CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::updateBlockChildDirtyBitsBeforeLayout(bool relayoutChildren, LayoutBox& child)
{
if (child.isLayoutMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder())
toLayoutMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder(child).markForLayoutIfObjectInFlowThreadNeedsLayout();
LayoutBlock::updateBlockChildDirtyBitsBeforeLayout(relayoutChildren, child);
}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::updateBlockChildDirtyBitsBeforeLayout(bool relayoutChildren, LayoutBox& child)
{
if (child.isLayoutMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder())
toLayoutMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder(child).markForLayoutIfObjectInFlowThreadNeedsLayout();
LayoutBlock::updateBlockChildDirtyBitsBeforeLayout(relayoutChildren, child);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14568
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14568/
| null |
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3428/commits/843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
|
843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
|
stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
|
static int StreamTcp3whsQueueSynAck(TcpSession *ssn, Packet *p)
{
/* first see if this is already in our list */
if (StreamTcp3whsFindSynAckBySynAck(ssn, p) != NULL)
return 0;
if (ssn->queue_len == stream_config.max_synack_queued) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ SYN/ACK queue limit reached", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_FLOOD);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpCheckMemcap((uint32_t)sizeof(TcpStateQueue)) == 0) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ SYN/ACK queue failed: stream memcap reached", ssn);
return -1;
}
TcpStateQueue *q = SCMalloc(sizeof(*q));
if (unlikely(q == NULL)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ SYN/ACK queue failed: alloc failed", ssn);
return -1;
}
memset(q, 0x00, sizeof(*q));
StreamTcpIncrMemuse((uint64_t)sizeof(TcpStateQueue));
StreamTcp3whsSynAckToStateQueue(p, q);
/* put in list */
q->next = ssn->queue;
ssn->queue = q;
ssn->queue_len++;
return 0;
}
|
static int StreamTcp3whsQueueSynAck(TcpSession *ssn, Packet *p)
{
/* first see if this is already in our list */
if (StreamTcp3whsFindSynAckBySynAck(ssn, p) != NULL)
return 0;
if (ssn->queue_len == stream_config.max_synack_queued) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ SYN/ACK queue limit reached", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_3WHS_SYNACK_FLOOD);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpCheckMemcap((uint32_t)sizeof(TcpStateQueue)) == 0) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ SYN/ACK queue failed: stream memcap reached", ssn);
return -1;
}
TcpStateQueue *q = SCMalloc(sizeof(*q));
if (unlikely(q == NULL)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =~ SYN/ACK queue failed: alloc failed", ssn);
return -1;
}
memset(q, 0x00, sizeof(*q));
StreamTcpIncrMemuse((uint64_t)sizeof(TcpStateQueue));
StreamTcp3whsSynAckToStateQueue(p, q);
/* put in list */
q->next = ssn->queue;
ssn->queue = q;
ssn->queue_len++;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13049
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13049/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/aa0858100096a3490edf93034a80e66a4d61aad5
|
aa0858100096a3490edf93034a80e66a4d61aad5
|
CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
fs_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
unsigned long i;
const struct rx_header *rxh;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from fsint/afsint.xg
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fs reply %s", tok2str(fs_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA) {
switch (opcode) {
case 131: /* Fetch ACL */
{
char a[AFSOPAQUEMAX+1];
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], i);
i = min(AFSOPAQUEMAX, i);
strncpy(a, (const char *) bp, i);
a[i] = '\0';
acl_print(ndo, (u_char *) a, sizeof(a), (u_char *) a + i);
break;
}
case 137: /* Create file */
case 141: /* MakeDir */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " new"));
FIDOUT();
break;
case 151: /* Get root volume */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " root volume"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 153: /* Get time */
DATEOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
} else if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT) {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
i = (int) EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " error %s", tok2str(afs_fs_errors, "#%d", i)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " strange fs reply of type %d", rxh->type));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|fs]"));
}
|
fs_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
unsigned long i;
const struct rx_header *rxh;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from fsint/afsint.xg
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fs reply %s", tok2str(fs_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA) {
switch (opcode) {
case 131: /* Fetch ACL */
{
char a[AFSOPAQUEMAX+1];
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], i);
i = min(AFSOPAQUEMAX, i);
strncpy(a, (const char *) bp, i);
a[i] = '\0';
acl_print(ndo, (u_char *) a, sizeof(a), (u_char *) a + i);
break;
}
case 137: /* Create file */
case 141: /* MakeDir */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " new"));
FIDOUT();
break;
case 151: /* Get root volume */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " root volume"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 153: /* Get time */
DATEOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
} else if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT) {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
i = (int) EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " error %s", tok2str(afs_fs_errors, "#%d", i)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " strange fs reply of type %d", rxh->type));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|fs]"));
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStrip::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(false);
switch (event->type()) {
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END:
case ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START:
case ui::ET_GESTURE_END:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_COMPLETE);
if (adjust_layout_) {
SetLayoutType(TAB_STRIP_LAYOUT_STACKED, true);
controller_->LayoutTypeMaybeChanged();
}
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_PRESS:
if (drag_controller_.get())
drag_controller_->SetMoveBehavior(TabDragController::REORDER);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_TAP: {
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
gfx::Point local_point = event->location();
Tab* tab = FindTabForEvent(local_point);
if (tab) {
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &local_point);
ShowContextMenuForTab(tab, local_point, ui::MENU_SOURCE_TOUCH);
}
break;
}
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE:
ContinueDrag(this, *event);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_BEGIN:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP: {
const int active_index = controller_->GetActiveIndex();
DCHECK_NE(-1, active_index);
Tab* active_tab = tab_at(active_index);
TouchUMA::GestureActionType action = TouchUMA::GESTURE_TABNOSWITCH_TAP;
if (active_tab->tab_activated_with_last_gesture_begin())
action = TouchUMA::GESTURE_TABSWITCH_TAP;
TouchUMA::RecordGestureAction(action);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
void TabStrip::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
SetResetToShrinkOnExit(false);
switch (event->type()) {
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END:
case ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START:
case ui::ET_GESTURE_END:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_COMPLETE);
if (adjust_layout_) {
SetLayoutType(TAB_STRIP_LAYOUT_STACKED, true);
controller_->LayoutTypeMaybeChanged();
}
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_PRESS:
if (drag_controller_.get())
drag_controller_->SetMoveBehavior(TabDragController::REORDER);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_LONG_TAP: {
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
gfx::Point local_point = event->location();
Tab* tab = FindTabForEvent(local_point);
if (tab) {
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &local_point);
ShowContextMenuForTab(tab, local_point, ui::MENU_SOURCE_TOUCH);
}
break;
}
case ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE:
ContinueDrag(this, *event);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_BEGIN:
EndDrag(END_DRAG_CANCEL);
break;
case ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP: {
const int active_index = controller_->GetActiveIndex();
DCHECK_NE(-1, active_index);
Tab* active_tab = tab_at(active_index);
TouchUMA::GestureActionType action = TouchUMA::GESTURE_TABNOSWITCH_TAP;
if (active_tab->tab_activated_with_last_gesture_begin())
action = TouchUMA::GESTURE_TABSWITCH_TAP;
TouchUMA::RecordGestureAction(action);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
event->SetHandled();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6040/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/209f225b2d51334eaf69ffdf002e25eaa1e0d448
|
209f225b2d51334eaf69ffdf002e25eaa1e0d448
|
Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
|
void Document::MaybeQueueSendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext() {
if (logged_field_edit_ || sensitive_input_edited_task_.IsActive() ||
IsSecureContext()) {
return;
}
logged_field_edit_ = true;
sensitive_input_edited_task_ =
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUserInteraction)
->PostCancellableTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&Document::SendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
}
|
void Document::MaybeQueueSendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext() {
if (logged_field_edit_ || sensitive_input_edited_task_.IsActive() ||
IsSecureContext()) {
return;
}
logged_field_edit_ = true;
sensitive_input_edited_task_ =
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUserInteraction)
->PostCancellableTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&Document::SendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1640
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1640/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
0a1c15fecb1240ab909e1431b6127410c3b380e0
|
Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
|
views::GridLayout* ExtensionInstallDialogView::CreateLayout(
int left_column_width,
int column_set_id) {
container_ = new views::View();
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(container_);
layout->SetInsets(0, views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew, views::kPanelVertMargin,
0);
container_->SetLayoutManager(layout);
AddChildView(container_);
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING, views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0, // no fixed width
left_column_width);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, views::kPanelHorizMargin);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::TRAILING, views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0, // no fixed width
kIconSize);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* title =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetDialogTitle(),
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetFontList(
ui::ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
title->SetMultiLine(true);
title->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
title->SizeToFit(left_column_width);
layout->AddView(title);
const gfx::ImageSkia* image = prompt_->icon().ToImageSkia();
gfx::Size size(image->width(), image->height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize)
size = gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize);
views::ImageView* icon = new views::ImageView();
icon->SetImageSize(size);
icon->SetImage(*image);
int icon_row_span = 1; // Always span the title.
if (prompt_->has_webstore_data()) {
icon_row_span += 3;
} else {
icon_row_span += 1;
}
layout->AddView(icon, 1, icon_row_span);
return layout;
}
|
views::GridLayout* ExtensionInstallDialogView::CreateLayout(
int left_column_width,
int column_set_id) {
container_ = new views::View();
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(container_);
layout->SetInsets(0, views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew, views::kPanelVertMargin,
0);
container_->SetLayoutManager(layout);
AddChildView(container_);
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(column_set_id);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::LEADING, views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0, // no fixed width
left_column_width);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, views::kPanelHorizMargin);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::TRAILING, views::GridLayout::LEADING,
0, // no resizing
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0, // no fixed width
kIconSize);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, views::kButtonHEdgeMarginNew);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* title =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetDialogTitle(),
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetFontList(
ui::ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
title->SetMultiLine(true);
title->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
title->SizeToFit(left_column_width);
layout->AddView(title);
const gfx::ImageSkia* image = prompt_->icon().ToImageSkia();
gfx::Size size(image->width(), image->height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize)
size = gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize);
views::ImageView* icon = new views::ImageView();
icon->SetImageSize(size);
icon->SetImage(*image);
int icon_row_span = 1; // Always span the title.
if (prompt_->has_webstore_data()) {
icon_row_span += 3;
} else {
icon_row_span += 1;
}
layout->AddView(icon, 1, icon_row_span);
return layout;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
WebUI* WebContentsImpl::GetWebUI() const {
WebUI* commited_web_ui = GetCommittedWebUI();
return commited_web_ui ? commited_web_ui
: GetRenderManager()->GetNavigatingWebUI();
}
|
WebUI* WebContentsImpl::GetWebUI() const {
WebUI* commited_web_ui = GetCommittedWebUI();
return commited_web_ui ? commited_web_ui
: GetRenderManager()->GetNavigatingWebUI();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8481
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8481/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
a430c9166312e1aa3d80bce32374233bdbfeba32
|
KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static int em_das(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u8 al, old_al;
bool af, cf, old_cf;
cf = ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_CF;
al = ctxt->dst.val;
old_al = al;
old_cf = cf;
cf = false;
af = ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AF;
if ((al & 0x0f) > 9 || af) {
al -= 6;
cf = old_cf | (al >= 250);
af = true;
} else {
af = false;
}
if (old_al > 0x99 || old_cf) {
al -= 0x60;
cf = true;
}
ctxt->dst.val = al;
/* Set PF, ZF, SF */
ctxt->src.type = OP_IMM;
ctxt->src.val = 0;
ctxt->src.bytes = 1;
fastop(ctxt, em_or);
ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_CF);
if (cf)
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
if (af)
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_AF;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
static int em_das(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u8 al, old_al;
bool af, cf, old_cf;
cf = ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_CF;
al = ctxt->dst.val;
old_al = al;
old_cf = cf;
cf = false;
af = ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AF;
if ((al & 0x0f) > 9 || af) {
al -= 6;
cf = old_cf | (al >= 250);
af = true;
} else {
af = false;
}
if (old_al > 0x99 || old_cf) {
al -= 0x60;
cf = true;
}
ctxt->dst.val = al;
/* Set PF, ZF, SF */
ctxt->src.type = OP_IMM;
ctxt->src.val = 0;
ctxt->src.bytes = 1;
fastop(ctxt, em_or);
ctxt->eflags &= ~(X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_CF);
if (cf)
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
if (af)
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_AF;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15423
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
explicit GpuDataManagerVisualProxy(GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager)
: gpu_data_manager_(gpu_data_manager) {
gpu_data_manager_->AddObserver(this);
}
|
explicit GpuDataManagerVisualProxy(GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager)
: gpu_data_manager_(gpu_data_manager) {
gpu_data_manager_->AddObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutoFillHelper::FrameContentsAvailable(WebFrame* frame) {
form_manager_.ExtractForms(frame);
SendForms(frame);
}
|
void AutoFillHelper::FrameContentsAvailable(WebFrame* frame) {
form_manager_.ExtractForms(frame);
SendForms(frame);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3110
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3110/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c036ca040c114c077e13c35baaea78e2ddbaf61
|
3c036ca040c114c077e13c35baaea78e2ddbaf61
|
[chromium] We should accelerate all transformations, except when we must blend matrices that cannot be decomposed.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95855
Reviewed by James Robinson.
Source/Platform:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
* chromium/public/WebTransformOperations.h:
(WebTransformOperations):
* chromium/public/WebTransformationMatrix.h:
(WebTransformationMatrix):
Source/WebCore:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
Unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformOperations.cpp:
(WebKit::blendTransformOperations):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blend):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::canBlendWith):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blendInternal):
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformationMatrix.cpp:
(WebKit::WebTransformationMatrix::blend):
* platform/graphics/chromium/AnimationTranslationUtil.cpp:
(WebCore::WebTransformAnimationCurve):
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Added the following unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* tests/AnimationTranslationUtilTest.cpp:
(WebKit::TEST):
(WebKit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127868 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static double blendDoubles(double from, double to, double progress)
{
return from * (1 - progress) + to * progress;
}
|
static double blendDoubles(double from, double to, double progress)
{
return from * (1 - progress) + to * progress;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bfb2b8299e2fb6a432390a93a99a85fed1d29c9
|
2bfb2b8299e2fb6a432390a93a99a85fed1d29c9
|
Fix erroneous semicolon causing build failure: if statement has empty body [-Werror,-Wempty-body]
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108241
Patch by Kiran Muppala <cmuppala@apple.com> on 2013-01-29
Reviewed by Anders Carlsson.
* UIProcess/WebProcessProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebProcessProxy::addExistingWebPage): Remove erroneous
semicolon following the if condition.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@141180 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebProcessProxy::getPlugins(CoreIPC::Connection*, uint64_t requestID, bool refresh)
{
pluginWorkQueue().dispatch(bind(&WebProcessProxy::handleGetPlugins, this, requestID, refresh));
}
|
void WebProcessProxy::getPlugins(CoreIPC::Connection*, uint64_t requestID, bool refresh)
{
pluginWorkQueue().dispatch(bind(&WebProcessProxy::handleGetPlugins, this, requestID, refresh));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void OverloadedMethodLMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(2, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
break;
case 2:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodL");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
|
static void OverloadedMethodLMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(2, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
break;
case 2:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodL");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15537
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15537/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/814fb7bb7db5433757d76f4c4502c96fc53b0b5e
|
814fb7bb7db5433757d76f4c4502c96fc53b0b5e
|
x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
int fpregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
int ret;
fpu__activate_fpstate_write(fpu);
fpstate_sanitize_xstate(fpu);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
return fpregs_soft_set(target, regset, pos, count, kbuf, ubuf);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&fpu->state.fsave, 0,
-1);
if (pos > 0 || count < sizeof(env))
convert_from_fxsr(&env, target);
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &env, 0, -1);
if (!ret)
convert_to_fxsr(target, &env);
/*
* update the header bit in the xsave header, indicating the
* presence of FP.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
fpu->state.xsave.header.xfeatures |= XFEATURE_MASK_FP;
return ret;
}
|
int fpregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
int ret;
fpu__activate_fpstate_write(fpu);
fpstate_sanitize_xstate(fpu);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
return fpregs_soft_set(target, regset, pos, count, kbuf, ubuf);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&fpu->state.fsave, 0,
-1);
if (pos > 0 || count < sizeof(env))
convert_from_fxsr(&env, target);
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &env, 0, -1);
if (!ret)
convert_to_fxsr(target, &env);
/*
* update the header bit in the xsave header, indicating the
* presence of FP.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
fpu->state.xsave.header.xfeatures |= XFEATURE_MASK_FP;
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
d926098e2e2be270c80a5ba25ab8a611b80b8556
|
Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::didLoseWebGLContext(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
int arb_robustness_status_code) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidLose3DContext(
GURL(frame->top()->securityOrigin().toString()),
THREE_D_API_TYPE_WEBGL,
arb_robustness_status_code));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::didLoseWebGLContext(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
int arb_robustness_status_code) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidLose3DContext(
GURL(frame->top()->securityOrigin().toString()),
THREE_D_API_TYPE_WEBGL,
arb_robustness_status_code));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6376/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271
|
17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271
|
KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
static inline bool pv_eoi_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED;
}
|
static inline bool pv_eoi_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10165/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
|
void* GenericMPEdup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsStageDup((cmsStage*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
|
void* GenericMPEdup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsStageDup((cmsStage*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2017-17862
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17862/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467
|
c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467
|
bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
bool changes_data;
int i, err;
/* find function prototype */
if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
if (!fn) {
verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
verbose(env, "cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
* is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
*/
err = check_raw_mode(fn);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
}
/* check args */
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
if (err)
return err;
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
/* reset caller saved regs */
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
}
/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
* can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
* to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
*/
if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
verbose(env,
"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
} else {
verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
if (err)
return err;
if (changes_data)
clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
return 0;
}
|
static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
bool changes_data;
int i, err;
/* find function prototype */
if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
if (!fn) {
verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
verbose(env, "cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
* is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
*/
err = check_raw_mode(fn);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
}
/* check args */
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
if (err)
return err;
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
/* reset caller saved regs */
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
}
/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
* can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
* to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
*/
if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
verbose(env,
"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
} else {
verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
if (err)
return err;
if (changes_data)
clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5252
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5252/
|
CWE-264
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e
|
4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e
| null |
static void vfs_init_default(connection_struct *conn)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Initialising default vfs hooks\n"));
vfs_init_custom(conn, DEFAULT_VFS_MODULE_NAME);
}
|
static void vfs_init_default(connection_struct *conn)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Initialising default vfs hooks\n"));
vfs_init_custom(conn, DEFAULT_VFS_MODULE_NAME);
}
|
C
|
samba
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5770
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5770/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba?w=1
|
Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
static int spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(spl_filesystem_object *intern TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (intern->u.file.current_line) {
return intern->u.file.current_line_len == 0;
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
switch(Z_TYPE_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
case IS_STRING:
return Z_STRLEN_P(intern->u.file.current_zval) == 0;
case IS_ARRAY:
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV)
&& zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 1) {
zval ** first = Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)->pListHead->pData;
return Z_TYPE_PP(first) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_PP(first) == 0;
}
return zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 0;
case IS_NULL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
} else {
return 1;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
static int spl_filesystem_file_is_empty_line(spl_filesystem_object *intern TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (intern->u.file.current_line) {
return intern->u.file.current_line_len == 0;
} else if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
switch(Z_TYPE_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) {
case IS_STRING:
return Z_STRLEN_P(intern->u.file.current_zval) == 0;
case IS_ARRAY:
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_CSV)
&& zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 1) {
zval ** first = Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)->pListHead->pData;
return Z_TYPE_PP(first) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_PP(first) == 0;
}
return zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(intern->u.file.current_zval)) == 0;
case IS_NULL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
} else {
return 1;
}
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool NewTabButton::HasHitTestMask() const {
return !tab_strip_->SizeTabButtonToTopOfTabStrip();
}
|
bool NewTabButton::HasHitTestMask() const {
return !tab_strip_->SizeTabButtonToTopOfTabStrip();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5112/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d65b01ca819881a507b5e60c25a2f9caff58cd57
|
d65b01ca819881a507b5e60c25a2f9caff58cd57
|
Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void QuotaManagerProxy::NotifyOriginInUse(
const GURL& origin) {
if (!io_thread_->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
io_thread_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&QuotaManagerProxy::NotifyOriginInUse, this, origin));
return;
}
if (manager_)
manager_->NotifyOriginInUse(origin);
}
|
void QuotaManagerProxy::NotifyOriginInUse(
const GURL& origin) {
if (!io_thread_->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
io_thread_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&QuotaManagerProxy::NotifyOriginInUse, this, origin));
return;
}
if (manager_)
manager_->NotifyOriginInUse(origin);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000050
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000050/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/nothings/stb/commit/244d83bc3d859293f55812d48b3db168e581f6ab
|
244d83bc3d859293f55812d48b3db168e581f6ab
|
fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
|
static void convert_channels_short_interleaved(int buf_c, short *buffer, int data_c, float **data, int d_offset, int len)
{
int i;
check_endianness();
if (buf_c != data_c && buf_c <= 2 && data_c <= 6) {
assert(buf_c == 2);
for (i=0; i < buf_c; ++i)
compute_stereo_samples(buffer, data_c, data, d_offset, len);
} else {
int limit = buf_c < data_c ? buf_c : data_c;
int j;
for (j=0; j < len; ++j) {
for (i=0; i < limit; ++i) {
FASTDEF(temp);
float f = data[i][d_offset+j];
int v = FAST_SCALED_FLOAT_TO_INT(temp, f,15);//data[i][d_offset+j],15);
if ((unsigned int) (v + 32768) > 65535)
v = v < 0 ? -32768 : 32767;
*buffer++ = v;
}
for ( ; i < buf_c; ++i)
*buffer++ = 0;
}
}
}
|
static void convert_channels_short_interleaved(int buf_c, short *buffer, int data_c, float **data, int d_offset, int len)
{
int i;
check_endianness();
if (buf_c != data_c && buf_c <= 2 && data_c <= 6) {
assert(buf_c == 2);
for (i=0; i < buf_c; ++i)
compute_stereo_samples(buffer, data_c, data, d_offset, len);
} else {
int limit = buf_c < data_c ? buf_c : data_c;
int j;
for (j=0; j < len; ++j) {
for (i=0; i < limit; ++i) {
FASTDEF(temp);
float f = data[i][d_offset+j];
int v = FAST_SCALED_FLOAT_TO_INT(temp, f,15);//data[i][d_offset+j],15);
if ((unsigned int) (v + 32768) > 65535)
v = v < 0 ? -32768 : 32767;
*buffer++ = v;
}
for ( ; i < buf_c; ++i)
*buffer++ = 0;
}
}
}
|
C
|
stb
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1221
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1221/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
a69c7b5d863dacbb08bfaa04359e3bc0bb4470dc
|
Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
|
static void countEditingEvent(ExecutionContext* executionContext,
const Event* event,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnInput,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnTextArea,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnContentEditable,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnNonNode) {
EventTarget* eventTarget = event->target();
Node* node = eventTarget->toNode();
if (!node) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnNonNode);
return;
}
if (isHTMLInputElement(node)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnInput);
return;
}
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(node)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnTextArea);
return;
}
TextControlElement* control = enclosingTextControl(node);
if (isHTMLInputElement(control)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnInput);
return;
}
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(control)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnTextArea);
return;
}
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnContentEditable);
}
|
static void countEditingEvent(ExecutionContext* executionContext,
const Event* event,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnInput,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnTextArea,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnContentEditable,
UseCounter::Feature featureOnNonNode) {
EventTarget* eventTarget = event->target();
Node* node = eventTarget->toNode();
if (!node) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnNonNode);
return;
}
if (isHTMLInputElement(node)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnInput);
return;
}
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(node)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnTextArea);
return;
}
TextControlElement* control = enclosingTextControl(node);
if (isHTMLInputElement(control)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnInput);
return;
}
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(control)) {
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnTextArea);
return;
}
UseCounter::count(executionContext, featureOnContentEditable);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9496/
|
CWE-787
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxaac/+/04e8cd58f075bec5892e369c8deebca9c67e855c
|
04e8cd58f075bec5892e369c8deebca9c67e855c
|
Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
|
WORD32 ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer) {
WORD32 idx;
WORD32 anal_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
WORD32 N = (10 * anal_size);
for (idx = 0; idx < (ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins >> 1); idx++) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l;
FLOAT32 window_output[640];
FLOAT32 u[128], u_in[256], u_out[256];
FLOAT32 accu_r, accu_i;
const FLOAT32 *inp_signal;
FLOAT32 *anal_buf;
FLOAT32 *analy_cos_sin_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff;
FLOAT32 *x = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf;
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
inp_signal = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
idx * 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size + 1;
anal_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1]
[4 * ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start];
for (i = N - 1; i >= anal_size; i--) {
x[i] = x[i - anal_size];
}
for (i = anal_size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
x[i] = inp_signal[anal_size - 1 - i];
}
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
window_output[i] = x[i] * interp_window_coeff[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 * anal_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + window_output[i + j * 2 * anal_size];
}
u[i] = accu_r;
}
if (anal_size == 40) {
for (i = 1; i < anal_size; i++) {
FLOAT32 temp1 = u[i] + u[2 * anal_size - i];
FLOAT32 temp2 = u[i] - u[2 * anal_size - i];
u[i] = temp1;
u[2 * anal_size - i] = temp2;
}
for (k = 0; k < anal_size; k++) {
accu_r = u[anal_size];
if (k & 1)
accu_i = u[0];
else
accu_i = -u[0];
for (l = 1; l < anal_size; l++) {
accu_r = accu_r + u[0 + l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 0];
accu_i = accu_i + u[2 * anal_size - l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 1];
}
analy_cos_sin_tab += (2 * anal_size);
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_i;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = u_in;
FLOAT32 *ptr_v = u_out;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size * 2; k++) {
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
}
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft != NULL)
(*(ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft))(u_in, u_out,
anal_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size / 2; k++) {
*(anal_buf + 1) = -*ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = *ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
*(anal_buf + 1) = *ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = -*ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
WORD32 ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer) {
WORD32 idx;
WORD32 anal_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
WORD32 N = (10 * anal_size);
for (idx = 0; idx < (ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins >> 1); idx++) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l;
FLOAT32 window_output[640];
FLOAT32 u[128], u_in[256], u_out[256];
FLOAT32 accu_r, accu_i;
const FLOAT32 *inp_signal;
FLOAT32 *anal_buf;
FLOAT32 *analy_cos_sin_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff;
FLOAT32 *x = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf;
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
inp_signal = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
idx * 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size + 1;
anal_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1]
[4 * ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start];
for (i = N - 1; i >= anal_size; i--) {
x[i] = x[i - anal_size];
}
for (i = anal_size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
x[i] = inp_signal[anal_size - 1 - i];
}
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
window_output[i] = x[i] * interp_window_coeff[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 * anal_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + window_output[i + j * 2 * anal_size];
}
u[i] = accu_r;
}
if (anal_size == 40) {
for (i = 1; i < anal_size; i++) {
FLOAT32 temp1 = u[i] + u[2 * anal_size - i];
FLOAT32 temp2 = u[i] - u[2 * anal_size - i];
u[i] = temp1;
u[2 * anal_size - i] = temp2;
}
for (k = 0; k < anal_size; k++) {
accu_r = u[anal_size];
if (k & 1)
accu_i = u[0];
else
accu_i = -u[0];
for (l = 1; l < anal_size; l++) {
accu_r = accu_r + u[0 + l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 0];
accu_i = accu_i + u[2 * anal_size - l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 1];
}
analy_cos_sin_tab += (2 * anal_size);
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_i;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = u_in;
FLOAT32 *ptr_v = u_out;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size * 2; k++) {
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
}
if (ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft)(u_in, u_out, anal_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size / 2; k++) {
*(anal_buf + 1) = -*ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = *ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
*(anal_buf + 1) = *ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = -*ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5517/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1
|
08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1
|
mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
int mem_online_node(int nid)
{
pg_data_t *pgdat;
int ret;
lock_memory_hotplug();
pgdat = hotadd_new_pgdat(nid, 0);
if (!pgdat) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
node_set_online(nid);
ret = register_one_node(nid);
BUG_ON(ret);
out:
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
|
int mem_online_node(int nid)
{
pg_data_t *pgdat;
int ret;
lock_memory_hotplug();
pgdat = hotadd_new_pgdat(nid, 0);
if (!pgdat) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
node_set_online(nid);
ret = register_one_node(nid);
BUG_ON(ret);
out:
unlock_memory_hotplug();
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b
|
961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b
|
Extract generation logic from the accessory controller into a separate one
This change adds a controller that is responsible for mediating
communication between ChromePasswordManagerClient and
PasswordAccessoryController for password generation. It is also
responsible for managing the modal dialog used to present the generated
password.
In the future it will make it easier to add manual generation to the
password accessory.
Bug: 845458
Change-Id: I0adbb2de9b9f5012745ae3963154f7d3247b3051
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1448181
Commit-Queue: Ioana Pandele <ioanap@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Friedrich [CET] <fhorschig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629542}
|
gfx::NativeWindow PasswordAccessoryControllerImpl::native_window() const {
|
gfx::NativeWindow PasswordAccessoryControllerImpl::native_window() const {
return web_contents_->GetTopLevelNativeWindow();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OmniboxViewViews::OnTabChanged(const content::WebContents* web_contents) {
security_level_ = controller()->GetToolbarModel()->GetSecurityLevel(false);
const OmniboxState* state = static_cast<OmniboxState*>(
web_contents->GetUserData(&OmniboxState::kKey));
model()->RestoreState(state ? &state->model_state : NULL);
if (state) {
SelectRange(state->selection);
saved_selection_for_focus_change_ = state->saved_selection_for_focus_change;
}
ClearEditHistory();
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::OnTabChanged(const content::WebContents* web_contents) {
security_level_ = controller()->GetToolbarModel()->GetSecurityLevel(false);
const OmniboxState* state = static_cast<OmniboxState*>(
web_contents->GetUserData(&OmniboxState::kKey));
model()->RestoreState(state ? &state->model_state : NULL);
if (state) {
SelectRange(state->selection);
saved_selection_for_focus_change_ = state->saved_selection_for_focus_change;
}
ClearEditHistory();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4998/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,
const struct xt_table *table,
void __user *userptr)
{
unsigned int off, num;
const struct ipt_entry *e;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
int ret = 0;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
counters = alloc_counters(table);
if (IS_ERR(counters))
return PTR_ERR(counters);
loc_cpu_entry = private->entries;
if (copy_to_user(userptr, loc_cpu_entry, total_size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
/* FIXME: use iterator macros --RR */
/* ... then go back and fix counters and names */
for (off = 0, num = 0; off < total_size; off += e->next_offset, num++){
unsigned int i;
const struct xt_entry_match *m;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)(loc_cpu_entry + off);
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off
+ offsetof(struct ipt_entry, counters),
&counters[num],
sizeof(counters[num])) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
for (i = sizeof(struct ipt_entry);
i < e->target_offset;
i += m->u.match_size) {
m = (void *)e + i;
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off + i
+ offsetof(struct xt_entry_match,
u.user.name),
m->u.kernel.match->name,
strlen(m->u.kernel.match->name)+1)
!= 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off + e->target_offset
+ offsetof(struct xt_entry_target,
u.user.name),
t->u.kernel.target->name,
strlen(t->u.kernel.target->name)+1) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
free_counters:
vfree(counters);
return ret;
}
|
copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,
const struct xt_table *table,
void __user *userptr)
{
unsigned int off, num;
const struct ipt_entry *e;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
int ret = 0;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
counters = alloc_counters(table);
if (IS_ERR(counters))
return PTR_ERR(counters);
loc_cpu_entry = private->entries;
if (copy_to_user(userptr, loc_cpu_entry, total_size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
/* FIXME: use iterator macros --RR */
/* ... then go back and fix counters and names */
for (off = 0, num = 0; off < total_size; off += e->next_offset, num++){
unsigned int i;
const struct xt_entry_match *m;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
e = (struct ipt_entry *)(loc_cpu_entry + off);
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off
+ offsetof(struct ipt_entry, counters),
&counters[num],
sizeof(counters[num])) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
for (i = sizeof(struct ipt_entry);
i < e->target_offset;
i += m->u.match_size) {
m = (void *)e + i;
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off + i
+ offsetof(struct xt_entry_match,
u.user.name),
m->u.kernel.match->name,
strlen(m->u.kernel.match->name)+1)
!= 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off + e->target_offset
+ offsetof(struct xt_entry_target,
u.user.name),
t->u.kernel.target->name,
strlen(t->u.kernel.target->name)+1) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
free_counters:
vfree(counters);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6836/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
|
fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
| null |
vmxnet3_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
size_t bytes_indicated;
uint8_t min_buf[MIN_BUF_SIZE];
if (!vmxnet3_can_receive(nc)) {
VMW_PKPRN("Cannot receive now");
return -1;
}
if (s->peer_has_vhdr) {
net_rx_pkt_set_vhdr(s->rx_pkt, (struct virtio_net_hdr *)buf);
buf += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
size -= sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
}
/* Pad to minimum Ethernet frame length */
if (size < sizeof(min_buf)) {
memcpy(min_buf, buf, size);
memset(&min_buf[size], 0, sizeof(min_buf) - size);
buf = min_buf;
size = sizeof(min_buf);
}
net_rx_pkt_set_packet_type(s->rx_pkt,
get_eth_packet_type(PKT_GET_ETH_HDR(buf)));
if (vmxnet3_rx_filter_may_indicate(s, buf, size)) {
net_rx_pkt_set_protocols(s->rx_pkt, buf, size);
vmxnet3_rx_need_csum_calculate(s->rx_pkt, buf, size);
net_rx_pkt_attach_data(s->rx_pkt, buf, size, s->rx_vlan_stripping);
bytes_indicated = vmxnet3_indicate_packet(s) ? size : -1;
if (bytes_indicated < size) {
VMW_PKPRN("RX: %zu of %zu bytes indicated", bytes_indicated, size);
}
} else {
VMW_PKPRN("Packet dropped by RX filter");
bytes_indicated = size;
}
assert(size > 0);
assert(bytes_indicated != 0);
return bytes_indicated;
}
|
vmxnet3_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
size_t bytes_indicated;
uint8_t min_buf[MIN_BUF_SIZE];
if (!vmxnet3_can_receive(nc)) {
VMW_PKPRN("Cannot receive now");
return -1;
}
if (s->peer_has_vhdr) {
net_rx_pkt_set_vhdr(s->rx_pkt, (struct virtio_net_hdr *)buf);
buf += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
size -= sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
}
/* Pad to minimum Ethernet frame length */
if (size < sizeof(min_buf)) {
memcpy(min_buf, buf, size);
memset(&min_buf[size], 0, sizeof(min_buf) - size);
buf = min_buf;
size = sizeof(min_buf);
}
net_rx_pkt_set_packet_type(s->rx_pkt,
get_eth_packet_type(PKT_GET_ETH_HDR(buf)));
if (vmxnet3_rx_filter_may_indicate(s, buf, size)) {
net_rx_pkt_set_protocols(s->rx_pkt, buf, size);
vmxnet3_rx_need_csum_calculate(s->rx_pkt, buf, size);
net_rx_pkt_attach_data(s->rx_pkt, buf, size, s->rx_vlan_stripping);
bytes_indicated = vmxnet3_indicate_packet(s) ? size : -1;
if (bytes_indicated < size) {
VMW_PKPRN("RX: %zu of %zu bytes indicated", bytes_indicated, size);
}
} else {
VMW_PKPRN("Packet dropped by RX filter");
bytes_indicated = size;
}
assert(size > 0);
assert(bytes_indicated != 0);
return bytes_indicated;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
String Document::domain() const
{
return getSecurityOrigin()->domain();
}
|
String Document::domain() const
{
return getSecurityOrigin()->domain();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8786
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8786/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FreeRDP/FreeRDP/commit/445a5a42c500ceb80f8fa7f2c11f3682538033f3
|
445a5a42c500ceb80f8fa7f2c11f3682538033f3
|
Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
static BOOL update_send_cache_brush(rdpContext* context,
const CACHE_BRUSH_ORDER* cache_brush)
{
wStream* s;
UINT16 flags;
size_t bm, em, inf;
int headerLength;
INT16 orderLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
flags = 0;
headerLength = 6;
inf = update_approximate_cache_brush_order(cache_brush, &flags);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_cache_brush_order(s, cache_brush, &flags))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
orderLength = (em - bm) - 13;
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_STANDARD |
ORDER_SECONDARY); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, orderLength); /* orderLength (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, flags); /* extraFlags (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_TYPE_CACHE_BRUSH); /* orderType (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
|
static BOOL update_send_cache_brush(rdpContext* context,
const CACHE_BRUSH_ORDER* cache_brush)
{
wStream* s;
UINT16 flags;
size_t bm, em, inf;
int headerLength;
INT16 orderLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
flags = 0;
headerLength = 6;
inf = update_approximate_cache_brush_order(cache_brush, &flags);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_cache_brush_order(s, cache_brush, &flags))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
orderLength = (em - bm) - 13;
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_STANDARD |
ORDER_SECONDARY); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, orderLength); /* orderLength (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, flags); /* extraFlags (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_TYPE_CACHE_BRUSH); /* orderType (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
FreeRDP
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSValue jsTestObjWithScriptArgumentsAndCallStackAttribute(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
RefPtr<ScriptCallStack> callStack(createScriptCallStackForInspector(exec));
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->withScriptArgumentsAndCallStackAttribute(callStack)));
return result;
}
|
JSValue jsTestObjWithScriptArgumentsAndCallStackAttribute(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
RefPtr<ScriptCallStack> callStack(createScriptCallStackForInspector(exec));
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->withScriptArgumentsAndCallStackAttribute(callStack)));
return result;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1294
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1294/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3ff403eecdd23a39853a4ebca52023fbba6c5d00
|
3ff403eecdd23a39853a4ebca52023fbba6c5d00
|
Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
|
void RunLoop::AddNestingObserverOnCurrentThread(NestingObserver* observer) {
Delegate* delegate = tls_delegate.Get().Get();
DCHECK(delegate);
CHECK(delegate->allow_nesting_);
delegate->nesting_observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
|
void RunLoop::AddNestingObserverOnCurrentThread(NestingObserver* observer) {
Delegate* delegate = tls_delegate.Get().Get();
DCHECK(delegate);
CHECK(delegate->allow_nesting_);
delegate->nesting_observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3099
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3099/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a
|
3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a
|
[GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebInspectorProxy::initializeInspectorClientGtk(const WKInspectorClientGtk* inspectorClient)
{
m_client.initialize(inspectorClient);
}
|
void WebInspectorProxy::initializeInspectorClientGtk(const WKInspectorClientGtk* inspectorClient)
{
m_client.initialize(inspectorClient);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5013
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5013/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f3a9a68b2dcdd2c54cf49a41ad34729ab576702
|
8f3a9a68b2dcdd2c54cf49a41ad34729ab576702
|
Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
|
bool Browser::IsFullscreenForTabOrPending(
const WebContents* web_contents) const {
return exclusive_access_manager_->fullscreen_controller()
->IsFullscreenForTabOrPending(web_contents);
}
|
bool Browser::IsFullscreenForTabOrPending(
const WebContents* web_contents) const {
return exclusive_access_manager_->fullscreen_controller()
->IsFullscreenForTabOrPending(web_contents);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
find_client_in_id_table(struct list_head *tbl, clientid_t *clid, bool sessions)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
unsigned int idhashval = clientid_hashval(clid->cl_id);
list_for_each_entry(clp, &tbl[idhashval], cl_idhash) {
if (same_clid(&clp->cl_clientid, clid)) {
if ((bool)clp->cl_minorversion != sessions)
return NULL;
renew_client_locked(clp);
return clp;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
find_client_in_id_table(struct list_head *tbl, clientid_t *clid, bool sessions)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
unsigned int idhashval = clientid_hashval(clid->cl_id);
list_for_each_entry(clp, &tbl[idhashval], cl_idhash) {
if (same_clid(&clp->cl_clientid, clid)) {
if ((bool)clp->cl_minorversion != sessions)
return NULL;
renew_client_locked(clp);
return clp;
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadUrl(
DownloadItem* download,
const base::FilePath& suggested_path,
const CheckDownloadUrlCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
safe_browsing::DownloadProtectionService* service =
GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service) {
bool is_content_check_supported =
service->IsSupportedDownload(*download, suggested_path);
DVLOG(2) << __func__ << "() Start SB URL check for download = "
<< download->DebugString(false);
service->CheckDownloadUrl(download,
base::Bind(&CheckDownloadUrlDone, callback,
is_content_check_supported));
return;
}
#endif
callback.Run(content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS);
}
|
void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadUrl(
DownloadItem* download,
const base::FilePath& suggested_path,
const CheckDownloadUrlCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
safe_browsing::DownloadProtectionService* service =
GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service) {
bool is_content_check_supported =
service->IsSupportedDownload(*download, suggested_path);
DVLOG(2) << __func__ << "() Start SB URL check for download = "
<< download->DebugString(false);
service->CheckDownloadUrl(download,
base::Bind(&CheckDownloadUrlDone, callback,
is_content_check_supported));
return;
}
#endif
callback.Run(content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
xscale1pmu_get_event_idx(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
struct hw_perf_event *event)
{
if (XSCALE_PERFCTR_CCNT == event->config_base) {
if (test_and_set_bit(XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER, cpuc->used_mask))
return -EAGAIN;
return XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER;
} else {
if (!test_and_set_bit(XSCALE_COUNTER1, cpuc->used_mask))
return XSCALE_COUNTER1;
if (!test_and_set_bit(XSCALE_COUNTER0, cpuc->used_mask))
return XSCALE_COUNTER0;
return -EAGAIN;
}
}
|
xscale1pmu_get_event_idx(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
struct hw_perf_event *event)
{
if (XSCALE_PERFCTR_CCNT == event->config_base) {
if (test_and_set_bit(XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER, cpuc->used_mask))
return -EAGAIN;
return XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER;
} else {
if (!test_and_set_bit(XSCALE_COUNTER1, cpuc->used_mask))
return XSCALE_COUNTER1;
if (!test_and_set_bit(XSCALE_COUNTER0, cpuc->used_mask))
return XSCALE_COUNTER0;
return -EAGAIN;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
static int ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t iblock,
unsigned int max_blocks)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex1 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex3 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
unsigned int allocated, ee_len, depth;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
int err = 0;
int ret = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
allocated = ee_len - (iblock - ee_block);
newblock = iblock - ee_block + ext_pblock(ex);
ex2 = ex;
orig_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&orig_ex, ext_pblock(ex));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* If extent has less than 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (ee_len <= 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
return allocated;
}
/* ex1: ee_block to iblock - 1 : uninitialized */
if (iblock > ee_block) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(iblock - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/*
* for sanity, update the length of the ex2 extent before
* we insert ex3, if ex1 is NULL. This is to avoid temporary
* overlap of blocks.
*/
if (!ex1 && allocated > max_blocks)
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(max_blocks);
/* ex3: to ee_block + ee_len : uninitialised */
if (allocated > max_blocks) {
unsigned int newdepth;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (allocated <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN) {
/*
* iblock == ee_block is handled by the zerouout
* at the beginning.
* Mark first half uninitialized.
* Mark second half initialized and zero out the
* initialized extent
*/
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - allocated);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path,
ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* blocks available from iblock */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* We need to zero out the second half because
* an fallocate request can update file size and
* converting the second half to initialized extent
* implies that we can leak some junk data to user
* space.
*/
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex3);
if (err) {
/*
* We should actually mark the
* second half as uninit and return error
* Insert would have changed the extent
*/
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode,
iblock, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
return err;
}
/* get the second half extent details */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode,
path + depth);
if (err)
return err;
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
/* zeroed the second half */
return allocated;
}
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock + max_blocks);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock + max_blocks);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated - max_blocks);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex3);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
/* blocks available from iblock */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* The depth, and hence eh & ex might change
* as part of the insert above.
*/
newdepth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* update the extent length after successful insert of the
* split extent
*/
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len -
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex3));
depth = newdepth;
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, iblock, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
goto out;
}
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex2 != &newex)
ex2 = ex;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
allocated = max_blocks;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN and we are trying
* to insert a extent in the middle zerout directly
* otherwise give the extent a chance to merge to left
*/
if (le16_to_cpu(orig_ex.ee_len) <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN &&
iblock != ee_block) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
/* blocks available from iblock */
return allocated;
}
}
/*
* If there was a change of depth as part of the
* insertion of ex3 above, we need to update the length
* of the ex1 extent again here
*/
if (ex1 && ex1 != ex) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(iblock - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/* ex2: iblock to iblock + maxblocks-1 : initialised */
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
if (ex2 != ex)
goto insert;
/*
* New (initialized) extent starts from the first block
* in the current extent. i.e., ex2 == ex
* We have to see if it can be merged with the extent
* on the left.
*/
if (ex2 > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/*
* To merge left, pass "ex2 - 1" to try_to_merge(),
* since it merges towards right _only_.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2 - 1);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex2--;
}
}
/*
* Try to Merge towards right. This might be required
* only when the whole extent is being written to.
* i.e. ex2 == ex and ex3 == NULL.
*/
if (!ex3) {
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
insert:
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err ? err : allocated;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
|
static int ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t iblock,
unsigned int max_blocks)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex1 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex3 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
unsigned int allocated, ee_len, depth;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
int err = 0;
int ret = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
allocated = ee_len - (iblock - ee_block);
newblock = iblock - ee_block + ext_pblock(ex);
ex2 = ex;
orig_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&orig_ex, ext_pblock(ex));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* If extent has less than 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (ee_len <= 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
return allocated;
}
/* ex1: ee_block to iblock - 1 : uninitialized */
if (iblock > ee_block) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(iblock - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/*
* for sanity, update the length of the ex2 extent before
* we insert ex3, if ex1 is NULL. This is to avoid temporary
* overlap of blocks.
*/
if (!ex1 && allocated > max_blocks)
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(max_blocks);
/* ex3: to ee_block + ee_len : uninitialised */
if (allocated > max_blocks) {
unsigned int newdepth;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (allocated <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN) {
/*
* iblock == ee_block is handled by the zerouout
* at the beginning.
* Mark first half uninitialized.
* Mark second half initialized and zero out the
* initialized extent
*/
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - allocated);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path,
ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* blocks available from iblock */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* We need to zero out the second half because
* an fallocate request can update file size and
* converting the second half to initialized extent
* implies that we can leak some junk data to user
* space.
*/
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex3);
if (err) {
/*
* We should actually mark the
* second half as uninit and return error
* Insert would have changed the extent
*/
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode,
iblock, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
return err;
}
/* get the second half extent details */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode,
path + depth);
if (err)
return err;
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
/* zeroed the second half */
return allocated;
}
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock + max_blocks);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock + max_blocks);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated - max_blocks);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex3);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
/* blocks available from iblock */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* The depth, and hence eh & ex might change
* as part of the insert above.
*/
newdepth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* update the extent length after successful insert of the
* split extent
*/
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len -
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex3));
depth = newdepth;
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, iblock, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
goto out;
}
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex2 != &newex)
ex2 = ex;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
allocated = max_blocks;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN and we are trying
* to insert a extent in the middle zerout directly
* otherwise give the extent a chance to merge to left
*/
if (le16_to_cpu(orig_ex.ee_len) <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN &&
iblock != ee_block) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
/* blocks available from iblock */
return allocated;
}
}
/*
* If there was a change of depth as part of the
* insertion of ex3 above, we need to update the length
* of the ex1 extent again here
*/
if (ex1 && ex1 != ex) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(iblock - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/* ex2: iblock to iblock + maxblocks-1 : initialised */
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
if (ex2 != ex)
goto insert;
/*
* New (initialized) extent starts from the first block
* in the current extent. i.e., ex2 == ex
* We have to see if it can be merged with the extent
* on the left.
*/
if (ex2 > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/*
* To merge left, pass "ex2 - 1" to try_to_merge(),
* since it merges towards right _only_.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2 - 1);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex2--;
}
}
/*
* Try to Merge towards right. This might be required
* only when the whole extent is being written to.
* i.e. ex2 == ex and ex3 == NULL.
*/
if (!ex3) {
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
insert:
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err ? err : allocated;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int inet6_dump_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int h, s_h;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
struct net_device *dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
struct hlist_head *head;
s_h = cb->args[0];
s_idx = cb->args[1];
rcu_read_lock();
for (h = s_h; h < NETDEV_HASHENTRIES; h++, s_idx = 0) {
idx = 0;
head = &net->dev_index_head[h];
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, head, index_hlist) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto cont;
idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (!idev)
goto cont;
if (inet6_fill_ifinfo(skb, idev,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_NEWLINK, NLM_F_MULTI) < 0)
goto out;
cont:
idx++;
}
}
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[1] = idx;
cb->args[0] = h;
return skb->len;
}
|
static int inet6_dump_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int h, s_h;
int idx = 0, s_idx;
struct net_device *dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
struct hlist_head *head;
s_h = cb->args[0];
s_idx = cb->args[1];
rcu_read_lock();
for (h = s_h; h < NETDEV_HASHENTRIES; h++, s_idx = 0) {
idx = 0;
head = &net->dev_index_head[h];
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, head, index_hlist) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto cont;
idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
if (!idev)
goto cont;
if (inet6_fill_ifinfo(skb, idev,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_NEWLINK, NLM_F_MULTI) < 0)
goto out;
cont:
idx++;
}
}
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[1] = idx;
cb->args[0] = h;
return skb->len;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2858
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244
|
Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetGLError() {
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR && error_bits_ != 0) {
for (uint32 mask = 1; mask != 0; mask = mask << 1) {
if ((error_bits_ & mask) != 0) {
error = GLES2Util::GLErrorBitToGLError(mask);
break;
}
}
}
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
error_bits_ &= ~GLES2Util::GLErrorToErrorBit(error);
}
return error;
}
|
GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetGLError() {
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR && error_bits_ != 0) {
for (uint32 mask = 1; mask != 0; mask = mask << 1) {
if ((error_bits_ & mask) != 0) {
error = GLES2Util::GLErrorBitToGLError(mask);
break;
}
}
}
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
error_bits_ &= ~GLES2Util::GLErrorToErrorBit(error);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1641
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662
|
Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
|
void WebContentsImpl::RenderFrameCreated(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
RenderFrameCreated(render_frame_host));
SetAccessibilityModeOnFrame(accessibility_mode_, render_frame_host);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::RenderFrameCreated(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
RenderFrameCreated(render_frame_host));
SetAccessibilityModeOnFrame(accessibility_mode_, render_frame_host);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(imagealphablending)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool blend;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rb", &IM, &blend) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
gdImageAlphaBlending(im, blend);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(imagealphablending)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool blend;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rb", &IM, &blend) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
gdImageAlphaBlending(im, blend);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3668
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3668/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=88412772d295ebf7dd34409534507dc9bcac726e
|
88412772d295ebf7dd34409534507dc9bcac726e
| null |
XMLRPC_SERVER XMLRPC_GetGlobalServer() {
static XMLRPC_SERVER xsServer = 0;
if(!xsServer) {
xsServer = XMLRPC_ServerCreate();
}
return xsServer;
}
|
XMLRPC_SERVER XMLRPC_GetGlobalServer() {
static XMLRPC_SERVER xsServer = 0;
if(!xsServer) {
xsServer = XMLRPC_ServerCreate();
}
return xsServer;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6136/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c
|
audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
kgid_t gid;
unsigned int sessionid;
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
sessionid);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
}
|
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
kgid_t gid;
unsigned int sessionid;
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
sessionid);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
MaybeShared<DOMArrayBufferView> pixels,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(
kTexSubImage2D, target, level, 0, width, height, 1, 0, format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, 0, pixels.View(), kNullNotReachable, src_offset);
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
MaybeShared<DOMArrayBufferView> pixels,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(
kTexSubImage2D, target, level, 0, width, height, 1, 0, format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, 0, pixels.View(), kNullNotReachable, src_offset);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2009-0946
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-0946/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=a18788b14db60ae3673f932249cd02d33a227c4e
|
a18788b14db60ae3673f932249cd02d33a227c4e
| null |
tt_cmap4_next( TT_CMap4 cmap )
{
FT_UInt charcode;
if ( cmap->cur_charcode >= 0xFFFFUL )
goto Fail;
charcode = cmap->cur_charcode + 1;
if ( charcode < cmap->cur_start )
charcode = cmap->cur_start;
for ( ;; )
{
FT_Byte* values = cmap->cur_values;
FT_UInt end = cmap->cur_end;
FT_Int delta = cmap->cur_delta;
if ( charcode <= end )
{
if ( values )
{
FT_Byte* p = values + 2 * ( charcode - cmap->cur_start );
do
{
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
gindex = (FT_UInt)( ( gindex + delta ) & 0xFFFFU );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
cmap->cur_charcode = charcode;
cmap->cur_gindex = gindex;
return;
}
}
} while ( ++charcode <= end );
}
else
{
do
{
FT_UInt gindex = (FT_UInt)( ( charcode + delta ) & 0xFFFFU );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
cmap->cur_charcode = charcode;
cmap->cur_gindex = gindex;
return;
}
} while ( ++charcode <= end );
}
}
/* we need to find another range */
if ( tt_cmap4_set_range( cmap, cmap->cur_range + 1 ) < 0 )
break;
if ( charcode < cmap->cur_start )
charcode = cmap->cur_start;
}
Fail:
cmap->cur_charcode = 0xFFFFFFFFUL;
cmap->cur_gindex = 0;
}
|
tt_cmap4_next( TT_CMap4 cmap )
{
FT_UInt charcode;
if ( cmap->cur_charcode >= 0xFFFFUL )
goto Fail;
charcode = cmap->cur_charcode + 1;
if ( charcode < cmap->cur_start )
charcode = cmap->cur_start;
for ( ;; )
{
FT_Byte* values = cmap->cur_values;
FT_UInt end = cmap->cur_end;
FT_Int delta = cmap->cur_delta;
if ( charcode <= end )
{
if ( values )
{
FT_Byte* p = values + 2 * ( charcode - cmap->cur_start );
do
{
FT_UInt gindex = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
gindex = (FT_UInt)( ( gindex + delta ) & 0xFFFFU );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
cmap->cur_charcode = charcode;
cmap->cur_gindex = gindex;
return;
}
}
} while ( ++charcode <= end );
}
else
{
do
{
FT_UInt gindex = (FT_UInt)( ( charcode + delta ) & 0xFFFFU );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
cmap->cur_charcode = charcode;
cmap->cur_gindex = gindex;
return;
}
} while ( ++charcode <= end );
}
}
/* we need to find another range */
if ( tt_cmap4_set_range( cmap, cmap->cur_range + 1 ) < 0 )
break;
if ( charcode < cmap->cur_start )
charcode = cmap->cur_start;
}
Fail:
cmap->cur_charcode = 0xFFFFFFFFUL;
cmap->cur_gindex = 0;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93c46cf417786f10d88c7153993370b1610c56b8
|
93c46cf417786f10d88c7153993370b1610c56b8
|
De-flake and re-enable a chrome.searchEnginesPrivate api test.
By checking the list of search engines, and only asserting against the one with
the expected name, we remove the dependency on order. This should get rid of
flakiness.
BUG=481924
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1121113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331060}
|
SearchEnginesPrivateApiTest() {}
|
SearchEnginesPrivateApiTest() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18445
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18445/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
struct bpf_insn *insn;
void *old_bpf_func;
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
return 0;
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
* need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
* propagated in any case.
*/
subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
if (subprog < 0) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
i + insn->imm + 1);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
* aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
*/
insn->off = subprog;
/* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
* to interpreter will be needed
*/
env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
insn->imm = 1;
}
func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!func)
goto out_undo_insn;
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
subprog_start = subprog_end;
subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
if (!func[i])
goto out_free;
memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
func[i]->type = prog->type;
func[i]->len = len;
if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
goto out_free;
func[i]->is_func = 1;
/* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces.
* Long term would need debug info to populate names
*/
func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (!func[i]->jited) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto out_free;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
* now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
* run last pass of JIT
*/
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
insn = func[i]->insnsi;
for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
subprog = insn->off;
insn->imm = (u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64))
func[subprog]->bpf_func -
__bpf_call_base;
}
/* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
* of the JITed images for each function in the program
*
* for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
* might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
* address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
*
* in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
* by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
* the call instruction, as an index for this list
*/
func[i]->aux->func = func;
func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
}
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto out_free;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
* populate kallsysm
*/
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
}
/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
* prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
* later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
*/
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
insn->imm = subprog;
}
prog->jited = 1;
prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
prog->aux->func = func;
prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
return 0;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
if (func[i])
bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
kfree(func);
out_undo_insn:
/* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
prog->jit_requested = 0;
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
insn->off = 0;
insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
}
return err;
}
|
static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
struct bpf_insn *insn;
void *old_bpf_func;
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
return 0;
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
/* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
* need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
* propagated in any case.
*/
subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
if (subprog < 0) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
i + insn->imm + 1);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
* aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
*/
insn->off = subprog;
/* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
* to interpreter will be needed
*/
env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
/* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
insn->imm = 1;
}
func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!func)
goto out_undo_insn;
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
subprog_start = subprog_end;
subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
if (!func[i])
goto out_free;
memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
func[i]->type = prog->type;
func[i]->len = len;
if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
goto out_free;
func[i]->is_func = 1;
/* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces.
* Long term would need debug info to populate names
*/
func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (!func[i]->jited) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto out_free;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
* now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
* run last pass of JIT
*/
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
insn = func[i]->insnsi;
for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
subprog = insn->off;
insn->imm = (u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64))
func[subprog]->bpf_func -
__bpf_call_base;
}
/* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
* of the JITed images for each function in the program
*
* for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
* might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
* address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
*
* in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
* by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
* the call instruction, as an index for this list
*/
func[i]->aux->func = func;
func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
}
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto out_free;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
* populate kallsysm
*/
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
}
/* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
* prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
* later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
*/
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
insn->imm = subprog;
}
prog->jited = 1;
prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
prog->aux->func = func;
prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
return 0;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
if (func[i])
bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
kfree(func);
out_undo_insn:
/* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
prog->jit_requested = 0;
for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
continue;
insn->off = 0;
insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5009
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60
|
DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
|
void FetchContext::PopulateResourceRequest(
Resource::Type,
const ClientHintsPreferences&,
const FetchParameters::ResourceWidth&,
ResourceRequest&) {}
|
void FetchContext::PopulateResourceRequest(
Resource::Type,
const ClientHintsPreferences&,
const FetchParameters::ResourceWidth&,
ResourceRequest&) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9
|
3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9
|
sync: ensure sync init path doesn't block on CheckTime
The call to RequestEarlyExit (which calls Abort) only happens if the SyncBackendHost has received the initialization callback from the SyncManager. But during init, the SyncManager could make a call to CheckTime, meaning that call would never be aborted. This patch makes sure to cover that case.
BUG=93829
TEST=None at the moment :(
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7862011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100543 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
NotificationInfo() : total_count(0) {}
|
NotificationInfo() : total_count(0) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool BrowserView::ExecuteWindowsCommand(int command_id) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (command_id == IDC_DEBUG_FRAME_TOGGLE)
GetWidget()->DebugToggleFrameType();
if (base::win::IsMetroProcess()) {
static const int sc_mask = 0xFFF0;
if (((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_MOVE) ||
((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_SIZE) ||
((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_MAXIMIZE))
return true;
}
#endif
int command_id_from_app_command = GetCommandIDForAppCommandID(command_id);
if (command_id_from_app_command != -1)
command_id = command_id_from_app_command;
return chrome::ExecuteCommand(browser_.get(), command_id);
}
|
bool BrowserView::ExecuteWindowsCommand(int command_id) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (command_id == IDC_DEBUG_FRAME_TOGGLE)
GetWidget()->DebugToggleFrameType();
if (base::win::IsMetroProcess()) {
static const int sc_mask = 0xFFF0;
if (((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_MOVE) ||
((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_SIZE) ||
((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_MAXIMIZE))
return true;
}
#endif
int command_id_from_app_command = GetCommandIDForAppCommandID(command_id);
if (command_id_from_app_command != -1)
command_id = command_id_from_app_command;
return chrome::ExecuteCommand(browser_.get(), command_id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual bool wifi_enabled() const {
return enabled_devices_ & (1 << TYPE_WIFI);
}
|
virtual bool wifi_enabled() const {
return enabled_devices_ & (1 << TYPE_WIFI);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2487/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/4e32001e4196f39ddd0b86686ae0231c8f5ed944
|
4e32001e4196f39ddd0b86686ae0231c8f5ed944
|
DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(opusParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
opusParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
opusParams->nSampleRate = kRate;
opusParams->nBitRate = 0;
if (!isConfigured()) {
opusParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
opusParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kRate;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(opusParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
opusParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
opusParams->nSampleRate = kRate;
opusParams->nBitRate = 0;
if (!isConfigured()) {
opusParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
opusParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kRate;
if (!isConfigured()) {
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
} else {
pcmParams->nChannels = mHeader->channels;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::ApplySurfaceDrawOffset() {
if (offscreen_ || !surface_->SupportsDCLayers()) {
return;
}
gfx::Vector2d framebuffer_offset = GetSurfaceDrawOffset();
api()->glViewportFn(viewport_[0] + framebuffer_offset.x(),
viewport_[1] + framebuffer_offset.y(), viewport_[2],
viewport_[3]);
api()->glScissorFn(scissor_[0] + framebuffer_offset.x(),
scissor_[1] + framebuffer_offset.y(), scissor_[2],
scissor_[3]);
}
|
void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::ApplySurfaceDrawOffset() {
if (offscreen_ || !surface_->SupportsDCLayers()) {
return;
}
gfx::Vector2d framebuffer_offset = GetSurfaceDrawOffset();
api()->glViewportFn(viewport_[0] + framebuffer_offset.x(),
viewport_[1] + framebuffer_offset.y(), viewport_[2],
viewport_[3]);
api()->glScissorFn(scissor_[0] + framebuffer_offset.x(),
scissor_[1] + framebuffer_offset.y(), scissor_[2],
scissor_[3]);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5101
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5101/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/29734f46c6dc9362783091180c2ee279ad53637f
|
29734f46c6dc9362783091180c2ee279ad53637f
|
media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
|
bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::EnqueueOutputRecord() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!free_output_buffers_.empty());
const int index = free_output_buffers_.back();
JpegBufferRecord& output_record = output_buffer_map_[index];
DCHECK(!output_record.at_device);
struct v4l2_buffer qbuf;
struct v4l2_plane planes[kMaxJpegPlane];
memset(&qbuf, 0, sizeof(qbuf));
memset(planes, 0, sizeof(planes));
qbuf.index = index;
qbuf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
qbuf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP;
qbuf.length = base::size(planes);
qbuf.m.planes = planes;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_QBUF, &qbuf);
output_record.at_device = true;
free_output_buffers_.pop_back();
return true;
}
|
bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::EnqueueOutputRecord() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!free_output_buffers_.empty());
const int index = free_output_buffers_.back();
JpegBufferRecord& output_record = output_buffer_map_[index];
DCHECK(!output_record.at_device);
struct v4l2_buffer qbuf;
struct v4l2_plane planes[kMaxJpegPlane];
memset(&qbuf, 0, sizeof(qbuf));
memset(planes, 0, sizeof(planes));
qbuf.index = index;
qbuf.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
qbuf.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP;
qbuf.length = base::size(planes);
qbuf.m.planes = planes;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_QBUF, &qbuf);
output_record.at_device = true;
free_output_buffers_.pop_back();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5138
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5138/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8083841913b8eb8018ae52f67c923f0b3d66c466
|
8083841913b8eb8018ae52f67c923f0b3d66c466
|
Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void TearDown() {
test_browser_client_.ClearSchemes();
GetContentClient()->set_browser_for_testing(old_browser_client_);
}
|
virtual void TearDown() {
test_browser_client_.ClearSchemes();
GetContentClient()->set_browser_for_testing(old_browser_client_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl(
int surface_id,
const GURL& active_url,
GpuChannelHostFactory* factory,
const base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DSwapBuffersClient>& swap_client)
: initialize_failed_(false),
factory_(factory),
visible_(false),
free_command_buffer_when_invisible_(false),
host_(NULL),
surface_id_(surface_id),
active_url_(active_url),
swap_client_(swap_client),
memory_allocation_changed_callback_(0),
context_lost_callback_(0),
context_lost_reason_(GL_NO_ERROR),
error_message_callback_(0),
swapbuffers_complete_callback_(0),
gpu_preference_(gfx::PreferIntegratedGpu),
cached_width_(0),
cached_height_(0),
bound_fbo_(0),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
initialized_(false),
parent_(NULL),
parent_texture_id_(0),
command_buffer_(NULL),
gles2_helper_(NULL),
transfer_buffer_(NULL),
gl_(NULL),
frame_number_(0),
bind_generates_resources_(false) {
}
|
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl(
int surface_id,
const GURL& active_url,
GpuChannelHostFactory* factory,
const base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DSwapBuffersClient>& swap_client)
: initialize_failed_(false),
factory_(factory),
visible_(false),
free_command_buffer_when_invisible_(false),
host_(NULL),
surface_id_(surface_id),
active_url_(active_url),
swap_client_(swap_client),
memory_allocation_changed_callback_(0),
context_lost_callback_(0),
context_lost_reason_(GL_NO_ERROR),
error_message_callback_(0),
swapbuffers_complete_callback_(0),
gpu_preference_(gfx::PreferIntegratedGpu),
cached_width_(0),
cached_height_(0),
bound_fbo_(0),
weak_ptr_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
initialized_(false),
parent_(NULL),
parent_texture_id_(0),
command_buffer_(NULL),
gles2_helper_(NULL),
transfer_buffer_(NULL),
gl_(NULL),
frame_number_(0),
bind_generates_resources_(false) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3885/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio/commit/983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
|
void CLASS parse_mos (int offset)
{
char data[40];
int skip, from, i, c, neut[4], planes=0, frot=0;
static const char *mod[] =
{ "","DCB2","Volare","Cantare","CMost","Valeo 6","Valeo 11","Valeo 22",
"Valeo 11p","Valeo 17","","Aptus 17","Aptus 22","Aptus 75","Aptus 65",
"Aptus 54S","Aptus 65S","Aptus 75S","AFi 5","AFi 6","AFi 7",
"","","","","","","","","","","","","","","","","","AFi-II 12" };
float romm_cam[3][3];
fseek (ifp, offset, SEEK_SET);
while (1) {
if (get4() != 0x504b5453) break;
get4();
fread (data, 1, 40, ifp);
skip = get4();
from = ftell(ifp);
if (!strcmp(data,"JPEG_preview_data")) {
thumb_offset = from;
thumb_length = skip;
}
if (!strcmp(data,"icc_camera_profile")) {
profile_offset = from;
profile_length = skip;
}
if (!strcmp(data,"ShootObj_back_type")) {
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &i);
if ((unsigned) i < sizeof mod / sizeof (*mod))
strcpy (model, mod[i]);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"icc_camera_to_tone_matrix")) {
for (i=0; i < 9; i++)
romm_cam[0][i] = int_to_float(get4());
romm_coeff (romm_cam);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_color_matrix")) {
for (i=0; i < 9; i++)
fscanf (ifp, "%f", &romm_cam[0][i]);
romm_coeff (romm_cam);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_number_of_planes"))
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &planes);
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_raw_data_rotation"))
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &flip);
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_mosaic_pattern"))
FORC4 {
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &i);
if (i == 1) frot = c ^ (c >> 1);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"ImgProf_rotation_angle")) {
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &i);
flip = i - flip;
}
if (!strcmp(data,"NeutObj_neutrals") && !cam_mul[0]) {
FORC4 fscanf (ifp, "%d", neut+c);
FORC3 cam_mul[c] = (float) neut[0] / neut[c+1];
}
if (!strcmp(data,"Rows_data"))
load_flags = get4();
parse_mos (from);
fseek (ifp, skip+from, SEEK_SET);
}
if (planes)
filters = (planes == 1) * 0x01010101 *
(uchar) "\x94\x61\x16\x49"[(flip/90 + frot) & 3];
}
|
void CLASS parse_mos (int offset)
{
char data[40];
int skip, from, i, c, neut[4], planes=0, frot=0;
static const char *mod[] =
{ "","DCB2","Volare","Cantare","CMost","Valeo 6","Valeo 11","Valeo 22",
"Valeo 11p","Valeo 17","","Aptus 17","Aptus 22","Aptus 75","Aptus 65",
"Aptus 54S","Aptus 65S","Aptus 75S","AFi 5","AFi 6","AFi 7",
"","","","","","","","","","","","","","","","","","AFi-II 12" };
float romm_cam[3][3];
fseek (ifp, offset, SEEK_SET);
while (1) {
if (get4() != 0x504b5453) break;
get4();
fread (data, 1, 40, ifp);
skip = get4();
from = ftell(ifp);
if (!strcmp(data,"JPEG_preview_data")) {
thumb_offset = from;
thumb_length = skip;
}
if (!strcmp(data,"icc_camera_profile")) {
profile_offset = from;
profile_length = skip;
}
if (!strcmp(data,"ShootObj_back_type")) {
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &i);
if ((unsigned) i < sizeof mod / sizeof (*mod))
strcpy (model, mod[i]);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"icc_camera_to_tone_matrix")) {
for (i=0; i < 9; i++)
romm_cam[0][i] = int_to_float(get4());
romm_coeff (romm_cam);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_color_matrix")) {
for (i=0; i < 9; i++)
fscanf (ifp, "%f", &romm_cam[0][i]);
romm_coeff (romm_cam);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_number_of_planes"))
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &planes);
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_raw_data_rotation"))
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &flip);
if (!strcmp(data,"CaptProf_mosaic_pattern"))
FORC4 {
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &i);
if (i == 1) frot = c ^ (c >> 1);
}
if (!strcmp(data,"ImgProf_rotation_angle")) {
fscanf (ifp, "%d", &i);
flip = i - flip;
}
if (!strcmp(data,"NeutObj_neutrals") && !cam_mul[0]) {
FORC4 fscanf (ifp, "%d", neut+c);
FORC3 cam_mul[c] = (float) neut[0] / neut[c+1];
}
if (!strcmp(data,"Rows_data"))
load_flags = get4();
parse_mos (from);
fseek (ifp, skip+from, SEEK_SET);
}
if (planes)
filters = (planes == 1) * 0x01010101 *
(uchar) "\x94\x61\x16\x49"[(flip/90 + frot) & 3];
}
|
C
|
rawstudio
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFinish() {
api()->glFinishFn();
error::Error error = ProcessReadPixels(true);
if (error != error::kNoError) {
return error;
}
return ProcessQueries(true);
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFinish() {
api()->glFinishFn();
error::Error error = ProcessReadPixels(true);
if (error != error::kNoError) {
return error;
}
return ProcessQueries(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18839/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/netdata/netdata/commit/92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca
|
92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca
|
fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
|
void web_client_api_v1_init(void) {
int i;
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_options[i].name ; i++)
api_v1_data_options[i].hash = simple_hash(api_v1_data_options[i].name);
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_formats[i].name ; i++)
api_v1_data_formats[i].hash = simple_hash(api_v1_data_formats[i].name);
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name ; i++)
api_v1_data_google_formats[i].hash = simple_hash(api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name);
web_client_api_v1_init_grouping();
}
|
void web_client_api_v1_init(void) {
int i;
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_options[i].name ; i++)
api_v1_data_options[i].hash = simple_hash(api_v1_data_options[i].name);
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_formats[i].name ; i++)
api_v1_data_formats[i].hash = simple_hash(api_v1_data_formats[i].name);
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name ; i++)
api_v1_data_google_formats[i].hash = simple_hash(api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name);
web_client_api_v1_init_grouping();
}
|
C
|
netdata
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::OpenBugReportDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ReportBug"), profile_);
browser::ShowHtmlBugReportView(this);
}
|
void Browser::OpenBugReportDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ReportBug"), profile_);
browser::ShowHtmlBugReportView(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6401
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6401/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/akheron/jansson/commit/8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
|
CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
json_t *json_real(double value)
{
json_real_t *real;
if(isnan(value) || isinf(value))
return NULL;
real = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_real_t));
if(!real)
return NULL;
json_init(&real->json, JSON_REAL);
real->value = value;
return &real->json;
}
|
json_t *json_real(double value)
{
json_real_t *real;
if(isnan(value) || isinf(value))
return NULL;
real = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_real_t));
if(!real)
return NULL;
json_init(&real->json, JSON_REAL);
real->value = value;
return &real->json;
}
|
C
|
jansson
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebPluginDelegateProxy::CreateResourceClient(
unsigned long resource_id, const GURL& url, int notify_id) {
if (!channel_host_)
return NULL;
ResourceClientProxy* proxy = new ResourceClientProxy(channel_host_,
instance_id_);
proxy->Initialize(resource_id, url, notify_id);
return proxy;
}
|
WebPluginDelegateProxy::CreateResourceClient(
unsigned long resource_id, const GURL& url, int notify_id) {
if (!channel_host_)
return NULL;
ResourceClientProxy* proxy = new ResourceClientProxy(channel_host_,
instance_id_);
proxy->Initialize(resource_id, url, notify_id);
return proxy;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
|
ofproto_set_rstp(struct ofproto *ofproto,
const struct ofproto_rstp_settings *s)
{
if (!ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp) {
return EOPNOTSUPP;
}
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp(ofproto, s);
return 0;
}
|
ofproto_set_rstp(struct ofproto *ofproto,
const struct ofproto_rstp_settings *s)
{
if (!ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp) {
return EOPNOTSUPP;
}
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp(ofproto, s);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RenderWidgetHostView::CreateViewForWidget(RenderWidgetHost* widget) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* rwhi = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget);
return new RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(rwhi, NULL);
}
|
RenderWidgetHostView::CreateViewForWidget(RenderWidgetHost* widget) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* rwhi = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget);
return new RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(rwhi, NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18241
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18241/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
static int __get_segment_type(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
int type = 0;
switch (fio->sbi->active_logs) {
case 2:
type = __get_segment_type_2(fio);
break;
case 4:
type = __get_segment_type_4(fio);
break;
case 6:
type = __get_segment_type_6(fio);
break;
default:
f2fs_bug_on(fio->sbi, true);
}
if (IS_HOT(type))
fio->temp = HOT;
else if (IS_WARM(type))
fio->temp = WARM;
else
fio->temp = COLD;
return type;
}
|
static int __get_segment_type(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
int type = 0;
switch (fio->sbi->active_logs) {
case 2:
type = __get_segment_type_2(fio);
break;
case 4:
type = __get_segment_type_4(fio);
break;
case 6:
type = __get_segment_type_6(fio);
break;
default:
f2fs_bug_on(fio->sbi, true);
}
if (IS_HOT(type))
fio->temp = HOT;
else if (IS_WARM(type))
fio->temp = WARM;
else
fio->temp = COLD;
return type;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-12984
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12984/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/385097a3675749cbc9e97c085c0e5dfe4269ca51
|
385097a3675749cbc9e97c085c0e5dfe4269ca51
|
nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void se_io_cb(void *context, u8 *apdu, size_t apdu_len, int err)
{
struct se_io_ctx *ctx = context;
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg) {
kfree(ctx);
return;
}
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_CMD_SE_IO);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, ctx->dev_idx) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX, ctx->se_idx) ||
nla_put(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_APDU, apdu_len, apdu))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(ctx);
return;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
kfree(ctx);
return;
}
|
static void se_io_cb(void *context, u8 *apdu, size_t apdu_len, int err)
{
struct se_io_ctx *ctx = context;
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg) {
kfree(ctx);
return;
}
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_CMD_SE_IO);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, ctx->dev_idx) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX, ctx->se_idx) ||
nla_put(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_APDU, apdu_len, apdu))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(ctx);
return;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
kfree(ctx);
return;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9798/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
AP_DECLARE(apr_size_t) ap_get_limit_xml_body(const request_rec *r)
{
core_dir_config *conf;
conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
if (conf->limit_xml_body == AP_LIMIT_UNSET)
return AP_DEFAULT_LIMIT_XML_BODY;
return (apr_size_t)conf->limit_xml_body;
}
|
AP_DECLARE(apr_size_t) ap_get_limit_xml_body(const request_rec *r)
{
core_dir_config *conf;
conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
if (conf->limit_xml_body == AP_LIMIT_UNSET)
return AP_DEFAULT_LIMIT_XML_BODY;
return (apr_size_t)conf->limit_xml_body;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPageProxy::backForwardForwardListCount(int32_t& count)
{
count = m_backForwardList->forwardListCount();
}
|
void WebPageProxy::backForwardForwardListCount(int32_t& count)
{
count = m_backForwardList->forwardListCount();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608
|
Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
|
void DeletedDiscardableSharedMemoryOnIO(
mojom::DiscardableSharedMemoryManagerPtr* manager_mojo,
int32_t id) {
(*manager_mojo)->DeletedDiscardableSharedMemory(id);
}
|
void DeletedDiscardableSharedMemoryOnIO(
mojom::DiscardableSharedMemoryManagerPtr* manager_mojo,
int32_t id) {
(*manager_mojo)->DeletedDiscardableSharedMemory(id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5156/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ConnectToExecutionServer(uint32 session_id,
base::win::ScopedHandle* pipe_out) {
string16 pipe_name;
FilePath winsta_path(base::GetNativeLibraryName(UTF8ToUTF16("winsta")));
base::ScopedNativeLibrary winsta(winsta_path);
if (winsta.is_valid()) {
PWINSTATIONQUERYINFORMATIONW win_station_query_information =
static_cast<PWINSTATIONQUERYINFORMATIONW>(
winsta.GetFunctionPointer("WinStationQueryInformationW"));
if (win_station_query_information) {
wchar_t name[MAX_PATH];
ULONG name_length;
if (win_station_query_information(0,
session_id,
kCreateProcessPipeNameClass,
name,
sizeof(name),
&name_length)) {
pipe_name.assign(name);
}
}
}
if (pipe_name.empty()) {
pipe_name = UTF8ToUTF16(
StringPrintf(kCreateProcessDefaultPipeNameFormat, session_id));
}
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
for (int i = 0; i < kPipeConnectMaxAttempts; ++i) {
pipe.Set(CreateFile(pipe_name.c_str(),
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
NULL));
if (pipe.IsValid()) {
break;
}
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_PIPE_BUSY) {
break;
}
if (!WaitNamedPipe(pipe_name.c_str(), kPipeBusyWaitTimeoutMs)) {
break;
}
}
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to connect to '" << pipe_name << "'";
return false;
}
*pipe_out = pipe.Pass();
return true;
}
|
bool ConnectToExecutionServer(uint32 session_id,
base::win::ScopedHandle* pipe_out) {
string16 pipe_name;
FilePath winsta_path(base::GetNativeLibraryName(UTF8ToUTF16("winsta")));
base::ScopedNativeLibrary winsta(winsta_path);
if (winsta.is_valid()) {
PWINSTATIONQUERYINFORMATIONW win_station_query_information =
static_cast<PWINSTATIONQUERYINFORMATIONW>(
winsta.GetFunctionPointer("WinStationQueryInformationW"));
if (win_station_query_information) {
wchar_t name[MAX_PATH];
ULONG name_length;
if (win_station_query_information(0,
session_id,
kCreateProcessPipeNameClass,
name,
sizeof(name),
&name_length)) {
pipe_name.assign(name);
}
}
}
if (pipe_name.empty()) {
pipe_name = UTF8ToUTF16(
StringPrintf(kCreateProcessDefaultPipeNameFormat, session_id));
}
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
for (int i = 0; i < kPipeConnectMaxAttempts; ++i) {
pipe.Set(CreateFile(pipe_name.c_str(),
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
0,
NULL));
if (pipe.IsValid()) {
break;
}
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_PIPE_BUSY) {
break;
}
if (!WaitNamedPipe(pipe_name.c_str(), kPipeBusyWaitTimeoutMs)) {
break;
}
}
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) << "Failed to connect to '" << pipe_name << "'";
return false;
}
*pipe_out = pipe.Pass();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5165/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19b8593007150b9a78da7d13f6e5f8feb10881a7
|
19b8593007150b9a78da7d13f6e5f8feb10881a7
|
Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
|
void MetricsLog::WriteMetricsEnableDefault(EnableMetricsDefault metrics_default,
SystemProfileProto* system_profile) {
if (client_->IsReportingPolicyManaged()) {
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_POLICY_FORCED_ENABLED);
return;
}
switch (metrics_default) {
case EnableMetricsDefault::DEFAULT_UNKNOWN:
break;
case EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_IN:
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_OPT_IN);
break;
case EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_OUT:
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_OPT_OUT);
}
}
|
void MetricsLog::WriteMetricsEnableDefault(EnableMetricsDefault metrics_default,
SystemProfileProto* system_profile) {
if (client_->IsReportingPolicyManaged()) {
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_POLICY_FORCED_ENABLED);
return;
}
switch (metrics_default) {
case EnableMetricsDefault::DEFAULT_UNKNOWN:
break;
case EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_IN:
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_OPT_IN);
break;
case EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_OUT:
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_OPT_OUT);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1345/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grep.git/commit/?id=83a95bd8c8561875b948cadd417c653dbe7ef2e2
|
83a95bd8c8561875b948cadd417c653dbe7ef2e2
| null |
kwsfree (kwset_t kwset)
{
obstack_free (&kwset->obstack, NULL);
free (kwset);
}
|
kwsfree (kwset_t kwset)
{
obstack_free (&kwset->obstack, NULL);
free (kwset);
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0828/
|
CWE-254
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/dded8fdbb700d6cc498debc69a780915bc34d755
|
dded8fdbb700d6cc498debc69a780915bc34d755
|
IGraphicBufferConsumer: fix ATTACH_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338113
Change-Id: I019c4df2c6adbc944122df96968ddd11a02ebe33
|
virtual status_t setDefaultBufferSize(uint32_t w, uint32_t h) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(w);
data.writeInt32(h);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
virtual status_t setDefaultBufferSize(uint32_t w, uint32_t h) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(w);
data.writeInt32(h);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static void *prb_dispatch_next_block(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc,
struct packet_sock *po)
{
struct tpacket_block_desc *pbd;
smp_rmb();
/* 1. Get current block num */
pbd = GET_CURR_PBLOCK_DESC_FROM_CORE(pkc);
/* 2. If this block is currently in_use then freeze the queue */
if (TP_STATUS_USER & BLOCK_STATUS(pbd)) {
prb_freeze_queue(pkc, po);
return NULL;
}
/*
* 3.
* open this block and return the offset where the first packet
* needs to get stored.
*/
prb_open_block(pkc, pbd);
return (void *)pkc->nxt_offset;
}
|
static void *prb_dispatch_next_block(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc,
struct packet_sock *po)
{
struct tpacket_block_desc *pbd;
smp_rmb();
/* 1. Get current block num */
pbd = GET_CURR_PBLOCK_DESC_FROM_CORE(pkc);
/* 2. If this block is currently in_use then freeze the queue */
if (TP_STATUS_USER & BLOCK_STATUS(pbd)) {
prb_freeze_queue(pkc, po);
return NULL;
}
/*
* 3.
* open this block and return the offset where the first packet
* needs to get stored.
*/
prb_open_block(pkc, pbd);
return (void *)pkc->nxt_offset;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
|
static void option_export_marks(const char *marks)
{
export_marks_file = make_fast_import_path(marks);
safe_create_leading_directories_const(export_marks_file);
}
|
static void option_export_marks(const char *marks)
{
export_marks_file = make_fast_import_path(marks);
safe_create_leading_directories_const(export_marks_file);
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
R=kinuko@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void DidDeleteOriginData(QuotaStatusCode status) {
DCHECK_GT(remaining_clients_, 0);
if (status != kQuotaStatusOk)
++error_count_;
if (--remaining_clients_ == 0)
CallCompleted();
}
|
void DidDeleteOriginData(QuotaStatusCode status) {
DCHECK_GT(remaining_clients_, 0);
if (status != kQuotaStatusOk)
++error_count_;
if (--remaining_clients_ == 0)
CallCompleted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1674
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1674/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
[Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::DestroyAccessibilityTree(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
if (args.Length() != 1 || !args[0]->IsNumber()) {
ThrowInvalidArgumentsException(this);
return;
}
int tree_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
auto iter = tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree_id);
if (iter == tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
TreeCache* cache = iter->second;
tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.erase(tree_id);
axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.erase(&cache->tree);
delete cache;
}
|
void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::DestroyAccessibilityTree(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
if (args.Length() != 1 || !args[0]->IsNumber()) {
ThrowInvalidArgumentsException(this);
return;
}
int tree_id = args[0]->Int32Value();
auto iter = tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree_id);
if (iter == tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
TreeCache* cache = iter->second;
tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.erase(tree_id);
axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.erase(&cache->tree);
delete cache;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1658
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1658/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866
|
5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866
|
Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
|
bool ExtensionOptionsGuest::CanRunInDetachedState() const {
return true;
}
|
bool ExtensionOptionsGuest::CanRunInDetachedState() const {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
InfoBarCountObserver::~InfoBarCountObserver() {}
|
InfoBarCountObserver::~InfoBarCountObserver() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010239
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010239/
|
CWE-754
|
https://github.com/DaveGamble/cJSON/commit/be749d7efa7c9021da746e685bd6dec79f9dd99b
|
be749d7efa7c9021da746e685bd6dec79f9dd99b
|
Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
|
static void* cast_away_const(const void* string)
{
return (void*)string;
}
|
static void* cast_away_const(const void* string)
{
return (void*)string;
}
|
C
|
cJSON
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7864
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7864/
|
CWE-787
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=e6699596af5c5d6f0ae0ea06e19df87dce088df8
|
e6699596af5c5d6f0ae0ea06e19df87dce088df8
| null |
tt_face_done( FT_Face ttface ) /* TT_Face */
{
TT_Face face = (TT_Face)ttface;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Stream stream;
SFNT_Service sfnt;
if ( !face )
return;
memory = ttface->memory;
stream = ttface->stream;
sfnt = (SFNT_Service)face->sfnt;
/* for `extended TrueType formats' (i.e. compressed versions) */
if ( face->extra.finalizer )
face->extra.finalizer( face->extra.data );
if ( sfnt )
sfnt->done_face( face );
/* freeing the locations table */
tt_face_done_loca( face );
tt_face_free_hdmx( face );
/* freeing the CVT */
FT_FREE( face->cvt );
face->cvt_size = 0;
/* freeing the programs */
FT_FRAME_RELEASE( face->font_program );
FT_FRAME_RELEASE( face->cvt_program );
face->font_program_size = 0;
face->cvt_program_size = 0;
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
tt_done_blend( face );
face->blend = NULL;
#endif
}
|
tt_face_done( FT_Face ttface ) /* TT_Face */
{
TT_Face face = (TT_Face)ttface;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Stream stream;
SFNT_Service sfnt;
if ( !face )
return;
memory = ttface->memory;
stream = ttface->stream;
sfnt = (SFNT_Service)face->sfnt;
/* for `extended TrueType formats' (i.e. compressed versions) */
if ( face->extra.finalizer )
face->extra.finalizer( face->extra.data );
if ( sfnt )
sfnt->done_face( face );
/* freeing the locations table */
tt_face_done_loca( face );
tt_face_free_hdmx( face );
/* freeing the CVT */
FT_FREE( face->cvt );
face->cvt_size = 0;
/* freeing the programs */
FT_FRAME_RELEASE( face->font_program );
FT_FRAME_RELEASE( face->cvt_program );
face->font_program_size = 0;
face->cvt_program_size = 0;
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
tt_done_blend( face );
face->blend = NULL;
#endif
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::setOverrideContainingBlockContentLogicalWidth(LayoutUnit logicalWidth)
{
if (!gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap)
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap = new OverrideSizeMap;
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap->set(this, logicalWidth);
}
|
void RenderBox::setOverrideContainingBlockContentLogicalWidth(LayoutUnit logicalWidth)
{
if (!gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap)
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap = new OverrideSizeMap;
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap->set(this, logicalWidth);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
static inline bool vruntime_normalized(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct sched_entity *se = &p->se;
/*
* In both the TASK_ON_RQ_QUEUED and TASK_ON_RQ_MIGRATING cases,
* the dequeue_entity(.flags=0) will already have normalized the
* vruntime.
*/
if (p->on_rq)
return true;
/*
* When !on_rq, vruntime of the task has usually NOT been normalized.
* But there are some cases where it has already been normalized:
*
* - A forked child which is waiting for being woken up by
* wake_up_new_task().
* - A task which has been woken up by try_to_wake_up() and
* waiting for actually being woken up by sched_ttwu_pending().
*/
if (!se->sum_exec_runtime ||
(p->state == TASK_WAKING && p->sched_remote_wakeup))
return true;
return false;
}
|
static inline bool vruntime_normalized(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct sched_entity *se = &p->se;
/*
* In both the TASK_ON_RQ_QUEUED and TASK_ON_RQ_MIGRATING cases,
* the dequeue_entity(.flags=0) will already have normalized the
* vruntime.
*/
if (p->on_rq)
return true;
/*
* When !on_rq, vruntime of the task has usually NOT been normalized.
* But there are some cases where it has already been normalized:
*
* - A forked child which is waiting for being woken up by
* wake_up_new_task().
* - A task which has been woken up by try_to_wake_up() and
* waiting for actually being woken up by sched_ttwu_pending().
*/
if (!se->sum_exec_runtime ||
(p->state == TASK_WAKING && p->sched_remote_wakeup))
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::ReleaseTileResources() {
active_tree_->ReleaseTileResources();
if (pending_tree_)
pending_tree_->ReleaseTileResources();
if (recycle_tree_)
recycle_tree_->ReleaseTileResources();
}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::ReleaseTileResources() {
active_tree_->ReleaseTileResources();
if (pending_tree_)
pending_tree_->ReleaseTileResources();
if (recycle_tree_)
recycle_tree_->ReleaseTileResources();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3200/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
c0947dabeaa10da67798c1bbc668dca4b280cad5
|
[Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
|
bool TryMatchSearchParam(base::StringPiece text,
base::StringPiece pattern,
std::string* prefix,
std::string* suffix) {
auto pos = text.find(pattern);
if (pos == base::StringPiece::npos)
return false;
text.substr(0, pos).CopyToString(prefix);
text.substr(pos + pattern.length()).CopyToString(suffix);
return true;
}
|
bool TryMatchSearchParam(base::StringPiece text,
base::StringPiece pattern,
std::string* prefix,
std::string* suffix) {
auto pos = text.find(pattern);
if (pos == base::StringPiece::npos)
return false;
text.substr(0, pos).CopyToString(prefix);
text.substr(pos + pattern.length()).CopyToString(suffix);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7526
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7526/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/d9b2209a69ee90d8df81fb124eb66f593eb9f599
|
d9b2209a69ee90d8df81fb124eb66f593eb9f599
|
Fixed out-of-bounds write reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102
|
static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(BImgBuff,i,image,bpp);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
|
static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->x_resolution=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->y_resolution=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelPacket *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(BImgBuff,i,image,bpp);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);;
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
CVE-2016-5243
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5243/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d2be1422e02ccd697ccfcd45c85b4a26e6178e2
|
5d2be1422e02ccd697ccfcd45c85b4a26e6178e2
|
tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int tipc_nl_compat_sk_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
int err;
u32 sock_ref;
struct nlattr *sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX + 1];
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(sock, TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
sock_ref = nla_get_u32(sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_REF]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%u:", sock_ref);
if (sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_CON]) {
u32 node;
struct nlattr *con[TIPC_NLA_CON_MAX + 1];
nla_parse_nested(con, TIPC_NLA_CON_MAX, sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_CON],
NULL);
node = nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_NODE]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " connected to <%u.%u.%u:%u>",
tipc_zone(node),
tipc_cluster(node),
tipc_node(node),
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_SOCK]));
if (con[TIPC_NLA_CON_FLAG])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " via {%u,%u}\n",
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_TYPE]),
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_INST]));
else
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
} else if (sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_HAS_PUBL]) {
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " bound to");
err = tipc_nl_compat_publ_dump(msg, sock_ref);
if (err)
return err;
}
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
return 0;
}
|
static int tipc_nl_compat_sk_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
int err;
u32 sock_ref;
struct nlattr *sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX + 1];
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK])
return -EINVAL;
err = nla_parse_nested(sock, TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX, attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK],
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
sock_ref = nla_get_u32(sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_REF]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%u:", sock_ref);
if (sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_CON]) {
u32 node;
struct nlattr *con[TIPC_NLA_CON_MAX + 1];
nla_parse_nested(con, TIPC_NLA_CON_MAX, sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_CON],
NULL);
node = nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_NODE]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " connected to <%u.%u.%u:%u>",
tipc_zone(node),
tipc_cluster(node),
tipc_node(node),
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_SOCK]));
if (con[TIPC_NLA_CON_FLAG])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " via {%u,%u}\n",
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_TYPE]),
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_INST]));
else
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
} else if (sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_HAS_PUBL]) {
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " bound to");
err = tipc_nl_compat_publ_dump(msg, sock_ref);
if (err)
return err;
}
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3236
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3236/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/680d04e0ba7e926233e3b9cee59125ce181f66ba
|
680d04e0ba7e926233e3b9cee59125ce181f66ba
|
VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int vmci_transport_dgram_enqueue(
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct sockaddr_vm *remote_addr,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t len)
{
int err;
struct vmci_datagram *dg;
if (len > VMCI_MAX_DG_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (!vmci_transport_allow_dgram(vsk, remote_addr->svm_cid))
return -EPERM;
/* Allocate a buffer for the user's message and our packet header. */
dg = kmalloc(len + sizeof(*dg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dg)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy_fromiovec(VMCI_DG_PAYLOAD(dg), iov, len);
dg->dst = vmci_make_handle(remote_addr->svm_cid,
remote_addr->svm_port);
dg->src = vmci_make_handle(vsk->local_addr.svm_cid,
vsk->local_addr.svm_port);
dg->payload_size = len;
err = vmci_datagram_send(dg);
kfree(dg);
if (err < 0)
return vmci_transport_error_to_vsock_error(err);
return err - sizeof(*dg);
}
|
static int vmci_transport_dgram_enqueue(
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct sockaddr_vm *remote_addr,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t len)
{
int err;
struct vmci_datagram *dg;
if (len > VMCI_MAX_DG_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (!vmci_transport_allow_dgram(vsk, remote_addr->svm_cid))
return -EPERM;
/* Allocate a buffer for the user's message and our packet header. */
dg = kmalloc(len + sizeof(*dg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dg)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy_fromiovec(VMCI_DG_PAYLOAD(dg), iov, len);
dg->dst = vmci_make_handle(remote_addr->svm_cid,
remote_addr->svm_port);
dg->src = vmci_make_handle(vsk->local_addr.svm_cid,
vsk->local_addr.svm_port);
dg->payload_size = len;
err = vmci_datagram_send(dg);
kfree(dg);
if (err < 0)
return vmci_transport_error_to_vsock_error(err);
return err - sizeof(*dg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9903/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
|
pick_next_task(struct rq *rq)
{
const struct sched_class *class;
struct task_struct *p;
/*
* Optimization: we know that if all tasks are in
* the fair class we can call that function directly:
*/
if (likely(rq->nr_running == rq->cfs.h_nr_running)) {
p = fair_sched_class.pick_next_task(rq);
if (likely(p))
return p;
}
for_each_class(class) {
p = class->pick_next_task(rq);
if (p)
return p;
}
BUG(); /* the idle class will always have a runnable task */
}
|
pick_next_task(struct rq *rq)
{
const struct sched_class *class;
struct task_struct *p;
/*
* Optimization: we know that if all tasks are in
* the fair class we can call that function directly:
*/
if (likely(rq->nr_running == rq->cfs.h_nr_running)) {
p = fair_sched_class.pick_next_task(rq);
if (likely(p))
return p;
}
for_each_class(class) {
p = class->pick_next_task(rq);
if (p)
return p;
}
BUG(); /* the idle class will always have a runnable task */
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1215/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bceda4948deeaed0a5a99305d0d488eb952f64f
|
2bceda4948deeaed0a5a99305d0d488eb952f64f
|
Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
|
ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryService(
ScriptState* scriptState,
const StringOrUnsignedLong& service,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
String serviceUUID = BluetoothUUID::getService(service, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return exceptionState.reject(scriptState);
return getPrimaryServicesImpl(
scriptState, mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE,
serviceUUID);
}
|
ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryService(
ScriptState* scriptState,
const StringOrUnsignedLong& service,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
String serviceUUID = BluetoothUUID::getService(service, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return exceptionState.reject(scriptState);
return getPrimaryServicesImpl(
scriptState, mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE,
serviceUUID);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err stsh_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_StshEntry *ent;
GF_ShadowSyncBox *ptr = (GF_ShadowSyncBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, gf_list_count(ptr->entries));
i=0;
while ((ent = (GF_StshEntry *)gf_list_enum(ptr->entries, &i))) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ent->shadowedSampleNumber);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ent->syncSampleNumber);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err stsh_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_StshEntry *ent;
GF_ShadowSyncBox *ptr = (GF_ShadowSyncBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, gf_list_count(ptr->entries));
i=0;
while ((ent = (GF_StshEntry *)gf_list_enum(ptr->entries, &i))) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ent->shadowedSampleNumber);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ent->syncSampleNumber);
}
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2482
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2482/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea2bc483ff5caada7c4aa0d5fbf87d3a6590273d
|
ea2bc483ff5caada7c4aa0d5fbf87d3a6590273d
|
[SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
static int sctp_copy_laddrs_to_user_old(struct sock *sk, __u16 port, int max_addrs,
void __user *to)
{
struct list_head *pos, *next;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr;
union sctp_addr temp;
int cnt = 0;
int addrlen;
list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &sctp_local_addr_list) {
addr = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
if ((PF_INET == sk->sk_family) &&
(AF_INET6 == addr->a.sa.sa_family))
continue;
memcpy(&temp, &addr->a, sizeof(temp));
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sctp_sk(sk),
&temp);
addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
if (copy_to_user(to, &temp, addrlen))
return -EFAULT;
to += addrlen;
cnt ++;
if (cnt >= max_addrs) break;
}
return cnt;
}
|
static int sctp_copy_laddrs_to_user_old(struct sock *sk, __u16 port, int max_addrs,
void __user *to)
{
struct list_head *pos, *next;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr;
union sctp_addr temp;
int cnt = 0;
int addrlen;
list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &sctp_local_addr_list) {
addr = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
if ((PF_INET == sk->sk_family) &&
(AF_INET6 == addr->a.sa.sa_family))
continue;
memcpy(&temp, &addr->a, sizeof(temp));
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sctp_sk(sk),
&temp);
addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
if (copy_to_user(to, &temp, addrlen))
return -EFAULT;
to += addrlen;
cnt ++;
if (cnt >= max_addrs) break;
}
return cnt;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4656
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4656/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
|
ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
|
ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
|
static int _snd_ctl_register_ioctl(snd_kctl_ioctl_func_t fcn, struct list_head *lists)
{
struct snd_kctl_ioctl *pn;
pn = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snd_kctl_ioctl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pn == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
pn->fioctl = fcn;
down_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
list_add_tail(&pn->list, lists);
up_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
return 0;
}
|
static int _snd_ctl_register_ioctl(snd_kctl_ioctl_func_t fcn, struct list_head *lists)
{
struct snd_kctl_ioctl *pn;
pn = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snd_kctl_ioctl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pn == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
pn->fioctl = fcn;
down_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
list_add_tail(&pn->list, lists);
up_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5013
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5013/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f3a9a68b2dcdd2c54cf49a41ad34729ab576702
|
8f3a9a68b2dcdd2c54cf49a41ad34729ab576702
|
Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
|
void Browser::FindReply(WebContents* web_contents,
int request_id,
int number_of_matches,
const gfx::Rect& selection_rect,
int active_match_ordinal,
bool final_update) {
FindTabHelper* find_tab_helper = FindTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!find_tab_helper)
return;
find_tab_helper->HandleFindReply(request_id,
number_of_matches,
selection_rect,
active_match_ordinal,
final_update);
}
|
void Browser::FindReply(WebContents* web_contents,
int request_id,
int number_of_matches,
const gfx::Rect& selection_rect,
int active_match_ordinal,
bool final_update) {
FindTabHelper* find_tab_helper = FindTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!find_tab_helper)
return;
find_tab_helper->HandleFindReply(request_id,
number_of_matches,
selection_rect,
active_match_ordinal,
final_update);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2451
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2451/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
f9ed2fe6d61259e779a37d4c2d7edb33a1c1f8ba
|
Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
|
status_t OMX::allocateBuffer(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, size_t size,
buffer_id *buffer, void **buffer_data) {
return findInstance(node)->allocateBuffer(
port_index, size, buffer, buffer_data);
}
|
status_t OMX::allocateBuffer(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, size_t size,
buffer_id *buffer, void **buffer_data) {
return findInstance(node)->allocateBuffer(
port_index, size, buffer, buffer_data);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6031
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6031/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2
|
01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2
|
[pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
|
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderWrapper> PDFiumEngine::CreateURLLoader() {
return std::make_unique<URLLoaderWrapperImpl>(GetPluginInstance(),
client_->CreateURLLoader());
}
|
std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderWrapper> PDFiumEngine::CreateURLLoader() {
return std::make_unique<URLLoaderWrapperImpl>(GetPluginInstance(),
client_->CreateURLLoader());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9718
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9718/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
|
3251bdcf1c67427d964517053c3d185b46e618e8
| null |
static void ahci_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
AHCIState *s = opaque;
/* Only aligned reads are allowed on AHCI */
if (addr & 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "ahci: Mis-aligned write to addr 0x"
TARGET_FMT_plx "\n", addr);
return;
}
if (addr < AHCI_GENERIC_HOST_CONTROL_REGS_MAX_ADDR) {
DPRINTF(-1, "(addr 0x%08X), val 0x%08"PRIX64"\n", (unsigned) addr, val);
switch (addr) {
case HOST_CAP: /* R/WO, RO */
/* FIXME handle R/WO */
break;
case HOST_CTL: /* R/W */
if (val & HOST_CTL_RESET) {
DPRINTF(-1, "HBA Reset\n");
ahci_reset(s);
} else {
s->control_regs.ghc = (val & 0x3) | HOST_CTL_AHCI_EN;
ahci_check_irq(s);
}
break;
case HOST_IRQ_STAT: /* R/WC, RO */
s->control_regs.irqstatus &= ~val;
ahci_check_irq(s);
break;
case HOST_PORTS_IMPL: /* R/WO, RO */
/* FIXME handle R/WO */
break;
case HOST_VERSION: /* RO */
/* FIXME report write? */
break;
default:
DPRINTF(-1, "write to unknown register 0x%x\n", (unsigned)addr);
}
} else if ((addr >= AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR) &&
(addr < (AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR +
(s->ports * AHCI_PORT_ADDR_OFFSET_LEN)))) {
ahci_port_write(s, (addr - AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR) >> 7,
addr & AHCI_PORT_ADDR_OFFSET_MASK, val);
}
}
|
static void ahci_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
AHCIState *s = opaque;
/* Only aligned reads are allowed on AHCI */
if (addr & 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "ahci: Mis-aligned write to addr 0x"
TARGET_FMT_plx "\n", addr);
return;
}
if (addr < AHCI_GENERIC_HOST_CONTROL_REGS_MAX_ADDR) {
DPRINTF(-1, "(addr 0x%08X), val 0x%08"PRIX64"\n", (unsigned) addr, val);
switch (addr) {
case HOST_CAP: /* R/WO, RO */
/* FIXME handle R/WO */
break;
case HOST_CTL: /* R/W */
if (val & HOST_CTL_RESET) {
DPRINTF(-1, "HBA Reset\n");
ahci_reset(s);
} else {
s->control_regs.ghc = (val & 0x3) | HOST_CTL_AHCI_EN;
ahci_check_irq(s);
}
break;
case HOST_IRQ_STAT: /* R/WC, RO */
s->control_regs.irqstatus &= ~val;
ahci_check_irq(s);
break;
case HOST_PORTS_IMPL: /* R/WO, RO */
/* FIXME handle R/WO */
break;
case HOST_VERSION: /* RO */
/* FIXME report write? */
break;
default:
DPRINTF(-1, "write to unknown register 0x%x\n", (unsigned)addr);
}
} else if ((addr >= AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR) &&
(addr < (AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR +
(s->ports * AHCI_PORT_ADDR_OFFSET_LEN)))) {
ahci_port_write(s, (addr - AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR) >> 7,
addr & AHCI_PORT_ADDR_OFFSET_MASK, val);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
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