CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2011-4131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4131/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
static int decode_attr_space_used(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *used)
{
__be32 *p;
int ret = 0;
*used = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
xdr_decode_hyper(p, used);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED;
ret = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_SPACE_USED;
}
dprintk("%s: space used=%Lu\n", __func__,
(unsigned long long)*used);
return ret;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
|
static int decode_attr_space_used(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *used)
{
__be32 *p;
int ret = 0;
*used = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
xdr_decode_hyper(p, used);
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_USED;
ret = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_SPACE_USED;
}
dprintk("%s: space used=%Lu\n", __func__,
(unsigned long long)*used);
return ret;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7532
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7532/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/4f2c04ea6673863b87ac7f186cbb0d911f74085c
|
4f2c04ea6673863b87ac7f186cbb0d911f74085c
|
Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDMergedImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
register ssize_t
i;
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (compression != Raw && compression != RLE)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeWarning,"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
return(MagickFalse);
}
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if (compression == RLE)
{
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(image,psd_info,image->rows*psd_info->channels);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) psd_info->channels; i++)
{
if (compression == RLE)
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(image,psd_info,i,offsets+(i*image->rows),
exception);
else
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(image,psd_info->channels,i,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,psd_info->channels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
status=NegateCMYK(image,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=CorrectPSDAlphaBlend(image_info,image,exception);
if (offsets != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDMergedImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
register ssize_t
i;
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (compression != Raw && compression != RLE)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeWarning,"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
return(MagickFalse);
}
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if (compression == RLE)
{
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(image,psd_info,image->rows*psd_info->channels);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) psd_info->channels; i++)
{
if (compression == RLE)
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(image,psd_info,i,offsets+(i*image->rows),
exception);
else
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(image,psd_info->channels,i,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,psd_info->channels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
status=NegateCMYK(image,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=CorrectPSDAlphaBlend(image_info,image,exception);
if (offsets != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err adkm_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox *)a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->header) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->header, trace);
if (ptr->au_format) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->au_format, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err adkm_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox *)a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->header) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->header, trace);
if (ptr->au_format) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->au_format, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetShaderiv(
GLuint shader, GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
shader, "glGetShaderiv");
if (!info) {
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_SHADER_SOURCE_LENGTH:
*params = info->source() ? info->source()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
case GL_COMPILE_STATUS:
*params = compile_shader_always_succeeds_ ? true : info->IsValid();
return;
case GL_INFO_LOG_LENGTH:
*params = info->log_info() ? info->log_info()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
case GL_TRANSLATED_SHADER_SOURCE_LENGTH_ANGLE:
ForceCompileShaderIfPending(info);
*params = info->translated_source() ?
info->translated_source()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
default:
break;
}
glGetShaderiv(info->service_id(), pname, params);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetShaderiv(
GLuint shader, GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
shader, "glGetShaderiv");
if (!info) {
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_SHADER_SOURCE_LENGTH:
*params = info->source() ? info->source()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
case GL_COMPILE_STATUS:
*params = compile_shader_always_succeeds_ ? true : info->IsValid();
return;
case GL_INFO_LOG_LENGTH:
*params = info->log_info() ? info->log_info()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
case GL_TRANSLATED_SHADER_SOURCE_LENGTH_ANGLE:
ForceCompileShaderIfPending(info);
*params = info->translated_source() ?
info->translated_source()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
default:
break;
}
glGetShaderiv(info->service_id(), pname, params);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameView::setContentsSize(const IntSize& size)
{
if (size == contentsSize())
return;
ScrollView::setContentsSize(size);
ScrollView::contentsResized();
Page* page = frame().page();
if (!page)
return;
updateScrollableAreaSet();
page->chrome().contentsSizeChanged(m_frame.get(), size);
}
|
void FrameView::setContentsSize(const IntSize& size)
{
if (size == contentsSize())
return;
ScrollView::setContentsSize(size);
ScrollView::contentsResized();
Page* page = frame().page();
if (!page)
return;
updateScrollableAreaSet();
page->chrome().contentsSizeChanged(m_frame.get(), size);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void voidMethodElementArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodElementArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Element*, elementArg, V8Element::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
imp->voidMethodElementArg(elementArg);
}
|
static void voidMethodElementArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodElementArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Element*, elementArg, V8Element::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
imp->voidMethodElementArg(elementArg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7010
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7010/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760
|
454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760
|
avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
static int nsse8_c(void *v, uint8_t *s1, uint8_t *s2, int stride, int h){
MpegEncContext *c = v;
int score1=0;
int score2=0;
int x,y;
for(y=0; y<h; y++){
for(x=0; x<8; x++){
score1+= (s1[x ] - s2[x ])*(s1[x ] - s2[x ]);
}
if(y+1<h){
for(x=0; x<7; x++){
score2+= FFABS( s1[x ] - s1[x +stride]
- s1[x+1] + s1[x+1+stride])
-FFABS( s2[x ] - s2[x +stride]
- s2[x+1] + s2[x+1+stride]);
}
}
s1+= stride;
s2+= stride;
}
if(c) return score1 + FFABS(score2)*c->avctx->nsse_weight;
else return score1 + FFABS(score2)*8;
}
|
static int nsse8_c(void *v, uint8_t *s1, uint8_t *s2, int stride, int h){
MpegEncContext *c = v;
int score1=0;
int score2=0;
int x,y;
for(y=0; y<h; y++){
for(x=0; x<8; x++){
score1+= (s1[x ] - s2[x ])*(s1[x ] - s2[x ]);
}
if(y+1<h){
for(x=0; x<7; x++){
score2+= FFABS( s1[x ] - s1[x +stride]
- s1[x+1] + s1[x+1+stride])
-FFABS( s2[x ] - s2[x +stride]
- s2[x+1] + s2[x+1+stride]);
}
}
s1+= stride;
s2+= stride;
}
if(c) return score1 + FFABS(score2)*c->avctx->nsse_weight;
else return score1 + FFABS(score2)*8;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8374/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
|
static int btrfs_submit_bio_hook(struct inode *inode, int rw, struct bio *bio,
int mirror_num, unsigned long bio_flags,
u64 bio_offset)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret = 0;
int skip_sum;
int metadata = 0;
int async = !atomic_read(&BTRFS_I(inode)->sync_writers);
skip_sum = BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM;
if (btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode))
metadata = 2;
if (!(rw & REQ_WRITE)) {
ret = btrfs_bio_wq_end_io(root->fs_info, bio, metadata);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (bio_flags & EXTENT_BIO_COMPRESSED) {
ret = btrfs_submit_compressed_read(inode, bio,
mirror_num,
bio_flags);
goto out;
} else if (!skip_sum) {
ret = btrfs_lookup_bio_sums(root, inode, bio, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
goto mapit;
} else if (async && !skip_sum) {
/* csum items have already been cloned */
if (root->root_key.objectid == BTRFS_DATA_RELOC_TREE_OBJECTID)
goto mapit;
/* we're doing a write, do the async checksumming */
ret = btrfs_wq_submit_bio(BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info,
inode, rw, bio, mirror_num,
bio_flags, bio_offset,
__btrfs_submit_bio_start,
__btrfs_submit_bio_done);
goto out;
} else if (!skip_sum) {
ret = btrfs_csum_one_bio(root, inode, bio, 0, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
mapit:
ret = btrfs_map_bio(root, rw, bio, mirror_num, 0);
out:
if (ret < 0) {
bio->bi_error = ret;
bio_endio(bio);
}
return ret;
}
|
static int btrfs_submit_bio_hook(struct inode *inode, int rw, struct bio *bio,
int mirror_num, unsigned long bio_flags,
u64 bio_offset)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret = 0;
int skip_sum;
int metadata = 0;
int async = !atomic_read(&BTRFS_I(inode)->sync_writers);
skip_sum = BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM;
if (btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode))
metadata = 2;
if (!(rw & REQ_WRITE)) {
ret = btrfs_bio_wq_end_io(root->fs_info, bio, metadata);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (bio_flags & EXTENT_BIO_COMPRESSED) {
ret = btrfs_submit_compressed_read(inode, bio,
mirror_num,
bio_flags);
goto out;
} else if (!skip_sum) {
ret = btrfs_lookup_bio_sums(root, inode, bio, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
goto mapit;
} else if (async && !skip_sum) {
/* csum items have already been cloned */
if (root->root_key.objectid == BTRFS_DATA_RELOC_TREE_OBJECTID)
goto mapit;
/* we're doing a write, do the async checksumming */
ret = btrfs_wq_submit_bio(BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info,
inode, rw, bio, mirror_num,
bio_flags, bio_offset,
__btrfs_submit_bio_start,
__btrfs_submit_bio_done);
goto out;
} else if (!skip_sum) {
ret = btrfs_csum_one_bio(root, inode, bio, 0, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
mapit:
ret = btrfs_map_bio(root, rw, bio, mirror_num, 0);
out:
if (ret < 0) {
bio->bi_error = ret;
bio_endio(bio);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6540/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680
|
2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680
|
ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int __net_init ip_vs_control_net_init_sysctl(struct net *net) { return 0; }
|
int __net_init ip_vs_control_net_init_sysctl(struct net *net) { return 0; }
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
int filter_assign_type(const char *type)
{
if (strstr(type, "__data_loc") && strstr(type, "char"))
return FILTER_DYN_STRING;
if (strchr(type, '[') && strstr(type, "char"))
return FILTER_STATIC_STRING;
return FILTER_OTHER;
}
|
int filter_assign_type(const char *type)
{
if (strstr(type, "__data_loc") && strstr(type, "char"))
return FILTER_DYN_STRING;
if (strchr(type, '[') && strstr(type, "char"))
return FILTER_STATIC_STRING;
return FILTER_OTHER;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3194
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3194/
| null |
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d8541d7e9e63bf5f343af24644046c8d96498c17
|
d8541d7e9e63bf5f343af24644046c8d96498c17
| null |
static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
}
|
static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7417
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7417/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/ecb7f58a069be0dec4a6131b6351a761f808f22e?w=1
|
ecb7f58a069be0dec4a6131b6351a761f808f22e?w=1
|
Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
|
SPL_METHOD(Array, getFlags)
{
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->ar_flags & ~SPL_ARRAY_INT_MASK);
}
|
SPL_METHOD(Array, getFlags)
{
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->ar_flags & ~SPL_ARRAY_INT_MASK);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9994
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9994/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static av_always_inline void color_cache_put(ImageContext *img, uint32_t c)
{
uint32_t cache_idx = (0x1E35A7BD * c) >> (32 - img->color_cache_bits);
img->color_cache[cache_idx] = c;
}
|
static av_always_inline void color_cache_put(ImageContext *img, uint32_t c)
{
uint32_t cache_idx = (0x1E35A7BD * c) >> (32 - img->color_cache_bits);
img->color_cache[cache_idx] = c;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void AppendStringToBuffer(std::vector<uint8_t>* data,
const char* str,
size_t len) {
const base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> old_size = data->size();
data->resize((old_size + len).ValueOrDie());
memcpy(data->data() + old_size.ValueOrDie(), str, len);
}
|
void AppendStringToBuffer(std::vector<uint8_t>* data,
const char* str,
size_t len) {
const base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> old_size = data->size();
data->resize((old_size + len).ValueOrDie());
memcpy(data->data() + old_size.ValueOrDie(), str, len);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
void account_steal_ticks(unsigned long ticks)
{
account_steal_time(jiffies_to_cputime(ticks));
}
|
void account_steal_ticks(unsigned long ticks)
{
account_steal_time(jiffies_to_cputime(ticks));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5232/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/01org/opa-fm/commit/c5759e7b76f5bf844be6c6641cc1b356bbc83869
|
c5759e7b76f5bf844be6c6641cc1b356bbc83869
|
Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
|
int sm_force_rebalance_toggle(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_FORCE_REBALANCE_TOGGLE, mgr, 0, NULL, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_force_rebalance_toggle: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent SM Force Rebalance control to local SM instance\n");
}
return 0;
}
|
int sm_force_rebalance_toggle(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_FORCE_REBALANCE_TOGGLE, mgr, 0, NULL, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_force_rebalance_toggle: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent SM Force Rebalance control to local SM instance\n");
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
opa-ff
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7539/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=ff82911cd3f69f028f2537825c9720ff78bc3f19
|
ff82911cd3f69f028f2537825c9720ff78bc3f19
| null |
int nbd_client(int fd)
{
int ret;
int serrno;
TRACE("Doing NBD loop");
ret = ioctl(fd, NBD_DO_IT);
if (ret < 0 && errno == EPIPE) {
/* NBD_DO_IT normally returns EPIPE when someone has disconnected
* the socket via NBD_DISCONNECT. We do not want to return 1 in
* that case.
*/
ret = 0;
}
serrno = errno;
TRACE("NBD loop returned %d: %s", ret, strerror(serrno));
TRACE("Clearing NBD queue");
ioctl(fd, NBD_CLEAR_QUE);
TRACE("Clearing NBD socket");
ioctl(fd, NBD_CLEAR_SOCK);
errno = serrno;
return ret;
}
|
int nbd_client(int fd)
{
int ret;
int serrno;
TRACE("Doing NBD loop");
ret = ioctl(fd, NBD_DO_IT);
if (ret < 0 && errno == EPIPE) {
/* NBD_DO_IT normally returns EPIPE when someone has disconnected
* the socket via NBD_DISCONNECT. We do not want to return 1 in
* that case.
*/
ret = 0;
}
serrno = errno;
TRACE("NBD loop returned %d: %s", ret, strerror(serrno));
TRACE("Clearing NBD queue");
ioctl(fd, NBD_CLEAR_QUE);
TRACE("Clearing NBD socket");
ioctl(fd, NBD_CLEAR_SOCK);
errno = serrno;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5023
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5023/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
03c2e97746a2c471ae136b0c669f8d0c033fe168
|
Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
|
void Histogram::WriteAsciiBucketContext(const int64_t past,
const Count current,
const int64_t remaining,
const uint32_t i,
std::string* output) const {
double scaled_sum = (past + current + remaining) / 100.0;
WriteAsciiBucketValue(current, scaled_sum, output);
if (0 < i) {
double percentage = past / scaled_sum;
StringAppendF(output, " {%3.1f%%}", percentage);
}
}
|
void Histogram::WriteAsciiBucketContext(const int64_t past,
const Count current,
const int64_t remaining,
const uint32_t i,
std::string* output) const {
double scaled_sum = (past + current + remaining) / 100.0;
WriteAsciiBucketValue(current, scaled_sum, output);
if (0 < i) {
double percentage = past / scaled_sum;
StringAppendF(output, " {%3.1f%%}", percentage);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7865/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static int unrefcount_frame(AVCodecInternal *avci, AVFrame *frame)
{
int ret;
/* move the original frame to our backup */
av_frame_unref(avci->to_free);
av_frame_move_ref(avci->to_free, frame);
/* now copy everything except the AVBufferRefs back
* note that we make a COPY of the side data, so calling av_frame_free() on
* the caller's frame will work properly */
ret = av_frame_copy_props(frame, avci->to_free);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
memcpy(frame->data, avci->to_free->data, sizeof(frame->data));
memcpy(frame->linesize, avci->to_free->linesize, sizeof(frame->linesize));
if (avci->to_free->extended_data != avci->to_free->data) {
int planes = av_frame_get_channels(avci->to_free);
int size = planes * sizeof(*frame->extended_data);
if (!size) {
av_frame_unref(frame);
return AVERROR_BUG;
}
frame->extended_data = av_malloc(size);
if (!frame->extended_data) {
av_frame_unref(frame);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memcpy(frame->extended_data, avci->to_free->extended_data,
size);
} else
frame->extended_data = frame->data;
frame->format = avci->to_free->format;
frame->width = avci->to_free->width;
frame->height = avci->to_free->height;
frame->channel_layout = avci->to_free->channel_layout;
frame->nb_samples = avci->to_free->nb_samples;
av_frame_set_channels(frame, av_frame_get_channels(avci->to_free));
return 0;
}
|
static int unrefcount_frame(AVCodecInternal *avci, AVFrame *frame)
{
int ret;
/* move the original frame to our backup */
av_frame_unref(avci->to_free);
av_frame_move_ref(avci->to_free, frame);
/* now copy everything except the AVBufferRefs back
* note that we make a COPY of the side data, so calling av_frame_free() on
* the caller's frame will work properly */
ret = av_frame_copy_props(frame, avci->to_free);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
memcpy(frame->data, avci->to_free->data, sizeof(frame->data));
memcpy(frame->linesize, avci->to_free->linesize, sizeof(frame->linesize));
if (avci->to_free->extended_data != avci->to_free->data) {
int planes = av_frame_get_channels(avci->to_free);
int size = planes * sizeof(*frame->extended_data);
if (!size) {
av_frame_unref(frame);
return AVERROR_BUG;
}
frame->extended_data = av_malloc(size);
if (!frame->extended_data) {
av_frame_unref(frame);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
memcpy(frame->extended_data, avci->to_free->extended_data,
size);
} else
frame->extended_data = frame->data;
frame->format = avci->to_free->format;
frame->width = avci->to_free->width;
frame->height = avci->to_free->height;
frame->channel_layout = avci->to_free->channel_layout;
frame->nb_samples = avci->to_free->nb_samples;
av_frame_set_channels(frame, av_frame_get_channels(avci->to_free));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10517/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
|
void preventCommandPropagation(client *c) {
c->flags |= CLIENT_PREVENT_PROP;
}
|
void preventCommandPropagation(client *c) {
c->flags |= CLIENT_PREVENT_PROP;
}
|
C
|
redis
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5156/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WorkerProcessLauncherTest::WorkerProcessLauncherTest()
: message_loop_(MessageLoop::TYPE_IO),
client_pid_(GetCurrentProcessId()),
permanent_error_(false) {
}
|
WorkerProcessLauncherTest::WorkerProcessLauncherTest()
: message_loop_(MessageLoop::TYPE_IO) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr invocNode,
const xmlChar *nsName, const xmlChar *nsPrefix,
xmlNodePtr target)
{
xmlNsPtr ns;
int prefixOccupied = 0;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (target == NULL) ||
(target->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return(NULL);
/*
* NOTE: Namespace exclusion and ns-aliasing is performed at
* compilation-time in the refactored code; so this need not be done
* here (it was in the old code).
* NOTE: @invocNode was named @cur in the old code and was documented to
* be an input node; since it was only used to anchor an error report
* somewhere, we can safely change this to @invocNode, which now
* will be the XSLT instruction (also a literal result element/attribute),
* which was responsible for this call.
*/
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: This all could be optimized by keeping track of
* the ns-decls currently in-scope via a specialized context.
*/
if ((nsPrefix == NULL) && ((nsName == NULL) || (nsName[0] == 0))) {
/*
* NOTE: the "undeclaration" of the default namespace was
* part of the logic of the old xsltGetSpecialNamespace() code,
* so we'll keep that mechanism.
* Related to the old code: bug #302020:
*/
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: This all could be optimized by keeping track of
* the ns-decls currently in-scope via a specialized context.
*/
/*
* Search on the result element itself.
*/
if (target->nsDef != NULL) {
ns = target->nsDef;
do {
if (ns->prefix == NULL) {
if ((ns->href != NULL) && (ns->href[0] != 0)) {
/*
* Raise a namespace normalization error.
*/
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"Namespace normalization error: Cannot undeclare "
"the default namespace, since the default namespace "
"'%s' is already declared on the result element "
"'%s'.\n", ns->href, target->name);
return(NULL);
} else {
/*
* The default namespace was undeclared on the
* result element.
*/
return(NULL);
}
break;
}
ns = ns->next;
} while (ns != NULL);
}
if ((target->parent != NULL) &&
(target->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
{
/*
* The parent element is in no namespace, so assume
* that there is no default namespace in scope.
*/
if (target->parent->ns == NULL)
return(NULL);
ns = xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target->parent,
NULL);
/*
* Fine if there's no default ns is scope, or if the
* default ns was undeclared.
*/
if ((ns == NULL) || (ns->href == NULL) || (ns->href[0] == 0))
return(NULL);
/*
* Undeclare the default namespace.
*/
xmlNewNs(target, BAD_CAST "", NULL);
/* TODO: Check result */
return(NULL);
}
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Handle the XML namespace.
* QUESTION: Is this faster than using xmlStrEqual() anyway?
*/
if ((nsPrefix != NULL) &&
(nsPrefix[0] == 'x') && (nsPrefix[1] == 'm') &&
(nsPrefix[2] == 'l') && (nsPrefix[3] == 0))
{
return(xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target, nsPrefix));
}
/*
* First: search on the result element itself.
*/
if (target->nsDef != NULL) {
ns = target->nsDef;
do {
if ((ns->prefix == NULL) == (nsPrefix == NULL)) {
if (ns->prefix == nsPrefix) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
prefixOccupied = 1;
break;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(ns->prefix, nsPrefix)) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
prefixOccupied = 1;
break;
}
}
ns = ns->next;
} while (ns != NULL);
}
if (prefixOccupied) {
/*
* If the ns-prefix is occupied by an other ns-decl on the
* result element, then this means:
* 1) The desired prefix is shadowed
* 2) There's no way around changing the prefix
*
* Try a desperate search for an in-scope ns-decl
* with a matching ns-name before we use the last option,
* which is to recreate the ns-decl with a modified prefix.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(target->doc, target, nsName);
if (ns != NULL)
return(ns);
/*
* Fallback to changing the prefix.
*/
} else if ((target->parent != NULL) &&
(target->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
{
/*
* Try to find a matching ns-decl in the ancestor-axis.
*
* Check the common case: The parent element of the current
* result element is in the same namespace (with an equal ns-prefix).
*/
if ((target->parent->ns != NULL) &&
((target->parent->ns->prefix != NULL) == (nsPrefix != NULL)))
{
ns = target->parent->ns;
if (nsPrefix == NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(ns->prefix, nsPrefix) &&
xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
{
return(ns);
}
}
/*
* Lookup the remaining in-scope namespaces.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target->parent, nsPrefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
/*
* Now check for a nasty case: We need to ensure that the new
* ns-decl won't shadow a prefix in-use by an existing attribute.
* <foo xmlns:a="urn:test:a">
* <bar a:a="val-a">
* <xsl:attribute xmlns:a="urn:test:b" name="a:b">
* val-b</xsl:attribute>
* </bar>
* </foo>
*/
if (target->properties) {
xmlAttrPtr attr = target->properties;
do {
if ((attr->ns) &&
xmlStrEqual(attr->ns->prefix, nsPrefix))
{
/*
* Bad, this prefix is already in use.
* Since we'll change the prefix anyway, try
* a search for a matching ns-decl based on the
* namespace name.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(target->doc, target, nsName);
if (ns != NULL)
return(ns);
goto declare_new_prefix;
}
attr = attr->next;
} while (attr != NULL);
}
} else {
/*
* Either no matching ns-prefix was found or the namespace is
* shadowed.
* Create a new ns-decl on the current result element.
*
* Hmm, we could also try to reuse an in-scope
* namespace with a matching ns-name but a different
* ns-prefix.
* What has higher priority?
* 1) If keeping the prefix: create a new ns-decl.
* 2) If reusal: first lookup ns-names; then fallback
* to creation of a new ns-decl.
* REVISIT: this currently uses case 1) although
* the old way was use xmlSearchNsByHref() and to let change
* the prefix.
*/
#if 0
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(target->doc, target, nsName);
if (ns != NULL)
return(ns);
#endif
}
/*
* Create the ns-decl on the current result element.
*/
ns = xmlNewNs(target, nsName, nsPrefix);
/* TODO: check errors */
return(ns);
} else {
/*
* This is either the root of the tree or something weird is going on.
*/
ns = xmlNewNs(target, nsName, nsPrefix);
/* TODO: Check result */
return(ns);
}
declare_new_prefix:
/*
* Fallback: we need to generate a new prefix and declare the namespace
* on the result element.
*/
{
xmlChar pref[30];
int counter = 1;
if (nsPrefix == NULL) {
nsPrefix = BAD_CAST "ns";
}
do {
snprintf((char *) pref, 30, "%s_%d", nsPrefix, counter++);
ns = xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target, BAD_CAST pref);
if (counter > 1000) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"Internal error in xsltAcquireResultInScopeNs(): "
"Failed to compute a unique ns-prefix for the "
"generated element");
return(NULL);
}
} while (ns != NULL);
ns = xmlNewNs(target, nsName, BAD_CAST pref);
/* TODO: Check result */
return(ns);
}
return(NULL);
}
|
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr invocNode,
const xmlChar *nsName, const xmlChar *nsPrefix,
xmlNodePtr target)
{
xmlNsPtr ns;
int prefixOccupied = 0;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (target == NULL) ||
(target->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return(NULL);
/*
* NOTE: Namespace exclusion and ns-aliasing is performed at
* compilation-time in the refactored code; so this need not be done
* here (it was in the old code).
* NOTE: @invocNode was named @cur in the old code and was documented to
* be an input node; since it was only used to anchor an error report
* somewhere, we can safely change this to @invocNode, which now
* will be the XSLT instruction (also a literal result element/attribute),
* which was responsible for this call.
*/
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: This all could be optimized by keeping track of
* the ns-decls currently in-scope via a specialized context.
*/
if ((nsPrefix == NULL) && ((nsName == NULL) || (nsName[0] == 0))) {
/*
* NOTE: the "undeclaration" of the default namespace was
* part of the logic of the old xsltGetSpecialNamespace() code,
* so we'll keep that mechanism.
* Related to the old code: bug #302020:
*/
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: This all could be optimized by keeping track of
* the ns-decls currently in-scope via a specialized context.
*/
/*
* Search on the result element itself.
*/
if (target->nsDef != NULL) {
ns = target->nsDef;
do {
if (ns->prefix == NULL) {
if ((ns->href != NULL) && (ns->href[0] != 0)) {
/*
* Raise a namespace normalization error.
*/
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"Namespace normalization error: Cannot undeclare "
"the default namespace, since the default namespace "
"'%s' is already declared on the result element "
"'%s'.\n", ns->href, target->name);
return(NULL);
} else {
/*
* The default namespace was undeclared on the
* result element.
*/
return(NULL);
}
break;
}
ns = ns->next;
} while (ns != NULL);
}
if ((target->parent != NULL) &&
(target->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
{
/*
* The parent element is in no namespace, so assume
* that there is no default namespace in scope.
*/
if (target->parent->ns == NULL)
return(NULL);
ns = xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target->parent,
NULL);
/*
* Fine if there's no default ns is scope, or if the
* default ns was undeclared.
*/
if ((ns == NULL) || (ns->href == NULL) || (ns->href[0] == 0))
return(NULL);
/*
* Undeclare the default namespace.
*/
xmlNewNs(target, BAD_CAST "", NULL);
/* TODO: Check result */
return(NULL);
}
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Handle the XML namespace.
* QUESTION: Is this faster than using xmlStrEqual() anyway?
*/
if ((nsPrefix != NULL) &&
(nsPrefix[0] == 'x') && (nsPrefix[1] == 'm') &&
(nsPrefix[2] == 'l') && (nsPrefix[3] == 0))
{
return(xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target, nsPrefix));
}
/*
* First: search on the result element itself.
*/
if (target->nsDef != NULL) {
ns = target->nsDef;
do {
if ((ns->prefix == NULL) == (nsPrefix == NULL)) {
if (ns->prefix == nsPrefix) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
prefixOccupied = 1;
break;
} else if (xmlStrEqual(ns->prefix, nsPrefix)) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
prefixOccupied = 1;
break;
}
}
ns = ns->next;
} while (ns != NULL);
}
if (prefixOccupied) {
/*
* If the ns-prefix is occupied by an other ns-decl on the
* result element, then this means:
* 1) The desired prefix is shadowed
* 2) There's no way around changing the prefix
*
* Try a desperate search for an in-scope ns-decl
* with a matching ns-name before we use the last option,
* which is to recreate the ns-decl with a modified prefix.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(target->doc, target, nsName);
if (ns != NULL)
return(ns);
/*
* Fallback to changing the prefix.
*/
} else if ((target->parent != NULL) &&
(target->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
{
/*
* Try to find a matching ns-decl in the ancestor-axis.
*
* Check the common case: The parent element of the current
* result element is in the same namespace (with an equal ns-prefix).
*/
if ((target->parent->ns != NULL) &&
((target->parent->ns->prefix != NULL) == (nsPrefix != NULL)))
{
ns = target->parent->ns;
if (nsPrefix == NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(ns->prefix, nsPrefix) &&
xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
{
return(ns);
}
}
/*
* Lookup the remaining in-scope namespaces.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target->parent, nsPrefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(ns->href, nsName))
return(ns);
/*
* Now check for a nasty case: We need to ensure that the new
* ns-decl won't shadow a prefix in-use by an existing attribute.
* <foo xmlns:a="urn:test:a">
* <bar a:a="val-a">
* <xsl:attribute xmlns:a="urn:test:b" name="a:b">
* val-b</xsl:attribute>
* </bar>
* </foo>
*/
if (target->properties) {
xmlAttrPtr attr = target->properties;
do {
if ((attr->ns) &&
xmlStrEqual(attr->ns->prefix, nsPrefix))
{
/*
* Bad, this prefix is already in use.
* Since we'll change the prefix anyway, try
* a search for a matching ns-decl based on the
* namespace name.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(target->doc, target, nsName);
if (ns != NULL)
return(ns);
goto declare_new_prefix;
}
attr = attr->next;
} while (attr != NULL);
}
} else {
/*
* Either no matching ns-prefix was found or the namespace is
* shadowed.
* Create a new ns-decl on the current result element.
*
* Hmm, we could also try to reuse an in-scope
* namespace with a matching ns-name but a different
* ns-prefix.
* What has higher priority?
* 1) If keeping the prefix: create a new ns-decl.
* 2) If reusal: first lookup ns-names; then fallback
* to creation of a new ns-decl.
* REVISIT: this currently uses case 1) although
* the old way was use xmlSearchNsByHref() and to let change
* the prefix.
*/
#if 0
ns = xmlSearchNsByHref(target->doc, target, nsName);
if (ns != NULL)
return(ns);
#endif
}
/*
* Create the ns-decl on the current result element.
*/
ns = xmlNewNs(target, nsName, nsPrefix);
/* TODO: check errors */
return(ns);
} else {
/*
* This is either the root of the tree or something weird is going on.
*/
ns = xmlNewNs(target, nsName, nsPrefix);
/* TODO: Check result */
return(ns);
}
declare_new_prefix:
/*
* Fallback: we need to generate a new prefix and declare the namespace
* on the result element.
*/
{
xmlChar pref[30];
int counter = 1;
if (nsPrefix == NULL) {
nsPrefix = BAD_CAST "ns";
}
do {
snprintf((char *) pref, 30, "%s_%d", nsPrefix, counter++);
ns = xmlSearchNs(target->doc, target, BAD_CAST pref);
if (counter > 1000) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"Internal error in xsltAcquireResultInScopeNs(): "
"Failed to compute a unique ns-prefix for the "
"generated element");
return(NULL);
}
} while (ns != NULL);
ns = xmlNewNs(target, nsName, BAD_CAST pref);
/* TODO: Check result */
return(ns);
}
return(NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6791/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
identity::mojom::IdentityManager& DriveFsHost::GetIdentityManager() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!identity_manager_) {
delegate_->GetConnector()->BindInterface(
identity::mojom::kServiceName, mojo::MakeRequest(&identity_manager_));
}
return *identity_manager_;
}
|
identity::mojom::IdentityManager& DriveFsHost::GetIdentityManager() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!identity_manager_) {
delegate_->GetConnector()->BindInterface(
identity::mojom::kServiceName, mojo::MakeRequest(&identity_manager_));
}
return *identity_manager_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
const AtomicString& DocumentLoader::MimeType() const {
if (writer_)
return writer_->MimeType();
return response_.MimeType();
}
|
const AtomicString& DocumentLoader::MimeType() const {
if (writer_)
return writer_->MimeType();
return response_.MimeType();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17468
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17468/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
5fe74f831fddb92afa5ddfe46490bb49f083132b
|
Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsCommandEnabled(const WebString& name) const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return GetFrame()->GetEditor().IsCommandEnabled(name);
}
|
bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsCommandEnabled(const WebString& name) const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return GetFrame()->GetEditor().IsCommandEnabled(name);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
bool AboutInSettingsEnabled() {
return SettingsWindowEnabled() &&
!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kDisableAboutInSettings);
}
|
bool AboutInSettingsEnabled() {
return SettingsWindowEnabled() &&
!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kDisableAboutInSettings);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12168/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9e3f7a29694049edd728e2400ab57ad7553e5aa9
|
9e3f7a29694049edd728e2400ab57ad7553e5aa9
|
arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
static void dbg_to_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
u64 *dbg_reg)
{
p->regval = *dbg_reg;
if (p->is_32bit)
p->regval &= 0xffffffffUL;
}
|
static void dbg_to_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
u64 *dbg_reg)
{
p->regval = *dbg_reg;
if (p->is_32bit)
p->regval &= 0xffffffffUL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3881/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/4974dcbd0289a2530df2ee2a25b5f92775df80da
|
4974dcbd0289a2530df2ee2a25b5f92775df80da
|
DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
|
static int frame_worker_hook(void *arg1, void *arg2) {
FrameWorkerData *const frame_worker_data = (FrameWorkerData *)arg1;
const uint8_t *data = frame_worker_data->data;
(void)arg2;
frame_worker_data->result =
vp9_receive_compressed_data(frame_worker_data->pbi,
frame_worker_data->data_size,
&data);
frame_worker_data->data_end = data;
if (frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_parallel_decode) {
if (frame_worker_data->result != 0 ||
frame_worker_data->data + frame_worker_data->data_size - 1 > data) {
VPxWorker *const worker = frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_worker_owner;
BufferPool *const pool = frame_worker_data->pbi->common.buffer_pool;
vp9_frameworker_lock_stats(worker);
frame_worker_data->frame_context_ready = 1;
lock_buffer_pool(pool);
frame_worker_data->pbi->cur_buf->buf.corrupted = 1;
unlock_buffer_pool(pool);
frame_worker_data->pbi->need_resync = 1;
vp9_frameworker_signal_stats(worker);
vp9_frameworker_unlock_stats(worker);
return 0;
}
} else if (frame_worker_data->result != 0) {
frame_worker_data->pbi->cur_buf->buf.corrupted = 1;
frame_worker_data->pbi->need_resync = 1;
}
return !frame_worker_data->result;
}
|
static int frame_worker_hook(void *arg1, void *arg2) {
FrameWorkerData *const frame_worker_data = (FrameWorkerData *)arg1;
const uint8_t *data = frame_worker_data->data;
(void)arg2;
frame_worker_data->result =
vp9_receive_compressed_data(frame_worker_data->pbi,
frame_worker_data->data_size,
&data);
frame_worker_data->data_end = data;
if (frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_parallel_decode) {
if (frame_worker_data->result != 0 ||
frame_worker_data->data + frame_worker_data->data_size - 1 > data) {
VPxWorker *const worker = frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_worker_owner;
BufferPool *const pool = frame_worker_data->pbi->common.buffer_pool;
vp9_frameworker_lock_stats(worker);
frame_worker_data->frame_context_ready = 1;
lock_buffer_pool(pool);
frame_worker_data->pbi->cur_buf->buf.corrupted = 1;
unlock_buffer_pool(pool);
frame_worker_data->pbi->need_resync = 1;
vp9_frameworker_signal_stats(worker);
vp9_frameworker_unlock_stats(worker);
return 0;
}
} else if (frame_worker_data->result != 0) {
frame_worker_data->pbi->cur_buf->buf.corrupted = 1;
frame_worker_data->pbi->need_resync = 1;
}
return !frame_worker_data->result;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2909/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool checkForFloatsFromLastLine() const { return m_checkForFloatsFromLastLine; }
|
bool checkForFloatsFromLastLine() const { return m_checkForFloatsFromLastLine; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4116
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4116/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=1cbd25ca15383394ffa9ee8601c5de4c0f2f90e1
|
1cbd25ca15383394ffa9ee8601c5de4c0f2f90e1
| null |
SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, current)
{
spl_heap_object *intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zval *element = (zval *)intern->heap->elements[0];
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!intern->heap->count || !element) {
RETURN_NULL();
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(element, 1, 0);
}
}
|
SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, current)
{
spl_heap_object *intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zval *element = (zval *)intern->heap->elements[0];
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!intern->heap->count || !element) {
RETURN_NULL();
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(element, 1, 0);
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9388
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9388/
| null |
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/411a4068f8c464e883358bf403a3e25158863823
|
411a4068f8c464e883358bf403a3e25158863823
|
Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
|
static int ras_putdata(jas_stream_t *out, ras_hdr_t *hdr, jas_image_t *image, int numcmpts, int *cmpts)
{
int ret;
switch (hdr->type) {
case RAS_TYPE_STD:
ret = ras_putdatastd(out, hdr, image, numcmpts, cmpts);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
return ret;
}
|
static int ras_putdata(jas_stream_t *out, ras_hdr_t *hdr, jas_image_t *image, int numcmpts, int *cmpts)
{
int ret;
switch (hdr->type) {
case RAS_TYPE_STD:
ret = ras_putdatastd(out, hdr, image, numcmpts, cmpts);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4470
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4470/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9
|
e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9
|
ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc, struct rtable **rtp,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
int err;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
err = ip_setup_cork(sk, &inet->cork.base, ipc, rtp);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
transhdrlen = 0;
}
return __ip_append_data(sk, fl4, &sk->sk_write_queue, &inet->cork.base,
sk_page_frag(sk), getfrag,
from, length, transhdrlen, flags);
}
|
int ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
struct ipcm_cookie *ipc, struct rtable **rtp,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
int err;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
err = ip_setup_cork(sk, &inet->cork.base, ipc, rtp);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
transhdrlen = 0;
}
return __ip_append_data(sk, fl4, &sk->sk_write_queue, &inet->cork.base,
sk_page_frag(sk), getfrag,
from, length, transhdrlen, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6213/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498
|
d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498
|
mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
static void put_mountpoint(struct mountpoint *mp)
{
if (!--mp->m_count) {
struct dentry *dentry = mp->m_dentry;
BUG_ON(!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list));
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_MOUNTED;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
hlist_del(&mp->m_hash);
kfree(mp);
}
}
|
static void put_mountpoint(struct mountpoint *mp)
{
if (!--mp->m_count) {
struct dentry *dentry = mp->m_dentry;
BUG_ON(!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list));
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_MOUNTED;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
hlist_del(&mp->m_hash);
kfree(mp);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1943
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1943/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e
|
fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e
|
KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
|
int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
/* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */
if (user_alloc &&
((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, mem->userspace_addr, mem->memory_size)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS + KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = &kvm->memslots->memslots[mem->slot];
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
#ifndef CONFIG_S390
if (npages && !new.rmap) {
new.rmap = vzalloc(npages * sizeof(*new.rmap));
if (!new.rmap)
goto out_free;
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
}
if (!npages)
goto skip_lpage;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
unsigned long j;
int lpages;
int level = i + 2;
/* Avoid unused variable warning if no large pages */
(void)level;
if (new.lpage_info[i])
continue;
lpages = 1 + ((base_gfn + npages - 1)
>> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
lpages -= base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level);
new.lpage_info[i] = vzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*new.lpage_info[i]));
if (!new.lpage_info[i])
goto out_free;
if (base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][0].write_count = 1;
if ((base_gfn+npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = new.userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!largepages_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
new.lpage_info[i][j].write_count = 1;
}
skip_lpage:
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
#else /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
if (user_alloc)
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
#endif /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
if (!npages) {
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
slots->memslots[mem->slot].flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.rmap = NULL;
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i)
new.lpage_info[i] = NULL;
}
slots->memslots[mem->slot] = new;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
|
int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (user_alloc && (mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS + KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = &kvm->memslots->memslots[mem->slot];
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
#ifndef CONFIG_S390
if (npages && !new.rmap) {
new.rmap = vzalloc(npages * sizeof(*new.rmap));
if (!new.rmap)
goto out_free;
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
}
if (!npages)
goto skip_lpage;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
unsigned long j;
int lpages;
int level = i + 2;
/* Avoid unused variable warning if no large pages */
(void)level;
if (new.lpage_info[i])
continue;
lpages = 1 + ((base_gfn + npages - 1)
>> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
lpages -= base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level);
new.lpage_info[i] = vzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*new.lpage_info[i]));
if (!new.lpage_info[i])
goto out_free;
if (base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][0].write_count = 1;
if ((base_gfn+npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = new.userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!largepages_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
new.lpage_info[i][j].write_count = 1;
}
skip_lpage:
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
#else /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
if (user_alloc)
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
#endif /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
if (!npages) {
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
slots->memslots[mem->slot].flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.rmap = NULL;
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i)
new.lpage_info[i] = NULL;
}
slots->memslots[mem->slot] = new;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2548/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5a663aa426f4884c71cd8580adae73f33570f0d
|
b5a663aa426f4884c71cd8580adae73f33570f0d
|
ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static void snd_timer_tasklet(unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_timer *timer = (struct snd_timer *) arg;
struct snd_timer_instance *ti;
struct list_head *p;
unsigned long resolution, ticks;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
/* now process all callbacks */
while (!list_empty(&timer->sack_list_head)) {
p = timer->sack_list_head.next; /* get first item */
ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, ack_list);
/* remove from ack_list and make empty */
list_del_init(p);
ticks = ti->pticks;
ti->pticks = 0;
resolution = ti->resolution;
ti->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
spin_unlock(&timer->lock);
if (ti->callback)
ti->callback(ti, resolution, ticks);
spin_lock(&timer->lock);
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
}
|
static void snd_timer_tasklet(unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_timer *timer = (struct snd_timer *) arg;
struct snd_timer_instance *ti;
struct list_head *p;
unsigned long resolution, ticks;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
/* now process all callbacks */
while (!list_empty(&timer->sack_list_head)) {
p = timer->sack_list_head.next; /* get first item */
ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, ack_list);
/* remove from ack_list and make empty */
list_del_init(p);
ticks = ti->pticks;
ti->pticks = 0;
resolution = ti->resolution;
ti->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
spin_unlock(&timer->lock);
if (ti->callback)
ti->callback(ti, resolution, ticks);
spin_lock(&timer->lock);
ti->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1271/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
|
const AtomicString& MediaControlCastButtonElement::shadowPseudoId() const {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, id_nonOverlay,
("-internal-media-controls-cast-button"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, id_overlay,
("-internal-media-controls-overlay-cast-button"));
return m_isOverlayButton ? id_overlay : id_nonOverlay;
}
|
const AtomicString& MediaControlCastButtonElement::shadowPseudoId() const {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, id_nonOverlay,
("-internal-media-controls-cast-button"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, id_overlay,
("-internal-media-controls-overlay-cast-button"));
return m_isOverlayButton ? id_overlay : id_nonOverlay;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
reactor_t *reactor_new(void) {
reactor_t *ret = (reactor_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(reactor_t));
if (!ret)
return NULL;
ret->epoll_fd = INVALID_FD;
ret->event_fd = INVALID_FD;
ret->epoll_fd = epoll_create(MAX_EVENTS);
if (ret->epoll_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create epoll instance: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
ret->event_fd = eventfd(0, 0);
if (ret->event_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create eventfd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
pthread_mutex_init(&ret->list_lock, NULL);
ret->invalidation_list = list_new(NULL);
if (!ret->invalidation_list) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate object invalidation list.", __func__);
goto error;
}
struct epoll_event event;
memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.events = EPOLLIN;
event.data.ptr = NULL;
if (epoll_ctl(ret->epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ret->event_fd, &event) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to register eventfd with epoll set: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
return ret;
error:;
reactor_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
|
reactor_t *reactor_new(void) {
reactor_t *ret = (reactor_t *)osi_calloc(sizeof(reactor_t));
if (!ret)
return NULL;
ret->epoll_fd = INVALID_FD;
ret->event_fd = INVALID_FD;
ret->epoll_fd = epoll_create(MAX_EVENTS);
if (ret->epoll_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create epoll instance: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
ret->event_fd = eventfd(0, 0);
if (ret->event_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create eventfd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
pthread_mutex_init(&ret->list_lock, NULL);
ret->invalidation_list = list_new(NULL);
if (!ret->invalidation_list) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate object invalidation list.", __func__);
goto error;
}
struct epoll_event event;
memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event));
event.events = EPOLLIN;
event.data.ptr = NULL;
if (epoll_ctl(ret->epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, ret->event_fd, &event) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to register eventfd with epoll set: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto error;
}
return ret;
error:;
reactor_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9665/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=b3500af717010137046ec4076d1e1c0641e33727
|
b3500af717010137046ec4076d1e1c0641e33727
| null |
ftc_snode_new( FTC_Node *ftcpsnode,
FT_Pointer ftcgquery,
FTC_Cache cache )
{
FTC_SNode *psnode = (FTC_SNode*)ftcpsnode;
FTC_GQuery gquery = (FTC_GQuery)ftcgquery;
return FTC_SNode_New( psnode, gquery, cache );
}
|
ftc_snode_new( FTC_Node *ftcpsnode,
FT_Pointer ftcgquery,
FTC_Cache cache )
{
FTC_SNode *psnode = (FTC_SNode*)ftcpsnode;
FTC_GQuery gquery = (FTC_GQuery)ftcgquery;
return FTC_SNode_New( psnode, gquery, cache );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4998/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
ip_checkentry(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
{
if (ip->flags & ~IPT_F_MASK) {
duprintf("Unknown flag bits set: %08X\n",
ip->flags & ~IPT_F_MASK);
return false;
}
if (ip->invflags & ~IPT_INV_MASK) {
duprintf("Unknown invflag bits set: %08X\n",
ip->invflags & ~IPT_INV_MASK);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
ip_checkentry(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
{
if (ip->flags & ~IPT_F_MASK) {
duprintf("Unknown flag bits set: %08X\n",
ip->flags & ~IPT_F_MASK);
return false;
}
if (ip->invflags & ~IPT_INV_MASK) {
duprintf("Unknown invflag bits set: %08X\n",
ip->invflags & ~IPT_INV_MASK);
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
TabContentsWrapper* tab_to_delete = tab_to_delete_;
tab_to_delete_ = NULL;
delete tab_to_delete;
}
|
virtual void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
TabContentsWrapper* tab_to_delete = tab_to_delete_;
tab_to_delete_ = NULL;
delete tab_to_delete;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5130/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
|
bool XmlReader::LoadFile(const std::string& file_path) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET; // forbid network access
reader_ = xmlReaderForFile(file_path.c_str(), NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
|
bool XmlReader::LoadFile(const std::string& file_path) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET | // forbid network access
XML_PARSE_NOXXE; // no external entities
reader_ = xmlReaderForFile(file_path.c_str(), NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2449/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353
|
b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353
|
Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
|
status_t Camera3Device::addDummyStreamLocked() {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
if (mDummyStreamId != NO_STREAM) {
SET_ERR_L("%s: Camera %d: A dummy stream already exists!",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Adding a dummy stream", __FUNCTION__, mId);
sp<Camera3OutputStreamInterface> dummyStream =
new Camera3DummyStream(mNextStreamId);
res = mOutputStreams.add(mNextStreamId, dummyStream);
if (res < 0) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't add dummy stream to set: %s (%d)", strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
mDummyStreamId = mNextStreamId;
mNextStreamId++;
return OK;
}
|
status_t Camera3Device::addDummyStreamLocked() {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
if (mDummyStreamId != NO_STREAM) {
SET_ERR_L("%s: Camera %d: A dummy stream already exists!",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Adding a dummy stream", __FUNCTION__, mId);
sp<Camera3OutputStreamInterface> dummyStream =
new Camera3DummyStream(mNextStreamId);
res = mOutputStreams.add(mNextStreamId, dummyStream);
if (res < 0) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't add dummy stream to set: %s (%d)", strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
mDummyStreamId = mNextStreamId;
mNextStreamId++;
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7990
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7990/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a
|
8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a
|
RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
__rds_send_complete(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm, int status)
{
struct rm_rdma_op *ro;
struct rm_atomic_op *ao;
ro = &rm->rdma;
if (ro->op_active && ro->op_notify && ro->op_notifier) {
ro->op_notifier->n_status = status;
list_add_tail(&ro->op_notifier->n_list, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
ro->op_notifier = NULL;
}
ao = &rm->atomic;
if (ao->op_active && ao->op_notify && ao->op_notifier) {
ao->op_notifier->n_status = status;
list_add_tail(&ao->op_notifier->n_list, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
ao->op_notifier = NULL;
}
/* No need to wake the app - caller does this */
}
|
__rds_send_complete(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_message *rm, int status)
{
struct rm_rdma_op *ro;
struct rm_atomic_op *ao;
ro = &rm->rdma;
if (ro->op_active && ro->op_notify && ro->op_notifier) {
ro->op_notifier->n_status = status;
list_add_tail(&ro->op_notifier->n_list, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
ro->op_notifier = NULL;
}
ao = &rm->atomic;
if (ao->op_active && ao->op_notify && ao->op_notifier) {
ao->op_notifier->n_status = status;
list_add_tail(&ao->op_notifier->n_list, &rs->rs_notify_queue);
ao->op_notifier = NULL;
}
/* No need to wake the app - caller does this */
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5472
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5472/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/410dd3cf4c9b36f27ed4542ee18b1af5e68645a4
|
410dd3cf4c9b36f27ed4542ee18b1af5e68645a4
|
isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
isofs_dentry_cmp(const struct dentry *parent, const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name)
{
return isofs_dentry_cmp_common(len, str, name, 0, 0);
}
|
isofs_dentry_cmp(const struct dentry *parent, const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name)
{
return isofs_dentry_cmp_common(len, str, name, 0, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2916/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/47a054e9ad826421b789097d82b44c102ab6ac97
|
47a054e9ad826421b789097d82b44c102ab6ac97
|
Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::updateForSameDocumentNavigation(const KURL& newURL, SameDocumentNavigationSource sameDocumentNavigationSource, PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data, const String& title, UpdateBackForwardListPolicy updateBackForwardList)
{
KURL oldURL = m_frame->document()->url();
m_frame->document()->setURL(newURL);
setOutgoingReferrer(newURL);
documentLoader()->replaceRequestURLForSameDocumentNavigation(newURL);
if (updateBackForwardList == UpdateBackForwardList)
history()->updateBackForwardListForFragmentScroll();
if (sameDocumentNavigationSource == SameDocumentNavigationDefault)
history()->updateForSameDocumentNavigation();
else if (sameDocumentNavigationSource == SameDocumentNavigationPushState)
history()->pushState(data, title, newURL.string());
else if (sameDocumentNavigationSource == SameDocumentNavigationReplaceState)
history()->replaceState(data, title, newURL.string());
else
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
if (m_frame->document()->loadEventFinished())
m_client->postProgressStartedNotification();
m_documentLoader->clearRedirectChain();
if (m_documentLoader->isClientRedirect())
m_documentLoader->appendRedirect(oldURL);
m_documentLoader->appendRedirect(newURL);
m_client->dispatchDidNavigateWithinPage();
m_client->dispatchDidReceiveTitle(m_frame->document()->title());
if (m_frame->document()->loadEventFinished())
m_client->postProgressFinishedNotification();
}
|
void FrameLoader::updateForSameDocumentNavigation(const KURL& newURL, SameDocumentNavigationSource sameDocumentNavigationSource, PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data, const String& title, UpdateBackForwardListPolicy updateBackForwardList)
{
KURL oldURL = m_frame->document()->url();
m_frame->document()->setURL(newURL);
setOutgoingReferrer(newURL);
documentLoader()->replaceRequestURLForSameDocumentNavigation(newURL);
if (updateBackForwardList == UpdateBackForwardList)
history()->updateBackForwardListForFragmentScroll();
if (sameDocumentNavigationSource == SameDocumentNavigationDefault)
history()->updateForSameDocumentNavigation();
else if (sameDocumentNavigationSource == SameDocumentNavigationPushState)
history()->pushState(data, title, newURL.string());
else if (sameDocumentNavigationSource == SameDocumentNavigationReplaceState)
history()->replaceState(data, title, newURL.string());
else
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
if (m_frame->document()->loadEventFinished())
m_client->postProgressStartedNotification();
m_documentLoader->clearRedirectChain();
if (m_documentLoader->isClientRedirect())
m_documentLoader->appendRedirect(oldURL);
m_documentLoader->appendRedirect(newURL);
m_client->dispatchDidNavigateWithinPage();
m_client->dispatchDidReceiveTitle(m_frame->document()->title());
if (m_frame->document()->loadEventFinished())
m_client->postProgressFinishedNotification();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0c4225d1e9b23e7071bbf47ada310a9a7e5661a3
|
0c4225d1e9b23e7071bbf47ada310a9a7e5661a3
|
2011-07-01 Oliver Hunt <oliver@apple.com>
IE Web Workers demo crashes in JSC::SlotVisitor::visitChildren()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=63732
Reviewed by Gavin Barraclough.
Initialise the memory at the head of the new storage so that
GC is safe if triggered by reportExtraMemoryCost.
* runtime/JSArray.cpp:
(JSC::JSArray::increaseVectorPrefixLength):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@90282 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static int compareNumbersForQSort(const void* a, const void* b)
{
double da = static_cast<const JSValue*>(a)->uncheckedGetNumber();
double db = static_cast<const JSValue*>(b)->uncheckedGetNumber();
return (da > db) - (da < db);
}
|
static int compareNumbersForQSort(const void* a, const void* b)
{
double da = static_cast<const JSValue*>(a)->uncheckedGetNumber();
double db = static_cast<const JSValue*>(b)->uncheckedGetNumber();
return (da > db) - (da < db);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static JSValueRef updateTouchPointCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
if (argumentCount < 3)
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
int index = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[0], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
int x = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[1], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
int y = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[2], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
if (index < 0 || index >= (int)touches.size())
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint& touch = touches[index];
// pixelViewportPosition is unused in the WebKit layer
IntPoint pos(x, y);
// Unfortunately we don't know the scroll position at this point, so use pos for the content position too.
// This assumes scroll position is 0,0
touch.populateDocumentPosition(pos, pos);
touch.setScreenPosition(pos);
touch.updateState(BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved);
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
|
static JSValueRef updateTouchPointCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
if (argumentCount < 3)
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
int index = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[0], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
int x = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[1], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
int y = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[2], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
if (index < 0 || index >= (int)touches.size())
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint& touch = touches[index];
IntPoint pos(x, y);
touch.m_pos = pos;
touch.m_screenPos = pos;
touch.m_state = BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved;
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1675
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1675/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b276d0570cc816bfe25b431f2ee9bc265a6ad478
|
b276d0570cc816bfe25b431f2ee9bc265a6ad478
|
Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
|
std::string TestURLLoader::TestTrustedJavascriptURLRestriction() {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("javascript:foo = bar");
int32_t rv = OpenTrusted(request, NULL);
if (rv == PP_ERROR_NOACCESS)
return ReportError(
"Trusted Javascript URL request", rv);
PASS();
}
|
std::string TestURLLoader::TestTrustedJavascriptURLRestriction() {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("javascript:foo = bar");
int32_t rv = OpenTrusted(request, NULL);
if (rv == PP_ERROR_NOACCESS)
return ReportError(
"Trusted Javascript URL request", rv);
PASS();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
static int task_clock_event_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
if (flags & PERF_EF_START)
task_clock_event_start(event, flags);
return 0;
}
|
static int task_clock_event_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
if (flags & PERF_EF_START)
task_clock_event_start(event, flags);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
LoadCredentialList () {
CredentialWrapper * pCred;
if (!credentials.IsEmpty()) {
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(pCred)) {
credentials.DeleteCurrent();
delete pCred;
}
}
credentials.Rewind();
classad::ClassAdXMLParser parser;
char buff[50000];
priv_state priv = set_root_priv();
FILE * fp = safe_fopen_wrapper(cred_index_file, "r");
if (!fp) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential database %s does not exist!\n", cred_index_file);
set_priv (priv);
return TRUE;
}
while (fgets(buff, 50000, fp)) {
if ((buff[0] == '\n') || (buff[0] == '\r')) {
continue;
}
classad::ClassAd * classad = parser.ParseClassAd (buff);
int type=0;
if ((!classad) || (!classad->EvaluateAttrInt ("Type", type))) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Invalid classad %s\n", buff);
set_priv (priv);
fclose (fp);
return FALSE;
}
if (type == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
pCred = new X509CredentialWrapper (*classad);
credentials.Append (pCred);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Invalid type %d\n",type);
}
}
fclose (fp);
set_priv (priv);
return TRUE;
}
|
LoadCredentialList () {
CredentialWrapper * pCred;
if (!credentials.IsEmpty()) {
credentials.Rewind();
while (credentials.Next(pCred)) {
credentials.DeleteCurrent();
delete pCred;
}
}
credentials.Rewind();
classad::ClassAdXMLParser parser;
char buff[50000];
priv_state priv = set_root_priv();
FILE * fp = safe_fopen_wrapper(cred_index_file, "r");
if (!fp) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "Credential database %s does not exist!\n", cred_index_file);
set_priv (priv);
return TRUE;
}
while (fgets(buff, 50000, fp)) {
if ((buff[0] == '\n') || (buff[0] == '\r')) {
continue;
}
classad::ClassAd * classad = parser.ParseClassAd (buff);
int type=0;
if ((!classad) || (!classad->EvaluateAttrInt ("Type", type))) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Invalid classad %s\n", buff);
set_priv (priv);
fclose (fp);
return FALSE;
}
if (type == X509_CREDENTIAL_TYPE) {
pCred = new X509CredentialWrapper (*classad);
credentials.Append (pCred);
}
else {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Invalid type %d\n",type);
}
}
fclose (fp);
set_priv (priv);
return TRUE;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2908
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2908/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7edf2c655761e7505950013e62c89e3bd2f7e6dc
|
7edf2c655761e7505950013e62c89e3bd2f7e6dc
|
Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void ScriptController::bindToWindowObject(Frame* frame, const String& key, NPObject* object)
{
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = ScriptController::mainWorldContext(frame);
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
return;
v8::Context::Scope scope(v8Context);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> value = createV8ObjectForNPObject(object, 0);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> global = v8Context->Global();
global->Set(v8String(key, m_isolate), value);
}
|
void ScriptController::bindToWindowObject(Frame* frame, const String& key, NPObject* object)
{
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = ScriptController::mainWorldContext(frame);
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
return;
v8::Context::Scope scope(v8Context);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> value = createV8ObjectForNPObject(object, 0);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> global = v8Context->Global();
global->Set(v8String(key, m_isolate), value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::stencilMaskSeparate(GLenum face, GLuint mask) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
switch (face) {
case GL_FRONT_AND_BACK:
stencil_mask_ = mask;
stencil_mask_back_ = mask;
break;
case GL_FRONT:
stencil_mask_ = mask;
break;
case GL_BACK:
stencil_mask_back_ = mask;
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "stencilMaskSeparate", "invalid face");
return;
}
ContextGL()->StencilMaskSeparate(face, mask);
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::stencilMaskSeparate(GLenum face, GLuint mask) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
switch (face) {
case GL_FRONT_AND_BACK:
stencil_mask_ = mask;
stencil_mask_back_ = mask;
break;
case GL_FRONT:
stencil_mask_ = mask;
break;
case GL_BACK:
stencil_mask_back_ = mask;
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "stencilMaskSeparate", "invalid face");
return;
}
ContextGL()->StencilMaskSeparate(face, mask);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6699
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6699/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3b1c9f692c4d4b7a683c2b358fc89e831a641b88
|
3b1c9f692c4d4b7a683c2b358fc89e831a641b88
|
Fix free-after-use for MediaHTTP
fix free-after-use when we reconnect to an HTTP media source.
Change-Id: I96da5a79f5382409a545f8b4e22a24523f287464
Tests: compilation and eyeballs
Bug: 31373622
(cherry picked from commit dd81e1592ffa77812998b05761eb840b70fed121)
|
sp<DecryptHandle> MediaHTTP::DrmInitialization(const char* mime) {
if (mDrmManagerClient == NULL) {
mDrmManagerClient = new DrmManagerClient();
}
if (mDrmManagerClient == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (mDecryptHandle == NULL) {
mDecryptHandle = mDrmManagerClient->openDecryptSession(
String8(mLastURI.c_str()), mime);
}
if (mDecryptHandle == NULL) {
delete mDrmManagerClient;
mDrmManagerClient = NULL;
}
return mDecryptHandle;
}
|
sp<DecryptHandle> MediaHTTP::DrmInitialization(const char* mime) {
if (mDrmManagerClient == NULL) {
mDrmManagerClient = new DrmManagerClient();
}
if (mDrmManagerClient == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (mDecryptHandle == NULL) {
mDecryptHandle = mDrmManagerClient->openDecryptSession(
String8(mLastURI.c_str()), mime);
}
if (mDecryptHandle == NULL) {
delete mDrmManagerClient;
mDrmManagerClient = NULL;
}
return mDecryptHandle;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RenderThreadImpl::GetPeerConnectionDependencyFactory() {
return peer_connection_factory_.get();
}
|
RenderThreadImpl::GetPeerConnectionDependencyFactory() {
return peer_connection_factory_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
asmlinkage __visible void __sched notrace preempt_schedule(void)
{
/*
* If there is a non-zero preempt_count or interrupts are disabled,
* we do not want to preempt the current task. Just return..
*/
if (likely(!preemptible()))
return;
preempt_schedule_common();
}
|
asmlinkage __visible void __sched notrace preempt_schedule(void)
{
/*
* If there is a non-zero preempt_count or interrupts are disabled,
* we do not want to preempt the current task. Just return..
*/
if (likely(!preemptible()))
return;
preempt_schedule_common();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7969
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7969/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libass/libass/pull/240/commits/b72b283b936a600c730e00875d7d067bded3fc26
|
b72b283b936a600c730e00875d7d067bded3fc26
|
Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
|
fix_glyph_scaling(ASS_Renderer *priv, GlyphInfo *glyph)
{
double ft_size;
if (priv->settings.hinting == ASS_HINTING_NONE) {
ft_size = 256.0;
} else {
ft_size = glyph->scale_y * glyph->font_size;
}
glyph->scale_x = glyph->scale_x * glyph->font_size / ft_size;
glyph->scale_y = glyph->scale_y * glyph->font_size / ft_size;
glyph->font_size = ft_size;
}
|
fix_glyph_scaling(ASS_Renderer *priv, GlyphInfo *glyph)
{
double ft_size;
if (priv->settings.hinting == ASS_HINTING_NONE) {
ft_size = 256.0;
} else {
ft_size = glyph->scale_y * glyph->font_size;
}
glyph->scale_x = glyph->scale_x * glyph->font_size / ft_size;
glyph->scale_y = glyph->scale_y * glyph->font_size / ft_size;
glyph->font_size = ft_size;
}
|
C
|
libass
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2517/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
|
void nl80211_exit(void)
{
netlink_unregister_notifier(&nl80211_netlink_notifier);
genl_unregister_family(&nl80211_fam);
}
|
void nl80211_exit(void)
{
netlink_unregister_notifier(&nl80211_netlink_notifier);
genl_unregister_family(&nl80211_fam);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
find_insert(png_const_charp what, png_charp param)
{
png_uint_32 chunk = 0;
png_charp parameter_list[1024];
int i, nparams;
/* Assemble the chunk name */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
{
char ch = what[i];
if ((ch >= 65 && ch <= 90) || (ch >= 97 && ch <= 122))
chunk = (chunk << 8) + what[i];
else
break;
}
if (i < 4 || what[4] != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": invalid chunk name\n", what);
exit(1);
}
/* Assemble the parameter list. */
nparams = find_parameters(what, param, parameter_list, 1024);
# define CHUNK(a,b,c,d) (((a)<<24)+((b)<<16)+((c)<<8)+(d))
switch (chunk)
{
case CHUNK(105,67,67,80): /* iCCP */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_iCCP, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(116,69,88,116): /* tEXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_tEXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(122,84,88,116): /* zTXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_zTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(105,84,88,116): /* iTXt */
if (nparams == 4)
return make_insert(what, insert_iTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(104,73,83,84): /* hIST */
if (nparams <= 256)
return make_insert(what, insert_hIST, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(115,66,73,84): /* sBIT */
if (nparams <= 4)
return make_insert(what, insert_sBIT, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
#if 0
case CHUNK(115,80,76,84): /* sPLT */
return make_insert(what, insert_sPLT, nparams, parameter_list);
#endif
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": unrecognized chunk name\n",
what);
exit(1);
}
bad_parameter_count(what, nparams);
return NULL;
}
|
find_insert(png_const_charp what, png_charp param)
{
png_uint_32 chunk = 0;
png_charp parameter_list[1024];
int i, nparams;
/* Assemble the chunk name */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
{
char ch = what[i];
if ((ch >= 65 && ch <= 90) || (ch >= 97 && ch <= 122))
chunk = (chunk << 8) + what[i];
else
break;
}
if (i < 4 || what[4] != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": invalid chunk name\n", what);
exit(1);
}
/* Assemble the parameter list. */
nparams = find_parameters(what, param, parameter_list, 1024);
# define CHUNK(a,b,c,d) (((a)<<24)+((b)<<16)+((c)<<8)+(d))
switch (chunk)
{
case CHUNK(105,67,67,80): /* iCCP */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_iCCP, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(116,69,88,116): /* tEXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_tEXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(122,84,88,116): /* zTXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_zTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(105,84,88,116): /* iTXt */
if (nparams == 4)
return make_insert(what, insert_iTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(104,73,83,84): /* hIST */
if (nparams <= 256)
return make_insert(what, insert_hIST, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
#if 0
case CHUNK(115,80,76,84): /* sPLT */
return make_insert(what, insert_sPLT, nparams, parameter_list);
#endif
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": unrecognized chunk name\n",
what);
exit(1);
}
bad_parameter_count(what, nparams);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1696/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
[Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
void WebstoreBindings::Install(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
if (!render_frame)
return;
int listener_mask = 0;
CHECK(args[0]->IsBoolean());
if (args[0]->BooleanValue())
listener_mask |= api::webstore::INSTALL_STAGE_LISTENER;
CHECK(args[1]->IsBoolean());
if (args[1]->BooleanValue())
listener_mask |= api::webstore::DOWNLOAD_PROGRESS_LISTENER;
std::string preferred_store_link_url;
if (!args[2]->IsUndefined()) {
CHECK(args[2]->IsString());
preferred_store_link_url = std::string(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[2]));
}
std::string webstore_item_id;
std::string error;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = context()->web_frame();
if (!GetWebstoreItemIdFromFrame(
frame, preferred_store_link_url, &webstore_item_id, &error)) {
args.GetIsolate()->ThrowException(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), error.c_str()));
return;
}
int install_id = g_next_install_id++;
Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_InlineWebstoreInstall(
render_frame->GetRoutingID(), install_id, GetRoutingID(),
webstore_item_id, frame->document().url(), listener_mask));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(install_id));
}
|
void WebstoreBindings::Install(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
if (!render_frame)
return;
int listener_mask = 0;
CHECK(args[0]->IsBoolean());
if (args[0]->BooleanValue())
listener_mask |= api::webstore::INSTALL_STAGE_LISTENER;
CHECK(args[1]->IsBoolean());
if (args[1]->BooleanValue())
listener_mask |= api::webstore::DOWNLOAD_PROGRESS_LISTENER;
std::string preferred_store_link_url;
if (!args[2]->IsUndefined()) {
CHECK(args[2]->IsString());
preferred_store_link_url = std::string(*v8::String::Utf8Value(args[2]));
}
std::string webstore_item_id;
std::string error;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = context()->web_frame();
if (!GetWebstoreItemIdFromFrame(
frame, preferred_store_link_url, &webstore_item_id, &error)) {
args.GetIsolate()->ThrowException(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(args.GetIsolate(), error.c_str()));
return;
}
int install_id = g_next_install_id++;
Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_InlineWebstoreInstall(
render_frame->GetRoutingID(), install_id, GetRoutingID(),
webstore_item_id, frame->document().url(), listener_mask));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(install_id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3636/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a134f083e79fb4c3d0a925691e732c56911b4326
|
a134f083e79fb4c3d0a925691e732c56911b4326
|
ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct icmphdr *icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_rcv */
pr_debug("ping_rcv(skb=%p,id=%04x,seq=%04x)\n",
skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id), ntohs(icmph->un.echo.sequence));
/* Push ICMP header back */
skb_push(skb, skb->data - (u8 *)icmph);
sk = ping_lookup(net, skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id));
if (sk) {
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
pr_debug("rcv on socket %p\n", sk);
if (skb2)
ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2);
sock_put(sk);
return true;
}
pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
return false;
}
|
bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct icmphdr *icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_rcv */
pr_debug("ping_rcv(skb=%p,id=%04x,seq=%04x)\n",
skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id), ntohs(icmph->un.echo.sequence));
/* Push ICMP header back */
skb_push(skb, skb->data - (u8 *)icmph);
sk = ping_lookup(net, skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id));
if (sk) {
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
pr_debug("rcv on socket %p\n", sk);
if (skb2)
ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2);
sock_put(sk);
return true;
}
pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
static void save_state_to_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
tss->cr3 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 3);
tss->eip = ctxt->_eip;
tss->eflags = ctxt->eflags;
tss->eax = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
tss->ecx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
tss->edx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
tss->ebx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
tss->esp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
tss->ebp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
tss->esi = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
tss->edi = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
tss->es = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_ES);
tss->cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
tss->ss = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_SS);
tss->ds = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
tss->fs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_FS);
tss->gs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_GS);
tss->ldt_selector = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
}
|
static void save_state_to_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
tss->cr3 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 3);
tss->eip = ctxt->_eip;
tss->eflags = ctxt->eflags;
tss->eax = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
tss->ecx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
tss->edx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
tss->ebx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
tss->esp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
tss->ebp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
tss->esi = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
tss->edi = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
tss->es = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_ES);
tss->cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
tss->ss = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_SS);
tss->ds = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
tss->fs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_FS);
tss->gs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_GS);
tss->ldt_selector = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6327
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6327/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
|
51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
|
IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
static int srpt_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx;
ioctx = container_of(se_cmd, struct srpt_send_ioctx, cmd);
return srpt_get_cmd_state(ioctx) == SRPT_STATE_NEED_DATA;
}
|
static int srpt_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx;
ioctx = container_of(se_cmd, struct srpt_send_ioctx, cmd);
return srpt_get_cmd_state(ioctx) == SRPT_STATE_NEED_DATA;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
MediaControls* HTMLMediaElement::GetMediaControls() const {
return media_controls_;
}
|
MediaControls* HTMLMediaElement::GetMediaControls() const {
return media_controls_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1738
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1738/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f
|
floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static int get_floppy_geometry(int drive, int type, struct floppy_struct **g)
{
if (type)
*g = &floppy_type[type];
else {
if (lock_fdc(drive, false))
return -EINTR;
if (poll_drive(false, 0) == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
process_fd_request();
*g = current_type[drive];
}
if (!*g)
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
}
|
static int get_floppy_geometry(int drive, int type, struct floppy_struct **g)
{
if (type)
*g = &floppy_type[type];
else {
if (lock_fdc(drive, false))
return -EINTR;
if (poll_drive(false, 0) == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
process_fd_request();
*g = current_type[drive];
}
if (!*g)
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
unsigned HTMLInputElement::selectionStartForBinding(
bool& is_null,
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
is_null = true;
return 0;
}
return TextControlElement::selectionStart();
}
|
unsigned HTMLInputElement::selectionStartForBinding(
bool& is_null,
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
is_null = true;
return 0;
}
return TextControlElement::selectionStart();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
f2f703241635fa96fa630b83afcc9a330cc21b7e
|
CrOS Shelf: Get rid of 'split view' mode for shelf background
In the new UI, "maximized" and "split view" are treated the same in
specs, so there is no more need for a separate "split view" mode. This
folds it into the "maximized" mode.
Note that the only thing that _seems_ different in
shelf_background_animator is ShelfBackgroundAnimator::kMaxAlpha (255)
vs kShelfTranslucentMaximizedWindow (254), which should be virtually
impossible to distinguish.
This CL therefore does not have any visual effect (and doesn't
directly fix the linked bug, but is relevant).
Bug: 899289
Change-Id: I60947338176ac15ca016b1ba4edf13d16362cb24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1469741
Commit-Queue: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Manu Cornet <manucornet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631752}
|
void ShelfWidget::DelegateView::UpdateShelfBackground(SkColor color) {
opaque_background_.SetColor(color);
UpdateOpaqueBackground();
}
|
void ShelfWidget::DelegateView::UpdateShelfBackground(SkColor color) {
opaque_background_.SetColor(color);
UpdateOpaqueBackground();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7191/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void tun_net_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
tun_detach_all(dev);
}
|
static void tun_net_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
tun_detach_all(dev);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
void __sched io_schedule(void)
{
struct rq *rq = raw_rq();
delayacct_blkio_start();
atomic_inc(&rq->nr_iowait);
current->in_iowait = 1;
schedule();
current->in_iowait = 0;
atomic_dec(&rq->nr_iowait);
delayacct_blkio_end();
}
|
void __sched io_schedule(void)
{
struct rq *rq = raw_rq();
delayacct_blkio_start();
atomic_inc(&rq->nr_iowait);
current->in_iowait = 1;
schedule();
current->in_iowait = 0;
atomic_dec(&rq->nr_iowait);
delayacct_blkio_end();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::vertexAttrib2fv(GLuint index,
const Vector<GLfloat>& v) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (v.size() < 2) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "vertexAttrib2fv", "invalid array");
return;
}
ContextGL()->VertexAttrib2fv(index, v.data());
SetVertexAttribType(index, kFloat32ArrayType);
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::vertexAttrib2fv(GLuint index,
const Vector<GLfloat>& v) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (v.size() < 2) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "vertexAttrib2fv", "invalid array");
return;
}
ContextGL()->VertexAttrib2fv(index, v.data());
SetVertexAttribType(index, kFloat32ArrayType);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
ar6000_channelList_rx(void *devt, s8 numChan, u16 *chanList)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)devt;
memcpy(ar->arChannelList, chanList, numChan * sizeof (u16));
ar->arNumChannels = numChan;
wake_up(&arEvent);
}
|
ar6000_channelList_rx(void *devt, s8 numChan, u16 *chanList)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)devt;
memcpy(ar->arChannelList, chanList, numChan * sizeof (u16));
ar->arNumChannels = numChan;
wake_up(&arEvent);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
predicate_parse(const char *str, int nr_parens, int nr_preds,
parse_pred_fn parse_pred, void *data,
struct filter_parse_error *pe)
{
struct prog_entry *prog_stack;
struct prog_entry *prog;
const char *ptr = str;
char *inverts = NULL;
int *op_stack;
int *top;
int invert = 0;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int len;
int N = 0;
int i;
nr_preds += 2; /* For TRUE and FALSE */
op_stack = kmalloc_array(nr_parens, sizeof(*op_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!op_stack)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
prog_stack = kmalloc_array(nr_preds, sizeof(*prog_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!prog_stack) {
parse_error(pe, -ENOMEM, 0);
goto out_free;
}
inverts = kmalloc_array(nr_preds, sizeof(*inverts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inverts) {
parse_error(pe, -ENOMEM, 0);
goto out_free;
}
top = op_stack;
prog = prog_stack;
*top = 0;
/* First pass */
while (*ptr) { /* #1 */
const char *next = ptr++;
if (isspace(*next))
continue;
switch (*next) {
case '(': /* #2 */
if (top - op_stack > nr_parens)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
*(++top) = invert;
continue;
case '!': /* #3 */
if (!is_not(next))
break;
invert = !invert;
continue;
}
if (N >= nr_preds) {
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_PREDS, next - str);
goto out_free;
}
inverts[N] = invert; /* #4 */
prog[N].target = N-1;
len = parse_pred(next, data, ptr - str, pe, &prog[N].pred);
if (len < 0) {
ret = len;
goto out_free;
}
ptr = next + len;
N++;
ret = -1;
while (1) { /* #5 */
next = ptr++;
if (isspace(*next))
continue;
switch (*next) {
case ')':
case '\0':
break;
case '&':
case '|':
if (next[1] == next[0]) {
ptr++;
break;
}
default:
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_PREDS,
next - str);
goto out_free;
}
invert = *top & INVERT;
if (*top & PROCESS_AND) { /* #7 */
update_preds(prog, N - 1, invert);
*top &= ~PROCESS_AND;
}
if (*next == '&') { /* #8 */
*top |= PROCESS_AND;
break;
}
if (*top & PROCESS_OR) { /* #9 */
update_preds(prog, N - 1, !invert);
*top &= ~PROCESS_OR;
}
if (*next == '|') { /* #10 */
*top |= PROCESS_OR;
break;
}
if (!*next) /* #11 */
goto out;
if (top == op_stack) {
ret = -1;
/* Too few '(' */
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_CLOSE, ptr - str);
goto out_free;
}
top--; /* #12 */
}
}
out:
if (top != op_stack) {
/* Too many '(' */
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_OPEN, ptr - str);
goto out_free;
}
if (!N) {
/* No program? */
ret = -EINVAL;
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_NO_FILTER, ptr - str);
goto out_free;
}
prog[N].pred = NULL; /* #13 */
prog[N].target = 1; /* TRUE */
prog[N+1].pred = NULL;
prog[N+1].target = 0; /* FALSE */
prog[N-1].target = N;
prog[N-1].when_to_branch = false;
/* Second Pass */
for (i = N-1 ; i--; ) {
int target = prog[i].target;
if (prog[i].when_to_branch == prog[target].when_to_branch)
prog[i].target = prog[target].target;
}
/* Third Pass */
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
invert = inverts[i] ^ prog[i].when_to_branch;
prog[i].when_to_branch = invert;
/* Make sure the program always moves forward */
if (WARN_ON(prog[i].target <= i)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
}
return prog;
out_free:
kfree(op_stack);
kfree(prog_stack);
kfree(inverts);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
|
predicate_parse(const char *str, int nr_parens, int nr_preds,
parse_pred_fn parse_pred, void *data,
struct filter_parse_error *pe)
{
struct prog_entry *prog_stack;
struct prog_entry *prog;
const char *ptr = str;
char *inverts = NULL;
int *op_stack;
int *top;
int invert = 0;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int len;
int N = 0;
int i;
nr_preds += 2; /* For TRUE and FALSE */
op_stack = kmalloc_array(nr_parens, sizeof(*op_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!op_stack)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
prog_stack = kmalloc_array(nr_preds, sizeof(*prog_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!prog_stack) {
parse_error(pe, -ENOMEM, 0);
goto out_free;
}
inverts = kmalloc_array(nr_preds, sizeof(*inverts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inverts) {
parse_error(pe, -ENOMEM, 0);
goto out_free;
}
top = op_stack;
prog = prog_stack;
*top = 0;
/* First pass */
while (*ptr) { /* #1 */
const char *next = ptr++;
if (isspace(*next))
continue;
switch (*next) {
case '(': /* #2 */
if (top - op_stack > nr_parens)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
*(++top) = invert;
continue;
case '!': /* #3 */
if (!is_not(next))
break;
invert = !invert;
continue;
}
if (N >= nr_preds) {
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_PREDS, next - str);
goto out_free;
}
inverts[N] = invert; /* #4 */
prog[N].target = N-1;
len = parse_pred(next, data, ptr - str, pe, &prog[N].pred);
if (len < 0) {
ret = len;
goto out_free;
}
ptr = next + len;
N++;
ret = -1;
while (1) { /* #5 */
next = ptr++;
if (isspace(*next))
continue;
switch (*next) {
case ')':
case '\0':
break;
case '&':
case '|':
if (next[1] == next[0]) {
ptr++;
break;
}
default:
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_PREDS,
next - str);
goto out_free;
}
invert = *top & INVERT;
if (*top & PROCESS_AND) { /* #7 */
update_preds(prog, N - 1, invert);
*top &= ~PROCESS_AND;
}
if (*next == '&') { /* #8 */
*top |= PROCESS_AND;
break;
}
if (*top & PROCESS_OR) { /* #9 */
update_preds(prog, N - 1, !invert);
*top &= ~PROCESS_OR;
}
if (*next == '|') { /* #10 */
*top |= PROCESS_OR;
break;
}
if (!*next) /* #11 */
goto out;
if (top == op_stack) {
ret = -1;
/* Too few '(' */
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_CLOSE, ptr - str);
goto out_free;
}
top--; /* #12 */
}
}
out:
if (top != op_stack) {
/* Too many '(' */
parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_TOO_MANY_OPEN, ptr - str);
goto out_free;
}
prog[N].pred = NULL; /* #13 */
prog[N].target = 1; /* TRUE */
prog[N+1].pred = NULL;
prog[N+1].target = 0; /* FALSE */
prog[N-1].target = N;
prog[N-1].when_to_branch = false;
/* Second Pass */
for (i = N-1 ; i--; ) {
int target = prog[i].target;
if (prog[i].when_to_branch == prog[target].when_to_branch)
prog[i].target = prog[target].target;
}
/* Third Pass */
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
invert = inverts[i] ^ prog[i].when_to_branch;
prog[i].when_to_branch = invert;
/* Make sure the program always moves forward */
if (WARN_ON(prog[i].target <= i)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
}
return prog;
out_free:
kfree(op_stack);
kfree(prog_stack);
kfree(inverts);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-12154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12154/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/51aa68e7d57e3217192d88ce90fd5b8ef29ec94f
|
51aa68e7d57e3217192d88ce90fd5b8ef29ec94f
|
kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool masked;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return false;
masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
return masked;
}
|
static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool masked;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return false;
masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
return masked;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0889/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1538367452b549d929aabb13d54c85ab99f65cd3
|
1538367452b549d929aabb13d54c85ab99f65cd3
|
For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GetAlternativeWebContentsToNotifyForDownload() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
return NULL;
#else
Browser* last_active = chrome::FindLastActiveWithProfile(profile_,
chrome::GetActiveDesktop());
return last_active ? chrome::GetActiveWebContents(last_active) : NULL;
#endif
}
|
GetAlternativeWebContentsToNotifyForDownload() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
return NULL;
#else
Browser* last_active = chrome::FindLastActiveWithProfile(profile_,
chrome::GetActiveDesktop());
return last_active ? chrome::GetActiveWebContents(last_active) : NULL;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6110
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6110/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9afc491d6d64d54bf01f526abcc3d8344d90fa42
|
9afc491d6d64d54bf01f526abcc3d8344d90fa42
|
Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
|
static bool SniffXML(const char* content,
size_t size,
bool* have_enough_content,
std::string* result) {
*have_enough_content &= TruncateSize(300, &size);
const char* pos = content;
const char* const end = content + size;
const int kMaxTagIterations = 5;
for (int i = 0; i < kMaxTagIterations && pos < end; ++i) {
pos = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(memchr(pos, '<', end - pos));
if (!pos)
return false;
static const char kXmlPrefix[] = "<?xml";
static const size_t kXmlPrefixLength = arraysize(kXmlPrefix) - 1;
static const char kDocTypePrefix[] = "<!DOCTYPE";
static const size_t kDocTypePrefixLength = arraysize(kDocTypePrefix) - 1;
if ((pos + kXmlPrefixLength <= end) &&
base::EqualsCaseInsensitiveASCII(
base::StringPiece(pos, kXmlPrefixLength),
base::StringPiece(kXmlPrefix, kXmlPrefixLength))) {
++pos;
continue;
} else if ((pos + kDocTypePrefixLength <= end) &&
base::EqualsCaseInsensitiveASCII(
base::StringPiece(pos, kDocTypePrefixLength),
base::StringPiece(kDocTypePrefix, kDocTypePrefixLength))) {
++pos;
continue;
}
if (CheckForMagicNumbers(pos, end - pos, kMagicXML, arraysize(kMagicXML),
result))
return true;
return true;
}
return pos < end;
}
|
static bool SniffXML(const char* content,
size_t size,
bool* have_enough_content,
std::string* result) {
*have_enough_content &= TruncateSize(300, &size);
const char* pos = content;
const char* const end = content + size;
const int kMaxTagIterations = 5;
for (int i = 0; i < kMaxTagIterations && pos < end; ++i) {
pos = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(memchr(pos, '<', end - pos));
if (!pos)
return false;
static const char kXmlPrefix[] = "<?xml";
static const size_t kXmlPrefixLength = arraysize(kXmlPrefix) - 1;
static const char kDocTypePrefix[] = "<!DOCTYPE";
static const size_t kDocTypePrefixLength = arraysize(kDocTypePrefix) - 1;
if ((pos + kXmlPrefixLength <= end) &&
base::EqualsCaseInsensitiveASCII(
base::StringPiece(pos, kXmlPrefixLength),
base::StringPiece(kXmlPrefix, kXmlPrefixLength))) {
++pos;
continue;
} else if ((pos + kDocTypePrefixLength <= end) &&
base::EqualsCaseInsensitiveASCII(
base::StringPiece(pos, kDocTypePrefixLength),
base::StringPiece(kDocTypePrefix, kDocTypePrefixLength))) {
++pos;
continue;
}
if (CheckForMagicNumbers(pos, end - pos, kMagicXML, arraysize(kMagicXML),
result))
return true;
return true;
}
return pos < end;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9727
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9727/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b
|
937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b
| null |
ENUM_PTRS_WITH(gx_ttfReader_enum_ptrs, gx_ttfReader *mptr)
{
/* The fields 'pfont' and 'glyph_data' may contain pointers from global
to local memory ( see a comment in gxttfb.h).
They must be NULL when a garbager is invoked.
Due to that we don't enumerate and don't relocate them.
*/
DISCARD(mptr);
return 0;
}
|
ENUM_PTRS_WITH(gx_ttfReader_enum_ptrs, gx_ttfReader *mptr)
{
/* The fields 'pfont' and 'glyph_data' may contain pointers from global
to local memory ( see a comment in gxttfb.h).
They must be NULL when a garbager is invoked.
Due to that we don't enumerate and don't relocate them.
*/
DISCARD(mptr);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14166/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71
|
fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71
|
Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
|
xar_bid(struct archive_read *a, int best_bid)
{
const unsigned char *b;
int bid;
(void)best_bid; /* UNUSED */
b = __archive_read_ahead(a, HEADER_SIZE, NULL);
if (b == NULL)
return (-1);
bid = 0;
/*
* Verify magic code
*/
if (archive_be32dec(b) != HEADER_MAGIC)
return (0);
bid += 32;
/*
* Verify header size
*/
if (archive_be16dec(b+4) != HEADER_SIZE)
return (0);
bid += 16;
/*
* Verify header version
*/
if (archive_be16dec(b+6) != HEADER_VERSION)
return (0);
bid += 16;
/*
* Verify type of checksum
*/
switch (archive_be32dec(b+24)) {
case CKSUM_NONE:
case CKSUM_SHA1:
case CKSUM_MD5:
bid += 32;
break;
default:
return (0);
}
return (bid);
}
|
xar_bid(struct archive_read *a, int best_bid)
{
const unsigned char *b;
int bid;
(void)best_bid; /* UNUSED */
b = __archive_read_ahead(a, HEADER_SIZE, NULL);
if (b == NULL)
return (-1);
bid = 0;
/*
* Verify magic code
*/
if (archive_be32dec(b) != HEADER_MAGIC)
return (0);
bid += 32;
/*
* Verify header size
*/
if (archive_be16dec(b+4) != HEADER_SIZE)
return (0);
bid += 16;
/*
* Verify header version
*/
if (archive_be16dec(b+6) != HEADER_VERSION)
return (0);
bid += 16;
/*
* Verify type of checksum
*/
switch (archive_be32dec(b+24)) {
case CKSUM_NONE:
case CKSUM_SHA1:
case CKSUM_MD5:
bid += 32;
break;
default:
return (0);
}
return (bid);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5150/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8ea3a5c06218fa42d25c3aa0a4ab57153e178523
|
8ea3a5c06218fa42d25c3aa0a4ab57153e178523
|
Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void ChromeClientImpl::scheduleAnimation()
{
m_webView->scheduleAnimation();
}
|
void ChromeClientImpl::scheduleAnimation()
{
m_webView->scheduleAnimation();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7513
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7513/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8
|
0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8
|
KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK)) {
/* This is a good place to trace that we are exiting SMM. */
trace_kvm_enter_smm(vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu->arch.smbase, false);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.smi_pending)) {
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
vcpu->arch.smi_pending = 0;
} else {
/* Process a latched INIT, if any. */
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
}
}
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
}
|
static void kvm_smm_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK)) {
/* This is a good place to trace that we are exiting SMM. */
trace_kvm_enter_smm(vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu->arch.smbase, false);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.smi_pending)) {
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu);
vcpu->arch.smi_pending = 0;
} else {
/* Process a latched INIT, if any. */
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
}
}
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXNodeObject::isReadOnly() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return true;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return toHTMLTextAreaElement(*node).isReadOnly();
if (isHTMLInputElement(*node)) {
HTMLInputElement& input = toHTMLInputElement(*node);
if (input.isTextField())
return input.isReadOnly();
}
return !hasEditableStyle(*node);
}
|
bool AXNodeObject::isReadOnly() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return true;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return toHTMLTextAreaElement(*node).isReadOnly();
if (isHTMLInputElement(*node)) {
HTMLInputElement& input = toHTMLInputElement(*node);
if (input.isTextField())
return input.isReadOnly();
}
return !hasEditableStyle(*node);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6196
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6196/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/8354763b90490d4105695df52674d0fcef823e92
|
8354763b90490d4105695df52674d0fcef823e92
|
Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
|
setwidth0(struct table *t, struct table_mode *mode)
{
int w;
int width = t->tabcontentssize;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
if (t->col < 0)
return -1;
if (t->tabwidth[t->col] < 0)
return -1;
check_row(t, t->row);
if (t->linfo.prev_spaces > 0)
width -= t->linfo.prev_spaces;
w = table_colspan(t, t->row, t->col);
if (w == 1) {
if (t->tabwidth[t->col] < width)
t->tabwidth[t->col] = width;
}
else if (cell->icell >= 0) {
if (cell->width[cell->icell] < width)
cell->width[cell->icell] = width;
}
return width;
}
|
setwidth0(struct table *t, struct table_mode *mode)
{
int w;
int width = t->tabcontentssize;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
if (t->col < 0)
return -1;
if (t->tabwidth[t->col] < 0)
return -1;
check_row(t, t->row);
if (t->linfo.prev_spaces > 0)
width -= t->linfo.prev_spaces;
w = table_colspan(t, t->row, t->col);
if (w == 1) {
if (t->tabwidth[t->col] < width)
t->tabwidth[t->col] = width;
}
else if (cell->icell >= 0) {
if (cell->width[cell->icell] < width)
cell->width[cell->icell] = width;
}
return width;
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15395/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/84ca1ee18bbc32f3cb035d071e8271e064dfd4d7
|
84ca1ee18bbc32f3cb035d071e8271e064dfd4d7
|
Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
|
ScriptPromise ImageCapture::grabFrame(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (TrackIsInactive(*stream_track_)) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "The associated Track is in an invalid state."));
return promise;
}
if (!frame_grabber_) {
frame_grabber_ = Platform::Current()->CreateImageCaptureFrameGrabber();
}
if (!frame_grabber_) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
kUnknownError, "Couldn't create platform resources"));
return promise;
}
WebMediaStreamTrack track(stream_track_->Component());
frame_grabber_->GrabFrame(
&track, new CallbackPromiseAdapter<ImageBitmap, void>(resolver));
return promise;
}
|
ScriptPromise ImageCapture::grabFrame(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (TrackIsInactive(*stream_track_)) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "The associated Track is in an invalid state."));
return promise;
}
if (!frame_grabber_) {
frame_grabber_ = Platform::Current()->CreateImageCaptureFrameGrabber();
}
if (!frame_grabber_) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(
kUnknownError, "Couldn't create platform resources"));
return promise;
}
WebMediaStreamTrack track(stream_track_->Component());
frame_grabber_->GrabFrame(
&track, new CallbackPromiseAdapter<ImageBitmap, void>(resolver));
return promise;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8839/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
|
ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
|
ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
static sector_t ext4_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
journal_t *journal;
int err;
/*
* We can get here for an inline file via the FIBMAP ioctl
*/
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
return 0;
if (mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY) &&
test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) {
/*
* With delalloc we want to sync the file
* so that we can make sure we allocate
* blocks for file
*/
filemap_write_and_wait(mapping);
}
if (EXT4_JOURNAL(inode) &&
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA)) {
/*
* This is a REALLY heavyweight approach, but the use of
* bmap on dirty files is expected to be extremely rare:
* only if we run lilo or swapon on a freshly made file
* do we expect this to happen.
*
* (bmap requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO so this does not
* represent an unprivileged user DOS attack --- we'd be
* in trouble if mortal users could trigger this path at
* will.)
*
* NB. EXT4_STATE_JDATA is not set on files other than
* regular files. If somebody wants to bmap a directory
* or symlink and gets confused because the buffer
* hasn't yet been flushed to disk, they deserve
* everything they get.
*/
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(inode);
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal);
err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal);
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
if (err)
return 0;
}
return generic_block_bmap(mapping, block, ext4_get_block);
}
|
static sector_t ext4_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
journal_t *journal;
int err;
/*
* We can get here for an inline file via the FIBMAP ioctl
*/
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
return 0;
if (mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY) &&
test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) {
/*
* With delalloc we want to sync the file
* so that we can make sure we allocate
* blocks for file
*/
filemap_write_and_wait(mapping);
}
if (EXT4_JOURNAL(inode) &&
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA)) {
/*
* This is a REALLY heavyweight approach, but the use of
* bmap on dirty files is expected to be extremely rare:
* only if we run lilo or swapon on a freshly made file
* do we expect this to happen.
*
* (bmap requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO so this does not
* represent an unprivileged user DOS attack --- we'd be
* in trouble if mortal users could trigger this path at
* will.)
*
* NB. EXT4_STATE_JDATA is not set on files other than
* regular files. If somebody wants to bmap a directory
* or symlink and gets confused because the buffer
* hasn't yet been flushed to disk, they deserve
* everything they get.
*/
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(inode);
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal);
err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal);
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
if (err)
return 0;
}
return generic_block_bmap(mapping, block, ext4_get_block);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::InitializeSRGBConverter(
const char* function_name) {
if (!srgb_converter_.get()) {
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(function_name);
srgb_converter_.reset(
new SRGBConverter(feature_info_.get()));
srgb_converter_->InitializeSRGBConverter(this);
if (LOCAL_PEEK_GL_ERROR(function_name) != GL_NO_ERROR) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
|
bool GLES2DecoderImpl::InitializeSRGBConverter(
const char* function_name) {
if (!srgb_converter_.get()) {
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(function_name);
srgb_converter_.reset(
new SRGBConverter(feature_info_.get()));
srgb_converter_->InitializeSRGBConverter(this);
if (LOCAL_PEEK_GL_ERROR(function_name) != GL_NO_ERROR) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3ea4ba8af75eb37860c15d02af94f272e5bbc235
|
3ea4ba8af75eb37860c15d02af94f272e5bbc235
|
Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FileSystemOperation::DidTouchFile(const StatusCallback& callback,
base::PlatformFileError rv) {
callback.Run(rv);
}
|
void FileSystemOperation::DidTouchFile(const StatusCallback& callback,
base::PlatformFileError rv) {
callback.Run(rv);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> stringAttrWithGetterExceptionAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.stringAttrWithGetterException._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
String v = imp->stringAttrWithGetterException(ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8String(v, info.GetIsolate());
}
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> stringAttrWithGetterExceptionAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.stringAttrWithGetterException._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
String v = imp->stringAttrWithGetterException(ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8String(v, info.GetIsolate());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5696/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
|
75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
|
tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void tcp_dsack_seen(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
tp->rx_opt.sack_ok |= TCP_DSACK_SEEN;
}
|
static void tcp_dsack_seen(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
tp->rx_opt.sack_ok |= TCP_DSACK_SEEN;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eb4bcacd683a68534bbe2e4d8d6eeafafc7f57ba
|
eb4bcacd683a68534bbe2e4d8d6eeafafc7f57ba
|
Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::SetAllowCrossOriginAuthPrompt(bool value) {
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_ = value;
}
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::SetAllowCrossOriginAuthPrompt(bool value) {
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_ = value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0281/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
init_remote_listener(int port, gboolean encrypted)
{
int rc;
int *ssock = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
int optval;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks remote_listen_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_listen,
.destroy = remote_connection_destroy,
};
if (port <= 0) {
/* dont start it */
return 0;
}
if (encrypted) {
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
crm_warn("TLS support is not available");
return 0;
#else
crm_notice("Starting a tls listener on port %d.", port);
gnutls_global_init();
/* gnutls_global_set_log_level (10); */
gnutls_global_set_log_function(debug_log);
gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params);
gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_params, DH_BITS);
gnutls_anon_allocate_server_credentials(&anon_cred_s);
gnutls_anon_set_server_dh_params(anon_cred_s, dh_params);
#endif
} else {
crm_warn("Starting a plain_text listener on port %d.", port);
}
#ifndef HAVE_PAM
crm_warn("PAM is _not_ enabled!");
#endif
/* create server socket */
ssock = malloc(sizeof(int));
*ssock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (*ssock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not create server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
free(ssock);
return -1;
}
/* reuse address */
optval = 1;
rc = setsockopt(*ssock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if(rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't allow the reuse of local addresses by our remote listener");
}
/* bind server socket */
memset(&saddr, '\0', sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (bind(*ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not bind server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -2;
}
if (listen(*ssock, 10) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not start listen." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -3;
}
mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, *ssock, ssock, &remote_listen_fd_callbacks);
return *ssock;
}
|
init_remote_listener(int port, gboolean encrypted)
{
int rc;
int *ssock = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in saddr;
int optval;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks remote_listen_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_listen,
.destroy = remote_connection_destroy,
};
if (port <= 0) {
/* dont start it */
return 0;
}
if (encrypted) {
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
crm_warn("TLS support is not available");
return 0;
#else
crm_notice("Starting a tls listener on port %d.", port);
gnutls_global_init();
/* gnutls_global_set_log_level (10); */
gnutls_global_set_log_function(debug_log);
gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params);
gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_params, DH_BITS);
gnutls_anon_allocate_server_credentials(&anon_cred_s);
gnutls_anon_set_server_dh_params(anon_cred_s, dh_params);
#endif
} else {
crm_warn("Starting a plain_text listener on port %d.", port);
}
#ifndef HAVE_PAM
crm_warn("PAM is _not_ enabled!");
#endif
/* create server socket */
ssock = malloc(sizeof(int));
*ssock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (*ssock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not create server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
free(ssock);
return -1;
}
/* reuse address */
optval = 1;
rc = setsockopt(*ssock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if(rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't allow the reuse of local addresses by our remote listener");
}
/* bind server socket */
memset(&saddr, '\0', sizeof(saddr));
saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
saddr.sin_port = htons(port);
if (bind(*ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not bind server socket." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -2;
}
if (listen(*ssock, 10) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Can not start listen." ERROR_SUFFIX);
close(*ssock);
free(ssock);
return -3;
}
mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, *ssock, ssock, &remote_listen_fd_callbacks);
return *ssock;
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1908
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1908/
|
CWE-254
|
https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c
|
ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c
| null |
mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
const char *display;
Channel *c, *cc;
int i;
Buffer reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
data, 1);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
CONFIRM_WARN);
}
}
if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
packet_send();
}
client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
done:
/* Send reply */
buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
buffer_free(&reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
free(cctx->term);
if (cctx->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
free(cctx);
}
|
mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
const char *display;
Channel *c, *cc;
int i;
Buffer reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
data, 1);
client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
}
if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
packet_send();
}
client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
done:
/* Send reply */
buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
buffer_free(&reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
free(cctx->term);
if (cctx->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
free(cctx);
}
|
C
|
mindrot
| 1 |
CVE-2013-4160
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4160/
| null |
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9
|
91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9
|
Non happy-path fixes
|
cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsMLUtranslationsCodes(const cmsMLU* mlu,
cmsUInt32Number idx,
char LanguageCode[3],
char CountryCode[3])
{
_cmsMLUentry *entry;
if (mlu == NULL) return FALSE;
if (idx >= (cmsUInt32Number) mlu->UsedEntries) return FALSE;
entry = &mlu->Entries[idx];
*(cmsUInt16Number *)LanguageCode = _cmsAdjustEndianess16(entry->Language);
*(cmsUInt16Number *)CountryCode = _cmsAdjustEndianess16(entry->Country);
return TRUE;
}
|
cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsMLUtranslationsCodes(const cmsMLU* mlu,
cmsUInt32Number idx,
char LanguageCode[3],
char CountryCode[3])
{
_cmsMLUentry *entry;
if (mlu == NULL) return FALSE;
if (idx >= (cmsUInt32Number) mlu->UsedEntries) return FALSE;
entry = &mlu->Entries[idx];
*(cmsUInt16Number *)LanguageCode = _cmsAdjustEndianess16(entry->Language);
*(cmsUInt16Number *)CountryCode = _cmsAdjustEndianess16(entry->Country);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eb4bcacd683a68534bbe2e4d8d6eeafafc7f57ba
|
eb4bcacd683a68534bbe2e4d8d6eeafafc7f57ba
|
Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnUserGesture(WebContentsImpl* contents) {
last_user_gesture_time_ = TimeTicks::Now();
}
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnUserGesture(WebContentsImpl* contents) {
last_user_gesture_time_ = TimeTicks::Now();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6761
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6761/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
fd506b0ac6c7846ae45b5034044fe85c28ee68ac
|
Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
|
void DocumentLoader::SetHistoryItemStateForCommit(
HistoryItem* old_item,
FrameLoadType load_type,
HistoryNavigationType navigation_type) {
if (!history_item_ || !IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type))
history_item_ = HistoryItem::Create();
history_item_->SetURL(UrlForHistory());
history_item_->SetReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
request_.GetReferrerPolicy(), history_item_->Url(),
request_.HttpReferrer()));
history_item_->SetFormInfoFromRequest(request_);
if (!old_item || IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type))
return;
HistoryCommitType history_commit_type = LoadTypeToCommitType(load_type);
if (navigation_type == HistoryNavigationType::kDifferentDocument &&
(history_commit_type != kHistoryInertCommit ||
!EqualIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(old_item->Url(), history_item_->Url())))
return;
history_item_->SetDocumentSequenceNumber(old_item->DocumentSequenceNumber());
history_item_->CopyViewStateFrom(old_item);
history_item_->SetScrollRestorationType(old_item->ScrollRestorationType());
if (history_commit_type == kHistoryInertCommit &&
(navigation_type == HistoryNavigationType::kHistoryApi ||
old_item->Url() == history_item_->Url())) {
history_item_->SetStateObject(old_item->StateObject());
history_item_->SetItemSequenceNumber(old_item->ItemSequenceNumber());
}
}
|
void DocumentLoader::SetHistoryItemStateForCommit(
HistoryItem* old_item,
FrameLoadType load_type,
HistoryNavigationType navigation_type) {
if (!history_item_ || !IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type))
history_item_ = HistoryItem::Create();
history_item_->SetURL(UrlForHistory());
history_item_->SetReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
request_.GetReferrerPolicy(), history_item_->Url(),
request_.HttpReferrer()));
history_item_->SetFormInfoFromRequest(request_);
if (!old_item || IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type))
return;
HistoryCommitType history_commit_type = LoadTypeToCommitType(load_type);
if (navigation_type == HistoryNavigationType::kDifferentDocument &&
(history_commit_type != kHistoryInertCommit ||
!EqualIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(old_item->Url(), history_item_->Url())))
return;
history_item_->SetDocumentSequenceNumber(old_item->DocumentSequenceNumber());
history_item_->CopyViewStateFrom(old_item);
history_item_->SetScrollRestorationType(old_item->ScrollRestorationType());
if (history_commit_type == kHistoryInertCommit &&
(navigation_type == HistoryNavigationType::kHistoryApi ||
old_item->Url() == history_item_->Url())) {
history_item_->SetStateObject(old_item->StateObject());
history_item_->SetItemSequenceNumber(old_item->ItemSequenceNumber());
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
|
954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
| null |
_dbus_fd_set_close_on_exec (intptr_t handle)
{
if ( !SetHandleInformation( (HANDLE) handle,
HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT | HANDLE_FLAG_PROTECT_FROM_CLOSE,
0 /*disable both flags*/ ) )
{
_dbus_win_warn_win_error ("Disabling socket handle inheritance failed:", GetLastError());
}
}
|
_dbus_fd_set_close_on_exec (intptr_t handle)
{
if ( !SetHandleInformation( (HANDLE) handle,
HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT | HANDLE_FLAG_PROTECT_FROM_CLOSE,
0 /*disable both flags*/ ) )
{
_dbus_win_warn_win_error ("Disabling socket handle inheritance failed:", GetLastError());
}
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1292
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1292/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5f372f899b8709dac700710b5f0f90959dcf9ecb
|
5f372f899b8709dac700710b5f0f90959dcf9ecb
|
Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
AutoFillMetrics::~AutoFillMetrics() {
}
|
AutoFillMetrics::~AutoFillMetrics() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5790/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/88fcb3a6899d77b64195423333ad81a00803f997
|
88fcb3a6899d77b64195423333ad81a00803f997
|
Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
|
String HTMLFormElement::action() const {
Document& document = GetDocument();
KURL action_url = document.CompleteURL(attributes_.Action().IsEmpty()
? document.Url().GetString()
: attributes_.Action());
return action_url.GetString();
}
|
String HTMLFormElement::action() const {
Document& document = GetDocument();
KURL action_url = document.CompleteURL(attributes_.Action().IsEmpty()
? document.Url().GetString()
: attributes_.Action());
return action_url.GetString();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void qeth_free_qdio_buffers(struct qeth_card *card)
{
int i, j;
if (atomic_xchg(&card->qdio.state, QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED) ==
QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED)
return;
qeth_free_cq(card);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&card->buffer_reclaim_work);
for (j = 0; j < QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q; ++j) {
if (card->qdio.in_q->bufs[j].rx_skb)
dev_kfree_skb_any(card->qdio.in_q->bufs[j].rx_skb);
}
kfree(card->qdio.in_q);
card->qdio.in_q = NULL;
/* inbound buffer pool */
qeth_free_buffer_pool(card);
/* free outbound qdio_qs */
if (card->qdio.out_qs) {
for (i = 0; i < card->qdio.no_out_queues; ++i) {
qeth_clear_outq_buffers(card->qdio.out_qs[i], 1);
kfree(card->qdio.out_qs[i]);
}
kfree(card->qdio.out_qs);
card->qdio.out_qs = NULL;
}
}
|
static void qeth_free_qdio_buffers(struct qeth_card *card)
{
int i, j;
if (atomic_xchg(&card->qdio.state, QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED) ==
QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED)
return;
qeth_free_cq(card);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&card->buffer_reclaim_work);
for (j = 0; j < QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q; ++j) {
if (card->qdio.in_q->bufs[j].rx_skb)
dev_kfree_skb_any(card->qdio.in_q->bufs[j].rx_skb);
}
kfree(card->qdio.in_q);
card->qdio.in_q = NULL;
/* inbound buffer pool */
qeth_free_buffer_pool(card);
/* free outbound qdio_qs */
if (card->qdio.out_qs) {
for (i = 0; i < card->qdio.no_out_queues; ++i) {
qeth_clear_outq_buffers(card->qdio.out_qs[i], 1);
kfree(card->qdio.out_qs[i]);
}
kfree(card->qdio.out_qs);
card->qdio.out_qs = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0889/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1538367452b549d929aabb13d54c85ab99f65cd3
|
1538367452b549d929aabb13d54c85ab99f65cd3
|
For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckVisitedReferrerBeforeDone(
int32 download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!download || (download->GetState() != DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS))
return;
bool should_prompt = (download->GetTargetDisposition() ==
DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT);
bool is_forced_path = !download->GetForcedFilePath().empty();
FilePath suggested_path;
if (!is_forced_path) {
FilePath generated_name;
GenerateFileNameFromRequest(
*download,
&generated_name,
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kDefaultCharset));
if (download_prefs_->PromptForDownload()) {
if (!download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(*download) &&
!ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(generated_name))
should_prompt = true;
}
if (download_prefs_->IsDownloadPathManaged())
should_prompt = false;
FilePath target_directory;
if (should_prompt && !last_download_path_.empty())
target_directory = last_download_path_;
else
target_directory = download_prefs_->DownloadPath();
suggested_path = target_directory.Append(generated_name);
} else {
DCHECK(!should_prompt);
suggested_path = download->GetForcedFilePath();
}
if (ShouldOpenWithWebIntents(download)) {
download->SetDisplayName(suggested_path.BaseName());
suggested_path = suggested_path.AddExtension(kWebIntentsFileExtension);
}
if (danger_type == content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS) {
if (!should_prompt && !is_forced_path &&
IsDangerousFile(*download, suggested_path, visited_referrer_before)) {
danger_type = content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_FILE;
}
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
DownloadProtectionService* service = GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service && service->enabled()) {
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo info =
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo::FromDownloadItem(*download);
info.target_file = suggested_path;
if (service->IsSupportedDownload(info))
danger_type = content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_MAYBE_DANGEROUS_CONTENT;
}
#endif
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_URL, danger_type);
}
#if defined (OS_CHROMEOS)
drive::DriveDownloadObserver::SubstituteDriveDownloadPath(
profile_, suggested_path, download,
base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::SubstituteDriveDownloadPathCallback,
this, download->GetId(), callback, should_prompt, is_forced_path,
danger_type));
#else
GetReservedPath(
*download, suggested_path, download_prefs_->DownloadPath(),
!is_forced_path,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathReservationAvailable,
this, download->GetId(), callback, should_prompt,
danger_type));
#endif
}
|
void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckVisitedReferrerBeforeDone(
int32 download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!download || (download->GetState() != DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS))
return;
bool should_prompt = (download->GetTargetDisposition() ==
DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT);
bool is_forced_path = !download->GetForcedFilePath().empty();
FilePath suggested_path;
if (!is_forced_path) {
FilePath generated_name;
GenerateFileNameFromRequest(
*download,
&generated_name,
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kDefaultCharset));
if (download_prefs_->PromptForDownload()) {
if (!download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(*download) &&
!ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(generated_name))
should_prompt = true;
}
if (download_prefs_->IsDownloadPathManaged())
should_prompt = false;
FilePath target_directory;
if (should_prompt && !last_download_path_.empty())
target_directory = last_download_path_;
else
target_directory = download_prefs_->DownloadPath();
suggested_path = target_directory.Append(generated_name);
} else {
DCHECK(!should_prompt);
suggested_path = download->GetForcedFilePath();
}
if (ShouldOpenWithWebIntents(download)) {
download->SetDisplayName(suggested_path.BaseName());
suggested_path = suggested_path.AddExtension(kWebIntentsFileExtension);
}
if (danger_type == content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS) {
if (!should_prompt && !is_forced_path &&
IsDangerousFile(*download, suggested_path, visited_referrer_before)) {
danger_type = content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_FILE;
}
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
DownloadProtectionService* service = GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service && service->enabled()) {
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo info =
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo::FromDownloadItem(*download);
info.target_file = suggested_path;
if (service->IsSupportedDownload(info))
danger_type = content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_MAYBE_DANGEROUS_CONTENT;
}
#endif
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_URL, danger_type);
}
#if defined (OS_CHROMEOS)
drive::DriveDownloadObserver::SubstituteDriveDownloadPath(
profile_, suggested_path, download,
base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::SubstituteDriveDownloadPathCallback,
this, download->GetId(), callback, should_prompt, is_forced_path,
danger_type));
#else
GetReservedPath(
*download, suggested_path, download_prefs_->DownloadPath(),
!is_forced_path,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathReservationAvailable,
this, download->GetId(), callback, should_prompt,
danger_type));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3097/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SessionService::SetWindowBounds(const SessionID& window_id,
const gfx::Rect& bounds,
ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
if (!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id))
return;
ScheduleCommand(CreateSetWindowBoundsCommand(window_id, bounds, show_state));
}
|
void SessionService::SetWindowBounds(const SessionID& window_id,
const gfx::Rect& bounds,
ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
if (!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id))
return;
ScheduleCommand(CreateSetWindowBoundsCommand(window_id, bounds, show_state));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16939
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16939/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2
|
1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2
|
ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
static int xfrm_do_migrate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *pi = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_migrate m[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_kmaddress km, *kmp;
u8 type;
int err;
int n = 0;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = NULL;
if (attrs[XFRMA_MIGRATE] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
kmp = attrs[XFRMA_KMADDRESS] ? &km : NULL;
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
err = copy_from_user_migrate((struct xfrm_migrate *)m, kmp, attrs, &n);
if (err)
return err;
if (!n)
return 0;
if (attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]) {
encap = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]),
sizeof(*encap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!encap)
return 0;
}
err = xfrm_migrate(&pi->sel, pi->dir, type, m, n, kmp, net, encap);
kfree(encap);
return err;
}
|
static int xfrm_do_migrate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *pi = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_migrate m[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_kmaddress km, *kmp;
u8 type;
int err;
int n = 0;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = NULL;
if (attrs[XFRMA_MIGRATE] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
kmp = attrs[XFRMA_KMADDRESS] ? &km : NULL;
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
err = copy_from_user_migrate((struct xfrm_migrate *)m, kmp, attrs, &n);
if (err)
return err;
if (!n)
return 0;
if (attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]) {
encap = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]),
sizeof(*encap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!encap)
return 0;
}
err = xfrm_migrate(&pi->sel, pi->dir, type, m, n, kmp, net, encap);
kfree(encap);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4303
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4303/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/esnet/iperf/commit/91f2fa59e8ed80dfbf400add0164ee0e508e412a
|
91f2fa59e8ed80dfbf400add0164ee0e508e412a
|
Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
iperf_set_test_one_off(struct iperf_test *ipt, int one_off)
{
ipt->one_off = one_off;
}
|
iperf_set_test_one_off(struct iperf_test *ipt, int one_off)
{
ipt->one_off = one_off;
}
|
C
|
iperf
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.