CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <webkit.review.bot@gmail.com> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
uint64_t InjectedBundlePage::didExceedDatabaseQuota(WKBundlePageRef page, WKSecurityOriginRef origin, WKStringRef databaseName, WKStringRef databaseDisplayName, uint64_t currentQuotaBytes, uint64_t currentOriginUsageBytes, uint64_t currentDatabaseUsageBytes, uint64_t expectedUsageBytes, const void* clientInfo)
{
return static_cast<InjectedBundlePage*>(const_cast<void*>(clientInfo))->didExceedDatabaseQuota(origin, databaseName, databaseDisplayName, currentQuotaBytes, currentOriginUsageBytes, currentDatabaseUsageBytes, expectedUsageBytes);
}
|
uint64_t InjectedBundlePage::didExceedDatabaseQuota(WKBundlePageRef page, WKSecurityOriginRef origin, WKStringRef databaseName, WKStringRef databaseDisplayName, uint64_t currentQuotaBytes, uint64_t currentOriginUsageBytes, uint64_t currentDatabaseUsageBytes, uint64_t expectedUsageBytes, const void* clientInfo)
{
return static_cast<InjectedBundlePage*>(const_cast<void*>(clientInfo))->didExceedDatabaseQuota(origin, databaseName, databaseDisplayName, currentQuotaBytes, currentOriginUsageBytes, currentDatabaseUsageBytes, expectedUsageBytes);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6420
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6420/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=c1224573c773b6845e83505f717fbf820fc18415
|
c1224573c773b6845e83505f717fbf820fc18415
| null |
int php_openssl_get_x509_list_id(void) /* {{{ */
{
return le_x509;
}
/* }}} */
|
int php_openssl_get_x509_list_id(void) /* {{{ */
{
return le_x509;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1278
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1278/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::FailedNavigation(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const BeginNavigationParams& begin_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params,
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int error_code) {
UpdatePermissionsForNavigation(common_params, request_params);
ResetWaitingState();
Send(new FrameMsg_FailedNavigation(routing_id_, common_params, request_params,
has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code));
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnFailedNavigation(
this, common_params, begin_params, static_cast<net::Error>(error_code));
is_loading_ = true;
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(true, true);
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::FailedNavigation(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const BeginNavigationParams& begin_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params,
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int error_code) {
UpdatePermissionsForNavigation(common_params, request_params);
ResetWaitingState();
Send(new FrameMsg_FailedNavigation(routing_id_, common_params, request_params,
has_stale_copy_in_cache, error_code));
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnFailedNavigation(
this, common_params, begin_params, static_cast<net::Error>(error_code));
is_loading_ = true;
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(true, true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
DownloadItemImpl::DestinationInfo::DestinationInfo(
const base::FilePath& target_path,
const base::FilePath& current_path,
int64_t received_bytes,
bool all_data_saved,
const std::string& hash,
base::Time end_time)
: target_path(target_path),
current_path(current_path),
received_bytes(received_bytes),
all_data_saved(all_data_saved),
hash(hash),
end_time(end_time) {}
|
DownloadItemImpl::DestinationInfo::DestinationInfo(
const base::FilePath& target_path,
const base::FilePath& current_path,
int64_t received_bytes,
bool all_data_saved,
const std::string& hash,
base::Time end_time)
: target_path(target_path),
current_path(current_path),
received_bytes(received_bytes),
all_data_saved(all_data_saved),
hash(hash),
end_time(end_time) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void HTMLInputElement::setRangeText(const String& replacement,
unsigned start,
unsigned end,
const String& selection_mode,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"The input element's type ('" +
input_type_->FormControlType() +
"') does not support selection.");
return;
}
TextControlElement::setRangeText(replacement, start, end, selection_mode,
exception_state);
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::setRangeText(const String& replacement,
unsigned start,
unsigned end,
const String& selection_mode,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"The input element's type ('" +
input_type_->FormControlType() +
"') does not support selection.");
return;
}
TextControlElement::setRangeText(replacement, start, end, selection_mode,
exception_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1672
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1672/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75b803b1c81ed9fa5513cbff550232b4fb915e7b
|
75b803b1c81ed9fa5513cbff550232b4fb915e7b
|
[Extensions] Harden against bindings interception
There's more we can do but this is a start.
BUG=590275
BUG=590118
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1748943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378621}
|
std::string ModuleSystem::ExceptionHandler::CreateExceptionString(
const v8::TryCatch& try_catch) {
v8::Local<v8::Message> message(try_catch.Message());
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
return "try_catch has no message";
}
std::string resource_name = "<unknown resource>";
if (!message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value resource_name_v8(
message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName());
resource_name.assign(*resource_name_v8, resource_name_v8.length());
}
std::string error_message = "<no error message>";
if (!message->Get().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value error_message_v8(message->Get());
error_message.assign(*error_message_v8, error_message_v8.length());
}
auto maybe = message->GetLineNumber(context_->v8_context());
int line_number = maybe.IsJust() ? maybe.FromJust() : 0;
return base::StringPrintf("%s:%d: %s",
resource_name.c_str(),
line_number,
error_message.c_str());
}
|
std::string ModuleSystem::ExceptionHandler::CreateExceptionString(
const v8::TryCatch& try_catch) {
v8::Local<v8::Message> message(try_catch.Message());
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
return "try_catch has no message";
}
std::string resource_name = "<unknown resource>";
if (!message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value resource_name_v8(
message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName());
resource_name.assign(*resource_name_v8, resource_name_v8.length());
}
std::string error_message = "<no error message>";
if (!message->Get().IsEmpty()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value error_message_v8(message->Get());
error_message.assign(*error_message_v8, error_message_v8.length());
}
auto maybe = message->GetLineNumber(context_->v8_context());
int line_number = maybe.IsJust() ? maybe.FromJust() : 0;
return base::StringPrintf("%s:%d: %s",
resource_name.c_str(),
line_number,
error_message.c_str());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13406
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13406/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9f645bcc566a1e9f921bdae7528a01ced5bc3713
|
9f645bcc566a1e9f921bdae7528a01ced5bc3713
|
video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
static ssize_t uvesafb_show_product_name(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct fb_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(to_platform_device(dev));
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
if (par->vbe_ib.oem_product_name_ptr)
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", (char *)
(&par->vbe_ib) + par->vbe_ib.oem_product_name_ptr);
else
return 0;
}
|
static ssize_t uvesafb_show_product_name(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct fb_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(to_platform_device(dev));
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
if (par->vbe_ib.oem_product_name_ptr)
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", (char *)
(&par->vbe_ib) + par->vbe_ib.oem_product_name_ptr);
else
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void writeFile(const File& file)
{
append(FileTag);
doWriteFile(file);
}
|
void writeFile(const File& file)
{
append(FileTag);
doWriteFile(file);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20169
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20169/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf
|
704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf
|
USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
int usb_port_disable(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
return hub_port_disable(hub, udev->portnum, 0);
}
|
int usb_port_disable(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev->parent);
return hub_port_disable(hub, udev->portnum, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
bool MojoAudioOutputIPC::AuthorizationRequested() {
return stream_provider_.is_bound();
}
|
bool MojoAudioOutputIPC::AuthorizationRequested() {
return stream_provider_.is_bound();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
mojom::blink::DocumentInterfaceBroker* Document::GetDocumentInterfaceBroker() {
if (!GetFrame())
return nullptr;
return &GetFrame()->GetDocumentInterfaceBroker();
}
|
mojom::blink::DocumentInterfaceBroker* Document::GetDocumentInterfaceBroker() {
if (!GetFrame())
return nullptr;
return &GetFrame()->GetDocumentInterfaceBroker();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12684
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12684/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/civetweb/civetweb/commit/8fd069f6dedb064339f1091069ac96f3f8bdb552
|
8fd069f6dedb064339f1091069ac96f3f8bdb552
|
Check length of memcmp
|
deprecated_websocket_data_wrapper(struct mg_connection *conn,
int bits,
char *data,
size_t len,
void *cbdata)
{
struct mg_callbacks *pcallbacks = (struct mg_callbacks *)cbdata;
if (pcallbacks->websocket_data) {
return pcallbacks->websocket_data(conn, bits, data, len);
}
/* No handler set - assume "OK" */
return 1;
}
|
deprecated_websocket_data_wrapper(struct mg_connection *conn,
int bits,
char *data,
size_t len,
void *cbdata)
{
struct mg_callbacks *pcallbacks = (struct mg_callbacks *)cbdata;
if (pcallbacks->websocket_data) {
return pcallbacks->websocket_data(conn, bits, data, len);
}
/* No handler set - assume "OK" */
return 1;
}
|
C
|
civetweb
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5035/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
c32cd2069ae8062b52e5b7b1faf5936bd71a583a
|
Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
DiscardPendingEntry(false);
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
DiscardPendingEntry(false);
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3136/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e9a0b05257f29cf4b75f3209243ed71614d062e
|
4e9a0b05257f29cf4b75f3209243ed71614d062e
|
USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.
CVE-2016-3136
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
static void mct_u232_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned int control_state;
spin_lock_irq(&priv->lock);
if ((priv->rx_flags & THROTTLED) && C_CRTSCTS(tty)) {
priv->rx_flags &= ~THROTTLED;
priv->control_state |= TIOCM_RTS;
control_state = priv->control_state;
spin_unlock_irq(&priv->lock);
mct_u232_set_modem_ctrl(port, control_state);
} else {
spin_unlock_irq(&priv->lock);
}
}
|
static void mct_u232_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned int control_state;
spin_lock_irq(&priv->lock);
if ((priv->rx_flags & THROTTLED) && C_CRTSCTS(tty)) {
priv->rx_flags &= ~THROTTLED;
priv->control_state |= TIOCM_RTS;
control_state = priv->control_state;
spin_unlock_irq(&priv->lock);
mct_u232_set_modem_ctrl(port, control_state);
} else {
spin_unlock_irq(&priv->lock);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13225
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13225/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
|
unset_addr_list_init(UnsetAddrList* list, int size)
{
UnsetAddr* p = (UnsetAddr* )xmalloc(sizeof(UnsetAddr)* size);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(p);
list->num = 0;
list->alloc = size;
list->us = p;
return 0;
}
|
unset_addr_list_init(UnsetAddrList* list, int size)
{
UnsetAddr* p = (UnsetAddr* )xmalloc(sizeof(UnsetAddr)* size);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(p);
list->num = 0;
list->alloc = size;
list->us = p;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2449/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353
|
b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353
|
Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
|
status_t Camera3Device::convertMetadataListToRequestListLocked(
const List<const CameraMetadata> &metadataList, RequestList *requestList) {
if (requestList == NULL) {
CLOGE("requestList cannot be NULL.");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
int32_t burstId = 0;
for (List<const CameraMetadata>::const_iterator it = metadataList.begin();
it != metadataList.end(); ++it) {
sp<CaptureRequest> newRequest = setUpRequestLocked(*it);
if (newRequest == 0) {
CLOGE("Can't create capture request");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
newRequest->mResultExtras.burstId = burstId++;
if (it->exists(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID)) {
if (it->find(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID).count == 0) {
CLOGE("RequestID entry exists; but must not be empty in metadata");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
newRequest->mResultExtras.requestId = it->find(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID).data.i32[0];
} else {
CLOGE("RequestID does not exist in metadata");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
requestList->push_back(newRequest);
ALOGV("%s: requestId = %" PRId32, __FUNCTION__, newRequest->mResultExtras.requestId);
}
if (mIsConstrainedHighSpeedConfiguration && requestList->size() > 0) {
auto firstRequest = requestList->begin();
for (auto& outputStream : (*firstRequest)->mOutputStreams) {
if (outputStream->isVideoStream()) {
(*firstRequest)->mBatchSize = requestList->size();
break;
}
}
}
return OK;
}
|
status_t Camera3Device::convertMetadataListToRequestListLocked(
const List<const CameraMetadata> &metadataList, RequestList *requestList) {
if (requestList == NULL) {
CLOGE("requestList cannot be NULL.");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
int32_t burstId = 0;
for (List<const CameraMetadata>::const_iterator it = metadataList.begin();
it != metadataList.end(); ++it) {
sp<CaptureRequest> newRequest = setUpRequestLocked(*it);
if (newRequest == 0) {
CLOGE("Can't create capture request");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
newRequest->mResultExtras.burstId = burstId++;
if (it->exists(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID)) {
if (it->find(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID).count == 0) {
CLOGE("RequestID entry exists; but must not be empty in metadata");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
newRequest->mResultExtras.requestId = it->find(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID).data.i32[0];
} else {
CLOGE("RequestID does not exist in metadata");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
requestList->push_back(newRequest);
ALOGV("%s: requestId = %" PRId32, __FUNCTION__, newRequest->mResultExtras.requestId);
}
if (mIsConstrainedHighSpeedConfiguration && requestList->size() > 0) {
auto firstRequest = requestList->begin();
for (auto& outputStream : (*firstRequest)->mOutputStreams) {
if (outputStream->isVideoStream()) {
(*firstRequest)->mBatchSize = requestList->size();
break;
}
}
}
return OK;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(link)
{
char *topath, *frompath;
int topath_len, frompath_len;
int ret;
char source_p[MAXPATHLEN];
char dest_p[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pp", &topath, &topath_len, &frompath, &frompath_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!expand_filepath(frompath, source_p TSRMLS_CC) || !expand_filepath(topath, dest_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No such file or directory");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(source_p, NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) ||
php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(dest_p, NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) )
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to link to a URL");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(dest_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(source_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef ZTS
ret = link(topath, frompath);
#else
ret = link(dest_p, source_p);
#endif
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(link)
{
char *topath, *frompath;
int topath_len, frompath_len;
int ret;
char source_p[MAXPATHLEN];
char dest_p[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pp", &topath, &topath_len, &frompath, &frompath_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!expand_filepath(frompath, source_p TSRMLS_CC) || !expand_filepath(topath, dest_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No such file or directory");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(source_p, NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) ||
php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(dest_p, NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) )
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to link to a URL");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(dest_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(source_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef ZTS
ret = link(topath, frompath);
#else
ret = link(dest_p, source_p);
#endif
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static void __exit fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_algs(bf_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(bf_algs));
}
|
static void __exit fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_algs(bf_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(bf_algs));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
GahpServer *GahpServer::FindOrCreateGahpServer(const char *id,
const char *path,
const ArgList *args)
{
int rc;
GahpServer *server = NULL;
if ( path == NULL ) {
path = GAHPCLIENT_DEFAULT_SERVER_PATH;
}
rc = GahpServersById.lookup( HashKey( id ), server );
if ( rc != 0 ) {
server = new GahpServer( id, path, args );
ASSERT(server);
GahpServersById.insert( HashKey( id ), server );
} else {
ASSERT(server);
}
return server;
}
|
GahpServer *GahpServer::FindOrCreateGahpServer(const char *id,
const char *path,
const ArgList *args)
{
int rc;
GahpServer *server = NULL;
if ( path == NULL ) {
path = GAHPCLIENT_DEFAULT_SERVER_PATH;
}
rc = GahpServersById.lookup( HashKey( id ), server );
if ( rc != 0 ) {
server = new GahpServer( id, path, args );
ASSERT(server);
GahpServersById.insert( HashKey( id ), server );
} else {
ASSERT(server);
}
return server;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2929/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348
|
d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348
|
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
umode_t mode;
struct inode * inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
int retval;
mode = inode->i_mode;
if (bprm->file->f_op == NULL)
return -EACCES;
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!current->no_new_privs &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
|
int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
umode_t mode;
struct inode * inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
int retval;
mode = inode->i_mode;
if (bprm->file->f_op == NULL)
return -EACCES;
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!current->no_new_privs &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
static int muscle_create_directory(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
msc_id objectId;
u8* oid = objectId.id;
unsigned id = file->id;
unsigned short read_perm = 0, write_perm = 0, delete_perm = 0;
int objectSize;
int r;
if(id == 0) /* No null name files */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* No nesting directories */
if(fs->currentPath[0] != 0x3F || fs->currentPath[1] != 0x00)
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
oid[0] = ((id & 0xFF00) >> 8) & 0xFF;
oid[1] = id & 0xFF;
oid[2] = oid[3] = 0;
objectSize = file->size;
muscle_parse_acls(file, &read_perm, &write_perm, &delete_perm);
r = msc_create_object(card, objectId, objectSize, read_perm, write_perm, delete_perm);
mscfs_clear_cache(fs);
if(r >= 0) return 0;
return r;
}
|
static int muscle_create_directory(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
msc_id objectId;
u8* oid = objectId.id;
unsigned id = file->id;
unsigned short read_perm = 0, write_perm = 0, delete_perm = 0;
int objectSize;
int r;
if(id == 0) /* No null name files */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* No nesting directories */
if(fs->currentPath[0] != 0x3F || fs->currentPath[1] != 0x00)
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
oid[0] = ((id & 0xFF00) >> 8) & 0xFF;
oid[1] = id & 0xFF;
oid[2] = oid[3] = 0;
objectSize = file->size;
muscle_parse_acls(file, &read_perm, &write_perm, &delete_perm);
r = msc_create_object(card, objectId, objectSize, read_perm, write_perm, delete_perm);
mscfs_clear_cache(fs);
if(r >= 0) return 0;
return r;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10012
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10012/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
|
dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
|
dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5014/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/35eb28748d45b87695a69eceffaff73a0be476af
|
35eb28748d45b87695a69eceffaff73a0be476af
|
Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
|
void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::OnNetworkBytesChanged(int64_t bytes) {
if (pending_request_ && save_state_ != SAVING) {
network_bytes_ += bytes;
progress_callback_.Run(*pending_request_, network_bytes_);
}
}
|
void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::OnNetworkBytesChanged(int64_t bytes) {
if (pending_request_ && save_state_ != SAVING) {
network_bytes_ += bytes;
progress_callback_.Run(*pending_request_, network_bytes_);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void InputType::SetValueAsDate(double, ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "This input element does not support Date values.");
}
|
void InputType::SetValueAsDate(double, ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "This input element does not support Date values.");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13694
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13694/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/acpica/acpica/pull/278/commits/4a0243ecb4c94e2d73510d096c5ea4d0711fc6c0
|
4a0243ecb4c94e2d73510d096c5ea4d0711fc6c0
|
acpi: acpica: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks
I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of
South Korea.
I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI
early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows:
[ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10
[ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.361873] Call Trace:
[ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and
“Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same
slab cache size.
I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache were leaked
using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.
Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows:
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.372000] Call Trace:
[ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-ParseExt: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.392000] Call Trace:
[ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.392000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.392000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.392000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.392000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ut_delete_caches() function to delete local caches (acpi_gbl_namespace_
cache, state_cache, operand_cache, ps_node_cache, ps_node_ext_cache).
But the deletion codes in acpi_ut_delete_caches() function only delete
slab caches using kmem_cache_destroy() function, therefore the cache
objects should be flushed before acpi_ut_delete_caches() function.
“Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache are used in an AML parse
function, acpi_ps_parse_loop(). The function should have flush codes to
handle an error state due to invalid AML codes.
This cache leak has a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
To fix ACPI cache leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which has
flush codes in acpi_ps_parse_loop() function.
I hope that this patch improves the security of Linux kernel.
Thank you.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
|
AcpiPsCreateOp (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
UINT8 *AmlOpStart,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT **NewOp)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Op;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *NamedOp = NULL;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *ParentScope;
UINT8 ArgumentCount;
const ACPI_OPCODE_INFO *OpInfo;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (PsCreateOp, WalkState);
Status = AcpiPsGetAmlOpcode (WalkState);
if (Status == AE_CTRL_PARSE_CONTINUE)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_CTRL_PARSE_CONTINUE);
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
/* Create Op structure and append to parent's argument list */
WalkState->OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (WalkState->Opcode);
Op = AcpiPsAllocOp (WalkState->Opcode, AmlOpStart);
if (!Op)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
if (WalkState->OpInfo->Flags & AML_NAMED)
{
Status = AcpiPsBuildNamedOp (WalkState, AmlOpStart, Op, &NamedOp);
AcpiPsFreeOp (Op);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
*NewOp = NamedOp;
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
/* Not a named opcode, just allocate Op and append to parent */
if (WalkState->OpInfo->Flags & AML_CREATE)
{
/*
* Backup to beginning of CreateXXXfield declaration
* BodyLength is unknown until we parse the body
*/
Op->Named.Data = AmlOpStart;
Op->Named.Length = 0;
}
if (WalkState->Opcode == AML_BANK_FIELD_OP)
{
/*
* Backup to beginning of BankField declaration
* BodyLength is unknown until we parse the body
*/
Op->Named.Data = AmlOpStart;
Op->Named.Length = 0;
}
ParentScope = AcpiPsGetParentScope (&(WalkState->ParserState));
AcpiPsAppendArg (ParentScope, Op);
if (ParentScope)
{
OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (ParentScope->Common.AmlOpcode);
if (OpInfo->Flags & AML_HAS_TARGET)
{
ArgumentCount = AcpiPsGetArgumentCount (OpInfo->Type);
if (ParentScope->Common.ArgListLength > ArgumentCount)
{
Op->Common.Flags |= ACPI_PARSEOP_TARGET;
}
}
/*
* Special case for both Increment() and Decrement(), where
* the lone argument is both a source and a target.
*/
else if ((ParentScope->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_INCREMENT_OP) ||
(ParentScope->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_DECREMENT_OP))
{
Op->Common.Flags |= ACPI_PARSEOP_TARGET;
}
}
if (WalkState->DescendingCallback != NULL)
{
/*
* Find the object. This will either insert the object into
* the namespace or simply look it up
*/
WalkState->Op = *NewOp = Op;
Status = WalkState->DescendingCallback (WalkState, &Op);
Status = AcpiPsNextParseState (WalkState, Op, Status);
if (Status == AE_CTRL_PENDING)
{
Status = AE_CTRL_PARSE_PENDING;
}
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
|
AcpiPsCreateOp (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
UINT8 *AmlOpStart,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT **NewOp)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Op;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *NamedOp = NULL;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *ParentScope;
UINT8 ArgumentCount;
const ACPI_OPCODE_INFO *OpInfo;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (PsCreateOp, WalkState);
Status = AcpiPsGetAmlOpcode (WalkState);
if (Status == AE_CTRL_PARSE_CONTINUE)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_CTRL_PARSE_CONTINUE);
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
/* Create Op structure and append to parent's argument list */
WalkState->OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (WalkState->Opcode);
Op = AcpiPsAllocOp (WalkState->Opcode, AmlOpStart);
if (!Op)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
if (WalkState->OpInfo->Flags & AML_NAMED)
{
Status = AcpiPsBuildNamedOp (WalkState, AmlOpStart, Op, &NamedOp);
AcpiPsFreeOp (Op);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
*NewOp = NamedOp;
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
/* Not a named opcode, just allocate Op and append to parent */
if (WalkState->OpInfo->Flags & AML_CREATE)
{
/*
* Backup to beginning of CreateXXXfield declaration
* BodyLength is unknown until we parse the body
*/
Op->Named.Data = AmlOpStart;
Op->Named.Length = 0;
}
if (WalkState->Opcode == AML_BANK_FIELD_OP)
{
/*
* Backup to beginning of BankField declaration
* BodyLength is unknown until we parse the body
*/
Op->Named.Data = AmlOpStart;
Op->Named.Length = 0;
}
ParentScope = AcpiPsGetParentScope (&(WalkState->ParserState));
AcpiPsAppendArg (ParentScope, Op);
if (ParentScope)
{
OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (ParentScope->Common.AmlOpcode);
if (OpInfo->Flags & AML_HAS_TARGET)
{
ArgumentCount = AcpiPsGetArgumentCount (OpInfo->Type);
if (ParentScope->Common.ArgListLength > ArgumentCount)
{
Op->Common.Flags |= ACPI_PARSEOP_TARGET;
}
}
/*
* Special case for both Increment() and Decrement(), where
* the lone argument is both a source and a target.
*/
else if ((ParentScope->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_INCREMENT_OP) ||
(ParentScope->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_DECREMENT_OP))
{
Op->Common.Flags |= ACPI_PARSEOP_TARGET;
}
}
if (WalkState->DescendingCallback != NULL)
{
/*
* Find the object. This will either insert the object into
* the namespace or simply look it up
*/
WalkState->Op = *NewOp = Op;
Status = WalkState->DescendingCallback (WalkState, &Op);
Status = AcpiPsNextParseState (WalkState, Op, Status);
if (Status == AE_CTRL_PENDING)
{
Status = AE_CTRL_PARSE_PENDING;
}
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
|
C
|
acpica
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5354
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5354/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/2cb5985bf47bdc8bea78d28483ed224abdd33dc6
|
2cb5985bf47bdc8bea78d28483ed224abdd33dc6
|
Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
|
dissect_bmControl(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
gint ett_subtree, const int** bm_items)
{
guint8 bm_size = 0;
bm_size = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_bControlSize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (bm_size > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_bitmask_len(tree, tvb, offset, bm_size, hf_usb_vid_bmControl,
ett_subtree, bm_items, &ei_usb_vid_bitmask_len, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += bm_size;
}
return offset;
}
|
dissect_bmControl(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
gint ett_subtree, const int** bm_items)
{
guint8 bm_size = 0;
bm_size = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_bControlSize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (bm_size > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_bitmask_len(tree, tvb, offset, bm_size, hf_usb_vid_bmControl,
ett_subtree, bm_items, &ei_usb_vid_bitmask_len, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += bm_size;
}
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2006-4192
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2006-4192/
| null |
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gst-plugins-bad/commit/?id=bc2cdd57d549ab3ba59782e9b395d0cd683fd3ac
|
bc2cdd57d549ab3ba59782e9b395d0cd683fd3ac
| null |
UINT CSoundFile::GetSaveFormats() const
{
UINT n = 0;
if ((!m_nSamples) || (!m_nChannels) || (m_nType == MOD_TYPE_NONE)) return 0;
switch(m_nType)
{
case MOD_TYPE_MOD: n = MOD_TYPE_MOD;
case MOD_TYPE_S3M: n = MOD_TYPE_S3M;
}
n |= MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_IT;
if (!m_nInstruments)
{
if (m_nSamples < 32) n |= MOD_TYPE_MOD;
n |= MOD_TYPE_S3M;
}
return n;
}
|
UINT CSoundFile::GetSaveFormats() const
{
UINT n = 0;
if ((!m_nSamples) || (!m_nChannels) || (m_nType == MOD_TYPE_NONE)) return 0;
switch(m_nType)
{
case MOD_TYPE_MOD: n = MOD_TYPE_MOD;
case MOD_TYPE_S3M: n = MOD_TYPE_S3M;
}
n |= MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_IT;
if (!m_nInstruments)
{
if (m_nSamples < 32) n |= MOD_TYPE_MOD;
n |= MOD_TYPE_S3M;
}
return n;
}
|
CPP
|
gstreamer
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6542
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6542/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
|
4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
| null |
static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
{
char *p;
int length;
Bignum b;
ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
if (!p)
return NULL;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
return NULL;
b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
return b;
}
|
static Bignum ssh2_pkt_getmp(struct Packet *pkt)
{
char *p;
int length;
Bignum b;
ssh_pkt_getstring(pkt, &p, &length);
if (!p)
return NULL;
if (p[0] & 0x80)
return NULL;
b = bignum_from_bytes((unsigned char *)p, length);
return b;
}
|
C
|
tartarus
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1667
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1667/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
void QuicTransportHost::OnConnectionFailed(const std::string& error_details,
bool from_remote) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
stream_hosts_.clear();
PostCrossThreadTask(*proxy_thread(), FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&QuicTransportProxy::OnConnectionFailed,
proxy_, error_details, from_remote));
}
|
void QuicTransportHost::OnConnectionFailed(const std::string& error_details,
bool from_remote) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
stream_hosts_.clear();
PostCrossThreadTask(*proxy_thread(), FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&QuicTransportProxy::OnConnectionFailed,
proxy_, error_details, from_remote));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::CustomSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_customSetterImplementedAsLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::CustomSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::CustomSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_customSetterImplementedAsLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::CustomSetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorPaaskSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnPhoneDarkIcon
: kWebauthnPhoneIcon;
}
|
const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorPaaskSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnPhoneDarkIcon
: kWebauthnPhoneIcon;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataRootDirectory::FindEntryByPath(const FilePath& file_path,
const FindEntryCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
std::vector<FilePath::StringType> components;
file_path.GetComponents(&components);
GDataDirectory* current_dir = this;
FilePath directory_path;
util::GDataSearchPathType path_type =
util::GetSearchPathStatusForPathComponents(components);
if (path_type == util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_ROOT ||
path_type == util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_QUERY) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, file_path.DirName(),
fake_search_directory_.get());
return;
}
if (path_type != util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_INVALID) {
if (!ModifyFindEntryParamsForSearchPath(file_path,
&components, ¤t_dir, &directory_path)) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < components.size() && current_dir; i++) {
directory_path = directory_path.Append(current_dir->file_name());
if (i == components.size() - 1) {
if (current_dir->file_name() == components[i])
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, directory_path, current_dir);
else
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
GDataEntry* entry = current_dir->FindChild(components[i + 1]);
if (!entry) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
if (entry->file_info().is_directory) {
current_dir = entry->AsGDataDirectory();
} else {
if ((i + 1) == (components.size() - 1))
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, directory_path, entry);
else
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
}
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
}
|
void GDataRootDirectory::FindEntryByPath(const FilePath& file_path,
const FindEntryCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
std::vector<FilePath::StringType> components;
file_path.GetComponents(&components);
GDataDirectory* current_dir = this;
FilePath directory_path;
util::GDataSearchPathType path_type =
util::GetSearchPathStatusForPathComponents(components);
if (path_type == util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_ROOT ||
path_type == util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_QUERY) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, file_path.DirName(),
fake_search_directory_.get());
return;
}
if (path_type != util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_INVALID) {
if (!ModifyFindEntryParamsForSearchPath(file_path,
&components, ¤t_dir, &directory_path)) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < components.size() && current_dir; i++) {
directory_path = directory_path.Append(current_dir->file_name());
if (i == components.size() - 1) {
if (current_dir->file_name() == components[i])
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, directory_path, current_dir);
else
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
GDataEntry* entry = current_dir->FindChild(components[i + 1]);
if (!entry) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
if (entry->file_info().is_directory) {
current_dir = entry->AsGDataDirectory();
} else {
if ((i + 1) == (components.size() - 1))
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, directory_path, entry);
else
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
}
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::attachShader(WebGLProgram* program,
WebGLShader* shader) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("attachShader", program) ||
!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("attachShader", shader))
return;
if (!program->AttachShader(shader)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "attachShader",
"shader attachment already has shader");
return;
}
ContextGL()->AttachShader(ObjectOrZero(program), ObjectOrZero(shader));
shader->OnAttached();
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::attachShader(WebGLProgram* program,
WebGLShader* shader) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("attachShader", program) ||
!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("attachShader", shader))
return;
if (!program->AttachShader(shader)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "attachShader",
"shader attachment already has shader");
return;
}
ContextGL()->AttachShader(ObjectOrZero(program), ObjectOrZero(shader));
shader->OnAttached();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserWindowGtk::MaybeShowBookmarkBar(bool animate) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::MaybeShowBookmarkBar");
if (!IsBookmarkBarSupported())
return;
TabContents* tab = GetDisplayedTab();
if (tab)
bookmark_bar_->SetPageNavigator(browser_.get());
BookmarkBar::State state = browser_->bookmark_bar_state();
if (contents_container_->HasPreview() && state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED)
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
toolbar_->UpdateForBookmarkBarVisibility(state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED);
PlaceBookmarkBar(state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED);
bookmark_bar_->SetBookmarkBarState(
state,
animate ? BookmarkBar::ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE :
BookmarkBar::DONT_ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE);
}
|
void BrowserWindowGtk::MaybeShowBookmarkBar(bool animate) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "BrowserWindowGtk::MaybeShowBookmarkBar");
if (!IsBookmarkBarSupported())
return;
TabContents* tab = GetDisplayedTab();
if (tab)
bookmark_bar_->SetPageNavigator(browser_.get());
BookmarkBar::State state = browser_->bookmark_bar_state();
if (contents_container_->HasPreview() && state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED)
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
toolbar_->UpdateForBookmarkBarVisibility(state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED);
PlaceBookmarkBar(state == BookmarkBar::DETACHED);
bookmark_bar_->SetBookmarkBarState(
state,
animate ? BookmarkBar::ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE :
BookmarkBar::DONT_ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3480
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3480/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/40bade80cbe2af1d0b2cd0420cebd5d5905a2382
|
40bade80cbe2af1d0b2cd0420cebd5d5905a2382
|
Fix incorrect bounds check for sector count. (Francisco Alonso and Jan Kaluza
at RedHat)
|
cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
|
cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void UnforgeableLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->unforgeableLongAttribute());
}
|
static void UnforgeableLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->unforgeableLongAttribute());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10048
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10048/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *DestroyXMLTree(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
DestroyXMLTreeChild(xml_info);
DestroyXMLTreeOrdered(xml_info);
DestroyXMLTreeRoot(xml_info);
xml_info->attributes=DestroyXMLTreeAttributes(xml_info->attributes);
xml_info->content=DestroyString(xml_info->content);
xml_info->tag=DestroyString(xml_info->tag);
xml_info=(XMLTreeInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xml_info);
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
}
|
MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *DestroyXMLTree(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
DestroyXMLTreeChild(xml_info);
DestroyXMLTreeOrdered(xml_info);
DestroyXMLTreeRoot(xml_info);
xml_info->attributes=DestroyXMLTreeAttributes(xml_info->attributes);
xml_info->content=DestroyString(xml_info->content);
xml_info->tag=DestroyString(xml_info->tag);
xml_info=(XMLTreeInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xml_info);
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
Capabilities GLES2DecoderImpl::GetCapabilities() {
DCHECK(initialized());
Capabilities caps;
const gl::GLVersionInfo& version_info = gl_version_info();
caps.VisitPrecisions([&version_info](
GLenum shader, GLenum type,
Capabilities::ShaderPrecision* shader_precision) {
GLint range[2] = {0, 0};
GLint precision = 0;
QueryShaderPrecisionFormat(version_info, shader, type, range, &precision);
shader_precision->min_range = range[0];
shader_precision->max_range = range[1];
shader_precision->precision = precision;
});
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COMBINED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS,
&caps.max_combined_texture_image_units, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_CUBE_MAP_TEXTURE_SIZE, &caps.max_cube_map_texture_size,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_VECTORS,
&caps.max_fragment_uniform_vectors, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_RENDERBUFFER_SIZE, &caps.max_renderbuffer_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS, &caps.max_texture_image_units, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_SIZE, &caps.max_texture_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VARYING_VECTORS, &caps.max_varying_vectors, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_ATTRIBS, &caps.max_vertex_attribs, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS,
&caps.max_vertex_texture_image_units, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_VECTORS, &caps.max_vertex_uniform_vectors,
1);
{
GLint dims[2] = {0, 0};
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS, dims, 2);
caps.max_viewport_width = dims[0];
caps.max_viewport_height = dims[1];
}
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_COMPRESSED_TEXTURE_FORMATS,
&caps.num_compressed_texture_formats, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_SHADER_BINARY_FORMATS, &caps.num_shader_binary_formats,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_BIND_GENERATES_RESOURCE_CHROMIUM,
&caps.bind_generates_resource_chromium, 1);
if (feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_3D_TEXTURE_SIZE, &caps.max_3d_texture_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ARRAY_TEXTURE_LAYERS, &caps.max_array_texture_layers,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS, &caps.max_color_attachments, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_COMBINED_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_combined_fragment_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COMBINED_UNIFORM_BLOCKS,
&caps.max_combined_uniform_blocks, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_COMBINED_VERTEX_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_combined_vertex_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS, &caps.max_draw_buffers, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_ELEMENT_INDEX, &caps.max_element_index, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ELEMENTS_INDICES, &caps.max_elements_indices, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ELEMENTS_VERTICES, &caps.max_elements_vertices, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_INPUT_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_fragment_input_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_BLOCKS,
&caps.max_fragment_uniform_blocks, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_fragment_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_PROGRAM_TEXEL_OFFSET, &caps.max_program_texel_offset,
1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_SERVER_WAIT_TIMEOUT, &caps.max_server_wait_timeout,
1);
if (caps.max_server_wait_timeout < 0)
caps.max_server_wait_timeout = 0;
DoGetFloatv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_LOD_BIAS, &caps.max_texture_lod_bias, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_INTERLEAVED_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_transform_feedback_interleaved_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_SEPARATE_ATTRIBS,
&caps.max_transform_feedback_separate_attribs, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_SEPARATE_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_transform_feedback_separate_components, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_UNIFORM_BLOCK_SIZE, &caps.max_uniform_block_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_UNIFORM_BUFFER_BINDINGS,
&caps.max_uniform_buffer_bindings, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VARYING_COMPONENTS, &caps.max_varying_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_OUTPUT_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_vertex_output_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_BLOCKS, &caps.max_vertex_uniform_blocks,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_vertex_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MIN_PROGRAM_TEXEL_OFFSET, &caps.min_program_texel_offset,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_EXTENSIONS, &caps.num_extensions, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_PROGRAM_BINARY_FORMATS,
&caps.num_program_binary_formats, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_OFFSET_ALIGNMENT,
&caps.uniform_buffer_offset_alignment, 1);
caps.major_version = 3;
caps.minor_version = 0;
}
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().multisampled_render_to_texture ||
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_framebuffer_multisample ||
feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
caps.max_samples = ComputeMaxSamples();
}
caps.num_stencil_bits = num_stencil_bits_;
caps.egl_image_external =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_egl_image_external;
caps.texture_format_astc =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_astc;
caps.texture_format_atc =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_atc;
caps.texture_format_bgra8888 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_bgra8888;
caps.texture_format_dxt1 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_dxt1;
caps.texture_format_dxt5 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_dxt5;
caps.texture_format_etc1 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_compressed_etc1_rgb8_texture;
caps.texture_format_etc1_npot =
caps.texture_format_etc1 && !workarounds().etc1_power_of_two_only;
caps.disable_one_component_textures =
mailbox_manager()->UsesSync() &&
workarounds().avoid_one_component_egl_images;
caps.texture_rectangle = feature_info_->feature_flags().arb_texture_rectangle;
caps.texture_usage = feature_info_->feature_flags().angle_texture_usage;
caps.texture_storage = feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_storage;
caps.discard_framebuffer =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_discard_framebuffer;
caps.sync_query = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_sync_query;
caps.chromium_image_rgb_emulation = ChromiumImageNeedsRGBEmulation();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
caps.iosurface = true;
#endif
caps.use_gpu_fences_for_overlay_planes = surface_->SupportsPlaneGpuFences();
caps.post_sub_buffer = supports_post_sub_buffer_;
caps.swap_buffers_with_bounds = supports_swap_buffers_with_bounds_;
caps.commit_overlay_planes = supports_commit_overlay_planes_;
caps.surfaceless = surfaceless_;
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
caps.flips_vertically = !is_offscreen && surface_->FlipsVertically();
caps.msaa_is_slow = workarounds().msaa_is_slow;
caps.avoid_stencil_buffers = workarounds().avoid_stencil_buffers;
caps.multisample_compatibility =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_multisample_compatibility;
caps.dc_layers = supports_dc_layers_;
caps.use_dc_overlays_for_video = surface_->UseOverlaysForVideo();
caps.protected_video_swap_chain = surface_->SupportsProtectedVideo();
caps.blend_equation_advanced =
feature_info_->feature_flags().blend_equation_advanced;
caps.blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
feature_info_->feature_flags().blend_equation_advanced_coherent;
caps.texture_rg = feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_rg;
caps.texture_norm16 = feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_norm16;
caps.texture_half_float_linear =
feature_info_->oes_texture_half_float_linear_available();
caps.color_buffer_half_float_rgba =
feature_info_->ext_color_buffer_float_available() ||
feature_info_->ext_color_buffer_half_float_available();
caps.image_ycbcr_422 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_ycbcr_422;
caps.image_ycbcr_420v =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_ycbcr_420v;
caps.image_ycbcr_420v_disabled_for_video_frames =
group_->gpu_preferences()
.disable_biplanar_gpu_memory_buffers_for_video_frames;
caps.image_xr30 = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_xr30;
caps.image_xb30 = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_xb30;
caps.max_copy_texture_chromium_size =
workarounds().max_copy_texture_chromium_size;
caps.render_buffer_format_bgra8888 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_render_buffer_format_bgra8888;
caps.occlusion_query = feature_info_->feature_flags().occlusion_query;
caps.occlusion_query_boolean =
feature_info_->feature_flags().occlusion_query_boolean;
caps.timer_queries = query_manager_->GPUTimingAvailable();
caps.gpu_rasterization =
group_->gpu_feature_info()
.status_values[GPU_FEATURE_TYPE_GPU_RASTERIZATION] ==
kGpuFeatureStatusEnabled;
if (workarounds().disable_non_empty_post_sub_buffers_for_onscreen_surfaces &&
!surface_->IsOffscreen()) {
caps.disable_non_empty_post_sub_buffers = true;
}
if (workarounds().broken_egl_image_ref_counting &&
group_->gpu_preferences().enable_threaded_texture_mailboxes) {
caps.disable_2d_canvas_copy_on_write = true;
}
caps.texture_npot = feature_info_->feature_flags().npot_ok;
caps.texture_storage_image =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_texture_storage_image;
caps.supports_oop_raster = false;
caps.chromium_gpu_fence = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_gpu_fence;
caps.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy =
feature_info_->feature_flags().unpremultiply_and_dither_copy;
caps.separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask =
feature_info_->feature_flags().separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask;
caps.chromium_nonblocking_readback =
feature_info_->context_type() == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2;
caps.num_surface_buffers = surface_->GetBufferCount();
caps.mesa_framebuffer_flip_y =
feature_info_->feature_flags().mesa_framebuffer_flip_y;
caps.gpu_memory_buffer_formats =
feature_info_->feature_flags().gpu_memory_buffer_formats;
caps.texture_target_exception_list =
group_->gpu_preferences().texture_target_exception_list;
return caps;
}
|
Capabilities GLES2DecoderImpl::GetCapabilities() {
DCHECK(initialized());
Capabilities caps;
const gl::GLVersionInfo& version_info = gl_version_info();
caps.VisitPrecisions([&version_info](
GLenum shader, GLenum type,
Capabilities::ShaderPrecision* shader_precision) {
GLint range[2] = {0, 0};
GLint precision = 0;
QueryShaderPrecisionFormat(version_info, shader, type, range, &precision);
shader_precision->min_range = range[0];
shader_precision->max_range = range[1];
shader_precision->precision = precision;
});
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COMBINED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS,
&caps.max_combined_texture_image_units, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_CUBE_MAP_TEXTURE_SIZE, &caps.max_cube_map_texture_size,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_VECTORS,
&caps.max_fragment_uniform_vectors, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_RENDERBUFFER_SIZE, &caps.max_renderbuffer_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS, &caps.max_texture_image_units, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_SIZE, &caps.max_texture_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VARYING_VECTORS, &caps.max_varying_vectors, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_ATTRIBS, &caps.max_vertex_attribs, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS,
&caps.max_vertex_texture_image_units, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_VECTORS, &caps.max_vertex_uniform_vectors,
1);
{
GLint dims[2] = {0, 0};
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS, dims, 2);
caps.max_viewport_width = dims[0];
caps.max_viewport_height = dims[1];
}
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_COMPRESSED_TEXTURE_FORMATS,
&caps.num_compressed_texture_formats, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_SHADER_BINARY_FORMATS, &caps.num_shader_binary_formats,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_BIND_GENERATES_RESOURCE_CHROMIUM,
&caps.bind_generates_resource_chromium, 1);
if (feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_3D_TEXTURE_SIZE, &caps.max_3d_texture_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ARRAY_TEXTURE_LAYERS, &caps.max_array_texture_layers,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS, &caps.max_color_attachments, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_COMBINED_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_combined_fragment_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COMBINED_UNIFORM_BLOCKS,
&caps.max_combined_uniform_blocks, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_COMBINED_VERTEX_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_combined_vertex_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS, &caps.max_draw_buffers, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_ELEMENT_INDEX, &caps.max_element_index, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ELEMENTS_INDICES, &caps.max_elements_indices, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_ELEMENTS_VERTICES, &caps.max_elements_vertices, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_INPUT_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_fragment_input_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_BLOCKS,
&caps.max_fragment_uniform_blocks, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_fragment_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_PROGRAM_TEXEL_OFFSET, &caps.max_program_texel_offset,
1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_SERVER_WAIT_TIMEOUT, &caps.max_server_wait_timeout,
1);
if (caps.max_server_wait_timeout < 0)
caps.max_server_wait_timeout = 0;
DoGetFloatv(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_LOD_BIAS, &caps.max_texture_lod_bias, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_INTERLEAVED_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_transform_feedback_interleaved_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_SEPARATE_ATTRIBS,
&caps.max_transform_feedback_separate_attribs, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_SEPARATE_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_transform_feedback_separate_components, 1);
DoGetInteger64v(GL_MAX_UNIFORM_BLOCK_SIZE, &caps.max_uniform_block_size, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_UNIFORM_BUFFER_BINDINGS,
&caps.max_uniform_buffer_bindings, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VARYING_COMPONENTS, &caps.max_varying_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_OUTPUT_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_vertex_output_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_BLOCKS, &caps.max_vertex_uniform_blocks,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS,
&caps.max_vertex_uniform_components, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MIN_PROGRAM_TEXEL_OFFSET, &caps.min_program_texel_offset,
1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_EXTENSIONS, &caps.num_extensions, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_NUM_PROGRAM_BINARY_FORMATS,
&caps.num_program_binary_formats, 1);
DoGetIntegerv(GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_OFFSET_ALIGNMENT,
&caps.uniform_buffer_offset_alignment, 1);
caps.major_version = 3;
caps.minor_version = 0;
}
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().multisampled_render_to_texture ||
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_framebuffer_multisample ||
feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
caps.max_samples = ComputeMaxSamples();
}
caps.num_stencil_bits = num_stencil_bits_;
caps.egl_image_external =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_egl_image_external;
caps.texture_format_astc =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_astc;
caps.texture_format_atc =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_atc;
caps.texture_format_bgra8888 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_bgra8888;
caps.texture_format_dxt1 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_dxt1;
caps.texture_format_dxt5 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_format_dxt5;
caps.texture_format_etc1 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().oes_compressed_etc1_rgb8_texture;
caps.texture_format_etc1_npot =
caps.texture_format_etc1 && !workarounds().etc1_power_of_two_only;
caps.disable_one_component_textures =
mailbox_manager()->UsesSync() &&
workarounds().avoid_one_component_egl_images;
caps.texture_rectangle = feature_info_->feature_flags().arb_texture_rectangle;
caps.texture_usage = feature_info_->feature_flags().angle_texture_usage;
caps.texture_storage = feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_storage;
caps.discard_framebuffer =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_discard_framebuffer;
caps.sync_query = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_sync_query;
caps.chromium_image_rgb_emulation = ChromiumImageNeedsRGBEmulation();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
caps.iosurface = true;
#endif
caps.use_gpu_fences_for_overlay_planes = surface_->SupportsPlaneGpuFences();
caps.post_sub_buffer = supports_post_sub_buffer_;
caps.swap_buffers_with_bounds = supports_swap_buffers_with_bounds_;
caps.commit_overlay_planes = supports_commit_overlay_planes_;
caps.surfaceless = surfaceless_;
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
caps.flips_vertically = !is_offscreen && surface_->FlipsVertically();
caps.msaa_is_slow = workarounds().msaa_is_slow;
caps.avoid_stencil_buffers = workarounds().avoid_stencil_buffers;
caps.multisample_compatibility =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_multisample_compatibility;
caps.dc_layers = supports_dc_layers_;
caps.use_dc_overlays_for_video = surface_->UseOverlaysForVideo();
caps.protected_video_swap_chain = surface_->SupportsProtectedVideo();
caps.blend_equation_advanced =
feature_info_->feature_flags().blend_equation_advanced;
caps.blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
feature_info_->feature_flags().blend_equation_advanced_coherent;
caps.texture_rg = feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_rg;
caps.texture_norm16 = feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_texture_norm16;
caps.texture_half_float_linear =
feature_info_->oes_texture_half_float_linear_available();
caps.color_buffer_half_float_rgba =
feature_info_->ext_color_buffer_float_available() ||
feature_info_->ext_color_buffer_half_float_available();
caps.image_ycbcr_422 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_ycbcr_422;
caps.image_ycbcr_420v =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_ycbcr_420v;
caps.image_ycbcr_420v_disabled_for_video_frames =
group_->gpu_preferences()
.disable_biplanar_gpu_memory_buffers_for_video_frames;
caps.image_xr30 = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_xr30;
caps.image_xb30 = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_image_xb30;
caps.max_copy_texture_chromium_size =
workarounds().max_copy_texture_chromium_size;
caps.render_buffer_format_bgra8888 =
feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_render_buffer_format_bgra8888;
caps.occlusion_query = feature_info_->feature_flags().occlusion_query;
caps.occlusion_query_boolean =
feature_info_->feature_flags().occlusion_query_boolean;
caps.timer_queries = query_manager_->GPUTimingAvailable();
caps.gpu_rasterization =
group_->gpu_feature_info()
.status_values[GPU_FEATURE_TYPE_GPU_RASTERIZATION] ==
kGpuFeatureStatusEnabled;
if (workarounds().disable_non_empty_post_sub_buffers_for_onscreen_surfaces &&
!surface_->IsOffscreen()) {
caps.disable_non_empty_post_sub_buffers = true;
}
if (workarounds().broken_egl_image_ref_counting &&
group_->gpu_preferences().enable_threaded_texture_mailboxes) {
caps.disable_2d_canvas_copy_on_write = true;
}
caps.texture_npot = feature_info_->feature_flags().npot_ok;
caps.texture_storage_image =
feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_texture_storage_image;
caps.supports_oop_raster = false;
caps.chromium_gpu_fence = feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_gpu_fence;
caps.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy =
feature_info_->feature_flags().unpremultiply_and_dither_copy;
caps.separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask =
feature_info_->feature_flags().separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask;
caps.chromium_nonblocking_readback =
feature_info_->context_type() == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2;
caps.num_surface_buffers = surface_->GetBufferCount();
caps.mesa_framebuffer_flip_y =
feature_info_->feature_flags().mesa_framebuffer_flip_y;
caps.gpu_memory_buffer_formats =
feature_info_->feature_flags().gpu_memory_buffer_formats;
caps.texture_target_exception_list =
group_->gpu_preferences().texture_target_exception_list;
return caps;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6066/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fad67a5b73639d7211b24fd9bdb242e82039b765
|
fad67a5b73639d7211b24fd9bdb242e82039b765
|
Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
|
void Resource::DidAddClient(ResourceClient* c) {
if (scoped_refptr<SharedBuffer> data = Data()) {
data->ForEachSegment([this, &c](const char* segment, size_t segment_size,
size_t segment_offset) -> bool {
c->DataReceived(this, segment, segment_size);
return HasClient(c);
});
}
if (!HasClient(c))
return;
if (IsLoaded()) {
c->NotifyFinished(this);
if (clients_.Contains(c)) {
finished_clients_.insert(c);
clients_.erase(c);
}
}
}
|
void Resource::DidAddClient(ResourceClient* c) {
if (scoped_refptr<SharedBuffer> data = Data()) {
data->ForEachSegment([this, &c](const char* segment, size_t segment_size,
size_t segment_offset) -> bool {
c->DataReceived(this, segment, segment_size);
return HasClient(c);
});
}
if (!HasClient(c))
return;
if (IsLoaded()) {
c->NotifyFinished(this);
if (clients_.Contains(c)) {
finished_clients_.insert(c);
clients_.erase(c);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0045/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
c2226fc9e87ba3da060e47333657cd6616652b84
|
KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
|
static int emulator_do_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct curr_tss_desc, next_tss_desc;
int ret;
u16 old_tss_sel = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
ulong old_tss_base =
ops->get_cached_segment_base(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
u32 desc_limit;
/* FIXME: old_tss_base == ~0 ? */
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
/* FIXME: check that next_tss_desc is tss */
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_IRET) {
if ((tss_selector & 3) > next_tss_desc.dpl ||
ops->cpl(ctxt) > next_tss_desc.dpl)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
desc_limit = desc_limit_scaled(&next_tss_desc);
if (!next_tss_desc.p ||
((desc_limit < 0x67 && (next_tss_desc.type & 8)) ||
desc_limit < 0x2b)) {
emulate_ts(ctxt, tss_selector & 0xfffc);
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET || reason == TASK_SWITCH_JMP) {
curr_tss_desc.type &= ~(1 << 1); /* clear busy flag */
write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc);
}
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET)
ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_NT;
/* set back link to prev task only if NT bit is set in eflags
note that old_tss_sel is not used afetr this point */
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_CALL && reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
old_tss_sel = 0xffff;
if (next_tss_desc.type & 8)
ret = task_switch_32(ctxt, tss_selector, old_tss_sel,
old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
else
ret = task_switch_16(ctxt, tss_selector, old_tss_sel,
old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_CALL || reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_IRET) {
next_tss_desc.type |= (1 << 1); /* set busy flag */
write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
}
ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) | X86_CR0_TS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_TR);
if (has_error_code) {
ctxt->op_bytes = ctxt->ad_bytes = (next_tss_desc.type & 8) ? 4 : 2;
ctxt->lock_prefix = 0;
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long) error_code;
ret = em_push(ctxt);
}
return ret;
}
|
static int emulator_do_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct curr_tss_desc, next_tss_desc;
int ret;
u16 old_tss_sel = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
ulong old_tss_base =
ops->get_cached_segment_base(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_TR);
u32 desc_limit;
/* FIXME: old_tss_base == ~0 ? */
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
/* FIXME: check that next_tss_desc is tss */
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_IRET) {
if ((tss_selector & 3) > next_tss_desc.dpl ||
ops->cpl(ctxt) > next_tss_desc.dpl)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
desc_limit = desc_limit_scaled(&next_tss_desc);
if (!next_tss_desc.p ||
((desc_limit < 0x67 && (next_tss_desc.type & 8)) ||
desc_limit < 0x2b)) {
emulate_ts(ctxt, tss_selector & 0xfffc);
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
}
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET || reason == TASK_SWITCH_JMP) {
curr_tss_desc.type &= ~(1 << 1); /* clear busy flag */
write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, old_tss_sel, &curr_tss_desc);
}
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_IRET)
ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_NT;
/* set back link to prev task only if NT bit is set in eflags
note that old_tss_sel is not used afetr this point */
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_CALL && reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
old_tss_sel = 0xffff;
if (next_tss_desc.type & 8)
ret = task_switch_32(ctxt, tss_selector, old_tss_sel,
old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
else
ret = task_switch_16(ctxt, tss_selector, old_tss_sel,
old_tss_base, &next_tss_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_CALL || reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE)
ctxt->eflags = ctxt->eflags | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_IRET) {
next_tss_desc.type |= (1 << 1); /* set busy flag */
write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
}
ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) | X86_CR0_TS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_TR);
if (has_error_code) {
ctxt->op_bytes = ctxt->ad_bytes = (next_tss_desc.type & 8) ? 4 : 2;
ctxt->lock_prefix = 0;
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long) error_code;
ret = em_push(ctxt);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2390
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2390/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
int hugetlb_overcommit_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *length, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct hstate *h = &default_hstate;
unsigned long tmp;
int ret;
tmp = h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages;
if (write && h->order >= MAX_ORDER)
return -EINVAL;
table->data = &tmp;
table->maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long);
ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (write) {
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages = tmp;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
}
out:
return ret;
}
|
int hugetlb_overcommit_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *length, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct hstate *h = &default_hstate;
unsigned long tmp;
int ret;
tmp = h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages;
if (write && h->order >= MAX_ORDER)
return -EINVAL;
table->data = &tmp;
table->maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long);
ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (write) {
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages = tmp;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
}
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int inet_sk_reselect_saddr(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__be32 old_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__be32 new_saddr;
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
inet_opt = rcu_dereference_protected(inet->inet_opt,
sock_owned_by_user(sk));
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
/* Query new route. */
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, daddr, 0, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_protocol,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk, false);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return PTR_ERR(rt);
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
new_saddr = rt->rt_src;
if (new_saddr == old_saddr)
return 0;
if (sysctl_ip_dynaddr > 1) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s(): shifting inet->saddr from %pI4 to %pI4\n",
__func__, &old_saddr, &new_saddr);
}
inet->inet_saddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr = new_saddr;
/*
* XXX The only one ugly spot where we need to
* XXX really change the sockets identity after
* XXX it has entered the hashes. -DaveM
*
* Besides that, it does not check for connection
* uniqueness. Wait for troubles.
*/
__sk_prot_rehash(sk);
return 0;
}
|
static int inet_sk_reselect_saddr(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__be32 old_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
__be32 new_saddr;
if (inet->opt && inet->opt->srr)
daddr = inet->opt->faddr;
/* Query new route. */
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, daddr, 0, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_protocol,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk, false);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return PTR_ERR(rt);
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
new_saddr = rt->rt_src;
if (new_saddr == old_saddr)
return 0;
if (sysctl_ip_dynaddr > 1) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s(): shifting inet->saddr from %pI4 to %pI4\n",
__func__, &old_saddr, &new_saddr);
}
inet->inet_saddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr = new_saddr;
/*
* XXX The only one ugly spot where we need to
* XXX really change the sockets identity after
* XXX it has entered the hashes. -DaveM
*
* Besides that, it does not check for connection
* uniqueness. Wait for troubles.
*/
__sk_prot_rehash(sk);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
QQmlComponent* OxideQQuickWebView::beforeUnloadDialog() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
return d->before_unload_dialog_;
}
|
QQmlComponent* OxideQQuickWebView::beforeUnloadDialog() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
return d->before_unload_dialog_;
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setProfileParams() {
IV_STATUS_T status;
ive_ctl_set_profile_params_ip_t s_profile_params_ip;
ive_ctl_set_profile_params_op_t s_profile_params_op;
s_profile_params_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_profile_params_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_PROFILE_PARAMS;
s_profile_params_ip.e_profile = DEFAULT_EPROFILE;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_entropy_coding_mode = mEntropyMode;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_profile_params_ip_t);
s_profile_params_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_profile_params_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_profile_params_ip, &s_profile_params_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to set profile params = 0x%x\n",
s_profile_params_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setProfileParams() {
IV_STATUS_T status;
ive_ctl_set_profile_params_ip_t s_profile_params_ip;
ive_ctl_set_profile_params_op_t s_profile_params_op;
s_profile_params_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_profile_params_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_PROFILE_PARAMS;
s_profile_params_ip.e_profile = DEFAULT_EPROFILE;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_entropy_coding_mode = mEntropyMode;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_profile_params_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_profile_params_ip_t);
s_profile_params_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_profile_params_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_profile_params_ip, &s_profile_params_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to set profile params = 0x%x\n",
s_profile_params_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
static int set_segment_reg(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long offset, u16 value)
{
/*
* The value argument was already truncated to 16 bits.
*/
if (invalid_selector(value))
return -EIO;
switch (offset) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs):
/*
* If this is setting fs as for normal 64-bit use but
* setting fs_base has implicitly changed it, leave it.
*/
if ((value == FS_TLS_SEL && task->thread.fsindex == 0 &&
task->thread.fs != 0) ||
(value == 0 && task->thread.fsindex == FS_TLS_SEL &&
task->thread.fs == 0))
break;
task->thread.fsindex = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(fs, task->thread.fsindex);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs):
/*
* If this is setting gs as for normal 64-bit use but
* setting gs_base has implicitly changed it, leave it.
*/
if ((value == GS_TLS_SEL && task->thread.gsindex == 0 &&
task->thread.gs != 0) ||
(value == 0 && task->thread.gsindex == GS_TLS_SEL &&
task->thread.gs == 0))
break;
task->thread.gsindex = value;
if (task == current)
load_gs_index(task->thread.gsindex);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ds):
task->thread.ds = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(ds, task->thread.ds);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,es):
task->thread.es = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(es, task->thread.es);
break;
/*
* Can't actually change these in 64-bit mode.
*/
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,cs):
if (unlikely(value == 0))
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32))
task_pt_regs(task)->cs = value;
#endif
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ss):
if (unlikely(value == 0))
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32))
task_pt_regs(task)->ss = value;
#endif
break;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int set_segment_reg(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long offset, u16 value)
{
/*
* The value argument was already truncated to 16 bits.
*/
if (invalid_selector(value))
return -EIO;
switch (offset) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs):
/*
* If this is setting fs as for normal 64-bit use but
* setting fs_base has implicitly changed it, leave it.
*/
if ((value == FS_TLS_SEL && task->thread.fsindex == 0 &&
task->thread.fs != 0) ||
(value == 0 && task->thread.fsindex == FS_TLS_SEL &&
task->thread.fs == 0))
break;
task->thread.fsindex = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(fs, task->thread.fsindex);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs):
/*
* If this is setting gs as for normal 64-bit use but
* setting gs_base has implicitly changed it, leave it.
*/
if ((value == GS_TLS_SEL && task->thread.gsindex == 0 &&
task->thread.gs != 0) ||
(value == 0 && task->thread.gsindex == GS_TLS_SEL &&
task->thread.gs == 0))
break;
task->thread.gsindex = value;
if (task == current)
load_gs_index(task->thread.gsindex);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ds):
task->thread.ds = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(ds, task->thread.ds);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,es):
task->thread.es = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(es, task->thread.es);
break;
/*
* Can't actually change these in 64-bit mode.
*/
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,cs):
if (unlikely(value == 0))
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32))
task_pt_regs(task)->cs = value;
#endif
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ss):
if (unlikely(value == 0))
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32))
task_pt_regs(task)->ss = value;
#endif
break;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static void __exit fcrypt_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&fcrypt_alg);
}
|
static void __exit fcrypt_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&fcrypt_alg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
ModuleExport void UnregisterDJVUImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("DJVU");
}
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterDJVUImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("DJVU");
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7395/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06
|
8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
|
static inline void SetPSDPixel(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const size_t packet_size,const Quantum pixel,Quantum *q,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
PixelInfo
*color;
if (type == 0)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
}
color=image->colormap+(ssize_t) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,
(ssize_t) GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception);
if ((type == 0) && (channels > 1))
return;
else
color->alpha=(MagickRealType) pixel;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,color,q);
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -3:
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -4:
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
}
}
|
static inline void SetPSDPixel(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const size_t packet_size,const Quantum pixel,Quantum *q,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
PixelInfo
*color;
if (type == 0)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
}
color=image->colormap+(ssize_t) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,
(ssize_t) GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception);
if ((type == 0) && (channels > 1))
return;
else
color->alpha=(MagickRealType) pixel;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,color,q);
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -3:
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -4:
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10065
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10065/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/134463b926fa965571aa4febd61b810be5e7da05
|
134463b926fa965571aa4febd61b810be5e7da05
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
|
static void ImportBGROQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelOpacity(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
}
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
|
static void ImportBGROQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelOpacity(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
}
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLInputElement::blur()
{
m_inputType->blur();
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::blur()
{
m_inputType->blur();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18345/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2078096efde1976b0fa9c820df90cedbfb2b13bc
|
2078096efde1976b0fa9c820df90cedbfb2b13bc
|
Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddIsolatedOrigins(
std::vector<url::Origin> origins_to_add) {
base::EraseIf(origins_to_add, [](const url::Origin& origin) {
if (IsolatedOriginUtil::IsValidIsolatedOrigin(origin))
return false; // Don't remove.
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid isolated origin: " << origin;
return true; // Remove.
});
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
for (const url::Origin& origin : origins_to_add) {
GURL key(SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForOrigin(origin));
isolated_origins_[key].insert(origin);
}
}
|
void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddIsolatedOrigins(
std::vector<url::Origin> origins_to_add) {
base::EraseIf(origins_to_add, [](const url::Origin& origin) {
if (IsolatedOriginUtil::IsValidIsolatedOrigin(origin))
return false; // Don't remove.
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid isolated origin: " << origin;
return true; // Remove.
});
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
for (const url::Origin& origin : origins_to_add) {
GURL key(SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForOrigin(origin));
isolated_origins_[key].insert(origin);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static inline bool is_invalid_opcode(u32 intr_info)
{
return is_exception_n(intr_info, UD_VECTOR);
}
|
static inline bool is_invalid_opcode(u32 intr_info)
{
return is_exception_n(intr_info, UD_VECTOR);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6158
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6158/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21
|
20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21
|
[oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
|
virtual ~Mixin() {}
|
virtual ~Mixin() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3412/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
static int efx_probe_interrupts(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
int max_channels =
min_t(int, efx->type->phys_addr_channels, EFX_MAX_CHANNELS);
int rc, i;
if (efx->interrupt_mode == EFX_INT_MODE_MSIX) {
struct msix_entry xentries[EFX_MAX_CHANNELS];
int n_channels;
n_channels = efx_wanted_channels();
if (separate_tx_channels)
n_channels *= 2;
n_channels = min(n_channels, max_channels);
for (i = 0; i < n_channels; i++)
xentries[i].entry = i;
rc = pci_enable_msix(efx->pci_dev, xentries, n_channels);
if (rc > 0) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"WARNING: Insufficient MSI-X vectors"
" available (%d < %d).\n", rc, n_channels);
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"WARNING: Performance may be reduced.\n");
EFX_BUG_ON_PARANOID(rc >= n_channels);
n_channels = rc;
rc = pci_enable_msix(efx->pci_dev, xentries,
n_channels);
}
if (rc == 0) {
efx->n_channels = n_channels;
if (separate_tx_channels) {
efx->n_tx_channels =
max(efx->n_channels / 2, 1U);
efx->n_rx_channels =
max(efx->n_channels -
efx->n_tx_channels, 1U);
} else {
efx->n_tx_channels = efx->n_channels;
efx->n_rx_channels = efx->n_channels;
}
rc = efx_init_rx_cpu_rmap(efx, xentries);
if (rc) {
pci_disable_msix(efx->pci_dev);
return rc;
}
for (i = 0; i < n_channels; i++)
efx_get_channel(efx, i)->irq =
xentries[i].vector;
} else {
/* Fall back to single channel MSI */
efx->interrupt_mode = EFX_INT_MODE_MSI;
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"could not enable MSI-X\n");
}
}
/* Try single interrupt MSI */
if (efx->interrupt_mode == EFX_INT_MODE_MSI) {
efx->n_channels = 1;
efx->n_rx_channels = 1;
efx->n_tx_channels = 1;
rc = pci_enable_msi(efx->pci_dev);
if (rc == 0) {
efx_get_channel(efx, 0)->irq = efx->pci_dev->irq;
} else {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"could not enable MSI\n");
efx->interrupt_mode = EFX_INT_MODE_LEGACY;
}
}
/* Assume legacy interrupts */
if (efx->interrupt_mode == EFX_INT_MODE_LEGACY) {
efx->n_channels = 1 + (separate_tx_channels ? 1 : 0);
efx->n_rx_channels = 1;
efx->n_tx_channels = 1;
efx->legacy_irq = efx->pci_dev->irq;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int efx_probe_interrupts(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
int max_channels =
min_t(int, efx->type->phys_addr_channels, EFX_MAX_CHANNELS);
int rc, i;
if (efx->interrupt_mode == EFX_INT_MODE_MSIX) {
struct msix_entry xentries[EFX_MAX_CHANNELS];
int n_channels;
n_channels = efx_wanted_channels();
if (separate_tx_channels)
n_channels *= 2;
n_channels = min(n_channels, max_channels);
for (i = 0; i < n_channels; i++)
xentries[i].entry = i;
rc = pci_enable_msix(efx->pci_dev, xentries, n_channels);
if (rc > 0) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"WARNING: Insufficient MSI-X vectors"
" available (%d < %d).\n", rc, n_channels);
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"WARNING: Performance may be reduced.\n");
EFX_BUG_ON_PARANOID(rc >= n_channels);
n_channels = rc;
rc = pci_enable_msix(efx->pci_dev, xentries,
n_channels);
}
if (rc == 0) {
efx->n_channels = n_channels;
if (separate_tx_channels) {
efx->n_tx_channels =
max(efx->n_channels / 2, 1U);
efx->n_rx_channels =
max(efx->n_channels -
efx->n_tx_channels, 1U);
} else {
efx->n_tx_channels = efx->n_channels;
efx->n_rx_channels = efx->n_channels;
}
rc = efx_init_rx_cpu_rmap(efx, xentries);
if (rc) {
pci_disable_msix(efx->pci_dev);
return rc;
}
for (i = 0; i < n_channels; i++)
efx_get_channel(efx, i)->irq =
xentries[i].vector;
} else {
/* Fall back to single channel MSI */
efx->interrupt_mode = EFX_INT_MODE_MSI;
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"could not enable MSI-X\n");
}
}
/* Try single interrupt MSI */
if (efx->interrupt_mode == EFX_INT_MODE_MSI) {
efx->n_channels = 1;
efx->n_rx_channels = 1;
efx->n_tx_channels = 1;
rc = pci_enable_msi(efx->pci_dev);
if (rc == 0) {
efx_get_channel(efx, 0)->irq = efx->pci_dev->irq;
} else {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"could not enable MSI\n");
efx->interrupt_mode = EFX_INT_MODE_LEGACY;
}
}
/* Assume legacy interrupts */
if (efx->interrupt_mode == EFX_INT_MODE_LEGACY) {
efx->n_channels = 1 + (separate_tx_channels ? 1 : 0);
efx->n_rx_channels = 1;
efx->n_tx_channels = 1;
efx->legacy_irq = efx->pci_dev->irq;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
group_sched_out(struct perf_event *group_event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event *event;
int state = group_event->state;
event_sched_out(group_event, cpuctx, ctx);
/*
* Schedule out siblings (if any):
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &group_event->sibling_list, group_entry)
event_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx);
if (state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE && group_event->attr.exclusive)
cpuctx->exclusive = 0;
}
|
group_sched_out(struct perf_event *group_event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event *event;
int state = group_event->state;
event_sched_out(group_event, cpuctx, ctx);
/*
* Schedule out siblings (if any):
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &group_event->sibling_list, group_entry)
event_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx);
if (state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE && group_event->attr.exclusive)
cpuctx->exclusive = 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool WebView::isViewWindowActive()
{
HWND activeWindow = ::GetActiveWindow();
return (activeWindow && m_topLevelParentWindow == findTopLevelParentWindow(activeWindow));
}
|
bool WebView::isViewWindowActive()
{
HWND activeWindow = ::GetActiveWindow();
return (activeWindow && m_topLevelParentWindow == findTopLevelParentWindow(activeWindow));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9511
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9511/
|
CWE-909
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/netd/+/931418b16c7197ca2df34c2a5609e49791125abe
|
931418b16c7197ca2df34c2a5609e49791125abe
|
Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
|
netdutils::Status XfrmController::ipSecAddSecurityAssociation(
int32_t transformId, int32_t mode, const std::string& sourceAddress,
const std::string& destinationAddress, int32_t underlyingNetId, int32_t spi, int32_t markValue,
int32_t markMask, const std::string& authAlgo, const std::vector<uint8_t>& authKey,
int32_t authTruncBits, const std::string& cryptAlgo, const std::vector<uint8_t>& cryptKey,
int32_t cryptTruncBits, const std::string& aeadAlgo, const std::vector<uint8_t>& aeadKey,
int32_t aeadIcvBits, int32_t encapType, int32_t encapLocalPort, int32_t encapRemotePort) {
ALOGD("XfrmController::%s, line=%d", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
ALOGD("transformId=%d", transformId);
ALOGD("mode=%d", mode);
ALOGD("sourceAddress=%s", sourceAddress.c_str());
ALOGD("destinationAddress=%s", destinationAddress.c_str());
ALOGD("underlyingNetworkId=%d", underlyingNetId);
ALOGD("spi=%0.8x", spi);
ALOGD("markValue=%x", markValue);
ALOGD("markMask=%x", markMask);
ALOGD("authAlgo=%s", authAlgo.c_str());
ALOGD("authTruncBits=%d", authTruncBits);
ALOGD("cryptAlgo=%s", cryptAlgo.c_str());
ALOGD("cryptTruncBits=%d,", cryptTruncBits);
ALOGD("aeadAlgo=%s", aeadAlgo.c_str());
ALOGD("aeadIcvBits=%d,", aeadIcvBits);
ALOGD("encapType=%d", encapType);
ALOGD("encapLocalPort=%d", encapLocalPort);
ALOGD("encapRemotePort=%d", encapRemotePort);
XfrmSaInfo saInfo{};
netdutils::Status ret = fillXfrmId(sourceAddress, destinationAddress, spi, markValue, markMask,
transformId, &saInfo);
if (!isOk(ret)) {
return ret;
}
saInfo.auth = XfrmAlgo{
.name = authAlgo, .key = authKey, .truncLenBits = static_cast<uint16_t>(authTruncBits)};
saInfo.crypt = XfrmAlgo{
.name = cryptAlgo, .key = cryptKey, .truncLenBits = static_cast<uint16_t>(cryptTruncBits)};
saInfo.aead = XfrmAlgo{
.name = aeadAlgo, .key = aeadKey, .truncLenBits = static_cast<uint16_t>(aeadIcvBits)};
switch (static_cast<XfrmMode>(mode)) {
case XfrmMode::TRANSPORT:
case XfrmMode::TUNNEL:
saInfo.mode = static_cast<XfrmMode>(mode);
break;
default:
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Invalid xfrm mode");
}
XfrmSocketImpl sock;
netdutils::Status socketStatus = sock.open();
if (!isOk(socketStatus)) {
ALOGD("Sock open failed for XFRM, line=%d", __LINE__);
return socketStatus;
}
switch (static_cast<XfrmEncapType>(encapType)) {
case XfrmEncapType::ESPINUDP:
case XfrmEncapType::ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
if (saInfo.addrFamily != AF_INET) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EAFNOSUPPORT, "IPv6 encap not supported");
}
saInfo.encap.srcPort = encapLocalPort;
saInfo.encap.dstPort = encapRemotePort;
case XfrmEncapType::NONE:
saInfo.encap.type = static_cast<XfrmEncapType>(encapType);
break;
default:
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Invalid encap type");
}
saInfo.netId = underlyingNetId;
ret = updateSecurityAssociation(saInfo, sock);
if (!isOk(ret)) {
ALOGD("Failed updating a Security Association, line=%d", __LINE__);
}
return ret;
}
|
netdutils::Status XfrmController::ipSecAddSecurityAssociation(
int32_t transformId, int32_t mode, const std::string& sourceAddress,
const std::string& destinationAddress, int32_t underlyingNetId, int32_t spi, int32_t markValue,
int32_t markMask, const std::string& authAlgo, const std::vector<uint8_t>& authKey,
int32_t authTruncBits, const std::string& cryptAlgo, const std::vector<uint8_t>& cryptKey,
int32_t cryptTruncBits, const std::string& aeadAlgo, const std::vector<uint8_t>& aeadKey,
int32_t aeadIcvBits, int32_t encapType, int32_t encapLocalPort, int32_t encapRemotePort) {
ALOGD("XfrmController::%s, line=%d", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
ALOGD("transformId=%d", transformId);
ALOGD("mode=%d", mode);
ALOGD("sourceAddress=%s", sourceAddress.c_str());
ALOGD("destinationAddress=%s", destinationAddress.c_str());
ALOGD("underlyingNetworkId=%d", underlyingNetId);
ALOGD("spi=%0.8x", spi);
ALOGD("markValue=%x", markValue);
ALOGD("markMask=%x", markMask);
ALOGD("authAlgo=%s", authAlgo.c_str());
ALOGD("authTruncBits=%d", authTruncBits);
ALOGD("cryptAlgo=%s", cryptAlgo.c_str());
ALOGD("cryptTruncBits=%d,", cryptTruncBits);
ALOGD("aeadAlgo=%s", aeadAlgo.c_str());
ALOGD("aeadIcvBits=%d,", aeadIcvBits);
ALOGD("encapType=%d", encapType);
ALOGD("encapLocalPort=%d", encapLocalPort);
ALOGD("encapRemotePort=%d", encapRemotePort);
XfrmSaInfo saInfo{};
netdutils::Status ret = fillXfrmId(sourceAddress, destinationAddress, spi, markValue, markMask,
transformId, &saInfo);
if (!isOk(ret)) {
return ret;
}
saInfo.auth = XfrmAlgo{
.name = authAlgo, .key = authKey, .truncLenBits = static_cast<uint16_t>(authTruncBits)};
saInfo.crypt = XfrmAlgo{
.name = cryptAlgo, .key = cryptKey, .truncLenBits = static_cast<uint16_t>(cryptTruncBits)};
saInfo.aead = XfrmAlgo{
.name = aeadAlgo, .key = aeadKey, .truncLenBits = static_cast<uint16_t>(aeadIcvBits)};
switch (static_cast<XfrmMode>(mode)) {
case XfrmMode::TRANSPORT:
case XfrmMode::TUNNEL:
saInfo.mode = static_cast<XfrmMode>(mode);
break;
default:
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Invalid xfrm mode");
}
XfrmSocketImpl sock;
netdutils::Status socketStatus = sock.open();
if (!isOk(socketStatus)) {
ALOGD("Sock open failed for XFRM, line=%d", __LINE__);
return socketStatus;
}
switch (static_cast<XfrmEncapType>(encapType)) {
case XfrmEncapType::ESPINUDP:
case XfrmEncapType::ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
if (saInfo.addrFamily != AF_INET) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EAFNOSUPPORT, "IPv6 encap not supported");
}
saInfo.encap.srcPort = encapLocalPort;
saInfo.encap.dstPort = encapRemotePort;
case XfrmEncapType::NONE:
saInfo.encap.type = static_cast<XfrmEncapType>(encapType);
break;
default:
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Invalid encap type");
}
saInfo.netId = underlyingNetId;
ret = updateSecurityAssociation(saInfo, sock);
if (!isOk(ret)) {
ALOGD("Failed updating a Security Association, line=%d", __LINE__);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool FrameView::isRubberBandInProgress() const
{
if (scrollbarsSuppressed())
return false;
if (ScrollAnimator* scrollAnimator = existingScrollAnimator())
return scrollAnimator->isRubberBandInProgress();
return false;
}
|
bool FrameView::isRubberBandInProgress() const
{
if (scrollbarsSuppressed())
return false;
if (ScrollAnimator* scrollAnimator = existingScrollAnimator())
return scrollAnimator->isRubberBandInProgress();
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
int __weak arch_update_cpu_topology(void)
{
return 0;
}
|
int __weak arch_update_cpu_topology(void)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
befb46ae3385fa13975521e9a2281e35805b339e
|
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <cevans@chromium.org>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Added test for bug 27239 (ignore Refresh for view source mode).
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html: Added
* http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh-expected.txt: Added
* http/tests/security/resources/view-source-no-refresh.php: Added
2009-10-23 Chris Evans <cevans@chromium.org>
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Ignore the Refresh header if we're in view source mode.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=27239
Test: http/tests/security/view-source-no-refresh.html
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp: ignore Refresh in view-source mode.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@50018 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoader::loadedResourceFromMemoryCache(const CachedResource* resource)
{
Page* page = m_frame->page();
if (!page)
return;
#if ENABLE(INSPECTOR)
page->inspectorController()->didLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(m_documentLoader.get(), resource);
#endif
if (!resource->sendResourceLoadCallbacks() || m_documentLoader->haveToldClientAboutLoad(resource->url()))
return;
if (!page->areMemoryCacheClientCallsEnabled()) {
m_documentLoader->recordMemoryCacheLoadForFutureClientNotification(resource->url());
m_documentLoader->didTellClientAboutLoad(resource->url());
return;
}
ResourceRequest request(resource->url());
if (m_client->dispatchDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(m_documentLoader.get(), request, resource->response(), resource->encodedSize())) {
m_documentLoader->didTellClientAboutLoad(resource->url());
return;
}
unsigned long identifier;
ResourceError error;
requestFromDelegate(request, identifier, error);
notifier()->sendRemainingDelegateMessages(m_documentLoader.get(), identifier, resource->response(), resource->encodedSize(), error);
}
|
void FrameLoader::loadedResourceFromMemoryCache(const CachedResource* resource)
{
Page* page = m_frame->page();
if (!page)
return;
#if ENABLE(INSPECTOR)
page->inspectorController()->didLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(m_documentLoader.get(), resource);
#endif
if (!resource->sendResourceLoadCallbacks() || m_documentLoader->haveToldClientAboutLoad(resource->url()))
return;
if (!page->areMemoryCacheClientCallsEnabled()) {
m_documentLoader->recordMemoryCacheLoadForFutureClientNotification(resource->url());
m_documentLoader->didTellClientAboutLoad(resource->url());
return;
}
ResourceRequest request(resource->url());
if (m_client->dispatchDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(m_documentLoader.get(), request, resource->response(), resource->encodedSize())) {
m_documentLoader->didTellClientAboutLoad(resource->url());
return;
}
unsigned long identifier;
ResourceError error;
requestFromDelegate(request, identifier, error);
notifier()->sendRemainingDelegateMessages(m_documentLoader.get(), identifier, resource->response(), resource->encodedSize(), error);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
|
static bool verify_and_prune(const char *cgroup_use)
{
const char *p;
char *e;
int i, j;
for (p = cgroup_use; p && *p; p = e + 1) {
e = strchr(p, ',');
if (e)
*e = '\0';
if (!in_subsystem_list(p)) {
ERROR("Controller %s required by lxc.cgroup.use but not available\n", p);
return false;
}
if (e)
*e = ',';
if (!e)
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < nr_subsystems;) {
if (in_comma_list(subsystems[i], cgroup_use)) {
i++;
continue;
}
free(subsystems[i]);
for (j = i; j < nr_subsystems-1; j++)
subsystems[j] = subsystems[j+1];
subsystems[nr_subsystems-1] = NULL;
nr_subsystems--;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool verify_and_prune(const char *cgroup_use)
{
const char *p;
char *e;
int i, j;
for (p = cgroup_use; p && *p; p = e + 1) {
e = strchr(p, ',');
if (e)
*e = '\0';
if (!in_subsystem_list(p)) {
ERROR("Controller %s required by lxc.cgroup.use but not available\n", p);
return false;
}
if (e)
*e = ',';
if (!e)
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < nr_subsystems;) {
if (in_comma_list(subsystems[i], cgroup_use)) {
i++;
continue;
}
free(subsystems[i]);
for (j = i; j < nr_subsystems-1; j++)
subsystems[j] = subsystems[j+1];
subsystems[nr_subsystems-1] = NULL;
nr_subsystems--;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1f6ba4c1c488be710013f8548ff5513b32a7f3b
|
a1f6ba4c1c488be710013f8548ff5513b32a7f3b
|
Define DEBUG_GL_COMMANDS only in debug builds.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=74083
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
No tests added as this change does not affect functionality.
* platform/graphics/opengl/TextureMapperGL.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@102359 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void BitmapTextureGL::setContentsToImage(Image* image)
{
ImageUID uid = image ? uidForImage(image) : 0;
if (!image || !uid) {
if (m_imageUID)
destroy();
return;
}
if (uid == m_imageUID)
return;
bool found = false;
GLuint newTextureID = m_textureMapper->data().directlyCompositedImages.findOrCreate(uid, found);
if (newTextureID != m_id) {
m_imageUID = uid;
destroy();
m_id = newTextureID;
reset(image->size(), false);
if (!found) {
GraphicsContext context(beginPaint(IntRect(0, 0, m_textureSize.width(), m_textureSize.height())));
context.drawImage(image, ColorSpaceDeviceRGB, IntPoint(0, 0), CompositeCopy);
endPaint();
}
}
}
|
void BitmapTextureGL::setContentsToImage(Image* image)
{
ImageUID uid = image ? uidForImage(image) : 0;
if (!image || !uid) {
if (m_imageUID)
destroy();
return;
}
if (uid == m_imageUID)
return;
bool found = false;
GLuint newTextureID = m_textureMapper->data().directlyCompositedImages.findOrCreate(uid, found);
if (newTextureID != m_id) {
m_imageUID = uid;
destroy();
m_id = newTextureID;
reset(image->size(), false);
if (!found) {
GraphicsContext context(beginPaint(IntRect(0, 0, m_textureSize.width(), m_textureSize.height())));
context.drawImage(image, ColorSpaceDeviceRGB, IntPoint(0, 0), CompositeCopy);
endPaint();
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2789
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2789/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
55ef04e135edaa9abfbf3647634b11ed57dc49e9
|
Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int32 ResourceTracker::AddVar(Var* var) {
if (last_var_id_ == std::numeric_limits<int32>::max() >> kPPIdTypeBits)
return 0;
int32 new_id = MakeTypedId(++last_var_id_, PP_ID_TYPE_VAR);
live_vars_.insert(std::make_pair(new_id, std::make_pair(var, 1)));
ObjectVar* object_var = var->AsObjectVar();
if (object_var) {
PP_Instance instance = object_var->instance()->pp_instance();
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(instance) != instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[instance]->object_vars.insert(new_id);
}
return new_id;
}
|
int32 ResourceTracker::AddVar(Var* var) {
if (last_var_id_ == std::numeric_limits<int32>::max() >> kPPIdTypeBits)
return 0;
int32 new_id = MakeTypedId(++last_var_id_, PP_ID_TYPE_VAR);
live_vars_.insert(std::make_pair(new_id, std::make_pair(var, 1)));
ObjectVar* object_var = var->AsObjectVar();
if (object_var) {
PP_Instance instance = object_var->instance()->pp_instance();
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(instance) != instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[instance]->object_vars.insert(new_id);
}
return new_id;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1593
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1593/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
|
4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77
|
x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
static int load_elf_library(struct file *file)
{
struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata;
struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
unsigned long elf_bss, bss, len;
int retval, error, i, j;
struct elfhdr elf_ex;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, 0, (char *)&elf_ex, sizeof(elf_ex));
if (retval != sizeof(elf_ex))
goto out;
if (memcmp(elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out;
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (elf_ex.e_type != ET_EXEC || elf_ex.e_phnum > 2 ||
!elf_check_arch(&elf_ex) || !file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
/* Now read in all of the header information */
j = sizeof(struct elf_phdr) * elf_ex.e_phnum;
/* j < ELF_MIN_ALIGN because elf_ex.e_phnum <= 2 */
error = -ENOMEM;
elf_phdata = kmalloc(j, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf_phdata)
goto out;
eppnt = elf_phdata;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, elf_ex.e_phoff, (char *)eppnt, j);
if (retval != j)
goto out_free_ph;
for (j = 0, i = 0; i<elf_ex.e_phnum; i++)
if ((eppnt + i)->p_type == PT_LOAD)
j++;
if (j != 1)
goto out_free_ph;
while (eppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
eppnt++;
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
error = vm_mmap(file,
ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr),
(eppnt->p_filesz +
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
(eppnt->p_offset -
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)));
if (error != ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr))
goto out_free_ph;
elf_bss = eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_ph;
}
len = ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_filesz + eppnt->p_vaddr +
ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
bss = eppnt->p_memsz + eppnt->p_vaddr;
if (bss > len)
vm_brk(len, bss - len);
error = 0;
out_free_ph:
kfree(elf_phdata);
out:
return error;
}
|
static int load_elf_library(struct file *file)
{
struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata;
struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
unsigned long elf_bss, bss, len;
int retval, error, i, j;
struct elfhdr elf_ex;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, 0, (char *)&elf_ex, sizeof(elf_ex));
if (retval != sizeof(elf_ex))
goto out;
if (memcmp(elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out;
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (elf_ex.e_type != ET_EXEC || elf_ex.e_phnum > 2 ||
!elf_check_arch(&elf_ex) || !file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
/* Now read in all of the header information */
j = sizeof(struct elf_phdr) * elf_ex.e_phnum;
/* j < ELF_MIN_ALIGN because elf_ex.e_phnum <= 2 */
error = -ENOMEM;
elf_phdata = kmalloc(j, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf_phdata)
goto out;
eppnt = elf_phdata;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, elf_ex.e_phoff, (char *)eppnt, j);
if (retval != j)
goto out_free_ph;
for (j = 0, i = 0; i<elf_ex.e_phnum; i++)
if ((eppnt + i)->p_type == PT_LOAD)
j++;
if (j != 1)
goto out_free_ph;
while (eppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
eppnt++;
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
error = vm_mmap(file,
ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr),
(eppnt->p_filesz +
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
(eppnt->p_offset -
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)));
if (error != ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr))
goto out_free_ph;
elf_bss = eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_ph;
}
len = ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_filesz + eppnt->p_vaddr +
ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
bss = eppnt->p_memsz + eppnt->p_vaddr;
if (bss > len)
vm_brk(len, bss - len);
error = 0;
out_free_ph:
kfree(elf_phdata);
out:
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3615/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=c1b886c45dc70f247300f549dce9833f3fa2def5
|
c1b886c45dc70f247300f549dce9833f3fa2def5
| null |
uint32_t vga_ioport_read(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
int val, index;
if (vga_ioport_invalid(s, addr)) {
val = 0xff;
} else {
switch(addr) {
case VGA_ATT_W:
if (s->ar_flip_flop == 0) {
val = s->ar_index;
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_ATT_R:
index = s->ar_index & 0x1f;
if (index < VGA_ATT_C) {
val = s->ar[index];
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_MIS_W:
val = s->st00;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_I:
val = s->sr_index;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_D:
val = s->sr[s->sr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read SR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_PEL_IR:
val = s->dac_state;
break;
case VGA_PEL_IW:
val = s->dac_write_index;
break;
case VGA_PEL_D:
val = s->palette[s->dac_read_index * 3 + s->dac_sub_index];
if (++s->dac_sub_index == 3) {
s->dac_sub_index = 0;
s->dac_read_index++;
}
break;
case VGA_FTC_R:
val = s->fcr;
break;
case VGA_MIS_R:
val = s->msr;
break;
case VGA_GFX_I:
val = s->gr_index;
break;
case VGA_GFX_D:
val = s->gr[s->gr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read GR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->gr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_CRT_IM:
case VGA_CRT_IC:
val = s->cr_index;
break;
case VGA_CRT_DM:
case VGA_CRT_DC:
val = s->cr[s->cr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read CR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->cr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_IS1_RM:
case VGA_IS1_RC:
/* just toggle to fool polling */
val = s->st01 = s->retrace(s);
s->ar_flip_flop = 0;
break;
default:
val = 0x00;
break;
}
}
#if defined(DEBUG_VGA)
printf("VGA: read addr=0x%04x data=0x%02x\n", addr, val);
#endif
return val;
}
|
uint32_t vga_ioport_read(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
int val, index;
if (vga_ioport_invalid(s, addr)) {
val = 0xff;
} else {
switch(addr) {
case VGA_ATT_W:
if (s->ar_flip_flop == 0) {
val = s->ar_index;
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_ATT_R:
index = s->ar_index & 0x1f;
if (index < VGA_ATT_C) {
val = s->ar[index];
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_MIS_W:
val = s->st00;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_I:
val = s->sr_index;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_D:
val = s->sr[s->sr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read SR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_PEL_IR:
val = s->dac_state;
break;
case VGA_PEL_IW:
val = s->dac_write_index;
break;
case VGA_PEL_D:
val = s->palette[s->dac_read_index * 3 + s->dac_sub_index];
if (++s->dac_sub_index == 3) {
s->dac_sub_index = 0;
s->dac_read_index++;
}
break;
case VGA_FTC_R:
val = s->fcr;
break;
case VGA_MIS_R:
val = s->msr;
break;
case VGA_GFX_I:
val = s->gr_index;
break;
case VGA_GFX_D:
val = s->gr[s->gr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read GR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->gr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_CRT_IM:
case VGA_CRT_IC:
val = s->cr_index;
break;
case VGA_CRT_DM:
case VGA_CRT_DC:
val = s->cr[s->cr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read CR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->cr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_IS1_RM:
case VGA_IS1_RC:
/* just toggle to fool polling */
val = s->st01 = s->retrace(s);
s->ar_flip_flop = 0;
break;
default:
val = 0x00;
break;
}
}
#if defined(DEBUG_VGA)
printf("VGA: read addr=0x%04x data=0x%02x\n", addr, val);
#endif
return val;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10517/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
|
void closeListeningSockets(int unlink_unix_socket) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < server.ipfd_count; j++) close(server.ipfd[j]);
if (server.sofd != -1) close(server.sofd);
if (server.cluster_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < server.cfd_count; j++) close(server.cfd[j]);
if (unlink_unix_socket && server.unixsocket) {
serverLog(LL_NOTICE,"Removing the unix socket file.");
unlink(server.unixsocket); /* don't care if this fails */
}
}
|
void closeListeningSockets(int unlink_unix_socket) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < server.ipfd_count; j++) close(server.ipfd[j]);
if (server.sofd != -1) close(server.sofd);
if (server.cluster_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < server.cfd_count; j++) close(server.cfd[j]);
if (unlink_unix_socket && server.unixsocket) {
serverLog(LL_NOTICE,"Removing the unix socket file.");
unlink(server.unixsocket); /* don't care if this fails */
}
}
|
C
|
redis
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11469
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11469/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.8.git;a=commit;h=17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
|
17514045e5d934dede62116216c1b016fe23dd06
| null |
enum act_return http_action_reject(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags)
{
channel_abort(&s->req);
channel_abort(&s->res);
s->req.analysers = 0;
s->res.analysers = 0;
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_req, 1);
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_req, 1);
if (sess->listener && sess->listener->counters)
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_req, 1);
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
return ACT_RET_CONT;
}
|
enum act_return http_action_reject(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags)
{
channel_abort(&s->req);
channel_abort(&s->res);
s->req.analysers = 0;
s->res.analysers = 0;
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_req, 1);
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_req, 1);
if (sess->listener && sess->listener->counters)
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_req, 1);
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
return ACT_RET_CONT;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeName(const blink::WebString& name) {
if (current_history_item_.IsNull()) {
unique_name_helper_.UpdateName(name.Utf8());
}
GetFrameHost()->DidChangeName(name.Utf8(), unique_name_helper_.value());
if (!committed_first_load_)
name_changed_before_first_commit_ = true;
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeName(const blink::WebString& name) {
if (current_history_item_.IsNull()) {
unique_name_helper_.UpdateName(name.Utf8());
}
GetFrameHost()->DidChangeName(name.Utf8(), unique_name_helper_.value());
if (!committed_first_load_)
name_changed_before_first_commit_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15398
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15398/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7a6484fa7b7f86ea06749bfc9d10bb67b145140b
|
7a6484fa7b7f86ea06749bfc9d10bb67b145140b
|
Fix Stack Buffer Overflow in QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders
BUG=777728
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I6a80db88aafdf20c7abd3847404b818565681310
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748425
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513105}
|
void QuicClientPromisedInfo::Reset(QuicRstStreamErrorCode error_code) {
QuicClientPushPromiseIndex::Delegate* delegate = client_request_delegate_;
session_->ResetPromised(id_, error_code);
session_->DeletePromised(this);
if (delegate) {
delegate->OnRendezvousResult(nullptr);
}
}
|
void QuicClientPromisedInfo::Reset(QuicRstStreamErrorCode error_code) {
QuicClientPushPromiseIndex::Delegate* delegate = client_request_delegate_;
session_->ResetPromised(id_, error_code);
session_->DeletePromised(this);
if (delegate) {
delegate->OnRendezvousResult(nullptr);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5
|
a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5
|
2009-05-04 Kai Brüning <kai@granus.net>
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24883
24883: Bad success test in parseXMLDocumentFragment in XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp
Fixed test whether all the chunk has been processed to correctly count utf8 bytes.
Test: fast/innerHTML/innerHTML-nbsp.xhtml
* dom/XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp:
(WebCore::parseXMLDocumentFragment):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@43195 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void XMLTokenizer::startDocument(const xmlChar* version, const xmlChar* encoding, int standalone)
{
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
if (version)
m_doc->setXMLVersion(toString(version), ec);
m_doc->setXMLStandalone(standalone == 1, ec); // possible values are 0, 1, and -1
if (encoding)
m_doc->setXMLEncoding(toString(encoding));
}
|
void XMLTokenizer::startDocument(const xmlChar* version, const xmlChar* encoding, int standalone)
{
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
if (version)
m_doc->setXMLVersion(toString(version), ec);
m_doc->setXMLStandalone(standalone == 1, ec); // possible values are 0, 1, and -1
if (encoding)
m_doc->setXMLEncoding(toString(encoding));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfs4_inc_and_copy_stateid(stateid_t *dst, struct nfs4_stid *stid)
{
stateid_t *src = &stid->sc_stateid;
spin_lock(&stid->sc_lock);
if (unlikely(++src->si_generation == 0))
src->si_generation = 1;
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
spin_unlock(&stid->sc_lock);
}
|
nfs4_inc_and_copy_stateid(stateid_t *dst, struct nfs4_stid *stid)
{
stateid_t *src = &stid->sc_stateid;
spin_lock(&stid->sc_lock);
if (unlikely(++src->si_generation == 0))
src->si_generation = 1;
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
spin_unlock(&stid->sc_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
static int no_givdecrypt(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
|
static int no_givdecrypt(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
bool WebViewTest::TapElement(WebInputEvent::Type type, Element* element) {
if (!element || !element->GetLayoutObject())
return false;
DCHECK(web_view_helper_.GetWebView());
element->scrollIntoViewIfNeeded();
IntPoint center =
web_view_helper_.GetWebView()
->MainFrameImpl()
->GetFrameView()
->ContentsToScreen(
element->GetLayoutObject()->AbsoluteBoundingBoxRect())
.Center();
WebGestureEvent event(type, WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
WebInputEvent::kTimeStampForTesting);
event.source_device = kWebGestureDeviceTouchscreen;
event.x = center.X();
event.y = center.Y();
web_view_helper_.GetWebView()->HandleInputEvent(
WebCoalescedInputEvent(event));
RunPendingTasks();
return true;
}
|
bool WebViewTest::TapElement(WebInputEvent::Type type, Element* element) {
if (!element || !element->GetLayoutObject())
return false;
DCHECK(web_view_helper_.GetWebView());
element->scrollIntoViewIfNeeded();
IntPoint center =
web_view_helper_.GetWebView()
->MainFrameImpl()
->GetFrameView()
->ContentsToScreen(
element->GetLayoutObject()->AbsoluteBoundingBoxRect())
.Center();
WebGestureEvent event(type, WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
WebInputEvent::kTimeStampForTesting);
event.source_device = kWebGestureDeviceTouchscreen;
event.x = center.X();
event.y = center.Y();
web_view_helper_.GetWebView()->HandleInputEvent(
WebCoalescedInputEvent(event));
RunPendingTasks();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5045/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/295dc39d941dc2ae53d5c170365af4c9d5c16212
|
295dc39d941dc2ae53d5c170365af4c9d5c16212
|
fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
static int follow_managed(struct path *path, unsigned flags)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = path->mnt; /* held by caller, must be left alone */
unsigned managed;
bool need_mntput = false;
int ret = 0;
/* Given that we're not holding a lock here, we retain the value in a
* local variable for each dentry as we look at it so that we don't see
* the components of that value change under us */
while (managed = ACCESS_ONCE(path->dentry->d_flags),
managed &= DCACHE_MANAGED_DENTRY,
unlikely(managed != 0)) {
/* Allow the filesystem to manage the transit without i_mutex
* being held. */
if (managed & DCACHE_MANAGE_TRANSIT) {
BUG_ON(!path->dentry->d_op);
BUG_ON(!path->dentry->d_op->d_manage);
ret = path->dentry->d_op->d_manage(path->dentry, false);
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
/* Transit to a mounted filesystem. */
if (managed & DCACHE_MOUNTED) {
struct vfsmount *mounted = lookup_mnt(path);
if (mounted) {
dput(path->dentry);
if (need_mntput)
mntput(path->mnt);
path->mnt = mounted;
path->dentry = dget(mounted->mnt_root);
need_mntput = true;
continue;
}
/* Something is mounted on this dentry in another
* namespace and/or whatever was mounted there in this
* namespace got unmounted before lookup_mnt() could
* get it */
}
/* Handle an automount point */
if (managed & DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT) {
ret = follow_automount(path, flags, &need_mntput);
if (ret < 0)
break;
continue;
}
/* We didn't change the current path point */
break;
}
if (need_mntput && path->mnt == mnt)
mntput(path->mnt);
if (ret == -EISDIR)
ret = 0;
return ret < 0 ? ret : need_mntput;
}
|
static int follow_managed(struct path *path, unsigned flags)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = path->mnt; /* held by caller, must be left alone */
unsigned managed;
bool need_mntput = false;
int ret = 0;
/* Given that we're not holding a lock here, we retain the value in a
* local variable for each dentry as we look at it so that we don't see
* the components of that value change under us */
while (managed = ACCESS_ONCE(path->dentry->d_flags),
managed &= DCACHE_MANAGED_DENTRY,
unlikely(managed != 0)) {
/* Allow the filesystem to manage the transit without i_mutex
* being held. */
if (managed & DCACHE_MANAGE_TRANSIT) {
BUG_ON(!path->dentry->d_op);
BUG_ON(!path->dentry->d_op->d_manage);
ret = path->dentry->d_op->d_manage(path->dentry, false);
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
/* Transit to a mounted filesystem. */
if (managed & DCACHE_MOUNTED) {
struct vfsmount *mounted = lookup_mnt(path);
if (mounted) {
dput(path->dentry);
if (need_mntput)
mntput(path->mnt);
path->mnt = mounted;
path->dentry = dget(mounted->mnt_root);
need_mntput = true;
continue;
}
/* Something is mounted on this dentry in another
* namespace and/or whatever was mounted there in this
* namespace got unmounted before lookup_mnt() could
* get it */
}
/* Handle an automount point */
if (managed & DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT) {
ret = follow_automount(path, flags, &need_mntput);
if (ret < 0)
break;
continue;
}
/* We didn't change the current path point */
break;
}
if (need_mntput && path->mnt == mnt)
mntput(path->mnt);
if (ret == -EISDIR)
ret = 0;
return ret < 0 ? ret : need_mntput;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-4508
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-4508/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dee1f973ca341c266229faa5a1a5bb268bed3531
|
dee1f973ca341c266229faa5a1a5bb268bed3531
|
ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
ssize_t len)
{
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int credits, blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
map.m_lblk = offset >> blkbits;
/*
* We can't just convert len to max_blocks because
* If blocksize = 4096 offset = 3072 and len = 2048
*/
max_blocks = ((EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(len + offset, blkbits) >> blkbits) -
map.m_lblk);
/*
* credits to insert 1 extent into extent tree
*/
credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
while (ret >= 0 && ret < max_blocks) {
map.m_lblk += ret;
map.m_len = (max_blocks -= ret);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
break;
}
ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, &map,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CONVERT_EXT);
if (ret <= 0) {
WARN_ON(ret <= 0);
ext4_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_ERR,
"%s:%d: inode #%lu: block %u: len %u: "
"ext4_ext_map_blocks returned %d",
__func__, __LINE__, inode->i_ino, map.m_lblk,
map.m_len, ret);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret <= 0 || ret2 )
break;
}
return ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret;
}
|
int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
ssize_t len)
{
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int credits, blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
map.m_lblk = offset >> blkbits;
/*
* We can't just convert len to max_blocks because
* If blocksize = 4096 offset = 3072 and len = 2048
*/
max_blocks = ((EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(len + offset, blkbits) >> blkbits) -
map.m_lblk);
/*
* credits to insert 1 extent into extent tree
*/
credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
while (ret >= 0 && ret < max_blocks) {
map.m_lblk += ret;
map.m_len = (max_blocks -= ret);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
break;
}
ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, &map,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CONVERT_EXT);
if (ret <= 0) {
WARN_ON(ret <= 0);
ext4_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_ERR,
"%s:%d: inode #%lu: block %u: len %u: "
"ext4_ext_map_blocks returned %d",
__func__, __LINE__, inode->i_ino, map.m_lblk,
map.m_len, ret);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret <= 0 || ret2 )
break;
}
return ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3154/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f14efc560a12a513696d6396413b138879dabd7a
|
f14efc560a12a513696d6396413b138879dabd7a
|
[FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChildThread::OnSetIPCLoggingEnabled(bool enable) {
if (enable)
IPC::Logging::GetInstance()->Enable();
else
IPC::Logging::GetInstance()->Disable();
}
|
void ChildThread::OnSetIPCLoggingEnabled(bool enable) {
if (enable)
IPC::Logging::GetInstance()->Enable();
else
IPC::Logging::GetInstance()->Disable();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorBleActivateSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnBleTapDarkIcon
: kWebauthnBleTapIcon;
}
|
const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorBleActivateSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnBleTapDarkIcon
: kWebauthnBleTapIcon;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void DrawingBuffer::SetFilterQuality(SkFilterQuality filter_quality) {
if (filter_quality_ != filter_quality) {
filter_quality_ = filter_quality;
if (layer_)
layer_->SetNearestNeighbor(filter_quality == kNone_SkFilterQuality);
}
}
|
void DrawingBuffer::SetFilterQuality(SkFilterQuality filter_quality) {
if (filter_quality_ != filter_quality) {
filter_quality_ = filter_quality;
if (layer_)
layer_->SetNearestNeighbor(filter_quality == kNone_SkFilterQuality);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::push_input_vc1 (OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
OMX_U8 *buf, *pdest;
OMX_U32 partial_frame = 1;
OMX_U32 buf_len, dest_len;
if (first_frame == 0) {
first_frame = 1;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("First i/p buffer for VC1 arbitrary bytes");
if (!m_vendor_config.pData) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Check profile type in 1st source buffer");
buf = psource_frame->pBuffer;
buf_len = psource_frame->nFilledLen;
if ((*((OMX_U32 *) buf) & VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) ==
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) {
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else if (*((OMX_U32 *) buf) & VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) {
m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid sequence layer in first buffer");
return OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt;
}
} else {
pdest = pdest_frame->pBuffer + pdest_frame->nFilledLen +
pdest_frame->nOffset;
dest_len = pdest_frame->nAllocLen - (pdest_frame->nFilledLen +
pdest_frame->nOffset);
if (dest_len < m_vendor_config.nDataSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Destination buffer full");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else {
memcpy(pdest, m_vendor_config.pData, m_vendor_config.nDataSize);
pdest_frame->nFilledLen += m_vendor_config.nDataSize;
}
}
}
switch (m_vc1_profile) {
case VC1_AP:
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VC1 AP, hence parse using frame start code");
if (push_input_sc_codec(hComp) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing VC1 AP start code");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
case VC1_SP_MP_RCV:
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unsupported VC1 profile in ArbitraryBytes Mode");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::push_input_vc1 (OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
OMX_U8 *buf, *pdest;
OMX_U32 partial_frame = 1;
OMX_U32 buf_len, dest_len;
if (first_frame == 0) {
first_frame = 1;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("First i/p buffer for VC1 arbitrary bytes");
if (!m_vendor_config.pData) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Check profile type in 1st source buffer");
buf = psource_frame->pBuffer;
buf_len = psource_frame->nFilledLen;
if ((*((OMX_U32 *) buf) & VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) ==
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) {
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else if (*((OMX_U32 *) buf) & VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) {
m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid sequence layer in first buffer");
return OMX_ErrorStreamCorrupt;
}
} else {
pdest = pdest_frame->pBuffer + pdest_frame->nFilledLen +
pdest_frame->nOffset;
dest_len = pdest_frame->nAllocLen - (pdest_frame->nFilledLen +
pdest_frame->nOffset);
if (dest_len < m_vendor_config.nDataSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Destination buffer full");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else {
memcpy(pdest, m_vendor_config.pData, m_vendor_config.nDataSize);
pdest_frame->nFilledLen += m_vendor_config.nDataSize;
}
}
}
switch (m_vc1_profile) {
case VC1_AP:
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VC1 AP, hence parse using frame start code");
if (push_input_sc_codec(hComp) != OMX_ErrorNone) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error In Parsing VC1 AP start code");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
case VC1_SP_MP_RCV:
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unsupported VC1 profile in ArbitraryBytes Mode");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
BOOLEAN btif_rc_get_connected_peer(BD_ADDR peer_addr)
{
if (btif_rc_cb.rc_connected == TRUE) {
bdcpy(peer_addr, btif_rc_cb.rc_addr);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
BOOLEAN btif_rc_get_connected_peer(BD_ADDR peer_addr)
{
if (btif_rc_cb.rc_connected == TRUE) {
bdcpy(peer_addr, btif_rc_cb.rc_addr);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3160
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3160/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee281f7cac9df44fe241a37f188b28be8845ded0
|
ee281f7cac9df44fe241a37f188b28be8845ded0
|
Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void ResourceFetcher::didFinishLoading(const Resource* resource, double finishTime, int64_t encodedDataLength)
{
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("net", "Resource", resource);
context().dispatchDidFinishLoading(m_documentLoader, resource->identifier(), finishTime, encodedDataLength);
}
|
void ResourceFetcher::didFinishLoading(const Resource* resource, double finishTime, int64_t encodedDataLength)
{
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("net", "Resource", resource);
context().dispatchDidFinishLoading(m_documentLoader, resource->identifier(), finishTime, encodedDataLength);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8863
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8863/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/stedolan/jq/commit/8eb1367ca44e772963e704a700ef72ae2e12babd
|
8eb1367ca44e772963e704a700ef72ae2e12babd
|
Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
|
static void parser_init(struct jv_parser* p, int flags) {
p->flags = flags;
if ((p->flags & JV_PARSE_STREAMING)) {
p->path = jv_array();
} else {
p->path = jv_invalid();
p->flags &= ~(JV_PARSE_STREAM_ERRORS);
}
p->stack = 0;
p->stacklen = p->stackpos = 0;
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_NONE;
p->output = jv_invalid();
p->next = jv_invalid();
p->tokenbuf = 0;
p->tokenlen = p->tokenpos = 0;
if ((p->flags & JV_PARSE_SEQ))
p->st = JV_PARSER_WAITING_FOR_RS;
else
p->st = JV_PARSER_NORMAL;
p->eof = 0;
p->curr_buf = 0;
p->curr_buf_length = p->curr_buf_pos = p->curr_buf_is_partial = 0;
p->bom_strip_position = 0;
p->last_ch_was_ws = 0;
p->line = 1;
p->column = 0;
jvp_dtoa_context_init(&p->dtoa);
}
|
static void parser_init(struct jv_parser* p, int flags) {
p->flags = flags;
if ((p->flags & JV_PARSE_STREAMING)) {
p->path = jv_array();
} else {
p->path = jv_invalid();
p->flags &= ~(JV_PARSE_STREAM_ERRORS);
}
p->stack = 0;
p->stacklen = p->stackpos = 0;
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_NONE;
p->output = jv_invalid();
p->next = jv_invalid();
p->tokenbuf = 0;
p->tokenlen = p->tokenpos = 0;
if ((p->flags & JV_PARSE_SEQ))
p->st = JV_PARSER_WAITING_FOR_RS;
else
p->st = JV_PARSER_NORMAL;
p->eof = 0;
p->curr_buf = 0;
p->curr_buf_length = p->curr_buf_pos = p->curr_buf_is_partial = 0;
p->bom_strip_position = 0;
p->last_ch_was_ws = 0;
p->line = 1;
p->column = 0;
jvp_dtoa_context_init(&p->dtoa);
}
|
C
|
jq
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16529
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16529/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfc81a8bc18e3c4ba0cbaa7666ff76be2f998991
|
bfc81a8bc18e3c4ba0cbaa7666ff76be2f998991
|
ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static int __usb_audio_resume(struct usb_interface *intf, bool reset_resume)
{
struct snd_usb_audio *chip = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer;
struct list_head *p;
int err = 0;
if (chip == (void *)-1L)
return 0;
if (--chip->num_suspended_intf)
return 0;
atomic_inc(&chip->active); /* avoid autopm */
/*
* ALSA leaves material resumption to user space
* we just notify and restart the mixers
*/
list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {
err = snd_usb_mixer_resume(mixer, reset_resume);
if (err < 0)
goto err_out;
}
list_for_each(p, &chip->midi_list) {
snd_usbmidi_resume(p);
}
if (!chip->autosuspended)
snd_power_change_state(chip->card, SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0);
chip->autosuspended = 0;
err_out:
atomic_dec(&chip->active); /* allow autopm after this point */
return err;
}
|
static int __usb_audio_resume(struct usb_interface *intf, bool reset_resume)
{
struct snd_usb_audio *chip = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer;
struct list_head *p;
int err = 0;
if (chip == (void *)-1L)
return 0;
if (--chip->num_suspended_intf)
return 0;
atomic_inc(&chip->active); /* avoid autopm */
/*
* ALSA leaves material resumption to user space
* we just notify and restart the mixers
*/
list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {
err = snd_usb_mixer_resume(mixer, reset_resume);
if (err < 0)
goto err_out;
}
list_for_each(p, &chip->midi_list) {
snd_usbmidi_resume(p);
}
if (!chip->autosuspended)
snd_power_change_state(chip->card, SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0);
chip->autosuspended = 0;
err_out:
atomic_dec(&chip->active); /* allow autopm after this point */
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
device_job_cancel_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
if (!device->priv->job_in_progress)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "There is no job to cancel");
goto out;
}
if (!device->priv->job_is_cancellable)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Job cannot be cancelled");
goto out;
}
job_cancel (device);
/* TODO: wait returning once the job is actually cancelled? */
dbus_g_method_return (context);
out:
;
}
|
device_job_cancel_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
if (!device->priv->job_in_progress)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "There is no job to cancel");
goto out;
}
if (!device->priv->job_is_cancellable)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Job cannot be cancelled");
goto out;
}
job_cancel (device);
/* TODO: wait returning once the job is actually cancelled? */
dbus_g_method_return (context);
out:
;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2390
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2390/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
static void enqueue_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page)
{
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
list_add(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_freelists[nid]);
h->free_huge_pages++;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
}
|
static void enqueue_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page)
{
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
list_add(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_freelists[nid]);
h->free_huge_pages++;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2538
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2538/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fe3c546c5ff2a6210f9a4d8561cc64051ca8603e
|
fe3c546c5ff2a6210f9a4d8561cc64051ca8603e
| null |
static int rndis_parse(USBNetState *s, uint8_t *data, int length)
{
uint32_t msg_type;
le32 *tmp = (le32 *) data;
msg_type = le32_to_cpup(tmp);
switch (msg_type) {
case RNDIS_INITIALIZE_MSG:
s->rndis_state = RNDIS_INITIALIZED;
return rndis_init_response(s, (rndis_init_msg_type *) data);
case RNDIS_HALT_MSG:
s->rndis_state = RNDIS_UNINITIALIZED;
return 0;
case RNDIS_QUERY_MSG:
return rndis_query_response(s, (rndis_query_msg_type *) data, length);
case RNDIS_SET_MSG:
return rndis_set_response(s, (rndis_set_msg_type *) data, length);
case RNDIS_RESET_MSG:
rndis_clear_responsequeue(s);
s->out_ptr = 0;
usb_net_reset_in_buf(s);
return rndis_reset_response(s, (rndis_reset_msg_type *) data);
case RNDIS_KEEPALIVE_MSG:
/* For USB: host does this every 5 seconds */
return rndis_keepalive_response(s, (rndis_keepalive_msg_type *) data);
}
return USB_RET_STALL;
}
|
static int rndis_parse(USBNetState *s, uint8_t *data, int length)
{
uint32_t msg_type;
le32 *tmp = (le32 *) data;
msg_type = le32_to_cpup(tmp);
switch (msg_type) {
case RNDIS_INITIALIZE_MSG:
s->rndis_state = RNDIS_INITIALIZED;
return rndis_init_response(s, (rndis_init_msg_type *) data);
case RNDIS_HALT_MSG:
s->rndis_state = RNDIS_UNINITIALIZED;
return 0;
case RNDIS_QUERY_MSG:
return rndis_query_response(s, (rndis_query_msg_type *) data, length);
case RNDIS_SET_MSG:
return rndis_set_response(s, (rndis_set_msg_type *) data, length);
case RNDIS_RESET_MSG:
rndis_clear_responsequeue(s);
s->out_ptr = 0;
usb_net_reset_in_buf(s);
return rndis_reset_response(s, (rndis_reset_msg_type *) data);
case RNDIS_KEEPALIVE_MSG:
/* For USB: host does this every 5 seconds */
return rndis_keepalive_response(s, (rndis_keepalive_msg_type *) data);
}
return USB_RET_STALL;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16359
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16359/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/62e39f34b2705131a2d08aff0c2e542c6a52cf0e
|
62e39f34b2705131a2d08aff0c2e542c6a52cf0e
|
Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
|
static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1 || shdr->sh_size > SIZE_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux;
if (vnaux < 1) {
goto beach;
}
vstart += vnaux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
|
static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1 || shdr->sh_size > SIZE_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux;
if (vnaux < 1) {
goto beach;
}
vstart += vnaux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8825
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8825/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/dinhviethoa/libetpan/commit/1fe8fbc032ccda1db9af66d93016b49c16c1f22d
|
1fe8fbc032ccda1db9af66d93016b49c16c1f22d
|
Fixed crash #274
|
int mailimf_word_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * word;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_atom_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &word);
if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
r = mailimf_quoted_string_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &word);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
* result = word;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
|
int mailimf_word_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * word;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_atom_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &word);
if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
r = mailimf_quoted_string_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &word);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
* result = word;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
|
C
|
libetpan
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17178/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/akallabeth/FreeRDP/commit/fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007
|
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
static void add_coins(Coin* c1, const Coin* c2)
{
size_t i;
for(i = 0; i < c2->symbols.size; i++) uivector_push_back(&c1->symbols, c2->symbols.data[i]);
c1->weight += c2->weight;
}
|
static void add_coins(Coin* c1, const Coin* c2)
{
size_t i;
for(i = 0; i < c2->symbols.size; i++) uivector_push_back(&c1->symbols, c2->symbols.data[i]);
c1->weight += c2->weight;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::AutomaticTrackSelectionForUpdatedUserPreference() {
if (!text_tracks_ || !text_tracks_->length())
return;
MarkCaptionAndSubtitleTracksAsUnconfigured();
processing_preference_change_ = true;
text_tracks_visible_ = false;
HonorUserPreferencesForAutomaticTextTrackSelection();
processing_preference_change_ = false;
text_tracks_visible_ = text_tracks_->HasShowingTracks();
UpdateTextTrackDisplay();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::AutomaticTrackSelectionForUpdatedUserPreference() {
if (!text_tracks_ || !text_tracks_->length())
return;
MarkCaptionAndSubtitleTracksAsUnconfigured();
processing_preference_change_ = true;
text_tracks_visible_ = false;
HonorUserPreferencesForAutomaticTextTrackSelection();
processing_preference_change_ = false;
text_tracks_visible_ = text_tracks_->HasShowingTracks();
UpdateTextTrackDisplay();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7906/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a2cf7d1376ae33054b878232fb38b8fbed29e31
|
3a2cf7d1376ae33054b878232fb38b8fbed29e31
|
Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
|
virtual ~TestDelegate() { CHECK(callbacks_.empty()); }
|
virtual ~TestDelegate() { CHECK(callbacks_.empty()); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15868
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15868/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/71bb99a02b32b4cc4265118e85f6035ca72923f0
|
71bb99a02b32b4cc4265118e85f6035ca72923f0
|
Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
static void __bnep_unlink_session(struct bnep_session *s)
{
list_del(&s->list);
}
|
static void __bnep_unlink_session(struct bnep_session *s)
{
list_del(&s->list);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10068
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10068/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/56d6e20de489113617cbbddaf41e92600a34db22
|
56d6e20de489113617cbbddaf41e92600a34db22
|
Prevent fault in MSL interpreter
|
static Image *ReadMSLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
(void) ProcessMSLScript(image_info,&image,exception);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
static Image *ReadMSLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
(void) ProcessMSLScript(image_info,&image,exception);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18352
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949
|
Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
|
double HTMLMediaElement::playbackRate() const {
return playback_rate_;
}
|
double HTMLMediaElement::playbackRate() const {
return playback_rate_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8284
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/
|
CWE-94
|
https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14
|
tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static void gen_lea_v_seg(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp aflag, TCGv a0,
int def_seg, int ovr_seg)
{
switch (aflag) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
if (ovr_seg < 0) {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
return;
}
break;
#endif
case MO_32:
/* 32 bit address */
if (ovr_seg < 0 && s->addseg) {
ovr_seg = def_seg;
}
if (ovr_seg < 0) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
return;
}
break;
case MO_16:
/* 16 bit address */
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
a0 = cpu_A0;
if (ovr_seg < 0) {
if (s->addseg) {
ovr_seg = def_seg;
} else {
return;
}
}
break;
default:
tcg_abort();
}
if (ovr_seg >= 0) {
TCGv seg = cpu_seg_base[ovr_seg];
if (aflag == MO_64) {
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, a0, seg);
} else if (CODE64(s)) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, seg);
} else {
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, a0, seg);
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0);
}
}
}
|
static void gen_lea_v_seg(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp aflag, TCGv a0,
int def_seg, int ovr_seg)
{
switch (aflag) {
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
case MO_64:
if (ovr_seg < 0) {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
return;
}
break;
#endif
case MO_32:
/* 32 bit address */
if (ovr_seg < 0 && s->addseg) {
ovr_seg = def_seg;
}
if (ovr_seg < 0) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
return;
}
break;
case MO_16:
/* 16 bit address */
tcg_gen_ext16u_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
a0 = cpu_A0;
if (ovr_seg < 0) {
if (s->addseg) {
ovr_seg = def_seg;
} else {
return;
}
}
break;
default:
tcg_abort();
}
if (ovr_seg >= 0) {
TCGv seg = cpu_seg_base[ovr_seg];
if (aflag == MO_64) {
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, a0, seg);
} else if (CODE64(s)) {
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, a0);
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0, seg);
} else {
tcg_gen_add_tl(cpu_A0, a0, seg);
tcg_gen_ext32u_tl(cpu_A0, cpu_A0);
}
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18690/
|
CWE-754
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c
|
7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c
|
xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: kanda.motohiro@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
|
xfs_attr_shortform_addname(xfs_da_args_t *args)
{
int newsize, forkoff, retval;
trace_xfs_attr_sf_addname(args);
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_lookup(args);
if ((args->flags & ATTR_REPLACE) && (retval == -ENOATTR)) {
return retval;
} else if (retval == -EEXIST) {
if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
return retval;
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_remove(args);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* Since we have removed the old attr, clear ATTR_REPLACE so
* that the leaf format add routine won't trip over the attr
* not being around.
*/
args->flags &= ~ATTR_REPLACE;
}
if (args->namelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX ||
args->valuelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX)
return -ENOSPC;
newsize = XFS_ATTR_SF_TOTSIZE(args->dp);
newsize += XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_BYNAME(args->namelen, args->valuelen);
forkoff = xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit(args->dp, newsize);
if (!forkoff)
return -ENOSPC;
xfs_attr_shortform_add(args, forkoff);
return 0;
}
|
xfs_attr_shortform_addname(xfs_da_args_t *args)
{
int newsize, forkoff, retval;
trace_xfs_attr_sf_addname(args);
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_lookup(args);
if ((args->flags & ATTR_REPLACE) && (retval == -ENOATTR)) {
return retval;
} else if (retval == -EEXIST) {
if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
return retval;
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_remove(args);
ASSERT(retval == 0);
}
if (args->namelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX ||
args->valuelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX)
return -ENOSPC;
newsize = XFS_ATTR_SF_TOTSIZE(args->dp);
newsize += XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_BYNAME(args->namelen, args->valuelen);
forkoff = xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit(args->dp, newsize);
if (!forkoff)
return -ENOSPC;
xfs_attr_shortform_add(args, forkoff);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
Build fix following bug #30696.
Patch by Gavin Barraclough <barraclough@apple.com> on 2009-10-22
Reviewed by NOBODY (build fix).
* WebCoreSupport/FrameLoaderClientGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::FrameLoaderClient::windowObjectCleared):
* webkit/webkitwebframe.cpp:
(webkit_web_frame_get_global_context):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@49964 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void FrameLoaderClient::dispatchDidChangeLocationWithinPage()
{
WebKitWebFramePrivate* priv = m_frame->priv;
g_free(priv->uri);
priv->uri = g_strdup(core(m_frame)->loader()->url().prettyURL().utf8().data());
g_object_notify(G_OBJECT(m_frame), "uri");
WebKitWebView* webView = getViewFromFrame(m_frame);
if (m_frame == webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(webView))
g_object_notify(G_OBJECT(webView), "uri");
}
|
void FrameLoaderClient::dispatchDidChangeLocationWithinPage()
{
WebKitWebFramePrivate* priv = m_frame->priv;
g_free(priv->uri);
priv->uri = g_strdup(core(m_frame)->loader()->url().prettyURL().utf8().data());
g_object_notify(G_OBJECT(m_frame), "uri");
WebKitWebView* webView = getViewFromFrame(m_frame);
if (m_frame == webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(webView))
g_object_notify(G_OBJECT(webView), "uri");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
static inline unsigned long task_util_est(struct task_struct *p)
{
return max(task_util(p), _task_util_est(p));
}
|
static inline unsigned long task_util_est(struct task_struct *p)
{
return max(task_util(p), _task_util_est(p));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0217/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7d5145d8eb2b9791533ffe4dc003b129b9696c48
|
7d5145d8eb2b9791533ffe4dc003b129b9696c48
|
xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
void xen_netbk_queue_tx_skb(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xen_netbk *netbk = vif->netbk;
skb_queue_tail(&netbk->rx_queue, skb);
xen_netbk_kick_thread(netbk);
}
|
void xen_netbk_queue_tx_skb(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xen_netbk *netbk = vif->netbk;
skb_queue_tail(&netbk->rx_queue, skb);
xen_netbk_kick_thread(netbk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
void qeth_qdio_input_handler(struct ccw_device *ccwdev, unsigned int qdio_err,
unsigned int queue, int first_elem, int count,
unsigned long card_ptr)
{
struct qeth_card *card = (struct qeth_card *)card_ptr;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "qihq%d", queue);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "qiec%d", qdio_err);
if (qeth_is_cq(card, queue))
qeth_qdio_cq_handler(card, qdio_err, queue, first_elem, count);
else if (qdio_err)
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
}
|
void qeth_qdio_input_handler(struct ccw_device *ccwdev, unsigned int qdio_err,
unsigned int queue, int first_elem, int count,
unsigned long card_ptr)
{
struct qeth_card *card = (struct qeth_card *)card_ptr;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "qihq%d", queue);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "qiec%d", qdio_err);
if (qeth_is_cq(card, queue))
qeth_qdio_cq_handler(card, qdio_err, queue, first_elem, count);
else if (qdio_err)
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.