CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewPort::GetDefaultScreenInfo(WebScreenInfo* results) {
GetScreenInfoForWindow(results, NULL);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewPort::GetDefaultScreenInfo(WebScreenInfo* results) {
GetScreenInfoForWindow(results, NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6415
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6415/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/252afb1cff9676f3ae1f341a28448bf2c8b6e308
|
252afb1cff9676f3ae1f341a28448bf2c8b6e308
|
fix #6872
|
static char *dex_class_name_byid(RBinDexObj *bin, int cid) {
int tid;
if (!bin || !bin->types) {
return NULL;
}
if (cid < 0 || cid >= bin->header.types_size) {
return NULL;
}
tid = bin->types[cid].descriptor_id;
return getstr (bin, tid);
}
|
static char *dex_class_name_byid(RBinDexObj *bin, int cid) {
int tid;
if (!bin || !bin->types) {
return NULL;
}
if (cid < 0 || cid >= bin->header.types_size) {
return NULL;
}
tid = bin->types[cid].descriptor_id;
return getstr (bin, tid);
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "doubleOrStringAttribute");
DoubleOrString cpp_value;
V8DoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, cpp_value, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNotNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setDoubleOrStringAttribute(cpp_value);
}
|
static void DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "doubleOrStringAttribute");
DoubleOrString cpp_value;
V8DoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, cpp_value, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNotNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setDoubleOrStringAttribute(cpp_value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Value* CreateChoiceData(const Experiment& experiment,
const std::set<std::string>& enabled_experiments) {
DCHECK_EQ(Experiment::MULTI_VALUE, experiment.type);
ListValue* result = new ListValue;
for (int i = 0; i < experiment.num_choices; ++i) {
const Experiment::Choice& choice = experiment.choices[i];
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue;
std::string name = NameForChoice(experiment, i);
value->SetString("description",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(choice.description_id));
value->SetString("internal_name", name);
value->SetBoolean("selected", enabled_experiments.count(name) > 0);
result->Append(value);
}
return result;
}
|
Value* CreateChoiceData(const Experiment& experiment,
const std::set<std::string>& enabled_experiments) {
DCHECK_EQ(Experiment::MULTI_VALUE, experiment.type);
ListValue* result = new ListValue;
for (int i = 0; i < experiment.num_choices; ++i) {
const Experiment::Choice& choice = experiment.choices[i];
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue;
std::string name = NameForChoice(experiment, i);
value->SetString("description",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(choice.description_id));
value->SetString("internal_name", name);
value->SetBoolean("selected", enabled_experiments.count(name) > 0);
result->Append(value);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
Fix glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv so it returns
current names for buffers.
TEST=unit_tests and conformance tests
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3135003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCheckFramebufferStatus(GLenum target) {
if (!bound_framebuffer_) {
return GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE;
}
return glCheckFramebufferStatusEXT(target);
}
|
GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCheckFramebufferStatus(GLenum target) {
if (!bound_framebuffer_) {
return GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE;
}
return glCheckFramebufferStatusEXT(target);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5185/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
[Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
AutofillPopupWarningView::CreateBackground() {
return views::CreateSolidBackground(popup_view_->GetBackgroundColor());
}
|
AutofillPopupWarningView::CreateBackground() {
return views::CreateSolidBackground(popup_view_->GetBackgroundColor());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void NamedPropertySetter(
const AtomicString& name,
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value,
const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> property_value = v8_value;
if (!property_value.Prepare())
return;
bool result = impl->AnonymousNamedSetter(script_state, name, property_value);
if (!result)
return;
V8SetReturnValue(info, v8_value);
}
|
static void NamedPropertySetter(
const AtomicString& name,
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value,
const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> property_value = v8_value;
if (!property_value.Prepare())
return;
bool result = impl->AnonymousNamedSetter(script_state, name, property_value);
if (!result)
return;
V8SetReturnValue(info, v8_value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1221/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
bool Editor::canUndo() {
return m_undoStack->canUndo();
}
|
bool Editor::canUndo() {
return m_undoStack->canUndo();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-10678
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10678/
|
CWE-93
|
https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/2119afbe74ee0c914c1d5c4c859c594c08b0ad42
|
2119afbe74ee0c914c1d5c4c859c594c08b0ad42
|
Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto)
|
std::string &stdstring_ltrim(std::string &s)
{
while (!s.empty())
{
if (s[0] != ' ')
return s;
s = s.substr(1);
}
return s;
}
|
std::string &stdstring_ltrim(std::string &s)
{
while (!s.empty())
{
if (s[0] != ' ')
return s;
s = s.substr(1);
}
return s;
}
|
C
|
domoticz
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
void Document::DecrementLoadEventDelayCountAndCheckLoadEvent() {
DCHECK(load_event_delay_count_);
--load_event_delay_count_;
if (!load_event_delay_count_)
CheckCompleted();
}
|
void Document::DecrementLoadEventDelayCountAndCheckLoadEvent() {
DCHECK(load_event_delay_count_);
--load_event_delay_count_;
if (!load_event_delay_count_)
CheckCompleted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14151/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/afb308b9ccbe129608c9205cf3bb39bbefad90b9
|
afb308b9ccbe129608c9205cf3bb39bbefad90b9
|
Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
|
static void opj_tcd_code_block_enc_deallocate(opj_tcd_precinct_t * p_precinct)
{
OPJ_UINT32 cblkno, l_nb_code_blocks;
opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t * l_code_block = p_precinct->cblks.enc;
if (l_code_block) {
l_nb_code_blocks = p_precinct->block_size / sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t);
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < l_nb_code_blocks; ++cblkno) {
if (l_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
/* in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() */
opj_free(l_code_block->data - 1);
l_code_block->data = 00;
}
if (l_code_block->layers) {
opj_free(l_code_block->layers);
l_code_block->layers = 00;
}
if (l_code_block->passes) {
opj_free(l_code_block->passes);
l_code_block->passes = 00;
}
++l_code_block;
}
opj_free(p_precinct->cblks.enc);
p_precinct->cblks.enc = 00;
}
}
|
static void opj_tcd_code_block_enc_deallocate(opj_tcd_precinct_t * p_precinct)
{
OPJ_UINT32 cblkno, l_nb_code_blocks;
opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t * l_code_block = p_precinct->cblks.enc;
if (l_code_block) {
l_nb_code_blocks = p_precinct->block_size / sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t);
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < l_nb_code_blocks; ++cblkno) {
if (l_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
/* in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() */
opj_free(l_code_block->data - 1);
l_code_block->data = 00;
}
if (l_code_block->layers) {
opj_free(l_code_block->layers);
l_code_block->layers = 00;
}
if (l_code_block->passes) {
opj_free(l_code_block->passes);
l_code_block->passes = 00;
}
++l_code_block;
}
opj_free(p_precinct->cblks.enc);
p_precinct->cblks.enc = 00;
}
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10147/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/48a992727d82cb7db076fa15d372178743b1f4cd
|
48a992727d82cb7db076fa15d372178743b1f4cd
|
crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
static inline bool mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return false;
*type |= algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
*mask |= algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if (*type & *mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL)
return true;
else
return false;
}
|
static inline void mcryptd_check_internal(struct rtattr **tb, u32 *type,
u32 *mask)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return;
if ((algt->type & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
if ((algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
*mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3835/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE OMXNodeInstance::OnFillBufferDone(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE /* hComponent */,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR pAppData,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* pBuffer) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance = static_cast<OMXNodeInstance *>(pAppData);
if (instance->mDying) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
return instance->owner()->OnFillBufferDone(instance->nodeID(),
instance->findBufferID(pBuffer), pBuffer);
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE OMXNodeInstance::OnFillBufferDone(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE /* hComponent */,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR pAppData,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* pBuffer) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance = static_cast<OMXNodeInstance *>(pAppData);
if (instance->mDying) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
return instance->owner()->OnFillBufferDone(instance->nodeID(),
instance->findBufferID(pBuffer), pBuffer);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Plugin::EnqueueProgressEvent(const char* event_type,
const nacl::string& url,
LengthComputable length_computable,
uint64_t loaded_bytes,
uint64_t total_bytes) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::EnqueueProgressEvent ("
"event_type='%s', url='%s', length_computable=%d, "
"loaded=%"NACL_PRIu64", total=%"NACL_PRIu64")\n",
event_type,
url.c_str(),
static_cast<int>(length_computable),
loaded_bytes,
total_bytes));
progress_events_.push(new ProgressEvent(event_type,
url,
length_computable,
loaded_bytes,
total_bytes));
pp::CompletionCallback callback =
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent);
pp::Core* core = pp::Module::Get()->core();
core->CallOnMainThread(0, callback, 0);
}
|
void Plugin::EnqueueProgressEvent(const char* event_type,
const nacl::string& url,
LengthComputable length_computable,
uint64_t loaded_bytes,
uint64_t total_bytes) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::EnqueueProgressEvent ("
"event_type='%s', url='%s', length_computable=%d, "
"loaded=%"NACL_PRIu64", total=%"NACL_PRIu64")\n",
event_type,
url.c_str(),
static_cast<int>(length_computable),
loaded_bytes,
total_bytes));
progress_events_.push(new ProgressEvent(event_type,
url,
length_computable,
loaded_bytes,
total_bytes));
pp::CompletionCallback callback =
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent);
pp::Core* core = pp::Module::Get()->core();
core->CallOnMainThread(0, callback, 0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15411
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15411/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d81094d7b0bfc8be6bba2f5084e790677e527c8
|
9d81094d7b0bfc8be6bba2f5084e790677e527c8
|
[Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
|
bool ProfilingProcessHost::OnMemoryDump(
const base::trace_event::MemoryDumpArgs& args,
base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump* pmd) {
profiling_service_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
base::BindOnce(&ProfilingProcessHost::OnDumpProcessesForTracingCallback,
base::Unretained(this), args.dump_guid));
return true;
}
|
bool ProfilingProcessHost::OnMemoryDump(
const base::trace_event::MemoryDumpArgs& args,
base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump* pmd) {
profiling_service_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
base::BindOnce(&ProfilingProcessHost::OnDumpProcessesForTracingCallback,
base::Unretained(this), args.dump_guid));
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
LayoutRect LayoutBlockFlow::logicalLeftSelectionGap(const LayoutBlock* rootBlock, const LayoutPoint& rootBlockPhysicalPosition, const LayoutSize& offsetFromRootBlock,
const LayoutObject* selObj, LayoutUnit logicalLeft, LayoutUnit logicalTop, LayoutUnit logicalHeight, const PaintInfo* paintInfo) const
{
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalTop = rootBlock->blockDirectionOffset(offsetFromRootBlock) + logicalTop;
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalLeft = std::max(logicalLeftSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop), logicalLeftSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop + logicalHeight));
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalRight = std::min(rootBlock->inlineDirectionOffset(offsetFromRootBlock) + logicalLeft, std::min(logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop), logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop + logicalHeight)));
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalWidth = rootBlockLogicalRight - rootBlockLogicalLeft;
if (rootBlockLogicalWidth <= 0)
return LayoutRect();
LayoutRect gapRect = rootBlock->logicalRectToPhysicalRect(rootBlockPhysicalPosition, LayoutRect(rootBlockLogicalLeft, rootBlockLogicalTop, rootBlockLogicalWidth, logicalHeight));
if (paintInfo) {
IntRect selectionGapRect = alignSelectionRectToDevicePixels(gapRect);
paintInfo->context->fillRect(selectionGapRect, selObj->selectionBackgroundColor());
}
return gapRect;
}
|
LayoutRect LayoutBlockFlow::logicalLeftSelectionGap(const LayoutBlock* rootBlock, const LayoutPoint& rootBlockPhysicalPosition, const LayoutSize& offsetFromRootBlock,
const LayoutObject* selObj, LayoutUnit logicalLeft, LayoutUnit logicalTop, LayoutUnit logicalHeight, const PaintInfo* paintInfo) const
{
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalTop = rootBlock->blockDirectionOffset(offsetFromRootBlock) + logicalTop;
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalLeft = std::max(logicalLeftSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop), logicalLeftSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop + logicalHeight));
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalRight = std::min(rootBlock->inlineDirectionOffset(offsetFromRootBlock) + logicalLeft, std::min(logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop), logicalRightSelectionOffset(rootBlock, logicalTop + logicalHeight)));
LayoutUnit rootBlockLogicalWidth = rootBlockLogicalRight - rootBlockLogicalLeft;
if (rootBlockLogicalWidth <= 0)
return LayoutRect();
LayoutRect gapRect = rootBlock->logicalRectToPhysicalRect(rootBlockPhysicalPosition, LayoutRect(rootBlockLogicalLeft, rootBlockLogicalTop, rootBlockLogicalWidth, logicalHeight));
if (paintInfo) {
IntRect selectionGapRect = alignSelectionRectToDevicePixels(gapRect);
paintInfo->context->fillRect(selectionGapRect, selObj->selectionBackgroundColor());
}
return gapRect;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4978
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4978/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio/commit/9c2cd3c93c05d009a91d84eedbb85873b0cb505d
|
9c2cd3c93c05d009a91d84eedbb85873b0cb505d
|
Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
|
rs_filter_init(RSFilter *self)
{
RS_DEBUG(FILTERS, "rs_filter_init(%p)", self);
self->previous = NULL;
self->next_filters = NULL;
self->enabled = TRUE;
}
|
rs_filter_init(RSFilter *self)
{
RS_DEBUG(FILTERS, "rs_filter_init(%p)", self);
self->previous = NULL;
self->next_filters = NULL;
self->enabled = TRUE;
}
|
C
|
rawstudio
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXTableCell::isTableHeaderCell() const {
return getNode() && getNode()->hasTagName(thTag);
}
|
bool AXTableCell::isTableHeaderCell() const {
return getNode() && getNode()->hasTagName(thTag);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9659
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9659/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=2cdc4562f873237f1c77d43540537c7a721d3fd8
|
2cdc4562f873237f1c77d43540537c7a721d3fd8
| null |
cf2_hint_lock( CF2_Hint hint )
{
hint->flags |= CF2_Locked;
}
|
cf2_hint_lock( CF2_Hint hint )
{
hint->flags |= CF2_Locked;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8106/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=bf25983345ca44aec3dd92c57142be45452bd38a
|
bf25983345ca44aec3dd92c57142be45452bd38a
| null |
static uint64_t cirrus_linear_bitblt_read(void *opaque,
hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
CirrusVGAState *s = opaque;
uint32_t ret;
/* XXX handle bitblt */
(void)s;
ret = 0xff;
return ret;
}
|
static uint64_t cirrus_linear_bitblt_read(void *opaque,
hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
CirrusVGAState *s = opaque;
uint32_t ret;
/* XXX handle bitblt */
(void)s;
ret = 0xff;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3699
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3699/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/mjg59/linux/commit/a4a5ed2835e8ea042868b7401dced3f517cafa76
|
a4a5ed2835e8ea042868b7401dced3f517cafa76
|
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
|
acpi_os_map_memory(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
{
return (void *)acpi_os_map_iomem(phys, size);
}
|
acpi_os_map_memory(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
{
return (void *)acpi_os_map_iomem(phys, size);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2634
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2634/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0
|
29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0
|
dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int dcb_ieee_delapp(struct net_device *dev, struct dcb_app *del)
{
struct dcb_app_type *itr;
struct dcb_app_type event;
int err = -ENOENT;
event.ifindex = dev->ifindex;
memcpy(&event.app, del, sizeof(event.app));
if (dev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx)
event.dcbx = dev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx(dev);
spin_lock(&dcb_lock);
/* Search for existing match and remove it. */
if ((itr = dcb_app_lookup(del, dev->ifindex, del->priority))) {
list_del(&itr->list);
kfree(itr);
err = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&dcb_lock);
if (!err)
call_dcbevent_notifiers(DCB_APP_EVENT, &event);
return err;
}
|
int dcb_ieee_delapp(struct net_device *dev, struct dcb_app *del)
{
struct dcb_app_type *itr;
struct dcb_app_type event;
int err = -ENOENT;
event.ifindex = dev->ifindex;
memcpy(&event.app, del, sizeof(event.app));
if (dev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx)
event.dcbx = dev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx(dev);
spin_lock(&dcb_lock);
/* Search for existing match and remove it. */
if ((itr = dcb_app_lookup(del, dev->ifindex, del->priority))) {
list_del(&itr->list);
kfree(itr);
err = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&dcb_lock);
if (!err)
call_dcbevent_notifiers(DCB_APP_EVENT, &event);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2806/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=libtasn1.git;a=commit;h=4d4f992826a4962790ecd0cce6fbba4a415ce149
|
4d4f992826a4962790ecd0cce6fbba4a415ce149
| null |
_asn1_change_integer_value (asn1_node node)
{
asn1_node p;
unsigned char val[SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT];
unsigned char val2[SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT + 1];
int len;
if (node == NULL)
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
p = node;
while (p)
{
if ((type_field (p->type) == ASN1_ETYPE_INTEGER)
&& (p->type & CONST_ASSIGN))
{
if (p->value)
{
_asn1_convert_integer (p->value, val, sizeof (val), &len);
asn1_octet_der (val, len, val2, &len);
_asn1_set_value (p, val2, len);
}
}
if (p->down)
{
p = p->down;
}
else
{
if (p == node)
p = NULL;
else if (p->right)
p = p->right;
else
{
while (1)
{
p = _asn1_get_up (p);
if (p == node)
{
p = NULL;
break;
}
if (p->right)
{
p = p->right;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
}
|
_asn1_change_integer_value (asn1_node node)
{
asn1_node p;
unsigned char val[SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT];
unsigned char val2[SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG_INT + 1];
int len;
if (node == NULL)
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
p = node;
while (p)
{
if ((type_field (p->type) == ASN1_ETYPE_INTEGER)
&& (p->type & CONST_ASSIGN))
{
if (p->value)
{
_asn1_convert_integer (p->value, val, sizeof (val), &len);
asn1_octet_der (val, len, val2, &len);
_asn1_set_value (p, val2, len);
}
}
if (p->down)
{
p = p->down;
}
else
{
if (p == node)
p = NULL;
else if (p->right)
p = p->right;
else
{
while (1)
{
p = _asn1_get_up (p);
if (p == node)
{
p = NULL;
break;
}
if (p->right)
{
p = p->right;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1a142d29ad1dfaecd3b609051b476440289ec72
|
f1a142d29ad1dfaecd3b609051b476440289ec72
|
Fix print media page size by using the value we compute.
BUG=82472
TEST=NONE (in bug)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8344016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@106160 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::InitWithNode(
const WebKit::WebNode& web_node) {
DCHECK(!web_node.isNull());
DCHECK(!IsRendering());
state_ = INITIALIZED;
frame_ = web_node.document().frame();
node_ = web_node;
}
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::InitWithNode(
const WebKit::WebNode& web_node) {
DCHECK(!web_node.isNull());
DCHECK(!IsRendering());
state_ = INITIALIZED;
frame_ = web_node.document().frame();
node_ = web_node;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1703
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1703/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
|
UsbSetInterfaceAlternateSettingFunction() {
}
|
UsbSetInterfaceAlternateSettingFunction() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4160
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4160/
| null |
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9
|
91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9
|
Non happy-path fixes
|
void FastIdentity16(register const cmsUInt16Number In[],
register cmsUInt16Number Out[],
register const void* D)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = (cmsPipeline*) D;
cmsUInt32Number i;
for (i=0; i < Lut ->InputChannels; i++) {
Out[i] = In[i];
}
}
|
void FastIdentity16(register const cmsUInt16Number In[],
register cmsUInt16Number Out[],
register const void* D)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = (cmsPipeline*) D;
cmsUInt32Number i;
for (i=0; i < Lut ->InputChannels; i++) {
Out[i] = In[i];
}
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
|
954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
| null |
_dbus_atomic_get (DBusAtomic *atomic)
{
#if DBUS_USE_SYNC
__sync_synchronize ();
return atomic->value;
#else
dbus_int32_t res;
_DBUS_LOCK (atomic);
res = atomic->value;
_DBUS_UNLOCK (atomic);
return res;
#endif
}
|
_dbus_atomic_get (DBusAtomic *atomic)
{
#if DBUS_USE_SYNC
__sync_synchronize ();
return atomic->value;
#else
dbus_int32_t res;
_DBUS_LOCK (atomic);
res = atomic->value;
_DBUS_UNLOCK (atomic);
return res;
#endif
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2635/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372
|
rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
void rtmsg_ifinfo(int type, struct net_device *dev, unsigned int change)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
size_t if_info_size;
skb = nlmsg_new((if_info_size = if_nlmsg_size(dev, 0)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
err = rtnl_fill_ifinfo(skb, dev, type, 0, 0, change, 0, 0);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in if_nlmsg_size() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_LINK, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
return;
errout:
if (err < 0)
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_LINK, err);
}
|
void rtmsg_ifinfo(int type, struct net_device *dev, unsigned int change)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
size_t if_info_size;
skb = nlmsg_new((if_info_size = if_nlmsg_size(dev, 0)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
err = rtnl_fill_ifinfo(skb, dev, type, 0, 0, change, 0, 0);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in if_nlmsg_size() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_LINK, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
return;
errout:
if (err < 0)
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_LINK, err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1066/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb
|
CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
|
SMB2_logoff(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
struct smb2_logoff_req *req; /* response is also trivial struct */
int rc = 0;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
int flags = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "disconnect session %p\n", ses);
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
/* no need to send SMB logoff if uid already closed due to reconnect */
if (ses->need_reconnect)
goto smb2_session_already_dead;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_LOGOFF, NULL, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* since no tcon, smb2_init can not do this, so do here */
req->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA)
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
else if (server->sign)
req->hdr.sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
rc = SendReceiveNoRsp(xid, ses, (char *) req, flags);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
smb2_session_already_dead:
return rc;
}
|
SMB2_logoff(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
struct smb2_logoff_req *req; /* response is also trivial struct */
int rc = 0;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
int flags = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "disconnect session %p\n", ses);
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
/* no need to send SMB logoff if uid already closed due to reconnect */
if (ses->need_reconnect)
goto smb2_session_already_dead;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_LOGOFF, NULL, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* since no tcon, smb2_init can not do this, so do here */
req->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA)
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
else if (server->sign)
req->hdr.sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
rc = SendReceiveNoRsp(xid, ses, (char *) req, flags);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
smb2_session_already_dead:
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19045/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067
|
c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067
|
Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
config_test_exit(void)
{
config_err_t config_err = get_config_status();
switch (config_err) {
case CONFIG_OK:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_OK);
case CONFIG_FILE_NOT_FOUND:
case CONFIG_BAD_IF:
case CONFIG_FATAL:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_CONFIG);
case CONFIG_SECURITY_ERROR:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_CONFIG_TEST_SECURITY);
default:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_CONFIG_TEST);
}
}
|
config_test_exit(void)
{
config_err_t config_err = get_config_status();
switch (config_err) {
case CONFIG_OK:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_OK);
case CONFIG_FILE_NOT_FOUND:
case CONFIG_BAD_IF:
case CONFIG_FATAL:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_CONFIG);
case CONFIG_SECURITY_ERROR:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_CONFIG_TEST_SECURITY);
default:
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_CONFIG_TEST);
}
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
DeliverEventToWindowMask(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, xEvent *events,
int count, Mask filter, GrabPtr grab,
ClientPtr *client_return, Mask *mask_return)
{
InputClients *iclients;
if (!GetClientsForDelivery(dev, win, events, filter, &iclients))
return EVENT_SKIP;
return DeliverEventToInputClients(dev, iclients, win, events, count, filter,
grab, client_return, mask_return);
}
|
DeliverEventToWindowMask(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, xEvent *events,
int count, Mask filter, GrabPtr grab,
ClientPtr *client_return, Mask *mask_return)
{
InputClients *iclients;
if (!GetClientsForDelivery(dev, win, events, filter, &iclients))
return EVENT_SKIP;
return DeliverEventToInputClients(dev, iclients, win, events, count, filter,
grab, client_return, mask_return);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-17439
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17439/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/commit/1a6a6e462dc2ac6111f9e02c6852ddec4849b887
|
1a6a6e462dc2ac6111f9e02c6852ddec4849b887
|
Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
|
_kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
{
if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
(etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
|| etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
|| etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
|
_kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
{
if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
(etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
|| etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
|| etype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
heimdal
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6198/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
getChar(char *p)
{
return wc_any_to_ucs(wtf_parse1((wc_uchar **)&p));
}
|
getChar(char *p)
{
return wc_any_to_ucs(wtf_parse1((wc_uchar **)&p));
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1800
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1800/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
1777aa6484af15014b8691082a8c3075418786f5
|
[Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void QQuickWebViewPrivate::_q_onOpenPanelFinished(int result)
{
if (result == QDialog::Rejected)
WKOpenPanelResultListenerCancel(openPanelResultListener);
fileDialog->deleteLater();
fileDialog = 0;
}
|
void QQuickWebViewPrivate::_q_onOpenPanelFinished(int result)
{
if (result == QDialog::Rejected)
WKOpenPanelResultListenerCancel(openPanelResultListener);
fileDialog->deleteLater();
fileDialog = 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int raw_geticmpfilter(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int len, ret = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (len < 0)
goto out;
if (len > sizeof(struct icmp_filter))
len = sizeof(struct icmp_filter);
ret = -EFAULT;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
copy_to_user(optval, &raw_sk(sk)->filter, len))
goto out;
ret = 0;
out: return ret;
}
|
static int raw_geticmpfilter(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int len, ret = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (len < 0)
goto out;
if (len > sizeof(struct icmp_filter))
len = sizeof(struct icmp_filter);
ret = -EFAULT;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
copy_to_user(optval, &raw_sk(sk)->filter, len))
goto out;
ret = 0;
out: return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::NotifyNavigationStateChanged(unsigned changed_flags) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->NavigationStateChanged(this, changed_flags);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::NotifyNavigationStateChanged(unsigned changed_flags) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->NavigationStateChanged(this, changed_flags);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0838/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/sonivox/+/24d7c408c52143bce7b49de82f3913fd8d1219cf
|
24d7c408c52143bce7b49de82f3913fd8d1219cf
|
Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
|
void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
|
void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-10966
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10966/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206384d291
|
5e26325317c72a04c1610ad952974e206384d291
|
Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
|
char *replace_chars(char *str, char from, char to)
{
char *p;
for (p = str; *p != '\0'; p++) {
if (*p == from) *p = to;
}
return str;
}
|
char *replace_chars(char *str, char from, char to)
{
char *p;
for (p = str; *p != '\0'; p++) {
if (*p == from) *p = to;
}
return str;
}
|
C
|
irssi
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6302/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=e97763c92c655dcf4af2860b3abd2bc4c8a267f9
|
e97763c92c655dcf4af2860b3abd2bc4c8a267f9
| null |
static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
if (curve[0])
return 1;
if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
return 0;
# endif
return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
}
|
static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
if (curve[0])
return 1;
if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
return 0;
# endif
return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0910/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ac8bd041b81e46e4e4fcd5021aaa5499703952e6
|
ac8bd041b81e46e4e4fcd5021aaa5499703952e6
|
Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RaiseInfobarForBlocked3DContentOnUIThread(
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
content::ThreeDAPIType requester) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::FromID(
render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (!rvh)
return;
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(
WebContents::FromRenderViewHost(rvh));
if (!web_contents)
return;
web_contents->DidBlock3DAPIs(url, requester);
}
|
void RaiseInfobarForBlocked3DContentOnUIThread(
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
content::ThreeDAPIType requester) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::FromID(
render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (!rvh)
return;
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(
WebContents::FromRenderViewHost(rvh));
if (!web_contents)
return;
web_contents->DidBlock3DAPIs(url, requester);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static void free_kmem_cache_cpus(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int cpu;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c = get_cpu_slab(s, cpu);
if (c) {
s->cpu_slab[cpu] = NULL;
free_kmem_cache_cpu(c, cpu);
}
}
}
|
static void free_kmem_cache_cpus(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int cpu;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c = get_cpu_slab(s, cpu);
if (c) {
s->cpu_slab[cpu] = NULL;
free_kmem_cache_cpu(c, cpu);
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3520/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid,
u32 group, gfp_t allocation)
{
return netlink_broadcast_filtered(ssk, skb, pid, group, allocation,
NULL, NULL);
}
|
int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid,
u32 group, gfp_t allocation)
{
return netlink_broadcast_filtered(ssk, skb, pid, group, allocation,
NULL, NULL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3646
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3646/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a642fc305053cc1c6e47e4f4df327895747ab485
|
a642fc305053cc1c6e47e4f4df327895747ab485
|
kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5302/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/abrt/libreport/commit/257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
|
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
|
static bool get_sensitive_data_permission(const char *event_name)
{
event_config_t *event_cfg = get_event_config(event_name);
if (!event_cfg || !event_cfg->ec_sending_sensitive_data)
return true;
char *msg = xasprintf(_("Event '%s' requires permission to send possibly sensitive data."
"\nDo you want to continue?"),
ec_get_screen_name(event_cfg) ? ec_get_screen_name(event_cfg) : event_name);
const bool response = run_ask_yes_no_yesforever_dialog("ask_send_sensitive_data", msg, GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant));
free(msg);
return response;
}
|
static bool get_sensitive_data_permission(const char *event_name)
{
event_config_t *event_cfg = get_event_config(event_name);
if (!event_cfg || !event_cfg->ec_sending_sensitive_data)
return true;
char *msg = xasprintf(_("Event '%s' requires permission to send possibly sensitive data."
"\nDo you want to continue?"),
ec_get_screen_name(event_cfg) ? ec_get_screen_name(event_cfg) : event_name);
const bool response = run_ask_yes_no_yesforever_dialog("ask_send_sensitive_data", msg, GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant));
free(msg);
return response;
}
|
C
|
libreport
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
void Document::RemoveFocusedElementOfSubtree(Node* node,
bool among_children_only) {
if (!focused_element_)
return;
if (!node->isConnected())
return;
bool contains =
node->IsShadowIncludingInclusiveAncestorOf(focused_element_.Get());
if (contains && (focused_element_ != node || !among_children_only))
ClearFocusedElement();
}
|
void Document::RemoveFocusedElementOfSubtree(Node* node,
bool among_children_only) {
if (!focused_element_)
return;
if (!node->isConnected())
return;
bool contains =
node->IsShadowIncludingInclusiveAncestorOf(focused_element_.Get());
if (contains && (focused_element_ != node || !among_children_only))
ClearFocusedElement();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3212
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3212/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4
|
2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4
|
sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_authkeyid val;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, val.scact_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && val.scact_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc)
val.scact_keynumber = asoc->active_key_id;
else
val.scact_keynumber = ep->active_key_id;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_authkeyid val;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, val.scact_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && val.scact_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc)
val.scact_keynumber = asoc->active_key_id;
else
val.scact_keynumber = ep->active_key_id;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3535
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3535/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/256df2f3879efdb2e9808bdb1b54b16fbb11fa38
|
256df2f3879efdb2e9808bdb1b54b16fbb11fa38
|
netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mq(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
void (*setup)(struct net_device *), unsigned int queue_count)
{
struct netdev_queue *tx;
struct net_device *dev;
size_t alloc_size;
struct net_device *p;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
struct netdev_rx_queue *rx;
int i;
#endif
BUG_ON(strlen(name) >= sizeof(dev->name));
alloc_size = sizeof(struct net_device);
if (sizeof_priv) {
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of private area */
alloc_size = ALIGN(alloc_size, NETDEV_ALIGN);
alloc_size += sizeof_priv;
}
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of whole construct */
alloc_size += NETDEV_ALIGN - 1;
p = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device.\n");
return NULL;
}
tx = kcalloc(queue_count, sizeof(struct netdev_queue), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate "
"tx qdiscs.\n");
goto free_p;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
rx = kcalloc(queue_count, sizeof(struct netdev_rx_queue), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate "
"rx queues.\n");
goto free_tx;
}
atomic_set(&rx->count, queue_count);
/*
* Set a pointer to first element in the array which holds the
* reference count.
*/
for (i = 0; i < queue_count; i++)
rx[i].first = rx;
#endif
dev = PTR_ALIGN(p, NETDEV_ALIGN);
dev->padded = (char *)dev - (char *)p;
if (dev_addr_init(dev))
goto free_rx;
dev_mc_init(dev);
dev_uc_init(dev);
dev_net_set(dev, &init_net);
dev->_tx = tx;
dev->num_tx_queues = queue_count;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = queue_count;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
dev->_rx = rx;
dev->num_rx_queues = queue_count;
#endif
dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE;
netdev_init_queues(dev);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.list);
dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list);
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
setup(dev);
strcpy(dev->name, name);
return dev;
free_rx:
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
kfree(rx);
free_tx:
#endif
kfree(tx);
free_p:
kfree(p);
return NULL;
}
|
struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mq(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
void (*setup)(struct net_device *), unsigned int queue_count)
{
struct netdev_queue *tx;
struct net_device *dev;
size_t alloc_size;
struct net_device *p;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
struct netdev_rx_queue *rx;
int i;
#endif
BUG_ON(strlen(name) >= sizeof(dev->name));
alloc_size = sizeof(struct net_device);
if (sizeof_priv) {
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of private area */
alloc_size = ALIGN(alloc_size, NETDEV_ALIGN);
alloc_size += sizeof_priv;
}
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of whole construct */
alloc_size += NETDEV_ALIGN - 1;
p = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device.\n");
return NULL;
}
tx = kcalloc(queue_count, sizeof(struct netdev_queue), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate "
"tx qdiscs.\n");
goto free_p;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
rx = kcalloc(queue_count, sizeof(struct netdev_rx_queue), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rx) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate "
"rx queues.\n");
goto free_tx;
}
atomic_set(&rx->count, queue_count);
/*
* Set a pointer to first element in the array which holds the
* reference count.
*/
for (i = 0; i < queue_count; i++)
rx[i].first = rx;
#endif
dev = PTR_ALIGN(p, NETDEV_ALIGN);
dev->padded = (char *)dev - (char *)p;
if (dev_addr_init(dev))
goto free_rx;
dev_mc_init(dev);
dev_uc_init(dev);
dev_net_set(dev, &init_net);
dev->_tx = tx;
dev->num_tx_queues = queue_count;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = queue_count;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
dev->_rx = rx;
dev->num_rx_queues = queue_count;
#endif
dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE;
netdev_init_queues(dev);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.list);
dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list);
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
setup(dev);
strcpy(dev->name, name);
return dev;
free_rx:
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
kfree(rx);
free_tx:
#endif
kfree(tx);
free_p:
kfree(p);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5045/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/295dc39d941dc2ae53d5c170365af4c9d5c16212
|
295dc39d941dc2ae53d5c170365af4c9d5c16212
|
fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
static int lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
struct path *path, struct inode **inode)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = nd->path.mnt;
struct dentry *dentry, *parent = nd->path.dentry;
int need_reval = 1;
int status = 1;
int err;
/*
* Rename seqlock is not required here because in the off chance
* of a false negative due to a concurrent rename, we're going to
* do the non-racy lookup, below.
*/
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
unsigned seq;
dentry = __d_lookup_rcu(parent, &nd->last, &seq);
if (!dentry)
goto unlazy;
/*
* This sequence count validates that the inode matches
* the dentry name information from lookup.
*/
*inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (read_seqcount_retry(&dentry->d_seq, seq))
return -ECHILD;
/*
* This sequence count validates that the parent had no
* changes while we did the lookup of the dentry above.
*
* The memory barrier in read_seqcount_begin of child is
* enough, we can use __read_seqcount_retry here.
*/
if (__read_seqcount_retry(&parent->d_seq, nd->seq))
return -ECHILD;
nd->seq = seq;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE)) {
status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(status <= 0)) {
if (status != -ECHILD)
need_reval = 0;
goto unlazy;
}
}
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dentry;
if (unlikely(!__follow_mount_rcu(nd, path, inode)))
goto unlazy;
if (unlikely(path->dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT))
goto unlazy;
return 0;
unlazy:
if (unlazy_walk(nd, dentry))
return -ECHILD;
} else {
dentry = __d_lookup(parent, &nd->last);
}
if (unlikely(!dentry))
goto need_lookup;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE) && need_reval)
status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(status <= 0)) {
if (status < 0) {
dput(dentry);
return status;
}
if (!d_invalidate(dentry)) {
dput(dentry);
goto need_lookup;
}
}
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dentry;
err = follow_managed(path, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
return err;
}
if (err)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
*inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
return 0;
need_lookup:
return 1;
}
|
static int lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
struct path *path, struct inode **inode)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = nd->path.mnt;
struct dentry *dentry, *parent = nd->path.dentry;
int need_reval = 1;
int status = 1;
int err;
/*
* Rename seqlock is not required here because in the off chance
* of a false negative due to a concurrent rename, we're going to
* do the non-racy lookup, below.
*/
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
unsigned seq;
dentry = __d_lookup_rcu(parent, &nd->last, &seq);
if (!dentry)
goto unlazy;
/*
* This sequence count validates that the inode matches
* the dentry name information from lookup.
*/
*inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (read_seqcount_retry(&dentry->d_seq, seq))
return -ECHILD;
/*
* This sequence count validates that the parent had no
* changes while we did the lookup of the dentry above.
*
* The memory barrier in read_seqcount_begin of child is
* enough, we can use __read_seqcount_retry here.
*/
if (__read_seqcount_retry(&parent->d_seq, nd->seq))
return -ECHILD;
nd->seq = seq;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE)) {
status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(status <= 0)) {
if (status != -ECHILD)
need_reval = 0;
goto unlazy;
}
}
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dentry;
if (unlikely(!__follow_mount_rcu(nd, path, inode)))
goto unlazy;
if (unlikely(path->dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT))
goto unlazy;
return 0;
unlazy:
if (unlazy_walk(nd, dentry))
return -ECHILD;
} else {
dentry = __d_lookup(parent, &nd->last);
}
if (unlikely(!dentry))
goto need_lookup;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE) && need_reval)
status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(status <= 0)) {
if (status < 0) {
dput(dentry);
return status;
}
if (!d_invalidate(dentry)) {
dput(dentry);
goto need_lookup;
}
}
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dentry;
err = follow_managed(path, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
return err;
}
if (err)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
*inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
return 0;
need_lookup:
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3899
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3899/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
97837bb6cbac21ea679843a0037779d3834bed64
|
OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
|
void OMXCodec::setState(State newState) {
mState = newState;
mAsyncCompletion.signal();
mBufferFilled.signal();
}
|
void OMXCodec::setState(State newState) {
mState = newState;
mAsyncCompletion.signal();
mBufferFilled.signal();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7480
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7480/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4
|
61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4
|
Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
|
SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, getHash)
{
zval *obj;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "o", &obj) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_NEW_STR(php_spl_object_hash(obj));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SplObjectStorage::offsetGet(object obj)
|
SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, getHash)
{
zval *obj;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "o", &obj) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_NEW_STR(php_spl_object_hash(obj));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SplObjectStorage::offsetGet(object obj)
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4652
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4652/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
|
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
card_id_show_attr(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct snd_card *card = container_of(dev, struct snd_card, card_dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", card->id);
}
|
card_id_show_attr(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct snd_card *card = container_of(dev, struct snd_card, card_dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", card->id);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5766
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5766/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7722455726bec8c53458a32851d2a87982cf0eac?w=1
|
7722455726bec8c53458a32851d2a87982cf0eac?w=1
|
Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
|
gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromGd2PartPtr (int size, void *data, int srcx, int srcy, int w, int h)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(size, data, 0);
im = gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx(in, srcx, srcy, w, h);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
|
gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromGd2PartPtr (int size, void *data, int srcx, int srcy, int w, int h)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(size, data, 0);
im = gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx(in, srcx, srcy, w, h);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6213/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498
|
d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498
|
mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
static inline int do_refcount_check(struct mount *mnt, int count)
{
return mnt_get_count(mnt) > count;
}
|
static inline int do_refcount_check(struct mount *mnt, int count)
{
return mnt_get_count(mnt) > count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17351/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ef36ab967c71690ebe7e5ef997a8be4da3bc844
|
6ef36ab967c71690ebe7e5ef997a8be4da3bc844
|
xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static struct page *balloon_next_page(struct page *page)
{
struct list_head *next = page->lru.next;
if (next == &ballooned_pages)
return NULL;
return list_entry(next, struct page, lru);
}
|
static struct page *balloon_next_page(struct page *page)
{
struct list_head *next = page->lru.next;
if (next == &ballooned_pages)
return NULL;
return list_entry(next, struct page, lru);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2784/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/225e7438996c9c939bd239376dfa93e562972cf8
|
225e7438996c9c939bd239376dfa93e562972cf8
|
Update PrerenderBrowserTests to work with new
PrerenderContents.
Also update PrerenderContents to pass plugin
and HTML5 prerender tests.
BUG=81229
TEST=PrerenderBrowserTests (Once the new code is enabled)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6905169
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83841 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NavigateToURLImpl(const GURL& dest_url) const {
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url_) != NULL);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), dest_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url_) == NULL);
if (call_javascript_) {
bool display_test_result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractBool(
browser()->GetSelectedTabContents()->render_view_host(), L"",
L"window.domAutomationController.send(DidDisplayPass())",
&display_test_result));
EXPECT_TRUE(display_test_result);
}
}
|
void NavigateToURLImpl(const GURL& dest_url) const {
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url_) != NULL);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), dest_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url_) == NULL);
if (call_javascript_) {
bool display_test_result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractBool(
browser()->GetSelectedTabContents()->render_view_host(), L"",
L"window.domAutomationController.send(DidDisplayPass())",
&display_test_result));
EXPECT_TRUE(display_test_result);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6351/
|
CWE-787
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=926cde5f3e4d2504ed161ed0cb771ac7cad6fd11
|
926cde5f3e4d2504ed161ed0cb771ac7cad6fd11
| null |
static void esp_dma_done(ESPState *s)
{
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] |= STAT_TC;
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = INTR_BS;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_TCLO] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_TCMID] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_TCHI] = 0;
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
|
static void esp_dma_done(ESPState *s)
{
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] |= STAT_TC;
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = INTR_BS;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_TCLO] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_TCMID] = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_TCHI] = 0;
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4656
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4656/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
|
ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
|
ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
struct snd_kcontrol *snd_ctl_find_id(struct snd_card *card,
struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !id))
return NULL;
if (id->numid != 0)
return snd_ctl_find_numid(card, id->numid);
list_for_each_entry(kctl, &card->controls, list) {
if (kctl->id.iface != id->iface)
continue;
if (kctl->id.device != id->device)
continue;
if (kctl->id.subdevice != id->subdevice)
continue;
if (strncmp(kctl->id.name, id->name, sizeof(kctl->id.name)))
continue;
if (kctl->id.index > id->index)
continue;
if (kctl->id.index + kctl->count <= id->index)
continue;
return kctl;
}
return NULL;
}
|
struct snd_kcontrol *snd_ctl_find_id(struct snd_card *card,
struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !id))
return NULL;
if (id->numid != 0)
return snd_ctl_find_numid(card, id->numid);
list_for_each_entry(kctl, &card->controls, list) {
if (kctl->id.iface != id->iface)
continue;
if (kctl->id.device != id->device)
continue;
if (kctl->id.subdevice != id->subdevice)
continue;
if (strncmp(kctl->id.name, id->name, sizeof(kctl->id.name)))
continue;
if (kctl->id.index > id->index)
continue;
if (kctl->id.index + kctl->count <= id->index)
continue;
return kctl;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5330/
|
CWE-78
|
https://cgit.kde.org/ark.git/commit/?id=82fdfd24d46966a117fa625b68784735a40f9065
|
82fdfd24d46966a117fa625b68784735a40f9065
| null |
void Part::loadArchive()
{
const QString fixedMimeType = arguments().metaData()[QStringLiteral("fixedMimeType")];
auto job = m_model->loadArchive(localFilePath(), fixedMimeType, m_model);
if (job) {
registerJob(job);
job->start();
} else {
updateActions();
}
}
|
void Part::loadArchive()
{
const QString fixedMimeType = arguments().metaData()[QStringLiteral("fixedMimeType")];
auto job = m_model->loadArchive(localFilePath(), fixedMimeType, m_model);
if (job) {
registerJob(job);
job->start();
} else {
updateActions();
}
}
|
CPP
|
kde
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2c3d133e93d0455eb64bd96384f317674db79ab5
|
2c3d133e93d0455eb64bd96384f317674db79ab5
|
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=48246
Reviewed by Sam Weinig.
Make selectionRect() on InlineTextBox give the right value for a vertical line. Selection is still too broken
to test anything though.
* rendering/InlineTextBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineTextBox::selectionRect):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@70456 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
int InlineTextBox::caretMaxOffset() const
{
return m_start + m_len;
}
|
int InlineTextBox::caretMaxOffset() const
{
return m_start + m_len;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
long Segment::DoLoadCluster(
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
pos += len; // consume ID
// Read Size
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
// pos now points to start of payload
if (size == 0) { // weird
m_pos = pos;
continue;
}
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
#if 0 // we must handle this to support live webm
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: allow this
#endif
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop)) {
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
#if 0 // commented-out, to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) { // Cues ID
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: liberalize
if (m_pCues == NULL) {
const long long element_size = (pos - idpos) + size;
m_pCues = new Cues(this, pos, size, idpos, element_size);
assert(m_pCues); // TODO
}
m_pos = pos + size; // consume payload
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) { // Cluster ID
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: liberalize
m_pos = pos + size; // consume payload
continue;
}
// We have a cluster.
cluster_off = idpos - m_start; // relative pos
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(cluster_off >= 0); // have cluster
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, cluster_off, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) { // error, or underflow
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
// status == 0 means "no block entries found"
// status > 0 means "found at least one block entry"
// TODO:
// The issue here is that the segment increments its own
// pos ptr past the most recent cluster parsed, and then
// starts from there to parse the next cluster. If we
// don't know the size of the current cluster, then we
// must either parse its payload (as we do below), looking
// for the cluster (or cues) ID to terminate the parse.
// This isn't really what we want: rather, we really need
// a way to create the curr cluster object immediately.
// The pity is that cluster::parse can determine its own
// boundary, and we largely duplicate that same logic here.
//
// Maybe we need to get rid of our look-ahead preloading
// in source::parse???
//
// As we're parsing the blocks in the curr cluster
//(in cluster::parse), we should have some way to signal
// to the segment that we have determined the boundary,
// so it can adjust its own segment::m_pos member.
//
// The problem is that we're asserting in asyncreadinit,
// because we adjust the pos down to the curr seek pos,
// and the resulting adjusted len is > 2GB. I'm suspicious
// that this is even correct, but even if it is, we can't
// be loading that much data in the cache anyway.
const long idx = m_clusterCount;
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0) {
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) { // preloaded already
if (status == 0) // no entries found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (cluster_size >= 0)
pos += cluster_size;
else {
const long long element_size = pCluster->GetElementSize();
if (element_size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: handle this case
pos = pCluster->m_element_start + element_size;
}
pCluster->m_index = idx; // move from preloaded to loaded
++m_clusterCount;
--m_clusterPreloadCount;
m_pos = pos; // consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0; // success
}
}
if (status == 0) { // no entries found
if (cluster_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: handle this
pos += cluster_size;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total)) {
m_pos = total;
return 1; // no more clusters
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop)) {
m_pos = segment_stop;
return 1; // no more clusters
}
m_pos = pos;
return 2; // try again
}
// status > 0 means we have an entry
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this, idx, cluster_off);
// element_size);
assert(pCluster);
AppendCluster(pCluster);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
if (cluster_size >= 0) {
pos += cluster_size;
m_pos = pos;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0;
}
m_pUnknownSize = pCluster;
m_pos = -pos;
return 0; // partial success, since we have a new cluster
//// status == 0 means "no block entries found"
//// pos designates start of payload
//// m_pos has NOT been adjusted yet (in case we need to come back here)
#if 0
if (cluster_size < 0) { //unknown size
const long long payload_pos = pos; //absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) { //determine cluster size
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; //no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0);
pos = payload_pos; //reset and re-parse original cluster
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //subtle
}
m_pos = pos + cluster_size; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; //try to find another cluster
#endif
}
|
long Segment::DoLoadCluster(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
if (m_pos < 0)
return DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(pos, len);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long cluster_off = -1; //offset relative to start of segment
long long cluster_size = -1; //size of cluster payload
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
return 1; //no more clusters
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; //no more clusters
pos = m_pos;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
if (size == 0) //weird
{
m_pos = pos;
continue;
}
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
#if 0 //we must handle this to support live webm
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: allow this
#endif
if ((segment_stop >= 0) &&
(size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop))
{
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
#if 0 //commented-out, to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
if (m_pCues == NULL)
{
const long long element_size = (pos - idpos) + size;
m_pCues = new Cues(this,
pos,
size,
idpos,
element_size);
assert(m_pCues); //TODO
}
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
cluster_off = idpos - m_start; //relative pos
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(cluster_off >= 0); //have cluster
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, cluster_off, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) //error, or underflow
{
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
const long idx = m_clusterCount;
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
{
if (status == 0) //no entries found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (cluster_size >= 0)
pos += cluster_size;
else
{
const long long element_size = pCluster->GetElementSize();
if (element_size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this case
pos = pCluster->m_element_start + element_size;
}
pCluster->m_index = idx; //move from preloaded to loaded
++m_clusterCount;
--m_clusterPreloadCount;
m_pos = pos; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0; //success
}
}
if (status == 0) //no entries found
{
if (cluster_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this
pos += cluster_size;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
m_pos = total;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
m_pos = segment_stop;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
m_pos = pos;
return 2; //try again
}
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this,
idx,
cluster_off);
assert(pCluster);
AppendCluster(pCluster);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
if (cluster_size >= 0)
{
pos += cluster_size;
m_pos = pos;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0;
}
m_pUnknownSize = pCluster;
m_pos = -pos;
return 0; //partial success, since we have a new cluster
//// status == 0 means "no block entries found"
//// pos designates start of payload
//// m_pos has NOT been adjusted yet (in case we need to come back here)
#if 0
if (cluster_size < 0) //unknown size
{
const long long payload_pos = pos; //absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; //no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0);
pos = payload_pos; //reset and re-parse original cluster
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //subtle
}
m_pos = pos + cluster_size; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; //try to find another cluster
#endif
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2016-10197
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10197/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libevent/libevent/commit/ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
|
evdns_set_random_bytes_fn(void (*fn)(char *, size_t))
{
}
|
evdns_set_random_bytes_fn(void (*fn)(char *, size_t))
{
}
|
C
|
libevent
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1212
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1212/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0c08ed56a3e5089b3cc4094e83daae196a6300c4
|
0c08ed56a3e5089b3cc4094e83daae196a6300c4
|
[Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
|
ControllerConnectionProxy::MakeRemoteRequest() {
DCHECK(!target_connection_ptr_)
<< "target_connection_ptr_ should only be bound once.";
return mojo::MakeRequest(&target_connection_ptr_);
}
|
ControllerConnectionProxy::MakeRemoteRequest() {
DCHECK(!target_connection_ptr_)
<< "target_connection_ptr_ should only be bound once.";
return mojo::MakeRequest(&target_connection_ptr_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7fdd2894ef51ee234882fa2457bb1f2a8895cbe
|
f7fdd2894ef51ee234882fa2457bb1f2a8895cbe
|
Makes the extension resize gripper only visible when the mouse is over
it.
BUG=45750
TEST=see bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2800022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@50515 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::Point ImageView::ComputeImageOrigin(const gfx::Size& image_size) const {
gfx::Insets insets = GetInsets();
int x;
Alignment actual_horiz_alignment = horiz_alignment_;
if (base::i18n::IsRTL() && (horiz_alignment_ != CENTER))
actual_horiz_alignment = (horiz_alignment_ == LEADING) ? TRAILING : LEADING;
switch (actual_horiz_alignment) {
case LEADING: x = insets.left(); break;
case TRAILING: x = width() - insets.right() - image_size.width(); break;
case CENTER: x = (width() - image_size.width()) / 2; break;
default: NOTREACHED(); x = 0; break;
}
int y;
switch (vert_alignment_) {
case LEADING: y = insets.top(); break;
case TRAILING: y = height() - insets.bottom() - image_size.height(); break;
case CENTER: y = (height() - image_size.height()) / 2; break;
default: NOTREACHED(); y = 0; break;
}
return gfx::Point(x, y);
}
|
gfx::Point ImageView::ComputeImageOrigin(const gfx::Size& image_size) const {
gfx::Insets insets = GetInsets();
int x;
Alignment actual_horiz_alignment = horiz_alignment_;
if (base::i18n::IsRTL() && (horiz_alignment_ != CENTER))
actual_horiz_alignment = (horiz_alignment_ == LEADING) ? TRAILING : LEADING;
switch (actual_horiz_alignment) {
case LEADING: x = insets.left(); break;
case TRAILING: x = width() - insets.right() - image_size.width(); break;
case CENTER: x = (width() - image_size.width()) / 2; break;
default: NOTREACHED(); x = 0; break;
}
int y;
switch (vert_alignment_) {
case LEADING: y = insets.top(); break;
case TRAILING: y = height() - insets.bottom() - image_size.height(); break;
case CENTER: y = (height() - image_size.height()) / 2; break;
default: NOTREACHED(); y = 0; break;
}
return gfx::Point(x, y);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6043
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6043/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36fd3c9a6ba9fce9dd80c442c3ba5decd8e4c065
|
36fd3c9a6ba9fce9dd80c442c3ba5decd8e4c065
|
Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
|
void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture,
Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
// TODO(mgiuca): This essentially amounts to "remove illegal characters from
// the URL", something that probably should be done by the GURL constructor
// itself. The GURL constructor does do it in some cases (e.g., mailto) but
// not in general. https://crbug.com/788244.
std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec());
GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string);
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id);
Profile* profile = nullptr;
if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing.
profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
BlockState block_state =
GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile);
if (block_state == BLOCK) {
if (delegate)
delegate->BlockRequest();
return;
}
g_accept_requests = false;
shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind(
&OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, escaped_url,
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN,
page_transition, has_user_gesture, delegate);
CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate)
->StartCheckIsDefault();
}
|
void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture,
Delegate* delegate) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
std::string escaped_url_string = net::EscapeExternalHandlerValue(url.spec());
GURL escaped_url(escaped_url_string);
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id);
Profile* profile = nullptr;
if (web_contents) // Maybe NULL during testing.
profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
BlockState block_state =
GetBlockStateWithDelegate(escaped_url.scheme(), delegate, profile);
if (block_state == BLOCK) {
if (delegate)
delegate->BlockRequest();
return;
}
g_accept_requests = false;
shell_integration::DefaultWebClientWorkerCallback callback = base::Bind(
&OnDefaultProtocolClientWorkerFinished, url, render_process_host_id,
render_view_routing_id, block_state == UNKNOWN, page_transition,
has_user_gesture, delegate);
CreateShellWorker(callback, escaped_url.scheme(), delegate)
->StartCheckIsDefault();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
warning_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp message)
{
struct file *file = get_control(png_ptr);
if (file->global->warnings)
emit_error(file, LIBPNG_WARNING_CODE, message);
}
|
warning_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp message)
{
struct file *file = get_control(png_ptr);
if (file->global->warnings)
emit_error(file, LIBPNG_WARNING_CODE, message);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
TBR=oshima@chromium.org
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124}
|
void HandleRotateActiveWindow() {
base::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Rotate_Window"));
aura::Window* active_window = wm::GetActiveWindow();
if (active_window) {
active_window->layer()->GetAnimator()->set_preemption_strategy(
ui::LayerAnimator::REPLACE_QUEUED_ANIMATIONS);
active_window->layer()->GetAnimator()->StartAnimation(
new ui::LayerAnimationSequence(
new WindowRotation(360, active_window->layer())));
}
}
|
void HandleRotateActiveWindow() {
base::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Rotate_Window"));
aura::Window* active_window = wm::GetActiveWindow();
if (active_window) {
active_window->layer()->GetAnimator()->set_preemption_strategy(
ui::LayerAnimator::REPLACE_QUEUED_ANIMATIONS);
active_window->layer()->GetAnimator()->StartAnimation(
new ui::LayerAnimationSequence(
new WindowRotation(360, active_window->layer())));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
String AXObject::textFromElements(bool inAriaLabelledbyTraversal,
AXObjectSet& visited,
HeapVector<Member<Element>>& elements,
AXRelatedObjectVector* relatedObjects) const {
StringBuilder accumulatedText;
bool foundValidElement = false;
AXRelatedObjectVector localRelatedObjects;
for (const auto& element : elements) {
AXObject* axElement = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(element);
if (axElement) {
foundValidElement = true;
String result = recursiveTextAlternative(
*axElement, inAriaLabelledbyTraversal, visited);
localRelatedObjects.push_back(
new NameSourceRelatedObject(axElement, result));
if (!result.isEmpty()) {
if (!accumulatedText.isEmpty())
accumulatedText.append(' ');
accumulatedText.append(result);
}
}
}
if (!foundValidElement)
return String();
if (relatedObjects)
*relatedObjects = localRelatedObjects;
return accumulatedText.toString();
}
|
String AXObject::textFromElements(bool inAriaLabelledbyTraversal,
AXObjectSet& visited,
HeapVector<Member<Element>>& elements,
AXRelatedObjectVector* relatedObjects) const {
StringBuilder accumulatedText;
bool foundValidElement = false;
AXRelatedObjectVector localRelatedObjects;
for (const auto& element : elements) {
AXObject* axElement = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(element);
if (axElement) {
foundValidElement = true;
String result = recursiveTextAlternative(
*axElement, inAriaLabelledbyTraversal, visited);
localRelatedObjects.push_back(
new NameSourceRelatedObject(axElement, result));
if (!result.isEmpty()) {
if (!accumulatedText.isEmpty())
accumulatedText.append(' ');
accumulatedText.append(result);
}
}
}
if (!foundValidElement)
return String();
if (relatedObjects)
*relatedObjects = localRelatedObjects;
return accumulatedText.toString();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5850/
|
CWE-770
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/142cfc82b932bc211218fbd7bdda8c7ce83f19df
|
142cfc82b932bc211218fbd7bdda8c7ce83f19df
|
Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
|
server_read_http(struct bufferevent *bev, void *arg)
{
struct client *clt = arg;
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct http_descriptor *desc = clt->clt_descreq;
struct evbuffer *src = EVBUFFER_INPUT(bev);
char *line = NULL, *key, *value;
const char *errstr;
size_t size, linelen;
struct kv *hdr = NULL;
getmonotime(&clt->clt_tv_last);
size = EVBUFFER_LENGTH(src);
DPRINTF("%s: session %d: size %lu, to read %lld",
__func__, clt->clt_id, size, clt->clt_toread);
if (!size) {
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_HEADER;
goto done;
}
while (!clt->clt_headersdone && (line =
evbuffer_readln(src, NULL, EVBUFFER_EOL_CRLF_STRICT)) != NULL) {
linelen = strlen(line);
/*
* An empty line indicates the end of the request.
* libevent already stripped the \r\n for us.
*/
if (!linelen) {
clt->clt_headersdone = 1;
free(line);
break;
}
key = line;
/* Limit the total header length minus \r\n */
clt->clt_headerlen += linelen;
if (clt->clt_headerlen > SERVER_MAXHEADERLENGTH) {
server_abort_http(clt, 413, "request too large");
goto abort;
}
/*
* The first line is the GET/POST/PUT/... request,
* subsequent lines are HTTP headers.
*/
if (++clt->clt_line == 1)
value = strchr(key, ' ');
else if (*key == ' ' || *key == '\t')
/* Multiline headers wrap with a space or tab */
value = NULL;
else
value = strchr(key, ':');
if (value == NULL) {
if (clt->clt_line == 1) {
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
/* Append line to the last header, if present */
if (kv_extend(&desc->http_headers,
desc->http_lastheader, line) == NULL)
goto fail;
free(line);
continue;
}
if (*value == ':') {
*value++ = '\0';
value += strspn(value, " \t\r\n");
} else {
*value++ = '\0';
}
DPRINTF("%s: session %d: header '%s: %s'", __func__,
clt->clt_id, key, value);
/*
* Identify and handle specific HTTP request methods
*/
if (clt->clt_line == 1) {
if ((desc->http_method = server_httpmethod_byname(key))
== HTTP_METHOD_NONE) {
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
/*
* Decode request path and query
*/
desc->http_path = strdup(value);
if (desc->http_path == NULL)
goto fail;
desc->http_version = strchr(desc->http_path, ' ');
if (desc->http_version == NULL) {
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
*desc->http_version++ = '\0';
desc->http_query = strchr(desc->http_path, '?');
if (desc->http_query != NULL)
*desc->http_query++ = '\0';
/*
* Have to allocate the strings because they could
* be changed independently by the filters later.
*/
if ((desc->http_version =
strdup(desc->http_version)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if (desc->http_query != NULL &&
(desc->http_query =
strdup(desc->http_query)) == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (desc->http_method != HTTP_METHOD_NONE &&
strcasecmp("Content-Length", key) == 0) {
if (desc->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_TRACE ||
desc->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_CONNECT) {
/*
* These method should not have a body
* and thus no Content-Length header.
*/
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
/*
* Need to read data from the client after the
* HTTP header.
* XXX What about non-standard clients not using
* the carriage return? And some browsers seem to
* include the line length in the content-length.
*/
clt->clt_toread = strtonum(value, 0, LLONG_MAX,
&errstr);
if (errstr) {
server_abort_http(clt, 500, errstr);
goto abort;
}
if ((size_t)clt->clt_toread >
srv_conf->maxrequestbody) {
server_abort_http(clt, 413, NULL);
goto abort;
}
}
if (strcasecmp("Transfer-Encoding", key) == 0 &&
strcasecmp("chunked", value) == 0)
desc->http_chunked = 1;
if (clt->clt_line != 1) {
if ((hdr = kv_add(&desc->http_headers, key,
value)) == NULL)
goto fail;
desc->http_lastheader = hdr;
}
free(line);
}
if (clt->clt_headersdone) {
if (desc->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_NONE) {
server_abort_http(clt, 406, "no method");
return;
}
switch (desc->http_method) {
case HTTP_METHOD_CONNECT:
/* Data stream */
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_UNLIMITED;
bev->readcb = server_read;
break;
case HTTP_METHOD_DELETE:
case HTTP_METHOD_GET:
case HTTP_METHOD_HEAD:
/* WebDAV methods */
case HTTP_METHOD_COPY:
case HTTP_METHOD_MOVE:
clt->clt_toread = 0;
break;
case HTTP_METHOD_OPTIONS:
case HTTP_METHOD_POST:
case HTTP_METHOD_PUT:
case HTTP_METHOD_RESPONSE:
/* WebDAV methods */
case HTTP_METHOD_PROPFIND:
case HTTP_METHOD_PROPPATCH:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKCOL:
case HTTP_METHOD_LOCK:
case HTTP_METHOD_UNLOCK:
case HTTP_METHOD_VERSION_CONTROL:
case HTTP_METHOD_REPORT:
case HTTP_METHOD_CHECKOUT:
case HTTP_METHOD_CHECKIN:
case HTTP_METHOD_UNCHECKOUT:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKWORKSPACE:
case HTTP_METHOD_UPDATE:
case HTTP_METHOD_LABEL:
case HTTP_METHOD_MERGE:
case HTTP_METHOD_BASELINE_CONTROL:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKACTIVITY:
case HTTP_METHOD_ORDERPATCH:
case HTTP_METHOD_ACL:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKREDIRECTREF:
case HTTP_METHOD_UPDATEREDIRECTREF:
case HTTP_METHOD_SEARCH:
case HTTP_METHOD_PATCH:
/* HTTP request payload */
if (clt->clt_toread > 0)
bev->readcb = server_read_httpcontent;
/* Single-pass HTTP body */
if (clt->clt_toread < 0) {
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_UNLIMITED;
bev->readcb = server_read;
}
break;
default:
server_abort_http(clt, 405, "method not allowed");
return;
}
if (desc->http_chunked) {
/* Chunked transfer encoding */
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_CHUNK_LENGTH;
bev->readcb = server_read_httpchunks;
}
done:
if (clt->clt_toread != 0)
bufferevent_disable(bev, EV_READ);
server_response(httpd_env, clt);
return;
}
if (clt->clt_done) {
server_close(clt, "done");
return;
}
if (EVBUFFER_LENGTH(src) && bev->readcb != server_read_http)
bev->readcb(bev, arg);
bufferevent_enable(bev, EV_READ);
return;
fail:
server_abort_http(clt, 500, strerror(errno));
abort:
free(line);
}
|
server_read_http(struct bufferevent *bev, void *arg)
{
struct client *clt = arg;
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct http_descriptor *desc = clt->clt_descreq;
struct evbuffer *src = EVBUFFER_INPUT(bev);
char *line = NULL, *key, *value;
const char *errstr;
size_t size, linelen;
struct kv *hdr = NULL;
getmonotime(&clt->clt_tv_last);
size = EVBUFFER_LENGTH(src);
DPRINTF("%s: session %d: size %lu, to read %lld",
__func__, clt->clt_id, size, clt->clt_toread);
if (!size) {
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_HEADER;
goto done;
}
while (!clt->clt_headersdone && (line =
evbuffer_readln(src, NULL, EVBUFFER_EOL_CRLF_STRICT)) != NULL) {
linelen = strlen(line);
/*
* An empty line indicates the end of the request.
* libevent already stripped the \r\n for us.
*/
if (!linelen) {
clt->clt_headersdone = 1;
free(line);
break;
}
key = line;
/* Limit the total header length minus \r\n */
clt->clt_headerlen += linelen;
if (clt->clt_headerlen > SERVER_MAXHEADERLENGTH) {
server_abort_http(clt, 413, "request too large");
goto abort;
}
/*
* The first line is the GET/POST/PUT/... request,
* subsequent lines are HTTP headers.
*/
if (++clt->clt_line == 1)
value = strchr(key, ' ');
else if (*key == ' ' || *key == '\t')
/* Multiline headers wrap with a space or tab */
value = NULL;
else
value = strchr(key, ':');
if (value == NULL) {
if (clt->clt_line == 1) {
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
/* Append line to the last header, if present */
if (kv_extend(&desc->http_headers,
desc->http_lastheader, line) == NULL)
goto fail;
free(line);
continue;
}
if (*value == ':') {
*value++ = '\0';
value += strspn(value, " \t\r\n");
} else {
*value++ = '\0';
}
DPRINTF("%s: session %d: header '%s: %s'", __func__,
clt->clt_id, key, value);
/*
* Identify and handle specific HTTP request methods
*/
if (clt->clt_line == 1) {
if ((desc->http_method = server_httpmethod_byname(key))
== HTTP_METHOD_NONE) {
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
/*
* Decode request path and query
*/
desc->http_path = strdup(value);
if (desc->http_path == NULL)
goto fail;
desc->http_version = strchr(desc->http_path, ' ');
if (desc->http_version == NULL) {
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
*desc->http_version++ = '\0';
desc->http_query = strchr(desc->http_path, '?');
if (desc->http_query != NULL)
*desc->http_query++ = '\0';
/*
* Have to allocate the strings because they could
* be changed independently by the filters later.
*/
if ((desc->http_version =
strdup(desc->http_version)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if (desc->http_query != NULL &&
(desc->http_query =
strdup(desc->http_query)) == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (desc->http_method != HTTP_METHOD_NONE &&
strcasecmp("Content-Length", key) == 0) {
if (desc->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_TRACE ||
desc->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_CONNECT) {
/*
* These method should not have a body
* and thus no Content-Length header.
*/
server_abort_http(clt, 400, "malformed");
goto abort;
}
/*
* Need to read data from the client after the
* HTTP header.
* XXX What about non-standard clients not using
* the carriage return? And some browsers seem to
* include the line length in the content-length.
*/
clt->clt_toread = strtonum(value, 0, LLONG_MAX,
&errstr);
if (errstr) {
server_abort_http(clt, 500, errstr);
goto abort;
}
if ((size_t)clt->clt_toread >
srv_conf->maxrequestbody) {
server_abort_http(clt, 413, NULL);
goto abort;
}
}
if (strcasecmp("Transfer-Encoding", key) == 0 &&
strcasecmp("chunked", value) == 0)
desc->http_chunked = 1;
if (clt->clt_line != 1) {
if ((hdr = kv_add(&desc->http_headers, key,
value)) == NULL)
goto fail;
desc->http_lastheader = hdr;
}
free(line);
}
if (clt->clt_headersdone) {
if (desc->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_NONE) {
server_abort_http(clt, 406, "no method");
return;
}
switch (desc->http_method) {
case HTTP_METHOD_CONNECT:
/* Data stream */
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_UNLIMITED;
bev->readcb = server_read;
break;
case HTTP_METHOD_DELETE:
case HTTP_METHOD_GET:
case HTTP_METHOD_HEAD:
/* WebDAV methods */
case HTTP_METHOD_COPY:
case HTTP_METHOD_MOVE:
clt->clt_toread = 0;
break;
case HTTP_METHOD_OPTIONS:
case HTTP_METHOD_POST:
case HTTP_METHOD_PUT:
case HTTP_METHOD_RESPONSE:
/* WebDAV methods */
case HTTP_METHOD_PROPFIND:
case HTTP_METHOD_PROPPATCH:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKCOL:
case HTTP_METHOD_LOCK:
case HTTP_METHOD_UNLOCK:
case HTTP_METHOD_VERSION_CONTROL:
case HTTP_METHOD_REPORT:
case HTTP_METHOD_CHECKOUT:
case HTTP_METHOD_CHECKIN:
case HTTP_METHOD_UNCHECKOUT:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKWORKSPACE:
case HTTP_METHOD_UPDATE:
case HTTP_METHOD_LABEL:
case HTTP_METHOD_MERGE:
case HTTP_METHOD_BASELINE_CONTROL:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKACTIVITY:
case HTTP_METHOD_ORDERPATCH:
case HTTP_METHOD_ACL:
case HTTP_METHOD_MKREDIRECTREF:
case HTTP_METHOD_UPDATEREDIRECTREF:
case HTTP_METHOD_SEARCH:
case HTTP_METHOD_PATCH:
/* HTTP request payload */
if (clt->clt_toread > 0)
bev->readcb = server_read_httpcontent;
/* Single-pass HTTP body */
if (clt->clt_toread < 0) {
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_UNLIMITED;
bev->readcb = server_read;
}
break;
default:
server_abort_http(clt, 405, "method not allowed");
return;
}
if (desc->http_chunked) {
/* Chunked transfer encoding */
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_CHUNK_LENGTH;
bev->readcb = server_read_httpchunks;
}
done:
if (clt->clt_toread != 0)
bufferevent_disable(bev, EV_READ);
server_response(httpd_env, clt);
return;
}
if (clt->clt_done) {
server_close(clt, "done");
return;
}
if (EVBUFFER_LENGTH(src) && bev->readcb != server_read_http)
bev->readcb(bev, arg);
bufferevent_enable(bev, EV_READ);
return;
fail:
server_abort_http(clt, 500, strerror(errno));
abort:
free(line);
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void WindowAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "windowAttribute");
DOMWindow* cpp_value = ToDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
if (!cpp_value) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'Window'.");
return;
}
impl->setWindowAttribute(cpp_value);
}
|
static void WindowAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "windowAttribute");
DOMWindow* cpp_value = ToDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
if (!cpp_value) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'Window'.");
return;
}
impl->setWindowAttribute(cpp_value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2485
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2485/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7cea5cb64b83d690fe02bc210bbdf08f5a87636f
|
7cea5cb64b83d690fe02bc210bbdf08f5a87636f
|
codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftGSM::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 8000;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftGSM::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = 8000;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6836/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
|
fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
| null |
static void vmxnet3_net_init(VMXNET3State *s)
{
DeviceState *d = DEVICE(s);
VMW_CBPRN("vmxnet3_net_init called...");
qemu_macaddr_default_if_unset(&s->conf.macaddr);
/* Windows guest will query the address that was set on init */
memcpy(&s->perm_mac.a, &s->conf.macaddr.a, sizeof(s->perm_mac.a));
s->mcast_list = NULL;
s->mcast_list_len = 0;
s->link_status_and_speed = VMXNET3_LINK_SPEED | VMXNET3_LINK_STATUS_UP;
VMW_CFPRN("Permanent MAC: " MAC_FMT, MAC_ARG(s->perm_mac.a));
s->nic = qemu_new_nic(&net_vmxnet3_info, &s->conf,
object_get_typename(OBJECT(s)),
d->id, s);
s->peer_has_vhdr = vmxnet3_peer_has_vnet_hdr(s);
s->tx_sop = true;
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = false;
s->tx_pkt = NULL;
s->rx_pkt = NULL;
s->rx_vlan_stripping = false;
s->lro_supported = false;
if (s->peer_has_vhdr) {
qemu_set_vnet_hdr_len(qemu_get_queue(s->nic)->peer,
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr));
qemu_using_vnet_hdr(qemu_get_queue(s->nic)->peer, 1);
}
qemu_format_nic_info_str(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->conf.macaddr.a);
}
|
static void vmxnet3_net_init(VMXNET3State *s)
{
DeviceState *d = DEVICE(s);
VMW_CBPRN("vmxnet3_net_init called...");
qemu_macaddr_default_if_unset(&s->conf.macaddr);
/* Windows guest will query the address that was set on init */
memcpy(&s->perm_mac.a, &s->conf.macaddr.a, sizeof(s->perm_mac.a));
s->mcast_list = NULL;
s->mcast_list_len = 0;
s->link_status_and_speed = VMXNET3_LINK_SPEED | VMXNET3_LINK_STATUS_UP;
VMW_CFPRN("Permanent MAC: " MAC_FMT, MAC_ARG(s->perm_mac.a));
s->nic = qemu_new_nic(&net_vmxnet3_info, &s->conf,
object_get_typename(OBJECT(s)),
d->id, s);
s->peer_has_vhdr = vmxnet3_peer_has_vnet_hdr(s);
s->tx_sop = true;
s->skip_current_tx_pkt = false;
s->tx_pkt = NULL;
s->rx_pkt = NULL;
s->rx_vlan_stripping = false;
s->lro_supported = false;
if (s->peer_has_vhdr) {
qemu_set_vnet_hdr_len(qemu_get_queue(s->nic)->peer,
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr));
qemu_using_vnet_hdr(qemu_get_queue(s->nic)->peer, 1);
}
qemu_format_nic_info_str(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->conf.macaddr.a);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1334
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1334/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/5c3fcae78b63ac9dd56e36075903921bd9461f9e
|
5c3fcae78b63ac9dd56e36075903921bd9461f9e
|
CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
static int lxc_attach_remount_sys_proc(void)
{
int ret;
ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to unshare mount namespace");
return -1;
}
if (detect_shared_rootfs()) {
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL)) {
SYSERROR("Failed to make / rslave");
ERROR("Continuing...");
}
}
/* assume /proc is always mounted, so remount it */
ret = umount2("/proc", MNT_DETACH);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to unmount /proc");
return -1;
}
ret = mount("none", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to remount /proc");
return -1;
}
/* try to umount /sys - if it's not a mount point,
* we'll get EINVAL, then we ignore it because it
* may not have been mounted in the first place
*/
ret = umount2("/sys", MNT_DETACH);
if (ret < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
SYSERROR("failed to unmount /sys");
return -1;
} else if (ret == 0) {
/* remount it */
ret = mount("none", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to remount /sys");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int lxc_attach_remount_sys_proc(void)
{
int ret;
ret = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to unshare mount namespace");
return -1;
}
if (detect_shared_rootfs()) {
if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL)) {
SYSERROR("Failed to make / rslave");
ERROR("Continuing...");
}
}
/* assume /proc is always mounted, so remount it */
ret = umount2("/proc", MNT_DETACH);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to unmount /proc");
return -1;
}
ret = mount("none", "/proc", "proc", 0, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to remount /proc");
return -1;
}
/* try to umount /sys - if it's not a mount point,
* we'll get EINVAL, then we ignore it because it
* may not have been mounted in the first place
*/
ret = umount2("/sys", MNT_DETACH);
if (ret < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
SYSERROR("failed to unmount /sys");
return -1;
} else if (ret == 0) {
/* remount it */
ret = mount("none", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to remount /sys");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5092
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5092/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/66b99f3fe60dce77f079cc9c07164f6a34dbea37
|
66b99f3fe60dce77f079cc9c07164f6a34dbea37
|
Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
|
PendingHostCreator::~PendingHostCreator() {
connection_->Send(new PpapiHostMsg_CreateResourceHostsFromHostReply(
routing_id_, sequence_id_, pending_resource_host_ids_));
}
|
PendingHostCreator::~PendingHostCreator() {
connection_->Send(new PpapiHostMsg_CreateResourceHostsFromHostReply(
routing_id_, sequence_id_, pending_resource_host_ids_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20
|
All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
|
void Sys_Init(void)
{
Cmd_AddCommand( "in_restart", Sys_In_Restart_f );
Cvar_Set( "arch", OS_STRING " " ARCH_STRING );
Cvar_Set( "username", Sys_GetCurrentUser( ) );
}
|
void Sys_Init(void)
{
Cmd_AddCommand( "in_restart", Sys_In_Restart_f );
Cvar_Set( "arch", OS_STRING " " ARCH_STRING );
Cvar_Set( "username", Sys_GetCurrentUser( ) );
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2117/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void atl2_get_wol(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_wolinfo *wol)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
wol->supported = WAKE_MAGIC;
wol->wolopts = 0;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_EX)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_UCAST;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_MC)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_MCAST;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_BC)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_BCAST;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_MAG)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_MAGIC;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_LNKC)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_PHY;
}
|
static void atl2_get_wol(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_wolinfo *wol)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
wol->supported = WAKE_MAGIC;
wol->wolopts = 0;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_EX)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_UCAST;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_MC)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_MCAST;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_BC)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_BCAST;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_MAG)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_MAGIC;
if (adapter->wol & ATLX_WUFC_LNKC)
wol->wolopts |= WAKE_PHY;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7912
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7912/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a
|
38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a
|
usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
|
static int __ffs_data_got_strings(struct ffs_data *ffs,
char *const _data, size_t len)
{
u32 str_count, needed_count, lang_count;
struct usb_gadget_strings **stringtabs, *t;
struct usb_string *strings, *s;
const char *data = _data;
ENTER();
if (unlikely(get_unaligned_le32(data) != FUNCTIONFS_STRINGS_MAGIC ||
get_unaligned_le32(data + 4) != len))
goto error;
str_count = get_unaligned_le32(data + 8);
lang_count = get_unaligned_le32(data + 12);
/* if one is zero the other must be zero */
if (unlikely(!str_count != !lang_count))
goto error;
/* Do we have at least as many strings as descriptors need? */
needed_count = ffs->strings_count;
if (unlikely(str_count < needed_count))
goto error;
/*
* If we don't need any strings just return and free all
* memory.
*/
if (!needed_count) {
kfree(_data);
return 0;
}
/* Allocate everything in one chunk so there's less maintenance. */
{
unsigned i = 0;
vla_group(d);
vla_item(d, struct usb_gadget_strings *, stringtabs,
lang_count + 1);
vla_item(d, struct usb_gadget_strings, stringtab, lang_count);
vla_item(d, struct usb_string, strings,
lang_count*(needed_count+1));
char *vlabuf = kmalloc(vla_group_size(d), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!vlabuf)) {
kfree(_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Initialize the VLA pointers */
stringtabs = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtabs);
t = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtab);
i = lang_count;
do {
*stringtabs++ = t++;
} while (--i);
*stringtabs = NULL;
/* stringtabs = vlabuf = d_stringtabs for later kfree */
stringtabs = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtabs);
t = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtab);
s = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, strings);
strings = s;
}
/* For each language */
data += 16;
len -= 16;
do { /* lang_count > 0 so we can use do-while */
unsigned needed = needed_count;
if (unlikely(len < 3))
goto error_free;
t->language = get_unaligned_le16(data);
t->strings = s;
++t;
data += 2;
len -= 2;
/* For each string */
do { /* str_count > 0 so we can use do-while */
size_t length = strnlen(data, len);
if (unlikely(length == len))
goto error_free;
/*
* User may provide more strings then we need,
* if that's the case we simply ignore the
* rest
*/
if (likely(needed)) {
/*
* s->id will be set while adding
* function to configuration so for
* now just leave garbage here.
*/
s->s = data;
--needed;
++s;
}
data += length + 1;
len -= length + 1;
} while (--str_count);
s->id = 0; /* terminator */
s->s = NULL;
++s;
} while (--lang_count);
/* Some garbage left? */
if (unlikely(len))
goto error_free;
/* Done! */
ffs->stringtabs = stringtabs;
ffs->raw_strings = _data;
return 0;
error_free:
kfree(stringtabs);
error:
kfree(_data);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int __ffs_data_got_strings(struct ffs_data *ffs,
char *const _data, size_t len)
{
u32 str_count, needed_count, lang_count;
struct usb_gadget_strings **stringtabs, *t;
struct usb_string *strings, *s;
const char *data = _data;
ENTER();
if (unlikely(get_unaligned_le32(data) != FUNCTIONFS_STRINGS_MAGIC ||
get_unaligned_le32(data + 4) != len))
goto error;
str_count = get_unaligned_le32(data + 8);
lang_count = get_unaligned_le32(data + 12);
/* if one is zero the other must be zero */
if (unlikely(!str_count != !lang_count))
goto error;
/* Do we have at least as many strings as descriptors need? */
needed_count = ffs->strings_count;
if (unlikely(str_count < needed_count))
goto error;
/*
* If we don't need any strings just return and free all
* memory.
*/
if (!needed_count) {
kfree(_data);
return 0;
}
/* Allocate everything in one chunk so there's less maintenance. */
{
unsigned i = 0;
vla_group(d);
vla_item(d, struct usb_gadget_strings *, stringtabs,
lang_count + 1);
vla_item(d, struct usb_gadget_strings, stringtab, lang_count);
vla_item(d, struct usb_string, strings,
lang_count*(needed_count+1));
char *vlabuf = kmalloc(vla_group_size(d), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!vlabuf)) {
kfree(_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Initialize the VLA pointers */
stringtabs = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtabs);
t = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtab);
i = lang_count;
do {
*stringtabs++ = t++;
} while (--i);
*stringtabs = NULL;
/* stringtabs = vlabuf = d_stringtabs for later kfree */
stringtabs = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtabs);
t = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, stringtab);
s = vla_ptr(vlabuf, d, strings);
strings = s;
}
/* For each language */
data += 16;
len -= 16;
do { /* lang_count > 0 so we can use do-while */
unsigned needed = needed_count;
if (unlikely(len < 3))
goto error_free;
t->language = get_unaligned_le16(data);
t->strings = s;
++t;
data += 2;
len -= 2;
/* For each string */
do { /* str_count > 0 so we can use do-while */
size_t length = strnlen(data, len);
if (unlikely(length == len))
goto error_free;
/*
* User may provide more strings then we need,
* if that's the case we simply ignore the
* rest
*/
if (likely(needed)) {
/*
* s->id will be set while adding
* function to configuration so for
* now just leave garbage here.
*/
s->s = data;
--needed;
++s;
}
data += length + 1;
len -= length + 1;
} while (--str_count);
s->id = 0; /* terminator */
s->s = NULL;
++s;
} while (--lang_count);
/* Some garbage left? */
if (unlikely(len))
goto error_free;
/* Done! */
ffs->stringtabs = stringtabs;
ffs->raw_strings = _data;
return 0;
error_free:
kfree(stringtabs);
error:
kfree(_data);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> TBR=dpranke@chromium.org
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
TBR=wuchengli@chromium.org,kcwu@chromium.org,sandersd@chromium.org,jorgelo@chromium.org,posciak@chromium.org
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
VaapiWrapper::LazyProfileInfos::LazyProfileInfos() {
static_assert(arraysize(supported_profiles_) == kCodecModeMax,
"The array size of supported profile is incorrect.");
scoped_ptr<VaapiWrapper> vaapi_wrapper(new VaapiWrapper());
if (!vaapi_wrapper->VaInitialize(base::Bind(&base::DoNothing)))
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kCodecModeMax; ++i) {
supported_profiles_[i] =
vaapi_wrapper->GetSupportedProfileInfosForCodecModeInternal(
static_cast<CodecMode>(i));
}
}
|
VaapiWrapper::LazyProfileInfos::LazyProfileInfos() {
static_assert(arraysize(supported_profiles_) == kCodecModeMax,
"The array size of supported profile is incorrect.");
scoped_ptr<VaapiWrapper> vaapi_wrapper(new VaapiWrapper());
if (!vaapi_wrapper->VaInitialize(base::Bind(&base::DoNothing)))
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kCodecModeMax; ++i) {
supported_profiles_[i] =
vaapi_wrapper->GetSupportedProfileInfosForCodecModeInternal(
static_cast<CodecMode>(i));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2902
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2902/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Layer::CalculateContentsScale(
float ideal_contents_scale,
float device_scale_factor,
float page_scale_factor,
bool animating_transform_to_screen,
float* contents_scale_x,
float* contents_scale_y,
gfx::Size* content_bounds) {
DCHECK(layer_tree_host_);
*contents_scale_x = 1;
*contents_scale_y = 1;
*content_bounds = bounds();
}
|
void Layer::CalculateContentsScale(
float ideal_contents_scale,
float device_scale_factor,
float page_scale_factor,
bool animating_transform_to_screen,
float* contents_scale_x,
float* contents_scale_y,
gfx::Size* content_bounds) {
DCHECK(layer_tree_host_);
*contents_scale_x = 1;
*contents_scale_y = 1;
*content_bounds = bounds();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4564
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4564/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/726812fa2fa7ce16bcf58f6e115f65427a1c0950
|
726812fa2fa7ce16bcf58f6e115f65427a1c0950
|
Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
|
static void TraceEllipse(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo stop,const PointInfo degrees)
{
double
delta,
step,
y;
PointInfo
angle,
point;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Ellipses are just short segmented polys.
*/
if ((stop.x == 0.0) && (stop.y == 0.0))
{
TracePoint(primitive_info,start);
return;
}
delta=2.0/MagickMax(stop.x,stop.y);
step=(double) (MagickPI/8.0);
if ((delta >= 0.0) && (delta < (double) (MagickPI/8.0)))
step=(double) (MagickPI/(4*(MagickPI/delta/2+0.5)));
angle.x=DegreesToRadians(degrees.x);
y=degrees.y;
while (y < degrees.x)
y+=360.0;
angle.y=(double) DegreesToRadians(y);
for (p=primitive_info; angle.x < angle.y; angle.x+=step)
{
point.x=cos(fmod(angle.x,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.x+start.x;
point.y=sin(fmod(angle.x,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.y+start.y;
TracePoint(p,point);
p+=p->coordinates;
}
point.x=cos(fmod(angle.y,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.x+start.x;
point.y=sin(fmod(angle.y,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.y+start.y;
TracePoint(p,point);
p+=p->coordinates;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
}
|
static void TraceEllipse(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo stop,const PointInfo degrees)
{
double
delta,
step,
y;
PointInfo
angle,
point;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Ellipses are just short segmented polys.
*/
if ((stop.x == 0.0) && (stop.y == 0.0))
{
TracePoint(primitive_info,start);
return;
}
delta=2.0/MagickMax(stop.x,stop.y);
step=(double) (MagickPI/8.0);
if ((delta >= 0.0) && (delta < (double) (MagickPI/8.0)))
step=(double) (MagickPI/(4*(MagickPI/delta/2+0.5)));
angle.x=DegreesToRadians(degrees.x);
y=degrees.y;
while (y < degrees.x)
y+=360.0;
angle.y=(double) DegreesToRadians(y);
for (p=primitive_info; angle.x < angle.y; angle.x+=step)
{
point.x=cos(fmod(angle.x,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.x+start.x;
point.y=sin(fmod(angle.x,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.y+start.y;
TracePoint(p,point);
p+=p->coordinates;
}
point.x=cos(fmod(angle.y,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.x+start.x;
point.y=sin(fmod(angle.y,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.y+start.y;
TracePoint(p,point);
p+=p->coordinates;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6775
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6775/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c
|
53f1c0f95e568d4b6b184904f98cfde2833c603c
|
Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
|
TextTrackCueList* TextTrack::EnsureTextTrackCueList() {
if (!cues_) {
cues_ = TextTrackCueList::Create();
}
return cues_.Get();
}
|
TextTrackCueList* TextTrack::EnsureTextTrackCueList() {
if (!cues_) {
cues_ = TextTrackCueList::Create();
}
return cues_.Get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6790/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.kde.org/plasma-workspace.git/commit/?id=5bc696b5abcdb460c1017592e80b2d7f6ed3107c
|
5bc696b5abcdb460c1017592e80b2d7f6ed3107c
| null |
Plasma::Service* NotificationsEngine::serviceForSource(const QString& source)
{
return new NotificationService(this, source);
}
|
Plasma::Service* NotificationsEngine::serviceForSource(const QString& source)
{
return new NotificationService(this, source);
}
|
CPP
|
kde
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15427/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16c719e0e275d2ee5d5c69e4962b744bcaf0fe40
|
16c719e0e275d2ee5d5c69e4962b744bcaf0fe40
|
Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::OnTabChanged(const content::WebContents* web_contents) {
UpdateSecurityLevel();
const OmniboxState* state = static_cast<OmniboxState*>(
web_contents->GetUserData(&OmniboxState::kKey));
model()->RestoreState(state ? &state->model_state : NULL);
if (state) {
SelectRange(state->selection);
saved_selection_for_focus_change_ = state->saved_selection_for_focus_change;
}
ClearEditHistory();
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::OnTabChanged(const content::WebContents* web_contents) {
UpdateSecurityLevel();
const OmniboxState* state = static_cast<OmniboxState*>(
web_contents->GetUserData(&OmniboxState::kKey));
model()->RestoreState(state ? &state->model_state : NULL);
if (state) {
SelectRange(state->selection);
saved_selection_for_focus_change_ = state->saved_selection_for_focus_change;
}
ClearEditHistory();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/aa0e1ed74972a619072341b6409dc5cacd2418aa
|
aa0e1ed74972a619072341b6409dc5cacd2418aa
|
[BlackBerry] willComposite() and didComposite() are now in InspectorController
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110343
Patch by Alberto Garcia <albgarcia@rim.com> on 2013-02-21
Reviewed by Carlos Garcia Campos.
This was changed in r142879.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::willComposite):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::didComposite):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@143584 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Node* WebPagePrivate::nodeForZoomUnderPoint(const IntPoint& documentPoint)
{
if (!m_mainFrame)
return 0;
HitTestResult result = m_mainFrame->eventHandler()->hitTestResultAtPoint(documentPoint);
Node* node = result.innerNonSharedNode();
if (!node)
return 0;
RenderObject* renderer = node->renderer();
while (!renderer) {
node = node->parentNode();
renderer = node->renderer();
}
return node;
}
|
Node* WebPagePrivate::nodeForZoomUnderPoint(const IntPoint& documentPoint)
{
if (!m_mainFrame)
return 0;
HitTestResult result = m_mainFrame->eventHandler()->hitTestResultAtPoint(documentPoint);
Node* node = result.innerNonSharedNode();
if (!node)
return 0;
RenderObject* renderer = node->renderer();
while (!renderer) {
node = node->parentNode();
renderer = node->renderer();
}
return node;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5796
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5796/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
[GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
RegisterNonNetworkSubresourceURLLoaderFactories(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
NonNetworkURLLoaderFactoryMap* factories) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
content::RenderFrameHost* frame_host =
RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_frame_id);
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (web_contents) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
factories->emplace(
content::kExternalFileScheme,
std::make_unique<chromeos::ExternalFileURLLoaderFactory>(profile));
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
auto factory = extensions::CreateExtensionURLLoaderFactory(render_process_id,
render_frame_id);
if (factory)
factories->emplace(extensions::kExtensionScheme, std::move(factory));
if (!web_contents)
return;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
InstantService* instant_service =
InstantServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (instant_service->IsInstantProcess(render_process_id)) {
factories->emplace(
chrome::kChromeSearchScheme,
content::CreateWebUIURLLoader(
frame_host, chrome::kChromeSearchScheme,
/*allowed_webui_hosts=*/base::flat_set<std::string>()));
}
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver* web_observer =
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::FromWebContents(
web_contents);
if (!web_observer)
return;
const Extension* extension =
web_observer->GetExtensionFromFrame(frame_host, false);
if (!extension)
return;
std::vector<std::string> allowed_webui_hosts;
if ((extension->is_extension() || extension->is_platform_app()) &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location())) {
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(content::kChromeUIResourcesHost);
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIThemeHost);
}
if (extension->is_extension() || extension->is_legacy_packaged_app() ||
(extension->is_platform_app() &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location()))) {
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconHost);
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIFaviconHost);
}
if (!allowed_webui_hosts.empty()) {
factories->emplace(
content::kChromeUIScheme,
content::CreateWebUIURLLoader(frame_host, content::kChromeUIScheme,
std::move(allowed_webui_hosts)));
}
extensions::ExtensionHost* host =
extensions::ProcessManager::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())
->GetBackgroundHostForExtension(extension->id());
if (host) {
factories->emplace(url::kFileScheme, std::make_unique<FileURLLoaderFactory>(
render_process_id));
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
}
|
RegisterNonNetworkSubresourceURLLoaderFactories(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
NonNetworkURLLoaderFactoryMap* factories) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
content::RenderFrameHost* frame_host =
RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_frame_id);
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (web_contents) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
factories->emplace(
content::kExternalFileScheme,
std::make_unique<chromeos::ExternalFileURLLoaderFactory>(profile));
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
auto factory = extensions::CreateExtensionURLLoaderFactory(render_process_id,
render_frame_id);
if (factory)
factories->emplace(extensions::kExtensionScheme, std::move(factory));
if (!web_contents)
return;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
InstantService* instant_service =
InstantServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (instant_service->IsInstantProcess(render_process_id)) {
factories->emplace(
chrome::kChromeSearchScheme,
content::CreateWebUIURLLoader(
frame_host, chrome::kChromeSearchScheme,
/*allowed_webui_hosts=*/base::flat_set<std::string>()));
}
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver* web_observer =
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::FromWebContents(
web_contents);
if (!web_observer)
return;
const Extension* extension =
web_observer->GetExtensionFromFrame(frame_host, false);
if (!extension)
return;
std::vector<std::string> allowed_webui_hosts;
if ((extension->is_extension() || extension->is_platform_app()) &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location())) {
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(content::kChromeUIResourcesHost);
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIThemeHost);
}
if (extension->is_extension() || extension->is_legacy_packaged_app() ||
(extension->is_platform_app() &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location()))) {
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconHost);
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIFaviconHost);
}
if (!allowed_webui_hosts.empty()) {
factories->emplace(
content::kChromeUIScheme,
content::CreateWebUIURLLoader(frame_host, content::kChromeUIScheme,
std::move(allowed_webui_hosts)));
}
extensions::ExtensionHost* host =
extensions::ProcessManager::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())
->GetBackgroundHostForExtension(extension->id());
if (host) {
factories->emplace(url::kFileScheme, std::make_unique<FileURLLoaderFactory>(
render_process_id));
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1636/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a60f01228557982e6508c5919cc21fcfddf110b
|
6a60f01228557982e6508c5919cc21fcfddf110b
|
[fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
void FrameImpl::LoadUrl(fidl::StringPtr url,
std::unique_ptr<chromium::web::LoadUrlParams> params) {
GURL validated_url(*url);
if (!validated_url.is_valid()) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Invalid URL: " << *url;
return;
}
content::NavigationController::LoadURLParams params_converted(validated_url);
params_converted.transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR);
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params_converted);
}
|
void FrameImpl::LoadUrl(fidl::StringPtr url,
std::unique_ptr<chromium::web::LoadUrlParams> params) {
GURL validated_url(*url);
if (!validated_url.is_valid()) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Invalid URL: " << *url;
return;
}
content::NavigationController::LoadURLParams params_converted(validated_url);
params_converted.transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR);
web_contents_->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params_converted);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
__svc_init_bc(struct svc_serv *serv)
{
}
|
__svc_init_bc(struct svc_serv *serv)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
|
9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
| null |
inline void Splash::drawAAPixel(SplashPipe *pipe, int x, int y) {
#if splashAASize == 4
static int bitCount4[16] = { 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3,
1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4 };
int w;
#else
int xx, yy;
#endif
SplashColorPtr p;
int x0, x1, t;
if (x < 0 || x >= bitmap->width ||
y < state->clip->getYMinI() || y > state->clip->getYMaxI()) {
return;
}
if (y != aaBufY) {
memset(aaBuf->getDataPtr(), 0xff,
aaBuf->getRowSize() * aaBuf->getHeight());
x0 = 0;
x1 = bitmap->width - 1;
state->clip->clipAALine(aaBuf, &x0, &x1, y);
aaBufY = y;
}
#if splashAASize == 4
p = aaBuf->getDataPtr() + (x >> 1);
w = aaBuf->getRowSize();
if (x & 1) {
t = bitCount4[*p & 0x0f] + bitCount4[p[w] & 0x0f] +
bitCount4[p[2*w] & 0x0f] + bitCount4[p[3*w] & 0x0f];
} else {
t = bitCount4[*p >> 4] + bitCount4[p[w] >> 4] +
bitCount4[p[2*w] >> 4] + bitCount4[p[3*w] >> 4];
}
#else
t = 0;
for (yy = 0; yy < splashAASize; ++yy) {
for (xx = 0; xx < splashAASize; ++xx) {
p = aaBuf->getDataPtr() + yy * aaBuf->getRowSize() +
((x * splashAASize + xx) >> 3);
t += (*p >> (7 - ((x * splashAASize + xx) & 7))) & 1;
}
}
#endif
if (t != 0) {
pipeSetXY(pipe, x, y);
pipe->shape *= aaGamma[t];
pipeRun(pipe);
updateModX(x);
updateModY(y);
}
}
|
inline void Splash::drawAAPixel(SplashPipe *pipe, int x, int y) {
#if splashAASize == 4
static int bitCount4[16] = { 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3,
1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4 };
int w;
#else
int xx, yy;
#endif
SplashColorPtr p;
int x0, x1, t;
if (x < 0 || x >= bitmap->width ||
y < state->clip->getYMinI() || y > state->clip->getYMaxI()) {
return;
}
if (y != aaBufY) {
memset(aaBuf->getDataPtr(), 0xff,
aaBuf->getRowSize() * aaBuf->getHeight());
x0 = 0;
x1 = bitmap->width - 1;
state->clip->clipAALine(aaBuf, &x0, &x1, y);
aaBufY = y;
}
#if splashAASize == 4
p = aaBuf->getDataPtr() + (x >> 1);
w = aaBuf->getRowSize();
if (x & 1) {
t = bitCount4[*p & 0x0f] + bitCount4[p[w] & 0x0f] +
bitCount4[p[2*w] & 0x0f] + bitCount4[p[3*w] & 0x0f];
} else {
t = bitCount4[*p >> 4] + bitCount4[p[w] >> 4] +
bitCount4[p[2*w] >> 4] + bitCount4[p[3*w] >> 4];
}
#else
t = 0;
for (yy = 0; yy < splashAASize; ++yy) {
for (xx = 0; xx < splashAASize; ++xx) {
p = aaBuf->getDataPtr() + yy * aaBuf->getRowSize() +
((x * splashAASize + xx) >> 3);
t += (*p >> (7 - ((x * splashAASize + xx) & 7))) & 1;
}
}
#endif
if (t != 0) {
pipeSetXY(pipe, x, y);
pipe->shape *= aaGamma[t];
pipeRun(pipe);
updateModX(x);
updateModY(y);
}
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
Frame* LocalFrameClientImpl::FindFrame(const AtomicString& name) const {
DCHECK(web_frame_->Client());
return ToCoreFrame(web_frame_->Client()->FindFrame(name));
}
|
Frame* LocalFrameClientImpl::FindFrame(const AtomicString& name) const {
DCHECK(web_frame_->Client());
return ToCoreFrame(web_frame_->Client()->FindFrame(name));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16932
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16932/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
899a5d9f0ed13b8e32449a08a361e0de127dd961
|
Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
|
static int areBlanks(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int len,
int blank_chars) {
int i, ret;
xmlNodePtr lastChild;
/*
* Don't spend time trying to differentiate them, the same callback is
* used !
*/
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace == ctxt->sax->characters)
return(0);
/*
* Check for xml:space value.
*/
if ((ctxt->space == NULL) || (*(ctxt->space) == 1) ||
(*(ctxt->space) == -2))
return(0);
/*
* Check that the string is made of blanks
*/
if (blank_chars == 0) {
for (i = 0;i < len;i++)
if (!(IS_BLANK_CH(str[i]))) return(0);
}
/*
* Look if the element is mixed content in the DTD if available
*/
if (ctxt->node == NULL) return(0);
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL) {
ret = xmlIsMixedElement(ctxt->myDoc, ctxt->node->name);
if (ret == 0) return(1);
if (ret == 1) return(0);
}
/*
* Otherwise, heuristic :-\
*/
if ((RAW != '<') && (RAW != 0xD)) return(0);
if ((ctxt->node->children == NULL) &&
(RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '/')) return(0);
lastChild = xmlGetLastChild(ctxt->node);
if (lastChild == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(ctxt->node->content != NULL)) return(0);
} else if (xmlNodeIsText(lastChild))
return(0);
else if ((ctxt->node->children != NULL) &&
(xmlNodeIsText(ctxt->node->children)))
return(0);
return(1);
}
|
static int areBlanks(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int len,
int blank_chars) {
int i, ret;
xmlNodePtr lastChild;
/*
* Don't spend time trying to differentiate them, the same callback is
* used !
*/
if (ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace == ctxt->sax->characters)
return(0);
/*
* Check for xml:space value.
*/
if ((ctxt->space == NULL) || (*(ctxt->space) == 1) ||
(*(ctxt->space) == -2))
return(0);
/*
* Check that the string is made of blanks
*/
if (blank_chars == 0) {
for (i = 0;i < len;i++)
if (!(IS_BLANK_CH(str[i]))) return(0);
}
/*
* Look if the element is mixed content in the DTD if available
*/
if (ctxt->node == NULL) return(0);
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL) {
ret = xmlIsMixedElement(ctxt->myDoc, ctxt->node->name);
if (ret == 0) return(1);
if (ret == 1) return(0);
}
/*
* Otherwise, heuristic :-\
*/
if ((RAW != '<') && (RAW != 0xD)) return(0);
if ((ctxt->node->children == NULL) &&
(RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '/')) return(0);
lastChild = xmlGetLastChild(ctxt->node);
if (lastChild == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(ctxt->node->content != NULL)) return(0);
} else if (xmlNodeIsText(lastChild))
return(0);
else if ((ctxt->node->children != NULL) &&
(xmlNodeIsText(ctxt->node->children)))
return(0);
return(1);
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9557
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_pad(%p, %d, %d)\n", stream, n, c));
if (n < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_pad");
}
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
|
int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_pad(%p, %d, %d)\n", stream, n, c));
if (n < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_pad");
}
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
bool check_selective_cr0_intercepted(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long val)
{
unsigned long cr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.cr0;
bool ret = false;
u64 intercept;
intercept = svm->nested.intercept;
if (!is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu) ||
(!(intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0))))
return false;
cr0 &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
val &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
if (cr0 ^ val) {
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
ret = (nested_svm_exit_handled(svm) == NESTED_EXIT_DONE);
}
return ret;
}
|
bool check_selective_cr0_intercepted(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long val)
{
unsigned long cr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.cr0;
bool ret = false;
u64 intercept;
intercept = svm->nested.intercept;
if (!is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu) ||
(!(intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0))))
return false;
cr0 &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
val &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
if (cr0 ^ val) {
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
ret = (nested_svm_exit_handled(svm) == NESTED_EXIT_DONE);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1415
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1415/
| null |
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e
|
f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e
|
PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
|
pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("pData %p *pulDataLen %d\n", (void *) pData,
(int) *pulDataLen);
}
return rv;
}
|
pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("pData %p *pulDataLen %d\n", (void *) pData,
(int) *pulDataLen);
}
return rv;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9317
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9317/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageDashedLine (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int dx, dy, incr1, incr2, d, x, y, xend, yend, xdirflag, ydirflag;
int dashStep = 0;
int on = 1;
int wid;
int vert;
int thick = im->thick;
dx = abs (x2 - x1);
dy = abs (y2 - y1);
if (dy <= dx) {
/* More-or-less horizontal. use wid for vertical stroke */
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double as = sin (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (as != 0) {
wid = thick / as;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
vert = 1;
d = 2 * dy - dx;
incr1 = 2 * dy;
incr2 = 2 * (dy - dx);
if (x1 > x2) {
x = x2;
y = y2;
ydirflag = (-1);
xend = x1;
} else {
x = x1;
y = y1;
ydirflag = 1;
xend = x2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
if (((y2 - y1) * ydirflag) > 0) {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y++;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
} else {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y--;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
}
} else {
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double as = sin (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (as != 0) {
wid = thick / as;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
vert = 0;
d = 2 * dx - dy;
incr1 = 2 * dx;
incr2 = 2 * (dx - dy);
if (y1 > y2) {
y = y2;
x = x2;
yend = y1;
xdirflag = (-1);
} else {
y = y1;
x = x1;
yend = y2;
xdirflag = 1;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
if (((x2 - x1) * xdirflag) > 0) {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x++;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
} else {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x--;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
}
}
}
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageDashedLine (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2, int color)
{
int dx, dy, incr1, incr2, d, x, y, xend, yend, xdirflag, ydirflag;
int dashStep = 0;
int on = 1;
int wid;
int vert;
int thick = im->thick;
dx = abs (x2 - x1);
dy = abs (y2 - y1);
if (dy <= dx) {
/* More-or-less horizontal. use wid for vertical stroke */
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double as = sin (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (as != 0) {
wid = thick / as;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
vert = 1;
d = 2 * dy - dx;
incr1 = 2 * dy;
incr2 = 2 * (dy - dx);
if (x1 > x2) {
x = x2;
y = y2;
ydirflag = (-1);
xend = x1;
} else {
x = x1;
y = y1;
ydirflag = 1;
xend = x2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
if (((y2 - y1) * ydirflag) > 0) {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y++;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
} else {
while (x < xend) {
x++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
y--;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
}
} else {
/* 2.0.12: Michael Schwartz: divide rather than multiply;
TBB: but watch out for /0! */
double as = sin (atan2 (dy, dx));
if (as != 0) {
wid = thick / as;
} else {
wid = 1;
}
vert = 0;
d = 2 * dx - dy;
incr1 = 2 * dx;
incr2 = 2 * (dx - dy);
if (y1 > y2) {
y = y2;
x = x2;
yend = y1;
xdirflag = (-1);
} else {
y = y1;
x = x1;
yend = y2;
xdirflag = 1;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
if (((x2 - x1) * xdirflag) > 0) {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x++;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
} else {
while (y < yend) {
y++;
if (d < 0) {
d += incr1;
} else {
x--;
d += incr2;
}
dashedSet (im, x, y, color, &on, &dashStep, wid, vert);
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8130/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
|
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
TIFFOpen(const char* name, const char* mode)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFOpen";
int m, fd;
TIFF* tif;
m = _TIFFgetMode(mode, module);
if (m == -1)
return ((TIFF*)0);
/* for cygwin and mingw */
#ifdef O_BINARY
m |= O_BINARY;
#endif
fd = open(name, m, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno > 0 && strerror(errno) != NULL ) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: %s", name, strerror(errno) );
} else {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: Cannot open", name);
}
return ((TIFF *)0);
}
tif = TIFFFdOpen((int)fd, name, mode);
if(!tif)
close(fd);
return tif;
}
|
TIFFOpen(const char* name, const char* mode)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFOpen";
int m, fd;
TIFF* tif;
m = _TIFFgetMode(mode, module);
if (m == -1)
return ((TIFF*)0);
/* for cygwin and mingw */
#ifdef O_BINARY
m |= O_BINARY;
#endif
fd = open(name, m, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno > 0 && strerror(errno) != NULL ) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: %s", name, strerror(errno) );
} else {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: Cannot open", name);
}
return ((TIFF *)0);
}
tif = TIFFFdOpen((int)fd, name, mode);
if(!tif)
close(fd);
return tif;
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4303
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4303/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/esnet/iperf/commit/91f2fa59e8ed80dfbf400add0164ee0e508e412a
|
91f2fa59e8ed80dfbf400add0164ee0e508e412a
|
Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
iperf_got_sigend(struct iperf_test *test)
{
/*
* If we're the client, or if we're a server and running a test,
* then dump out the accumulated stats so far.
*/
if (test->role == 'c' ||
(test->role == 's' && test->state == TEST_RUNNING)) {
test->done = 1;
cpu_util(test->cpu_util);
test->stats_callback(test);
test->state = DISPLAY_RESULTS; /* change local state only */
if (test->on_test_finish)
test->on_test_finish(test);
test->reporter_callback(test);
}
if (test->ctrl_sck >= 0) {
test->state = (test->role == 'c') ? CLIENT_TERMINATE : SERVER_TERMINATE;
(void) Nwrite(test->ctrl_sck, (char*) &test->state, sizeof(signed char), Ptcp);
}
i_errno = (test->role == 'c') ? IECLIENTTERM : IESERVERTERM;
iperf_errexit(test, "interrupt - %s", iperf_strerror(i_errno));
}
|
iperf_got_sigend(struct iperf_test *test)
{
/*
* If we're the client, or if we're a server and running a test,
* then dump out the accumulated stats so far.
*/
if (test->role == 'c' ||
(test->role == 's' && test->state == TEST_RUNNING)) {
test->done = 1;
cpu_util(test->cpu_util);
test->stats_callback(test);
test->state = DISPLAY_RESULTS; /* change local state only */
if (test->on_test_finish)
test->on_test_finish(test);
test->reporter_callback(test);
}
if (test->ctrl_sck >= 0) {
test->state = (test->role == 'c') ? CLIENT_TERMINATE : SERVER_TERMINATE;
(void) Nwrite(test->ctrl_sck, (char*) &test->state, sizeof(signed char), Ptcp);
}
i_errno = (test->role == 'c') ? IECLIENTTERM : IESERVERTERM;
iperf_errexit(test, "interrupt - %s", iperf_strerror(i_errno));
}
|
C
|
iperf
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0076
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0076/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29
|
2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29
| null |
int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
{
int i,j,k;
if (n < 0)
return 0;
i=n/BN_BITS2;
j=n%BN_BITS2;
if (a->top <= i)
{
if (bn_wexpand(a,i+1) == NULL) return(0);
for(k=a->top; k<i+1; k++)
a->d[k]=0;
a->top=i+1;
}
a->d[i]|=(((BN_ULONG)1)<<j);
bn_check_top(a);
return(1);
}
|
int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
{
int i,j,k;
if (n < 0)
return 0;
i=n/BN_BITS2;
j=n%BN_BITS2;
if (a->top <= i)
{
if (bn_wexpand(a,i+1) == NULL) return(0);
for(k=a->top; k<i+1; k++)
a->d[k]=0;
a->top=i+1;
}
a->d[i]|=(((BN_ULONG)1)<<j);
bn_check_top(a);
return(1);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
|
static void cm_format_path_from_lap(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_sa_path_rec *path,
struct cm_lap_msg *lap_msg)
{
memset(path, 0, sizeof *path);
path->dgid = lap_msg->alt_local_gid;
path->sgid = lap_msg->alt_remote_gid;
path->dlid = lap_msg->alt_local_lid;
path->slid = lap_msg->alt_remote_lid;
path->flow_label = cm_lap_get_flow_label(lap_msg);
path->hop_limit = lap_msg->alt_hop_limit;
path->traffic_class = cm_lap_get_traffic_class(lap_msg);
path->reversible = 1;
path->pkey = cm_id_priv->pkey;
path->sl = cm_lap_get_sl(lap_msg);
path->mtu_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->mtu = cm_id_priv->path_mtu;
path->rate_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->rate = cm_lap_get_packet_rate(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->packet_life_time = cm_lap_get_local_ack_timeout(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time -= (path->packet_life_time > 0);
}
|
static void cm_format_path_from_lap(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_sa_path_rec *path,
struct cm_lap_msg *lap_msg)
{
memset(path, 0, sizeof *path);
path->dgid = lap_msg->alt_local_gid;
path->sgid = lap_msg->alt_remote_gid;
path->dlid = lap_msg->alt_local_lid;
path->slid = lap_msg->alt_remote_lid;
path->flow_label = cm_lap_get_flow_label(lap_msg);
path->hop_limit = lap_msg->alt_hop_limit;
path->traffic_class = cm_lap_get_traffic_class(lap_msg);
path->reversible = 1;
path->pkey = cm_id_priv->pkey;
path->sl = cm_lap_get_sl(lap_msg);
path->mtu_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->mtu = cm_id_priv->path_mtu;
path->rate_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->rate = cm_lap_get_packet_rate(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->packet_life_time = cm_lap_get_local_ack_timeout(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time -= (path->packet_life_time > 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6942
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6942/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
|
29c759284e305ec428703c9a5831d0b1fc3497ef
| null |
Ins_ALIGNPTS( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort p1, p2;
FT_F26Dot6 distance;
p1 = (FT_UShort)args[0];
p2 = (FT_UShort)args[1];
if ( BOUNDS( p1, exc->zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( p2, exc->zp0.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
distance = PROJECT( exc->zp0.cur + p2, exc->zp1.cur + p1 ) / 2;
exc->func_move( exc, &exc->zp1, p1, distance );
exc->func_move( exc, &exc->zp0, p2, NEG_LONG( distance ) );
}
|
Ins_ALIGNPTS( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort p1, p2;
FT_F26Dot6 distance;
p1 = (FT_UShort)args[0];
p2 = (FT_UShort)args[1];
if ( BOUNDS( p1, exc->zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( p2, exc->zp0.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
distance = PROJECT( exc->zp0.cur + p2, exc->zp1.cur + p1 ) / 2;
exc->func_move( exc, &exc->zp1, p1, distance );
exc->func_move( exc, &exc->zp0, p2, NEG_LONG( distance ) );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11811
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11811/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4
|
401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4
|
ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
|
static void setup_oem_data_handler(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
setup_dell_poweredge_oem_data_handler(smi_info);
}
|
static void setup_oem_data_handler(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
setup_dell_poweredge_oem_data_handler(smi_info);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
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