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Over the years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military ? arms purchases, its relations with Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of populism to other ? Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts has been ? a major concern. The United States has imposed sanctions: on several Venezuelan government ? and military officials for helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug ? and weapons trafficking; on three Venezuelan companies for providing support to Iran; and on ? several Venezuelan individuals for providing support to Hezbollah. In late 2010, the Chávez ? government revoked an agreement for U.S. Ambassador-designate Larry Palmer to be posted to ? Venezuela. The Obama Administration responded by revoking the diplomatic visa of the ? Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States. ? Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration maintains that it remains committed to ? seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and ? counterterrorism efforts. In the aftermath of President Chávez’s reelection in October 2012, the ? White House, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez, congratulated the ? Venezuelan people on the high level of participation and the relatively peaceful election process. ? Subsequently, in November 2012, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for Western ? Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, engaged in a conversation with Vice President Maduro ? about improving bilateral relations, including greater cooperation on counternarcotics issues. ? In early January 2013, the State Department reiterated that the United States remained open to ? dialogue with Venezuela on a range of issues of mutual interest. In light of the setback in ? President Chávez’s health, a State Department spokesman maintained on January 9, 2013, that ? “regardless of what happens politically in Venezuela, if the Venezuelan government and if the ? Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think there is a path that’s possible.”11? In response to President Chávez’s death, President Obama issued the following statement: ? At this challenging time of President Hugo Chávez’s passing, the United States reaffirms its ? support for the Venezuelan people and its interest in developing a constructive relationship ? with the Venezuelan government. As Venezuela begins a new chapter in its history, the ? United States remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the rule of ? law, and respect for human rights.? While the President’s statement did not offer traditional condolences, the State Department ? maintains that it expressed U.S. sympathy to Chávez’s family and to the Venezuelan people.13? Many Latin American and other foreign leaders have expressed their condolences to Venezuela on ? Chávez’s passing. The White House statement focused on the U.S. interest in getting cooperative ? bilateral relations back on track while at the same time reiterating that the United States is ? committed to promoting democratic practices and respect for human rights. A number of other ? statements by Members of Congress also expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan ? relations. ? While some observers contend that Chávez’s passing and the beginning of a new political era in ? Venezuela could ultimately lessen tensions in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, there is no expectation ? that this will happen quickly. In fact, State Department officials have cautioned that the upcoming ? electoral campaign could delay any forward movement in improving bilateral relations.14 Just ? hours before Chávez’s death on March 5, Vice President Maduro announced that two U.S. ? military attachés were being expelled from Venezuela for reportedly attempting to provoke ? dissent in the Venezuelan military and even appeared to blame Chávez’s sickness on the United ? States. State Department officials strongly denied the Venezuelan charges regarding the attachés, ? and ultimately responded on March 11 by expelling two Venezuelan diplomats (a consular official ? in New York and a second secretary at the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington).15? Hostility toward the United States was often used by the Chávez government as a way to shore up support during elections, and it appears that this is being employed by the PSUV once again in ? the current presidential campaign. On March 20, 2013, Foreign Minister Elias Jaua said that ? Venezuelan officials would no longer be talking about improving U.S.-Venezuelan relations with ? Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson because of comments that Jacobson had made in a Spanish ? newspaper; Jacobson had said that “Venezuelans deserve open, fair and transparent elections.” A ? senior U.S. official reportedly said that such bizarre accusations and behavior raises doubts over ? whether bilateral relations will be able to be improved with a Maduro government.16 Another ? strange accusation by Maduro is that two former U.S. State Department officials were plotting to ? kill Capriles and to blame it on the Maduro government; the State Department strongly rejected ? the “allegations of U.S. government involvement to harm anyone in Venezuela.”17 Looking ? ahead, some observers contend that anti-Americanism could also be a means for PSUV leaders to mask internal problems within Chavismo, and even could be utilized as a potential new PSUV ? government led by Maduro deals with a deteriorating economy.
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Sullivan ‘13 (Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, "Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Services, 4/9/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf)//SL
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U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military arms purchases, its relations with Iran, Declining cooperation on anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts has been a major concern. Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration maintains that it remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counterterrorism efforts. Subsequently, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, engaged in a conversation with Maduro about improving bilateral relations, including greater cooperation on counternarcotics issues. 2013, the State Department reiterated that the United States remained open to dialogue with Venezuela on a range of issues of mutual interest spokesman maintained “regardless of what happens politically in Venezuela, if the Venezuelan government and if the Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think there is a path that’s possible. Maduro announced that two U.S. military attachés were being expelled from Venezuela for reportedly attempting to provoke dissent in the Venezuelan military and even appeared to blame Chávez’s sickness on the United States. State Department responded on March 11 by expelling two Venezuelan diplomats Hostility toward the United States was often used by the Chávez government as a way to shore up support during elections this is being employed by the PSUV once again Venezuelan officials would no longer be talking about improving U.S.-Venezuelan relations anti-Americanism could also be a means for PSUV leaders to mask internal problems within Chavismo, and even could be utilized as a potential new PSUV government led by Maduro deals with a deteriorating economy.
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Maduro rejecting counterrorism and counternarcotic assistance from US to shore up political support
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This intelligence suggests that the long-term political future of Maduro remains uncertain at this stage. But while Cabello’s stand could ultimately pose a threat to the president in the long term, Maduro seems to have the ability to govern for the remainder of 2013. A former Chavista official tells us that the rivals appear to need each other to govern. According to this source, Maduro needs someone to keep the armed forces in check, while Cabello needs to appear to respect Chávez’s wish for Maduro to follow as his successor, at least in the short term. Maduro’s executive power seems to be limited by Cabello’s control of key state powers. However, as president he still retains control of the country’s key oil resources through the management of state oil company, PDVSA , whose head Rafael Ramírez remains a close ally. According to our sources, the Cuban government provides Maduro with intelligence in exchange for economic support, and has been instrumental in providing the president with parallel military and police intelligence to that controlled by Cabello. Maduro constantly refers to plots to oust him, and relies on Cuban security, as he seems to mistrust Cabello. These indicators suggest that Maduro has resources at his disposal to secure his immediate political survival. In addition, several countries tacitly support Maduro’s continuation in power. As former foreign affairs minister, Maduro knows most international leaders personally and has the tacit support of powers such as China, Brazil and Russia, which were the first countries to congratulate him after the election. All of these countries seem to support the status quo and the continuation of key contracts in the energy, construction and food industries.
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Renuncio’13 - Senior Associate, Intelligence & Analysis, London (Irenea, Risk Advisory, “Venezuela: strategic risk outlook for 2013,” 6/19/2013, http://news.riskadvisory.net/index.php/2013/06/venezuela-strategic-risk-outlook-for-2013/) //CT
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while Cabello’s stand could pose a threat in the long term, Maduro seems to have the ability to govern for the remainder of 2013 rivals appear to need each other to govern Maduro needs someone to keep the armed forces in check, while Cabello needs to appear to respect Chávez’s wish for Maduro Cuban government provides Maduro with intelligence in exchange for economic support, and has been instrumental in providing the president with parallel military and police intelligence to that controlled by Cabello. Maduro has resources to secure his immediate political survival Maduro knows most international leaders personally and has the tacit support of powers such as China, Brazil and Russia, these countries support the status quo and the continuation of key contracts in the energy, construction and food industries
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Economic cooperation with China, Russia, and Brazil resources critical to maintain Maduro’s political power - Maduro will maintain power until December 2013, but coming municipal elections could doom agenda if his opponents make gains.
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Chávez's death is certainly changing the political calculus in Venezuela , but will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America and affect attitudes toward, and relationships with, the United States? ¶ The answer is likely "yes." ¶ First, the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela , Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua , and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela 's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela 's financial backing. When combined with reports of Chávez's expressed desire to strengthen ties with the Obama administration, regional hostility towards the United States may decline. ¶ Since assuming office in 1999, Chávez viewed Washington as an oppressive force manipulating Latin American politics while keeping the region underdeveloped through its dependence on U.S. resources. In response, Chávez approached like-minded leaders to build a coalition challenging the regional influence of the United States. ¶ By 2005, Bolivia, Nicaragua , Cuba, Honduras and Ecuador joined Chávez's coalition, which led to the formation of the Bolivian Alliance of the Americas, also known as Alba. Alba served as an alternative to the Free Trade Act of the Americas, with an explicit focus on poverty reduction, but it also facilitated the unification of these nations in their anti-American sentiments . ¶ With Chávez gone, however, there may be no one left who has the clout to keep financing this alliance. Venezuela is Alba's largest financier, contributing millions in aid to its members as well as oil at low prices. But Venezuelans may believe that with ongoing poverty and inequality, their country's needs are more important than those of Chávez's small club of nations. ¶ This situation worries Alba members. According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, while Bolivia and Ecuador are independently wealthy and not financially dependent on Venezuela , Cuba and Nicaragua are. ¶ Cuba receives roughly 100,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil a day, while Venezuela accounted for $8.3 billion of Cuba's $20 billion in foreign trade in 2011. Chávez also paid approximately $6 billion annually for 40,000 Cuban doctors and nurses, according to Reuters. ¶ Cuban citizens fear that Chávez's death will push them back to the days of the post-Cold War recession, when Russia gradually withdrew its funding for Cuba. Meanwhile, Nicaragua has received approximately $500 million a year in loans and oil credits, increasing to $609 million in 2011, while earnings from agricultural exports to Venezuela increased from $2 million in 2006 to $300 million in 2011. ¶ But alliance members also realize that they have options. Nicaragua 's economic minister, Bayardo Arce, recently stated that it's time to diversify Nicaragua 's economic relations with China, Europe and the United States, mainly because Nicaragua has "to anticipate that Alba is not going to be permanent." Cuba may also seek to strengthen its relations with Brazil, its second-largest trade partner in the region. In fact, both governments already have plans to engage in several trade and infrastructure projects and are ramping up trade, mainly in sugar exports.
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Gómez, 3-12-13, (Eduardo J., “Ahmadinejad's hug and the future of Chavez's alliance”, CNN, Internal Bank News, March 12, 2013) EC
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Chávez's death will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela , Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua , and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela 's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela 's financial backing , Chávez approached like-minded leaders to build a coalition challenging the regional influence of the United States. By 2005, Bolivia, Nicaragua , Cuba, Honduras and Ecuador joined Chávez's coalition, there may be no one left who has the clout to keep financing this alliance. Venezuela is Alba's largest financier, contributing millions in aid to its members as well as oil at low prices. But Venezuelans may believe that with ongoing poverty and inequality, their country's needs are more important than those of Chávez's small club of nations. ¶ while Bolivia and Ecuador are independently wealthy and not financially dependent on Venezuela , Cuba and Nicaragua are. Cuba receives roughly 100,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil a day, while Venezuela accounted for $8.3 billion of Cuba's $20 billion in foreign trade in 2011. Chávez also paid approximately $6 billion annually for 40,000 Cuban doctors and nurses, according to Reuters. ¶ citizens fear that Chávez's death will push them back to the days of the post-Cold War recession Nicaragua has received approximately $500 million a year in loans and oil credits, increasing to $609 million in 2011, while earnings from agricultural exports to Venezuela increased from $2 million in 2006 to $300 million in 2011.
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*US economic engagement pushes China, Brazil and Russia out of the Venezuela – causing Maduro to lose necessary international support from Russia, China, and Brazil.
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According to figures from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16 countries across Latin America. Yet the absence of Chávez and the potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals."
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Keppel ’13 - Director of Empowerment Initiatives at Univision News (Stephen, “What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S.”, 3/16/13, ABS News, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003)//MC
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in 2011 Venezuela sent around 8 percent of its production to 16 countries across Latin America. potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals."
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Economic instability in Venezuela will spillover to Cuba – economic interdependence
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MANAGUA, Nicaragua — Nicaragua ’s exponential export growth to Venezuela has its government singing the praises of Hugo Chavez's socialist alliance. But, economists warn, once the wonderment ceases, Nicaragua could be left with a nasty hangover. ¶ Since Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega returned to power three and a half years ago, exports to Venezuela have jumped by nearly 6,000 percent, from $2 million in 2006 to $119 million in 2009 — an amount that is projected to double again this year. Venezuela is now Nicaragua ’s second-biggest export market behind the United States — a remarkably fast achievement considering three years ago Venezuela didn’t even rank in Nicaragua ’s top 25. ¶ Though Nicaragua has always relied heavily on Venezuelan oil imports, it has only recently started to reciprocate by exporting beans, beef and cattle. ¶ Ortega claims the numbers offer convincing proof that the “fair-trade” economic model of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas is redefining international relations in a world dominated by “savage capitalism.” The alliance, known as ALBA, is a a leftist cooperation agreement between Venezuela , Cuba, Nicaragua , Ecuador, Bolivia and three small Caribbean nations. ¶ Originally formed as a socialist alternative to U.S.-led free-trade advances in Latin America, ALBA has evolved into a Venezuelan-bankrolled effort to promote political, commercial and cultural unity among likeminded countries in Latin America. But five years after its inception, critics argue ALBA is little more than a clubhouse of impoverished nations dependent on Venezuelan oil and a political platform for Chavez’ arbitrary style of leadership.
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Rogers, ’10 (Tim, Author for Beats-North America, “Has Nicaragua found its silver bullet? - Exports to Venezuela have skyrocketed but Nicaragua could be trusting its fate to a house of cards.” Beats, Internal Bank News, 7-25-13) EC
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Nicaragua ’s exponential export growth to Venezuela has its government singing praises economists warn, once the wonderment ceases, Nicaragua could be left with a nasty hangover exports to Venezuela have jumped by nearly 6,000 percent, from $2 million in 2006 to $119 million in 2009 — an amount that is projected to double again this year Venezuela is now Nicaragua ’s second-biggest export market behind the United States Nicaragua has always relied heavily on Venezuelan oil imports, it has only recently started to reciprocate by exporting beans, beef and cattle. The alliance, known as ALBA, is a a leftist cooperation agreement between Venezuela , Cuba, Nicaragua , Ecuador, Bolivia and three small Caribbean nations. critics argue ALBA is little more than a clubhouse of impoverished nations dependent on Venezuelan oil and a political platform for Chavez’ arbitrary style of leadership.
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*Cuban economic collapse impact – find from Cuba Aff file
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Although Mr Maduro has ample experience as a trade union activist, legislator and diplomat, he may struggle to maintain the fierce loyalty that Chávez created among senior military officials, perhaps the most powerful faction in the disparate movement known as “chavismo”. “There are concerns in the military high command about Maduro,” says Antonio Rivero, a retired general who left the army in 2010 in protest at Cuban influence, and is now affiliated with the opposition. Some question Mr Maduro’s legitimacy, others his competence, while others are suspicious of his status as a civilian. “Chávez knew how to talk to the army, he knew how to demand obedience and discipline. Maduro hasn’t the slightest idea,” adds Gen Rivero, describing him as “the complete opposite to Chávez” in the army’s eyes. “It’s an issue that is being monitored, evaluated and discussed internally, both by chavistas and non-chavistas.” The army’s presence in government is strong. During the former tank commander’s 14-year rule, he spread martial ideals in an attempt to achieve a “civic-military union”. Today, former military officers run 11 of the 20 state governorships held by Venezuela’s United Socialist party, and account for a quarter of the cabinet. That includes the defence minister, Admiral Diego Molero Bellavia, who explicitly backed Chávez’s handpicked successor after his death on March 5. “Now more than ever, the armed forces must unite to ensure Maduro is the next elected president of all Venezuelans,” the admiral said. The opposition, already scandalised by a 115,000-strong militia set up by Chávez to defend his “Bolivarian revolution”, strongly rejected Admiral Molero’s statement, pointing out that the constitution forbids the armed forces to take sides. The opposition even claims there is a plan to use military resources to intimidate Venezuelans into voting for Mr Maduro. Mr Maduro has been backed by other key military figures too, including Diosdado Cabello, the head of the national assembly who participated alongside Chávez in the 1992 coup attempt, even though he is widely considered Mr Maduro’s most powerful rival. With his strong military following, some question how long that loyalty will last. Either way, the army’s support is crucial for any president. “Very lamentably, political power in Venezuela has always depended on two things: oil wealth and the armed forces,” said Rocío San Miguel, who runs Citizen Control, which monitors Venezuelan security issues. Ms San Miguel argues that the armed forces are split into opposing factions, some of which are concerned about the prospect of a Maduro presidency. Especially sensitive is how he will respond to accusations concerning a group of high-ranking officers dubbed the “Cartel of the Suns”, because of the gold stars worn on their epaulettes. Under Chávez, Venezuela became an important transshipment hub for trafficking cocaine to the US and Europe. Walid “The Turk” Makled, a drug lord captured in 2011, claims he had as many as 40 generals in his pay. Since 2008, the US Treasury Department has also accused a number of senior military and government officials of being “kingpins” and collaborating with the Colombian rebel group FARC, including the exchange of weapons for drugs. They include former defence minister and head of the army, Henry Rangel Silva, now governor of Trujillo state, and former interior minister and retired naval officer Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, now governor of Guárico state. The government has denied these accusations. Military officials have also been accused of involvement in other dubious activities, such as illegal gold mining after 43 soldiers were captured in southern Bolívar state by irate indigenous groups this year, and petrol smuggling, a business which could yield as much as a billion dollars each year. Whether Mr Maduro is seen as a threat or a help to the military’s interests remains to be seen. Gen Rivero thinks he may have to become “very generous” to keep some officers happy, through pay rises or handing out new cars. However, Venezuela may have trouble keeping up the immense spending on Russian arms that Chávez indulged in to keep the military happy. Most analysts reject the threat of a coup, but it is not inconceivable. “In the last century, five years haven’t gone by without groups of officers being involved in conspiratorial activities,” said Domingo Irwin, a Venezuelan military historian. Indeed, Hugo Chávez was one of them.
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Mander, 13 – the FT's Venezuela and Caribbean correspondent (Benedict, “Maduro needs military's loyalty”, The Financial Times Limited, 4/7, ABI/INFORM Complete)//CC
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There are concerns in the military high command about Maduro,” army’s presence in government is strong former military officers run 11 of the 20 state governorships held by Venezuela’s United Socialist party, and account for a quarter of the cabinet With his strong military following, some question how long that loyalty will last. political power in Venezuela has always depended on two things: oil wealth and the armed forces Under Chávez, Venezuela became an important transshipment hub for trafficking cocaine to the US and Europe. Since 2008, the US Treasury Department has also accused a number of senior military and government officials of being “kingpins” and collaborating with FARC Whether Mr Maduro is seen as a threat or a help to the military’s interests remains to be seen. a coup is not inconceivable In the last century, five years haven’t gone by without groups of officers being involved in conspiratorial activities
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Maduro on brink of losing military support and causing violent coup – this turns case
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With little hope of restoring Venezuela’s regional authority, Maduro will have to focus on safeguarding his tenuous leadership position at home. This means that forging a strong partnership with the military is essential.¶ The military embodies the most extreme institutional transformation that Chávez achieved in Venezuela. Under his leadership, what was once an apolitical and non-deliberative institution – as is standard in a democracy – became the engine of Chávez’s “twenty-first-century socialism.” Just as the Argentine working class formed Juan Perón’s electoral base 70 years ago, Venezuela’s armed forces served as Chávez’s most steadfast supporters, executing his authority throughout the country under the motto, “Country, socialism, or death.”¶ As Chávez’s health deteriorated, however, so did the motto’s significance. But the overwhelming military presence in government ministries and institutions, state-owned companies, provincial governments, and private businesses remains intact. The military has effectively achieved a coup d’état without any struggle.¶ Maduro seems to have the military’s support – at least for now. Whether or not the partnership lasts will depend on how Maduro tackles Venezuela’s many problems, including high inflation, a soaring crime rate, pervasive corruption, economic stagnation, low productivity, supply shortages, capital flight, insufficient investment, weak institutions, and a lack of respect for the rule of law.
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Lotitto, 13 – The founder and director of Producto Editorial Group in Caracas, Venezuela (Raúl, “Chávismo After Chávez”, Project Syndicate, 5/6, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-future-of-ch-vismo-in-venezuela-by-ra-l-lotitto)//CC
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forging a strong partnership with the military is essential overwhelming military presence in government ministries and institutions, state-owned companies, provincial governments, and private businesses remains intact. The military has effectively achieved a coup d’état without any struggle. Maduro seems to have the military’s support – at least for now. Whether or not the partnership lasts will depend on how Maduro tackles Venezuela’s many problems
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Maduro’s must maintain strong military support to prevent a coup
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But Mr. Maduro has never been a soldier. Experts say that could present a challenge if he takes up the mantle of Mr. Chávez, an ex-army tank commander who boosted the sway of the military in government.¶ "I think Maduro has an enormous problem, he doesn't understand the military world," said Rocío San Miguel, head of Citizen Control, a Venezuela nonprofit that tracks military issues. "Without Chávez, who is going to sit on top of this military hierarchy that has co-opted public administration?"¶ More¶ Nearly half of Venezuela's 23 states have a former military officer as governor, while a quarter of the executive cabinet is composed of members of the armed forces. The army also controls the ports, in a country where currency controls have created shortages and a thriving black market in everything from dollars to milk.
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Minaya, 13 – Writer for Wall Street Journal (Ezequiel, “Military Poses Risk for Next Venezuela Leader”, The Wall Street Journal, 4/11, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324695104578416943869466554.html) //CC
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Mr. Maduro has never been a soldier. Maduro has an enormous problem, he doesn't understand the military world Nearly half of Venezuela's 23 states have a former military officer as governor, while a quarter of the executive cabinet is composed of members of the armed forces. The army also controls the ports, in a country where currency controls have created shortages and a thriving black market in everything from dollars to milk
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Military has political strength and key to resources and trade in Venezuela
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In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook.¶ While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions.
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Christy ‘13 (Patrick, Senior Policy Analyst for Republican National Committee, Analyst for National Republican Congressional Committee, Clerk at International practice, Manfred Worner Fellow, Publius Fellow, BA from Vanderbilt, 6/13/13, “US Overtures To Maduro Hurt Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition”, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition)//JLev
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it remains unclear why Obama seeks, dialogue between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. . For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut if the U S is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could cover the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions.
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US engagement undermines democracy in Latin America -
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Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro told supporters on Tuesday (July 23) that better relations with Washington was only possible if the United States changed its tact towards Latin America.¶ ¶ [Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela]:¶ "Do you want to have good relations with the United States? This does not depend on just us, it depends on the U.S.. If they can rectify their policy and are able to, which I doubt, there will be another position, we will renew dialogue. The government of the United States should reconsider its imperialistic attitude on Latin America and the Caribbean and its aggression towards Venezuela. When they rectify this, here we will wait with our hands stretched and as usual a smile.”¶ ¶
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NTD TV 7/24 (“Venezuela’s Maduro Conditions U.S. Relations on End to ‘Imperialism’”, 7/24/13, http://www.ntd.tv/en/news/world/south-america/20130724/81817-venezuela39s-maduro-conditions-us-relations-on-end-to-imperialism.html)//AD
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Maduro told supporters better relations with Washington was possible if the U S changed its tact towards Latin A good relations with the U S does not depend on just us, it depends on the U.S. If they can rectify their policy we will renew dialogue with our hands stretched and as usual a smile
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Maduro open to improve relations with U.S.
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After months of tensions between the United States and Venezuela, Secretary of State John Kerry met on Wednesday with the Venezuelan foreign minister, ElÌas Jaua, in Antigua, Guatemala, and announced the start of talks aimed at improving relations between the two countries.
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NYT, 7/6/13 (WILLIAM NEUMAN and RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD, Journalists, “Kerry Meets With Official Of Venezuela To Set Talks,” 7/6/13, p.A9, L-N)//CT
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Kerry met with the Venezuelan foreign minister aimed at improving relations between the two countries
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US-Venezuelan relations increasing now – Kerry meeting proves
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ANTIGUA, Guatemala (AP) — The United States and Venezuela have agreed to begin a high-level dialogue with the aim of restoring ambassador-level relations and ending more than a decade of steadily deteriorating ties, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said Wednesday. On his first trip to Latin America since taking office and after meeting Venezuela's foreign minister in the first cabinet-level discussion between the two nations in at least several years, Kerry said he was hopeful that a rapprochement could be achieved. The meeting, which came at Venezuela's request, took place just hours after Venezuela released from prison an American filmmaker who had been jailed on espionage charges, removing an immediate irritant in the relationship. Kerry thanked Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua for the release of Timothy Tracy, calling it a "very positive development" and said he and his counterpart had spent about 40 minutes going over in detail areas in which the two countries could cooperate. "We agreed today — both of us, Venezuela and the United States — that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that," he told reporters after the meeting. It took place in Guatemala on the sidelines of the annual Organization of American States general assembly. "We agreed today there would an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high-level between the State Department and the foreign ministry and we will try to set out an agenda on which we agree on things we can work on together," Kerry said. He said the two countries aim to "begin to change the dialogue between our countries and hopefully quickly move to the appointment of ambassadors between our nations." That process, he said, could lead "ultimately to a series of steps that will indicate to the people of both countries as well as to the region that we're finding a way forward to a more constructive and understandable relationship." The two countries haven't had ambassadors posted in each other's capitals since 2010 near the height of the estrangement between the U.S. and late populist Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who died in March. The Obama administration has been eager to mend ties with Venezuela since the death of Chavez, who delighted in tweaking the United States and pursued policies that U.S. officials regarded as hostile. However, until Wednesday there had been little to show for the outreach. In fact, U.S.-Venezuelan relations had been especially tense in recent months. Nicolas Maduro, a Chavez protege who claimed victory in the presidential election, expelled two U.S. military attaches in March the same day Chavez died, accusing them of trying to foment instability, and Tracy's arrest came amid domestic political turmoil over the election to replace Chavez. In addition to being the first ministerial level meeting between the two nations since 2009, Wednesday's talks were the first significant contact between the two since the disputed April 14 election to replace Chavez. The opposition is still contesting the results. Washington is willing to work with Maduro's new government but has said opposition questions about the electoral process must be addressed. The Obama administration has backed opposition candidate Henrique Capriles' call for a full recount. But Kerry offered his thanks to Maduro, referring to him as president, after his meeting with the foreign minister. "I want to thank the foreign minister, I want to thank President Maduro for taking the step to meet here on the sidelines of this conference," Kerry said. "I think it was a very important step." U.S. officials have said despite the desire to move forward with a new chapter in ties with Venezuela, Washington would not stop expressing concerns about democracy and human rights in the country, particularly after the election.¶
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Lee ‘13 – Lawyer, author and has worked as an investigative journalist for the UN, the AP and many others (Matthew “Kerry says US, Venezuela on tracks to better ties,” The Associated Press, 6/5/13, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kerry-eyes-better-ties-venezuela) // CC
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The United States and Venezuela have agreed to begin a high-level dialogue with the aim of restoring ambassador-level relations and ending more than a decade of steadily deteriorating ties, Kerry said he was hopeful that a rapprochement could be achieved. "We agreed today — both of us, Venezuela and the United States — that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that," the two countries aim to "begin to change the dialogue between our countries and hopefully quickly move to the appointment of ambassadors between our nations." In fact, U.S.-Venezuelan relations had been especially tense in recent months. Nicolas Maduro, two U.S. military attaches in March Washington is willing to work with Maduro's new government Kerry offered his thanks to Maduro, referring to him as president, , I want to thank President Maduro for taking the step to meet here on the sidelines of this conference U.S. officials have said despite the desire to move forward with a new chapter in ties with Venezuela, Washington would not stop expressing concerns about democracy and human rights in the country
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US-Venezuela relations improving – normalizing relations now
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Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua said last Thursday that he hopes his country and the United States will be able to exchange ambassadors by the end of the year as diplomatic relations between the two countries are normalized.¶ Jaua, who is considered the third-most-powerful man in the Venezuelan government, told EL PAÍS in a brief interview that the late President Hugo Chávez had pushed for the normalization of relations with Washington before he died from cancer on March 5.¶ "We have agreed [with the United States] on a meeting point, and also that our relationship will be one of mutual respect so that we can appoint ambassadors later this year," the foreign minister said during a side interview at the Organization of American States (OAS) summit in Antigua, Guatemala.¶ Jaua met with US Secretary of State John Kerry for 40 minutes last week to discuss the next moves. Relations between Washington and Caracas soured in 2010 when Chávez accused the United States of spying and trying to destabilize his socialist government.¶ Kerry's meeting with Jaua is "the result of a process that began in November, [after being] authorized by Commander Chávez for the then-foreign minister and now-president, Nicolás Maduro," he said.¶ Washington has never officially recognized Maduro's election victory, something that has angered the Caracas government. President Obama has only said that he had hoped the Venezuelan authorities would agree to a recount as demanded by defeated opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. When asked whether official recognition would lead to improved bilateral relations, Jaua said that "it wasn't necessary."¶ "Venezuela has a legitimate and constitutional government headed by Nicolás Maduro," the foreign minister said. "We haven't broken relations."¶ Jaua said that issues concerning Venezuela's political situation were not brought up during the meeting with Kerry. "There is a stable situation in Venezuela. The government of Nicolás Maduro is working hard to overcome the challenges it faces in the economy, security and fixing the electoral system."¶ In another issue, Jaua said that in September, Venezuela will abandon its participation in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
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Herald Tribune 6/13 (Newspaper, 6/13/13, Proquest, “Venezuela, US may exchange ambassadors later this year,” http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1366724182)//JL
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Elías Jaua said he hopes his country and the United States will be able to exchange ambassadors by the end of the year as diplomatic relations between the two countries are normalized. Jaua , told EL PAÍS that Chávez had pushed for the normalization of relations with Washington before he died we can appoint ambassadors later this year When asked whether official recognition would lead to improved bilateral relations, Jaua said that "it wasn't necessary We haven't broken relations There is a stable situation in Venezuela Maduro is working hard to overcome the challenges
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Relations increasing – coming ambassador appointments prove
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Overall, though, Maduro garnered praise from respected leaders such as Uruguayan President Jos "Pepe" Mujica, who during Maduro's visit to Montevideo on Tuesday gushed about Venezuela's new role in the regional trade group, Mercosur, of which Uruguay is a founding member. Maduro in turn pledged "a permanent supply of petroleum" to Uruguay. In Caracas last Sunday, Maduro oversaw a gathering of the small Central American and Caribbean countries that make up the Petrocaribe alliance, in which Venezuela provides cut-rate oil. Maduro announced that two new members, Honduras and Guatemala, would be incorporated into Petrocaribe. Gargantuan Brazil, the world's seventh-largest economy, also sees big economic opportunities in a country deeply dependent on imported food and open to Brazil's biggest construction firms. Rousseff said that under Maduro, the two countries would increase their trade, which in 2012 totaled $6 billion. "I'm sure that with President Maduro, I will have the same high-level relationship that I had with President Chvez," Rousseff said.
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WA Post, ‘13 (Emilia Diaz-Struck and Juan Forero, Journalists, “New Venezuelan leader wins support in region,” 5/11, p.A6, L-N)//CT
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Maduro garnered praise from leaders Maduro pledged "a permanent supply of petroleum" to Uruguay Maduro oversaw a gathering of the Petrocaribe alliance, in which Venezuela provides cut-rate oil Brazil, sees big economic opportunities in a country deeply dependent on imported food and open to Brazil's biggest construction firms. under Maduro countries would increase their trade
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Venezuela will maintain regional power – oil and trade opportunities means control
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Venezuela's defense minister would never entertain the idea of supporting a military coup to unseat President Nicolas Maduro. Adm. Diego Molero also said that Venezuela's military takes advice from Cubans but that they do not influence its decisions. Molero's statements on Sunday during a television talk show appear to reflect official concern over the opposition's recent release of a recording allegedly showing an influential pro-government figure discussing coup rumors with a Cuban intelligence officer, a conversation that seemed to highlight Cuban influence in the oil-rich nation. In the lengthy conversation, the purported voice of influential TV talk show Mario Silva discusses a power struggle between Maduro and National Assembly president Diosdado Cabello, whom he accuses of conspiring against the president amid rumors of "saber rattling" in the military. The speaker on the recording suggests Cabello's allies are behind false rumors that Molero might back an attempt to oust Maduro, who is close to Cuba's leaders and is said by analysts to have less backing in the military. Silva alleged the recording was a fraud, but his show was pulled from state TV after the conversation's release. Maduro squandered a double-digit lead in less than two weeks, but defeated challenger Henrique Capriles by a razor-thin margin on April 14 in an election to replace the late President Hugo Chavez. On Sunday, former Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel asked Molero on his talk show if "democratic and institutional stability is guaranteed in Venezuela," if a coup attempt were possible. Molero turned his head, looked straight into the camera and responded: "It's impossible." "I am a loyal guarantor of the constitutional concept that Maduro remain in the government until the people decide otherwise," Molero said, adding for emphasis: "It's impossible that such an idea would go through my head." Capriles has repeatedly complained about what he calls Cuba's growing influence over Venezuela's government and military under Maduro, whose first postelection foreign trip was to Havana. Cabello has denied plotting against Maduro and called for unity among the political heirs of Chavez, who are struggling with widespread discontent over worsening food shortage, rampant power outages and decreasing oil production.
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Fox News Latino, 13 (“Venezuela's Defense Minister Would Never Support A Coup To Unseat Maduro,” Fox News Latino, 6/2, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/06/02/venezuela-defense-minister-would-never-support-coup-to-unseat-president-nicolas/)//CC
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Venezuela's defense minister would never entertain the idea of supporting a military coup to unseat President Nicolas Maduro. former Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel asked Molero if a coup attempt were possible Molero turned his head, looked straight into the camera and responded: "It's impossible." Cabello has denied plotting against Maduro and called for unity among the political heirs of Chavez
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Coup won’t happen – Maduro denies military action
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On the sidelines of talks held earlier this month in Guatemala by the Organisation of American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua, with Kerry's subsequent statements indicating that relations could be heading in a friendlier direction.¶ "We agreed today - both of us, Venezuela and the United States - that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that," Kerry said following the meeting with Jaua, which was reportedly requested by the Venezuelans.¶ The meeting happened on the heels of the release of Timothy Tracy, a U.S. filmmaker whom Venezuela had been holding on accusations of espionage. His release was interpreted by many as an "olive branch" being offered by the new Venezuelan government of Nicholas Maduro, whose presidency Washington still has not formally recognised.¶ Only months ago, before the death of Venezuela's long-time socialist leader Hugo Chavez, any normalisation of relations between Venezuela and the United States seemed highly unlikely.¶ In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power by a military coup d'etat that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had known was imminent. Chavez immediately accused the United States of having played a part in the event. After his suspicions were confirmed partly valid, his rhetoric grew more scathing.¶ In 2006, he famously told the United Nations General Assembly that then-U.S. President George W. Bush was "the devil himself".¶ Following Chavez's death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former vice-president, has not been as vitriolic in his posturing vis-a-vis the United States.¶ According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered "conflicting signals".¶ "Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one," Shifter told IPS.¶ The new president's waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes.¶ In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez's own former political base.¶ Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela's parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency.¶ Maduro's legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to "emulate" his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable.¶ Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation.¶ Oil economy¶ Over half of Venezuela's federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country's exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world.¶ Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela.¶ Venezuela's oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies.¶ While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company.¶ The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure.¶ In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites.¶ "The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela - production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating," explained Shifter. "They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out."¶ If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry's recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms.¶ "Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time," Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, "and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests."¶ Indeed, Negroponte said she was "optimistic" about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a "troika" of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.¶ Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as "a small step") was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.¶ "I don't think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas," he said. "It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going."
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Metzker ’13 (Jared, studies American Foreign Policy at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 6/17/13, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend US-Venezuela Relations”, Inter Press Service, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/)//JL
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Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one president's waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power Maduro's legitimacy stems from ideological fidelity to "emulate" his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the U S less probable ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuela's oil industry has been officially nationalised While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of PdVSA to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron to develop new extraction sites They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time Negroponte was "optimistic" about rapprochement within the next six months She notes a "troika" of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.
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DA non-unique and turn – oil investment starting already and further US FDI critical to prevent Venezuelan economic collapse – this card accounts for neg internal link analysis and concludes FDI still key
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Despite his declared commitment to toe his predecessor’s ideological line, the gravity of the economic problems affecting Venezuela may force Maduro to depart from some of Chavez’s policies, especially those governing foreign direct investment (FDI) in Venezuela. Maduro may elect to liberalize certain sectors of the Venezuelan economy and institute other economic reforms in a possible bid to cater to his more moderate opponents, undercutting segments of the opposition and bolstering his own credentials in the process. The potential loss of a Venezuelan benefactor will also present new opportunities in countries previously dependent on Caracas. Eager to adapt to an evolving geopolitical order, countries previously reliant on Venezuela will seek out new partners and, potentially, sources of FDI.
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Fair Observer, ’13 –a team of researchers, analysts, facilitators and problem-solvers that speak more than a dozen languages, and have lived, worked, or studied in nearly 50 countries. (Helios Global, “Change in Venezuela Yields Political and Economic Uncertainty”, Fair Observer, 6/4/13, http://www.fairobserver.com/article/change-venezuela-yields-political-and-economic-uncertainty)//MC
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economic problems affecting Venezuela may force Maduro to depart from some of Chavez’s policies, especially those governing FDI Maduro may elect to liberalize certain sectors of the Venezuelan economy to cater to his more moderate opponents, undercutting segments of the opposition and bolstering his own credentials loss of a Venezuelan benefactor will present new opportunities in countries dependent on Caracas. Eager to adapt to an evolving geopolitical order, countries will seek new partners and sources of FDI
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Liberalization will undercut Maduro’s opponents and increase his credibility - it will also force other regional partners to diversify
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NICOLAS MADURO, the former bus driver chosen by Hugo Ch·vez to lead Venezuela after his death, has been struggling to consolidate his position since being declared the victor in a questionable presidential election in April . With the economy stalling, inflation spiking and shortages spreading, the new president appears at a loss about how to respond, other than to blame domestic and foreign enemies. Nor has he been able to overcome a serious split in the Chavista movement between his own, Cuba-backed clique and another based in the military.
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WA Post, ’13 (Editorial Board, “An unexpected lifeline,” 6/12, p.A14, L-N)//CT
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MADURO has been struggling to consolidate his position With the economy stalling, inflation spiking and shortages spreading, the new president appears at a loss about how to overcome a serious split in the Chavista movement between his Cuba-backed clique and another based in the military
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Openness to US will consolidated Maduro’s power – Kerry proves
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Chávez's death is certainly changing the political calculus in Venezuela , but will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America and affect attitudes toward, and relationships with, the United States? ¶ The answer is likely "yes." ¶ First, the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela , Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua , and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela 's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela 's financial backing. When combined with reports of Chávez's expressed desire to strengthen ties with the Obama administration, regional hostility towards the United States may decline. ¶ Since assuming office in 1999, Chávez viewed Washington as an oppressive force manipulating Latin American politics while keeping the region underdeveloped through its dependence on U.S. resources. In response, Chávez approached like-minded leaders to build a coalition challenging the regional influence of the United States. ¶ By 2005, Bolivia, Nicaragua , Cuba, Honduras and Ecuador joined Chávez's coalition, which led to the formation of the Bolivian Alliance of the Americas, also known as Alba. Alba served as an alternative to the Free Trade Act of the Americas, with an explicit focus on poverty reduction, but it also facilitated the unification of these nations in their anti-American sentiments . ¶ With Chávez gone, however, there may be no one left who has the clout to keep financing this alliance. Venezuela is Alba's largest financier, contributing millions in aid to its members as well as oil at low prices. But Venezuelans may believe that with ongoing poverty and inequality, their country's needs are more important than those of Chávez's small club of nations.
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Gomez, ‘13 (Eduardo J, Special to CNN, “Ahmadinejad's hug and the future of Chavez's alliance”, 3-12-13, CNN Wire, Internal Bank News, Accessed 7-25-13) EC
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Chávez's death is changing the political calculus in Venezuela , but will it also result in a broader shift that could realign much of Latin America and affect attitudes toward the United States the grouping of nations previously opposing the United States under Chávez's leftist alliance -- namely the "Alba" alliance, comprised of Venezuela , Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua , and Bolivia -- could well wither away, due to Venezuela 's ongoing recession and fears that alliance members will no longer have Venezuela 's financial backing. When combined with reports of Chávez's expressed desire to strengthen ties with the Obama administration, regional hostility towards the United States may decline. By 2005, Bolivia, Nicaragua , Cuba, Honduras and Ecuador joined Chávez's coalition, which led to the formation of the Bolivian Alliance of the Americas, also known as Alba. it also facilitated the unification of these nations in their anti-American sentiments . ¶ With Chávez gone, however, there may be no one left who has the clout to keep financing this alliance.
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ALBA collapse will increase US influence in Latin America
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Over the past year, policymakers in Washington have woken up to a new threat to U.S. security. Since October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled a plot by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the nation’s capital, U.S. officials have begun to pay attention in earnest to Iran’s growing activities and influence in the Western Hemisphere.¶ f. The Islamic Republic, it turns out, has made serious inroads into Latin America since the mid-2000s, beginning with its vibrant strategic partnership with the regime of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Today, Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties not only to Venezuela, but to similarly sympathetic governments in Bolivia and Ecuador as well. It has begun to exploit the region’s strategic resource wealth to fuel its nuclear program. And it is building an operational presence in the region that poses a direct danger to U.S. security.¶ Exactly how significant this threat is represents the subject of a new study released in late November by the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. That report, entitled A Line In The Sand, documents the sinister synergies that have been created in recent years between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and radical regional regimes and actors—from Venezuela to Mexican drug cartels—on the other. Some of these contacts, the study notes, are financial in nature, as Iran seeks to leverage Latin America’s permissive political and fiscal environments to skirt sanctions and continue to engage in international commerce amid tightening Western sanctions. But these contacts could easily become operational as well. The report suggests that “the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation.”¶ The U.S. response, meanwhile, is still nascent. To date, only one piece of Congressional legislation—the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012—has seriously taken up the issue of Iran’s penetration of the Americas, and the potentially adverse implications for U.S. security. Fortunately, the Act has found a receptive ear among many in Congress, and is now likely to pass the Senate with only minor modifications during the current lame duck session of Congress. Yet, in and of itself, the Act does not constitute a comprehensive strategy for competing with Iran in the Americas—or for diluting its influence there.¶ To the contrary, America’s strategic profile in Latin America is now poised to constrict precipitously. As a result of looming defense cuts, and with the specter of additional, and ruinous, “sequester” provisions on the horizon, the Pentagon is now actively planning a more modest global profile. To that end, back in May, General Douglas Fraser, the outgoing head of U.S. Southern Command, the combatant command responsible for the Americas, told lawmakers that it plans to retract to Central America and focus predominantly on the threats posed by the region’s rampant drug and arms trades. In other words, the United States is getting out of the business of competing for strategic influence in Latin America, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran is getting serious about it.¶ That could end up being a costly mistake. As the findings of the Homeland Security Committee’s study indicate, Iran’s presence south of the U.S. border represents more than a mere annoyance. It is, rather, a potential front for Iranian action against the United States—one that could well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program heats up in earnest. Washington needs to be prepared should that happen.¶ Better yet, it needs to craft a proactive approach to confronting Iran influence and activity south of our border. That, after all, is the surest way for us to avoid having to face Iran and its proxies here at home.
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Berman ’12 - writes about foreign policy and national security issues (Ilan, Forbes, “Confronting Iran's Latin American Ambitions“ 12/04/2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latin-american-ambitions/) //RGP
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policymakers in Washington have woken up to a new threat to U.S. security , U.S. officials have begun to pay attention in earnest to Iran’s growing activities and influence in the Western Hemisphere . The Islamic Republic, it turns out, has made serious inroads into Latin America Today, Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties not only to Venezuela . It has begun to exploit the region’s strategic resource wealth to fuel its nuclear program. the sinister synergies that have been created in recent years between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and radical regional regimes and actors—from Venezuela Iran seeks to leverage Latin America’s permissive political and fiscal environments to skirt sanctions and continue to engage in international commerce amid tightening Western sanctions. Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. the United States is getting out of the business of competing for strategic influence in Latin America, and doing so at precisely the time that Iran is getting serious about it.¶ It is, rather, a potential front for Iranian action against the United States—one that could well be activated if and when the current cold war between Iran and the West over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program heats up in earnest.
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Iran will exploit Venezuelan weakness to gain support for its nuclear program -increasing US liberalization will push Iran out
| 4,065 | 126 | 1,287 | 650 | 19 | 208 | 0.029231 | 0.32 |
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If nothing is done to shore up U.S. and allied security relations with the Gulf Coordination Council states and with Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own. Similarly, if the U.S. fails to hold Pyongyang accountable for its violation of the NPT or lets Pyongyang hold on to one or more nuclear weapons while appearing to reward its violation with a new deal--one that heeds North Korea's demand for a nonaggression pact and continued construction of the two light water reactors--South Korea and Japan (and later, perhaps, Taiwan) will have powerful cause to question Washington's security commitment to them and their own pledges to stay non-nuclear. In such a world, Washington's worries would not be limited to gauging the military capabilities of a growing number of hostile, nuclear, or near-nuclear-armed nations. In addition, it would have to gauge the reliability of a growing number of nuclear or near-nuclear friends. Washington might still be able to assemble coalitions, but with more nations like France, with nuclear options of their own, it would be much, much more iffy. The amount of international intrigue such a world would generate would also easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could manage or track. Rather than worry about using force for fear of producing another Vietnam, Washington and its very closest allies are more likely to grow weary of working closely with others and view military options through the rosy lens of their relatively quick victories in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Just Cause. This would be a world disturbingly similar to that of 1914 but with one big difference: It would be spring-loaded to go nuclear.
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Sokolsky ‘4 - executive dir. of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, (Henry (Ed.), “Taking Proliferation Seriously,” Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, November 2004, p.351, Google Books)
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Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own The amount of international intrigue such a world would generate would easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could manage This would be a world disturbingly similar to 1914 but would be spring-loaded to go nuclear
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Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war.
| 1,832 | 41 | 382 | 299 | 5 | 64 | 0.016722 | 0.214047 |
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Even so, the departure of Chavez is bound to be a blow to Tehran. Without its most reliable broker, Iran now faces a region in profound political flux. During his 14 years in office, Chavez had served as the champion of anti-Americanism in Latin America. Now that mantle of leadership, coveted by power-hungry regional leaders like Ecuador's Correa, is up for grabs. So, too, is the prevailing attitude toward Tehran.? Coming weeks will see the emergence of a new regime in Venezuela—one that, by all accounts, will look strikingly similar to the one that preceded it. Indeed, late last year, an ailing Chavez anointed his anti-American vice president, Nicolas Maduro, as his heir apparent, thereby guaranteeing a preservation of his "Bolivarian" ideas. But Maduro now faces a snap election next month, and could see his power diminished by internal challengers as well as an increasingly capable Venezuelan opposition. In other words, for the first time in nearly 15 years, the current regime's hold on power isn't assured beyond the shadow of a doubt.? Neither is the relationship between Caracas and Tehran. While Maduro can be counted on to preserve Venezuela's revolutionary character, the closeness of its ties to the Iranian regime is suddenly an open question—one made all the more acute by the fact that Chavez's Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will also leave the political scene in just a few months, when his term in office ends this June.
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Berman ‘13 (Ilan, VP of the American Foreign Policy Council in WA, DC,March 12, 2013, "Hugo Chavez's Death Is a Blow to Iran," US News, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/12/after-chavez-a-challenge-for-iran)//SL
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Without its most reliable broker, Iran now faces a region in profound political flux. Chavez had served as the champion of anti-Americanism Coming weeks will see the emergence of a new regime in Venezuela Maduro could see his power diminished by internal challengers as well as an increasingly capable opposition for the first time current regime's hold on power isn't assured Neither is the relationship between Caracas and Tehran Venezuela's ties to Iran is suddenly open
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Venezuelan-Iran relations on brink now – political turnover.
| 1,462 | 60 | 474 | 239 | 8 | 76 | 0.033473 | 0.317992 |
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Small-time diaspora capital may prove easier to regulate and rely on than funds from multinational corporations driven strictly by profits. Under the repatriation provisions of the island's new migration law, some Cubans may even retire to the island with their pensions and savings after decades of working abroad. Yet opening the doors for more young citizens to leave could prove risky for a quickly aging, low-birthrate society that has been suffering from a brain drain for some time. Besides, along with remittance dollars, Cuba urgently needs both medium and large investors. Ultimately, only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base. Castro appears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector are the only ways to tackle this long-term predicament. The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution, however. Officials are wary of rocking the domestic political boat, and citizens and party leaders alike recoil from the prospect of more radical shock therapy. Rising public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption have only reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism. Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task. In late 2012, Havana legalized the creation of transportation cooperatives -- private, profit-sharing entities owned and manage by their members -- to fix bottlenecks in agricultural distribution. Meanwhile, 100 state enterprises are now running their finances completely autonomously as part of a yearlong pilot program. The government is also reportedly considering ways to offer a wider array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms for joint ventures. But the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions -- recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing the budget while incongruously insisting, in the words of its official 2011 guidelines, that "central planning, and not the market, will take precedence."¶ EASING OFF THE DADDY STATE¶ Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuity requires threading a delicate ideological needle. Although the government expects to continue providing Cubans with key social services, such as health care and education, party leaders have reprimanded the island's citizens for otherwise depending too heavily on what one prominent official a few years ago called the "daddy state." In the eyes of many Cubans, this is deeply ironic. Cuba's revolutionary founders, who built up a paternalistic state in the service of equality, are now calling for that state's partial dismantlement. What's more, most Cubans already need to resort to the black market or assistance from family abroad to acquire many daily necessities.
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Sweig and Rockefeller, 2013 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, and Michael Bustamante “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991)
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Under the island's new migration law Cubans retire to the island with pensions and savings Cuba needs both investors only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base Castro appears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector are the only ways to tackle this long-term predicament The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution, Officials are wary of rocking the domestic political boat and citizens and party leaders alike recoil from radical shock therapy ng public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism. Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task The government is considering ways to offer a array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuity requires threading a delicate ideological needle
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Castro is implementing gradual economic reforms now - but – he must walk a fine line and avoid rocking the political boat
| 2,913 | 122 | 1,209 | 430 | 22 | 172 | 0.051163 | 0.4 |
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As far as costs are concerned, although many Cubans favor detente and appreciate its economic benefits, they also remain worried about its political and ideological effects. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value. A wave of U.S. capital flooding a Cuban economy that has not completed its reform process could have some counterproductive effects. The U.S. government could try to steer the flow of capital to favor its political goals. Various groups— Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses—would have more avenues to influence the Cuban domestic context.¶ Given the fundamental asymmetry of power between the two sides, once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the United States were to reverse its policy and begin to "make concessions" in return for "equivalent Cuban responses," the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation. This won't be one more round but, rather, a whole new rule book. In other words, with any increased chance of an alternative form of relations, the risk profile of quid pro quo increases. For Cuba, to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a conservative line and play defensively only; or it could mean to invent a new proactive strategy for the game. Within such a new approach, the ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive. Classically, the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in alliances and in consensus. This issue is complex both for Cuba and for the United States. Besides allied powers, affinities within the international system, and sympathetic ideological currents, the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "rivals" or "opponents" but also that of" allies" within the "enemy's" own camp. The identities of such allies of the United States in the region, in Europe, and also on the Island are obvious. The allies of Cuba are also well known, paradoxically including novel ones such as many business executives and military officials who had classically been the "tips of the imperialist spear."¶ In a scenario of re-encounter between the United States and Cuba, both governments face the challenge of overcoming old dogmas, dealing with changes in the respective political consensus of each, trying to reshape those and restructure their alliances. The main weakness Cuba must overcome is not its lesser military or physical power but its siege mentality. That of the United States is not its ineptitude in dealing effectively with "communist regimes" but its sense of superpower omnipotence.
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Hernandez, 2012 (Cuba’s Leading Social Sciences professor and researcher at the University of Havana and the High Institute of International Relations; Director of U.S. studies at the Centro de Estudios sobre America; and a Senior Research Fellow at the Instituto cubano de Investigacion Cultural “Juan Marinello” in Havana. “Debating U.S-Cuban Relations”)
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although many Cubans favor economic benefits they remain worried about its political and ideological effects. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value A wave of U.S. capital flooding a Cuban economy that has not completed its reform process could have counterproductive effects. The U.S. could steer the capital to favor its political goals. Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses would have more avenues to influence the Cuban domestic context Given the fundamental asymmetry of power between once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the U S were to reverse its policy and begin to "make concessions the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation with any increased chance of an alternative form of relations For Cuba to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a conservative line to invent a new proactive strategy for the game Within such the ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in alliances and in consensus the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "rivals" or "opponents but also that of" allies" within the "enemy's" own camp. The allies had been the tips of the imperialist spear In a scenario of re-encounter both governments face the challenge of dealing with changes in the respective political consensus trying to reshape those and restructure their alliances
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The Plan causes a political whirlwind in Cuba that decimates Castro’s ability to reform
| 2,783 | 87 | 1,660 | 440 | 14 | 262 | 0.031818 | 0.595455 |
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In the historical period preceding the one analyzed here, two opposite visions took shape. To the governmental leaders and the majority of the Cuban people, the United States has been a permanent and powerful threat to national security. To the government leaders and elites and a good part of the population of the United States, Cuba has been a small country capable of endangering legitimate U.S. interests, through its alliance with extra-continental powers (case in point, the Soviet Union), its example and attraction (soft power) in the eyes of other Latin American countries, and the internationalist policies that led it to actively support liberation movements in Africa from Algeria to South Africa.¶ The Cold War's legacy is a security relationship that is complex and, in general, conflictual and potentially explosive. This agenda has continued into the succeeding period, which has been marked by the continuation of multi-tracked Washington policies designed to produce "regime change" in Cuba and to limit Cuba's role as an example for the region. It has been marked as well by a logical Cuban response of emphasizing stubborn but realistic resistance and a disposition to seek any possibility of normalization that respects Cuba's sovereignty and self-determination. This has opened up opportunities for limited cooperation in certain security spheres, which is one of the most interesting and enduring traits of the relationship after the end of the Cold War.¶ The potential for armed conflict springs from the existence of two borders between countries that have been mutually hostile for the past fifty years. The sea frontier runs throughout the Florida Straits with a separation of as little as 145 kilometers, a distance that jet aircraft can cover in a few minutes. The land border separates a Cuban defensive perimeter from U.S. troops stationed at the Guantanamo naval base, which is situated on land occupied by the United States for more than a century under the provisions of a treaty that Cuba, with merit, views as lacking legitimacy.¶ The most important fact is that the two nations are close enough to each other to share security issues such as borders, terrorism, migration, environment, natural disasters, and drug trafficking, but the hostile U.S. attitude toward an independent Cuba, when joined with the asymmetry in the countries' hard power resources, imposes significant obstacles for advance and requires Havana to act cautiously with respect to all of these issues. Nonetheless, in normal conditions there would be broad opportunities for cooperation.¶ In terms of traditional security threats, there are obvious signs that both parties prefer the present stable environment and see possibilities for more cooperation and confidence-building measures. These have been adopted on both the maritime and land borders, facilitating some forms of cooperation between the two countries' armed forces, including the Cuban border guards and the U.S. Coast Guard.¶ The border agreement signed during the Carter administration was strengthened by the migration accord of 1995, which has been respected and implemented by both governments. The United States has prevented Miami groups hostile to Cuba from mounting provocations in the border area, especially since the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes in 1996.¶ Nonetheless, a structural contradiction exists insofar as security is concerned. This contradiction is between, on the one hand, the confidence-building measures in the areas of potential armed conflict and the pragmatism shown by both sides in such sensitive areas as migration, and, on the other hand, the manifest US. hostility toward the social, economic, and political regime which has prevailed in Cuba over the last fifty years. Although it is possible to widen cooperation in areas such as the struggle against drug trafficking, the structural contradiction constitutes an obstacle to any greater forward motion, especially on issues such as the struggle against terrorism. The influence of some non-governmental actors such as Cuban-American conservative political figures is a clear demonstration that there are constraints to what can be done. The mutual accusations of terrorism, which carry a lot of weight in the Cuban case, are the "elephant in the room," especially because Washington applies the hard sanction of putting Cuba on the list of "states that sponsor terrorism," when there has not been any concrete and proven accusation of Cuban participation or stimulus to terrorist actors that have damaged the United States or any other country.¶
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Treto, 2012 (Carlos, Professor and Senior researcher at the University of Havana’s Centro de Estudios Hemisfericos y de Estados Unidos and a member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. He was a former Cuban ambassador the EU and to Belgium and Luxembourg and a former Cuban Minister to Ethiopia; visiting scholar at universities in the US, Mexico and Europe; visiting professor at Beloit College, the University of Basque Country, and the University of Winnipeg. Debating U.S. - Cuban Relations Chapter: “Cuba’s National Security vis-à-vis the United States”)
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To the governmental leaders and the majority of the Cuban people the U S has been a permanent and powerful threat to national security To the U S Cuba has been a country capable of endangering legitimate U.S. interests through its alliance and attraction in the eyes of other countries, and the internationalist policies The Cold War's legacy is a security relationship that is conflictual and explosive This agenda has continued into the succeeding period marked by multi-tracked Washington policies designed to produce regime change and to limit Cuba's role The potential for armed conflict springs from the existence of two borders between countries that have been mutually hostile for the past fifty years the two nations are close enough to each other to share security issues such as borders, terrorism, migration environment natural disasters, and drug trafficking but the hostile U.S. attitude when joined with the asymmetry in the countries' hard power resources imposes significant obstacles for advance and requires Havana to act cautiously a structural contradiction exists insofar as security This contradiction is the manifest US. hostility toward the social, economic, and political regime Although it is possible to widen cooperation the structural contradiction constitutes an obstacle to any greater forward motion, especially on issues such as terrorism The influence of non-governmental actors such as Cuban-American conservative political figures is a clear demonstration that there are constraints to what can be done. mutual accusations of terrorism are the "elephant in the room," especially because Washington applies the hard sanction of putting Cuba on the list of "states that sponsor terrorism,
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This turns the Aff, makes armed conflict inevitable, and triggers a laundry list of impacts
| 4,624 | 91 | 1,723 | 717 | 15 | 262 | 0.020921 | 0.365411 |
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Raul Castro's first presidential term was marked by economic reform and political liberalization. Over the last five years, the government created important institutional foundations for a mixed economy and a less vertical relationship between the state and civil society. Beginning in 2009, a commission to discuss and implement the reforms was created, and through its own initiative, the Council of State instituted an anti-corruption general agency, while restructuring various ministries, in particular, the Super Ministry for Basic Industry in charge of Energy and Mining, and the Sugar Industry. The institutional changes have been accompanied by fiscal, credit and migration reform, a law for cooperatives, as well as the legalization of various markets for consumer goods (real estate, used cars, fast food and restaurants) and services (transportation) directly impacting Cubans' daily lives.¶ The presidential succession from Fidel to Raul Castro has been complemented by an almost completely renovated Council of Ministers and an inter-generational transition in the military command at the level of regional armies and in the party and government at intermediate levels.¶ The Economy as Priority¶ The strategic nature of the economic transition is expressed in the changes in the composition of the labor force. In less than three years between 2010 and 2013, the number of individuals working in small businesses practically tripled, from around 160,000 to 390,000. The liberalization of the licensing process and the amplifying of the production scale on which these businesses operate are significant. Likewise, contracts between state and non-state sectors have been liberalized, opening the possibility for improved productive and administrative synergies between the two, as well as the creation of wholesale markets and credit mechanisms to support the emerging private sector.¶ By the end of 2012, the law of cooperatives was approved, indicating a move away from government control over significant areas of agricultural production, services, small industries and transportation. The legislation included mechanisms to create as well as dissolve such entities, offering a legal framework for their operation within market logic. The law allows for the creation of second degree or cluster cooperatives, a legal mechanism that facilitates amplification of production, the coordination of activities and the establishment of stable relationships between various cooperatives.¶ This shift away from state control is very far removed from an optimal process in economic terms. Instead of maximizing government revenue by selling or renting the assets (taxi cars, restaurants, cafeterias) to the highest bidder, the government has chosen a second best, less disruptive, option: offering the property in usufruct to the same workers who have so far been mismanaging it, with the hope that under the new conditions they will do better. It remains to be seen how emerging institutions will commit to competition and market selection of best practices and administrators, and whether hard budget constraints will be applied in order to allow those who are inefficient under the new conditions to fail.¶ The cooperatives law expressed a compromise between a desire to improve productivity and a political framework biased towards collectivist forms. Property rights in cooperatives are less defined than in small or medium private business. That situation makes an efficient system of contracts and rule of law more relevant than ever, an area in which Cuba is not exactly the epitome of virtue. The experience since the 1990s with the Units of Basic Cooperative Production (UBCP) illustrates that, in the absence of a market framework and the proper legal autonomy, the record for a cooperative is not substantially different than that for a State enterprise, unlike that of the private businesses.¶ The new flexibility of contracts between state-owned companies and the non-state sector favor the expansion of areas (such as transportation) in which private or cooperative ownership has expanded in the last three years. This expansion has already created competitive dynamics allowing good State managers to take advantage of the new conditions, and differentiate themselves from those lacking such adaptive capacities, especially at the local level. The government's discipline regarding the granting of subsidies and non-competitive contracts, controlling corruption, and promoting transparency may contribute to the creation of a labor market for administrators, in which those who are able to manage better receive better salaries.¶ Unfortunately Cuba lacks legal and administrative experience in the preparation and implementation of efficient contracts and this is more difficult to achieve in the short term than simply allowing the expansion of private property. As modern economic theory has shown, in contrast to that what neoliberal ideologues postulate, a better definition of property rights is associated with production increases at the level of small- and medium-sized business. However when corporate structure is more complex, the incomplete nature of contracts between a principal (shareholders, cooperative owners, the government) and its agent (managers) and an environment committed to competition become more fundamental factors.¶ Two notable failures of the reform so far are the lack of a substantial revival of agricultural production, including in the sugarcane industry, and the weak impulse toward export-oriented foreign investment. Even in East Asian countries, with far larger markets than that of Cuba, state promotion of foreign investment was oriented toward the promotion of exports, where competition performs with greater rigor. In the Cuban case, as University of Havana economist Juan Triana has pointed out, the very meager growth is affected by the perverse incentive that many of the foreign enterprises have, even in the midst of full reform, to increase their projections toward the captive national market. In this context, contracts with state enterprises and monopolistic chains of stores, foreign and local corporations extract the maximum rent from a basically unprotected Cuban consumer.
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Lopez, 2/25 (Arturo, LevyLecturer and Doctoral Candidate, University of Denver “Cuba Under Raul Castro: Economic Reform as Priority?” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-lopez-levy/cuba-under-raul-castro_b_2754397.html)
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Raul first presidential term was marked by economic reform and political liberalization the government created important institutional foundations for a mixed economy the Council of State instituted an anti-corruption general agency, while restructuring ministries institutional changes have been accompanied by fiscal, credit and migration reform, a law for cooperatives, as well as the legalization of various markets for consumer goods and services directly impacting Cubans' daily lives The strategic nature of the economic transition is expressed in the changes in the composition of the labor force. The liberalization of the licensing process and the amplifying of the production scale on which these businesses operate are significant contracts between state and non-state sectors have been liberalized, opening the possibility for improved productive and administrative synergies The government's discipline regarding the granting of subsidies and non-competitive contracts, controlling corruption, and promoting transparency may contribute to the creation of a labor market for administrators In the Cuban case, the growth is affected by the perverse incentive to increase their projections toward the captive national market contracts with state enterprises and monopolistic chains of stores, foreign and local corporations extract the maximum rent from a basically unprotected Cuban consumer.
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Gradual economic development now in the status squo --- status squo resolves anti-government corruption and causes economic reforms--- those are unique in this instance --- 1NC internal link evidence indicates that is what is going to cause political instability.
| 6,253 | 264 | 1,404 | 929 | 39 | 195 | 0.041981 | 0.209903 |
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Nevertheless, the move marks the beginning of the passing of the torch of power to a new generation.¶ For the first time in half a century, there is the real possibility that a person who did not fight in the Cuban Revolution will lead the country. Diaz-Canel was not even born when Fidel Castro overthrew Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. Since then, a Castro has been in power in Cuba: first the now-retired, 86-year-old Fidel, and from 2006 to now, his younger brother, Raul, 81.¶ This generational change does not mean that Cuba will move to a different political system. There is no going back to capitalism, Raul Castro told the National Assembly on Sunday. Nevertheless, the move toward a generational change must be seen in the context of other reforms implemented by the younger Castro.¶ These reforms already are changing the face of Cuban socialism. Castro has introduced private farms, cooperatives in industries and activities outside agriculture, and an array of small business. Granted, these are restricted and heavily regulated, but still they are earning profits and starting to create a segment of wealthier, successful entrepreneurs. Cubans are also now allowed to sell houses and cars, and more recently, to travel abroad if they can get a visa from another country.¶ While little is known of Diaz-Canel’s ideology, it is likely that as the appointed Castro successor he is on board with the reforms.¶ The U.S. State Department reacted tepidly to Castro’s announcement and made clear that it would not be sufficient to prompt a lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. Although President Barack Obama doesn’t have election constraints in formulating a Cuba policy in his second term, the issue remains emotionally and politically charged in the U.S., and Congress is not likely to change its mind and lift the embargo while a Castro remains in power.¶ That doesn’t mean relations can’t change, however.¶ For instance, the Obama administration could remove Cuba from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. Cuba had been on that list since 1982, when it had the financial support of the Soviet Union and could afford to help guerrilla groups in Central and South America.¶ Cuba doesn’t have the resources to help armed groups - or even the political will to do so. Cuba is not Syria, North Korea or Iran in terms of being a threat to the U.S.¶ However, the lifting of the embargo is likely only after a period of more normal relations between the countries. There is also a legal obstacle: According to the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the U.S. will recognize the legitimacy of a Cuban government only when someone other than a Castro is in power. For now, at least, it seems that won’t happen until 2018.¶ Demotions The generational change in Cuba is real. Not only does Diaz-Canel take the place of the 83-year-old Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, but the composition of others organs of power is younger as well. Eighty percent of the members of the National Assembly were born after the revolution, and the average age of members of the Council of State is 57, with about 60 percent having been born post-revolution.¶ As is the tradition in Cuba, Diaz-Canel owes his influential position to one of the Castros -- in this case, Raul. As far back as 2003, the younger Castro talked about the “solid ideological firmness” of the electrical engineer, who also has served as a university professor and party boss in the Cuban provinces of Villa Clara and Holguin. Notably, Diaz-Canel served in the armed forces under Raul Castro and earned a reputation as a good manager of the military’s diverse commercial enterprises.¶ Diaz-Canel will have to be careful. There have been several young leaders who once looked like they had been chosen as a Castro successor but later fell from grace. In every case -- Roberto Robaina, Carlos Lague, Felipe Perez Roque -- they went from being the heir apparent to being suddenly demoted without much ceremony or explanation. The difference is that all were put in their positions of power by Fidel Castro and were demoted when they fell out of favor with him. Diaz-Canel is said to be Raul Castro’s favorite.¶ Assuming that nothing extraordinary happens before 2018, that Raul remains healthy and that there are no ideological purges – “corruption” is the favorite accusation of the Cuban leadership when it comes to making demotions -- the big question for Cuba, and for Diaz-Canel himself, is the success of Raul’s reforms.¶ If they work well, perhaps the regime will develop a sort of hybrid socialism-communism with a dynamic, state-controlled capitalist economy. Or maybe day by day the reforms will penetrate Cuban society and ultimately destroy one the few communist systems left in the world. Diaz-Canel, meanwhile, will start toying with the torch of power.
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Telmundo, 2013 (Carlos Rajo, World/ABC News Partner “Analysis: Castro Brothers’ Successor May inherit a Very Different Cuba” http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/02/17133513-analysis-castro-brothers-successor-may-inherit-a-very-different-cuba?lite)
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This generational change does not mean that Cuba will move to a different political system Nevertheless, the move toward a generational change must be seen in the context of other reforms implemented by the younger Castro. These reforms already are changing the face of Cuban socialism Castro has introduced private farms cooperatives in industries and activities outside agriculture, and small business these are earning profits and starting to create a segment of wealthier, successful entrepreneurs Cubans are allowed to sell houses and cars, and to travel abroad Diaz-Canel’s on board with the reforms Although Obama doesn’t have election constraints in formulating a Cuba polic the issue remains politically charged in the U.S., and Congress is not likely to change its mind That doesn’t mean relations can’t change The generational change in Cuba is real. Diaz-Canel owes his influential position to Raul Diaz-Canel will have to be careful There have been several young leaders who looked like they had been chosen as a Castro successor but later fell from grace -Canel is said to be Raul Castro’s favorite.¶ Assuming that nothing extraordinary happens the success of Raul’s reforms work the regime will develop a sort of hybrid socialism-communism with a dynamic, state-controlled capitalist economy
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Reforms coming now in the status squo and will be successful - but only if there isn’t a radical shift from the status squo will a stable regime develop
| 4,810 | 152 | 1,306 | 805 | 29 | 203 | 0.036025 | 0.252174 |
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1,427 |
The Central Report to the PCC Congress reflects a set of proposals generally associated with unorthodox propositions by government supporters. Positions in favor of term limits, decentralization, revaluation of the market as a development tool, separation of party and state functions, increasing the representation of women, blacks, mestizos and youth in government leadership and in favor of checks and balances between the branches of government and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) have been present in Cuba's internal debates since the 80's.¶ In practice, the transition to a mixed economy model with a decentralized state and a major non-state sector, considered in the past as antithetical to the official communist ideology, has already begun. President Raul Castro has taken (some would say stolen) agendas promoted in the past by reformist groups or even opponents and has set out to implement them under the leadership of the PCC. It will be a challenge for a bureaucracy, steeped in hostility toward these very concepts, to do so.¶ Market oriented reforms and a reduction of the State's distributive role had already been decided. The questions put to the PCC concerned the speed, methods, sequence, scope and progression of the reforms. The report lacks clear answers. It insinuates a gradual approach by ruling out IMF-style shock therapy and sudden removal of the ration card. But there is still no overall vision or alternative economic model put forward and no discussion of the political risks that the PCC will face in implementing changes.
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Lopez-Levy, 2011 (Arturo, PhD Candidate @ Josef Korbel School of International Studies; Research Associate of the Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East; ches Latin American Politics, and Comparative Politics at the University of Denver and the Colorado School of Mines; Lopez-Levy received the Leonard Marks Essay Award of the American Academy of Diplomacy; fellow of the Inter American Dialogue, the Carter Center, International Foundation for Electoral Systems-IFES, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. “Economic Reform Living with Ambiguity” http://thehavananote.com/tags/economic_reform?page=1)
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The Central Report reflects a set of proposals associated with government supporters have been present in the transition to a mixed economy model with a decentralized state and a major non-state sector, has already begun Raul has taken agendas promoted by reformist groups and has set out to implement them . It will be a challenge for a bureaucracy, steeped in hostility Market oriented reforms and a reduction of the State's role had already been decided The questions concern speed scope and progression of the reforms The report insinuates a gradual approach
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The question is not whether reforms are coming or not but rather the speed at which they are implemented.
| 1,560 | 106 | 562 | 248 | 19 | 92 | 0.076613 | 0.370968 |
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1,428 |
Raúl’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies of economic centralization and opposition to the U.S. He cannot now reject Fidel’s legacy and move closer to the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms.¶ Raúl is also unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S. At a time when the U.S. is seeking regime change in the Middle East, Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the U.S. and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶
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Suchlicki, 2012 (Jaime, professor and director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “Ignore Raúl Castro’s siren song” http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/01/3025115/ignore-raul-castros-siren-song.html)
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Raúl’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies He cannot reject Fidel legacy and move closer to the U.S A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change The Cuban population could see this as an opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms Raúl is also unwilling to renounce the support of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S At a time when the U.S. is seeking regime change in the Middle East, Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the U.S.
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The plan overwhelms Cuban internal stability --- multiple links ---
| 926 | 67 | 725 | 153 | 10 | 122 | 0.065359 | 0.797386 |
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1,429 |
When the U.S.S.R. collapsed and its former allies underwent rapid economic reforms, Cuba took note of the consequences in Russia and Eastern ¶ Europe—rapid price increases and hyper-inflation, high interest rates, and ¶ wide-scale privatization contributing to corruption, allocation of state assets ¶ to crony capitalists and inadequate institutional transparency. By contrast to ¶ the dismaying economic transition of the Soviet countries, Cuban citizens and ¶ policymakers also observed many successes of gradual, experimental approaches ¶ to economic reforms in Communist Vietnam and China.¶ Cubans are now nervous that, as has occurred in other transitioning ¶ societies, suddenly empowered or re-empowered economic groups will seek ¶ to increase their influence in political and economic decision-making. “The ¶ government needs to be careful so this thing doesn’t spin out of control,” ¶ worried one academic who spoke with CDA about the lessons of the Soviet ¶ Union and Eastern Europe. “We need to avoid the same mistakes.”¶ Despite public debates and consultations, they reasonably fear key ¶ decisions are being concentrated in a limited number of hands and will be ¶ implemented too quickly.
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Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
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When the U.S.S.R. collapsed and underwent rapid economic reforms Cuba took note of the consequences Europe—rapid price increases and hyper-inflation, high interest rates, and privatization contributing to corruption to crony capitalists and inadequate institutional transparenc Cuban citizens and policymakers observed successes of gradual, approaches to economic reforms Cubans are nervous that suddenly empowered or re-empowered economic groups will seek to increase their influence in political and economic decision-making. “The government needs to be careful so this thing doesn’t spin out of control they fear decisions will be implemented too quickly.
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c) Fear and speculation --- Cubans base their economic reforms off of the consequences of the U.S.S.R. --- fear of economic collapse will cause actions to spin out of control
| 1,203 | 174 | 658 | 183 | 30 | 90 | 0.163934 | 0.491803 |
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Relations with the United States are at a historical nadir, but improving them is not a priority, Alarcón said. In fact, Cuba would be challenged to come up with a good strategy if the next U.S. administration were inclined to improve relations. Raúl should carefully weigh whether and to what degree Cuba should seek better relations with the Americans or respond to a new administration’s decision to permit increased travel to Cuba. Although Cuba ultimately stands to gain access to the U.S. market from a normal bilateral relationship, the potential costs in terms of open flows of communication and people could weaken the government’s control over its population. Weaker U.S. sanctions and a more cordial relationship would also make it harder to scapegoat the United States and would shift the onus for economic and political reform to the Cuban leadership. More critical to Cuba than improved relations with the United States is for it to strengthen its relations with the major developing nations, especially Russia, Mexico, and Brazil Speaking for all those present, Machado Ventura thanked Raúl for his confidence in them and assured him of their absolute loyalty. Raúl could be confident because it was highly unlikely that domestic or international conditions would threaten his hold on power, but in any case¶ he should seek to establish his credibility as a leader on his own terms. One way to do so would be to reinforce the fusion of leadership at the highest levels of the Council of State, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Cuban Communist Party. As for the international community, Cuba could count on Venezuelan oil subsidies in the short term, and in the longer term would have access to substantial new energy reserves from offshore oil and gas and the production of sugarcane ethanol. Raúl should concentrate his international efforts on promoting and diversifying Cuba’s economic relationships. Raúl’s greatest challenge will be the rise in expectations for further reforms among the Cuban population, which could be worsened if the new U.S. administration decides to loosen restrictions on travel and remittances. More contact with relatives and friends will result in demands for better jobs and increased freedoms. Remittances are already creating disparities among Cubans with and without access to hard currency.. Since Cuba cannot move quickly or undertake broad reforms, it should attempt to limit expectations Raúl has been skillful in allowing some social reforms; additional reforms, however, should be undertaken cautiously and with the full support of the Party and the armed forces.
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Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa)
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Relations with the U S are at a historical nadir but improving them is not a priority, Raúl should weigh whether and to what degree Cuba should seek better relations Although Cuba ultimately stands to gain access the potential costs in terms of open flows of communication and people could weaken the government’s control over its population. Weaker U.S. sanctions and a more cordial relationship would also make it harder to scapegoat the United States and would shift the onus for economic and political reform to the Cuban leadership. Raúl should seek to establish his credibility Raúl’s greatest challenge will be the rise in expectations for further reforms among the Cuban population which could be worsened if the U.S. decides to loosen restrictions More contact with relatives and friends will result in demands for better jobs and increased freedoms. Remittances are already creating disparities among Cubans with and without access to hard currency Since Cuba cannot move quickly or undertake broad reforms, it should attempt to limit expectations additional reforms should be undertaken cautiously and with the full support of the Party and the armed forces.
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d) Communication and people --- Plan allows for larger access to media and revolutionist ideals --- loosens Raul’s control.
| 2,626 | 124 | 1,169 | 417 | 19 | 186 | 0.045564 | 0.446043 |
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1,431 |
Ultimately, it is up to the American and Cuban governments to commit themselves to what inevitably will be a slow, incremental, sometimes regressive process of overcoming the well of mistrust accumulated over more than five decades—indeed from Havana's perspective, over more than a century—so that in the end, the two countries can establish normal relations for the first time ever. Conditioning the process to impossible demands—the United States that Cuba move toward a democratic transition, Havana that Washington lift the embargo wholesale—only extends the stalemated status quo. Even though the Obama administration has taken baby steps in that direction, both capitals sorely need to make a concerted effort at realpolitik.
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Perez-Stable, 2011 (Marifeli, Professor of Sociology at Florida Internatonal University and non-resident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and Cuba “Policy in Place for 50 Years Hasn’t Worked”)
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it is up to the American and Cuban governments to commit themselves to a slow, incremental regressive process of overcoming the well of mistrust accumulated over more than five decades over more than a century the two countries can establish normal relations for the first time ever Conditioning the process to impossible demands the U S that Cuba move toward a democratic transition Havana that Washington lift the embargo wholesale only extends the stalemated status quo Even though Obama has taken baby steps in that direction, both capitals need to make a concerted effort at realpolitik.
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Plan fails to resolve relations - it’s a status quo stalement
| 732 | 61 | 592 | 110 | 11 | 96 | 0.1 | 0.872727 |
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Cuba's stability—something that ought to be of interest to a neighbor as powerful as the United States—has been preserved thanks to the policies that have been carried out. But the Island's authorities have recognized that the revolution could possibly be destroyed from within. This introduces an important element into Cuban national security policy and opens up some questions for Washington. The Cuban government is in the midst of a process of updating its economic model, which will inevitably have political consequences. Like it or not, all of this will affect Cuba's capacity to maintain its social stability and cohesion, which is to say, it will affect the country's national security policy. This will also be important for the United States, which cannot block the process but can make it either harder or easier.
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Treto, 2012 (Carlos, Professor and Senior researcher at the University of Havana’s Centro de Estudios Hemisfericos y de Estados Unidos and a member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. Former Cuban ambassador the EU and to Belgium and Luxembourg and a former Cuban Minister to Ethiopia. Visiting scholar at universities in the US, Mexico and Europe; visiting professor at Beloit College, the University of Basque Country, and the University of Winnipeg. Debating U.S.- Cuban Relations Chp: “Cuba’s National Security vis-à-vis the United States”)
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Cuba's stability has been preserved thanks to the policies carried out But the revolution could be destroyed from within. This introduces an important element into Cuban national security policy and opens up questions for Washington. The Cuban government is in the midst of updating its economic model, which will inevitably have political consequences all of this will affect Cuba's capacity to maintain its social stability and cohesion it will affect the country's national security policy This will be important for the U S which cannot block the process but can make it either harder or easier.
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Internal disruptions lead to internal Cuban stability
| 826 | 53 | 599 | 133 | 7 | 96 | 0.052632 | 0.721805 |
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Whatever the role or structure of the Party, all the advisers agreed that the military would remain the backbone of the Cuban State. Despite limited resources and some evidence of corruption, the Cuban military is a disciplined, professional, hierarchically organized, and comparatively well-run institution. General Casas Regueiro observed that there was no potential for disloyalty within military ranks, although it was noted that some lower-ranking officers remained disenchanted by their low salaries and the lingering disillusionment generated by the June 12, 1989, execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a hero of the Revolution and of Cuba’s military victories in Angola. Raúl pointed out that the Cuban military has a proven track record of adapting, rationalizing, and carrying out the government’s programs. The military not only ensured the success of the Revolution but has proved to be the critical factor in the survival of the Revolution at every crisis. Its ability to turn itself into an effective agent for building and managing a tourism infrastructure allowed Cuba to adapt to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the ensuing loss of five billion dollars’ worth of annual subsidies. On the political side, the nationwide military mobilization of over 200,000 active and reserve troops at the time of Fidel’s illness ensured the smooth transition of power to Raúl Castro.
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Brookings Institute, 2010 (US Insitute for think tanks Learning the salsa: New steps in US-Cuba relations)
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Whatever the role or structure of the Party, the military would remain the backbone of the Cuban State. the Cuban military is a disciplined, professional, hierarchically organized, and comparatively well-run institution Raúl pointed out that the Cuban military has a proven track record of adapting, rationalizing, and carrying out the government’s programs. he military not only ensured the success of the Revolution but has proved to be the critical factor in the survival of the Revolution at every crisis. ability to turn itself into an effective agent for building and managing a tourism infrastructure allowed Cuba to adapt to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the ensuing loss of five billion dollars’ worth of annual subsidies On the political side, the nationwide military mobilization of over 200,000 active and reserve troops at the time of Fidel’s illness ensured the smooth transition of power to Raúl Castro.
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The military will step in --- they are the backbone of any political reform --- makes militaristic conflict inevitable.
| 1,398 | 120 | 927 | 217 | 19 | 147 | 0.087558 | 0.677419 |
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Striking the right balance between realism and principle on Cuba would not come easily.¶ Meanwhile Raul Castro was caught in a bind, trapped between his own modest reformism and his brother's behind-the-scenes vigilance and frequent, widely diffused columns. In late December 2009, Raul acknowledged the "expectations and honest concerns" regarding the limited, slow-moving changes he was attempting to put in place: "In updating Cuba's economic model, we cannot run the risk of improvisation and haste. We must walk toward the future in firm and certain steps because we simply do not have the right to make mistakes."2 So spoke a cautious leader well aware of what was better left unsaid: that over five decades too many mistakes had been made and that this time everything was on the line. While ordinary Cubans bore the brunt of the country's economic stagnation, Raul's timidity on reforms also had repercussions for the island's standing in the world. He rightly boasted that forty-one heads of state or government and seventy-eight foreign ministers had visited Cuba in 2009. Their presence confirmed the "support and solidarity that our just cause commands," he claimed. Most dignitaries, however, visited Cuba in the routine course of diplomacy, not necessarily to embrace Havana's "just cause," though all expressed opposition to the U.S. embargo. Still, without some movement on human rights and more purposeful reforms, Havana was not likely to receive the kind of support it really needed—for instance, an economic cooperation agreement with the European Union—or to help build momentum .in the United States for ending the embargo. Cuba had managed without either in the past and might do so again. All the same, dire economic conditions could yet prompt Cuban leaders to embrace a meaningful opening to the market or ordinary Cubans to take their frustrations to the streets, a particularly dreaded scenario for the leadership. Much to Havana's chagrin, Cuban domestic affairs mattered, sometimes decisively, for its foreign relations.
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Perez-Stable, 2011 (Marifeli, Professor of Sociology at Florida Internatonal University and non-resident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and Cuba “Policy in Place for 50 Years Hasn’t Worked”)
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Striking the right balance between realism and principle on Cuba would not come easily Raul was caught in a bind, trapped between modest reformism and his brother's vigilance Raul acknowledged expectations and honest concerns regarding the limited, slow-moving changes In updating Cuba's economic model, we cannot run the risk of improvisation and haste we not have the right to make mistakes over five decades too many mistakes had been made and everything was on the line Raul's reforms had repercussions for the island's standing in the world. economic cooperation with the U S Cuba had managed and might do so again. dire economic conditions could prompt Cuban leaders to embrace a meaningful opening or ordinary Cubans to take their frustrations to the streets, a dreaded scenario for the leadership Cuban domestic affairs mattered, decisively, for its foreign relations
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Disad turns case before case can turn the disad --- Status squo reforms resolve structural barriers to US-Cuban cooperation -- plan overwhelms those changes and empowers pro-US groups within Cuba --- that decimates all chances of successful relations --- status squo politics is encroached with Cold war hostilities --- that imposes a significant structural contradiction preventing greater forward motion on cooperation --- Cuban politics are always going to backlash and adopt a hardline approach against reciprocal actions preventing successful relations --- That’s Treto
| 2,055 | 574 | 879 | 321 | 83 | 138 | 0.258567 | 0.429907 |
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The United States, however, seemed unwilling or unable to abandon the strict condition that any improvement in relations depended on Havana making progress on human rights and democracy. After the early 1960s, Washington slowly accepted the Cuban government as a fixture of the Cold War. With detente in the 1970s, the Ford and Carter administrations both concluded that normalizing relations and ending the "perpetual antagonism" was the best way to advance American national interests. Flawless as that argument was, Cuban actions in Africa, a renewed Cold War after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election of Ronald Reagan eventually derailed that process. Nonetheless, in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration twice dispatched high-ranking officials to meet with Cuban officials over Havana's support of Central American revolutionary movements.140 Subsequently, it negotiated an immigration accord. At the end of Reagan's presidency, Cuban and American diplomats crafted an agreement that ended the wars in southern Africa. For Havana's foreign policy, it was a stellar moment that brought Cuba well-deserved satisfaction: for once the United States dealt with Cuba on an equal footing.¶ But then Berliners tore down the wall, Eastern European Communism ceased to be and the Soviet Union disintegrated. How could Cuba survive without Soviet subsidies? The Cuban Democracy and Helms-Burton acts tightened the embargo on the assumption that Havana would crumble as well. Two decades later, another Castro presides over Cuba, and the Cuban government's ability to survive without the Soviet Union had defied expectations of a quick democratic transition in Cuba. In addition, the strict conditionality inherent in these two acts carried perverse consequences for both countries. The United States, in effect, turned over control of American policy to Cuba: If Havana did not change, neither would Washington. And Havana, for all its bravado on national sovereignty, held off making domestic changes that would benefit the Cuban people until the United States lifted the embargo. Secretary Clinton was right when she said:¶ It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years.141¶ No stronger argument was needed to move U.S. policy away from the conditionality of the past twenty years.142 If the embargo served the regime with a¶ Scapegoat for its failures, would it not be wise for the Obama administration to¶ challenge Cuba through dialogue and openness?¶ Any attempt to engage the Cuban government is fraught with frustrations. ¶ On June 1, the Catholic Church announced that six prisoners of conscience ¶ were being transferred to prisons closer to their homes. Though three were ¶ among the twenty-six in frail health, none had yet been taken to civilian hospitals, let alone freed.143 Still, church authorities remained optimistic that progress¶ would be made, if at official Cuba's glacial tempo. Then, amid the hopes that ¶ i dents who had been planning to attend a meeting called by two leading opposition organizations.144 Even if these women and men were only briefly held, the roundup underscored how difficult any dialogue with Havana could be. But the course of non-engagement had proven no more efficient. Tightening the embargo in the 1990s yielded no benefits, nor did the Bush administration's¶ recent events had fanned, on June 3-4, state security arrested thirty-eight dissi- confrontational stance move Havana any closer to respecting human rights or launching a democratic transition.145 Since the Cold War ended but especially during the Bush years, the United States has dwelled "in the satisfying purity of indignation" at the Cuban regime's behavior without duly considering how its policy may have contributed to "a crippling status quo" in relations with Cuba.146¶ And so The United States and Cuba: Intimate Enemies ends where it began: Normal relations between the two countries—which will require that the United States take into account Cuban sensibilities and that Cuba turn geographic proximity into an asset—are nowhere in the offing. With Obama, the United States has taken small steps in the right direction. Havana might be willing to do the same on matters of immigration or combating the drug trade, common interests that could help build mutual trust.147 Cuban leaders, however, should come to terms with the reality that Cuban domestic politics matter in their relations with the United States. Washington, Cuban Miami, the European Union, most of Latin America and, indeed, the Cuban people would happily welcome a democratic Cuba; Havana, however, might not need to call free elections immediately to improve its relations with the democratic world. The dialogue started between Raul Castro and Cuba's Catholic bishops could serve as a model for state authorities in crafting an acceptable approach to human rights. Or Cuba could follow the model of China and Vietnam, where the ruling Communist parties have fully embraced economic reforms and have sometimes found ways to address Western concerns on human rights. Cuba's elderly leaders may hesitate to improve living standards out of ideological concerns or, more likely, for fear of losing control. However, many others—perhaps most—in middle-level positions in the party and the ministries are aware that current policies are leading nowhere and that the economic rights of ordinary Cubans must be restored for the economy to recover. Staying the course against the clamor from within official ranks and from the Cuban people might¶ well bring dire consequences for the leadership. A peaceful transformation— whether to market reforms under the Communist Party or democracy and'a market economy—is a matter of mutual interest for the United States and Cuba. For five decades, both the United States and Cuba have failed: Washington in overturning the Cuban revolution and Havana in improving the material well-being of the Cuban people. Doing things differently might finally put the great power and its weaker neighbor on the right path towards achieving normal relations for the first time ever.
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Perez-Stable, 2011 (Marifeli, Professor of Sociology at Florida Internatonal University and non-resident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and Cuba “Policy in Place for 50 Years Hasn’t Worked”)
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The Cuban Democracy and Helms-Burton acts tightened Two decades later another Castro presides over Cuba, and the Cuban government's ability to survive without the Soviet Union defied expectations the strict conditionality inherent in these two acts carried perverse consequences for The U S in effect turned over control of American policy to Cuba If Havana did not change, neither would Washington And Havana held off making domestic changes that would benefit the Cuban people Any attempt to engage the Cuban government is fraught with frustrations On June 1, the Catholic Church announced that six prisoners of conscience were being transferred to prisons closer to their homes. church authorities remained optimistic that progress would be made the roundup underscored how difficult any dialogue with Havana could be Since the Cold War ended the U S has dwelled "in the satisfying purity of indignation With Obama, the U S has taken small steps in the right direction Havana might be willing to do the same on immigration leaders however should come to terms with the reality that Cuban domestic politics matter in their relations with the United States. indeed, the Cuban people would happily welcome a democratic Cuba Havana might not need to call free elections immediately The dialogue started between Raul and Cuba's bishops serve as a model for state authorities in crafting an acceptable approach to human rights. Cuba's leaders hesitate to improve living standards out of ideological concerns , , for fear of losing control However many others are aware that current policies are leading nowhere and that the economic rights must be restored . A peaceful transformation is a matter of mutual interest Doing things differently might put the great power and its weaker neighbor on the path towards achieving normal relations
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And there is no risk of Cuban collapse in the status squo --- Cuba will preserve --- only international dialogue puts pressure on shifting political leaders’ control over normalizing relations.
| 6,320 | 194 | 1,837 | 988 | 30 | 294 | 0.030364 | 0.297571 |
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Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.
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Bryan 1 (Anthony T. Bryan, director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, 10-21-2001. CFR, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, p. http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism_porous_borders_and%20_homeland_%20security.html)
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Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.
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Caribbean terrorism leads to attack on the US---they’ll use bioweapons
| 1,661 | 70 | 632 | 252 | 10 | 95 | 0.039683 | 0.376984 |
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Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?
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Gorrell, 2005 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)
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Regardless of the succession Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor can hold power is debatable. that individual will extend the current policies which will only compound the situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. thousands will flee the island. this time the number could be several hundred thousand flee to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. the GWOT will be long and protracted. Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. I can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out?
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Cuban instability causes Caribbean instability, democratic backsliding, and refugee flows
| 5,036 | 89 | 2,653 | 823 | 10 | 434 | 0.012151 | 0.527339 |
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This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. ¶ LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ¶ The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Diamond, 1995 (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution – “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
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. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the absence of democracy, with its provisions for accountability and openness Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations do not build weapons of mass destruction They are more environmentally responsible
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And democracy spread is key to prevent extinction
| 2,110 | 49 | 583 | 315 | 8 | 86 | 0.025397 | 0.273016 |
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¶ The United States and Cuba have a strong mutual interest in closing off trafficking routes in the western Caribbean and in preventing attempts by Mexican and South American cocaine mafias to set up shop in Cuba proper. Yet they have not entered into a formal agreement to fight drugs – even though Havana maintains such agreements with at least 32 other countries – and what cooperation exists occurs episodically, on a case-by-case basis. Washington and Havana need to engage more fully on the issue, deploying intelligence and interdiction assets to disrupt smuggling networks through and around Cuba. Washington hitherto has shied away from a deeper relationship, fearing that it would lead to a political opening and confer a measure of legitimacy on the Castro regime. Yet current strategic realities in the region and Havana's own willingness to engage in such a relationship, as well as impending leadership changes in Cuba, argue for rethinking these concerns, even in the absence of formal diplomatic ties.¶ ¶ Cuba's relations with the international drug trade are historically complex and controversial and deserve some mention here. The Castro regime, on its accession to power in 1959, largely wiped out what had been a flourishing domestic market for cocaine and marijuana that was closely associated with the mob-run Havana casino-nightclub scene. Despite this achievement, opportunistic ties with foreign drug-trafficking organizations apparently persisted. Allegations of Cuban state complicity in the drug trade date to the early 1960s, although hard evidence of a Cuban drug connection did not surface until the 1980s.¶ ¶ Such cozy relationships reached a height in the late 1980s, when a group of Cuban Ministry of Interior officials, led by MC department head Antonio de la Guardia, together with representatives of Colombia’s Medellin cartel coordinated some 15 successful smuggling operations through Cuba to the United States which – according to Cuban officials – moved a total of six tons of cocaine and earned the conspirators $3.4 million.¶ ¶ Also complicit in these activities, though tangentially, was Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a decorated hero of the Cuban revolution. An Ochoa emissary met with Medellin cartel chief Pablo Escobar in 1988 to discuss a cocaine-smuggling venture and also a proposal to set up a cocaine laboratory in Cuba. The discussions also touched on another topic – and this is what Escobar really wanted most – the transfer of some surface-to-air missiles to the cartel in Colombia. The trafficking schemes never materialized, but in early 1990 the Colombian National Police discovered an assortment of 10 ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles of French manufacture (apparently originating in Angola) in a Bogotá residence belonging to an assassin employed by the Medellin cartel.¶ ¶ The Ochoa-de la Guardia machinations and the subsequent trials, executions, and purges marked the beginning of a watershed in the Cuban government’s policies toward illegal drugs. In subsequent years the regime made a visible and mostly successful effort to distance itself from the international drug trade, setting up new and elaborate drug-fighting institutions, establishing narcotics cooperation agreements with European and other Latin American states, and adopting an increasingly prohibitionist approach toward the sale and use of drugs inside Cuba. (This, incidentally, contrasts sharply with the harm-reduction approach being advocated by three former Latin American presidents.)¶ ¶ This policy shift was attributable to three main factors:¶ ¶ First, the corruption scandals of the late 1980s brought home to Cuba’s leaders the reality that in Cuba – as elsewhere in Latin America – the illegal drug trade could spawn independent centers of power, posing potential challenges to the existing political order. Generally speaking, the Ochoa-de la Guardia conspirators tended to favor the liberalizing tendencies that at the time were occurring elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, and Castro must have wanted to prevent the emergence of a narco-funded reformist movement that could weaken the totalitarian underpinnings of the Cuban system.¶ Second, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc eliminated the protective mantle of Soviet patronage that had sustained Cuba for years, and thus forced Cuba to reorient its entire foreign economic posture to seek vastly improved trade, investment, and tourism ties with the West. To do this, Cuba needed to burnish its international image and to project an aura of respectability. This meant taking visible domestic and foreign policy steps to try to erase the drug stigma acquired in earlier years.¶ The third factor was the emergence in the 1990s of a domestic consumer market for cocaine, crack, and marijuana, which was propelled by the increasing inflow of dollars from the tourist economy and by remittances sent from Cuban communities abroad to their relatives on the island. In what appeared to be a replay of the 1950s, drugs circulated freely in Havana’s nightclubs, bordellos, streets, and hotels. The internal drug market was never large, at least in relation to what we see here in the United States, but it alarmed Cuban authorities because it pre-supposed the development of a sphere of criminality outside the regime’s effective control.¶ An interesting question is: Where did all of these drugs come from?¶ ¶ The main source, at least according to Cuban official statistics, were so-called “recalos,” bulk packages of cocaine and marijuana that are dumped at sea, and then carried by wind and tides to Cuba’s shores – the detritus of failed rendezvous between Colombian planes or Jamaican marijuana carriers and go-fast boats based in Florida. Drugs are also brought to the island by foreign tourists, usually for their own use, but sometimes with the intent of introducing them into the Cuban market. A third source is domestic marijuana cultivation, which yields a relatively low-quality leaf, mainly in Cuba’s eastern provinces (Granma, Santiago de Cuba). Finally, there was cocaine that leaked into the domestic Cuban market from the trafficking pipeline that Interior Ministry officials set up through Cuba in the late 1980s. This pipeline, I suspect, carried a lot more than the six tons officially acknowledged by the Cuban regime.¶ ¶ The policies adopted by the Castro regime to counteract the perceived drug threat to Cuban society took several forms. One was to strengthen counter-narcotics legislation. Between 1988 and 1999 maximum penalties for drug dealing in Cuba’s criminal code increased from 7-15 years imprisonment to 20 years to death. Money laundering was made a crime punishable by up to 12 years in jail, and Cuban banks were compelled to adopt “know your customer" rules and to maintain records of transactions of more than 10,000 pesos (roughly $10,000 equivalent) for five years. In 2003, the government tightened the screws further with a decree prescribing the confiscation of business and residential property where drugs were produced, sold, stored, or consumed, a step that precipitated nationwide house-to-house searches to root out evidence of drug crimes.¶ ¶ Drug interdiction efforts were expanded to deny Cuban airspace and territorial waters to traffickers. Much of the emphasis here was on clearing Cuba’s coast of recalos of cocaine and marijuana and to this end the regime mobilized various social organizations – youth brigades, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, fishing collectives, tourism workers, et. al. – to cooperate with the Cuban Border Guard in patrolling the island’s shores. Also, to facilitate information-sharing on suspected drug shipments crossing Cuban territory, in 1999 Havana allowed the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard officer in the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.¶ ¶ On the demand-reduction front Cuba set up a vast network of nearly 200 mental health centers, staffed by psychologists and family physicians, which were charged with preventing the spread of drug abuse within the Cuban population. Some of these facilities provided in-house treatment and rehabilitation for cocaine and marijuana addicts. The regime mounted an extensive education and prevention campaign targeting schools and youth organizations, evidently aiming to insulate the younger generation from the scourge of drugs.¶ ¶ By some indications, the regime’s draconian drug policies seem to have worked, at least up to a point. My contacts within the Cuban public health system have told me that the average price of a gram of cocaine increased from about $15-20 in the 1999-2003 period to $90 in mid-2008, and the price for a joint of imported marijuana from $1 to $10 over the same years. Also, admissions of the numbers of new entrants into drug treatment facilities in the Havana area have dwindled significantly since the 1990s.¶ ¶ Now on the foreign policy front: looking back in time, narcotics-trafficking was a focal point of conflict in U.S.-Cuban relations for most of the pre-1990 years, except for a brief period during the Carter administration. The focus gradually shifted to cooperation in the 1990s, as the Cuban leadership ostensibly severed connections to the international drug trade. Cooperation and information-sharing between the two countries have netted a few high profile seizures, arrests, and extraditions, but all of this has occurred rather episodically, without an umbrella agreement on counter-narcotics cooperation, (although Cuba has concluded such agreements with many other countries inside and outside the hemisphere).¶ ¶ Such an agreed framework could set the stage for a more substantive level of engagement on drugs. For example, we could train and equip Cuban Border Guards and Interior Ministry operatives, we could conduct joint naval patrols with Cuba in the western Caribbean, we could coordinate investigation of regional trafficking networks and suspicious financial transactions through Cuban banks and commercial entities, and we could station DEA and FBI contingents in the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. We could also negotiate a ship-rider agreement with the Cuban authorities, and possibly even the right to pursue drug-laden vessels and aircraft seeking safe haven in Cuban territory.¶ ¶ How far Havana and Washington would be willing to proceed in these directions is unclear, since the political barriers on both sides are formidable. Yet the prospects for more productive collaboration against the hemispheric drug threat seem a lot more promising today than in the past. In any event, failure to exploit Cuba's law enforcement and intelligence assets to good advantage leaves a major gap in U.S. defenses against drug trafficking through the Caribbean. Interdiction successes n Mexico seem likely to augment this flow down the road, a further reason to closely monitor trafficking trends in a Caribbean country only 90 miles from U.S. shores. The drug threat from Cuba seems destined to increase as the Castro regime's revolutionary order loses its hold and appeal, as the island's economic ties with the outside world continue to expand, and as criminally-inclined Cuban nationals seek alliances with South American and Mexican drug kingpins. Such an outcome is hardly in the best interests of the United States and other countries in the hemisphere.
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Lee, 2009 (Rens, Foreign Policy Research Institute --- Authority on International crime and narcotics and nuclear security issues -- Stanford phD “Cuba, Drugs, and U.S.-Cuban Relations” https://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/04/cuba-drugs-and-us-cuban-relations)
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The U S and Cuba have a strong interest in closing off trafficking routes in the Caribbean and preventing cocaine mafias Yet they have not entered into a formal agreement to fight drugs Washington and Havana need to engage more deploying intelligence and interdiction assets to disrupt smuggling networks strategic realities as well as impending leadership changes argue for rethinking these concerns, even in the absence of formal diplomatic ties.¶ ¶ Cuba's relations with the international drug trade deserve mention The Castro regime in 1959 wiped out a flourishing domestic market for cocaine and marijuana Despite this opportunistic ties with foreign drug-trafficking organizations apparently persisted In subsequent years the regime made a successful effort to distance itself from the international drug trade setting up new and elaborate drug-fighting institutions establishing narcotics cooperation and increasingly prohibitionist approach toward the sale and use of drugs inside Cuba looking back in time, narcotics-trafficking was a focal point of conflict in U.S.-Cuban relations Cooperation and information-sharing netted a few high profile seizures, arrests, and extraditions but this has occurred rather episodically Such a framework could set the stage for a more substantive level of engagement on drugs we could train and equip Cuban Border Guards and Interior Ministry operatives, we could conduct joint naval patrols with Cuba in the western Caribbean, we could coordinate investigation of regional trafficking networks and suspicious financial transactions through Cuban banks and commercial entities negotiate a ship-rider agreement with the Cuban authorities, and possibly even the right to pursue drug-laden vessels and aircraft political barriers are formidable Yet more productive collaboration against the hemispheric drug threat seem a lot more promising today than in the past The drug threat seems destined to increase Such an outcome is hardly in the best interests of the United States and other countries in the hemisphere.
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Empirically proven --- Cuba is crucial to fighting the drug trade --- but political barriers remain
| 11,397 | 99 | 2,057 | 1,771 | 16 | 303 | 0.009034 | 0.17109 |
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Hezbollah remains especially active in the TBA. 25 With an estimated $12 billion a year in illegal commerce, the TBA is the center of the largest underground economy in the Western Hemisphere.26 Financial crimes are a specialty of the area and include intellectual property fraud, counterfeiting, money laundering and smuggling. Moreover, lax customs enforcement in the area allows these crimes to continue largely unabated from one country to the other.27 The TBA has been described as one of the most lucrative sources of revenue for Hezbollah outside of state sponsorship.28¶ The evidence to suggest Hezbollah is actively involved in the trafficking of South American cocaine to fund its operations is mounting as well. In 2008, U.S. and Colombian authorities dismantled a cocainesmuggling and money-laundering organization that allegedly helped fund Hezbollah operations. Dubbed Operation Titan, the enforcement effort uncovered a money laundering operation that is suspected of laundering hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds a year and paying 12 percent of those profits to Hezbollah.29 Operation Titan has led to more than 130 arrests and the seizure of $23 million.30 One of those arrests was of Chekri Mahmoud Harb (also known as “Taliban” or “Tali”) who is a Lebanese national suspected of being a kingpin of the operation. In 2010, Harb pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine knowing the drugs would ultimately be smuggled into the United States.31¶ In another example, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed Ayman “Junior” Joumaa, a Lebanese national and Hezbollah supporter, as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker based upon his involvement in the transportation, distribution and sale of multi-ton shipments of cocaine from South America along with the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds from Europe and the Middle East.32¶ Federal prosecutors in Virginia also charged Joumaa for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and money laundering charges. The indictment alleges Joumaa shipped thousands of kilograms of Colombian cocaine to the United States via Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. Specifically mentioned in the indictment was 85,000 kilograms of cocaine that was sold to the Los Zetas drug cartel from 2005 to 2007.33 The indictment further substantiates the established relationship between Hezbollah, a proxy for Iran, and Mexican drug cartels, which control secured smuggling routes into the United States. This nexus potentially provides Iranian operatives with undetected access into the United States.¶ Joumaa allegedly laundered in excess of $250 million of cocaine proceeds from sales in the United States, Mexico, Central America, West Africa and Europe. Joumaa would typically receive these proceeds in Mexico as bulk cash deliveries. Once the proceeds were laundered, they would be paid out in Venezuelan or Colombian currency to the cocaine suppliers in Colombia. Joumaa’s fee for laundering the currency would vary from eight to 14 percent.34 A recent civil complaint filed by the U.S. Department of Justice states that Joumaa relied heavily upon the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) and the Lebanese exchange houses Hassan Ayash Exchange Company (Hassan) and Ellissa Holding (Ellissa) to conduct the money laundering operation described above.35 The complaint also alleges these businesses partnered with Hezbollah in various other money laundering schemes. One such scheme involved LCB allowing Hezbollah-related entities to conduct transactions as large as $260,000 per day without disclosing any information about the transaction.36¶ According to the 2011 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the Barakat Network in the TBA is another example of drug money being funneled to Hezbollah. Although the total amount of money being sent to Hezbollah is difficult to determine, the Barakat Network provided, and perhaps still provides, a sizeable amount of the money sent annually from the TBA to finance Hezbollah and its operations around the world.¶ Another scheme that took place from 2007 to early 2011 involved LCB, Hassan and Ellissa transferring at least $329 million of illicit proceeds to the United States for the purchase of used cars through 30 car dealerships that typically had no assets other than the bank accounts which received the overseas wire transfers. Once in receipt of the wired funds, these dealerships would purchase used vehicles and ship them to West Africa to be sold. The cash proceeds would then make their way to Lebanon under the security of Hezbollah and its illegitimate money transfer systems.37¶ Hezbollah has also involved itself in the trafficking of weapons, which fuels the violence so intrinsic to drug trafficking and terrorism in Latin America. On July 6, 2009, Jamal Yousef, also known as Talal Hassan Ghantou, was indicted in New York City on federal narco-terrorism conspiracy charges. According to the unsealed indictment, Yousef is a former member of the Syrian military and an international arms trafficker who was attempting to make a weapons-forcocaine deal with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC).38¶ What Yousef did not know was that he was actually negotiating with an undercover operative of the Drug Enforcement Administration who was posing as a representative of the FARC. Yousef had agreed to provide the FARC military-grade weapons that included 100 AR-15 and 100 M-16 assault rifles, 10 M-60 machine guns, C-4 explosives, 2,500 hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades. In exchange for the weapons, the FARC was to deliver 938 kilograms of cocaine to Yousef.39¶ While negotiations progressed, Yousef stated that the weapons had been stolen from Iraq and were being stored in Mexico by Yousef’s cousin who is an active member of Hezbollah. To establish their bona fides for the trade, Yousef’s cousin videotaped the weapons cache on location in Mexico. Towards the completion of the transaction, it was learned that the weapons cache was actually larger than had been first reported. The deal was amended to include the additional weapons in exchange for 7,000 to 8,000 more kilograms of cocaine that would be delivered to the coast of Honduras.40¶ The transaction was never completed because Yousef was arrested and imprisoned in Honduras on separate charges beforehand. In August 2009, Yousef was extradited to New York where he awaits trial.¶ The explanation for Iranian presence in Latin America begins with its symbiotic relationship with Hezbollah.41 United in their dedication to the destruction of Israel, Iran has helped Hezbollah grow from a small group of untrained guerrillas into what is arguably the most highly trained, organized and equipped terrorist organization in the world.42 In return, Hezbollah has served as an ideal proxy for Iranian military force – particularly against Israel – which affords Iran plausible deniability diplomatically.43 Hence wherever Hezbollah is entrenched, Iran will be as well and vice-versa. ¶ The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela. Ideologically speaking, both regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United States.44 Economically speaking, the two countries have partnered together in an attempt to survive and thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its financial and trade systems.45¶ On the latter score one would be hard pressed to find a country that has been more successful at overcoming sanctions and embargoes levied by the United States and international community than Iran. In spite of ever-increasing economic constraints dating back to the Carter Administration, Iran has managed to fight an eight year war with Iraq, become the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism, vigorously pursued its own nuclear program and become the prime destabilizing factor in the Middle East.46¶ This impressive adaptability relies in no small part on Iran’s creativity in exploiting unscrupulous businesses, criminal networks and other corrupt regimes for economic survival. For rogue leaders like Venezuela President Hugo Chavez, who see embargoes and sanctions as just another manifestation of American oppression and imperialism, Iran has become their champion and welcomed ally.47 This sentiment has developed into a cooperative understanding that, to the extent they can be successful at overcoming economic sanctions and creating their own economy, Iran and Venezuela can continue to pursue their ideological agendas beyond the reproach of their Western first-world oppressors.¶ In their efforts to achieve this independence, neither Iran nor Venezuela has ignored the pecuniary and political benefits of participating in the illicit drug trade. For example, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Gholamreza Baghbani has been working in conjunction with the Taliban to oversee the trafficking of opium and heroin from Afghanistan through Iran in order to generate revenue to support Hezbollah.48¶ General Baghbani is a commander in the IRGC Qods Force which is the Iranian Special Forces unit that works closely with Hezbollah in conducting terror operations throughout the world. In a similar fashion to Iran’s ideological relationship with Hezbollah, Venezuela and the FARC often work together in the trafficking of cocaine for mutual benefit. Numerous Venezuela government officials have been designated by the OFAC as providing assistance to the FARC in the trafficking of cocaine and the purchasing of weapons.49 In addition to participating in cocaine trafficking, Venezuela affords the FARC respite from United States and Colombian pursuit via safe havens within the country.50¶ Venezuela extends this assistance in part because the socialist regime of Hugo Chavez aligns well ideologically with the FARC’s Marxist underpinnings. Pragmatically speaking, Venezuela provides support to the FARC insurgency because it believes it helps mitigate the perceived threat of United States intervention in the region.51 The FARC in turn has provided reciprocal support of the Chavez regime by such actions as training pro-Chavez militants and assassinating anti-Chavez politicians within Venezuela.52¶ Given their own individual propensities in the trafficking of illicit drugs to further ideological interests, it should come as no surprise that the activity is so intrinsic to the ongoing VenezuelanIranian enterprise in Latin America.53 Each country brings valuable infrastructure to drug trafficking that can be used to help expand and supply a worldwide cocaine market. Assets such as state-owned airlines, shipping companies, airports and sea ports can operate beyond the watchful eyes of the legitimate world.¶ This can be seen in the regularly scheduled flights between Caracas and Tehran that continue despite Venezuelan-owned Conviasa Airlines’ claims they ended in September 2010.54 Even though it was described as a regular commercial flight, there was no means by which to purchase a ticket to travel onboard. Moreover, the flight would depart Caracas from a secluded non-public terminal without the normal manifests associated with legitimate air commerce.55 Another example that also illustrates the ingenuity of Iran in circumventing international sanctions involves the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is responsible for moving almost one-third of Iran’s imports and exports. The IRISL has been under OFAC economic sanction since September 2008 for providing logistical services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.56¶ In order to stay one step ahead of OFAC and United Nations regulatory efforts, the IRISL regularly reflags and changes the owners of its ships. Between September 2008 and February 2012, there were 878 changes to the IRISL fleet including 157 name changes, 94 changes of flag, 122 changes of operator and 127 changes of registered ownership. This simple tactic has allowed Iran to continue shipping goods to and from Venezuela and all over the world despite the best efforts of the international community to prevent it.57¶ Being able to control major modes of transportation that operate from one safe port to another beyond the watchful eyes of legitimate immigration and customs authorities is a fundamental advantage that is very difficult to counter. While Iran and Venezuela may be much more interested in using this advantage for commercial, military and nuclear purposes, there is no reason to doubt they would use it in the trafficking of drugs to finance covert terrorist activities for themselves and their allies.¶ IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY ¶ Iran and Hezbollah have been involved in the underworld of Latin America long enough to become intimately familiar with all of its inhabitants and capitalize on their capabilities. Former DEA executive Michael Braun has an interesting way of describing this dynamic:¶ “…If you want to visualize ungoverned space or a permissive environment, I tell people to simply think of the bar scene in the first “Star Wars” movie. Operatives from FTOs (foreign terrorist organizations) and DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are frequenting the same shady bars, the same seedy hotels and the same sweaty brothels in a growing number of areas around the world. And what else are they doing? Based upon over 37 years in the law enforcement and security sectors, you can mark my word that they are most assuredly talking business and sharing lessons learned.”58¶ Braun says as Europe's demand for cocaine continues to grow and TCO's operate in West and North Africa to establish infrastructure to move the drugs:¶ "These bad guys (cartels) are now routinely coming in very close contact with the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, who are vying for the same money, the same turf and same dollars. It's really a nightmare scenario. And my point being is if anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah and Qods Force, the masters at leveraging and exploiting existing elicit infrastructures globally, are not going to focus on our southwest border and use that as perhaps a spring board in attacking our country then they just don't understand how the real underworld works."59¶ Iran attempted to leverage this capability in October 2011 with the foiled plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. According to a federal arrest complaint filed in New York City, the Qods Force attempted to hire a drug cartel (identified by other sources as the Los Zetas) to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir for a fee of $1.5 million. The terror attack was to take place at a popular restaurant in Washington, D.C. without regard to collateral deaths or damage.60¶ The Qods Force made this solicitation because it knows drug traffickers are willing to undertake such criminal activity in exchange for money. Moreover, if this terror attack had been successful, the Qods Force intended to use the Los Zetas for other attacks in the future.61 Had it not been for a DEA informant posing as the Los Zetas operative, this attack could have very well taken place.¶ It has been suggested that this assassination was directed by the Iranian government in retaliation for a Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain against an Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim majority that was protesting a Saudi-backed Sunni Muslim minority government.62 There are also indications that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has ordered the Qods Force to intensify terror attacks against the United States and other Western countries for supporting the ousting of Syrian President and Iranian ally Bashar al-Assad.63¶ How all of this plays into the Iranian nuclear threat leaves troubling possibilities for the U.S. and our ally Israel. We know that Hezbollah has a significant presence in the United States that could be utilized in terror attacks intended to deter our efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.64 For this same reason, Israelis in the United States and around the world have gone on high alert to prevent a repeat of deadly Hezbollah terror attacks against Israeli facilities that occurred in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. ¶ These increasingly hostile actions taken by the Iranian government would be alarming enough without Iran and Hezbollah having well-established bases of operations in Latin America. While Latin American bases serve as a finance mechanism for Hezbollah, it is believed the ability exists to turn operational if the need arises. There is no doubt that the enemy is at our doorstep and we must do something about it now. While a very aggressive foreign policy to counteract these threats is in order, we must not forget that a secure Southwest border is always our first and last line of defense.
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McCaul, 2012 (Michael, Rep. “A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER: MAJORITY REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT,” http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf)
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Hezbollah remains especially active in the TBA. With an estimated $12 billion a year in illegal commerce The TBA has been described as one of the most lucrative sources of revenue for Hezbollah outside of state sponsorship. The evidence to suggest Hezbollah is actively involved in the trafficking of South American cocaine to fund its operations is mounting as well. U.S. and Colombian authorities dismantled a cocainesmuggling and money-laundering organization the Barakat Network in the TBA is another example of drug money being funneled to Hezbollah. the Barakat Network provided a sizeable amount of the money to finance Hezbollah and its operations Hezbollah has also involved itself in the trafficking of weapons, which fuels the violence so intrinsic to drug trafficking and terrorism in Latin America. The explanation for Iranian presence in Latin America begins with its symbiotic relationship with Hezbollah. Iran has helped Hezbollah grow Hezbollah has served as an ideal proxy for Iranian military force The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on Venezuela both share a mutual enmity of the United States. the two countries have partnered together in an attempt to survive and thrive one would be hard pressed to find a country that has been more successful at overcoming sanctions and embargoes than Iran. In spite of ever-increasing economic constraints Iran has managed to fight an eight year war with Iraq, become the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism, vigorously pursued its own nuclear program and become the prime destabilizing factor in the Middle East. This impressive adaptability relies in no small part on Iran’s creativity in exploiting unscrupulous businesses, criminal networks and other corrupt regimes for economic survival. neither Iran nor Venezuela has ignored the pecuniary and political benefits of participating in the illicit drug trade. Baghbani has been working in conjunction with the Taliban to oversee the trafficking of opium and heroin in order to generate revenue to support Hezbollah. the activity is so intrinsic to the ongoing VenezuelanIranian enterprise in Latin America. Each country brings valuable infrastructure to drug trafficking if anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah are not going to focus on our southwest border and use that as perhaps a spring board in attacking our country then they just don't understand how the real underworld works How all of this plays into the Iranian nuclear threat leaves troubling possibilities for the U.S. and our ally Israel. Hezbollah has a significant presence in the United States that could be utilized in terror attacks intended to deter our efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear program. Israelis in the United States and around the world have gone on high alert to prevent a repeat of deadly Hezbollah terror attacks These increasingly hostile actions taken by the Iranian government would be alarming enough without Iran and Hezbollah having well-established bases of operations in Latin America. Latin American bases serve as a finance mechanism for Hezbollah There is no doubt that the enemy is at our doorstep and we must do something about it now.
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Plan solves --- 1NC --- only status squo reforms resolve political barriers within Cuba to allow for greater anti-Narcotic missions
| 17,038 | 131 | 3,206 | 2,631 | 20 | 506 | 0.007602 | 0.192322 |
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Today, how many people can a small group of terrorists kill in a single blow? Had Bruce Ivins, the U.S. government microbiologist responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks, distributed his deadly agent with sprayers he could have purchased off the shelf, tens of thousands of Americans would have died. Had the 2001 “Dragonfire” report that Al Qaeda had a small nuclear weapon (from the former Soviet arsenal) in New York City proved correct, and not a false alarm, detonation of that bomb in Times Square could have incinerated a half million Americans.¶ In this electoral season, President Obama is claiming credit, rightly, for actions he and U.S. Special Forces took in killing Osama bin Laden. Similarly, at last week’s Republican convention in Tampa, Jeb Bush praised his brother for making the United States safer after 9/11. There can be no doubt that the thousands of actions taken at federal, state and local levels have made people safer from terrorist attacks.¶ Many are therefore attracted to the chorus of officials and experts claiming that the “strategic defeat” of Al Qaeda means the end of this chapter of history. But we should remember a deeper and more profound truth. While applauding actions that have made us safer from future terrorist attacks, we must recognize that they have not reversed an inescapable reality: The relentless advance of science and technology is making it possible for smaller and smaller groups to kill larger and larger numbers of people.¶ If a Qaeda affiliate, or some terrorist group in Pakistan whose name readers have never heard, acquires highly enriched uranium or plutonium made by a state, they can construct an elementary nuclear bomb capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people. At biotech labs across the United States and around the world, research scientists making medicines that advance human well-being are also capable of making pathogens, like anthrax, that can produce massive casualties.¶ What to do? Sherlock Holmes examined crime scenes using a method he called M.M.O.: motive, means and opportunity. In a society where citizens gather in unprotected movie theaters, churches, shopping centers and stadiums, opportunities for attack abound. Free societies are inherently “target rich.”¶ Motive to commit such atrocities poses a more difficult challenge. In all societies, a percentage of the population will be homicidal. No one can examine the mounting number of cases of mass murder in schools, movie theaters and elsewhere without worrying about a society’s mental health. Additionally, actions we take abroad unquestionably impact others’ motivation to attack us.¶ As Faisal Shahzad, the 2010 would-be “Times Square bomber,” testified at his trial: “Until the hour the U.S. ... stops the occupation of Muslim lands, and stops killing the Muslims ... we will be attacking U.S., and I plead guilty to that.”¶ Fortunately, it is more difficult for a terrorist to acquire the “means” to cause mass casualties. Producing highly enriched uranium or plutonium requires expensive industrial-scale investments that only states will make. If all fissile material can be secured to a gold standard beyond the reach of thieves or terrorists, aspirations to become the world’s first nuclear terrorist can be thwarted.
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Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, 9/7/12, "Living in the Era of Megaterror", belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22302/living_in_the_era_of_megaterror.html
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Had the Dragonfire” report that Al Qaeda had a small nuclear weapon in New York City proved correct detonation of that bomb could have incinerated a half million Americans Many are attracted to the chorus of experts claiming the “strategic defeat” of Al Qaeda means the end of this chapter of history remember a deeper truth actions have not reversed an inescapable reality The relentless advance of technology is making it possible for smaller groups to kill larger numbers of people a Qaeda affiliate or group in Pakistan acquires highly enriched uranium by a state they can construct an elementary nuclear bomb At biotech labs scientists are also capable of making pathogens that can produce massive casualties.¶ .: motive, means and opportunity Fortunately, it is more difficult for a terrorist to acquire the “means” to cause mass casualties. Producing highly enriched uranium requires investments that only states will make If material can be secured aspirations to become the world’s first nuclear terrorist can be thwarted.
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Nuclear terrorism likely—state sponsorship key
| 3,284 | 46 | 1,031 | 520 | 5 | 165 | 0.009615 | 0.317308 |
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A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. ¶ Nuclear Terrorism Against Smaller Nuclear Powers¶ There is also the question of what lesser powers in the international system might do in response to a terrorist attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in sympathy¶ or support of their attacked colleague. Moreover, if these countries are themselves nuclear¶ armed, additional possibilities for a wider catastrophe may lie here as well. For example,¶ if in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, a nuclear armed ally such¶ as Israel might possess special information about the group believed to be responsible and¶ be willing and able to take the action required to punish that group. If its action involved¶ threats of the use of nuclear force, or the use of nuclear force itself (perhaps against a¶ country Israel believed to be harboring the nuclear terrorists), how might other nuclear¶ armed countries react? Might some other nuclear powers demand that the United States¶ rein in its friend, and suggest a catastrophic outcome should this restraint not take place?¶ Or would they wait long enough to ask the question?¶ Alternatively, what if some states used the nuclear terrorist attack on another country to justify a major—and perhaps even nuclear—attack on other terrorist groups on the grounds¶ that it was now clear that it was too dangerous to allow these groups to exist when they¶ might very well also be planning similar nuclear action? (Just as Al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11¶ raised some of the threat assessments of other terrorist groups, the same and more might¶ occur if any terrorist group had used a nuclear weapon,) If a nuclear armed third party took¶ things into its own hands and decided that the time for decisive action had now come, how¶ might this action affect the nuclear peace between states?¶ But it needs to be realized that a catalytic exchange is not only possible if the terrorists¶ have exploded a nuclear device on one of the established nuclear weapons states, including¶ and especially the United States. A catalytic nuclear war might also be initiated by a nuclear¶ terrorist attack on a country that possesses a nuclear arsenal of a more modest scale, and¶ which is geographically much closer to the group concerned. For example, if a South Asian terrorist group exploded a nuclear device in India, it is very difficult to see how major¶ suspicions could not be raised in that country (and elsewhere) that Pakistan was somehow¶ involved—either as a direct aider and abetter of the terrorists (including the provision of¶ the bomb to them) or as at the very least a passive and careless harborer of the groups¶ perpetrating the act. In a study that seeks to reduce overall fears of nuclear terrorism, Frost¶ nonetheless observes that if one of the nuclear powers in South Asia was “thought to be¶ behind a ‘terrorist’ nuclear attack in the region, the risks of the incident escalating into a full nuclear exchange would be high.”¶ 43¶ Kapur is equally definite on this score, observing that¶ “if a nuclear detonation occurred within India, the attack would be undoubtedly blamed on¶ Pakistan, with potentially catastrophic results.”¶ 44
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Ayson, 2010 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld]
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as long as major nuclear weapons states have thousands of nuclear weapons there is always the possibility of nuclear exchange a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not separable an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between states that possess them terrorist groups might rais the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers in the event of a terrorist attack on the U S it might be wondered just how Russia and China could be brought into the picture if the act of nuclear terrorism came officials would shift immediately to state possessors Washington would be left with a very short list if the act of terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension with Russia and China would officials not be tempted to assume the worst Washington’s response to a terrorist attack might raise the possibility of nuclear confrontation with Russia and China in the confusion during the immediate aftermath the president might place the nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert Moscow and China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use nuclear force temptations to preempt such actions might grow Washington might decide to order a or nuclear) retaliatory attack against the terrorist group , Russia and China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and as an infringement on their spheres of influence If Washington found the responses of Russia and China underwhelming might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing the chances of a major exchange If Washington decided to use nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to avoid a nuclear exchange Russia possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and has been one of the most important trustees of the non-use taboo In the charged atmosphere after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists This might not help nuclear restraint if one of the nuclear powers in South Asia was “thought to be behind a ‘terrorist’ attack in the region, the risks of the incident escalating into a full nuclear exchange would be high
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A nuclear terrorist attack causes extinction
| 13,516 | 44 | 2,506 | 2,218 | 6 | 421 | 0.002705 | 0.189811 |
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As insanely dangerous as the mega-nuclear disaster in Japan is, events in the Middle East may be nearing a dangerous flash point that will be several orders of magnitude greater in terms of danger to the entire human race.
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Stirling, 2011—B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies (“General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”, 3/30/11, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html)
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events in the Middle East may be nearing a dangerous flash point that will be several orders of magnitude greater in terms of danger to the entire human race
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Middle East war leads to extinction
| 222 | 36 | 157 | 39 | 6 | 29 | 0.153846 | 0.74359 |
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By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.
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Major David N. Diner, U.S. Army, 94 [“The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who’s Endangering Whom?” Military Law Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, 1994, LEXIS]
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By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.
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Each instance increases the risk of extinction- evaluate linear risk of net benefit
| 679 | 84 | 403 | 104 | 13 | 59 | 0.125 | 0.567308 |
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It has now been more than two decades since the Worldwatch Institute’s Lester Brown first issued a plea to adopt a new and more robust conception of national security attuned to the contemporary world. The threats to security, he argued even then, now may arise less from relations between nations than from man’s relations with nature—dwindling reserves of critical resources, for example, or the deterioration of earth’s biological systems: The military threat to national security is only one of many that governments must now address. The numerous new threats derive directly or indirectly from the rapidly changing relationship between humanity and the earth’s natural systems and resources. The unfolding stresses in this relationship initially manifest themselves as ecological stresses and resource scarcities. Later they translate into economic stresses—inflation, unemployment, capital scarcity, and monetary instability. Ultimately, these economic stresses convert into social unrest and political instability.1 Brown was followed—cautiously at first—by others who recognized the need not only to expand the bounds of national security thinking and discourse, but to take particular account of environmental concerns in such deliberations. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, then affiliated with the World Resources Institute, argued, for example: “Global developments now suggest the need for . . . [a] broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues.”2 One of the most powerful observations made to date—one that could be judged, in equal measure, as either visionary or hyperbolic—is that by writer-analyst Milton Viorst, who argues that “population and environment . . . seem the obvious sources of the next wave of wars, perhaps major wars.”3…CONTINUES…Where Homer-Dixon is especially insightful is in leading us in the direction of the most powerful counterargument that can be made to resolute critics of environmental causation. He says that whereas, on first analysis, the main causes of civil strife appear to be social disruptions (e.g., poverty, migrations, ethnic tension, institutional breakdown), in reality scarcities of renewable resources, including water, fuelwood, cropland and fish, can precipitate these disruptions and thereby powerfully contribute to strife. By broadening his formulation, we may posit the existence of a more general masking phenomenon by which ostensibly political and economic causes of unrest, violence, conflict, and destabilization (e.g., political repression; economic deprivation, exploitation, and dislocation) actually may mask underlying, less visible, less discernible environmental sources of dissatisfaction, discontent, and alienation (e.g., diminished quality of life; threats to safety and well-being).
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Foster 00 (Gregory Foster, civilian professor at the National Defense University, September 2000, http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/china-environmental-dragon.pdf)
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threats to security arise less from relations between nations than from relations with nature deterioration of earth’s biological systems numerous new threats derive from the earth’s natural systems unfolding stresses in this relationship initially manifest themselves as ecological stresses and resource scarcities. Later they translate into economic stresses these convert into social unrest and political instability Global developments now suggest the need for . broadening definition of national security environment . . . seem the obvious sources of the next wave of wars, perhaps major wars whereas the main causes of civil strife appear to be social disruptions poverty institutional breakdown in reality scarcities of resources can precipitate these disruptions and thereby powerfully contribute to strife. we may posit the existence of a more general masking phenomenon by which ostensibly political and economic causes of conflict actually may mask underlying, less visible, less discernible environmental sources of dissatisfaction
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The disad accesses the case and not the other way around---environmental degradation is the root cause of all conflict
| 2,814 | 119 | 1,043 | 396 | 19 | 148 | 0.04798 | 0.373737 |
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In other words, even though Cuban society has changed dramatically, they want to continue running the show like they did before the 1990s, when they controlled social mobility and political discourse down to the minutest details.¶ They are unwilling to part with their totalitarian methods, even though Cuban society no longer allows for such control, and they themselves are unable to exercise it.¶ The problem faced by Cuba’s leadership is that both Cuban society and its political system have changed.¶ It’s not simply a question of growing social dissatisfaction with the government’s political and economic ineptness, and that this expresses itself as an avalanche of unorganized discontent that pushes some of the country’s best minds to emigrate. Nor is it limited to the fact that some spaces for private enterprise have been opened up.¶ The problem is that the very coordinates of social power and the configuration of political spaces have changed, and that a good part of the population – which has no intention of leaving – expects a political change that will give voice to their legitimate aspirations.¶ Cuban society is riven by variables arising from public and private undertakings which were unthinkable two decades ago. All of this, in a broad sense, is political.¶ There is now a determined opposition – active in public spaces, both real and virtual – which is evidently here to stay. There are now spaces where critiques of the regime – moderate, of course – may be formulated, which are highly innovative in cultural terms and which regularly address the State with the demands of different social sectors.¶ Finally, we’re also seeing that Granma, Cuba’s main newspaper, called “unusual situations”, developing in the fissures of the country’s “revolutionary moral code”, which go from luxury-filled, glamorous galas thrown by a jet-set of nouveaux riche to the mad ravings of a pastor who entrenched himself in his Church, with his flock, to await the coming of the Messiah.¶ The challenge faced by the Cuban leadership is to transform the current political regime – gradually but consistently – into a pluralist system without political exclusion.¶ If it fails to do this, Cuban society will continue to be confined by a sinister situation in which individuals are made to endure a form of control that is incompatible with their education and their political awareness, and entirely incongruous with the world we all live in.¶ It will continue to suffer the pangs of a society scourged by extremisms, polarization, exclusion and the concept that all dissenting thought is a form of treason – and the island’s population will continue to dwindle, and apathy and cynicism will continue to be the hard currency of its political market
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Alfonso, 6/25 (Haroldo Dilla, Previous director of the Latin American Studies Center in Havana. Founded the Cities and Borders Group “The Fortified Walls of Cuba’s Political Regime” http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95349)
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even though Cuba has changed they want to continue running the show like when they controlled social mobility and political discourse They are unwilling to part with their totalitarian methods even though Cuban society no longer allows for such control The problem faced is It’s not simply a question of growing social dissatisfaction and that this expresses itself as an avalanche of discontent The problem is coordinates of social power and political spaces have changed and the population expects a political change that will give voice to their legitimate aspirations Cuban society is riven by public and private undertakings All political There is now a determined opposition active in public spaces we’re seeing Cuba’s situations developing fissures of the country’s “revolutionary moral code The challenge faced by Cuba is to transform the regime If it fails to do this Cuban society will continue to be confined by a sinister situation in which individuals are made to endure a form of control It will continue to suffer a society scourged by extremisms, polarization, exclusion the population will dwindle apathy and cynicism will continue
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If Cuba fails to reform that dooms their population to governmental oppression and exclusion
| 2,757 | 92 | 1,148 | 449 | 14 | 182 | 0.03118 | 0.405345 |
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Judging by the Castro regime’s 50 years of survival vis-à-vis now 11 U.S. administrations from Eisenhower to Obama, one has to give the Devil his due: Fidel and Raúl Castro have outwitted their Yankee opponents through a combination of shrewd poker diplomacy and reckless brinksmanship. Students of Machiavelli as well as of Marx and Lenin, the Castro brothers have never wasted an opportunity to exploit the miscalculations of the State Department nor to manipulate the goodwill of the American people. Well-intentioned U.S. policymakers have often projected their own enthusiasm for friendly relations with Cuba in mistakenly assuming that Fidel sincerely sought a neighborly relationship with Washington, or believing that Raul is any different. On the contrary, unilateral gestures and concessions to Havana are ultimately interpreted as signs of weakness and naïveté by the Castro brothers. And on the issue of migration the Obama administration has already blinked. The Castro regime holds the winning hand with its keen understanding of Washington’s fears of a visible mass migration of desperate and destitute Cubans across the Florida Straits in the context of an already highly polarized debate in the U.S. Congress over the looming question of amnesty for millions of illegal immigrants. Expect Raul Castro to use his trump card of mass migration to obtain further major concessions from the Obama administration. Indeed, one could argue that Raul has already won the game.¶ Political Implications and Economic Impact of Cuban Immigration ¶ The total economic cost of Cuban immigration, still heavily concentrated in Miami-Dade County and the surrounding South Florida region, is difficult to estimate as Cubans quickly – within a year or so of setting foot on U.S. territory – acquire permanent legal resident status and therefore blend into the larger population, competing for the same jobs and qualifying over time for the same benefits and federal/state entitlements as U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, at a minimum, initial public expenditures for each annual wave of Cubans entering the U.S. easily run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. In a single year the approximately 50,000 Cubans who were granted U.S. legal permanent resident status in 2008 received upwards of US$322 million through a variety of transitional or temporary federal assistance programs for refugees as well as in basic local and state-funded services, including free public education for their children (Table VI). Many newly arrived Cubans, especially the elderly, children, and the unemployed who together account for about half of the contemporary Cuban immigrant population (Table IV), continue to benefit from such entitlement programs for up to seven years and then indefinitely once they have acquired American citizenship, as most Cubans tend to do within five to 10 years of residing in the United States. At the current rate of migration the direct minimum cost of subsidizing the needs of Cuban immigrants during their first twelve months or so in the U.S. would be about US$1.3 billion over the next four years (FY 2009-2012). Should Cuban immigration into the U.S. continue to increase the costs will not only grow accordingly but the demographic effects will overwhelm South Florida’s low-wage service-oriented labor market; strangulate an already congested transportation infrastructure; and impose an expansion of social services and subsidies ranging from K-12 education to food stamps at a time when there are a million unemployed Floridians, including 11 percent of Miami-Dade County’s workforce. High as the unemployment rate is in Florida, among new immigrants of Cuban origin unemployment reached 13.5 percent in 2008 while another 43 percent of newly-arrived Cubans in the U.S. were economically inactive (e.g., the elderly, homemakers, and children). As of 2008 more than 56 percent of Cuban immigrants who had arrived in the U.S. within the last year or so remained either unemployed, underemployed, inactive or otherwise marginally attached to the mainstream economy.¶ Difficult Questions How many more individuals will abandon the island during the rapidly fading twilight years of the Castro brothers? The present rate of migration suggests that some 250,000 more Cubans will have fled to the United States by the end of 2013, or roughly 50,000 new residents of Cuban origin annually. However, should the rate of Cuban immigration continue to grow by 100 percent or greater as it has in the years since the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords of 1994-1995, Americans may have to make room for a million or more newcomers in the coming decade. Assimilating such unprecedented numbers of newly arrived Cuban migrants within an already demographically saturated South Florida region could pose challenges that transcend the upwards of US$3.2 billion in estimated first-year federal, state, and local additional expenditures on aid and services for Cubans arriving between 2009 and 2018. Above and beyond the direct monetary costs associated with any mass migration of such a magnitude are the cultural, socioeconomic, and political transformations that follow the immediate demographic impact. Not only will South Florida’s physical infrastructure, natural resources, and already struggling economy be stretched and strained even further to accommodate a surge in population but, longer-term, the region will not likely return to its pre-mass migration condition.
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Salas-del Valle, 2009 (Hans de Salas-del Valle, Research Associate, Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. “An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami” http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue114.htm)
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Judging by the Castro regime’s Fidel and Raúl Castro have outwitted their Yankee opponents through shrewd diplomacy and reckless brinksmanship. the Castro brothers have never wasted an opportunity to exploit miscalculations unilateral gestures and concessions to Havana are ultimately interpreted as signs of weakness and naïveté And on the issue of migration the Obama administration has already blinked The Castro regime holds the winning hand with understanding of Washington’s fears of a visible mass migration Economic Impact of Cuban Immigration The total economic cost of Cuban immigration at a minimum initial public expenditures for each annual wave entering the U.S. easily run into hundreds of millions of dollars In a single year 50,000 Cubans who were granted U.S. legal permanent resident status in 2008 received 322 million through federal assistance Many newly arrived Cubans especially the elderly, children, and the unemployed continue to benefit from such programs indefinitely At the current rate of migration the minimum cost would be $1.3 billion Should Cuban immigration into the U.S continue to increase costs will not only grow accordingly but the demographic effects will overwhelm low-wage service-oriented labor market strangulate an congested transportation infrastructure and impose an expansion of social services and subsidies at a time when there are a million unemployed Floridians, High as the unemployment rate is another 43 percent of newly-arrived Cubans in the U.S. were economically inactive As of 2008 more than 56 percent of immigrants who had arrived in the U.S. within the last year remained unemployed, underemployed, inactive or marginally attached to the mainstream economy How many more individuals will abandon the island The present rate of migration suggests 250,000 more Cubans will have fled to the U S by the end of 2013, However should the rate of Cuban immigration continue to grow Americans may have to make room for a million or more newcomers in the coming decade Assimilating such numbers within an already demographically saturated South Florida region could pose challenges that transcend $3.2 billion in estimated first-year federal expenditures on aid and services for Cubans arriving Above and beyond the direct monetary costs associated with migration are cultural, socioeconomic, and political transformations the impact South Florida’s physical infrastructure, natural resources, and already struggling economy be stretched and strained
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Status quo is causing massive migrations of Cubans to South Florida due to a lack of restrictions and opposition to the Cuban Regime/political maneuvering --- Collapses the US Economy
| 5,474 | 183 | 2,504 | 840 | 29 | 375 | 0.034524 | 0.446429 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,448 |
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
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Royal, 2010 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives”, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
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Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power if the expectations of future trade decline particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources the likelihood for conflict increases as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level Hess find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict particularly during periods of economic downturn The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism ). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict
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Best studies prove economic collapse results in great power war
| 4,444 | 63 | 2,024 | 651 | 10 | 301 | 0.015361 | 0.462366 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,449 |
Participants considered the wide range of actors that constitute the “established opposition” within Cuba today and debated whether these diverse groups could coalesce around a common denominator or vision. Despite the signing of several declarations of unity among leading opposition activists, for the most part the three traditional political fronts— Liberals, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats— being shaped by the most prominent dissident groups continue to pursue their own uncoordinated and often conflicting visions of change. 5 The question of leadership remains a problem, with most opposition groups known for their individual leaders rather than the movements they represent. Such personality-driven activism has had the tendency, many believe, to keep the opposition fractured. Significant efforts have been undertaken to mobilize political opinion, the most well-known being the Varela Project— started in 1998 by Oswaldo Payá of the Christian Liberation Movement and named after Felix Varela, a Cuban religious leader— and its continuation, the Todos Cubanos (All Cubans) program. The Varela Project relied upon Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, which provides for citizens to introduce legislation by petition containing at least 10,000 signatures. The principles of the Varela petition, demanding the rights to free expression and association, amnesty for nonviolent political prisoners, free enterprise, and electoral reforms, were seen as the first steps to create the necessary space for all Cubans to be able to freely participate in economic and political life on the island. The petition was an unprecedented example of successful political organizing and was presented to the National Assembly with a total of 25,404 signatures in 2002 and 2003. The Cuban legislature rejected the petition, and the Assembly’s Constitution and Legal Affairs Committee responded with its own counterinitiative: to amend the Cuban constitution to make the socialist nature of the Cuban state permanent. The government claimed that its own petition met with 99 percent voter approval. To further crush the Varela Project and the dissident movement at large, beginning on March 18, 2003, the Cuban government arrested, summarily tried, and jailed seventy-five civil society leaders, including independent journalists, librarians, and trade unionists. In spite of the continued existence of mobilizations such as the Varela Project, participants disagreed in their assessment of the dissident movement’s level of impact within Cuba today. Most agreed that because of the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media and their constant vilification in the state press, few Cubans are likely to recognize the dissident movement as a true symbolic or practical alternative. Some participants felt that international support may be the only thread propping the movement up. Others saw the opposition as a weak but nonetheless substantive movement with significant roots. The key issue confronting participants was whether a dissident-based opposition culture could provide the foundation for an opposition movement, or whether dissident groups in their current form would become less relevant in light of changing political and economic dynamics. In the end, a common concern emerged: with greater economic openings in the offing, more is now at stake for the dissident movement than at perhaps any other moment in its history.
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Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa)
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Liberals, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats shape most prominent dissident groups pursue conflicting visions of change. Significant efforts have been undertaken to mobilize political opinion The Varela Project demand the rights to free expression and association, amnesty for nonviolent political prisoners, free enterprise, and electoral reforms, The petition was unprecedented because of the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media few Cubans are likely to recognize the dissident movement as a true symbolic or practical alternative The key issue was whether a dissident-based opposition culture could provide the foundation for an opposition movement, or whether dissident groups in their current form would become less relevant In the end a common concern emerged: with greater economic openings in the offing, more is now at stake for the dissident movement than at perhaps any other moment in its history.
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That increase in communication and access makes status squo opposition movements effective --- achieves Cuban Instability
| 3,451 | 121 | 931 | 513 | 16 | 138 | 0.031189 | 0.269006 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,450 |
HAVANA – Cuba cannot use shock therapy to open its economy but must do everything possible to speed up reforms and “regain time lost,” an academic report recommends.¶ Cuban economist Pavel Vidal did a comparative study of the reforms undertaken by Cuba and Vietnam that was published by the Institute of Developing Economies of Japan’s Foreign Trade Organization (JETRO, for its initials in English.)¶ The author recommends that the liberalization of Cuba’s economy not be limited to agriculture and microbusinesses but be used to facilitate the emergence of a broader private sector and the promotion of direct foreign investment. This would foster productivity and take advantage of the high level of social development on the island, especially in education.¶ Finding the right pace for the changes is crucial, Vidal stresses. Compared with Vietnam’s approach to reforms, Cuba’s disadvantages now are the big size of his state sector, the lack of recent experience with the market and the delay of its leaders to recognize “the structural problems of the model, and the need for dramatic changes. A pessimistic view of the current reforms is that they’re too few and too late.” Vidal is a researcher at the Center of Studies of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana. Using various approaches, he insists on the relevance of undertaking the changes at the right time.¶ For example, he recalls that, because it had already initiated its opening, Vietnam avoided a setback in 1991 when the Soviet Union disappeared, while the collapse of the former socialist power dragged Cuba into a deep crisis.¶ In the current circumstances, Vidal doubts that Cuba will modify everything at one blow, because that could lead to fractures in the stability of the institutional and macroeconomic sectors.
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Arreola, 2012 (Gerardo, Mexican Newspaper citing Vidal, Centro de Estudios sobre la Economia Cubana “Cuba must hasten reforms to regain time lost, economist says” http://progreso-weekly.com/ini/index.php/cuba/3106-cuba-must-hasten-reforms-to-regain-time-lost-economist-says)
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Cuba cannot use shock therapy to open its economy Finding the right pace for the changes is crucial Compared with Vietnam’s approach Cuba’s disadvantages now are the big size of his state sector lack of recent experience with the market and the delay of its leaders to recognize “the structural problems and dramatic changes one blow could lead to fractures in the stability of the institutional and macroeconomic sectors.
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Shock therapy collapses and fractures Cuba’s economic sector
| 1,797 | 60 | 422 | 290 | 8 | 69 | 0.027586 | 0.237931 |
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1,451 |
¶ Gradualists, in response, objected to the elimination of old regulations and institutions ¶ before the new ones are created, warning that the institutional vacuum may have a devastating ¶ impact on output. In particular, they believed that the Chinese strategy of growing out of ¶ socialism (relying on the rapid growth of newly created private businesses) is superior to the ¶ large scale privatization, since property rights in this case can be better preserved and enforced. ¶ There were developed a number of models showing that under particular assumptions slow ¶ liberalization may be preferable to the big bang approach. For instance, Friedman and Johnson ¶ (1995) argued that in the presence of complementarities between government policies and ¶ enterprise attributes and convex adjustment costs for enterprises (i.e. costs increasing with the ¶ speed of reforms) radical "big bang" reforms might not necessarily be optimal.4¶ It was argued (Li, ¶ 1996) that in the absence of competitive product markets (monopolization) on the outset of the ¶ reforms shock therapy can only lead to the reduction of output, while incremental reforms, such as¶ Chinese type dual track pricing system forcing enterprises to meet production quotas, but allowing ¶ them to sell above-the-plan output at market prices, may contribute to the expansion of output. It ¶ was also argued that if state firms are allowed to choose between market and centrally planned ¶ prices (for both - inputs and outputs), then not only the Pareto optimality is guaranteed at the end ¶ of the process, but also with the appropriate state allocation of cheap resources and production ¶ quotas - it could be ensured that at every stage of the transition process no one is going to be ¶ worse off and at least someone is constantly made better off (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 1997). ¶ Roland and Verdier (1999) showed that investment and output may fall as a result of immediate ¶ price deregulation due to the need to find new partners and that under gradual dual track price ¶ liberalization it is possible avoid this effect.
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Popov, 1999 (Vladimir, Institute of European and Russian Studies “SHOCK THERAPY VERSUS GRADUALISM: THE END OF THE DEBATE” http://fir.nes.ru/~vpopov/documents/tr-rec-full.pdf)
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Gradualists object to the elimination of old regulations and institutions warning institutional vacuum may have a devastating impact on output the Chinese strategy of growing out of socialism is superior liberalization may be preferable to the big bang approach in the presence of complementarities between government policies and nterprise attributes and convex adjustment costs for enterprises radical "big bang" reforms might not be optimal in the absence of competitive product markets the reforms shock therapy can only lead to reduction of output, while incremental reforms allow them to sell output investment and output may fall as a result of immediate price deregulation due to the need to find new partners
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Rapid shock therapy collapses Cuban economic output
| 2,092 | 51 | 717 | 347 | 7 | 110 | 0.020173 | 0.317003 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,452 |
3. Gradualist and sequentialist economic strategies can succeed.¶ ‘Shock’ strategies that generate fast change and implementation have¶ worked well in the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, among others, but¶ gradualist and sequentialist strategies have worked well in China, Vietnam,¶ and Uzbekistan. In the early 1990s, the ‘big bang’ approach promoted the¶ rapid embrace of market-oriented reforms, but the results were decidedly¶ mixed for many of the countries that rushed into privatization before the¶ appropriate legal and economic mechanisms were in place. The ‘window of¶ opportunity’ for reforms may not remain open for long before disaster¶ strikes, but the window does not shut instantly. History demonstrates that¶ there is substantial room for gradual reform during the period when the¶ ‘window of opportunity’ is open. ¶
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Burki and Erikson, 2005 (Shahid, Chief Executive Officer @ EMP Financial Advisors; Daniel, Director of Caribbean Programs @ the Inter-American Dialogue Transforming Socialist Economies Lessons for Cuba and Beyon)
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Gradualist strategies can succeed Shock’ strategies that generate fast change and implementation have worked well in the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, but gradualist strategies have worked well in China, Vietnam and Uzbekistan the ‘big bang’ approach promoted rapid market-oriented reforms but the results were mixed for many of the countries that rushed the window does not shut instantly History demonstrates there is substantial room for gradual reform
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No offense --- there is room for gradual reform now --- only rapid changes risk derailing status squo economic stabilization
| 839 | 124 | 463 | 125 | 20 | 69 | 0.16 | 0.552 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,453 |
Despite doubts on both sides of the Florida Straits, the evidence leads us to ¶ conclude that Cuba’s reform process is here to stay. The changes are most ¶ likely irreversible; and the decisions taken to date show substantial willingness to depart from the status quo. The economic team is different than in ¶ previous attempts for reform, the rhetoric is more deliberate, the policies are ¶ more substantive, and the totality of the changes—the benefits they offer, ¶ the expectations they create, and the hardships they will exact on many ¶ Cubans—require a long-term commitment by the Cuban State that makes ¶ reversal at a later date very unlikely. ¶ Fidel Castro no longer runs Cuba. His periodic communications with the ¶ Cuban public—through signed editorial columns called “Reflections”—largely ¶ address foreign policy. While President Raúl Castro regularly pays public ¶ homage to his retired older brother, he has replaced every member of Fidel ¶ Castro’s economic cabinet with appointees of his own. By his rhetoric and his ¶ actions, Raúl has made it clear that policies that once guided the economy ¶ didn’t work and had to be discarded.¶ These statements highlight Raúl Castro’s commitment to a new Cuban ¶ economic model. “Two generations of Cubans have spent their lives under ¶ this rationing system that, despite its harmful egalitarian qualityhas for four ¶ decades ensured every citizen access to basic food at highly subsidized derisory ¶ prices,” he told the Party Congress. The most durable systemic process of ¶ the revolutionary government, the monthly ration book “has remained with ¶ us for too long …it contradicts the substance of the distribution principle that ¶ should characterize Socialism.”109¶ Rhetoric in a top-down society matters. The fact that the Cuban leadership no longer primarily blames the U.S. for all of its economic problems, ¶ publicly recognizes the importance of private entrepreneurs, and openly, if imperfectly, engages in a public debate about ambitious changes to the Cuban system, all demonstrate a new direction to the Cuban public.
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Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
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evidence conclude that Cuba’s reform process is here to stay. The changes are likely irreversible and the decisions taken to date show substantial willingness to depart from the status quo. The economic team is different than previous attempts for reform the rhetoric is more deliberate policies are more substantive, and the totality of the changes the benefits they offer, expectations they create, and the hardships they will exact on many Cubans require a long-term commitment that makes reversal at a later date very unlikely Fidel no longer runs Cuba Raúl has replaced every member of Fidel Castro’s economic cabinet By his rhetoric and his actions Raúl has made it clear that policies that once guided the economy didn’t work and had to be discarded These highlight Raúl commitment to a new Cuban economic model Two generations of Cubans have spent their lives under this system ¶ Rhetoric in a top-down society matters The fact that the Cuba recognizes entrepreneurs and openly, engages in a public debate all demonstrate a new direction to the Cuban public
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Status quo reforms won’t be altered --- but only if a long term commitment is present.
| 2,091 | 87 | 1,065 | 337 | 16 | 175 | 0.047478 | 0.519288 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,454 |
Unless the frame of reference for political relations changes, the potential for economic relations remains hypothetical, as it has been in recent years. However, Cuba's prosperity does not depend on having economic relations—good or bad— with the United States. It depends on Cubans' capacity to reinvent their country. Thus, the positive side of such bilateral relations (if they become a reality) would be a welcome complement, and the negative side could be managed without recourse to extraordinary sacrifices that would mortgage the future. For both governments, a process of normalization will not be viable without passing through gradual stages. Therefore, it is essential to preserve flexibility to adapt to new circumstances without implying, from the Cuban side, ceding national sovereignty or paying unacceptable social costs.¶ The challenges such processes would pose do not exceed current Cuban technical capacities, nor do they pose new problems that would require rebuilding support at a public and governmental level. Cuba has already established such ties with other developed countries in past decades, and the results show that—given minimum acceptable conditions—important advances in strategic economic sectors are possible. In the case of the United States, the differences that stem from the asymmetry of power, the political systems, and the historical legacy will not vanish in the immediate future. Neither, however, is it necessary to assume that the conflict between the two countries is a dead-end street because there are accessible solutions to issues of common interest, even if as yet there is no political framework appropriate to achieve them. The normalization of economic relations between the two nations should not be reduced to a polar conflict between sovereignty and benefits. Complex as it may be, we can and must work to advance beyond what has been achieved so far, for the benefit of both nations.
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Egozcue, 2012 (Jorge Mario Sachez, Researcher and Professor at the Univeristy of Havana’s Centro de Estudios de la Econmia Cubana. Expert in International trade, macroeconomics, social and economic development, and the application of econometric models to monetary, exchange rate, and trade policies. Visiting professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amerique Latine at the University Sorbonne Nouvelle and a visiting scholar at the Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations “The Pending Normalization”)
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Unless the frame of reference for political relations changes the potential for economic relations remains hypothetical Cuba's prosperity does not depend on having economic relations with the U S It depends on Cubans' capacity to reinvent their country positive relations a would be a welcome complement For both governments normalization will not be viable without passing through gradual stages it is essential to preserve flexibility without ceding national sovereignty or paying unacceptable social costs. important advances in strategic economic sectors are possible. the differences that stem from the asymmetry of power, the political systems, will not vanish in the immediate future
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1. Irrelevant - gradual political changes are the only medium for successful economic relations --- the plan collapses that gradual approach
| 1,945 | 140 | 690 | 300 | 21 | 101 | 0.07 | 0.336667 |
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2013
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1,455 |
Normalization in the Context of Economic Liberalization¶ The gains from normalization for Cuba would be augmented considerably if this occurred prior to, simultaneous with, or shortly after a process of economic policy¶ reform within Cuba. Greater prosperity for Cuba would then result also in increased interaction and benefits for the United States as well.¶ Imagine that the following types of reform were implemented in Cuba:¶ Unification of the dual monetary and exchange rate systems;¶ Relaxation of the tax burden and restrictions on self-employment;¶ Establishment of a supportive regulatory framework for small enterprise;¶ Legalization of private sector small, medium and cooperative enterprises (SMCEs);¶ Relaxation of bureaucratic controls on imports, within the context of a realistic exchange rate;¶ Modification of policy towards foreign investment permitting majority ownership in some sectors with a rules-based legal environment regarding admission;¶ Relaxation of controls on foreign investment regarding hiring and remuneration, etc.;¶ Relaxation on controls of funds flowing through NGOs;¶ Relaxed commercial bank lending.¶ !¶ I Implementation of these policy modifications would result in the Cuban¶ economy approximating that of China, characterized by economic liberalization within a one-party system. Some of these policy changes have been under discussion within Cuba for some time. Monetary and exchange rate policy have been under discussion in academia and the Banco Central de Cuba since the 1990s, with an¶ ] ' excellent analysis of the issue published in 2009.13 The conversion of hundreds¶ of state-run beauty shops and barbershops to employee-run cooperatives in April¶ , 2010 also suggests that a process of reform in the regulatory environment for small¶ enterprise may be beginning. Though admittedly a modest change, this may have¶ * major implications for small and medium enterprise in the longer term.14¶ ' Economic changes such as the ones listed above would augment and improve¶ Cuba's interaction with the world including the United States and have salutary¶ I effects on the domestic economy. The unification of the monetary and exchange rate¶ !¶ systems and establishment of a realistic exchange rate would end the dysfunctional¶ and counter-productive incentive structure that has deformed the economic behavior and lives of citizens for almost two decades. A realistic exchange rate is also necessary to link the domestic economy with the rest of the world in a rational manner. Monetary and exchange rate unification would provide the incentive structure and the resources for domestic enterprises, public and private, to export effectively, as they would receive the foreign exchange earnings from their foreign sales at a reasonable rate of exchange. The result, in time, would then be increased exports to the United States and the world, and increased substitution of imported products with domestically produced goods and services. Such unification would¶ also permit foreign investors to have the possibility of investing in sectors servicing the domestic economy as well as foreign exchange-earning markets outside Cuba.
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Ritter, 2012 (Archilbald, Research professor Emeritus in the Department of Economics and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton university in Ottawa; Worked at the United Nations Economic Commission for latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago, Chile, the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Government of Canada, and the Long-Range Planning Unit, Ministry of planning and national development; Chair of Economics Department at Carleton. Works on the international dimensions of develop and on Latin American development with an emphasis on Cuba and Chile. Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations “The Potential Economic Implications of Normalization”)
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The gains from normalization for Cuba would be augmented if this occurred prior to, simultaneous with, or shortly after a process of economic policy reform within Cuba Implementation of economic liberalization within a one-party system. policy changes have been under discussion within Cuba a process of reform may be beginning Though modest this have major implications in the longer term Economic changes would augment and improve Cuba's interaction with the world including the U S and have salutary effects on the domestic economy unification of the monetary and exchange rate would end the dysfunctional and counter-productive incentive structure that has deformed the economic behavior A realistic exchange rate is necessary to link the domestic economy with the rest of the world Monetary and exchange rate unification would provide the incentive structure and the resources for domestic enterprises, public and private, to export effectively, as they would receive the foreign exchange earnings from their foreign sales at a reasonable rate of exchange The result would then be increased exports to the U S and the world unification would permit foreign investors to have the possibility of investing in sectors servicing the domestic economy as well as foreign exchange-earning markets outside Cuba.
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2. And the plan’s economic benefits will fail in the long run --- even if status squo reforms don’t happen its alternative causes to aff solvency --- Specifically with their economy impact --- lack of successful Cuban reforms prevents a broader spillover and normalization of the world economy
| 3,177 | 293 | 1,308 | 470 | 48 | 200 | 0.102128 | 0.425532 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,456 |
Cuba occupies a special place in the history of American imperialism. It has served as something of a laboratory for the development of the methods by which the United States has pursued the creation of a global empire. In the aggregate, the means used by the United States in Cuba constitute a microcosm of the American imperial experience: armed intervention and military occupation; nation building and constitution writing; capital penetration and cultural saturation; the installation of puppet regimes, the formation of clientele political classes, and the organization of proxy armies; the imposition of binding treaties; the establishment of a permanent military base; economic assistance— or not—and diplomatic recognition—or not—as circumstances warranted. And after 1959, trade sanctions, political isolation, covert operations, and economic embargo. All that is American imperialism has been practiced in Cuba.7
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Treto, 2012 (Carlos, Professor and Senior researcher at the University of Havana’s Centro de Estudios Hemisfericos y de Estados Unidos and a member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. Former Cuban ambassador the EU and to Belgium and Luxembourg and a former Cuban Minister to Ethiopia. Visiting scholar at universities in the US, Mexico and Europe; visiting professor at Beloit College, the University of Basque Country, and the University of Winnipeg. Debating U.S.- Cuban Relations Chp: “Cuba’s National Security vis-à-vis the United States”)
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Cuba occupies a special place in American imperialism It has served as a laboratory for the development of the methods by which the U S has pursued the creation of a global empire the means used by the U S in Cuba constitute a microcosm of the imperial experience armed intervention nation building capital penetration installation of puppet regimes, the formation of clientele political classes and proxy armies imposition of binding treaties permanent military base economic assistance as circumstances warranted
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3. The Affs inevitably going to be hostile --- Cuba’s American’s Imperialistic outlet --- We will attempt to expedite their reforms.
| 923 | 133 | 514 | 133 | 21 | 80 | 0.157895 | 0.601504 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,457 |
With normalization, trade between the two countries would expand considerably, with beneficial consequences for economic performance and well-being for the citizens of both countries but most importantly for Cuban citizens. Given the rapidity with which agricultural imports to Cuba from the United States expanded after food and medicines were exempted from the embargo, geo-economic gravitational forces—-i.e. proximity, complementarity, and lower transportation costs—between¶ the two countries, together with the diversified range of goods and services that the U.S. economy can provide will lead to a rapid expansion of a broad range of U.S. exports to Cuba. Moreover, many Cuban-Americans in particular, and notably those based in Florida, are poised to play a major role in facilitating economic interaction between the two countries. This community includes people with a strong interest in promoting such interactions together with the financial resources and a broad range of business-oriented experience and talent to do so.¶ Despite these positive factors, Cuban merchandise exports to the United States likely will increase, but only modestly due to supply side constraints. In contrast, Cuba's service exports to the United States—notably tourism—should increase significandy.¶ A normalization of relations would be of major benefit to the United States, which would acquire a nearby market for its merchandise exports. With some intermediation by the Cuban-American as well as a broader business community, U.S. exports of many types of products would increase quickly. Such exports would pardy displace some products currently imported by Cuba from Europe, Latin America, and Asia as well as Canada. One indication of how quickly U.S. exports to Cuba would increase is provided by the U.S. liberalization of agricultural and medical exports in 2002. From 2001 to 2008,agricultural exports increased from $4.6 million to almost $700 million (see Table 9.1). Cuba's increased foreign exchange availability was pardy responsible for this increase in food imports. In effect, U.S. farmers, exporting enterprises, the producing states and the U.S. economy generally were benefitting from greater Cuban prosperity.
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Ritter, 2012 (Archilbald, Research professor Emeritus in the Department of Economics and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton university in Ottawa; Worked at the United Nations Economic Commission for latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago, Chile, the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Government of Canada, and the Long-Range Planning Unit, Ministry of planning and national development; Chair of Economics Department at Carleton. Works on the international dimensions of develop and on Latin American development with an emphasis on Cuba and Chile. Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations “The Potential Economic Implications of Normalization”)
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With normalization trade would expand considerably Given the rapidity with which agricultural imports expanded food and medicines were exempted from the embargo proximity, complementarity, and lower transportation costs with the diversified range of goods and services that the U.S. economy can provide will lead to a rapid expansion Cuban merchandise exports will increase U.S. exports of many types of products would increase quickly Such would displace some products
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FOR AFF that has a larger economic reform --- Plan massively and rapidly increases exports
| 2,224 | 90 | 469 | 325 | 15 | 68 | 0.046154 | 0.209231 |
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1,458 |
Under the real world of Castroism, however, the answer must be a terse one: none. The embargo has not harmed the Cuban economy. Cooperation between the United States and Cuba would have been impossible from the very beginning of the Revolution for legal, political, ideological, strategic, and economic reasons, not to mention others of a philosophical or moral character. In other words, it was in the past, and continues to be at present, contrary to the United States’ national interest and to its fundamental foreign policy orientation and objectives to lift the embargo under Castro’s conditions: that is, without a firm commitment to the political democratization and market reforms that his regime has stubbornly opposed for the last 40 years. However, if, purely for the sake of an intellectual exercise, we were to assume that the embargo had never existed, its nonexistence would have had no effect whatsoever on the Cuban economy. Castro simply would have squandered U.S. instead of Soviet resources. Given Castro’s objectives and policies, the ultimate result for the Cuban economy could not have been any different, regardless of who had financed his Revolution.
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Jorge, 2000 (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)
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The embargo has not harmed the Cuban economy Cooperation would have been impossible for legal political, ideological strategic, and economic reasons contrary to the U S national interest and to its fundamental foreign policy orientation to lift the embargo if the embargo had never existed its nonexistence would have had no effect on the Cuban economy Given Castro’s objectives and policies, the result for the economy could not have been any different
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The embargo is irrelevant --- doesn’t have any effect on Cuba’s Economy
| 1,175 | 71 | 453 | 187 | 12 | 72 | 0.064171 | 0.385027 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,459 |
Cuban President Raul Castro made the strongest statement yet that the island nation is preparing for a post-Castro era in announcing yesterday that he will step down in five years with plans to institute term limits.¶ He also replaced his No. 2 with a younger Cuban who would be poised to rule if something were to befell Mr. Castro before his second term ends in five years – the first time the nation would be led by someone who did not directly fight in the 1959 Cuban revolution.¶ Castro himself told lawmakers the nation was at a moment of “historic transcendence.”¶ But while a monumental announcement internally, it does not necessarily imply that a vastly different Cuba awaits in 2018 – one of capitalism and free elections, for example. And the generational transition underway faces several risks as Cuba inches forward with reforms to save its economy, says William LeoGrande, a Cuba expert at American University.¶ “One risk is that it fails, that resistance from... party bureaucrats prevents the government from carrying out reform,” he says. “The other is that the reforms will work but they create both winners and losers, that they’ll intensify economic inequality and undermine the social safety network that Cuba has been so proud of.”¶ Raul Castro, who temporarily took over from his ailing brother Fidel Castro in 2006 and permanently two years later, has long been considered the more practical of the Castro brothers. In just under seven years he has already ushered in historic change, introducing a legalized real estate market, an end to travel restrictions, and more permissions for private businesses.¶ He had long said he was committed to generational change in top leadership but his words were never followed by action. The Castro brothers have preserved legitimacy in Cuba for several reasons, including free healthcare and education for all. But much of it came from the direct role that government officials played in the successful revolution that overthrew a US-backed regime that was widely unpopular.¶ On Sunday, however, Castro hinted that a non-Cold War figure will soon lead the nation, replacing Jose Ramon Machado Ventura with Miguel Diaz-Canel, aged 52, as his number 2.¶ Term limits¶ On Sunday he said that he would like to establish two consecutive term limits with age limits for leaders, including presidents. In doing so, he would set the first example, in contrast to his brother, who held onto power for nearly 50 years.¶ Yet while it’s a direct break with the Fidel Castro government, it does so in the name of preserving the old system, which Raul Castro reiterated on Sunday. "I was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to Cuba," he said. "I was elected to defend, maintain, and continue to perfect socialism, not destroy it."¶ “He is slowly but continuously rolling out his version of a new Cuba, which is half continuity with the past and half breaking with past,” says Ted Henken, president of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. That means that he is forging forward with change, but in a way that “protects the top-down control and authoritarian nature of the regime,” Mr. Henken, also a professor at Baruch College at The City University of New York, says. “This is the first sign of a real of generational transfer. But it doesn’t mean at all that there will be a transition.”¶ That’s because the changes announced are not the result of grassroots work but a hand-picked succession in an authoritarian context. At any time, any member of the younger generation could be reined in for not aligning closely enough with the revolution, says Henken. “This is the older generation methodically and thoughtfully choosing people they can then trust with their revolution,” he says.
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Llana, 2/25 (Sara, Seven year researcher on Latin America for The Monitor’s European Bureau Chief --- Master in Journalism from Columbia and a BA from UM “Is Raul Castro ushering in political change for Cuba?” http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/raul-castro-ushering-political-change-cuba)
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Raul made the strongest statement announcing that he will step down while a monumental announcement it does not imply a different Cuba in 2018 the transition faces several risks as Cuba inches with reforms to its economy One risk is that it fails, that resistance from bureaucrats prevents the government from carrying out reform The other is reforms will work but create both winners and losers that ’ll intensify economic inequality and undermine the social safety network Castro had long said he was committed to generational change in top leadership but his words were never followed by action. The Castro brothers have preserved legitimacy But it came from the role officials played in the successful revolution that overthrew a US-backed regime Castro hinted that a non-Cold War figure will lead Miguel Diaz-Canel he said that he would like to establish two consecutive term limits it does so in the name of preserving the old system which Rau reiterated "I was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to defend, maintain, and continue to perfect socialism, not destroy it."¶ He is protects the top-down control and authoritarian nature of the regime, This is the first sign of a transfer. But it doesn’t mean at all that there will be a transition the changes announced are not the result of grassroots work but hand-picked succession in an authoritarian context any member of the younger generation could be reined in for not aligning closely enough with the revolution This is the older generation methodically and thoughtfully choosing people they can then trust
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1. Even if the status quo reforms aren’t successful that still doesn’t take out the scenario -- 1NC evidence indicates that when the Aff floods the Cuban market with capital its
| 3,764 | 177 | 1,581 | 627 | 31 | 260 | 0.049442 | 0.414673 |
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1,460 |
Will the Reforms Work?¶ There are game-changing events outside of Cuba’s control that can negatively ¶ affect the future success of the reforms. Cuba’s economic reforms cannot ¶ insulate the island from hurricanes, global fluctuations in food prices, ¶ nickel prices, and tourism flows, or the risk that Venezuela’s voters or their ¶ president’s poor health will sever the lifeline of petroleum that flows from ¶ Caracas to Havana. ¶ Within Cuba’s control, however, is whether the program can substantively ¶ achieve the ambitious goals set out by the Guidelines, and whether the ¶ leadership will see the process through, and bring the Cuban people along, ¶ during a period that is likely to be painful and uncertain.¶ It is critically important that Cuba is liberalizing the rules. But, the ¶ prospects for success should not be exaggerated. The reforms announced and implemented to date are unlikely to be sufficient to overcome all of Cuba’s ¶ economic problems. Not every Cuban who is laid-off will be able to form his ¶ or her own business or find alternative employment. Not every Cuban has ¶ the skill to be self-employed or to work in an enterprise created and run by ¶ others.115 Most lack the capital or training required to start or manage such ¶ businesses. Many will continue to rely on support from relatives abroad and ¶ do jobs that are not a part of the formal economy to get by.¶ Even though Cubans have historically learned entrepreneurial skills just to ¶ make ends meet, they still face problems—identified by observers including ¶ the Cuba Study Group,116 Dr. Archibald Ritter, Dr. Manuel Orozco and others—that make forming a business and running it profitably really difficult. ¶ Dr. Orozco explained, “The 178 [licensed] activities pertain predominantly ¶ to the service industry, yet these activities have severe limitations. For example, ¶ there are provisions to establish a paladar, but not a food manufacturing ¶ enterprise. If an entrepreneur wants to establish a manufacturing business ¶ in the food sector, such as building a food processing factory, she will need ¶ to hire cooking experts, health quality testers, marketing officials, a raw ¶ material food buyer, an accountant with legal skills to meet all regulations. ¶ The country still doesn’t have the incentives to motivate a [Cuban] national ¶ to invest $50,000 … to carry out such an enterprise, yet it will have a larger, ¶ multiplying effect than a paladar. Enterprises like this can be food suppliers ¶ to the paladars and motivate greater competition.”117¶ Such findings have led Dr. Ritter among others to conclude that there ¶ is a low probability of sufficient job creation by the micro-enterprise and ¶ cooperative sectors to absorb 1,000,000 Cuban workers in the next few years, ¶ and that further liberalization will be necessary.118¶ More broadly, Adam Hersh, an economist at the Center for American ¶ Progress, and a scholar of economic transitions in China and Vietnam, told ¶ CDA: “The reforms proposed with respect to layoffs and self-employment ¶ and the end to the libreta are economically important … and likely to deliver ¶ general welfare benefits through improved access to goods and services. But ¶ so far the reforms envisioned will do little to address Cuba’s fundamental ¶ economic problems in the productive structure of the Cuban economy: ¶ inefficiency, low productivity, and antiquated capital stock. Cuba’s challenge will be to tackle this next stage of reform while preserving its high level of ¶ development in health and education.”119¶ Cuba needs foreign exchange to import capital goods from abroad. ¶ Without it, the island cannot create wealth beyond the retail sector in ways ¶ that utilize Cubans and newly-legalized small businesses. Today, no clear ¶ avenue to increased foreign exchange is open, and agriculture reforms have ¶ yet to reduce Cuba’s import bill. ¶ Similarly, no clear direction exists for large businesses on questions such ¶ as production, investment, or how much latitude managers will have to make ¶ productivity decisions. Experts tell us this is not a question of private versus ¶ public—as reforms in China have demonstrated—but about whether the ¶ system, however it is constructed, will allow entrepreneurial and economically ¶ rational decisions to be made
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Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
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Will the Reforms Work There are game-changing events outside of Cuba’s control prospects for success should not be exaggerated The reforms announced are unlikely to be sufficient to overcome all of Cuba’s problems. Not every Cuban who is laid-off will be able to form his or her own business or find alternative employment. Not every Cuban has the skill to be self-employed or to work in an enterprise created and run by others Most lack the capital or training required to start or manage businesses Many will rely on support from relatives abroad and jobs that are not a part of the formal economy Even though Cubans have entrepreneurial skills they still face problems that make forming a business and running it profitably really difficult The country doesn’t have the incentives to motivate a Cuban to invest $50,000 to carry out such an enterpris findings have led others to conclude that there a low probability of sufficient job creation by the micro-enterprise and cooperative sectors to absorb 1,000,000 Cuban workers in the next few years and further liberalization will be necessary The reforms proposed with respect to layoffs and self-employment and the end to the libreta are economically importan But the reforms envisioned will do little to address Cuba’s fundamental economic problems inefficiency, low productivity, and antiquated capital stock Cuba’s challenge will be to tackle this next stage of reform while preserving health and education Cuba needs foreign exchange Without it, the island cannot create wealth beyond the retail sector
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Plan is crucial to Cuba’s economy --- Reforms don’t go far enough to imply enough workers and stabilize the economy
| 4,317 | 115 | 1,559 | 706 | 20 | 250 | 0.028329 | 0.354108 |
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1,461 |
Harness foreign knowledge for domestic gain¶ Advanced economies possess a wealth of knowledge about building a¶ market economy and making loss-making enterprises viable. However,¶ socialist countries have traditionally been reluctant to embrace foreign¶ expertise, as a result of strong nationalism, residual hostilities from the¶ Cold War, and concern for developing a domestic private sector. These¶ are indeed important considerations, but this does not mean that foreign¶ knowledge should be shunned; quite the opposite, it should be welcomed. International know-how can increase managerial efficiency,¶ improve corporate governance, and prevent the crony capitalism that has¶ stalked many of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.¶ Slovakia remains the example of a country that did all that it could utilizing only domestic managers, and it did a credible job for a people with¶ scarce experience with capitalism. But the needed restructuring was¶ avoided in order to reward political cronies, undermining national competitiveness
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Burki and Erikson, 2005 (Shahid, Chief Executive Officer @ EMP Financial Advisors; Daniel, Director of Caribbean Programs @ the Inter-American Dialogue Transforming Socialist Economies Lessons for Cuba and Beyon)
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Harness foreign knowledge for domestic gain Advanced economies possess knowledge about building a market economy and making loss-making enterprises viable However socialist countries have been reluctant to embrace foreign expertise as a result of strong nationalism, hostilities and concern These are important considerations, but this does not mean that foreign knowledge should be shunned the opposite, it should be welcomed International know-how can increase managerial efficiency prove corporate governance, and prevent the crony capitalism Slovakia remains the example utilizing only domestic managers, and the needed restructuring was avoided in order to reward political cronies, undermining national competitiveness
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No link --- plan is uniquely key to making Cuban reforms successful and avoids empowering crony capitalists and political corruptions
| 1,044 | 133 | 723 | 148 | 20 | 97 | 0.135135 | 0.655405 |
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1,462 |
Cuba’s economic future will be determined by the leadership and circumstances at the time, and many argue that the country would be well¶ suited to a gradualist approach towards the ‘market socialism’ practiced in¶ several East Asian countries. However, Eastern Europe also presents a telling¶ example for Cuba, as the island’s geographical and cultural orientation is¶ similarly westward-looking. In terms of size, proximity to advanced¶ markets, and rich human and intellectual capital, Cuba has much in¶ common with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Slovakia and¶ Bulgaria both eventually did undertake a shock therapy, but only after¶ years of half-hearted measures that increased the impoverishment of their¶ peoples. Moving away from a planned economy entails managing¶ significant, and often abrupt, change, but the temptation to proceed slowly¶ can result in market distortions that cripple the economy down the road.¶ The Cuban government is no stranger to decisive action. But the question¶ remains whether Cuba will adopt the more comprehensive reform path¶ that has benefited the Czech Republic, or instead engage in the series of¶ adjustments that have hampered the economic development of Slovakia,¶ Bulgaria, and other lagging countries in the region.
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Burki and Erikson, 2005 (Shahid, Chief Executive Officer @ EMP Financial Advisors; Daniel, Director of Caribbean Programs @ the Inter-American Dialogue Transforming Socialist Economies Lessons for Cuba and Beyon)
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Cuba’s economic future will be determined by leadership and circumstances and many argue that the country would be well suited to a gradualist approach However Eastern Europe presents a telling example as the island’s geographical and cultural orientation Moving away from a planned economy entails managing significant, and often abrupt, change, but the temptation to proceed slowly can result in market distortions that cripple the economy down the road
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No Economy impact --- slow reforms cripple long term economic successes
| 1,274 | 71 | 454 | 191 | 11 | 69 | 0.057592 | 0.361257 |
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1,463 |
Poland and Romania began their transition processes¶ with similar initial conditions and similar policy aims¶ in mind. Yet Poland proceeded in implementing its¶ reforms in a rapid fashion, while Romania delayed¶ implementation. This may appear as a deliberate¶ choice on Romania’s part, as many still contend that¶ gradualism is a viable option in the presence of political constraints. For example, Coricelli (1996) notes¶ that there is often a need for initial transfers to economic “losers” to create support for and foster reforms, and such transfers should be incorporated into¶ policy design. Indeed, gradualists were not opposed¶ to stabilization per se, nor were gradualists necessarily¶ interested in keeping reforms open to reversal. Indeed, most gradualist strategies often resulted from a¶ lack of political consensus over what to do, a desire to¶ soften initial shocks, and fears that initial reforms¶ that create a backlash would make future reforms politically unsustainable (Lavigne 1999).¶ Yet it is the potential presence of this backlash that¶ makes the choice of rapid reform compelling. If certain reforms are implemented piecemeal, opponents¶ have the time to mobilize and become a more formidable force of opposition. Rapid reform that utilizes¶ the economic crisis as a window of opportunity does¶ not meet with a “groundswell of political opposition”¶ threatening to reverse reforms (Åslund, Boone and¶ Johnson 1996). Windows of opportunity, in which¶ potentially unpopular reforms can be rapidly implemented with little opposition, do exist in transition¶ because the deeper the crisis, the more willing the¶ public is to accept deeper reforms. Many of the initial costs of stabilization are temporary and spread¶ over much of the population; institutional reforms¶ such as privatization are usually those reforms that¶ attract the most vocal rent-seeking minorities (Diamond 1995).
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Gauck, 2003 (Jennifer, London School of Economics and Political Sciences “MACROECONOMIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN EARLY TRANSITION: LESSONS FOR CUBA FROM POLAND AND ROMANIA” http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume13/pdfs/gauck.pdf)
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many contend that gradualism is a viable option in the presence of political constraints. Coricelli notes that there is a need for initial transfers to economic “losers” to create support for and foster reforms most gradualist strategies resulted from a lack of political consensus over what to do, a desire to soften initial shocks, and fears that initial reforms that create a backlash would make future reforms politically unsustainable it is the potential presence of this backlash that makes rapid reform compelling If certain reforms are implemented piecemeal opponents have the time to mobilize and become a more formidable force of opposition Rapid reform that utilizes economic crisis as a window of opportunity does not meet with a “groundswell of political opposition threatening to reverse reforms Windows of opportunity in which potentially unpopular reforms can be rapidly implemented with little opposition exist in transition because the deeper the crisis, the more willing the public is to accept deeper reforms. of the initial costs of stabilization are temporary and spread
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That is because political opposition mounts and grows during periods of long term change.
| 1,908 | 89 | 1,092 | 285 | 14 | 169 | 0.049123 | 0.592982 |
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1,464 |
At the beginning of 2010, the Cuban government continued to move slowly on domestic matters. The disastrous 2008 hurricane season only served to heighten the leadership's indecisiveness on economic reforms, which in any case never lived up to the expectations raised by Raul Castro's earlier call for "structural changes." Still, throughout 2009, ordinary Cubans heard hints of change. There were calls to increase productivity and warnings that some subsidies would be reduced or eliminated. There was talk of doing away with the ration book, and there was a new slogan, /ahorro o muerte! (saving or death!), along with critiques of the "paternalistic state."96 The latter, of course, followed naturally from the revolution's socialist turn as well as the Comandante's aversion to decentralization and the market. In keeping with his emphasis on la institucionalidad, Raul Castro led a whirlwind of meetings in mid-2009: the National Defense Council, the1' Council of Ministers, the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee (CC) and the National Assembly. The CC meeting postponed the Party Congress, which had been scheduled for the second half of 2009. In Castro's words,¶ "identifying our principal problems will take us some more time."97 Cuba's "principal problems," however, had long been identified. In 1970, Fidel Castro acknowledged them, and Granma reprinted an excerpt of his speech in November 2009:¶ Lack of productivity is an abyss that threatens to swallow our human resources and the country's wealth. We have to become aware, the workers need to raise their conciencia about this problem. We need to overcome bottlenecks, be more organized, work diligendy every day with more discipline, rationality, common sense.98¶ From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the Cuban economy registered modest growth only after the government received large increases in Soviet subsidies and applied the post-Stalinist model of relative decentralization and material incentives. Unlike his brother, Raul Castro embraced market socialism and remained more open to economic reforms, except he favored a failed model over the model that has yielded economic success for China and Vietnam. More than three years after succeeding the Comandante, Raul had thwarted popular expectations that his government might create "a breathing space and perhaps a turning point in the nation's economic environment," and opted instead to prolong the status quo "in spite of its manifest inefficiency."99 As a result, the Cuban economy tottered, its fragility no doubt aggravated by the global financial crisis. Still, in good or bad times, the regime never put forward an economic program that placed living standards and individual initiatives at the center. Instead, it preferred token measures such as allowing beauticians to take over Havana beauty shops by paying a $45 monthly tax or piloting a program that permitted taxi drivers to use their vehicles as their own if they assumed responsibility for maintenance. In the meantime, the state sector was bloated by at least a million excess workers.100¶ In part, Cuban leaders had failed to grapple with the country's economic woes due to their military mindset. At the Central Committee gathering in late July 2009, Raul Castro repeatedly mentioned the party's failure to replicate in the economy the strength it had achieved with its armed forces. Both, he added, were equally essential to national security.101 In the early 1990s, when he was defense minister, he had said something similar: "Beans are more important than cannons."102 Each sector, however, thrives on different principles: A strong military depends on an inviolable discipline down the chain of command; a strong economy needs entrepreneurship, innovation, competition and, yes, self-interest. At the CC meeting, Raul brought up "false unanimity," a pernicious practice that he said stifled "debate and a healthy discrepancy." His words harked back to the Llamamiento, the convocation of the 1992 party congress that . decried la doble moral—saying one thing in public while believing another—and called on the citizenry to speak out without el a/an de unanimidad, the zeal of¶ unanimity.103 A few years later, Raul said it differently: "We need to learn to disagree with those in charge. We don't say anything in meetings but we talk endlessly in hallways."104 Raul was, nonetheless, not inviting disagreements with the Comandante, himself or the PCC. How else but under constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties could citizens feel safe to freely express healthy discrepancies?
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Perez-Stable, 2011 (Marifeli, Professor of Sociology at Florida Internatonal University and non-resident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and Cuba “Policy in Place for 50 Years Hasn’t Worked”)
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the Cuban government continued to move slowly on domestic matters. The disastrous 2008 hurricane season only served to heighten the leadership's indecisiveness on economic reforms which never lived up to the expectations In keeping with his emphasis Castro led a whirlwind identifying our principal problems will take us some more time." Cuba's "principal problems had long been identified Lack of productivity is an abyss that threatens to swallow our human resources and the country's wealth Unlike his brother Raul embraced market socialism and remained more open except he favored a failed model over the model that has yielded economic success for China and Vietnam Raul opted to prolong the status quo in spite of manifest inefficiency As a result, the Cuban economy tottered its fragility aggravated by the global financial crisis the regime never put forward an economic program it preferred token measures the state sector was bloated by at least a million excess workers Cuban leaders had failed to grapple with the country's economic woes due to their military mindset
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No public support for Raul now --- his reforms are failing to revitalize the status squo now
| 4,593 | 92 | 1,081 | 706 | 17 | 171 | 0.024079 | 0.24221 |
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1,465 |
Venezuela and China—and other countries—are making significant investments in Cuba’s oil industry, hoping to find commercially viable deposits in the ¶ Gulf of Mexico. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Canadians continue to ¶ flock to Cuba’s beaches and urban centers, while a Canadian company plays ¶ a key role in the nickel sector. According to Canadian officials, the country ¶ hopes to leverage its trade and travel relations with Cuba to offer technical ¶ assistance on economic reforms.
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Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)
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Venezuela and China are making significant investments in Cuba’s oil industry hoping to find commercially viable deposits hundreds of thousands of Canadians continue to flock to Cuba’s beaches and urban centers while a Canadian company plays a key role in the nickel sector. According to Canadian officials, the country hopes to leverage its trade and travel relations with Cuba to offer technical assistance on economic reforms
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Venezuela and China are already investing in Cuba’s oil industry
| 495 | 65 | 428 | 78 | 10 | 66 | 0.128205 | 0.846154 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,466 |
Mexico’s four-month-old administration on Wednesday appeared to overcome its first political crisis after opposition leaders said that they had largely settled their differences with the government.¶ The agreement, which came after an emergency meeting of party heads, appears to put the government’s economic reform back on track in a turnaround that will doubtless ease investor concerns.¶ Billions of dollars have flowed into Mexico in recent months on hopes that centrist President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party will push a series of reforms aimed at transforming Latin America’s second-largest economy into a more vibrant emerging market.¶ The inflows have pushed the local stock market index to record highs. In one clear sign of investors’ new-found fascination with Mexico, the local currency this month strengthened against the US dollar, reaching an 18-month high.¶ Speaking after the meeting on Wednesday, Jesús Zambrano, leader of the leftwing Democratic Revolution Party, suggested that things were getting back to normal after a tense week. “At least we have laid the foundations for continuing along the reform path,” Reforma, the Mexican daily, quoted him as saying.¶ A statement by Mexico’s interior ministry, which organised the meeting, confirmed that the parties had agreed to keep working together to further the so-called Pact for Mexico, a list of economic, social and political reform pledges signed in December by party leaders.¶ “Everyone reaffirmed their conviction that the reform agenda laid out in the Pact comes before party interests,” said the statement.¶ In Lima, Luis Videgaray, Mexico’s finance minister, expressed optimism that a banking-reform bill, which the government had planned to unveil this week but postponed because of the political tension, would get back on track.¶ “I haven’t the slightest doubt the financial reform will be presented in the next few days,” he told Reuters. “I’m sure it’ll have strong support from the political forces and representatives in the Pact for Mexico.”¶ The latest events come after Democratic Revolution Party members and the conservative National Action Party, both signatories to the Pact, recently accused government officials of using social-assistance programmes in the state of Veracruz to gain an advantage in forthcoming elections.¶ Almost half of Mexico’s 31 states go to the polls in the coming months, and political rivalries have already started to surface in the run-up to voting day.¶ Roy Campos, a pollster in Mexico City, argues that Mr Peña Nieto’s swift and energetic response to the building storm – after initially underestimating the problem – went a long way to resolving what could have become much worse.¶ Not least, on Tuesday Mexico’s leader gave a rousing speech in the state of Puebla where he asked all the political parties to join him in helping to ensure that social programmes were protected from the threat of use for political gain “Let’s bulletproof them,” he said.¶ That, says Mr Campos, allowed everyone involved to claim some sort of victory – the opposition parties that they brought the administration to task, and Mr Peña Nieto that he was able to pull in the opposition in a joint crusade against corruption.¶ “Peña Nieto has recovered very quickly,” says Mr Campos. “The pact is far from broken.”¶ Yet it seems clear that the Veracruz scandal serves as a reminder of how carefully Mr Peña Nieto must tread in the coming months as he seeks to bring his economic reform agenda to fruition.¶
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Thomson 4-24 - Adam Thomson is the FT's Mexico and Central America correspondent (Adam, “President Enrique Peña Nieto works to soothe Mexico tensions”, April 24 of 2013, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/628aabae-acfa-11e2-9454-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2YVlziShn)
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Mexico’s four-month-old administration appeared to overcome its first political crisis after opposition leaders said that they had largely settled their differences with the government The agreement appears to put the government’s economic reform back on track the parties had agreed to keep working together to further the so-called Pact for Mexico, a list of economic, social and political reform pledges signed in December by party leaders Everyone reaffirmed their conviction that the reform agenda laid out in the Pact comes before party interests I’m sure it’ll have strong support from the political forces and representatives in the Pact for Mexico Nieto’s swift and energetic response to the building storm went a long way to resolving what could have become much worse Mexico’s leader gave a rousing speech allowed everyone involved to claim some sort of victory – the opposition parties that they brought the administration to task the Veracruz scandal serves as a reminder of how carefully Mr Peña Nieto must tread in the coming months as he seeks to bring his economic reform agenda to fruition
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Nieto has to credibility to follow through with his reform efforts now – but he has to tread carefully
| 3,542 | 102 | 1,107 | 561 | 19 | 177 | 0.033868 | 0.315508 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,467 |
The final implication of Mexican nationalism for U.S.-Mexico relations is the nearly insurmountable obstacle it erected to political alliances between Mexican actors and their U.S. counterparts, which has broken down only gradually and incompletely since the mid-1990s. For decades, the fear of being tarred as a traitor to the nation prevented Mexican leaders from seeking allies to their cause in the United States and thereby deprived U.S. actors of an easy point of entry into Mexican politics. Mexicans who ignored this taboo paid the price even in the final years of the twentieth century. In the 1980s, the then opposition National Action Party openly elicited U.S. backing for its charges of electoral fraud and associated actions of civil disobedience, producing a nationalist backlash in Mexico that sharply undercut the legitimacy of its claims. In the early 1990s, Mexican opponents of the North American Free Trade Agreement formed an alliance with their U.S. and Canadian counterparts, leading to accusations of having organized traitorous “campaigns against Mexico in the United States.” ¶ Carlos Salinas’ 1990 decision to summon U.S. assistance to lock in his domestic economic reform agenda through a bilateral trade treaty and his active lobbying to gain U.S. congressional approval of the treaty dealt a blow to this long-standing taboo. As a result, cross-border alliances are now increasingly common and accepted, but they are heavily concentrated among civil society actors. Mexico’s continuing anxiety about U.S. political domination, however, means that tolerance for cross-border political alliances is much less developed. While Mexican policy makers and analysts of the bilateral relationship have significantly more freedom of action to work with their U.S. counterparts in the early twenty-first century than did their predecessors, they still must watch their step or risk having their reputation sullied for being excessively “pro-gringo.” Mexicans remain uneasy living next door to a superpower; they continue to worry that the United States might get the notion to translate its power into domination of Mexico, its politics, policy, and culture, and they thus still approach their neighbor with trepidation. As a result, Mexican politicians and policy makers still must take care to avoid the appearance of being too willing to accept support and guidance from north of the border.
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Starr 12 - Director, U.S.-Mexico Network Associate Professor (NTT) University Fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy University of Southern California (Pamela, “U.S.-Mexico Relations and Mexican Domestic Politics”, October 6 of 2012, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD4QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcollege.usc.edu%2Fusmexnet%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2010%2F10%2FCamp-Oxford-paper-final.doc&ei=mTLYUZTDMbOLyQGT14GwCQ&usg=AFQjCNH_cqiYTQRo7SFmpfWugH9ABshhCg&sig2=_M2KmLNnt3e8v4vVshc_fQ)
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The implication of Mexican nationalism for U.S.-Mexico relations is the nearly insurmountable obstacle it erected to political alliances between Mexican actors and their U.S. counterparts the fear of being tarred as a traitor to the nation prevented Mexican leaders from seeking allies to their cause in the U S and thereby deprived U.S. actors of an easy point of entry into Mexican politics Mexicans who ignored this taboo paid the price Mexican opponents of N A F T A formed an alliance with U.S. leading to accusations of having organized traitorous “campaigns against Mexico in the U S cross-border alliances are heavily concentrated among civil society actors Mexico’s continuing anxiety about U.S. political domination, however, means that tolerance for cross-border political alliances is much less developed While Mexican policy makers and analysts of the bilateral relationship have significantly more freedom of action they still must watch their step or risk having their reputation sullied for being excessively “pro-gringo.” Mexicans continue to worry that the U S might get the notion to translate its power into domination of Mexico, its politics, policy, and culture
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Overwhelming opposition to the AFF – the plan is an insurmountable obstacle which kills Nieto’s credibility
| 2,415 | 107 | 1,183 | 369 | 16 | 183 | 0.04336 | 0.495935 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,468 |
For one, Peña Nieto will likely bring about major reforms in the energy sector soon after he takes office. The new laws should enable Mexico, one of the world's top 10 producers, to follow Brazil in developing a successful oil and gas industry in South America. That will attract several potential investors from abroad.¶ Two, fiscal and labor reforms will enable Mexico to become more competitive. The former will help the government switch from volatile sources of revenue, such as oil prices, to more stable ones. Fiscal stability will also create a more competitive environment and eliminate subsidies, such as those on gasoline. An economy without subsidies will undoubtedly attract more foreign investment.¶ The changes in the labor laws are also linked to fiscal reforms since the current tax regime doesn't provide incentives for the informal economy to change. Mexico is the only OECD economy that doesn't offer unemployment insurance; health insurance for informal workers; or short-term contracts that will attract more women to the workforce.¶ Many of these reforms have been on the agenda for the last decade, so the PAN will have to support policies that it promoted when it was in power. Moreover, allies and adversaries alike concede that Peña Nieto showed a knack for working with opposition parties when he was the governor of the state of Mexico, but lacked a majority in the legislature.¶ Three, Peña Nieto wants to develop closer links between the Mexican economy and those of the Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America. That's a step in the right direction.¶ Historically, Mexico hasn't taken advantage of the three most important predictors of trade: A shared history, a common language, and regional trade agreements. As a result, big Mexican companies haven't moved into Latin America while American multinational corporations have done so, and Mexico depends on NAFTA for more than 80% of its exports.¶ Finally, Peña Nieto's economic slogan during the election campaign was Para Que Ganes Mas (You Will Earn More). He hasn't quite explained how his government will ensure that, but the message sends the signal that the PRI wishes not just to create jobs, but jobs that will pay higher salaries.¶ That's a major shift from the ideas of a previous PRI president, Ernesto Zedillo, who firmly believed that "the best industrial policy is one that doesn't exist." Instead, Mexico must grow by developing policies that will augment the value of the products and services produced in the country -- just like some other countries in Latin America.
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Ruelas-Gossi 12 - professor of strategy at the Santiago, Chile-based Universidad Adolfo Ibañez (Alejandro, “Peña Nieto's Plans for Mexico's Economy”, October 15 of 2012, Harvard Business Review, http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/10/mexico_is_the_perfect_dictator.html)
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Nieto will bring about major reforms in the energy sector The new laws enable Mexico to follow Brazil in developing a successful oil and gas industry That will attract investors from abroad fiscal and labor reforms will enable Mexico to become more competitive The former will help the government switch from volatile sources of revenue, such as oil prices, to more stable ones. Fiscal stability will also create a more competitive environment and eliminate subsidies An economy without subsidies will undoubtedly attract more foreign investment changes in the labor laws are also linked to fiscal reforms since the current tax regime doesn't provide incentives for the informal economy to change allies and adversaries concede that Nieto showed a knack for working with opposition parties Mexico hasn't taken advantage of the three most important predictors of trade: A shared history, a common language, and regional trade agreements. As a result, big Mexican companies haven't moved into Latin America while American multinational corporations have done so, and Mexico depends on NAFTA for more than 80% of its exports That's a major shift from the ideas of a previous PRI president
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Nieto credibility is key the Mexican economy – loss of cred guarantees collapse
| 2,572 | 80 | 1,185 | 417 | 13 | 188 | 0.031175 | 0.450839 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,469 |
Now near the 150-day mark of his six-year term, Peña Nieto has pushed through a number of long-awaited reforms — to labor, education and telecommunications — and is readying other, thornier ones for action. His efforts have been widely praised, and his popularity is high, but passing the reforms is just the opening act. Implementation is crucial.¶ The foundation for the administration’s ambitious reform drive has been the Pact for Mexico, a historic agreement Peña Nieto and the leaders of the two main opposition parties signed the day after the new PRI president took office. A few days ago, the administration was forced to temporarily suspend all activities related to the pact, including a planned announcement of financial reforms.
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Garza 4-28 - former U.S. ambassador to Mexico, is counsel in the Mexico City office of White & Case (Antonio, “Antonio Garza: High stakes and big opportunities for Obama and Peña Nieto”, April 28 of 2013, http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/latest-columns/20130428-antonio-garza-high-stakes-and-big-opportunities-for-obama-and-pena-nieto.ece)
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Now near the 150-day mark of his six-year term Nieto has pushed through a number of long-awaited reforms — to labor, education and telecommunications and is readying other ones His efforts have been widely praised, and his popularity is high, but passing the reforms is just the opening act Implementation is crucial the Pact for Mexico Nieto and the leaders of the two main opposition parties signed the day after the new PRI president took office
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Nieto’s popularity is high now but fragile – he needs to follow through on reforms
| 741 | 82 | 448 | 119 | 15 | 76 | 0.12605 | 0.638655 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,470 |
Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has a lower approval rating at the start of his term than his predecessor did, a poll showed on Monday, underscoring the challenge he faces to push key economic reforms through a divided Congress.¶ Less than three months into office, 56 percent of Mexicans approve of Pena Nieto as president compared to 29 percent who disapprove of the job he is doing, according to a survey by Buendia y Laredo published by daily El Universal on Monday.¶ After 12 years of opposition rule, Pena Nieto returned to power his centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled Mexico for most of the past century.¶ Pena Nieto's ranking is below the 58 percent approval rating scored by former President Felipe Calderon at the start of his own term. Some 26 percent disapproved of Calderon at the time.
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O’Boyle 2-18 – Reuters staff writer, cites new Reuters Poll internally (Michael, “Mexico's new president has 56 percent approval rating: poll”, February 18 of 2013, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/us-mexico-president-idUSBRE91H0N220130218)
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Nieto has a lower approval rating at the start of his term than his predecessor did, a poll showed on Monday 56 percent of Mexicans approve of Pena Nieto as president compared to 29 percent who disapprove Nieto's ranking is below the 58 percent approval rating scored by former President Felipe Calderon at the start of his own term
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Nieto’s credibility is on the verge now
| 831 | 40 | 332 | 140 | 7 | 59 | 0.05 | 0.421429 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,471 |
The new administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto, who took office in December, has shifted priorities away from arresting cartel leaders and toward reducing the violence on Mexican streets, according to The Washington Post. Peña Nieto’s government also has moved to centralize authority over the drug war in the Interior Ministry, according to the Post report, and plans to establish a 10,000-member “super police” force, in addition to the existing federal police.¶ While 57% of Mexicans in the Pew Research survey said Peña Nieto was generally having a good influence on the way things are going in the country (the same support level Calderón received when the same question was asked last year), their views on particular issues were more divided.¶ Specifically, 47% said they approved of the way Peña Nieto was dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers, as against 45% who disapproved. And 44% approved of the new president’s handling of corruption, versus 48% who disapproved.
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Desilver 5-2 - Senior Writer at the Pew Research Center (Drew, “Mexicans see less progress on drug war; split on Peña Nieto”, May 2 of 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/02/mexicans-see-less-progress-on-drug-war-split-on-pena-nieto/)
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Nieto has shifted priorities away from arresting cartel leaders and toward reducing the violence on Mexican streets 57% of Mexicans in the Pew Research survey said Peña Nieto was generally having a good influence on the way things are going in the country their views on particular issues were more divided. 47% said they approved of the way Peña Nieto was dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers 45% who disapproved 48% disapproved
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Nieto’s credibility is fragile now
| 996 | 35 | 442 | 158 | 5 | 73 | 0.031646 | 0.462025 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,472 |
The nature, depth, and anti-American undertones of Mexican nationalism have operated as a powerful impediment to U.S. interference in Mexican domestic matters. While Mexico’s resulting hypersensitivity to any sign that the United States might be trying to have an effect on its internal affairs has softened in recent years, it remains a strong barrier to the capacity of the United States to exercise its power to positive effect. Growing interdependence between the United States and Mexico beginning in the last decades of the twentieth century transformed a traditionally arm’s-length relationship into one characterized by mutual dependencies that have narrowed the range of viable policy options for both countries. At the same time, the gradual emergence of shared ideas about economics, politics, and most recently narcotics control has encouraged each country to perceive the challenges and policy solutions for a key set of national interests in a similar light. This has reduced the range of situations in which Mexico follows a policy approach unacceptable to U.S. national interests and which might thereby stimulate the natural impulse of the powerful to exploit its position to gain cooperation through coercion. Shared ideas and policy approaches have also encouraged the United States to see Mexico as a kindred state worthy of the benefit of the doubt. Finally, as interdependence has amplified Mexico’s impact on U.S. domestic concerns, the role of the U.S. Congress in bilateral affairs has increased. The bias of this institution, and especially the House of Representatives, toward domestic instead of international concerns weakens the restraining influence that interdependence and shared ideas can have on the interventionist impulse. Members of the U.S. Congress are thus prone to demand and even require the exercise of U.S. power to force Mexico to help resolve a U.S. domestic policy problem. As a consequence, Mexico has repeatedly found its policy autonomy constrained in situations where Congress has interests.
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Starr 12 - Director, U.S.-Mexico Network Associate Professor (NTT) University Fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy University of Southern California (Pamela, “U.S.-Mexico Relations and Mexican Domestic Politics”, October 6 of 2012, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD4QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcollege.usc.edu%2Fusmexnet%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2010%2F10%2FCamp-Oxford-paper-final.doc&ei=mTLYUZTDMbOLyQGT14GwCQ&usg=AFQjCNH_cqiYTQRo7SFmpfWugH9ABshhCg&sig2=_M2KmLNnt3e8v4vVshc_fQ)
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anti-American undertones of Mexican nationalism have operated as a powerful impediment to U.S. interference in Mexican domestic matters Mexico’s resulting hypersensitivity to any sign that the U S might be trying to have an effect on its internal affairs has softened in recent years, it remains a strong barrier to the capacity of the U S to exercise its power to positive effect This has reduced the range of situations in which Mexico follows a policy approach unacceptable to U.S. national interests and which might thereby stimulate the natural impulse of the powerful to exploit its position to gain cooperation through coercion the role of the U.S. Congress in bilateral affairs has increased. The bias of this institution especially the House toward domestic instead of international concerns weakens the restraining influence that interdependence and shared ideas can have on the interventionist impulse Mexico has repeatedly found its policy autonomy constrained in situations where Congress has interests
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a. Hypersensitivity – Mexico hates the US Congress
| 2,043 | 51 | 1,015 | 312 | 8 | 156 | 0.025641 | 0.5 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,473 |
Many have criticized the Washington Consensus, considering it a set of neoliberal policies imposed on hapless countries by Washington-based financial institutions and leading these governments into crisis and misery. Although there is still a push for furthering these reforms and for what many call the second wave of reforms (which consist mostly of institutional strengthening), the “damaged brand name” of the Washington Consensus has given rise to a significant level of political antagonism. The opposition to further reforms or even to the conclusion of previous reforms has come from what is perceived to be an outright failure of the recommendations made by the Washington Consensus and from what has been coined the “reform fatigue syndrome”.
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Rioff et al 5 – Research Associate for CSIS Mexico Project (Sara, Armand Peschard-Sverdrup is the director of the CSIS Mexico Project, “Mexican Governance From Single-Party Rule to Divided Government”, 2005, pg 148)
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Many have criticized the Washington Consensus, considering it a set of neoliberal policies imposed on hapless countries by Washington-based financial institutions and leading these governments into crisis and misery. the “damaged brand name” of the Washington Consensus has given rise to a significant level of political antagonism an outright failure of the recommendations made by the Washington Consensus and from what has been coined the “reform fatigue syndrome”.
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b. the Washington Consensus – the plan faces political antagonism
| 752 | 65 | 468 | 115 | 10 | 68 | 0.086957 | 0.591304 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,474 |
When President Barack Obama meets this week with President Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, he will be visiting a country that was much maligned throughout his first term.¶ Washington has viewed Mexico largely as a source of problems for the United States in the past six years. Many Mexicans, in a mirror image, consider the United States the origin of their troubles. They blame Mexico’s epidemic of violent crime on an insatiable appetite for drugs and loose control over gun and ammunition sales in the United States. In addition, the U.S. financial crisis left the Mexican economy reeling in 2009.
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Hakim 13 - president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs (Peter, “Which Mexico for Obama?”, May 1 of 2013, Inter-American Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3296)
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Washington has viewed Mexico largely as a source of problems for the United States in the past six years. Mexicans in a mirror image, consider the U S the origin of their troubles They blame Mexico’s epidemic of violent crime on an insatiable appetite for drugs and loose control over gun and ammunition sales in the U S the U.S. financial crisis left the Mexican economy reeling in 2009.
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c. The public – they will antagonize Nieto if he engages with the USS
| 599 | 69 | 388 | 100 | 14 | 69 | 0.14 | 0.69 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,475 |
"President Peña¶ Nieto has excellent political instincts and¶ he understands building momentum to¶ accomplish his political goals. While the¶ anticipated energy and fiscal reforms¶ seem to have been pushed back to the¶ second half of this year, I don't detect any¶ substantive or permanent retreat by the¶ government in pursuing such reforms.¶ Peña Nieto's performance has been¶ impressive so far. Even before taking¶ office, Peña Nieto and the PRI worked¶ with the ruling PAN government to¶ achieve significant, although not complete, reforms to Mexico's labor laws. And¶ this week, Peña Nieto signed into law¶ comprehensive education reforms which¶ are absolutely necessary if Mexico is to be¶ a competitive global economic player in¶ the future. As if to emphasize that he¶ intends to fundamentally reform education, the government arrested and criminally charged the powerful leader of the¶ teachers' union who had been considered¶ the main obstacle to giving Mexico a¶ first-class education system. This also¶ sends a strong signal to other powerful¶ interests not to block other reforms that¶ will be proposed. Next come reforms to¶ the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors as well as transparency¶ reforms to state and local government¶ financing. All of these reforms have popular public support. Such support should¶ help Peña Nieto build further backing in¶ the summer local elections. With all of¶ that political capital banked, every indication is that Peña Nieto will start spending it during the last session of Congress this year to advance the energy and fiscal¶ reforms. If all of this unfolds successfully,¶ Peña Nieto will have moved Mexico forward more progressively than anyone¶ since NAFTA passed and put Mexico on¶ the path to economic and democratic¶ modernity. His next challenge needs to be¶ reforming and strengthening the rule of¶ law."
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Jones 3-1 - member of the Advisor board and co-chair of Manatt Jones Global Strategies (James, “How Well Has Peña Nieto Performed in His First 100 Days?”, March 1 of 2013, Inter-American Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/LAA/Daily/2013/LAA130301.pdf)
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Nieto has excellent political instincts and he understands building momentum to accomplish his political goals Nieto's performance has been impressive so far Even before taking office, Peña Nieto and the PRI worked with the ruling PAN government to achieve significant reforms to Mexico's labor laws . This also sends a strong signal to other powerful interests not to block other reforms that will be proposed All of these reforms have popular public support Such support should help Peña Nieto build further backing in the summer local elections With all of that political capital banked, every indication is that Peña Nieto will start spending it during the last session of Congress this year to advance the energy and fiscal reforms
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Credibility is key – spills over to other agenda items
| 1,871 | 54 | 736 | 289 | 10 | 119 | 0.034602 | 0.411765 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,476 |
Former Secretary Clinton and then Mexican Foreign Secretary Espinosa signed the Agreement in Los Cabos in February, 2012. Mexico ratified the agreement in April 2012.
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DoS 13 – United States Department of State (“U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement”, May 2 of 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/208650.htm)
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Secretary Clinton and Espinosa signed the Agreement in February, 2012 Mexico ratified the agreement in April 2012.
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THA was ratified in April 2012
| 166 | 30 | 114 | 25 | 6 | 17 | 0.24 | 0.68 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,477 |
The PRI leader, Enrique Peña Nieto, assumes the Mexican presidency on Dec. 1. Manufacturing output is up, official unemployment is low and drug related homicides are down. This is an auspicious time to inherit the presidency. What are the principal challenges facing a historic party in a modern era?
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Negroponte 12 - professor of law at Fordham University (Diana Villiers, “Mexico's Enrique Peña Nieto Confronts the Challenges of Federalism, Fiscal Reform and Education”, November 30 of 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/11/30-mexico-pena-nieto-negroponte)
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The PRI leader Enrique Peña Nieto, assumes the Mexican presidency on Dec. 1.
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Nieto took office in December 2012 – means he didn’t play any part in THA
| 300 | 73 | 76 | 49 | 15 | 13 | 0.306122 | 0.265306 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,478 |
Mexico also remains vital for the U.S. economy, although the current economic slowdown presents special challenges that will have to be addressed with great care. Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, and the first or second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states. Over six million Americans live in cities and counties on the border and over 60 million in border states, whose economies are particularly tied with Mexico’s. This degree of integration creates opportunities for more focused economic cooperation, but also generates risks for spillover effects in times of economic crisis. An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border. Moreover, the persistent wage gap between the two countries presents a long-term challenge that has been insufficiently addressed in past efforts at deepening cross-border economic ties. The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop a framework for economic integration that helps to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes advantage of complementarities to increase the competitive position of both countries, and, above all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being of average citizens in both countries.
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Selee 9 – Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins (Andrew, “ The United States and Mexico: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January of 2009, Woodrow Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf)
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Mexico remains vital for the U.S. economy Mexico is the second destination for U.S. exports, and the first or second destination of exports for at least twenty two U.S. states This degree of integration creates opportunities for more focused economic cooperation, but also generates risks for spillover effects in times of economic crisis. An economic slowdown in either country will inevitably affect the other and a full-scale crisis could send shockwaves across the border The United States and Mexico have the opportunity to develop a framework for economic integration that helps to contain the effect of economic shocks, takes advantage of complementarities to increase the competitive position of both countries, and, above all, places an emphasis on improving the well-being of average citizens in both countries.
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Mexico is key to the US economy
| 1,290 | 31 | 820 | 196 | 7 | 126 | 0.035714 | 0.642857 |
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All year long, thousands of foreign investors have nervously watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets as the Clinton administration and congressional leaders debated the pros and cons of bailing out a battered currency. With the exception of 1982 - when Mexico defaulted on its foreign debt and a handful of giant New York banks worried they would lose billions of dollars in loans - few people abroad ever cared about a weak peso. But now it’s different, experts say. This time, the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. “It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy,” said economist Victor Lpez Villafane of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. “I hate to say it, but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse” not seen since the Great Depression, said Dr. Lpez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican economy and the economies of some Asian and Latin American countries. “That’s why it’s in the best interests of the United States and the industrialized world to help Mexico weather its economic crisis,” he said. The crisis began last December when the Mexican government devalued the currency. Last March, after weeks of debate, President Clinton, the International Monetary Fund and a handful of other countries and international agencies put together a $ 53 billion rescue package for Mexico. But despite the help - $ 20 billion in guarantee loans from the United States - Mexico’s financial markets have been volatile for most of the year. The peso is now trading at about 7.70 to the dollar, after falling to an all-time low of 8.30 to the dollar Nov. 9. The road has been bumpy, and that has made many - particularly U.S. investors - nervous. No country understands better the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the United States, said Jorge Gonzlez Dvila, an economist at Trinity University in San Antonio. “Despite the rhetoric that you hear in Washington, I think that most people agree - even those who oppose any aid to Mexico - that when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold,” Mr. Gonzlez said. “That’s why nowadays any talk of aid to Mexico or trade with Mexico gets a lot of attention,” he said. Most economists, analysts and business leaders on both sides of the border agree that the biggest impact abroad of a prolonged Mexican fiscal crisis may be on the U.S. economy, especially in Texas and in cities bordering Mexico.
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Rangel 95 – Writer for the Dallas Morning News (Enrique, “Pressure on the Peso”., Novermber 28 of 1995, Lexis)
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thousands of investors have watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. “It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy,” said economist Villafane of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse” not seen since the Great Depression, said Lpez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican economy and the economies of Asian and Latin American countries. it’s in the best interests of the U S to help Mexico weather its economic crisis, No country understands better the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the U S said Dvila, an economist at Trinity University when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold, the biggest impact abroad of a prolonged Mexican fiscal crisis may be on the U.S. economy
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Mexico is key to the world economy
| 2,778 | 34 | 1,187 | 468 | 7 | 192 | 0.014957 | 0.410256 |
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Mexico’s security crisis is largely a reflection of the country’s economic struggles over the last ¶ few decades. As a result of a series of economic crises starting in the 1970s, Mexico’s total ¶ underground economy —including street vendors, pirate taxis, and a burgeoning market for ―secondhand‖ goods stolen from local sources (such as auto parts, electronics, etc.)— now accounts for as ¶ much as 40 percent of all economic activity.iv According to official estimates, illegal drug production ¶ and trafficking provides employment opportunities for an estimated 450,000 people, and perhaps 3-4 ¶ percent of Mexico’s more than $1 trillion GDP.v Today, the illicit drug sector involves large numbers ¶ of young men aged 18-35 who have neither educational nor employment opportunities, known ¶ commonly in Mexico as ―ni-ni’s‖ (ni estudian, ni trabajan). Where other options have failed them, these ¶ young men have found substantial economic opportunities in the illicit global economy for drugs.
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Shirk 11 – PhD in PoliSci, David A. Shirk, PhD, teaches Latin American studies, and U.S.-Latin American relations, with a concentration in Mexico and border politics (David, “Transnational Crime, U.S. Border Security, and the War on Drugs in Mexico”, March 31 of 2011, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Shirk.pdf)
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Mexico’s security crisis is largely a reflection of the country’s economic struggles over the last few decades. As a result of a series of economic crises Mexico’s total underground economy now accounts for 40 percent of all economic activity illegal drug production and trafficking provides employment opportunities for an estimated 450,000 people Where other options have failed them, these young men have found substantial economic opportunities in the illicit global economy for drugs.
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Mexican economic decline causes instability – it fuels the drug war
| 1,002 | 67 | 493 | 155 | 11 | 73 | 0.070968 | 0.470968 |
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Recently installed President Enrique Peña Nieto hopes to reverse this trend with a new anticrime strategy — transforming poor neighborhoods like Nezahualcóyotl where cartels make their bastions and preventing young people from joining their criminal armies. On Feb. 12, Peña Nieto announced there would be more than $9 billion for crime prevention aimed at 57 hot spots. “We must put special emphasis on prevention, because we can’t only keep employing more sophisticated weapons, better equipment, more police, a higher presence of the armed forces in the country as the only form of combating organized crime,” Peña Nieto said. Rather than just shooting or incarcerating the seemingly endless ranks of cartel gunmen, the President hopes to stop young people from becoming assassins in the first place.¶ The 57 target areas include traditional hotbeds of violence such as cities on the U.S. border and Acapulco, on the Pacific Coast. But they also include places where cartels have been encroaching more recently, such as Nezahualcóyotl, commonly referred to as Neza. Named after an Aztec poet king, Neza was populated by squatters who built shantytowns in the 1970s and has since grown to more than 1 million people on the rim of Mexico City’s urban sprawl — growth that has attracted the attention of investors like billionaire Carlos Slim. Cartels like La Familia have moved into its slums from marijuana-growing mountains to sell drugs, extort businesses and kidnap for ransom. Some of their new members hail from Neza’s streets.¶ Roberto Campa, who has been named to run the national prevention program, says there is a clear link between conditions in these ghettos and the rise of cartels. “When you see the circumstances that young people live in in many of these communities, you can easily explain why they are involved in these [criminal] activities,” Campa tells TIME. “You find young people suffer violence in the home, in many cases are from broken homes, where there is presence of alcohol or drugs, in communities where they have no chance to enjoy their free time. They form groups in the barrio, and then they are in gangs and then they are openly involved with organized crime. Yes, without a doubt, we have to work with containing [crime], with all the issues of police, prisons, prosecutors and the presence of armed forces. But on the other side, we have to start systematically confronting the causes of these problems.”¶ The plan includes gang-outreach schemes, community centers and employment projects to try to steer the young away from criminal life. There will also be construction programs aimed at transforming chaotic urban jungles into prettier spaces where people will feel inspired to say no to crime mobs. Mexican officials cite Ciudad Juárez as an example of where prevention programs have worked. In 2010, Juárez suffered over 3,000 homicides, making it the most murderous city on the planet by some counts. In response, the Mexican government poured money into social work, including tripling the number of community centers. This helped reduce homicides by three-quarters, to less than 750 last year. Medellín, Colombia, is also a case study in urban renewal. It was named the most violent city in the world in 1993, when it was the virtual fiefdom of cocaine king Pablo Escobar. But murders declined enormously as mayors erected state-of-the-art buildings in its slums and cable cars transporting residents up its hills to increase economic opportunity.
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Grillo et al 13 - journalist and author of the book El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency, has been reporting on the Mexican Drug War and the Latin American illegal drug trade since 2001 (Ioan, Dolly Mascarenas, “Mexico Goes After the Narcos — Before They Join the Gangs”, February 25 of 2013, Time, http://world.time.com/2013/02/25/mexico-goes-after-the-narcos-before-they-join-the-gangs/)
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Nieto hopes to reverse this trend with a new anticrime strategy transforming poor neighborhoods where cartels make their bastions and preventing young people from joining their criminal armies Nieto announced there would be more than $9 billion for crime prevention aimed at 57 hot spots We must put special emphasis on prevention, more police, a higher presence of the armed forces in the country as the only form of combating organized crime the President hopes to stop young people from becoming assassins in the first place.¶ The 57 target areas include traditional hotbeds of violence such as cities on the U.S. border they also include places where cartels have been encroaching more Cartels have moved into its slums from marijuana-growing mountains to sell drugs, extort businesses and kidnap for ransom Campa who has been named to run the national prevention program, says there is a clear link between conditions in these ghettos and the rise of cartels without a doubt, we have to work with containing [crime], with all the issues of police, prisons, prosecutors and the presence of armed forces. we have to start systematically confronting the causes of these problems.”¶ The plan includes gang-outreach schemes community centers and employment projects There will also be construction programs aimed at transforming chaotic urban jungles into prettier spaces where people will feel inspired to say no to crime mobs. officials cite Ciudad Juárez as an example of where prevention programs have worked. Juárez suffered over 3,000 homicides, making it the most murderous city on the planet by some counts. This helped reduce homicides by three-quarters
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Nieto key to the drug war – new strategy stops the root cause of cartels and empirics prove
| 3,495 | 91 | 1,662 | 566 | 18 | 264 | 0.031802 | 0.466431 |
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(CNN) -- Creating more economic opportunities will be Mexico's greatest weapon in the war on drugs, the country's president-elect said Tuesday.¶ "That, I think, is going to be the best way my government can prevent organized crime," President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto told CNN's Wolf Blitzer.¶ Without jobs and social programs, he said, "millions of my countrymen have no other option than to dedicate themselves sometimes to criminal activity."¶ The wide-ranging interview was recorded just a few hours before the incoming leader met with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington. In his first meeting with Obama, Pena Nieto said he planned to focus on building trust and boosting economic ties to create jobs.¶ "We've lost presence and competitiveness on the international market. ... There's still space, an opportunity, to achieve greater integration as far as productivity, which will allow us to improve the competitive conditions for creating jobs across North America," he said.¶ Pena Nieto, 46, said his security strategy will focus on reducing the drug-related violence that took 60,000 lives during his predecessor's six-year term, though he provided few specifics about how he would stem the violence or what aspects of outgoing President Felipe Caderon's strategy he will change.¶ "We will keep the policies that I think work," he said, "including cooperation with the United States to effectively fight organized crime."
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Shoichet 12 – M.A. from Colombia in Political Journalism, now writer and editor for CNN (Catherine, “Mexican president-elect: Economic growth is key weapon in drug war”, November 27 of 2012, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/27/politics/mexico-president-interview)
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Creating more economic opportunities will be Mexico's greatest weapon in the war on drugs That is going to be the best way my government can prevent organized crime Without jobs and social programs millions have no other option than to dedicate themselves to criminal activity Nieto said he planned to focus on building trust and boosting economic ties to create jobs We've lost presence and competitiveness on the international market. There's still space to achieve greater integration as far as productivity, which will allow us to improve the competitive conditions for creating jobs his security strategy will focus on reducing the drug-related violence
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Economic growth stops the drug war
| 1,435 | 34 | 658 | 221 | 6 | 103 | 0.027149 | 0.466063 |
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Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence:¶ At Stake: Oil prices, refugee flows, NAFTA, U.S. economic stability¶ A story receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the northern states of Mexico, where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption.¶ The tales of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses?¶ The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better.¶ The prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so far seems remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. With Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.¶ Meanwhile, Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do without. Should things come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, the shock on oil markets could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. Long-term, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on foreign investment.¶ Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.
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Moran 9 (7/31/09, Michael, executive editor and policy analyst, Council on Foreign Relations, “Six Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery,” http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopolitics-could-upset-global-recovery/)
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Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence:¶ At Stake: Oil prices, refugee flows, NAFTA, U.S. economic stability¶ A story receiving more attention days is the horrific drug-related violence across the northern states of Mexico, where Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better.¶ With Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.¶ Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do without. Should things come unglued and Pemex production shut down the shock on oil markets could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,”
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Mexico drug violence leads to oil shocks
| 2,260 | 41 | 1,123 | 352 | 7 | 169 | 0.019886 | 0.480114 |
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Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not hesitate to unleash their economic and military power to ensure secure access to oil resources, triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear weapons in pursues of national interests are high.
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Islam Yasin Qasem 7, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,” online: http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm
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Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not hesitate to unleash military power to ensure secure access to oil triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. while the United States maintain superior conventional military power weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear weapons are high
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Energy shocks cause great power nuke war
| 642 | 41 | 493 | 95 | 7 | 72 | 0.073684 | 0.757895 |
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A recent poll also shows increased public skepticism in Peña Nieto's, "Pact for Mexico," Today, only 21 percent of the population believes that this pact will benefit them while 31 percent are convinced that it will harm them. This same independent poll reveals that the majority of the population perceives the agreement to be in the interests principally of the political parties and big business. Only 35 percent think that the country as a whole will benefit.¶ It is important to remember that Peña Nieto only received 38.2 percent of the vote in the 2012 presidential elections and that the voting base of his party (Party of the Institutional Revolution-PRI) is principally located in the poorest, least educated, and most isolated rural sectors of the population. All of the most "modern" and "middle class" sectors of the population voted overwhelmingly against bringing the PRI and its pretty-boy candidate back to power, according to independent exit polls and demographic surveys. For instance, the only time Peña Nieto dared to hold a campaign event with college students during last year's presidential race, he was aggressively run off the campus amid shouts that he was an "assassin" and a "thief."¶ Peña Nieto's strategy has been to compensate for this weakness in public support by co-opting the old political opposition and turning his back on his critics in society. But this approach has recently come up against a brick wall.¶ For instance, in their haste to demonstrate quick legislative results, the politicians forgot to consult with civil society before pushing through a controversial education reform at lightning speed last December. As a result, today thousands of teachers are on strike throughout Mexico's poorest southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán in protest against a reform which they correctly claim threatens to drastically reduce job security, introduce excessive standardized testing, entrench inequality between schools in wealthy and poor areas, and privatize public education. In the state of Guerrero, local citizen militias, parents, and youth groups have even joined with the teachers in a broad-based coalition against Peña Nieto's broader neoliberal economic agenda.
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Ackerman 5-1 - professor at the Institute of Legal Research of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and vice president of the International Association of Administrative Law (John, “The Mexico Bubble: Is President Enrique Peña Nieto about to fall to Earth?”, May 1 of 2013, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/01/the_mexico_bubble_enrique_pena_nieto)
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A recent poll shows increased public skepticism in Nieto's, "Pact for Mexico 21 percent of the population believes that this pact will benefit them 31 percent are convinced that it will harm them. the majority of the population perceives the agreement to be in the interests principally of the political parties and big business Nieto only received 38.2 percent of the vote in the 2012 presidential elections the most "modern" and "middle class voted overwhelmingly against bringing the PRI and its pretty-boy candidate back to power the only time Peña Nieto dared to hold a campaign event with college students during last year's presidential race, he was aggressively run off the campus amid shouts that he was an "assassin" and a "thief." Nieto's strategy has been to compensate by co-opting the old political opposition and turning his back on his critics in society. But this approach has recently come up against a brick wall. the politicians forgot to consult with civil society before pushing through a controversial education reform . As a result, thousands of teachers are on strike in protest against a reform which they correctly claim threatens to drastically reduce job security, introduce excessive standardized testing, entrench inequality between schools in wealthy and poor areas, and privatize public education militias parents groups have joined with the teachers in a broad-based coalition against Nieto's broader neoliberal economic agenda.
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Nieto’s cred is low now and irrecoverable
| 2,237 | 42 | 1,462 | 348 | 7 | 229 | 0.020115 | 0.658046 |
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Given domestic political sensitivities about oil within Mexico, the¶ bilateral relationship on this topic has struggled. Yet, the newly¶ elected President of Mexico has signaled a desire to work together¶ on energy issues, and the largest opposition political party joins in¶ that call.
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Lugar 12 - Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Richard, “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT”, December 1 of 2012, pdf)
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the bilateral relationship on this topic has struggled. the President of Mexico has signaled a desire to work together on energy issues, and the largest opposition political party joins in¶ that call.
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The plan builds support for Nieto
| 286 | 33 | 200 | 43 | 6 | 32 | 0.139535 | 0.744186 |
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Mexico President Enrique Pena Nieto’s reform agenda that includes legislation to end the monopoly of state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos faces delays due to a shake-up in the former ruling party’s leadership.¶ Former President Felipe Calderon’s National Action Party, or PAN, yesterday ousted former Finance Minister Ernesto Cordero from the Senate party leadership. The decision erodes the political consensus parties have built in congress, complicating the economic reform agenda, according to IdeaGlobal and Javier Oliva, a political scientist at Mexico’s National Autonomous University.¶ “What may happen is that factions of the party would vote against part of an energy reform,” Oliva said in a telephone interview from Cuernavaca, outside Mexico City. “It may slow down the reform’s approval process.”¶ Pena Nieto has pledged to double the pace of economic growth by passing reforms to open up the state-owned oil company to private investment, boost tax revenue and spur competition in sectors like telecommunications. A multiparty accord, led by Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, and PAN that has sped up passage of reforms in Congress and that recently resolved differences over vote buying allegations now faces a divided PAN in the Senate, where it’s the second-largest party.¶ Cordero, who will remain president of the Senate, confirmed yesterday that 24 of 37 PAN senators wrote a letter backing his leadership in the Senate.
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Cattan 5-21 - reporter for Bloomberg News in Mexico City (Nacha, “Pena Nieto’s Mexico Energy Reform Faces Delay in PAN Shakeup”, May 21 of 2013, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-21/pena-nieto-s-mexico-energy-reform-faces-delay-in-pan-shakeup.html)
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Nieto’s reform agenda that includes legislation to end the monopoly of state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos faces delays due to a shake-up in the former ruling party’s leadership PAN ousted Cordero from the Senate party leadership The decision erodes the political consensus parties have built in congres complicating the economic reform agenda What may happen is that factions of the party would vote against part of an energy reform It may slow down the reform’s approval process Nieto has pledged to double the pace of economic growth by passing reforms to open up the state-owned oil company to private investment
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Nieto can’t solve the economy – Congressional hold-up prevents reform
| 1,458 | 69 | 612 | 221 | 10 | 98 | 0.045249 | 0.443439 |
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First, the little things. Last week, Pieña Nieto recruited Colombian General Oscar Naranjo — a veteran of the war against the notorious drug lord Pablo Escobar — as his top security adviser. Peña Nieto wants to boost Mexico’s Federal Police, and he’s for creating a new national paramilitary police force to fight the cartels. His campaign has also been “highly solicitous” of the United States, notes Patrick Corcoran of InSight, an organized crime monitoring group. This could mean a bigger U.S. role. Naranjo is also reportedly close to U.S. officials.¶ This is while the cartels still exercise draconian rule over cities throughout many parts of the country, especially along the border. Ciudad Juárez, which came to define Mexico’s drug violence when viewed from outside the country, has seen a drop in murders to 2007 levels, Corcoran adds. But other cities, like Nuevo Laredo, experienced lower and lower levels of violence only for gangland killings to spark anew. The cartels have also spread to new areas.¶ “If you noticed, none of the presidential candidates broke openly with [outgoing President Felipe Calderón's] strategy — the farthest they went was to criticize the level of violence,” César Martinez Espinosa, a doctoral candidate at the University of Texas and a specialist in Mexican national security issues, writes in an e-mail. ”This is because they recognized that a majority of people (outside of Mexico City) approves Calderón’s fight against the cartels (some polls have tracked that), especially the participation of the military in it and because they might not have that much room to maneuver once they are in power.”¶ Reducing violence by legalizing drugs? Not likely in the least. A darker suggestion floated as a possibility in press reports is some kind of deal with the cartels, but Pieña Nieto has ruled out negotiating a truce.¶ The reason why a truce is brought up: Peña Nieto’s political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (or PRI), formerly maintained uninterrupted single-party rule for most of the 20th century. But when it lost power 12 years ago, it also lost a patronage system between regional party bosses and the cartels. This system meant drugs were allowed to flow relatively freely, provided physical disputes between the cartels didn’t get out of hand. But losing a (note: corrupt) system of checks and balances, beef between cartels escalated.¶ Nor is it likely that such a deal could be made today. In some states that maintained PRI rule, these networks were maintained but still failed to stop the surge in violence. Some of the state-level politicians with ties to the cartels are now being purged. In any case, the PRI will be governing a different Mexico: one in which corruption is still a major problem, but in which a single party is not able to maintain control over the entire governing apparatus. Another problem is that today’s cartels are smaller, a lot more numerous and increasingly decentralized. With so many cartels operating in Mexico today, who do you cut a deal with?¶ “Should he win, Peña Nieto will surely seek some cosmetic changes, and he may push the philosophy underlying Mexico’s crime strategy in a new direction. But the obstacles to a different approach are enormous; as a result, for better or worse, the shifts are likely to be marginal,” notes Corcoran.
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Beckhusen 12 – Latin American defense news journalist, internally cites Patrick Corcoran who works for an organized crime monitoring group (Robert, “Mexico’s Next President Won’t Slow The Drug War”, June 29 of 2012, Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/penanieto/)
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Nieto recruited Colombian General Oscar Naranjo — a veteran of the war against the notorious drug lord Pablo Escobar — as his top security adviser His campaign has also been “highly solicitous” of the U S other cities, like Nuevo Laredo, experienced lower and lower levels of violence only for gangland killings to spark anew. The cartels have also spread to new areas none of the presidential candidates broke openly with Calderón's strategy they recognized that a majority of people approves Calderón’s fight against the cartels especially the participation of the military in it Reducing violence by legalizing drugs? Not likely in the least when it lost power 12 years ago, it also lost a patronage system between regional party bosses and the cartels This system meant drugs were allowed to flow relatively freely, provided physical disputes between the cartels didn’t get out of hand Nor is it likely that such a deal could be made today. the PRI will be governing a different Mexico: one in which corruption is still a major problem, but in which a single party is not able to maintain control over the entire governing apparatus today’s cartels are smaller numerous and increasingly decentralized Nieto will surely seek some cosmetic changes . But the obstacles to a different approach are enormous
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Nieto can’t stop the drug war – no connection to the cartels and corruption
| 3,350 | 75 | 1,306 | 550 | 14 | 216 | 0.025455 | 0.392727 |
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Yet building the new gendarmerie will take a lot of time. One of the major problems with the Calderón ¶ strategy was that it assumed that police reform could take place much faster than was realistic and ¶ that the reform was initiated the same time as—not prior to, as should have been the case—the ¶ launching of the assault on the DTOs. Even under auspicious circumstances, a robust police reform ¶ would take a decade—essentially an entire generation of officers needs to be replaced and habituated to new values and doctrines. Steady reformist leadership is required throughout the period. Thus, ¶ standing up a gendarmerie from scratch in Mexico will take a lot of time, easily far longer than Peña ¶ Nieto’s six-year term. And it is always problematic to be flying a plane while one is still building it—in ¶ this case, deploying the gendarmerie into actual battle zones while the force is being created. The ¶ realization that standing up a new security force takes a lot of time was one of the reasons why the ¶ new administration in Mexico City quickly scaled down the size of the gendarmerie from an originally ¶ envisioned force of up to 60,000 to 10,000.
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Felbab-Brown 13 (Vanda, Latin American Initiative Foreign Policy;a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence, and illicit economies; “Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/02/mexico%20new%20security%20policy%20felbabbrown/mexico%20new%20security%20policy%20felbabbrown.pdf)
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building the new gendarmerie will take a lot of time. the launching of the assault on the DTOs. Even under auspicious circumstances a robust police reform would take a decade an entire generation of officers needs to be replaced and habituated to new values and doctrines standing up a gendarmerie from scratch in Mexico will take a lot of time, easily far longer than Peña Nieto’s six-year term And it is always problematic to be flying a plane while one is still building it—in this case, deploying the gendarmerie into actual battle zones while the force is being created. tanding up a new security force takes a lot of time
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Nieto’s police force will take years to build – can’t stop the war
| 1,167 | 66 | 627 | 205 | 13 | 110 | 0.063415 | 0.536585 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,490 |
Cleansing Mexican institutions of corruption needs to remain as key a priority for Peña Nieto as ¶ enforcing better coordination, but that too is a long and difficult process. The August 2012 attack ¶ on U.S. CIA agents and their Mexican navy colleague by active officers of Mexico’s Federal Police ¶ showed that even the law enforcement institution that has received the most training, vetting, and ¶ focus from the Mexican government—and greatest U.S. assistance—continues to be pervaded by the ¶ drug trafficking groups. What to do with corrupt police officers continues to pose a difficult dilemma. Imprisoning many strains the capacity of Mexico’s corrections systems, already flooded by tens ¶ of thousands of presumed offenders arrested during the Calderón years. The expansion of federal ¶ prison facilities in Mexico from three to twelve during the same period only partially alleviated the ¶ strain.24 Mexico’s correction facilities continue to be overcrowded, unsafe and porous, with corrupt ¶ corrections officers facilitating not only smuggling between the prison and the street but also at ¶ times mass escapes from the prison.25 But simply firing corrupt police officers is a prescription for ¶ their joining criminal groups.
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Felbab-Brown 13 (Vanda, Latin American Initiative Foreign Policy;a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence, and illicit economies; “Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/02/mexico%20new%20security%20policy%20felbabbrown/mexico%20new%20security%20policy%20felbabbrown.pdf)
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Cleansing Mexican institutions of corruption needs to remain as key a priority but that too is a long and difficult The August 2012 attack showed that even the law enforcement institution that has received the most training and greatest U.S. assistance continues to be pervaded by the drug trafficking groups. What to do with corrupt police officers Imprisoning many strains the capacity of Mexico’s corrections systems already flooded by tens of thousands of presumed offenders arrested The expansion of federal prison only partially alleviated the strain Mexico’s correction facilities continue to be overcrowded unsafe and porous with corrupt corrections officers facilitating not only smuggling but mass escapes from the prison. simply firing corrupt police officers is a prescription for their joining criminal groups.
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Corrupt police force prevents Nieto from ending the war
| 1,240 | 55 | 823 | 194 | 9 | 123 | 0.046392 | 0.634021 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,491 |
Newly inaugurated Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has promised to shift the country’s approach to the drug war, from taking down high value targets to reducing crime – especially homicides – of the everyday Mexican citizens.¶ The argument is that despite financial resources to fight cartels under Calderón had doubled, crime had increased and the drug gangs had become more violent.¶ "We are all clear that México now demands a country in peace, a quiet country, a safe country," Peña Nieto said on Monday, according to the Wall Street Jorunal. "This is our main objective."¶ The new president said that he wants a rural gendarmerie of around 10,000 people to go into areas where the police and army have failed to take control. While the approach was praised by some, it’s a far cry from the 80,000-member corps he promoted on the campaign trail, said Eric Olson, a México analyst at the Woodrow Wilson Center.¶ "It reflects that reality is setting in that they don't have people sitting idly to join these forces," he added.¶ Despite his promises of reform, some human rights experts worry that Peña Nieto has not been transparent enough with his plans and needs to reveal more details of his new strategy.¶ "While it is a good sign that Peña Nieto has committed to prioritizing human rights, the real question is what concrete steps he will take to tackle the lasting problems, like prosecuting widespread abuses by security forces and coming up with a plan to address thousands of disappearances," José Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch told The Wall Street Journal.¶
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Fox News Latino 12 (US News station “Mexico's Drug War Made Crisis Worse, Pena Nieto Administration Says” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/12/19/mexico-drug-war-made-crisis-worse-pena-nieto-administration-says/)
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Nieto has promised to shift the country’s approach to the drug war The new president said that he wants a rural gendarmerie to go into areas where the police and army have failed to take control. While the approach was praised it’s a far cry from the 80,000-member corps he promoted on the campaign trail, they don't have people sitting idly to join these forces Despite his promises Nieto has not been transparent enough with his plans and needs to reveal more details of his new strategy the question is what concrete steps he will take to tackle the lasting problems
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Neito won’t fix the drug war --- not enough concrete action
| 1,580 | 59 | 569 | 266 | 11 | 101 | 0.041353 | 0.379699 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,492 |
When Vikram Pandit, the chief executive of Citigroup, was asked on Monday to break down the emerging markets that had contributed to some good-looking financial results for the third-biggest U.S. bank, the first country he pointed to was Mexico.¶ Driven by Mexico, Citigroup’s Latin-American consumer banking revenue grew 7% year-over-year in the third quarter to $2.4 billion, while the bank’s revenue in Asia was down. “We think that Mexico is extremely well-poised for growth,” Pandit said on Citigroup’s earnings conference call. “I was just there not too long ago and with the leadership change there in addition to prospects for reforms and what you are seeing on the ground—that is a high spot definitely.” Citigroup’s stock was up 4% on Monday.¶ Not too long ago, the idea that big-shot American CEOs would be touting Mexico would have seemed unlikely. When the financial crisis hit the U.S. in 2008, FORBES predicted a “Mexican Meltdown.” The explosion of the drug war between the Mexican drug cartels and the government, coupled with the sure-to-come drop in exports to the contracting U.S. economy, seemed like it would derail Mexico again and ensure that other emerging markets like Brazil would keep passing it by. The U.S. Joint Forces Command lumped Mexico in the same category as Pakistan and worried it was becoming a failed state.¶ Mexico’s economy was hit very hard by the financial crisis and its recession was severe, but its recovery miraculously has been even stronger. Even with the weak U.S. recovery and the ongoing drug violence, Mexico has boomed. Top officials in the Mexican government predict the country’s economic growth could reach 5% in 2012, after gross domestic product increased by 3.9% and 5.5% in the last two years.
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Vardi 12 - Associate Editor for Forbes (Nathan, “The Mexican Miracle: Despite Drug War, Economy Is Booming”, October 15 of 2012, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/10/15/the-mexican-mircale/)
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When Pandit the chief executive of Citigroup, was asked to break down the emerging markets that had contributed to some good-looking financial results for the third-biggest U.S. bank, the first country he pointed to was Mexico Driven by Mexico Citigroup’s Latin-American consumer banking revenue grew 7% year-over-year in the third quarter to $2.4 billion Mexico is extremely well-poised for growth with the leadership change there in addition to prospects for reforms and what you are seeing on the ground—that is a high spot definitely Not too long ago, the idea that big-shot American CEOs would be touting Mexico would have seemed unlikely When the financial crisis hit the U.S. in 2008, FORBES predicted a “Mexican Meltdown explosion of the drug war between the Mexican drug cartels and the government seemed like it would derail Mexico again and ensure that other emerging markets like Brazil would keep passing it by Mexico’s economy recovery miraculously has been even stronger. Even with the weak U.S. recovery and the ongoing drug violence, Mexico has boomed. economic growth could reach 5% in 2012, after gross domestic product increased by 3.9% and 5.5% in the last two years.
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Mexico’s economy is high now despite the drug war
| 1,756 | 50 | 1,188 | 287 | 9 | 192 | 0.031359 | 0.66899 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,493 |
Q3: How will Maduro’s showing affect his ability to govern?¶ ¶ A3: In many ways, the results reflect a disaster for Maduro and likely signify the continued decline of Venezuela’s economy. The results also mean that political divisions within Maduro's coalition will worsen. Maduro’s lack of political experience and weak political base caused many to wonder how he might hold together the numerous factions that make up the PSUV, even with an easy victory. Now, with the elections' close results, how Maduro responds to voters’ frustrations, from high inflation to rising violent crime rates, will come under increasing scrutiny. If Maduro is unable to secure quick improvements in these arenas, he may find himself facing a quick backlash from former supporters. Diosdado Cabello, head of the National Assembly and widely considered Maduro’s main rival, raised eyebrows by tweeting during election night that the PSUV needed to undergo a period of self-criticism. This was viewed by many as Cabello trying to increase his appeal with those moderate Chavistas who voted for Capriles.¶ ¶ Lacking the strong base of support and resounding electoral victories that Chávez enjoyed, Maduro is likely to find rival factions within the PSUV more assertive. Add to this a reinvigorated opposition, and prospects for Maduro’s ability to run the state appear poor at best.¶ ¶ Maduro's narrow victory also dashes any expectations that he might turn pragmatic when dealing with such issues as the Venezuelan economy. Maduro’s first goal will likely be to show himself in charge and to satisfy Chavistas. This will likely lead to a doubling-down of Chávez’s policies and to profligate spending on social programs within Venezuela.
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Meacham 4-16 (Carl Meacham, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., Michael Graybeal, program coordinator with the Americas Program at CSIS, provided research assistance, “Venezuela Post-Election: Can Maduro Govern?” Center for Strategic Studies, April 16, 2013, http://csis.org/publication/venezuela-post-election-can-maduro-govern)
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results reflect a disaster for Maduro The results also mean that political divisions within Maduro's coalition will worsen Maduro’s lack of political experience and weak political base aused many to wonder how he might hold together the numerous factions that make up the PSUV, even with an easy victory. how Maduro responds to voters’ frustrations, from high inflation to rising violent crime rates, will come under increasing scrutiny If Maduro is unable to secure quick improvements in these arenas, he may find himself facing a quick backlash from former supporters Lacking the strong base of support and resounding electoral victories that Chávez enjoyed, Maduro is likely to find rival factions within the PSUV more assertive Add to this a reinvigorated opposition prospects for Maduro’s ability to run the state appear poor at best.
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Maduro has no credibility to act now – kills his agenda
| 1,717 | 56 | 839 | 272 | 11 | 133 | 0.040441 | 0.488971 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,494 |
While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week.¶ ¶ For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. ¶ ¶ The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power.¶ ¶ Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government. ¶ ¶ By resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.
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Christy 6-13 (Patrick Christy, Senior Policy Analyst, Foreign Policy Initiative, experience in foreign policy and politics, previously the Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC), focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues, worked at the National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst, “U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition,” article, US News, June 13, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition)
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if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States By resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.
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The plan provides political cover to Maduro and bolsters his credibility
| 2,698 | 73 | 854 | 401 | 11 | 126 | 0.027431 | 0.314214 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,495 |
¶ CARACAS, Venezuela — Nicolas Maduro's narrow victory in an election to serve out the late Hugo Chavez's presidential term in Venezuela will complicate tackling major issues on his agenda: fixing a crumbling economy, addressing violent crime and restoring relations with the United States.¶ ¶ The election results, coming amid allegations by rival Henrique Capriles of widespread voting abuses, will make governing this polarized country even more difficult because Maduro will lack the broader public support enjoyed by his colorful predecessor, analysts said Monday.¶ Maduro won Sunday by 1.5 percentage points; Chavez never triumphed in his four presidential elections by less than 10 percentage points, margins that strengthened the socialist's claim of a popular mandate for his "Bolivarian revolution."¶ ¶ Maduro, at one point leading Capriles in preelection polls by double digits, can make no such claims.¶ ¶ "The revolution almost slipped through Maduro's fingers," said political scientist Luis Salamanca, who described Sunday's result as "an electoral victory but political rout.... He can't govern with confrontations and insults as his mentor did. He won't be able to manage the country that way."¶ ¶ In addition to undercutting Maduro's hope of wielding unchallenged authority, the close race could weaken his support inside the Chavismo movement, Salamanca said. Chavez managed, with charisma and no small amount of effort, to hold together his following's many interest groups. For the less popular Maduro, a step toward austerity could lose him support among the poor, and an olive branch offered to the United States could cause the far left to turn on him.
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Kraul 4-15 (Chris Kraul, LA Times, “Tight election in Venezuela complicates Nicolas Maduro's plans,” April 15, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/15/world/la-fg-venezuela-maduro-20130416)
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Nicolas Maduro's narrow victory in an election to serve out the late Hugo Chavez's presidential term in Venezuela will complicate tackling major issues on his agenda The election results, coming amid allegations by rival Henrique Capriles of widespread voting abuses, will make governing this polarized country even more difficult because Maduro will lack the broader public support enjoyed by his colorful predecessor, analysts said Monday. political scientist Luis Salamanca described Sunday's result as "an electoral victory but political rout.... He can't govern with confrontations and insults as his mentor did. He won't be able to manage the country that way." the close race could weaken his support inside the Chavismo movement
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Maduro has no credibility now – recent election
| 1,682 | 47 | 742 | 258 | 8 | 111 | 0.031008 | 0.430233 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,496 |
¶ Nearly five minutes to midnight, the National Electoral Council (CNE in Spanish) announced that Venezuela’s interim president and Hugo Chávez’s heir apparent Nicolás Maduro won the April 14 presidential election, defeating opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski with only 50.66 percent of the vote. With reports of vote-rigging and fraud, Capriles, who garnered 49.07 of vote, has been reluctant to concede. But even if these numbers stand, the surprisingly narrow victory and the ongoing post-election fiasco suggest a gradual decline of chavismo and the continuation of a deep political polarization rooted in Chávez’s 14-year reign. ¶ ¶ With Chávez dead, the opposition is closing in. In October 2012, Chávez won the presidency with 55 percent, while Capriles secured 44 percent of the vote. The April 14 results demonstrate a growing dissatisfaction among Venezuelans, particularly those from the Bolivarian Revolution’s ranks. Chávez-leaning inhabitants from the cities of Valencia or Ciudad Guayana, for example, outlined a swath of unfulfilled promises from the 14-year-long Chávez administration. Under Chávez, only 370,000 houses were constructed in the last two years. That number falls short of the demand, as 3 million Venezuelans have applied for government housing. Many Venezuelans have been forced to squat in private properties. With an aging electrical grid, Venezuela experiences power outages four to five times a week, and a failing oil refinery infrastructure has caused oil exports to fall by more than 300,000 barrels per day since 2007. All this in a country that is home to the world’s largest oil reserves.¶ ¶ Prior to the April 14 elections, there were no concrete solutions to Venezuela’s problems. Fear mongering, name-calling, and accusing each other of murder plots prevailed during the two-week presidential race. In an attempt to highlight the image of Chávez, Maduro explained that the former comandante appeared to him in the shape of a bird: “I felt him [Chávez] there as if he were blessing us, telling us that today our battle begins. As I was praying in a small chapel in Barinas, suddenly a small bird entered and hovered around my head three times and chirped. I felt his spirit.” His comments became the butt of jokes on media and social media platforms. But the reaction to his comments did not deter Maduro from using Chávez as his campaign springboard. Under the slogans “Chávez lives, the fight goes on!” and “I swear to you Chávez that my vote is for Maduro,” Maduro has proclaimed himself to be a “son of Chávez” as he rallies across the country with images of Hugo Chávez displayed on jumbotrons in stadiums and squares.¶ ¶ Maduro doesn’t have the same charisma Chávez had, but he can still rely on his association with the deceased leader. A website called Madurodice.com (“Maduro says,” in Spanish) has counted 7,288 instances where Maduro has invoked Chávez’s name. Following his reelection in October 2012, Chávez named Maduro his successor, saying Maduro is capable of carrying the Bolivarian Revolution’s torch. Maduro, however, has met some animosity even among his fellow chavistas, and factions of Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela showed support for Capriles. Maduro voters did not turnout in the expected numbers, suggesting a lack of enthusiasm among his supporters.¶ ¶ Maduro’s vitriolic, parochial rhetoric and actions resemble those of Chávez. He expelled two U.S. diplomats a few hours before announcing the death of Chávez on March 5, accusing both U.S. attachés of destabilizing the country. Maduro blames the United States of having inflicted cancer on Chávez and accused former American diplomats of plotting to kill him. The same virulent rhetoric has been directed toward the opposition and Capriles, whom Maduro has called a “Pharisee from the Venezuelan bourgeoisie that has derailed the economy,” and an “obsessed, silly boy” who has abandoned his governorship of the Miranda state to pursue the higher office. Maduro also claimed that whoever casts a vote for Capriles “will be damned.”¶ ¶ With an iron grip on TV and other media outlets, four out of five members of the National Electoral Council (CNE) on his side, the unstoppable cash flow from oil revenues, 60 percent of the Venezuelan Congress, and 20 out of 23 governorships belonging to Maduro’s United Socialist Party, Maduro should have won by a landslide. In less than 10 days, Capriles managed to attract nearly 679,000 votes while Maduro lost about the same number.¶ ¶ Capriles has refused to recognize Maduro’s narrow victory and asked the CNE not to proclaim Maduro as president. Despite Capriles’ petition, supported by the U.S. and the Organization of American States, the CNE recognized Maduro as the president-elect on April 15 and refused to do another vote recount, thus prompting thousands of Capriles supporters to protest by way of the emblematic cacerolazos, which consist of banging pots or pans. Now, Maduro faces numerous challenges during his six-year administration, such as high crime rate and an infrastructure in shambles, but his biggest challenge is the economy. According to a document published by Spanish newspaper ABC, Maduro’s economic team forecast that the Revolution’s economic model is untenable and that different measures may be necessary in order to put Venezuela back on track. Shortage in basic goods such as cooking oil, rice, and meat as well as double-digit inflation that could reach 50 percent this year are just some of the outcomes of Chávez’s fiscal mismanagement of Venezuela. In addition, Maduro will have to demonstrate before a disgruntled Socialist cohort that he is capable of embodying Chávez’s leadership both in Venezuela and abroad. But most importantly, the Bolivarian Revolution no longer has a monopoly on politics. Maduro may have won the election, but in the long run, it appears his Revolution is losing.
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Valencia 4-16 (Robert Valencia, New York-based political analyst and is a contributing writer for Global Voices Online, specializes in US foreign policy towards Latin America, “Maduro's Slim Win: An Omen of Waning Chavismo,” World Policy Institute Blog, April 16, 2013, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/04/16/maduros-slim-win-omen-waning-chavismo)
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the surprisingly narrow victory and the ongoing post-election fiasco suggest a gradual decline of chavismo and the continuation of a deep political polarization rooted in Chávez’s 14-year reign the opposition is closing in The April 14 results demonstrate a growing dissatisfaction among Venezuelans particularly those from the Bolivarian Revolution’s ranks Maduro, however, has met some animosity even among his fellow chavistas Despite Capriles’ petition, supported by the U.S. and the Organization of American States, the CNE recognized Maduro as the president Maduro faces numerous challenges during his six-year administration the Bolivarian Revolution no longer has a monopoly on politics. Maduro may have won the election, but in the long run, it appears his Revolution is losing
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Prefer predictive forecasts – he’s losing credibility
| 5,922 | 53 | 786 | 945 | 7 | 116 | 0.007407 | 0.122751 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,497 |
¶ ¶ A bulging in-box¶ ¶ The most pressing problems facing Maduro are related to the economy. While some of Chávez's social programmes helped reduce poverty and income inequality, the oil bonanza was not efficiently managed amid widespread corruption and weak institutional capacity. Oil revenue was channelled off-budget and spent at the government's discretion and with no institutional oversight. This created massive captive liquidity in the domestic economy, which fuelled inflation. The authorities responded by putting in place capital controls (essentially to prevent the currency from weakening) and price controls on basic food items. In turn, this has spawned a massive black market and has resulted in food shortages. And with the government nationalising key industries, investors have run a mile. In an era when funds have flowed rapidly into emerging economies, Venezuela stands apart, recording year-after-year of large-scale capital flight.¶ ¶ There are no quick fixes for the Venezuelan economy and putting it on the road to recovery would test even a popular leader with ample political capital. It remains unclear how Maduro intends to tackle these challenges in the months ahead. The only promise he made during the presidential campaign was for a 40% increase in the minimum wage, which will further fan the inflationary flames. He has spoken repeatedly about continuing Chávez's legacy, but the problem is that it was never particularly clear what '21st century socialism' constituted, even when Chávez was alive.¶ ¶ Puppet on a string¶ ¶ Complicating matters, Maduro's fellow party members are acutely aware of their leader's innate vulnerability and will be jostling for position. On the right of the PSUV, the chairman of the national assembly, Diosdado Cabello, is a powerful figure and wields significant influence over the economy, including both nationalised companies and private industry. On the left of the party, Elias Jaua (vice president until Chávez's death) is another powerful figure. Together with other senior party figures, they will seek to extract concessions from Maduro, who risks becoming a puppet leader. However, with deepening divisions within the PSUV, it is hard to see how he will be able to placate the entire party.¶ ¶ Capriles will also have a key role in determining how long the new administration lasts. His standing -- and that of his party, the unfortunately-named MUD (Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, or Democratic Unity Roundtable) -- has risen sharply in recent weeks. Many would even go so far as to say that Capriles has come out of the election as more of a winner than Maduro. Going forwards, rather than solely criticising the new administration, the opposition needs to portray itself as a government-in-waiting. During Chávez's tenure, this is something that it patently failed to do, partly reflecting deep divisions within its own ranks. But now there is more incentive than ever for the opposition to stay united behind Capriles. Even if there is no election before 2018, it is clear that 'chavismo' will not outlive its name-sake for long. The opposition may have to play the waiting game for just a little bit longer.
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Parker 4-17 (Kate Parker, Senior editor, Huffington Post Blog, “Are Maduro's Days Numbered After the Election?” April 17, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kate-parker/maduro-venezuela-election_b_3103366.html)
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The most pressing problems facing Maduro are related to the economy There are no quick fixes for the Venezuelan economy and putting it on the road to recovery would test even a popular leader with ample political capital Maduro's fellow party members are acutely aware of their leader's innate vulnerability and will be jostling for position. On the right of the PSUV Diosdado Cabello, is a powerful figure and wields significant influence over the economy, On the left of the party, Elias Jaua is another powerful figure Together with other senior party figures, they will seek to extract concessions from Maduro, who risks becoming a puppet leader Capriles will also have a key role in determining how long the new administration lasts His standing has risen sharply in recent weeks. now there is more incentive than ever for the opposition to stay united behind Capriles it is clear that 'chavismo' will not outlive its name-sake for long The opposition may have to play the waiting game for just a little bit longer.
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No credibility – economy, internal divisions, opposition party leaders
| 3,191 | 70 | 1,020 | 509 | 9 | 172 | 0.017682 | 0.337917 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,498 |
Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government and was the guiding hand behind a wave of political violence that followed his narrow election victory against right-wing candidate Henrique Capriles in April. Yet Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Elias Jaua was all smiles Wednesday, following a 40-minute meeting in Guatemala with US Secretary of State John Kerry.¶ The two, who met privately on the sidelines of the Organization of American States General Assembly meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, declared their commitment to, in Kerry’s words, “establish a more constructive and positive relationship.” This is to include resuming the exchange of ambassadors, which has been suspended since late 2010. It was Venezuela that requested the meeting.¶ “We agreed today there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue between the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and we will try to set out an agenda by which we agree on things we can work together,” said Kerry.¶ For his part, Jaua declared that “A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace and stability for our peoples.”¶ Just last month, Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils” and accused him of backing the “fascist right” in attacking the Venezuelan people.¶ In Guatemala, Jaua said that he had presented Kerry with a report on the violence that followed the April 14 election to choose Chavez’s successor in which 11 people were killed and 80 injured, most of them Maduro supporters. He gave the US secretary of state an extract of the report prepared on the incidents by Venezuela’s Public Advocate’s office.¶ He said that the discussion had “alerted Kerry to the actions of anti-democratic groups in Venezuela, which threaten Venezuelan democracy, stability and which often are being supported by political and economic sectors of other countries.”¶ In point of fact, the most significant “sectors” seeking to destabilize the Venezuelan regime have long been the CIA and the US State Department.¶ Maduro’s turn toward accommodation with US imperialism has been accompanied by a similar approach to both foreign and domestic capital.¶ Among the most significant deals in terms of foreign capital was reached late last month with Chevron Corp. Chevron is providing $2 billion in financing for Petroboscan, a joint venture between the US oil giant and Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to boost heavy crude production in the northwestern state of Zulia. Shortly beforehand, PDVSA secured a $1 billion credit line with Houston-based Schlumberger Ltd., the world’s largest oilfield services company.¶ While oil exports to the US have declined to about 900,000 barrels a day, it remains Venezuela’s chief customer for oil, responsible for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings and roughly half of its federal budget revenue.¶ From the standpoint of the US-based energy conglomerates, securing dominance over Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world, remains a strategic objective. The investments by Chevron and Schlumberger make clear that they see the potential for major profits, the Venezuelan government’s rhetoric about “Bolivarian socialism” notwithstanding.¶ Domestically, after charging for months that major Venezuelan capitalists, backed by the US, were waging an “economic war” against his government, Maduro invited the country’s second-richest individual, Lorenzo Mendoza, the head of the country’s largest food company, Polar, to meet with him last month at the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas.¶ Both Chavez and Maduro had singled out Polar and Mendoza for attack over the country’s increasingly severe shortages and rising food prices. Holding them responsible for hoarding and waging an “economic war,” they threatened to nationalize the firm.¶ For his part, Mendoza, who is worth some $4.5 billion, was an enthusiastic supporter of the US-backed coup that briefly unseated Chavez in April 2002. This history had contributed to his keeping a fairly low profile under Chavez, but it was noted in the Venezuelan media that he mounted a vigorous public defense of his company in the face of Maduro’s recent charges.¶ Mendoza described the meeting as “very cordial, direct, sincere,” adding, “The president was very kind in listening to us and communicating the need to keep investing, producing and supplying markets. That is our lifelong commitment, passion and vocation.” He said that the two had reached an agreement “not to politicize” the issue of food.¶ Vice President Jorge Arreaza provided a similar description of the encounter between the “working class” president and the billionaire. “The problem’s been overcome,” he said.¶ The meeting with Mendoza was only the most visible of a series of talks between the government and prominent Venezuelan capitalists. Among the deals reached is the lifting of certain price controls and the easing of currency restrictions.¶ “In another sign of the rapprochement, the hallways of the finance ministry for the first time in years are filled with businessmen in sharp suits,” Reuters reported. “Many carry folders stuffed with requests for greater flexibility in the currency control system and an easing of price controls.”¶ The news agency quoted Finance Minister Nelson Merentes stating after one meeting with business executives: “We’ve entered a phase of creating closer ties with the private sector, without ignoring the new socialist economy.”¶ After months of charging the big bourgeoisie in Venezuela with “sabotage,” the Maduro government is now currying its favor and begging it to increase production. This turn is driven by a deepening economic crisis characterized by a decline in growth, soaring inflation and widespread shortages.¶ Venezuela’s inflation rate is now near 30 percent, with the bulk of it reflecting the sharp rise in the price of food. Meanwhile, the growth rate for the first quarter of 2013 amounted to just 0.7 percent. This overall figure, however, masks the severity of the situation. ¶ Venezuela’s financial sector, which continues to enjoy some of the highest profit rates in the world, saw a 31 percent growth during this period, while manufacturing declined by 3.6 percent and construction by 1.2 percent. The scarcity index, which tracks the amount of products missing from store shelves, has hit its highest level since the Central Bank began tracking these figures.¶ The accommodation between the Maduro government and Venezuelan capitalists, on the one hand, and Washington, on the other, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles, who has continued to charge electoral fraud and condemn Maduro as an illegitimate president. While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory, it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela. And Mendoza’s visit to Miraflores indicates that the billionaire accepts Maduro as legitimate.
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Van Auken 6-7 (Bill Van Auken, reporter, World Socialist Web Site, political activist, Socialist Equality Party, 2004 Presidential candidate “Venezuela’s Maduro reaches out to big business and Washington,” article, World Socialist Web Site, June 7, 2013, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/07/vene-j07.html)
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Maduro has repeatedly charged in recent months that US imperialism was conspiring to bring down his government A good relationship between the government of President Nicolas Maduro and the government of President Barack Obama is what suits both peoples, it’s the guarantee of peace Maduro referred to Obama in a public speech as “the big boss of the devils accommodation between the Maduro government and Washington, has taken the political wind out of the sails of the rightist candidate Henrique Capriles While the Obama administration has yet to formally recognize Maduro’s close election victory it has turned a cold shoulder to demands for OAS sanctions against Venezuela
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Plan crushes internal opposition – ensures there are no challenges to his credibility
| 7,163 | 85 | 677 | 1,113 | 13 | 107 | 0.01168 | 0.096137 |
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1,499 |
¶ Although President Obama has refused to recognize the legitimacy of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, the career diplomat who handles Latin American affairs seems to be convinced that holding talks with representatives of the Venezuelan narcostate is the right way to promote our values and interests in the region – despite the fact that such a dialogue bestows de facto recognition on an undemocratic, criminal regime.¶ ¶ The charge d’affaires of Venezuela in Washington and staunch critic of the United States, Calixto Ortega, revealed recently that a meeting had been scheduled with Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobson to improve relations between the two countries. Ironically, Ortega has been one of the most intransigent inquisitors against the democratic opposition in Venezuela. And now he is Ms. Jacobson’s new best friend.¶ ¶ That the State Department accepted the appointment of Ortega as Venezuela’s envoy in Washington is disgraceful and inconsistent with what President Obama has expressed publicly. But one wonders, how are our economic interests with petroleum-rich Venezuela advanced by a dialogue with the regime that has politicized, looted, and bankrupted the Venezuelan state oil company, PDVSA? How are our concerns about terrorism addressed by throwing a lifeline to the best friend of Iran and Hezbollah in the Americas? How will these clever US diplomats advance our counternarcotics agenda with a state whose senior security officials have been implicated personally and directly in narcotrafficking by US authorities?¶ ¶ Rather than conferring even a small dose of legitimacy on the regime in Caracas, US policymakers should have left it alone to grapple with the economic chaos and internal divisions that threaten its grip on power. Ironically, two administrations (in Washington and in Caracas) that heap scorn on a history of US “interference” in Latin America have dragged American diplomats into the middle of Venezuela’s dispute over a stolen election.¶ ¶ This wrong-headed rapprochement with Venezuela – which is inconsistent with the public position of President Obama – should be scrutinized by both Congress and the White House.¶ ¶ The Venezuelan people and the opposition that represents them deserve our support to establish a democratic government that believes in the rule of law. Maduro’s administration, like that of his political mentor Hugo Chávez, represents a continuing threat to the stability of the region and for democracy in Latin America.¶ ¶ For decades, the United States has promoted democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the benefits of a free market, and open trade in the Americas. The chavista regime in Venezuela is a declared enemy of each of these objectives. A dialogue with such a government is a waste of time, of course. However, a dialogue that bestows Washington’s blessing on a government struggling to stay upright is worse than foolish, because it sends mixed signals to every one of our neighbors who think we believe what we say.¶ ¶ The Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), which represents the opposition factions in Venezuela, must act with consistency and seriousness if they want to restore democracy in their country. In the past, MUD functionaries were summoned to Washington by the State Department to rubberstamp a dialogue with Maduro – but that was before the chavista machine stole the election. Elected leaders from the opposition should open channels of communication with Washington, just as the have done with other nations, to seek support for their worthy cause.¶ ¶ The State Department should rethink its position with regard to Venezuela and heed the democratic voices in the region that are bewildered by an American foreign policy whose direction is unclear and whose objectives are unknown.
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Noriega 6-14 (Roger Noriega, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Why is the State Department obsessed with legitimizing the Venezuelan narco-state?” American Enterprise Institute public policy blog, June 14, 2013, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/06/why-is-the-state-department-obsessed-with-legitimizing-the-venezuelan-narco-state/)
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Obama has refused to recognize the legitimacy of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro dialogue bestows de facto recognition on an undemocratic, criminal regime. how are our economic interests with petroleum-rich Venezuela advanced by a dialogue with the regime that has politicized, looted, and bankrupted the Venezuelan state oil company How will these clever US diplomats advance our counternarcotics agenda with a state whose senior security officials have been implicated personally and directly in narcotrafficking by US authorities Rather than conferring even a small dose of legitimacy on the regime in Caracas, US policymakers should have left it alone to grapple with the economic chaos and internal divisions that threaten its grip on power The Venezuelan people and the opposition that represents them deserve our support to establish a democratic government that believes in the rule of law. Maduro’s administration, represents a continuing threat to the stability of the region and for democracy in Latin America. For decades, the United States has promoted democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the benefits of a free market, and open trade in the Americas The chavista regime in Venezuela is a declared enemy of each of these objectives. dialogue that bestows Washington’s blessing on a government struggling to stay upright is worse than foolish, because it sends mixed signals to every one of our neighbors who think we believe what we say. The State Department should rethink its position with regard to Venezuela and heed the democratic voices in the region that are bewildered by an American foreign policy whose direction is unclear
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The plan sends mixed signals that crushes international pressure to check Maduro’s power
| 3,811 | 88 | 1,672 | 598 | 13 | 261 | 0.021739 | 0.436455 |
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