CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-6308
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6308/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/verdammelt/tnef/commit/c5044689e50039635e7700fe2472fd632ac77176
|
c5044689e50039635e7700fe2472fd632ac77176
|
Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
|
get_alloc_limit()
{
return alloc_limit;
}
|
get_alloc_limit()
{
return alloc_limit;
}
|
C
|
tnef
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1805
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1805/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
|
f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045
|
new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
static int __init init_pipe_fs(void)
{
int err = register_filesystem(&pipe_fs_type);
if (!err) {
pipe_mnt = kern_mount(&pipe_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(pipe_mnt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(pipe_mnt);
unregister_filesystem(&pipe_fs_type);
}
}
return err;
}
|
static int __init init_pipe_fs(void)
{
int err = register_filesystem(&pipe_fs_type);
if (!err) {
pipe_mnt = kern_mount(&pipe_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(pipe_mnt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(pipe_mnt);
unregister_filesystem(&pipe_fs_type);
}
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4129
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4129/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1
|
c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1
|
bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_mdb_ip6_get(
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb, const struct in6_addr *dst,
__u16 vid)
{
struct br_ip br_dst;
br_dst.u.ip6 = *dst;
br_dst.proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
br_dst.vid = vid;
return br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &br_dst);
}
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_mdb_ip6_get(
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb, const struct in6_addr *dst,
__u16 vid)
{
struct br_ip br_dst;
br_dst.u.ip6 = *dst;
br_dst.proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
br_dst.vid = vid;
return br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &br_dst);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
QuotaPermissionContext* ContentBrowserClient::CreateQuotaPermissionContext() {
return NULL;
}
|
QuotaPermissionContext* ContentBrowserClient::CreateQuotaPermissionContext() {
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::BeginNavigation(blink::WebURLRequest* request) {
CHECK(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableBrowserSideNavigation));
DCHECK(request);
willSendRequest(frame_, 0, *request, blink::WebURLResponse());
bool should_replace_current_entry = false;
WebDataSource* provisional_data_source = frame_->provisionalDataSource();
WebDataSource* current_data_source = frame_->dataSource();
WebDataSource* data_source =
provisional_data_source ? provisional_data_source : current_data_source;
if (data_source && render_view_->history_list_length_ > 0) {
should_replace_current_entry = data_source->replacesCurrentHistoryItem();
}
Send(new FrameHostMsg_BeginNavigation(
routing_id_,
MakeCommonNavigationParams(request, should_replace_current_entry),
BeginNavigationParams(
request->httpMethod().latin1(), GetWebURLRequestHeaders(*request),
GetLoadFlagsForWebURLRequest(*request), request->hasUserGesture()),
GetRequestBodyForWebURLRequest(*request)));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::BeginNavigation(blink::WebURLRequest* request) {
CHECK(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableBrowserSideNavigation));
DCHECK(request);
willSendRequest(frame_, 0, *request, blink::WebURLResponse());
bool should_replace_current_entry = false;
WebDataSource* provisional_data_source = frame_->provisionalDataSource();
WebDataSource* current_data_source = frame_->dataSource();
WebDataSource* data_source =
provisional_data_source ? provisional_data_source : current_data_source;
if (data_source && render_view_->history_list_length_ > 0) {
should_replace_current_entry = data_source->replacesCurrentHistoryItem();
}
Send(new FrameHostMsg_BeginNavigation(
routing_id_,
MakeCommonNavigationParams(request, should_replace_current_entry),
BeginNavigationParams(
request->httpMethod().latin1(), GetWebURLRequestHeaders(*request),
GetLoadFlagsForWebURLRequest(*request), request->hasUserGesture()),
GetRequestBodyForWebURLRequest(*request)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
void get_token(FILE *pnm_file, char *token)
{
int i = 0;
int ret;
/* remove white-space and comment lines */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
if (ret == '#') {
/* the rest of this line is a comment */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
}
while ((ret != '\n') && (ret != '\r') && (ret != EOF));
}
if (ret == EOF) break;
token[i] = (unsigned char) ret;
}
while ((token[i] == '\n') || (token[i] == '\r') || (token[i] == ' '));
/* read string */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
if (ret == EOF) break;
i++;
token[i] = (unsigned char) ret;
}
while ((token[i] != '\n') && (token[i] != '\r') && (token[i] != ' '));
token[i] = '\0';
return;
}
|
void get_token(FILE *pnm_file, char *token)
{
int i = 0;
int ret;
/* remove white-space and comment lines */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
if (ret == '#') {
/* the rest of this line is a comment */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
}
while ((ret != '\n') && (ret != '\r') && (ret != EOF));
}
if (ret == EOF) break;
token[i] = (unsigned char) ret;
}
while ((token[i] == '\n') || (token[i] == '\r') || (token[i] == ' '));
/* read string */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
if (ret == EOF) break;
i++;
token[i] = (unsigned char) ret;
}
while ((token[i] != '\n') && (token[i] != '\r') && (token[i] != ' '));
token[i] = '\0';
return;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
const VisibleSelection& SelectionEditor::ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree()
const {
DCHECK_EQ(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), GetDocument());
DCHECK_EQ(GetFrame(), GetDocument().GetFrame());
UpdateCachedVisibleSelectionIfNeeded();
if (cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_.IsNone())
return cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_;
DCHECK_EQ(cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_.Base().GetDocument(),
GetDocument());
return cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_;
}
|
const VisibleSelection& SelectionEditor::ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree()
const {
DCHECK_EQ(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), GetDocument());
DCHECK_EQ(GetFrame(), GetDocument().GetFrame());
UpdateCachedVisibleSelectionIfNeeded();
if (cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_.IsNone())
return cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_;
DCHECK_EQ(cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_.Base().GetDocument(),
GetDocument());
return cached_visible_selection_in_dom_tree_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd
|
0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd
|
NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
|
void hv_kvp_deinit(void)
{
cn_del_callback(&kvp_id);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvp_work);
cancel_work_sync(&kvp_sendkey_work);
}
|
void hv_kvp_deinit(void)
{
cn_del_callback(&kvp_id);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvp_work);
cancel_work_sync(&kvp_sendkey_work);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool isFixedPositionedContainer(RenderLayer* layer)
{
RenderObject* o = layer->renderer();
return o->isRenderView() || (o->isOutOfFlowPositioned() && o->style()->position() == FixedPosition);
}
|
static bool isFixedPositionedContainer(RenderLayer* layer)
{
RenderObject* o = layer->renderer();
return o->isRenderView() || (o->isOutOfFlowPositioned() && o->style()->position() == FixedPosition);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2880
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5
|
[Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SyncBackendHost::SyncBackendHost(const std::string& name,
Profile* profile,
const base::WeakPtr<SyncPrefs>& sync_prefs)
: weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
sync_thread_("Chrome_SyncThread"),
frontend_loop_(MessageLoop::current()),
profile_(profile),
name_(name),
core_(new Core(name, profile_->GetPath().Append(kSyncDataFolderName),
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr())),
initialization_state_(NOT_ATTEMPTED),
sync_prefs_(sync_prefs),
chrome_sync_notification_bridge_(profile_),
sync_notifier_factory_(
ParseNotifierOptions(*CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(),
profile_->GetRequestContext()),
content::GetUserAgent(GURL()),
sync_prefs),
frontend_(NULL) {
}
|
SyncBackendHost::SyncBackendHost(const std::string& name,
Profile* profile,
const base::WeakPtr<SyncPrefs>& sync_prefs)
: weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
sync_thread_("Chrome_SyncThread"),
frontend_loop_(MessageLoop::current()),
profile_(profile),
name_(name),
core_(new Core(name, profile_->GetPath().Append(kSyncDataFolderName),
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr())),
initialization_state_(NOT_ATTEMPTED),
sync_prefs_(sync_prefs),
chrome_sync_notification_bridge_(profile_),
sync_notifier_factory_(
ParseNotifierOptions(*CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(),
profile_->GetRequestContext()),
content::GetUserAgent(GURL()),
sync_prefs),
frontend_(NULL) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18238
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18238/
|
CWE-835
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=886cd1d2314755adb1f4cdb99c16ff00830f0331
|
886cd1d2314755adb1f4cdb99c16ff00830f0331
| null |
bool ConvertToMacLang ( const std::string & utf8Value, XMP_Uns16 macLang, std::string * macValue )
{
macValue->erase();
if ( macLang == kNoMacLang ) macLang = 0; // *** Zero is English, ought to use the "active" OS lang.
if ( ! IsMacLangKnown ( macLang ) ) return false;
#if XMP_MacBuild
XMP_Uns16 macScript = GetMacScript ( macLang );
ReconcileUtils::UTF8ToMacEncoding ( macScript, macLang, (XMP_Uns8*)utf8Value.c_str(), utf8Value.size(), macValue );
#elif XMP_UNIXBuild
UTF8ToMacRoman ( utf8Value, macValue );
#elif XMP_WinBuild
UINT winCP = GetWinCP ( macLang );
ReconcileUtils::UTF8ToWinEncoding ( winCP, (XMP_Uns8*)utf8Value.c_str(), utf8Value.size(), macValue );
#elif XMP_iOSBuild
XMP_Uns32 iosEncCF = GetIOSEncodingCF(macLang);
ReconcileUtils::IOSConvertEncoding(kCFStringEncodingUTF8, iosEncCF, (XMP_Uns8*)utf8Value.c_str(), utf8Value.size(), macValue);
#endif
return true;
} // ConvertToMacLang
|
bool ConvertToMacLang ( const std::string & utf8Value, XMP_Uns16 macLang, std::string * macValue )
{
macValue->erase();
if ( macLang == kNoMacLang ) macLang = 0; // *** Zero is English, ought to use the "active" OS lang.
if ( ! IsMacLangKnown ( macLang ) ) return false;
#if XMP_MacBuild
XMP_Uns16 macScript = GetMacScript ( macLang );
ReconcileUtils::UTF8ToMacEncoding ( macScript, macLang, (XMP_Uns8*)utf8Value.c_str(), utf8Value.size(), macValue );
#elif XMP_UNIXBuild
UTF8ToMacRoman ( utf8Value, macValue );
#elif XMP_WinBuild
UINT winCP = GetWinCP ( macLang );
ReconcileUtils::UTF8ToWinEncoding ( winCP, (XMP_Uns8*)utf8Value.c_str(), utf8Value.size(), macValue );
#elif XMP_iOSBuild
XMP_Uns32 iosEncCF = GetIOSEncodingCF(macLang);
ReconcileUtils::IOSConvertEncoding(kCFStringEncodingUTF8, iosEncCF, (XMP_Uns8*)utf8Value.c_str(), utf8Value.size(), macValue);
#endif
return true;
} // ConvertToMacLang
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1220/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f9c9adef4036aff60b734b4a0045c43c320fe1d
|
4f9c9adef4036aff60b734b4a0045c43c320fe1d
|
Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool GIFLZWContext::prepareToDecode()
{
ASSERT(m_frameContext->isDataSizeDefined() && m_frameContext->isHeaderDefined());
if (m_frameContext->dataSize() >= MAX_DICTIONARY_ENTRY_BITS)
return false;
clearCode = 1 << m_frameContext->dataSize();
avail = clearCode + 2;
oldcode = -1;
codesize = m_frameContext->dataSize() + 1;
codemask = (1 << codesize) - 1;
datum = bits = 0;
ipass = m_frameContext->interlaced() ? 1 : 0;
irow = 0;
const size_t maxBytes = MAX_DICTIONARY_ENTRIES - 1;
rowBuffer.resize(m_frameContext->width() - 1 + maxBytes);
rowIter = rowBuffer.begin();
rowsRemaining = m_frameContext->height();
for (int i = 0; i < clearCode; ++i) {
suffix[i] = i;
suffixLength[i] = 1;
}
return true;
}
|
bool GIFLZWContext::prepareToDecode()
{
ASSERT(m_frameContext->isDataSizeDefined() && m_frameContext->isHeaderDefined());
if (m_frameContext->dataSize() >= MAX_DICTIONARY_ENTRY_BITS)
return false;
clearCode = 1 << m_frameContext->dataSize();
avail = clearCode + 2;
oldcode = -1;
codesize = m_frameContext->dataSize() + 1;
codemask = (1 << codesize) - 1;
datum = bits = 0;
ipass = m_frameContext->interlaced() ? 1 : 0;
irow = 0;
const size_t maxBytes = MAX_DICTIONARY_ENTRIES - 1;
rowBuffer.resize(m_frameContext->width() - 1 + maxBytes);
rowIter = rowBuffer.begin();
rowsRemaining = m_frameContext->height();
for (int i = 0; i < clearCode; ++i) {
suffix[i] = i;
suffixLength[i] = 1;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5146/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74aaa70032784e7cf00256821f29b2b53edb6589
|
74aaa70032784e7cf00256821f29b2b53edb6589
|
Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ParamTraits<gfx::RectF>::Log(const gfx::RectF& p, std::string* l) {
l->append(base::StringPrintf("(%f, %f, %f, %f)", p.x(), p.y(),
p.width(), p.height()));
}
|
void ParamTraits<gfx::RectF>::Log(const gfx::RectF& p, std::string* l) {
l->append(base::StringPrintf("(%f, %f, %f, %f)", p.x(), p.y(),
p.width(), p.height()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/hexchat/hexchat/commit/c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
server_read (GIOChannel *source, GIOCondition condition, server *serv)
{
int sok = serv->sok;
int error, i, len;
char lbuf[2050];
while (1)
{
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (!serv->ssl)
#endif
len = recv (sok, lbuf, sizeof (lbuf) - 2, 0);
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
else
len = _SSL_recv (serv->ssl, lbuf, sizeof (lbuf) - 2);
#endif
if (len < 1)
{
error = 0;
if (len < 0)
{
if (would_block ())
return TRUE;
error = sock_error ();
}
if (!serv->end_of_motd)
{
server_disconnect (serv->server_session, FALSE, error);
if (!servlist_cycle (serv))
{
if (prefs.hex_net_auto_reconnect)
auto_reconnect (serv, FALSE, error);
}
} else
{
if (prefs.hex_net_auto_reconnect)
auto_reconnect (serv, FALSE, error);
else
server_disconnect (serv->server_session, FALSE, error);
}
return TRUE;
}
i = 0;
lbuf[len] = 0;
while (i < len)
{
switch (lbuf[i])
{
case '\r':
break;
case '\n':
serv->linebuf[serv->pos] = 0;
server_inline (serv, serv->linebuf, serv->pos);
serv->pos = 0;
break;
default:
serv->linebuf[serv->pos] = lbuf[i];
if (serv->pos >= (sizeof (serv->linebuf) - 1))
fprintf (stderr,
"*** HEXCHAT WARNING: Buffer overflow - shit server!\n");
else
serv->pos++;
}
i++;
}
}
}
|
server_read (GIOChannel *source, GIOCondition condition, server *serv)
{
int sok = serv->sok;
int error, i, len;
char lbuf[2050];
while (1)
{
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
if (!serv->ssl)
#endif
len = recv (sok, lbuf, sizeof (lbuf) - 2, 0);
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
else
len = _SSL_recv (serv->ssl, lbuf, sizeof (lbuf) - 2);
#endif
if (len < 1)
{
error = 0;
if (len < 0)
{
if (would_block ())
return TRUE;
error = sock_error ();
}
if (!serv->end_of_motd)
{
server_disconnect (serv->server_session, FALSE, error);
if (!servlist_cycle (serv))
{
if (prefs.hex_net_auto_reconnect)
auto_reconnect (serv, FALSE, error);
}
} else
{
if (prefs.hex_net_auto_reconnect)
auto_reconnect (serv, FALSE, error);
else
server_disconnect (serv->server_session, FALSE, error);
}
return TRUE;
}
i = 0;
lbuf[len] = 0;
while (i < len)
{
switch (lbuf[i])
{
case '\r':
break;
case '\n':
serv->linebuf[serv->pos] = 0;
server_inline (serv, serv->linebuf, serv->pos);
serv->pos = 0;
break;
default:
serv->linebuf[serv->pos] = lbuf[i];
if (serv->pos >= (sizeof (serv->linebuf) - 1))
fprintf (stderr,
"*** HEXCHAT WARNING: Buffer overflow - shit server!\n");
else
serv->pos++;
}
i++;
}
}
}
|
C
|
hexchat
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3835/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
3cb1b6944e776863aea316e25fdc16d7f9962902
|
IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
|
OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::findBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
if (bufferHeader == NULL) {
return 0;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
return mBufferHeaderToBufferID.valueFor(bufferHeader);
}
|
OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::findBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
if (bufferHeader == NULL) {
return 0;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
return mBufferHeaderToBufferID.valueFor(bufferHeader);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10088
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10088/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835
|
128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835
|
sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
static int __bsg_write(struct bsg_device *bd, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, ssize_t *bytes_written,
fmode_t has_write_perm)
{
struct bsg_command *bc;
struct request *rq;
int ret, nr_commands;
if (count % sizeof(struct sg_io_v4))
return -EINVAL;
nr_commands = count / sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
rq = NULL;
bc = NULL;
ret = 0;
while (nr_commands) {
struct request_queue *q = bd->queue;
bc = bsg_alloc_command(bd);
if (IS_ERR(bc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bc);
bc = NULL;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&bc->hdr, buf, sizeof(bc->hdr))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/*
* get a request, fill in the blanks, and add to request queue
*/
rq = bsg_map_hdr(bd, &bc->hdr, has_write_perm, bc->sense);
if (IS_ERR(rq)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(rq);
rq = NULL;
break;
}
bsg_add_command(bd, q, bc, rq);
bc = NULL;
rq = NULL;
nr_commands--;
buf += sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
*bytes_written += sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
}
if (bc)
bsg_free_command(bc);
return ret;
}
|
static int __bsg_write(struct bsg_device *bd, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, ssize_t *bytes_written,
fmode_t has_write_perm)
{
struct bsg_command *bc;
struct request *rq;
int ret, nr_commands;
if (count % sizeof(struct sg_io_v4))
return -EINVAL;
nr_commands = count / sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
rq = NULL;
bc = NULL;
ret = 0;
while (nr_commands) {
struct request_queue *q = bd->queue;
bc = bsg_alloc_command(bd);
if (IS_ERR(bc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bc);
bc = NULL;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&bc->hdr, buf, sizeof(bc->hdr))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/*
* get a request, fill in the blanks, and add to request queue
*/
rq = bsg_map_hdr(bd, &bc->hdr, has_write_perm, bc->sense);
if (IS_ERR(rq)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(rq);
rq = NULL;
break;
}
bsg_add_command(bd, q, bc, rq);
bc = NULL;
rq = NULL;
nr_commands--;
buf += sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
*bytes_written += sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
}
if (bc)
bsg_free_command(bc);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7495
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7495/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/06bd3c36a733ac27962fea7d6f47168841376824
|
06bd3c36a733ac27962fea7d6f47168841376824
|
ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
int ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
static unsigned int mnt_count;
int err, ret;
might_sleep();
trace_ext4_mark_inode_dirty(inode, _RET_IP_);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
return err;
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle) &&
EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize < sbi->s_want_extra_isize &&
!ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND)) {
/*
* We need extra buffer credits since we may write into EA block
* with this same handle. If journal_extend fails, then it will
* only result in a minor loss of functionality for that inode.
* If this is felt to be critical, then e2fsck should be run to
* force a large enough s_min_extra_isize.
*/
if ((jbd2_journal_extend(handle,
EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb))) == 0) {
ret = ext4_expand_extra_isize(inode,
sbi->s_want_extra_isize,
iloc, handle);
if (ret) {
ext4_set_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND);
if (mnt_count !=
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_mnt_count)) {
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"Unable to expand inode %lu. Delete"
" some EAs or run e2fsck.",
inode->i_ino);
mnt_count =
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_mnt_count);
}
}
}
}
return ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
}
|
int ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
static unsigned int mnt_count;
int err, ret;
might_sleep();
trace_ext4_mark_inode_dirty(inode, _RET_IP_);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
return err;
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle) &&
EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize < sbi->s_want_extra_isize &&
!ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND)) {
/*
* We need extra buffer credits since we may write into EA block
* with this same handle. If journal_extend fails, then it will
* only result in a minor loss of functionality for that inode.
* If this is felt to be critical, then e2fsck should be run to
* force a large enough s_min_extra_isize.
*/
if ((jbd2_journal_extend(handle,
EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb))) == 0) {
ret = ext4_expand_extra_isize(inode,
sbi->s_want_extra_isize,
iloc, handle);
if (ret) {
ext4_set_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND);
if (mnt_count !=
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_mnt_count)) {
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"Unable to expand inode %lu. Delete"
" some EAs or run e2fsck.",
inode->i_ino);
mnt_count =
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_mnt_count);
}
}
}
}
return ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> Element::ensureCachedHTMLCollection(CollectionType type)
{
if (HTMLCollection* collection = cachedHTMLCollection(type))
return collection;
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> collection;
if (type == TableRows) {
ASSERT(hasTagName(tableTag));
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLTableRowsCollection>(this, type);
} else if (type == SelectOptions) {
ASSERT(hasTagName(selectTag));
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLOptionsCollection>(this, type);
} else if (type == FormControls) {
ASSERT(hasTagName(formTag) || hasTagName(fieldsetTag));
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLFormControlsCollection>(this, type);
}
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLCollection>(this, type);
}
|
PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> Element::ensureCachedHTMLCollection(CollectionType type)
{
if (HTMLCollection* collection = cachedHTMLCollection(type))
return collection;
RefPtr<HTMLCollection> collection;
if (type == TableRows) {
ASSERT(hasTagName(tableTag));
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLTableRowsCollection>(this, type);
} else if (type == SelectOptions) {
ASSERT(hasTagName(selectTag));
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLOptionsCollection>(this, type);
} else if (type == FormControls) {
ASSERT(hasTagName(formTag) || hasTagName(fieldsetTag));
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLFormControlsCollection>(this, type);
}
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLCollection>(this, type);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4263
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4263/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/e43a0a232dbf6d3c161823c2e07c52e76227a1bc
|
e43a0a232dbf6d3c161823c2e07c52e76227a1bc
|
avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
static int query_formats(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
static const enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmts[] = {
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P, AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P,
AV_PIX_FMT_NONE
};
ff_set_common_formats(ctx, ff_make_format_list(pix_fmts));
return 0;
}
|
static int query_formats(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
static const enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmts[] = {
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P, AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P, AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P,
AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P,
AV_PIX_FMT_NONE
};
ff_set_common_formats(ctx, ff_make_format_list(pix_fmts));
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8467/
|
CWE-264
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=b000da128b5fb519d2d3f2e7fd20e4a25b7dae7d
|
b000da128b5fb519d2d3f2e7fd20e4a25b7dae7d
| null |
static int samldb_prim_group_tester(struct samldb_ctx *ac, uint32_t rid)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
struct dom_sid *sid;
struct ldb_result *res;
int ret;
const char * const noattrs[] = { NULL };
sid = dom_sid_add_rid(ac, samdb_domain_sid(ldb), rid);
if (sid == NULL) {
return ldb_operr(ldb);
}
ret = dsdb_module_search(ac->module, ac, &res,
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
noattrs, DSDB_FLAG_NEXT_MODULE,
ac->req,
"(objectSid=%s)",
ldap_encode_ndr_dom_sid(ac, sid));
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
if (res->count != 1) {
talloc_free(res);
ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb,
"Failed to find primary group with RID %u!",
rid);
return LDB_ERR_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
}
talloc_free(res);
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
|
static int samldb_prim_group_tester(struct samldb_ctx *ac, uint32_t rid)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
struct dom_sid *sid;
struct ldb_result *res;
int ret;
const char * const noattrs[] = { NULL };
sid = dom_sid_add_rid(ac, samdb_domain_sid(ldb), rid);
if (sid == NULL) {
return ldb_operr(ldb);
}
ret = dsdb_module_search(ac->module, ac, &res,
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
noattrs, DSDB_FLAG_NEXT_MODULE,
ac->req,
"(objectSid=%s)",
ldap_encode_ndr_dom_sid(ac, sid));
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
if (res->count != 1) {
talloc_free(res);
ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb,
"Failed to find primary group with RID %u!",
rid);
return LDB_ERR_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
}
talloc_free(res);
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7976
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7976/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=user/chrisl/ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d
|
6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d
| null |
gs_setnamedprofileicc(const gs_gstate * pgs, gs_param_string * pval)
{
int code;
char* pname;
int namelen = (pval->size)+1;
gs_memory_t *mem = pgs->memory;
/* Check if it was "NULL" */
if (pval->size != 0) {
pname = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem, namelen,
"set_named_profile_icc");
if (pname == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(pname,pval->data,namelen-1);
pname[namelen-1] = 0;
code = gsicc_set_profile(pgs->icc_manager,
(const char*) pname, namelen, NAMED_TYPE);
gs_free_object(mem, pname,
"set_named_profile_icc");
if (code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot find named color icc profile");
return code;
}
return 0;
}
|
gs_setnamedprofileicc(const gs_gstate * pgs, gs_param_string * pval)
{
int code;
char* pname;
int namelen = (pval->size)+1;
gs_memory_t *mem = pgs->memory;
/* Check if it was "NULL" */
if (pval->size != 0) {
pname = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem, namelen,
"set_named_profile_icc");
if (pname == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(pname,pval->data,namelen-1);
pname[namelen-1] = 0;
code = gsicc_set_profile(pgs->icc_manager,
(const char*) pname, namelen, NAMED_TYPE);
gs_free_object(mem, pname,
"set_named_profile_icc");
if (code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot find named color icc profile");
return code;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void cachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(ScriptValue, cppValue, ScriptValue(jsValue, info.GetIsolate()));
imp->setCachedAttributeAnyAttribute(cppValue);
V8HiddenValue::deleteHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "cachedAttributeAnyAttribute")); // Invalidate the cached value.
}
|
static void cachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(ScriptValue, cppValue, ScriptValue(jsValue, info.GetIsolate()));
imp->setCachedAttributeAnyAttribute(cppValue);
V8HiddenValue::deleteHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "cachedAttributeAnyAttribute")); // Invalidate the cached value.
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2836/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d662b905d30cec7899bbb15140dcfacd73506167
|
d662b905d30cec7899bbb15140dcfacd73506167
|
Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PluginInfoBarDelegate::LinkClicked(WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
GURL url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(GURL(GetLearnMoreURL()));
tab_contents_->OpenURL(url, GURL(), NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, PageTransition::LINK);
return false;
}
|
bool PluginInfoBarDelegate::LinkClicked(WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
GURL url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(GURL(GetLearnMoreURL()));
tab_contents_->OpenURL(url, GURL(), NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, PageTransition::LINK);
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18234/
|
CWE-416
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
|
c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
| null |
ImportArrayTIFF_SByte ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_Int8 * binPtr = (XMP_Int8*)tagInfo.dataPtr;
xmp->DeleteProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp ); // ! Don't keep appending, create a new array.
for ( size_t i = 0; i < tagInfo.count; ++i, ++binPtr ) {
XMP_Int8 binValue = *binPtr;
char strValue[20];
snprintf ( strValue, sizeof(strValue), "%hd", (short)binValue ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(strValue) is safe.
xmp->AppendArrayItem ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_PropArrayIsOrdered, strValue );
}
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportArrayTIFF_SByte
|
ImportArrayTIFF_SByte ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_Int8 * binPtr = (XMP_Int8*)tagInfo.dataPtr;
xmp->DeleteProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp ); // ! Don't keep appending, create a new array.
for ( size_t i = 0; i < tagInfo.count; ++i, ++binPtr ) {
XMP_Int8 binValue = *binPtr;
char strValue[20];
snprintf ( strValue, sizeof(strValue), "%hd", (short)binValue ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(strValue) is safe.
xmp->AppendArrayItem ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_PropArrayIsOrdered, strValue );
}
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportArrayTIFF_SByte
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18079/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/340d394a789518018f834ff70f7534fc463d3226
|
340d394a789518018f834ff70f7534fc463d3226
|
Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
void i8042_lock_chip(void)
{
mutex_lock(&i8042_mutex);
}
|
void i8042_lock_chip(void)
{
mutex_lock(&i8042_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12684
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12684/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/civetweb/civetweb/commit/8fd069f6dedb064339f1091069ac96f3f8bdb552
|
8fd069f6dedb064339f1091069ac96f3f8bdb552
|
Check length of memcmp
|
bin2str(char *to, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
for (; len--; p++) {
*to++ = hex[p[0] >> 4];
*to++ = hex[p[0] & 0x0f];
}
*to = '\0';
}
|
bin2str(char *to, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
for (; len--; p++) {
*to++ = hex[p[0] >> 4];
*to++ = hex[p[0] & 0x0f];
}
*to = '\0';
}
|
C
|
civetweb
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18232/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0558f33c06bb910e2879e355192227a8e8f0219d
|
0558f33c06bb910e2879e355192227a8e8f0219d
|
scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
int sas_smp_get_phy_events(struct sas_phy *phy)
{
int res;
u8 *req;
u8 *resp;
struct sas_rphy *rphy = dev_to_rphy(phy->dev.parent);
struct domain_device *dev = sas_find_dev_by_rphy(rphy);
req = alloc_smp_req(RPEL_REQ_SIZE);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
resp = alloc_smp_resp(RPEL_RESP_SIZE);
if (!resp) {
kfree(req);
return -ENOMEM;
}
req[1] = SMP_REPORT_PHY_ERR_LOG;
req[9] = phy->number;
res = smp_execute_task(dev, req, RPEL_REQ_SIZE,
resp, RPEL_RESP_SIZE);
if (res)
goto out;
phy->invalid_dword_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[12]);
phy->running_disparity_error_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[16]);
phy->loss_of_dword_sync_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[20]);
phy->phy_reset_problem_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[24]);
out:
kfree(req);
kfree(resp);
return res;
}
|
int sas_smp_get_phy_events(struct sas_phy *phy)
{
int res;
u8 *req;
u8 *resp;
struct sas_rphy *rphy = dev_to_rphy(phy->dev.parent);
struct domain_device *dev = sas_find_dev_by_rphy(rphy);
req = alloc_smp_req(RPEL_REQ_SIZE);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
resp = alloc_smp_resp(RPEL_RESP_SIZE);
if (!resp) {
kfree(req);
return -ENOMEM;
}
req[1] = SMP_REPORT_PHY_ERR_LOG;
req[9] = phy->number;
res = smp_execute_task(dev, req, RPEL_REQ_SIZE,
resp, RPEL_RESP_SIZE);
if (res)
goto out;
phy->invalid_dword_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[12]);
phy->running_disparity_error_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[16]);
phy->loss_of_dword_sync_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[20]);
phy->phy_reset_problem_count = scsi_to_u32(&resp[24]);
out:
kfree(req);
kfree(resp);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db
|
d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1
| null |
fbCombineConjointOverReverseU (CARD32 *dest, const CARD32 *src, int width)
{
fbCombineConjointGeneralU (dest, src, width, CombineBOver);
}
|
fbCombineConjointOverReverseU (CARD32 *dest, const CARD32 *src, int width)
{
fbCombineConjointGeneralU (dest, src, width, CombineBOver);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2858/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/828eab2216a765dea92575c290421c115b8ad028
|
828eab2216a765dea92575c290421c115b8ad028
|
Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void IOThread::InitAsync() {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync");
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
#if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
net::SetMessageLoopForNSSHttpIO();
#endif
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
DCHECK(!globals_);
globals_ = new Globals;
network_change_observer_.reset(
new LoggingNetworkChangeObserver(net_log_));
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::InitHistogramWatcher();
globals_->extension_event_router_forwarder =
extension_event_router_forwarder_;
ChromeNetworkDelegate* network_delegate =
new ChromeNetworkDelegate(extension_event_router_forwarder_,
&system_enable_referrers_);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableClientHints))
network_delegate->SetEnableClientHints();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExtensionsHttpThrottling))
network_delegate->NeverThrottleRequests();
globals_->system_network_delegate.reset(network_delegate);
globals_->host_resolver = CreateGlobalHostResolver(net_log_);
UpdateDnsClientEnabled();
globals_->cert_verifier.reset(net::CertVerifier::CreateDefault());
globals_->transport_security_state.reset(new net::TransportSecurityState());
#if !defined(USE_OPENSSL)
net::MultiLogCTVerifier* ct_verifier = new net::MultiLogCTVerifier();
globals_->cert_transparency_verifier.reset(ct_verifier);
ct_verifier->AddLog(net::ct::CreateGooglePilotLogVerifier().Pass());
ct_verifier->AddLog(net::ct::CreateGoogleAviatorLogVerifier().Pass());
ct_verifier->AddLog(net::ct::CreateGoogleRocketeerLogVerifier().Pass());
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCertificateTransparencyLog)) {
std::string switch_value = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kCertificateTransparencyLog);
size_t delim_pos = switch_value.find(":");
CHECK(delim_pos != std::string::npos)
<< "CT log description not provided (switch format"
" is 'description:base64_key')";
std::string log_description(switch_value.substr(0, delim_pos));
std::string ct_public_key_data;
CHECK(base::Base64Decode(
switch_value.substr(delim_pos + 1),
&ct_public_key_data)) << "Unable to decode CT public key.";
scoped_ptr<net::CTLogVerifier> external_log_verifier(
net::CTLogVerifier::Create(ct_public_key_data, log_description));
CHECK(external_log_verifier) << "Unable to parse CT public key.";
ct_verifier->AddLog(external_log_verifier.Pass());
}
#else
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCertificateTransparencyLog)) {
LOG(DFATAL) << "Certificate Transparency is not yet supported in Chrome "
"builds using OpenSSL.";
}
#endif
globals_->ssl_config_service = GetSSLConfigService();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
if (DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyAllowed()) {
spdyproxy_auth_origins_ =
DataReductionProxySettings::GetDataReductionProxies();
}
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
globals_->http_auth_handler_factory.reset(CreateDefaultAuthHandlerFactory(
globals_->host_resolver.get()));
globals_->http_server_properties.reset(new net::HttpServerPropertiesImpl());
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_proxy_service.reset(
net::ProxyService::CreateDirectWithNetLog(net_log_));
globals_->system_cookie_store = new net::CookieMonster(NULL, NULL);
globals_->system_server_bound_cert_service.reset(
new net::ServerBoundCertService(
new net::DefaultServerBoundCertStore(NULL),
base::WorkerPool::GetTaskRunner(true)));
globals_->dns_probe_service.reset(new chrome_browser_net::DnsProbeService());
globals_->load_time_stats.reset(new chrome_browser_net::LoadTimeStats());
globals_->host_mapping_rules.reset(new net::HostMappingRules());
globals_->http_user_agent_settings.reset(
new BasicHttpUserAgentSettings(std::string()));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kHostRules)) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:SetRulesFromString");
globals_->host_mapping_rules->SetRulesFromString(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kHostRules));
TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:SetRulesFromString");
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kIgnoreCertificateErrors))
globals_->ignore_certificate_errors = true;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kTestingFixedHttpPort)) {
globals_->testing_fixed_http_port =
GetSwitchValueAsInt(command_line, switches::kTestingFixedHttpPort);
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kTestingFixedHttpsPort)) {
globals_->testing_fixed_https_port =
GetSwitchValueAsInt(command_line, switches::kTestingFixedHttpsPort);
}
ConfigureQuic(command_line);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableUserAlternateProtocolPorts)) {
globals_->enable_user_alternate_protocol_ports = true;
}
InitializeNetworkOptions(command_line);
net::HttpNetworkSession::Params session_params;
InitializeNetworkSessionParams(&session_params);
session_params.net_log = net_log_;
session_params.proxy_service =
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_proxy_service.get();
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:HttpNetworkSession");
scoped_refptr<net::HttpNetworkSession> network_session(
new net::HttpNetworkSession(session_params));
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_http_transaction_factory
.reset(new net::HttpNetworkLayer(network_session.get()));
TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:HttpNetworkSession");
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactoryImpl> job_factory(
new net::URLRequestJobFactoryImpl());
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(chrome::kDataScheme,
new net::DataProtocolHandler());
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
chrome::kFileScheme,
new net::FileProtocolHandler(
content::BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->
GetTaskRunnerWithShutdownBehavior(
base::SequencedWorkerPool::SKIP_ON_SHUTDOWN)));
#if !defined(DISABLE_FTP_SUPPORT)
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_ftp_transaction_factory.reset(
new net::FtpNetworkLayer(globals_->host_resolver.get()));
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
content::kFtpScheme,
new net::FtpProtocolHandler(
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_ftp_transaction_factory.get()));
#endif
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_url_request_job_factory =
job_factory.PassAs<net::URLRequestJobFactory>();
globals_->throttler_manager.reset(new net::URLRequestThrottlerManager());
globals_->throttler_manager->set_net_log(net_log_);
globals_->throttler_manager->set_enable_thread_checks(true);
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_context.reset(
ConstructProxyScriptFetcherContext(globals_, net_log_));
globals_->network_time_notifier.reset(
new net::NetworkTimeNotifier(
scoped_ptr<base::TickClock>(new base::DefaultTickClock())));
sdch_manager_ = new net::SdchManager();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ObserveKeychainEvents));
#endif
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IOThread::InitSystemRequestContext,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
|
void IOThread::InitAsync() {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync");
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
#if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
net::SetMessageLoopForNSSHttpIO();
#endif
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
DCHECK(!globals_);
globals_ = new Globals;
network_change_observer_.reset(
new LoggingNetworkChangeObserver(net_log_));
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::InitHistogramWatcher();
globals_->extension_event_router_forwarder =
extension_event_router_forwarder_;
ChromeNetworkDelegate* network_delegate =
new ChromeNetworkDelegate(extension_event_router_forwarder_,
&system_enable_referrers_);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableClientHints))
network_delegate->SetEnableClientHints();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExtensionsHttpThrottling))
network_delegate->NeverThrottleRequests();
globals_->system_network_delegate.reset(network_delegate);
globals_->host_resolver = CreateGlobalHostResolver(net_log_);
UpdateDnsClientEnabled();
globals_->cert_verifier.reset(net::CertVerifier::CreateDefault());
globals_->transport_security_state.reset(new net::TransportSecurityState());
#if !defined(USE_OPENSSL)
net::MultiLogCTVerifier* ct_verifier = new net::MultiLogCTVerifier();
globals_->cert_transparency_verifier.reset(ct_verifier);
ct_verifier->AddLog(net::ct::CreateGooglePilotLogVerifier().Pass());
ct_verifier->AddLog(net::ct::CreateGoogleAviatorLogVerifier().Pass());
ct_verifier->AddLog(net::ct::CreateGoogleRocketeerLogVerifier().Pass());
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCertificateTransparencyLog)) {
std::string switch_value = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kCertificateTransparencyLog);
size_t delim_pos = switch_value.find(":");
CHECK(delim_pos != std::string::npos)
<< "CT log description not provided (switch format"
" is 'description:base64_key')";
std::string log_description(switch_value.substr(0, delim_pos));
std::string ct_public_key_data;
CHECK(base::Base64Decode(
switch_value.substr(delim_pos + 1),
&ct_public_key_data)) << "Unable to decode CT public key.";
scoped_ptr<net::CTLogVerifier> external_log_verifier(
net::CTLogVerifier::Create(ct_public_key_data, log_description));
CHECK(external_log_verifier) << "Unable to parse CT public key.";
ct_verifier->AddLog(external_log_verifier.Pass());
}
#else
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCertificateTransparencyLog)) {
LOG(DFATAL) << "Certificate Transparency is not yet supported in Chrome "
"builds using OpenSSL.";
}
#endif
globals_->ssl_config_service = GetSSLConfigService();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
if (DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyAllowed()) {
spdyproxy_auth_origins_ =
DataReductionProxySettings::GetDataReductionProxies();
}
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
globals_->http_auth_handler_factory.reset(CreateDefaultAuthHandlerFactory(
globals_->host_resolver.get()));
globals_->http_server_properties.reset(new net::HttpServerPropertiesImpl());
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_proxy_service.reset(
net::ProxyService::CreateDirectWithNetLog(net_log_));
globals_->system_cookie_store = new net::CookieMonster(NULL, NULL);
globals_->system_server_bound_cert_service.reset(
new net::ServerBoundCertService(
new net::DefaultServerBoundCertStore(NULL),
base::WorkerPool::GetTaskRunner(true)));
globals_->dns_probe_service.reset(new chrome_browser_net::DnsProbeService());
globals_->load_time_stats.reset(new chrome_browser_net::LoadTimeStats());
globals_->host_mapping_rules.reset(new net::HostMappingRules());
globals_->http_user_agent_settings.reset(
new BasicHttpUserAgentSettings(std::string()));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kHostRules)) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:SetRulesFromString");
globals_->host_mapping_rules->SetRulesFromString(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kHostRules));
TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:SetRulesFromString");
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kIgnoreCertificateErrors))
globals_->ignore_certificate_errors = true;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kTestingFixedHttpPort)) {
globals_->testing_fixed_http_port =
GetSwitchValueAsInt(command_line, switches::kTestingFixedHttpPort);
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kTestingFixedHttpsPort)) {
globals_->testing_fixed_https_port =
GetSwitchValueAsInt(command_line, switches::kTestingFixedHttpsPort);
}
ConfigureQuic(command_line);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableUserAlternateProtocolPorts)) {
globals_->enable_user_alternate_protocol_ports = true;
}
InitializeNetworkOptions(command_line);
net::HttpNetworkSession::Params session_params;
InitializeNetworkSessionParams(&session_params);
session_params.net_log = net_log_;
session_params.proxy_service =
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_proxy_service.get();
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:HttpNetworkSession");
scoped_refptr<net::HttpNetworkSession> network_session(
new net::HttpNetworkSession(session_params));
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_http_transaction_factory
.reset(new net::HttpNetworkLayer(network_session.get()));
TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "IOThread::InitAsync:HttpNetworkSession");
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactoryImpl> job_factory(
new net::URLRequestJobFactoryImpl());
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(chrome::kDataScheme,
new net::DataProtocolHandler());
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
chrome::kFileScheme,
new net::FileProtocolHandler(
content::BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->
GetTaskRunnerWithShutdownBehavior(
base::SequencedWorkerPool::SKIP_ON_SHUTDOWN)));
#if !defined(DISABLE_FTP_SUPPORT)
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_ftp_transaction_factory.reset(
new net::FtpNetworkLayer(globals_->host_resolver.get()));
job_factory->SetProtocolHandler(
content::kFtpScheme,
new net::FtpProtocolHandler(
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_ftp_transaction_factory.get()));
#endif
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_url_request_job_factory =
job_factory.PassAs<net::URLRequestJobFactory>();
globals_->throttler_manager.reset(new net::URLRequestThrottlerManager());
globals_->throttler_manager->set_net_log(net_log_);
globals_->throttler_manager->set_enable_thread_checks(true);
globals_->proxy_script_fetcher_context.reset(
ConstructProxyScriptFetcherContext(globals_, net_log_));
globals_->network_time_notifier.reset(
new net::NetworkTimeNotifier(
scoped_ptr<base::TickClock>(new base::DefaultTickClock())));
sdch_manager_ = new net::SdchManager();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ObserveKeychainEvents));
#endif
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IOThread::InitSystemRequestContext,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
device_filesystem_list_open_files (Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
if (!device->priv->device_is_mounted || device->priv->device_mount_paths->len == 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not mounted");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
device->priv->device_is_system_internal ? "org.freedesktop.udisks.filesystem-lsof-system-internal"
: "org.freedesktop.udisks.filesystem-lsof",
"FilesystemListOpenFiles",
TRUE,
device_filesystem_list_open_files_authorized_cb,
context,
0);
out:
return TRUE;
}
|
device_filesystem_list_open_files (Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
if (!device->priv->device_is_mounted || device->priv->device_mount_paths->len == 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not mounted");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
device->priv->device_is_system_internal ? "org.freedesktop.udisks.filesystem-lsof-system-internal"
: "org.freedesktop.udisks.filesystem-lsof",
"FilesystemListOpenFiles",
TRUE,
device_filesystem_list_open_files_authorized_cb,
context,
0);
out:
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6079/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
|
static GpuMemoryBufferImpl* FromClientBuffer(ClientBuffer buffer) {
return reinterpret_cast<GpuMemoryBufferImpl*>(buffer);
}
|
static GpuMemoryBufferImpl* FromClientBuffer(ClientBuffer buffer) {
return reinterpret_cast<GpuMemoryBufferImpl*>(buffer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2804
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2804/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc7b094a338c6c521f918f478e993f0f74bbea0d
|
dc7b094a338c6c521f918f478e993f0f74bbea0d
|
Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetConnection(
// TODO(satorux,yusukes): Remove use of singleton here.
static IBusControllerImpl* GetInstance() {
return Singleton<IBusControllerImpl,
LeakySingletonTraits<IBusControllerImpl> >::get();
}
|
static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetConnection(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_change_handler) {
DCHECK(language_library);
DCHECK(current_input_method_changed),
DCHECK(register_ime_properties);
DCHECK(update_ime_property);
InputMethodStatusConnection* object = GetInstance();
if (!object->language_library_) {
object->language_library_ = language_library;
object->current_input_method_changed_ = current_input_method_changed;
object->register_ime_properties_= register_ime_properties;
object->update_ime_property_ = update_ime_property;
object->connection_change_handler_ = connection_change_handler;
object->MaybeRestoreConnections();
} else if (object->language_library_ != language_library) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown language_library is passed";
}
return object;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1229/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::RestartWithAuth(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
next_state_ = STATE_DISCONNECTED;
return OK;
}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::RestartWithAuth(const CompletionCallback& callback) {
next_state_ = STATE_DISCONNECTED;
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13051
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13051/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/289c672020280529fd382f3502efab7100d638ec
|
289c672020280529fd382f3502efab7100d638ec
|
CVE-2017-13051/RSVP: fix bounds checks for UNI
Fixup the part of rsvp_obj_print() that decodes the GENERALIZED_UNI
object from RFC 3476 Section 3.1 to check the sub-objects inside that
object more thoroughly.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
rsvp_obj_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int plen, const u_char *tptr,
const char *ident, u_int tlen,
const struct rsvp_common_header *rsvp_com_header)
{
const struct rsvp_object_header *rsvp_obj_header;
const u_char *obj_tptr;
union {
const struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t *rsvp_obj_integrity;
const struct rsvp_obj_frr_t *rsvp_obj_frr;
} obj_ptr;
u_short rsvp_obj_len,rsvp_obj_ctype,obj_tlen,intserv_serv_tlen;
int hexdump,processed,padbytes,error_code,error_value,i,sigcheck;
union {
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
uint8_t namelen;
u_int action, subchannel;
while(tlen>=sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header)) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header));
rsvp_obj_header = (const struct rsvp_object_header *)tptr;
rsvp_obj_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(rsvp_obj_header->length);
rsvp_obj_ctype=rsvp_obj_header->ctype;
if(rsvp_obj_len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object header size %u not a multiple of 4", ident, rsvp_obj_len));
return -1;
}
if(rsvp_obj_len < sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object header too short %u < %lu", ident, rsvp_obj_len,
(unsigned long)sizeof(const struct rsvp_object_header)));
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s Object (%u) Flags: [%s",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_values,
"Unknown",
rsvp_obj_header->class_num),
rsvp_obj_header->class_num,
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num) & 0x80) ? "ignore" : "reject"));
if (rsvp_obj_header->class_num > 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num) & 0x40) ? "and forward" : "silently"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " if unknown], Class-Type: %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(rsvp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num)<<8)+rsvp_obj_ctype),
rsvp_obj_ctype,
rsvp_obj_len));
if(tlen < rsvp_obj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object goes past end of objects TLV", ident));
return -1;
}
obj_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header);
obj_tlen=rsvp_obj_len-sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, rsvp_obj_len))
return -1;
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(rsvp_obj_header->class_num) {
case RSVP_OBJ_SESSION:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 DestAddress: %s, Protocol ID: 0x%02x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in_addr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags: [0x%02x], DestPort %u",
ident,
*(obj_tptr+5),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 DestAddress: %s, Protocol ID: 0x%02x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in6_addr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags: [0x%02x], DestPort %u",
ident,
*(obj_tptr+sizeof(struct in6_addr)+1),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in6_addr) + 2)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 36)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel EndPoint: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 20)));
obj_tlen-=36;
obj_tptr+=36;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_14: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP Tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 26)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 P2MP LSP ID: 0x%08x, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=26;
obj_tptr+=26;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP Tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 P2MP LSP ID: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
case RSVP_CTYPE_UNI_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel EndPoint: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_CONFIRM:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Receiver Address: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Receiver Address: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_NOTIFY_REQ:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Notify Node Address: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Notify Node Address: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SUGGESTED_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_UPSTREAM_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_RECOVERY_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Label: %u", ident, EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Generalized Label: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Waveband ID: %u%s Start Label: %u, Stop Label: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_STYLE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Reservation Style: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_resstyle_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr+1)),
*(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SENDER_TEMPLATE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 40)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+20),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 38)));
obj_tlen-=40;
obj_tptr+=40;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_12: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL_REQ:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",%s merge capability",((*(obj_tptr + 4)) & 0x80) ? "no" : "" ));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Minimum VPI/VCI: %u/%u",
ident,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0xfff,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)) & 0xfff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Maximum VPI/VCI: %u/%u",
ident,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+8))&0xfff,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 10)) & 0xfff));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Minimum/Maximum DLCI: %u/%u, %s%s bit DLCI",
ident,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0x7fffff,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8))&0x7fffff,
(((EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4)>>7)&3) == 0 ) ? "10" : "",
(((EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 4) >> 7) & 3) == 2 ) ? "23" : ""));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s LSP Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
*obj_tptr),
*obj_tptr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Switching Type: %s (%u), Payload ID: %s (0x%04x)",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
*(obj_tptr+1)),
*(obj_tptr+1),
tok2str(gmpls_payload_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RRO:
case RSVP_OBJ_ERO:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
u_char length;
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
length = *(obj_tptr + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subobject Type: %s, length %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_xro_values,
"Unknown %u",
RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_SUBOBJ(*obj_tptr)),
length));
if (length == 0) { /* prevent infinite loops */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ERROR: zero length ERO subtype", ident));
break;
}
switch(RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_SUBOBJ(*obj_tptr)) {
u_char prefix_length;
case RSVP_OBJ_XRO_IPV4:
if (length != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: length != 8"));
goto invalid;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 8);
prefix_length = *(obj_tptr+6);
if (prefix_length != 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: Prefix length %u != 32",
prefix_length));
goto invalid;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s, %s/%u, Flags: [%s]",
RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_LOOSE(*obj_tptr) ? "Loose" : "Strict",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+2),
*(obj_tptr+6),
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_rro_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr + 7)))); /* rfc3209 says that this field is rsvd. */
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_XRO_LABEL:
if (length != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: length != 8"));
goto invalid;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s] (%#x), Class-Type: %s (%u), %u",
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_rro_label_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr+2)),
*(obj_tptr+2),
tok2str(rsvp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
*(obj_tptr+3) + 256*RSVP_OBJ_RRO),
*(obj_tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
}
obj_tlen-=*(obj_tptr+1);
obj_tptr+=*(obj_tptr+1);
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_HELLO:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Instance: 0x%08x, Destination Instance: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RESTART_CAPABILITY:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Restart Time: %ums, Recovery Time: %ums",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SESSION_ATTRIBUTE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
namelen = *(obj_tptr+3);
if (obj_tlen < 4+namelen)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Session Name: ", ident));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(obj_tptr + 4 + i));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Flags: [%s] (%#x)",
ident,
(int)*obj_tptr,
(int)*(obj_tptr+1),
bittok2str(rsvp_session_attribute_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr+2)),
*(obj_tptr + 2)));
obj_tlen-=4+*(obj_tptr+3);
obj_tptr+=4+*(obj_tptr+3);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_GENERALIZED_UNI:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
int subobj_type,af,subobj_len,total_subobj_len;
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
/* read variable length subobjects */
total_subobj_len = obj_tlen;
while(total_subobj_len > 0) {
/* If RFC 3476 Section 3.1 defined that a sub-object of the
* GENERALIZED_UNI RSVP object must have the Length field as
* a multiple of 4, instead of the check below it would be
* better to test total_subobj_len only once before the loop.
* So long as it does not define it and this while loop does
* not implement such a requirement, let's accept that within
* each iteration subobj_len may happen to be a multiple of 1
* and test it and total_subobj_len respectively.
*/
if (total_subobj_len < 4)
goto invalid;
subobj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr);
subobj_type = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2))>>8;
af = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2))&0x00FF;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subobject Type: %s (%u), AF: %s (%u), length: %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_generalized_uni_values, "Unknown", subobj_type),
subobj_type,
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown", af), af,
subobj_len));
/* In addition to what is explained above, the same spec does not
* explicitly say that the same Length field includes the 4-octet
* sub-object header, but as long as this while loop implements it
* as it does include, let's keep the check below consistent with
* the rest of the code.
*/
if(subobj_len < 4 || subobj_len > total_subobj_len)
goto invalid;
switch(subobj_type) {
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_SOURCE_TNA_ADDRESS:
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_DESTINATION_TNA_ADDRESS:
switch(af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (subobj_len < 8)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s UNI IPv4 TNA address: %s",
ident, ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (subobj_len < 20)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s UNI IPv6 TNA address: %s",
ident, ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
break;
case AFNUM_NSAP:
if (subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
}
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_DIVERSITY:
if (subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_EGRESS_LABEL:
if (subobj_len < 16) {
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s U-bit: %x, Label type: %u, Logical port id: %u, Label: %u",
ident,
((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))>>31),
((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0xFF),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_SERVICE_LEVEL:
if (subobj_len < 8) {
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Service level: %u",
ident, (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)) >> 24));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
obj_tptr+=subobj_len;
obj_tlen+=subobj_len;
}
if (total_subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RSVP_HOP:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_3: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Previous/Next Interface: %s, Logical Interface Handle: 0x%08x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
if (obj_tlen)
hexdump=TRUE; /* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Previous/Next Interface: %s, Logical Interface Handle: 0x%08x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 16)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
hexdump=TRUE; /* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_TIME_VALUES:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Refresh Period: %ums",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
/* those three objects do share the same semantics */
case RSVP_OBJ_SENDER_TSPEC:
case RSVP_OBJ_ADSPEC:
case RSVP_OBJ_FLOWSPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Msg-Version: %u, length: %u",
ident,
(*obj_tptr & 0xf0) >> 4,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2) << 2));
obj_tptr+=4; /* get to the start of the service header */
obj_tlen-=4;
while (obj_tlen >= 4) {
intserv_serv_tlen=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)<<2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Service Type: %s (%u), break bit %s set, Service length: %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_intserv_service_type_values,"unknown",*(obj_tptr)),
*(obj_tptr),
(*(obj_tptr+1)&0x80) ? "" : "not",
intserv_serv_tlen));
obj_tptr+=4; /* get to the start of the parameter list */
obj_tlen-=4;
while (intserv_serv_tlen>=4) {
processed = rsvp_intserv_print(ndo, obj_tptr, obj_tlen);
if (processed == 0)
break;
obj_tlen-=processed;
intserv_serv_tlen-=processed;
obj_tptr+=processed;
}
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_FILTERSPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Flow Label: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr + 17)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 40)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+20),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 38)));
obj_tlen-=40;
obj_tptr+=40;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_12: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_FASTREROUTE:
/* the differences between c-type 1 and 7 are minor */
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr = (const struct rsvp_obj_frr_t *)obj_tptr;
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1: /* new style */
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t))
return-1;
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->bandwidth);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Hop-limit: %u, Bandwidth: %.10g Mbps",
ident,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->setup_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hold_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hop_limit,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Include-any: 0x%08x, Exclude-any: 0x%08x, Include-all: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->exclude_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_all)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4: /* old style */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->bandwidth);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Hop-limit: %u, Bandwidth: %.10g Mbps",
ident,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->setup_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hold_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hop_limit,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Include Colors: 0x%08x, Exclude Colors: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->exclude_any)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_DETOUR:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
while(obj_tlen >= 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s PLR-ID: %s, Avoid-Node-ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_CLASSTYPE:
case RSVP_OBJ_CLASSTYPE_OLD: /* fall through */
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s CT: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x7));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_3: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
error_code=*(obj_tptr+5);
error_value=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Error Node Address: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]%s Error Code: %s (%u)",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr+4),
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_values,"unknown",error_code),
error_code));
switch (error_code) {
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_ROUTING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_routing_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_DIFFSERV_TE: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_DIFFSERV_TE_OLD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_diffserv_te_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Unknown Error Value (%u)", error_value));
break;
}
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
error_code=*(obj_tptr+17);
error_value=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Error Node Address: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]%s Error Code: %s (%u)",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr+16),
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_values,"unknown",error_code),
error_code));
switch (error_code) {
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_ROUTING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_routing_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
default:
break;
}
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_PROPERTIES:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
padbytes = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s TLV count: %u, padding bytes: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
padbytes));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
/* loop through as long there is anything longer than the TLV header (2) */
while(obj_tlen >= 2 + padbytes) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s TLV (0x%02x), length: %u", /* length includes header */
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_prop_tlv_values,"unknown",*obj_tptr),
*obj_tptr,
*(obj_tptr + 1)));
if (obj_tlen < *(obj_tptr+1))
return-1;
if (*(obj_tptr+1) < 2)
return -1;
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr + 2, "\n\t\t", *(obj_tptr + 1) - 2);
obj_tlen-=*(obj_tptr+1);
obj_tptr+=*(obj_tptr+1);
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID_ACK: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID_LIST:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags [0x%02x], epoch: %u",
ident,
*obj_tptr,
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr + 1)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
/* loop through as long there are no messages left */
while(obj_tlen >= 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Message-ID 0x%08x (%u)",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_INTEGRITY:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t))
return-1;
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity = (const struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Key-ID 0x%04x%08x, Sequence 0x%08x%08x, Flags [%s]",
ident,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->key_id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->key_id+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->sequence),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->sequence+4),
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_integrity_flag_values,
"none",
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s MD5-sum 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x ",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest + 12)));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, pptr, plen,
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest,
rsvp_clear_checksum,
rsvp_com_header);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
obj_tlen+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ADMIN_STATUS:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags [%s]", ident,
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_admin_status_flag_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL_SET:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
action = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Action: %s (%u), Label type: %u", ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_label_set_action_values, "Unknown", action),
action, ((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x7F))));
switch (action) {
case LABEL_SET_INCLUSIVE_RANGE:
case LABEL_SET_EXCLUSIVE_RANGE: /* fall through */
/* only a couple of subchannels are expected */
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Start range: %u, End range: %u", ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
subchannel = 1;
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subchannel #%u: %u", ident, subchannel,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tptr+=4;
obj_tlen-=4;
subchannel++;
}
break;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_S2L:
switch (rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Sub-LSP destination address: %s",
ident, ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Sub-LSP destination address: %s",
ident, ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case RSVP_OBJ_SCOPE:
case RSVP_OBJ_POLICY_DATA:
case RSVP_OBJ_ACCEPT_LABEL_SET:
case RSVP_OBJ_PROTECTION:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen); /* FIXME indentation */
break;
}
/* do we also want to see a hex dump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump == TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header), "\n\t ", /* FIXME indentation */
rsvp_obj_len - sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header));
tptr+=rsvp_obj_len;
tlen-=rsvp_obj_len;
}
return 0;
invalid:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
return -1;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return -1;
}
|
rsvp_obj_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int plen, const u_char *tptr,
const char *ident, u_int tlen,
const struct rsvp_common_header *rsvp_com_header)
{
const struct rsvp_object_header *rsvp_obj_header;
const u_char *obj_tptr;
union {
const struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t *rsvp_obj_integrity;
const struct rsvp_obj_frr_t *rsvp_obj_frr;
} obj_ptr;
u_short rsvp_obj_len,rsvp_obj_ctype,obj_tlen,intserv_serv_tlen;
int hexdump,processed,padbytes,error_code,error_value,i,sigcheck;
union {
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
uint8_t namelen;
u_int action, subchannel;
while(tlen>=sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header)) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header));
rsvp_obj_header = (const struct rsvp_object_header *)tptr;
rsvp_obj_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(rsvp_obj_header->length);
rsvp_obj_ctype=rsvp_obj_header->ctype;
if(rsvp_obj_len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object header size %u not a multiple of 4", ident, rsvp_obj_len));
return -1;
}
if(rsvp_obj_len < sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object header too short %u < %lu", ident, rsvp_obj_len,
(unsigned long)sizeof(const struct rsvp_object_header)));
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s Object (%u) Flags: [%s",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_values,
"Unknown",
rsvp_obj_header->class_num),
rsvp_obj_header->class_num,
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num) & 0x80) ? "ignore" : "reject"));
if (rsvp_obj_header->class_num > 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num) & 0x40) ? "and forward" : "silently"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " if unknown], Class-Type: %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(rsvp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
((rsvp_obj_header->class_num)<<8)+rsvp_obj_ctype),
rsvp_obj_ctype,
rsvp_obj_len));
if(tlen < rsvp_obj_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sERROR: object goes past end of objects TLV", ident));
return -1;
}
obj_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header);
obj_tlen=rsvp_obj_len-sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, rsvp_obj_len))
return -1;
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(rsvp_obj_header->class_num) {
case RSVP_OBJ_SESSION:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 DestAddress: %s, Protocol ID: 0x%02x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in_addr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags: [0x%02x], DestPort %u",
ident,
*(obj_tptr+5),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 DestAddress: %s, Protocol ID: 0x%02x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in6_addr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags: [0x%02x], DestPort %u",
ident,
*(obj_tptr+sizeof(struct in6_addr)+1),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + sizeof(struct in6_addr) + 2)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 36)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel EndPoint: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 20)));
obj_tlen-=36;
obj_tptr+=36;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_14: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP Tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 26)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 P2MP LSP ID: 0x%08x, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=26;
obj_tptr+=26;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP Tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 P2MP LSP ID: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
case RSVP_CTYPE_UNI_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel EndPoint: %s, Tunnel ID: 0x%04x, Extended Tunnel ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_CONFIRM:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Receiver Address: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Receiver Address: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_NOTIFY_REQ:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in_addr))
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Notify Node Address: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Notify Node Address: %s",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SUGGESTED_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_UPSTREAM_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_RECOVERY_LABEL: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Label: %u", ident, EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Generalized Label: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Waveband ID: %u%s Start Label: %u, Stop Label: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_STYLE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Reservation Style: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_resstyle_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr+1)),
*(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SENDER_TEMPLATE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 40)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+20),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 38)));
obj_tlen-=40;
obj_tptr+=40;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_12: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL_REQ:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",%s merge capability",((*(obj_tptr + 4)) & 0x80) ? "no" : "" ));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Minimum VPI/VCI: %u/%u",
ident,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0xfff,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)) & 0xfff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Maximum VPI/VCI: %u/%u",
ident,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+8))&0xfff,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 10)) & 0xfff));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s L3 Protocol ID: %s",
ident,
tok2str(ethertype_values,
"Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Minimum/Maximum DLCI: %u/%u, %s%s bit DLCI",
ident,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0x7fffff,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8))&0x7fffff,
(((EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4)>>7)&3) == 0 ) ? "10" : "",
(((EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 4) >> 7) & 3) == 2 ) ? "23" : ""));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s LSP Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
*obj_tptr),
*obj_tptr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Switching Type: %s (%u), Payload ID: %s (0x%04x)",
ident,
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
*(obj_tptr+1)),
*(obj_tptr+1),
tok2str(gmpls_payload_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RRO:
case RSVP_OBJ_ERO:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
u_char length;
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
length = *(obj_tptr + 1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subobject Type: %s, length %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_xro_values,
"Unknown %u",
RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_SUBOBJ(*obj_tptr)),
length));
if (length == 0) { /* prevent infinite loops */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ERROR: zero length ERO subtype", ident));
break;
}
switch(RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_SUBOBJ(*obj_tptr)) {
u_char prefix_length;
case RSVP_OBJ_XRO_IPV4:
if (length != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: length != 8"));
goto invalid;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 8);
prefix_length = *(obj_tptr+6);
if (prefix_length != 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: Prefix length %u != 32",
prefix_length));
goto invalid;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s, %s/%u, Flags: [%s]",
RSVP_OBJ_XRO_MASK_LOOSE(*obj_tptr) ? "Loose" : "Strict",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+2),
*(obj_tptr+6),
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_rro_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr + 7)))); /* rfc3209 says that this field is rsvd. */
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_XRO_LABEL:
if (length != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ERROR: length != 8"));
goto invalid;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags: [%s] (%#x), Class-Type: %s (%u), %u",
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_rro_label_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr+2)),
*(obj_tptr+2),
tok2str(rsvp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
*(obj_tptr+3) + 256*RSVP_OBJ_RRO),
*(obj_tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
}
obj_tlen-=*(obj_tptr+1);
obj_tptr+=*(obj_tptr+1);
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_HELLO:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Instance: 0x%08x, Destination Instance: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RESTART_CAPABILITY:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Restart Time: %ums, Recovery Time: %ums",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_SESSION_ATTRIBUTE:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
namelen = *(obj_tptr+3);
if (obj_tlen < 4+namelen)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Session Name: ", ident));
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(obj_tptr + 4 + i));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Flags: [%s] (%#x)",
ident,
(int)*obj_tptr,
(int)*(obj_tptr+1),
bittok2str(rsvp_session_attribute_flag_values,
"none",
*(obj_tptr+2)),
*(obj_tptr + 2)));
obj_tlen-=4+*(obj_tptr+3);
obj_tptr+=4+*(obj_tptr+3);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_GENERALIZED_UNI:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
int subobj_type,af,subobj_len,total_subobj_len;
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
/* read variable length subobjects */
total_subobj_len = obj_tlen;
while(total_subobj_len > 0) {
subobj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr);
subobj_type = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2))>>8;
af = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2))&0x00FF;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subobject Type: %s (%u), AF: %s (%u), length: %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_generalized_uni_values, "Unknown", subobj_type),
subobj_type,
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown", af), af,
subobj_len));
if(subobj_len == 0)
goto invalid;
switch(subobj_type) {
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_SOURCE_TNA_ADDRESS:
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_DESTINATION_TNA_ADDRESS:
switch(af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (subobj_len < 8)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s UNI IPv4 TNA address: %s",
ident, ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (subobj_len < 20)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s UNI IPv6 TNA address: %s",
ident, ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
break;
case AFNUM_NSAP:
if (subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
}
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_DIVERSITY:
if (subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_EGRESS_LABEL:
if (subobj_len < 16) {
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s U-bit: %x, Label type: %u, Logical port id: %u, Label: %u",
ident,
((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))>>31),
((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4))&0xFF),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
break;
case RSVP_GEN_UNI_SUBOBJ_SERVICE_LEVEL:
if (subobj_len < 8) {
return -1;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Service level: %u",
ident, (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)) >> 24));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
obj_tptr+=subobj_len;
obj_tlen+=subobj_len;
}
if (total_subobj_len) {
/* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_RSVP_HOP:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_3: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Previous/Next Interface: %s, Logical Interface Handle: 0x%08x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
if (obj_tlen)
hexdump=TRUE; /* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Previous/Next Interface: %s, Logical Interface Handle: 0x%08x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 16)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
hexdump=TRUE; /* unless we have a TLV parser lets just hexdump */
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_TIME_VALUES:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Refresh Period: %ums",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
/* those three objects do share the same semantics */
case RSVP_OBJ_SENDER_TSPEC:
case RSVP_OBJ_ADSPEC:
case RSVP_OBJ_FLOWSPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Msg-Version: %u, length: %u",
ident,
(*obj_tptr & 0xf0) >> 4,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 2) << 2));
obj_tptr+=4; /* get to the start of the service header */
obj_tlen-=4;
while (obj_tlen >= 4) {
intserv_serv_tlen=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)<<2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Service Type: %s (%u), break bit %s set, Service length: %u",
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_intserv_service_type_values,"unknown",*(obj_tptr)),
*(obj_tptr),
(*(obj_tptr+1)&0x80) ? "" : "not",
intserv_serv_tlen));
obj_tptr+=4; /* get to the start of the parameter list */
obj_tlen-=4;
while (intserv_serv_tlen>=4) {
processed = rsvp_intserv_print(ndo, obj_tptr, obj_tlen);
if (processed == 0)
break;
obj_tlen-=processed;
intserv_serv_tlen-=processed;
obj_tptr+=processed;
}
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_FILTERSPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Source Port: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_3:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, Flow Label: %u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr + 17)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 18)));
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_13: /* IPv6 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 40)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv6 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18),
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+20),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 38)));
obj_tlen-=40;
obj_tptr+=40;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Source Address: %s, LSP-ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 6)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_12: /* IPv4 p2mp LSP tunnel */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s IPv4 Tunnel Sender Address: %s, LSP ID: 0x%04x"
"%s Sub-Group Originator ID: %s, Sub-Group ID: 0x%04x",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6),
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr + 12)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_FASTREROUTE:
/* the differences between c-type 1 and 7 are minor */
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr = (const struct rsvp_obj_frr_t *)obj_tptr;
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1: /* new style */
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t))
return-1;
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->bandwidth);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Hop-limit: %u, Bandwidth: %.10g Mbps",
ident,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->setup_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hold_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hop_limit,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Include-any: 0x%08x, Exclude-any: 0x%08x, Include-all: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->exclude_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_all)));
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_frr_t);
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4: /* old style */
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->bandwidth);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Setup Priority: %u, Holding Priority: %u, Hop-limit: %u, Bandwidth: %.10g Mbps",
ident,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->setup_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hold_prio,
(int)obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->hop_limit,
bw.f * 8 / 1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Include Colors: 0x%08x, Exclude Colors: 0x%08x",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->include_any),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_frr->exclude_any)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_DETOUR:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_TUNNEL_IPV4:
while(obj_tlen >= 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s PLR-ID: %s, Avoid-Node-ID: %s",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr + 4)));
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_CLASSTYPE:
case RSVP_OBJ_CLASSTYPE_OLD: /* fall through */
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s CT: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x7));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_3: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
error_code=*(obj_tptr+5);
error_value=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Error Node Address: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]%s Error Code: %s (%u)",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr+4),
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_values,"unknown",error_code),
error_code));
switch (error_code) {
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_ROUTING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_routing_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_DIFFSERV_TE: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_DIFFSERV_TE_OLD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_diffserv_te_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Unknown Error Value (%u)", error_value));
break;
}
obj_tlen-=8;
obj_tptr+=8;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_4: /* fall through - FIXME add TLV parser */
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 20)
return-1;
error_code=*(obj_tptr+17);
error_value=EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+18);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Error Node Address: %s, Flags: [0x%02x]%s Error Code: %s (%u)",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
*(obj_tptr+16),
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_values,"unknown",error_code),
error_code));
switch (error_code) {
case RSVP_OBJ_ERROR_SPEC_CODE_ROUTING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Error Value: %s (%u)",
tok2str(rsvp_obj_error_code_routing_values,"unknown",error_value),
error_value));
break;
default:
break;
}
obj_tlen-=20;
obj_tptr+=20;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_PROPERTIES:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
padbytes = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s TLV count: %u, padding bytes: %u",
ident,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
padbytes));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
/* loop through as long there is anything longer than the TLV header (2) */
while(obj_tlen >= 2 + padbytes) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s TLV (0x%02x), length: %u", /* length includes header */
ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_prop_tlv_values,"unknown",*obj_tptr),
*obj_tptr,
*(obj_tptr + 1)));
if (obj_tlen < *(obj_tptr+1))
return-1;
if (*(obj_tptr+1) < 2)
return -1;
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr + 2, "\n\t\t", *(obj_tptr + 1) - 2);
obj_tlen-=*(obj_tptr+1);
obj_tptr+=*(obj_tptr+1);
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID_ACK: /* fall through */
case RSVP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID_LIST:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
case RSVP_CTYPE_2:
if (obj_tlen < 8)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags [0x%02x], epoch: %u",
ident,
*obj_tptr,
EXTRACT_24BITS(obj_tptr + 1)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
/* loop through as long there are no messages left */
while(obj_tlen >= 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Message-ID 0x%08x (%u)",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_INTEGRITY:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t))
return-1;
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity = (const struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Key-ID 0x%04x%08x, Sequence 0x%08x%08x, Flags [%s]",
ident,
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->key_id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->key_id+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->sequence),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->sequence+4),
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_integrity_flag_values,
"none",
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s MD5-sum 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x ",
ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest + 12)));
sigcheck = signature_verify(ndo, pptr, plen,
obj_ptr.rsvp_obj_integrity->digest,
rsvp_clear_checksum,
rsvp_com_header);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", tok2str(signature_check_values, "Unknown", sigcheck)));
obj_tlen+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t);
obj_tptr+=sizeof(struct rsvp_obj_integrity_t);
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_ADMIN_STATUS:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Flags [%s]", ident,
bittok2str(rsvp_obj_admin_status_flag_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_LABEL_SET:
switch(rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_1:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
action = (EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Action: %s (%u), Label type: %u", ident,
tok2str(rsvp_obj_label_set_action_values, "Unknown", action),
action, ((EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x7F))));
switch (action) {
case LABEL_SET_INCLUSIVE_RANGE:
case LABEL_SET_EXCLUSIVE_RANGE: /* fall through */
/* only a couple of subchannels are expected */
if (obj_tlen < 12)
return -1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Start range: %u, End range: %u", ident,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr + 8)));
obj_tlen-=12;
obj_tptr+=12;
break;
default:
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
subchannel = 1;
while(obj_tlen >= 4 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Subchannel #%u: %u", ident, subchannel,
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
obj_tptr+=4;
obj_tlen-=4;
subchannel++;
}
break;
}
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case RSVP_OBJ_S2L:
switch (rsvp_obj_ctype) {
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV4:
if (obj_tlen < 4)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Sub-LSP destination address: %s",
ident, ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=4;
obj_tptr+=4;
break;
case RSVP_CTYPE_IPV6:
if (obj_tlen < 16)
return-1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s Sub-LSP destination address: %s",
ident, ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr)));
obj_tlen-=16;
obj_tptr+=16;
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case RSVP_OBJ_SCOPE:
case RSVP_OBJ_POLICY_DATA:
case RSVP_OBJ_ACCEPT_LABEL_SET:
case RSVP_OBJ_PROTECTION:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen); /* FIXME indentation */
break;
}
/* do we also want to see a hex dump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump == TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr + sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header), "\n\t ", /* FIXME indentation */
rsvp_obj_len - sizeof(struct rsvp_object_header));
tptr+=rsvp_obj_len;
tlen-=rsvp_obj_len;
}
return 0;
invalid:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
return -1;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return -1;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static void ParseSystem(SystemInfo* system,
EthernetNetwork** ethernet,
WifiNetworkVector* wifi_networks,
CellularNetworkVector* cellular_networks,
WifiNetworkVector* remembered_wifi_networks) {
DVLOG(1) << "ParseSystem:";
DCHECK(!(*ethernet));
for (int i = 0; i < system->service_size; i++) {
const ServiceInfo* service = system->GetServiceInfo(i);
DVLOG(1) << " (" << service->type << ") " << service->name
<< " mode=" << service->mode
<< " state=" << service->state
<< " sec=" << service->security
<< " req=" << service->passphrase_required
<< " pass=" << service->passphrase
<< " id=" << service->identity
<< " certpath=" << service->cert_path
<< " str=" << service->strength
<< " fav=" << service->favorite
<< " auto=" << service->auto_connect
<< " is_active=" << service->is_active
<< " error=" << service->error;
if (service->type == TYPE_ETHERNET)
(*ethernet) = new EthernetNetwork(service);
else if (service->type == TYPE_WIFI) {
wifi_networks->push_back(new WifiNetwork(service));
} else if (service->type == TYPE_CELLULAR) {
cellular_networks->push_back(new CellularNetwork(service));
}
}
if (!(*ethernet))
(*ethernet) = new EthernetNetwork();
DVLOG(1) << "Remembered networks:";
for (int i = 0; i < system->remembered_service_size; i++) {
const ServiceInfo* service = system->GetRememberedServiceInfo(i);
if (service->auto_connect) {
DVLOG(1) << " (" << service->type << ") " << service->name
<< " mode=" << service->mode
<< " sec=" << service->security
<< " pass=" << service->passphrase
<< " id=" << service->identity
<< " certpath=" << service->cert_path
<< " auto=" << service->auto_connect;
if (service->type == TYPE_WIFI) {
remembered_wifi_networks->push_back(new WifiNetwork(service));
}
}
}
}
|
static void ParseSystem(SystemInfo* system,
EthernetNetwork** ethernet,
WifiNetworkVector* wifi_networks,
CellularNetworkVector* cellular_networks,
WifiNetworkVector* remembered_wifi_networks) {
DVLOG(1) << "ParseSystem:";
DCHECK(!(*ethernet));
for (int i = 0; i < system->service_size; i++) {
const ServiceInfo* service = system->GetServiceInfo(i);
DVLOG(1) << " (" << service->type << ") " << service->name
<< " mode=" << service->mode
<< " state=" << service->state
<< " sec=" << service->security
<< " req=" << service->passphrase_required
<< " pass=" << service->passphrase
<< " id=" << service->identity
<< " certpath=" << service->cert_path
<< " str=" << service->strength
<< " fav=" << service->favorite
<< " auto=" << service->auto_connect
<< " is_active=" << service->is_active
<< " error=" << service->error;
if (service->type == TYPE_ETHERNET)
(*ethernet) = new EthernetNetwork(service);
else if (service->type == TYPE_WIFI) {
wifi_networks->push_back(new WifiNetwork(service));
} else if (service->type == TYPE_CELLULAR) {
cellular_networks->push_back(new CellularNetwork(service));
}
}
if (!(*ethernet))
(*ethernet) = new EthernetNetwork();
DVLOG(1) << "Remembered networks:";
for (int i = 0; i < system->remembered_service_size; i++) {
const ServiceInfo* service = system->GetRememberedServiceInfo(i);
if (service->auto_connect) {
DVLOG(1) << " (" << service->type << ") " << service->name
<< " mode=" << service->mode
<< " sec=" << service->security
<< " pass=" << service->passphrase
<< " id=" << service->identity
<< " certpath=" << service->cert_path
<< " auto=" << service->auto_connect;
if (service->type == TYPE_WIFI) {
remembered_wifi_networks->push_back(new WifiNetwork(service));
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1300/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::BeginFrame(
const base::TimeTicks& frame_timeticks,
const base::TimeTicks& deadline,
const base::TimeDelta& interval,
bool capture_screenshot,
const FrameFinishedCallback& frame_finished_callback) {
DCHECK(begin_frame_control_enabled_);
TRACE_EVENT2("headless", "HeadlessWebContentsImpl::BeginFrame", "frame_time",
frame_timeticks, "capture_screenshot", capture_screenshot);
uint64_t sequence_number = begin_frame_sequence_number_++;
auto pending_frame = base::MakeUnique<PendingFrame>();
pending_frame->sequence_number = sequence_number;
pending_frame->callback = frame_finished_callback;
if (capture_screenshot) {
pending_frame->wait_for_copy_result = true;
content::RenderWidgetHostView* view =
web_contents()->GetRenderWidgetHostView();
if (view) {
view->CopyFromSurface(
gfx::Rect(), gfx::Size(),
base::Bind(&HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete,
base::Unretained(this),
base::Unretained(pending_frame.get())),
kN32_SkColorType);
}
}
pending_frames_.push_back(std::move(pending_frame));
ui::Compositor* compositor = browser()->PlatformGetCompositor(this);
DCHECK(compositor);
compositor->IssueExternalBeginFrame(viz::BeginFrameArgs::Create(
BEGINFRAME_FROM_HERE, begin_frame_source_id_, sequence_number,
frame_timeticks, deadline, interval, viz::BeginFrameArgs::NORMAL));
}
|
void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::BeginFrame(
const base::TimeTicks& frame_timeticks,
const base::TimeTicks& deadline,
const base::TimeDelta& interval,
bool capture_screenshot,
const FrameFinishedCallback& frame_finished_callback) {
DCHECK(begin_frame_control_enabled_);
TRACE_EVENT2("headless", "HeadlessWebContentsImpl::BeginFrame", "frame_time",
frame_timeticks, "capture_screenshot", capture_screenshot);
uint64_t sequence_number = begin_frame_sequence_number_++;
auto pending_frame = base::MakeUnique<PendingFrame>();
pending_frame->sequence_number = sequence_number;
pending_frame->callback = frame_finished_callback;
if (capture_screenshot) {
pending_frame->wait_for_copy_result = true;
content::RenderWidgetHostView* view =
web_contents()->GetRenderWidgetHostView();
if (view) {
view->CopyFromSurface(
gfx::Rect(), gfx::Size(),
base::Bind(&HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete,
base::Unretained(this),
base::Unretained(pending_frame.get())),
kN32_SkColorType);
}
}
pending_frames_.push_back(std::move(pending_frame));
ui::Compositor* compositor = browser()->PlatformGetCompositor(this);
DCHECK(compositor);
compositor->IssueExternalBeginFrame(viz::BeginFrameArgs::Create(
BEGINFRAME_FROM_HERE, begin_frame_source_id_, sequence_number,
frame_timeticks, deadline, interval, viz::BeginFrameArgs::NORMAL));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLInputElement::supportLabels() const
{
return m_inputType->isInteractiveContent();
}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::supportLabels() const
{
return m_inputType->isInteractiveContent();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4352/
|
CWE-399
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4
|
7d65a3a6ed8815e34a99c680ac3869fde49dbbd4
| null |
generate_many_bodies_inner (DBusMessageDataIter *iter,
DBusMessage **message_p)
{
DBusMessage *message;
DBusString signature;
DBusString body;
/* Keeping this small makes things go faster */
message = dbus_message_new_method_call ("o.z.F",
"/",
"o.z.B",
"Nah");
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
set_reply_serial (message);
if (!_dbus_string_init (&signature) || !_dbus_string_init (&body))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (dbus_internal_do_not_use_generate_bodies (iter_get_sequence (iter),
message->byte_order,
&signature, &body))
{
const char *v_SIGNATURE;
v_SIGNATURE = _dbus_string_get_const_data (&signature);
if (!_dbus_header_set_field_basic (&message->header,
DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_SIGNATURE,
DBUS_TYPE_SIGNATURE,
&v_SIGNATURE))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (!_dbus_string_move (&body, 0, &message->body, 0))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
_dbus_marshal_set_uint32 (&message->header.data, BODY_LENGTH_OFFSET,
_dbus_string_get_length (&message->body),
message->byte_order);
*message_p = message;
}
else
{
dbus_message_unref (message);
*message_p = NULL;
}
_dbus_string_free (&signature);
_dbus_string_free (&body);
return *message_p != NULL;
}
|
generate_many_bodies_inner (DBusMessageDataIter *iter,
DBusMessage **message_p)
{
DBusMessage *message;
DBusString signature;
DBusString body;
/* Keeping this small makes things go faster */
message = dbus_message_new_method_call ("o.z.F",
"/",
"o.z.B",
"Nah");
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
set_reply_serial (message);
if (!_dbus_string_init (&signature) || !_dbus_string_init (&body))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (dbus_internal_do_not_use_generate_bodies (iter_get_sequence (iter),
message->byte_order,
&signature, &body))
{
const char *v_SIGNATURE;
v_SIGNATURE = _dbus_string_get_const_data (&signature);
if (!_dbus_header_set_field_basic (&message->header,
DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_SIGNATURE,
DBUS_TYPE_SIGNATURE,
&v_SIGNATURE))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
if (!_dbus_string_move (&body, 0, &message->body, 0))
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
_dbus_marshal_set_uint32 (&message->header.data, BODY_LENGTH_OFFSET,
_dbus_string_get_length (&message->body),
message->byte_order);
*message_p = message;
}
else
{
dbus_message_unref (message);
*message_p = NULL;
}
_dbus_string_free (&signature);
_dbus_string_free (&body);
return *message_p != NULL;
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1229/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::GetLocalAddress(IPEndPoint* address) const {
if (!IsConnected())
return ERR_SOCKET_NOT_CONNECTED;
return spdy_stream_->GetLocalAddress(address);
}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::GetLocalAddress(IPEndPoint* address) const {
if (!IsConnected())
return ERR_SOCKET_NOT_CONNECTED;
return spdy_stream_->GetLocalAddress(address);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RVHObserver(RenderViewHostObserverArray* parent, RenderViewHost* rvh)
: RenderViewHostObserver(rvh),
parent_(parent) {
}
|
RVHObserver(RenderViewHostObserverArray* parent, RenderViewHost* rvh)
: RenderViewHostObserver(rvh),
parent_(parent) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OmniboxViewViews::CandidateWindowClosed(
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager* manager) {
ime_candidate_window_open_ = false;
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::CandidateWindowClosed(
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager* manager) {
ime_candidate_window_open_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13304
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13304/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/7689875ef64f34141e7292f6945efdf0530b4a5e
|
7689875ef64f34141e7292f6945efdf0530b4a5e
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1614
|
static Image *ReadPNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowPNMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (comment_info.comment != (char *) NULL) \
comment_info.comment=DestroyString(comment_info.comment); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
format;
CommentInfo
comment_info;
double
quantum_scale;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
max_value;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
depth,
extent,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
row,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PNM image.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,(unsigned char *) &format);
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
comment_info.comment=AcquireString(NULL);
comment_info.extent=MagickPathExtent;
if ((count != 1) || (format != 'P'))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=1;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
quantum_scale=1.0;
format=(char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (format != '7')
{
/*
PBM, PGM, PPM, and PNM.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,exception);
image->rows=(size_t) PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,exception);
if ((format == 'f') || (format == 'F'))
{
char
scale[MagickPathExtent];
if (ReadBlobString(image,scale) != (char *) NULL)
quantum_scale=StringToDouble(scale,(char **) NULL);
}
else
{
if ((format == '1') || (format == '4'))
max_value=1; /* bitmap */
else
max_value=(QuantumAny) PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception);
}
}
else
{
char
keyword[MagickPathExtent],
value[MagickPathExtent];
int
c;
register char
*p;
/*
PAM.
*/
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '#')
{
/*
Comment.
*/
c=PNMComment(image,&comment_info,exception);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (isalnum(c));
*p='\0';
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endhdr") == 0)
break;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
p=value;
while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
packet_size=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
(void) packet_size;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maxval") == 0)
max_value=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"TUPLTYPE") == 0)
{
if (LocaleCompare(value,"BLACKANDWHITE") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"BLACKANDWHITE_ALPHA") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"GRAYSCALE") == 0)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"GRAYSCALE_ALPHA") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"RGB_ALPHA") == 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"CMYK") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"CMYK_ALPHA") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
}
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if ((max_value == 0) || (max_value > 4294967295UL))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (depth=1; GetQuantumRange(depth) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((MagickSizeType) (image->columns*image->rows/8) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
comment_info.comment=DestroyString(comment_info.comment); \
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) ResetImagePixels(image,exception);
/*
Convert PNM pixels to runextent-encoded MIFF packets.
*/
row=0;
y=0;
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
/*
Convert PBM image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGray(image,PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,2,exception) ==
0 ? QuantumRange : 0,q);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->type=BilevelType;
break;
}
case '2':
{
Quantum
intensity;
/*
Convert PGM image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
intensity=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelGray(image,intensity,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->type=GrayscaleType;
break;
}
case '3':
{
/*
Convert PNM image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Quantum
pixel;
pixel=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
/*
Convert PBM raw image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
size_t
length;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (length != extent)
break;
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
case '5':
{
/*
Convert PGM raw image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
extent=(image->depth <= 8 ? 1 : image->depth <= 16 ? 2 : 4)*
image->columns;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const unsigned char
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
}
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
case '6':
{
/*
Convert PNM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
extent=3*(image->depth <= 8 ? 1 : image->depth <= 16 ? 2 : 4)*
image->columns;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const unsigned char
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
}
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
size_t
channels;
/*
Convert PAM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
channels=1;
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
channels=4;
break;
}
default:
{
channels=3;
break;
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
channels++;
extent=channels*(image->depth <= 8 ? 1 : image->depth <= 16 ? 2 : 4)*
image->columns;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const unsigned char
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
if (image->depth != 1)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
else
SetPixelAlpha(image,QuantumRange-
ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
}
}
}
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
/*
Convert PFM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (format == 'f')
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
image->endian=quantum_scale < 0.0 ? LSBEndian : MSBEndian;
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,32);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
SetQuantumScale(quantum_info,(double) QuantumRange*fabs(quantum_scale));
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
size_t
length;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,(ssize_t) (image->rows-offset-1),
image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (length != extent)
break;
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
default:
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (*comment_info.comment != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment_info.comment,exception);
comment_info.comment=DestroyString(comment_info.comment);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile","`%s'",image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((format == '1') || (format == '2') || (format == '3'))
do
{
/*
Skip to end of line.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,(unsigned char *) &format);
if (count != 1)
break;
if (format == 'P')
break;
} while (format != '\n');
count=ReadBlob(image,1,(unsigned char *) &format);
if ((count == 1) && (format == 'P'))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count == 1) && (format == 'P'));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadPNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowPNMException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (comment_info.comment != (char *) NULL) \
comment_info.comment=DestroyString(comment_info.comment); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
format;
CommentInfo
comment_info;
double
quantum_scale;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
max_value;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
size_t
depth,
extent,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
row,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PNM image.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,(unsigned char *) &format);
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
comment_info.comment=AcquireString(NULL);
comment_info.extent=MagickPathExtent;
if ((count != 1) || (format != 'P'))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=1;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
quantum_scale=1.0;
format=(char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (format != '7')
{
/*
PBM, PGM, PPM, and PNM.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,exception);
image->rows=(size_t) PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,exception);
if ((format == 'f') || (format == 'F'))
{
char
scale[MagickPathExtent];
if (ReadBlobString(image,scale) != (char *) NULL)
quantum_scale=StringToDouble(scale,(char **) NULL);
}
else
{
if ((format == '1') || (format == '4'))
max_value=1; /* bitmap */
else
max_value=(QuantumAny) PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception);
}
}
else
{
char
keyword[MagickPathExtent],
value[MagickPathExtent];
int
c;
register char
*p;
/*
PAM.
*/
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '#')
{
/*
Comment.
*/
c=PNMComment(image,&comment_info,exception);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
p=keyword;
do
{
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (isalnum(c));
*p='\0';
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endhdr") == 0)
break;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
p=value;
while (isalnum(c) || (c == '_'))
{
if ((size_t) (p-value) < (MagickPathExtent-1))
*p++=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
packet_size=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
(void) packet_size;
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"height") == 0)
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maxval") == 0)
max_value=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"TUPLTYPE") == 0)
{
if (LocaleCompare(value,"BLACKANDWHITE") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"BLACKANDWHITE_ALPHA") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"GRAYSCALE") == 0)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"GRAYSCALE_ALPHA") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"RGB_ALPHA") == 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"CMYK") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
}
if (LocaleCompare(value,"CMYK_ALPHA") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
}
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"width") == 0)
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
}
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if ((max_value == 0) || (max_value > 4294967295UL))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (depth=1; GetQuantumRange(depth) < max_value; depth++) ;
image->depth=depth;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((MagickSizeType) (image->columns*image->rows/8) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
comment_info.comment=DestroyString(comment_info.comment); \
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) ResetImagePixels(image,exception);
/*
Convert PNM pixels to runextent-encoded MIFF packets.
*/
row=0;
y=0;
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
/*
Convert PBM image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGray(image,PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,2,exception) ==
0 ? QuantumRange : 0,q);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->type=BilevelType;
break;
}
case '2':
{
Quantum
intensity;
/*
Convert PGM image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
intensity=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelGray(image,intensity,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
image->type=GrayscaleType;
break;
}
case '3':
{
/*
Convert PNM image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Quantum
pixel;
pixel=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleAnyToQuantum(PNMInteger(image,&comment_info,10,
exception),max_value);
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
/*
Convert PBM raw image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
size_t
length;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (length != extent)
break;
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
case '5':
{
/*
Convert PGM raw image to pixel packets.
*/
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
extent=(image->depth <= 8 ? 1 : image->depth <= 16 ? 2 : 4)*
image->columns;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const unsigned char
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
}
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
case '6':
{
/*
Convert PNM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
extent=3*(image->depth <= 8 ? 1 : image->depth <= 16 ? 2 : 4)*
image->columns;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const unsigned char
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
}
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
size_t
channels;
/*
Convert PAM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
channels=1;
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
channels=4;
break;
}
default:
{
channels=3;
break;
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
channels++;
extent=channels*(image->depth <= 8 ? 1 : image->depth <= 16 ? 2 : 4)*
image->columns;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const unsigned char
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
if (image->depth != 1)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
else
SetPixelAlpha(image,QuantumRange-
ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGray(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else if (image->depth <= 16)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,max_value),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,
max_value),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
}
}
}
}
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
/*
Convert PFM raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (format == 'f')
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
image->endian=quantum_scale < 0.0 ? LSBEndian : MSBEndian;
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,32);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPNMException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
SetQuantumScale(quantum_info,(double) QuantumRange*fabs(quantum_scale));
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
const unsigned char
*pixels;
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
offset;
size_t
length;
pixels=(unsigned char *) ReadBlobStream(image,extent,
GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info),&count);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
row,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
offset=row++;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,(ssize_t) (image->rows-offset-1),
image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (length != extent)
break;
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
break;
}
default:
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (*comment_info.comment != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment_info.comment,exception);
comment_info.comment=DestroyString(comment_info.comment);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowPNMException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile","`%s'",image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((format == '1') || (format == '2') || (format == '3'))
do
{
/*
Skip to end of line.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,(unsigned char *) &format);
if (count != 1)
break;
if (format == 'P')
break;
} while (format != '\n');
count=ReadBlob(image,1,(unsigned char *) &format);
if ((count == 1) && (format == 'P'))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count == 1) && (format == 'P'));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5125
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5125/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d
|
Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
|
void PushMessagingServiceImpl::SubscribeEndWithError(
const RegisterCallback& callback,
content::mojom::PushRegistrationStatus status) {
SubscribeEnd(callback, std::string() /* subscription_id */,
std::vector<uint8_t>() /* p256dh */,
std::vector<uint8_t>() /* auth */, status);
}
|
void PushMessagingServiceImpl::SubscribeEndWithError(
const RegisterCallback& callback,
content::mojom::PushRegistrationStatus status) {
SubscribeEnd(callback, std::string() /* subscription_id */,
std::vector<uint8_t>() /* p256dh */,
std::vector<uint8_t>() /* auth */, status);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
String LocalFrameClientImpl::UserAgent() {
WebString override =
web_frame_->Client() ? web_frame_->Client()->UserAgentOverride() : "";
if (!override.IsEmpty())
return override;
if (user_agent_.IsEmpty())
user_agent_ = Platform::Current()->UserAgent();
return user_agent_;
}
|
String LocalFrameClientImpl::UserAgent() {
WebString override =
web_frame_->Client() ? web_frame_->Client()->UserAgentOverride() : "";
if (!override.IsEmpty())
return override;
if (user_agent_.IsEmpty())
user_agent_ = Platform::Current()->UserAgent();
return user_agent_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5850/
|
CWE-770
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/142cfc82b932bc211218fbd7bdda8c7ce83f19df
|
142cfc82b932bc211218fbd7bdda8c7ce83f19df
|
Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
|
server_file_request(struct httpd *env, struct client *clt, char *path,
struct stat *st)
{
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct media_type *media;
const char *errstr = NULL;
int fd = -1, ret, code = 500;
if ((ret = server_file_method(clt)) != 0) {
code = ret;
goto abort;
}
if ((ret = server_file_modified_since(clt->clt_descreq, st)) != -1)
return (ret);
/* Now open the file, should be readable or we have another problem */
if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
goto abort;
media = media_find_config(env, srv_conf, path);
ret = server_response_http(clt, 200, media, st->st_size,
MINIMUM(time(NULL), st->st_mtim.tv_sec));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
goto fail;
case 0:
/* Connection is already finished */
close(fd);
goto done;
default:
break;
}
clt->clt_fd = fd;
if (clt->clt_srvbev != NULL)
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_srvbev);
clt->clt_srvbev_throttled = 0;
clt->clt_srvbev = bufferevent_new(clt->clt_fd, server_read,
server_write, server_file_error, clt);
if (clt->clt_srvbev == NULL) {
errstr = "failed to allocate file buffer event";
goto fail;
}
/* Adjust read watermark to the socket output buffer size */
bufferevent_setwatermark(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ, 0,
clt->clt_sndbufsiz);
bufferevent_settimeout(clt->clt_srvbev,
srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec, srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec);
bufferevent_enable(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ);
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ);
done:
server_reset_http(clt);
return (0);
fail:
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_bev);
clt->clt_bev = NULL;
abort:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
if (errstr == NULL)
errstr = strerror(errno);
server_abort_http(clt, code, errstr);
return (-1);
}
|
server_file_request(struct httpd *env, struct client *clt, char *path,
struct stat *st)
{
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct media_type *media;
const char *errstr = NULL;
int fd = -1, ret, code = 500;
if ((ret = server_file_method(clt)) != 0) {
code = ret;
goto abort;
}
if ((ret = server_file_modified_since(clt->clt_descreq, st)) != -1)
return (ret);
/* Now open the file, should be readable or we have another problem */
if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
goto abort;
media = media_find_config(env, srv_conf, path);
ret = server_response_http(clt, 200, media, st->st_size,
MINIMUM(time(NULL), st->st_mtim.tv_sec));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
goto fail;
case 0:
/* Connection is already finished */
close(fd);
goto done;
default:
break;
}
clt->clt_fd = fd;
if (clt->clt_srvbev != NULL)
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_srvbev);
clt->clt_srvbev_throttled = 0;
clt->clt_srvbev = bufferevent_new(clt->clt_fd, server_read,
server_write, server_file_error, clt);
if (clt->clt_srvbev == NULL) {
errstr = "failed to allocate file buffer event";
goto fail;
}
/* Adjust read watermark to the socket output buffer size */
bufferevent_setwatermark(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ, 0,
clt->clt_sndbufsiz);
bufferevent_settimeout(clt->clt_srvbev,
srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec, srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec);
bufferevent_enable(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ);
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ);
done:
server_reset_http(clt);
return (0);
fail:
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_bev);
clt->clt_bev = NULL;
abort:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
if (errstr == NULL)
errstr = strerror(errno);
server_abort_http(clt, code, errstr);
return (-1);
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
LocationBarView* BrowserView::GetLocationBarView() const {
return toolbar_ ? toolbar_->location_bar() : NULL;
}
|
LocationBarView* BrowserView::GetLocationBarView() const {
return toolbar_ ? toolbar_->location_bar() : NULL;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12588/
|
CWE-134
|
https://github.com/rsyslog/rsyslog/commit/062d0c671a29f7c6f7dff4a2f1f35df375bbb30b
|
062d0c671a29f7c6f7dff4a2f1f35df375bbb30b
|
Merge pull request #1565 from Whissi/fix-format-security-issue-in-zmq-modules
Fix format security issue in zmq3 modules
|
static rsRetVal createSocket(instanceConf_t* info, void** sock) {
int rv;
sublist* sub;
*sock = zsocket_new(s_context, info->type);
if (!sock) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zsocket_new failed: %s, for type %d",
zmq_strerror(errno),info->type);
/* DK: invalid params seems right here */
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: socket of type %d created successfully\n", info->type)
/* Set options *before* the connect/bind. */
if (info->identity) zsocket_set_identity(*sock, info->identity);
if (info->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(*sock, info->sndBuf);
if (info->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_rcvbuf(*sock, info->rcvBuf);
if (info->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(*sock, info->linger);
if (info->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(*sock, info->backlog);
if (info->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(*sock, info->sndTimeout);
if (info->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(*sock, info->rcvTimeout);
if (info->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(*sock, info->maxMsgSize);
if (info->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(*sock, info->rate);
if (info->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(*sock, info->recoveryIVL);
if (info->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(*sock, info->multicastHops);
if (info->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(*sock, info->reconnectIVL);
if (info->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(*sock, info->reconnectIVLMax);
if (info->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(*sock, info->ipv4Only);
if (info->affinity > -1) zsocket_set_affinity(*sock, info->affinity);
if (info->sndHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_sndhwm(*sock, info->sndHWM);
if (info->rcvHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(*sock, info->rcvHWM);
/* Set subscriptions.*/
if (info->type == ZMQ_SUB) {
for(sub = info->subscriptions; sub!=NULL; sub=sub->next) {
zsocket_set_subscribe(*sock, sub->subscribe);
}
}
/* Do the bind/connect... */
if (info->action==ACTION_CONNECT) {
rv = zsocket_connect(*sock, "%s", info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_connect using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: connect for %s successful\n",info->description);
} else {
rv = zsocket_bind(*sock, "%s", info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_bind using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: bind for %s successful\n",info->description);
}
return RS_RET_OK;
}
|
static rsRetVal createSocket(instanceConf_t* info, void** sock) {
int rv;
sublist* sub;
*sock = zsocket_new(s_context, info->type);
if (!sock) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zsocket_new failed: %s, for type %d",
zmq_strerror(errno),info->type);
/* DK: invalid params seems right here */
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: socket of type %d created successfully\n", info->type)
/* Set options *before* the connect/bind. */
if (info->identity) zsocket_set_identity(*sock, info->identity);
if (info->sndBuf > -1) zsocket_set_sndbuf(*sock, info->sndBuf);
if (info->rcvBuf > -1) zsocket_set_rcvbuf(*sock, info->rcvBuf);
if (info->linger > -1) zsocket_set_linger(*sock, info->linger);
if (info->backlog > -1) zsocket_set_backlog(*sock, info->backlog);
if (info->sndTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_sndtimeo(*sock, info->sndTimeout);
if (info->rcvTimeout > -1) zsocket_set_rcvtimeo(*sock, info->rcvTimeout);
if (info->maxMsgSize > -1) zsocket_set_maxmsgsize(*sock, info->maxMsgSize);
if (info->rate > -1) zsocket_set_rate(*sock, info->rate);
if (info->recoveryIVL > -1) zsocket_set_recovery_ivl(*sock, info->recoveryIVL);
if (info->multicastHops > -1) zsocket_set_multicast_hops(*sock, info->multicastHops);
if (info->reconnectIVL > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl(*sock, info->reconnectIVL);
if (info->reconnectIVLMax > -1) zsocket_set_reconnect_ivl_max(*sock, info->reconnectIVLMax);
if (info->ipv4Only > -1) zsocket_set_ipv4only(*sock, info->ipv4Only);
if (info->affinity > -1) zsocket_set_affinity(*sock, info->affinity);
if (info->sndHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_sndhwm(*sock, info->sndHWM);
if (info->rcvHWM > -1 ) zsocket_set_rcvhwm(*sock, info->rcvHWM);
/* Set subscriptions.*/
if (info->type == ZMQ_SUB) {
for(sub = info->subscriptions; sub!=NULL; sub=sub->next) {
zsocket_set_subscribe(*sock, sub->subscribe);
}
}
/* Do the bind/connect... */
if (info->action==ACTION_CONNECT) {
rv = zsocket_connect(*sock, info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_connect using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: connect for %s successful\n",info->description);
} else {
rv = zsocket_bind(*sock, info->description);
if (rv == -1) {
errmsg.LogError(0,
RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS,
"zmq_bind using %s failed: %s",
info->description, zmq_strerror(errno));
return RS_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
}
DBGPRINTF("imzmq3: bind for %s successful\n",info->description);
}
return RS_RET_OK;
}
|
C
|
rsyslog
| 1 |
CVE-2019-5786
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5786/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba9748e78ec7e9c0d594e7edf7b2c07ea2a90449
|
ba9748e78ec7e9c0d594e7edf7b2c07ea2a90449
|
FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <adamk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251}
|
void FileReaderLoader::Start(scoped_refptr<BlobDataHandle> blob_data) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(!started_loading_) << "FileReaderLoader can only be used once";
started_loading_ = true;
#endif // DCHECK_IS_ON()
MojoCreateDataPipeOptions options;
options.struct_size = sizeof(MojoCreateDataPipeOptions);
options.flags = MOJO_CREATE_DATA_PIPE_FLAG_NONE;
options.element_num_bytes = 1;
options.capacity_num_bytes =
blink::BlobUtils::GetDataPipeCapacity(blob_data->size());
mojo::ScopedDataPipeProducerHandle producer_handle;
MojoResult rv = CreateDataPipe(&options, &producer_handle, &consumer_handle_);
if (rv != MOJO_RESULT_OK) {
Failed(FileErrorCode::kNotReadableErr, FailureType::kMojoPipeCreation);
return;
}
mojom::blink::BlobReaderClientPtr client_ptr;
binding_.Bind(MakeRequest(&client_ptr, task_runner_), task_runner_);
blob_data->ReadAll(std::move(producer_handle), std::move(client_ptr));
if (IsSyncLoad()) {
binding_.WaitForIncomingMethodCall();
if (received_on_complete_)
return;
if (!received_all_data_) {
Failed(FileErrorCode::kNotReadableErr,
FailureType::kSyncDataNotAllLoaded);
return;
}
binding_.WaitForIncomingMethodCall();
if (!received_on_complete_) {
Failed(FileErrorCode::kNotReadableErr,
FailureType::kSyncOnCompleteNotReceived);
}
}
}
|
void FileReaderLoader::Start(scoped_refptr<BlobDataHandle> blob_data) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(!started_loading_) << "FileReaderLoader can only be used once";
started_loading_ = true;
#endif // DCHECK_IS_ON()
MojoCreateDataPipeOptions options;
options.struct_size = sizeof(MojoCreateDataPipeOptions);
options.flags = MOJO_CREATE_DATA_PIPE_FLAG_NONE;
options.element_num_bytes = 1;
options.capacity_num_bytes =
blink::BlobUtils::GetDataPipeCapacity(blob_data->size());
mojo::ScopedDataPipeProducerHandle producer_handle;
MojoResult rv = CreateDataPipe(&options, &producer_handle, &consumer_handle_);
if (rv != MOJO_RESULT_OK) {
Failed(FileErrorCode::kNotReadableErr, FailureType::kMojoPipeCreation);
return;
}
mojom::blink::BlobReaderClientPtr client_ptr;
binding_.Bind(MakeRequest(&client_ptr, task_runner_), task_runner_);
blob_data->ReadAll(std::move(producer_handle), std::move(client_ptr));
if (IsSyncLoad()) {
binding_.WaitForIncomingMethodCall();
if (received_on_complete_)
return;
if (!received_all_data_) {
Failed(FileErrorCode::kNotReadableErr,
FailureType::kSyncDataNotAllLoaded);
return;
}
binding_.WaitForIncomingMethodCall();
if (!received_on_complete_) {
Failed(FileErrorCode::kNotReadableErr,
FailureType::kSyncOnCompleteNotReceived);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1174
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1174/
|
CWE-362
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/commit/?id=5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
|
5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
| null |
bool is_device_path(const char *path) {
/* Returns true on paths that refer to a device, either in
* sysfs or in /dev */
return
path_startswith(path, "/dev/") ||
path_startswith(path, "/sys/");
}
|
bool is_device_path(const char *path) {
/* Returns true on paths that refer to a device, either in
* sysfs or in /dev */
return
path_startswith(path, "/dev/") ||
path_startswith(path, "/sys/");
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static struct crypto_alg *crypto_user_skcipher_alg(const char *name, u32 type,
u32 mask)
{
int err;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
type = crypto_skcipher_type(type);
mask = crypto_skcipher_mask(mask);
for (;;) {
alg = crypto_lookup_skcipher(name, type, mask);
if (!IS_ERR(alg))
return alg;
err = PTR_ERR(alg);
if (err != -EAGAIN)
break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
static struct crypto_alg *crypto_user_skcipher_alg(const char *name, u32 type,
u32 mask)
{
int err;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
type = crypto_skcipher_type(type);
mask = crypto_skcipher_mask(mask);
for (;;) {
alg = crypto_lookup_skcipher(name, type, mask);
if (!IS_ERR(alg))
return alg;
err = PTR_ERR(alg);
if (err != -EAGAIN)
break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb
|
d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb
|
Fix eliding, truncation issues with hostnames in security information dialog for windows, linux platforms resp.
BUG=48597
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2958002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@51972 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PageInfoWindowGtk::PageInfoWindowGtk(gfx::NativeWindow parent,
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const NavigationEntry::SSLStatus& ssl,
bool show_history)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(model_(profile, url, ssl,
show_history, this)),
url_(url),
contents_(NULL),
cert_id_(ssl.cert_id()) {
dialog_ = gtk_dialog_new_with_buttons(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_PAGEINFO_WINDOW_TITLE).c_str(),
parent,
GTK_DIALOG_NO_SEPARATOR,
NULL);
if (cert_id_) {
gtk_dialog_add_button(
GTK_DIALOG(dialog_),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_PAGEINFO_CERT_INFO_BUTTON).c_str(),
RESPONSE_SHOW_CERT_INFO);
}
gtk_dialog_add_button(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_), GTK_STOCK_CLOSE,
GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
gtk_box_set_spacing(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_)->vbox),
gtk_util::kContentAreaSpacing);
g_signal_connect(dialog_, "response", G_CALLBACK(OnDialogResponse), this);
g_signal_connect(dialog_, "destroy", G_CALLBACK(OnDestroy), this);
InitContents();
g_page_info_window_map[url.spec()] = this;
}
|
PageInfoWindowGtk::PageInfoWindowGtk(gfx::NativeWindow parent,
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const NavigationEntry::SSLStatus& ssl,
bool show_history)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(model_(profile, url, ssl,
show_history, this)),
url_(url),
contents_(NULL),
cert_id_(ssl.cert_id()) {
dialog_ = gtk_dialog_new_with_buttons(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_PAGEINFO_WINDOW_TITLE).c_str(),
parent,
GTK_DIALOG_NO_SEPARATOR,
NULL);
if (cert_id_) {
gtk_dialog_add_button(
GTK_DIALOG(dialog_),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_PAGEINFO_CERT_INFO_BUTTON).c_str(),
RESPONSE_SHOW_CERT_INFO);
}
gtk_dialog_add_button(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_), GTK_STOCK_CLOSE,
GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
gtk_box_set_spacing(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog_)->vbox),
gtk_util::kContentAreaSpacing);
g_signal_connect(dialog_, "response", G_CALLBACK(OnDialogResponse), this);
g_signal_connect(dialog_, "destroy", G_CALLBACK(OnDestroy), this);
InitContents();
g_page_info_window_map[url.spec()] = this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6376/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271
|
17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271
|
KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static u32 __apic_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, unsigned int offset)
{
u32 val = 0;
if (offset >= LAPIC_MMIO_LENGTH)
return 0;
switch (offset) {
case APIC_ID:
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
val = kvm_apic_id(apic);
else
val = kvm_apic_id(apic) << 24;
break;
case APIC_ARBPRI:
apic_debug("Access APIC ARBPRI register which is for P6\n");
break;
case APIC_TMCCT: /* Timer CCR */
if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
return 0;
val = apic_get_tmcct(apic);
break;
case APIC_PROCPRI:
apic_update_ppr(apic);
val = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, offset);
break;
case APIC_TASKPRI:
report_tpr_access(apic, false);
/* fall thru */
default:
val = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, offset);
break;
}
return val;
}
|
static u32 __apic_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, unsigned int offset)
{
u32 val = 0;
if (offset >= LAPIC_MMIO_LENGTH)
return 0;
switch (offset) {
case APIC_ID:
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
val = kvm_apic_id(apic);
else
val = kvm_apic_id(apic) << 24;
break;
case APIC_ARBPRI:
apic_debug("Access APIC ARBPRI register which is for P6\n");
break;
case APIC_TMCCT: /* Timer CCR */
if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
return 0;
val = apic_get_tmcct(apic);
break;
case APIC_PROCPRI:
apic_update_ppr(apic);
val = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, offset);
break;
case APIC_TASKPRI:
report_tpr_access(apic, false);
/* fall thru */
default:
val = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, offset);
break;
}
return val;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
RenderWidgetHostViewAuraWithViewHarnessTest()
: view_(nullptr) {}
|
RenderWidgetHostViewAuraWithViewHarnessTest()
: view_(nullptr) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestContentClient::SetActiveURL(const GURL& url) {
}
|
void TestContentClient::SetActiveURL(const GURL& url) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1670
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1670/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1af4fada49c4f3890f16daac31d38379a9d782b2
|
1af4fada49c4f3890f16daac31d38379a9d782b2
|
Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
|
RenderViewHostImpl* PrepareToDuplicateHosts(Shell* shell,
int* target_routing_id) {
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
NavigateToURL(shell, foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell->web_contents()->GetTitle());
ShellAddedObserver shell2_observer;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(
shell->web_contents(), "window.open(document.URL + '#2');"));
Shell* shell2 = shell2_observer.GetShell();
EXPECT_EQ(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID());
*target_routing_id =
shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID();
EXPECT_NE(*target_routing_id,
shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID());
GURL extension_url("https://bar.com/simple_page.html");
WebContentsImpl* wc = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell->web_contents());
wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->navigator()->RequestOpenURL(
wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->current_frame_host(), extension_url, nullptr,
Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, false, true);
RenderFrameHostImpl* next_rfh;
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled())
next_rfh = wc->GetRenderManagerForTesting()->speculative_frame_host();
else
next_rfh = wc->GetRenderManagerForTesting()->pending_frame_host();
EXPECT_TRUE(next_rfh);
EXPECT_NE(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID(),
next_rfh->GetProcess()->GetID());
return next_rfh->render_view_host();
}
|
RenderViewHostImpl* PrepareToDuplicateHosts(Shell* shell,
int* target_routing_id) {
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
NavigateToURL(shell, foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell->web_contents()->GetTitle());
ShellAddedObserver shell2_observer;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(
shell->web_contents(), "window.open(document.URL + '#2');"));
Shell* shell2 = shell2_observer.GetShell();
EXPECT_EQ(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetProcess()->GetID());
*target_routing_id =
shell2->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID();
EXPECT_NE(*target_routing_id,
shell->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetRoutingID());
GURL extension_url("https://bar.com/simple_page.html");
WebContentsImpl* wc = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(shell->web_contents());
wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->navigator()->RequestOpenURL(
wc->GetFrameTree()->root()->current_frame_host(), extension_url, nullptr,
Referrer(), CURRENT_TAB, false, true);
RenderFrameHostImpl* next_rfh;
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled())
next_rfh = wc->GetRenderManagerForTesting()->speculative_frame_host();
else
next_rfh = wc->GetRenderManagerForTesting()->pending_frame_host();
EXPECT_TRUE(next_rfh);
EXPECT_NE(shell->web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->GetID(),
next_rfh->GetProcess()->GetID());
return next_rfh->render_view_host();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1790/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
|
b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
| null |
GBool FlateStream::isBinary(GBool last) {
return str->isBinary(gTrue);
}
|
GBool FlateStream::isBinary(GBool last) {
return str->isBinary(gTrue);
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5696/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
|
75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758
|
tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static inline void tcp_init_undo(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
tp->undo_marker = tp->snd_una;
/* Retransmission still in flight may cause DSACKs later. */
tp->undo_retrans = tp->retrans_out ? : -1;
}
|
static inline void tcp_init_undo(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
tp->undo_marker = tp->snd_una;
/* Retransmission still in flight may cause DSACKs later. */
tp->undo_retrans = tp->retrans_out ? : -1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1667
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1667/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
Result Perform(const ArgumentTuple& args) const {
callback_.Run();
}
|
Result Perform(const ArgumentTuple& args) const {
callback_.Run();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8
|
kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static bool nested_guest_cr0_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
u64 fixed0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed0;
u64 fixed1 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1;
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST &&
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST))
fixed0 &= ~(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_PG);
return fixed_bits_valid(val, fixed0, fixed1);
}
|
static bool nested_guest_cr0_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
u64 fixed0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed0;
u64 fixed1 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1;
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST &&
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST))
fixed0 &= ~(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_PG);
return fixed_bits_valid(val, fixed0, fixed1);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8849
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8849/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.kde.org/smb4k.git/commit/?id=a90289b0962663bc1d247bbbd31b9e65b2ca000e
|
a90289b0962663bc1d247bbbd31b9e65b2ca000e
| null |
void Smb4KGlobal::clearSharesList()
{
mutex.lock();
while (!p->sharesList.isEmpty())
{
delete p->sharesList.takeFirst();
}
mutex.unlock();
}
|
void Smb4KGlobal::clearSharesList()
{
mutex.lock();
while (!p->sharesList.isEmpty())
{
delete p->sharesList.takeFirst();
}
mutex.unlock();
}
|
CPP
|
kde
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::EnsureRenderbufferBound() {
if (!state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid) {
state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid = true;
api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_RENDERBUFFER,
state_.bound_renderbuffer.get()
? state_.bound_renderbuffer->service_id()
: 0);
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::EnsureRenderbufferBound() {
if (!state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid) {
state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid = true;
api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_RENDERBUFFER,
state_.bound_renderbuffer.get()
? state_.bound_renderbuffer->service_id()
: 0);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1674
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1674/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
[Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
void CastStreamingNativeHandler::CallStopCallback(int stream_id) const {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context()->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Array> event_args = v8::Array::New(isolate, 1);
event_args->Set(0, v8::Integer::New(isolate, stream_id));
context()->DispatchEvent("cast.streaming.rtpStream.onStopped", event_args);
}
|
void CastStreamingNativeHandler::CallStopCallback(int stream_id) const {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context()->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Array> event_args = v8::Array::New(isolate, 1);
event_args->Set(0, v8::Integer::New(isolate, stream_id));
context()->DispatchEvent("cast.streaming.rtpStream.onStopped", event_args);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
TBR=akalin@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void UpdateBookmarkSpecifics(const std::string& singleton_tag,
const std::string& url,
const std::string& favicon_bytes,
MutableEntry* local_entry) {
if (singleton_tag == "google_chrome")
return;
sync_pb::EntitySpecifics pb;
sync_pb::BookmarkSpecifics* bookmark = pb.MutableExtension(sync_pb::bookmark);
if (!url.empty())
bookmark->set_url(url);
if (!favicon_bytes.empty())
bookmark->set_favicon(favicon_bytes);
local_entry->Put(SERVER_SPECIFICS, pb);
}
|
void UpdateBookmarkSpecifics(const std::string& singleton_tag,
const std::string& url,
const std::string& favicon_bytes,
MutableEntry* local_entry) {
if (singleton_tag == "google_chrome")
return;
sync_pb::EntitySpecifics pb;
sync_pb::BookmarkSpecifics* bookmark = pb.MutableExtension(sync_pb::bookmark);
if (!url.empty())
bookmark->set_url(url);
if (!favicon_bytes.empty())
bookmark->set_favicon(favicon_bytes);
local_entry->Put(SERVER_SPECIFICS, pb);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static void ipa_device_close(wmfAPI * API)
{
wmf_magick_t
*ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData(API);
DestroyDrawingWand(ddata->draw_wand);
DestroyDrawInfo(ddata->draw_info);
RelinquishMagickMemory(WMF_MAGICK_GetFontData(API)->ps_name);
}
|
static void ipa_device_close(wmfAPI * API)
{
wmf_magick_t
*ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData(API);
DestroyDrawingWand(ddata->draw_wand);
DestroyDrawInfo(ddata->draw_info);
RelinquishMagickMemory(WMF_MAGICK_GetFontData(API)->ps_name);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1215/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bceda4948deeaed0a5a99305d0d488eb952f64f
|
2bceda4948deeaed0a5a99305d0d488eb952f64f
|
Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
|
DEFINE_TRACE(BluetoothRemoteGATTService) {
visitor->trace(m_device);
}
|
DEFINE_TRACE(BluetoothRemoteGATTService) {
visitor->trace(m_device);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
void reset_new_content_rendering_timeout_fired() {
new_content_rendering_timeout_fired_ = false;
}
|
void reset_new_content_rendering_timeout_fired() {
new_content_rendering_timeout_fired_ = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1647/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e5787005a9004d7be289cc649c6ae4f3051996cd
|
e5787005a9004d7be289cc649c6ae4f3051996cd
|
Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMouseEventAck(
const MouseEventWithLatencyInfo& mouse_event,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
latency_tracker_.OnInputEventAck(mouse_event.event, &mouse_event.latency);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMouseEventAck(
const MouseEventWithLatencyInfo& mouse_event,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
latency_tracker_.OnInputEventAck(mouse_event.event, &mouse_event.latency);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void unsignedShortAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "unsignedShortAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned, cppValue, toUInt16(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setUnsignedShortAttribute(cppValue);
}
|
static void unsignedShortAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "unsignedShortAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned, cppValue, toUInt16(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setUnsignedShortAttribute(cppValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
xsltSwapTopCompMatch(xsltCompMatchPtr comp) {
int i;
int j = comp->nbStep - 1;
if (j > 0) {
register xmlChar *tmp;
register xsltOp op;
register xmlXPathCompExprPtr expr;
register int t;
i = j - 1;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value;
comp->steps[i].value = comp->steps[j].value;
comp->steps[j].value = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value2;
comp->steps[i].value2 = comp->steps[j].value2;
comp->steps[j].value2 = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value3;
comp->steps[i].value3 = comp->steps[j].value3;
comp->steps[j].value3 = tmp;
op = comp->steps[i].op;
comp->steps[i].op = comp->steps[j].op;
comp->steps[j].op = op;
expr = comp->steps[i].comp;
comp->steps[i].comp = comp->steps[j].comp;
comp->steps[j].comp = expr;
t = comp->steps[i].previousExtra;
comp->steps[i].previousExtra = comp->steps[j].previousExtra;
comp->steps[j].previousExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].indexExtra;
comp->steps[i].indexExtra = comp->steps[j].indexExtra;
comp->steps[j].indexExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].lenExtra;
comp->steps[i].lenExtra = comp->steps[j].lenExtra;
comp->steps[j].lenExtra = t;
}
}
|
xsltSwapTopCompMatch(xsltCompMatchPtr comp) {
int i;
int j = comp->nbStep - 1;
if (j > 0) {
register xmlChar *tmp;
register xsltOp op;
register xmlXPathCompExprPtr expr;
register int t;
i = j - 1;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value;
comp->steps[i].value = comp->steps[j].value;
comp->steps[j].value = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value2;
comp->steps[i].value2 = comp->steps[j].value2;
comp->steps[j].value2 = tmp;
tmp = comp->steps[i].value3;
comp->steps[i].value3 = comp->steps[j].value3;
comp->steps[j].value3 = tmp;
op = comp->steps[i].op;
comp->steps[i].op = comp->steps[j].op;
comp->steps[j].op = op;
expr = comp->steps[i].comp;
comp->steps[i].comp = comp->steps[j].comp;
comp->steps[j].comp = expr;
t = comp->steps[i].previousExtra;
comp->steps[i].previousExtra = comp->steps[j].previousExtra;
comp->steps[j].previousExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].indexExtra;
comp->steps[i].indexExtra = comp->steps[j].indexExtra;
comp->steps[j].indexExtra = t;
t = comp->steps[i].lenExtra;
comp->steps[i].lenExtra = comp->steps[j].lenExtra;
comp->steps[j].lenExtra = t;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
SProcXvStopVideo(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvStopVideoReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvStopVideoReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->port);
swapl(&stuff->drawable);
return XvProcVector[xv_StopVideo] (client);
}
|
SProcXvStopVideo(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvStopVideoReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvStopVideoReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->port);
swapl(&stuff->drawable);
return XvProcVector[xv_StopVideo] (client);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0376/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/56a7c5bc15e0447203a491c1ee37de9939ad1dcd
|
56a7c5bc15e0447203a491c1ee37de9939ad1dcd
|
TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circuit_t *circ)
{
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
return circ->streams_blocked_on_n_chan;
} else {
return circ->streams_blocked_on_p_chan;
}
}
|
circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circuit_t *circ)
{
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
return circ->streams_blocked_on_n_chan;
} else {
return circ->streams_blocked_on_p_chan;
}
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6888/
|
CWE-190
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=47882fa4975bf0b58dd74474329fdd7154e8f04c
|
47882fa4975bf0b58dd74474329fdd7154e8f04c
| null |
void net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(struct NetTxPkt *pkt, bool tso_enable,
bool csum_enable, uint32_t gso_size)
{
struct tcp_hdr l4hdr;
assert(pkt);
/* csum has to be enabled if tso is. */
assert(csum_enable || !tso_enable);
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_type = net_tx_pkt_get_gso_type(pkt, tso_enable);
switch (pkt->virt_hdr.gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE:
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = 0;
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = 0;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = gso_size;
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = pkt->hdr_len + sizeof(struct udp_header);
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
iov_to_buf(&pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG], pkt->payload_frags,
0, &l4hdr, sizeof(l4hdr));
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = pkt->hdr_len + l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t);
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = gso_size;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (csum_enable) {
switch (pkt->l4proto) {
case IP_PROTO_TCP:
pkt->virt_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_start = pkt->hdr_len;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_offset = offsetof(struct tcp_hdr, th_sum);
break;
case IP_PROTO_UDP:
pkt->virt_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_start = pkt->hdr_len;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_offset = offsetof(struct udp_hdr, uh_sum);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
|
void net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(struct NetTxPkt *pkt, bool tso_enable,
bool csum_enable, uint32_t gso_size)
{
struct tcp_hdr l4hdr;
assert(pkt);
/* csum has to be enabled if tso is. */
assert(csum_enable || !tso_enable);
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_type = net_tx_pkt_get_gso_type(pkt, tso_enable);
switch (pkt->virt_hdr.gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE:
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = 0;
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = 0;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = gso_size;
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = pkt->hdr_len + sizeof(struct udp_header);
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
iov_to_buf(&pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG], pkt->payload_frags,
0, &l4hdr, sizeof(l4hdr));
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = pkt->hdr_len + l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t);
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = gso_size;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (csum_enable) {
switch (pkt->l4proto) {
case IP_PROTO_TCP:
pkt->virt_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_start = pkt->hdr_len;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_offset = offsetof(struct tcp_hdr, th_sum);
break;
case IP_PROTO_UDP:
pkt->virt_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_start = pkt->hdr_len;
pkt->virt_hdr.csum_offset = offsetof(struct udp_hdr, uh_sum);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5
|
a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5
|
2009-05-04 Kai Brüning <kai@granus.net>
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24883
24883: Bad success test in parseXMLDocumentFragment in XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp
Fixed test whether all the chunk has been processed to correctly count utf8 bytes.
Test: fast/innerHTML/innerHTML-nbsp.xhtml
* dom/XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp:
(WebCore::parseXMLDocumentFragment):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@43195 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void appendCharactersCallback(const xmlChar* s, int len)
{
PendingCharactersCallback* callback = new PendingCharactersCallback;
callback->s = xmlStrndup(s, len);
callback->len = len;
m_callbacks.append(callback);
}
|
void appendCharactersCallback(const xmlChar* s, int len)
{
PendingCharactersCallback* callback = new PendingCharactersCallback;
callback->s = xmlStrndup(s, len);
callback->len = len;
m_callbacks.append(callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13093/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff
|
afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff
|
xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
xfs_reclaim_inodes(
xfs_mount_t *mp,
int mode)
{
int nr_to_scan = INT_MAX;
return xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag(mp, mode, &nr_to_scan);
}
|
xfs_reclaim_inodes(
xfs_mount_t *mp,
int mode)
{
int nr_to_scan = INT_MAX;
return xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag(mp, mode, &nr_to_scan);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15423
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
bool RenderThreadImpl::IsDistanceFieldTextEnabled() {
return is_distance_field_text_enabled_;
}
|
bool RenderThreadImpl::IsDistanceFieldTextEnabled() {
return is_distance_field_text_enabled_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int netlink_has_listeners(struct sock *sk, unsigned int group)
{
int res = 0;
struct listeners *listeners;
BUG_ON(!netlink_is_kernel(sk));
rcu_read_lock();
listeners = rcu_dereference(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].listeners);
if (listeners && group - 1 < nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].groups)
res = test_bit(group - 1, listeners->masks);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
|
int netlink_has_listeners(struct sock *sk, unsigned int group)
{
int res = 0;
struct listeners *listeners;
BUG_ON(!netlink_is_kernel(sk));
rcu_read_lock();
listeners = rcu_dereference(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].listeners);
if (listeners && group - 1 < nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].groups)
res = test_bit(group - 1, listeners->masks);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965
|
Move variations prefs into the variations component
These prefs are used by variations code that is targeted for componentization.
BUG=382865
TBR=thakis
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1265423003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#343661}
|
void RecordVariationSeedEmptyHistogram(VariationSeedEmptyState state) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Variations.SeedEmpty", state,
VARIATIONS_SEED_EMPTY_ENUM_SIZE);
}
|
void RecordVariationSeedEmptyHistogram(VariationSeedEmptyState state) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Variations.SeedEmpty", state,
VARIATIONS_SEED_EMPTY_ENUM_SIZE);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3916/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/media/+/8e7a2b4d13bff03973dbad2bfb88a04296140433
|
8e7a2b4d13bff03973dbad2bfb88a04296140433
|
Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
|
size_t calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(uint8_t type,
|
size_t calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(uint8_t type,
size_t data_count) {
if (type >= NUM_TYPES) return 0;
size_t data_bytes = data_count *
camera_metadata_type_size[type];
return data_bytes <= 4 ? 0 : ALIGN_TO(data_bytes, DATA_ALIGNMENT);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2015-8852
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8852/
| null |
https://github.com/varnish/Varnish-Cache/commit/29870c8fe95e4e8a672f6f28c5fbe692bea09e9c
|
29870c8fe95e4e8a672f6f28c5fbe692bea09e9c
|
Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
|
http_ProtoVer(struct http *hp)
{
if (!strcasecmp(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_PROTO].b, "HTTP/1.0"))
hp->protover = 10;
else if (!strcasecmp(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_PROTO].b, "HTTP/1.1"))
hp->protover = 11;
else
hp->protover = 9;
}
|
http_ProtoVer(struct http *hp)
{
if (!strcasecmp(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_PROTO].b, "HTTP/1.0"))
hp->protover = 10;
else if (!strcasecmp(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_PROTO].b, "HTTP/1.1"))
hp->protover = 11;
else
hp->protover = 9;
}
|
C
|
Varnish-Cache
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
|
SpoolssOpenPrinterEx_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
char *name;
/* Parse packet */
dcv->private_data=NULL;
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer_cb(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
dissect_ndr_wchar_cvstring, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
"Printer name", hf_printername, cb_wstr_postprocess,
GINT_TO_POINTER(CB_STR_COL_INFO | CB_STR_SAVE | 1));
name = (char *)dcv->private_data;
/* OpenPrinterEx() stores the key/value in se_data */
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
if(!dcv->se_data){
dcv->se_data = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_file_scope(),
"%s", name?name:"");
}
}
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
dissect_PRINTER_DATATYPE, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
"Printer datatype", -1);
offset = dissect_DEVMODE_CTR(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep);
name=(char *)dcv->se_data;
if (name) {
if (name[0] == '\\' && name[1] == '\\')
name += 2;
/* Determine if we are opening a printer or a print server */
if (strchr(name, '\\'))
offset = dissect_nt_access_mask(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_access_required,
&spoolss_printer_access_mask_info, NULL);
else
offset = dissect_nt_access_mask(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_access_required,
&spoolss_printserver_access_mask_info, NULL);
} else {
/* We can't decide what type of object being opened */
offset = dissect_nt_access_mask(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_access_required,
NULL, NULL);
}
offset = dissect_USER_LEVEL_CTR(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep);
return offset;
}
|
SpoolssOpenPrinterEx_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
char *name;
/* Parse packet */
dcv->private_data=NULL;
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer_cb(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
dissect_ndr_wchar_cvstring, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
"Printer name", hf_printername, cb_wstr_postprocess,
GINT_TO_POINTER(CB_STR_COL_INFO | CB_STR_SAVE | 1));
name = (char *)dcv->private_data;
/* OpenPrinterEx() stores the key/value in se_data */
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
if(!dcv->se_data){
dcv->se_data = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_file_scope(),
"%s", name?name:"");
}
}
offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
dissect_PRINTER_DATATYPE, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
"Printer datatype", -1);
offset = dissect_DEVMODE_CTR(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep);
name=(char *)dcv->se_data;
if (name) {
if (name[0] == '\\' && name[1] == '\\')
name += 2;
/* Determine if we are opening a printer or a print server */
if (strchr(name, '\\'))
offset = dissect_nt_access_mask(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_access_required,
&spoolss_printer_access_mask_info, NULL);
else
offset = dissect_nt_access_mask(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_access_required,
&spoolss_printserver_access_mask_info, NULL);
} else {
/* We can't decide what type of object being opened */
offset = dissect_nt_access_mask(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_access_required,
NULL, NULL);
}
offset = dissect_USER_LEVEL_CTR(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5767/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c395c6e5d7e8df37a21265ff76e48fe75ceb5ae6?w=1
|
c395c6e5d7e8df37a21265ff76e48fe75ceb5ae6?w=1
|
iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
|
void gdImageSetTile (gdImagePtr im, gdImagePtr tile)
{
int i;
im->tile = tile;
if (!im->trueColor && !im->tile->trueColor) {
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(tile); i++) {
int index;
index = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(im, gdImageRed(tile, i), gdImageGreen(tile, i), gdImageBlue(tile, i), gdImageAlpha(tile, i));
im->tileColorMap[i] = index;
}
}
}
|
void gdImageSetTile (gdImagePtr im, gdImagePtr tile)
{
int i;
im->tile = tile;
if (!im->trueColor && !im->tile->trueColor) {
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(tile); i++) {
int index;
index = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(im, gdImageRed(tile, i), gdImageGreen(tile, i), gdImageBlue(tile, i), gdImageAlpha(tile, i));
im->tileColorMap[i] = index;
}
}
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5011/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
void DevToolsUIBindings::CallClientFunction(const std::string& function_name,
const base::Value* arg1,
const base::Value* arg2,
const base::Value* arg3) {
if (!web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
return;
// If we're not exposing bindings, we shouldn't call functions either.
if (!frontend_host_)
return;
std::string javascript = function_name + "(";
if (arg1) {
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg1, &json);
javascript.append(json);
if (arg2) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg2, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
if (arg3) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg3, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
}
}
}
javascript.append(");");
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->ExecuteJavaScript(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(javascript));
}
|
void DevToolsUIBindings::CallClientFunction(const std::string& function_name,
const base::Value* arg1,
const base::Value* arg2,
const base::Value* arg3) {
if (!web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme))
return;
std::string javascript = function_name + "(";
if (arg1) {
std::string json;
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg1, &json);
javascript.append(json);
if (arg2) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg2, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
if (arg3) {
base::JSONWriter::Write(*arg3, &json);
javascript.append(", ").append(json);
}
}
}
javascript.append(");");
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->ExecuteJavaScript(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(javascript));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-6545
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6545/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f9432c5ec8b1e9a09b9b0e5569e3c73db8de432a
|
f9432c5ec8b1e9a09b9b0e5569e3c73db8de432a
|
Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static struct rfcomm_dev *__rfcomm_dev_get(int id)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev;
list_for_each_entry(dev, &rfcomm_dev_list, list)
if (dev->id == id)
return dev;
return NULL;
}
|
static struct rfcomm_dev *__rfcomm_dev_get(int id)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev;
list_for_each_entry(dev, &rfcomm_dev_list, list)
if (dev->id == id)
return dev;
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8645/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int tcp_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct tcp_seq_afinfo *afinfo = PDE_DATA(inode);
struct tcp_iter_state *s;
int err;
err = seq_open_net(inode, file, &afinfo->seq_ops,
sizeof(struct tcp_iter_state));
if (err < 0)
return err;
s = ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private;
s->family = afinfo->family;
s->last_pos = 0;
return 0;
}
|
int tcp_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct tcp_seq_afinfo *afinfo = PDE_DATA(inode);
struct tcp_iter_state *s;
int err;
err = seq_open_net(inode, file, &afinfo->seq_ops,
sizeof(struct tcp_iter_state));
if (err < 0)
return err;
s = ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private;
s->family = afinfo->family;
s->last_pos = 0;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void unforgeableVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->unforgeableVoidMethod();
}
|
static void unforgeableVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->unforgeableVoidMethod();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_API void zend_replace_error_handling(zend_error_handling_t error_handling, zend_class_entry *exception_class, zend_error_handling *current TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (current) {
zend_save_error_handling(current TSRMLS_CC);
if (error_handling != EH_NORMAL && EG(user_error_handler)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&EG(user_error_handler));
EG(user_error_handler) = NULL;
}
}
EG(error_handling) = error_handling;
EG(exception_class) = error_handling == EH_THROW ? exception_class : NULL;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API void zend_replace_error_handling(zend_error_handling_t error_handling, zend_class_entry *exception_class, zend_error_handling *current TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (current) {
zend_save_error_handling(current TSRMLS_CC);
if (error_handling != EH_NORMAL && EG(user_error_handler)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&EG(user_error_handler));
EG(user_error_handler) = NULL;
}
}
EG(error_handling) = error_handling;
EG(exception_class) = error_handling == EH_THROW ? exception_class : NULL;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLTextAreaElement::handleFocusEvent(Element*, FocusDirection)
{
if (Frame* frame = document().frame())
frame->spellChecker().didBeginEditing(this);
}
|
void HTMLTextAreaElement::handleFocusEvent(Element*, FocusDirection)
{
if (Frame* frame = document().frame())
frame->spellChecker().didBeginEditing(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-3702
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-3702/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
|
e853106b58d6b4b0467dbd6436c9bb1cfbd372cf
| null |
void Gfx::opFillStroke(Object args[], int numArgs) {
if (!state->isCurPt()) {
return;
}
if (state->isPath() && !contentIsHidden()) {
if (state->getFillColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
doPatternFill(gFalse);
} else {
out->fill(state);
}
if (state->getStrokeColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
doPatternStroke();
} else {
out->stroke(state);
}
}
doEndPath();
}
|
void Gfx::opFillStroke(Object args[], int numArgs) {
if (!state->isCurPt()) {
return;
}
if (state->isPath() && !contentIsHidden()) {
if (state->getFillColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
doPatternFill(gFalse);
} else {
out->fill(state);
}
if (state->getStrokeColorSpace()->getMode() == csPattern) {
doPatternStroke();
} else {
out->stroke(state);
}
}
doEndPath();
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7446
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7446/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
|
7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
|
unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static struct sock *unix_find_other(struct net *net,
struct sockaddr_un *sunname, int len,
int type, unsigned int hash, int *error)
{
struct sock *u;
struct path path;
int err = 0;
if (sunname->sun_path[0]) {
struct inode *inode;
err = kern_path(sunname->sun_path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (err)
goto fail;
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (err)
goto put_fail;
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
goto put_fail;
u = unix_find_socket_byinode(inode);
if (!u)
goto put_fail;
if (u->sk_type == type)
touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
err = -EPROTOTYPE;
if (u->sk_type != type) {
sock_put(u);
goto fail;
}
} else {
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
u = unix_find_socket_byname(net, sunname, len, type, hash);
if (u) {
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = unix_sk(u)->path.dentry;
if (dentry)
touch_atime(&unix_sk(u)->path);
} else
goto fail;
}
return u;
put_fail:
path_put(&path);
fail:
*error = err;
return NULL;
}
|
static struct sock *unix_find_other(struct net *net,
struct sockaddr_un *sunname, int len,
int type, unsigned int hash, int *error)
{
struct sock *u;
struct path path;
int err = 0;
if (sunname->sun_path[0]) {
struct inode *inode;
err = kern_path(sunname->sun_path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (err)
goto fail;
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (err)
goto put_fail;
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
goto put_fail;
u = unix_find_socket_byinode(inode);
if (!u)
goto put_fail;
if (u->sk_type == type)
touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
err = -EPROTOTYPE;
if (u->sk_type != type) {
sock_put(u);
goto fail;
}
} else {
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
u = unix_find_socket_byname(net, sunname, len, type, hash);
if (u) {
struct dentry *dentry;
dentry = unix_sk(u)->path.dentry;
if (dentry)
touch_atime(&unix_sk(u)->path);
} else
goto fail;
}
return u;
put_fail:
path_put(&path);
fail:
*error = err;
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14223
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14223/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/afc9c683ed9db01edb357bc8c19edad4282b3a97
|
afc9c683ed9db01edb357bc8c19edad4282b3a97
|
avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static int asf_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
ff_asf_guid g;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int i;
int64_t gsize;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
if (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_header))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rl64(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
memset(&asf->asfid2avid, -1, sizeof(asf->asfid2avid));
for (i = 0; i<128; i++)
asf->streams[i].stream_language_index = 128; // invalid stream index means no language info
for (;;) {
uint64_t gpos = avio_tell(pb);
int ret = 0;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
gsize = avio_rl64(pb);
print_guid(&g);
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_data_header)) {
asf->data_object_offset = avio_tell(pb);
/* If not streaming, gsize is not unlimited (how?),
* and there is enough space in the file.. */
if (!(asf->hdr.flags & 0x01) && gsize >= 100)
asf->data_object_size = gsize - 24;
else
asf->data_object_size = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
if (gsize < 24)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_file_header)) {
ret = asf_read_file_properties(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_stream_header)) {
ret = asf_read_stream_properties(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_comment_header)) {
asf_read_content_desc(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_language_guid)) {
asf_read_language_list(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_extended_content_header)) {
asf_read_ext_content_desc(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_metadata_header)) {
asf_read_metadata(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_metadata_library_header)) {
asf_read_metadata(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_header)) {
asf_read_ext_stream_properties(s, gsize);
continue;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_head1_guid)) {
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_skip(pb, 6);
continue;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_marker_header)) {
asf_read_marker(s, gsize);
} else if (avio_feof(pb)) {
return AVERROR_EOF;
} else {
if (!s->keylen) {
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_content_encryption)) {
unsigned int len;
AVPacket pkt;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"DRM protected stream detected, decoding will likely fail!\n");
len= avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Secret data:\n");
if ((ret = av_get_packet(pb, &pkt, len)) < 0)
return ret;
av_hex_dump_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, pkt.data, pkt.size);
av_packet_unref(&pkt);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_Protection_Type", -1, len, 32);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_Key_ID", -1, len, 32);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_License_URL", -1, len, 32);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_content_encryption)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Ext DRM protected stream detected, decoding will likely fail!\n");
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, "encryption", "ASF Extended Content Encryption", 0);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_digital_signature)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Digital signature detected!\n");
}
}
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (avio_tell(pb) != gpos + gsize)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"gpos mismatch our pos=%"PRIu64", end=%"PRId64"\n",
avio_tell(pb) - gpos, gsize);
avio_seek(pb, gpos + gsize, SEEK_SET);
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl64(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_EOF;
asf->data_offset = avio_tell(pb);
asf->packet_size_left = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
int stream_num = asf->asfid2avid[i];
if (stream_num >= 0) {
AVStream *st = s->streams[stream_num];
if (!st->codecpar->bit_rate)
st->codecpar->bit_rate = asf->stream_bitrates[i];
if (asf->dar[i].num > 0 && asf->dar[i].den > 0) {
av_reduce(&st->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&st->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
asf->dar[i].num, asf->dar[i].den, INT_MAX);
} else if ((asf->dar[0].num > 0) && (asf->dar[0].den > 0) &&
(st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO))
av_reduce(&st->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&st->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
asf->dar[0].num, asf->dar[0].den, INT_MAX);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "i=%d, st->codecpar->codec_type:%d, asf->dar %d:%d sar=%d:%d\n",
i, st->codecpar->codec_type, asf->dar[i].num, asf->dar[i].den,
st->sample_aspect_ratio.num, st->sample_aspect_ratio.den);
if (asf->streams[i].stream_language_index < 128) {
const char *rfc1766 = asf->stream_languages[asf->streams[i].stream_language_index];
if (rfc1766 && strlen(rfc1766) > 1) {
const char primary_tag[3] = { rfc1766[0], rfc1766[1], '\0' }; // ignore country code if any
const char *iso6392 = ff_convert_lang_to(primary_tag,
AV_LANG_ISO639_2_BIBL);
if (iso6392)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "language", iso6392, 0);
}
}
}
}
ff_metadata_conv(&s->metadata, NULL, ff_asf_metadata_conv);
return 0;
}
|
static int asf_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
ff_asf_guid g;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
int i;
int64_t gsize;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
if (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_header))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_rl64(pb);
avio_rl32(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
memset(&asf->asfid2avid, -1, sizeof(asf->asfid2avid));
for (i = 0; i<128; i++)
asf->streams[i].stream_language_index = 128; // invalid stream index means no language info
for (;;) {
uint64_t gpos = avio_tell(pb);
int ret = 0;
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
gsize = avio_rl64(pb);
print_guid(&g);
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_data_header)) {
asf->data_object_offset = avio_tell(pb);
/* If not streaming, gsize is not unlimited (how?),
* and there is enough space in the file.. */
if (!(asf->hdr.flags & 0x01) && gsize >= 100)
asf->data_object_size = gsize - 24;
else
asf->data_object_size = (uint64_t)-1;
break;
}
if (gsize < 24)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_file_header)) {
ret = asf_read_file_properties(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_stream_header)) {
ret = asf_read_stream_properties(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_comment_header)) {
asf_read_content_desc(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_language_guid)) {
asf_read_language_list(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_extended_content_header)) {
asf_read_ext_content_desc(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_metadata_header)) {
asf_read_metadata(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_metadata_library_header)) {
asf_read_metadata(s, gsize);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_stream_header)) {
asf_read_ext_stream_properties(s, gsize);
continue;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_head1_guid)) {
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_skip(pb, 6);
continue;
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_marker_header)) {
asf_read_marker(s, gsize);
} else if (avio_feof(pb)) {
return AVERROR_EOF;
} else {
if (!s->keylen) {
if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_content_encryption)) {
unsigned int len;
AVPacket pkt;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"DRM protected stream detected, decoding will likely fail!\n");
len= avio_rl32(pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Secret data:\n");
if ((ret = av_get_packet(pb, &pkt, len)) < 0)
return ret;
av_hex_dump_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, pkt.data, pkt.size);
av_packet_unref(&pkt);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_Protection_Type", -1, len, 32);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_Key_ID", -1, len, 32);
len= avio_rl32(pb);
get_tag(s, "ASF_License_URL", -1, len, 32);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_ext_content_encryption)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Ext DRM protected stream detected, decoding will likely fail!\n");
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, "encryption", "ASF Extended Content Encryption", 0);
} else if (!ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_digital_signature)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "Digital signature detected!\n");
}
}
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (avio_tell(pb) != gpos + gsize)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"gpos mismatch our pos=%"PRIu64", end=%"PRId64"\n",
avio_tell(pb) - gpos, gsize);
avio_seek(pb, gpos + gsize, SEEK_SET);
}
ff_get_guid(pb, &g);
avio_rl64(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb);
if (avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_EOF;
asf->data_offset = avio_tell(pb);
asf->packet_size_left = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
int stream_num = asf->asfid2avid[i];
if (stream_num >= 0) {
AVStream *st = s->streams[stream_num];
if (!st->codecpar->bit_rate)
st->codecpar->bit_rate = asf->stream_bitrates[i];
if (asf->dar[i].num > 0 && asf->dar[i].den > 0) {
av_reduce(&st->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&st->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
asf->dar[i].num, asf->dar[i].den, INT_MAX);
} else if ((asf->dar[0].num > 0) && (asf->dar[0].den > 0) &&
(st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO))
av_reduce(&st->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
&st->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
asf->dar[0].num, asf->dar[0].den, INT_MAX);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "i=%d, st->codecpar->codec_type:%d, asf->dar %d:%d sar=%d:%d\n",
i, st->codecpar->codec_type, asf->dar[i].num, asf->dar[i].den,
st->sample_aspect_ratio.num, st->sample_aspect_ratio.den);
if (asf->streams[i].stream_language_index < 128) {
const char *rfc1766 = asf->stream_languages[asf->streams[i].stream_language_index];
if (rfc1766 && strlen(rfc1766) > 1) {
const char primary_tag[3] = { rfc1766[0], rfc1766[1], '\0' }; // ignore country code if any
const char *iso6392 = ff_convert_lang_to(primary_tag,
AV_LANG_ISO639_2_BIBL);
if (iso6392)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "language", iso6392, 0);
}
}
}
}
ff_metadata_conv(&s->metadata, NULL, ff_asf_metadata_conv);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9739/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
|
c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
| null |
static void Ins_FLIPON( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.auto_flip = TRUE;
}
|
static void Ins_FLIPON( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.auto_flip = TRUE;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16163
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16163/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/4097828d7cc87589864fecf452f2cd46c5f37180
|
4097828d7cc87589864fecf452f2cd46c5f37180
|
fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
|
callout_name_table_cmp(st_callout_name_key* x, st_callout_name_key* y)
{
UChar *p, *q;
int c;
if (x->enc != y->enc) return 1;
if (x->type != y->type) return 1;
if ((x->end - x->s) != (y->end - y->s))
return 1;
p = x->s;
q = y->s;
while (p < x->end) {
c = (int )*p - (int )*q;
if (c != 0) return c;
p++; q++;
}
return 0;
}
|
callout_name_table_cmp(st_callout_name_key* x, st_callout_name_key* y)
{
UChar *p, *q;
int c;
if (x->enc != y->enc) return 1;
if (x->type != y->type) return 1;
if ((x->end - x->s) != (y->end - y->s))
return 1;
p = x->s;
q = y->s;
while (p < x->end) {
c = (int )*p - (int )*q;
if (c != 0) return c;
p++; q++;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8658
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8658/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c
|
ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c
|
brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
|
brcmf_configure_wpaie(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
const struct brcmf_vs_tlv *wpa_ie,
bool is_rsn_ie)
{
u32 auth = 0; /* d11 open authentication */
u16 count;
s32 err = 0;
s32 len;
u32 i;
u32 wsec;
u32 pval = 0;
u32 gval = 0;
u32 wpa_auth = 0;
u32 offset;
u8 *data;
u16 rsn_cap;
u32 wme_bss_disable;
u32 mfp;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
if (wpa_ie == NULL)
goto exit;
len = wpa_ie->len + TLV_HDR_LEN;
data = (u8 *)wpa_ie;
offset = TLV_HDR_LEN;
if (!is_rsn_ie)
offset += VS_IE_FIXED_HDR_LEN;
else
offset += WPA_IE_VERSION_LEN;
/* check for multicast cipher suite */
if (offset + WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN > len) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("no multicast cipher suite\n");
goto exit;
}
if (!brcmf_valid_wpa_oui(&data[offset], is_rsn_ie)) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("ivalid OUI\n");
goto exit;
}
offset += TLV_OUI_LEN;
/* pick up multicast cipher */
switch (data[offset]) {
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE:
gval = 0;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_40:
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_104:
gval = WEP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
gval = TKIP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_CCM:
gval = AES_ENABLED;
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("Invalid multi cast cipher info\n");
goto exit;
}
offset++;
/* walk thru unicast cipher list and pick up what we recognize */
count = data[offset] + (data[offset + 1] << 8);
offset += WPA_IE_SUITE_COUNT_LEN;
/* Check for unicast suite(s) */
if (offset + (WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN * count) > len) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("no unicast cipher suite\n");
goto exit;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (!brcmf_valid_wpa_oui(&data[offset], is_rsn_ie)) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("ivalid OUI\n");
goto exit;
}
offset += TLV_OUI_LEN;
switch (data[offset]) {
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE:
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_40:
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_104:
pval |= WEP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
pval |= TKIP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_CCM:
pval |= AES_ENABLED;
break;
default:
brcmf_err("Ivalid unicast security info\n");
}
offset++;
}
/* walk thru auth management suite list and pick up what we recognize */
count = data[offset] + (data[offset + 1] << 8);
offset += WPA_IE_SUITE_COUNT_LEN;
/* Check for auth key management suite(s) */
if (offset + (WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN * count) > len) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("no auth key mgmt suite\n");
goto exit;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (!brcmf_valid_wpa_oui(&data[offset], is_rsn_ie)) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("ivalid OUI\n");
goto exit;
}
offset += TLV_OUI_LEN;
switch (data[offset]) {
case RSN_AKM_NONE:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_NONE\n");
wpa_auth |= WPA_AUTH_NONE;
break;
case RSN_AKM_UNSPECIFIED:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_UNSPECIFIED\n");
is_rsn_ie ? (wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED) :
(wpa_auth |= WPA_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED);
break;
case RSN_AKM_PSK:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_PSK\n");
is_rsn_ie ? (wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_PSK) :
(wpa_auth |= WPA_AUTH_PSK);
break;
case RSN_AKM_SHA256_PSK:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_MFP_PSK\n");
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256;
break;
case RSN_AKM_SHA256_1X:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_MFP_1X\n");
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256;
break;
default:
brcmf_err("Ivalid key mgmt info\n");
}
offset++;
}
mfp = BRCMF_MFP_NONE;
if (is_rsn_ie) {
wme_bss_disable = 1;
if ((offset + RSN_CAP_LEN) <= len) {
rsn_cap = data[offset] + (data[offset + 1] << 8);
if (rsn_cap & RSN_CAP_PTK_REPLAY_CNTR_MASK)
wme_bss_disable = 0;
if (rsn_cap & RSN_CAP_MFPR_MASK) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "MFP Required\n");
mfp = BRCMF_MFP_REQUIRED;
/* Firmware only supports mfp required in
* combination with WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256 or
* WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256.
*/
if (!(wpa_auth & (WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256 |
WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
/* Firmware has requirement that WPA2_AUTH_PSK/
* WPA2_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED be set, if SHA256 OUI
* is to be included in the rsn ie.
*/
if (wpa_auth & WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256)
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_PSK;
else if (wpa_auth & WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256)
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED;
} else if (rsn_cap & RSN_CAP_MFPC_MASK) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "MFP Capable\n");
mfp = BRCMF_MFP_CAPABLE;
}
}
offset += RSN_CAP_LEN;
/* set wme_bss_disable to sync RSN Capabilities */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wme_bss_disable",
wme_bss_disable);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("wme_bss_disable error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* Skip PMKID cnt as it is know to be 0 for AP. */
offset += RSN_PMKID_COUNT_LEN;
/* See if there is BIP wpa suite left for MFP */
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MFP) &&
((offset + WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN) <= len)) {
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_data_set(ifp, "bip",
&data[offset],
WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("bip error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
}
/* FOR WPS , set SES_OW_ENABLED */
wsec = (pval | gval | SES_OW_ENABLED);
/* set auth */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "auth", auth);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("auth error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* set wsec */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wsec", wsec);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("wsec error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* Configure MFP, this needs to go after wsec otherwise the wsec command
* will overwrite the values set by MFP
*/
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MFP)) {
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "mfp", mfp);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("mfp error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
/* set upper-layer auth */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wpa_auth", wpa_auth);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("wpa_auth error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
exit:
return err;
}
|
brcmf_configure_wpaie(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
const struct brcmf_vs_tlv *wpa_ie,
bool is_rsn_ie)
{
u32 auth = 0; /* d11 open authentication */
u16 count;
s32 err = 0;
s32 len;
u32 i;
u32 wsec;
u32 pval = 0;
u32 gval = 0;
u32 wpa_auth = 0;
u32 offset;
u8 *data;
u16 rsn_cap;
u32 wme_bss_disable;
u32 mfp;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
if (wpa_ie == NULL)
goto exit;
len = wpa_ie->len + TLV_HDR_LEN;
data = (u8 *)wpa_ie;
offset = TLV_HDR_LEN;
if (!is_rsn_ie)
offset += VS_IE_FIXED_HDR_LEN;
else
offset += WPA_IE_VERSION_LEN;
/* check for multicast cipher suite */
if (offset + WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN > len) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("no multicast cipher suite\n");
goto exit;
}
if (!brcmf_valid_wpa_oui(&data[offset], is_rsn_ie)) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("ivalid OUI\n");
goto exit;
}
offset += TLV_OUI_LEN;
/* pick up multicast cipher */
switch (data[offset]) {
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE:
gval = 0;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_40:
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_104:
gval = WEP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
gval = TKIP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_CCM:
gval = AES_ENABLED;
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("Invalid multi cast cipher info\n");
goto exit;
}
offset++;
/* walk thru unicast cipher list and pick up what we recognize */
count = data[offset] + (data[offset + 1] << 8);
offset += WPA_IE_SUITE_COUNT_LEN;
/* Check for unicast suite(s) */
if (offset + (WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN * count) > len) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("no unicast cipher suite\n");
goto exit;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (!brcmf_valid_wpa_oui(&data[offset], is_rsn_ie)) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("ivalid OUI\n");
goto exit;
}
offset += TLV_OUI_LEN;
switch (data[offset]) {
case WPA_CIPHER_NONE:
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_40:
case WPA_CIPHER_WEP_104:
pval |= WEP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
pval |= TKIP_ENABLED;
break;
case WPA_CIPHER_AES_CCM:
pval |= AES_ENABLED;
break;
default:
brcmf_err("Ivalid unicast security info\n");
}
offset++;
}
/* walk thru auth management suite list and pick up what we recognize */
count = data[offset] + (data[offset + 1] << 8);
offset += WPA_IE_SUITE_COUNT_LEN;
/* Check for auth key management suite(s) */
if (offset + (WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN * count) > len) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("no auth key mgmt suite\n");
goto exit;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (!brcmf_valid_wpa_oui(&data[offset], is_rsn_ie)) {
err = -EINVAL;
brcmf_err("ivalid OUI\n");
goto exit;
}
offset += TLV_OUI_LEN;
switch (data[offset]) {
case RSN_AKM_NONE:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_NONE\n");
wpa_auth |= WPA_AUTH_NONE;
break;
case RSN_AKM_UNSPECIFIED:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_UNSPECIFIED\n");
is_rsn_ie ? (wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED) :
(wpa_auth |= WPA_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED);
break;
case RSN_AKM_PSK:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_PSK\n");
is_rsn_ie ? (wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_PSK) :
(wpa_auth |= WPA_AUTH_PSK);
break;
case RSN_AKM_SHA256_PSK:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_MFP_PSK\n");
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256;
break;
case RSN_AKM_SHA256_1X:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "RSN_AKM_MFP_1X\n");
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256;
break;
default:
brcmf_err("Ivalid key mgmt info\n");
}
offset++;
}
mfp = BRCMF_MFP_NONE;
if (is_rsn_ie) {
wme_bss_disable = 1;
if ((offset + RSN_CAP_LEN) <= len) {
rsn_cap = data[offset] + (data[offset + 1] << 8);
if (rsn_cap & RSN_CAP_PTK_REPLAY_CNTR_MASK)
wme_bss_disable = 0;
if (rsn_cap & RSN_CAP_MFPR_MASK) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "MFP Required\n");
mfp = BRCMF_MFP_REQUIRED;
/* Firmware only supports mfp required in
* combination with WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256 or
* WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256.
*/
if (!(wpa_auth & (WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256 |
WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
/* Firmware has requirement that WPA2_AUTH_PSK/
* WPA2_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED be set, if SHA256 OUI
* is to be included in the rsn ie.
*/
if (wpa_auth & WPA2_AUTH_PSK_SHA256)
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_PSK;
else if (wpa_auth & WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256)
wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_UNSPECIFIED;
} else if (rsn_cap & RSN_CAP_MFPC_MASK) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "MFP Capable\n");
mfp = BRCMF_MFP_CAPABLE;
}
}
offset += RSN_CAP_LEN;
/* set wme_bss_disable to sync RSN Capabilities */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wme_bss_disable",
wme_bss_disable);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("wme_bss_disable error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* Skip PMKID cnt as it is know to be 0 for AP. */
offset += RSN_PMKID_COUNT_LEN;
/* See if there is BIP wpa suite left for MFP */
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MFP) &&
((offset + WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN) <= len)) {
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_data_set(ifp, "bip",
&data[offset],
WPA_IE_MIN_OUI_LEN);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("bip error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
}
/* FOR WPS , set SES_OW_ENABLED */
wsec = (pval | gval | SES_OW_ENABLED);
/* set auth */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "auth", auth);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("auth error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* set wsec */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wsec", wsec);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("wsec error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* Configure MFP, this needs to go after wsec otherwise the wsec command
* will overwrite the values set by MFP
*/
if (brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MFP)) {
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "mfp", mfp);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("mfp error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
/* set upper-layer auth */
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wpa_auth", wpa_auth);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("wpa_auth error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
exit:
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2008-7316
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-7316/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/124d3b7041f9a0ca7c43a6293e1cae4576c32fd5
|
124d3b7041f9a0ca7c43a6293e1cae4576c32fd5
|
fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
int __filemap_fdatawrite_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t start,
loff_t end, int sync_mode)
{
int ret;
struct writeback_control wbc = {
.sync_mode = sync_mode,
.nr_to_write = mapping->nrpages * 2,
.range_start = start,
.range_end = end,
};
if (!mapping_cap_writeback_dirty(mapping))
return 0;
ret = do_writepages(mapping, &wbc);
return ret;
}
|
int __filemap_fdatawrite_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t start,
loff_t end, int sync_mode)
{
int ret;
struct writeback_control wbc = {
.sync_mode = sync_mode,
.nr_to_write = mapping->nrpages * 2,
.range_start = start,
.range_end = end,
};
if (!mapping_cap_writeback_dirty(mapping))
return 0;
ret = do_writepages(mapping, &wbc);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1705
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1705/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
gpu::ContextCreationAttribs GetCompositorContextAttributes(
const gfx::ColorSpace& display_color_space,
bool requires_alpha_channel) {
gpu::ContextCreationAttribs attributes;
attributes.alpha_size = -1;
attributes.stencil_size = 0;
attributes.depth_size = 0;
attributes.samples = 0;
attributes.sample_buffers = 0;
attributes.bind_generates_resource = false;
if (display_color_space == gfx::ColorSpace::CreateSRGB()) {
attributes.color_space = gpu::COLOR_SPACE_SRGB;
} else if (display_color_space == gfx::ColorSpace::CreateDisplayP3D65()) {
attributes.color_space = gpu::COLOR_SPACE_DISPLAY_P3;
} else {
attributes.color_space = gpu::COLOR_SPACE_UNSPECIFIED;
DLOG(ERROR) << "Android color space is neither sRGB nor P3, output color "
"will be incorrect.";
}
if (requires_alpha_channel) {
attributes.alpha_size = 8;
} else if (base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemoryMB() <= 512) {
attributes.alpha_size = 0;
attributes.red_size = 5;
attributes.green_size = 6;
attributes.blue_size = 5;
}
attributes.enable_swap_timestamps_if_supported = true;
return attributes;
}
|
gpu::ContextCreationAttribs GetCompositorContextAttributes(
const gfx::ColorSpace& display_color_space,
bool requires_alpha_channel) {
gpu::ContextCreationAttribs attributes;
attributes.alpha_size = -1;
attributes.stencil_size = 0;
attributes.depth_size = 0;
attributes.samples = 0;
attributes.sample_buffers = 0;
attributes.bind_generates_resource = false;
if (display_color_space == gfx::ColorSpace::CreateSRGB()) {
attributes.color_space = gpu::COLOR_SPACE_SRGB;
} else if (display_color_space == gfx::ColorSpace::CreateDisplayP3D65()) {
attributes.color_space = gpu::COLOR_SPACE_DISPLAY_P3;
} else {
attributes.color_space = gpu::COLOR_SPACE_UNSPECIFIED;
DLOG(ERROR) << "Android color space is neither sRGB nor P3, output color "
"will be incorrect.";
}
if (requires_alpha_channel) {
attributes.alpha_size = 8;
} else if (base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemoryMB() <= 512) {
attributes.alpha_size = 0;
attributes.red_size = 5;
attributes.green_size = 6;
attributes.blue_size = 5;
}
attributes.enable_swap_timestamps_if_supported = true;
return attributes;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
lseg_horizontal(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(lseg->p[0].y, lseg->p[1].y));
}
|
lseg_horizontal(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(lseg->p[0].y, lseg->p[1].y));
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnClearFocusedNode() {
if (webview())
webview()->clearFocusedNode();
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::OnClearFocusedNode() {
if (webview())
webview()->clearFocusedNode();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6057
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6057/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
void PlatformSensor::AddClient(Client* client) {
DCHECK(client);
clients_.AddObserver(client);
}
|
void PlatformSensor::AddClient(Client* client) {
DCHECK(client);
clients_.AddObserver(client);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1624
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1624/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7716418a27d561ee295a99f11fd3865580748de2
|
7716418a27d561ee295a99f11fd3865580748de2
|
Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
|
void BrotliSetCustomDictionary(
size_t size, const uint8_t* dict, BrotliState* s) {
s->custom_dict = dict;
s->custom_dict_size = (int) size;
}
|
void BrotliSetCustomDictionary(
size_t size, const uint8_t* dict, BrotliState* s) {
s->custom_dict = dict;
s->custom_dict_size = (int) size;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7533
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
|
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
static struct dentry *start_creating(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
pr_debug("debugfs: creating file '%s'\n",name);
if (IS_ERR(parent))
return parent;
error = simple_pin_fs(&debug_fs_type, &debugfs_mount,
&debugfs_mount_count);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
/* If the parent is not specified, we create it in the root.
* We need the root dentry to do this, which is in the super
* block. A pointer to that is in the struct vfsmount that we
* have around.
*/
if (!parent)
parent = debugfs_mount->mnt_root;
inode_lock(d_inode(parent));
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name));
if (!IS_ERR(dentry) && d_really_is_positive(dentry)) {
dput(dentry);
dentry = ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
}
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
simple_release_fs(&debugfs_mount, &debugfs_mount_count);
}
return dentry;
}
|
static struct dentry *start_creating(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
pr_debug("debugfs: creating file '%s'\n",name);
if (IS_ERR(parent))
return parent;
error = simple_pin_fs(&debug_fs_type, &debugfs_mount,
&debugfs_mount_count);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
/* If the parent is not specified, we create it in the root.
* We need the root dentry to do this, which is in the super
* block. A pointer to that is in the struct vfsmount that we
* have around.
*/
if (!parent)
parent = debugfs_mount->mnt_root;
inode_lock(d_inode(parent));
dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name));
if (!IS_ERR(dentry) && d_really_is_positive(dentry)) {
dput(dentry);
dentry = ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
}
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
simple_release_fs(&debugfs_mount, &debugfs_mount_count);
}
return dentry;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
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Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
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Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
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Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.