTimeStart, NULL);
gettimeofday(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
return OK;
}
|
status_t SoftAVC::resetPlugin() {
mIsInFlush = false;
mReceivedEOS = false;
memset(mTimeStamps, 0, sizeof(mTimeStamps));
memset(mTimeStampsValid, 0, sizeof(mTimeStampsValid));
/* Initialize both start and end times */
gettimeofday(&mTimeStart, NULL);
gettimeofday(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
{
unsigned long check_addr = *start;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
return;
for (check_addr = *start; check_addr < *end; check_addr += PUD_SIZE) {
unsigned long a_start = check_addr & PUD_MASK;
unsigned long a_end = a_start + PUD_SIZE;
/*
* If sharing is possible, adjust start/end if necessary.
*/
if (range_in_vma(vma, a_start, a_end)) {
if (a_start < *start)
*start = a_start;
if (a_end > *end)
*end = a_end;
}
}
}
|
void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
{
unsigned long check_addr = *start;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
return;
for (check_addr = *start; check_addr < *end; check_addr += PUD_SIZE) {
unsigned long a_start = check_addr & PUD_MASK;
unsigned long a_end = a_start + PUD_SIZE;
/*
* If sharing is possible, adjust start/end if necessary.
*/
if (range_in_vma(vma, a_start, a_end)) {
if (a_start < *start)
*start = a_start;
if (a_end > *end)
*end = a_end;
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-5344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5344/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5
|
loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
static int lo_discard(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq, loff_t pos)
{
/*
* We use punch hole to reclaim the free space used by the
* image a.k.a. discard. However we do not support discard if
* encryption is enabled, because it may give an attacker
* useful information.
*/
struct file *file = lo->lo_backing_file;
int mode = FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE;
int ret;
if ((!file->f_op->fallocate) || lo->lo_encrypt_key_size) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
ret = file->f_op->fallocate(file, mode, pos, blk_rq_bytes(rq));
if (unlikely(ret && ret != -EINVAL && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP))
ret = -EIO;
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int lo_discard(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq, loff_t pos)
{
/*
* We use punch hole to reclaim the free space used by the
* image a.k.a. discard. However we do not support discard if
* encryption is enabled, because it may give an attacker
* useful information.
*/
struct file *file = lo->lo_backing_file;
int mode = FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE;
int ret;
if ((!file->f_op->fallocate) || lo->lo_encrypt_key_size) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
ret = file->f_op->fallocate(file, mode, pos, blk_rq_bytes(rq));
if (unlikely(ret && ret != -EINVAL && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP))
ret = -EIO;
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
static int read_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long addr, void *dest, unsigned size)
{
int rc;
struct read_cache *mc = &ctxt->mem_read;
while (size) {
int n = min(size, 8u);
size -= n;
if (mc->pos < mc->end)
goto read_cached;
rc = ctxt->ops->read_emulated(ctxt, addr, mc->data + mc->end, n,
&ctxt->exception);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
mc->end += n;
read_cached:
memcpy(dest, mc->data + mc->pos, n);
mc->pos += n;
dest += n;
addr += n;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int read_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long addr, void *dest, unsigned size)
{
int rc;
struct read_cache *mc = &ctxt->mem_read;
while (size) {
int n = min(size, 8u);
size -= n;
if (mc->pos < mc->end)
goto read_cached;
rc = ctxt->ops->read_emulated(ctxt, addr, mc->data + mc->end, n,
&ctxt->exception);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
mc->end += n;
read_cached:
memcpy(dest, mc->data + mc->pos, n);
mc->pos += n;
dest += n;
addr += n;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0850/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/bluetooth/bluedroid/+/c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a
|
c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a
|
DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
|
void btm_sec_role_changed (void *p_ref_data)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = (tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *)p_ref_data;
UINT8 res;
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("Security Manager: role changed");
/* If this role switch was started by peer do not need to do anything */
if (p_dev_rec->sec_state != BTM_SEC_STATE_SWITCHING_ROLE)
return;
/* If serurity required was to FORCE switch and it failed, notify the waiting layer */
if (((p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER) && !p_dev_rec->role_master)
|| ((p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE) && p_dev_rec->role_master))
{
btm_sec_dev_rec_cback_event (p_dev_rec, BTM_ERR_PROCESSING, FALSE);
return;
}
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_ROLE_SWITCHED;
p_dev_rec->security_required &= ~(BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_MASTER |
BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_SLAVE);
p_dev_rec->sec_state = BTM_SEC_STATE_IDLE;
if ((res = (UINT8)btm_sec_execute_procedure (p_dev_rec)) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_dev_rec_cback_event (p_dev_rec, res, FALSE);
}
}
|
void btm_sec_role_changed (void *p_ref_data)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = (tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *)p_ref_data;
UINT8 res;
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("Security Manager: role changed");
/* If this role switch was started by peer do not need to do anything */
if (p_dev_rec->sec_state != BTM_SEC_STATE_SWITCHING_ROLE)
return;
/* If serurity required was to FORCE switch and it failed, notify the waiting layer */
if (((p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER) && !p_dev_rec->role_master)
|| ((p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE) && p_dev_rec->role_master))
{
btm_sec_dev_rec_cback_event (p_dev_rec, BTM_ERR_PROCESSING, FALSE);
return;
}
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_ROLE_SWITCHED;
p_dev_rec->security_required &= ~(BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_MASTER |
BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_SLAVE);
p_dev_rec->sec_state = BTM_SEC_STATE_IDLE;
if ((res = (UINT8)btm_sec_execute_procedure (p_dev_rec)) != BTM_CMD_STARTED)
{
btm_sec_dev_rec_cback_event (p_dev_rec, res, FALSE);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4072
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4072/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=1e9b175204e3286d64dfd6c9f09151c31b5e099a
|
1e9b175204e3286d64dfd6c9f09151c31b5e099a
| null |
PHP_METHOD(Phar, createDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *error;
zend_string *stub;
size_t index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|pp", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
RETURN_NEW_STR(stub);
}
|
PHP_METHOD(Phar, createDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *error;
zend_string *stub;
size_t index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|ss", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
RETURN_NEW_STR(stub);
}
|
C
|
php
| 1 |
CVE-2017-14058
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14058/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/7ec414892ddcad88313848494b6fc5f437c9ca4a
|
7ec414892ddcad88313848494b6fc5f437c9ca4a
|
avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static int64_t default_reload_interval(struct playlist *pls)
{
return pls->n_segments > 0 ?
pls->segments[pls->n_segments - 1]->duration :
pls->target_duration;
}
|
static int64_t default_reload_interval(struct playlist *pls)
{
return pls->n_segments > 0 ?
pls->segments[pls->n_segments - 1]->duration :
pls->target_duration;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5330/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=a118d4220ed85749c07fb43c1229d9e2fecbea6b
|
a118d4220ed85749c07fb43c1229d9e2fecbea6b
| null |
static ssize_t push_ucs2(void *dest, const char *src, size_t dest_len, int flags)
{
size_t len=0;
size_t src_len = strlen(src);
size_t size = 0;
bool ret;
if (flags & STR_UPPER) {
char *tmpbuf = strupper_talloc(NULL, src);
ssize_t retval;
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return -1;
}
retval = push_ucs2(dest, tmpbuf, dest_len, flags & ~STR_UPPER);
talloc_free(tmpbuf);
return retval;
}
if (flags & STR_TERMINATE)
src_len++;
if (ucs2_align(NULL, dest, flags)) {
*(char *)dest = 0;
dest = (void *)((char *)dest + 1);
if (dest_len) dest_len--;
len++;
}
/* ucs2 is always a multiple of 2 bytes */
dest_len &= ~1;
ret = convert_string(CH_UNIX, CH_UTF16, src, src_len, dest, dest_len, &size);
if (ret == false) {
return 0;
}
len += size;
return (ssize_t)len;
}
|
static ssize_t push_ucs2(void *dest, const char *src, size_t dest_len, int flags)
{
size_t len=0;
size_t src_len = strlen(src);
size_t size = 0;
bool ret;
if (flags & STR_UPPER) {
char *tmpbuf = strupper_talloc(NULL, src);
ssize_t retval;
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return -1;
}
retval = push_ucs2(dest, tmpbuf, dest_len, flags & ~STR_UPPER);
talloc_free(tmpbuf);
return retval;
}
if (flags & STR_TERMINATE)
src_len++;
if (ucs2_align(NULL, dest, flags)) {
*(char *)dest = 0;
dest = (void *)((char *)dest + 1);
if (dest_len) dest_len--;
len++;
}
/* ucs2 is always a multiple of 2 bytes */
dest_len &= ~1;
ret = convert_string(CH_UNIX, CH_UTF16, src, src_len, dest, dest_len, &size);
if (ret == false) {
return 0;
}
len += size;
return (ssize_t)len;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5153
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5153/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/20a9e39a925dd0fb183acb61bb7b87f29abea83f
|
20a9e39a925dd0fb183acb61bb7b87f29abea83f
|
Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
|
bool TracingControllerImpl::IsTracing() const {
return trace_config_ != nullptr;
}
|
bool TracingControllerImpl::IsTracing() const {
return trace_config_ != nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000039
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000039/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05;hp=8ec561d1bccc46e9db40a9f61310cd8b3763914e
|
4dcc6affe04368461310a21238f7e1871a752a05
| null |
pdf_keep_material(fz_context *ctx, pdf_material *mat)
{
if (mat->colorspace)
fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, mat->colorspace);
if (mat->pattern)
pdf_keep_pattern(ctx, mat->pattern);
if (mat->shade)
fz_keep_shade(ctx, mat->shade);
return mat;
}
|
pdf_keep_material(fz_context *ctx, pdf_material *mat)
{
if (mat->colorspace)
fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, mat->colorspace);
if (mat->pattern)
pdf_keep_pattern(ctx, mat->pattern);
if (mat->shade)
fz_keep_shade(ctx, mat->shade);
return mat;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathEqualNodeSetString(xmlXPathObjectPtr arg, const xmlChar * str, int neq)
{
int i;
xmlNodeSetPtr ns;
xmlChar *str2;
unsigned int hash;
if ((str == NULL) || (arg == NULL) ||
((arg->type != XPATH_NODESET) && (arg->type != XPATH_XSLT_TREE)))
return (0);
ns = arg->nodesetval;
/*
* A NULL nodeset compared with a string is always false
* (since there is no node equal, and no node not equal)
*/
if ((ns == NULL) || (ns->nodeNr <= 0) )
return (0);
hash = xmlXPathStringHash(str);
for (i = 0; i < ns->nodeNr; i++) {
if (xmlXPathNodeValHash(ns->nodeTab[i]) == hash) {
str2 = xmlNodeGetContent(ns->nodeTab[i]);
if ((str2 != NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(str, str2))) {
xmlFree(str2);
if (neq)
continue;
return (1);
} else if ((str2 == NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(str, BAD_CAST ""))) {
if (neq)
continue;
return (1);
} else if (neq) {
if (str2 != NULL)
xmlFree(str2);
return (1);
}
if (str2 != NULL)
xmlFree(str2);
} else if (neq)
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
|
xmlXPathEqualNodeSetString(xmlXPathObjectPtr arg, const xmlChar * str, int neq)
{
int i;
xmlNodeSetPtr ns;
xmlChar *str2;
unsigned int hash;
if ((str == NULL) || (arg == NULL) ||
((arg->type != XPATH_NODESET) && (arg->type != XPATH_XSLT_TREE)))
return (0);
ns = arg->nodesetval;
/*
* A NULL nodeset compared with a string is always false
* (since there is no node equal, and no node not equal)
*/
if ((ns == NULL) || (ns->nodeNr <= 0) )
return (0);
hash = xmlXPathStringHash(str);
for (i = 0; i < ns->nodeNr; i++) {
if (xmlXPathNodeValHash(ns->nodeTab[i]) == hash) {
str2 = xmlNodeGetContent(ns->nodeTab[i]);
if ((str2 != NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(str, str2))) {
xmlFree(str2);
if (neq)
continue;
return (1);
} else if ((str2 == NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(str, BAD_CAST ""))) {
if (neq)
continue;
return (1);
} else if (neq) {
if (str2 != NULL)
xmlFree(str2);
return (1);
}
if (str2 != NULL)
xmlFree(str2);
} else if (neq)
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static void add_acl_entry(sc_file_t *file, int op, u8 byte)
{
unsigned int method, key_ref = SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE;
switch (byte >> 4) {
case 0:
method = SC_AC_NONE;
break;
case 1:
method = SC_AC_CHV;
key_ref = 1;
break;
case 2:
method = SC_AC_CHV;
key_ref = 2;
break;
case 4:
method = SC_AC_TERM;
break;
case 15:
method = SC_AC_NEVER;
break;
default:
method = SC_AC_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, method, key_ref);
}
|
static void add_acl_entry(sc_file_t *file, int op, u8 byte)
{
unsigned int method, key_ref = SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE;
switch (byte >> 4) {
case 0:
method = SC_AC_NONE;
break;
case 1:
method = SC_AC_CHV;
key_ref = 1;
break;
case 2:
method = SC_AC_CHV;
key_ref = 2;
break;
case 4:
method = SC_AC_TERM;
break;
case 15:
method = SC_AC_NEVER;
break;
default:
method = SC_AC_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, method, key_ref);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0716
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0716/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_mdb_ip4_get(
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb, __be32 dst)
{
struct br_ip br_dst;
br_dst.u.ip4 = dst;
br_dst.proto = htons(ETH_P_IP);
return br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &br_dst);
}
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_mdb_ip4_get(
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb, __be32 dst)
{
struct br_ip br_dst;
br_dst.u.ip4 = dst;
br_dst.proto = htons(ETH_P_IP);
return br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &br_dst);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15951/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76
|
363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76
|
KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
long ret, serial;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
ret = commit_creds(new);
if (ret == 0)
ret = serial;
goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
keyring = keyring_alloc(
name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
ret = 0;
goto error3;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error3;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
okay:
return ret;
error3:
key_put(keyring);
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
|
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
{
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
struct key *keyring;
long ret, serial;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
if (!name) {
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
ret = commit_creds(new);
if (ret == 0)
ret = serial;
goto okay;
}
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
keyring = keyring_alloc(
name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
}
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
ret = 0;
goto error3;
}
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error3;
commit_creds(new);
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
ret = keyring->serial;
key_put(keyring);
okay:
return ret;
error3:
key_put(keyring);
error2:
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9503
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9503/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/92a7bf8c44a236607c146240f3c0adc1ae01fedf
|
92a7bf8c44a236607c146240f3c0adc1ae01fedf
|
Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
|
uint8_t rfc_parse_data(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, MX_FRAME* p_frame, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t ead, eal, fcs;
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
uint8_t* p_start = p_data;
uint16_t len;
if (p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length1: %d", p_buf->len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_CTRL_FIELD(ead, p_frame->cr, p_frame->dlci, p_data);
if (!ead) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Address(EA must be 1)");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_TYPE_FIELD(p_frame->type, p_frame->pf, p_data);
RFCOMM_PARSE_LEN_FIELD(eal, len, p_data);
p_buf->len -= (3 + !ead + !eal + 1); /* Additional 1 for FCS */
p_buf->offset += (3 + !ead + !eal);
/* handle credit if credit based flow control */
if ((p_mcb->flow == PORT_FC_CREDIT) && (p_frame->type == RFCOMM_UIH) &&
(p_frame->dlci != RFCOMM_MX_DLCI) && (p_frame->pf == 1)) {
p_frame->credit = *p_data++;
p_buf->len--;
p_buf->offset++;
} else
p_frame->credit = 0;
if (p_buf->len != len) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length2 %d %d", p_buf->len, len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
fcs = *(p_data + len);
/* All control frames that we are sending are sent with P=1, expect */
/* reply with F=1 */
/* According to TS 07.10 spec ivalid frames are discarded without */
/* notification to the sender */
switch (p_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_SABME:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad SABME");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_SABME);
case RFCOMM_UA:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UA");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UA);
case RFCOMM_DM:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) || len ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DM");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DM);
case RFCOMM_DISC:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DISC");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DISC);
case RFCOMM_UIH:
if (!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - invalid DLCI");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (!rfc_check_fcs(2, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - FCS");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr)) {
/* we assume that this is ok to allow bad implementations to work */
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - response");
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
}
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
|
uint8_t rfc_parse_data(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, MX_FRAME* p_frame, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t ead, eal, fcs;
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
uint8_t* p_start = p_data;
uint16_t len;
if (p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length1: %d", p_buf->len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_CTRL_FIELD(ead, p_frame->cr, p_frame->dlci, p_data);
if (!ead) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Address(EA must be 1)");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_TYPE_FIELD(p_frame->type, p_frame->pf, p_data);
RFCOMM_PARSE_LEN_FIELD(eal, len, p_data);
p_buf->len -= (3 + !ead + !eal + 1); /* Additional 1 for FCS */
p_buf->offset += (3 + !ead + !eal);
/* handle credit if credit based flow control */
if ((p_mcb->flow == PORT_FC_CREDIT) && (p_frame->type == RFCOMM_UIH) &&
(p_frame->dlci != RFCOMM_MX_DLCI) && (p_frame->pf == 1)) {
p_frame->credit = *p_data++;
p_buf->len--;
p_buf->offset++;
} else
p_frame->credit = 0;
if (p_buf->len != len) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length2 %d %d", p_buf->len, len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
fcs = *(p_data + len);
/* All control frames that we are sending are sent with P=1, expect */
/* reply with F=1 */
/* According to TS 07.10 spec ivalid frames are discarded without */
/* notification to the sender */
switch (p_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_SABME:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad SABME");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_SABME);
case RFCOMM_UA:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UA");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UA);
case RFCOMM_DM:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) || len ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DM");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DM);
case RFCOMM_DISC:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DISC");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DISC);
case RFCOMM_UIH:
if (!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - invalid DLCI");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (!rfc_check_fcs(2, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - FCS");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr)) {
/* we assume that this is ok to allow bad implementations to work */
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - response");
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
}
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2494
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2494/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1a51410abe7d0ee4b1d112780f46df87d3621043
|
1a51410abe7d0ee4b1d112780f46df87d3621043
|
Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static int cgroupstats_user_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sk_buff *rep_skb;
struct cgroupstats *stats;
struct nlattr *na;
size_t size;
u32 fd;
struct file *file;
int fput_needed;
na = info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD];
if (!na)
return -EINVAL;
fd = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD]);
file = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
if (!file)
return 0;
size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
rc = prepare_reply(info, CGROUPSTATS_CMD_NEW, &rep_skb,
size);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
na = nla_reserve(rep_skb, CGROUPSTATS_TYPE_CGROUP_STATS,
sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
stats = nla_data(na);
memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
rc = cgroupstats_build(stats, file->f_dentry);
if (rc < 0) {
nlmsg_free(rep_skb);
goto err;
}
rc = send_reply(rep_skb, info);
err:
fput_light(file, fput_needed);
return rc;
}
|
static int cgroupstats_user_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sk_buff *rep_skb;
struct cgroupstats *stats;
struct nlattr *na;
size_t size;
u32 fd;
struct file *file;
int fput_needed;
na = info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD];
if (!na)
return -EINVAL;
fd = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD]);
file = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
if (!file)
return 0;
size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
rc = prepare_reply(info, CGROUPSTATS_CMD_NEW, &rep_skb,
size);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
na = nla_reserve(rep_skb, CGROUPSTATS_TYPE_CGROUP_STATS,
sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
stats = nla_data(na);
memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
rc = cgroupstats_build(stats, file->f_dentry);
if (rc < 0) {
nlmsg_free(rep_skb);
goto err;
}
rc = send_reply(rep_skb, info);
err:
fput_light(file, fput_needed);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8935
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8935/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
Update header handling to RFC 7230
|
SAPI_API SAPI_POST_READER_FUNC(sapi_read_standard_form_data)
{
int read_bytes;
int allocated_bytes=SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE+1;
if ((SG(post_max_size) > 0) && (SG(request_info).content_length > SG(post_max_size))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "POST Content-Length of %ld bytes exceeds the limit of %ld bytes",
SG(request_info).content_length, SG(post_max_size));
return;
}
SG(request_info).post_data = emalloc(allocated_bytes);
for (;;) {
read_bytes = sapi_module.read_post(SG(request_info).post_data+SG(read_post_bytes), SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
if (read_bytes<=0) {
break;
}
SG(read_post_bytes) += read_bytes;
if ((SG(post_max_size) > 0) && (SG(read_post_bytes) > SG(post_max_size))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Actual POST length does not match Content-Length, and exceeds %ld bytes", SG(post_max_size));
break;
}
if (read_bytes < SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE) {
break;
}
if (SG(read_post_bytes)+SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE >= allocated_bytes) {
allocated_bytes = SG(read_post_bytes)+SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE+1;
SG(request_info).post_data = erealloc(SG(request_info).post_data, allocated_bytes);
}
}
SG(request_info).post_data[SG(read_post_bytes)] = 0; /* terminating NULL */
SG(request_info).post_data_length = SG(read_post_bytes);
}
|
SAPI_API SAPI_POST_READER_FUNC(sapi_read_standard_form_data)
{
int read_bytes;
int allocated_bytes=SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE+1;
if ((SG(post_max_size) > 0) && (SG(request_info).content_length > SG(post_max_size))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "POST Content-Length of %ld bytes exceeds the limit of %ld bytes",
SG(request_info).content_length, SG(post_max_size));
return;
}
SG(request_info).post_data = emalloc(allocated_bytes);
for (;;) {
read_bytes = sapi_module.read_post(SG(request_info).post_data+SG(read_post_bytes), SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE TSRMLS_CC);
if (read_bytes<=0) {
break;
}
SG(read_post_bytes) += read_bytes;
if ((SG(post_max_size) > 0) && (SG(read_post_bytes) > SG(post_max_size))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Actual POST length does not match Content-Length, and exceeds %ld bytes", SG(post_max_size));
break;
}
if (read_bytes < SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE) {
break;
}
if (SG(read_post_bytes)+SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE >= allocated_bytes) {
allocated_bytes = SG(read_post_bytes)+SAPI_POST_BLOCK_SIZE+1;
SG(request_info).post_data = erealloc(SG(request_info).post_data, allocated_bytes);
}
}
SG(request_info).post_data[SG(read_post_bytes)] = 0; /* terminating NULL */
SG(request_info).post_data_length = SG(read_post_bytes);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/99844692ee805d18d5ee7fd9c62f14d2dffa2e06
|
99844692ee805d18d5ee7fd9c62f14d2dffa2e06
|
Removing unnecessary DCHECK from SafeBrowsing interstitial.
BUG=30079
TEST=None.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1131003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42049 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void InterstitialPage::InterstitialPageRVHViewDelegate::ShowCreatedWidget(
int route_id, const gfx::Rect& initial_pos) {
NOTREACHED() << "InterstitialPage does not support showing drop-downs yet.";
}
|
void InterstitialPage::InterstitialPageRVHViewDelegate::ShowCreatedWidget(
int route_id, const gfx::Rect& initial_pos) {
NOTREACHED() << "InterstitialPage does not support showing drop-downs yet.";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2807
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2807/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f183580d61c054f7f6bb35cfe29e1b342390fbeb
|
f183580d61c054f7f6bb35cfe29e1b342390fbeb
|
Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
__xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue);
}
|
__xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4530
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4530/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=d8d0a0bc7e194300e53a346d25fe5724fd588387
|
d8d0a0bc7e194300e53a346d25fe5724fd588387
| null |
static void pl022_xfer(PL022State *s)
{
int i;
int o;
int val;
if ((s->cr1 & PL022_CR1_SSE) == 0) {
pl022_update(s);
DPRINTF("Disabled\n");
return;
}
DPRINTF("Maybe xfer %d/%d\n", s->tx_fifo_len, s->rx_fifo_len);
i = (s->tx_fifo_head - s->tx_fifo_len) & 7;
o = s->rx_fifo_head;
/* ??? We do not emulate the line speed.
This may break some applications. The are two problematic cases:
(a) A driver feeds data into the TX FIFO until it is full,
and only then drains the RX FIFO. On real hardware the CPU can
feed data fast enough that the RX fifo never gets chance to overflow.
(b) A driver transmits data, deliberately allowing the RX FIFO to
overflow because it ignores the RX data anyway.
We choose to support (a) by stalling the transmit engine if it would
cause the RX FIFO to overflow. In practice much transmit-only code
falls into (a) because it flushes the RX FIFO to determine when
the transfer has completed. */
while (s->tx_fifo_len && s->rx_fifo_len < 8) {
DPRINTF("xfer\n");
val = s->tx_fifo[i];
if (s->cr1 & PL022_CR1_LBM) {
/* Loopback mode. */
} else {
val = ssi_transfer(s->ssi, val);
}
s->rx_fifo[o] = val & s->bitmask;
i = (i + 1) & 7;
o = (o + 1) & 7;
s->tx_fifo_len--;
s->rx_fifo_len++;
}
s->rx_fifo_head = o;
pl022_update(s);
}
|
static void pl022_xfer(PL022State *s)
{
int i;
int o;
int val;
if ((s->cr1 & PL022_CR1_SSE) == 0) {
pl022_update(s);
DPRINTF("Disabled\n");
return;
}
DPRINTF("Maybe xfer %d/%d\n", s->tx_fifo_len, s->rx_fifo_len);
i = (s->tx_fifo_head - s->tx_fifo_len) & 7;
o = s->rx_fifo_head;
/* ??? We do not emulate the line speed.
This may break some applications. The are two problematic cases:
(a) A driver feeds data into the TX FIFO until it is full,
and only then drains the RX FIFO. On real hardware the CPU can
feed data fast enough that the RX fifo never gets chance to overflow.
(b) A driver transmits data, deliberately allowing the RX FIFO to
overflow because it ignores the RX data anyway.
We choose to support (a) by stalling the transmit engine if it would
cause the RX FIFO to overflow. In practice much transmit-only code
falls into (a) because it flushes the RX FIFO to determine when
the transfer has completed. */
while (s->tx_fifo_len && s->rx_fifo_len < 8) {
DPRINTF("xfer\n");
val = s->tx_fifo[i];
if (s->cr1 & PL022_CR1_LBM) {
/* Loopback mode. */
} else {
val = ssi_transfer(s->ssi, val);
}
s->rx_fifo[o] = val & s->bitmask;
i = (i + 1) & 7;
o = (o + 1) & 7;
s->tx_fifo_len--;
s->rx_fifo_len++;
}
s->rx_fifo_head = o;
pl022_update(s);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/820957a3386e960334be3b93b48636e749d38ea3
|
820957a3386e960334be3b93b48636e749d38ea3
|
Make WebContentsDelegate::OpenColorChooser return NULL on failure
Changing WebContentsDelegate::OpenColorChooser to return NULL on failure so we don't put the same ColorChooser into two scoped_ptrs(WebContentsImpl::color_chooser_)
BUG=331790
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/128053002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244710 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::AddCreatedCallback(const CreatedCallback& callback) {
g_created_callbacks.Get().push_back(callback);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::AddCreatedCallback(const CreatedCallback& callback) {
g_created_callbacks.Get().push_back(callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1640
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1640/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
|
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt::GetPermissionsForType(
PermissionsType permissions_type) {
DCHECK_NE(ALL_PERMISSIONS, permissions_type);
return permissions_type == REGULAR_PERMISSIONS ? prompt_permissions_
: withheld_prompt_permissions_;
}
|
ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt::GetPermissionsForType(
PermissionsType permissions_type) {
DCHECK_NE(ALL_PERMISSIONS, permissions_type);
return permissions_type == REGULAR_PERMISSIONS ? prompt_permissions_
: withheld_prompt_permissions_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5771
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5771/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/3f627e580acfdaf0595ae3b115b8bec677f203ee?w=1
|
3f627e580acfdaf0595ae3b115b8bec677f203ee?w=1
|
Fixed ##72433: Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
|
static HashTable* spl_array_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, *storage;
int name_len;
char *zname;
zend_class_entry *base;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (HASH_OF(intern->array) == intern->std.properties) {
return intern->std.properties;
} else {
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
zend_hash_clean(intern->debug_info);
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
storage = intern->array;
zval_add_ref(&storage);
base = (Z_OBJ_HT_P(obj) == &spl_handler_ArrayIterator) ? spl_ce_ArrayIterator : spl_ce_ArrayObject;
zname = spl_gen_private_prop_name(base, "storage", sizeof("storage")-1, &name_len TSRMLS_CC);
zend_symtable_update(intern->debug_info, zname, name_len+1, &storage, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
efree(zname);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
static HashTable* spl_array_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, *storage;
int name_len;
char *zname;
zend_class_entry *base;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (HASH_OF(intern->array) == intern->std.properties) {
return intern->std.properties;
} else {
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
zend_hash_clean(intern->debug_info);
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
storage = intern->array;
zval_add_ref(&storage);
base = (Z_OBJ_HT_P(obj) == &spl_handler_ArrayIterator) ? spl_ce_ArrayIterator : spl_ce_ArrayObject;
zname = spl_gen_private_prop_name(base, "storage", sizeof("storage")-1, &name_len TSRMLS_CC);
zend_symtable_update(intern->debug_info, zname, name_len+1, &storage, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
efree(zname);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int old = vmx->ple_window;
vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
ple_window_grow,
ple_window_max);
if (vmx->ple_window != old)
vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
trace_kvm_ple_window_grow(vcpu->vcpu_id, vmx->ple_window, old);
}
|
static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int old = vmx->ple_window;
vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
ple_window_grow,
ple_window_max);
if (vmx->ple_window != old)
vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
trace_kvm_ple_window_grow(vcpu->vcpu_id, vmx->ple_window, old);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5601
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5601/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/98dcbbf0bf4854bf987557e55e55fff7abbf3ea9
|
98dcbbf0bf4854bf987557e55e55fff7abbf3ea9
|
Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
|
lha_read_file_header_1(struct archive_read *a, struct lha *lha)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t extdsize;
int i, err, err2;
int namelen, padding;
unsigned char headersum, sum_calculated;
err = ARCHIVE_OK;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, H1_FIXED_SIZE, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
lha->header_size = p[H1_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET] + 2;
headersum = p[H1_HEADER_SUM_OFFSET];
/* Note: An extended header size is included in a compsize. */
lha->compsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_COMP_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->origsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_ORIG_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->mtime = lha_dos_time(p + H1_DOS_TIME_OFFSET);
namelen = p[H1_NAME_LEN_OFFSET];
/* Calculate a padding size. The result will be normally 0 only(?) */
padding = ((int)lha->header_size) - H1_FIXED_SIZE - namelen;
if (namelen > 230 || padding < 0)
goto invalid;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, lha->header_size, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) {
if (p[i + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET] == 0xff)
goto invalid;/* Invalid filename. */
}
archive_strncpy(&lha->filename, p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET, namelen);
lha->crc = archive_le16dec(p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET + namelen);
lha->setflag |= CRC_IS_SET;
sum_calculated = lha_calcsum(0, p, 2, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Consume used bytes but not include `next header size' data
* since it will be consumed in lha_read_file_extended_header(). */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Read extended headers */
err2 = lha_read_file_extended_header(a, lha, NULL, 2,
(size_t)(lha->compsize + 2), &extdsize);
if (err2 < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (err2);
if (err2 < err)
err = err2;
/* Get a real compressed file size. */
lha->compsize -= extdsize - 2;
if (lha->compsize < 0)
goto invalid; /* Invalid compressed file size */
if (sum_calculated != headersum) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"LHa header sum error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (err);
invalid:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
|
lha_read_file_header_1(struct archive_read *a, struct lha *lha)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t extdsize;
int i, err, err2;
int namelen, padding;
unsigned char headersum, sum_calculated;
err = ARCHIVE_OK;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, H1_FIXED_SIZE, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
lha->header_size = p[H1_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET] + 2;
headersum = p[H1_HEADER_SUM_OFFSET];
/* Note: An extended header size is included in a compsize. */
lha->compsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_COMP_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->origsize = archive_le32dec(p + H1_ORIG_SIZE_OFFSET);
lha->mtime = lha_dos_time(p + H1_DOS_TIME_OFFSET);
namelen = p[H1_NAME_LEN_OFFSET];
/* Calculate a padding size. The result will be normally 0 only(?) */
padding = ((int)lha->header_size) - H1_FIXED_SIZE - namelen;
if (namelen > 230 || padding < 0)
goto invalid;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, lha->header_size, NULL)) == NULL)
return (truncated_error(a));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++) {
if (p[i + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET] == 0xff)
goto invalid;/* Invalid filename. */
}
archive_strncpy(&lha->filename, p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET, namelen);
lha->crc = archive_le16dec(p + H1_FILE_NAME_OFFSET + namelen);
lha->setflag |= CRC_IS_SET;
sum_calculated = lha_calcsum(0, p, 2, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Consume used bytes but not include `next header size' data
* since it will be consumed in lha_read_file_extended_header(). */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->header_size - 2);
/* Read extended headers */
err2 = lha_read_file_extended_header(a, lha, NULL, 2,
(size_t)(lha->compsize + 2), &extdsize);
if (err2 < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (err2);
if (err2 < err)
err = err2;
/* Get a real compressed file size. */
lha->compsize -= extdsize - 2;
if (sum_calculated != headersum) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"LHa header sum error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (err);
invalid:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid LHa header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 1 |
CVE-2011-5321
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-5321/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
c290f8358acaeffd8e0c551ddcc24d1206143376
|
TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
void start_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (!tty->stopped || tty->flow_stopped) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
return;
}
tty->stopped = 0;
if (tty->link && tty->link->packet) {
tty->ctrl_status &= ~TIOCPKT_STOP;
tty->ctrl_status |= TIOCPKT_START;
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->link->read_wait, POLLIN);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->ops->start)
(tty->ops->start)(tty);
/* If we have a running line discipline it may need kicking */
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
|
void start_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (!tty->stopped || tty->flow_stopped) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
return;
}
tty->stopped = 0;
if (tty->link && tty->link->packet) {
tty->ctrl_status &= ~TIOCPKT_STOP;
tty->ctrl_status |= TIOCPKT_START;
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->link->read_wait, POLLIN);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->ops->start)
(tty->ops->start)(tty);
/* If we have a running line discipline it may need kicking */
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2861/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/508b89a64ab700aa09f21fc666a5588b47360eab
|
508b89a64ab700aa09f21fc666a5588b47360eab
|
Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GetTaskbarRect(gfx::Rect* rect) {
HWND taskbar_hwnd = FindWindow(kTrayClassName, NULL);
if (!taskbar_hwnd)
return false;
RECT win_rect;
if (!GetWindowRect(taskbar_hwnd, &win_rect))
return false;
*rect = gfx::Rect(win_rect);
return true;
}
|
bool GetTaskbarRect(gfx::Rect* rect) {
HWND taskbar_hwnd = FindWindow(kTrayClassName, NULL);
if (!taskbar_hwnd)
return false;
RECT win_rect;
if (!GetWindowRect(taskbar_hwnd, &win_rect))
return false;
*rect = gfx::Rect(win_rect);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltUnregisterExtModule(const xmlChar * URI)
{
int ret;
if (URI == NULL)
return (-1);
if (xsltExtensionsHash == NULL)
return (-1);
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
ret = xmlHashRemoveEntry(xsltExtensionsHash, URI,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtModule);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
return (ret);
}
|
xsltUnregisterExtModule(const xmlChar * URI)
{
int ret;
if (URI == NULL)
return (-1);
if (xsltExtensionsHash == NULL)
return (-1);
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
ret = xmlHashRemoveEntry(xsltExtensionsHash, URI,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtModule);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
return (ret);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5023
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5023/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
|
SparseHistogram::SparseHistogram(const std::string& name)
: HistogramBase(name),
samples_(new SampleMap(HashMetricName(name))),
logged_samples_(new SampleMap(samples_->id())) {}
|
SparseHistogram::SparseHistogram(const std::string& name)
: HistogramBase(name),
samples_(new SampleMap(HashMetricName(name))),
logged_samples_(new SampleMap(samples_->id())) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void PasswordInputType::DisableSecureTextInput() {
|
void PasswordInputType::DisableSecureTextInput() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetElement().GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
frame->Selection().SetUseSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-12176
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12176/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=b747da5e25be944337a9cd1415506fc06b70aa81
|
b747da5e25be944337a9cd1415506fc06b70aa81
| null |
ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
long length; /* length of scanline server padded */
long lengthProto; /* length of scanline protocol padded */
char *tmpImage;
REQUEST(xPutImageReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPutImageReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
if (stuff->format == XYBitmap) {
if ((stuff->depth != 1) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
}
else if (stuff->format == XYPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
length *= stuff->depth;
}
else if (stuff->format == ZPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) || (stuff->leftPad != 0))
return BadMatch;
length = PixmapBytePad(stuff->width, stuff->depth);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->format;
return BadValue;
}
tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1];
lengthProto = length;
if (stuff->height != 0 && lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
return BadLength;
if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) +
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len)
return BadLength;
ReformatImage(tmpImage, lengthProto * stuff->height,
stuff->format == ZPixmap ? BitsPerPixel(stuff->depth) : 1,
ClientOrder(client));
(*pGC->ops->PutImage) (pDraw, pGC, stuff->depth, stuff->dstX, stuff->dstY,
stuff->width, stuff->height,
stuff->leftPad, stuff->format, tmpImage);
return Success;
}
|
ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
long length; /* length of scanline server padded */
long lengthProto; /* length of scanline protocol padded */
char *tmpImage;
REQUEST(xPutImageReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPutImageReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->drawable, pDraw, DixWriteAccess);
if (stuff->format == XYBitmap) {
if ((stuff->depth != 1) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
}
else if (stuff->format == XYPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) ||
(stuff->leftPad >= (unsigned int) screenInfo.bitmapScanlinePad))
return BadMatch;
length = BitmapBytePad(stuff->width + stuff->leftPad);
length *= stuff->depth;
}
else if (stuff->format == ZPixmap) {
if ((pDraw->depth != stuff->depth) || (stuff->leftPad != 0))
return BadMatch;
length = PixmapBytePad(stuff->width, stuff->depth);
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->format;
return BadValue;
}
tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1];
lengthProto = length;
if (stuff->height != 0 && lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
return BadLength;
if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) +
bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len)
return BadLength;
ReformatImage(tmpImage, lengthProto * stuff->height,
stuff->format == ZPixmap ? BitsPerPixel(stuff->depth) : 1,
ClientOrder(client));
(*pGC->ops->PutImage) (pDraw, pGC, stuff->depth, stuff->dstX, stuff->dstY,
stuff->width, stuff->height,
stuff->leftPad, stuff->format, tmpImage);
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1593
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1593/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
|
4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
|
x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
static void free_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
while (!list_empty(&info->thread_list)) {
struct list_head *tmp = info->thread_list.next;
list_del(tmp);
kfree(list_entry(tmp, struct elf_thread_status, list));
}
/* Free data possibly allocated by fill_files_note(): */
if (info->notes_files)
vfree(info->notes_files->data);
kfree(info->prstatus);
kfree(info->psinfo);
kfree(info->notes);
kfree(info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
kfree(info->xfpu);
#endif
}
|
static void free_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
while (!list_empty(&info->thread_list)) {
struct list_head *tmp = info->thread_list.next;
list_del(tmp);
kfree(list_entry(tmp, struct elf_thread_status, list));
}
/* Free data possibly allocated by fill_files_note(): */
if (info->notes_files)
vfree(info->notes_files->data);
kfree(info->prstatus);
kfree(info->psinfo);
kfree(info->notes);
kfree(info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
kfree(info->xfpu);
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame(
int32 page_id) {
delegate_->DocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame(this, page_id);
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame(
int32 page_id) {
delegate_->DocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame(this, page_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2375/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68
|
Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl, int recovery_type)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOCK],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = NFS_CLIENT(state->inode),
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_lock_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int ret;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
data = nfs4_alloc_lockdata(fl, nfs_file_open_context(fl->fl_file),
fl->fl_u.nfs4_fl.owner,
recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_NEW ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_NOFS);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (IS_SETLKW(cmd))
data->arg.block = 1;
if (recovery_type > NFS_LOCK_NEW) {
if (recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM)
data->arg.reclaim = NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM;
task_setup_data.callback_ops = &nfs4_recover_lock_ops;
}
nfs41_init_sequence(&data->arg.seq_args, &data->res.seq_res, 1);
msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = data;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
ret = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = data->rpc_status;
if (ret)
nfs4_handle_setlk_error(data->server, data->lsp,
data->arg.new_lock_owner, ret);
} else
data->cancelled = 1;
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
|
static int _nfs4_do_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl, int recovery_type)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_LOCK],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = NFS_CLIENT(state->inode),
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_lock_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int ret;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
data = nfs4_alloc_lockdata(fl, nfs_file_open_context(fl->fl_file),
fl->fl_u.nfs4_fl.owner,
recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_NEW ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_NOFS);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (IS_SETLKW(cmd))
data->arg.block = 1;
if (recovery_type > NFS_LOCK_NEW) {
if (recovery_type == NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM)
data->arg.reclaim = NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM;
task_setup_data.callback_ops = &nfs4_recover_lock_ops;
}
nfs41_init_sequence(&data->arg.seq_args, &data->res.seq_res, 1);
msg.rpc_argp = &data->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &data->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = data;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
ret = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = data->rpc_status;
if (ret)
nfs4_handle_setlk_error(data->server, data->lsp,
data->arg.new_lock_owner, ret);
} else
data->cancelled = 1;
rpc_put_task(task);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1416
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1416/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/8ee70ec63931d1e38567905387ab9b1d45734d81
|
8ee70ec63931d1e38567905387ab9b1d45734d81
|
KDC TGS-REQ null deref [CVE-2013-1416]
By sending an unusual but valid TGS-REQ, an authenticated remote
attacker can cause the KDC process to crash by dereferencing a null
pointer.
prep_reprocess_req() can cause a null pointer dereference when
processing a service principal name. Code in this function can
inappropriately pass a null pointer to strlcpy(). Unmodified client
software can trivially trigger this vulnerability, but the attacker
must have already authenticated and received a valid Kerberos ticket.
The vulnerable code was introduced by the implementation of new
service principal realm referral functionality in krb5-1.7, but was
corrected as a side effect of the KDC refactoring in krb5-1.11.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 7600 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.5
status: resolved
|
find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2, tmpprinc;
krb5_data tmp;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
*server_ptr = NULL;
/*
* Call to krb5_princ_component is normally not safe but is so
* here only because find_alternate_tgs() is only called from
* somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
* the principal.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
&plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
return retval;
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
continue;
else if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Found it. */
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = tmpprinc;
log_tgs_alt_tgt(request->server);
*server_ptr = server;
server = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
cleanup:
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
return retval;
}
|
find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry **server_ptr)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2, tmpprinc;
krb5_data tmp;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
*server_ptr = NULL;
/*
* Call to krb5_princ_component is normally not safe but is so
* here only because find_alternate_tgs() is only called from
* somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
* the principal.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
&plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
return retval;
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
continue;
else if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Found it. */
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = tmpprinc;
log_tgs_alt_tgt(request->server);
*server_ptr = server;
server = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY;
cleanup:
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2019-6974
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-6974/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cfa39381173d5f969daf43582c95ad679189cbc9
|
cfa39381173d5f969daf43582c95ad679189cbc9
|
kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
int kvm_write_guest_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
void *data, unsigned long len)
{
return kvm_write_guest_offset_cached(kvm, ghc, data, 0, len);
}
|
int kvm_write_guest_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
void *data, unsigned long len)
{
return kvm_write_guest_offset_cached(kvm, ghc, data, 0, len);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8294/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/83d799804648c2a0895d40a19835d9b757c6fa4e
|
83d799804648c2a0895d40a19835d9b757c6fa4e
|
Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
|
int _yr_emit_inst_arg_uint32(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
uint32_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
uint32_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(uint32_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
|
int _yr_emit_inst_arg_uint32(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
uint32_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
uint32_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(uint32_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
yara
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9710
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9710/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339
|
5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339
|
Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
|
static bool btrfs_is_valid_xattr(const char *name)
{
return !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_BTRFS_PREFIX, XATTR_BTRFS_PREFIX_LEN);
}
|
static bool btrfs_is_valid_xattr(const char *name)
{
return !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX, XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) ||
!strncmp(name, XATTR_BTRFS_PREFIX, XATTR_BTRFS_PREFIX_LEN);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8785
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8785/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876
|
3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876
|
fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
|
long fuse_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
struct fuse_ioctl_in inarg = {
.fh = ff->fh,
.cmd = cmd,
.arg = arg,
.flags = flags
};
struct fuse_ioctl_out outarg;
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct page **pages = NULL;
struct iovec *iov_page = NULL;
struct iovec *in_iov = NULL, *out_iov = NULL;
unsigned int in_iovs = 0, out_iovs = 0, num_pages = 0, max_pages;
size_t in_size, out_size, transferred;
int err;
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
inarg.flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_32BIT;
#else
if (flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT)
inarg.flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_32BIT;
#endif
/* assume all the iovs returned by client always fits in a page */
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct fuse_ioctl_iovec) * FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV > PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ, sizeof(pages[0]), GFP_KERNEL);
iov_page = (struct iovec *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages || !iov_page)
goto out;
/*
* If restricted, initialize IO parameters as encoded in @cmd.
* RETRY from server is not allowed.
*/
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED)) {
struct iovec *iov = iov_page;
iov->iov_base = (void __user *)arg;
iov->iov_len = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
in_iov = iov;
in_iovs = 1;
}
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) {
out_iov = iov;
out_iovs = 1;
}
}
retry:
inarg.in_size = in_size = iov_length(in_iov, in_iovs);
inarg.out_size = out_size = iov_length(out_iov, out_iovs);
/*
* Out data can be used either for actual out data or iovs,
* make sure there always is at least one page.
*/
out_size = max_t(size_t, out_size, PAGE_SIZE);
max_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(max(in_size, out_size), PAGE_SIZE);
/* make sure there are enough buffer pages and init request with them */
err = -ENOMEM;
if (max_pages > FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ)
goto out;
while (num_pages < max_pages) {
pages[num_pages] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM);
if (!pages[num_pages])
goto out;
num_pages++;
}
req = fuse_get_req(fc, num_pages);
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
err = PTR_ERR(req);
req = NULL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(req->pages, pages, sizeof(req->pages[0]) * num_pages);
req->num_pages = num_pages;
fuse_page_descs_length_init(req, 0, req->num_pages);
/* okay, let's send it to the client */
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_IOCTL;
req->in.h.nodeid = ff->nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 1;
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
req->in.args[0].value = &inarg;
if (in_size) {
req->in.numargs++;
req->in.args[1].size = in_size;
req->in.argpages = 1;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, in_iov, in_iovs, in_size,
false);
if (err)
goto out;
}
req->out.numargs = 2;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(outarg);
req->out.args[0].value = &outarg;
req->out.args[1].size = out_size;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->out.argvar = 1;
fuse_request_send(fc, req);
err = req->out.h.error;
transferred = req->out.args[1].size;
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
req = NULL;
if (err)
goto out;
/* did it ask for retry? */
if (outarg.flags & FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY) {
void *vaddr;
/* no retry if in restricted mode */
err = -EIO;
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED))
goto out;
in_iovs = outarg.in_iovs;
out_iovs = outarg.out_iovs;
/*
* Make sure things are in boundary, separate checks
* are to protect against overflow.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
if (in_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
in_iovs + out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV)
goto out;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(pages[0]);
err = fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec(fc, iov_page, vaddr,
transferred, in_iovs + out_iovs,
(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT) != 0);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
if (err)
goto out;
in_iov = iov_page;
out_iov = in_iov + in_iovs;
err = fuse_verify_ioctl_iov(in_iov, in_iovs);
if (err)
goto out;
err = fuse_verify_ioctl_iov(out_iov, out_iovs);
if (err)
goto out;
goto retry;
}
err = -EIO;
if (transferred > inarg.out_size)
goto out;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, out_iov, out_iovs, transferred, true);
out:
if (req)
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
free_page((unsigned long) iov_page);
while (num_pages)
__free_page(pages[--num_pages]);
kfree(pages);
return err ? err : outarg.result;
}
|
long fuse_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
struct fuse_ioctl_in inarg = {
.fh = ff->fh,
.cmd = cmd,
.arg = arg,
.flags = flags
};
struct fuse_ioctl_out outarg;
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct page **pages = NULL;
struct iovec *iov_page = NULL;
struct iovec *in_iov = NULL, *out_iov = NULL;
unsigned int in_iovs = 0, out_iovs = 0, num_pages = 0, max_pages;
size_t in_size, out_size, transferred;
int err;
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
inarg.flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_32BIT;
#else
if (flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT)
inarg.flags |= FUSE_IOCTL_32BIT;
#endif
/* assume all the iovs returned by client always fits in a page */
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct fuse_ioctl_iovec) * FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV > PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ, sizeof(pages[0]), GFP_KERNEL);
iov_page = (struct iovec *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages || !iov_page)
goto out;
/*
* If restricted, initialize IO parameters as encoded in @cmd.
* RETRY from server is not allowed.
*/
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED)) {
struct iovec *iov = iov_page;
iov->iov_base = (void __user *)arg;
iov->iov_len = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
in_iov = iov;
in_iovs = 1;
}
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) {
out_iov = iov;
out_iovs = 1;
}
}
retry:
inarg.in_size = in_size = iov_length(in_iov, in_iovs);
inarg.out_size = out_size = iov_length(out_iov, out_iovs);
/*
* Out data can be used either for actual out data or iovs,
* make sure there always is at least one page.
*/
out_size = max_t(size_t, out_size, PAGE_SIZE);
max_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(max(in_size, out_size), PAGE_SIZE);
/* make sure there are enough buffer pages and init request with them */
err = -ENOMEM;
if (max_pages > FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ)
goto out;
while (num_pages < max_pages) {
pages[num_pages] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM);
if (!pages[num_pages])
goto out;
num_pages++;
}
req = fuse_get_req(fc, num_pages);
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
err = PTR_ERR(req);
req = NULL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(req->pages, pages, sizeof(req->pages[0]) * num_pages);
req->num_pages = num_pages;
fuse_page_descs_length_init(req, 0, req->num_pages);
/* okay, let's send it to the client */
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_IOCTL;
req->in.h.nodeid = ff->nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 1;
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
req->in.args[0].value = &inarg;
if (in_size) {
req->in.numargs++;
req->in.args[1].size = in_size;
req->in.argpages = 1;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, in_iov, in_iovs, in_size,
false);
if (err)
goto out;
}
req->out.numargs = 2;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(outarg);
req->out.args[0].value = &outarg;
req->out.args[1].size = out_size;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->out.argvar = 1;
fuse_request_send(fc, req);
err = req->out.h.error;
transferred = req->out.args[1].size;
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
req = NULL;
if (err)
goto out;
/* did it ask for retry? */
if (outarg.flags & FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY) {
void *vaddr;
/* no retry if in restricted mode */
err = -EIO;
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED))
goto out;
in_iovs = outarg.in_iovs;
out_iovs = outarg.out_iovs;
/*
* Make sure things are in boundary, separate checks
* are to protect against overflow.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
if (in_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
in_iovs + out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV)
goto out;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(pages[0]);
err = fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec(fc, iov_page, vaddr,
transferred, in_iovs + out_iovs,
(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT) != 0);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
if (err)
goto out;
in_iov = iov_page;
out_iov = in_iov + in_iovs;
err = fuse_verify_ioctl_iov(in_iov, in_iovs);
if (err)
goto out;
err = fuse_verify_ioctl_iov(out_iov, out_iovs);
if (err)
goto out;
goto retry;
}
err = -EIO;
if (transferred > inarg.out_size)
goto out;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, out_iov, out_iovs, transferred, true);
out:
if (req)
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
free_page((unsigned long) iov_page);
while (num_pages)
__free_page(pages[--num_pages]);
kfree(pages);
return err ? err : outarg.result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5011/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
void DefaultBindingsDelegate::OpenInNewTab(const std::string& url) {
content::OpenURLParams params(GURL(url), content::Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
Browser* browser = FindBrowser(web_contents_);
browser->OpenURL(params);
}
|
void DefaultBindingsDelegate::OpenInNewTab(const std::string& url) {
content::OpenURLParams params(GURL(url), content::Referrer(),
WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
Browser* browser = FindBrowser(web_contents_);
browser->OpenURL(params);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1278
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1278/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> ConvertToSiteInstance(
RenderFrameHostManager* rfhm,
const SiteInstanceDescriptor& descriptor,
SiteInstance* candidate_instance) {
return rfhm->ConvertToSiteInstance(descriptor, candidate_instance);
}
|
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> ConvertToSiteInstance(
RenderFrameHostManager* rfhm,
const SiteInstanceDescriptor& descriptor,
SiteInstance* candidate_instance) {
return rfhm->ConvertToSiteInstance(descriptor, candidate_instance);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3097/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BaseSessionService::RestoreSetTabExtensionAppIDCommand(
const SessionCommand& command,
SessionID::id_type* tab_id,
std::string* extension_app_id) {
scoped_ptr<Pickle> pickle(command.PayloadAsPickle());
if (!pickle.get())
return false;
void* iterator = NULL;
return pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, tab_id) &&
pickle->ReadString(&iterator, extension_app_id);
}
|
bool BaseSessionService::RestoreSetTabExtensionAppIDCommand(
const SessionCommand& command,
SessionID::id_type* tab_id,
std::string* extension_app_id) {
scoped_ptr<Pickle> pickle(command.PayloadAsPickle());
if (!pickle.get())
return false;
void* iterator = NULL;
return pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, tab_id) &&
pickle->ReadString(&iterator, extension_app_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static void __exit cast6_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
}
|
static void __exit cast6_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18350/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d683fb12566eaec180ee0e0506288f46cc7a43e7
|
d683fb12566eaec180ee0e0506288f46cc7a43e7
|
Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
|
const AtomicString& DocumentLoader::RequiredCSP() {
return GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP();
}
|
const AtomicString& DocumentLoader::RequiredCSP() {
return GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3233
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3233/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d26d6504f23e803824e8ebd14e52d4fc0a0b09cb
|
d26d6504f23e803824e8ebd14e52d4fc0a0b09cb
|
NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
void nfc_llcp_sock_free(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock)
{
kfree(sock->service_name);
skb_queue_purge(&sock->tx_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sock->tx_pending_queue);
list_del_init(&sock->accept_queue);
sock->parent = NULL;
nfc_llcp_local_put(sock->local);
}
|
void nfc_llcp_sock_free(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock)
{
kfree(sock->service_name);
skb_queue_purge(&sock->tx_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sock->tx_pending_queue);
list_del_init(&sock->accept_queue);
sock->parent = NULL;
nfc_llcp_local_put(sock->local);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3835/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
|
void omx_video::omx_c2d_conv::close()
{
if (mLibHandle) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c_lock);
if (mConvertClose && c2dcc)
mConvertClose(c2dcc);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c_lock);
c2dcc = NULL;
}
}
|
void omx_video::omx_c2d_conv::close()
{
if (mLibHandle) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c_lock);
if (mConvertClose && c2dcc)
mConvertClose(c2dcc);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c_lock);
c2dcc = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::IsPepperAcceptingCompositionEvents() const {
if (!focused_pepper_plugin_)
return false;
return focused_pepper_plugin_->IsPluginAcceptingCompositionEvents();
}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::IsPepperAcceptingCompositionEvents() const {
if (!focused_pepper_plugin_)
return false;
return focused_pepper_plugin_->IsPluginAcceptingCompositionEvents();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1334
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1334/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/5c3fcae78b63ac9dd56e36075903921bd9461f9e
|
5c3fcae78b63ac9dd56e36075903921bd9461f9e
|
CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
static void lxc_proc_put_context_info(struct lxc_proc_context_info *ctx)
{
free(ctx->lsm_label);
if (ctx->container)
lxc_container_put(ctx->container);
free(ctx);
}
|
static void lxc_proc_put_context_info(struct lxc_proc_context_info *ctx)
{
free(ctx->lsm_label);
if (ctx->container)
lxc_container_put(ctx->container);
free(ctx);
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3400
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3400/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/FransUrbo/zfs/commit/99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4
|
99aa4d2b4fd12c6bef62d02ffd1b375ddd42fcf4
|
Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
|
alloc_share(const char *sharepath)
{
sa_share_impl_t impl_share;
impl_share = calloc(sizeof (struct sa_share_impl), 1);
if (impl_share == NULL)
return (NULL);
impl_share->sharepath = strdup(sharepath);
if (impl_share->sharepath == NULL) {
free(impl_share);
return (NULL);
}
impl_share->fsinfo = calloc(sizeof (sa_share_fsinfo_t), fstypes_count);
if (impl_share->fsinfo == NULL) {
free(impl_share->sharepath);
free(impl_share);
return (NULL);
}
return (impl_share);
}
|
alloc_share(const char *sharepath)
{
sa_share_impl_t impl_share;
impl_share = calloc(sizeof (struct sa_share_impl), 1);
if (impl_share == NULL)
return (NULL);
impl_share->sharepath = strdup(sharepath);
if (impl_share->sharepath == NULL) {
free(impl_share);
return (NULL);
}
impl_share->fsinfo = calloc(sizeof (sa_share_fsinfo_t), fstypes_count);
if (impl_share->fsinfo == NULL) {
free(impl_share->sharepath);
free(impl_share);
return (NULL);
}
return (impl_share);
}
|
C
|
zfs
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7010
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7010/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760
|
454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760
|
avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
av_cold void avpriv_dsputil_init(DSPContext *c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
ff_dsputil_init(c, avctx);
}
|
av_cold void avpriv_dsputil_init(DSPContext *c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
ff_dsputil_init(c, avctx);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9
|
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void __net_exit inet6_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
udp6_proc_exit(net);
tcp6_proc_exit(net);
ac6_proc_exit(net);
#endif
ipv6_cleanup_mibs(net);
}
|
static void __net_exit inet6_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
udp6_proc_exit(net);
tcp6_proc_exit(net);
ac6_proc_exit(net);
#endif
ipv6_cleanup_mibs(net);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6775
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6775/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c
|
53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c
|
Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
|
const AtomicString& TextTrack::MetadataKeyword() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, metadata, ("metadata"));
return metadata;
}
|
const AtomicString& TextTrack::MetadataKeyword() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, metadata, ("metadata"));
return metadata;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
bool TabStripIsKeyboardFocused() {
return tab_strip_->GetPaneFocusTraversable() != nullptr;
}
|
bool TabStripIsKeyboardFocused() {
return tab_strip_->GetPaneFocusTraversable() != nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5688
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5688/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
|
aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
|
Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
|
static inline MagickModulo VirtualPixelModulo(const ssize_t offset,
const size_t extent)
{
MagickModulo
modulo;
/*
Compute the remainder of dividing offset by extent. It returns not only
the quotient (tile the offset falls in) but also the positive remainer
within that tile such that 0 <= remainder < extent. This method is
essentially a ldiv() using a floored modulo division rather than the
normal default truncated modulo division.
*/
modulo.quotient=offset/(ssize_t) extent;
if (offset < 0L)
modulo.quotient--;
modulo.remainder=offset-modulo.quotient*(ssize_t) extent;
return(modulo);
}
|
static inline MagickModulo VirtualPixelModulo(const ssize_t offset,
const size_t extent)
{
MagickModulo
modulo;
/*
Compute the remainder of dividing offset by extent. It returns not only
the quotient (tile the offset falls in) but also the positive remainer
within that tile such that 0 <= remainder < extent. This method is
essentially a ldiv() using a floored modulo division rather than the
normal default truncated modulo division.
*/
modulo.quotient=offset/(ssize_t) extent;
if (offset < 0L)
modulo.quotient--;
modulo.remainder=offset-modulo.quotient*(ssize_t) extent;
return(modulo);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5668
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5668/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/bitlbee/bitlbee/commit/30d598ce7cd3f136ee9d7097f39fa9818a272441
|
30d598ce7cd3f136ee9d7097f39fa9818a272441
|
purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
|
static gboolean prplcb_xfer_new_send_cb(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
PurpleXfer *xfer = data;
struct im_connection *ic = purple_ic_by_pa(xfer->account);
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
PurpleBuddy *buddy;
const char *who;
buddy = purple_find_buddy(xfer->account, xfer->who);
who = buddy ? purple_buddy_get_name(buddy) : xfer->who;
/* TODO(wilmer): After spreading some more const goodness in BitlBee,
remove the evil cast below. */
px->ft = imcb_file_send_start(ic, (char *) who, xfer->filename, xfer->size);
if (!px->ft) {
return FALSE;
}
px->ft->data = px;
px->ft->accept = prpl_xfer_accept;
px->ft->canceled = prpl_xfer_canceled;
px->ft->free = prpl_xfer_free;
px->ft->write_request = prpl_xfer_write_request;
return FALSE;
}
|
static gboolean prplcb_xfer_new_send_cb(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
PurpleXfer *xfer = data;
struct im_connection *ic = purple_ic_by_pa(xfer->account);
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
PurpleBuddy *buddy;
const char *who;
buddy = purple_find_buddy(xfer->account, xfer->who);
who = buddy ? purple_buddy_get_name(buddy) : xfer->who;
/* TODO(wilmer): After spreading some more const goodness in BitlBee,
remove the evil cast below. */
px->ft = imcb_file_send_start(ic, (char *) who, xfer->filename, xfer->size);
px->ft->data = px;
px->ft->accept = prpl_xfer_accept;
px->ft->canceled = prpl_xfer_canceled;
px->ft->free = prpl_xfer_free;
px->ft->write_request = prpl_xfer_write_request;
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
bitlbee
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5551
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5551/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/497de07d89c1410d76a15bec2bb41f24a2a89f31
|
497de07d89c1410d76a15bec2bb41f24a2a89f31
|
tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permissions")
It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:
touch $testfile
chown 100:100 $testfile
chmod 2755 $testfile
_runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile
Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
struct posix_acl **acl)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int error;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(*acl, &mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (error == 0)
*acl = NULL;
if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
*mode_p = mode;
return 0;
}
|
int posix_acl_update_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t *mode_p,
struct posix_acl **acl)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int error;
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(*acl, &mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (error == 0)
*acl = NULL;
if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
*mode_p = mode;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int index;
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
pud_t *pud, *pud_k;
pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_k;
if (addr < TASK_SIZE)
return do_page_fault(addr, fsr, regs);
if (user_mode(regs))
goto bad_area;
index = pgd_index(addr);
/*
* FIXME: CP15 C1 is write only on ARMv3 architectures.
*/
pgd = cpu_get_pgd() + index;
pgd_k = init_mm.pgd + index;
if (pgd_none(*pgd_k))
goto bad_area;
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
set_pgd(pgd, *pgd_k);
pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
pud_k = pud_offset(pgd_k, addr);
if (pud_none(*pud_k))
goto bad_area;
if (!pud_present(*pud))
set_pud(pud, *pud_k);
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
pmd_k = pmd_offset(pud_k, addr);
/*
* On ARM one Linux PGD entry contains two hardware entries (see page
* tables layout in pgtable.h). We normally guarantee that we always
* fill both L1 entries. But create_mapping() doesn't follow the rule.
* It can create inidividual L1 entries, so here we have to call
* pmd_none() check for the entry really corresponded to address, not
* for the first of pair.
*/
index = (addr >> SECTION_SHIFT) & 1;
if (pmd_none(pmd_k[index]))
goto bad_area;
copy_pmd(pmd, pmd_k);
return 0;
bad_area:
do_bad_area(addr, fsr, regs);
return 0;
}
|
do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int index;
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
pud_t *pud, *pud_k;
pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_k;
if (addr < TASK_SIZE)
return do_page_fault(addr, fsr, regs);
if (user_mode(regs))
goto bad_area;
index = pgd_index(addr);
/*
* FIXME: CP15 C1 is write only on ARMv3 architectures.
*/
pgd = cpu_get_pgd() + index;
pgd_k = init_mm.pgd + index;
if (pgd_none(*pgd_k))
goto bad_area;
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
set_pgd(pgd, *pgd_k);
pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
pud_k = pud_offset(pgd_k, addr);
if (pud_none(*pud_k))
goto bad_area;
if (!pud_present(*pud))
set_pud(pud, *pud_k);
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
pmd_k = pmd_offset(pud_k, addr);
/*
* On ARM one Linux PGD entry contains two hardware entries (see page
* tables layout in pgtable.h). We normally guarantee that we always
* fill both L1 entries. But create_mapping() doesn't follow the rule.
* It can create inidividual L1 entries, so here we have to call
* pmd_none() check for the entry really corresponded to address, not
* for the first of pair.
*/
index = (addr >> SECTION_SHIFT) & 1;
if (pmd_none(pmd_k[index]))
goto bad_area;
copy_pmd(pmd, pmd_k);
return 0;
bad_area:
do_bad_area(addr, fsr, regs);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb
|
d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb
|
Fix eliding, truncation issues with hostnames in security information dialog for windows, linux platforms resp.
BUG=48597
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2958002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@51972 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OnDestroy(GtkDialog* dialog, PageInfoWindowGtk* page_info) {
delete page_info;
}
|
void OnDestroy(GtkDialog* dialog, PageInfoWindowGtk* page_info) {
delete page_info;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2008-7316
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-7316/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/124d3b7041f9a0ca7c43a6293e1cae4576c32fd5
|
124d3b7041f9a0ca7c43a6293e1cae4576c32fd5
|
fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void remove_from_page_cache(struct page *page)
{
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
write_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
__remove_from_page_cache(page);
write_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
}
|
void remove_from_page_cache(struct page *page)
{
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
write_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
__remove_from_page_cache(page);
write_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(
DownloadId global_id, const base::Closure& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
// Done here on Windows so that anti-virus scanners invoked by
// the attachment service actually see the data; see
// http://crbug.com/127999.
// Done here for mac because we only want to do this once; see
// http://crbug.com/13120 for details.
// Other platforms don't currently do source annotation.
download_file->AnnotateWithSourceInformation();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
// Notify our caller we've let it go.
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, callback);
}
|
void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-1000524
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000524/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/fatcerberus/minisphere/commit/252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
|
person_queue_script(person_t* person, script_t* script, bool is_immediate)
{
++person->num_commands;
if (person->num_commands > person->max_commands) {
person->max_commands = person->num_commands * 2;
if (!(person->commands = realloc(person->commands, person->max_commands * sizeof(struct command))))
return false;
}
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].type = COMMAND_RUN_SCRIPT;
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].is_immediate = is_immediate;
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].script = script;
return true;
}
|
person_queue_script(person_t* person, script_t* script, bool is_immediate)
{
++person->num_commands;
if (person->num_commands > person->max_commands) {
person->max_commands = person->num_commands * 2;
if (!(person->commands = realloc(person->commands, person->max_commands * sizeof(struct command))))
return false;
}
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].type = COMMAND_RUN_SCRIPT;
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].is_immediate = is_immediate;
person->commands[person->num_commands - 1].script = script;
return true;
}
|
C
|
minisphere
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
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This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
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