CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2015-5195
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5195/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/ntp-project/ntp/commit/52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be
|
52e977d79a0c4ace997e5c74af429844da2f27be
|
[Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
|
create_attr_ival(
int attr,
int value
)
{
attr_val *my_val;
my_val = emalloc_zero(sizeof(*my_val));
my_val->attr = attr;
my_val->value.i = value;
my_val->type = T_Integer;
return my_val;
}
|
create_attr_ival(
int attr,
int value
)
{
attr_val *my_val;
my_val = emalloc_zero(sizeof(*my_val));
my_val->attr = attr;
my_val->value.i = value;
my_val->type = T_Integer;
return my_val;
}
|
C
|
ntp
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static Image *ReadMVGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BoundingBox "viewbox"
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
char
primitive[MaxTextExtent];
register char
*p;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
/*
Determine size of image canvas.
*/
while (ReadBlobString(image,primitive) != (char *) NULL)
{
for (p=primitive; (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'); p++) ;
if (LocaleNCompare(BoundingBox,p,strlen(BoundingBox)) != 0)
continue;
(void) sscanf(p,"viewbox %lf %lf %lf %lf",&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,
&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
image->columns=(size_t) floor((bounds.x2-bounds.x1)+0.5);
image->rows=(size_t) floor((bounds.y2-bounds.y1)+0.5);
break;
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
draw_info->affine.sx=image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 1.0 : image->x_resolution/
DefaultResolution;
draw_info->affine.sy=image->y_resolution == 0.0 ? 1.0 : image->y_resolution/
DefaultResolution;
image->columns=(size_t) (draw_info->affine.sx*image->columns);
image->rows=(size_t) (draw_info->affine.sy*image->rows);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Render drawing.
*/
if (GetBlobStreamData(image) == (unsigned char *) NULL)
draw_info->primitive=FileToString(image->filename,~0UL,exception);
else
{
draw_info->primitive=(char *) AcquireMagickMemory(GetBlobSize(image)+1);
if (draw_info->primitive != (char *) NULL)
{
CopyMagickMemory(draw_info->primitive,GetBlobStreamData(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
draw_info->primitive[GetBlobSize(image)]='\0';
}
}
(void) DrawImage(image,draw_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadMVGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BoundingBox "viewbox"
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
char
primitive[MaxTextExtent];
register char
*p;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
/*
Determine size of image canvas.
*/
while (ReadBlobString(image,primitive) != (char *) NULL)
{
for (p=primitive; (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'); p++) ;
if (LocaleNCompare(BoundingBox,p,strlen(BoundingBox)) != 0)
continue;
(void) sscanf(p,"viewbox %lf %lf %lf %lf",&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,
&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
image->columns=(size_t) floor((bounds.x2-bounds.x1)+0.5);
image->rows=(size_t) floor((bounds.y2-bounds.y1)+0.5);
break;
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
draw_info->affine.sx=image->x_resolution == 0.0 ? 1.0 : image->x_resolution/
DefaultResolution;
draw_info->affine.sy=image->y_resolution == 0.0 ? 1.0 : image->y_resolution/
DefaultResolution;
image->columns=(size_t) (draw_info->affine.sx*image->columns);
image->rows=(size_t) (draw_info->affine.sy*image->rows);
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Render drawing.
*/
if (GetBlobStreamData(image) == (unsigned char *) NULL)
draw_info->primitive=FileToString(image->filename,~0UL,exception);
else
{
draw_info->primitive=(char *) AcquireMagickMemory(GetBlobSize(image)+1);
if (draw_info->primitive != (char *) NULL)
{
CopyMagickMemory(draw_info->primitive,GetBlobStreamData(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
draw_info->primitive[GetBlobSize(image)]='\0';
}
}
(void) DrawImage(image,draw_info);
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5111/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ef97ce340c462d5212336f09bf8075d1cb10faa4
|
ef97ce340c462d5212336f09bf8075d1cb10faa4
|
Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PpapiPluginProcessHost* PpapiPluginProcessHost::CreateBrokerHost(
const content::PepperPluginInfo& info) {
PpapiPluginProcessHost* plugin_host =
new PpapiPluginProcessHost();
if (plugin_host->Init(info))
return plugin_host;
NOTREACHED(); // Init is not expected to fail.
return NULL;
}
|
PpapiPluginProcessHost* PpapiPluginProcessHost::CreateBrokerHost(
const content::PepperPluginInfo& info) {
PpapiPluginProcessHost* plugin_host =
new PpapiPluginProcessHost();
if (plugin_host->Init(info))
return plugin_host;
NOTREACHED(); // Init is not expected to fail.
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1182/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/da48524eb20662618854bb3df2db01fc65f3070c
|
da48524eb20662618854bb3df2db01fc65f3070c
|
Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static int __send_signal(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t,
int group, int from_ancestor_ns)
{
struct sigpending *pending;
struct sigqueue *q;
int override_rlimit;
trace_signal_generate(sig, info, t);
assert_spin_locked(&t->sighand->siglock);
if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, from_ancestor_ns))
return 0;
pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
/*
* Short-circuit ignored signals and support queuing
* exactly one non-rt signal, so that we can get more
* detailed information about the cause of the signal.
*/
if (legacy_queue(pending, sig))
return 0;
/*
* fast-pathed signals for kernel-internal things like SIGSTOP
* or SIGKILL.
*/
if (info == SEND_SIG_FORCED)
goto out_set;
/* Real-time signals must be queued if sent by sigqueue, or
some other real-time mechanism. It is implementation
defined whether kill() does so. We attempt to do so, on
the principle of least surprise, but since kill is not
allowed to fail with EAGAIN when low on memory we just
make sure at least one signal gets delivered and don't
pass on the info struct. */
if (sig < SIGRTMIN)
override_rlimit = (is_si_special(info) || info->si_code >= 0);
else
override_rlimit = 0;
q = __sigqueue_alloc(sig, t, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOTRACK_FALSE_POSITIVE,
override_rlimit);
if (q) {
list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
switch ((unsigned long) info) {
case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_NOINFO:
q->info.si_signo = sig;
q->info.si_errno = 0;
q->info.si_code = SI_USER;
q->info.si_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current,
task_active_pid_ns(t));
q->info.si_uid = current_uid();
break;
case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_PRIV:
q->info.si_signo = sig;
q->info.si_errno = 0;
q->info.si_code = SI_KERNEL;
q->info.si_pid = 0;
q->info.si_uid = 0;
break;
default:
copy_siginfo(&q->info, info);
if (from_ancestor_ns)
q->info.si_pid = 0;
break;
}
} else if (!is_si_special(info)) {
if (sig >= SIGRTMIN && info->si_code != SI_USER) {
/*
* Queue overflow, abort. We may abort if the
* signal was rt and sent by user using something
* other than kill().
*/
trace_signal_overflow_fail(sig, group, info);
return -EAGAIN;
} else {
/*
* This is a silent loss of information. We still
* send the signal, but the *info bits are lost.
*/
trace_signal_lose_info(sig, group, info);
}
}
out_set:
signalfd_notify(t, sig);
sigaddset(&pending->signal, sig);
complete_signal(sig, t, group);
return 0;
}
|
static int __send_signal(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t,
int group, int from_ancestor_ns)
{
struct sigpending *pending;
struct sigqueue *q;
int override_rlimit;
trace_signal_generate(sig, info, t);
assert_spin_locked(&t->sighand->siglock);
if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, from_ancestor_ns))
return 0;
pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
/*
* Short-circuit ignored signals and support queuing
* exactly one non-rt signal, so that we can get more
* detailed information about the cause of the signal.
*/
if (legacy_queue(pending, sig))
return 0;
/*
* fast-pathed signals for kernel-internal things like SIGSTOP
* or SIGKILL.
*/
if (info == SEND_SIG_FORCED)
goto out_set;
/* Real-time signals must be queued if sent by sigqueue, or
some other real-time mechanism. It is implementation
defined whether kill() does so. We attempt to do so, on
the principle of least surprise, but since kill is not
allowed to fail with EAGAIN when low on memory we just
make sure at least one signal gets delivered and don't
pass on the info struct. */
if (sig < SIGRTMIN)
override_rlimit = (is_si_special(info) || info->si_code >= 0);
else
override_rlimit = 0;
q = __sigqueue_alloc(sig, t, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOTRACK_FALSE_POSITIVE,
override_rlimit);
if (q) {
list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
switch ((unsigned long) info) {
case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_NOINFO:
q->info.si_signo = sig;
q->info.si_errno = 0;
q->info.si_code = SI_USER;
q->info.si_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current,
task_active_pid_ns(t));
q->info.si_uid = current_uid();
break;
case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_PRIV:
q->info.si_signo = sig;
q->info.si_errno = 0;
q->info.si_code = SI_KERNEL;
q->info.si_pid = 0;
q->info.si_uid = 0;
break;
default:
copy_siginfo(&q->info, info);
if (from_ancestor_ns)
q->info.si_pid = 0;
break;
}
} else if (!is_si_special(info)) {
if (sig >= SIGRTMIN && info->si_code != SI_USER) {
/*
* Queue overflow, abort. We may abort if the
* signal was rt and sent by user using something
* other than kill().
*/
trace_signal_overflow_fail(sig, group, info);
return -EAGAIN;
} else {
/*
* This is a silent loss of information. We still
* send the signal, but the *info bits are lost.
*/
trace_signal_lose_info(sig, group, info);
}
}
out_set:
signalfd_notify(t, sig);
sigaddset(&pending->signal, sig);
complete_signal(sig, t, group);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4326
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4326/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde
|
a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde
|
ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *saddr, __be16 sport,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 dport, int dif)
{
return __udp6_lib_lookup(net, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, dif, &udp_table);
}
|
struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *saddr, __be16 sport,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 dport, int dif)
{
return __udp6_lib_lookup(net, saddr, sport, daddr, dport, dif, &udp_table);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
|
void terminate_string8()
{
SharedBuffer::bufferFromData(gEmptyString)->release();
gEmptyStringBuf = NULL;
gEmptyString = NULL;
}
|
void terminate_string8()
{
SharedBuffer::bufferFromData(gEmptyString)->release();
gEmptyStringBuf = NULL;
gEmptyString = NULL;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15423
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
static void RecordMemoryUsageAfterBackgroundedMB(const char* basename,
const char* suffix,
int memory_usage) {
std::string histogram_name = base::StringPrintf("%s.%s", basename, suffix);
base::UmaHistogramMemoryLargeMB(histogram_name, memory_usage);
}
|
static void RecordMemoryUsageAfterBackgroundedMB(const char* basename,
const char* suffix,
int memory_usage) {
std::string histogram_name = base::StringPrintf("%s.%s", basename, suffix);
base::UmaHistogramMemoryLargeMB(histogram_name, memory_usage);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool DocumentLoader::maybeLoadEmpty()
{
bool shouldLoadEmpty = !m_substituteData.isValid() && (m_request.url().isEmpty() || SchemeRegistry::shouldLoadURLSchemeAsEmptyDocument(m_request.url().protocol()));
if (!shouldLoadEmpty && !frameLoader()->client()->representationExistsForURLScheme(m_request.url().protocol()))
return false;
if (m_request.url().isEmpty() && !frameLoader()->stateMachine()->creatingInitialEmptyDocument())
m_request.setURL(blankURL());
String mimeType = shouldLoadEmpty ? "text/html" : frameLoader()->client()->generatedMIMETypeForURLScheme(m_request.url().protocol());
m_response = ResourceResponse(m_request.url(), mimeType, 0, String(), String());
finishedLoading(monotonicallyIncreasingTime());
return true;
}
|
bool DocumentLoader::maybeLoadEmpty()
{
bool shouldLoadEmpty = !m_substituteData.isValid() && (m_request.url().isEmpty() || SchemeRegistry::shouldLoadURLSchemeAsEmptyDocument(m_request.url().protocol()));
if (!shouldLoadEmpty && !frameLoader()->client()->representationExistsForURLScheme(m_request.url().protocol()))
return false;
if (m_request.url().isEmpty() && !frameLoader()->stateMachine()->creatingInitialEmptyDocument())
m_request.setURL(blankURL());
String mimeType = shouldLoadEmpty ? "text/html" : frameLoader()->client()->generatedMIMETypeForURLScheme(m_request.url().protocol());
m_response = ResourceResponse(m_request.url(), mimeType, 0, String(), String());
finishedLoading(monotonicallyIncreasingTime());
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9994
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9994/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef
|
avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static void update_lf_deltas(VP8Context *s)
{
VP56RangeCoder *c = &s->c;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (vp8_rac_get(c)) {
s->lf_delta.ref[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 6);
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
s->lf_delta.ref[i] = -s->lf_delta.ref[i];
}
}
for (i = MODE_I4x4; i <= VP8_MVMODE_SPLIT; i++) {
if (vp8_rac_get(c)) {
s->lf_delta.mode[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 6);
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
s->lf_delta.mode[i] = -s->lf_delta.mode[i];
}
}
}
|
static void update_lf_deltas(VP8Context *s)
{
VP56RangeCoder *c = &s->c;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (vp8_rac_get(c)) {
s->lf_delta.ref[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 6);
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
s->lf_delta.ref[i] = -s->lf_delta.ref[i];
}
}
for (i = MODE_I4x4; i <= VP8_MVMODE_SPLIT; i++) {
if (vp8_rac_get(c)) {
s->lf_delta.mode[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 6);
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
s->lf_delta.mode[i] = -s->lf_delta.mode[i];
}
}
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2141/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void __set_current_blocked(const sigset_t *newset)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
__set_task_blocked(tsk, newset);
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
}
|
void __set_current_blocked(const sigset_t *newset)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
__set_task_blocked(tsk, newset);
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16229/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66
|
211124b972e74f0da66bc8b16f181f78793e2f66
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
|
static inline unsigned int dccp_basic_hdr_len(const struct dccp_hdr *dh)
{
return DCCPH_X(dh) ? sizeof(struct dccp_hdr_ext) : sizeof(struct dccp_hdr);
}
|
static inline unsigned int dccp_basic_hdr_len(const struct dccp_hdr *dh)
{
return DCCPH_X(dh) ? sizeof(struct dccp_hdr_ext) : sizeof(struct dccp_hdr);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4470
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4470/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/38327424b40bcebe2de92d07312c89360ac9229a
|
38327424b40bcebe2de92d07312c89360ac9229a
|
KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
{
down_write(&key_types_sem);
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
downgrade_write(&key_types_sem);
key_gc_keytype(ktype);
pr_notice("Key type %s unregistered\n", ktype->name);
up_read(&key_types_sem);
}
|
void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
{
down_write(&key_types_sem);
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
downgrade_write(&key_types_sem);
key_gc_keytype(ktype);
pr_notice("Key type %s unregistered\n", ktype->name);
up_read(&key_types_sem);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseSurface() {
if (!context_.get())
return;
if (WasContextLost()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Trying to release lost context.";
return;
}
context_->ReleaseCurrent(surface_.get());
surface_ = nullptr;
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::ReleaseSurface() {
if (!context_.get())
return;
if (WasContextLost()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Trying to release lost context.";
return;
}
context_->ReleaseCurrent(surface_.get());
surface_ = nullptr;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool JSTestObjPrototype::getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertyDescriptor& descriptor)
{
JSTestObjPrototype* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestObjPrototype*>(object);
return getStaticPropertyDescriptor<JSTestObjPrototype, JSObject>(exec, &JSTestObjPrototypeTable, thisObject, propertyName, descriptor);
}
|
bool JSTestObjPrototype::getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertyDescriptor& descriptor)
{
JSTestObjPrototype* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestObjPrototype*>(object);
return getStaticPropertyDescriptor<JSTestObjPrototype, JSObject>(exec, &JSTestObjPrototypeTable, thisObject, propertyName, descriptor);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8935
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8935/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1
|
Update header handling to RFC 7230
|
SAPI_API struct stat *sapi_get_stat(TSRMLS_D)
{
if (sapi_module.get_stat) {
return sapi_module.get_stat(TSRMLS_C);
} else {
if (!SG(request_info).path_translated || (VCWD_STAT(SG(request_info).path_translated, &SG(global_stat)) == -1)) {
return NULL;
}
return &SG(global_stat);
}
}
|
SAPI_API struct stat *sapi_get_stat(TSRMLS_D)
{
if (sapi_module.get_stat) {
return sapi_module.get_stat(TSRMLS_C);
} else {
if (!SG(request_info).path_translated || (VCWD_STAT(SG(request_info).path_translated, &SG(global_stat)) == -1)) {
return NULL;
}
return &SG(global_stat);
}
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreCurrentTexture2DBindings() {
GLES2DecoderImpl::TextureUnit& info = texture_units_[0];
GLuint last_id;
if (info.bound_texture_2d) {
last_id = info.bound_texture_2d->service_id();
} else {
last_id = 0;
}
glBindTexture(GL_TEXTURE_2D, last_id);
glActiveTexture(GL_TEXTURE0 + active_texture_unit_);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreCurrentTexture2DBindings() {
GLES2DecoderImpl::TextureUnit& info = texture_units_[0];
GLuint last_id;
if (info.bound_texture_2d) {
last_id = info.bound_texture_2d->service_id();
} else {
last_id = 0;
}
glBindTexture(GL_TEXTURE_2D, last_id);
glActiveTexture(GL_TEXTURE0 + active_texture_unit_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0879/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
0f05aa7e29cf814a204830c82ba2619f9c636894
|
DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ProfileDependencyManager* ProfileDependencyManager::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ProfileDependencyManager>::get();
}
|
ProfileDependencyManager* ProfileDependencyManager::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ProfileDependencyManager>::get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010294/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/7e768f8a473409215fe3fff8f6e31f8a3a0103c6
|
7e768f8a473409215fe3fff8f6e31f8a3a0103c6
|
core: clear the entire TA area
Previously we cleared (memset to zero) the size corresponding to code
and data segments, however the allocation for the TA is made on the
granularity of the memory pool, meaning that we did not clear all memory
and because of that we could potentially leak code and data of a
previous loaded TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0006: "Potential disclosure of previously loaded TA
code and data"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
|
static uint32_t elf_flags_to_mattr(uint32_t flags)
{
uint32_t mattr = 0;
if (flags & PF_X)
mattr |= TEE_MATTR_UX;
if (flags & PF_W)
mattr |= TEE_MATTR_UW;
if (flags & PF_R)
mattr |= TEE_MATTR_UR;
return mattr;
}
|
static uint32_t elf_flags_to_mattr(uint32_t flags)
{
uint32_t mattr = 0;
if (flags & PF_X)
mattr |= TEE_MATTR_UX;
if (flags & PF_W)
mattr |= TEE_MATTR_UW;
if (flags & PF_R)
mattr |= TEE_MATTR_UR;
return mattr;
}
|
C
|
optee_os
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9586/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/curl-7_51_0-162-g3ab3c16
|
curl-7_51_0-162-g3ab3c16
|
printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
|
int curl_msnprintf(char *buffer, size_t maxlength, const char *format, ...)
{
int retcode;
va_list ap_save; /* argument pointer */
va_start(ap_save, format);
retcode = curl_mvsnprintf(buffer, maxlength, format, ap_save);
va_end(ap_save);
return retcode;
}
|
int curl_msnprintf(char *buffer, size_t maxlength, const char *format, ...)
{
int retcode;
va_list ap_save; /* argument pointer */
va_start(ap_save, format);
retcode = curl_mvsnprintf(buffer, maxlength, format, ap_save);
va_end(ap_save);
return retcode;
}
|
C
|
curl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::get_supported_profile_level_for_1080p(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevelType)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (!profileLevelType)
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (profileLevelType->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel4;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 1) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel4;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 2) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel4;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = QOMX_VIDEO_MVCProfileStereoHigh;
profileLevelType->eLevel = QOMX_VIDEO_MVCLevel51;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_HEVCProfileMain;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_HEVCMainTierLevel51;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if ((!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level70;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileSimple;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level5;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 1) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level5;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2ProfileSimple;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2LevelHL;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 1) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2ProfileMain;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2LevelHL;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported ret NoMore for codec: %s", drv_ctx.kind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported should be queries on Input port only %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
return eRet;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::get_supported_profile_level_for_1080p(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevelType)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (!profileLevelType)
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (profileLevelType->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel4;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 1) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel4;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 2) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_AVCLevel4;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = QOMX_VIDEO_MVCProfileStereoHigh;
profileLevelType->eLevel = QOMX_VIDEO_MVCLevel51;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_HEVCProfileMain;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_HEVCMainTierLevel51;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if ((!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level70;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileSimple;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level5;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 1) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level5;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 0) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2ProfileSimple;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2LevelHL;
} else if (profileLevelType->nProfileIndex == 1) {
profileLevelType->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2ProfileMain;
profileLevelType->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG2LevelHL;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported nProfileIndex ret NoMore %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nProfileIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported ret NoMore for codec: %s", drv_ctx.kind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("get_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported should be queries on Input port only %u",
(unsigned int)profileLevelType->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
return eRet;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18218/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
|
27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
|
net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
hns_nic_alloc_rx_buffers(struct hns_nic_ring_data *ring_data, int cleand_count)
{
int i, ret;
struct hnae_desc_cb res_cbs;
struct hnae_desc_cb *desc_cb;
struct hnae_ring *ring = ring_data->ring;
struct net_device *ndev = ring_data->napi.dev;
for (i = 0; i < cleand_count; i++) {
desc_cb = &ring->desc_cb[ring->next_to_use];
if (desc_cb->reuse_flag) {
ring->stats.reuse_pg_cnt++;
hnae_reuse_buffer(ring, ring->next_to_use);
} else {
ret = hnae_reserve_buffer_map(ring, &res_cbs);
if (ret) {
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
netdev_err(ndev, "hnae reserve buffer map failed.\n");
break;
}
hnae_replace_buffer(ring, ring->next_to_use, &res_cbs);
}
ring_ptr_move_fw(ring, next_to_use);
}
wmb(); /* make all data has been write before submit */
writel_relaxed(i, ring->io_base + RCB_REG_HEAD);
}
|
hns_nic_alloc_rx_buffers(struct hns_nic_ring_data *ring_data, int cleand_count)
{
int i, ret;
struct hnae_desc_cb res_cbs;
struct hnae_desc_cb *desc_cb;
struct hnae_ring *ring = ring_data->ring;
struct net_device *ndev = ring_data->napi.dev;
for (i = 0; i < cleand_count; i++) {
desc_cb = &ring->desc_cb[ring->next_to_use];
if (desc_cb->reuse_flag) {
ring->stats.reuse_pg_cnt++;
hnae_reuse_buffer(ring, ring->next_to_use);
} else {
ret = hnae_reserve_buffer_map(ring, &res_cbs);
if (ret) {
ring->stats.sw_err_cnt++;
netdev_err(ndev, "hnae reserve buffer map failed.\n");
break;
}
hnae_replace_buffer(ring, ring->next_to_use, &res_cbs);
}
ring_ptr_move_fw(ring, next_to_use);
}
wmb(); /* make all data has been write before submit */
writel_relaxed(i, ring->io_base + RCB_REG_HEAD);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9490
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9490/
|
CWE-704
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/v8/+/a24543157ae2cdd25da43e20f4e48a07481e6ceb
|
a24543157ae2cdd25da43e20f4e48a07481e6ceb
|
Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
|
static void DeleteImpl(Handle<JSObject> holder, uint32_t entry) {
uint32_t length = static_cast<uint32_t>(GetString(*holder)->length());
if (entry < length) {
return; // String contents can't be deleted.
}
BackingStoreAccessor::DeleteImpl(holder, entry - length);
}
|
static void DeleteImpl(Handle<JSObject> holder, uint32_t entry) {
uint32_t length = static_cast<uint32_t>(GetString(*holder)->length());
if (entry < length) {
return; // String contents can't be deleted.
}
BackingStoreAccessor::DeleteImpl(holder, entry - length);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6414
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6414/
|
CWE-772
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/libcacard/commit/?id=9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c
|
9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c
| null |
vcard_apdu_set_length(VCardAPDU *apdu)
{
int L, Le;
/* process according to table 5 of the 7816-4 Part 4 spec.
* variable names match the variables in the spec */
L = apdu->a_len-4; /* fixed APDU header */
apdu->a_Lc = 0;
apdu->a_Le = 0;
apdu->a_body = NULL;
switch (L) {
case 0:
/* 1 minimal apdu */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
case 1:
/* 2S only return values apdu */
/* zero maps to 256 here */
apdu->a_Le = apdu->a_header->ah_Le ?
apdu->a_header->ah_Le : 256;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
default:
/* if the ah_Le byte is zero and we have more than
* 1 byte in the header, then we must be using extended Le and Lc.
* process the extended now. */
if (apdu->a_header->ah_Le == 0) {
if (L < 3) {
/* coding error, need at least 3 bytes */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
/* calculate the first extended value. Could be either Le or Lc */
Le = (apdu->a_header->ah_body[0] << 8)
| apdu->a_header->ah_body[1];
if (L == 3) {
/* 2E extended, return data only */
/* zero maps to 65536 */
apdu->a_Le = Le ? Le : 65536;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if (Le == 0) {
/* reserved for future use, probably for next time we need
* to extend the lengths */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
/* we know that the first extended value is Lc now */
apdu->a_Lc = Le;
apdu->a_body = &apdu->a_header->ah_body[2];
if (L == Le+3) {
/* 3E extended, only body parameters */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if (L == Le+5) {
/* 4E extended, parameters and return data */
Le = (apdu->a_data[apdu->a_len-2] << 8)
| apdu->a_data[apdu->a_len-1];
apdu->a_Le = Le ? Le : 65536;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
/* not extended */
apdu->a_Lc = apdu->a_header->ah_Le;
apdu->a_body = &apdu->a_header->ah_body[0];
if (L == apdu->a_Lc + 1) {
/* 3S only body parameters */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if (L == apdu->a_Lc + 2) {
/* 4S parameters and return data */
Le = apdu->a_data[apdu->a_len-1];
apdu->a_Le = Le ? Le : 256;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
|
vcard_apdu_set_length(VCardAPDU *apdu)
{
int L, Le;
/* process according to table 5 of the 7816-4 Part 4 spec.
* variable names match the variables in the spec */
L = apdu->a_len-4; /* fixed APDU header */
apdu->a_Lc = 0;
apdu->a_Le = 0;
apdu->a_body = NULL;
switch (L) {
case 0:
/* 1 minimal apdu */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
case 1:
/* 2S only return values apdu */
/* zero maps to 256 here */
apdu->a_Le = apdu->a_header->ah_Le ?
apdu->a_header->ah_Le : 256;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
default:
/* if the ah_Le byte is zero and we have more than
* 1 byte in the header, then we must be using extended Le and Lc.
* process the extended now. */
if (apdu->a_header->ah_Le == 0) {
if (L < 3) {
/* coding error, need at least 3 bytes */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
/* calculate the first extended value. Could be either Le or Lc */
Le = (apdu->a_header->ah_body[0] << 8)
| apdu->a_header->ah_body[1];
if (L == 3) {
/* 2E extended, return data only */
/* zero maps to 65536 */
apdu->a_Le = Le ? Le : 65536;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if (Le == 0) {
/* reserved for future use, probably for next time we need
* to extend the lengths */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
/* we know that the first extended value is Lc now */
apdu->a_Lc = Le;
apdu->a_body = &apdu->a_header->ah_body[2];
if (L == Le+3) {
/* 3E extended, only body parameters */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if (L == Le+5) {
/* 4E extended, parameters and return data */
Le = (apdu->a_data[apdu->a_len-2] << 8)
| apdu->a_data[apdu->a_len-1];
apdu->a_Le = Le ? Le : 65536;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
/* not extended */
apdu->a_Lc = apdu->a_header->ah_Le;
apdu->a_body = &apdu->a_header->ah_body[0];
if (L == apdu->a_Lc + 1) {
/* 3S only body parameters */
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
if (L == apdu->a_Lc + 2) {
/* 4S parameters and return data */
Le = apdu->a_data[apdu->a_len-1];
apdu->a_Le = Le ? Le : 256;
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
return VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3120/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7
|
93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7
|
Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
|
kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *req_s4u_user,
krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part *reply_encpart)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user rep_s4u_user;
krb5_pa_data padata;
krb5_enctype enctype;
krb5_keyusage usage;
memset(&rep_s4u_user, 0, sizeof(rep_s4u_user));
rep_s4u_user.user_id.nonce = req_s4u_user->user_id.nonce;
rep_s4u_user.user_id.user = req_s4u_user->user_id.user;
rep_s4u_user.user_id.options =
req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE;
code = encode_krb5_s4u_userid(&rep_s4u_user.user_id, &data);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE)
usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REPLY;
else
usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REQUEST;
code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, req_s4u_user->cksum.checksum_type,
tgs_subkey != NULL ? tgs_subkey : tgs_session,
usage, data,
&rep_s4u_user.cksum);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_free_data(context, data);
data = NULL;
code = encode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&rep_s4u_user, &data);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
padata.magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
padata.pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER;
padata.length = data->length;
padata.contents = (krb5_octet *)data->data;
code = add_pa_data_element(context, &padata, &reply->padata, FALSE);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
free(data);
data = NULL;
if (tgs_subkey != NULL)
enctype = tgs_subkey->enctype;
else
enctype = tgs_session->enctype;
/*
* Owing to a bug in Windows, unkeyed checksums were used for older
* enctypes, including rc4-hmac. A forthcoming workaround for this
* includes the checksum bytes in the encrypted padata.
*/
if ((req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE) &&
enctype_requires_etype_info_2(enctype) == FALSE) {
padata.length = req_s4u_user->cksum.length +
rep_s4u_user.cksum.length;
padata.contents = malloc(padata.length);
if (padata.contents == NULL) {
code = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(padata.contents,
req_s4u_user->cksum.contents,
req_s4u_user->cksum.length);
memcpy(&padata.contents[req_s4u_user->cksum.length],
rep_s4u_user.cksum.contents,
rep_s4u_user.cksum.length);
code = add_pa_data_element(context,&padata,
&reply_encpart->enc_padata, FALSE);
if (code != 0) {
free(padata.contents);
goto cleanup;
}
}
cleanup:
if (rep_s4u_user.cksum.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &rep_s4u_user.cksum);
krb5_free_data(context, data);
return code;
}
|
kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *req_s4u_user,
krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part *reply_encpart)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user rep_s4u_user;
krb5_pa_data padata;
krb5_enctype enctype;
krb5_keyusage usage;
memset(&rep_s4u_user, 0, sizeof(rep_s4u_user));
rep_s4u_user.user_id.nonce = req_s4u_user->user_id.nonce;
rep_s4u_user.user_id.user = req_s4u_user->user_id.user;
rep_s4u_user.user_id.options =
req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE;
code = encode_krb5_s4u_userid(&rep_s4u_user.user_id, &data);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE)
usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REPLY;
else
usage = KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REQUEST;
code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, req_s4u_user->cksum.checksum_type,
tgs_subkey != NULL ? tgs_subkey : tgs_session,
usage, data,
&rep_s4u_user.cksum);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_free_data(context, data);
data = NULL;
code = encode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&rep_s4u_user, &data);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
padata.magic = KV5M_PA_DATA;
padata.pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER;
padata.length = data->length;
padata.contents = (krb5_octet *)data->data;
code = add_pa_data_element(context, &padata, &reply->padata, FALSE);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
free(data);
data = NULL;
if (tgs_subkey != NULL)
enctype = tgs_subkey->enctype;
else
enctype = tgs_session->enctype;
/*
* Owing to a bug in Windows, unkeyed checksums were used for older
* enctypes, including rc4-hmac. A forthcoming workaround for this
* includes the checksum bytes in the encrypted padata.
*/
if ((req_s4u_user->user_id.options & KRB5_S4U_OPTS_USE_REPLY_KEY_USAGE) &&
enctype_requires_etype_info_2(enctype) == FALSE) {
padata.length = req_s4u_user->cksum.length +
rep_s4u_user.cksum.length;
padata.contents = malloc(padata.length);
if (padata.contents == NULL) {
code = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(padata.contents,
req_s4u_user->cksum.contents,
req_s4u_user->cksum.length);
memcpy(&padata.contents[req_s4u_user->cksum.length],
rep_s4u_user.cksum.contents,
rep_s4u_user.cksum.length);
code = add_pa_data_element(context,&padata,
&reply_encpart->enc_padata, FALSE);
if (code != 0) {
free(padata.contents);
goto cleanup;
}
}
cleanup:
if (rep_s4u_user.cksum.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &rep_s4u_user.cksum);
krb5_free_data(context, data);
return code;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
static int sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_read_tokeninfo (sc_pkcs15_card_t * p15card)
{
sc_card_t *card = p15card->card;
int r;
u8 efbin[512];
size_t len;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* Read token info */
len = sizeof efbin;
r = read_file(p15card, (u8 *) "\x2F\x03", efbin, &len, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.TokenInfo");
r = sc_pkcs15_parse_tokeninfo(card->ctx, p15card->tokeninfo, efbin, len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.TokenInfo");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
static int sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_read_tokeninfo (sc_pkcs15_card_t * p15card)
{
sc_card_t *card = p15card->card;
int r;
u8 efbin[512];
size_t len;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* Read token info */
len = sizeof efbin;
r = read_file(p15card, (u8 *) "\x2F\x03", efbin, &len, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.TokenInfo");
r = sc_pkcs15_parse_tokeninfo(card->ctx, p15card->tokeninfo, efbin, len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.TokenInfo");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
int kgdb_ll_trap(int cmd, const char *str,
struct pt_regs *regs, long err, int trap, int sig)
{
struct die_args args = {
.regs = regs,
.str = str,
.err = err,
.trapnr = trap,
.signr = sig,
};
if (!kgdb_io_module_registered)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
return __kgdb_notify(&args, cmd);
}
|
int kgdb_ll_trap(int cmd, const char *str,
struct pt_regs *regs, long err, int trap, int sig)
{
struct die_args args = {
.regs = regs,
.str = str,
.err = err,
.trapnr = trap,
.signr = sig,
};
if (!kgdb_io_module_registered)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
return __kgdb_notify(&args, cmd);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11810
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11810/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
megasas_check_reset_gen2(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL)
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
megasas_check_reset_gen2(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL)
return 1;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathCacheConvertNumber(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathObjectPtr val) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
if (val == NULL)
return(xmlXPathCacheNewFloat(ctxt, 0.0));
if (val->type == XPATH_NUMBER)
return(val);
ret = xmlXPathCacheNewFloat(ctxt, xmlXPathCastToNumber(val));
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt, val);
return(ret);
}
|
xmlXPathCacheConvertNumber(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, xmlXPathObjectPtr val) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
if (val == NULL)
return(xmlXPathCacheNewFloat(ctxt, 0.0));
if (val->type == XPATH_NUMBER)
return(val);
ret = xmlXPathCacheNewFloat(ctxt, xmlXPathCastToNumber(val));
xmlXPathReleaseObject(ctxt, val);
return(ret);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0881/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/634c5943f46abe8c6280079f6d394dfee08c3c8f
|
634c5943f46abe8c6280079f6d394dfee08c3c8f
|
Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool RenderLayerCompositor::requiresOverhangLayers() const
{
if (!isMainFrame())
return false;
if (scrollingCoordinator() && m_renderView->frameView()->hasOpaqueBackground())
return true;
return true;
}
|
bool RenderLayerCompositor::requiresOverhangLayers() const
{
if (!isMainFrame())
return false;
if (scrollingCoordinator() && m_renderView->frameView()->hasOpaqueBackground())
return true;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::NotEnumerableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_notEnumerableLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::NotEnumerableLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::NotEnumerableLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_notEnumerableLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::NotEnumerableLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdateWebContentsVisibility(Visibility visibility) {
const bool occlusion_is_disabled =
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebContentsOcclusion) ||
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableBackgroundingOccludedWindowsForTesting);
if (occlusion_is_disabled && visibility == Visibility::OCCLUDED)
visibility = Visibility::VISIBLE;
if (!did_first_set_visible_) {
if (visibility == Visibility::VISIBLE) {
WasShown();
did_first_set_visible_ = true;
}
return;
}
if (visibility == visibility_)
return;
if (visibility == Visibility::VISIBLE)
WasShown();
else if (visibility == Visibility::OCCLUDED)
WasOccluded();
else
WasHidden();
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdateWebContentsVisibility(Visibility visibility) {
const bool occlusion_is_disabled =
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebContentsOcclusion) ||
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableBackgroundingOccludedWindowsForTesting);
if (occlusion_is_disabled && visibility == Visibility::OCCLUDED)
visibility = Visibility::VISIBLE;
if (!did_first_set_visible_) {
if (visibility == Visibility::VISIBLE) {
WasShown();
did_first_set_visible_ = true;
}
return;
}
if (visibility == visibility_)
return;
if (visibility == Visibility::VISIBLE)
WasShown();
else if (visibility == Visibility::OCCLUDED)
WasOccluded();
else
WasHidden();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1748
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1748/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2327c7044eeabc2e70700ff7f752e4b2e2978657
|
2327c7044eeabc2e70700ff7f752e4b2e2978657
|
Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
|
PluginDataRemoverImpl::~PluginDataRemoverImpl() {
}
|
PluginDataRemoverImpl::~PluginDataRemoverImpl() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
IntRect RenderBox::logicalVisualOverflowRectForPropagation(RenderStyle* parentStyle) const
{
IntRect rect = visualOverflowRectForPropagation(parentStyle);
if (!parentStyle->isHorizontalWritingMode())
return rect.transposedRect();
return rect;
}
|
IntRect RenderBox::logicalVisualOverflowRectForPropagation(RenderStyle* parentStyle) const
{
IntRect rect = visualOverflowRectForPropagation(parentStyle);
if (!parentStyle->isHorizontalWritingMode())
return rect.transposedRect();
return rect;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void ipv6_ifa_notify(int event, struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
rcu_read_lock_bh();
if (likely(ifp->idev->dead == 0))
__ipv6_ifa_notify(event, ifp);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
}
|
static void ipv6_ifa_notify(int event, struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp)
{
rcu_read_lock_bh();
if (likely(ifp->idev->dead == 0))
__ipv6_ifa_notify(event, ifp);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11810
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11810/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c
|
scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
megasas_make_sgl_skinny(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct scsi_cmnd *scp, union megasas_sgl *mfi_sgl)
{
int i;
int sge_count;
struct scatterlist *os_sgl;
sge_count = scsi_dma_map(scp);
if (sge_count) {
scsi_for_each_sg(scp, os_sgl, sge_count, i) {
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].length =
cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_len(os_sgl));
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].phys_addr =
cpu_to_le64(sg_dma_address(os_sgl));
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].flag = cpu_to_le32(0);
}
}
return sge_count;
}
|
megasas_make_sgl_skinny(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct scsi_cmnd *scp, union megasas_sgl *mfi_sgl)
{
int i;
int sge_count;
struct scatterlist *os_sgl;
sge_count = scsi_dma_map(scp);
if (sge_count) {
scsi_for_each_sg(scp, os_sgl, sge_count, i) {
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].length =
cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_len(os_sgl));
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].phys_addr =
cpu_to_le64(sg_dma_address(os_sgl));
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].flag = cpu_to_le32(0);
}
}
return sge_count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0203/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 1);
if (error)
return error;
if (!dir->i_op->rmdir)
return -EPERM;
vfs_dq_init(dir);
mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry_unhash(dentry);
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else {
error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
if (!error) {
error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
if (!error)
dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (!error) {
d_delete(dentry);
}
dput(dentry);
return error;
}
|
int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 1);
if (error)
return error;
if (!dir->i_op->rmdir)
return -EPERM;
vfs_dq_init(dir);
mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry_unhash(dentry);
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else {
error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
if (!error) {
error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
if (!error)
dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (!error) {
d_delete(dentry);
}
dput(dentry);
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18345/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2078096efde1976b0fa9c820df90cedbfb2b13bc
|
2078096efde1976b0fa9c820df90cedbfb2b13bc
|
Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Remove(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
security_state_.erase(child_id);
worker_map_.erase(child_id);
}
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Remove(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
security_state_.erase(child_id);
worker_map_.erase(child_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6086
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6086/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c9d673b54832afde658f214d7da7d0453fa89774
|
c9d673b54832afde658f214d7da7d0453fa89774
|
[MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236}
|
bool MemBackendImpl::Init() {
if (max_size_)
return true;
int64_t total_memory = base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory();
if (total_memory <= 0) {
max_size_ = kDefaultInMemoryCacheSize;
return true;
}
total_memory = total_memory * 2 / 100;
if (total_memory > kDefaultInMemoryCacheSize * 5)
max_size_ = kDefaultInMemoryCacheSize * 5;
else
max_size_ = static_cast<int32_t>(total_memory);
return true;
}
|
bool MemBackendImpl::Init() {
if (max_size_)
return true;
int64_t total_memory = base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory();
if (total_memory <= 0) {
max_size_ = kDefaultInMemoryCacheSize;
return true;
}
total_memory = total_memory * 2 / 100;
if (total_memory > kDefaultInMemoryCacheSize * 5)
max_size_ = kDefaultInMemoryCacheSize * 5;
else
max_size_ = static_cast<int32_t>(total_memory);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16541
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16541/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d
|
241d91112771a6104de10b3948c3f350d6690c1d
| null |
get_local_op_array(const gs_memory_t *mem)
{
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory(mem);
return &minst->i_ctx_p->op_array_table_local;
}
|
get_local_op_array(const gs_memory_t *mem)
{
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory(mem);
return &minst->i_ctx_p->op_array_table_local;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DeleteFramebuffersHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
bool supports_separate_framebuffer_binds =
features().chromium_framebuffer_multisample;
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebuffer(client_ids[ii]);
if (framebuffer && !framebuffer->IsDeleted()) {
if (framebuffer == framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer.get()) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer = NULL;
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
GLenum target = supports_separate_framebuffer_binds ?
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT : GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, GetBackbufferServiceId());
}
if (framebuffer == framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get()) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer = NULL;
GLenum target = supports_separate_framebuffer_binds ?
GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT : GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, GetBackbufferServiceId());
}
OnFboChanged();
RemoveFramebuffer(client_ids[ii]);
}
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DeleteFramebuffersHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
bool supports_separate_framebuffer_binds =
features().chromium_framebuffer_multisample;
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebuffer(client_ids[ii]);
if (framebuffer && !framebuffer->IsDeleted()) {
if (framebuffer == framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer.get()) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer = NULL;
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
GLenum target = supports_separate_framebuffer_binds ?
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT : GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, GetBackbufferServiceId());
}
if (framebuffer == framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get()) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer = NULL;
GLenum target = supports_separate_framebuffer_binds ?
GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT : GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, GetBackbufferServiceId());
}
OnFboChanged();
RemoveFramebuffer(client_ids[ii]);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16358/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
|
d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
|
Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
|
static void r_bin_object_free(void /*RBinObject*/ *o_) {
RBinObject *o = o_;
if (!o) {
return;
}
r_bin_info_free (o->info);
r_bin_object_delete_items (o);
R_FREE (o);
}
|
static void r_bin_object_free(void /*RBinObject*/ *o_) {
RBinObject *o = o_;
if (!o) {
return;
}
r_bin_info_free (o->info);
r_bin_object_delete_items (o);
R_FREE (o);
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5375/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
|
static noinline int btrfs_mksubvol(struct path *parent,
char *name, int namelen,
struct btrfs_root *snap_src,
u64 *async_transid, bool readonly,
struct btrfs_qgroup_inherit **inherit)
{
struct inode *dir = parent->dentry->d_inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
mutex_lock_nested(&dir->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent->dentry, namelen);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
goto out_unlock;
error = -EEXIST;
if (dentry->d_inode)
goto out_dput;
error = btrfs_may_create(dir, dentry);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
/*
* even if this name doesn't exist, we may get hash collisions.
* check for them now when we can safely fail
*/
error = btrfs_check_dir_item_collision(BTRFS_I(dir)->root,
dir->i_ino, name,
namelen);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
down_read(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
if (btrfs_root_refs(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->root_item) == 0)
goto out_up_read;
if (snap_src) {
error = create_snapshot(snap_src, dentry, name, namelen,
async_transid, readonly, inherit);
} else {
error = create_subvol(BTRFS_I(dir)->root, dentry,
name, namelen, async_transid, inherit);
}
if (!error)
fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
out_up_read:
up_read(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
out_dput:
dput(dentry);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->i_mutex);
return error;
}
|
static noinline int btrfs_mksubvol(struct path *parent,
char *name, int namelen,
struct btrfs_root *snap_src,
u64 *async_transid, bool readonly,
struct btrfs_qgroup_inherit **inherit)
{
struct inode *dir = parent->dentry->d_inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
mutex_lock_nested(&dir->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent->dentry, namelen);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
goto out_unlock;
error = -EEXIST;
if (dentry->d_inode)
goto out_dput;
error = btrfs_may_create(dir, dentry);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
down_read(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
if (btrfs_root_refs(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->root_item) == 0)
goto out_up_read;
if (snap_src) {
error = create_snapshot(snap_src, dentry, name, namelen,
async_transid, readonly, inherit);
} else {
error = create_subvol(BTRFS_I(dir)->root, dentry,
name, namelen, async_transid, inherit);
}
if (!error)
fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
out_up_read:
up_read(&BTRFS_I(dir)->root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
out_dput:
dput(dentry);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->i_mutex);
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void withExecutionContextAndScriptStateMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
ExecutionContext* scriptContext = currentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
imp->withExecutionContextAndScriptState(&state, scriptContext);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
}
|
static void withExecutionContextAndScriptStateMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
ExecutionContext* scriptContext = currentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
imp->withExecutionContextAndScriptState(&state, scriptContext);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0
|
4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0
|
USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static unsigned iowarrior_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
struct iowarrior *dev = file->private_data;
unsigned int mask = 0;
if (!dev->present)
return POLLERR | POLLHUP;
poll_wait(file, &dev->read_wait, wait);
poll_wait(file, &dev->write_wait, wait);
if (!dev->present)
return POLLERR | POLLHUP;
if (read_index(dev) != -1)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (atomic_read(&dev->write_busy) < MAX_WRITES_IN_FLIGHT)
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
return mask;
}
|
static unsigned iowarrior_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
struct iowarrior *dev = file->private_data;
unsigned int mask = 0;
if (!dev->present)
return POLLERR | POLLHUP;
poll_wait(file, &dev->read_wait, wait);
poll_wait(file, &dev->write_wait, wait);
if (!dev->present)
return POLLERR | POLLHUP;
if (read_index(dev) != -1)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (atomic_read(&dev->write_busy) < MAX_WRITES_IN_FLIGHT)
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
return mask;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::ReceiveDroppedFiles(const DragData* drag_data) {
return input_type_->ReceiveDroppedFiles(drag_data);
}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::ReceiveDroppedFiles(const DragData* drag_data) {
return input_type_->ReceiveDroppedFiles(drag_data);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6399
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6399/
|
CWE-94
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4b53c2c72cb5541cf394033b528a6fe2a86c0ac1
|
4b53c2c72cb5541cf394033b528a6fe2a86c0ac1
| null |
int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
if (vdev->queue_sel >= VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
return -1;
}
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
|
int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
static void stream_int_shutw_conn(struct stream_interface *si)
{
struct connection *conn = __objt_conn(si->end);
si->ob->flags &= ~CF_SHUTW_NOW;
if (si->ob->flags & CF_SHUTW)
return;
si->ob->flags |= CF_SHUTW;
si->ob->wex = TICK_ETERNITY;
si->flags &= ~SI_FL_WAIT_DATA;
switch (si->state) {
case SI_ST_EST:
/* we have to shut before closing, otherwise some short messages
* may never leave the system, especially when there are remaining
* unread data in the socket input buffer, or when nolinger is set.
* However, if SI_FL_NOLINGER is explicitly set, we know there is
* no risk so we close both sides immediately.
*/
if (si->flags & SI_FL_ERR) {
/* quick close, the socket is alredy shut anyway */
}
else if (si->flags & SI_FL_NOLINGER) {
/* unclean data-layer shutdown */
if (conn->xprt && conn->xprt->shutw)
conn->xprt->shutw(conn, 0);
}
else {
/* clean data-layer shutdown */
if (conn->xprt && conn->xprt->shutw)
conn->xprt->shutw(conn, 1);
/* If the stream interface is configured to disable half-open
* connections, we'll skip the shutdown(), but only if the
* read size is already closed. Otherwise we can't support
* closed write with pending read (eg: abortonclose while
* waiting for the server).
*/
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_NOHALF) || !(si->ib->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_DONT_READ))) {
/* We shutdown transport layer */
if (conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
shutdown(conn->t.sock.fd, SHUT_WR);
if (!(si->ib->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_DONT_READ))) {
/* OK just a shutw, but we want the caller
* to disable polling on this FD if exists.
*/
if (conn->ctrl)
conn_data_stop_send(conn);
return;
}
}
}
/* fall through */
case SI_ST_CON:
/* we may have to close a pending connection, and mark the
* response buffer as shutr
*/
conn_full_close(conn);
/* fall through */
case SI_ST_CER:
case SI_ST_QUE:
case SI_ST_TAR:
si->state = SI_ST_DIS;
/* fall through */
default:
si->flags &= ~(SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM | SI_FL_NOLINGER);
si->ib->flags &= ~CF_SHUTR_NOW;
si->ib->flags |= CF_SHUTR;
si->ib->rex = TICK_ETERNITY;
si->exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
}
}
|
static void stream_int_shutw_conn(struct stream_interface *si)
{
struct connection *conn = __objt_conn(si->end);
si->ob->flags &= ~CF_SHUTW_NOW;
if (si->ob->flags & CF_SHUTW)
return;
si->ob->flags |= CF_SHUTW;
si->ob->wex = TICK_ETERNITY;
si->flags &= ~SI_FL_WAIT_DATA;
switch (si->state) {
case SI_ST_EST:
/* we have to shut before closing, otherwise some short messages
* may never leave the system, especially when there are remaining
* unread data in the socket input buffer, or when nolinger is set.
* However, if SI_FL_NOLINGER is explicitly set, we know there is
* no risk so we close both sides immediately.
*/
if (si->flags & SI_FL_ERR) {
/* quick close, the socket is alredy shut anyway */
}
else if (si->flags & SI_FL_NOLINGER) {
/* unclean data-layer shutdown */
if (conn->xprt && conn->xprt->shutw)
conn->xprt->shutw(conn, 0);
}
else {
/* clean data-layer shutdown */
if (conn->xprt && conn->xprt->shutw)
conn->xprt->shutw(conn, 1);
/* If the stream interface is configured to disable half-open
* connections, we'll skip the shutdown(), but only if the
* read size is already closed. Otherwise we can't support
* closed write with pending read (eg: abortonclose while
* waiting for the server).
*/
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_NOHALF) || !(si->ib->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_DONT_READ))) {
/* We shutdown transport layer */
if (conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
shutdown(conn->t.sock.fd, SHUT_WR);
if (!(si->ib->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_DONT_READ))) {
/* OK just a shutw, but we want the caller
* to disable polling on this FD if exists.
*/
if (conn->ctrl)
conn_data_stop_send(conn);
return;
}
}
}
/* fall through */
case SI_ST_CON:
/* we may have to close a pending connection, and mark the
* response buffer as shutr
*/
conn_full_close(conn);
/* fall through */
case SI_ST_CER:
case SI_ST_QUE:
case SI_ST_TAR:
si->state = SI_ST_DIS;
/* fall through */
default:
si->flags &= ~(SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM | SI_FL_NOLINGER);
si->ib->flags &= ~CF_SHUTR_NOW;
si->ib->flags |= CF_SHUTR;
si->ib->rex = TICK_ETERNITY;
si->exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
}
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6430
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6430/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/LocutusOfBorg/ettercap/commit/626dc56686f15f2dda13c48f78c2a666cb6d8506
|
626dc56686f15f2dda13c48f78c2a666cb6d8506
|
Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
|
struct block * compiler_add_instr(struct instruction *ins, struct block *blk)
{
struct block *bl;
SAFE_CALLOC(bl, 1, sizeof(struct block));
/* copy the current instruction in the block */
bl->type = BLK_INSTR;
bl->un.ins = ins;
/* link it to the old block chain */
bl->next = blk;
return bl;
}
|
struct block * compiler_add_instr(struct instruction *ins, struct block *blk)
{
struct block *bl;
SAFE_CALLOC(bl, 1, sizeof(struct block));
/* copy the current instruction in the block */
bl->type = BLK_INSTR;
bl->un.ins = ins;
/* link it to the old block chain */
bl->next = blk;
return bl;
}
|
C
|
ettercap
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
ssize_t lxc_read_nointr_expect(int fd, void* buf, size_t count, const void* expected_buf)
{
ssize_t ret;
ret = lxc_read_nointr(fd, buf, count);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
if ((size_t)ret != count)
return -1;
if (expected_buf && memcmp(buf, expected_buf, count) != 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return ret;
}
|
ssize_t lxc_read_nointr_expect(int fd, void* buf, size_t count, const void* expected_buf)
{
ssize_t ret;
ret = lxc_read_nointr(fd, buf, count);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
if ((size_t)ret != count)
return -1;
if (expected_buf && memcmp(buf, expected_buf, count) != 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType WriteEXRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
ImageInfo
*write_info;
ImfHalf
half_quantum;
ImfHeader
*hdr_info;
ImfOutputFile
*file;
ImfRgba
*scanline;
int
compression;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(write_info->filename);
hdr_info=ImfNewHeader();
ImfHeaderSetDataWindow(hdr_info,0,0,(int) image->columns-1,(int)
image->rows-1);
ImfHeaderSetDisplayWindow(hdr_info,0,0,(int) image->columns-1,(int)
image->rows-1);
compression=IMF_NO_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == ZipSCompression)
compression=IMF_ZIPS_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == ZipCompression)
compression=IMF_ZIP_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == PizCompression)
compression=IMF_PIZ_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == Pxr24Compression)
compression=IMF_PXR24_COMPRESSION;
#if defined(B44Compression)
if (write_info->compression == B44Compression)
compression=IMF_B44_COMPRESSION;
#endif
#if defined(B44ACompression)
if (write_info->compression == B44ACompression)
compression=IMF_B44A_COMPRESSION;
#endif
ImfHeaderSetCompression(hdr_info,compression);
ImfHeaderSetLineOrder(hdr_info,IMF_INCREASING_Y);
file=ImfOpenOutputFile(write_info->filename,hdr_info,IMF_WRITE_RGBA);
ImfDeleteHeader(hdr_info);
if (file == (ImfOutputFile *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(write_info->filename);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,BlobError,"UnableToOpenBlob",
ImfErrorMessage());
return(MagickFalse);
}
scanline=(ImfRgba *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (ImfRgba *) NULL)
{
(void) ImfCloseOutputFile(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(write_info->filename);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,image->columns*sizeof(*scanline));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ImfFloatToHalf(QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(p),&half_quantum);
scanline[x].r=half_quantum;
ImfFloatToHalf(QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(p),&half_quantum);
scanline[x].g=half_quantum;
ImfFloatToHalf(QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(p),&half_quantum);
scanline[x].b=half_quantum;
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
ImfFloatToHalf(1.0,&half_quantum);
else
ImfFloatToHalf(1.0-QuantumScale*GetPixelOpacity(p),
&half_quantum);
scanline[x].a=half_quantum;
p++;
}
ImfOutputSetFrameBuffer(file,scanline-(y*image->columns),1,image->columns);
ImfOutputWritePixels(file,1);
}
(void) ImfCloseOutputFile(file);
scanline=(ImfRgba *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
(void) FileToImage(image,write_info->filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(write_info->filename);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType WriteEXRImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
ImageInfo
*write_info;
ImfHalf
half_quantum;
ImfHeader
*hdr_info;
ImfOutputFile
*file;
ImfRgba
*scanline;
int
compression;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(write_info->filename);
hdr_info=ImfNewHeader();
ImfHeaderSetDataWindow(hdr_info,0,0,(int) image->columns-1,(int)
image->rows-1);
ImfHeaderSetDisplayWindow(hdr_info,0,0,(int) image->columns-1,(int)
image->rows-1);
compression=IMF_NO_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == ZipSCompression)
compression=IMF_ZIPS_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == ZipCompression)
compression=IMF_ZIP_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == PizCompression)
compression=IMF_PIZ_COMPRESSION;
if (write_info->compression == Pxr24Compression)
compression=IMF_PXR24_COMPRESSION;
#if defined(B44Compression)
if (write_info->compression == B44Compression)
compression=IMF_B44_COMPRESSION;
#endif
#if defined(B44ACompression)
if (write_info->compression == B44ACompression)
compression=IMF_B44A_COMPRESSION;
#endif
ImfHeaderSetCompression(hdr_info,compression);
ImfHeaderSetLineOrder(hdr_info,IMF_INCREASING_Y);
file=ImfOpenOutputFile(write_info->filename,hdr_info,IMF_WRITE_RGBA);
ImfDeleteHeader(hdr_info);
if (file == (ImfOutputFile *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(write_info->filename);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,BlobError,"UnableToOpenBlob",
ImfErrorMessage());
return(MagickFalse);
}
scanline=(ImfRgba *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (ImfRgba *) NULL)
{
(void) ImfCloseOutputFile(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(write_info->filename);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,image->columns*sizeof(*scanline));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ImfFloatToHalf(QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(p),&half_quantum);
scanline[x].r=half_quantum;
ImfFloatToHalf(QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(p),&half_quantum);
scanline[x].g=half_quantum;
ImfFloatToHalf(QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(p),&half_quantum);
scanline[x].b=half_quantum;
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
ImfFloatToHalf(1.0,&half_quantum);
else
ImfFloatToHalf(1.0-QuantumScale*GetPixelOpacity(p),
&half_quantum);
scanline[x].a=half_quantum;
p++;
}
ImfOutputSetFrameBuffer(file,scanline-(y*image->columns),1,image->columns);
ImfOutputWritePixels(file,1);
}
(void) ImfCloseOutputFile(file);
scanline=(ImfRgba *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
(void) FileToImage(image,write_info->filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(write_info->filename);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5165/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19b8593007150b9a78da7d13f6e5f8feb10881a7
|
19b8593007150b9a78da7d13f6e5f8feb10881a7
|
Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
|
void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnEnvironmentUpdate(std::string* environment) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
DCHECK(environment);
if (!g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get().empty())
return;
g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get() = std::move(*environment);
crashpad::CrashpadInfo::GetCrashpadInfo()->AddUserDataMinidumpStream(
kSystemProfileMinidumpStreamType,
reinterpret_cast<const void*>(
g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get().data()),
g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get().size());
#endif // OS_WIN || OS_MACOSX
}
|
void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnEnvironmentUpdate(std::string* environment) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
DCHECK(environment);
if (!g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get().empty())
return;
g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get() = std::move(*environment);
crashpad::CrashpadInfo::GetCrashpadInfo()->AddUserDataMinidumpStream(
kSystemProfileMinidumpStreamType,
reinterpret_cast<const void*>(
g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get().data()),
g_environment_for_crash_reporter.Get().size());
#endif // OS_WIN || OS_MACOSX
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3137/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c55aee1bf0e6b6feec8b2927b43f7a09a6d5f754
|
c55aee1bf0e6b6feec8b2927b43f7a09a6d5f754
|
USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void cypress_write_int_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct cypress_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, status);
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
return;
case -EPIPE:
/* Cannot call usb_clear_halt while in_interrupt */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
dev_err(dev, "%s - unexpected nonzero write status received: %d\n",
__func__, status);
cypress_set_dead(port);
break;
}
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
/* send any buffered data */
cypress_send(port);
}
|
static void cypress_write_int_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct cypress_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, status);
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
return;
case -EPIPE:
/* Cannot call usb_clear_halt while in_interrupt */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
dev_err(dev, "%s - unexpected nonzero write status received: %d\n",
__func__, status);
cypress_set_dead(port);
break;
}
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
/* send any buffered data */
cypress_send(port);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
static void si_conn_recv_cb(struct connection *conn)
{
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct channel *chn = si->ib;
int ret, max, cur_read;
int read_poll = MAX_READ_POLL_LOOPS;
/* stop immediately on errors. Note that we DON'T want to stop on
* POLL_ERR, as the poller might report a write error while there
* are still data available in the recv buffer. This typically
* happens when we send too large a request to a backend server
* which rejects it before reading it all.
*/
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
/* stop here if we reached the end of data */
if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
goto out_shutdown_r;
/* maybe we were called immediately after an asynchronous shutr */
if (chn->flags & CF_SHUTR)
return;
cur_read = 0;
if ((chn->flags & (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST)) && !chn->buf->o &&
global.tune.idle_timer &&
(unsigned short)(now_ms - chn->last_read) >= global.tune.idle_timer) {
/* The buffer was empty and nothing was transferred for more
* than one second. This was caused by a pause and not by
* congestion. Reset any streaming mode to reduce latency.
*/
chn->xfer_small = 0;
chn->xfer_large = 0;
chn->flags &= ~(CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST);
}
/* First, let's see if we may splice data across the channel without
* using a buffer.
*/
if (conn->xprt->rcv_pipe &&
(chn->pipe || chn->to_forward >= MIN_SPLICE_FORWARD) &&
chn->flags & CF_KERN_SPLICING) {
if (buffer_not_empty(chn->buf)) {
/* We're embarrassed, there are already data pending in
* the buffer and we don't want to have them at two
* locations at a time. Let's indicate we need some
* place and ask the consumer to hurry.
*/
goto abort_splice;
}
if (unlikely(chn->pipe == NULL)) {
if (pipes_used >= global.maxpipes || !(chn->pipe = get_pipe())) {
chn->flags &= ~CF_KERN_SPLICING;
goto abort_splice;
}
}
ret = conn->xprt->rcv_pipe(conn, chn->pipe, chn->to_forward);
if (ret < 0) {
/* splice not supported on this end, let's disable it */
chn->flags &= ~CF_KERN_SPLICING;
goto abort_splice;
}
if (ret > 0) {
if (chn->to_forward != CHN_INFINITE_FORWARD)
chn->to_forward -= ret;
chn->total += ret;
cur_read += ret;
chn->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL;
}
if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
goto out_shutdown_r;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_ROOM) {
/* the pipe is full or we have read enough data that it
* could soon be full. Let's stop before needing to poll.
*/
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
__conn_data_stop_recv(conn);
}
/* splice not possible (anymore), let's go on on standard copy */
}
abort_splice:
if (chn->pipe && unlikely(!chn->pipe->data)) {
put_pipe(chn->pipe);
chn->pipe = NULL;
}
/* Important note : if we're called with POLL_IN|POLL_HUP, it means the read polling
* was enabled, which implies that the recv buffer was not full. So we have a guarantee
* that if such an event is not handled above in splice, it will be handled here by
* recv().
*/
while (!(conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH | CO_FL_WAIT_ROOM | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
max = bi_avail(chn);
if (!max) {
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
break;
}
ret = conn->xprt->rcv_buf(conn, chn->buf, max);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
cur_read += ret;
/* if we're allowed to directly forward data, we must update ->o */
if (chn->to_forward && !(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
unsigned long fwd = ret;
if (chn->to_forward != CHN_INFINITE_FORWARD) {
if (fwd > chn->to_forward)
fwd = chn->to_forward;
chn->to_forward -= fwd;
}
b_adv(chn->buf, fwd);
}
chn->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL;
chn->total += ret;
if (channel_full(chn)) {
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
break;
}
if ((chn->flags & CF_READ_DONTWAIT) || --read_poll <= 0) {
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
__conn_data_stop_recv(conn);
break;
}
/* if too many bytes were missing from last read, it means that
* it's pointless trying to read again because the system does
* not have them in buffers.
*/
if (ret < max) {
/* if a streamer has read few data, it may be because we
* have exhausted system buffers. It's not worth trying
* again.
*/
if (chn->flags & CF_STREAMER)
break;
/* if we read a large block smaller than what we requested,
* it's almost certain we'll never get anything more.
*/
if (ret >= global.tune.recv_enough)
break;
}
} /* while !flags */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
if (cur_read) {
if ((chn->flags & (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST)) &&
(cur_read <= chn->buf->size / 2)) {
chn->xfer_large = 0;
chn->xfer_small++;
if (chn->xfer_small >= 3) {
/* we have read less than half of the buffer in
* one pass, and this happened at least 3 times.
* This is definitely not a streamer.
*/
chn->flags &= ~(CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST);
}
else if (chn->xfer_small >= 2) {
/* if the buffer has been at least half full twice,
* we receive faster than we send, so at least it
* is not a "fast streamer".
*/
chn->flags &= ~CF_STREAMER_FAST;
}
}
else if (!(chn->flags & CF_STREAMER_FAST) &&
(cur_read >= chn->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite)) {
/* we read a full buffer at once */
chn->xfer_small = 0;
chn->xfer_large++;
if (chn->xfer_large >= 3) {
/* we call this buffer a fast streamer if it manages
* to be filled in one call 3 consecutive times.
*/
chn->flags |= (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST);
}
}
else {
chn->xfer_small = 0;
chn->xfer_large = 0;
}
chn->last_read = now_ms;
}
if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
/* connection closed */
goto out_shutdown_r;
return;
out_shutdown_r:
/* we received a shutdown */
chn->flags |= CF_READ_NULL;
if (chn->flags & CF_AUTO_CLOSE)
channel_shutw_now(chn);
stream_sock_read0(si);
conn_data_read0(conn);
return;
}
|
static void si_conn_recv_cb(struct connection *conn)
{
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct channel *chn = si->ib;
int ret, max, cur_read;
int read_poll = MAX_READ_POLL_LOOPS;
/* stop immediately on errors. Note that we DON'T want to stop on
* POLL_ERR, as the poller might report a write error while there
* are still data available in the recv buffer. This typically
* happens when we send too large a request to a backend server
* which rejects it before reading it all.
*/
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
/* stop here if we reached the end of data */
if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
goto out_shutdown_r;
/* maybe we were called immediately after an asynchronous shutr */
if (chn->flags & CF_SHUTR)
return;
cur_read = 0;
if ((chn->flags & (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST)) && !chn->buf->o &&
global.tune.idle_timer &&
(unsigned short)(now_ms - chn->last_read) >= global.tune.idle_timer) {
/* The buffer was empty and nothing was transferred for more
* than one second. This was caused by a pause and not by
* congestion. Reset any streaming mode to reduce latency.
*/
chn->xfer_small = 0;
chn->xfer_large = 0;
chn->flags &= ~(CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST);
}
/* First, let's see if we may splice data across the channel without
* using a buffer.
*/
if (conn->xprt->rcv_pipe &&
(chn->pipe || chn->to_forward >= MIN_SPLICE_FORWARD) &&
chn->flags & CF_KERN_SPLICING) {
if (buffer_not_empty(chn->buf)) {
/* We're embarrassed, there are already data pending in
* the buffer and we don't want to have them at two
* locations at a time. Let's indicate we need some
* place and ask the consumer to hurry.
*/
goto abort_splice;
}
if (unlikely(chn->pipe == NULL)) {
if (pipes_used >= global.maxpipes || !(chn->pipe = get_pipe())) {
chn->flags &= ~CF_KERN_SPLICING;
goto abort_splice;
}
}
ret = conn->xprt->rcv_pipe(conn, chn->pipe, chn->to_forward);
if (ret < 0) {
/* splice not supported on this end, let's disable it */
chn->flags &= ~CF_KERN_SPLICING;
goto abort_splice;
}
if (ret > 0) {
if (chn->to_forward != CHN_INFINITE_FORWARD)
chn->to_forward -= ret;
chn->total += ret;
cur_read += ret;
chn->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL;
}
if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
goto out_shutdown_r;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_ROOM) {
/* the pipe is full or we have read enough data that it
* could soon be full. Let's stop before needing to poll.
*/
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
__conn_data_stop_recv(conn);
}
/* splice not possible (anymore), let's go on on standard copy */
}
abort_splice:
if (chn->pipe && unlikely(!chn->pipe->data)) {
put_pipe(chn->pipe);
chn->pipe = NULL;
}
/* Important note : if we're called with POLL_IN|POLL_HUP, it means the read polling
* was enabled, which implies that the recv buffer was not full. So we have a guarantee
* that if such an event is not handled above in splice, it will be handled here by
* recv().
*/
while (!(conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH | CO_FL_WAIT_ROOM | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
max = bi_avail(chn);
if (!max) {
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
break;
}
ret = conn->xprt->rcv_buf(conn, chn->buf, max);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
cur_read += ret;
/* if we're allowed to directly forward data, we must update ->o */
if (chn->to_forward && !(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
unsigned long fwd = ret;
if (chn->to_forward != CHN_INFINITE_FORWARD) {
if (fwd > chn->to_forward)
fwd = chn->to_forward;
chn->to_forward -= fwd;
}
b_adv(chn->buf, fwd);
}
chn->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL;
chn->total += ret;
if (channel_full(chn)) {
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
break;
}
if ((chn->flags & CF_READ_DONTWAIT) || --read_poll <= 0) {
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
__conn_data_stop_recv(conn);
break;
}
/* if too many bytes were missing from last read, it means that
* it's pointless trying to read again because the system does
* not have them in buffers.
*/
if (ret < max) {
/* if a streamer has read few data, it may be because we
* have exhausted system buffers. It's not worth trying
* again.
*/
if (chn->flags & CF_STREAMER)
break;
/* if we read a large block smaller than what we requested,
* it's almost certain we'll never get anything more.
*/
if (ret >= global.tune.recv_enough)
break;
}
} /* while !flags */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
if (cur_read) {
if ((chn->flags & (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST)) &&
(cur_read <= chn->buf->size / 2)) {
chn->xfer_large = 0;
chn->xfer_small++;
if (chn->xfer_small >= 3) {
/* we have read less than half of the buffer in
* one pass, and this happened at least 3 times.
* This is definitely not a streamer.
*/
chn->flags &= ~(CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST);
}
else if (chn->xfer_small >= 2) {
/* if the buffer has been at least half full twice,
* we receive faster than we send, so at least it
* is not a "fast streamer".
*/
chn->flags &= ~CF_STREAMER_FAST;
}
}
else if (!(chn->flags & CF_STREAMER_FAST) &&
(cur_read >= chn->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite)) {
/* we read a full buffer at once */
chn->xfer_small = 0;
chn->xfer_large++;
if (chn->xfer_large >= 3) {
/* we call this buffer a fast streamer if it manages
* to be filled in one call 3 consecutive times.
*/
chn->flags |= (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST);
}
}
else {
chn->xfer_small = 0;
chn->xfer_large = 0;
}
chn->last_read = now_ms;
}
if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
/* connection closed */
goto out_shutdown_r;
return;
out_shutdown_r:
/* we received a shutdown */
chn->flags |= CF_READ_NULL;
if (chn->flags & CF_AUTO_CLOSE)
channel_shutw_now(chn);
stream_sock_read0(si);
conn_data_read0(conn);
return;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1300/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
PendingFrame() {}
|
PendingFrame() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3845
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3845/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20
|
e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20
|
Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
|
inline static status_t finish_unflatten_binder(
BpBinder* /*proxy*/, const flat_binder_object& /*flat*/,
const Parcel& /*in*/)
{
return NO_ERROR;
}
|
inline static status_t finish_unflatten_binder(
BpBinder* /*proxy*/, const flat_binder_object& /*flat*/,
const Parcel& /*in*/)
{
return NO_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3456
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3456/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c
|
e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c
| null |
static uint32_t fdctrl_read_statusB(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
uint32_t retval = fdctrl->srb;
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("status register B: 0x%02x\n", retval);
return retval;
}
|
static uint32_t fdctrl_read_statusB(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
uint32_t retval = fdctrl->srb;
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("status register B: 0x%02x\n", retval);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static inline void sysfs_slab_remove(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
kfree(s);
}
|
static inline void sysfs_slab_remove(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
kfree(s);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2430
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2430/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ad54cfed4516292654c997910839153264ae00a0
|
ad54cfed4516292654c997910839153264ae00a0
|
Don't demangle symbol names.
Bug: http://b/27299236
Change-Id: I26ef47f80d4d6048a316ba51e83365ff65d70439
|
std::string Backtrace::FormatFrameData(size_t frame_num) {
if (frame_num >= frames_.size()) {
return "";
}
return FormatFrameData(&frames_[frame_num]);
}
|
std::string Backtrace::FormatFrameData(size_t frame_num) {
if (frame_num >= frames_.size()) {
return "";
}
return FormatFrameData(&frames_[frame_num]);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRouteCloseEvent() {
delegate_->RouteCloseEvent(this);
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRouteCloseEvent() {
delegate_->RouteCloseEvent(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8655
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8655/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c
|
84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c
|
packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static unsigned int fanout_demux_hash(struct packet_fanout *f,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int num)
{
return reciprocal_scale(__skb_get_hash_symmetric(skb), num);
}
|
static unsigned int fanout_demux_hash(struct packet_fanout *f,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int num)
{
return reciprocal_scale(__skb_get_hash_symmetric(skb), num);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int dccp_v6_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
static __u8 dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized;
int err = dccp_init_sock(sk, dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized);
if (err == 0) {
if (unlikely(!dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized))
dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized = 1;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_af_ops;
}
return err;
}
|
static int dccp_v6_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
static __u8 dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized;
int err = dccp_init_sock(sk, dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized);
if (err == 0) {
if (unlikely(!dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized))
dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized = 1;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_af_ops;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err tpyl_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_NTYLBox *ptr = (GF_NTYLBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->nbBytes);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err tpyl_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_NTYLBox *ptr = (GF_NTYLBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->nbBytes);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::ProcessPendingUIUpdates() {
#ifndef NDEBUG
for (UpdateMap::const_iterator i = scheduled_updates_.begin();
i != scheduled_updates_.end(); ++i) {
bool found = false;
for (int tab = 0; tab < tab_count(); tab++) {
if (GetTabContentsAt(tab) == i->first) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
DCHECK(found);
}
#endif
chrome_updater_factory_.RevokeAll();
for (UpdateMap::const_iterator i = scheduled_updates_.begin();
i != scheduled_updates_.end(); ++i) {
const TabContents* contents = i->first;
unsigned flags = i->second;
if (contents == GetSelectedTabContents()) {
if (flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_PAGE_ACTIONS) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->UpdatePageActions();
}
if (flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_LOAD && GetStatusBubble()) {
GetStatusBubble()->SetStatus(
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->GetStatusText());
}
if (flags & (TabContents::INVALIDATE_TAB |
TabContents::INVALIDATE_TITLE)) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS,
web_app::IsValidUrl(contents->GetURL()));
#endif
window_->UpdateTitleBar();
}
}
if (flags & (TabContents::INVALIDATE_TAB | TabContents::INVALIDATE_TITLE)) {
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->UpdateTabContentsStateAt(
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetWrapperIndex(contents),
TabStripModelObserver::ALL);
}
}
scheduled_updates_.clear();
}
|
void Browser::ProcessPendingUIUpdates() {
#ifndef NDEBUG
for (UpdateMap::const_iterator i = scheduled_updates_.begin();
i != scheduled_updates_.end(); ++i) {
bool found = false;
for (int tab = 0; tab < tab_count(); tab++) {
if (GetTabContentsAt(tab) == i->first) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
DCHECK(found);
}
#endif
chrome_updater_factory_.RevokeAll();
for (UpdateMap::const_iterator i = scheduled_updates_.begin();
i != scheduled_updates_.end(); ++i) {
const TabContents* contents = i->first;
unsigned flags = i->second;
if (contents == GetSelectedTabContents()) {
if (flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_PAGE_ACTIONS) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->UpdatePageActions();
}
if (flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_LOAD && GetStatusBubble()) {
GetStatusBubble()->SetStatus(
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->GetStatusText());
}
if (flags & (TabContents::INVALIDATE_TAB |
TabContents::INVALIDATE_TITLE)) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS,
web_app::IsValidUrl(contents->GetURL()));
#endif
window_->UpdateTitleBar();
}
}
if (flags & (TabContents::INVALIDATE_TAB | TabContents::INVALIDATE_TITLE)) {
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->UpdateTabContentsStateAt(
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetWrapperIndex(contents),
TabStripModelObserver::ALL);
}
}
scheduled_updates_.clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8062
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8062/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/606142af57dad981b78707234cfbd15f9f7b7125
|
606142af57dad981b78707234cfbd15f9f7b7125
|
[media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
|
static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
struct dw2102_state *state = d->priv;
mutex_lock(&d->data_mutex);
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x87;
state->data[2] = 0x0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x86;
state->data[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x80;
state->data[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(50);
state->data[0] = 0xe;
state->data[1] = 0x80;
state->data[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 3, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
state->data[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, state->data, 1, state->data, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
mutex_unlock(&d->data_mutex);
adap->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(cxd2820r_attach, &cxd2820r_config,
&d->i2c_adap, NULL);
if (adap->fe_adap[0].fe != NULL) {
if (dvb_attach(tda18271_attach, adap->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x60,
&d->i2c_adap, &tda18271_config)) {
info("Attached TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return 0;
}
}
info("Failed to attach TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return -EIO;
}
|
static int t220_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *d)
{
u8 obuf[3] = { 0xe, 0x87, 0 };
u8 ibuf[] = { 0 };
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x86;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x80;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
msleep(50);
obuf[0] = 0xe;
obuf[1] = 0x80;
obuf[2] = 1;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 3, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x0e transfer failed.");
obuf[0] = 0x51;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d->dev, obuf, 1, ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("command 0x51 transfer failed.");
d->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(cxd2820r_attach, &cxd2820r_config,
&d->dev->i2c_adap, NULL);
if (d->fe_adap[0].fe != NULL) {
if (dvb_attach(tda18271_attach, d->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x60,
&d->dev->i2c_adap, &tda18271_config)) {
info("Attached TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return 0;
}
}
info("Failed to attach TDA18271HD/CXD2820R!");
return -EIO;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-11472
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11472/
|
CWE-755
|
https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
|
a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
|
Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
|
AcpiNsBuildInternalName (
ACPI_NAMESTRING_INFO *Info)
{
UINT32 NumSegments = Info->NumSegments;
char *InternalName = Info->InternalName;
const char *ExternalName = Info->NextExternalChar;
char *Result = NULL;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsBuildInternalName);
/* Setup the correct prefixes, counts, and pointers */
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
InternalName[0] = AML_ROOT_PREFIX;
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[1];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[1] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[2];
}
else
{
InternalName[1] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[2] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[3];
}
}
else
{
/*
* Not fully qualified.
* Handle Carats first, then append the name segments
*/
i = 0;
if (Info->NumCarats)
{
for (i = 0; i < Info->NumCarats; i++)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_PARENT_PREFIX;
}
}
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[i];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1];
}
else
{
InternalName[i] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+2];
}
}
/* Build the name (minus path separators) */
for (; NumSegments; NumSegments--)
{
for (i = 0; i < ACPI_NAME_SIZE; i++)
{
if (ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) ||
(*ExternalName == 0))
{
/* Pad the segment with underscore(s) if segment is short */
Result[i] = '_';
}
else
{
/* Convert the character to uppercase and save it */
Result[i] = (char) toupper ((int) *ExternalName);
ExternalName++;
}
}
/* Now we must have a path separator, or the pathname is bad */
if (!ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) &&
(*ExternalName != 0))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PATHNAME);
}
/* Move on the next segment */
ExternalName++;
Result += ACPI_NAME_SIZE;
}
/* Terminate the string */
*Result = 0;
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (abs) \"\\%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
else
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (rel) \"%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
|
AcpiNsBuildInternalName (
ACPI_NAMESTRING_INFO *Info)
{
UINT32 NumSegments = Info->NumSegments;
char *InternalName = Info->InternalName;
const char *ExternalName = Info->NextExternalChar;
char *Result = NULL;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsBuildInternalName);
/* Setup the correct prefixes, counts, and pointers */
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
InternalName[0] = AML_ROOT_PREFIX;
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[1];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[1] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[2];
}
else
{
InternalName[1] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[2] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[3];
}
}
else
{
/*
* Not fully qualified.
* Handle Carats first, then append the name segments
*/
i = 0;
if (Info->NumCarats)
{
for (i = 0; i < Info->NumCarats; i++)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_PARENT_PREFIX;
}
}
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[i];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1];
}
else
{
InternalName[i] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+2];
}
}
/* Build the name (minus path separators) */
for (; NumSegments; NumSegments--)
{
for (i = 0; i < ACPI_NAME_SIZE; i++)
{
if (ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) ||
(*ExternalName == 0))
{
/* Pad the segment with underscore(s) if segment is short */
Result[i] = '_';
}
else
{
/* Convert the character to uppercase and save it */
Result[i] = (char) toupper ((int) *ExternalName);
ExternalName++;
}
}
/* Now we must have a path separator, or the pathname is bad */
if (!ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) &&
(*ExternalName != 0))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PATHNAME);
}
/* Move on the next segment */
ExternalName++;
Result += ACPI_NAME_SIZE;
}
/* Terminate the string */
*Result = 0;
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (abs) \"\\%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
else
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (rel) \"%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8970
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8970/
|
CWE-295
|
https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/commit/0654414afcce51a16d35d05060190a3ec4618d42
|
0654414afcce51a16d35d05060190a3ec4618d42
|
Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen)
{
return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param->id, ADD_HOST, name, namelen);
}
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen)
{
return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param->id, ADD_HOST, name, namelen);
}
|
C
|
openbsd
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7191/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static ssize_t tun_chr_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct tun_struct *tun = tun_get(file);
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
ssize_t result;
if (!tun)
return -EBADFD;
result = tun_get_user(tun, tfile, NULL, from,
file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, false);
tun_put(tun);
return result;
}
|
static ssize_t tun_chr_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct tun_struct *tun = tun_get(file);
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
ssize_t result;
if (!tun)
return -EBADFD;
result = tun_get_user(tun, tfile, NULL, from,
file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, false);
tun_put(tun);
return result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SendGpuProcessMessage(GpuProcessHost::GpuProcessKind kind,
CauseForGpuLaunch cause,
IPC::Message* message) {
GpuProcessHost* host = GpuProcessHost::Get(kind, cause);
if (host) {
host->Send(message);
} else {
delete message;
}
}
|
void SendGpuProcessMessage(GpuProcessHost::GpuProcessKind kind,
CauseForGpuLaunch cause,
IPC::Message* message) {
GpuProcessHost* host = GpuProcessHost::Get(kind, cause);
if (host) {
host->Send(message);
} else {
delete message;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5217/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
|
gfx::AcceleratedWidget DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::GetAcceleratedWidget() {
return xwindow_;
}
|
gfx::AcceleratedWidget DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::GetAcceleratedWidget() {
return xwindow_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2482
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2482/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea2bc483ff5caada7c4aa0d5fbf87d3a6590273d
|
ea2bc483ff5caada7c4aa0d5fbf87d3a6590273d
|
[SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int sctp_setsockopt_default_send_param(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo info;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&info, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info.sinfo_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && info.sinfo_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
asoc->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
asoc->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
asoc->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
asoc->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
asoc->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
} else {
sp->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
sp->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
sp->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
sp->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
sp->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_setsockopt_default_send_param(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo info;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&info, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info.sinfo_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && info.sinfo_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
asoc->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
asoc->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
asoc->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
asoc->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
asoc->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
} else {
sp->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
sp->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
sp->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
sp->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
sp->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11232/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static int etm_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int ret = 0;
if (event->attr.type != etm_pmu.type) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
ret = etm_addr_filters_alloc(event);
if (ret)
goto out;
event->destroy = etm_event_destroy;
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int etm_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int ret = 0;
if (event->attr.type != etm_pmu.type) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
ret = etm_addr_filters_alloc(event);
if (ret)
goto out;
event->destroy = etm_event_destroy;
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2906/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
[SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
|
static u8 pmcraid_task_attributes(struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd)
{
char tag[2];
u8 rc = 0;
if (scsi_populate_tag_msg(scsi_cmd, tag)) {
switch (tag[0]) {
case MSG_SIMPLE_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_SIMPLE;
break;
case MSG_HEAD_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_QUEUE_HEAD;
break;
case MSG_ORDERED_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_ORDERED;
break;
};
}
return rc;
}
|
static u8 pmcraid_task_attributes(struct scsi_cmnd *scsi_cmd)
{
char tag[2];
u8 rc = 0;
if (scsi_populate_tag_msg(scsi_cmd, tag)) {
switch (tag[0]) {
case MSG_SIMPLE_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_SIMPLE;
break;
case MSG_HEAD_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_QUEUE_HEAD;
break;
case MSG_ORDERED_TAG:
rc = TASK_TAG_ORDERED;
break;
};
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1826/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int verify_newpolicy_info(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p)
{
switch (p->share) {
case XFRM_SHARE_ANY:
case XFRM_SHARE_SESSION:
case XFRM_SHARE_USER:
case XFRM_SHARE_UNIQUE:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (p->action) {
case XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW:
case XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (p->sel.family) {
case AF_INET:
break;
case AF_INET6:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
break;
#else
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
#endif
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
}
|
static int verify_newpolicy_info(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p)
{
switch (p->share) {
case XFRM_SHARE_ANY:
case XFRM_SHARE_SESSION:
case XFRM_SHARE_USER:
case XFRM_SHARE_UNIQUE:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (p->action) {
case XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW:
case XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (p->sel.family) {
case AF_INET:
break;
case AF_INET6:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
break;
#else
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
#endif
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1301/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/616568a633a3e2ae10537d14d3944d87ec382b8f
|
616568a633a3e2ae10537d14d3944d87ec382b8f
|
Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
|
bool ShouldTabShowAlertIndicator(int capacity,
bool is_pinned_tab,
bool is_active_tab,
bool has_favicon,
TabAlertState alert_state) {
if (alert_state == TabAlertState::NONE)
return false;
if (ShouldTabShowCloseButton(capacity, is_pinned_tab, is_active_tab))
return capacity >= 2;
return capacity >= 1;
}
|
bool ShouldTabShowAlertIndicator(int capacity,
bool is_pinned_tab,
bool is_active_tab,
bool has_favicon,
TabAlertState alert_state) {
if (alert_state == TabAlertState::NONE)
return false;
if (ShouldTabShowCloseButton(capacity, is_pinned_tab, is_active_tab))
return capacity >= 2;
return capacity >= 1;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15129
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15129/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21b5944350052d2583e82dd59b19a9ba94a007f0
|
21b5944350052d2583e82dd59b19a9ba94a007f0
|
net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void dec_net_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_NET_NAMESPACES);
}
|
static void dec_net_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_NET_NAMESPACES);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5754
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5754/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd2335678e96c34d14f4b20f0d9613dfbd1ccdb4
|
fd2335678e96c34d14f4b20f0d9613dfbd1ccdb4
|
Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
|
net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::Type ChooseCacheType() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
const std::string experiment_name =
base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("SimpleCacheTrial");
if (base::StartsWith(experiment_name, "Disable",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_BLOCKFILE;
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
if (base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_14())
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_SIMPLE;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
if (base::StartsWith(experiment_name, "ExperimentYes",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_SIMPLE;
}
#endif // #if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_SIMPLE;
#else
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_BLOCKFILE;
#endif
}
|
net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::Type ChooseCacheType() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
const std::string experiment_name =
base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("SimpleCacheTrial");
if (base::StartsWith(experiment_name, "Disable",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_BLOCKFILE;
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
if (base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_14())
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_SIMPLE;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
if (base::StartsWith(experiment_name, "ExperimentYes",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_SIMPLE;
}
#endif // #if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_SIMPLE;
#else
return net::URLRequestContextBuilder::HttpCacheParams::DISK_BLOCKFILE;
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebPluginDelegatePepper::~WebPluginDelegatePepper() {
DestroyInstance();
if (render_view_)
render_view_->OnPepperPluginDestroy(this);
}
|
WebPluginDelegatePepper::~WebPluginDelegatePepper() {
DestroyInstance();
if (render_view_)
render_view_->OnPepperPluginDestroy(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2498
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2498/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
|
8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
| null |
psh_glyph_compute_inflections( PSH_Glyph glyph )
{
FT_UInt n;
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_contours; n++ )
{
PSH_Point first, start, end, before, after;
FT_Pos in_x, in_y, out_x, out_y;
FT_Int orient_prev, orient_cur;
FT_Int finished = 0;
/* we need at least 4 points to create an inflection point */
if ( glyph->contours[n].count < 4 )
continue;
/* compute first segment in contour */
first = glyph->contours[n].start;
start = end = first;
do
{
end = end->next;
if ( end == first )
goto Skip;
in_x = end->org_u - start->org_u;
in_y = end->org_v - start->org_v;
} while ( in_x == 0 && in_y == 0 );
/* extend the segment start whenever possible */
before = start;
do
{
do
{
start = before;
before = before->prev;
if ( before == first )
goto Skip;
out_x = start->org_u - before->org_u;
out_y = start->org_v - before->org_v;
} while ( out_x == 0 && out_y == 0 );
orient_prev = psh_corner_orientation( in_x, in_y, out_x, out_y );
} while ( orient_prev == 0 );
first = start;
in_x = out_x;
in_y = out_y;
/* now, process all segments in the contour */
do
{
/* first, extend current segment's end whenever possible */
after = end;
do
{
do
{
end = after;
after = after->next;
if ( after == first )
finished = 1;
out_x = after->org_u - end->org_u;
out_y = after->org_v - end->org_v;
} while ( out_x == 0 && out_y == 0 );
orient_cur = psh_corner_orientation( in_x, in_y, out_x, out_y );
} while ( orient_cur == 0 );
if ( ( orient_cur ^ orient_prev ) < 0 )
{
do
{
psh_point_set_inflex( start );
start = start->next;
}
while ( start != end );
psh_point_set_inflex( start );
}
start = end;
end = after;
orient_prev = orient_cur;
in_x = out_x;
in_y = out_y;
} while ( !finished );
Skip:
;
}
}
|
psh_glyph_compute_inflections( PSH_Glyph glyph )
{
FT_UInt n;
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_contours; n++ )
{
PSH_Point first, start, end, before, after;
FT_Pos in_x, in_y, out_x, out_y;
FT_Int orient_prev, orient_cur;
FT_Int finished = 0;
/* we need at least 4 points to create an inflection point */
if ( glyph->contours[n].count < 4 )
continue;
/* compute first segment in contour */
first = glyph->contours[n].start;
start = end = first;
do
{
end = end->next;
if ( end == first )
goto Skip;
in_x = end->org_u - start->org_u;
in_y = end->org_v - start->org_v;
} while ( in_x == 0 && in_y == 0 );
/* extend the segment start whenever possible */
before = start;
do
{
do
{
start = before;
before = before->prev;
if ( before == first )
goto Skip;
out_x = start->org_u - before->org_u;
out_y = start->org_v - before->org_v;
} while ( out_x == 0 && out_y == 0 );
orient_prev = psh_corner_orientation( in_x, in_y, out_x, out_y );
} while ( orient_prev == 0 );
first = start;
in_x = out_x;
in_y = out_y;
/* now, process all segments in the contour */
do
{
/* first, extend current segment's end whenever possible */
after = end;
do
{
do
{
end = after;
after = after->next;
if ( after == first )
finished = 1;
out_x = after->org_u - end->org_u;
out_y = after->org_v - end->org_v;
} while ( out_x == 0 && out_y == 0 );
orient_cur = psh_corner_orientation( in_x, in_y, out_x, out_y );
} while ( orient_cur == 0 );
if ( ( orient_cur ^ orient_prev ) < 0 )
{
do
{
psh_point_set_inflex( start );
start = start->next;
}
while ( start != end );
psh_point_set_inflex( start );
}
start = end;
end = after;
orient_prev = orient_cur;
in_x = out_x;
in_y = out_y;
} while ( !finished );
Skip:
;
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
TriState Editor::SelectionHasStyle(CSSPropertyID property_id,
const String& value) const {
return EditingStyle::Create(property_id, value)
->TriStateOfStyle(
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated());
}
|
TriState Editor::SelectionHasStyle(CSSPropertyID property_id,
const String& value) const {
return EditingStyle::Create(property_id, value)
->TriStateOfStyle(
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
void GfxState::setTransfer(Function **funcs) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
if (transfer[i]) {
delete transfer[i];
}
transfer[i] = funcs[i];
}
}
|
void GfxState::setTransfer(Function **funcs) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
if (transfer[i]) {
delete transfer[i];
}
transfer[i] = funcs[i];
}
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
RootInlineBox* RenderBlock::lineAtIndex(int i) const
{
ASSERT(i >= 0);
if (style()->visibility() != VISIBLE)
return 0;
if (childrenInline()) {
for (RootInlineBox* box = firstRootBox(); box; box = box->nextRootBox())
if (!i--)
return box;
} else {
for (RenderObject* child = firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!shouldCheckLines(child))
continue;
if (RootInlineBox* box = toRenderBlock(child)->lineAtIndex(i))
return box;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
RootInlineBox* RenderBlock::lineAtIndex(int i) const
{
ASSERT(i >= 0);
if (style()->visibility() != VISIBLE)
return 0;
if (childrenInline()) {
for (RootInlineBox* box = firstRootBox(); box; box = box->nextRootBox())
if (!i--)
return box;
} else {
for (RenderObject* child = firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!shouldCheckLines(child))
continue;
if (RootInlineBox* box = toRenderBlock(child)->lineAtIndex(i))
return box;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void dccp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
dccp_destroy_sock(sk);
inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
}
|
static void dccp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
dccp_destroy_sock(sk);
inet6_destroy_sock(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
void WebContext::setDevtoolsBindIp(const QString& ip) {
if (IsInitialized()) {
DevToolsManager::Get(context_.get())->SetAddress(ip.toStdString());
} else {
construct_props_->devtools_ip = ip.toStdString();
}
}
|
void WebContext::setDevtoolsBindIp(const QString& ip) {
if (IsInitialized()) {
DevToolsManager::Get(context_.get())->SetAddress(ip.toStdString());
} else {
construct_props_->devtools_ip = ip.toStdString();
}
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int qeth_read_conf_data(struct qeth_card *card, void **buffer,
int *length)
{
struct ciw *ciw;
char *rcd_buf;
int ret;
struct qeth_channel *channel = &card->data;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* scan for RCD command in extended SenseID data
*/
ciw = ccw_device_get_ciw(channel->ccwdev, CIW_TYPE_RCD);
if (!ciw || ciw->cmd == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
rcd_buf = kzalloc(ciw->count, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
if (!rcd_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
channel->ccw.cmd_code = ciw->cmd;
channel->ccw.cda = (__u32) __pa(rcd_buf);
channel->ccw.count = ciw->count;
channel->ccw.flags = CCW_FLAG_SLI;
channel->state = CH_STATE_RCD;
spin_lock_irqsave(get_ccwdev_lock(channel->ccwdev), flags);
ret = ccw_device_start_timeout(channel->ccwdev, &channel->ccw,
QETH_RCD_PARM, LPM_ANYPATH, 0,
QETH_RCD_TIMEOUT);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(get_ccwdev_lock(channel->ccwdev), flags);
if (!ret)
wait_event(card->wait_q,
(channel->state == CH_STATE_RCD_DONE ||
channel->state == CH_STATE_DOWN));
if (channel->state == CH_STATE_DOWN)
ret = -EIO;
else
channel->state = CH_STATE_DOWN;
if (ret) {
kfree(rcd_buf);
*buffer = NULL;
*length = 0;
} else {
*length = ciw->count;
*buffer = rcd_buf;
}
return ret;
}
|
static int qeth_read_conf_data(struct qeth_card *card, void **buffer,
int *length)
{
struct ciw *ciw;
char *rcd_buf;
int ret;
struct qeth_channel *channel = &card->data;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* scan for RCD command in extended SenseID data
*/
ciw = ccw_device_get_ciw(channel->ccwdev, CIW_TYPE_RCD);
if (!ciw || ciw->cmd == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
rcd_buf = kzalloc(ciw->count, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
if (!rcd_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
channel->ccw.cmd_code = ciw->cmd;
channel->ccw.cda = (__u32) __pa(rcd_buf);
channel->ccw.count = ciw->count;
channel->ccw.flags = CCW_FLAG_SLI;
channel->state = CH_STATE_RCD;
spin_lock_irqsave(get_ccwdev_lock(channel->ccwdev), flags);
ret = ccw_device_start_timeout(channel->ccwdev, &channel->ccw,
QETH_RCD_PARM, LPM_ANYPATH, 0,
QETH_RCD_TIMEOUT);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(get_ccwdev_lock(channel->ccwdev), flags);
if (!ret)
wait_event(card->wait_q,
(channel->state == CH_STATE_RCD_DONE ||
channel->state == CH_STATE_DOWN));
if (channel->state == CH_STATE_DOWN)
ret = -EIO;
else
channel->state = CH_STATE_DOWN;
if (ret) {
kfree(rcd_buf);
*buffer = NULL;
*length = 0;
} else {
*length = ciw->count;
*buffer = rcd_buf;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0837/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d333e22282bd4bdaa2864980cd45c272f206a44c
|
d333e22282bd4bdaa2864980cd45c272f206a44c
|
[BlackBerry] GraphicsLayer: rename notifySyncRequired to notifyFlushRequired
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111997
Patch by Alberto Garcia <agarcia@igalia.com> on 2013-03-11
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
This changed in r130439 but the old name was introduced again by
mistake in r144465.
* platform/graphics/blackberry/GraphicsLayerBlackBerry.h:
(WebCore::GraphicsLayerBlackBerry::notifyFlushRequired):
* platform/graphics/blackberry/LayerWebKitThread.cpp:
(WebCore::LayerWebKitThread::setNeedsCommit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145363 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void LayerWebKitThread::updateTextureContents(double scale)
{
if (m_contentsScale != scale) {
m_contentsScale = scale;
if (drawsContent())
setNeedsDisplay();
}
updateTextureContentsIfNeeded();
if (includeVisibility()) {
RenderLayer* renderLayer(static_cast<RenderLayerBacking*>(m_owner->client())->owningLayer());
bool isVisible(renderLayer->hasVisibleContent() || renderLayer->hasVisibleDescendant());
if (m_isVisible != isVisible) {
m_isVisible = isVisible;
setNeedsCommit();
}
}
size_t listSize = m_sublayers.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < listSize; ++i)
m_sublayers[i]->updateTextureContents(scale);
listSize = m_overlays.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < listSize; ++i)
m_overlays[i]->updateTextureContents(scale);
if (maskLayer())
maskLayer()->updateTextureContents(scale);
if (replicaLayer())
replicaLayer()->updateTextureContents(scale);
}
|
void LayerWebKitThread::updateTextureContents(double scale)
{
if (m_contentsScale != scale) {
m_contentsScale = scale;
if (drawsContent())
setNeedsDisplay();
}
updateTextureContentsIfNeeded();
if (includeVisibility()) {
RenderLayer* renderLayer(static_cast<RenderLayerBacking*>(m_owner->client())->owningLayer());
bool isVisible(renderLayer->hasVisibleContent() || renderLayer->hasVisibleDescendant());
if (m_isVisible != isVisible) {
m_isVisible = isVisible;
setNeedsCommit();
}
}
size_t listSize = m_sublayers.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < listSize; ++i)
m_sublayers[i]->updateTextureContents(scale);
listSize = m_overlays.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < listSize; ++i)
m_overlays[i]->updateTextureContents(scale);
if (maskLayer())
maskLayer()->updateTextureContents(scale);
if (replicaLayer())
replicaLayer()->updateTextureContents(scale);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9605/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07678eca2cf9c9a18584e546c2b2a0d0c9a3150c
|
07678eca2cf9c9a18584e546c2b2a0d0c9a3150c
|
drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
|
vmw_surface_handle_reference(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
struct drm_file *file_priv,
uint32_t u_handle,
enum drm_vmw_handle_type handle_type,
struct ttm_base_object **base_p)
{
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
uint32_t handle;
struct ttm_base_object *base;
int ret;
bool require_exist = false;
if (handle_type == DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME) {
ret = ttm_prime_fd_to_handle(tfile, u_handle, &handle);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
} else {
if (unlikely(drm_is_render_client(file_priv)))
require_exist = true;
if (ACCESS_ONCE(vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->locked_master)) {
DRM_ERROR("Locked master refused legacy "
"surface reference.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
handle = u_handle;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
base = ttm_base_object_lookup_for_ref(dev_priv->tdev, handle);
if (unlikely(!base)) {
DRM_ERROR("Could not find surface to reference.\n");
goto out_no_lookup;
}
if (unlikely(ttm_base_object_type(base) != VMW_RES_SURFACE)) {
DRM_ERROR("Referenced object is not a surface.\n");
goto out_bad_resource;
}
if (handle_type != DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME) {
user_srf = container_of(base, struct vmw_user_surface,
prime.base);
/*
* Make sure the surface creator has the same
* authenticating master, or is already registered with us.
*/
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv) &&
user_srf->master != file_priv->master)
require_exist = true;
ret = ttm_ref_object_add(tfile, base, TTM_REF_USAGE, NULL,
require_exist);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
DRM_ERROR("Could not add a reference to a surface.\n");
goto out_bad_resource;
}
}
*base_p = base;
return 0;
out_bad_resource:
ttm_base_object_unref(&base);
out_no_lookup:
if (handle_type == DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME)
(void) ttm_ref_object_base_unref(tfile, handle, TTM_REF_USAGE);
return ret;
}
|
vmw_surface_handle_reference(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
struct drm_file *file_priv,
uint32_t u_handle,
enum drm_vmw_handle_type handle_type,
struct ttm_base_object **base_p)
{
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
uint32_t handle;
struct ttm_base_object *base;
int ret;
bool require_exist = false;
if (handle_type == DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME) {
ret = ttm_prime_fd_to_handle(tfile, u_handle, &handle);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
} else {
if (unlikely(drm_is_render_client(file_priv)))
require_exist = true;
if (ACCESS_ONCE(vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->locked_master)) {
DRM_ERROR("Locked master refused legacy "
"surface reference.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
handle = u_handle;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
base = ttm_base_object_lookup_for_ref(dev_priv->tdev, handle);
if (unlikely(!base)) {
DRM_ERROR("Could not find surface to reference.\n");
goto out_no_lookup;
}
if (unlikely(ttm_base_object_type(base) != VMW_RES_SURFACE)) {
DRM_ERROR("Referenced object is not a surface.\n");
goto out_bad_resource;
}
if (handle_type != DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME) {
user_srf = container_of(base, struct vmw_user_surface,
prime.base);
/*
* Make sure the surface creator has the same
* authenticating master, or is already registered with us.
*/
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv) &&
user_srf->master != file_priv->master)
require_exist = true;
ret = ttm_ref_object_add(tfile, base, TTM_REF_USAGE, NULL,
require_exist);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
DRM_ERROR("Could not add a reference to a surface.\n");
goto out_bad_resource;
}
}
*base_p = base;
return 0;
out_bad_resource:
ttm_base_object_unref(&base);
out_no_lookup:
if (handle_type == DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME)
(void) ttm_ref_object_base_unref(tfile, handle, TTM_REF_USAGE);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19497
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19497/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/sleuthkit/sleuthkit/commit/bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d
|
bc04aa017c0bd297de8a3b7fc40ffc6ddddbb95d
|
Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
|
static int hfs_file_read_zlib_attr(TSK_FS_FILE* fs_file,
char* buffer,
uint32_t attributeLength,
uint64_t uncSize)
{
return hfs_file_read_compressed_attr(
fs_file, DECMPFS_TYPE_ZLIB_ATTR,
buffer, attributeLength, uncSize,
hfs_decompress_zlib_attr
);
}
|
static int hfs_file_read_zlib_attr(TSK_FS_FILE* fs_file,
char* buffer,
uint32_t attributeLength,
uint64_t uncSize)
{
return hfs_file_read_compressed_attr(
fs_file, DECMPFS_TYPE_ZLIB_ATTR,
buffer, attributeLength, uncSize,
hfs_decompress_zlib_attr
);
}
|
C
|
sleuthkit
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0292
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0292/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d0666f289ac013094bbbf547bfbcd616199b7d2d
|
d0666f289ac013094bbbf547bfbcd616199b7d2d
| null |
void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
unsigned int ret=0;
if (ctx->num != 0)
{
ret=EVP_EncodeBlock(out,ctx->enc_data,ctx->num);
out[ret++]='\n';
out[ret]='\0';
ctx->num=0;
}
*outl=ret;
}
|
void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
unsigned int ret=0;
if (ctx->num != 0)
{
ret=EVP_EncodeBlock(out,ctx->enc_data,ctx->num);
out[ret++]='\n';
out[ret]='\0';
ctx->num=0;
}
*outl=ret;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7797
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7797/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/5ec24a2642bd0854b884d1a9b51d12371373b410
|
5ec24a2642bd0854b884d1a9b51d12371373b410
|
Fix: remote: cl#5269 - Notify other clients of a new connection only if the handshake has completed (bsc#967388)
|
lrmd_remote_listen(gpointer data)
{
int csock = 0;
int flag = 0;
unsigned laddr = 0;
struct sockaddr addr;
gnutls_session_t *session = NULL;
crm_client_t *new_client = NULL;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks lrmd_remote_fd_cb = {
.dispatch = lrmd_remote_client_msg,
.destroy = lrmd_remote_client_destroy,
};
laddr = sizeof(addr);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
getsockname(ssock, &addr, &laddr);
/* accept the connection */
if (addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 sa;
char addr_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
} else {
struct sockaddr_in sa;
char addr_str[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
}
if (csock == -1) {
crm_err("accept socket failed");
return TRUE;
}
if ((flag = fcntl(csock, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
if (fcntl(csock, F_SETFL, flag | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
crm_err("fcntl() write failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
} else {
crm_err("fcntl() read failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
session = create_psk_tls_session(csock, GNUTLS_SERVER, psk_cred_s);
if (session == NULL) {
crm_err("TLS session creation failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
new_client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
new_client->remote = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_remote_t));
new_client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_TLS;
new_client->remote->tls_session = session;
new_client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
new_client->remote->auth_timeout =
g_timeout_add(LRMD_REMOTE_AUTH_TIMEOUT, lrmd_auth_timeout_cb, new_client);
crm_notice("LRMD client connection established. %p id: %s", new_client, new_client->id);
new_client->remote->source =
mainloop_add_fd("lrmd-remote-client", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, csock, new_client,
&lrmd_remote_fd_cb);
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, new_client->id, new_client);
return TRUE;
}
|
lrmd_remote_listen(gpointer data)
{
int csock = 0;
int flag = 0;
unsigned laddr = 0;
struct sockaddr addr;
gnutls_session_t *session = NULL;
crm_client_t *new_client = NULL;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks lrmd_remote_fd_cb = {
.dispatch = lrmd_remote_client_msg,
.destroy = lrmd_remote_client_destroy,
};
laddr = sizeof(addr);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
getsockname(ssock, &addr, &laddr);
/* accept the connection */
if (addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 sa;
char addr_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
} else {
struct sockaddr_in sa;
char addr_str[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
laddr = sizeof(sa);
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
csock = accept(ssock, &sa, &laddr);
get_ip_str((struct sockaddr *)&sa, addr_str, INET_ADDRSTRLEN);
crm_info("New remote connection from %s", addr_str);
}
if (csock == -1) {
crm_err("accept socket failed");
return TRUE;
}
if ((flag = fcntl(csock, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
if (fcntl(csock, F_SETFL, flag | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
crm_err("fcntl() write failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
} else {
crm_err("fcntl() read failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
session = create_psk_tls_session(csock, GNUTLS_SERVER, psk_cred_s);
if (session == NULL) {
crm_err("TLS session creation failed");
close(csock);
return TRUE;
}
new_client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
new_client->remote = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_remote_t));
new_client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_TLS;
new_client->remote->tls_session = session;
new_client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
new_client->remote->auth_timeout =
g_timeout_add(LRMD_REMOTE_AUTH_TIMEOUT, lrmd_auth_timeout_cb, new_client);
crm_notice("LRMD client connection established. %p id: %s", new_client, new_client->id);
new_client->remote->source =
mainloop_add_fd("lrmd-remote-client", G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, csock, new_client,
&lrmd_remote_fd_cb);
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, new_client->id, new_client);
/* Alert other clients of the new connection */
notify_of_new_client(new_client);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 1 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
void FrameSelection::PaintCaret(GraphicsContext& context,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
frame_caret_->PaintCaret(context, paint_offset);
}
|
void FrameSelection::PaintCaret(GraphicsContext& context,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
frame_caret_->PaintCaret(context, paint_offset);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void *packet_lookup_frame(struct packet_sock *po,
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb,
unsigned int position,
int status)
{
unsigned int pg_vec_pos, frame_offset;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
pg_vec_pos = position / rb->frames_per_block;
frame_offset = position % rb->frames_per_block;
h.raw = rb->pg_vec[pg_vec_pos].buffer +
(frame_offset * rb->frame_size);
if (status != __packet_get_status(po, h.raw))
return NULL;
return h.raw;
}
|
static void *packet_lookup_frame(struct packet_sock *po,
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb,
unsigned int position,
int status)
{
unsigned int pg_vec_pos, frame_offset;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
pg_vec_pos = position / rb->frames_per_block;
frame_offset = position % rb->frames_per_block;
h.raw = rb->pg_vec[pg_vec_pos].buffer +
(frame_offset * rb->frame_size);
if (status != __packet_get_status(po, h.raw))
return NULL;
return h.raw;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10807
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10807/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/jabberd2/jabberd2/commit/8416ae54ecefa670534f27a31db71d048b9c7f16
|
8416ae54ecefa670534f27a31db71d048b9c7f16
|
Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
|
static nad_t _sx_sasl_abort(sx_t s) {
nad_t nad;
int ns;
nad = nad_new();
ns = nad_add_namespace(nad, uri_SASL, NULL);
nad_append_elem(nad, ns, "abort", 0);
return nad;
}
|
static nad_t _sx_sasl_abort(sx_t s) {
nad_t nad;
int ns;
nad = nad_new();
ns = nad_add_namespace(nad, uri_SASL, NULL);
nad_append_elem(nad, ns, "abort", 0);
return nad;
}
|
C
|
jabberd2
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f84286649c35f951996885aebd0400ea0c3c44cb
|
f84286649c35f951996885aebd0400ea0c3c44cb
|
Revert "OnionSoup: Move mojom files from public/platform/web to public/mojom folder"
This reverts commit e656908dbda6ced2f4743a9b5c2ed926dc6b5b67.
Reason for revert: Appears to cause build failure on Android
[71296/78273] ACTION //content/public/android:content_java__process_prebuilt__bytecode_rewrite(//build/toolchain/android:android_clang_arm)
FAILED: obj/content/public/android/content_java__process_prebuilt-bytecode-rewritten.jar
python ../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py --script bin/helper/java_bytecode_rewriter [...removed for brevity, see link...]
Missing 2 classes missing in direct classpath. To fix, add GN deps for:
gen/third_party/blink/public/mojom/android_mojo_bindings_java.javac.jar
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py", line 76, in <module>
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
File "../../build/android/gyp/bytecode_processor.py", line 72, in main
subprocess.check_call(cmd)
File "/b/swarming/w/ir/cipd_bin_packages/lib/python2.7/subprocess.py", line 186, in check_call
raise CalledProcessError(retcode, cmd)
(https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/android-rel/9664)
Original change's description:
> OnionSoup: Move mojom files from public/platform/web to public/mojom folder
>
> This CL moves window_features.mojom, commit_result.mojom,
> devtools_frontend.mojom, selection_menu_behavior.mojom and
> remote_objects.mojom from public/platform/web to public/mojom/
> to gather mojom files to mojom folder and updates paths for these
> mojom files.
>
> Bug: 919393
> Change-Id: If6df031ed39d70e700986bd13a40d0598257e009
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1514434
> Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Julie Jeongeun Kim <jkim@igalia.com>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640633}
TBR=dgozman@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org,kinuko@chromium.org,haraken@chromium.org,jkim@igalia.com
Change-Id: I5744072dbaeffba5706f329838e37d74c065ae27
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 919393
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1523386
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640688}
|
static mojom::RequestContextType DetermineRequestContextFromNavigationType(
const WebNavigationType navigation_type) {
switch (navigation_type) {
case kWebNavigationTypeLinkClicked:
return mojom::RequestContextType::HYPERLINK;
case kWebNavigationTypeOther:
return mojom::RequestContextType::LOCATION;
case kWebNavigationTypeFormResubmitted:
case kWebNavigationTypeFormSubmitted:
return mojom::RequestContextType::FORM;
case kWebNavigationTypeBackForward:
case kWebNavigationTypeReload:
return mojom::RequestContextType::INTERNAL;
}
NOTREACHED();
return mojom::RequestContextType::HYPERLINK;
}
|
static mojom::RequestContextType DetermineRequestContextFromNavigationType(
const WebNavigationType navigation_type) {
switch (navigation_type) {
case kWebNavigationTypeLinkClicked:
return mojom::RequestContextType::HYPERLINK;
case kWebNavigationTypeOther:
return mojom::RequestContextType::LOCATION;
case kWebNavigationTypeFormResubmitted:
case kWebNavigationTypeFormSubmitted:
return mojom::RequestContextType::FORM;
case kWebNavigationTypeBackForward:
case kWebNavigationTypeReload:
return mojom::RequestContextType::INTERNAL;
}
NOTREACHED();
return mojom::RequestContextType::HYPERLINK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14230
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14230/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-imapd/commit/6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79
|
mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
|
static int find_p(void *rockp,
const char *key, size_t keylen,
const char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct find_rock *rock = (struct find_rock *) rockp;
char intname[MAX_MAILBOX_PATH+1];
int i;
/* skip any $RACL or future $ space keys */
if (key[0] == '$') return 0;
memcpy(intname, key, keylen);
intname[keylen] = 0;
assert(!rock->mbname);
rock->mbname = mbname_from_intname(intname);
if (!rock->isadmin && !config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CROSSDOMAINS)) {
/* don't list mailboxes outside of the default domain */
if (strcmpsafe(rock->domain, mbname_domain(rock->mbname)))
goto nomatch;
}
if (rock->mb_category && mbname_category(rock->mbname, rock->namespace, rock->userid) != rock->mb_category)
goto nomatch;
/* NOTE: this will all be cleaned up to be much more efficient sooner or later, with
* a mbname_t being kept inside the mbentry, and the extname cached all the way to
* final use. For now, we pay the cost of re-calculating for simplicity of the
* changes to mbname_t itself */
const char *extname = mbname_extname(rock->mbname, rock->namespace, rock->userid);
if (!extname) goto nomatch;
int matchlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < rock->globs.count; i++) {
glob *g = ptrarray_nth(&rock->globs, i);
int thismatch = glob_test(g, extname);
if (thismatch > matchlen) matchlen = thismatch;
}
/* If its not a match, skip it -- partial matches are ok. */
if (!matchlen) goto nomatch;
rock->matchlen = matchlen;
/* subs DB has empty keys */
if (rock->issubs)
goto good;
/* ignore entirely deleted records */
if (mboxlist_parse_entry(&rock->mbentry, key, keylen, data, datalen))
goto nomatch;
/* nobody sees tombstones */
if (rock->mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_DELETED)
goto nomatch;
/* check acl */
if (!rock->isadmin) {
/* always suppress deleted for non-admin */
if (mbname_isdeleted(rock->mbname)) goto nomatch;
/* check the acls */
if (!(cyrus_acl_myrights(rock->auth_state, rock->mbentry->acl) & ACL_LOOKUP)) goto nomatch;
}
good:
return 1;
nomatch:
mboxlist_entry_free(&rock->mbentry);
mbname_free(&rock->mbname);
return 0;
}
|
static int find_p(void *rockp,
const char *key, size_t keylen,
const char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct find_rock *rock = (struct find_rock *) rockp;
char intname[MAX_MAILBOX_PATH+1];
int i;
/* skip any $RACL or future $ space keys */
if (key[0] == '$') return 0;
memcpy(intname, key, keylen);
intname[keylen] = 0;
assert(!rock->mbname);
rock->mbname = mbname_from_intname(intname);
if (!rock->isadmin && !config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CROSSDOMAINS)) {
/* don't list mailboxes outside of the default domain */
if (strcmpsafe(rock->domain, mbname_domain(rock->mbname)))
goto nomatch;
}
if (rock->mb_category && mbname_category(rock->mbname, rock->namespace, rock->userid) != rock->mb_category)
goto nomatch;
/* NOTE: this will all be cleaned up to be much more efficient sooner or later, with
* a mbname_t being kept inside the mbentry, and the extname cached all the way to
* final use. For now, we pay the cost of re-calculating for simplicity of the
* changes to mbname_t itself */
const char *extname = mbname_extname(rock->mbname, rock->namespace, rock->userid);
if (!extname) goto nomatch;
int matchlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < rock->globs.count; i++) {
glob *g = ptrarray_nth(&rock->globs, i);
int thismatch = glob_test(g, extname);
if (thismatch > matchlen) matchlen = thismatch;
}
/* If its not a match, skip it -- partial matches are ok. */
if (!matchlen) goto nomatch;
rock->matchlen = matchlen;
/* subs DB has empty keys */
if (rock->issubs)
goto good;
/* ignore entirely deleted records */
if (mboxlist_parse_entry(&rock->mbentry, key, keylen, data, datalen))
goto nomatch;
/* nobody sees tombstones */
if (rock->mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_DELETED)
goto nomatch;
/* check acl */
if (!rock->isadmin) {
/* always suppress deleted for non-admin */
if (mbname_isdeleted(rock->mbname)) goto nomatch;
/* check the acls */
if (!(cyrus_acl_myrights(rock->auth_state, rock->mbentry->acl) & ACL_LOOKUP)) goto nomatch;
}
good:
return 1;
nomatch:
mboxlist_entry_free(&rock->mbentry);
mbname_free(&rock->mbname);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
cyrus-imapd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
init_display(display *d, const char *program)
{
memset(d, 0, sizeof *d);
d->png_ptr = NULL;
d->info_ptr = d->end_ptr = NULL;
d->error_count = d->warning_count = 0;
d->program = program;
d->file = program;
d->test = init;
}
|
init_display(display *d, const char *program)
{
memset(d, 0, sizeof *d);
d->png_ptr = NULL;
d->info_ptr = d->end_ptr = NULL;
d->error_count = d->warning_count = 0;
d->program = program;
d->file = program;
d->test = init;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13090
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13090/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba
|
ba6b44f6745b14dce414761a8e4b35d31b176bba
| null |
limit_bandwidth_reset (void)
{
xzero (limit_data);
}
|
limit_bandwidth_reset (void)
{
xzero (limit_data);
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
check_v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
}
|
check_v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
(void)remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
|
freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2015-3288
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3288/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b7339f4c31ad69c8e9c0b2859276e22cf72176d
|
6b7339f4c31ad69c8e9c0b2859276e22cf72176d
|
mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static inline void free_pmd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
unsigned long floor, unsigned long ceiling)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
unsigned long start;
start = addr;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
start &= PUD_MASK;
if (start < floor)
return;
if (ceiling) {
ceiling &= PUD_MASK;
if (!ceiling)
return;
}
if (end - 1 > ceiling - 1)
return;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, start);
pud_clear(pud);
pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, start);
mm_dec_nr_pmds(tlb->mm);
}
|
static inline void free_pmd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
unsigned long floor, unsigned long ceiling)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
unsigned long start;
start = addr;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr);
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
start &= PUD_MASK;
if (start < floor)
return;
if (ceiling) {
ceiling &= PUD_MASK;
if (!ceiling)
return;
}
if (end - 1 > ceiling - 1)
return;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, start);
pud_clear(pud);
pmd_free_tlb(tlb, pmd, start);
mm_dec_nr_pmds(tlb->mm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void strictTypeCheckingFloatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::strictTypeCheckingFloatAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void strictTypeCheckingFloatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::strictTypeCheckingFloatAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.