CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2015-1339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1339/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2c5816b4beccc8ba709144539f6fdd764f8fa49c
|
2c5816b4beccc8ba709144539f6fdd764f8fa49c
|
cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
|
static int cuse_channel_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud;
struct cuse_conn *cc;
int rc;
/* set up cuse_conn */
cc = kzalloc(sizeof(*cc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cc)
return -ENOMEM;
fuse_conn_init(&cc->fc);
fud = fuse_dev_alloc(&cc->fc);
if (!fud) {
kfree(cc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cc->list);
cc->fc.release = cuse_fc_release;
cc->fc.initialized = 1;
rc = cuse_send_init(cc);
if (rc) {
fuse_dev_free(fud);
return rc;
}
file->private_data = fud;
return 0;
}
|
static int cuse_channel_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_dev *fud;
struct cuse_conn *cc;
int rc;
/* set up cuse_conn */
cc = kzalloc(sizeof(*cc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cc)
return -ENOMEM;
fuse_conn_init(&cc->fc);
fud = fuse_dev_alloc(&cc->fc);
if (!fud) {
kfree(cc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cc->list);
cc->fc.release = cuse_fc_release;
cc->fc.initialized = 1;
rc = cuse_send_init(cc);
if (rc) {
fuse_dev_free(fud);
return rc;
}
file->private_data = fud;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5104/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a
|
Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
|
void WebContentsImpl::GetManifest(const GetManifestCallback& callback) {
manifest_manager_host_->GetManifest(callback);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::GetManifest(const GetManifestCallback& callback) {
manifest_manager_host_->GetManifest(callback);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeSwapBuffersToRenderer() {
if (!is_threaded_compositing_enabled_)
Send(new ViewMsg_SwapBuffers_ACK(routing_id_));
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeSwapBuffersToRenderer() {
if (!is_threaded_compositing_enabled_)
Send(new ViewMsg_SwapBuffers_ACK(routing_id_));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static int crypto_grab_nivcipher(struct crypto_skcipher_spawn *spawn,
const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
type = crypto_skcipher_type(type);
mask = crypto_skcipher_mask(mask)| CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(name, type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
err = crypto_init_spawn(&spawn->base, alg, spawn->base.inst, mask);
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
|
static int crypto_grab_nivcipher(struct crypto_skcipher_spawn *spawn,
const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
int err;
type = crypto_skcipher_type(type);
mask = crypto_skcipher_mask(mask)| CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(name, type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
err = crypto_init_spawn(&spawn->base, alg, spawn->base.inst, mask);
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static struct packet *packet_alloc(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len)
{
struct packet *p = osi_calloc(sizeof(*p));
uint8_t *buf = osi_malloc(len);
if (p && buf) {
p->data = buf;
p->len = len;
memcpy(p->data, data, len);
return p;
} else if (p)
osi_free(p);
else if (buf)
osi_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
|
static struct packet *packet_alloc(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len)
{
struct packet *p = osi_calloc(sizeof(*p));
uint8_t *buf = osi_malloc(len);
if (p && buf) {
p->data = buf;
p->len = len;
memcpy(p->data, data, len);
return p;
} else if (p)
osi_free(p);
else if (buf)
osi_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
get32(png_bytep buffer, int offset)
/* Read a 32-bit value from an 8-byte circular buffer (used only below).
*/
{
return
(buffer[ offset & 7] << 24) +
(buffer[(offset+1) & 7] << 16) +
(buffer[(offset+2) & 7] << 8) +
(buffer[(offset+3) & 7] );
}
|
get32(png_bytep buffer, int offset)
/* Read a 32-bit value from an 8-byte circular buffer (used only below).
*/
{
return
(buffer[ offset & 7] << 24) +
(buffer[(offset+1) & 7] << 16) +
(buffer[(offset+2) & 7] << 8) +
(buffer[(offset+3) & 7] );
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1833
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1833/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97
|
764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97
|
Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options)
static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options,
uid_t *check_ruid)
{
char *p;
int rc = 0;
int sig_set = 0;
int cipher_name_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_name_set = 0;
int cipher_key_bytes;
int cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
char *sig_src;
char *cipher_name_dst;
char *cipher_name_src;
char *fn_cipher_name_dst;
char *fn_cipher_name_src;
char *fnek_dst;
char *fnek_src;
char *cipher_key_bytes_src;
char *fn_cipher_key_bytes_src;
*check_ruid = 0;
if (!options) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(mount_crypt_stat);
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case ecryptfs_opt_sig:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig:
sig_src = args[0].from;
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat,
sig_src, 0);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
sig_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_cipher:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_cipher:
cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->
global_default_cipher_name;
strncpy(cipher_name_dst, cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
cipher_name_dst[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes:
cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(cipher_key_bytes_src,
&cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
cipher_key_bytes;
cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_passthrough:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_xattr_metadata:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_encrypted_view:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fnek_sig:
fnek_src = args[0].from;
fnek_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig;
strncpy(fnek_dst, fnek_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig[
ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(
mount_crypt_stat,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
rc);
goto out;
}
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
(ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES
| ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK);
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher:
fn_cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name;
strncpy(fn_cipher_name_dst, fn_cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name[
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
fn_cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes:
fn_cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(fn_cipher_key_bytes_src,
&fn_cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
fn_cipher_key_bytes;
fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_UNLINK_SIGS;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_mount_auth_tok_only:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_MOUNT_AUTH_TOK_ONLY;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid:
*check_ruid = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_err:
default:
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: eCryptfs: unrecognized option [%s]\n",
__func__, p);
}
}
if (!sig_set) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply at least one valid "
"auth tok signature as a mount "
"parameter; see the eCryptfs README\n");
goto out;
}
if (!cipher_name_set) {
int cipher_name_len = strlen(ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
BUG_ON(cipher_name_len >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_name_set)
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
if (!cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ecryptfs_tfm_exists(
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name, NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
"properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
out:
return rc;
}
|
static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options)
{
char *p;
int rc = 0;
int sig_set = 0;
int cipher_name_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_name_set = 0;
int cipher_key_bytes;
int cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes;
int fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 0;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
char *sig_src;
char *cipher_name_dst;
char *cipher_name_src;
char *fn_cipher_name_dst;
char *fn_cipher_name_src;
char *fnek_dst;
char *fnek_src;
char *cipher_key_bytes_src;
char *fn_cipher_key_bytes_src;
if (!options) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(mount_crypt_stat);
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case ecryptfs_opt_sig:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig:
sig_src = args[0].from;
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat,
sig_src, 0);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
sig_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_cipher:
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_cipher:
cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->
global_default_cipher_name;
strncpy(cipher_name_dst, cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
cipher_name_dst[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_key_bytes:
cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(cipher_key_bytes_src,
&cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
cipher_key_bytes;
cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_passthrough:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_xattr_metadata:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_encrypted_view:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED;
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fnek_sig:
fnek_src = args[0].from;
fnek_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig;
strncpy(fnek_dst, fnek_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig[
ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(
mount_crypt_stat,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
"global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig,
rc);
goto out;
}
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
(ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES
| ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCFN_USE_MOUNT_FNEK);
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher:
fn_cipher_name_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_name_dst =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name;
strncpy(fn_cipher_name_dst, fn_cipher_name_src,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name[
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
fn_cipher_name_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes:
fn_cipher_key_bytes_src = args[0].from;
fn_cipher_key_bytes =
(int)simple_strtol(fn_cipher_key_bytes_src,
&fn_cipher_key_bytes_src, 0);
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
fn_cipher_key_bytes;
fn_cipher_key_bytes_set = 1;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_UNLINK_SIGS;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_mount_auth_tok_only:
mount_crypt_stat->flags |=
ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_MOUNT_AUTH_TOK_ONLY;
break;
case ecryptfs_opt_err:
default:
printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: eCryptfs: unrecognized option [%s]\n",
__func__, p);
}
}
if (!sig_set) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "You must supply at least one valid "
"auth tok signature as a mount "
"parameter; see the eCryptfs README\n");
goto out;
}
if (!cipher_name_set) {
int cipher_name_len = strlen(ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
BUG_ON(cipher_name_len >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_name_set)
strcpy(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
if (!cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !fn_cipher_key_bytes_set)
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes =
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
if (!ecryptfs_tfm_exists(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !ecryptfs_tfm_exists(
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name, NULL)) {
rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize "
"cipher with name = [%s] and key size = [%td]; "
"rc = [%d]\n",
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_name,
mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fn_cipher_key_bytes,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
"properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
out:
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-9754
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9754/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
|
59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
|
ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
static int rb_head_page_set_update(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
struct buffer_page *head,
struct buffer_page *prev,
int old_flag)
{
return rb_head_page_set(cpu_buffer, head, prev,
old_flag, RB_PAGE_UPDATE);
}
|
static int rb_head_page_set_update(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
struct buffer_page *head,
struct buffer_page *prev,
int old_flag)
{
return rb_head_page_set(cpu_buffer, head, prev,
old_flag, RB_PAGE_UPDATE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12249
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12249/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
`mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
|
mrb_class_defined(mrb_state *mrb, const char *name)
{
mrb_value sym = mrb_check_intern_cstr(mrb, name);
if (mrb_nil_p(sym)) {
return FALSE;
}
return mrb_const_defined(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->object_class), mrb_symbol(sym));
}
|
mrb_class_defined(mrb_state *mrb, const char *name)
{
mrb_value sym = mrb_check_intern_cstr(mrb, name);
if (mrb_nil_p(sym)) {
return FALSE;
}
return mrb_const_defined(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->object_class), mrb_symbol(sym));
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13454
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13454/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/commit/4f31d78716ac94c85c244efcea368fea202e2ed4
|
4f31d78716ac94c85c244efcea368fea202e2ed4
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
|
MagickExport Image *DisposeImages(const Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*dispose_image,
*dispose_images;
RectangleInfo
bounds;
register Image
*image,
*next;
/*
Run the image through the animation sequence
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=GetFirstImageInList(images);
dispose_image=CloneImage(image,image->page.width,image->page.height,
MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
dispose_image->page=image->page;
dispose_image->page.x=0;
dispose_image->page.y=0;
dispose_image->dispose=NoneDispose;
dispose_image->background_color.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(dispose_image);
dispose_images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*current_image;
/*
Overlay this frame's image over the previous disposal image.
*/
current_image=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (current_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_images=DestroyImageList(dispose_images);
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CompositeImage(current_image,next->matte != MagickFalse ?
OverCompositeOp : CopyCompositeOp,next,next->page.x,next->page.y);
/*
Handle Background dispose: image is displayed for the delay period.
*/
if (next->dispose == BackgroundDispose)
{
bounds=next->page;
bounds.width=next->columns;
bounds.height=next->rows;
if (bounds.x < 0)
{
bounds.width+=bounds.x;
bounds.x=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.x+bounds.width) > (ssize_t) current_image->columns)
bounds.width=current_image->columns-bounds.x;
if (bounds.y < 0)
{
bounds.height+=bounds.y;
bounds.y=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.y+bounds.height) > (ssize_t) current_image->rows)
bounds.height=current_image->rows-bounds.y;
ClearBounds(current_image,&bounds);
}
/*
Select the appropriate previous/disposed image.
*/
if (next->dispose == PreviousDispose)
current_image=DestroyImage(current_image);
else
{
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
dispose_image=current_image;
current_image=(Image *) NULL;
}
/*
Save the dispose image just calculated for return.
*/
{
Image
*dispose;
dispose=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_images=DestroyImageList(dispose_images);
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloneImageProfiles(dispose,next);
(void) CloneImageProperties(dispose,next);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(dispose,next);
dispose->page.x=0;
dispose->page.y=0;
dispose->dispose=next->dispose;
AppendImageToList(&dispose_images,dispose);
}
}
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(dispose_images));
}
|
MagickExport Image *DisposeImages(const Image *images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*dispose_image,
*dispose_images;
RectangleInfo
bounds;
register Image
*image,
*next;
/*
Run the image through the animation sequence
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=GetFirstImageInList(images);
dispose_image=CloneImage(image,image->page.width,image->page.height,
MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
dispose_image->page=image->page;
dispose_image->page.x=0;
dispose_image->page.y=0;
dispose_image->dispose=NoneDispose;
dispose_image->background_color.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(dispose_image);
dispose_images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*current_image;
/*
Overlay this frame's image over the previous disposal image.
*/
current_image=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (current_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_images=DestroyImageList(dispose_images);
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CompositeImage(current_image,next->matte != MagickFalse ?
OverCompositeOp : CopyCompositeOp,next,next->page.x,next->page.y);
/*
Handle Background dispose: image is displayed for the delay period.
*/
if (next->dispose == BackgroundDispose)
{
bounds=next->page;
bounds.width=next->columns;
bounds.height=next->rows;
if (bounds.x < 0)
{
bounds.width+=bounds.x;
bounds.x=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.x+bounds.width) > (ssize_t) current_image->columns)
bounds.width=current_image->columns-bounds.x;
if (bounds.y < 0)
{
bounds.height+=bounds.y;
bounds.y=0;
}
if ((ssize_t) (bounds.y+bounds.height) > (ssize_t) current_image->rows)
bounds.height=current_image->rows-bounds.y;
ClearBounds(current_image,&bounds);
}
/*
Select the appropriate previous/disposed image.
*/
if (next->dispose == PreviousDispose)
current_image=DestroyImage(current_image);
else
{
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
dispose_image=current_image;
current_image=(Image *) NULL;
}
/*
Save the dispose image just calculated for return.
*/
{
Image
*dispose;
dispose=CloneImage(dispose_image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (dispose == (Image *) NULL)
{
dispose_images=DestroyImageList(dispose_images);
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloneImageProfiles(dispose,next);
(void) CloneImageProperties(dispose,next);
(void) CloneImageArtifacts(dispose,next);
dispose->page.x=0;
dispose->page.y=0;
dispose->dispose=next->dispose;
AppendImageToList(&dispose_images,dispose);
}
}
dispose_image=DestroyImage(dispose_image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(dispose_images));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5
|
a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5
|
2009-05-04 Kai Brüning <kai@granus.net>
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24883
24883: Bad success test in parseXMLDocumentFragment in XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp
Fixed test whether all the chunk has been processed to correctly count utf8 bytes.
Test: fast/innerHTML/innerHTML-nbsp.xhtml
* dom/XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp:
(WebCore::parseXMLDocumentFragment):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@43195 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void externalSubsetHandler(void* closure, const xmlChar*, const xmlChar* externalId, const xmlChar*)
{
String extId = toString(externalId);
if ((extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Frameset//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1 plus MathML 2.0//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1 plus MathML 2.0 plus SVG 1.1//EN")
|| (extId == "-//WAPFORUM//DTD XHTML Mobile 1.0//EN"))
getTokenizer(closure)->setIsXHTMLDocument(true); // controls if we replace entities or not.
}
|
static void externalSubsetHandler(void* closure, const xmlChar*, const xmlChar* externalId, const xmlChar*)
{
String extId = toString(externalId);
if ((extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Frameset//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1 plus MathML 2.0//EN")
|| (extId == "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1 plus MathML 2.0 plus SVG 1.1//EN")
|| (extId == "-//WAPFORUM//DTD XHTML Mobile 1.0//EN"))
getTokenizer(closure)->setIsXHTMLDocument(true); // controls if we replace entities or not.
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7395/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06
|
8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const StringInfo
*icc_profile;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length,
num_channels,
packet_size;
StringInfo
*bim_profile;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 6 : 3);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
packet_size+=image->depth > 8 ? 2 : 1;
psd_info.version=1;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PSB") == 0) ||
(image->columns > 30000) || (image->rows > 30000))
psd_info.version=2;
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BPS");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,psd_info.version); /* version */
for (i=1; i <= 6; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image, 0); /* 6 bytes of reserved */
/* When the image has a color profile it won't be converted to gray scale */
if ((GetImageProfile(image,"icc") == (StringInfo *) NULL) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) && (image_info->type !=
TrueColorAlphaType) && (image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4UL : 3UL);
else
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 5UL : 4UL);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) num_channels);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
if (IsImageGray(image) != MagickFalse)
{
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
/*
Write depth & mode.
*/
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? 1 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? BitmapMode : GrayscaleMode));
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->storage_class ==
PseudoClass ? 8 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
if (((image_info->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace) ||
(image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)) &&
(image_info->colorspace != CMYKColorspace))
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(image->storage_class == PseudoClass ? IndexedMode : RGBMode));
}
else
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,CMYKMode);
}
}
if ((IsImageGray(image) != MagickFalse) ||
(image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
else
{
/*
Write PSD raster colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,768);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].red)));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].green)));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].blue)));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
/*
Image resource block.
*/
length=28; /* 0x03EB */
bim_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
icc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
bim_profile=CloneStringInfo(bim_profile);
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile));
}
if (icc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile))+12;
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length);
WriteResolutionResourceBlock(image);
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile));
bim_profile=DestroyStringInfo(bim_profile);
}
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BIM");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000040F);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) GetStringInfoLength(
icc_profile));
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(icc_profile));
if ((ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile) != PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile)))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
MagickOffsetType
size_offset;
size_t
size;
size_offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,0);
status=WritePSDLayersInternal(image,image_info,&psd_info,&size,
exception);
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(&psd_info,image,size+
(psd_info.version == 1 ? 8 : 12),size_offset);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0); /* user mask data */
/*
Write composite image.
*/
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
CompressionType
compression;
compression=image->compression;
if (image->compression == ZipCompression)
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
image->compression=image_info->compression;
if (WritePSDChannels(&psd_info,image_info,image,image,0,MagickFalse,
exception) == 0)
status=MagickFalse;
image->compression=compression;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const StringInfo
*icc_profile;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length,
num_channels,
packet_size;
StringInfo
*bim_profile;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 6 : 3);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
packet_size+=image->depth > 8 ? 2 : 1;
psd_info.version=1;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PSB") == 0) ||
(image->columns > 30000) || (image->rows > 30000))
psd_info.version=2;
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BPS");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,psd_info.version); /* version */
for (i=1; i <= 6; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image, 0); /* 6 bytes of reserved */
/* When the image has a color profile it won't be converted to gray scale */
if ((GetImageProfile(image,"icc") == (StringInfo *) NULL) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) && (image_info->type !=
TrueColorAlphaType) && (image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4UL : 3UL);
else
num_channels=(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 5UL : 4UL);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) num_channels);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
if (IsImageGray(image) != MagickFalse)
{
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
/*
Write depth & mode.
*/
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? 1 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? BitmapMode : GrayscaleMode));
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->storage_class ==
PseudoClass ? 8 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
if (((image_info->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace) ||
(image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)) &&
(image_info->colorspace != CMYKColorspace))
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(image->storage_class == PseudoClass ? IndexedMode : RGBMode));
}
else
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,CMYKMode);
}
}
if ((IsImageGray(image) != MagickFalse) ||
(image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
else
{
/*
Write PSD raster colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,768);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].red)));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].green)));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
image->colormap[i].blue)));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
/*
Image resource block.
*/
length=28; /* 0x03EB */
bim_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
icc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
bim_profile=CloneStringInfo(bim_profile);
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile));
}
if (icc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile))+12;
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length);
WriteResolutionResourceBlock(image);
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile));
bim_profile=DestroyStringInfo(bim_profile);
}
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BIM");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000040F);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) GetStringInfoLength(
icc_profile));
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(icc_profile));
if ((ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile) != PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile)))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
MagickOffsetType
size_offset;
size_t
size;
size_offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,0);
status=WritePSDLayersInternal(image,image_info,&psd_info,&size,
exception);
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(&psd_info,image,size+
(psd_info.version == 1 ? 8 : 12),size_offset);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0); /* user mask data */
/*
Write composite image.
*/
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
CompressionType
compression;
compression=image->compression;
if (image->compression == ZipCompression)
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
image->compression=image_info->compression;
if (WritePSDChannels(&psd_info,image_info,image,image,0,MagickFalse,
exception) == 0)
status=MagickFalse;
image->compression=compression;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0836/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7038db6ef172459f14b1b67a5155b8dd210be0f
|
f7038db6ef172459f14b1b67a5155b8dd210be0f
|
Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JPEGImageDecoder* decoder() { return m_decoder; }
|
JPEGImageDecoder* decoder() { return m_decoder; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void MeasureAsVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->measureAsVoidMethod();
}
|
static void MeasureAsVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->measureAsVoidMethod();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3920
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3920/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/6d0249be2275fd4086783f259f4e2c54722a7c55
|
6d0249be2275fd4086783f259f4e2c54722a7c55
|
better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
|
MemorySource(const uint8_t *data, size_t size)
: mData(data),
mSize(size) {
}
|
MemorySource(const uint8_t *data, size_t size)
: mData(data),
mSize(size) {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15296
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15296/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/knik0/faad2/commit/942c3e0aee748ea6fe97cb2c1aa5893225316174
|
942c3e0aee748ea6fe97cb2c1aa5893225316174
|
Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
|
static void tns_data(ic_stream *ics, tns_info *tns, bitfile *ld)
{
uint8_t w, filt, i, start_coef_bits, coef_bits;
uint8_t n_filt_bits = 2;
uint8_t length_bits = 6;
uint8_t order_bits = 5;
if (ics->window_sequence == EIGHT_SHORT_SEQUENCE)
{
n_filt_bits = 1;
length_bits = 4;
order_bits = 3;
}
for (w = 0; w < ics->num_windows; w++)
{
tns->n_filt[w] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, n_filt_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,74,"tns_data(): n_filt"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->n_filt[w]);
#endif
if (tns->n_filt[w])
{
if ((tns->coef_res[w] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,75,"tns_data(): coef_res"))) & 1)
{
start_coef_bits = 4;
} else {
start_coef_bits = 3;
}
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->coef_res[w]);
#endif
}
for (filt = 0; filt < tns->n_filt[w]; filt++)
{
tns->length[w][filt] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, length_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,76,"tns_data(): length"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->length[w][filt]);
#endif
tns->order[w][filt] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, order_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,77,"tns_data(): order"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->order[w][filt]);
#endif
if (tns->order[w][filt])
{
tns->direction[w][filt] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,78,"tns_data(): direction"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->direction[w][filt]);
#endif
tns->coef_compress[w][filt] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,79,"tns_data(): coef_compress"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->coef_compress[w][filt]);
#endif
coef_bits = start_coef_bits - tns->coef_compress[w][filt];
for (i = 0; i < tns->order[w][filt]; i++)
{
tns->coef[w][filt][i] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, coef_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,80,"tns_data(): coef"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->coef[w][filt][i]);
#endif
}
}
}
}
}
|
static void tns_data(ic_stream *ics, tns_info *tns, bitfile *ld)
{
uint8_t w, filt, i, start_coef_bits, coef_bits;
uint8_t n_filt_bits = 2;
uint8_t length_bits = 6;
uint8_t order_bits = 5;
if (ics->window_sequence == EIGHT_SHORT_SEQUENCE)
{
n_filt_bits = 1;
length_bits = 4;
order_bits = 3;
}
for (w = 0; w < ics->num_windows; w++)
{
tns->n_filt[w] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, n_filt_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,74,"tns_data(): n_filt"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->n_filt[w]);
#endif
if (tns->n_filt[w])
{
if ((tns->coef_res[w] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,75,"tns_data(): coef_res"))) & 1)
{
start_coef_bits = 4;
} else {
start_coef_bits = 3;
}
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->coef_res[w]);
#endif
}
for (filt = 0; filt < tns->n_filt[w]; filt++)
{
tns->length[w][filt] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, length_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,76,"tns_data(): length"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->length[w][filt]);
#endif
tns->order[w][filt] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, order_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,77,"tns_data(): order"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->order[w][filt]);
#endif
if (tns->order[w][filt])
{
tns->direction[w][filt] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,78,"tns_data(): direction"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->direction[w][filt]);
#endif
tns->coef_compress[w][filt] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,79,"tns_data(): coef_compress"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->coef_compress[w][filt]);
#endif
coef_bits = start_coef_bits - tns->coef_compress[w][filt];
for (i = 0; i < tns->order[w][filt]; i++)
{
tns->coef[w][filt][i] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, coef_bits
DEBUGVAR(1,80,"tns_data(): coef"));
#if 0
printf("%d\n", tns->coef[w][filt][i]);
#endif
}
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
faad2
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3194
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3194/
| null |
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e
|
c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e
| null |
static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *pss;
*pmaskHash = NULL;
if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
pss = d2i_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
if (!pss)
return NULL;
*pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenFunc);
return pss;
}
|
static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *pss;
*pmaskHash = NULL;
if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return NULL;
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
pss = d2i_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
if (!pss)
return NULL;
*pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenFunc);
return pss;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d193f6bb5aa5bdc05e07f314abacf7d7bc466d3d
|
d193f6bb5aa5bdc05e07f314abacf7d7bc466d3d
|
cc: Make the PictureLayerImpl raster source null until commit.
No need to make a raster source that is never used.
R=enne, vmpstr
BUG=387116
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/809433003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#308466}
|
bool PictureLayerImpl::AllTilesRequiredAreReadyToDraw(
TileRequirementCheck is_tile_required_callback) const {
if (!HasValidTilePriorities())
return true;
if (!tilings_)
return true;
if (visible_rect_for_tile_priority_.IsEmpty())
return true;
gfx::Rect rect = GetViewportForTilePriorityInContentSpace();
rect.Intersect(visible_rect_for_tile_priority_);
PictureLayerTiling* tiling =
tilings_->FindTilingWithResolution(HIGH_RESOLUTION);
if (!tiling)
return true;
for (PictureLayerTiling::CoverageIterator iter(tiling, 1.f, rect); iter;
++iter) {
const Tile* tile = *iter;
if (!tile)
continue;
if ((tiling->*is_tile_required_callback)(tile) && !tile->IsReadyToDraw()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("cc", "Tile required, but not ready to draw.",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
|
bool PictureLayerImpl::AllTilesRequiredAreReadyToDraw(
TileRequirementCheck is_tile_required_callback) const {
if (!HasValidTilePriorities())
return true;
if (!tilings_)
return true;
if (visible_rect_for_tile_priority_.IsEmpty())
return true;
gfx::Rect rect = GetViewportForTilePriorityInContentSpace();
rect.Intersect(visible_rect_for_tile_priority_);
PictureLayerTiling* tiling =
tilings_->FindTilingWithResolution(HIGH_RESOLUTION);
if (!tiling)
return true;
for (PictureLayerTiling::CoverageIterator iter(tiling, 1.f, rect); iter;
++iter) {
const Tile* tile = *iter;
if (!tile)
continue;
if ((tiling->*is_tile_required_callback)(tile) && !tile->IsReadyToDraw()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("cc", "Tile required, but not ready to draw.",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0925
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0925/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f7ae1f7a918f1973dca241a7a23169906eaf4fe3
|
f7ae1f7a918f1973dca241a7a23169906eaf4fe3
|
Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
MessageService::MessageService(
LazyBackgroundTaskQueue* queue)
: lazy_background_task_queue_(queue),
weak_factory_(this) {
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_TERMINATED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
}
|
MessageService::MessageService(
LazyBackgroundTaskQueue* queue)
: lazy_background_task_queue_(queue),
weak_factory_(this) {
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_TERMINATED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnOpenFile(const FilePath& path,
int mode,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->CanUploadFile(id(), path)) {
ViewHostMsg_OpenFile::WriteReplyParams(
reply_msg, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
Send(reply_msg);
return;
}
ChromeThread::PostTask(
ChromeThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(
this, &ResourceMessageFilter::OnOpenFileOnFileThread,
path, mode, reply_msg));
}
|
void ResourceMessageFilter::OnOpenFile(const FilePath& path,
int mode,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->CanUploadFile(id(), path)) {
ViewHostMsg_OpenFile::WriteReplyParams(
reply_msg, base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue);
Send(reply_msg);
return;
}
ChromeThread::PostTask(
ChromeThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(
this, &ResourceMessageFilter::OnOpenFileOnFileThread,
path, mode, reply_msg));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5204/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e1e67d5d341d82c61cab2c41ff4163f17caf14ae
|
e1e67d5d341d82c61cab2c41ff4163f17caf14ae
|
Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
|
void MetricsWebContentsObserver::NotifyPageEndAllLoadsWithTimestamp(
PageEndReason page_end_reason,
UserInitiatedInfo user_initiated_info,
base::TimeTicks timestamp,
bool is_certainly_browser_timestamp) {
if (committed_load_) {
committed_load_->NotifyPageEnd(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info,
timestamp, is_certainly_browser_timestamp);
}
for (const auto& kv : provisional_loads_) {
kv.second->NotifyPageEnd(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info, timestamp,
is_certainly_browser_timestamp);
}
for (const auto& tracker : aborted_provisional_loads_) {
if (tracker->IsLikelyProvisionalAbort(timestamp)) {
tracker->UpdatePageEnd(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info, timestamp,
is_certainly_browser_timestamp);
}
}
aborted_provisional_loads_.clear();
}
|
void MetricsWebContentsObserver::NotifyPageEndAllLoadsWithTimestamp(
PageEndReason page_end_reason,
UserInitiatedInfo user_initiated_info,
base::TimeTicks timestamp,
bool is_certainly_browser_timestamp) {
if (committed_load_) {
committed_load_->NotifyPageEnd(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info,
timestamp, is_certainly_browser_timestamp);
}
for (const auto& kv : provisional_loads_) {
kv.second->NotifyPageEnd(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info, timestamp,
is_certainly_browser_timestamp);
}
for (const auto& tracker : aborted_provisional_loads_) {
if (tracker->IsLikelyProvisionalAbort(timestamp)) {
tracker->UpdatePageEnd(page_end_reason, user_initiated_info, timestamp,
is_certainly_browser_timestamp);
}
}
aborted_provisional_loads_.clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18351/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/07fbae50670ea44e35e1d554db1bbece7fe3711f
|
07fbae50670ea44e35e1d554db1bbece7fe3711f
|
Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnStartChecksComplete(
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_RESPONSE);
if (on_start_checks_complete_closure_)
on_start_checks_complete_closure_.Run();
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST) {
DCHECK(result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_ADMINISTRATOR);
}
else if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE) {
DCHECK_EQ(result.net_error_code(), net::ERR_ABORTED);
}
#endif
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailedInternal,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), false,
result.net_error_code(), base::nullopt, true,
result.error_page_content()));
return;
}
DCHECK_NE(AssociatedSiteInstanceType::NONE, associated_site_instance_type_);
RenderFrameHostImpl* navigating_frame_host =
associated_site_instance_type_ == AssociatedSiteInstanceType::SPECULATIVE
? frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->speculative_frame_host()
: frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host();
DCHECK(navigating_frame_host);
navigation_handle_->SetExpectedProcess(navigating_frame_host->GetProcess());
BrowserContext* browser_context =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetBrowserContext();
StoragePartition* partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
browser_context, navigating_frame_host->GetSiteInstance());
DCHECK(partition);
bool can_create_service_worker =
(frame_tree_node_->pending_frame_policy().sandbox_flags &
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin) != blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin;
request_params_.should_create_service_worker = can_create_service_worker;
if (can_create_service_worker) {
ServiceWorkerContextWrapper* service_worker_context =
static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
partition->GetServiceWorkerContext());
navigation_handle_->InitServiceWorkerHandle(service_worker_context);
}
if (IsSchemeSupportedForAppCache(common_params_.url)) {
if (navigating_frame_host->GetRenderViewHost()
->GetWebkitPreferences()
.application_cache_enabled) {
navigation_handle_->InitAppCacheHandle(
static_cast<ChromeAppCacheService*>(partition->GetAppCacheService()));
}
}
request_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start = base::TimeTicks::Now();
GURL base_url;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
NavigationEntry* last_committed_entry =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (last_committed_entry)
base_url = last_committed_entry->GetBaseURLForDataURL();
#endif
const GURL& top_document_url =
!base_url.is_empty()
? base_url
: frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->root()->current_url();
// Walk the ancestor chain to determine whether all frames are same-site. If
// not, the |site_for_cookies| is set to an empty URL.
//
// 'Document::SiteForCookies()' in Blink, which special-cases extension
// URLs and a few other sharp edges.
const FrameTreeNode* current = frame_tree_node_->parent();
bool ancestors_are_same_site = true;
while (current && ancestors_are_same_site) {
if (!net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
top_document_url, current->current_url(),
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
ancestors_are_same_site = false;
}
current = current->parent();
}
const GURL& site_for_cookies =
ancestors_are_same_site
? (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() ? common_params_.url
: top_document_url)
: GURL::EmptyGURL();
bool parent_is_main_frame = !frame_tree_node_->parent()
? false
: frame_tree_node_->parent()->IsMainFrame();
std::unique_ptr<NavigationUIData> navigation_ui_data;
if (navigation_handle_->GetNavigationUIData())
navigation_ui_data = navigation_handle_->GetNavigationUIData()->Clone();
bool is_for_guests_only =
navigation_handle_->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL().
SchemeIs(kGuestScheme);
bool report_raw_headers = false;
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::ApplyOverrides(
frame_tree_node_, begin_params_.get(), &report_raw_headers);
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(*this);
loader_ = NavigationURLLoader::Create(
browser_context->GetResourceContext(), partition,
std::make_unique<NavigationRequestInfo>(
common_params_, begin_params_.Clone(), site_for_cookies,
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(), parent_is_main_frame,
IsSecureFrame(frame_tree_node_->parent()),
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), is_for_guests_only,
report_raw_headers,
navigating_frame_host->GetVisibilityState() ==
blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState::kPrerender,
blob_url_loader_factory_ ? blob_url_loader_factory_->Clone()
: nullptr),
std::move(navigation_ui_data),
navigation_handle_->service_worker_handle(),
navigation_handle_->appcache_handle(), this);
}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnStartChecksComplete(
NavigationThrottle::ThrottleCheckResult result) {
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::DEFER);
DCHECK(result.action() != NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_RESPONSE);
if (on_start_checks_complete_closure_)
on_start_checks_complete_closure_.Run();
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST_AND_COLLAPSE) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::BLOCK_REQUEST) {
DCHECK(result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT ||
result.net_error_code() == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_ADMINISTRATOR);
}
else if (result.action() == NavigationThrottle::CANCEL_AND_IGNORE) {
DCHECK_EQ(result.net_error_code(), net::ERR_ABORTED);
}
#endif
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailedInternal,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), false,
result.net_error_code(), base::nullopt, true,
result.error_page_content()));
return;
}
DCHECK_NE(AssociatedSiteInstanceType::NONE, associated_site_instance_type_);
RenderFrameHostImpl* navigating_frame_host =
associated_site_instance_type_ == AssociatedSiteInstanceType::SPECULATIVE
? frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->speculative_frame_host()
: frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host();
DCHECK(navigating_frame_host);
navigation_handle_->SetExpectedProcess(navigating_frame_host->GetProcess());
BrowserContext* browser_context =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetBrowserContext();
StoragePartition* partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
browser_context, navigating_frame_host->GetSiteInstance());
DCHECK(partition);
bool can_create_service_worker =
(frame_tree_node_->pending_frame_policy().sandbox_flags &
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin) != blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin;
request_params_.should_create_service_worker = can_create_service_worker;
if (can_create_service_worker) {
ServiceWorkerContextWrapper* service_worker_context =
static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>(
partition->GetServiceWorkerContext());
navigation_handle_->InitServiceWorkerHandle(service_worker_context);
}
if (IsSchemeSupportedForAppCache(common_params_.url)) {
if (navigating_frame_host->GetRenderViewHost()
->GetWebkitPreferences()
.application_cache_enabled) {
navigation_handle_->InitAppCacheHandle(
static_cast<ChromeAppCacheService*>(partition->GetAppCacheService()));
}
}
request_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start = base::TimeTicks::Now();
GURL base_url;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
NavigationEntry* last_committed_entry =
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->GetController()->GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (last_committed_entry)
base_url = last_committed_entry->GetBaseURLForDataURL();
#endif
const GURL& top_document_url =
!base_url.is_empty()
? base_url
: frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->root()->current_url();
const GURL& site_for_cookies =
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() ? common_params_.url : top_document_url;
bool parent_is_main_frame = !frame_tree_node_->parent()
? false
: frame_tree_node_->parent()->IsMainFrame();
std::unique_ptr<NavigationUIData> navigation_ui_data;
if (navigation_handle_->GetNavigationUIData())
navigation_ui_data = navigation_handle_->GetNavigationUIData()->Clone();
bool is_for_guests_only =
navigation_handle_->GetStartingSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL().
SchemeIs(kGuestScheme);
bool report_raw_headers = false;
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::ApplyOverrides(
frame_tree_node_, begin_params_.get(), &report_raw_headers);
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnNavigationRequestWillBeSent(*this);
loader_ = NavigationURLLoader::Create(
browser_context->GetResourceContext(), partition,
std::make_unique<NavigationRequestInfo>(
common_params_, begin_params_.Clone(), site_for_cookies,
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(), parent_is_main_frame,
IsSecureFrame(frame_tree_node_->parent()),
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), is_for_guests_only,
report_raw_headers,
navigating_frame_host->GetVisibilityState() ==
blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState::kPrerender,
blob_url_loader_factory_ ? blob_url_loader_factory_->Clone()
: nullptr),
std::move(navigation_ui_data),
navigation_handle_->service_worker_handle(),
navigation_handle_->appcache_handle(), this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5164
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5164/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93bc623489bdcfc7e9127614fcfb3258edf3f0f9
|
93bc623489bdcfc7e9127614fcfb3258edf3f0f9
|
[DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
|
void V8Debugger::setBreakpointsActivated(bool activated)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
v8::HandleScope scope(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(debuggerContext());
v8::Local<v8::Object> info = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
info->Set(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "enabled"), v8::Boolean::New(m_isolate, activated));
v8::Local<v8::Function> setBreakpointsActivated = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(m_debuggerScript.Get(m_isolate)->Get(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "setBreakpointsActivated")));
v8::Debug::Call(debuggerContext(), setBreakpointsActivated, info).ToLocalChecked();
m_breakpointsActivated = activated;
}
|
void V8Debugger::setBreakpointsActivated(bool activated)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
v8::HandleScope scope(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(debuggerContext());
v8::Local<v8::Object> info = v8::Object::New(m_isolate);
info->Set(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "enabled"), v8::Boolean::New(m_isolate, activated));
v8::Local<v8::Function> setBreakpointsActivated = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(m_debuggerScript.Get(m_isolate)->Get(toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "setBreakpointsActivated")));
v8::Debug::Call(debuggerContext(), setBreakpointsActivated, info).ToLocalChecked();
m_breakpointsActivated = activated;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1639
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1639/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c66b1fc49870c514b1c1e8b53498153176d7ec2b
|
c66b1fc49870c514b1c1e8b53498153176d7ec2b
|
cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
bool IsEnterpriseManaged() {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnectorChromeOS* connector =
g_browser_process->platform_part()->browser_policy_connector_chromeos();
return connector->IsEnterpriseManaged();
}
|
bool IsEnterpriseManaged() {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnectorChromeOS* connector =
g_browser_process->platform_part()->browser_policy_connector_chromeos();
return connector->IsEnterpriseManaged();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11469
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11469/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.8.git;a=commit;h=17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
|
17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
| null |
int del_hdr_value(struct buffer *buf, char **from, char *next)
{
char *prev = *from;
if (*prev == ':') {
/* We're removing the first value, preserve the colon and add a
* space if possible.
*/
if (!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*next))
next++;
prev++;
if (prev < next)
*prev++ = ' ';
while (HTTP_IS_SPHT(*next))
next++;
} else {
/* Remove useless spaces before the old delimiter. */
while (HTTP_IS_SPHT(*(prev-1)))
prev--;
*from = prev;
/* copy the delimiter and if possible a space if we're
* not at the end of the line.
*/
if (!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*next)) {
*prev++ = *next++;
if (prev + 1 < next)
*prev++ = ' ';
while (HTTP_IS_SPHT(*next))
next++;
}
}
return buffer_replace2(buf, prev, next, NULL, 0);
}
|
int del_hdr_value(struct buffer *buf, char **from, char *next)
{
char *prev = *from;
if (*prev == ':') {
/* We're removing the first value, preserve the colon and add a
* space if possible.
*/
if (!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*next))
next++;
prev++;
if (prev < next)
*prev++ = ' ';
while (HTTP_IS_SPHT(*next))
next++;
} else {
/* Remove useless spaces before the old delimiter. */
while (HTTP_IS_SPHT(*(prev-1)))
prev--;
*from = prev;
/* copy the delimiter and if possible a space if we're
* not at the end of the line.
*/
if (!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*next)) {
*prev++ = *next++;
if (prev + 1 < next)
*prev++ = ' ';
while (HTTP_IS_SPHT(*next))
next++;
}
}
return buffer_replace2(buf, prev, next, NULL, 0);
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4467/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d
|
ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d
|
Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void vlan_ioctl_set(int (*hook) (struct net *, void __user *))
{
mutex_lock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
vlan_ioctl_hook = hook;
mutex_unlock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
}
|
void vlan_ioctl_set(int (*hook) (struct net *, void __user *))
{
mutex_lock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
vlan_ioctl_hook = hook;
mutex_unlock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/1f4b49e64adf4623eefda503bca61e253597b9bf
|
1f4b49e64adf4623eefda503bca61e253597b9bf
|
Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
|
status_t Parcel::writeChar(char16_t val)
{
return writeInt32(int32_t(val));
}
|
status_t Parcel::writeChar(char16_t val)
{
return writeInt32(int32_t(val));
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7515
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7515/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96
|
8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96
|
Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
store_tabletToolMode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_mode = map_str_to_val(tool_mode_map, buf, count);
if (new_mode == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.toolMode = new_mode;
return count;
}
|
store_tabletToolMode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_mode = map_str_to_val(tool_mode_map, buf, count);
if (new_mode == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.toolMode = new_mode;
return count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2508/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f81038006b4c59a5a148dcad887371206033c28f
|
f81038006b4c59a5a148dcad887371206033c28f
|
MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
|
NuPlayer::GenericSource::GenericSource(
const sp<AMessage> ¬ify,
bool uidValid,
uid_t uid)
: Source(notify),
mAudioTimeUs(0),
mAudioLastDequeueTimeUs(0),
mVideoTimeUs(0),
mVideoLastDequeueTimeUs(0),
mFetchSubtitleDataGeneration(0),
mFetchTimedTextDataGeneration(0),
mDurationUs(-1ll),
mAudioIsVorbis(false),
mIsWidevine(false),
mIsSecure(false),
mIsStreaming(false),
mUIDValid(uidValid),
mUID(uid),
mFd(-1),
mDrmManagerClient(NULL),
mBitrate(-1ll),
mPollBufferingGeneration(0),
mPendingReadBufferTypes(0),
mBuffering(false),
mPrepareBuffering(false),
mPrevBufferPercentage(-1) {
resetDataSource();
DataSource::RegisterDefaultSniffers();
}
|
NuPlayer::GenericSource::GenericSource(
const sp<AMessage> ¬ify,
bool uidValid,
uid_t uid)
: Source(notify),
mAudioTimeUs(0),
mAudioLastDequeueTimeUs(0),
mVideoTimeUs(0),
mVideoLastDequeueTimeUs(0),
mFetchSubtitleDataGeneration(0),
mFetchTimedTextDataGeneration(0),
mDurationUs(-1ll),
mAudioIsVorbis(false),
mIsWidevine(false),
mIsSecure(false),
mIsStreaming(false),
mUIDValid(uidValid),
mUID(uid),
mFd(-1),
mDrmManagerClient(NULL),
mBitrate(-1ll),
mPollBufferingGeneration(0),
mPendingReadBufferTypes(0),
mBuffering(false),
mPrepareBuffering(false),
mPrevBufferPercentage(-1) {
resetDataSource();
DataSource::RegisterDefaultSniffers();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c58d6ae09d0c916b6003238de09e34f14cce758f
|
c58d6ae09d0c916b6003238de09e34f14cce758f
|
Introduce a method to build the tree from a CompactHTMLToken
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107082
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
No new tests because covered by existing fast/parser tests.
* html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.cpp:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::constructTreeFromCompactHTMLToken):
* html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.h:
* html/parser/HTMLToken.h:
(AtomicHTMLToken):
(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken::create):
(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken::AtomicHTMLToken):
* xml/parser/MarkupTokenBase.h:
(WebCore::AtomicMarkupTokenBase::AtomicMarkupTokenBase):
(AtomicMarkupTokenBase):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139953 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLDocumentParser::append(const SegmentedString& source)
{
if (isStopped())
return;
RefPtr<HTMLDocumentParser> protect(this);
if (m_preloadScanner) {
if (m_input.current().isEmpty() && !isWaitingForScripts()) {
m_preloadScanner.clear();
} else {
m_preloadScanner->appendToEnd(source);
if (isWaitingForScripts())
m_preloadScanner->scan();
}
}
m_input.appendToEnd(source);
if (inPumpSession()) {
return;
}
pumpTokenizerIfPossible(AllowYield);
endIfDelayed();
}
|
void HTMLDocumentParser::append(const SegmentedString& source)
{
if (isStopped())
return;
RefPtr<HTMLDocumentParser> protect(this);
if (m_preloadScanner) {
if (m_input.current().isEmpty() && !isWaitingForScripts()) {
m_preloadScanner.clear();
} else {
m_preloadScanner->appendToEnd(source);
if (isWaitingForScripts())
m_preloadScanner->scan();
}
}
m_input.appendToEnd(source);
if (inPumpSession()) {
return;
}
pumpTokenizerIfPossible(AllowYield);
endIfDelayed();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14363
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14363/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
|
static int pop_fetch_message(struct Context *ctx, struct Message *msg, int msgno)
{
void *uidl = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct Progress progressbar;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct PopCache *cache = NULL;
struct Header *h = ctx->hdrs[msgno];
unsigned short bcache = 1;
/* see if we already have the message in body cache */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_get(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(h->data));
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
/*
* see if we already have the message in our cache in
* case $message_cachedir is unset
*/
cache = &pop_data->cache[h->index % POP_CACHE_LEN];
if (cache->path)
{
if (cache->index == h->index)
{
/* yes, so just return a pointer to the message */
msg->fp = fopen(cache->path, "r");
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
mutt_perror(cache->path);
return -1;
}
else
{
/* clear the previous entry */
unlink(cache->path);
FREE(&cache->path);
}
}
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
/* verify that massage index is correct */
if (h->refno < 0)
{
mutt_error(
_("The message index is incorrect. Try reopening the mailbox."));
return -1;
}
mutt_progress_init(&progressbar, _("Fetching message..."), MUTT_PROGRESS_SIZE,
NetInc, h->content->length + h->content->offset - 1);
/* see if we can put in body cache; use our cache as fallback */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_put(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(h->data));
if (!msg->fp)
{
/* no */
bcache = 0;
mutt_mktemp(path, sizeof(path));
msg->fp = mutt_file_fopen(path, "w+");
if (!msg->fp)
{
mutt_perror(path);
return -1;
}
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "RETR %d\r\n", h->refno);
const int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, buf, &progressbar, fetch_message, msg->fp);
if (ret == 0)
break;
mutt_file_fclose(&msg->fp);
/* if RETR failed (e.g. connection closed), be sure to remove either
* the file in bcache or from POP's own cache since the next iteration
* of the loop will re-attempt to put() the message */
if (!bcache)
unlink(path);
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
if (ret == -3)
{
mutt_error(_("Can't write message to temporary file!"));
return -1;
}
}
/* Update the header information. Previously, we only downloaded a
* portion of the headers, those required for the main display.
*/
if (bcache)
mutt_bcache_commit(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(h->data));
else
{
cache->index = h->index;
cache->path = mutt_str_strdup(path);
}
rewind(msg->fp);
uidl = h->data;
/* we replace envelop, key in subj_hash has to be updated as well */
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_delete(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_remove(ctx, h);
mutt_env_free(&h->env);
h->env = mutt_rfc822_read_header(msg->fp, h, 0, 0);
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_insert(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_add(ctx, h);
h->data = uidl;
h->lines = 0;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
while (!feof(msg->fp))
{
ctx->hdrs[msgno]->lines++;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
}
h->content->length = ftello(msg->fp) - h->content->offset;
/* This needs to be done in case this is a multipart message */
if (!WithCrypto)
h->security = crypt_query(h->content);
mutt_clear_error();
rewind(msg->fp);
return 0;
}
|
static int pop_fetch_message(struct Context *ctx, struct Message *msg, int msgno)
{
void *uidl = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct Progress progressbar;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct PopCache *cache = NULL;
struct Header *h = ctx->hdrs[msgno];
unsigned short bcache = 1;
/* see if we already have the message in body cache */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_get(pop_data->bcache, h->data);
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
/*
* see if we already have the message in our cache in
* case $message_cachedir is unset
*/
cache = &pop_data->cache[h->index % POP_CACHE_LEN];
if (cache->path)
{
if (cache->index == h->index)
{
/* yes, so just return a pointer to the message */
msg->fp = fopen(cache->path, "r");
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
mutt_perror(cache->path);
return -1;
}
else
{
/* clear the previous entry */
unlink(cache->path);
FREE(&cache->path);
}
}
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
/* verify that massage index is correct */
if (h->refno < 0)
{
mutt_error(
_("The message index is incorrect. Try reopening the mailbox."));
return -1;
}
mutt_progress_init(&progressbar, _("Fetching message..."), MUTT_PROGRESS_SIZE,
NetInc, h->content->length + h->content->offset - 1);
/* see if we can put in body cache; use our cache as fallback */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_put(pop_data->bcache, h->data);
if (!msg->fp)
{
/* no */
bcache = 0;
mutt_mktemp(path, sizeof(path));
msg->fp = mutt_file_fopen(path, "w+");
if (!msg->fp)
{
mutt_perror(path);
return -1;
}
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "RETR %d\r\n", h->refno);
const int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, buf, &progressbar, fetch_message, msg->fp);
if (ret == 0)
break;
mutt_file_fclose(&msg->fp);
/* if RETR failed (e.g. connection closed), be sure to remove either
* the file in bcache or from POP's own cache since the next iteration
* of the loop will re-attempt to put() the message */
if (!bcache)
unlink(path);
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
if (ret == -3)
{
mutt_error(_("Can't write message to temporary file!"));
return -1;
}
}
/* Update the header information. Previously, we only downloaded a
* portion of the headers, those required for the main display.
*/
if (bcache)
mutt_bcache_commit(pop_data->bcache, h->data);
else
{
cache->index = h->index;
cache->path = mutt_str_strdup(path);
}
rewind(msg->fp);
uidl = h->data;
/* we replace envelop, key in subj_hash has to be updated as well */
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_delete(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_remove(ctx, h);
mutt_env_free(&h->env);
h->env = mutt_rfc822_read_header(msg->fp, h, 0, 0);
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_insert(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_add(ctx, h);
h->data = uidl;
h->lines = 0;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
while (!feof(msg->fp))
{
ctx->hdrs[msgno]->lines++;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
}
h->content->length = ftello(msg->fp) - h->content->offset;
/* This needs to be done in case this is a multipart message */
if (!WithCrypto)
h->security = crypt_query(h->content);
mutt_clear_error();
rewind(msg->fp);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 1 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void writeArrayBuffer(const ArrayBuffer& arrayBuffer)
{
append(ArrayBufferTag);
doWriteArrayBuffer(arrayBuffer);
}
|
void writeArrayBuffer(const ArrayBuffer& arrayBuffer)
{
append(ArrayBufferTag);
doWriteArrayBuffer(arrayBuffer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
|
int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = SafeArrayAlloc<char>(1, len + 1);
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
|
int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = SafeArrayAlloc<char>(1, len + 1);
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
|
static int nfs4_xdr_dec_create(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfs4_create_res *res)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, p);
if ((status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_putfh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_savefh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_create(&xdr,&res->dir_cinfo)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_getfh(&xdr, res->fh)) != 0)
goto out;
if (decode_getfattr(&xdr, res->fattr, res->server) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_restorefh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
decode_getfattr(&xdr, res->dir_fattr, res->server);
out:
return status;
}
|
static int nfs4_xdr_dec_create(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfs4_create_res *res)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, p);
if ((status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_putfh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_savefh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_create(&xdr,&res->dir_cinfo)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_getfh(&xdr, res->fh)) != 0)
goto out;
if (decode_getfattr(&xdr, res->fattr, res->server) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_restorefh(&xdr)) != 0)
goto out;
decode_getfattr(&xdr, res->dir_fattr, res->server);
out:
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
try_up_instance(vrrp_t *vrrp, bool leaving_init)
{
int wantstate;
if (leaving_init) {
if (vrrp->num_script_if_fault)
return;
}
else if (--vrrp->num_script_if_fault || vrrp->num_script_init)
return;
if (vrrp->wantstate == VRRP_STATE_MAST && vrrp->base_priority == VRRP_PRIO_OWNER) {
vrrp->wantstate = VRRP_STATE_MAST;
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
vrrp->stats->next_master_reason = VRRPV3_MASTER_REASON_PREEMPTED;
#endif
} else {
vrrp->wantstate = VRRP_STATE_BACK;
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
vrrp->stats->next_master_reason = VRRPV3_MASTER_REASON_MASTER_NO_RESPONSE;
#endif
}
vrrp->master_adver_int = vrrp->adver_int;
if (vrrp->wantstate == VRRP_STATE_MAST && vrrp->base_priority == VRRP_PRIO_OWNER)
vrrp->ms_down_timer = vrrp->master_adver_int + VRRP_TIMER_SKEW(vrrp);
else
vrrp->ms_down_timer = 3 * vrrp->master_adver_int + VRRP_TIMER_SKEW(vrrp);
if (vrrp->sync) {
if (leaving_init) {
if (vrrp->sync->num_member_fault)
return;
}
else if (--vrrp->sync->num_member_fault || vrrp->sync->num_member_init)
return;
}
/* If the sync group can't go to master, we must go to backup state */
wantstate = vrrp->wantstate;
if (vrrp->sync && vrrp->wantstate == VRRP_STATE_MAST && !vrrp_sync_can_goto_master(vrrp))
vrrp->wantstate = VRRP_STATE_BACK;
/* We can come up */
vrrp_state_leave_fault(vrrp);
vrrp_init_instance_sands(vrrp);
vrrp_thread_requeue_read(vrrp);
vrrp->wantstate = wantstate;
if (vrrp->sync) {
if (vrrp->state == VRRP_STATE_MAST)
vrrp_sync_master(vrrp);
else
vrrp_sync_backup(vrrp);
}
}
|
try_up_instance(vrrp_t *vrrp, bool leaving_init)
{
int wantstate;
if (leaving_init) {
if (vrrp->num_script_if_fault)
return;
}
else if (--vrrp->num_script_if_fault || vrrp->num_script_init)
return;
if (vrrp->wantstate == VRRP_STATE_MAST && vrrp->base_priority == VRRP_PRIO_OWNER) {
vrrp->wantstate = VRRP_STATE_MAST;
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
vrrp->stats->next_master_reason = VRRPV3_MASTER_REASON_PREEMPTED;
#endif
} else {
vrrp->wantstate = VRRP_STATE_BACK;
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
vrrp->stats->next_master_reason = VRRPV3_MASTER_REASON_MASTER_NO_RESPONSE;
#endif
}
vrrp->master_adver_int = vrrp->adver_int;
if (vrrp->wantstate == VRRP_STATE_MAST && vrrp->base_priority == VRRP_PRIO_OWNER)
vrrp->ms_down_timer = vrrp->master_adver_int + VRRP_TIMER_SKEW(vrrp);
else
vrrp->ms_down_timer = 3 * vrrp->master_adver_int + VRRP_TIMER_SKEW(vrrp);
if (vrrp->sync) {
if (leaving_init) {
if (vrrp->sync->num_member_fault)
return;
}
else if (--vrrp->sync->num_member_fault || vrrp->sync->num_member_init)
return;
}
/* If the sync group can't go to master, we must go to backup state */
wantstate = vrrp->wantstate;
if (vrrp->sync && vrrp->wantstate == VRRP_STATE_MAST && !vrrp_sync_can_goto_master(vrrp))
vrrp->wantstate = VRRP_STATE_BACK;
/* We can come up */
vrrp_state_leave_fault(vrrp);
vrrp_init_instance_sands(vrrp);
vrrp_thread_requeue_read(vrrp);
vrrp->wantstate = wantstate;
if (vrrp->sync) {
if (vrrp->state == VRRP_STATE_MAST)
vrrp_sync_master(vrrp);
else
vrrp_sync_backup(vrrp);
}
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
InRegionScroller* WebPage::inRegionScroller() const
{
return d->m_inRegionScroller.get();
}
|
InRegionScroller* WebPage::inRegionScroller() const
{
return d->m_inRegionScroller.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
status_t ACodec::setVideoFormatOnPort(
OMX_U32 portIndex,
int32_t width, int32_t height, OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE compressionFormat,
float frameRate) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_VIDEO_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *video_def = &def.format.video;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
const size_t X = 64 * 1024;
if (def.nBufferSize < X) {
def.nBufferSize = X;
}
}
if (def.eDomain != OMX_PortDomainVideo) {
ALOGE("expected video port, got %s(%d)", asString(def.eDomain), def.eDomain);
return FAILED_TRANSACTION;
}
video_def->nFrameWidth = width;
video_def->nFrameHeight = height;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
video_def->eCompressionFormat = compressionFormat;
video_def->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
if (frameRate >= 0) {
video_def->xFramerate = (OMX_U32)(frameRate * 65536.0f);
}
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
return err;
}
|
status_t ACodec::setVideoFormatOnPort(
OMX_U32 portIndex,
int32_t width, int32_t height, OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE compressionFormat,
float frameRate) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_VIDEO_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *video_def = &def.format.video;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
const size_t X = 64 * 1024;
if (def.nBufferSize < X) {
def.nBufferSize = X;
}
}
if (def.eDomain != OMX_PortDomainVideo) {
ALOGE("expected video port, got %s(%d)", asString(def.eDomain), def.eDomain);
return FAILED_TRANSACTION;
}
video_def->nFrameWidth = width;
video_def->nFrameHeight = height;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
video_def->eCompressionFormat = compressionFormat;
video_def->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
if (frameRate >= 0) {
video_def->xFramerate = (OMX_U32)(frameRate * 65536.0f);
}
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
return err;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void variadicNodeMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("variadicNodeMethod", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Node*, head, V8Node::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
Vector<RefPtr<Node> > tail;
for (int i = 1; i < info.Length(); ++i) {
if (!V8Node::hasInstance(info[i], info.GetIsolate())) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("variadicNodeMethod", "TestObject", "parameter 2 is not of type 'Node'."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
tail.append(V8Node::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(info[i])));
}
imp->variadicNodeMethod(head, tail);
}
|
static void variadicNodeMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("variadicNodeMethod", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Node*, head, V8Node::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
Vector<RefPtr<Node> > tail;
for (int i = 1; i < info.Length(); ++i) {
if (!V8Node::hasInstance(info[i], info.GetIsolate())) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("variadicNodeMethod", "TestObject", "parameter 2 is not of type 'Node'."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
tail.append(V8Node::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(info[i])));
}
imp->variadicNodeMethod(head, tail);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4387
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4387/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47
|
2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47
|
ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int ip6_finish_output2(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct neighbour *neigh;
struct in6_addr *nexthop;
int ret;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->dev = dev;
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && sk_mc_loop(skb->sk) &&
((mroute6_socket(dev_net(dev), skb) &&
!(IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)) ||
ipv6_chk_mcast_addr(dev, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr))) {
struct sk_buff *newskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Do not check for IFF_ALLMULTI; multicast routing
is not supported in any case.
*/
if (newskb)
NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
newskb, NULL, newskb->dev,
dev_loopback_xmit);
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev,
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST,
skb->len);
if (IPV6_ADDR_MC_SCOPE(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr) <=
IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_NODELOCAL &&
!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
rcu_read_lock_bh();
nexthop = rt6_nexthop((struct rt6_info *)dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
neigh = __ipv6_neigh_lookup_noref(dst->dev, nexthop);
if (unlikely(!neigh))
neigh = __neigh_create(&nd_tbl, nexthop, dst->dev, false);
if (!IS_ERR(neigh)) {
ret = dst_neigh_output(dst, neigh, skb);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return ret;
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dst->dev),
ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int ip6_finish_output2(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct neighbour *neigh;
struct in6_addr *nexthop;
int ret;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->dev = dev;
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && sk_mc_loop(skb->sk) &&
((mroute6_socket(dev_net(dev), skb) &&
!(IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)) ||
ipv6_chk_mcast_addr(dev, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr))) {
struct sk_buff *newskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Do not check for IFF_ALLMULTI; multicast routing
is not supported in any case.
*/
if (newskb)
NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
newskb, NULL, newskb->dev,
dev_loopback_xmit);
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev,
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST,
skb->len);
if (IPV6_ADDR_MC_SCOPE(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr) <=
IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_NODELOCAL &&
!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
rcu_read_lock_bh();
nexthop = rt6_nexthop((struct rt6_info *)dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
neigh = __ipv6_neigh_lookup_noref(dst->dev, nexthop);
if (unlikely(!neigh))
neigh = __neigh_create(&nd_tbl, nexthop, dst->dev, false);
if (!IS_ERR(neigh)) {
ret = dst_neigh_output(dst, neigh, skb);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return ret;
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dst->dev),
ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
|
static void start_io_acct(struct dm_io *io)
{
struct mapped_device *md = io->md;
struct bio *bio = io->bio;
int cpu;
int rw = bio_data_dir(bio);
io->start_time = jiffies;
cpu = part_stat_lock();
part_round_stats(md->queue, cpu, &dm_disk(md)->part0);
part_stat_unlock();
atomic_set(&dm_disk(md)->part0.in_flight[rw],
atomic_inc_return(&md->pending[rw]));
if (unlikely(dm_stats_used(&md->stats)))
dm_stats_account_io(&md->stats, bio_data_dir(bio),
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector, bio_sectors(bio),
false, 0, &io->stats_aux);
}
|
static void start_io_acct(struct dm_io *io)
{
struct mapped_device *md = io->md;
struct bio *bio = io->bio;
int cpu;
int rw = bio_data_dir(bio);
io->start_time = jiffies;
cpu = part_stat_lock();
part_round_stats(md->queue, cpu, &dm_disk(md)->part0);
part_stat_unlock();
atomic_set(&dm_disk(md)->part0.in_flight[rw],
atomic_inc_return(&md->pending[rw]));
if (unlikely(dm_stats_used(&md->stats)))
dm_stats_account_io(&md->stats, bio_data_dir(bio),
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector, bio_sectors(bio),
false, 0, &io->stats_aux);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0635
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0635/
|
CWE-476
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/523f6b49c1a2289161f40cf9fe80b92e592e9441
|
523f6b49c1a2289161f40cf9fe80b92e592e9441
|
Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
|
status_t HevcParameterSets::makeHvcc(uint8_t *hvcc, size_t *hvccSize,
size_t nalSizeLength) {
if (hvcc == NULL || hvccSize == NULL
|| (nalSizeLength != 4 && nalSizeLength != 2)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
size_t size = 23; // 23 bytes in the header
size_t numOfArrays = 0;
const size_t numNalUnits = getNumNalUnits();
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kHevcNalUnitTypes); ++i) {
uint8_t type = kHevcNalUnitTypes[i];
size_t numNalus = getNumNalUnitsOfType(type);
if (numNalus == 0) {
continue;
}
++numOfArrays;
size += 3;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numNalUnits; ++j) {
if (getType(j) != type) {
continue;
}
size += 2 + getSize(j);
}
}
uint8_t generalProfileSpace, generalTierFlag, generalProfileIdc;
if (!findParam8(kGeneralProfileSpace, &generalProfileSpace)
|| !findParam8(kGeneralTierFlag, &generalTierFlag)
|| !findParam8(kGeneralProfileIdc, &generalProfileIdc)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t compatibilityFlags;
uint64_t constraintIdcFlags;
if (!findParam32(kGeneralProfileCompatibilityFlags, &compatibilityFlags)
|| !findParam64(kGeneralConstraintIndicatorFlags, &constraintIdcFlags)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t generalLevelIdc;
if (!findParam8(kGeneralLevelIdc, &generalLevelIdc)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t chromaFormatIdc, bitDepthLumaMinus8, bitDepthChromaMinus8;
if (!findParam8(kChromaFormatIdc, &chromaFormatIdc)
|| !findParam8(kBitDepthLumaMinus8, &bitDepthLumaMinus8)
|| !findParam8(kBitDepthChromaMinus8, &bitDepthChromaMinus8)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > *hvccSize) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
*hvccSize = size;
uint8_t *header = hvcc;
header[0] = 1;
header[1] = (kGeneralProfileSpace << 6) | (kGeneralTierFlag << 5) | kGeneralProfileIdc;
header[2] = (compatibilityFlags >> 24) & 0xff;
header[3] = (compatibilityFlags >> 16) & 0xff;
header[4] = (compatibilityFlags >> 8) & 0xff;
header[5] = compatibilityFlags & 0xff;
header[6] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 40) & 0xff;
header[7] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 32) & 0xff;
header[8] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 24) & 0xff;
header[9] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 16) & 0xff;
header[10] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 8) & 0xff;
header[11] = constraintIdcFlags & 0xff;
header[12] = generalLevelIdc;
header[13] = 0xf0;
header[14] = 0;
header[15] = 0xfc;
header[16] = 0xfc | chromaFormatIdc;
header[17] = 0xf8 | bitDepthLumaMinus8;
header[18] = 0xf8 | bitDepthChromaMinus8;
header[19] = 0;
header[20] = 0;
header[21] = nalSizeLength - 1;
header[22] = numOfArrays;
header += 23;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kHevcNalUnitTypes); ++i) {
uint8_t type = kHevcNalUnitTypes[i];
size_t numNalus = getNumNalUnitsOfType(type);
if (numNalus == 0) {
continue;
}
header[0] = type;
header[1] = (numNalus >> 8) & 0xff;
header[2] = numNalus & 0xff;
header += 3;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numNalUnits; ++j) {
if (getType(j) != type) {
continue;
}
header[0] = (getSize(j) >> 8) & 0xff;
header[1] = getSize(j) & 0xff;
if (!write(j, header + 2, size - (header - (uint8_t *)hvcc))) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
header += (2 + getSize(j));
}
}
CHECK_EQ(header - size, hvcc);
return OK;
}
|
status_t HevcParameterSets::makeHvcc(uint8_t *hvcc, size_t *hvccSize,
size_t nalSizeLength) {
if (hvcc == NULL || hvccSize == NULL
|| (nalSizeLength != 4 && nalSizeLength != 2)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
size_t size = 23; // 23 bytes in the header
size_t numOfArrays = 0;
const size_t numNalUnits = getNumNalUnits();
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kHevcNalUnitTypes); ++i) {
uint8_t type = kHevcNalUnitTypes[i];
size_t numNalus = getNumNalUnitsOfType(type);
if (numNalus == 0) {
continue;
}
++numOfArrays;
size += 3;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numNalUnits; ++j) {
if (getType(j) != type) {
continue;
}
size += 2 + getSize(j);
}
}
uint8_t generalProfileSpace, generalTierFlag, generalProfileIdc;
if (!findParam8(kGeneralProfileSpace, &generalProfileSpace)
|| !findParam8(kGeneralTierFlag, &generalTierFlag)
|| !findParam8(kGeneralProfileIdc, &generalProfileIdc)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t compatibilityFlags;
uint64_t constraintIdcFlags;
if (!findParam32(kGeneralProfileCompatibilityFlags, &compatibilityFlags)
|| !findParam64(kGeneralConstraintIndicatorFlags, &constraintIdcFlags)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t generalLevelIdc;
if (!findParam8(kGeneralLevelIdc, &generalLevelIdc)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t chromaFormatIdc, bitDepthLumaMinus8, bitDepthChromaMinus8;
if (!findParam8(kChromaFormatIdc, &chromaFormatIdc)
|| !findParam8(kBitDepthLumaMinus8, &bitDepthLumaMinus8)
|| !findParam8(kBitDepthChromaMinus8, &bitDepthChromaMinus8)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > *hvccSize) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
*hvccSize = size;
uint8_t *header = hvcc;
header[0] = 1;
header[1] = (kGeneralProfileSpace << 6) | (kGeneralTierFlag << 5) | kGeneralProfileIdc;
header[2] = (compatibilityFlags >> 24) & 0xff;
header[3] = (compatibilityFlags >> 16) & 0xff;
header[4] = (compatibilityFlags >> 8) & 0xff;
header[5] = compatibilityFlags & 0xff;
header[6] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 40) & 0xff;
header[7] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 32) & 0xff;
header[8] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 24) & 0xff;
header[9] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 16) & 0xff;
header[10] = (constraintIdcFlags >> 8) & 0xff;
header[11] = constraintIdcFlags & 0xff;
header[12] = generalLevelIdc;
header[13] = 0xf0;
header[14] = 0;
header[15] = 0xfc;
header[16] = 0xfc | chromaFormatIdc;
header[17] = 0xf8 | bitDepthLumaMinus8;
header[18] = 0xf8 | bitDepthChromaMinus8;
header[19] = 0;
header[20] = 0;
header[21] = nalSizeLength - 1;
header[22] = numOfArrays;
header += 23;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kHevcNalUnitTypes); ++i) {
uint8_t type = kHevcNalUnitTypes[i];
size_t numNalus = getNumNalUnitsOfType(type);
if (numNalus == 0) {
continue;
}
header[0] = type;
header[1] = (numNalus >> 8) & 0xff;
header[2] = numNalus & 0xff;
header += 3;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numNalUnits; ++j) {
if (getType(j) != type) {
continue;
}
header[0] = (getSize(j) >> 8) & 0xff;
header[1] = getSize(j) & 0xff;
if (!write(j, header + 2, size - (header - (uint8_t *)hvcc))) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
header += (2 + getSize(j));
}
}
CHECK_EQ(header - size, hvcc);
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6644
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6644/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/db93178bcaaf7e99ebb18bd51fa99b2feaf47e1f
|
db93178bcaaf7e99ebb18bd51fa99b2feaf47e1f
|
[Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
|
AppListSyncableService::SyncItem* AppListSyncableService::FindOrAddSyncItem(
AppListItem* app_item) {
const std::string& item_id = app_item->id();
if (item_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AppListItem item with empty ID";
return NULL;
}
SyncItem* sync_item = FindSyncItem(item_id);
if (sync_item) {
if (sync_item->item_type !=
sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP) {
DVLOG(2) << this << ": AddItem already exists: " << sync_item->ToString();
return sync_item;
}
if (RemoveDefaultApp(app_item, sync_item))
return NULL;
}
return CreateSyncItemFromAppItem(app_item);
}
|
AppListSyncableService::SyncItem* AppListSyncableService::FindOrAddSyncItem(
AppListItem* app_item) {
const std::string& item_id = app_item->id();
if (item_id.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "AppListItem item with empty ID";
return NULL;
}
SyncItem* sync_item = FindSyncItem(item_id);
if (sync_item) {
if (sync_item->item_type !=
sync_pb::AppListSpecifics::TYPE_REMOVE_DEFAULT_APP) {
DVLOG(2) << this << ": AddItem already exists: " << sync_item->ToString();
return sync_item;
}
if (RemoveDefaultApp(app_item, sync_item))
return NULL;
}
return CreateSyncItemFromAppItem(app_item);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Renderbuffer* GetRenderbufferInfoForTarget(
GLenum target) {
Renderbuffer* renderbuffer = NULL;
switch (target) {
case GL_RENDERBUFFER:
renderbuffer = state_.bound_renderbuffer.get();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return renderbuffer;
}
|
Renderbuffer* GetRenderbufferInfoForTarget(
GLenum target) {
Renderbuffer* renderbuffer = NULL;
switch (target) {
case GL_RENDERBUFFER:
renderbuffer = state_.bound_renderbuffer.get();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return renderbuffer;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2349/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e755d9faf5c7d75a8ea290892cb1b5cc07c412ec
|
e755d9faf5c7d75a8ea290892cb1b5cc07c412ec
|
cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PluginSelectionPolicy::StartInit() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &chromeos::PluginSelectionPolicy::Init));
}
|
void PluginSelectionPolicy::StartInit() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &chromeos::PluginSelectionPolicy::Init));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6085
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6085/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444
|
Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
|
BackendImpl::~BackendImpl() {
if (user_flags_ & kNoRandom) {
background_queue_.WaitForPendingIO();
} else {
background_queue_.DropPendingIO();
}
if (background_queue_.BackgroundIsCurrentSequence()) {
CleanupCache();
} else {
background_queue_.background_thread()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&FinalCleanupCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowWait allow_wait;
done_.Wait();
}
}
|
BackendImpl::~BackendImpl() {
if (user_flags_ & kNoRandom) {
background_queue_.WaitForPendingIO();
} else {
background_queue_.DropPendingIO();
}
if (background_queue_.BackgroundIsCurrentSequence()) {
CleanupCache();
} else {
background_queue_.background_thread()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&FinalCleanupCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowWait allow_wait;
done_.Wait();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
static void sched_domain_node_span(int node, struct cpumask *span)
{
nodemask_t used_nodes;
int i;
cpumask_clear(span);
nodes_clear(used_nodes);
cpumask_or(span, span, cpumask_of_node(node));
node_set(node, used_nodes);
for (i = 1; i < SD_NODES_PER_DOMAIN; i++) {
int next_node = find_next_best_node(node, &used_nodes);
if (next_node < 0)
break;
cpumask_or(span, span, cpumask_of_node(next_node));
}
}
|
static void sched_domain_node_span(int node, struct cpumask *span)
{
nodemask_t used_nodes;
int i;
cpumask_clear(span);
nodes_clear(used_nodes);
cpumask_or(span, span, cpumask_of_node(node));
node_set(node, used_nodes);
for (i = 1; i < SD_NODES_PER_DOMAIN; i++) {
int next_node = find_next_best_node(node, &used_nodes);
if (next_node < 0)
break;
cpumask_or(span, span, cpumask_of_node(next_node));
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2799/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void webViewEnterFullscreen(WebKitWebView* webView, Node* node)
{
if (!node->hasTagName(HTMLNames::videoTag))
return;
#if ENABLE(VIDEO)
HTMLMediaElement* videoElement = static_cast<HTMLMediaElement*>(node);
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
if (priv->fullscreenVideoController)
priv->fullscreenVideoController->exitFullscreen();
priv->fullscreenVideoController = new FullscreenVideoController;
priv->fullscreenVideoController->setMediaElement(videoElement);
priv->fullscreenVideoController->enterFullscreen();
#endif
}
|
void webViewEnterFullscreen(WebKitWebView* webView, Node* node)
{
if (!node->hasTagName(HTMLNames::videoTag))
return;
#if ENABLE(VIDEO)
HTMLMediaElement* videoElement = static_cast<HTMLMediaElement*>(node);
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
if (priv->fullscreenVideoController)
priv->fullscreenVideoController->exitFullscreen();
priv->fullscreenVideoController = new FullscreenVideoController;
priv->fullscreenVideoController->setMediaElement(videoElement);
priv->fullscreenVideoController->enterFullscreen();
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0006/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9
|
867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9
|
ima: fix add LSM rule bug
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.
This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.
default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
int i, entries;
/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
if (ima_use_tcb)
entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
else
entries = 0;
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
}
|
void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
int i, entries;
/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
if (ima_use_tcb)
entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
else
entries = 0;
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7e899141194fa27d55a990e38ae8bdcc5183a90
|
b7e899141194fa27d55a990e38ae8bdcc5183a90
|
C++ readability change for cindylau.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2090008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void set_linked_profile(OtrTestingProfile* profile) {
linked_profile_ = profile;
}
|
void set_linked_profile(OtrTestingProfile* profile) {
linked_profile_ = profile;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16528
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16528/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57
|
fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57
|
ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static int snd_seq_bus_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv)
{
struct snd_seq_device *sdev = to_seq_dev(dev);
struct snd_seq_driver *sdrv = to_seq_drv(drv);
return strcmp(sdrv->id, sdev->id) == 0 &&
sdrv->argsize == sdev->argsize;
}
|
static int snd_seq_bus_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv)
{
struct snd_seq_device *sdev = to_seq_dev(dev);
struct snd_seq_driver *sdrv = to_seq_drv(drv);
return strcmp(sdrv->id, sdev->id) == 0 &&
sdrv->argsize == sdev->argsize;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebView::registerEditCommand(PassRefPtr<WebEditCommandProxy> prpCommand, WebPageProxy::UndoOrRedo undoOrRedo)
{
RefPtr<WebEditCommandProxy> command = prpCommand;
m_undoClient.registerEditCommand(this, command, undoOrRedo);
}
|
void WebView::registerEditCommand(PassRefPtr<WebEditCommandProxy> prpCommand, WebPageProxy::UndoOrRedo undoOrRedo)
{
RefPtr<WebEditCommandProxy> command = prpCommand;
m_undoClient.registerEditCommand(this, command, undoOrRedo);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
DevTools: 'Overrides' UI overlay obstructs page and element inspector
BUG=302862
R=vsevik@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/40233006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160559 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InspectorPageAgent::updateViewMetrics(int width, int height, double deviceScaleFactor, bool fitWindow, bool textAutosizing)
{
m_client->overrideDeviceMetrics(width, height, static_cast<float>(deviceScaleFactor), fitWindow);
Settings& settings = m_page->settings();
if (m_enabled && textAutosizing) {
IntSize textAutosizingWindowSizeOverride = IntSize(width, height);
textAutosizingWindowSizeOverride.scale((float)(1.0 / deviceScaleFactor));
settings.setTextAutosizingWindowSizeOverride(textAutosizingWindowSizeOverride);
}
Document* document = mainFrame()->document();
if (document)
document->styleResolverChanged(RecalcStyleImmediately);
InspectorInstrumentation::mediaQueryResultChanged(document);
bool override = width && height;
m_client->setShowFPSCounter(m_state->getBoolean(PageAgentState::pageAgentShowFPSCounter) && !override);
m_client->setContinuousPaintingEnabled(m_state->getBoolean(PageAgentState::pageAgentContinuousPaintingEnabled) && !override);
}
|
void InspectorPageAgent::updateViewMetrics(int width, int height, double deviceScaleFactor, bool fitWindow, bool textAutosizing)
{
m_client->overrideDeviceMetrics(width, height, static_cast<float>(deviceScaleFactor), fitWindow);
Settings& settings = m_page->settings();
if (m_enabled && textAutosizing) {
IntSize textAutosizingWindowSizeOverride = IntSize(width, height);
textAutosizingWindowSizeOverride.scale((float)(1.0 / deviceScaleFactor));
settings.setTextAutosizingWindowSizeOverride(textAutosizingWindowSizeOverride);
}
Document* document = mainFrame()->document();
if (document)
document->styleResolverChanged(RecalcStyleImmediately);
InspectorInstrumentation::mediaQueryResultChanged(document);
m_overlay->setOverride(InspectorOverlay::ViewportOverride, width && height);
bool override = width && height;
m_client->setShowFPSCounter(m_state->getBoolean(PageAgentState::pageAgentShowFPSCounter) && !override);
m_client->setContinuousPaintingEnabled(m_state->getBoolean(PageAgentState::pageAgentContinuousPaintingEnabled) && !override);
updateOverridesTopOffset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2803
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2803/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/48f2ec5c24570c9b96bb2798a9ffe956117c5066
|
48f2ec5c24570c9b96bb2798a9ffe956117c5066
|
Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TreeView::CreateItem(HTREEITEM parent_item,
HTREEITEM after,
TreeModelNode* node) {
DCHECK(node);
TVINSERTSTRUCT insert_struct = {0};
insert_struct.hParent = parent_item;
insert_struct.hInsertAfter = after;
insert_struct.itemex.mask = TVIF_PARAM | TVIF_CHILDREN | TVIF_TEXT |
TVIF_SELECTEDIMAGE | TVIF_IMAGE;
insert_struct.itemex.pszText = LPSTR_TEXTCALLBACK;
insert_struct.itemex.cChildren = I_CHILDRENCALLBACK;
int icon_index = model_->GetIconIndex(node);
if (icon_index == -1) {
insert_struct.itemex.iImage = 0;
insert_struct.itemex.iSelectedImage = 1;
} else {
insert_struct.itemex.iImage = icon_index + 2;
insert_struct.itemex.iSelectedImage = icon_index + 2;
}
int node_id = next_id_++;
insert_struct.itemex.lParam = node_id;
NodeDetails* node_details = new NodeDetails(node_id, node);
DCHECK(node_to_details_map_.count(node) == 0);
DCHECK(id_to_details_map_.count(node_id) == 0);
node_to_details_map_[node] = node_details;
id_to_details_map_[node_id] = node_details;
node_details->tree_item = TreeView_InsertItem(tree_view_, &insert_struct);
}
|
void TreeView::CreateItem(HTREEITEM parent_item,
HTREEITEM after,
TreeModelNode* node) {
DCHECK(node);
TVINSERTSTRUCT insert_struct = {0};
insert_struct.hParent = parent_item;
insert_struct.hInsertAfter = after;
insert_struct.itemex.mask = TVIF_PARAM | TVIF_CHILDREN | TVIF_TEXT |
TVIF_SELECTEDIMAGE | TVIF_IMAGE;
insert_struct.itemex.pszText = LPSTR_TEXTCALLBACK;
insert_struct.itemex.cChildren = I_CHILDRENCALLBACK;
int icon_index = model_->GetIconIndex(node);
if (icon_index == -1) {
insert_struct.itemex.iImage = 0;
insert_struct.itemex.iSelectedImage = 1;
} else {
insert_struct.itemex.iImage = icon_index + 2;
insert_struct.itemex.iSelectedImage = icon_index + 2;
}
int node_id = next_id_++;
insert_struct.itemex.lParam = node_id;
NodeDetails* node_details = new NodeDetails(node_id, node);
DCHECK(node_to_details_map_.count(node) == 0);
DCHECK(id_to_details_map_.count(node_id) == 0);
node_to_details_map_[node] = node_details;
id_to_details_map_[node_id] = node_details;
node_details->tree_item = TreeView_InsertItem(tree_view_, &insert_struct);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static int setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize)
{
struct salsa20_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
salsa20_keysetup(ctx, key, keysize);
return 0;
}
|
static int setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize)
{
struct salsa20_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
salsa20_keysetup(ctx, key, keysize);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9992
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9992/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/f52fbf4f3ed02a7d872d8a102006f29b4421f360
|
f52fbf4f3ed02a7d872d8a102006f29b4421f360
|
avcodec/dfa: Fix off by 1 error
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1345/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6062963045695488
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static int decode_wdlt(GetByteContext *gb, uint8_t *frame, int width, int height)
{
const uint8_t *frame_end = frame + width * height;
uint8_t *line_ptr;
int count, i, v, lines, segments;
int y = 0;
lines = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
if (lines > height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
while (lines--) {
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16u(gb);
while ((segments & 0xC000) == 0xC000) {
unsigned skip_lines = -(int16_t)segments;
unsigned delta = -((int16_t)segments * width);
if (frame_end - frame <= delta || y + lines + skip_lines > height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += delta;
y += skip_lines;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
}
if (frame_end <= frame)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (segments & 0x8000) {
frame[width - 1] = segments & 0xFF;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
}
line_ptr = frame;
if (frame_end - frame < width)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += width;
y++;
while (segments--) {
if (frame - line_ptr <= bytestream2_peek_byte(gb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
line_ptr += bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
count = (int8_t)bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
if (count >= 0) {
if (frame - line_ptr < count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bytestream2_get_buffer(gb, line_ptr, count * 2) != count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
line_ptr += count * 2;
} else {
count = -count;
if (frame - line_ptr < count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
v = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
bytestream_put_le16(&line_ptr, v);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int decode_wdlt(GetByteContext *gb, uint8_t *frame, int width, int height)
{
const uint8_t *frame_end = frame + width * height;
uint8_t *line_ptr;
int count, i, v, lines, segments;
int y = 0;
lines = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
if (lines > height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
while (lines--) {
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16u(gb);
while ((segments & 0xC000) == 0xC000) {
unsigned skip_lines = -(int16_t)segments;
unsigned delta = -((int16_t)segments * width);
if (frame_end - frame <= delta || y + lines + skip_lines > height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += delta;
y += skip_lines;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
}
if (frame_end <= frame)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (segments & 0x8000) {
frame[width - 1] = segments & 0xFF;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
}
line_ptr = frame;
if (frame_end - frame < width)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += width;
y++;
while (segments--) {
if (frame - line_ptr <= bytestream2_peek_byte(gb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
line_ptr += bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
count = (int8_t)bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
if (count >= 0) {
if (frame - line_ptr < count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bytestream2_get_buffer(gb, line_ptr, count * 2) != count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
line_ptr += count * 2;
} else {
count = -count;
if (frame - line_ptr < count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
v = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
bytestream_put_le16(&line_ptr, v);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
int snd_seq_delete_kernel_client(int client)
{
struct snd_seq_client *ptr;
if (snd_BUG_ON(in_interrupt()))
return -EBUSY;
ptr = clientptr(client);
if (ptr == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
seq_free_client(ptr);
kfree(ptr);
return 0;
}
|
int snd_seq_delete_kernel_client(int client)
{
struct snd_seq_client *ptr;
if (snd_BUG_ON(in_interrupt()))
return -EBUSY;
ptr = clientptr(client);
if (ptr == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
seq_free_client(ptr);
kfree(ptr);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
|
7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a
| null |
GBool GfxShadingBitBuf::getBits(int n, Guint *val) {
int x;
if (nBits >= n) {
x = (bitBuf >> (nBits - n)) & ((1 << n) - 1);
nBits -= n;
} else {
x = 0;
if (nBits > 0) {
x = bitBuf & ((1 << nBits) - 1);
n -= nBits;
nBits = 0;
}
while (n > 0) {
if ((bitBuf = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
nBits = 0;
return gFalse;
}
if (n >= 8) {
x = (x << 8) | bitBuf;
n -= 8;
} else {
x = (x << n) | (bitBuf >> (8 - n));
nBits = 8 - n;
n = 0;
}
}
}
*val = x;
return gTrue;
}
|
GBool GfxShadingBitBuf::getBits(int n, Guint *val) {
int x;
if (nBits >= n) {
x = (bitBuf >> (nBits - n)) & ((1 << n) - 1);
nBits -= n;
} else {
x = 0;
if (nBits > 0) {
x = bitBuf & ((1 << nBits) - 1);
n -= nBits;
nBits = 0;
}
while (n > 0) {
if ((bitBuf = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
nBits = 0;
return gFalse;
}
if (n >= 8) {
x = (x << 8) | bitBuf;
n -= 8;
} else {
x = (x << n) | (bitBuf >> (8 - n));
nBits = 8 - n;
n = 0;
}
}
}
*val = x;
return gTrue;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
unsigned HTMLInputElement::selectionEndForBinding(
bool& is_null,
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
is_null = true;
return 0;
}
return TextControlElement::selectionEnd();
}
|
unsigned HTMLInputElement::selectionEndForBinding(
bool& is_null,
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
is_null = true;
return 0;
}
return TextControlElement::selectionEnd();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9840/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/madler/zlib/commit/6a043145ca6e9c55184013841a67b2fef87e44c0
|
6a043145ca6e9c55184013841a67b2fef87e44c0
|
Remove offset pointer optimization in inftrees.c.
inftrees.c was subtracting an offset from a pointer to an array,
in order to provide a pointer that allowed indexing starting at
the offset. This is not compliant with the C standard, for which
the behavior of a pointer decremented before its allocated memory
is undefined. Per the recommendation of a security audit of the
zlib code by Trail of Bits and TrustInSoft, in support of the
Mozilla Foundation, this tiny optimization was removed, in order
to avoid the possibility of undefined behavior.
|
int ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_table(type, lens, codes, table, bits, work)
codetype type;
unsigned short FAR *lens;
unsigned codes;
code FAR * FAR *table;
unsigned FAR *bits;
unsigned short FAR *work;
{
unsigned len; /* a code's length in bits */
unsigned sym; /* index of code symbols */
unsigned min, max; /* minimum and maximum code lengths */
unsigned root; /* number of index bits for root table */
unsigned curr; /* number of index bits for current table */
unsigned drop; /* code bits to drop for sub-table */
int left; /* number of prefix codes available */
unsigned used; /* code entries in table used */
unsigned huff; /* Huffman code */
unsigned incr; /* for incrementing code, index */
unsigned fill; /* index for replicating entries */
unsigned low; /* low bits for current root entry */
unsigned mask; /* mask for low root bits */
code here; /* table entry for duplication */
code FAR *next; /* next available space in table */
const unsigned short FAR *base; /* base value table to use */
const unsigned short FAR *extra; /* extra bits table to use */
unsigned match; /* use base and extra for symbol >= match */
unsigned short count[MAXBITS+1]; /* number of codes of each length */
unsigned short offs[MAXBITS+1]; /* offsets in table for each length */
static const unsigned short lbase[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 base */
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 27, 31,
35, 43, 51, 59, 67, 83, 99, 115, 131, 163, 195, 227, 258, 0, 0};
static const unsigned short lext[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 extra */
16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 17, 18, 18, 18, 18,
19, 19, 19, 19, 20, 20, 20, 20, 21, 21, 21, 21, 16, 203, 198};
static const unsigned short dbase[32] = { /* Distance codes 0..29 base */
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 17, 25, 33, 49, 65, 97, 129, 193,
257, 385, 513, 769, 1025, 1537, 2049, 3073, 4097, 6145,
8193, 12289, 16385, 24577, 0, 0};
static const unsigned short dext[32] = { /* Distance codes 0..29 extra */
16, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 18, 18, 19, 19, 20, 20, 21, 21, 22, 22,
23, 23, 24, 24, 25, 25, 26, 26, 27, 27,
28, 28, 29, 29, 64, 64};
/*
Process a set of code lengths to create a canonical Huffman code. The
code lengths are lens[0..codes-1]. Each length corresponds to the
symbols 0..codes-1. The Huffman code is generated by first sorting the
symbols by length from short to long, and retaining the symbol order
for codes with equal lengths. Then the code starts with all zero bits
for the first code of the shortest length, and the codes are integer
increments for the same length, and zeros are appended as the length
increases. For the deflate format, these bits are stored backwards
from their more natural integer increment ordering, and so when the
decoding tables are built in the large loop below, the integer codes
are incremented backwards.
This routine assumes, but does not check, that all of the entries in
lens[] are in the range 0..MAXBITS. The caller must assure this.
1..MAXBITS is interpreted as that code length. zero means that that
symbol does not occur in this code.
The codes are sorted by computing a count of codes for each length,
creating from that a table of starting indices for each length in the
sorted table, and then entering the symbols in order in the sorted
table. The sorted table is work[], with that space being provided by
the caller.
The length counts are used for other purposes as well, i.e. finding
the minimum and maximum length codes, determining if there are any
codes at all, checking for a valid set of lengths, and looking ahead
at length counts to determine sub-table sizes when building the
decoding tables.
*/
/* accumulate lengths for codes (assumes lens[] all in 0..MAXBITS) */
for (len = 0; len <= MAXBITS; len++)
count[len] = 0;
for (sym = 0; sym < codes; sym++)
count[lens[sym]]++;
/* bound code lengths, force root to be within code lengths */
root = *bits;
for (max = MAXBITS; max >= 1; max--)
if (count[max] != 0) break;
if (root > max) root = max;
if (max == 0) { /* no symbols to code at all */
here.op = (unsigned char)64; /* invalid code marker */
here.bits = (unsigned char)1;
here.val = (unsigned short)0;
*(*table)++ = here; /* make a table to force an error */
*(*table)++ = here;
*bits = 1;
return 0; /* no symbols, but wait for decoding to report error */
}
for (min = 1; min < max; min++)
if (count[min] != 0) break;
if (root < min) root = min;
/* check for an over-subscribed or incomplete set of lengths */
left = 1;
for (len = 1; len <= MAXBITS; len++) {
left <<= 1;
left -= count[len];
if (left < 0) return -1; /* over-subscribed */
}
if (left > 0 && (type == CODES || max != 1))
return -1; /* incomplete set */
/* generate offsets into symbol table for each length for sorting */
offs[1] = 0;
for (len = 1; len < MAXBITS; len++)
offs[len + 1] = offs[len] + count[len];
/* sort symbols by length, by symbol order within each length */
for (sym = 0; sym < codes; sym++)
if (lens[sym] != 0) work[offs[lens[sym]]++] = (unsigned short)sym;
/*
Create and fill in decoding tables. In this loop, the table being
filled is at next and has curr index bits. The code being used is huff
with length len. That code is converted to an index by dropping drop
bits off of the bottom. For codes where len is less than drop + curr,
those top drop + curr - len bits are incremented through all values to
fill the table with replicated entries.
root is the number of index bits for the root table. When len exceeds
root, sub-tables are created pointed to by the root entry with an index
of the low root bits of huff. This is saved in low to check for when a
new sub-table should be started. drop is zero when the root table is
being filled, and drop is root when sub-tables are being filled.
When a new sub-table is needed, it is necessary to look ahead in the
code lengths to determine what size sub-table is needed. The length
counts are used for this, and so count[] is decremented as codes are
entered in the tables.
used keeps track of how many table entries have been allocated from the
provided *table space. It is checked for LENS and DIST tables against
the constants ENOUGH_LENS and ENOUGH_DISTS to guard against changes in
the initial root table size constants. See the comments in inftrees.h
for more information.
sym increments through all symbols, and the loop terminates when
all codes of length max, i.e. all codes, have been processed. This
routine permits incomplete codes, so another loop after this one fills
in the rest of the decoding tables with invalid code markers.
*/
/* set up for code type */
switch (type) {
case CODES:
base = extra = work; /* dummy value--not used */
match = 20;
break;
case LENS:
base = lbase;
extra = lext;
match = 257;
break;
default: /* DISTS */
base = dbase;
extra = dext;
match = 0;
}
/* initialize state for loop */
huff = 0; /* starting code */
sym = 0; /* starting code symbol */
len = min; /* starting code length */
next = *table; /* current table to fill in */
curr = root; /* current table index bits */
drop = 0; /* current bits to drop from code for index */
low = (unsigned)(-1); /* trigger new sub-table when len > root */
used = 1U << root; /* use root table entries */
mask = used - 1; /* mask for comparing low */
/* check available table space */
if ((type == LENS && used > ENOUGH_LENS) ||
(type == DISTS && used > ENOUGH_DISTS))
return 1;
/* process all codes and make table entries */
for (;;) {
/* create table entry */
here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
if (work[sym] + 1 < match) {
here.op = (unsigned char)0;
here.val = work[sym];
}
else if (work[sym] >= match) {
here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym] - match]);
here.val = base[work[sym] - match];
}
else {
here.op = (unsigned char)(32 + 64); /* end of block */
here.val = 0;
}
/* replicate for those indices with low len bits equal to huff */
incr = 1U << (len - drop);
fill = 1U << curr;
min = fill; /* save offset to next table */
do {
fill -= incr;
next[(huff >> drop) + fill] = here;
} while (fill != 0);
/* backwards increment the len-bit code huff */
incr = 1U << (len - 1);
while (huff & incr)
incr >>= 1;
if (incr != 0) {
huff &= incr - 1;
huff += incr;
}
else
huff = 0;
/* go to next symbol, update count, len */
sym++;
if (--(count[len]) == 0) {
if (len == max) break;
len = lens[work[sym]];
}
/* create new sub-table if needed */
if (len > root && (huff & mask) != low) {
/* if first time, transition to sub-tables */
if (drop == 0)
drop = root;
/* increment past last table */
next += min; /* here min is 1 << curr */
/* determine length of next table */
curr = len - drop;
left = (int)(1 << curr);
while (curr + drop < max) {
left -= count[curr + drop];
if (left <= 0) break;
curr++;
left <<= 1;
}
/* check for enough space */
used += 1U << curr;
if ((type == LENS && used > ENOUGH_LENS) ||
(type == DISTS && used > ENOUGH_DISTS))
return 1;
/* point entry in root table to sub-table */
low = huff & mask;
(*table)[low].op = (unsigned char)curr;
(*table)[low].bits = (unsigned char)root;
(*table)[low].val = (unsigned short)(next - *table);
}
}
/* fill in remaining table entry if code is incomplete (guaranteed to have
at most one remaining entry, since if the code is incomplete, the
maximum code length that was allowed to get this far is one bit) */
if (huff != 0) {
here.op = (unsigned char)64; /* invalid code marker */
here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
here.val = (unsigned short)0;
next[huff] = here;
}
/* set return parameters */
*table += used;
*bits = root;
return 0;
}
|
int ZLIB_INTERNAL inflate_table(type, lens, codes, table, bits, work)
codetype type;
unsigned short FAR *lens;
unsigned codes;
code FAR * FAR *table;
unsigned FAR *bits;
unsigned short FAR *work;
{
unsigned len; /* a code's length in bits */
unsigned sym; /* index of code symbols */
unsigned min, max; /* minimum and maximum code lengths */
unsigned root; /* number of index bits for root table */
unsigned curr; /* number of index bits for current table */
unsigned drop; /* code bits to drop for sub-table */
int left; /* number of prefix codes available */
unsigned used; /* code entries in table used */
unsigned huff; /* Huffman code */
unsigned incr; /* for incrementing code, index */
unsigned fill; /* index for replicating entries */
unsigned low; /* low bits for current root entry */
unsigned mask; /* mask for low root bits */
code here; /* table entry for duplication */
code FAR *next; /* next available space in table */
const unsigned short FAR *base; /* base value table to use */
const unsigned short FAR *extra; /* extra bits table to use */
int end; /* use base and extra for symbol > end */
unsigned short count[MAXBITS+1]; /* number of codes of each length */
unsigned short offs[MAXBITS+1]; /* offsets in table for each length */
static const unsigned short lbase[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 base */
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 27, 31,
35, 43, 51, 59, 67, 83, 99, 115, 131, 163, 195, 227, 258, 0, 0};
static const unsigned short lext[31] = { /* Length codes 257..285 extra */
16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 17, 18, 18, 18, 18,
19, 19, 19, 19, 20, 20, 20, 20, 21, 21, 21, 21, 16, 203, 198};
static const unsigned short dbase[32] = { /* Distance codes 0..29 base */
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 17, 25, 33, 49, 65, 97, 129, 193,
257, 385, 513, 769, 1025, 1537, 2049, 3073, 4097, 6145,
8193, 12289, 16385, 24577, 0, 0};
static const unsigned short dext[32] = { /* Distance codes 0..29 extra */
16, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 18, 18, 19, 19, 20, 20, 21, 21, 22, 22,
23, 23, 24, 24, 25, 25, 26, 26, 27, 27,
28, 28, 29, 29, 64, 64};
/*
Process a set of code lengths to create a canonical Huffman code. The
code lengths are lens[0..codes-1]. Each length corresponds to the
symbols 0..codes-1. The Huffman code is generated by first sorting the
symbols by length from short to long, and retaining the symbol order
for codes with equal lengths. Then the code starts with all zero bits
for the first code of the shortest length, and the codes are integer
increments for the same length, and zeros are appended as the length
increases. For the deflate format, these bits are stored backwards
from their more natural integer increment ordering, and so when the
decoding tables are built in the large loop below, the integer codes
are incremented backwards.
This routine assumes, but does not check, that all of the entries in
lens[] are in the range 0..MAXBITS. The caller must assure this.
1..MAXBITS is interpreted as that code length. zero means that that
symbol does not occur in this code.
The codes are sorted by computing a count of codes for each length,
creating from that a table of starting indices for each length in the
sorted table, and then entering the symbols in order in the sorted
table. The sorted table is work[], with that space being provided by
the caller.
The length counts are used for other purposes as well, i.e. finding
the minimum and maximum length codes, determining if there are any
codes at all, checking for a valid set of lengths, and looking ahead
at length counts to determine sub-table sizes when building the
decoding tables.
*/
/* accumulate lengths for codes (assumes lens[] all in 0..MAXBITS) */
for (len = 0; len <= MAXBITS; len++)
count[len] = 0;
for (sym = 0; sym < codes; sym++)
count[lens[sym]]++;
/* bound code lengths, force root to be within code lengths */
root = *bits;
for (max = MAXBITS; max >= 1; max--)
if (count[max] != 0) break;
if (root > max) root = max;
if (max == 0) { /* no symbols to code at all */
here.op = (unsigned char)64; /* invalid code marker */
here.bits = (unsigned char)1;
here.val = (unsigned short)0;
*(*table)++ = here; /* make a table to force an error */
*(*table)++ = here;
*bits = 1;
return 0; /* no symbols, but wait for decoding to report error */
}
for (min = 1; min < max; min++)
if (count[min] != 0) break;
if (root < min) root = min;
/* check for an over-subscribed or incomplete set of lengths */
left = 1;
for (len = 1; len <= MAXBITS; len++) {
left <<= 1;
left -= count[len];
if (left < 0) return -1; /* over-subscribed */
}
if (left > 0 && (type == CODES || max != 1))
return -1; /* incomplete set */
/* generate offsets into symbol table for each length for sorting */
offs[1] = 0;
for (len = 1; len < MAXBITS; len++)
offs[len + 1] = offs[len] + count[len];
/* sort symbols by length, by symbol order within each length */
for (sym = 0; sym < codes; sym++)
if (lens[sym] != 0) work[offs[lens[sym]]++] = (unsigned short)sym;
/*
Create and fill in decoding tables. In this loop, the table being
filled is at next and has curr index bits. The code being used is huff
with length len. That code is converted to an index by dropping drop
bits off of the bottom. For codes where len is less than drop + curr,
those top drop + curr - len bits are incremented through all values to
fill the table with replicated entries.
root is the number of index bits for the root table. When len exceeds
root, sub-tables are created pointed to by the root entry with an index
of the low root bits of huff. This is saved in low to check for when a
new sub-table should be started. drop is zero when the root table is
being filled, and drop is root when sub-tables are being filled.
When a new sub-table is needed, it is necessary to look ahead in the
code lengths to determine what size sub-table is needed. The length
counts are used for this, and so count[] is decremented as codes are
entered in the tables.
used keeps track of how many table entries have been allocated from the
provided *table space. It is checked for LENS and DIST tables against
the constants ENOUGH_LENS and ENOUGH_DISTS to guard against changes in
the initial root table size constants. See the comments in inftrees.h
for more information.
sym increments through all symbols, and the loop terminates when
all codes of length max, i.e. all codes, have been processed. This
routine permits incomplete codes, so another loop after this one fills
in the rest of the decoding tables with invalid code markers.
*/
/* set up for code type */
switch (type) {
case CODES:
base = extra = work; /* dummy value--not used */
end = 19;
break;
case LENS:
base = lbase;
base -= 257;
extra = lext;
extra -= 257;
end = 256;
break;
default: /* DISTS */
base = dbase;
extra = dext;
end = -1;
}
/* initialize state for loop */
huff = 0; /* starting code */
sym = 0; /* starting code symbol */
len = min; /* starting code length */
next = *table; /* current table to fill in */
curr = root; /* current table index bits */
drop = 0; /* current bits to drop from code for index */
low = (unsigned)(-1); /* trigger new sub-table when len > root */
used = 1U << root; /* use root table entries */
mask = used - 1; /* mask for comparing low */
/* check available table space */
if ((type == LENS && used > ENOUGH_LENS) ||
(type == DISTS && used > ENOUGH_DISTS))
return 1;
/* process all codes and make table entries */
for (;;) {
/* create table entry */
here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
if ((int)(work[sym]) < end) {
here.op = (unsigned char)0;
here.val = work[sym];
}
else if ((int)(work[sym]) > end) {
here.op = (unsigned char)(extra[work[sym]]);
here.val = base[work[sym]];
}
else {
here.op = (unsigned char)(32 + 64); /* end of block */
here.val = 0;
}
/* replicate for those indices with low len bits equal to huff */
incr = 1U << (len - drop);
fill = 1U << curr;
min = fill; /* save offset to next table */
do {
fill -= incr;
next[(huff >> drop) + fill] = here;
} while (fill != 0);
/* backwards increment the len-bit code huff */
incr = 1U << (len - 1);
while (huff & incr)
incr >>= 1;
if (incr != 0) {
huff &= incr - 1;
huff += incr;
}
else
huff = 0;
/* go to next symbol, update count, len */
sym++;
if (--(count[len]) == 0) {
if (len == max) break;
len = lens[work[sym]];
}
/* create new sub-table if needed */
if (len > root && (huff & mask) != low) {
/* if first time, transition to sub-tables */
if (drop == 0)
drop = root;
/* increment past last table */
next += min; /* here min is 1 << curr */
/* determine length of next table */
curr = len - drop;
left = (int)(1 << curr);
while (curr + drop < max) {
left -= count[curr + drop];
if (left <= 0) break;
curr++;
left <<= 1;
}
/* check for enough space */
used += 1U << curr;
if ((type == LENS && used > ENOUGH_LENS) ||
(type == DISTS && used > ENOUGH_DISTS))
return 1;
/* point entry in root table to sub-table */
low = huff & mask;
(*table)[low].op = (unsigned char)curr;
(*table)[low].bits = (unsigned char)root;
(*table)[low].val = (unsigned short)(next - *table);
}
}
/* fill in remaining table entry if code is incomplete (guaranteed to have
at most one remaining entry, since if the code is incomplete, the
maximum code length that was allowed to get this far is one bit) */
if (huff != 0) {
here.op = (unsigned char)64; /* invalid code marker */
here.bits = (unsigned char)(len - drop);
here.val = (unsigned short)0;
next[huff] = here;
}
/* set return parameters */
*table += used;
*bits = root;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
zlib
| 1 |
CVE-2018-20839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20839/
|
CWE-255
|
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/9725f1a10f80f5e0ae7d9b60547458622aeb322f
|
9725f1a10f80f5e0ae7d9b60547458622aeb322f
|
Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
|
int acquire_terminal(
const char *name,
AcquireTerminalFlags flags,
usec_t timeout) {
_cleanup_close_ int notify = -1, fd = -1;
usec_t ts = USEC_INFINITY;
int r, wd = -1;
assert(name);
assert(IN_SET(flags & ~ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT));
/* We use inotify to be notified when the tty is closed. We create the watch before checking if we can actually
* acquire it, so that we don't lose any event.
*
* Note: strictly speaking this actually watches for the device being closed, it does *not* really watch
* whether a tty loses its controlling process. However, unless some rogue process uses TIOCNOTTY on /dev/tty
* *after* closing its tty otherwise this will not become a problem. As long as the administrator makes sure to
* not configure any service on the same tty as an untrusted user this should not be a problem. (Which they
* probably should not do anyway.) */
if ((flags & ~ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE) == ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT) {
notify = inotify_init1(IN_CLOEXEC | (timeout != USEC_INFINITY ? IN_NONBLOCK : 0));
if (notify < 0)
return -errno;
wd = inotify_add_watch(notify, name, IN_CLOSE);
if (wd < 0)
return -errno;
if (timeout != USEC_INFINITY)
ts = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
}
for (;;) {
struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = {
.sa_handler = SIG_IGN,
.sa_flags = SA_RESTART,
};
if (notify >= 0) {
r = flush_fd(notify);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* We pass here O_NOCTTY only so that we can check the return value TIOCSCTTY and have a reliable way
* to figure out if we successfully became the controlling process of the tty */
fd = open_terminal(name, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
/* Temporarily ignore SIGHUP, so that we don't get SIGHUP'ed if we already own the tty. */
assert_se(sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa_new, &sa_old) == 0);
/* First, try to get the tty */
r = ioctl(fd, TIOCSCTTY,
(flags & ~ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE) == ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
/* Reset signal handler to old value */
assert_se(sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa_old, NULL) == 0);
/* Success? Exit the loop now! */
if (r >= 0)
break;
/* Any failure besides -EPERM? Fail, regardless of the mode. */
if (r != -EPERM)
return r;
if (flags & ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE) /* If we are in permissive mode, then EPERM is fine, turn this
* into a success. Note that EPERM is also returned if we
* already are the owner of the TTY. */
break;
if (flags != ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT) /* If we are in TRY or FORCE mode, then propagate EPERM as EPERM */
return r;
assert(notify >= 0);
assert(wd >= 0);
for (;;) {
union inotify_event_buffer buffer;
struct inotify_event *e;
ssize_t l;
if (timeout != USEC_INFINITY) {
usec_t n;
assert(ts != USEC_INFINITY);
n = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
if (ts + timeout < n)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
r = fd_wait_for_event(notify, POLLIN, ts + timeout - n);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
l = read(notify, &buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (l < 0) {
if (IN_SET(errno, EINTR, EAGAIN))
continue;
return -errno;
}
FOREACH_INOTIFY_EVENT(e, buffer, l) {
if (e->mask & IN_Q_OVERFLOW) /* If we hit an inotify queue overflow, simply check if the terminal is up for grabs now. */
break;
if (e->wd != wd || !(e->mask & IN_CLOSE)) /* Safety checks */
return -EIO;
}
break;
}
/* We close the tty fd here since if the old session ended our handle will be dead. It's important that
* we do this after sleeping, so that we don't enter an endless loop. */
fd = safe_close(fd);
}
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
|
int acquire_terminal(
const char *name,
AcquireTerminalFlags flags,
usec_t timeout) {
_cleanup_close_ int notify = -1, fd = -1;
usec_t ts = USEC_INFINITY;
int r, wd = -1;
assert(name);
assert(IN_SET(flags & ~ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT));
/* We use inotify to be notified when the tty is closed. We create the watch before checking if we can actually
* acquire it, so that we don't lose any event.
*
* Note: strictly speaking this actually watches for the device being closed, it does *not* really watch
* whether a tty loses its controlling process. However, unless some rogue process uses TIOCNOTTY on /dev/tty
* *after* closing its tty otherwise this will not become a problem. As long as the administrator makes sure to
* not configure any service on the same tty as an untrusted user this should not be a problem. (Which they
* probably should not do anyway.) */
if ((flags & ~ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE) == ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT) {
notify = inotify_init1(IN_CLOEXEC | (timeout != USEC_INFINITY ? IN_NONBLOCK : 0));
if (notify < 0)
return -errno;
wd = inotify_add_watch(notify, name, IN_CLOSE);
if (wd < 0)
return -errno;
if (timeout != USEC_INFINITY)
ts = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
}
for (;;) {
struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = {
.sa_handler = SIG_IGN,
.sa_flags = SA_RESTART,
};
if (notify >= 0) {
r = flush_fd(notify);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
/* We pass here O_NOCTTY only so that we can check the return value TIOCSCTTY and have a reliable way
* to figure out if we successfully became the controlling process of the tty */
fd = open_terminal(name, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
/* Temporarily ignore SIGHUP, so that we don't get SIGHUP'ed if we already own the tty. */
assert_se(sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa_new, &sa_old) == 0);
/* First, try to get the tty */
r = ioctl(fd, TIOCSCTTY,
(flags & ~ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE) == ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
/* Reset signal handler to old value */
assert_se(sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa_old, NULL) == 0);
/* Success? Exit the loop now! */
if (r >= 0)
break;
/* Any failure besides -EPERM? Fail, regardless of the mode. */
if (r != -EPERM)
return r;
if (flags & ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_PERMISSIVE) /* If we are in permissive mode, then EPERM is fine, turn this
* into a success. Note that EPERM is also returned if we
* already are the owner of the TTY. */
break;
if (flags != ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT) /* If we are in TRY or FORCE mode, then propagate EPERM as EPERM */
return r;
assert(notify >= 0);
assert(wd >= 0);
for (;;) {
union inotify_event_buffer buffer;
struct inotify_event *e;
ssize_t l;
if (timeout != USEC_INFINITY) {
usec_t n;
assert(ts != USEC_INFINITY);
n = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
if (ts + timeout < n)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
r = fd_wait_for_event(notify, POLLIN, ts + timeout - n);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
l = read(notify, &buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (l < 0) {
if (IN_SET(errno, EINTR, EAGAIN))
continue;
return -errno;
}
FOREACH_INOTIFY_EVENT(e, buffer, l) {
if (e->mask & IN_Q_OVERFLOW) /* If we hit an inotify queue overflow, simply check if the terminal is up for grabs now. */
break;
if (e->wd != wd || !(e->mask & IN_CLOSE)) /* Safety checks */
return -EIO;
}
break;
}
/* We close the tty fd here since if the old session ended our handle will be dead. It's important that
* we do this after sleeping, so that we don't enter an endless loop. */
fd = safe_close(fd);
}
return TAKE_FD(fd);
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18203/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
b9a41d21dceadf8104812626ef85dc56ee8a60ed
|
dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
|
int dm_create(int minor, struct mapped_device **result)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
md = alloc_dev(minor);
if (!md)
return -ENXIO;
dm_sysfs_init(md);
*result = md;
return 0;
}
|
int dm_create(int minor, struct mapped_device **result)
{
struct mapped_device *md;
md = alloc_dev(minor);
if (!md)
return -ENXIO;
dm_sysfs_init(md);
*result = md;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8955
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8955/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071
|
8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071
|
arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
armpmu_enable_percpu_irq(void *data)
{
unsigned int irq = *(unsigned int *)data;
enable_percpu_irq(irq, IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
}
|
armpmu_enable_percpu_irq(void *data)
{
unsigned int irq = *(unsigned int *)data;
enable_percpu_irq(irq, IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::CopyToFindPboard() {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(
new InputMsg_CopyToFindPboard(focused_frame->GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CopyToFindPboard"));
#endif
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::CopyToFindPboard() {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(
new InputMsg_CopyToFindPboard(focused_frame->GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CopyToFindPboard"));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathCompFunctionCall(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *name;
xmlChar *prefix;
int nbargs = 0;
int sort = 1;
name = xmlXPathParseQName(ctxt, &prefix);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFree(prefix);
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXPR
if (prefix == NULL)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "Calling function %s\n",
name);
else
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "Calling function %s:%s\n",
prefix, name);
#endif
if (CUR != '(') {
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Optimization for count(): we don't need the node-set to be sorted.
*/
if ((prefix == NULL) && (name[0] == 'c') &&
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "count"))
{
sort = 0;
}
ctxt->comp->last = -1;
if (CUR != ')') {
while (CUR != 0) {
int op1 = ctxt->comp->last;
ctxt->comp->last = -1;
xmlXPathCompileExpr(ctxt, sort);
if (ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
xmlFree(name);
xmlFree(prefix);
return;
}
PUSH_BINARY_EXPR(XPATH_OP_ARG, op1, ctxt->comp->last, 0, 0);
nbargs++;
if (CUR == ')') break;
if (CUR != ',') {
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
PUSH_LONG_EXPR(XPATH_OP_FUNCTION, nbargs, 0, 0,
name, prefix);
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
|
xmlXPathCompFunctionCall(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *name;
xmlChar *prefix;
int nbargs = 0;
int sort = 1;
name = xmlXPathParseQName(ctxt, &prefix);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFree(prefix);
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXPR
if (prefix == NULL)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "Calling function %s\n",
name);
else
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "Calling function %s:%s\n",
prefix, name);
#endif
if (CUR != '(') {
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Optimization for count(): we don't need the node-set to be sorted.
*/
if ((prefix == NULL) && (name[0] == 'c') &&
xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "count"))
{
sort = 0;
}
ctxt->comp->last = -1;
if (CUR != ')') {
while (CUR != 0) {
int op1 = ctxt->comp->last;
ctxt->comp->last = -1;
xmlXPathCompileExpr(ctxt, sort);
if (ctxt->error != XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
xmlFree(name);
xmlFree(prefix);
return;
}
PUSH_BINARY_EXPR(XPATH_OP_ARG, op1, ctxt->comp->last, 0, 0);
nbargs++;
if (CUR == ')') break;
if (CUR != ',') {
XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR);
}
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
PUSH_LONG_EXPR(XPATH_OP_FUNCTION, nbargs, 0, 0,
name, prefix);
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10021
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10021/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
|
318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
|
scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
|
static void sas_scsi_task_done(struct sas_task *task)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *sc = task->uldd_task;
struct domain_device *dev = task->dev;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->done_lock, flags);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_FROZEN, &ha->state))
task = NULL;
else
ASSIGN_SAS_TASK(sc, NULL);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->done_lock, flags);
if (unlikely(!task)) {
/* task will be completed by the error handler */
SAS_DPRINTK("task done but aborted\n");
return;
}
if (unlikely(!sc)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("task_done called with non existing SCSI cmnd!\n");
sas_free_task(task);
return;
}
sas_end_task(sc, task);
sc->scsi_done(sc);
}
|
static void sas_scsi_task_done(struct sas_task *task)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *sc = task->uldd_task;
struct domain_device *dev = task->dev;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->done_lock, flags);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_FROZEN, &ha->state))
task = NULL;
else
ASSIGN_SAS_TASK(sc, NULL);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->done_lock, flags);
if (unlikely(!task)) {
/* task will be completed by the error handler */
SAS_DPRINTK("task done but aborted\n");
return;
}
if (unlikely(!sc)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("task_done called with non existing SCSI cmnd!\n");
sas_free_task(task);
return;
}
sas_end_task(sc, task);
sc->scsi_done(sc);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
static void lxc_cgroup_hierarchy_free(struct cgroup_hierarchy *h)
{
if (!h)
return;
lxc_free_array((void **)h->subsystems, free);
free(h->all_mount_points);
free(h);
}
|
static void lxc_cgroup_hierarchy_free(struct cgroup_hierarchy *h)
{
if (!h)
return;
lxc_free_array((void **)h->subsystems, free);
free(h->all_mount_points);
free(h);
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0069
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0069/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d81de8e8667da7135d3a32a964087c0faf5483f
|
5d81de8e8667da7135d3a32a964087c0faf5483f
|
cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
|
cifs_uncached_read_into_pages(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
struct cifs_readdata *rdata, unsigned int len)
{
int total_read = 0, result = 0;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int nr_pages = rdata->nr_pages;
struct kvec iov;
rdata->tailsz = PAGE_SIZE;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = rdata->pages[i];
if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
/* enough data to fill the page */
iov.iov_base = kmap(page);
iov.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%u: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n",
i, iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
} else if (len > 0) {
/* enough for partial page, fill and zero the rest */
iov.iov_base = kmap(page);
iov.iov_len = len;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%u: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n",
i, iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len);
memset(iov.iov_base + len, '\0', PAGE_SIZE - len);
rdata->tailsz = len;
len = 0;
} else {
/* no need to hold page hostage */
rdata->pages[i] = NULL;
rdata->nr_pages--;
put_page(page);
continue;
}
result = cifs_readv_from_socket(server, &iov, 1, iov.iov_len);
kunmap(page);
if (result < 0)
break;
total_read += result;
}
return total_read > 0 ? total_read : result;
}
|
cifs_uncached_read_into_pages(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
struct cifs_readdata *rdata, unsigned int len)
{
int total_read = 0, result = 0;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int nr_pages = rdata->nr_pages;
struct kvec iov;
rdata->tailsz = PAGE_SIZE;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = rdata->pages[i];
if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
/* enough data to fill the page */
iov.iov_base = kmap(page);
iov.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%u: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n",
i, iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len);
len -= PAGE_SIZE;
} else if (len > 0) {
/* enough for partial page, fill and zero the rest */
iov.iov_base = kmap(page);
iov.iov_len = len;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%u: iov_base=%p iov_len=%zu\n",
i, iov.iov_base, iov.iov_len);
memset(iov.iov_base + len, '\0', PAGE_SIZE - len);
rdata->tailsz = len;
len = 0;
} else {
/* no need to hold page hostage */
rdata->pages[i] = NULL;
rdata->nr_pages--;
put_page(page);
continue;
}
result = cifs_readv_from_socket(server, &iov, 1, iov.iov_len);
kunmap(page);
if (result < 0)
break;
total_read += result;
}
return total_read > 0 ? total_read : result;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6051
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6051/
| null |
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=quagga.git;a=commitdiff;h=8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408
|
8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408
| null |
attrhash_init (void)
{
attrhash = hash_create (attrhash_key_make, attrhash_cmp);
}
|
attrhash_init (void)
{
attrhash = hash_create (attrhash_key_make, attrhash_cmp);
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void objMethodWithArgsMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "objMethodWithArgs", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 3)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(3, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, strArg, info[1]);
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestObject*, objArg, V8TestObject::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[2]));
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->objMethodWithArgs(longArg, strArg, objArg));
}
|
static void objMethodWithArgsMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "objMethodWithArgs", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 3)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(3, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, strArg, info[1]);
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestObject*, objArg, V8TestObject::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[2]));
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->objMethodWithArgs(longArg, strArg, objArg));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6079/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
|
GLuint GetBufferId(const Buffer* buffer) {
if (buffer)
return buffer->service_id();
return 0;
}
|
GLuint GetBufferId(const Buffer* buffer) {
if (buffer)
return buffer->service_id();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793
|
6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793
|
Don't delete the current NavigationEntry when leaving an interstitial page.
BUG=107182
TEST=See bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8976014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115189 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
FakeMalwareDetails(SafeBrowsingService* sb_service,
TabContents* tab_contents,
const SafeBrowsingService::UnsafeResource& unsafe_resource)
: MalwareDetails(sb_service, tab_contents, unsafe_resource) { }
|
FakeMalwareDetails(SafeBrowsingService* sb_service,
TabContents* tab_contents,
const SafeBrowsingService::UnsafeResource& unsafe_resource)
: MalwareDetails(sb_service, tab_contents, unsafe_resource) { }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
Tab* tab() { return tab_; }
|
Tab* tab() { return tab_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11328
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11328/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/4a342f01e5439b9bb901aff1c6c23c536baeeb3f
|
4a342f01e5439b9bb901aff1c6c23c536baeeb3f
|
Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
|
YR_OBJECT* yr_object_array_get_item(
YR_OBJECT* object,
int flags,
int index)
{
YR_OBJECT* result = NULL;
YR_OBJECT_ARRAY* array;
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
array = object_as_array(object);
if (array->items != NULL && array->items->count > index)
result = array->items->objects[index];
if (result == NULL && flags & OBJECT_CREATE)
{
yr_object_copy(array->prototype_item, &result);
if (result != NULL)
yr_object_array_set_item(object, result, index);
}
return result;
}
|
YR_OBJECT* yr_object_array_get_item(
YR_OBJECT* object,
int flags,
int index)
{
YR_OBJECT* result = NULL;
YR_OBJECT_ARRAY* array;
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
array = object_as_array(object);
if (array->items != NULL && array->items->count > index)
result = array->items->objects[index];
if (result == NULL && flags & OBJECT_CREATE)
{
yr_object_copy(array->prototype_item, &result);
if (result != NULL)
yr_object_array_set_item(object, result, index);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
yara
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_API int zend_get_object_classname(const zval *object, const char **class_name, zend_uint *class_name_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (Z_OBJ_HT_P(object)->get_class_name == NULL ||
Z_OBJ_HT_P(object)->get_class_name(object, class_name, class_name_len, 0 TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
zend_class_entry *ce = Z_OBJCE_P(object);
*class_name = ce->name;
*class_name_len = ce->name_length;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API int zend_get_object_classname(const zval *object, const char **class_name, zend_uint *class_name_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (Z_OBJ_HT_P(object)->get_class_name == NULL ||
Z_OBJ_HT_P(object)->get_class_name(object, class_name, class_name_len, 0 TSRMLS_CC) != SUCCESS) {
zend_class_entry *ce = Z_OBJCE_P(object);
*class_name = ce->name;
*class_name_len = ce->name_length;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathNodeLeadingSorted (xmlNodeSetPtr nodes, xmlNodePtr node) {
int i, l;
xmlNodePtr cur;
xmlNodeSetPtr ret;
if (node == NULL)
return(nodes);
ret = xmlXPathNodeSetCreate(NULL);
if (ret == NULL)
return(ret);
if (xmlXPathNodeSetIsEmpty(nodes) ||
(!xmlXPathNodeSetContains(nodes, node)))
return(ret);
l = xmlXPathNodeSetGetLength(nodes);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
cur = xmlXPathNodeSetItem(nodes, i);
if (cur == node)
break;
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(ret, cur);
}
return(ret);
}
|
xmlXPathNodeLeadingSorted (xmlNodeSetPtr nodes, xmlNodePtr node) {
int i, l;
xmlNodePtr cur;
xmlNodeSetPtr ret;
if (node == NULL)
return(nodes);
ret = xmlXPathNodeSetCreate(NULL);
if (ret == NULL)
return(ret);
if (xmlXPathNodeSetIsEmpty(nodes) ||
(!xmlXPathNodeSetContains(nodes, node)))
return(ret);
l = xmlXPathNodeSetGetLength(nodes);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
cur = xmlXPathNodeSetItem(nodes, i);
if (cur == node)
break;
xmlXPathNodeSetAddUnique(ret, cur);
}
return(ret);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4014/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
|
23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03
|
fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
void unlock_new_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
WARN_ON(!(inode->i_state & I_NEW));
inode->i_state &= ~I_NEW;
smp_mb();
wake_up_bit(&inode->i_state, __I_NEW);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
|
void unlock_new_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(inode);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
WARN_ON(!(inode->i_state & I_NEW));
inode->i_state &= ~I_NEW;
smp_mb();
wake_up_bit(&inode->i_state, __I_NEW);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1705
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1705/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
void Compositor::Initialize() {
DCHECK(!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized());
g_initialized = true;
}
|
void Compositor::Initialize() {
DCHECK(!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized());
g_initialized = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12984
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12984/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/385097a3675749cbc9e97c085c0e5dfe4269ca51
|
385097a3675749cbc9e97c085c0e5dfe4269ca51
|
nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
void nfc_genl_data_exit(struct nfc_genl_data *genl_data)
{
mutex_destroy(&genl_data->genl_data_mutex);
}
|
void nfc_genl_data_exit(struct nfc_genl_data *genl_data)
{
mutex_destroy(&genl_data->genl_data_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d358f57009b85fb7440208afa5ba87636b491889
|
d358f57009b85fb7440208afa5ba87636b491889
|
Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::~BluetoothDeviceChromeOS() {
}
|
BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::~BluetoothDeviceChromeOS() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
static bool NeedsPaintOffsetTranslation(const LayoutObject& object) {
if (!object.IsBoxModelObject())
return false;
if (object.IsSVGForeignObject())
return false;
const LayoutBoxModelObject& box_model = ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object);
if (box_model.IsLayoutView()) {
return true;
}
if (box_model.HasLayer() && box_model.Layer()->PaintsWithTransform(
kGlobalPaintFlattenCompositingLayers)) {
return true;
}
if (NeedsScrollOrScrollTranslation(object))
return true;
if (NeedsPaintOffsetTranslationForScrollbars(box_model))
return true;
if (NeedsSVGLocalToBorderBoxTransform(object))
return true;
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() &&
(object.IsLayoutBlock() || object.IsLayoutReplaced()) &&
object.HasLayer() &&
!ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object).Layer()->EnclosingPaginationLayer() &&
object.GetCompositingState() == kPaintsIntoOwnBacking)
return true;
return false;
}
|
static bool NeedsPaintOffsetTranslation(const LayoutObject& object) {
if (!object.IsBoxModelObject())
return false;
if (object.IsSVGForeignObject())
return false;
const LayoutBoxModelObject& box_model = ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object);
if (box_model.IsLayoutView()) {
return true;
}
if (box_model.HasLayer() && box_model.Layer()->PaintsWithTransform(
kGlobalPaintFlattenCompositingLayers)) {
return true;
}
if (NeedsScrollOrScrollTranslation(object))
return true;
if (NeedsPaintOffsetTranslationForScrollbars(box_model))
return true;
if (NeedsSVGLocalToBorderBoxTransform(object))
return true;
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() &&
(object.IsLayoutBlock() || object.IsLayoutReplaced()) &&
object.HasLayer() &&
!ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object).Layer()->EnclosingPaginationLayer() &&
object.GetCompositingState() == kPaintsIntoOwnBacking)
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2543
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2543/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1
|
ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static int check_subscription_permission(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport,
struct snd_seq_client_port *dport,
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs)
{
if (client->number != subs->sender.client &&
client->number != subs->dest.client) {
/* connection by third client - check export permission */
if (check_port_perm(sport, SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_CAP_NO_EXPORT))
return -EPERM;
if (check_port_perm(dport, SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_CAP_NO_EXPORT))
return -EPERM;
}
/* check read permission */
/* if sender or receiver is the subscribing client itself,
* no permission check is necessary
*/
if (client->number != subs->sender.client) {
if (! check_port_perm(sport, PERM_RD))
return -EPERM;
}
/* check write permission */
if (client->number != subs->dest.client) {
if (! check_port_perm(dport, PERM_WR))
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int check_subscription_permission(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport,
struct snd_seq_client_port *dport,
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs)
{
if (client->number != subs->sender.client &&
client->number != subs->dest.client) {
/* connection by third client - check export permission */
if (check_port_perm(sport, SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_CAP_NO_EXPORT))
return -EPERM;
if (check_port_perm(dport, SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_CAP_NO_EXPORT))
return -EPERM;
}
/* check read permission */
/* if sender or receiver is the subscribing client itself,
* no permission check is necessary
*/
if (client->number != subs->sender.client) {
if (! check_port_perm(sport, PERM_RD))
return -EPERM;
}
/* check write permission */
if (client->number != subs->dest.client) {
if (! check_port_perm(dport, PERM_WR))
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
4f1f3d0f03c79ddaace56f067cf28a27f9466b7d
|
Improve handling and testing of reparse points.
BUG=28804
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/553080
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37286 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool DeleteReparsePoint(HANDLE source) {
|
bool DeleteReparsePoint(HANDLE source) {
DWORD returned;
REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER data = {0};
data.ReparseTag = 0xa0000003;
if (!DeviceIoControl(source, FSCTL_DELETE_REPARSE_POINT, &data, 8, NULL, 0,
&returned, NULL)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0
|
4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0
|
USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void iowarrior_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct iowarrior *dev = urb->context;
int intr_idx;
int read_idx;
int aux_idx;
int offset;
int status = urb->status;
int retval;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
return;
default:
goto exit;
}
spin_lock(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
intr_idx = atomic_read(&dev->intr_idx);
/* aux_idx become previous intr_idx */
aux_idx = (intr_idx == 0) ? (MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER - 1) : (intr_idx - 1);
read_idx = atomic_read(&dev->read_idx);
/* queue is not empty and it's interface 0 */
if ((intr_idx != read_idx)
&& (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0)) {
/* + 1 for serial number */
offset = aux_idx * (dev->report_size + 1);
if (!memcmp
(dev->read_queue + offset, urb->transfer_buffer,
dev->report_size)) {
/* equal values on interface 0 will be ignored */
spin_unlock(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
goto exit;
}
}
/* aux_idx become next intr_idx */
aux_idx = (intr_idx == (MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER - 1)) ? 0 : (intr_idx + 1);
if (read_idx == aux_idx) {
/* queue full, dropping oldest input */
read_idx = (++read_idx == MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER) ? 0 : read_idx;
atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, read_idx);
atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 1);
}
/* +1 for serial number */
offset = intr_idx * (dev->report_size + 1);
memcpy(dev->read_queue + offset, urb->transfer_buffer,
dev->report_size);
*(dev->read_queue + offset + (dev->report_size)) = dev->serial_number++;
atomic_set(&dev->intr_idx, aux_idx);
spin_unlock(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
/* tell the blocking read about the new data */
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->read_wait);
exit:
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (retval)
dev_err(&dev->interface->dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n",
__func__, retval);
}
|
static void iowarrior_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct iowarrior *dev = urb->context;
int intr_idx;
int read_idx;
int aux_idx;
int offset;
int status = urb->status;
int retval;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
return;
default:
goto exit;
}
spin_lock(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
intr_idx = atomic_read(&dev->intr_idx);
/* aux_idx become previous intr_idx */
aux_idx = (intr_idx == 0) ? (MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER - 1) : (intr_idx - 1);
read_idx = atomic_read(&dev->read_idx);
/* queue is not empty and it's interface 0 */
if ((intr_idx != read_idx)
&& (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0)) {
/* + 1 for serial number */
offset = aux_idx * (dev->report_size + 1);
if (!memcmp
(dev->read_queue + offset, urb->transfer_buffer,
dev->report_size)) {
/* equal values on interface 0 will be ignored */
spin_unlock(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
goto exit;
}
}
/* aux_idx become next intr_idx */
aux_idx = (intr_idx == (MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER - 1)) ? 0 : (intr_idx + 1);
if (read_idx == aux_idx) {
/* queue full, dropping oldest input */
read_idx = (++read_idx == MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER) ? 0 : read_idx;
atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, read_idx);
atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 1);
}
/* +1 for serial number */
offset = intr_idx * (dev->report_size + 1);
memcpy(dev->read_queue + offset, urb->transfer_buffer,
dev->report_size);
*(dev->read_queue + offset + (dev->report_size)) = dev->serial_number++;
atomic_set(&dev->intr_idx, aux_idx);
spin_unlock(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
/* tell the blocking read about the new data */
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->read_wait);
exit:
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (retval)
dev_err(&dev->interface->dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n",
__func__, retval);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14358/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/1b0f0d0988e6df4e32e9f4bf8780846ea95d4485
|
1b0f0d0988e6df4e32e9f4bf8780846ea95d4485
|
Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
|
static void alloc_msn_index(struct ImapData *idata, size_t msn_count)
{
size_t new_size;
if (msn_count <= idata->msn_index_size)
return;
/* This is a conservative check to protect against a malicious imap
* server. Most likely size_t is bigger than an unsigned int, but
* if msn_count is this big, we have a serious problem. */
if (msn_count >= (UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct Header *)))
{
mutt_error(_("Integer overflow -- can't allocate memory."));
mutt_exit(1);
}
/* Add a little padding, like mx_allloc_memory() */
new_size = msn_count + 25;
if (!idata->msn_index)
idata->msn_index = mutt_mem_calloc(new_size, sizeof(struct Header *));
else
{
mutt_mem_realloc(&idata->msn_index, sizeof(struct Header *) * new_size);
memset(idata->msn_index + idata->msn_index_size, 0,
sizeof(struct Header *) * (new_size - idata->msn_index_size));
}
idata->msn_index_size = new_size;
}
|
static void alloc_msn_index(struct ImapData *idata, size_t msn_count)
{
size_t new_size;
if (msn_count <= idata->msn_index_size)
return;
/* This is a conservative check to protect against a malicious imap
* server. Most likely size_t is bigger than an unsigned int, but
* if msn_count is this big, we have a serious problem. */
if (msn_count >= (UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct Header *)))
{
mutt_error(_("Integer overflow -- can't allocate memory."));
mutt_exit(1);
}
/* Add a little padding, like mx_allloc_memory() */
new_size = msn_count + 25;
if (!idata->msn_index)
idata->msn_index = mutt_mem_calloc(new_size, sizeof(struct Header *));
else
{
mutt_mem_realloc(&idata->msn_index, sizeof(struct Header *) * new_size);
memset(idata->msn_index + idata->msn_index_size, 0,
sizeof(struct Header *) * (new_size - idata->msn_index_size));
}
idata->msn_index_size = new_size;
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db
|
d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1
| null |
fbCombineOverReverseC (CARD32 *dest, CARD32 *src, CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
CARD32 a = ~d >> 24;
if (a)
{
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 m = READ(mask + i);
fbCombineMaskValueC (&s, &m);
if (a != 0xff)
{
FbByteMulAdd(s, a, d);
}
WRITE(dest + i, s);
}
}
}
|
fbCombineOverReverseC (CARD32 *dest, CARD32 *src, CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
CARD32 a = ~d >> 24;
if (a)
{
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 m = READ(mask + i);
fbCombineMaskValueC (&s, &m);
if (a != 0xff)
{
FbByteMulAdd(s, a, d);
}
WRITE(dest + i, s);
}
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14170/
|
CWE-834
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/900f39692ca0337a98a7cf047e4e2611071810c2
|
900f39692ca0337a98a7cf047e4e2611071810c2
|
avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
static int mxf_set_audio_pts(MXFContext *mxf, AVCodecParameters *par,
AVPacket *pkt)
{
MXFTrack *track = mxf->fc->streams[pkt->stream_index]->priv_data;
int64_t bits_per_sample = par->bits_per_coded_sample;
if (!bits_per_sample)
bits_per_sample = av_get_bits_per_sample(par->codec_id);
pkt->pts = track->sample_count;
if ( par->channels <= 0
|| bits_per_sample <= 0
|| par->channels * (int64_t)bits_per_sample < 8)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
track->sample_count += pkt->size / (par->channels * (int64_t)bits_per_sample / 8);
return 0;
}
|
static int mxf_set_audio_pts(MXFContext *mxf, AVCodecParameters *par,
AVPacket *pkt)
{
MXFTrack *track = mxf->fc->streams[pkt->stream_index]->priv_data;
int64_t bits_per_sample = par->bits_per_coded_sample;
if (!bits_per_sample)
bits_per_sample = av_get_bits_per_sample(par->codec_id);
pkt->pts = track->sample_count;
if ( par->channels <= 0
|| bits_per_sample <= 0
|| par->channels * (int64_t)bits_per_sample < 8)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
track->sample_count += pkt->size / (par->channels * (int64_t)bits_per_sample / 8);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0885/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f335421145bb7f82c60fb9d61babcd6ce2e4b21e
|
f335421145bb7f82c60fb9d61babcd6ce2e4b21e
|
Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Extension::CanSpecifyHostPermission(const URLPattern& pattern,
const APIPermissionSet& permissions) const {
if (!pattern.match_all_urls() &&
pattern.MatchesScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme)) {
if (pattern.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFaviconHost)
return true;
if (pattern.host() == chrome::kChromeUIThumbnailHost) {
return permissions.find(APIPermission::kExperimental) !=
permissions.end();
}
if (CanExecuteScriptEverywhere())
return true;
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
bool Extension::CanSpecifyHostPermission(const URLPattern& pattern,
const APIPermissionSet& permissions) const {
if (!pattern.match_all_urls() &&
pattern.MatchesScheme(chrome::kChromeUIScheme)) {
if (pattern.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFaviconHost)
return true;
if (pattern.host() == chrome::kChromeUIThumbnailHost) {
return permissions.find(APIPermission::kExperimental) !=
permissions.end();
}
if (CanExecuteScriptEverywhere())
return true;
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3515
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3515/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
|
88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
| null |
static HashTable* spl_array_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, *storage;
int name_len;
char *zname;
zend_class_entry *base;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (HASH_OF(intern->array) == intern->std.properties) {
return intern->std.properties;
} else {
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
zend_hash_clean(intern->debug_info);
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
storage = intern->array;
zval_add_ref(&storage);
base = (Z_OBJ_HT_P(obj) == &spl_handler_ArrayIterator) ? spl_ce_ArrayIterator : spl_ce_ArrayObject;
zname = spl_gen_private_prop_name(base, "storage", sizeof("storage")-1, &name_len TSRMLS_CC);
zend_symtable_update(intern->debug_info, zname, name_len+1, &storage, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
efree(zname);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
static HashTable* spl_array_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
zval *tmp, *storage;
int name_len;
char *zname;
zend_class_entry *base;
*is_temp = 0;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
if (HASH_OF(intern->array) == intern->std.properties) {
return intern->std.properties;
} else {
if (intern->debug_info == NULL) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(intern->debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(intern->debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 1, 0);
}
if (intern->debug_info->nApplyCount == 0) {
zend_hash_clean(intern->debug_info);
zend_hash_copy(intern->debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
storage = intern->array;
zval_add_ref(&storage);
base = (Z_OBJ_HT_P(obj) == &spl_handler_ArrayIterator) ? spl_ce_ArrayIterator : spl_ce_ArrayObject;
zname = spl_gen_private_prop_name(base, "storage", sizeof("storage")-1, &name_len TSRMLS_CC);
zend_symtable_update(intern->debug_info, zname, name_len+1, &storage, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
efree(zname);
}
return intern->debug_info;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5797
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
ba169c14aa9cc2efd708a878ae21ff34f3898fe0
|
Fixing BadMessageCallback usage by SessionStorage
TBR: jam@chromium.org
Bug: 916523
Change-Id: I027cc818cfba917906844ad2ec0edd7fa4761bd1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401604
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621772}
|
PaymentAppContextImpl* StoragePartitionImpl::GetPaymentAppContext() {
return payment_app_context_.get();
}
|
PaymentAppContextImpl* StoragePartitionImpl::GetPaymentAppContext() {
return payment_app_context_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7970
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7970/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/libass/libass/pull/240/commits/08e754612019ed84d1db0d1fc4f5798248decd75
|
08e754612019ed84d1db0d1fc4f5798248decd75
|
Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
|
static void find_best_method(BlurMethod *blur, double r2)
{
static const int index[][4] = {
{ 1, 2, 3, 4 },
{ 1, 2, 3, 5 },
{ 1, 2, 4, 6 },
};
double mu[5];
if (r2 < 1.9) {
blur->level = blur->prefilter = blur->filter = 0;
if (r2 < 0.5) {
mu[2] = 0.085 * r2 * r2 * r2;
mu[1] = 0.5 * r2 - 4 * mu[2];
mu[3] = mu[4] = 0;
} else {
calc_gauss(mu, 4, r2);
}
} else {
double mul = 1;
if (r2 < 6.693) {
blur->level = 0;
if (r2 < 2.8)
blur->prefilter = 1;
else if (r2 < 4.4)
blur->prefilter = 2;
else
blur->prefilter = 3;
blur->filter = blur->prefilter - 1;
} else {
frexp((r2 + 0.7) / 26.5, &blur->level);
blur->level = (blur->level + 3) >> 1;
mul = pow(0.25, blur->level);
r2 *= mul;
if (r2 < 3.15 - 1.5 * mul)
blur->prefilter = 0;
else if (r2 < 5.3 - 5.2 * mul)
blur->prefilter = 1;
else
blur->prefilter = 2;
blur->filter = blur->prefilter;
}
calc_coeff(mu + 1, index[blur->filter], blur->prefilter, r2, mul);
}
for (int i = 1; i <= 4; ++i)
blur->coeff[i - 1] = (int)(0x10000 * mu[i] + 0.5);
}
|
static void find_best_method(BlurMethod *blur, double r2)
{
static const int index[][4] = {
{ 1, 2, 3, 4 },
{ 1, 2, 3, 5 },
{ 1, 2, 4, 6 },
};
double mu[5];
if (r2 < 1.9) {
blur->level = blur->prefilter = blur->filter = 0;
if (r2 < 0.5) {
mu[2] = 0.085 * r2 * r2 * r2;
mu[1] = 0.5 * r2 - 4 * mu[2];
mu[3] = mu[4] = 0;
} else {
calc_gauss(mu, 4, r2);
}
} else {
double mul = 1;
if (r2 < 6.693) {
blur->level = 0;
if (r2 < 2.8)
blur->prefilter = 1;
else if (r2 < 4.4)
blur->prefilter = 2;
else
blur->prefilter = 3;
blur->filter = blur->prefilter - 1;
} else {
frexp((r2 + 0.7) / 26.5, &blur->level);
blur->level = (blur->level + 3) >> 1;
mul = pow(0.25, blur->level);
r2 *= mul;
if (r2 < 3.15 - 1.5 * mul)
blur->prefilter = 0;
else if (r2 < 5.3 - 5.2 * mul)
blur->prefilter = 1;
else
blur->prefilter = 2;
blur->filter = blur->prefilter;
}
calc_coeff(mu + 1, index[blur->filter], blur->prefilter, r2, mul);
}
for (int i = 1; i <= 4; ++i)
blur->coeff[i - 1] = (int)(0x10000 * mu[i] + 0.5);
}
|
C
|
libass
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7144/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/unrealircd/unrealircd/commit/f473e355e1dc422c4f019dbf86bc50ba1a34a766
|
f473e355e1dc422c4f019dbf86bc50ba1a34a766
|
Fix AUTHENTICATE bug
|
CMD_FUNC(m_svslogin)
{
if (!SASL_SERVER || MyClient(sptr) || (parc < 3) || !parv[3])
return 0;
if (!stricmp(parv[1], me.name))
{
aClient *target_p;
/* is the PUID valid? */
if ((target_p = decode_puid(parv[2])) == NULL)
return 0;
if (target_p->user == NULL)
make_user(target_p);
strlcpy(target_p->user->svid, parv[3], sizeof(target_p->user->svid));
sendto_one(target_p, err_str(RPL_LOGGEDIN), me.name,
BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name,
BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name,
BadPtr(target_p->user->username) ? "*" : target_p->user->username,
BadPtr(target_p->user->realhost) ? "*" : target_p->user->realhost,
target_p->user->svid, target_p->user->svid);
return 0;
}
/* not for us; propagate. */
sendto_server(cptr, 0, 0, ":%s SVSLOGIN %s %s %s",
sptr->name, parv[1], parv[2], parv[3]);
return 0;
}
|
CMD_FUNC(m_svslogin)
{
if (!SASL_SERVER || MyClient(sptr) || (parc < 3) || !parv[3])
return 0;
if (!stricmp(parv[1], me.name))
{
aClient *target_p;
/* is the PUID valid? */
if ((target_p = decode_puid(parv[2])) == NULL)
return 0;
if (target_p->user == NULL)
make_user(target_p);
strlcpy(target_p->user->svid, parv[3], sizeof(target_p->user->svid));
sendto_one(target_p, err_str(RPL_LOGGEDIN), me.name,
BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name,
BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name,
BadPtr(target_p->user->username) ? "*" : target_p->user->username,
BadPtr(target_p->user->realhost) ? "*" : target_p->user->realhost,
target_p->user->svid, target_p->user->svid);
return 0;
}
/* not for us; propagate. */
sendto_server(cptr, 0, 0, ":%s SVSLOGIN %s %s %s",
sptr->name, parv[1], parv[2], parv[3]);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
unrealircd
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1874
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1874/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98
|
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
{
int i, fail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
fail = 1;
break;
}
return !fail;
}
|
static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
{
int i, fail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
fail = 1;
break;
}
return !fail;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14106/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/499350a5a6e7512d9ed369ed63a4244b6536f4f8
|
499350a5a6e7512d9ed369ed63a4244b6536f4f8
|
tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
int tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (level != SOL_TCP)
return icsk->icsk_af_ops->setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
return do_tcp_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
int tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (level != SOL_TCP)
return icsk->icsk_af_ops->setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
return do_tcp_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::UpdateBookmarkBarState(BookmarkBarStateChangeReason reason) {
BookmarkBar::State state;
if ((profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kShowBookmarkBar) &&
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kEnableBookmarkBar)) &&
(!window_ || !window_->IsFullscreen())) {
state = BookmarkBar::SHOW;
} else {
TabContentsWrapper* tab = GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper();
if (tab && tab->bookmark_tab_helper()->ShouldShowBookmarkBar())
state = BookmarkBar::DETACHED;
else
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
}
if (state == bookmark_bar_state_)
return;
bookmark_bar_state_ = state;
if (!window_)
return; // This is called from the constructor when window_ is NULL.
if (reason == BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH) {
return;
}
BookmarkBar::AnimateChangeType animate_type =
(reason == BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_PREF_CHANGE) ?
BookmarkBar::ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE :
BookmarkBar::DONT_ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE;
window_->BookmarkBarStateChanged(animate_type);
}
|
void Browser::UpdateBookmarkBarState(BookmarkBarStateChangeReason reason) {
BookmarkBar::State state;
if ((profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kShowBookmarkBar) &&
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kEnableBookmarkBar)) &&
(!window_ || !window_->IsFullscreen())) {
state = BookmarkBar::SHOW;
} else {
TabContentsWrapper* tab = GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper();
if (tab && tab->bookmark_tab_helper()->ShouldShowBookmarkBar())
state = BookmarkBar::DETACHED;
else
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
}
if (state == bookmark_bar_state_)
return;
bookmark_bar_state_ = state;
if (!window_)
return; // This is called from the constructor when window_ is NULL.
if (reason == BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH) {
return;
}
BookmarkBar::AnimateChangeType animate_type =
(reason == BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_PREF_CHANGE) ?
BookmarkBar::ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE :
BookmarkBar::DONT_ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE;
window_->BookmarkBarStateChanged(animate_type);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loaders) {
DCHECK(loader_factories_);
static_cast<URLLoaderFactoryBundle*>(loader_factories_.get())
->Update(std::move(subresource_loaders));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo> subresource_loaders) {
DCHECK(loader_factories_);
static_cast<URLLoaderFactoryBundle*>(loader_factories_.get())
->Update(std::move(subresource_loaders));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static inline int create_server_socket(const char* name)
{
int s = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if(s < 0)
return -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("covert name to android abstract name:%s", name);
if(socket_local_server_bind(s, name, ANDROID_SOCKET_NAMESPACE_ABSTRACT) >= 0)
{
if(listen(s, 5) == 0)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("listen to local socket:%s, fd:%d", name, s);
return s;
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("listen to local socket:%s, fd:%d failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("create local socket:%s fd:%d, failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
close(s);
return -1;
}
|
static inline int create_server_socket(const char* name)
{
int s = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if(s < 0)
return -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("covert name to android abstract name:%s", name);
if(socket_local_server_bind(s, name, ANDROID_SOCKET_NAMESPACE_ABSTRACT) >= 0)
{
if(listen(s, 5) == 0)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("listen to local socket:%s, fd:%d", name, s);
return s;
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("listen to local socket:%s, fd:%d failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
}
else APPL_TRACE_ERROR("create local socket:%s fd:%d, failed, errno:%d", name, s, errno);
close(s);
return -1;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static size_t adev_get_input_buffer_size(const struct audio_hw_device *dev,
const struct audio_config *config)
{
UNUSED(dev);
UNUSED(config);
FNLOG();
return 320;
}
|
static size_t adev_get_input_buffer_size(const struct audio_hw_device *dev,
const struct audio_config *config)
{
UNUSED(dev);
UNUSED(config);
FNLOG();
return 320;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/99844692ee805d18d5ee7fd9c62f14d2dffa2e06
|
99844692ee805d18d5ee7fd9c62f14d2dffa2e06
|
Removing unnecessary DCHECK from SafeBrowsing interstitial.
BUG=30079
TEST=None.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1131003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42049 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void Run() {
switch (action_) {
case BLOCK:
resource_dispatcher_host_->BlockRequestsForRoute(
process_id_, render_view_host_id_);
break;
case RESUME:
resource_dispatcher_host_->ResumeBlockedRequestsForRoute(
process_id_, render_view_host_id_);
break;
case CANCEL:
resource_dispatcher_host_->CancelBlockedRequestsForRoute(
process_id_, render_view_host_id_);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
|
virtual void Run() {
switch (action_) {
case BLOCK:
resource_dispatcher_host_->BlockRequestsForRoute(
process_id_, render_view_host_id_);
break;
case RESUME:
resource_dispatcher_host_->ResumeBlockedRequestsForRoute(
process_id_, render_view_host_id_);
break;
case CANCEL:
resource_dispatcher_host_->CancelBlockedRequestsForRoute(
process_id_, render_view_host_id_);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14763/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c91815b596245fd7da349ecc43c8def670d2269e
|
c91815b596245fd7da349ecc43c8def670d2269e
|
usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void dwc3_prepare_one_trb_sg(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
struct dwc3_request *req)
{
struct scatterlist *sg = req->sg;
struct scatterlist *s;
int i;
for_each_sg(sg, s, req->num_pending_sgs, i) {
unsigned int length = req->request.length;
unsigned int maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(dep->endpoint.desc);
unsigned int rem = length % maxp;
unsigned chain = true;
if (sg_is_last(s))
chain = false;
if (rem && usb_endpoint_dir_out(dep->endpoint.desc) && !chain) {
struct dwc3 *dwc = dep->dwc;
struct dwc3_trb *trb;
req->unaligned = true;
/* prepare normal TRB */
dwc3_prepare_one_trb(dep, req, true, i);
/* Now prepare one extra TRB to align transfer size */
trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->trb_enqueue];
__dwc3_prepare_one_trb(dep, trb, dwc->bounce_addr,
maxp - rem, false, 0,
req->request.stream_id,
req->request.short_not_ok,
req->request.no_interrupt);
} else {
dwc3_prepare_one_trb(dep, req, chain, i);
}
if (!dwc3_calc_trbs_left(dep))
break;
}
}
|
static void dwc3_prepare_one_trb_sg(struct dwc3_ep *dep,
struct dwc3_request *req)
{
struct scatterlist *sg = req->sg;
struct scatterlist *s;
int i;
for_each_sg(sg, s, req->num_pending_sgs, i) {
unsigned int length = req->request.length;
unsigned int maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(dep->endpoint.desc);
unsigned int rem = length % maxp;
unsigned chain = true;
if (sg_is_last(s))
chain = false;
if (rem && usb_endpoint_dir_out(dep->endpoint.desc) && !chain) {
struct dwc3 *dwc = dep->dwc;
struct dwc3_trb *trb;
req->unaligned = true;
/* prepare normal TRB */
dwc3_prepare_one_trb(dep, req, true, i);
/* Now prepare one extra TRB to align transfer size */
trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->trb_enqueue];
__dwc3_prepare_one_trb(dep, trb, dwc->bounce_addr,
maxp - rem, false, 0,
req->request.stream_id,
req->request.short_not_ok,
req->request.no_interrupt);
} else {
dwc3_prepare_one_trb(dep, req, chain, i);
}
if (!dwc3_calc_trbs_left(dep))
break;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4601
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4601/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0c136a2abd49298b66acb0cad504f0f972f5bfe8
|
0c136a2abd49298b66acb0cad504f0f972f5bfe8
| null |
PHP_METHOD(SoapServer, addSoapHeader)
{
soapServicePtr service;
zval *fault;
soapHeader **p;
SOAP_SERVER_BEGIN_CODE();
FETCH_THIS_SERVICE(service);
if (!service || !service->soap_headers_ptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The SoapServer::addSoapHeader function may be called only during SOAP request processing");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "O", &fault, soap_header_class_entry) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
p = service->soap_headers_ptr;
while (*p != NULL) {
p = &(*p)->next;
}
*p = emalloc(sizeof(soapHeader));
memset(*p, 0, sizeof(soapHeader));
ZVAL_NULL(&(*p)->function_name);
(*p)->retval = *fault;
zval_copy_ctor(&(*p)->retval);
SOAP_SERVER_END_CODE();
}
|
PHP_METHOD(SoapServer, addSoapHeader)
{
soapServicePtr service;
zval *fault;
soapHeader **p;
SOAP_SERVER_BEGIN_CODE();
FETCH_THIS_SERVICE(service);
if (!service || !service->soap_headers_ptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The SoapServer::addSoapHeader function may be called only during SOAP request processing");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "O", &fault, soap_header_class_entry) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
p = service->soap_headers_ptr;
while (*p != NULL) {
p = &(*p)->next;
}
*p = emalloc(sizeof(soapHeader));
memset(*p, 0, sizeof(soapHeader));
ZVAL_NULL(&(*p)->function_name);
(*p)->retval = *fault;
zval_copy_ctor(&(*p)->retval);
SOAP_SERVER_END_CODE();
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.