CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-0603
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0603/
|
CWE-190
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/36b04932bb93cc3269279282686b439a17a89920
|
36b04932bb93cc3269279282686b439a17a89920
|
Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
|
static status_t getFrameSizeByOffset(const sp<DataSource> &source,
off64_t offset, bool isWide, size_t *frameSize) {
uint8_t header;
ssize_t count = source->readAt(offset, &header, 1);
if (count == 0) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
} else if (count < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
unsigned FT = (header >> 3) & 0x0f;
*frameSize = getFrameSize(isWide, FT);
if (*frameSize == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
|
static status_t getFrameSizeByOffset(const sp<DataSource> &source,
off64_t offset, bool isWide, size_t *frameSize) {
uint8_t header;
ssize_t count = source->readAt(offset, &header, 1);
if (count == 0) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
} else if (count < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
unsigned FT = (header >> 3) & 0x0f;
*frameSize = getFrameSize(isWide, FT);
if (*frameSize == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12893
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12893/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6f5ba2b651cd9d4b7fa8ee5c4f94460645877c45
|
6f5ba2b651cd9d4b7fa8ee5c4f94460645877c45
|
CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
nt_errstr(uint32_t err)
{
static char ret[128];
int i;
ret[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; nt_errors[i].name; i++) {
if (err == nt_errors[i].code)
return nt_errors[i].name;
}
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "0x%08x", err);
return ret;
}
|
nt_errstr(uint32_t err)
{
static char ret[128];
int i;
ret[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; nt_errors[i].name; i++) {
if (err == nt_errors[i].code)
return nt_errors[i].name;
}
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "0x%08x", err);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
Build fix following bug #30696.
Patch by Gavin Barraclough <barraclough@apple.com> on 2009-10-22
Reviewed by NOBODY (build fix).
* WebCoreSupport/FrameLoaderClientGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::FrameLoaderClient::windowObjectCleared):
* webkit/webkitwebframe.cpp:
(webkit_web_frame_get_global_context):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@49964 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static WebKitWebNavigationAction* getNavigationAction(const NavigationAction& action, const char* targetFrame)
{
gint button = -1;
const Event* event = action.event();
if (event && event->isMouseEvent()) {
const MouseEvent* mouseEvent = static_cast<const MouseEvent*>(event);
button = mouseEvent->button() + 1;
}
gint modifierFlags = 0;
UIEventWithKeyState* keyStateEvent = findEventWithKeyState(const_cast<Event*>(event));
if (keyStateEvent) {
if (keyStateEvent->shiftKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_SHIFT_MASK;
if (keyStateEvent->ctrlKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_CONTROL_MASK;
if (keyStateEvent->altKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_MOD1_MASK;
if (keyStateEvent->metaKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_MOD2_MASK;
}
return WEBKIT_WEB_NAVIGATION_ACTION(g_object_new(WEBKIT_TYPE_WEB_NAVIGATION_ACTION,
"reason", kit(action.type()),
"original-uri", action.url().string().utf8().data(),
"button", button,
"modifier-state", modifierFlags,
"target-frame", targetFrame,
NULL));
}
|
static WebKitWebNavigationAction* getNavigationAction(const NavigationAction& action, const char* targetFrame)
{
gint button = -1;
const Event* event = action.event();
if (event && event->isMouseEvent()) {
const MouseEvent* mouseEvent = static_cast<const MouseEvent*>(event);
button = mouseEvent->button() + 1;
}
gint modifierFlags = 0;
UIEventWithKeyState* keyStateEvent = findEventWithKeyState(const_cast<Event*>(event));
if (keyStateEvent) {
if (keyStateEvent->shiftKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_SHIFT_MASK;
if (keyStateEvent->ctrlKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_CONTROL_MASK;
if (keyStateEvent->altKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_MOD1_MASK;
if (keyStateEvent->metaKey())
modifierFlags |= GDK_MOD2_MASK;
}
return WEBKIT_WEB_NAVIGATION_ACTION(g_object_new(WEBKIT_TYPE_WEB_NAVIGATION_ACTION,
"reason", kit(action.type()),
"original-uri", action.url().string().utf8().data(),
"button", button,
"modifier-state", modifierFlags,
"target-frame", targetFrame,
NULL));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
|
static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13142
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13142/
|
CWE-754
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/aa84944b405acebbeefe871d0f64969b9e9f31ac
|
aa84944b405acebbeefe871d0f64969b9e9f31ac
|
...
|
static Image *ReadJNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
size_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadJNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JNG") != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Verify JNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\213JNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a JNG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 147)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/* Allocate a MngInfo structure. */
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*mng_info));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* Initialize members of the MngInfo structure. */
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadJNGImage()");
return(image);
}
|
static Image *ReadJNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
size_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadJNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JNG") != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Verify JNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\213JNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Allocate a MngInfo structure. */
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*mng_info));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* Initialize members of the MngInfo structure. */
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadJNGImage()");
return(image);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_write_hIST(png_structp png_ptr, png_uint_16p hist, int num_hist)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_hIST;
#endif
int i;
png_byte buf[3];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_hIST");
if (num_hist > (int)png_ptr->num_palette)
{
png_debug2(3, "num_hist = %d, num_palette = %d", num_hist,
png_ptr->num_palette);
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid number of histogram entries specified");
return;
}
png_write_chunk_start(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_hIST,
(png_uint_32)(num_hist * 2));
for (i = 0; i < num_hist; i++)
{
png_save_uint_16(buf, hist[i]);
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)2);
}
png_write_chunk_end(png_ptr);
}
|
png_write_hIST(png_structp png_ptr, png_uint_16p hist, int num_hist)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_hIST;
#endif
int i;
png_byte buf[3];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_hIST");
if (num_hist > (int)png_ptr->num_palette)
{
png_debug2(3, "num_hist = %d, num_palette = %d", num_hist,
png_ptr->num_palette);
png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid number of histogram entries specified");
return;
}
png_write_chunk_start(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_hIST,
(png_uint_32)(num_hist * 2));
for (i = 0; i < num_hist; i++)
{
png_save_uint_16(buf, hist[i]);
png_write_chunk_data(png_ptr, buf, (png_size_t)2);
}
png_write_chunk_end(png_ptr);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void HTMLInputElement::ResetListAttributeTargetObserver() {
const AtomicString& value = FastGetAttribute(listAttr);
if (!value.IsNull() && isConnected()) {
SetListAttributeTargetObserver(
ListAttributeTargetObserver::Create(value, this));
} else {
SetListAttributeTargetObserver(nullptr);
}
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::ResetListAttributeTargetObserver() {
const AtomicString& value = FastGetAttribute(listAttr);
if (!value.IsNull() && isConnected()) {
SetListAttributeTargetObserver(
ListAttributeTargetObserver::Create(value, this));
} else {
SetListAttributeTargetObserver(nullptr);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
|
long Cluster::HasBlockEntries(
const Segment* pSegment,
long long off, // relative to start of segment payload
long long& pos, long& len) {
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0); // relative to segment
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = pSegment->m_start + off; // absolute
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return 0; // we don't even have a complete cluster
const long long segment_stop =
(pSegment->m_size < 0) ? -1 : pSegment->m_start + pSegment->m_size;
long long cluster_stop = -1; // interpreted later to mean "unknown size"
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) // weird: not cluster ID
return -1; // generic error
pos += len; // consume Cluster ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0)
return 0; // cluster does not have entries
pos += len; // consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size) {
cluster_stop = pos + size;
assert(cluster_stop >= 0);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (cluster_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (cluster_stop > total))
return 0; // cluster does not have any entries
}
}
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return 0; // no entries detected
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return 0; // no entries found
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return 0; // no entries found
pos += len; // consume id field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // not supported inside cluster
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return 1; // have at least one entry
if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock ID
return 1; // have at least one entry
pos += size; // consume payload
if (cluster_stop >= 0 && pos > cluster_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
}
|
long Cluster::HasBlockEntries(
const Segment* pSegment,
long long off, // relative to start of segment payload
long long& pos, long& len) {
assert(pSegment);
assert(off >= 0); // relative to segment
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = pSegment->m_start + off; // absolute
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
return 0; // we don't even have a complete cluster
const long long segment_stop =
(pSegment->m_size < 0) ? -1 : pSegment->m_start + pSegment->m_size;
long long cluster_stop = -1; // interpreted later to mean "unknown size"
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) // weird: not cluster ID
return -1; // generic error
pos += len; // consume Cluster ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && ((pos + len) > total))
return 0;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0)
return 0; // cluster does not have entries
pos += len; // consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size) {
cluster_stop = pos + size;
assert(cluster_stop >= 0);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (cluster_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (cluster_stop > total))
return 0; // cluster does not have any entries
}
}
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return 0; // no entries detected
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // need more data
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return 0; // no entries found
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return 0; // no entries found
pos += len; // consume id field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // not supported inside cluster
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return 1; // have at least one entry
if (id == 0x23) // SimpleBlock ID
return 1; // have at least one entry
pos += size; // consume payload
if (cluster_stop >= 0 && pos > cluster_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14363
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14363/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
|
int nntp_newsrc_update(struct NntpServer *nserv)
{
char *buf = NULL;
size_t buflen, off;
int rc = -1;
if (!nserv)
return -1;
buflen = 10 * LONG_STRING;
buf = mutt_mem_calloc(1, buflen);
off = 0;
/* we will generate full newsrc here */
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nserv->groups_num; i++)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = nserv->groups_list[i];
if (!nntp_data || !nntp_data->newsrc_ent)
continue;
/* write newsgroup name */
if (off + strlen(nntp_data->group) + 3 > buflen)
{
buflen *= 2;
mutt_mem_realloc(&buf, buflen);
}
snprintf(buf + off, buflen - off, "%s%c ", nntp_data->group,
nntp_data->subscribed ? ':' : '!');
off += strlen(buf + off);
/* write entries */
for (unsigned int j = 0; j < nntp_data->newsrc_len; j++)
{
if (off + LONG_STRING > buflen)
{
buflen *= 2;
mutt_mem_realloc(&buf, buflen);
}
if (j)
buf[off++] = ',';
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first == nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].last)
snprintf(buf + off, buflen - off, "%u", nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first);
else if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first < nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].last)
{
snprintf(buf + off, buflen - off, "%u-%u",
nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first, nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].last);
}
off += strlen(buf + off);
}
buf[off++] = '\n';
}
buf[off] = '\0';
/* newrc being fully rewritten */
mutt_debug(1, "Updating %s\n", nserv->newsrc_file);
if (nserv->newsrc_file && update_file(nserv->newsrc_file, buf) == 0)
{
struct stat sb;
rc = stat(nserv->newsrc_file, &sb);
if (rc == 0)
{
nserv->size = sb.st_size;
nserv->mtime = sb.st_mtime;
}
else
{
mutt_perror(nserv->newsrc_file);
}
}
FREE(&buf);
return rc;
}
|
int nntp_newsrc_update(struct NntpServer *nserv)
{
char *buf = NULL;
size_t buflen, off;
int rc = -1;
if (!nserv)
return -1;
buflen = 10 * LONG_STRING;
buf = mutt_mem_calloc(1, buflen);
off = 0;
/* we will generate full newsrc here */
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nserv->groups_num; i++)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = nserv->groups_list[i];
if (!nntp_data || !nntp_data->newsrc_ent)
continue;
/* write newsgroup name */
if (off + strlen(nntp_data->group) + 3 > buflen)
{
buflen *= 2;
mutt_mem_realloc(&buf, buflen);
}
snprintf(buf + off, buflen - off, "%s%c ", nntp_data->group,
nntp_data->subscribed ? ':' : '!');
off += strlen(buf + off);
/* write entries */
for (unsigned int j = 0; j < nntp_data->newsrc_len; j++)
{
if (off + LONG_STRING > buflen)
{
buflen *= 2;
mutt_mem_realloc(&buf, buflen);
}
if (j)
buf[off++] = ',';
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first == nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].last)
snprintf(buf + off, buflen - off, "%u", nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first);
else if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first < nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].last)
{
snprintf(buf + off, buflen - off, "%u-%u",
nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].first, nntp_data->newsrc_ent[j].last);
}
off += strlen(buf + off);
}
buf[off++] = '\n';
}
buf[off] = '\0';
/* newrc being fully rewritten */
mutt_debug(1, "Updating %s\n", nserv->newsrc_file);
if (nserv->newsrc_file && update_file(nserv->newsrc_file, buf) == 0)
{
struct stat sb;
rc = stat(nserv->newsrc_file, &sb);
if (rc == 0)
{
nserv->size = sb.st_size;
nserv->mtime = sb.st_mtime;
}
else
{
mutt_perror(nserv->newsrc_file);
}
}
FREE(&buf);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2141/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f
|
kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
kdb_send_sig_info(struct task_struct *t, struct siginfo *info)
{
static struct task_struct *kdb_prev_t;
int sig, new_t;
if (!spin_trylock(&t->sighand->siglock)) {
kdb_printf("Can't do kill command now.\n"
"The sigmask lock is held somewhere else in "
"kernel, try again later\n");
return;
}
spin_unlock(&t->sighand->siglock);
new_t = kdb_prev_t != t;
kdb_prev_t = t;
if (t->state != TASK_RUNNING && new_t) {
kdb_printf("Process is not RUNNING, sending a signal from "
"kdb risks deadlock\n"
"on the run queue locks. "
"The signal has _not_ been sent.\n"
"Reissue the kill command if you want to risk "
"the deadlock.\n");
return;
}
sig = info->si_signo;
if (send_sig_info(sig, info, t))
kdb_printf("Fail to deliver Signal %d to process %d.\n",
sig, t->pid);
else
kdb_printf("Signal %d is sent to process %d.\n", sig, t->pid);
}
|
kdb_send_sig_info(struct task_struct *t, struct siginfo *info)
{
static struct task_struct *kdb_prev_t;
int sig, new_t;
if (!spin_trylock(&t->sighand->siglock)) {
kdb_printf("Can't do kill command now.\n"
"The sigmask lock is held somewhere else in "
"kernel, try again later\n");
return;
}
spin_unlock(&t->sighand->siglock);
new_t = kdb_prev_t != t;
kdb_prev_t = t;
if (t->state != TASK_RUNNING && new_t) {
kdb_printf("Process is not RUNNING, sending a signal from "
"kdb risks deadlock\n"
"on the run queue locks. "
"The signal has _not_ been sent.\n"
"Reissue the kill command if you want to risk "
"the deadlock.\n");
return;
}
sig = info->si_signo;
if (send_sig_info(sig, info, t))
kdb_printf("Fail to deliver Signal %d to process %d.\n",
sig, t->pid);
else
kdb_printf("Signal %d is sent to process %d.\n", sig, t->pid);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0273
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0273/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=71335e6ebabc1b12c057d8017fd811892ecdfd24
|
71335e6ebabc1b12c057d8017fd811892ecdfd24
| null |
static char *date_format(char *format, int format_len, timelib_time *t, int localtime)
{
smart_str string = {0};
int i, length = 0;
char buffer[97];
timelib_time_offset *offset = NULL;
timelib_sll isoweek, isoyear;
int rfc_colon;
int weekYearSet = 0;
if (!format_len) {
return estrdup("");
}
if (localtime) {
if (t->zone_type == TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR) {
offset = timelib_time_offset_ctor();
offset->offset = (t->z - (t->dst * 60)) * -60;
offset->leap_secs = 0;
offset->is_dst = t->dst;
offset->abbr = strdup(t->tz_abbr);
} else if (t->zone_type == TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET) {
offset = timelib_time_offset_ctor();
offset->offset = (t->z) * -60;
offset->leap_secs = 0;
offset->is_dst = 0;
offset->abbr = malloc(9); /* GMT�xxxx\0 */
snprintf(offset->abbr, 9, "GMT%c%02d%02d",
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0 );
} else {
offset = timelib_get_time_zone_info(t->sse, t->tz_info);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < format_len; i++) {
rfc_colon = 0;
switch (format[i]) {
/* day */
case 'd': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->d); break;
case 'D': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", php_date_short_day_name(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'j': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) t->d); break;
case 'l': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", php_date_full_day_name(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'S': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", english_suffix(t->d)); break;
case 'w': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_day_of_week(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'N': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_iso_day_of_week(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'z': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_day_of_year(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
/* week */
case 'W':
if(!weekYearSet) { timelib_isoweek_from_date(t->y, t->m, t->d, &isoweek, &isoyear); weekYearSet = 1; }
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) isoweek); break; /* iso weeknr */
case 'o':
if(!weekYearSet) { timelib_isoweek_from_date(t->y, t->m, t->d, &isoweek, &isoyear); weekYearSet = 1; }
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) isoyear); break; /* iso year */
/* month */
case 'F': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", mon_full_names[t->m - 1]); break;
case 'm': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->m); break;
case 'M': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", mon_short_names[t->m - 1]); break;
case 'n': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) t->m); break;
case 't': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_days_in_month(t->y, t->m)); break;
/* year */
case 'L': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", timelib_is_leap((int) t->y)); break;
case 'y': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->y % 100); break;
case 'Y': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s%04lld", t->y < 0 ? "-" : "", php_date_llabs((timelib_sll) t->y)); break;
/* time */
case 'a': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", t->h >= 12 ? "pm" : "am"); break;
case 'A': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", t->h >= 12 ? "PM" : "AM"); break;
case 'B': {
int retval = (((((long)t->sse)-(((long)t->sse) - ((((long)t->sse) % 86400) + 3600))) * 10) / 864);
while (retval < 0) {
retval += 1000;
}
retval = retval % 1000;
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%03d", retval);
break;
}
case 'g': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (t->h % 12) ? (int) t->h % 12 : 12); break;
case 'G': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) t->h); break;
case 'h': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (t->h % 12) ? (int) t->h % 12 : 12); break;
case 'H': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->h); break;
case 'i': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->i); break;
case 's': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->s); break;
case 'u': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%06d", (int) floor(t->f * 1000000 + 0.5)); break;
/* timezone */
case 'I': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", localtime ? offset->is_dst : 0); break;
case 'P': rfc_colon = 1; /* break intentionally missing */
case 'O': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%c%02d%s%02d",
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
rfc_colon ? ":" : "",
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0
);
break;
case 'T': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", localtime ? offset->abbr : "GMT"); break;
case 'e': if (!localtime) {
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", "UTC");
} else {
switch (t->zone_type) {
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ID:
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", t->tz_info->name);
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR:
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", offset->abbr);
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET:
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%c%02d:%02d",
((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+'),
abs(offset->offset / 3600),
abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60)
);
break;
}
}
break;
case 'Z': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", localtime ? offset->offset : 0); break;
/* full date/time */
case 'c': length = slprintf(buffer, 96, "%04d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02d%c%02d:%02d",
(int) t->y, (int) t->m, (int) t->d,
(int) t->h, (int) t->i, (int) t->s,
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0
);
break;
case 'r': length = slprintf(buffer, 96, "%3s, %02d %3s %04d %02d:%02d:%02d %c%02d%02d",
php_date_short_day_name(t->y, t->m, t->d),
(int) t->d, mon_short_names[t->m - 1],
(int) t->y, (int) t->h, (int) t->i, (int) t->s,
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0
);
break;
case 'U': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%lld", (timelib_sll) t->sse); break;
case '\\': if (i < format_len) i++; /* break intentionally missing */
default: buffer[0] = format[i]; buffer[1] = '\0'; length = 1; break;
}
smart_str_appendl(&string, buffer, length);
}
smart_str_0(&string);
if (localtime) {
timelib_time_offset_dtor(offset);
}
return string.c;
}
|
static char *date_format(char *format, int format_len, timelib_time *t, int localtime)
{
smart_str string = {0};
int i, length = 0;
char buffer[97];
timelib_time_offset *offset = NULL;
timelib_sll isoweek, isoyear;
int rfc_colon;
int weekYearSet = 0;
if (!format_len) {
return estrdup("");
}
if (localtime) {
if (t->zone_type == TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR) {
offset = timelib_time_offset_ctor();
offset->offset = (t->z - (t->dst * 60)) * -60;
offset->leap_secs = 0;
offset->is_dst = t->dst;
offset->abbr = strdup(t->tz_abbr);
} else if (t->zone_type == TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET) {
offset = timelib_time_offset_ctor();
offset->offset = (t->z) * -60;
offset->leap_secs = 0;
offset->is_dst = 0;
offset->abbr = malloc(9); /* GMT�xxxx\0 */
snprintf(offset->abbr, 9, "GMT%c%02d%02d",
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0 );
} else {
offset = timelib_get_time_zone_info(t->sse, t->tz_info);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < format_len; i++) {
rfc_colon = 0;
switch (format[i]) {
/* day */
case 'd': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->d); break;
case 'D': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", php_date_short_day_name(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'j': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) t->d); break;
case 'l': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", php_date_full_day_name(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'S': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", english_suffix(t->d)); break;
case 'w': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_day_of_week(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'N': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_iso_day_of_week(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
case 'z': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_day_of_year(t->y, t->m, t->d)); break;
/* week */
case 'W':
if(!weekYearSet) { timelib_isoweek_from_date(t->y, t->m, t->d, &isoweek, &isoyear); weekYearSet = 1; }
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) isoweek); break; /* iso weeknr */
case 'o':
if(!weekYearSet) { timelib_isoweek_from_date(t->y, t->m, t->d, &isoweek, &isoyear); weekYearSet = 1; }
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) isoyear); break; /* iso year */
/* month */
case 'F': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", mon_full_names[t->m - 1]); break;
case 'm': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->m); break;
case 'M': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", mon_short_names[t->m - 1]); break;
case 'n': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) t->m); break;
case 't': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) timelib_days_in_month(t->y, t->m)); break;
/* year */
case 'L': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", timelib_is_leap((int) t->y)); break;
case 'y': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->y % 100); break;
case 'Y': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s%04lld", t->y < 0 ? "-" : "", php_date_llabs((timelib_sll) t->y)); break;
/* time */
case 'a': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", t->h >= 12 ? "pm" : "am"); break;
case 'A': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", t->h >= 12 ? "PM" : "AM"); break;
case 'B': {
int retval = (((((long)t->sse)-(((long)t->sse) - ((((long)t->sse) % 86400) + 3600))) * 10) / 864);
while (retval < 0) {
retval += 1000;
}
retval = retval % 1000;
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%03d", retval);
break;
}
case 'g': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (t->h % 12) ? (int) t->h % 12 : 12); break;
case 'G': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", (int) t->h); break;
case 'h': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (t->h % 12) ? (int) t->h % 12 : 12); break;
case 'H': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->h); break;
case 'i': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->i); break;
case 's': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%02d", (int) t->s); break;
case 'u': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%06d", (int) floor(t->f * 1000000 + 0.5)); break;
/* timezone */
case 'I': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", localtime ? offset->is_dst : 0); break;
case 'P': rfc_colon = 1; /* break intentionally missing */
case 'O': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%c%02d%s%02d",
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
rfc_colon ? ":" : "",
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0
);
break;
case 'T': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", localtime ? offset->abbr : "GMT"); break;
case 'e': if (!localtime) {
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", "UTC");
} else {
switch (t->zone_type) {
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ID:
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", t->tz_info->name);
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR:
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%s", offset->abbr);
break;
case TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_OFFSET:
length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%c%02d:%02d",
((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+'),
abs(offset->offset / 3600),
abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60)
);
break;
}
}
break;
case 'Z': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%d", localtime ? offset->offset : 0); break;
/* full date/time */
case 'c': length = slprintf(buffer, 96, "%04d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02d%c%02d:%02d",
(int) t->y, (int) t->m, (int) t->d,
(int) t->h, (int) t->i, (int) t->s,
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0
);
break;
case 'r': length = slprintf(buffer, 96, "%3s, %02d %3s %04d %02d:%02d:%02d %c%02d%02d",
php_date_short_day_name(t->y, t->m, t->d),
(int) t->d, mon_short_names[t->m - 1],
(int) t->y, (int) t->h, (int) t->i, (int) t->s,
localtime ? ((offset->offset < 0) ? '-' : '+') : '+',
localtime ? abs(offset->offset / 3600) : 0,
localtime ? abs((offset->offset % 3600) / 60) : 0
);
break;
case 'U': length = slprintf(buffer, 32, "%lld", (timelib_sll) t->sse); break;
case '\\': if (i < format_len) i++; /* break intentionally missing */
default: buffer[0] = format[i]; buffer[1] = '\0'; length = 1; break;
}
smart_str_appendl(&string, buffer, length);
}
smart_str_0(&string);
if (localtime) {
timelib_time_offset_dtor(offset);
}
return string.c;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4565
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4565/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3
|
IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
struct file *ib_uverbs_alloc_event_file(struct ib_uverbs_file *uverbs_file,
struct ib_device *ib_dev,
int is_async)
{
struct ib_uverbs_event_file *ev_file;
struct file *filp;
int ret;
ev_file = kzalloc(sizeof(*ev_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ev_file)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kref_init(&ev_file->ref);
spin_lock_init(&ev_file->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ev_file->event_list);
init_waitqueue_head(&ev_file->poll_wait);
ev_file->uverbs_file = uverbs_file;
kref_get(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref);
ev_file->async_queue = NULL;
ev_file->is_closed = 0;
filp = anon_inode_getfile("[infinibandevent]", &uverbs_event_fops,
ev_file, O_RDONLY);
if (IS_ERR(filp))
goto err_put_refs;
mutex_lock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ev_file->list,
&uverbs_file->device->uverbs_events_file_list);
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
if (is_async) {
WARN_ON(uverbs_file->async_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = ev_file;
kref_get(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref);
INIT_IB_EVENT_HANDLER(&uverbs_file->event_handler,
ib_dev,
ib_uverbs_event_handler);
ret = ib_register_event_handler(&uverbs_file->event_handler);
if (ret)
goto err_put_file;
/* At that point async file stuff was fully set */
ev_file->is_async = 1;
}
return filp;
err_put_file:
fput(filp);
kref_put(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = NULL;
return ERR_PTR(ret);
err_put_refs:
kref_put(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
kref_put(&ev_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
return filp;
}
|
struct file *ib_uverbs_alloc_event_file(struct ib_uverbs_file *uverbs_file,
struct ib_device *ib_dev,
int is_async)
{
struct ib_uverbs_event_file *ev_file;
struct file *filp;
int ret;
ev_file = kzalloc(sizeof(*ev_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ev_file)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kref_init(&ev_file->ref);
spin_lock_init(&ev_file->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ev_file->event_list);
init_waitqueue_head(&ev_file->poll_wait);
ev_file->uverbs_file = uverbs_file;
kref_get(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref);
ev_file->async_queue = NULL;
ev_file->is_closed = 0;
filp = anon_inode_getfile("[infinibandevent]", &uverbs_event_fops,
ev_file, O_RDONLY);
if (IS_ERR(filp))
goto err_put_refs;
mutex_lock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ev_file->list,
&uverbs_file->device->uverbs_events_file_list);
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
if (is_async) {
WARN_ON(uverbs_file->async_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = ev_file;
kref_get(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref);
INIT_IB_EVENT_HANDLER(&uverbs_file->event_handler,
ib_dev,
ib_uverbs_event_handler);
ret = ib_register_event_handler(&uverbs_file->event_handler);
if (ret)
goto err_put_file;
/* At that point async file stuff was fully set */
ev_file->is_async = 1;
}
return filp;
err_put_file:
fput(filp);
kref_put(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = NULL;
return ERR_PTR(ret);
err_put_refs:
kref_put(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
kref_put(&ev_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
return filp;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0881
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0881/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/634c5943f46abe8c6280079f6d394dfee08c3c8f
|
634c5943f46abe8c6280079f6d394dfee08c3c8f
|
Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool requiresSquashing(CompositingReasons reasons)
{
return !requiresCompositing(reasons) && (reasons & CompositingReasonComboSquashableReasons);
}
|
static bool requiresSquashing(CompositingReasons reasons)
{
return !requiresCompositing(reasons) && (reasons & CompositingReasonComboSquashableReasons);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=0be839a2701369f669532ea5884c15bead1c6e08
|
0be839a2701369f669532ea5884c15bead1c6e08
| null |
static inline void *host_from_stream_offset(QEMUFile *f,
ram_addr_t offset,
int flags)
{
static RAMBlock *block = NULL;
char id[256];
uint8_t len;
if (flags & RAM_SAVE_FLAG_CONTINUE) {
if (!block || block->length <= offset) {
error_report("Ack, bad migration stream!");
return NULL;
}
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
len = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)id, len);
id[len] = 0;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(block, &ram_list.blocks, next) {
if (!strncmp(id, block->idstr, sizeof(id)) && block->length > offset) {
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
}
error_report("Can't find block %s!", id);
}
|
static inline void *host_from_stream_offset(QEMUFile *f,
ram_addr_t offset,
int flags)
{
static RAMBlock *block = NULL;
char id[256];
uint8_t len;
if (flags & RAM_SAVE_FLAG_CONTINUE) {
if (!block) {
error_report("Ack, bad migration stream!");
return NULL;
}
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
len = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)id, len);
id[len] = 0;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(block, &ram_list.blocks, next) {
if (!strncmp(id, block->idstr, sizeof(id)))
return memory_region_get_ram_ptr(block->mr) + offset;
}
error_report("Can't find block %s!", id);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8866
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8866/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=de31324c221c1791b26350ba106cc26bad23ace9
|
de31324c221c1791b26350ba106cc26bad23ace9
| null |
php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename(const char *URI,
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr encoder,
int compression ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
xmlOutputBufferPtr ret;
xmlURIPtr puri;
void *context = NULL;
char *unescaped = NULL;
if (URI == NULL)
return(NULL);
puri = xmlParseURI(URI);
if (puri != NULL) {
if (puri->scheme != NULL)
unescaped = xmlURIUnescapeString(URI, 0, NULL);
xmlFreeURI(puri);
}
if (unescaped != NULL) {
context = php_libxml_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(unescaped);
xmlFree(unescaped);
}
/* try with a non-escaped URI this may be a strange filename */
if (context == NULL) {
context = php_libxml_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(URI);
}
if (context == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
/* Allocate the Output buffer front-end. */
ret = xmlAllocOutputBuffer(encoder);
if (ret != NULL) {
ret->context = context;
ret->writecallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_write;
ret->closecallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_close;
}
return(ret);
}
|
php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename(const char *URI,
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr encoder,
int compression ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
xmlOutputBufferPtr ret;
xmlURIPtr puri;
void *context = NULL;
char *unescaped = NULL;
if (URI == NULL)
return(NULL);
puri = xmlParseURI(URI);
if (puri != NULL) {
if (puri->scheme != NULL)
unescaped = xmlURIUnescapeString(URI, 0, NULL);
xmlFreeURI(puri);
}
if (unescaped != NULL) {
context = php_libxml_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(unescaped);
xmlFree(unescaped);
}
/* try with a non-escaped URI this may be a strange filename */
if (context == NULL) {
context = php_libxml_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(URI);
}
if (context == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
/* Allocate the Output buffer front-end. */
ret = xmlAllocOutputBuffer(encoder);
if (ret != NULL) {
ret->context = context;
ret->writecallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_write;
ret->closecallback = php_libxml_streams_IO_close;
}
return(ret);
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3477
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3477/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?h=dbus-1.8&id=24c590703ca47eb71ddef453de43126b90954567
|
24c590703ca47eb71ddef453de43126b90954567
| null |
bus_owner_new (BusService *service,
DBusConnection *conn,
dbus_uint32_t flags)
{
BusOwner *result;
result = _dbus_mem_pool_alloc (service->registry->owner_pool);
if (result != NULL)
{
result->refcount = 1;
/* don't ref the connection because we don't want
to block the connection from going away.
transactions take care of reffing the connection
but we need to use refcounting on the owner
so that the owner does not get freed before
we can deref the connection in the transaction
*/
result->conn = conn;
result->service = service;
if (!bus_connection_add_owned_service (conn, service))
{
_dbus_mem_pool_dealloc (service->registry->owner_pool, result);
return NULL;
}
bus_owner_set_flags (result, flags);
}
return result;
}
|
bus_owner_new (BusService *service,
DBusConnection *conn,
dbus_uint32_t flags)
{
BusOwner *result;
result = _dbus_mem_pool_alloc (service->registry->owner_pool);
if (result != NULL)
{
result->refcount = 1;
/* don't ref the connection because we don't want
to block the connection from going away.
transactions take care of reffing the connection
but we need to use refcounting on the owner
so that the owner does not get freed before
we can deref the connection in the transaction
*/
result->conn = conn;
result->service = service;
if (!bus_connection_add_owned_service (conn, service))
{
_dbus_mem_pool_dealloc (service->registry->owner_pool, result);
return NULL;
}
bus_owner_set_flags (result, flags);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool convertStringToWcharVector(const WTF::String& string, WTF::Vector<wchar_t>& wcharString)
{
ASSERT(wcharString.isEmpty());
int length = string.length();
if (!length)
return true;
if (!wcharString.tryReserveCapacity(length + 1)) {
logAlways(LogLevelCritical, "InputHandler::convertStringToWcharVector Cannot allocate memory for string.");
return false;
}
int destLength = 0;
if (!convertStringToWchar(string, wcharString.data(), length + 1, &destLength))
return false;
wcharString.resize(destLength);
return true;
}
|
static bool convertStringToWcharVector(const WTF::String& string, WTF::Vector<wchar_t>& wcharString)
{
ASSERT(wcharString.isEmpty());
int length = string.length();
if (!length)
return true;
if (!wcharString.tryReserveCapacity(length + 1)) {
logAlways(LogLevelCritical, "InputHandler::convertStringToWcharVector Cannot allocate memory for string.");
return false;
}
int destLength = 0;
if (!convertStringToWchar(string, wcharString.data(), length + 1, &destLength))
return false;
wcharString.resize(destLength);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13695
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13695/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/acpica/acpica/pull/296/commits/37f2c716f2c6ab14c3ba557a539c3ee3224931b5
|
37f2c716f2c6ab14c3ba557a539c3ee3224931b5
|
acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in nseval.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled
>[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0)
>[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing
>[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991)
>[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.529668] Call Trace:
>[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found AcpiNsEvaluate() function
only removes Info->ReturnObject in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors
occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and Info->ReturnObject is
also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
|
AcpiNsExecModuleCode (
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *MethodObj,
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info)
{
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *ParentObj;
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE *ParentNode;
ACPI_OBJECT_TYPE Type;
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsExecModuleCode);
/*
* Get the parent node. We cheat by using the NextObject field
* of the method object descriptor.
*/
ParentNode = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, MethodObj->Method.NextObject);
Type = AcpiNsGetType (ParentNode);
/*
* Get the region handler and save it in the method object. We may need
* this if an operation region declaration causes a _REG method to be run.
*
* We can't do this in AcpiPsLinkModuleCode because
* AcpiGbl_RootNode->Object is NULL at PASS1.
*/
if ((Type == ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE) && ParentNode->Object)
{
MethodObj->Method.Dispatch.Handler =
ParentNode->Object->Device.Handler;
}
/* Must clear NextObject (AcpiNsAttachObject needs the field) */
MethodObj->Method.NextObject = NULL;
/* Initialize the evaluation information block */
memset (Info, 0, sizeof (ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO));
Info->PrefixNode = ParentNode;
/*
* Get the currently attached parent object. Add a reference,
* because the ref count will be decreased when the method object
* is installed to the parent node.
*/
ParentObj = AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (ParentNode);
if (ParentObj)
{
AcpiUtAddReference (ParentObj);
}
/* Install the method (module-level code) in the parent node */
Status = AcpiNsAttachObject (ParentNode, MethodObj, ACPI_TYPE_METHOD);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Exit;
}
/* Execute the parent node as a control method */
Status = AcpiNsEvaluate (Info);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_INIT_NAMES,
"Executed module-level code at %p\n",
MethodObj->Method.AmlStart));
/* Delete a possible implicit return value (in slack mode) */
if (Info->ReturnObject)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
}
/* Detach the temporary method object */
AcpiNsDetachObject (ParentNode);
/* Restore the original parent object */
if (ParentObj)
{
Status = AcpiNsAttachObject (ParentNode, ParentObj, Type);
}
else
{
ParentNode->Type = (UINT8) Type;
}
Exit:
if (ParentObj)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (ParentObj);
}
return_VOID;
}
|
AcpiNsExecModuleCode (
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *MethodObj,
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info)
{
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *ParentObj;
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE *ParentNode;
ACPI_OBJECT_TYPE Type;
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsExecModuleCode);
/*
* Get the parent node. We cheat by using the NextObject field
* of the method object descriptor.
*/
ParentNode = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, MethodObj->Method.NextObject);
Type = AcpiNsGetType (ParentNode);
/*
* Get the region handler and save it in the method object. We may need
* this if an operation region declaration causes a _REG method to be run.
*
* We can't do this in AcpiPsLinkModuleCode because
* AcpiGbl_RootNode->Object is NULL at PASS1.
*/
if ((Type == ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE) && ParentNode->Object)
{
MethodObj->Method.Dispatch.Handler =
ParentNode->Object->Device.Handler;
}
/* Must clear NextObject (AcpiNsAttachObject needs the field) */
MethodObj->Method.NextObject = NULL;
/* Initialize the evaluation information block */
memset (Info, 0, sizeof (ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO));
Info->PrefixNode = ParentNode;
/*
* Get the currently attached parent object. Add a reference,
* because the ref count will be decreased when the method object
* is installed to the parent node.
*/
ParentObj = AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (ParentNode);
if (ParentObj)
{
AcpiUtAddReference (ParentObj);
}
/* Install the method (module-level code) in the parent node */
Status = AcpiNsAttachObject (ParentNode, MethodObj, ACPI_TYPE_METHOD);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Exit;
}
/* Execute the parent node as a control method */
Status = AcpiNsEvaluate (Info);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_INIT_NAMES,
"Executed module-level code at %p\n",
MethodObj->Method.AmlStart));
/* Delete a possible implicit return value (in slack mode) */
if (Info->ReturnObject)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
}
/* Detach the temporary method object */
AcpiNsDetachObject (ParentNode);
/* Restore the original parent object */
if (ParentObj)
{
Status = AcpiNsAttachObject (ParentNode, ParentObj, Type);
}
else
{
ParentNode->Type = (UINT8) Type;
}
Exit:
if (ParentObj)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (ParentObj);
}
return_VOID;
}
|
C
|
acpica
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1271/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
|
void MediaControlCastButtonElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::click) {
if (m_isOverlayButton)
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.CastOverlay"));
else
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.Cast"));
if (m_isOverlayButton && !m_clickUseCounted) {
m_clickUseCounted = true;
recordMetrics(CastOverlayMetrics::Clicked);
}
if (mediaElement().isPlayingRemotely()) {
mediaElement().requestRemotePlaybackControl();
} else {
mediaElement().requestRemotePlayback();
}
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
|
void MediaControlCastButtonElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::click) {
if (m_isOverlayButton)
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.CastOverlay"));
else
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.Cast"));
if (m_isOverlayButton && !m_clickUseCounted) {
m_clickUseCounted = true;
recordMetrics(CastOverlayMetrics::Clicked);
}
if (mediaElement().isPlayingRemotely()) {
mediaElement().requestRemotePlaybackControl();
} else {
mediaElement().requestRemotePlayback();
}
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4029
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4029/
|
CWE-362
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=b67581cf825940fdf52bf2e0af4330e695d724a4
|
b67581cf825940fdf52bf2e0af4330e695d724a4
| null |
UnlockServer(void)
{
if (nolock) return;
if (!StillLocking){
(void) unlink(LockFile);
}
}
|
UnlockServer(void)
{
if (nolock) return;
if (!StillLocking){
(void) unlink(LockFile);
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Response InputHandler::EmulateTouchFromMouseEvent(const std::string& type,
int x,
int y,
const std::string& button,
Maybe<double> maybe_timestamp,
Maybe<double> delta_x,
Maybe<double> delta_y,
Maybe<int> modifiers,
Maybe<int> click_count) {
blink::WebInputEvent::Type event_type;
if (type == Input::EmulateTouchFromMouseEvent::TypeEnum::MouseWheel) {
event_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseWheel;
if (!delta_x.isJust() || !delta_y.isJust()) {
return Response::InvalidParams(
"'deltaX' and 'deltaY' are expected for mouseWheel event");
}
} else {
event_type = GetMouseEventType(type);
if (event_type == blink::WebInputEvent::kUndefined) {
return Response::InvalidParams(
base::StringPrintf("Unexpected event type '%s'", type.c_str()));
}
}
blink::WebPointerProperties::Button event_button =
blink::WebPointerProperties::Button::kNoButton;
int button_modifiers = 0;
if (!GetMouseEventButton(button, &event_button, &button_modifiers))
return Response::InvalidParams("Invalid mouse button");
ui::WebScopedInputEvent event;
blink::WebMouseWheelEvent* wheel_event = nullptr;
blink::WebMouseEvent* mouse_event = nullptr;
if (type == Input::EmulateTouchFromMouseEvent::TypeEnum::MouseWheel) {
wheel_event = new blink::WebMouseWheelEvent(
event_type,
GetEventModifiers(
modifiers.fromMaybe(blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers), false,
false, 0) |
button_modifiers,
GetEventTimestamp(maybe_timestamp));
mouse_event = wheel_event;
event.reset(wheel_event);
wheel_event->delta_x = static_cast<float>(delta_x.fromJust());
wheel_event->delta_y = static_cast<float>(delta_y.fromJust());
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kTouchpadAndWheelScrollLatching)) {
wheel_event->phase = blink::WebMouseWheelEvent::kPhaseBegan;
}
} else {
mouse_event = new blink::WebMouseEvent(
event_type,
GetEventModifiers(
modifiers.fromMaybe(blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers), false,
false, 0) |
button_modifiers,
GetEventTimestamp(maybe_timestamp));
event.reset(mouse_event);
}
mouse_event->SetPositionInWidget(x, y);
mouse_event->button = event_button;
mouse_event->SetPositionInScreen(x, y);
mouse_event->click_count = click_count.fromMaybe(0);
mouse_event->pointer_type = blink::WebPointerProperties::PointerType::kTouch;
if (!host_ || !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return Response::InternalError();
if (wheel_event) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardWheelEvent(*wheel_event);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kTouchpadAndWheelScrollLatching)) {
wheel_event->delta_x = 0;
wheel_event->delta_y = 0;
wheel_event->phase = blink::WebMouseWheelEvent::kPhaseEnded;
wheel_event->dispatch_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kEventNonBlocking;
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardWheelEvent(*wheel_event);
}
} else {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(*mouse_event);
}
return Response::OK();
}
|
Response InputHandler::EmulateTouchFromMouseEvent(const std::string& type,
int x,
int y,
const std::string& button,
Maybe<double> maybe_timestamp,
Maybe<double> delta_x,
Maybe<double> delta_y,
Maybe<int> modifiers,
Maybe<int> click_count) {
blink::WebInputEvent::Type event_type;
if (type == Input::EmulateTouchFromMouseEvent::TypeEnum::MouseWheel) {
event_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseWheel;
if (!delta_x.isJust() || !delta_y.isJust()) {
return Response::InvalidParams(
"'deltaX' and 'deltaY' are expected for mouseWheel event");
}
} else {
event_type = GetMouseEventType(type);
if (event_type == blink::WebInputEvent::kUndefined) {
return Response::InvalidParams(
base::StringPrintf("Unexpected event type '%s'", type.c_str()));
}
}
blink::WebPointerProperties::Button event_button =
blink::WebPointerProperties::Button::kNoButton;
int button_modifiers = 0;
if (!GetMouseEventButton(button, &event_button, &button_modifiers))
return Response::InvalidParams("Invalid mouse button");
ui::WebScopedInputEvent event;
blink::WebMouseWheelEvent* wheel_event = nullptr;
blink::WebMouseEvent* mouse_event = nullptr;
if (type == Input::EmulateTouchFromMouseEvent::TypeEnum::MouseWheel) {
wheel_event = new blink::WebMouseWheelEvent(
event_type,
GetEventModifiers(
modifiers.fromMaybe(blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers), false,
false, 0) |
button_modifiers,
GetEventTimestamp(maybe_timestamp));
mouse_event = wheel_event;
event.reset(wheel_event);
wheel_event->delta_x = static_cast<float>(delta_x.fromJust());
wheel_event->delta_y = static_cast<float>(delta_y.fromJust());
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kTouchpadAndWheelScrollLatching)) {
wheel_event->phase = blink::WebMouseWheelEvent::kPhaseBegan;
}
} else {
mouse_event = new blink::WebMouseEvent(
event_type,
GetEventModifiers(
modifiers.fromMaybe(blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers), false,
false, 0) |
button_modifiers,
GetEventTimestamp(maybe_timestamp));
event.reset(mouse_event);
}
mouse_event->SetPositionInWidget(x, y);
mouse_event->button = event_button;
mouse_event->SetPositionInScreen(x, y);
mouse_event->click_count = click_count.fromMaybe(0);
mouse_event->pointer_type = blink::WebPointerProperties::PointerType::kTouch;
if (!host_ || !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return Response::InternalError();
if (wheel_event) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardWheelEvent(*wheel_event);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kTouchpadAndWheelScrollLatching)) {
wheel_event->delta_x = 0;
wheel_event->delta_y = 0;
wheel_event->phase = blink::WebMouseWheelEvent::kPhaseEnded;
wheel_event->dispatch_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kEventNonBlocking;
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardWheelEvent(*wheel_event);
}
} else {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(*mouse_event);
}
return Response::OK();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
44a637b47793512bfb1d2589d43b8dc492a97629
|
Desist libxml from continuing the parse after a SAX callback has stopped the
parse.
Attempt 2 -- now with less compile fail on Mac / Clang.
BUG=95465
TBR=cdn
TEST=covered by existing tests under ASAN
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7892003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100953 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlParsePITarget(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if ((name != NULL) &&
((name[0] == 'x') || (name[0] == 'X')) &&
((name[1] == 'm') || (name[1] == 'M')) &&
((name[2] == 'l') || (name[2] == 'L'))) {
int i;
if ((name[0] == 'x') && (name[1] == 'm') &&
(name[2] == 'l') && (name[3] == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME,
"XML declaration allowed only at the start of the document\n");
return(name);
} else if (name[3] == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME, NULL);
return(name);
}
for (i = 0;;i++) {
if (xmlW3CPIs[i] == NULL) break;
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)xmlW3CPIs[i]))
return(name);
}
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME,
"xmlParsePITarget: invalid name prefix 'xml'\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
if ((name != NULL) && (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colon are forbidden from PI names '%s'\n", name, NULL, NULL);
}
return(name);
}
|
xmlParsePITarget(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if ((name != NULL) &&
((name[0] == 'x') || (name[0] == 'X')) &&
((name[1] == 'm') || (name[1] == 'M')) &&
((name[2] == 'l') || (name[2] == 'L'))) {
int i;
if ((name[0] == 'x') && (name[1] == 'm') &&
(name[2] == 'l') && (name[3] == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME,
"XML declaration allowed only at the start of the document\n");
return(name);
} else if (name[3] == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME, NULL);
return(name);
}
for (i = 0;;i++) {
if (xmlW3CPIs[i] == NULL) break;
if (xmlStrEqual(name, (const xmlChar *)xmlW3CPIs[i]))
return(name);
}
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME,
"xmlParsePITarget: invalid name prefix 'xml'\n",
NULL, NULL);
}
if ((name != NULL) && (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colon are forbidden from PI names '%s'\n", name, NULL, NULL);
}
return(name);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8a50f99c25fb70ff43aaa82b6f9569db383f0ca8
|
8a50f99c25fb70ff43aaa82b6f9569db383f0ca8
|
[Sync] Rework unit tests for ChromeInvalidationClient
In particular, add unit tests that would have caught bug 139424.
Dep-inject InvalidationClient into ChromeInvalidationClient.
Use the function name 'UpdateRegisteredIds' consistently.
Replace some mocks with fakes.
BUG=139424
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10827133
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FireInvalidate(const char* type_name,
// Restart client without re-registering IDs.
void RestartClient() {
StopClient();
StartClient();
}
int GetInvalidationCount(const ObjectId& id) const {
return fake_listener_.GetInvalidationCount(id);
}
std::string GetPayload(const ObjectId& id) const {
return fake_listener_.GetPayload(id);
}
NotificationsDisabledReason GetNotificationsDisabledReason() const {
return fake_listener_.GetNotificationsDisabledReason();
}
int64 GetMaxVersion(const ObjectId& id) const {
return fake_tracker_.GetMaxVersion(id);
}
std::string GetInvalidationState() const {
return fake_tracker_.GetInvalidationState();
}
ObjectIdSet GetRegisteredIds() const {
return fake_invalidation_client_->GetRegisteredIds();
}
// |payload| can be NULL.
void FireInvalidate(const ObjectId& object_id,
int64 version, const char* payload) {
invalidation::Invalidation inv;
if (payload) {
inv = invalidation::Invalidation(object_id, version, payload);
} else {
inv = invalidation::Invalidation(object_id, version);
}
const AckHandle ack_handle("fakedata");
fake_invalidation_client_->ClearAckedHandles();
client_.Invalidate(fake_invalidation_client_, inv, ack_handle);
EXPECT_TRUE(fake_invalidation_client_->IsAckedHandle(ack_handle));
message_loop_.RunAllPending();
}
|
void FireInvalidate(const char* type_name,
int64 version, const char* payload) {
const invalidation::ObjectId object_id(
ipc::invalidation::ObjectSource::CHROME_SYNC, type_name);
std::string payload_tmp = payload ? payload : "";
invalidation::Invalidation inv;
if (payload) {
inv = invalidation::Invalidation(object_id, version, payload);
} else {
inv = invalidation::Invalidation(object_id, version);
}
invalidation::AckHandle ack_handle("fakedata");
EXPECT_CALL(mock_invalidation_client_, Acknowledge(ack_handle));
client_.Invalidate(&mock_invalidation_client_, inv, ack_handle);
message_loop_.RunAllPending();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void TestObjectReplaceableAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
info.This()->ForceSet(name, jsValue);
}
|
static void TestObjectReplaceableAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
info.This()->ForceSet(name, jsValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static bool CharacterIsValidForGLES(unsigned char c) {
if (c >= 32 && c <= 126 &&
c != '"' &&
c != '$' &&
c != '`' &&
c != '@' &&
c != '\\' &&
c != '\'') {
return true;
}
if (c >= 9 && c <= 13) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
static bool CharacterIsValidForGLES(unsigned char c) {
if (c >= 32 && c <= 126 &&
c != '"' &&
c != '$' &&
c != '`' &&
c != '@' &&
c != '\\' &&
c != '\'') {
return true;
}
if (c >= 9 && c <= 13) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7586/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074
|
708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074
|
src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
psf_f2i_array (const float *src, int *dest, int count, int normalize)
{ float normfact ;
normfact = normalize ? (1.0 * 0x7FFFFFFF) : 1.0 ;
while (--count >= 0)
dest [count] = lrintf (src [count] * normfact) ;
return ;
} /* psf_f2i_array */
|
psf_f2i_array (const float *src, int *dest, int count, int normalize)
{ float normfact ;
normfact = normalize ? (1.0 * 0x7FFFFFFF) : 1.0 ;
while (--count >= 0)
dest [count] = lrintf (src [count] * normfact) ;
return ;
} /* psf_f2i_array */
|
C
|
libsndfile
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void reflectedIntegralAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedIntegralAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void reflectedIntegralAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedIntegralAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5375/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
|
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
|
void btrfs_orphan_commit_root(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct btrfs_block_rsv *block_rsv;
int ret;
if (atomic_read(&root->orphan_inodes) ||
root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE)
return;
spin_lock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (atomic_read(&root->orphan_inodes)) {
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
return;
}
if (root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE) {
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
return;
}
block_rsv = root->orphan_block_rsv;
root->orphan_block_rsv = NULL;
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (root->orphan_item_inserted &&
btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) > 0) {
ret = btrfs_del_orphan_item(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
root->root_key.objectid);
BUG_ON(ret);
root->orphan_item_inserted = 0;
}
if (block_rsv) {
WARN_ON(block_rsv->size > 0);
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, block_rsv);
}
}
|
void btrfs_orphan_commit_root(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct btrfs_block_rsv *block_rsv;
int ret;
if (atomic_read(&root->orphan_inodes) ||
root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE)
return;
spin_lock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (atomic_read(&root->orphan_inodes)) {
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
return;
}
if (root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE) {
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
return;
}
block_rsv = root->orphan_block_rsv;
root->orphan_block_rsv = NULL;
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (root->orphan_item_inserted &&
btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) > 0) {
ret = btrfs_del_orphan_item(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
root->root_key.objectid);
BUG_ON(ret);
root->orphan_item_inserted = 0;
}
if (block_rsv) {
WARN_ON(block_rsv->size > 0);
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, block_rsv);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct tcphdr *th, unsigned int len)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
int queued = 0;
int res;
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_CLOSE:
goto discard;
case TCP_LISTEN:
if (th->ack)
return 1;
if (th->rst)
goto discard;
if (th->syn) {
if (th->fin)
goto discard;
if (icsk->icsk_af_ops->conn_request(sk, skb) < 0)
return 1;
/* Now we have several options: In theory there is
* nothing else in the frame. KA9Q has an option to
* send data with the syn, BSD accepts data with the
* syn up to the [to be] advertised window and
* Solaris 2.1 gives you a protocol error. For now
* we just ignore it, that fits the spec precisely
* and avoids incompatibilities. It would be nice in
* future to drop through and process the data.
*
* Now that TTCP is starting to be used we ought to
* queue this data.
* But, this leaves one open to an easy denial of
* service attack, and SYN cookies can't defend
* against this problem. So, we drop the data
* in the interest of security over speed unless
* it's still in use.
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
goto discard;
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
queued = tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(sk, skb, th, len);
if (queued >= 0)
return queued;
/* Do step6 onward by hand. */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
__kfree_skb(skb);
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
return 0;
}
res = tcp_validate_incoming(sk, skb, th, 0);
if (res <= 0)
return -res;
/* step 5: check the ACK field */
if (th->ack) {
int acceptable = tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) > 0;
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
if (acceptable) {
tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
smp_mb();
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
/* Note, that this wakeup is only for marginal
* crossed SYN case. Passively open sockets
* are not waked up, because sk->sk_sleep ==
* NULL and sk->sk_socket == NULL.
*/
if (sk->sk_socket)
sk_wake_async(sk,
SOCK_WAKE_IO, POLL_OUT);
tp->snd_una = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq;
tp->snd_wnd = ntohs(th->window) <<
tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
tcp_init_wl(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok)
tp->advmss -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
/* Make sure socket is routed, for
* correct metrics.
*/
icsk->icsk_af_ops->rebuild_header(sk);
tcp_init_metrics(sk);
tcp_init_congestion_control(sk);
/* Prevent spurious tcp_cwnd_restart() on
* first data packet.
*/
tp->lsndtime = tcp_time_stamp;
tcp_mtup_init(sk);
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk);
tcp_init_buffer_space(sk);
tcp_fast_path_on(tp);
} else {
return 1;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2);
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
dst_confirm(__sk_dst_get(sk));
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
/* Wake up lingering close() */
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
else {
int tmo;
if (tp->linger2 < 0 ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt))) {
tcp_done(sk);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA);
return 1;
}
tmo = tcp_fin_time(sk);
if (tmo > TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN) {
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo - TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
} else if (th->fin || sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
/* Bad case. We could lose such FIN otherwise.
* It is not a big problem, but it looks confusing
* and not so rare event. We still can lose it now,
* if it spins in bh_lock_sock(), but it is really
* marginal case.
*/
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo);
} else {
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2, tmo);
goto discard;
}
}
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSING:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_TIME_WAIT, 0);
goto discard;
}
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_update_metrics(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
goto discard;
}
break;
}
} else
goto discard;
/* step 6: check the URG bit */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
/* step 7: process the segment text */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
case TCP_CLOSING:
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt))
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
/* RFC 793 says to queue data in these states,
* RFC 1122 says we MUST send a reset.
* BSD 4.4 also does reset.
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA);
tcp_reset(sk);
return 1;
}
}
/* Fall through */
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
tcp_data_queue(sk, skb);
queued = 1;
break;
}
/* tcp_data could move socket to TIME-WAIT */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
tcp_ack_snd_check(sk);
}
if (!queued) {
discard:
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
return 0;
}
|
int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct tcphdr *th, unsigned int len)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
int queued = 0;
int res;
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_CLOSE:
goto discard;
case TCP_LISTEN:
if (th->ack)
return 1;
if (th->rst)
goto discard;
if (th->syn) {
if (icsk->icsk_af_ops->conn_request(sk, skb) < 0)
return 1;
/* Now we have several options: In theory there is
* nothing else in the frame. KA9Q has an option to
* send data with the syn, BSD accepts data with the
* syn up to the [to be] advertised window and
* Solaris 2.1 gives you a protocol error. For now
* we just ignore it, that fits the spec precisely
* and avoids incompatibilities. It would be nice in
* future to drop through and process the data.
*
* Now that TTCP is starting to be used we ought to
* queue this data.
* But, this leaves one open to an easy denial of
* service attack, and SYN cookies can't defend
* against this problem. So, we drop the data
* in the interest of security over speed unless
* it's still in use.
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
goto discard;
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
queued = tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(sk, skb, th, len);
if (queued >= 0)
return queued;
/* Do step6 onward by hand. */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
__kfree_skb(skb);
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
return 0;
}
res = tcp_validate_incoming(sk, skb, th, 0);
if (res <= 0)
return -res;
/* step 5: check the ACK field */
if (th->ack) {
int acceptable = tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) > 0;
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
if (acceptable) {
tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
smp_mb();
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
/* Note, that this wakeup is only for marginal
* crossed SYN case. Passively open sockets
* are not waked up, because sk->sk_sleep ==
* NULL and sk->sk_socket == NULL.
*/
if (sk->sk_socket)
sk_wake_async(sk,
SOCK_WAKE_IO, POLL_OUT);
tp->snd_una = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq;
tp->snd_wnd = ntohs(th->window) <<
tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
tcp_init_wl(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok)
tp->advmss -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
/* Make sure socket is routed, for
* correct metrics.
*/
icsk->icsk_af_ops->rebuild_header(sk);
tcp_init_metrics(sk);
tcp_init_congestion_control(sk);
/* Prevent spurious tcp_cwnd_restart() on
* first data packet.
*/
tp->lsndtime = tcp_time_stamp;
tcp_mtup_init(sk);
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk);
tcp_init_buffer_space(sk);
tcp_fast_path_on(tp);
} else {
return 1;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2);
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
dst_confirm(__sk_dst_get(sk));
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
/* Wake up lingering close() */
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
else {
int tmo;
if (tp->linger2 < 0 ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt))) {
tcp_done(sk);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA);
return 1;
}
tmo = tcp_fin_time(sk);
if (tmo > TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN) {
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo - TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
} else if (th->fin || sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
/* Bad case. We could lose such FIN otherwise.
* It is not a big problem, but it looks confusing
* and not so rare event. We still can lose it now,
* if it spins in bh_lock_sock(), but it is really
* marginal case.
*/
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo);
} else {
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2, tmo);
goto discard;
}
}
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSING:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_TIME_WAIT, 0);
goto discard;
}
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_update_metrics(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
goto discard;
}
break;
}
} else
goto discard;
/* step 6: check the URG bit */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
/* step 7: process the segment text */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
case TCP_CLOSING:
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt))
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
/* RFC 793 says to queue data in these states,
* RFC 1122 says we MUST send a reset.
* BSD 4.4 also does reset.
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA);
tcp_reset(sk);
return 1;
}
}
/* Fall through */
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
tcp_data_queue(sk, skb);
queued = 1;
break;
}
/* tcp_data could move socket to TIME-WAIT */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
tcp_ack_snd_check(sk);
}
if (!queued) {
discard:
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2018-20854
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20854/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6acb47d1a318e5b3b7115354ebc4ea060c59d3a1
|
6acb47d1a318e5b3b7115354ebc4ea060c59d3a1
|
phy: ocelot-serdes: fix out-of-bounds read
Currently, there is an out-of-bounds read on array ctrl->phys,
once variable i reaches the maximum array size of SERDES_MAX
in the for loop.
Fix this by changing the condition in the for loop from
i <= SERDES_MAX to i < SERDES_MAX.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473966 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473959 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Fixes: 51f6b410fc22 ("phy: add driver for Microsemi Ocelot SerDes muxing")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int serdes_init_s1g(struct regmap *regmap, u8 serdes)
{
int ret;
ret = serdes_update_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_LANE |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_ELOOP |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_FLOOP,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_LANE);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_ENA |
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_CTRL_DATA_M,
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_CTRL_DATA(200) |
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_ENA);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_DES_100FX_CPMD_ENA |
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST);
ret = serdes_commit_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST, 0);
ret = serdes_commit_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
|
static int serdes_init_s1g(struct regmap *regmap, u8 serdes)
{
int ret;
ret = serdes_update_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_LANE |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_ELOOP |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_FLOOP,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_LANE);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_ENA |
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_CTRL_DATA_M,
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_CTRL_DATA(200) |
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_ENA);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_DES_100FX_CPMD_ENA |
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST);
ret = serdes_commit_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST, 0);
ret = serdes_commit_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0377
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0377/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/665baf5ed5c6186d973c46cdea165c0548027350
|
665baf5ed5c6186d973c46cdea165c0548027350
|
Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
|
entry_guard_encode_for_state(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
/*
* The meta-format we use is K=V K=V K=V... where K can be any
* characters excepts space and =, and V can be any characters except
* space. The order of entries is not allowed to matter.
* Unrecognized K=V entries are persisted; recognized but erroneous
* entries are corrected.
*/
smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
tor_assert(guard);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "in=%s", guard->selection_name);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "rsa_id=%s",
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
if (guard->bridge_addr) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "bridge_addr=%s:%d",
fmt_and_decorate_addr(&guard->bridge_addr->addr),
guard->bridge_addr->port);
}
if (strlen(guard->nickname) && is_legal_nickname(guard->nickname)) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "nickname=%s", guard->nickname);
}
format_iso_time_nospace(tbuf, guard->sampled_on_date);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "sampled_on=%s", tbuf);
if (guard->sampled_by_version) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "sampled_by=%s",
guard->sampled_by_version);
}
if (guard->unlisted_since_date > 0) {
format_iso_time_nospace(tbuf, guard->unlisted_since_date);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "unlisted_since=%s", tbuf);
}
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "listed=%d",
(int)guard->currently_listed);
if (guard->confirmed_idx >= 0) {
format_iso_time_nospace(tbuf, guard->confirmed_on_date);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "confirmed_on=%s", tbuf);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "confirmed_idx=%d", guard->confirmed_idx);
}
const double EPSILON = 1.0e-6;
/* Make a copy of the pathbias object, since we will want to update
some of them */
guard_pathbias_t *pb = tor_memdup(&guard->pb, sizeof(*pb));
pb->use_successes = pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard);
pb->successful_circuits_closed = pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard);
#define PB_FIELD(field) do { \
if (pb->field >= EPSILON) { \
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "pb_" #field "=%f", pb->field); \
} \
} while (0)
PB_FIELD(use_attempts);
PB_FIELD(use_successes);
PB_FIELD(circ_attempts);
PB_FIELD(circ_successes);
PB_FIELD(successful_circuits_closed);
PB_FIELD(collapsed_circuits);
PB_FIELD(unusable_circuits);
PB_FIELD(timeouts);
tor_free(pb);
#undef PB_FIELD
if (guard->extra_state_fields)
smartlist_add_strdup(result, guard->extra_state_fields);
char *joined = smartlist_join_strings(result, " ", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(result);
return joined;
}
|
entry_guard_encode_for_state(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
/*
* The meta-format we use is K=V K=V K=V... where K can be any
* characters excepts space and =, and V can be any characters except
* space. The order of entries is not allowed to matter.
* Unrecognized K=V entries are persisted; recognized but erroneous
* entries are corrected.
*/
smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
tor_assert(guard);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "in=%s", guard->selection_name);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "rsa_id=%s",
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
if (guard->bridge_addr) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "bridge_addr=%s:%d",
fmt_and_decorate_addr(&guard->bridge_addr->addr),
guard->bridge_addr->port);
}
if (strlen(guard->nickname) && is_legal_nickname(guard->nickname)) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "nickname=%s", guard->nickname);
}
format_iso_time_nospace(tbuf, guard->sampled_on_date);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "sampled_on=%s", tbuf);
if (guard->sampled_by_version) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "sampled_by=%s",
guard->sampled_by_version);
}
if (guard->unlisted_since_date > 0) {
format_iso_time_nospace(tbuf, guard->unlisted_since_date);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "unlisted_since=%s", tbuf);
}
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "listed=%d",
(int)guard->currently_listed);
if (guard->confirmed_idx >= 0) {
format_iso_time_nospace(tbuf, guard->confirmed_on_date);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "confirmed_on=%s", tbuf);
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "confirmed_idx=%d", guard->confirmed_idx);
}
const double EPSILON = 1.0e-6;
/* Make a copy of the pathbias object, since we will want to update
some of them */
guard_pathbias_t *pb = tor_memdup(&guard->pb, sizeof(*pb));
pb->use_successes = pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard);
pb->successful_circuits_closed = pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard);
#define PB_FIELD(field) do { \
if (pb->field >= EPSILON) { \
smartlist_add_asprintf(result, "pb_" #field "=%f", pb->field); \
} \
} while (0)
PB_FIELD(use_attempts);
PB_FIELD(use_successes);
PB_FIELD(circ_attempts);
PB_FIELD(circ_successes);
PB_FIELD(successful_circuits_closed);
PB_FIELD(collapsed_circuits);
PB_FIELD(unusable_circuits);
PB_FIELD(timeouts);
tor_free(pb);
#undef PB_FIELD
if (guard->extra_state_fields)
smartlist_add_strdup(result, guard->extra_state_fields);
char *joined = smartlist_join_strings(result, " ", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(result);
return joined;
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20855/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00
|
IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
|
static int set_reg_umr_segment(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_wqe_umr_ctrl_seg *umr,
const struct ib_send_wr *wr, int atomic)
{
const struct mlx5_umr_wr *umrwr = umr_wr(wr);
memset(umr, 0, sizeof(*umr));
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_FAIL_IF_FREE)
umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_FREE; /* fail if free */
else
umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_NOT_FREE; /* fail if not free */
umr->xlt_octowords = cpu_to_be16(get_xlt_octo(umrwr->xlt_size));
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_XLT) {
u64 offset = get_xlt_octo(umrwr->offset);
umr->xlt_offset = cpu_to_be16(offset & 0xffff);
umr->xlt_offset_47_16 = cpu_to_be32(offset >> 16);
umr->flags |= MLX5_UMR_TRANSLATION_OFFSET_EN;
}
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_TRANSLATION)
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_update_translation_mask();
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_PD_ACCESS) {
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_update_access_mask(atomic);
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_update_pd_mask();
}
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_ENABLE_MR)
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_enable_mr_mask();
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_DISABLE_MR)
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_disable_mr_mask();
if (!wr->num_sge)
umr->flags |= MLX5_UMR_INLINE;
return umr_check_mkey_mask(dev, be64_to_cpu(umr->mkey_mask));
}
|
static int set_reg_umr_segment(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_wqe_umr_ctrl_seg *umr,
const struct ib_send_wr *wr, int atomic)
{
const struct mlx5_umr_wr *umrwr = umr_wr(wr);
memset(umr, 0, sizeof(*umr));
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_FAIL_IF_FREE)
umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_FREE; /* fail if free */
else
umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_NOT_FREE; /* fail if not free */
umr->xlt_octowords = cpu_to_be16(get_xlt_octo(umrwr->xlt_size));
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_XLT) {
u64 offset = get_xlt_octo(umrwr->offset);
umr->xlt_offset = cpu_to_be16(offset & 0xffff);
umr->xlt_offset_47_16 = cpu_to_be32(offset >> 16);
umr->flags |= MLX5_UMR_TRANSLATION_OFFSET_EN;
}
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_TRANSLATION)
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_update_translation_mask();
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_UPDATE_PD_ACCESS) {
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_update_access_mask(atomic);
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_update_pd_mask();
}
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_ENABLE_MR)
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_enable_mr_mask();
if (wr->send_flags & MLX5_IB_SEND_UMR_DISABLE_MR)
umr->mkey_mask |= get_umr_disable_mr_mask();
if (!wr->num_sge)
umr->flags |= MLX5_UMR_INLINE;
return umr_check_mkey_mask(dev, be64_to_cpu(umr->mkey_mask));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7a3439b3d169047c1c07f28a6f9cda341328980b
|
7a3439b3d169047c1c07f28a6f9cda341328980b
|
[Print Preview]: Added code to support pdf fit to page functionality.
BUG=85132
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10083060
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
int page_number = params.page_number;
if (page_number < FIRST_PAGE_INDEX || !params.data_size)
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
base::RefCountedBytes* data_bytes =
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size);
DCHECK(data_bytes);
print_preview_ui->SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(page_number, data_bytes);
print_preview_ui->OnDidPreviewPage(page_number, params.preview_request_id);
}
|
void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
int page_number = params.page_number;
if (page_number < FIRST_PAGE_INDEX || !params.data_size)
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
base::RefCountedBytes* data_bytes =
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size);
DCHECK(data_bytes);
print_preview_ui->SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(page_number, data_bytes);
print_preview_ui->OnDidPreviewPage(page_number, params.preview_request_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
GahpClient::globus_gram_client_job_cancel(const char * job_contact)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_JOB_CANCEL";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(job_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
|
GahpClient::globus_gram_client_job_cancel(const char * job_contact)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_JOB_CANCEL";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(job_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5827
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5827/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
517ac71c9ee27f856f9becde8abea7d1604af9d4
|
sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
|
static SQLITE_NOINLINE void autoIncrementEnd(Parse *pParse){
AutoincInfo *p;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
assert( v );
for(p = pParse->pAinc; p; p = p->pNext){
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList autoIncEnd[] = {
/* 0 */ {OP_NotNull, 0, 2, 0},
/* 1 */ {OP_NewRowid, 0, 0, 0},
/* 2 */ {OP_MakeRecord, 0, 2, 0},
/* 3 */ {OP_Insert, 0, 0, 0},
/* 4 */ {OP_Close, 0, 0, 0}
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
Db *pDb = &db->aDb[p->iDb];
int iRec;
int memId = p->regCtr;
iRec = sqlite3GetTempReg(pParse);
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, 0, pDb->pSchema) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Le, memId+2, sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v)+7, memId);
VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, 0, p->iDb, pDb->pSchema->pSeqTab, OP_OpenWrite);
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(autoIncEnd), autoIncEnd, iLn);
if( aOp==0 ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = memId+1;
aOp[1].p2 = memId+1;
aOp[2].p1 = memId-1;
aOp[2].p3 = iRec;
aOp[3].p2 = iRec;
aOp[3].p3 = memId+1;
aOp[3].p5 = OPFLAG_APPEND;
sqlite3ReleaseTempReg(pParse, iRec);
}
}
|
static SQLITE_NOINLINE void autoIncrementEnd(Parse *pParse){
AutoincInfo *p;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
assert( v );
for(p = pParse->pAinc; p; p = p->pNext){
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList autoIncEnd[] = {
/* 0 */ {OP_NotNull, 0, 2, 0},
/* 1 */ {OP_NewRowid, 0, 0, 0},
/* 2 */ {OP_MakeRecord, 0, 2, 0},
/* 3 */ {OP_Insert, 0, 0, 0},
/* 4 */ {OP_Close, 0, 0, 0}
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
Db *pDb = &db->aDb[p->iDb];
int iRec;
int memId = p->regCtr;
iRec = sqlite3GetTempReg(pParse);
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, 0, pDb->pSchema) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Le, memId+2, sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v)+7, memId);
VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, 0, p->iDb, pDb->pSchema->pSeqTab, OP_OpenWrite);
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(autoIncEnd), autoIncEnd, iLn);
if( aOp==0 ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = memId+1;
aOp[1].p2 = memId+1;
aOp[2].p1 = memId-1;
aOp[2].p3 = iRec;
aOp[3].p2 = iRec;
aOp[3].p3 = memId+1;
aOp[3].p5 = OPFLAG_APPEND;
sqlite3ReleaseTempReg(pParse, iRec);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3412/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
static int efx_ethtool_set_ringparam(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_ringparam *ring)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
u32 txq_entries;
if (ring->rx_mini_pending || ring->rx_jumbo_pending ||
ring->rx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (ring->rx_pending < EFX_RXQ_MIN_ENT) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"RX queues cannot be smaller than %u\n",
EFX_RXQ_MIN_ENT);
return -EINVAL;
}
txq_entries = max(ring->tx_pending, EFX_TXQ_MIN_ENT(efx));
if (txq_entries != ring->tx_pending)
netif_warn(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"increasing TX queue size to minimum of %u\n",
txq_entries);
return efx_realloc_channels(efx, ring->rx_pending, txq_entries);
}
|
static int efx_ethtool_set_ringparam(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_ringparam *ring)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
if (ring->rx_mini_pending || ring->rx_jumbo_pending ||
ring->rx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (ring->rx_pending < EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE ||
ring->tx_pending < EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"TX and RX queues cannot be smaller than %ld\n",
EFX_MIN_RING_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
return efx_realloc_channels(efx, ring->rx_pending, ring->tx_pending);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Browser::HasFindBarController() const {
return find_bar_controller_.get() != NULL;
}
|
bool Browser::HasFindBarController() const {
return find_bar_controller_.get() != NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GDataDirectory::TakeOverEntries(GDataDirectory* dir) {
for (GDataFileCollection::iterator iter = dir->child_files_.begin();
iter != dir->child_files_.end(); ++iter) {
AddEntry(iter->second);
}
dir->child_files_.clear();
for (GDataDirectoryCollection::iterator iter =
dir->child_directories_.begin();
iter != dir->child_directories_.end(); ++iter) {
AddEntry(iter->second);
}
dir->child_directories_.clear();
return true;
}
|
bool GDataDirectory::TakeOverEntries(GDataDirectory* dir) {
for (GDataFileCollection::iterator iter = dir->child_files_.begin();
iter != dir->child_files_.end(); ++iter) {
AddEntry(iter->second);
}
dir->child_files_.clear();
for (GDataDirectoryCollection::iterator iter =
dir->child_directories_.begin();
iter != dir->child_directories_.end(); ++iter) {
AddEntry(iter->second);
}
dir->child_directories_.clear();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void voidMethodArrayBufferViewArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodArrayBufferViewArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(ArrayBufferView*, arrayBufferViewArg, info[0]->IsArrayBufferView() ? V8ArrayBufferView::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::ArrayBufferView>::Cast(info[0])) : 0);
imp->voidMethodArrayBufferViewArg(arrayBufferViewArg);
}
|
static void voidMethodArrayBufferViewArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodArrayBufferViewArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(ArrayBufferView*, arrayBufferViewArg, info[0]->IsArrayBufferView() ? V8ArrayBufferView::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::ArrayBufferView>::Cast(info[0])) : 0);
imp->voidMethodArrayBufferViewArg(arrayBufferViewArg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15650
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15650/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395
|
45ca5d3fcb6f874bf5ba55d0e9651cef68515395
| null |
static int name_from_dns_search(struct address buf[static MAXADDRS], char canon[static 256], const char *name, int family)
{
char search[256];
struct resolvconf conf;
size_t l, dots;
char *p, *z;
if (__get_resolv_conf(&conf, search, sizeof search) < 0) return -1;
/* Count dots, suppress search when >=ndots or name ends in
* a dot, which is an explicit request for global scope. */
for (dots=l=0; name[l]; l++) if (name[l]=='.') dots++;
if (dots >= conf.ndots || name[l-1]=='.') *search = 0;
/* This can never happen; the caller already checked length. */
if (l >= 256) return EAI_NONAME;
/* Name with search domain appended is setup in canon[]. This both
* provides the desired default canonical name (if the requested
* name is not a CNAME record) and serves as a buffer for passing
* the full requested name to name_from_dns. */
memcpy(canon, name, l);
canon[l] = '.';
for (p=search; *p; p=z) {
for (; isspace(*p); p++);
for (z=p; *z && !isspace(*z); z++);
if (z==p) break;
if (z-p < 256 - l - 1) {
memcpy(canon+l+1, p, z-p);
canon[z-p+1+l] = 0;
int cnt = name_from_dns(buf, canon, canon, family, &conf);
if (cnt) return cnt;
}
}
canon[l] = 0;
return name_from_dns(buf, canon, name, family, &conf);
}
|
static int name_from_dns_search(struct address buf[static MAXADDRS], char canon[static 256], const char *name, int family)
{
char search[256];
struct resolvconf conf;
size_t l, dots;
char *p, *z;
if (__get_resolv_conf(&conf, search, sizeof search) < 0) return -1;
/* Count dots, suppress search when >=ndots or name ends in
* a dot, which is an explicit request for global scope. */
for (dots=l=0; name[l]; l++) if (name[l]=='.') dots++;
if (dots >= conf.ndots || name[l-1]=='.') *search = 0;
/* This can never happen; the caller already checked length. */
if (l >= 256) return EAI_NONAME;
/* Name with search domain appended is setup in canon[]. This both
* provides the desired default canonical name (if the requested
* name is not a CNAME record) and serves as a buffer for passing
* the full requested name to name_from_dns. */
memcpy(canon, name, l);
canon[l] = '.';
for (p=search; *p; p=z) {
for (; isspace(*p); p++);
for (z=p; *z && !isspace(*z); z++);
if (z==p) break;
if (z-p < 256 - l - 1) {
memcpy(canon+l+1, p, z-p);
canon[z-p+1+l] = 0;
int cnt = name_from_dns(buf, canon, canon, family, &conf);
if (cnt) return cnt;
}
}
canon[l] = 0;
return name_from_dns(buf, canon, name, family, &conf);
}
|
C
|
musl
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5534/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=weechat.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=efb795c74fe954b9544074aafcebb1be4452b03a
|
efb795c74fe954b9544074aafcebb1be4452b03a
| null |
hook_fd_set (fd_set *read_fds, fd_set *write_fds, fd_set *exception_fds)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook;
int max_fd;
max_fd = 0;
for (ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FD]; ptr_hook;
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook)
{
if (!ptr_hook->deleted)
{
/* skip invalid file descriptors */
if ((fcntl (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook,fd), F_GETFD) == -1)
&& (errno == EBADF))
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) == 0)
{
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) = errno;
gui_chat_printf (NULL,
_("%sError: bad file descriptor (%d) "
"used in hook_fd"),
gui_chat_prefix[GUI_CHAT_PREFIX_ERROR],
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd));
}
}
else
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), read_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), write_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), exception_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
}
}
}
return max_fd;
}
|
hook_fd_set (fd_set *read_fds, fd_set *write_fds, fd_set *exception_fds)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook;
int max_fd;
max_fd = 0;
for (ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FD]; ptr_hook;
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook)
{
if (!ptr_hook->deleted)
{
/* skip invalid file descriptors */
if ((fcntl (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook,fd), F_GETFD) == -1)
&& (errno == EBADF))
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) == 0)
{
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) = errno;
gui_chat_printf (NULL,
_("%sError: bad file descriptor (%d) "
"used in hook_fd"),
gui_chat_prefix[GUI_CHAT_PREFIX_ERROR],
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd));
}
}
else
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), read_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), write_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), exception_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
}
}
}
return max_fd;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8963
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8963/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
|
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
{
struct perf_event *event, *tmp;
int ctxn;
mutex_lock(&child->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &child->perf_event_list,
owner_entry) {
list_del_init(&event->owner_entry);
/*
* Ensure the list deletion is visible before we clear
* the owner, closes a race against perf_release() where
* we need to serialize on the owner->perf_event_mutex.
*/
smp_wmb();
event->owner = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&child->perf_event_mutex);
for_each_task_context_nr(ctxn)
perf_event_exit_task_context(child, ctxn);
/*
* The perf_event_exit_task_context calls perf_event_task
* with child's task_ctx, which generates EXIT events for
* child contexts and sets child->perf_event_ctxp[] to NULL.
* At this point we need to send EXIT events to cpu contexts.
*/
perf_event_task(child, NULL, 0);
}
|
void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
{
struct perf_event *event, *tmp;
int ctxn;
mutex_lock(&child->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &child->perf_event_list,
owner_entry) {
list_del_init(&event->owner_entry);
/*
* Ensure the list deletion is visible before we clear
* the owner, closes a race against perf_release() where
* we need to serialize on the owner->perf_event_mutex.
*/
smp_wmb();
event->owner = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&child->perf_event_mutex);
for_each_task_context_nr(ctxn)
perf_event_exit_task_context(child, ctxn);
/*
* The perf_event_exit_task_context calls perf_event_task
* with child's task_ctx, which generates EXIT events for
* child contexts and sets child->perf_event_ctxp[] to NULL.
* At this point we need to send EXIT events to cpu contexts.
*/
perf_event_task(child, NULL, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
4afa45dfbf11e9334e63aef002cd854ec86f6d44
|
Revert 37061 because it caused ui_tests to not finish.
TBR=estade
TEST=none
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/549155
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37075 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
BrowserActionsContainer::BrowserActionsContainer(
Profile* profile, ToolbarView* toolbar)
: profile_(profile),
toolbar_(toolbar),
popup_(NULL),
popup_button_(NULL),
resize_gripper_(NULL),
chevron_(NULL),
suppress_chevron_(false),
resize_amount_(0),
animation_target_size_(0),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(task_factory_(this)) {
ExtensionsService* extension_service = profile->GetExtensionsService();
if (!extension_service) // The |extension_service| can be NULL in Incognito.
return;
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_LOADED,
Source<Profile>(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_UNLOADED,
Source<Profile>(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_UNLOADED_DISABLED,
Source<Profile>(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_HOST_VIEW_SHOULD_CLOSE,
Source<Profile>(profile_));
resize_animation_.reset(new SlideAnimation(this));
resize_gripper_ = new views::ResizeGripper(this);
resize_gripper_->SetVisible(false);
AddChildView(resize_gripper_);
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
SkBitmap* chevron_image = rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_BOOKMARK_BAR_CHEVRONS);
chevron_ = new views::MenuButton(NULL, std::wstring(), this, false);
chevron_->SetVisible(false);
chevron_->SetIcon(*chevron_image);
chevron_->EnableCanvasFlippingForRTLUI(true);
AddChildView(chevron_);
int predefined_width =
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(prefs::kBrowserActionContainerWidth);
container_size_ = gfx::Size(predefined_width, kButtonSize);
SetID(VIEW_ID_BROWSER_ACTION_TOOLBAR);
}
|
BrowserActionsContainer::BrowserActionsContainer(
Profile* profile, ToolbarView* toolbar)
: profile_(profile),
toolbar_(toolbar),
popup_(NULL),
popup_button_(NULL),
model_(NULL),
resize_gripper_(NULL),
chevron_(NULL),
suppress_chevron_(false),
resize_amount_(0),
animation_target_size_(0),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(task_factory_(this)) {
SetID(VIEW_ID_BROWSER_ACTION_TOOLBAR);
ExtensionsService* extension_service = profile->GetExtensionsService();
if (!extension_service) // The |extension_service| can be NULL in Incognito.
return;
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::EXTENSION_HOST_VIEW_SHOULD_CLOSE,
Source<Profile>(profile_));
model_ = extension_service->toolbar_model();
model_->AddObserver(this);
resize_animation_.reset(new SlideAnimation(this));
resize_gripper_ = new views::ResizeGripper(this);
resize_gripper_->SetVisible(false);
AddChildView(resize_gripper_);
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
SkBitmap* chevron_image = rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_BOOKMARK_BAR_CHEVRONS);
chevron_ = new views::MenuButton(NULL, std::wstring(), this, false);
chevron_->SetVisible(false);
chevron_->SetIcon(*chevron_image);
chevron_->EnableCanvasFlippingForRTLUI(true);
AddChildView(chevron_);
int predefined_width =
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(prefs::kBrowserActionContainerWidth);
container_size_ = gfx::Size(predefined_width, kButtonSize);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int qeth_core_ethtool_get_settings(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_cmd *ecmd)
{
struct qeth_card *card = netdev->ml_priv;
enum qeth_link_types link_type;
if ((card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD) || (card->info.guestlan))
link_type = QETH_LINK_TYPE_10GBIT_ETH;
else
link_type = card->info.link_type;
ecmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
ecmd->supported = SUPPORTED_Autoneg;
ecmd->advertising = ADVERTISED_Autoneg;
ecmd->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
ecmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_ENABLE;
switch (link_type) {
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_FAST_ETH:
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_ETH100:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_TP;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_TP;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_100;
ecmd->port = PORT_TP;
break;
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_GBIT_ETH:
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_ETH1000:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_FIBRE;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_FIBRE;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_1000;
ecmd->port = PORT_FIBRE;
break;
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_10GBIT_ETH:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_10000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_FIBRE;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_10000baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_FIBRE;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_10000;
ecmd->port = PORT_FIBRE;
break;
default:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_TP;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_TP;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_10;
ecmd->port = PORT_TP;
}
return 0;
}
|
int qeth_core_ethtool_get_settings(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_cmd *ecmd)
{
struct qeth_card *card = netdev->ml_priv;
enum qeth_link_types link_type;
if ((card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD) || (card->info.guestlan))
link_type = QETH_LINK_TYPE_10GBIT_ETH;
else
link_type = card->info.link_type;
ecmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
ecmd->supported = SUPPORTED_Autoneg;
ecmd->advertising = ADVERTISED_Autoneg;
ecmd->duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
ecmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_ENABLE;
switch (link_type) {
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_FAST_ETH:
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_ETH100:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_TP;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_TP;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_100;
ecmd->port = PORT_TP;
break;
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_GBIT_ETH:
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_ETH1000:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_FIBRE;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_FIBRE;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_1000;
ecmd->port = PORT_FIBRE;
break;
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_10GBIT_ETH:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_10000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_FIBRE;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_10000baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_FIBRE;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_10000;
ecmd->port = PORT_FIBRE;
break;
default:
ecmd->supported |= SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_TP;
ecmd->advertising |= ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full |
ADVERTISED_TP;
ecmd->speed = SPEED_10;
ecmd->port = PORT_TP;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12589
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12589/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/commit/eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134
|
eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134
|
mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
|
static void install_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sga;
sigemptyset(&sga.sa_mask);
sigaddset(&sga.sa_mask, SIGTERM);
sga.sa_handler = sandbox_handler;
sga.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGINT, &sga, NULL);
sigemptyset(&sga.sa_mask);
sigaddset(&sga.sa_mask, SIGINT);
sga.sa_handler = sandbox_handler;
sga.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGTERM, &sga, NULL);
}
|
static void install_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sga;
sigemptyset(&sga.sa_mask);
sigaddset(&sga.sa_mask, SIGTERM);
sga.sa_handler = sandbox_handler;
sga.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGINT, &sga, NULL);
sigemptyset(&sga.sa_mask);
sigaddset(&sga.sa_mask, SIGINT);
sga.sa_handler = sandbox_handler;
sga.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGTERM, &sga, NULL);
}
|
C
|
firejail
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7124
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7124/
|
CWE-502
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/20ce2fe8e3c211a42fee05a461a5881be9a8790e?w=1
|
20ce2fe8e3c211a42fee05a461a5881be9a8790e?w=1
|
Fix bug #72663 - destroy broken object when unserializing
(cherry picked from commit 448c9be157f4147e121f1a2a524536c75c9c6059)
|
static inline zend_long parse_iv(const unsigned char *p)
{
return parse_iv2(p, NULL);
}
|
static inline zend_long parse_iv(const unsigned char *p)
{
return parse_iv2(p, NULL);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1536
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1536/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb
|
d44e5bde18a41beda39d49189bef7f2ba7c8f3cb
|
Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
|
static jboolean Bitmap_hasAlpha(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
return !bitmap->isOpaque() ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
}
|
static jboolean Bitmap_hasAlpha(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
return !bitmap->isOpaque() ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4350/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7
|
95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7
|
net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void sctp_v6_to_sk_saddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk)
{
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped) {
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[0] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[1] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[2] = htonl(0x0000ffff);
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[3] =
addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
} else {
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr = addr->v6.sin6_addr;
}
}
|
static void sctp_v6_to_sk_saddr(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sock *sk)
{
if (addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped) {
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[0] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[1] = 0;
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[2] = htonl(0x0000ffff);
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[3] =
addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
} else {
inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr = addr->v6.sin6_addr;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2870/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44
|
ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44
|
Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SetOnAuthRequired(
const base::Callback<void(SocketStreamEvent*)>& callback) {
on_auth_required_ = callback;
}
|
void SetOnAuthRequired(
const base::Callback<void(SocketStreamEvent*)>& callback) {
on_auth_required_ = callback;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16910/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/33f66ba6fd234114aa37f0209dac031bb2870a9b
|
33f66ba6fd234114aa37f0209dac031bb2870a9b
|
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
|
void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
}
|
void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx );
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2887
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2887/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01924fbe6c0e0f059ca46a03f9f6b2670ae3e0fa
|
01924fbe6c0e0f059ca46a03f9f6b2670ae3e0fa
|
Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const std::vector<ui::EventType>& events() const { return events_; };
|
const std::vector<ui::EventType>& events() const { return events_; };
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
static void ext4_da_release_space(struct inode *inode, int to_free)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
if (!to_free)
return; /* Nothing to release, exit */
spin_lock(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_reservation_lock);
if (unlikely(to_free > ei->i_reserved_data_blocks)) {
/*
* if there aren't enough reserved blocks, then the
* counter is messed up somewhere. Since this
* function is called from invalidate page, it's
* harmless to return without any action.
*/
ext4_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_NOTICE, "ext4_da_release_space: "
"ino %lu, to_free %d with only %d reserved "
"data blocks\n", inode->i_ino, to_free,
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks);
WARN_ON(1);
to_free = ei->i_reserved_data_blocks;
}
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks -= to_free;
if (ei->i_reserved_data_blocks == 0) {
/*
* We can release all of the reserved metadata blocks
* only when we have written all of the delayed
* allocation blocks.
*/
to_free += ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
}
/* update fs dirty blocks counter */
percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, to_free);
spin_unlock(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_reservation_lock);
vfs_dq_release_reservation_block(inode, to_free);
}
|
static void ext4_da_release_space(struct inode *inode, int to_free)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
if (!to_free)
return; /* Nothing to release, exit */
spin_lock(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_reservation_lock);
if (unlikely(to_free > ei->i_reserved_data_blocks)) {
/*
* if there aren't enough reserved blocks, then the
* counter is messed up somewhere. Since this
* function is called from invalidate page, it's
* harmless to return without any action.
*/
ext4_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_NOTICE, "ext4_da_release_space: "
"ino %lu, to_free %d with only %d reserved "
"data blocks\n", inode->i_ino, to_free,
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks);
WARN_ON(1);
to_free = ei->i_reserved_data_blocks;
}
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks -= to_free;
if (ei->i_reserved_data_blocks == 0) {
/*
* We can release all of the reserved metadata blocks
* only when we have written all of the delayed
* allocation blocks.
*/
to_free += ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
}
/* update fs dirty blocks counter */
percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, to_free);
spin_unlock(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_reservation_lock);
vfs_dq_release_reservation_block(inode, to_free);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4131/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
__be32 * xdr_reserve_space(struct xdr_stream *xdr, size_t nbytes)
{
__be32 *p = xdr->p;
__be32 *q;
/* align nbytes on the next 32-bit boundary */
nbytes += 3;
nbytes &= ~3;
q = p + (nbytes >> 2);
if (unlikely(q > xdr->end || q < p))
return NULL;
xdr->p = q;
xdr->iov->iov_len += nbytes;
xdr->buf->len += nbytes;
return p;
}
|
__be32 * xdr_reserve_space(struct xdr_stream *xdr, size_t nbytes)
{
__be32 *p = xdr->p;
__be32 *q;
/* align nbytes on the next 32-bit boundary */
nbytes += 3;
nbytes &= ~3;
q = p + (nbytes >> 2);
if (unlikely(q > xdr->end || q < p))
return NULL;
xdr->p = q;
xdr->iov->iov_len += nbytes;
xdr->buf->len += nbytes;
return p;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ProfileSyncService::AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
|
void ProfileSyncService::AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getTexParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum target,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost())
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
if (!ValidateTextureBinding("getTexParameter", target))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
switch (pname) {
case GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER:
case GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER:
case GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S:
case GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T: {
GLint value = 0;
ContextGL()->GetTexParameteriv(target, pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
case GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT: // EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTTextureFilterAnisotropicName)) {
GLfloat value = 0.f;
ContextGL()->GetTexParameterfv(target, pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getTexParameter",
"invalid parameter name, EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getTexParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
|
ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getTexParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum target,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost())
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
if (!ValidateTextureBinding("getTexParameter", target))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
switch (pname) {
case GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER:
case GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER:
case GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S:
case GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T: {
GLint value = 0;
ContextGL()->GetTexParameteriv(target, pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(value));
}
case GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT: // EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTTextureFilterAnisotropicName)) {
GLfloat value = 0.f;
ContextGL()->GetTexParameterfv(target, pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getTexParameter",
"invalid parameter name, EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getTexParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1428
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1428/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=weechat.git;a=commit;h=c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
|
c265cad1c95b84abfd4e8d861f25926ef13b5d91
| null |
network_pass_socks5proxy (struct t_proxy *proxy, int sock, const char *address,
int port)
{
/*
* socks5 protocol is explained in RFC 1928
* socks5 authentication with username/pass is explained in RFC 1929
*/
struct t_network_socks5 socks5;
unsigned char buffer[288];
int username_len, password_len, addr_len, addr_buffer_len;
unsigned char *addr_buffer;
socks5.version = 5;
socks5.nmethods = 1;
if (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])
&& CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])[0])
socks5.method = 2; /* with authentication */
else
socks5.method = 0; /* without authentication */
send (sock, (char *) &socks5, sizeof(socks5), 0);
/* server socks5 must respond with 2 bytes */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 2, 0) != 2)
return 0;
if (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])
&& CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])[0])
{
/*
* with authentication
* -> socks server must respond with :
* - socks version (buffer[0]) = 5 => socks5
* - socks method (buffer[1]) = 2 => authentication
*/
if (buffer[0] != 5 || buffer[1] != 2)
return 0;
/* authentication as in RFC 1929 */
username_len = strlen (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME]));
password_len = strlen (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_PASSWORD]));
/* make username/password buffer */
buffer[0] = 1;
buffer[1] = (unsigned char) username_len;
memcpy(buffer + 2, CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME]), username_len);
buffer[2 + username_len] = (unsigned char) password_len;
memcpy (buffer + 3 + username_len,
CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_PASSWORD]), password_len);
send (sock, buffer, 3 + username_len + password_len, 0);
/* server socks5 must respond with 2 bytes */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 2, 0) != 2)
return 0;
/* buffer[1] = auth state, must be 0 for success */
if (buffer[1] != 0)
return 0;
}
else
{
/*
* without authentication
* -> socks server must respond with :
* - socks version (buffer[0]) = 5 => socks5
* - socks method (buffer[1]) = 0 => no authentication
*/
if (!((buffer[0] == 5) && (buffer[1] == 0)))
return 0;
}
/* authentication successful then giving address/port to connect */
addr_len = strlen(address);
addr_buffer_len = 4 + 1 + addr_len + 2;
addr_buffer = malloc (addr_buffer_len * sizeof(*addr_buffer));
if (!addr_buffer)
return 0;
addr_buffer[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
addr_buffer[1] = 1; /* command: 1 for connect */
addr_buffer[2] = 0; /* reserved */
addr_buffer[3] = 3; /* address type : ipv4 (1), domainname (3), ipv6 (4) */
addr_buffer[4] = (unsigned char) addr_len;
memcpy (addr_buffer + 5, address, addr_len); /* server address */
*((unsigned short *) (addr_buffer + 5 + addr_len)) = htons (port); /* server port */
send (sock, addr_buffer, addr_buffer_len, 0);
free (addr_buffer);
/* dialog with proxy server */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 4, 0) != 4)
return 0;
if (!((buffer[0] == 5) && (buffer[1] == 0)))
return 0;
/* buffer[3] = address type */
switch (buffer[3])
{
case 1:
/*
* ipv4
* server socks return server bound address and port
* address of 4 bytes and port of 2 bytes (= 6 bytes)
*/
if (recv (sock, buffer, 6, 0) != 6)
return 0;
break;
case 3:
/*
* domainname
* server socks return server bound address and port
*/
/* read address length */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 1, 0) != 1)
return 0;
addr_len = buffer[0];
/* read address + port = addr_len + 2 */
if (recv (sock, buffer, addr_len + 2, 0) != (addr_len + 2))
return 0;
break;
case 4:
/*
* ipv6
* server socks return server bound address and port
* address of 16 bytes and port of 2 bytes (= 18 bytes)
*/
if (recv (sock, buffer, 18, 0) != 18)
return 0;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
/* connection ok */
return 1;
}
|
network_pass_socks5proxy (struct t_proxy *proxy, int sock, const char *address,
int port)
{
/*
* socks5 protocol is explained in RFC 1928
* socks5 authentication with username/pass is explained in RFC 1929
*/
struct t_network_socks5 socks5;
unsigned char buffer[288];
int username_len, password_len, addr_len, addr_buffer_len;
unsigned char *addr_buffer;
socks5.version = 5;
socks5.nmethods = 1;
if (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])
&& CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])[0])
socks5.method = 2; /* with authentication */
else
socks5.method = 0; /* without authentication */
send (sock, (char *) &socks5, sizeof(socks5), 0);
/* server socks5 must respond with 2 bytes */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 2, 0) != 2)
return 0;
if (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])
&& CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME])[0])
{
/*
* with authentication
* -> socks server must respond with :
* - socks version (buffer[0]) = 5 => socks5
* - socks method (buffer[1]) = 2 => authentication
*/
if (buffer[0] != 5 || buffer[1] != 2)
return 0;
/* authentication as in RFC 1929 */
username_len = strlen (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME]));
password_len = strlen (CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_PASSWORD]));
/* make username/password buffer */
buffer[0] = 1;
buffer[1] = (unsigned char) username_len;
memcpy(buffer + 2, CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_USERNAME]), username_len);
buffer[2 + username_len] = (unsigned char) password_len;
memcpy (buffer + 3 + username_len,
CONFIG_STRING(proxy->options[PROXY_OPTION_PASSWORD]), password_len);
send (sock, buffer, 3 + username_len + password_len, 0);
/* server socks5 must respond with 2 bytes */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 2, 0) != 2)
return 0;
/* buffer[1] = auth state, must be 0 for success */
if (buffer[1] != 0)
return 0;
}
else
{
/*
* without authentication
* -> socks server must respond with :
* - socks version (buffer[0]) = 5 => socks5
* - socks method (buffer[1]) = 0 => no authentication
*/
if (!((buffer[0] == 5) && (buffer[1] == 0)))
return 0;
}
/* authentication successful then giving address/port to connect */
addr_len = strlen(address);
addr_buffer_len = 4 + 1 + addr_len + 2;
addr_buffer = malloc (addr_buffer_len * sizeof(*addr_buffer));
if (!addr_buffer)
return 0;
addr_buffer[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
addr_buffer[1] = 1; /* command: 1 for connect */
addr_buffer[2] = 0; /* reserved */
addr_buffer[3] = 3; /* address type : ipv4 (1), domainname (3), ipv6 (4) */
addr_buffer[4] = (unsigned char) addr_len;
memcpy (addr_buffer + 5, address, addr_len); /* server address */
*((unsigned short *) (addr_buffer + 5 + addr_len)) = htons (port); /* server port */
send (sock, addr_buffer, addr_buffer_len, 0);
free (addr_buffer);
/* dialog with proxy server */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 4, 0) != 4)
return 0;
if (!((buffer[0] == 5) && (buffer[1] == 0)))
return 0;
/* buffer[3] = address type */
switch (buffer[3])
{
case 1:
/*
* ipv4
* server socks return server bound address and port
* address of 4 bytes and port of 2 bytes (= 6 bytes)
*/
if (recv (sock, buffer, 6, 0) != 6)
return 0;
break;
case 3:
/*
* domainname
* server socks return server bound address and port
*/
/* read address length */
if (recv (sock, buffer, 1, 0) != 1)
return 0;
addr_len = buffer[0];
/* read address + port = addr_len + 2 */
if (recv (sock, buffer, addr_len + 2, 0) != (addr_len + 2))
return 0;
break;
case 4:
/*
* ipv6
* server socks return server bound address and port
* address of 16 bytes and port of 2 bytes (= 18 bytes)
*/
if (recv (sock, buffer, 18, 0) != 18)
return 0;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
/* connection ok */
return 1;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
static struct stored_bitmap *store_bitmap(struct bitmap_index *index,
struct ewah_bitmap *root,
const unsigned char *sha1,
struct stored_bitmap *xor_with,
int flags)
{
struct stored_bitmap *stored;
khiter_t hash_pos;
int ret;
stored = xmalloc(sizeof(struct stored_bitmap));
stored->root = root;
stored->xor = xor_with;
stored->flags = flags;
hashcpy(stored->sha1, sha1);
hash_pos = kh_put_sha1(index->bitmaps, stored->sha1, &ret);
/* a 0 return code means the insertion succeeded with no changes,
* because the SHA1 already existed on the map. this is bad, there
* shouldn't be duplicated commits in the index */
if (ret == 0) {
error("Duplicate entry in bitmap index: %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
return NULL;
}
kh_value(index->bitmaps, hash_pos) = stored;
return stored;
}
|
static struct stored_bitmap *store_bitmap(struct bitmap_index *index,
struct ewah_bitmap *root,
const unsigned char *sha1,
struct stored_bitmap *xor_with,
int flags)
{
struct stored_bitmap *stored;
khiter_t hash_pos;
int ret;
stored = xmalloc(sizeof(struct stored_bitmap));
stored->root = root;
stored->xor = xor_with;
stored->flags = flags;
hashcpy(stored->sha1, sha1);
hash_pos = kh_put_sha1(index->bitmaps, stored->sha1, &ret);
/* a 0 return code means the insertion succeeded with no changes,
* because the SHA1 already existed on the map. this is bad, there
* shouldn't be duplicated commits in the index */
if (ret == 0) {
error("Duplicate entry in bitmap index: %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
return NULL;
}
kh_value(index->bitmaps, hash_pos) = stored;
return stored;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75f1a0ebf09d110642f19dd4e389004e949a7828
|
75f1a0ebf09d110642f19dd4e389004e949a7828
|
Web Animations: Temporary fix for performance regression in transition tests
This patch adds a flag to Player::setStartTime to permit it to only call
update() instead of serviceAnimations() (as per previous behaviour). We
intend to in the near future replace the serviceAnimations calls with a
deferred timing update system. Note that update() here is not correct in
general as we may need to ask the timeline to request frame callbacks.
BUG=340511
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/155303002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void DocumentTimeline::DocumentTimelineTiming::serviceOnNextFrame()
{
if (m_timeline->m_document->view())
m_timeline->m_document->view()->scheduleAnimation();
}
|
void DocumentTimeline::DocumentTimelineTiming::serviceOnNextFrame()
{
if (m_timeline->m_document->view())
m_timeline->m_document->view()->scheduleAnimation();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9508/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/e8bbf5b0889790cf8616f4004867f0ff656f0551
|
e8bbf5b0889790cf8616f4004867f0ff656f0551
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
|
void smp_send_pair_fail(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
p_cb->failure = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status,
p_cb->failure);
if (p_cb->status <= SMP_MAX_FAIL_RSN_PER_SPEC &&
p_cb->status != SMP_SUCCESS) {
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED, p_cb);
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = true;
}
}
|
void smp_send_pair_fail(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
p_cb->failure = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: status=%d failure=%d ", __func__, p_cb->status,
p_cb->failure);
if (p_cb->status <= SMP_MAX_FAIL_RSN_PER_SPEC &&
p_cb->status != SMP_SUCCESS) {
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED, p_cb);
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = true;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da9a32b9e282c1653bb6b5c1b8c89a1970905f21
|
da9a32b9e282c1653bb6b5c1b8c89a1970905f21
|
Add filtering of IPC messages when RenderFrameHost is swapped out.
BUG=351815
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/205543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@258521 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int RenderFrameHostImpl::GetRoutingID() {
return routing_id_;
}
|
int RenderFrameHostImpl::GetRoutingID() {
return routing_id_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
long long SegmentInfo::GetDuration() const {
if (m_duration < 0)
return -1;
assert(m_timecodeScale >= 1);
const double dd = double(m_duration) * double(m_timecodeScale);
const long long d = static_cast<long long>(dd);
return d;
}
|
long long SegmentInfo::GetDuration() const {
if (m_duration < 0)
return -1;
assert(m_timecodeScale >= 1);
const double dd = double(m_duration) * double(m_timecodeScale);
const long long d = static_cast<long long>(dd);
return d;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5757
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5757/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/032c3339bfb454c65ce38e7eafe49a54bac83073
|
032c3339bfb454c65ce38e7eafe49a54bac83073
|
Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
|
AffineTransform SVGElement::CalculateTransform(
ApplyMotionTransform apply_motion_transform) const {
const ComputedStyle* style =
GetLayoutObject() ? GetLayoutObject()->Style() : nullptr;
AffineTransform matrix;
if (style && style->HasTransform()) {
FloatRect reference_box = ComputeTransformReferenceBox(*this);
if (TransformUsesBoxSize(*style))
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(), WebFeature::kTransformUsesBoxSizeOnSVG);
float zoom = style->EffectiveZoom();
TransformationMatrix transform;
if (zoom != 1)
reference_box.Scale(zoom);
style->ApplyTransform(
transform, reference_box, ComputedStyle::kIncludeTransformOrigin,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeMotionPath,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeIndependentTransformProperties);
if (zoom != 1)
transform.Zoom(1 / zoom);
matrix = transform.ToAffineTransform();
}
if (apply_motion_transform == kIncludeMotionTransform && HasSVGRareData())
matrix.PreMultiply(*SvgRareData()->AnimateMotionTransform());
return matrix;
}
|
AffineTransform SVGElement::CalculateTransform(
ApplyMotionTransform apply_motion_transform) const {
const ComputedStyle* style =
GetLayoutObject() ? GetLayoutObject()->Style() : nullptr;
AffineTransform matrix;
if (style && style->HasTransform()) {
FloatRect reference_box = ComputeTransformReferenceBox(*this);
if (TransformUsesBoxSize(*style))
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(), WebFeature::kTransformUsesBoxSizeOnSVG);
float zoom = style->EffectiveZoom();
TransformationMatrix transform;
if (zoom != 1)
reference_box.Scale(zoom);
style->ApplyTransform(
transform, reference_box, ComputedStyle::kIncludeTransformOrigin,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeMotionPath,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeIndependentTransformProperties);
if (zoom != 1)
transform.Zoom(1 / zoom);
matrix = transform.ToAffineTransform();
}
if (apply_motion_transform == kIncludeMotionTransform && HasSVGRareData())
matrix.PreMultiply(*SvgRareData()->AnimateMotionTransform());
return matrix;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
ftrace_enable_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
goto out;
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret || !write || (last_ftrace_enabled == !!ftrace_enabled))
goto out;
last_ftrace_enabled = !!ftrace_enabled;
if (ftrace_enabled) {
ftrace_startup_sysctl();
/* we are starting ftrace again */
if (ftrace_ops_list != &ftrace_list_end)
update_ftrace_function();
} else {
/* stopping ftrace calls (just send to ftrace_stub) */
ftrace_trace_function = ftrace_stub;
ftrace_shutdown_sysctl();
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&ftrace_lock);
return ret;
}
|
ftrace_enable_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
goto out;
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret || !write || (last_ftrace_enabled == !!ftrace_enabled))
goto out;
last_ftrace_enabled = !!ftrace_enabled;
if (ftrace_enabled) {
ftrace_startup_sysctl();
/* we are starting ftrace again */
if (ftrace_ops_list != &ftrace_list_end)
update_ftrace_function();
} else {
/* stopping ftrace calls (just send to ftrace_stub) */
ftrace_trace_function = ftrace_stub;
ftrace_shutdown_sysctl();
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&ftrace_lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnFileChooserResponse(
const std::vector<content::FileChooserFileInfo>& files) {
if (file_chooser_completions_.empty())
return;
WebVector<blink::WebFileChooserCompletion::SelectedFileInfo> selected_files(
files.size());
size_t current_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < files.size(); ++i) {
blink::WebFileChooserCompletion::SelectedFileInfo selected_file;
selected_file.path = blink::FilePathToWebString(files[i].file_path);
if (selected_file.path.IsEmpty())
continue;
selected_file.display_name =
blink::FilePathToWebString(base::FilePath(files[i].display_name));
if (files[i].file_system_url.is_valid()) {
selected_file.file_system_url = files[i].file_system_url;
selected_file.length = files[i].length;
selected_file.modification_time = files[i].modification_time.ToDoubleT();
selected_file.is_directory = files[i].is_directory;
}
selected_files[current_size] = selected_file;
current_size++;
}
if (current_size < selected_files.size()) {
WebVector<blink::WebFileChooserCompletion::SelectedFileInfo> truncated_list(
selected_files.Data(), current_size);
selected_files.Swap(truncated_list);
}
if (file_chooser_completions_.front()->completion) {
file_chooser_completions_.front()->completion->DidChooseFile(
selected_files);
}
file_chooser_completions_.pop_front();
if (!file_chooser_completions_.empty()) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser(
routing_id_, file_chooser_completions_.front()->params));
}
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::OnFileChooserResponse(
const std::vector<content::FileChooserFileInfo>& files) {
if (file_chooser_completions_.empty())
return;
WebVector<blink::WebFileChooserCompletion::SelectedFileInfo> selected_files(
files.size());
size_t current_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < files.size(); ++i) {
blink::WebFileChooserCompletion::SelectedFileInfo selected_file;
selected_file.path = blink::FilePathToWebString(files[i].file_path);
if (selected_file.path.IsEmpty())
continue;
selected_file.display_name =
blink::FilePathToWebString(base::FilePath(files[i].display_name));
if (files[i].file_system_url.is_valid()) {
selected_file.file_system_url = files[i].file_system_url;
selected_file.length = files[i].length;
selected_file.modification_time = files[i].modification_time.ToDoubleT();
selected_file.is_directory = files[i].is_directory;
}
selected_files[current_size] = selected_file;
current_size++;
}
if (current_size < selected_files.size()) {
WebVector<blink::WebFileChooserCompletion::SelectedFileInfo> truncated_list(
selected_files.Data(), current_size);
selected_files.Swap(truncated_list);
}
if (file_chooser_completions_.front()->completion) {
file_chooser_completions_.front()->completion->DidChooseFile(
selected_files);
}
file_chooser_completions_.pop_front();
if (!file_chooser_completions_.empty()) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser(
routing_id_, file_chooser_completions_.front()->params));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10021
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10021/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
|
318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
|
scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
int sas_eh_target_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
int res;
struct Scsi_Host *host = cmd->device->host;
struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
struct sas_internal *i = to_sas_internal(host->transportt);
if (current != host->ehandler)
return sas_queue_reset(dev, SAS_DEV_RESET, 0, 0);
if (!i->dft->lldd_I_T_nexus_reset)
return FAILED;
res = i->dft->lldd_I_T_nexus_reset(dev);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_SUCC || res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE ||
res == -ENODEV)
return SUCCESS;
return FAILED;
}
|
int sas_eh_target_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
int res;
struct Scsi_Host *host = cmd->device->host;
struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
struct sas_internal *i = to_sas_internal(host->transportt);
if (current != host->ehandler)
return sas_queue_reset(dev, SAS_DEV_RESET, 0, 0);
if (!i->dft->lldd_I_T_nexus_reset)
return FAILED;
res = i->dft->lldd_I_T_nexus_reset(dev);
if (res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_SUCC || res == TMF_RESP_FUNC_COMPLETE ||
res == -ENODEV)
return SUCCESS;
return FAILED;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
|
parse_GOTO_TABLE(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
struct ofpact_goto_table *ogt = ofpact_put_GOTO_TABLE(ofpacts);
char *table_s = strsep(&arg, ",");
if (!table_s || !table_s[0]) {
return xstrdup("instruction goto-table needs table id");
}
return str_to_u8(table_s, "table", &ogt->table_id);
}
|
parse_GOTO_TABLE(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
struct ofpact_goto_table *ogt = ofpact_put_GOTO_TABLE(ofpacts);
char *table_s = strsep(&arg, ",");
if (!table_s || !table_s[0]) {
return xstrdup("instruction goto-table needs table id");
}
return str_to_u8(table_s, "table", &ogt->table_id);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7397
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7397/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/306c1f0fa5754ca78efd16ab752f0e981d4f6b82
|
306c1f0fa5754ca78efd16ab752f0e981d4f6b82
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454
|
static MagickBooleanType InvokePDFDelegate(const MagickBooleanType verbose,
const char *command,char *message,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
status;
#define ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status) \
{ \
status=ExternalDelegateCommand(MagickFalse,verbose,command,message, \
exception); \
if (status == 0) \
return(MagickTrue); \
if (status < 0) \
return(MagickFalse); \
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),DelegateError, \
"FailedToExecuteCommand","`%s' (%d)",command,status); \
return(MagickFalse); \
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_GS_DELEGATE) || defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
#define SetArgsStart(command,args_start) \
if (args_start == (const char *) NULL) \
{ \
if (*command != '"') \
args_start=strchr(command,' '); \
else \
{ \
args_start=strchr(command+1,'"'); \
if (args_start != (const char *) NULL) \
args_start++; \
} \
}
char
**argv,
*errors;
const char
*args_start = (const char *) NULL;
const GhostInfo
*ghost_info;
gs_main_instance
*interpreter;
gsapi_revision_t
revision;
int
argc,
code;
register ssize_t
i;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
ghost_info=NTGhostscriptDLLVectors();
#else
GhostInfo
ghost_info_struct;
ghost_info=(&ghost_info_struct);
(void) memset(&ghost_info_struct,0,sizeof(ghost_info_struct));
ghost_info_struct.delete_instance=(void (*)(gs_main_instance *))
gsapi_delete_instance;
ghost_info_struct.exit=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *)) gsapi_exit;
ghost_info_struct.new_instance=(int (*)(gs_main_instance **,void *))
gsapi_new_instance;
ghost_info_struct.init_with_args=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *,int,char **))
gsapi_init_with_args;
ghost_info_struct.run_string=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *,const char *,int,
int *)) gsapi_run_string;
ghost_info_struct.set_stdio=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *,int (*)(void *,char *,
int),int (*)(void *,const char *,int),int (*)(void *, const char *, int)))
gsapi_set_stdio;
ghost_info_struct.revision=(int (*)(gsapi_revision_t *,int)) gsapi_revision;
#endif
if (ghost_info == (GhostInfo *) NULL)
ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status);
if ((ghost_info->revision)(&revision,sizeof(revision)) != 0)
revision.revision=0;
if (verbose != MagickFalse)
{
(void) fprintf(stdout,"[ghostscript library %.2f]",(double)
revision.revision/100.0);
SetArgsStart(command,args_start);
(void) fputs(args_start,stdout);
}
errors=(char *) NULL;
status=(ghost_info->new_instance)(&interpreter,(void *) &errors);
if (status < 0)
ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status);
code=0;
argv=StringToArgv(command,&argc);
if (argv == (char **) NULL)
{
(ghost_info->delete_instance)(interpreter);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) (ghost_info->set_stdio)(interpreter,(int (MagickDLLCall *)(void *,
char *,int)) NULL,PDFDelegateMessage,PDFDelegateMessage);
status=(ghost_info->init_with_args)(interpreter,argc-1,argv+1);
if (status == 0)
status=(ghost_info->run_string)(interpreter,"systemdict /start get exec\n",
0,&code);
(ghost_info->exit)(interpreter);
(ghost_info->delete_instance)(interpreter);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
argv[i]=DestroyString(argv[i]);
argv=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(argv);
if (status != 0)
{
SetArgsStart(command,args_start);
if (status == -101) /* quit */
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"[ghostscript library %.2f]%s: %s",(double) revision.revision/100.0,
args_start,errors);
else
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),DelegateError,
"PDFDelegateFailed","`[ghostscript library %.2f]%s': %s",(double)
revision.revision/100.0,args_start,errors);
if (errors != (char *) NULL)
errors=DestroyString(errors);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Ghostscript returns status %d, exit code %d",status,code);
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
if (errors != (char *) NULL)
errors=DestroyString(errors);
return(MagickTrue);
#else
ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status);
#endif
}
|
static MagickBooleanType InvokePDFDelegate(const MagickBooleanType verbose,
const char *command,char *message,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
status;
#define ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status) \
{ \
status=ExternalDelegateCommand(MagickFalse,verbose,command,message, \
exception); \
if (status == 0) \
return(MagickTrue); \
if (status < 0) \
return(MagickFalse); \
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),DelegateError, \
"FailedToExecuteCommand","`%s' (%d)",command,status); \
return(MagickFalse); \
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_GS_DELEGATE) || defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
#define SetArgsStart(command,args_start) \
if (args_start == (const char *) NULL) \
{ \
if (*command != '"') \
args_start=strchr(command,' '); \
else \
{ \
args_start=strchr(command+1,'"'); \
if (args_start != (const char *) NULL) \
args_start++; \
} \
}
char
**argv,
*errors;
const char
*args_start = (const char *) NULL;
const GhostInfo
*ghost_info;
gs_main_instance
*interpreter;
gsapi_revision_t
revision;
int
argc,
code;
register ssize_t
i;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
ghost_info=NTGhostscriptDLLVectors();
#else
GhostInfo
ghost_info_struct;
ghost_info=(&ghost_info_struct);
(void) memset(&ghost_info_struct,0,sizeof(ghost_info_struct));
ghost_info_struct.delete_instance=(void (*)(gs_main_instance *))
gsapi_delete_instance;
ghost_info_struct.exit=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *)) gsapi_exit;
ghost_info_struct.new_instance=(int (*)(gs_main_instance **,void *))
gsapi_new_instance;
ghost_info_struct.init_with_args=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *,int,char **))
gsapi_init_with_args;
ghost_info_struct.run_string=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *,const char *,int,
int *)) gsapi_run_string;
ghost_info_struct.set_stdio=(int (*)(gs_main_instance *,int (*)(void *,char *,
int),int (*)(void *,const char *,int),int (*)(void *, const char *, int)))
gsapi_set_stdio;
ghost_info_struct.revision=(int (*)(gsapi_revision_t *,int)) gsapi_revision;
#endif
if (ghost_info == (GhostInfo *) NULL)
ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status);
if ((ghost_info->revision)(&revision,sizeof(revision)) != 0)
revision.revision=0;
if (verbose != MagickFalse)
{
(void) fprintf(stdout,"[ghostscript library %.2f]",(double)
revision.revision/100.0);
SetArgsStart(command,args_start);
(void) fputs(args_start,stdout);
}
errors=(char *) NULL;
status=(ghost_info->new_instance)(&interpreter,(void *) &errors);
if (status < 0)
ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status);
code=0;
argv=StringToArgv(command,&argc);
if (argv == (char **) NULL)
{
(ghost_info->delete_instance)(interpreter);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) (ghost_info->set_stdio)(interpreter,(int (MagickDLLCall *)(void *,
char *,int)) NULL,PDFDelegateMessage,PDFDelegateMessage);
status=(ghost_info->init_with_args)(interpreter,argc-1,argv+1);
if (status == 0)
status=(ghost_info->run_string)(interpreter,"systemdict /start get exec\n",
0,&code);
(ghost_info->exit)(interpreter);
(ghost_info->delete_instance)(interpreter);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
argv[i]=DestroyString(argv[i]);
argv=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(argv);
if (status != 0)
{
SetArgsStart(command,args_start);
if (status == -101) /* quit */
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"[ghostscript library %.2f]%s: %s",(double) revision.revision/100.0,
args_start,errors);
else
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),DelegateError,
"PDFDelegateFailed","`[ghostscript library %.2f]%s': %s",(double)
revision.revision/100.0,args_start,errors);
if (errors != (char *) NULL)
errors=DestroyString(errors);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Ghostscript returns status %d, exit code %d",status,code);
return(MagickFalse);
}
}
if (errors != (char *) NULL)
errors=DestroyString(errors);
return(MagickTrue);
#else
ExecuteGhostscriptCommand(command,status);
#endif
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> TBR=dpranke@chromium.org
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
TBR=wuchengli@chromium.org,kcwu@chromium.org,sandersd@chromium.org,jorgelo@chromium.org,posciak@chromium.org
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
VP9Picture::~VP9Picture() {}
|
VP9Picture::~VP9Picture() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3688
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3688/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4
|
26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4
|
net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
sctp_init_chunk_t *initchunk;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
struct sctp_packet *packet;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* 6.10 Bundling
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
*/
if (!chunk->singleton)
return sctp_sf_violation_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the INIT-ACK chunk has a valid length */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_initack_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Grab the INIT header. */
chunk->subh.init_hdr = (sctp_inithdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
/* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
err_chunk = NULL;
if (!sctp_verify_init(net, ep, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
(sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
&err_chunk)) {
sctp_error_t error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_RESOURCE;
/* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded.
* Send an ABORT, with causes. If there are no causes,
* then there wasn't enough memory. Just terminate
* the association.
*/
if (err_chunk) {
packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg,
(__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t),
ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk);
if (packet) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT,
SCTP_PACKET(packet));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
error = SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
}
}
/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
* It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear
* down an association in an authenticated way only, the
* handling of malformed packets should not result in
* tearing down the association.
*
* This means that if we only want to abort associations
* in an authenticated way (i.e AUTH+ABORT), then we
* can't destroy this association just because the packet
* was malformed.
*/
if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
return sctp_stop_t1_and_abort(net, commands, error, ECONNREFUSED,
asoc, chunk->transport);
}
/* Tag the variable length parameters. Note that we never
* convert the parameters in an INIT chunk.
*/
chunk->param_hdr.v = skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_inithdr_t));
initchunk = (sctp_init_chunk_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT,
SCTP_PEER_INIT(initchunk));
/* Reset init error count upon receipt of INIT-ACK. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_COUNTER_RESET, SCTP_NULL());
/* 5.1 C) "A" shall stop the T1-init timer and leave
* COOKIE-WAIT state. "A" shall then ... start the T1-cookie
* timer, and enter the COOKIE-ECHOED state.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_COOKIE));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED));
/* SCTP-AUTH: genereate the assocition shared keys so that
* we can potentially signe the COOKIE-ECHO.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL());
/* 5.1 C) "A" shall then send the State Cookie received in the
* INIT ACK chunk in a COOKIE ECHO chunk, ...
*/
/* If there is any errors to report, send the ERROR chunk generated
* for unknown parameters as well.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO,
SCTP_CHUNK(err_chunk));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
sctp_init_chunk_t *initchunk;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
struct sctp_packet *packet;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* 6.10 Bundling
* An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks.
*/
if (!chunk->singleton)
return sctp_sf_violation_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the INIT-ACK chunk has a valid length */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_initack_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Grab the INIT header. */
chunk->subh.init_hdr = (sctp_inithdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
/* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
err_chunk = NULL;
if (!sctp_verify_init(net, ep, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
(sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
&err_chunk)) {
sctp_error_t error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_RESOURCE;
/* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded.
* Send an ABORT, with causes. If there are no causes,
* then there wasn't enough memory. Just terminate
* the association.
*/
if (err_chunk) {
packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg,
(__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) +
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t),
ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk);
if (packet) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT,
SCTP_PACKET(packet));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
error = SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
}
}
/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
* It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear
* down an association in an authenticated way only, the
* handling of malformed packets should not result in
* tearing down the association.
*
* This means that if we only want to abort associations
* in an authenticated way (i.e AUTH+ABORT), then we
* can't destroy this association just because the packet
* was malformed.
*/
if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
return sctp_stop_t1_and_abort(net, commands, error, ECONNREFUSED,
asoc, chunk->transport);
}
/* Tag the variable length parameters. Note that we never
* convert the parameters in an INIT chunk.
*/
chunk->param_hdr.v = skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_inithdr_t));
initchunk = (sctp_init_chunk_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT,
SCTP_PEER_INIT(initchunk));
/* Reset init error count upon receipt of INIT-ACK. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_COUNTER_RESET, SCTP_NULL());
/* 5.1 C) "A" shall stop the T1-init timer and leave
* COOKIE-WAIT state. "A" shall then ... start the T1-cookie
* timer, and enter the COOKIE-ECHOED state.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_COOKIE));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED));
/* SCTP-AUTH: genereate the assocition shared keys so that
* we can potentially signe the COOKIE-ECHO.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL());
/* 5.1 C) "A" shall then send the State Cookie received in the
* INIT ACK chunk in a COOKIE ECHO chunk, ...
*/
/* If there is any errors to report, send the ERROR chunk generated
* for unknown parameters as well.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO,
SCTP_CHUNK(err_chunk));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltParseStylesheetInclude(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr cur) {
int ret = -1;
xmlDocPtr oldDoc;
xmlChar *base = NULL;
xmlChar *uriRef = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL;
xsltStylesheetPtr result;
xsltDocumentPtr include;
xsltDocumentPtr docptr;
int oldNopreproc;
if ((cur == NULL) || (style == NULL))
return (ret);
uriRef = xmlGetNsProp(cur, (const xmlChar *)"href", NULL);
if (uriRef == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : missing href attribute\n");
goto error;
}
base = xmlNodeGetBase(style->doc, cur);
URI = xmlBuildURI(uriRef, base);
if (URI == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : invalid URI reference %s\n", uriRef);
goto error;
}
/*
* in order to detect recursion, we check all previously included
* stylesheets.
*/
docptr = style->includes;
while (docptr != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(docptr->doc->URL, URI)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : recursion detected on included URL %s\n", URI);
goto error;
}
docptr = docptr->includes;
}
include = xsltLoadStyleDocument(style, URI);
if (include == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : unable to load %s\n", URI);
goto error;
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM_FAST(cur) && (cur->psvi != NULL)) {
((xsltStyleItemIncludePtr) cur->psvi)->include = include;
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Internal error: (xsltParseStylesheetInclude) "
"The xsl:include element was not compiled.\n", URI);
style->errors++;
}
#endif
oldDoc = style->doc;
style->doc = include->doc;
/* chain to stylesheet for recursion checking */
include->includes = style->includes;
style->includes = include;
oldNopreproc = style->nopreproc;
style->nopreproc = include->preproc;
/*
* TODO: This will change some values of the
* including stylesheet with every included module
* (e.g. excluded-result-prefixes)
* We need to strictly seperate such stylesheet-owned values.
*/
result = xsltParseStylesheetProcess(style, include->doc);
style->nopreproc = oldNopreproc;
include->preproc = 1;
style->includes = include->includes;
style->doc = oldDoc;
if (result == NULL) {
ret = -1;
goto error;
}
ret = 0;
error:
if (uriRef != NULL)
xmlFree(uriRef);
if (base != NULL)
xmlFree(base);
if (URI != NULL)
xmlFree(URI);
return (ret);
}
|
xsltParseStylesheetInclude(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr cur) {
int ret = -1;
xmlDocPtr oldDoc;
xmlChar *base = NULL;
xmlChar *uriRef = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL;
xsltStylesheetPtr result;
xsltDocumentPtr include;
xsltDocumentPtr docptr;
int oldNopreproc;
if ((cur == NULL) || (style == NULL))
return (ret);
uriRef = xmlGetNsProp(cur, (const xmlChar *)"href", NULL);
if (uriRef == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : missing href attribute\n");
goto error;
}
base = xmlNodeGetBase(style->doc, cur);
URI = xmlBuildURI(uriRef, base);
if (URI == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : invalid URI reference %s\n", uriRef);
goto error;
}
/*
* in order to detect recursion, we check all previously included
* stylesheets.
*/
docptr = style->includes;
while (docptr != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(docptr->doc->URL, URI)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : recursion detected on included URL %s\n", URI);
goto error;
}
docptr = docptr->includes;
}
include = xsltLoadStyleDocument(style, URI);
if (include == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:include : unable to load %s\n", URI);
goto error;
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM_FAST(cur) && (cur->psvi != NULL)) {
((xsltStyleItemIncludePtr) cur->psvi)->include = include;
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"Internal error: (xsltParseStylesheetInclude) "
"The xsl:include element was not compiled.\n", URI);
style->errors++;
}
#endif
oldDoc = style->doc;
style->doc = include->doc;
/* chain to stylesheet for recursion checking */
include->includes = style->includes;
style->includes = include;
oldNopreproc = style->nopreproc;
style->nopreproc = include->preproc;
/*
* TODO: This will change some values of the
* including stylesheet with every included module
* (e.g. excluded-result-prefixes)
* We need to strictly seperate such stylesheet-owned values.
*/
result = xsltParseStylesheetProcess(style, include->doc);
style->nopreproc = oldNopreproc;
include->preproc = 1;
style->includes = include->includes;
style->doc = oldDoc;
if (result == NULL) {
ret = -1;
goto error;
}
ret = 0;
error:
if (uriRef != NULL)
xmlFree(uriRef);
if (base != NULL)
xmlFree(base);
if (URI != NULL)
xmlFree(URI);
return (ret);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6057
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6057/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac::GetDefaultConfiguration() {
PlatformSensorConfiguration default_configuration;
default_configuration.set_frequency(
SensorTraits<SensorType::AMBIENT_LIGHT>::kDefaultFrequency);
return default_configuration;
}
|
PlatformSensorAmbientLightMac::GetDefaultConfiguration() {
PlatformSensorConfiguration default_configuration;
default_configuration.set_frequency(
SensorTraits<SensorType::AMBIENT_LIGHT>::kDefaultFrequency);
return default_configuration;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16527/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
|
124751d5e63c823092060074bd0abaae61aaa9c4
|
ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static inline void check_mapped_dB(const struct usbmix_name_map *p,
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval)
{
if (p && p->dB) {
cval->dBmin = p->dB->min;
cval->dBmax = p->dB->max;
cval->initialized = 1;
}
}
|
static inline void check_mapped_dB(const struct usbmix_name_map *p,
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval)
{
if (p && p->dB) {
cval->dBmin = p->dB->min;
cval->dBmax = p->dB->max;
cval->initialized = 1;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1019/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
static void ipip_tunnel_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ipip_net *ipn = net_generic(net, ipip_net_id);
if (dev == ipn->fb_tunnel_dev)
rcu_assign_pointer(ipn->tunnels_wc[0], NULL);
else
ipip_tunnel_unlink(ipn, netdev_priv(dev));
dev_put(dev);
}
|
static void ipip_tunnel_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ipip_net *ipn = net_generic(net, ipip_net_id);
if (dev == ipn->fb_tunnel_dev)
rcu_assign_pointer(ipn->tunnels_wc[0], NULL);
else
ipip_tunnel_unlink(ipn, netdev_priv(dev));
dev_put(dev);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6766
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6766/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2cb006bc9d3ad16353ed49c2b75faea618156d0f
|
2cb006bc9d3ad16353ed49c2b75faea618156d0f
|
Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
|
void AppCacheHost::MarkAsForeignEntry(const GURL& document_url,
bool AppCacheHost::MarkAsForeignEntry(const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
if (was_select_cache_called_)
return false;
storage()->MarkEntryAsForeign(
main_resource_was_namespace_entry_ ? namespace_entry_url_ : document_url,
cache_document_was_loaded_from);
SelectCache(document_url, kAppCacheNoCacheId, GURL());
return true;
}
|
void AppCacheHost::MarkAsForeignEntry(const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
storage()->MarkEntryAsForeign(
main_resource_was_namespace_entry_ ? namespace_entry_url_ : document_url,
cache_document_was_loaded_from);
SelectCache(document_url, kAppCacheNoCacheId, GURL());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb
|
d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb
|
Fix eliding, truncation issues with hostnames in security information dialog for windows, linux platforms resp.
BUG=48597
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2958002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@51972 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PageInfoWindowGtk::InitContents() {
if (contents_)
gtk_widget_destroy(contents_);
contents_ = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, gtk_util::kContentAreaSpacing);
for (int i = 0; i < model_.GetSectionCount(); i++) {
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(contents_),
CreateSection(model_.GetSectionInfo(i)),
FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
gtk_widget_show_all(contents_);
gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_)->vbox), contents_);
}
|
void PageInfoWindowGtk::InitContents() {
if (contents_)
gtk_widget_destroy(contents_);
contents_ = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, gtk_util::kContentAreaSpacing);
for (int i = 0; i < model_.GetSectionCount(); i++) {
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(contents_),
CreateSection(model_.GetSectionInfo(i)),
FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
gtk_widget_show_all(contents_);
gtk_container_add(GTK_CONTAINER(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_)->vbox), contents_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc3c351a3d995f73ead5c92354396a7ec2b14e3f
|
fc3c351a3d995f73ead5c92354396a7ec2b14e3f
|
Split infobars.{cc,h} into separate pieces for the different classes defined within, so that each piece is shorter and clearer.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6250057
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73235 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void InfoBar::DeleteSelf() {
delete this;
}
|
void InfoBar::DeleteSelf() {
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8284
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static void gen_eob_worker(DisasContext *s, bool inhibit, bool recheck_tf)
{
gen_update_cc_op(s);
/* If several instructions disable interrupts, only the first does it. */
if (inhibit && !(s->flags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK)) {
gen_set_hflag(s, HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK);
} else {
gen_reset_hflag(s, HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK);
}
if (s->tb->flags & HF_RF_MASK) {
gen_helper_reset_rf(cpu_env);
}
if (s->singlestep_enabled) {
gen_helper_debug(cpu_env);
} else if (recheck_tf) {
gen_helper_rechecking_single_step(cpu_env);
tcg_gen_exit_tb(0);
} else if (s->tf) {
gen_helper_single_step(cpu_env);
} else {
tcg_gen_exit_tb(0);
}
s->is_jmp = DISAS_TB_JUMP;
}
|
static void gen_eob_worker(DisasContext *s, bool inhibit, bool recheck_tf)
{
gen_update_cc_op(s);
/* If several instructions disable interrupts, only the first does it. */
if (inhibit && !(s->flags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK)) {
gen_set_hflag(s, HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK);
} else {
gen_reset_hflag(s, HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK);
}
if (s->tb->flags & HF_RF_MASK) {
gen_helper_reset_rf(cpu_env);
}
if (s->singlestep_enabled) {
gen_helper_debug(cpu_env);
} else if (recheck_tf) {
gen_helper_rechecking_single_step(cpu_env);
tcg_gen_exit_tb(0);
} else if (s->tf) {
gen_helper_single_step(cpu_env);
} else {
tcg_gen_exit_tb(0);
}
s->is_jmp = DISAS_TB_JUMP;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6158
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6158/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21
|
20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21
|
[oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
NormalPage::~NormalPage() {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(IsPageHeaderAddress(reinterpret_cast<Address>(this)));
#endif
}
|
NormalPage::~NormalPage() {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(IsPageHeaderAddress(reinterpret_cast<Address>(this)));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/57fb5393bf051c590769c9b5723d5a9f4090a4cc
|
57fb5393bf051c590769c9b5723d5a9f4090a4cc
|
Implement range reading for NetworkReaderProxy.
The feature is not yet actually used, but will be used for range reading
of DriveFileStreamReader.
BUG=127129
TEST=Ran unit_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14493008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196636 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int LocalReaderProxy::Read(net::IOBuffer* buffer, int buffer_length,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(file_stream_);
return file_stream_->Read(buffer, buffer_length, callback);
}
|
int LocalReaderProxy::Read(net::IOBuffer* buffer, int buffer_length,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(file_stream_);
return file_stream_->Read(buffer, buffer_length, callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3234/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/52dac009556881941c60d378e34867cdb2fd00a0
|
52dac009556881941c60d378e34867cdb2fd00a0
|
Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionPrefs::UpdateManifest(const Extension* extension) {
if (extension->location() != Extension::LOAD) {
const DictionaryValue* extension_dict = GetExtensionPref(extension->id());
if (!extension_dict)
return;
DictionaryValue* old_manifest = NULL;
bool update_required =
!extension_dict->GetDictionary(kPrefManifest, &old_manifest) ||
!extension->manifest_value()->Equals(old_manifest);
if (update_required) {
UpdateExtensionPref(extension->id(), kPrefManifest,
extension->manifest_value()->DeepCopy());
}
}
}
|
void ExtensionPrefs::UpdateManifest(const Extension* extension) {
if (extension->location() != Extension::LOAD) {
const DictionaryValue* extension_dict = GetExtensionPref(extension->id());
if (!extension_dict)
return;
DictionaryValue* old_manifest = NULL;
bool update_required =
!extension_dict->GetDictionary(kPrefManifest, &old_manifest) ||
!extension->manifest_value()->Equals(old_manifest);
if (update_required) {
UpdateExtensionPref(extension->id(), kPrefManifest,
extension->manifest_value()->DeepCopy());
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserView::UpdateChildViewAndLayout(views::View* new_view,
views::View** old_view) {
DCHECK(old_view);
if (*old_view == new_view) {
if (new_view) {
if (new_view->GetPreferredSize().height() != new_view->height())
return true;
}
return false;
}
int current_height = 0;
if (*old_view) {
current_height = (*old_view)->height();
RemoveChildView(*old_view);
}
int new_height = 0;
if (new_view) {
new_height = new_view->GetPreferredSize().height();
AddChildView(new_view);
}
bool changed = false;
if (new_height != current_height) {
changed = true;
} else if (new_view && *old_view) {
new_view->SetBoundsRect((*old_view)->bounds());
new_view->SchedulePaint();
} else if (new_view) {
DCHECK_EQ(0, new_height);
new_view->SetBounds(0, 0, 0, 0);
}
*old_view = new_view;
return changed;
}
|
bool BrowserView::UpdateChildViewAndLayout(views::View* new_view,
views::View** old_view) {
DCHECK(old_view);
if (*old_view == new_view) {
if (new_view) {
if (new_view->GetPreferredSize().height() != new_view->height())
return true;
}
return false;
}
int current_height = 0;
if (*old_view) {
current_height = (*old_view)->height();
RemoveChildView(*old_view);
}
int new_height = 0;
if (new_view) {
new_height = new_view->GetPreferredSize().height();
AddChildView(new_view);
}
bool changed = false;
if (new_height != current_height) {
changed = true;
} else if (new_view && *old_view) {
new_view->SetBoundsRect((*old_view)->bounds());
new_view->SchedulePaint();
} else if (new_view) {
DCHECK_EQ(0, new_height);
new_view->SetBounds(0, 0, 0, 0);
}
*old_view = new_view;
return changed;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1792
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1792/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cd30f03ac5bf2962f44bd02ae8d88245dff2f12c
|
cd30f03ac5bf2962f44bd02ae8d88245dff2f12c
|
Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
|
static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
X509_STORE *store,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
unsigned int flags)
{
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
X509 *signer;
int i, j, r = 0;
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, certs))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, "smime_sign");
if (crls)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&ctx, crls);
i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
if (i <= 0)
{
j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
goto err;
}
r = 1;
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return r;
}
|
static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
X509_STORE *store,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
unsigned int flags)
{
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
X509 *signer;
int i, j, r = 0;
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, certs))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, "smime_sign");
if (crls)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&ctx, crls);
i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
if (i <= 0)
{
j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
goto err;
}
r = 1;
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return r;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17476/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
|
void Browser::LoadingStateChanged(WebContents* source,
bool to_different_document) {
ScheduleUIUpdate(source, content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD);
UpdateWindowForLoadingStateChanged(source, to_different_document);
}
|
void Browser::LoadingStateChanged(WebContents* source,
bool to_different_document) {
ScheduleUIUpdate(source, content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD);
UpdateWindowForLoadingStateChanged(source, to_different_document);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0131/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f
|
skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void sock_spd_release(struct splice_pipe_desc *spd, unsigned int i)
{
put_page(spd->pages[i]);
}
|
static void sock_spd_release(struct splice_pipe_desc *spd, unsigned int i)
{
put_page(spd->pages[i]);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
static int p4_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
{
int cpu = get_cpu();
int rc = 0;
u32 escr, cccr;
/*
* the reason we use cpu that early is that: if we get scheduled
* first time on the same cpu -- we will not need swap thread
* specific flags in config (and will save some cpu cycles)
*/
cccr = p4_default_cccr_conf(cpu);
escr = p4_default_escr_conf(cpu, event->attr.exclude_kernel,
event->attr.exclude_user);
event->hw.config = p4_config_pack_escr(escr) |
p4_config_pack_cccr(cccr);
if (p4_ht_active() && p4_ht_thread(cpu))
event->hw.config = p4_set_ht_bit(event->hw.config);
if (event->attr.type == PERF_TYPE_RAW) {
struct p4_event_bind *bind;
unsigned int esel;
/*
* Clear bits we reserve to be managed by kernel itself
* and never allowed from a user space
*/
event->attr.config &= P4_CONFIG_MASK;
rc = p4_validate_raw_event(event);
if (rc)
goto out;
/*
* Note that for RAW events we allow user to use P4_CCCR_RESERVED
* bits since we keep additional info here (for cache events and etc)
*/
event->hw.config |= event->attr.config;
bind = p4_config_get_bind(event->attr.config);
if (!bind) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
esel = P4_OPCODE_ESEL(bind->opcode);
event->hw.config |= p4_config_pack_cccr(P4_CCCR_ESEL(esel));
}
rc = x86_setup_perfctr(event);
out:
put_cpu();
return rc;
}
|
static int p4_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
{
int cpu = get_cpu();
int rc = 0;
u32 escr, cccr;
/*
* the reason we use cpu that early is that: if we get scheduled
* first time on the same cpu -- we will not need swap thread
* specific flags in config (and will save some cpu cycles)
*/
cccr = p4_default_cccr_conf(cpu);
escr = p4_default_escr_conf(cpu, event->attr.exclude_kernel,
event->attr.exclude_user);
event->hw.config = p4_config_pack_escr(escr) |
p4_config_pack_cccr(cccr);
if (p4_ht_active() && p4_ht_thread(cpu))
event->hw.config = p4_set_ht_bit(event->hw.config);
if (event->attr.type == PERF_TYPE_RAW) {
struct p4_event_bind *bind;
unsigned int esel;
/*
* Clear bits we reserve to be managed by kernel itself
* and never allowed from a user space
*/
event->attr.config &= P4_CONFIG_MASK;
rc = p4_validate_raw_event(event);
if (rc)
goto out;
/*
* Note that for RAW events we allow user to use P4_CCCR_RESERVED
* bits since we keep additional info here (for cache events and etc)
*/
event->hw.config |= event->attr.config;
bind = p4_config_get_bind(event->attr.config);
if (!bind) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
esel = P4_OPCODE_ESEL(bind->opcode);
event->hw.config |= p4_config_pack_cccr(P4_CCCR_ESEL(esel));
}
rc = x86_setup_perfctr(event);
out:
put_cpu();
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15397
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15397/
|
CWE-311
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0579ed631fb37de5704b54ed2ee466bf29630ad0
|
0579ed631fb37de5704b54ed2ee466bf29630ad0
|
Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
|
NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
std::make_unique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
|
NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::NetworkThrottleManagerImpl()
: lifetime_median_estimate_(PercentileEstimator::kMedianPercentile,
kInitialMedianInMs),
outstanding_recomputation_timer_(
base::MakeUnique<base::Timer>(false /* retain_user_task */,
false /* is_repeating */)),
tick_clock_(new base::DefaultTickClock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
static void sched_ttwu_pending(void)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
struct task_struct *list = xchg(&rq->wake_list, NULL);
if (!list)
return;
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
while (list) {
struct task_struct *p = list;
list = list->wake_entry;
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, 0);
}
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
|
static void sched_ttwu_pending(void)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
struct task_struct *list = xchg(&rq->wake_list, NULL);
if (!list)
return;
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
while (list) {
struct task_struct *p = list;
list = list->wake_entry;
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, 0);
}
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11368/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/ffb35baac6981f9e8914f8f3bffd37f284b85970
|
ffb35baac6981f9e8914f8f3bffd37f284b85970
|
Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
char **realms = NULL, *hostname = NULL;
krb5_data srealm = request->server->realm;
if (!is_referral_req(kdc_active_realm, request))
goto cleanup;
hostname = data2string(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
request->server, 1));
if (hostname == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the hostname doesn't contain a '.', it's not a FQDN. */
if (strchr(hostname, '.') == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = krb5_get_host_realm(kdc_context, hostname, &realms);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
srealm.length, srealm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
cleanup:
krb5_free_host_realm(kdc_context, realms);
free(hostname);
return retval;
}
|
find_referral_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
char **realms = NULL, *hostname = NULL;
krb5_data srealm = request->server->realm;
if (!is_referral_req(kdc_active_realm, request))
goto cleanup;
hostname = data2string(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context,
request->server, 1));
if (hostname == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the hostname doesn't contain a '.', it's not a FQDN. */
if (strchr(hostname, '.') == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = krb5_get_host_realm(kdc_context, hostname, &realms);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the empty realm or the service realm. */
if (realms == NULL || realms[0] == NULL || *realms[0] == '\0' ||
data_eq_string(srealm, realms[0])) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
srealm.length, srealm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
cleanup:
krb5_free_host_realm(kdc_context, realms);
free(hostname);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/262e77a72493e36e8006aeeba1c7497a42ee5ad9
|
262e77a72493e36e8006aeeba1c7497a42ee5ad9
|
WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
|
DEFINE_TRACE(VRDisplay) {
EventTargetWithInlineData::Trace(visitor);
ContextLifecycleObserver::Trace(visitor);
visitor->Trace(navigator_vr_);
visitor->Trace(capabilities_);
visitor->Trace(stage_parameters_);
visitor->Trace(eye_parameters_left_);
visitor->Trace(eye_parameters_right_);
visitor->Trace(layer_);
visitor->Trace(rendering_context_);
visitor->Trace(scripted_animation_controller_);
visitor->Trace(pending_present_resolvers_);
}
|
DEFINE_TRACE(VRDisplay) {
EventTargetWithInlineData::Trace(visitor);
ContextLifecycleObserver::Trace(visitor);
visitor->Trace(navigator_vr_);
visitor->Trace(capabilities_);
visitor->Trace(stage_parameters_);
visitor->Trace(eye_parameters_left_);
visitor->Trace(eye_parameters_right_);
visitor->Trace(layer_);
visitor->Trace(rendering_context_);
visitor->Trace(scripted_animation_controller_);
visitor->Trace(pending_present_resolvers_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10197
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10197/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libevent/libevent/commit/ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
ec65c42052d95d2c23d1d837136d1cf1d9ecef9e
|
evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
|
evdns_base_new(struct event_base *event_base, int flags)
{
struct evdns_base *base;
if (evutil_secure_rng_init() < 0) {
log(EVDNS_LOG_WARN, "Unable to seed random number generator; "
"DNS can't run.");
return NULL;
}
/* Give the evutil library a hook into its evdns-enabled
* functionality. We can't just call evdns_getaddrinfo directly or
* else libevent-core will depend on libevent-extras. */
evutil_set_evdns_getaddrinfo_fn_(evdns_getaddrinfo);
evutil_set_evdns_getaddrinfo_cancel_fn_(evdns_getaddrinfo_cancel);
base = mm_malloc(sizeof(struct evdns_base));
if (base == NULL)
return (NULL);
memset(base, 0, sizeof(struct evdns_base));
base->req_waiting_head = NULL;
EVTHREAD_ALLOC_LOCK(base->lock, EVTHREAD_LOCKTYPE_RECURSIVE);
EVDNS_LOCK(base);
/* Set max requests inflight and allocate req_heads. */
base->req_heads = NULL;
evdns_base_set_max_requests_inflight(base, 64);
base->server_head = NULL;
base->event_base = event_base;
base->global_good_nameservers = base->global_requests_inflight =
base->global_requests_waiting = 0;
base->global_timeout.tv_sec = 5;
base->global_timeout.tv_usec = 0;
base->global_max_reissues = 1;
base->global_max_retransmits = 3;
base->global_max_nameserver_timeout = 3;
base->global_search_state = NULL;
base->global_randomize_case = 1;
base->global_getaddrinfo_allow_skew.tv_sec = 3;
base->global_getaddrinfo_allow_skew.tv_usec = 0;
base->global_nameserver_probe_initial_timeout.tv_sec = 10;
base->global_nameserver_probe_initial_timeout.tv_usec = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&base->hostsdb);
#define EVDNS_BASE_ALL_FLAGS (0x8001)
if (flags & ~EVDNS_BASE_ALL_FLAGS) {
flags = EVDNS_BASE_INITIALIZE_NAMESERVERS;
log(EVDNS_LOG_WARN,
"Unrecognized flag passed to evdns_base_new(). Assuming "
"you meant EVDNS_BASE_INITIALIZE_NAMESERVERS.");
}
#undef EVDNS_BASE_ALL_FLAGS
if (flags & EVDNS_BASE_INITIALIZE_NAMESERVERS) {
int r;
#ifdef _WIN32
r = evdns_base_config_windows_nameservers(base);
#else
r = evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(base, DNS_OPTIONS_ALL, "/etc/resolv.conf");
#endif
if (r == -1) {
evdns_base_free_and_unlock(base, 0);
return NULL;
}
}
if (flags & EVDNS_BASE_DISABLE_WHEN_INACTIVE) {
base->disable_when_inactive = 1;
}
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return base;
}
|
evdns_base_new(struct event_base *event_base, int flags)
{
struct evdns_base *base;
if (evutil_secure_rng_init() < 0) {
log(EVDNS_LOG_WARN, "Unable to seed random number generator; "
"DNS can't run.");
return NULL;
}
/* Give the evutil library a hook into its evdns-enabled
* functionality. We can't just call evdns_getaddrinfo directly or
* else libevent-core will depend on libevent-extras. */
evutil_set_evdns_getaddrinfo_fn_(evdns_getaddrinfo);
evutil_set_evdns_getaddrinfo_cancel_fn_(evdns_getaddrinfo_cancel);
base = mm_malloc(sizeof(struct evdns_base));
if (base == NULL)
return (NULL);
memset(base, 0, sizeof(struct evdns_base));
base->req_waiting_head = NULL;
EVTHREAD_ALLOC_LOCK(base->lock, EVTHREAD_LOCKTYPE_RECURSIVE);
EVDNS_LOCK(base);
/* Set max requests inflight and allocate req_heads. */
base->req_heads = NULL;
evdns_base_set_max_requests_inflight(base, 64);
base->server_head = NULL;
base->event_base = event_base;
base->global_good_nameservers = base->global_requests_inflight =
base->global_requests_waiting = 0;
base->global_timeout.tv_sec = 5;
base->global_timeout.tv_usec = 0;
base->global_max_reissues = 1;
base->global_max_retransmits = 3;
base->global_max_nameserver_timeout = 3;
base->global_search_state = NULL;
base->global_randomize_case = 1;
base->global_getaddrinfo_allow_skew.tv_sec = 3;
base->global_getaddrinfo_allow_skew.tv_usec = 0;
base->global_nameserver_probe_initial_timeout.tv_sec = 10;
base->global_nameserver_probe_initial_timeout.tv_usec = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&base->hostsdb);
#define EVDNS_BASE_ALL_FLAGS (0x8001)
if (flags & ~EVDNS_BASE_ALL_FLAGS) {
flags = EVDNS_BASE_INITIALIZE_NAMESERVERS;
log(EVDNS_LOG_WARN,
"Unrecognized flag passed to evdns_base_new(). Assuming "
"you meant EVDNS_BASE_INITIALIZE_NAMESERVERS.");
}
#undef EVDNS_BASE_ALL_FLAGS
if (flags & EVDNS_BASE_INITIALIZE_NAMESERVERS) {
int r;
#ifdef _WIN32
r = evdns_base_config_windows_nameservers(base);
#else
r = evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(base, DNS_OPTIONS_ALL, "/etc/resolv.conf");
#endif
if (r == -1) {
evdns_base_free_and_unlock(base, 0);
return NULL;
}
}
if (flags & EVDNS_BASE_DISABLE_WHEN_INACTIVE) {
base->disable_when_inactive = 1;
}
EVDNS_UNLOCK(base);
return base;
}
|
C
|
libevent
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11413
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11413/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/ccxvii/mujs/commit/00d4606c3baf813b7b1c176823b2729bf51002a2
|
00d4606c3baf813b7b1c176823b2729bf51002a2
|
Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
|
static void Sp_match(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int len;
const char *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!(re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)) {
js_RegExp_prototype_exec(J, re, text);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
a = text;
e = text + strlen(text);
while (a <= e) {
if (js_doregexec(J, re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break;
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
js_pushlstring(J, b, c - b);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
a = c;
if (c - b == 0)
++a;
}
if (len == 0) {
js_pop(J, 1);
js_pushnull(J);
}
}
|
static void Sp_match(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int len;
const char *a, *b, *c, *e;
Resub m;
text = checkstring(J, 0);
if (js_isregexp(J, 1))
js_copy(J, 1);
else if (js_isundefined(J, 1))
js_newregexp(J, "", 0);
else
js_newregexp(J, js_tostring(J, 1), 0);
re = js_toregexp(J, -1);
if (!(re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)) {
js_RegExp_prototype_exec(J, re, text);
return;
}
re->last = 0;
js_newarray(J);
len = 0;
a = text;
e = text + strlen(text);
while (a <= e) {
if (js_regexec(re->prog, a, &m, a > text ? REG_NOTBOL : 0))
break;
b = m.sub[0].sp;
c = m.sub[0].ep;
js_pushlstring(J, b, c - b);
js_setindex(J, -2, len++);
a = c;
if (c - b == 0)
++a;
}
if (len == 0) {
js_pop(J, 1);
js_pushnull(J);
}
}
|
C
|
mujs
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2844
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2844/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/46afbe7f7f55280947e9c06c429a68983ba9d8dd
|
46afbe7f7f55280947e9c06c429a68983ba9d8dd
|
[EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static Browser_Window *browser_view_find(Evas_Object *view)
{
Eina_List *l;
void *data;
if (!view)
return NULL;
EINA_LIST_FOREACH(windows, l, data) {
Browser_Window *browser_window = (Browser_Window *)data;
if (browser_window->webview == view)
return browser_window;
}
return NULL;
}
|
static Browser_Window *browser_view_find(Evas_Object *view)
{
Eina_List *l;
void *data;
if (!view)
return NULL;
EINA_LIST_FOREACH(windows, l, data) {
Browser_Window *browser_window = (Browser_Window *)data;
if (browser_window->webview == view)
return browser_window;
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3535
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3535/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/256df2f3879efdb2e9808bdb1b54b16fbb11fa38
|
256df2f3879efdb2e9808bdb1b54b16fbb11fa38
|
netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static inline void skb_orphan_try(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!skb_tx(skb)->flags)
skb_orphan(skb);
}
|
static inline void skb_orphan_try(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!skb_tx(skb)->flags)
skb_orphan(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
int config_get_int(const config_t *config, const char *section, const char *key, int def_value) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
entry_t *entry = entry_find(config, section, key);
if (!entry)
return def_value;
char *endptr;
int ret = strtol(entry->value, &endptr, 0);
return (*endptr == '\0') ? ret : def_value;
}
|
int config_get_int(const config_t *config, const char *section, const char *key, int def_value) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
entry_t *entry = entry_find(config, section, key);
if (!entry)
return def_value;
char *endptr;
int ret = strtol(entry->value, &endptr, 0);
return (*endptr == '\0') ? ret : def_value;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9317
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9317/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b
|
Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
|
static void gdImageVLine(gdImagePtr im, int x, int y1, int y2, int col)
{
if (im->thick > 1) {
int thickhalf = im->thick >> 1;
gdImageFilledRectangle(im, x - thickhalf, y1, x + im->thick - thickhalf - 1, y2, col);
} else {
if (y2 < y1) {
int t = y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = t;
}
for (; y1 <= y2; y1++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y1, col);
}
}
return;
}
|
static void gdImageVLine(gdImagePtr im, int x, int y1, int y2, int col)
{
if (im->thick > 1) {
int thickhalf = im->thick >> 1;
gdImageFilledRectangle(im, x - thickhalf, y1, x + im->thick - thickhalf - 1, y2, col);
} else {
if (y2 < y1) {
int t = y1;
y1 = y2;
y2 = t;
}
for (; y1 <= y2; y1++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y1, col);
}
}
return;
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6051
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6051/
| null |
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=quagga.git;a=commitdiff;h=8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408
|
8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408
| null |
transit_hash_cmp (const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const struct transit * transit1 = p1;
const struct transit * transit2 = p2;
return (transit1->length == transit2->length &&
memcmp (transit1->val, transit2->val, transit1->length) == 0);
}
|
transit_hash_cmp (const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const struct transit * transit1 = p1;
const struct transit * transit2 = p2;
return (transit1->length == transit2->length &&
memcmp (transit1->val, transit2->val, transit1->length) == 0);
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9718
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9718/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
|
3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
| null |
static bool cmd_device_reset(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
ide_set_signature(s);
s->status = 0x00; /* NOTE: READY is _not_ set */
s->error = 0x01;
return false;
}
|
static bool cmd_device_reset(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
ide_set_signature(s);
s->status = 0x00; /* NOTE: READY is _not_ set */
s->error = 0x01;
return false;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
WebGLShaderPrecisionFormat* WebGLRenderingContextBase::getShaderPrecisionFormat(
GLenum shader_type,
GLenum precision_type) {
if (isContextLost())
return nullptr;
switch (shader_type) {
case GL_VERTEX_SHADER:
case GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER:
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getShaderPrecisionFormat",
"invalid shader type");
return nullptr;
}
switch (precision_type) {
case GL_LOW_FLOAT:
case GL_MEDIUM_FLOAT:
case GL_HIGH_FLOAT:
case GL_LOW_INT:
case GL_MEDIUM_INT:
case GL_HIGH_INT:
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getShaderPrecisionFormat",
"invalid precision type");
return nullptr;
}
GLint range[2] = {0, 0};
GLint precision = 0;
ContextGL()->GetShaderPrecisionFormat(shader_type, precision_type, range,
&precision);
return WebGLShaderPrecisionFormat::Create(range[0], range[1], precision);
}
|
WebGLShaderPrecisionFormat* WebGLRenderingContextBase::getShaderPrecisionFormat(
GLenum shader_type,
GLenum precision_type) {
if (isContextLost())
return nullptr;
switch (shader_type) {
case GL_VERTEX_SHADER:
case GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER:
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getShaderPrecisionFormat",
"invalid shader type");
return nullptr;
}
switch (precision_type) {
case GL_LOW_FLOAT:
case GL_MEDIUM_FLOAT:
case GL_HIGH_FLOAT:
case GL_LOW_INT:
case GL_MEDIUM_INT:
case GL_HIGH_INT:
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getShaderPrecisionFormat",
"invalid precision type");
return nullptr;
}
GLint range[2] = {0, 0};
GLint precision = 0;
ContextGL()->GetShaderPrecisionFormat(shader_type, precision_type, range,
&precision);
return WebGLShaderPrecisionFormat::Create(range[0], range[1], precision);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
static int nfs4_xdr_dec_lock(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfs_lock_res *res)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(&xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_lock(&xdr, res);
out:
return status;
}
|
static int nfs4_xdr_dec_lock(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfs_lock_res *res)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(&xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_lock(&xdr, res);
out:
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
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