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Q2: Does the Venezuelan government want good relations?¶ ¶ A2: Despite recent discussions with the United States, it doesn’t seem to be the case. Earlier this year, the Venezuelan government suspended talks between the U.S. State Department and Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that had begun in late 2012, citing alleged U.S. meddling in Venezuela’s April election. The Maduro government has also largely followed the Chávez playbook, constantly accusing the United States of assassination plots, spying, and economic and political sabotage. While the Kerry-Jaua meeting may have made for nice headlines, it’s difficult to imagine that the Venezuelan government will not play the anti-U.S. card again, if needed.¶ ¶ This week, Calixto Ortega—appointed to handle matters with the United States—will meet with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to continue discussions and establish a new set of concrete goals to guide the relationship forward.¶ ¶ These good-faith gestures made by the Venezuelan government are neither new nor unheard of. Despite recent efforts, U.S. policymakers should temper any positive expectations, as a core basis of Chavismo is its anti-U.S. ideology. It’s of course difficult to improve relations with a government that consistently defines itself as vehemently against your foreign policy agenda. This suggests that Venezuela may be looking to reestablish a purely economic relationship—one that will eliminate U.S. sanctions.¶ ¶ Still, even if certain positive steps are taken, history suggests that the Venezuelan government could quickly scuttle progress made, likely with the goal of Maduro shoring up support within his own ranks.¶ ¶ Q3: Should the United States pursue exchanging ambassadors?¶ ¶ A3: If the United States continues on this road, both countries will seek to appoint ambassadors as a step in normalizing relations.¶ ¶ Last week, the Washington Post published an editorial that suggested recent U.S. overtures to Venezuela are something of a lifeline, thrown while the Venezuelan government is struggling to maintain its legitimacy and when its neighbors, although having recognized the Maduro government, have recognized the need for an impartial audit of the election results.¶ ¶ Many believe it more appropriate for the United States to prioritize delicate issues such as human rights violations and antidrug policies before being willing to consider reinstating ambassadors.¶ ¶ Appointing ambassadors would certainly signal a real intention from both countries to forge a positive relationship. Having a U.S. ambassador in countries that have similar conditions to those of Venezuela is not something to be opposed across the board. In many situations, having a U.S. ambassador in a nondemocratic country serves as a symbol to advance our most cherished beliefs. It also serves as proof of the U.S. government’s willingness to keep lines of communication open. But the timing of this appointment would imply that the Unites States would deny the opposition’s claims of a fraudulent election, as well as the urgency of the audit of the election results. This also comes at a time when Venezuela is more divided than ever, politically and economically. So rather than serve as an example of a pragmatic posture, this maneuver would be viewed by a critical mass of a very motivated Venezuelan opposition as U.S. government support for the Maduro government.¶ ¶ Conclusion: In short, relations between the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track record that recent headlines cannot obscure. And while there are undoubtedly members of the Venezuelan government who want to improve relations, it’s difficult to see their argument winning over the more hardline Chavistas in the government, who would likely see any steps to building ties as betraying the cause.¶ ¶ Venezuela has time and again proven to be unwilling to work with the United States, making it difficult for the United States to gauge any real intentions of change. In order to move ahead and legitimize this new relationship, the United States must make a decision regarding Maduro’s legitimacy: does the United States recognize Maduro’s election sans a proper audit?
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Meacham 6-21 (Carl Meacham, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Pamela Pamelá, intern scholar with the Americas Program at CSIS, provided research assistance, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” interview, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jun 21, 2013, http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations)
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Despite recent discussions with the United States, it doesn’t seem to be the case Venezuelan government suspended talks between the U.S. State Department and Venezuelan Foreign Ministry Maduro largely followed the Chávez playbook, constantly accusing the United States of assassination plots, spying, and economic and political sabotage While the Kerry-Jaua meeting may have made for nice headlines, it’s difficult to imagine that the Venezuelan government will not play the anti-U.S. card again, U.S. policymakers should temper any positive expectations, as a core basis of Chavismo is its anti-U.S. ideology. It’s of course difficult to improve relations with a government that consistently defines itself as vehemently against your foreign policy agenda. the Venezuelan government could quickly scuttle progress made, likely with the goal of Maduro shoring up support within his own ranks U.S. overtures to Venezuela are something of a lifeline, thrown while the Venezuelan government is struggling to maintain its legitimacy the timing would imply that the Unites States would deny the opposition’s claims of a fraudulent election this maneuver would be viewed by a critical mass of a very motivated Venezuelan opposition as U.S. government support for the Maduro government relations between the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track record that recent headlines cannot obscure it’s difficult to see their argument winning over the more hardline Chavistas in the government, who would likely see any steps to building ties as betraying the cause.
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Turns relations advantage – Maduro will resort to anti-americanism despite previous olive branches
| 4,224 | 98 | 1,562 | 653 | 13 | 236 | 0.019908 | 0.361409 |
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President Barack Obama said the U.S. has not and will not get tangled up in Venezuela's political conflict.¶ ¶ Commenting in an interview with Spanish-language network Telemundo that's set to air Sunday, Obama said the U.S. hasn't tried "in any way" to interfere with the recent election of Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela's president.¶ ¶ On Saturday Venezuela's government accused Washington and the Obama administration of being behind violence that has followed its recent presidential election.¶ ¶ A foreign ministry statement said that Obama's "fallacious, intemperate and interventionist declaration" will lead toward deteriorating relations between the countries and "confirms to the world the policy of aggression his government maintains against our country."¶ ¶ The statement read by Foreign Minister Elias Jaua on state television referred to comments the U.S. president made to Spanish-language television network Univision during his trip to Mexico and Costa Rica.¶ ¶ In the interview that aired Friday, Obama wouldn't say if the United States recognizes Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela's new president following elections that have been disputed by the opposition.¶ ¶ When asked, he replied that it's up to the people of Venezuela to choose their leaders in legitimate elections.¶ ¶ He also said that reports indicate that basic principles of human rights, democracy, press freedom and freedom of assembly were not observed in Venezuela following the election.¶ ¶ "Venezuela rejects with all the force of its Bolivarian dignity the declaration by United States President Barack Obama which again attacks the legitimate Venezuelan government," the foreign ministry statement said.¶ ¶ Maduro, the hand-picked successor to late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, narrowly won April 14 presidential elections. But opposition leader Henrique Capriles contends the election was stolen from him and has challenged the result.¶ ¶ Tensions between supporters on both sides remain high, with tens of thousands of Venezuelans protesting in the streets. Lawmakers even brawled on the floor of the National Assembly last week.¶ ¶ In another interview with Spanish-language network Telemundo that's set to air on Sunday, Obama described as "ridiculous" the idea that an American filmmaker detained by Venezuela's government is a spy.¶ ¶ Thirty-five-year-old Timothy Tracy, of West Hollywood, California, was formally charged last week with crimes including conspiracy, association for criminal purposes and use of a false document.¶ ¶ Obama says Tracy's case will be handled like every other in which a U.S. citizen gets into a "legal tangle" while abroad.¶ ¶ The president also said the U.S. hasn't tried "in any way" to interfere with Venezuela's recent elections.
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Fox 5-5 (Fox News Latino, “Obama Says The U.S. Will Not Get Tangled In Venezuela's Politics,” based on reporting by the Associated Press, Published May 05, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/05/05/obama-says-us-will-not-get-tangled-in-venezuela-politics/#ixzz2Y5xcp6xt)
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Obama said the U.S. will not get tangled up in Venezuela's political conflict. Obama wouldn't say if the United States recognizes Maduro as Venezuela's new he replied that it's up to the people of Venezuela to choose their leaders in legitimate elections He also said that reports indicate that basic principles of human rights, democracy, press freedom and freedom of assembly were not observed in Venezuela following the election.
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Obama is staying out of Venezuelan politics and refusing to recognize Maduro – emboldens opposition
| 2,759 | 99 | 434 | 416 | 15 | 69 | 0.036058 | 0.165865 |
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¶ Despite the ongoing political diatribe between the Venezuelan and the United States governments, the latter country has remained the first buyer of Venezuelan oil.¶ ¶ However, US government statistics suggest that this year trade partners such as China and India are displacing the United States as the top buyer of Venezuelan crude oil.¶ ¶ According to the US Department of Energy, in February 2013 Venezuelan crude oil and byproducts shipments to the United States totaled some 601,000 bpd. This represents a sharp drop of 33% compared to 898,000 bpd in January 2013, and a decrease of 35% from 931,000 bpd in February 2012.¶ ¶ Venezuelan crude oil shipments to the US account for 96% of oil exports to the United States. Crude oil sales tumbled by 33.5%, from 871,000 bpd in January to 579,000 bpd in February 2013.¶ ¶ Meanwhile, shipments of oil byproducts and fuels to the US kept their downward trend unchanged, and totaled only 22,000 bpd in February, a fall of 18% from 27,000 bpd in January.¶ ¶ New priorities¶ ¶ The drop in Venezuelan oil exports to the US in February came hand in hand with a period of decline in Venezuelan oil production. According to a report published by state-run oil firm Pdvsa, Venezuelan oil output hit some 2.85 million bpd in the first week of February. At El Furrial oilfield in Monagas state, north Venezuela, production fell to some 800,000 bpd. Overall, from August 2012 to February this year, the decrease was about 100,000 bpd, according to Pdvsa.¶ ¶ In this scenario of shrinking output, it is worth to remind that Pdvsa is set to keep unchanged or increase oil shipments to Asia.¶ ¶ Although Venezuela is a major oil supplier to the United States, the trend shows that China and India will become the Venezuela's top oil buyers.¶ ¶ The Venezuelan government has many a time voiced plans to ship up to 1 million bpd of crude oil and byproducts to China. Currently, the figure stands at 650,000 bpd, including some 240,000 that are shipped under the Venezuela-Chinese Fund.¶ ¶ Additionally, it is worth noting that Venezuelan oil sales to the United States –which are paid in cash- are declining as oil shipments intended to repay loans granted to Venezuela under financing schemes such as the Venezuela-Chinese Fund are growing. This means lower oil revenue for the Central Bank of Venezuela.¶ ¶ Fewer imports¶ ¶ In February, Venezuela's purchases of oil derivatives from the US plummeted 62%, from 154,000 to 58,000 bpd. This includes a decrease of 94% in purchases of gasoline, which fell 94% to 7,000 bpd.
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Tovar 4-30 (Ernesto J Tovar, reporter, El Universal, “Venezuelan oil sales to the US plummet 33% in February,” El Universal, Venezuelan newspaper, April 30, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130430/venezuelan-oil-sales-to-the-us-plummet-33-in-february)
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US government statistics suggest that this year trade partners such as China and India are displacing the United States as the top buyer of Venezuelan crude oil Venezuelan crude oil and byproducts shipments to the United States represents a sharp drop of 33% shipments of oil byproducts and fuels to the US kept their downward trend unchanged The drop in Venezuelan oil exports to the US in February came hand in hand with a period of decline in Venezuelan oil production production fell to some 800,000 bpd China and India will become the Venezuela's top oil buyers. Venezuelan oil sales to the United States –which are paid in cash- are declining as oil shipments intended to repay loans granted to Venezuela under financing schemes such as the Venezuela-Chinese Fund are growing. Venezuela's purchases of oil derivatives from the US plummeted 62%
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Venezuelan-US oil cooperation is falling – newest statistics prove – increasing cooperation over the plan would link
| 2,557 | 116 | 851 | 436 | 17 | 141 | 0.038991 | 0.323394 |
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The winds of change are once again blowing in Venezuela. The recent announcement of Hugo Chavez’s passing has opened up a host of questions about the future leadership of Venezuela and the potential impact this leadership transition could have on Venezuelan oil production and global oil markets.¶ ¶ Venezuela is one of the largest oil and natural gas resource holders in the world. It is among the world’s largest oil producers (13th) and exporters (10th) and has historically been one of the United States’ largest sources of oil imports (4th behind Canada, Saudi Arabia and Mexico). Ever since the failed coup and the subsequent strike that brought about a short collapse in oil production in 2002, followed by nationalization of the oil sector, onlookers have been waiting for indications that the regime’s approach to energy production would either fail once and for all or that some political change would bring about reform and rejuvenation of the energy sector. A political transition in Venezuela is now upon us but how it evolves could mean a lot for the energy sector and global energy markets.¶ ¶ Despite its enormous oil resources, Venezuela's oil production (regardless of whose figures you use) has long been in steady decline. In 2011 liquids production was 2.47 million barrels per day (mmbd) , down a million barrels per day since 1999. Some of this is reflects the changing cost and economics of Venezuelan oil production but field decline is significant and expertise and reinvestment are questionable and looking harder to come by. The internal technical and managerial capabilities of state run oil and gas company PDVSA have deteriorated since the 2002 strike and aftermath. Increasingly, PDVSA relies on contractors, as well as other private company partners, to keep the fields in production but reports state that contractors have not been paid in months and that the political uncertainty in the country has even driven routine decision making to a halt.¶ ¶ The sustained political uncertainty has also slowed investment; Russian and Indian companies were planning to invest in Venezuela's oil fields but so far have withheld incremental new money. China has not announced a new line of credit or extensions on its development-linked financing since last April.¶ ¶ At the same time that production is dropping, highly subsidized domestic consumption of oil is increasing while revenue from exports is also declining. The United States remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil exports at 950,000 barrels per day in 2011, roughly 40 percent, plus another 185,000 barrels per day from the Caribbean that was Venezuelan sourced but those volumes area down as U.S. demand has declined and other crudes have become available. Venezuela's next largest export destinations are the Caribbean (31 percent) and then China (around 10 percent). Venezuela sells to many of its Caribbean neighbors at below market rates due to extremely preferential financing relationships, including additional heavy subsidies for Cuban exports. All of this culminates in an outlook for continued decline in oil production and a worsening economic outlook for Venezuela during a politically difficult time.¶ ¶ However, conventional wisdom argues that maintaining oil production is in the interest of any regime. Revenue from oil production is such a large part of Venezuela’s government balance sheet that no leadership could survive for long without a sustained cash flow that oil exports bring. The converse of this argument is that revenues generated by the energy sector are such an important source of power and influence in Venezuela that there is potential for infighting over control of the sector. Moreover, the potential for strikes or instability among groups involved in the sector (some of whom have not been paid) could have additional negative impacts on production.¶ ¶ While oil markets have so far taken the news of Chavez’s demise in stride (many claim because the news was largely expected, others because the political outcome is still so uncertain) an actual disruption in Venezuelan production could add pressure to an already difficult market outlook. The last year has produced a number of supply disruptions around the world from OPEC, the Middle East North Africa region, as well as non-OPEC sources. If the economic outlook continues to improve and yield an increase global energy demand, if Iran sanctions remain in place, and if Venezuelan production be compromised, then oil prices would experience much more significant upside pressure from any new disruptions.¶ ¶ Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to emerge. The damage that has been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state and civil society could take years to rehabilitate. A few key reasons for this include:¶ 1.revenue from the oil and gas sector that is diverted for political purposes and not reinvested in a way that will drive new production will be hard to direct back to useful investment in the sector,¶ 2.much of the private sector has been driven away from investment in Venezuela and may be reluctant to return, or for the companies in country to re-invest in the short-term given their experience in the 2000s,¶ 3.oil field mismanagement and damage may have likely occurred over the last decade and it will take time and investment to revitalize,¶ 4.many of Venezuela’s core assets are in technologically complex and capital-intensive heavy oil projects that take time and resources to develop and must now be viewed in light of the global array of upstream options that are now on the table for international oil investors as compared to a decade ago,¶ 5.some of Venezuela’s current commercial relationships on the upstream or export side may have to be revisited in light of a more commercially-based hydrocarbon policy,¶ 6.Venezuela’s energy sector is dominated by the state’s decisions and management and it will take time to replace the managerial competency that once existed,¶ 7.highly subsidized oil is a key feature of Venezuelan society and the political will to reform the entire energy sector into one that is more market-based and open to private investment will necessarily have to feed into the domestic demand-side of that equation.¶ ¶ What about Venezuela’s relationship with the United States? Over the last ten years the sustained trading relationship between the United States and Venezuela has been one of the stabilizing forces in an otherwise contentious and sometimes volatile relationship. U.S. refineries in the Gulf Coast are specifically designed to process Venezuela’s sour and medium to heavy crude and serves as its natural market. Despite oil production being down, the United States still imports just under a million barrels of crude per day from Venezuela (down from a peak of 1.4 mmbd in 1997) and, as stated earlier, the government of Venezuela is highly dependent on those revenues for their ongoing stability, especially as revenue from other exports and domestic consumption decline. As we look ahead to another period of transition in Venezuela it is important to be mindful of the potential for disruption and to look for ways to mitigate the impacts of such disruption, but it is equally important to remember the trade ties that bind the two countries for the time being and to find opportunities to drive change in a positive direction.¶ ¶ Time may be limited in this regard because the U.S. domestic production outlook is changing thanks to tight oil development in the United States and the influx of Canadian oil sands, both of which are giving U.S. refiners more options in terms of the crudes they use and more decisions to make about how they want to configure their refineries going forward. A future in which Venezuela is no longer as competitive in its natural market in the United States would change the outlook for Venezuelan crude marketing decisions.¶ ¶ The long-term outlook for Venezuela’s continued oil market production is changing both in commercial and political terms. The situation has looked unsustainable for a long period of time but has managed to persist longer than most people though it would. Only time will tell if the upcoming leadership changes will bring a new chapter for Venezuela.
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Ladislaw and Verrastro 3-6 (Sarah O. Ladislaw is co-director and senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., Frank Verrastro is senior vice president and James R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS, “Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 6, 2013, http://csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-production)
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Venezuela's oil production has long been in steady decline. The sustained political uncertainty has also slowed investment highly subsidized domestic consumption of oil is increasing while revenue from exports is also declining. The United States remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil exports at 950,000 barrels per day in 2011, roughly 40 percent, plus another 185,000 barrels per day from the Caribbean that was Venezuelan sourced but those volumes area down as U.S. demand has declined maintaining oil production is in the interest of any regime Revenue from oil production is such a large part of Venezuela’s government balance sheet that no leadership could survive for long without a sustained cash flow that oil exports bring much of the private sector has been driven away from investment in Venezuela oil field mismanagement and damage may have likely occurred over the last decade many of Venezuela’s core assets are in technologically complex and capital-intensive heavy oil projects that take time and resources to develop the sustained trading relationship between the United States and Venezuela has been one of the stabilizing forces in an otherwise contentious and sometimes volatile relationship. the government of Venezuela is highly dependent on those revenues for their ongoing stability U.S. domestic production outlook is changing thanks to tight oil development in the United States and the influx of Canadian oil sands, both of which are giving U.S. refiners more options A future in which Venezuela is no longer as competitive in its natural market in the United States would change the outlook for Venezuelan crude marketing decisions.
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Declining production and US diversification kills the oil industry now – that hurts Maduro – only the plan can revitalize his political power
| 8,337 | 141 | 1,671 | 1,351 | 23 | 260 | 0.017024 | 0.19245 |
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Latin American governments are acutely aware of and worried about the continued economic deterioration, criminal violence, and political unraveling in Venezuela. (In 2012, the capital, Caracas, registered more murders than any other city in the world.) Regional leaders also know that Maduro's political position under such circumstances is precarious. An audiotape of a conversation between a Chavista hard-liner and a Cuban intelligence officer was recently released, revealing internecine fights within the late president's ruling coalition of Socialists. The tape exposes palace intrigue in Caracas and a fierce power struggle within the government's ranks, including discussion of a possible coup against Maduro by his longtime rival, National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello.¶ ¶ The episode was another reminder of the privileged access and influence Cuba has enjoyed in Venezuelan politics since Chávez came to power. The island receives an estimated subsidy of $4 billion to $5 billion annually through discounted oil and has vigorously backed Maduro, who is close to the Cuban regime. In exchange for these subsidies, Cuba provides Venezuela with medical and security support and has effectively operated as a proxy for PDVSA, Venezuela's national oil company, to conduct financial transactions with little oversight.¶ ¶ Still, though the governments of Cuba, along with those of ALBA members Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, cheered when Maduro was officially declared the winner of the April 14 election, they can hardly be reassured by his shaky political position in Venezuela. They know that given the depth of the economic crisis, Venezuela's generous oil-backed aid cannot continue indefinitely.¶ ¶ Yet, curiously and unfortunately, for a combination of economic, geopolitical, and ideological reasons, even those governments not ideologically aligned to Venezuela have been unwilling to risk antagonizing the debilitated Maduro. The Venezuelan opposition has appealed to the region's governments to apply pressure on Maduro to conduct a serious recount of the April 14 election, which, according to official figures, Maduro won by a razor-thin margin of 1.5 percentage points. Neighboring heads of state have not, however, been responsive to these calls. Latin American governments even remained silent in the face of physical violence against some opposition lawmakers on April 30.¶ ¶ Regional groupings have been similarly indifferent. Following the Venezuelan election, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a continentwide political forum created in 2008, plainly sided with Maduro and rushed to recognize his government. Although several UNASUR members also asked for a recount, the group has been extremely passive and shown little if any interest in pressing Caracas for a review of the contested vote. In backing Maduro, UNASUR is overlooking Venezuela's domestic legitimacy crisis, which will make it that much harder for the country's profound problems to be effectively addressed.¶ ¶ The Organization of American States (OAS), the Western Hemisphere's long-established multilateral body, has also been characterized by inaction regarding the Venezuelan situation. While OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza did take a stand in calling for an audit of the election, member governments were unwilling to back him up. It was regarded as an internal question, rather than a matter of hemispheric concern. Yet, it is striking that even though Venezuela is arguably the most troubling and volatile situation on the continent for regional peace and democracy, it was not seen as justifying a place on the agenda at the OAS General Assembly meeting in Guatemala on June 5. Among the OAS's chief purposes is serving as watchdog and defender for democracy in the hemisphere -- it took action most recently after events in Honduras in 2009 and Paraguay in 2012 -- but Venezuela was excluded from the plenary meeting. No member state wanted to take on Maduro.
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Shifter 6-24 (Michael Shifter, President of Inter-American Dialogue, professor of International Relations at Boston University, “A Bolivarian Dream Deferred,” article, Foreign Policy, pg 1-3, June 24, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/a_bolivarian_dream_deferred_latin_american_left_chavez?page=0,0&wp_login_redirect=0)
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Latin American governments are acutely aware of and worried about political unraveling in Venezuela Regional leaders also know that Maduro's political position under such circumstances is precarious ALBA members cheered when Maduro was officially declared the winner they can hardly be reassured by his shaky political position in Venezuela even those governments not ideologically aligned to Venezuela have been unwilling to risk antagonizing the debilitated Maduro. UNASUR), a continentwide political forum created in 2008, plainly sided with Maduro and rushed to recognize his government In backing Maduro, UNASUR is overlooking Venezuela's domestic legitimacy crisis (OAS), the Western Hemisphere's long-established multilateral body, has also been characterized by inaction regarding the Venezuelan situation
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US is key – recognition from South American states didn’t boost legitimacy
| 3,992 | 74 | 813 | 604 | 12 | 111 | 0.019868 | 0.183775 |
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Following Chavez’s death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former vice-president, has not been as vitriolic in his posturing vis-à-vis the United States.¶ ¶ According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”.¶ ¶ “Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one,” Shifter told IPS.¶ The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes.¶ ¶ In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base.¶ ¶ Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela’s parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency.¶ ¶ Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable.¶ ¶ Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation.¶ ¶ Oil economy¶ ¶ Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world.¶ ¶ Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela.¶ ¶ Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies.¶ ¶ While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company.¶ ¶ The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure.¶ ¶ In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites.¶ “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.”¶ If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry's recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms.¶ "Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time," Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, "and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests."¶ Indeed, Negroponte said she was "optimistic" about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a "troika" of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.¶ Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as "a small step") was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.¶ "I don't think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas," he said. "It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going."
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Metzker 6-17 (Jared Metzker, Inter Press Service, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” article, Global Issues, June 17, 2013, http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/06/17/16843)
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Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”. Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base. ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue nezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.” , major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed I don't think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going."
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No concrete attempts at rapprochement now – even if both sides are reaching out – plan still triggers the link
| 4,713 | 110 | 1,086 | 739 | 20 | 179 | 0.027064 | 0.242219 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,506 |
¶ On the margins of the general assembly of the Organization of American States in Guatemala, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuela’s foreign minister, Elias Jaua, representing the democratically challenged and crisis-prone government of Nicolas Maduro, handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez and self-proclaimed victor of the April 14th presidential elections.¶ ¶ After the meeting, Kerry told the press: “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela [read: the Maduro regime] and the United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship.”¶ ¶ Regrettably, Secretary Kerry and his Department of State colleagues are succumbing to Diplomat’s Syndrome, a form of optical illusion or mental disorientation that mistakes talk for action and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds.¶ ¶ That top diplomats of the U.S. and Venezuela talked is no big deal. President Obama made nice with President Chavez in April 2009 and relations continued to deteriorate. What really matters is whether Venezuela’s populist authoritarian leadership is genuinely ready to modify behaviours that clash with important U.S. interests and values.¶ ¶ Beginning with the death of Chavez on March 5th, the Maduro regime has engaged in virtually non-stop anti-American diatribes. It arrested U.S. citizen and filmmaker Tim Tracy on farcical charges of espionage. His recent release is long overdue and little more than a concession to reality.¶ ¶ Since March, President Maduro and company have repeatedly blocked efforts to obtain a fair review of voting irregularities in the April 14th elections and threatened and assaulted members of the democratic opposition, including a brutal attack on opposition legislators on the floor of the National Assembly. Maduro and company have also spoken of punitive reprisals against U.S. ally Colombia, because Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with defeated opposition candidate Henrique Capriles.¶ ¶ Maduro and Jaua clearly hope that Secretary Kerry and the Obama Administration will finally recognise the outcome of the April 14th elections and legitimise Maduro’s presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus. In this light, Kerry’s statement equating Maduro’s mouthpiece Jaua with Venezuela is disconcerting.¶ The offensive of Maduro and Jaua is aimed at undercutting the diplomatic offensive of the opposition. They also hope to keep the systemic failures of their Cuban-inspired socialism and economic mismanagement out of the discussion and obscure their ties with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.¶ ¶ Therefore, the bar for genuine improvements in U.S.–Venezuela relations should remain high. It should include a serious commitment by the Maduro regime to not only respect the rights of the democratic opposition but to enter into an actual dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and preserving fundamental political and economic rights.¶ ¶ Critically, it will also require a major reversal in persistent anti-Americanism coupled with genuine cooperation to combat illicit drug trafficking and terrorism and adherence to all Iran and Syria sanctions.¶ ¶ Without progress on these keys themes, Kerry and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic with post-Chavez Venezuela and legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.
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Walser 6-10 (Ray Walser is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Heritage Foundation, where this article originally appeared, “Don't be naive when it comes to Venezuela, Mr. Kerry,” accessed via The Commentator, June 10, 2013, http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3752/don_t_be_naive_when_it_comes_to_venezuela_mr_kerry)
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Kerry are succumbing to Diplomat’s Syndrome form of optical illusion or mental disorientation that mistakes talk for action and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds. That top diplomats of the U.S. and Venezuela talked is no big deal Maduro hope that Obama will finally recognise the outcome of the April 14th elections and legitimise Maduro’s presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus. The offensive of Maduro and Jaua is aimed at undercutting the diplomatic offensive of the opposition Kerry and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic with post-Chavez Venezuela and legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.
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The meeting was just empty posturing by Venezuela to try and earn legitimacy – taking a hardline stance now is key
| 3,393 | 114 | 682 | 509 | 21 | 104 | 0.041257 | 0.204322 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,507 |
Now that Nicolas Maduro—the late Hugo Chavez’s choice for successor—has narrowly won Sunday’s presidential elections in Venezuela, oil and gas investors can expect a perpetuation of the status quo.¶ ¶ In Sunday’s vote, Maduro won with a very narrow 50.7% and a vow to continue with Chavez’s “revolution,” which has seen the oil industry nationalized and the state-run PDVSA oil company funding social programs and voraciously courting China and Russia.¶ ¶ The narrow vote will not be without its challenges. Opposition rival candidate Henrique Capriles has refused to recognize the results and is demanding a recount, though the electoral commission is standing firm on Maduro’s victory.¶ ¶ For foreign oil and gas companies, we can expect more of the same. There are no regulatory changes in the works, and an unattractive windfall tax system announced in January will likely be pushed forward under Maduro.¶ ¶ What Maduro is inheriting, though, is a nightmare situation that will see him stuck between using PDVSA to fund expensive social programs that cost it $44 billion last year alone diverted from oil revenues, and cutting social spending or allowing a rise in the price of fuel that could spark regime-threatening unrest.¶ ¶ If Maduro feels compelled to reduce fuel subsidies, it could lead to riots as cheap fuel—which cannot be sustained—is one of the most crucial social benefits for Venezuelans, who pay around 6 cents per gallon.¶ ¶ Maduro has inherited a “sinking ship” and does not appear to have the political capital to make any short-term changes in Venezuela’s energy policy, experts at Southern Pulse told Oilprice.com.¶ ¶ “The main energy issue for Venezuela is that oil production is struggling, down from a peak of about 3.2 million barrels per day in 1998 to less than 2.8 million bpd now. One would hope that fixing infrastructure, completing refinery repairs and construction, and investing in exploration and new technology would be priorities but Maduro will not have funds to invest unless he makes controversial cuts to social programs,” according to Southern Pulse, which does not believe that Maduro will attempt to cut fuel subsidies any time soon.¶ ¶ A top priority for Maduro will be boosting refining capacity, says Southern Pulse. Towards this end, Maduro may be willing to negotiate if a partner steps forward to build a new refinery, which is a goal Chavez failed to realize.¶ ¶ “If PDVSA fails to increase production, PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez may be replaced this year. One way for Maduro to keep his presidency afloat is to bring new proven wells online in the Orinoco Belt; but that will require major investment. PDVSA may need more than a minority-partner-with-a-service-contract at those fields if they want to start pumping soon.”¶ ¶ In the meantime, China’s foothold in Venezuela remains on solid ground. China is already privy to 600,000 bpd from Venezuela in return for $42 billion in loans. Maduro is not likely to rock this boat with Beijing, and according to the terms already in place, Venezuelan exports are set to increase to one million bpd by 2015, though most of the loan money has already been spent. According to Southern Pulse, Maduro will likely seek new loans from China, but this will depend on the terms and stability in Venezuela.¶ ¶ If this doesn’t work, Maduro will have to look elsewhere—first to Russia and then perhaps to US Chevron or Spanish Repsol, the latter two having only limited operations in the country.¶ ¶ Overall, we should consider that Maduro will pursue all-out chavismo. “As president, Maduro will govern as he thinks Chavez himself would have ruled. However, Maduro probably will not begin pandering to the most radical elements of his party, PSUV, because he has little to gain from that. Maduro is not blind to the myriad problems facing the next president such as blackouts, food shortages and rampant criminal violence,” according to Southern Pulse.¶ ¶ While it’s status quo for now for the oil and gas industry, it’s clearly bad news for Maduro.¶ ¶ “Despite Chavez’s immense popularity, his memory will fade. And with time citizens who loved Chavez will blame Maduro for their struggles,” experts at Southern Pulse say. “If Maduro survives that long, the next election in 2018 will involve a much deeper conversation about the direction of the country.”¶ ¶ “In fact, some think that one reason former military leader and current National Assembly Diosdado Cabello—a Chavez loyalist–did not dispute Maduro’s succession is precisely because of the precarious financial and political situation he would have inherited.”
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Alic 4-21 (Jen Alic, senior journalist at the energy news site Oilprice.com, geopolitical analyst, co-founder of ISA Intel in Sarajevo and Tel Aviv, and the former editor-in-chief of ISN Security Watch in Zurich. , “Foreign oil and gas companies look to status quo in Venezuela,” article, Mining.com, mining news source, April 21, 2013, http://www.mining.com/web/foreign-oil-and-gas-companies-look-to-status-quo-in-venezuela/)
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Maduro is inheriting a nightmare situation that will see him stuck between using PDVSA to fund expensive social programs d cutting social spending or allowing a rise in the price of fuel that could spark regime-threatening unrest. Maduro has inherited a “sinking ship” and does not appear to have the political capital to make any short-term changes in Venezuela’s energy policy The main energy issue for Venezuela is that oil production is struggling fixing infrastructure, completing refinery repairs and construction, and investing in exploration and new technology would be priorities Maduro will not have funds to invest unless he makes controversial cuts to social programs Maduro may be willing to negotiate if a partner steps forward Maduro will look to US Chevron Maduro will pursue all-out chavismo status quo for now for the oil and gas industry it’s bad news for Maduro citizens will blame Maduro for their struggles
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Status quo oil industry will kill Maduro’s credibility – the plan gives him a way out
| 4,616 | 85 | 928 | 754 | 16 | 149 | 0.02122 | 0.197613 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,508 |
¶ At worst, it is an example of U.S. external pressure that encourages a break with the rule of law and violates the principle of self-determination that President Barack Obama claims to uphold.¶ ¶ This is the first time the U.S. government has refused to recognize a Venezuelan election result, as Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Political Research points out. Weisbrot notes, “Washington's efforts to de-legitimise the election mark a significant escalation of US efforts at regime change in Venezuela. Not since its involvement in the 2002 military coup has the US government done this much to promote open conflict in Venezuela.”¶ ¶ The Obama administration is bending over backwards to spur on an opposition movement that has no virtually legal leg to stand on in its desire for new presidential elections. There are some indications that the strategy to refuse to accept defeat at the polls was considered even before the close vote. Although Capriles conceded rapidly and gracefully to former President Hugo Chavez in the presidential elections last fall, it was a bad omen when he refused to sign a pre-electoral pact to respect the results prior to this election.¶ ¶ Now violent opposition protests in the streets have led to the deaths of nine people. Maduro has attended the funerals of his supporters killed in the disturbances with vows to defend his victory and prosecute those inciting and participating in violent acts. Health clinics established by Chavez have been frequent targets.¶ ¶ It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his future on rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have the support of the U.S. government. It is even more unlikely that he could sustain a movement for non-recognition. Even many members of his own coalition will not go so far as to say they honestly believe he won the April 14th elections. The other countries of the region recognized Maduro as the new president within hours of the results. Not only did the left-leaning governments provide their diplomatic welcome, but also Colombia, Mexico, and other nations closely allied with the United States.¶ ¶ Capriles’ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post-electoral unrest not only endanger peace and stability in Venezuela, but also potentially the entire region. Venezuela is a geopolitical hub—for its oil, for its role in building south-south integration projects like ALBA and Unasur, for its solidarity trade pacts, and for its defiance of U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ To illegally disrupt the constitutional order there will not be as easy as it was in Honduras, where even a broad opposition movement couldn’t restore the constitutionally elected president after a right-wing coup in 2009. Inevitably, nations across the hemisphere and the world will react with anger if the Obama administration decides to maintain this course, both in defense of their neighbor Venezuela and also in what they see as a threat to their own sovereignty. Already former Brazilian president Lula da Silva has warned that "Americans should take care of their own business a little and let us decide our own destiny."¶ ¶ The longer the United States remains globally isolated in its refusal to accept Venezuela’s election results, the longer the instability, uncertainty, and violence will continue. Extending the conflict could very well end up unnecessarily costing more lives.¶ ¶ The Obama administration should consider that its stubbornness about what it considers an adverse election result in a foreign country is a direct cause of bloodshed. It harms relations with our hemispheric neighbors and partners and sows the seeds of distrust and enmity in a region where we have a good chance at building cooperation on issues of vital importance to all of our countries. Venezuela’s elections must be accepted at once to show that the United States will uphold democratic processes and the rule of law, even when its government is not particularly pleased with the results.
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Carlsen 5-2 (Laura Carlsen director of the Americas Policy Program (www.americaspolicy.org) in Mexico City, where she has been an analyst and writer for two decades, Foreign Policy In Focus columnist, “US Efforts to Block Democracy in Venezuela Harm Hemispheric Relations,” column, Foreign Policy in Focus, May 2, 2013, http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere)
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This is the first time the U.S. government has refused to recognize a Venezuelan election result, Washington's efforts to de-legitimise the election mark a significant escalation of US efforts at regime change The Obama administration is bending over backwards to spur on an opposition movement It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his future on rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have the support of the U.S. government. Capriles’ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post-electoral unrest endanger peace and stability in Venezuela The longer the United States remains globally isolated in its refusal to accept Venezuela’s election results, the longer the instability, uncertainty, and violence will continue It harms relations with our hemispheric neighbors and partners and sows the seeds of distrust and enmity
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US response is key – failure to cooperate with Maduro undermines his entire agenda and emboldens the opposition
| 4,000 | 111 | 856 | 649 | 18 | 130 | 0.027735 | 0.200308 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,509 |
This past Sunday, Venezuelans went to the polls to choose the successor to longtime leader Hugo Chavez. Chavez’s hand-picked successor, Nicolas Maduro, was announced as the winner with 50.6 percent of the vote. Because this is nowhere near the 11 point victory that Chavez had over the same opponent, Henrique Capriles, last October, this election spells serious trouble for Maduro’s presidency.¶ Note that Capriles is contesting the narrow election results stating that there were irregularities in the voting system that cost him votes. Whether this is true or not, the most surprising thing about this election is how close the results were. Considering that Chavez endorsed Maduro before his death, that Chavez supporters did not give Maduro the thumbs-up was expected.¶ Maduro will undoubtedly continue down the path of Chavez’s version of socialism. But with only 0.6 percent more than a majority, the Venezuelans may be having second doubts. I believe that this shows the incredible influence that Chavez had, while at the same time showing that Venezuelans are getting ready to move past the ideal that is Chavez.¶ Capriles’s persistence, with taking on both Chavez and Maduro, has not paid off thus far, but that does not mean that it won’t in the future. If this election is any indication, without Chavez, the style of socialism that exists in Venezuela is under direct threat. Should Maduro fail to spout the same charisma that Chavez did, I think that Capriles or any other opposition leader could have a very good shot at the presidency next election cycle.¶ Maduro will lack the same legitimacy that Chavez held and will find it very hard to advance his agenda in the same manner that Chavez did. The opposition can now use these elections results to show that Venezuelans do not overwhelmingly want the past to repeat itself. I can only foresee greater political tension in Venezuela over the rest of Maduro’s term.
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Bach 4-16 (Chris Bach, Denver Universtiy, “Venezuelan victory with opposition, not Maduro,” The Clarion, Denver University newspaper, April 16, 2013, http://duclarion.com/venezuelan-victory-with-opposition-not-maduro/)
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Maduro, was announced as the winner this election spells serious trouble for Maduro’s presidency. Maduro will undoubtedly continue down the path of Chavez’s version of socialism Venezuelans may be having second doubts Capriles’s persistence as not paid off thus far, but that does not mean that it won’t in the future Maduro will lack the same legitimacy that Chavez held and will find it very hard to advance his agenda The opposition can now use these elections results to show that Venezuelans do not overwhelmingly want the past to repeat itself.
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Attempts at pursuing his agenda are inevitable – it’s only a question of effectiveness – lack of legitimacy makes his efforts fail
| 1,931 | 130 | 550 | 319 | 22 | 91 | 0.068966 | 0.285266 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,510 |
¶ ¶ Venezuela's deepening domestic crises compound Maduro's ineptitude to make it virtually impossible for him to stride the regional -- not to mention global -- stage, as Chávez had done so naturally and with such aplomb for many years. Although Maduro has tried to emulate the Chávez playbook and engage in aggressive and confrontational diplomacy, the result has been, in the words of Venezuelan newspaper editor and intellectual Teodoro Petkoff, a "sad caricature" of the deceased leader. What Petkoff dubbed Venezuela's "scoundrel diplomacy" -- the coarse, anti-U.S. posturing that Chávez had mastered -- has been far less productive under Maduro, who seems chiefly interested in holding onto power. ¶ ¶ Latin American governments are acutely aware of and worried about the continued economic deterioration, criminal violence, and political unraveling in Venezuela. (In 2012, the capital, Caracas, registered more murders than any other city in the world.) Regional leaders also know that Maduro's political position under such circumstances is precarious. An audiotape of a conversation between a Chavista hard-liner and a Cuban intelligence officer was recently released, revealing internecine fights within the late president's ruling coalition of Socialists. The tape exposes palace intrigue in Caracas and a fierce power struggle within the government's ranks, including discussion of a possible coup against Maduro by his longtime rival, National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello.¶ ¶ The episode was another reminder of the privileged access and influence Cuba has enjoyed in Venezuelan politics since Chávez came to power. The island receives an estimated subsidy of $4 billion to $5 billion annually through discounted oil and has vigorously backed Maduro, who is close to the Cuban regime. In exchange for these subsidies, Cuba provides Venezuela with medical and security support and has effectively operated as a proxy for PDVSA, Venezuela's national oil company, to conduct financial transactions with little oversight.¶ ¶ Still, though the governments of Cuba, along with those of ALBA members Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, cheered when Maduro was officially declared the winner of the April 14 election, they can hardly be reassured by his shaky political position in Venezuela. They know that given the depth of the economic crisis, Venezuela's generous oil-backed aid cannot continue indefinitely.¶ ¶ Yet, curiously and unfortunately, for a combination of economic, geopolitical, and ideological reasons, even those governments not ideologically aligned to Venezuela have been unwilling to risk antagonizing the debilitated Maduro. The Venezuelan opposition has appealed to the region's governments to apply pressure on Maduro to conduct a serious recount of the April 14 election, which, according to official figures, Maduro won by a razor-thin margin of 1.5 percentage points. Neighboring heads of state have not, however, been responsive to these calls. Latin American governments even remained silent in the face of physical violence against some opposition lawmakers on April 30.¶ ¶ Regional groupings have been similarly indifferent. Following the Venezuelan election, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a continentwide political forum created in 2008, plainly sided with Maduro and rushed to recognize his government. Although several UNASUR members also asked for a recount, the group has been extremely passive and shown little if any interest in pressing Caracas for a review of the contested vote. In backing Maduro, UNASUR is overlooking Venezuela's domestic legitimacy crisis, which will make it that much harder for the country's profound problems to be effectively addressed.¶ ¶ The Organization of American States (OAS), the Western Hemisphere's long-established multilateral body, has also been characterized by inaction regarding the Venezuelan situation. While OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza did take a stand in calling for an audit of the election, member governments were unwilling to back him up. It was regarded as an internal question, rather than a matter of hemispheric concern. Yet, it is striking that even though Venezuela is arguably the most troubling and volatile situation on the continent for regional peace and democracy, it was not seen as justifying a place on the agenda at the OAS General Assembly meeting in Guatemala on June 5. Among the OAS's chief purposes is serving as watchdog and defender for democracy in the hemisphere -- it took action most recently after events in Honduras in 2009 and Paraguay in 2012 -- but Venezuela was excluded from the plenary meeting. No member state wanted to take on Maduro. ¶ ¶ One litmus test for the region's reaction to Maduro has been the Latin American tour undertaken by his vanquished election opponent, Henrique Capriles, the governor of Miranda state. Since the vote, Capriles has been traveling throughout the region, seeking to obtain support -- or at least recognition of -- the seriousness of his charges of electoral fraud. He just announced that he will soon travel to Peru, Chile, Brazil, and probably Mexico, and he has said that a visit to Washington lies "on the horizon." Capriles, who deserves credit for forcing the issue, has already put some regional leaders in tough spots. Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, whose chief priority is ending his country's half-century-old armed conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), received Capriles at the presidential palace on May 29 in a low-profile meeting. The Venezuelan government, which had long provided support to the FARC, has been a key player in the peace talks under way in Havana.¶ ¶ Santos probably calculated that though a meeting with Capriles might risk some strain with Maduro, it would also help neutralize the unremitting flak he is getting from the right (led by former President Uribe) for trusting the FARC and the Venezuelans. Maduro was indeed incensed by the Santos-Capriles meeting and threatened to withdraw support from the peace process. Santos initially characterized Maduro's reaction as "crazy," but then backed off and chalked up the rising tension to a "misunderstanding." Still, Santos, who was the first regional leader to recognize Maduro, showed some backbone in receiving Capriles. Although relations between Bogotá and Caracas now seem back on track, this episode revealed the lingering mistrust between the two Andean governments. And Maduro's warning to the rest of the region not to question his legitimacy was clear.¶ ¶ Things have been even more awkward in Peru. Capriles's previously scheduled visit to the country on June 4 posed a quandary for President Ollanta Humala. Although the onetime leader of a military revolt had received support from Chávez for his 2006 presidential bid, in his successful 2011 campaign Humala had distanced himself from the Venezuelans and had identified with Lula's more moderate brand of leftism. In his two years as president, Humala has broken with the left and, whether because of convenience or conviction, has embraced free market economics. Yet, the prospect of meeting with Capriles -- and thus provoking Maduro's ire -- created discomfort for the Peruvian president. The visit was postponed. Tellingly, Capriles has since declared that in future visits to the region he will no longer insist on being received by presidents.¶ ¶ Maduro has also sought to shore up support abroad. He has made several regional visits since being elected and even traveled to Europe, where he met with Pope Francis and several heads of state. On balance, these meetings have succeeded in securing political backing.¶ ¶ As South America's regional power and arguably the country with the greatest leverage on developments in Venezuela, Brazil's posture is critical. The left-leaning government of Dilma Rousseff is mainly concerned with maintaining stability on its borders and, of course, protecting its considerable trade surplus with Venezuela. Although media accounts vary, it appears that Rousseff received Maduro cordially and properly following his election in April, but was apparently cooler and more restrained than, say, her Argentine and Uruguayan counterparts. Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who had been particularly close to Chávez, received Maduro warmly and with great fanfare.¶ ¶ Then, of course, there's the elephant in the room. For the United States, Venezuela is a matter of concern because of both the erosion of democratic safeguards and the heightened risks of chaos. Barack Obama's administration has stuck to its position in supporting Capriles's call for a full recount of the disputed election, and so far it has held off from recognizing Maduro's victory. At the same time, Washington remains open to engaging with Caracas. During his first visit to Latin America as secretary of state this month, John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua at the OAS meeting in Guatemala and discussed restoring ambassadorial relations, which have been suspended since 2010. Although the meeting was sharply criticized by some in the United States for legitimizing the Maduro government, the opposition itself viewed the meeting as "positive" and hopes that over time increased cooperation might help relieve Venezuela's severe predicament.
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Shifter 6-24 (Michael Shifter, President of Inter-American Dialogue, professor of International Relations at Boston University, “A Bolivarian Dream Deferred,” article, Foreign Policy, pg 1-3, June 24, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/a_bolivarian_dream_deferred_latin_american_left_chavez?page=0,0&wp_login_redirect=0)
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Although Maduro has tried to emulate the Chávez playbook and engage in aggressive and confrontational diplomacy, the result has been a "sad caricature" of the deceased leader. the coarse, anti-U.S. posturing that Chávez had mastered -- has been far less productive under Maduro Obama's administration has stuck to its position in supporting Capriles's call for a full recount of the disputed election, and so far it has held off from recognizing Maduro's victory Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua at the OAS meeting in Guatemala the opposition itself viewed the meeting as "positive" and hopes that over time increased cooperation might help relieve Venezuela's severe predicament.
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Cooperating over the plan helps Maduro – public perception and stops anti-american rhetoric
| 9,380 | 91 | 701 | 1,446 | 13 | 108 | 0.00899 | 0.074689 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,511 |
¶ ¶ Iran has illegally laundered billions of dollars through the Venezuelan financial sector and is currently stashing “hundreds of millions” of dollars in “virtually every Venezuelan bank today,” according to a former senior State Department official.¶ ¶ “It’s a huge blind spot in those trying to implement sanctions” on Iran, Roger Noriega, a former United States ambassador and assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, told the Washington Free Beacon.¶ ¶ Venezuela served as Iran’s closest Western ally under the late President Hugo Chavez, who allowed the rogue regime to establish a military and financial presence at the highest levels of the Venezuelan government.¶ ¶ Iran’s foothold in the country is expected to grow exponentially under the rule of Chavez’s likely successor, Vice President Nicolas Maduro.¶ ¶ Noriega and other experts warned House lawmakers at a Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Wednesday that Iran’s terrorist proxy Hezbollah is gaining power in Venezuela.¶ ¶ Hezbollah, which carries out terrorist attacks on Iran’s behalf, has helped Tehran access Venezuela’s sophisticated financial sector, experts said.¶ ¶ “It’s easy to say billions have been laundered through various Iranian enterprises and institutions through the Venezuelan economy,” Noriega told the Free Beacon in an interview Thursday. “The Iranians have seized on this as a way to evade sanctions.”¶ ¶ Hezbollah has not only infiltrated Venezuela’s governmental bodies. The organization has also established terrorist training facilities on the country’s Margarita Island, according to Noriega.¶ ¶ Hezbollah has been able to form from this Caribbean haven “a marriage of convenience” with various narcotics traffickers and drug gangs that bring the terrorist “threat to our doorstep,” Noriega told lawmakers Wednesday.¶ ¶ The Mexican drug lord Joaquin Guzman, ringleader of the deadly Sinaloa Cartel, is known to have spent time on Margarita Island where he likely established ties with Hezbollah, according to Noriega.¶ ¶ “Our [belief] is that the brokered a relationship, a collaboration between Hezbollah and that narco group,” said Noriega, who also served as the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American states from 2001 to 2003.¶ ¶ Hezbollah has been able to profit from its partnerships with drug traffickers and smugglers, money that likely goes to fund its terrorist operations across the globe.¶ ¶ Lawmakers and experts believe the U.S. government has failed to properly combat Hezbollah’s Latin American activities or even take the issue seriously.¶ ¶ “We have to do more and we have to do it quicker,” said Rep. Brad Sherman (D., Calif.), explaining that economic sanctions and other measures have failed to stymie Iran’s illicit behavior.¶ ¶ “The presence of Hezbollah in the region could serve as an important part of Iran’s [ability] to retaliate for [Western] efforts to curtail its nuclear program,” Sherman said.¶ ¶ The State Department, however, has mostly ignored the issue, Noriega said.¶ ¶ “They pass off statements of concerns,” he said. “That’s the best they’re able to do.”¶ ¶ Senior U.S. officials “minimize discussion of this problem and it has to change,” Noriega added. “At this point it’s bordering on criminal negligence.”¶ ¶ Hezbollah’s presence in the country is likely to grow as Venezuela determines Chavez’s successor, according to Noriega.¶ ¶ The terror group is likely “to emerge with potentially more powerful roles [in the Venezuelan government] because of their relationships with Maduro,” said Noriega. “This could go from bad to worse. If anything, they’ll have greater access at the highest levels.”¶ ¶ The only way for the U.S. to effectively combat this threat is to take action against the narcotics traffickers tied to Hezbollah.¶ ¶ U.S. authorities must investigate the money laundering activities, capture operatives as they travel across the region, and seize various bank assets associated with these groups, Noriega said.¶ ¶ “You track their involvements and do your best to intercept these people,” he said.¶ ¶ But “it all starts with an acknowledgement of the problem,” Noriega added. “It’s very frustrating, the State Department’s ostrich-like response.”
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Kredo 3-22 (Adam Kredo, senior writer for the Washington Free Beacon, formerly an award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, “The Iran, Hezbollah, Venezuela Axis,” article, Washington Free Beacon, March 22, 2013, http://freebeacon.com/the-iran-hezbollah-venezuela-axis/)
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Iran has illegally laundered billions of dollars through the Venezuelan financial sector Venezuela served as Iran’s closest Western ally under Chavez, Iran’s foothold in the country is expected to grow exponentially under Maduro. Iran’s terrorist proxy Hezbollah is gaining power in Venezuela. Hezbollah, carries out terrorist attacks on Iran’s behalf Hezbollah has infiltrated Venezuela’s governmental bodies The organization has also established terrorist training facilities on the country’s Margarita Island Hezbollah has been able to form this Caribbean haven with various narcotics traffickers and drug gangs that bring the terrorist “threat to our doorstep Hezbollah has been able to profit from its partnerships with drug traffickers and smugglers, money that likely goes to fund its terrorist operations across the globe. The presence of Hezbollah in the region could serve as an important part of Iran’s [ability] to retaliate for [Western] efforts to curtail its nuclear program, The terror group is likely “to emerge with potentially more powerful roles [in the Venezuelan government] because of their relationships with Maduro
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A credible Maduro empowers the Hezbollah in Latin America
| 4,238 | 57 | 1,143 | 652 | 9 | 167 | 0.013804 | 0.256135 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,512 |
¶ When Americans think of terrorist activity, we think of Yemen, Pakistan, Palestine and other places in the Middle East, but we overlook the rapidly increasing terrorism threat coming from Hezbollah operations taking place in Latin America.¶ ¶ “This is a very important issue we pay too little attention to,” Senior Fellow for the International Assessment and Strategy Center Douglas Farah told lawmakers on Capitol Hill yesterday during a counterterrorism hearing.¶ ¶ According to testimony given on Capitol Hill yesterday, Hezbollah, the most extensive terrorist organization in the world, is operating along the U.S.-Mexico border and has vast influence in Latin America. Hezbollah is anti-American and anti-Israeli, and the United States has been concerned about the group since the 1980s.¶ ¶ Before 9/11, Hezbollah, not Al Qaeda, was responsible for the majority of U.S. terrorism deaths, including the 1983 bombings of U.S. Marine barracks and U.S. embassy in Beirut, in addition to a series of attacks in the '80s. Hezbollah is also responsible for countless attacks on Israel. In 1992, Hezbollah, with help from Iran, bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. In 1994 they bombed the Jewish community center in the same South American city. Those are just a handful of examples that don’t even account for the thousands of rockets Hezbollah has launched into Israel throughout the years.¶ ¶ “Hezbollah makes Al Qaeda look like a minor league team,” Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Rep. Patrick Meehan (R-Pa.) said.¶ ¶ Hezbollah was created by Iran and has close ties to Syria. The group is also backed by Venezuelan Dictator Hugo Chavez, who has a cozy relationship with Iran.¶ ¶ “Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Venezuela, is a determined enemy of the United States that has made substantial progress in Latin America,” Ambassador and American Enterprise Institute visiting fellow Roger Noriega said during the hearing, adding that he believes there will be an attack on U.S. personnel if nothing is done soon to counter Hezbollah in Latin America.¶ ¶ Hezbollah is the most prevalent terrorist organization in the world. The group operates in over 40 countries and on 5 continents, including operations in at least 15 U.S. cities and four major Canadian cities. In South America specifically, the group operates in the region where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet. Brazil is used as a major terrorism hub and cocaine is exchanged for weapons in Colombia.¶ ¶ “Hezbollah remains the premium terrorist organization in the world,” Farah said in testimony.¶ ¶ Hezbollah is a very sophisticated terrorist group, with activity beyond criminal. Intelligence shows the group started pushing its terrorism initiative into South America a decade ago but upped its efforts in 2005, a new approach that is a threat to the United States. Testimony showed Hezbollah is strategically positioning itself in order to possibly launch a response to an Iranian attack either from the U.S. or Isreal on their nuclear program. Intelligence cited during the hearing also shows the group is interested in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, which should be taken seriously since the group has published entire books about how to build and use WMDs and terrorist operations are justified by Hezbollah’s belief in Islam’s ongoing struggle with the West through violent jihad.¶ ¶ Hezbollah has also been supplying explosives training to Mexican drug cartels operating along the U.S.-Mexico border, and tunnels used in the area are near replicas of weapons-smuggling tunnels built by Hezbollah and used in Lebanon. Since 2006, violence in Mexico has rapidly escaladed and cartels have become more ruthless. In addition, Mexican cartels are serving as source of financing and easy entrance for the organization into the United States.¶ ¶ “Hezbollah members have used the porous U.S.-Mexico border as an entrance to the United States,” Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council Ilan Berman said.¶ ¶ Farah agreed, saying that some gang members, who entered the U.S. through the southern border with Mexico, have been arrested in the U.S. proudly displaying Farsi tattoos. He also said these groups together have access to hundreds of millions of dollars and that money funneled back to the Middle East is used to purchase weapons for attacks on Israel.¶ ¶ GOP NewYork Rep. Pete King has called for Mexican drug cartels to be classified by the Department of Homeland Security as terrorist groups in order to better track finances and operations, and, knowing Mexican cartels are being trained to build tunnels and to use explosives by Hezbollah, a new classification for Mexican drug cartels would be appropriate. Hezbollah and drug cartels are actively exchanging technology and training.¶ ¶ It was also revealed during the hearing that unstable political atmospheres in the Middle East could make Hezbollah an even larger threat to U.S. national security. Hezbollah also has the potential to gain even more power through the rise of Iran’s nuclear program.¶ ¶ “As the events in the Middle East and with the Arab spring continue to unfold, we must keep a close eye on Hezbollah,” Democrat Rep. Jackie Speier of California said.
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Pavlich 11 (Katie Pavlich, degree in Broadcast Journalism, award-winning author, “A Growing Terror Threat: Hezbollah in Latin America,” article, Townhall, July 08, 2011, http://townhall.com/columnists/katiepavlich/2011/07/08/a_growing_terror_threat_hezbollah_in_latin_america/page/full)
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we overlook the rapidly increasing terrorism threat coming from Hezbollah operations taking place in Latin America. This is a very important issue we pay too little attention to,” , Hezbollah has vast influence in Latin America Hezbollah is also backed by Venezuelan Dictator Hugo Chavez, who has a cozy relationship with Iran. Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Venezuela, is a determined enemy of the United States that has made substantial progress in Latin America there will be an attack on U.S. personnel if nothing is done soon to counter Hezbollah in Latin America. Hezbollah is the most prevalent terrorist organization in the world. Hezbollah remains the premium terrorist organization in the world Hezbollah is strategically positioning itself in order to possibly launch a response to an Iranian attack either from the U.S. or Isreal on their nuclear program the group is obtaining weapons of mass destruction Hezbollah has also been supplying explosives training to Mexican drug cartels operating along the U.S.-Mexico border, and tunnels used in the area are near replicas of weapons-smuggling tunnels built by Hezbollah and used in Lebanon. Mexican cartels are serving as source of financing and easy entrance for the organization into the United States unstable political atmospheres in the Middle East could make Hezbollah an even larger threat to U.S. national security. Hezbollah also has the potential to gain even more power through the rise of Iran’s nuclear program
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Hezbollah influence in Latin America causes a nuclear terrorist attack
| 5,260 | 70 | 1,485 | 839 | 10 | 234 | 0.011919 | 0.278903 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,513 |
In light of Central and South America’s proximity to the United States, both¶ geographically and politically, more attention must be placed on them in the current War on¶ Terror. Central and South America, which shall hereto be referred to as Latin America, are no¶ strangers to terrorist activity on their soil. On the surface, Latin America does not seem as¶ though it is a region that would have to struggle with such subversive activity. After all, Latin¶ states do not have significant Muslim populations for international terrorist networks such as Al¶ Qaida to blend into. Furthermore, unlike Middle Eastern States, their democratically elected¶ leaders will not hesitate to engage them in military confrontations. Lastly, their economies are¶ not as easy to establish faceless financial networks as they are in Europe or the Middle East.¶ However, beneath the surface, Latin America is a porous region, ideal for terrorist activity to¶ flourish.¶ These factors fall in line with the current administration’s policy of keeping nuclear¶ weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It has stated that although the threat of a nuclear attack by¶ sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists¶ has gone up. Latin America has not only a history of terrorist activity and stratocracy, but¶ nuclear activity as well. Although the region is known internationally as a nuclear-free zone,¶ recent developments have demonstrated that a renewed interest in nuclear weapons development¶ may be on the rise. This will mean a risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of domestic¶ or international terrorists is now a real concern for the US in the region itself.
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Pavlich 11 (Katie Pavlich, degree in Broadcast Journalism, award-winning author, “A Growing Terror Threat: Hezbollah in Latin America,” article, Townhall, July 08, 2011, http://townhall.com/columnists/katiepavlich/2011/07/08/a_growing_terror_threat_hezbollah_in_latin_america/page/full)
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Latin America is ideal for terrorist activity to flourish. although the threat of a nuclear attack by sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has gone up Latin America has a history of terrorist activity but nuclear activity as well recent developments have demonstrated a renewed interest in nuclear weapons development This will mean nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists is now a real concern
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Latin American terrorism goes nuclear
| 1,719 | 37 | 479 | 274 | 5 | 76 | 0.018248 | 0.277372 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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1,514 |
Islamabad, April 17, IRNA – A Pakistani educationist said here Wednesday relationship between Islamic Republic of Iran and Republic of Venezuela would further strengthen after election of Nicolas Maduro as President of the Latin American state.¶ Talking to IRNA Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University said that Nicolas Maduro would continue with the policies of late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. ¶ He said that western countries, especially the US could not digest the independent foreign policies of Hugo Chavez and had tried to destabilize his government. ¶ Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas expressing his views said that newly elected President of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro would follow the policies of his predecessor.¶ The analyst said that every country in world has the right to pursue an independent foreign policy. He said that according to all international laws the will of the people must be respected. ¶ “If the people of Venezuela have chosen Nicolas Maduro as their president so nobody has the right to object the decision of Venezuelan people,” he said. ¶ Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas was confident that Nicolas Maduro would work for the betterment of his nation and maintain the sovereignty of his country. He said that there should be no differences after a free and fair election is conducted. ¶ He said that relationship between Islamic Republic of Iran and Venezuela would further strengthen during the tenure of Nicolas Maduro. ¶ The analyst said that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has visited Venezuela so many times and is witness to the close relationship between Nicolas Maduro and Hugo Chavez.
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IRNA 4-17 (Islamist Republic News Agency, Pakistani news source, “Iran-Venezuela relations will continue to grow: Educationist,” April 17, 2013, http://www3.irna.ir/en/News/80619033/Politic/Iran-Venezuela_relations_will_continue_to_grow__Educationist)
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relationship between Iran and Venezuela would further strengthen after election of Nicolas Maduro Maduro would continue with the policies Chavez Maduro would follow the policies of his predecessor. relationship between Iran and Venezuela would further strengthen during the tenure of Maduro. Ahmadinejad has visited Venezuela so many times and is witness to the close relationship between Maduro
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Maduro will follow Chavez – strengthens the relationship with Iran
| 1,665 | 66 | 395 | 265 | 10 | 57 | 0.037736 | 0.215094 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,515 |
¶ The same week that President Obama downplayed the threat to U.S. security from Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, a high-level delegation from Hezbollah was visiting Caracas and Havana. Ammar Musawi, head of Hezbollah International Department, praised Cuba as a model on how to oppose “imperialist hegemony, arrogance, and plunder.” In Venezuela, he met with the Vice-Foreign Minister and condemned the “ferocious attack” against their Syrian ally. Venezuela’s growing relations with Iran and Chávez’ support for terrorist groups both in the Americas and the Middle East should worry the U.S.¶ ¶ The most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative of the Chávez regime has been allying Venezuela with Iran. Chávez has allowed the Iranians to use Venezuelan territory to penetrate the Western Hemisphere and to mine for uranium in Venezuela. Chávez policy is aiding Iran in developing nuclear technology and in evading U.N. sanctions and U.S. vigilance of the Iranian drug trade and other illicit activities.¶ ¶ The Chávez regime is also providing Venezuelan passports to Iranian operatives. Venezuela’s Mining and Basic Industries Minister Rodolfo Sanz, acknowledged that Iran is “helping Venezuela to explore for uranium.” ¶ ¶ What would stop the Iranians, once they develop their own weapons, from providing some to their close ally in Caracas? Or worse, will the Iranians use Venezuela as a transshipment point to provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups? Or with the help of Venezuelans, would the Iranians smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S.?
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Suchlicki 12 (Jaime Suchlicki, reporter, Miami Herald, “Iran’s influence in Venezuela: Washington should worry,” article, Miami Herald, August 5, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/05/2930050/irans-influence-in-venezuela-washington.html#storylink=cpy)
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Venezuela’s growing relations with Iran should worry the U.S. The most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative has been allying Venezuela with Iran Iranians use Venezuelan territory to penetrate the Western Hemisphere and to mine for uranium in Venezuela policy is aiding Iran in developing nuclear technology and in evading U.N. sanctions nd U.S. vigilance Iran is “helping Venezuela to explore for uranium What would stop the Iranians, once they develop their own weapons, from providing some to their close ally in Caracas Iranians use Venezuela as a transshipment point to provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups with the help of Venezuelans the Iranians smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S.?
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Key to Iran’s nuclear program – triggers terrorism Iranian and Venezuelan prolif
| 1,553 | 80 | 713 | 240 | 12 | 111 | 0.05 | 0.4625 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,516 |
¶ ¶ Today, Jan. 10, was the day when Hugo Chávez was scheduled to be sworn in for the fourth time as Venezuela’s president. Instead, he is lying in a Cuban hospital, suffering serious complications from cancer surgery, and the country’s legislature, dominated by the president’s loyalists, has delayed the ceremony indefinitely. As Venezuelans grapple with the political uncertainty created by Chávez’s precarious health, the prospect of a post-Chávez era poses complex choices for a number of other countries, not least among them, the United States. ¶ ¶ During almost 14 years in office, Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. ¶ ¶ As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions.¶ ¶ The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade.¶ ¶ Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.”¶ ¶ For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time. Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and Hezbollah.¶ ¶ The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as specific challenges. ¶ ¶ Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery, Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. ¶ ¶ Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. ¶ ¶ The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts.¶ ¶ However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. ¶ ¶ At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas.¶ ¶ The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president.¶ ¶ Chávez’s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader.¶ ¶ And yet, there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez. There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. ¶ ¶ For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution.¶ ¶ Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition.¶ ¶ Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. ¶ ¶ Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. ¶ ¶ A close relationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela.
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Ghitis 13 (Frida Ghitis, columnist, World Politics Review, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive Chávez?” column, World Politics Review, January 10, 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez)
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s the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions The question is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene the ties linking Caracas and Tehran , will fade Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is the country’s most powerful man Chavismo thrived because of Chávez. There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long term For Washington forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution A close relationship between Iran and Venezuela Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela
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A strong Maduro is key – a weak leader will let the relationship collapse
| 6,633 | 73 | 1,420 | 1,081 | 14 | 229 | 0.012951 | 0.211841 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,517 |
Iran's nuclear ambitions are likely driven by multiple factors, from security concerns to domestic policies. However, political competition within Iran, rather than Israel's nuclear capabilities, plays a more significant role in driving Iran's nuclear ambition.¶ ¶ In one view, Iran is threatened by Israel, a state with opaque nuclear capabilities, and seeks its own nuclear weapons to balance Israel. However, this interpretation is problematic. First, research suggests that states seek nuclear weapons to respond not only to nuclear adversaries, but to security threats more broadly, including conventionally armed neighbors. Second, from Iran's perspective, the principal threat to its security is the United States, not Israel. Even without Israel's nuclear or conventional weapons superiority, Iran might see security as a reason to seek nuclear weapons. Additionally, other states in the region, such as Egypt, could likewise be threatened by Israel's capabilities, and yet they have not pursued nuclear weapons.¶ ¶ Iran's nuclear ambitions may be driven more by forces within its own borders than from external pressures. Some domestic political actors may favor a nuclear program because it gives their groups additional power, influence or resources. There is evidence that Iranian elites are not monolithic, suggesting that tensions are likely. For example, some actors in Iran have been unwavering in their commitment to a nuclear program, and some more open to negotiations. Opposing Western pressure and rejecting any accommodation with the US also gives legitimacy to the Iranian regime. The Iranian leadership could be using the international dispute over the nuclear issue to justify silencing political opposition within Iran, and therefore has political incentives to continue pursing the program. Such observations suggest that Iran's nuclear program may not be the result of a calculated security decision in response to Israel, but rather domestic political competition.
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Vaynman 5-10 (Jane Vaynman, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, “How does Israel's nuclear program contribute to Iran's nuclear ambitions?” Council on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/iran/does-israels-nuclear-program-contribute-irans-nuclear-ambitions/p30664)
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Iran's nuclear ambitions are driven by multiple factors, from security concerns to domestic policies political competition within Iran plays a more significant role in driving Iran's nuclear ambition Iran is threatened by Israel and seeks its own nuclear weapons to balance Israel the principal threat to its security is the United States Iran might see security as a reason to seek nuclear weapons Iran's nuclear ambitions may be driven more by forces within its own borders than from external pressures Some domestic political actors may favor a nuclear program because it gives their groups additional power Opposing Western pressure and rejecting any accommodation with the US also gives legitimacy to the Iranian regime The Iranian leadership could be using the international dispute over the nuclear issue to justify silencing political opposition within Iran, and therefore has political incentives to continue pursing the program.
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Iran is pursuing weapons – multiple domestic and international factors
| 1,993 | 70 | 938 | 294 | 10 | 143 | 0.034014 | 0.486395 |
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¶ Venezuela’s national assembly recently ratified a measure that allows for civilian nuclear energy cooperation with Russia. The vote was part of an agreement made two years ago between Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. The deal calls for Russia to provide Venezuela with technical support to develop two reactors for power generation and a third small-scale research reactor. ¶ It might seem alarmist to equate a civilian nuclear program with the weakening of the non-proliferation regime, the threat of a nuclear arms race, or the further deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations. Unfortunately, history and the facts support such a conclusion.¶ ¶ A Venezuelan nuclear program is bad for global non-proliferation efforts. The civilian program is a necessary precondition for a weapons program and makes such a program possible. Venezuela’s close ties with Syria and Iran should cause observers to doubt just how seriously it will take its non-proliferation requirements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 1967 treaty making all of Latin America a nuclear weapons-free zone. Assuming that Chávez has the best of intentions now, there is the possibility that in the future he will choose to pursue nuclear weapons as a way to blunt U.S. power, shore up domestic support by rallying his people behind a nuclear crusade, or assert Venezuela’s role in the Americas. It is worth noting that leaders rarely announce that they plan to use peaceful nuclear technology as a stepping stone to a weapons program. Given Venezuela’s rich oil, gas, and hydroelectric resources, the need for a nuclear power program seems questionable.¶ ¶ Considering Chávez’s willingness to stand with those who snub the global non-proliferation regime and his hostility towards the United States and western institutions, he must be considered a candidate to say one thing and do another on the nuclear issue. Playing cat-and-mouse with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has proven to be a good way to win international attention, exact concessions from the West, or raise fears in neighbors’ minds about the possibility that a country has nuclear weapons capabilities. Unfortunately, the IAEA has not come up with a good way to keep leaders from stonewalling or punish those who do so. Even if Chávez neither has nor develops the intention to pursue nuclear weapons, he will find it increasingly attractive to evade or complicate the IAEA inspection regime for other reasons. In so doing, he will provide yet another example of ways to exploit weaknesses in the global non-proliferation regime. ¶ Mixed signals from a nuclear Venezuela would have troubling implications for keeping Latin America free of nuclear weapons. Brazil and Argentina would most likely seriously reconsider their earlier decisions to forgo nuclear weapons in the face of a Venezuela with ambiguous nuclear priorities. If either country concluded it could not trust Venezuela’s statements on its nuclear program, a South American nuclear arms race could quite likely happen. Proliferation on the continent may start in Caracas but it would almost certainly spread, ending the international success story of Latin America as a nuclear-weapons free zone.
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Garner 10 (By Calvin Garner, Staff Editor, International Affairs Review, “Venezuela’s nuclear program – the alarmists are right,” International Affairs Review, December 13, 2010, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/240 )
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A Venezuelan nuclear program is bad for global non-proliferation efforts civilian program is a necessary precondition for a weapons program and makes such a program possible. Venezuela’s close ties with Iran should cause observers to doubt just how seriously it will take its non-proliferation requirements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the future he will choose to pursue nuclear weapons as a way to blunt U.S. power or assert Venezuela’s role in the Americas Mixed signals from a nuclear Venezuela would have troubling implications for keeping Latin America free of nuclear weapons Brazil and Argentina would most likely seriously reconsider their earlier decisions to forgo nuclear weapons in the face of a Venezuela with ambiguous nuclear priorities a South American nuclear arms race could quite likely happen Proliferation would almost certainly spread
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Independently, Venezuelan proliferation snowballs throughout Latin America
| 3,287 | 74 | 903 | 513 | 7 | 137 | 0.013645 | 0.267057 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,519 |
¶ The rallies are getting bigger and the accusations are growing wilder, but in Venezuela's presidential poll this Sunday, the voters' choice of a successor to Hugo Chávez looks set to be just as strongly influenced by a political ghost and a campaign machine.¶ ¶ Polls suggest Chávez's political heir, Nicolás Maduro, is on course for a double-digit victory that would keep the ruling party in control of the world's biggest oil reserves and a country of 29 million people.¶ ¶ The Datanalisis research firm puts the former union negotiator 17 percentage points ahead of his rival, Henrique Capriles. Others suggest the margin could be more than 20 points.¶ ¶ Despite a rally of more than 100,000 Capriles supporters in Caracas on Sunday, allegations of campaign impropriety and increasingly strange conspiracy theories, the momentum has remained firmly with Maduro.¶ ¶ As well as promising a continuation of popular wealth redistribution policies, the burly frontrunner has capitalised on an emotional bond with his predecessor.¶ ¶ Maduro's campaign slogans – "We are all Chávez" and "With Chávez and Maduro, the people are safe" – underpin the close connection that the trade union negotiator is emphasising between himself and the deceased leader. During rallies, Maduro has described Chávez as "my father" and played video recordings of the former president endorsing him as successor.¶ ¶ At times, the claimed link has slipped into the supernatural. Maduro has said Chávez appeared to him as a bird that circled three times and whistled a blessing for the presidential campaign.¶ ¶ A pseudo-religious air is also apparent at a shrine and museum dedicated to Chávez in the 23rd of January barrio, where pictures of the dead president sit beside images and statues of Jesus Christ with a crucifix. Maduro has also announced that Chávez's former office in the presidential palace, Miraflores, will be turned into a museum.¶ ¶ Analysts say Maduro has to resort to such tactics to channel Chávez's popularity and influence because he does not have the same visibility or charm.¶ ¶ "Maduro was hardly known to Venezuelans even last year. His intrinsic value was low and he wasn't seen as a leader. His possibility of winning is tied to him being viewed as a vehicle for Chávez. People are not voting for him per se, but for Chávez through him," said Luis Vicente Leon, director of Datanalisis.¶ ¶ Previously minister of foreign affairs, Maduro was made vice-president by Chávez shortly after winning the October presidential election and stepped up to become acting president, days after Chávez's death.¶ ¶ Maduro claims to be a reluctant leader whose only ambition was to serve Chávez, and to honour a dying wish that he consolidate Chávez's Bolivarian socialism.¶ ¶ While this has gone down well with the many who benefited from Chávez's wealth-distribution policies, the downside is an absence of policy initiatives to address chronic problems such as crime, inflation and an overreliance on oil exports.¶ ¶ "There is nothing inherently flawed with campaigning on a platform of continuity. Most candidates from ruling parties do. However, typically, these ruling party candidates also use the opportunity of a new election to promise some innovations and deviations from how things were being done thus far. Maduro is completely rejecting this strategy of 'brand improvement'," says Javier Corrales, professor of Latin American Studies in Amherst College. "He is promising continuismo, not just symbolically, but also, literally."
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Lopez and Watts 4-11 (Virginia Lopez, Jonathan Watts, reporters, the Guardian, “Venezuela elections: Chávez ghost looms large over Maduro campaign,” The Guardian, UK news source, 11 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/11/venezuela-elections-chavez-ghost-maduro)
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Chávez's political heir Maduro, is on course for victory he burly frontrunner has capitalised on an emotional bond with his predecessor. Maduro's campaign slogans – "We are all Chávez" and "With Chávez and Maduro, the people are safe" – underpin the close connection that the trade union negotiator is emphasising between himself and the deceased leader Maduro has described Chávez as "my father" Maduro channel Chávez's popularity because he does not have the same visibility or charm. Maduro is viewed as a vehicle for Chávez People are not voting for him but for Chávez through him," Maduro is completely rejecting this strategy of 'brand improvement' He is promising continuismo, not just symbolically, but also, literally."
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Won’t be moderate – he wants to continue Chavez’s agenda and be seen as Chavez’s son
| 3,532 | 84 | 728 | 565 | 16 | 115 | 0.028319 | 0.20354 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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2013
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1,520 |
¶ On the margins of the general assembly of the Organization of American States in Guatemala, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuela’s foreign minister, Elias Jaua, representing the democratically challenged and crisis-prone government of Nicolas Maduro, handpicked successor of the late Hugo Chavez and self-proclaimed victor of the April 14th presidential elections.¶ ¶ After the meeting, Kerry told the press: “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela and the United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship.”¶ ¶ Regrettably, Secretary Kerry and his Department of State colleagues are succumbing to Diplomat’s Syndrome, a form of optical illusion or mental disorientation that mistakes talk for action and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds.¶ ¶ That top diplomats of the U.S. and Venezuela talked is no big deal. President Obama made nice with President Chavez in April 2009 and relations continued to deteriorate. What really matters is whether Venezuela’s populist authoritarian leadership is genuinely ready to modify behaviours that clash with important U.S. interests and values.¶ ¶ Beginning with the death of Chavez on March 5th, the Maduro regime has engaged in virtually non-stop anti-American diatribes. It arrested U.S. citizen and filmmaker Tim Tracy on farcical charges of espionage. His recent release is long overdue and little more than a concession to reality.¶ ¶ Since March, President Maduro and company have repeatedly blocked efforts to obtain a fair review of voting irregularities in the April 14th elections and threatened and assaulted members of the democratic opposition, including a brutal attack on opposition legislators on the floor of the National Assembly. Maduro and company have also spoken of punitive reprisals against U.S. ally Colombia, because Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with defeated opposition candidate Henrique Capriles.¶ ¶ Maduro and Jaua clearly hope that Secretary Kerry and the Obama Administration will finally recognise the outcome of the April 14th elections and legitimise Maduro’s presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus. In this light, Kerry’s statement equating Maduro’s mouthpiece Jaua with Venezuela is disconcerting.¶ ¶ The offensive of Maduro and Jaua is aimed at undercutting the diplomatic offensive of the opposition. They also hope to keep the systemic failures of their Cuban-inspired socialism and economic mismanagement out of the discussion and obscure their ties with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.¶ ¶ Therefore, the bar for genuine improvements in U.S.–Venezuela relations should remain high. It should include a serious commitment by the Maduro regime to not only respect the rights of the democratic opposition but to enter into an actual dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and preserving fundamental political and economic rights.¶ ¶ Critically, it will also require a major reversal in persistent anti-Americanism coupled with genuine cooperation to combat illicit drug trafficking and terrorism and adherence to all Iran and Syria sanctions.¶ ¶ Without progress on these keys themes, Kerry and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic with post-Chavez Venezuela and legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.
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Walser 6-10 (Ray Walser is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Heritage Foundation, where this article originally appeared, “Don't be naive when it comes to Venezuela, Mr. Kerry,” accessed via The Commentator, June 10, 2013, http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3752/don_t_be_naive_when_it_comes_to_venezuela_mr_kerry)
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Kerry and his Department of State colleagues are succumbing to Diplomat’s Syndrome, a form of optical illusion or mental disorientation that mistakes talk for action and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds. That top diplomats of the U.S. and Venezuela talked is no big deal. Obama made nice with President Chavez in April 2009 and relations continued to deteriorate. Venezuela’s populist authoritarian leadership is genuinely ready to modify behaviours that clash with important U.S. interests and values. the Maduro regime has engaged in virtually non-stop anti-American diatribes Tim Tracy recent release is long overdue and little more than a concession to reality Maduro and Jaua clearly hope that Secretary Kerry and the Obama Administration will finally recognise the outcome of the April 14th elections and legitimise Maduro’s presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus It should include a serious commitment by the Maduro regime to not only respect the rights of the democratic opposition but to enter into an actual dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and preserving fundamental political and economic rights. Critically, it will also require a major reversal in persistent anti-Americanism coupled with genuine cooperation to combat illicit drug trafficking and terrorism and adherence to all Iran and Syria sanctions. Kerry and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic and legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.
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Venezuela won’t listen to the US requests – requests for relations are empty rhetoric – the US can’t solve our scenarios
| 3,374 | 120 | 1,502 | 506 | 21 | 225 | 0.041502 | 0.444664 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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¶ LIMA: Venezuelan President-elect Nicolas Maduro won a collective show of support from South American leaders early on Friday in Lima as his plans to widen an audit of electronic votes helped calm tensions over the disputed election. ¶ The last-minute meeting of the regional group Unasur ended in Peru hours before Maduro’s scheduled swearing in ceremony in Caracas. ¶ Protests erupted in Venezuela after Maduro won Sunday’s election by about 2 percentage points, and the government says eight people have been killed in opposition-led protests. ¶ Responding to demands by Maduro’s rival Henrique Capriles for a recount, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) said late on Thursday it would audit the 46 percent of electronic votes that remain unchecked. An audit of more than half of votes was carried out on voting day. ¶ “We welcome the decision of the CNE to implement a system that permits a full audit of election results,” Unasur said in an official declaration in which it congratulated Maduro on his victory and called on both sides to “reject violent acts that put the social peace of the country at risk”. ¶ Maduro had blamed the United States for casting doubt on the result. He was named by late President Hugo Chavez, a self-styled socialist who died of cancer in March, as his chosen successor. ¶ Washington has not recognized the election result, while the European Union had suggested Venezuelan authorities consider an audit of the vote. ¶ The governments of Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia and Argentina, among others, had recognized Maduro’s victory before the summit. ¶ But two of the more moderate countries - Peru and Brazil - were especially concerned about growing polarization in Venezuela and how it might hurt governance, diplomats and lawmakers said. ¶ Leftist Bolivian President Evo Morales, who was a close ally of Chavez, said Washington had no right to question the legitimacy of Maduro’s victory because US President George W. Bush was re-elected by a similarly narrow margin in 2004. “This is clearly meddling,” Morales said on Thursday. “We condemn this and repudiate it. We won’t permit that Bolivia or Latin America be treated as the US government’s backyard.” ¶ US Secretary of State John Kerry told lawmakers on Wednesday he favored a recount because of possible voting irregularities. Maduro’s supporters have defended his victory with repeated references to the 2000 US election dispute, when the US Supreme Court halted a recount in Florida and Bush was declared the winner in the state by just 537 votes. ¶ Peruvian Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa, who was a fierce critic of Chavez, urged international observers to scrutinize the results to “stop the authoritarian drift that seems to be underway.” ¶ Peru holds the rotating presidency of Unasur and the group’s election monitors have said Maduro’s win was legitimate. ¶ Most of the leaders, including Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff, will now head to Venezuela for the swearing-in ceremony. Capriles, the opposition candidate, says his team’s figures show he won. He immediately accepted the CNE’s decision, even though it falls short of the manual recount that he had wanted, and said he believed the truth would come out. ¶ “We have identified where the problems are. With this, we’re where we want to be,” he told a news conference in Caracas. He also called on the government to stop “persecuting” his supporters. ¶ The CNE said it would announce the date for the start of the wider audit next week. Maduro’s allies had argued that a recount was unnecessary because the electoral council had already carried out a partial audit. reuters
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Daily Times 4-20 (Daily Times, Pakistani news source, “Maduro gets South American backing in Venezuela votes dispute,” Saturday, April 20, 2013, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C04%5C20%5Cstory_20-4-2013_pg4_1)
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Maduro won a collective show of support from South American leaders The governments of Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia and Argentina, among others, had recognized Maduro’s victory before the summit. Leftist Bolivian President Evo Morales aid Washington had no right to question the legitimacy of Maduro’s victory We condemn this and repudiate it. We won’t permit that Bolivia or Latin America be treated as the US government’s backyard.”
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He already has legitimacy – South American leaders are supporting him
| 3,660 | 69 | 448 | 601 | 11 | 68 | 0.018303 | 0.113145 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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¶ A few weeks ago, lawmaker Maria Corina Machado was tipped to head the foreign lobbying efforts for the opposition coalition, known as the Democratic Unity Roundable, or MUD. Since then, Machado has traveled to Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, and the United States. During her travels, she has met with legislators, government officials, former heads of state, presidential candidates, opinion makers, international bodies, and even Nobel-prize winners.¶ ¶ She has also faced resistance from local sympathizers of the chavista movement, as well as from the Venezuelan government. In Chile, for example, I witnessed how a group of angry protestors hurled insults at everyone who attended Machado's meeting with the Venezuelan expat community, held in the majestic Main Hall of the old Congress building. For its part, the Maduro government says that the opposition's efforts to lobby its case abroad amount to "treason," a charge frequently hurled at anyone who dissents from the official party line.¶ ¶ Machado is the ideal person for this job. Smart, telegenic, and an excellent English speaker, she has the star quality as well as the gravitas to discuss Venezuelan politics with anyone.¶ ¶ She also bears the scars of chavista violence -- literally. On April 30th, she, along with two other opposition legislators, was savagely beaten on the floor of the National Assembly while chavista authorities locked the doors and Assembly President Diosdado Cabello smirked with approval. Machado's nose was broken and nobody was punished. She is traveling with her nose still heavily bandaged post-surgery.¶ ¶ Machado's actions are paving the way for Capriles to make such trips. When Capriles traveled to Bogotá last week to meet with Colombian authorities, he also held a private meeting with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. This prompted a furious reaction from the Venezuelan government. Cabello, speaking out of turn and before anyone in the cabinet, said that Santos' meeting with the "fascist, murderous" Capriles amounted to putting "a bomb" on bilateral relations between the two countries. Prompted by Cabello's outburst, and considering the enormous sway he holds over the government, the Foreign Ministry called home its envoy from Colombia's peace talks with the FARC guerrilla group.¶ ¶ The Maduro government is not only reacting to the opposition's lobbying. They're also trying to seize the initiative. Yesterday, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. This coincided with the Venezuelan government freeing documentary filmmaker Timothy Tracy, who was jailed a few weeks ago after the Venezuelans (falsely) accused him of being a CIA spy. In spite of this meeting, the Obama administration has so far refused to recognize Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela.¶ ¶ As the battle over Venezuela moves to the international arena, one is left wondering what other options the opposition is left with. As much as foreign opinion may count, the fight to topple a president many view as illegitimate is going to require oppositionists hitting the streets of their own country in protest.
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Nagel 6-6 (Juan Nagel, Venezuela blogger for Transitions – blog for Foreign Policy — and co-author of Blogging the Revolution, “Venezuela's opposition hits the diplomatic road,” June 6, 2013, http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/06/venezuela_s_opposition_hits_the_diplomatic_road)
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Machado was tipped to head the foreign lobbying efforts for the opposition coalition Machado has traveled to Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, and the United States She has also faced resistance from local sympathizers of the chavista movement as well as from the Venezuelan government Machado is the ideal person for this job She also bears the scars of chavista violence Machado's actions are paving the way for Capriles to make such trips The Maduro government is reacting to the opposition's lobbying They're also trying to seize the initiative Jaua met with Kerry. one is left wondering what other options the opposition is left with. the fight to topple a president require oppositionists hitting the streets of their own country in protest
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Opposition can’t hurt him – they already failed and have no options left
| 3,165 | 72 | 754 | 496 | 13 | 122 | 0.02621 | 0.245968 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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¶ Presidents from across South America will attend an emergency meeting tonight in Lima, Peru, to discuss the contested election of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.¶ ¶ Analysts say they will likely support Mr. Maduro’s election in order to maintain stability and avoid a fruitless fight, despite ongoing complaints from some Venezuelans that the election was fraudulent.¶ ¶ “It’s the appropriate forum,” says Adrian Bonilla, general secretary of the Latin American Faculty of Social Science, an international research organization headquartered in Costa Rica. “If they adopt a resolution, that’s going to be definitive.”¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The meeting was called by Peruvian President Ollanta Humala in his role as president of Unasur, a body of all 12 independent South American states. Unasur is a forum for political discussions that was founded as a local body for dispute resolution in order to increase South American independence. It gained legitimacy as a regional player when it supported President Rafael Correa of Ecuador against what he said was a coup attempt in December 2010, and by suspending Paraguay’s membership after the hasty removal of President Fernando Lugo last year.¶ ¶ Unasur has aimed to replace the Organization of American States as the go-to conflict resolution body in South America, Mr. Bonilla says. Its decisions are made by a consensus of its diverse members and it avoids the perception of outside interference in the region’s affairs, he says.¶ ¶ Venezuelan election authorities declared Maduro the winner by less than a 2 percent margin Sunday night. Neighbors including Colombia and Brazil have recognized him as the winner, even as his opponent, Henrique Capriles, complains of irregularities.¶ ¶ “It’s very difficult for [other states] to question the legitimacy” of a country’s own electoral authority, Bonilla says. And even if they did, it would be difficult for a recount to reverse a difference of almost 300,000 votes, he says.¶ ¶ Venezuela’s more conservative neighbors including Chile and Colombia are taking a “pragmatic” approach, says James Bosworth, an independent analyst who writes about Latin American diplomacy and defense. Colombia, which has often clashed with Venezuela’s socialist government, has “concrete objectives, and they don’t gain from a dispute over idealistic democratic principles,” Mr. Bosworth says. (Editor's note: Bosworth's writing is frequently posted on The Christian Science Monitor's Latin America Monitor blog).¶ ¶ Chile and Colombia are most concerned about commercial relations and stability, he says. Realistically, they aren’t likely to change the presidency in Venezuela, and they will instead focus on maintaining good relations with the Bolivarian Republic.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The US is in a similar situation. Despite a petition at Whitehouse.gov calling for “the international community to interfere immediately” in Venezuela, the US wants to avoid a “pissing match” with its fourth-biggest oil supplier, Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, told Bloomberg News yesterday.¶ ¶ The quickly convened meeting tonight in Lima doesn’t have a specific agenda, according to two people helping plan the event’s logistics who asked not to be named because they aren't authorized to speak to the press.¶ ¶ The goal will be to write a declaration on the crisis in Venezuela, one of the sources says. Venezuelans who are questioning the results of the election won’t be represented at the meeting, the person says. Maduro himself will attend, he said today on state television. Presidents from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, and Peru will take part, according to Peruvian state newswire Andina.
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Bodzin 4-19 (Steven Bodzin, columnist, Christian Science Monitor, “South American leaders likely to back Venezuela's Maduro in emergency meeting,” first published for CSM, reposted on Minn News, April 19, 2013, http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2013/04/south-american-leaders-likely-back-venezuelas-maduro-emergency-mee)
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Presidents from across South America will likely support Maduro’s election in order to maintain stability and avoid a fruitless fight If they adopt a resolution, that’s going to be definitive.” Unasur is a forum for political discussions that was founded as a local body for dispute resolution in order to increase South American independence Unasur replace the Organization of American States as the go-to conflict resolution body in South America “It’s very difficult for [other states] to question the legitimacy Despite a petition for “the international community to interfere immediately” in Venezuela, the US wants to avoid a “pissing match
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Legitimacy now – Unasur is a greater internal link and US support is inevitable
| 3,722 | 79 | 648 | 574 | 14 | 100 | 0.02439 | 0.174216 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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¶ U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry thanked Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro for encouraging a meeting Wednesday with Foreign Minister Elías Jaua in order to begin a new phase in relations between the countries.¶ ¶ “I want to thank the foreign minister, I want to thank President Nicolás Maduro for taking the step to meet here on the sidelines of this conference. I think it was a very important step,” Kerry said after his 40-minute meeting with Minister Jaua, which was held during the 43rd General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Antigua, Guatemala.¶ ¶ “I think it has been a very positive encounter,” he added, saying “We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela and the United States, that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship.”¶ ¶ The Secretary of State confirmed what was said by Minister Jaua, who told the press upon leaving the meeting that the two had set “a positive agenda,” agreeing to form a high level committee to discuss issues of shared interest and repair relations between the countries.¶ ¶ Kerry said: “We agreed today that there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the foreign ministry.”¶ ¶ Tapped to work on the bilateral relationship are Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson and the new chargé d’affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, Calixto Ortega.¶ ¶ President Maduro spoke Tuesday before the meeting, saying “it is important because it is going to allow us to directly transmit to the government of President Obama the vision that the Venezuelan government has of what relations should be between our two governments.”
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Venezuelan Embassy 6-6 (Venezuelan Embassy to the United States, “Secretary Kerry Thanks President Maduro for Positive Meeting Between Venezuela and U.S.” June 6, 2013, http://venezuela-us.org/2013/06/06/secretary-kerry-thanks-president-maduro-for-positive-meeting-between-venezuela-and-u-s/)
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Kerry thanked Maduro for encouraging a meeting to begin a new phase in relations between the countries it was a very important step it has been a very positive encounter,” Venezuela and the U S would like to see our countries find a new way forward Kerry said We agreed today that there will be an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the foreign ministry.” Maduro spoke saying “it is important because it is going to allow us to directly transmit to the government of President Obama the vision that the Venezuelan government has of what relations should be between our two governments.”
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US has legitimized Maduro already – diplomatic talks – our evidence is predictive
| 1,750 | 81 | 631 | 289 | 13 | 109 | 0.044983 | 0.377163 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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¶ ¶ The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. ¶ ¶ “Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela,” says Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. “The US’s refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet minimum democratic standards.”¶ ¶ Other observers cite the socialist leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington – Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Mr. Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor – as a factor in the US’s reluctance to recognize Maduro as president.¶ ¶ “You can’t blame the US for not extending their hand,” says Mr. Smilde. “Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chávez died.”¶ ¶ Maduro reacted publicly to President Obama’s announcement that the US was withholding recognition of his victory by describing the US president as the “Grand chief of devils” and threatening to cut off oil exports to the country. “That’s an entirely hollow threat,” says Professor Jones, “96 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues come from oil, so Maduro is not going to do anything to upset that.”¶ ¶ Regional recognition¶ ¶ Meanwhile, other countries in the region were quick to congratulate Maduro on his victory. In fact, the new leader spent last week on a whistle-stop tour of friendly regional governments including Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil in an attempt to secure his leadership status. ¶ ¶ “Things haven’t been going well for Maduro since the election,” says Smilde. “his recent touring of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy.” ¶ ¶ Following the hotly contested election, which many Venezuelans believe was stolen by a socialist government fearing the loss of power, country-wide protests erupted. Riot police fought protesters with tear gas and nightly "cacerolazo" sound protests filled the capital with a cacophony of noise. Although officially victorious, Maduro’s slim win compared to the eleven percent by which Chávez defeated the same opponent last October left the new premier with little mandate to govern. ¶ ¶ “A lot of Venezuelans seem to think that a close election is not a valid election, so this leaves room for Maduro’s critics to question it,” says Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy research, an independent think-tank in Washington. Mr. Weisbrot says he thinks the US is trying to take advantage of this situation.¶ ¶ Far from putting a dent in Maduro’s credibility, other observers believe that continued tensions between Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for a president whose supporters have come to expect belligerence towards “las imperialistas.”¶ ¶ “In many ways John Kerry is doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him,” says Jones. “The US’s refusal to cooperate plays into the socialists’ broader narrative that the US is conspiring to defeat Venezuela’s revolution.”
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Baverstock 5-17 (Alasdair Baverstock, Contributor, Christian Science Monitor, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition,” CSM, May 17, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition)
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The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. other countries in the region were quick to congratulate Maduro his recent touring of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy.” Far from putting a dent in Maduro’s credibility, other observers believe that continued tensions between Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for a president whose supporters have come to expect belligerence towards “las imperialistas Kerry is doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him The US’s refusal to cooperate plays into the socialists’ broader narrative that the US is conspiring to defeat Venezuela’s revolution.”
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Failure to cooperate doesn’t affect credibility – but allowing Maduro to preach anti-americanism absent the plan increases his legitimacy
| 3,398 | 137 | 759 | 543 | 19 | 118 | 0.034991 | 0.217311 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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1,526 |
¶ Venezuela's Acting President Nicolas Maduro has been making unsubstantiated accusations against Washington, also accusing the United States of plotting to kill Venezuela's opposition candidate for president. Maduro's allegations are being interpreted as campaign rhetoric for now. But there is growing concern they could incite political violence and further damage relations with the United States.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ Maduro contends Washington has been plotting to assassinate opposition leader Henrique Capriles, and has specifically named two former U.S. officials as part of the alleged conspiracy. They worked in the Bush administration, but are not current U.S. government employees. ¶ ¶ “I’m addressing President Obama and Roger Noriega and Otto Reich, Pentagon officials and the CIA. They are behind a plan to kill the presidential candidate of the Venezuelan right wing, to create chaos in Venezuela,” said Maduro.¶ ¶ The U.S. State Department has dismissed the accusation.¶ ¶ "The United States categorically rejects allegations of any U.S. government involvement in any plot to destabilize the Venezuelan government or to harm anyone in Venezuela," said State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland.¶ ¶ And so, too, does former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega, now an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.¶ ¶ “I don’t have any relation with the U.S. government. I was an administration official in the past, and really I have been quite critical of the current administration,” said Noriega.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ Cynthia Arnson, a Latin American analyst at the Wilson Center in Washington, said that Maduro's accusation is similar to those made by President Hugo Chavez during election cycles. ¶ ¶ “We have seen in the past the use of the international threat from the United States of imperialism to maintain a united Chavista base,” said Arnson.¶ ¶ Noriega offers his own theory. He said that Maduro, with help from Cuba, may raise the threat of U.S. intervention to sanction political violence against his opponents. ¶ ¶ “My concern is that maybe Maduro, or I should say his Cubans who are manipulating the succession in Venezuela, are signaling the possible use of political violence in Venezuela,” he said.¶ ¶ Arnson said the Obama administration should be cautious. ¶ ¶ “Maintain silence for now. Don’t say too much. Don’t be a factor in the electoral campaign in Venezuela. This is what has been the strategy for a long time, including in 2012, and they should continue like this,” said Arnson.¶ ¶ And if the situation does not deteriorate, she said that after the election there still might be an opening for the U.S. and Venezuela to repair their relationship.
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Padden 13 (Brian Padden, Voice of America, “Anti-US Accusations in Venezuela Seen as Campaign Rhetoric,” article, Voice of America, March 19, 2013, http://m.voanews.com/a/1624784.html)
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Maduro has been making unsubstantiated accusations against Washington Maduro's allegations are campaign rhetoric Maduro's accusation is similar to those made by President Hugo Chavez We have seen in the past the use of the international threat from the United States of imperialism to maintain a united Chavista base Maduro raise the threat of U.S. intervention to sanction political violence against his opponents
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Maduro is using anti-American rhetoric to shore up political support – pursuing rapprochement solves
| 2,676 | 100 | 414 | 428 | 14 | 62 | 0.03271 | 0.14486 |
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Northwestern (NHSI)
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Yet while the politicians bicker, Venezuela is suffering. The annual inflation rate is nearing 30 percent, the country's annual homicides exceed those of the United States and Europe's combined, and the chronic shortages of basic goods are causing supermarket waiting times of up to three hours.¶ ¶ "There's no sugar, flour, oil, or toilet paper," said Ricardo Mota, a 34-year-old publicist waiting in a Caracas store to buy four bags of rice, the maximum permitted due to short supply. "We're forced to stock up on these things because we don't know when there will be more."¶ ¶ "It's the government's fault," he added. "The socialists have been fighting so hard to stay in power that they've ignored the needs of the people."¶ ¶ Many observers doubt Maduro's ability to handle these problems. The new president's public confidence and political influence have suffered following a difficult post-election period for the socialists.¶ ¶ "Maduro looks like someone who just barely scraped a win after Chavez left him a 15 percentage point lead," says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. "His lack of popularity gives him less power within the government, and therefore less mandate to be an effective president."¶ ¶ Maduro has been left with no one but himself to blame for the country's worsening situation. The political strategy of passing the buck to the preceding government is unavailable to a politician who campaigned primarily on extolling the virtues of his predecessor.¶ ¶ "Right from the beginning there was the danger that whoever had to follow Chavez would become the scapegoat for the problems he left behind", says Professor Smilde, "and it's going to make Maduro go down in history as the man who couldn't keep up Chavez's legacy".¶ ¶ "Chavez's charisma and popularity allowed him to get away with far more in terms of policy shortcomings," says Professor Jones. "Maduro gets none of that benefit because he lacks the built-up goodwill that Chavez enjoyed."
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Baverstock 5-23 (Alasdair Baverstock, Caracas-based correspondent, The Atlantic, “What's Behind Venezuela's Toilet-Paper Shortage?” article, The Atlantic, May 23 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/whats-behind-venezuelas-toilet-paper-shortage/276191/)
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Venezuela is suffering The annual inflation rate is nearing 30 percent chronic shortages of basic goods are causing supermarket waiting times of up to three hours There's no sugar, flour, oil, or toilet paper It's the government's fault Many observers doubt Maduro's ability to handle these problems. Maduro looks like someone who just barely scraped a win His lack of popularity gives him less power within the government, and therefore less mandate to be an effective president." whoever had to follow Chavez would become the scapegoat for the problems he left behind", Chavez's charisma and popularity allowed him to get away with far more in terms of policy shortcomings Maduro gets none of that benefit because he lacks the built-up goodwill that Chavez enjoyed
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US recognition not key – economy and lack of popularity are alt causes to legitimacy
| 2,004 | 84 | 766 | 327 | 15 | 124 | 0.045872 | 0.379205 |
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2013
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1,528 |
(Reuters) - Acting President Nicolas Maduro may struggle to advance the late Hugo Chavez's socialist policies if he wins Venezuela's election on Sunday, lacking both his predecessor's iron grip on a disparate ruling coalition and the robust state finances that cemented his rule.¶ ¶ Maduro holds a wide lead in opinion polls over opposition candidate Henrique Capriles for the election triggered by Chavez's death last month after a two-year battle with cancer.¶ Late last year, Chavez named Maduro as his chosen successor in case he did not survive his fourth surgery for the disease. That was his last public speech and Chavez died on March 5.¶ If the 50-year-old Maduro wins the election, he will inherit government finances strained by heavy spending during Chavez's 2012 re-election campaign, the highest inflation in the Americas, and nagging shortages of basic consumer goods.¶ Widely liked among Chavez supporters but lacking his mentor's charisma, the former bus driver and union organizer may also have trouble controlling "Chavismo," a movement ranging from military officers and oil executives to slum community organizers and ideologues.¶ Top allies have recognized the importance the politically wily former soldier Chavez had in keeping them all in line.¶ "Chavez was a barrier to a lot of the crazy ideas that occurred to us," said Diosdado Cabello, a powerful party leader seen by many Venezuelans as a potential rival to Maduro.¶ "He imposed his leadership, his prudence and his conscience, and in many cases ensured we did not carry on."¶ Maduro scoffs at suggestions of divisions in the coalition. As president, he would have the backing of those who over a decade benefited from Chavez's ambitious oil-funded social programs that put free clinics in slums, provided subsidized groceries and built hundreds of thousands of new homes.¶ Jose Albornoz, who worked alongside Maduro for years as a lawmaker before joining the opposition, said his experience as a union negotiator would stand him in good stead to forge consensus among different factions.¶ But he noted that Cabello has considerably greater sway than Maduro in important areas such as the military, the legislature and state governorships, and predicted that Maduro could come under pressure from inside the coalition.¶ "With the death of President Chavez, the struggle for leadership is starting to heat up," said Albornoz, who is now one of the leaders of a small opposition party.¶ Maduro served as Chavez's foreign minister for six years and, as he now campaigns for president, he is trying to elevate his former boss's image to that of a saint.¶ He is also portraying himself as Chavez's political "son," pulling at the heart strings of millions of rank-and-file followers who might otherwise doubt his leadership.¶ Despite maintaining his late boss's shrill rhetoric - including calling foes heirs of Hitler - Maduro is unlikely to maintain Chavez's torrid pace of nationalizations, his regular confrontations with private enterprise, or the diplomatic run-ins with the United States and its allies.¶ Maduro may be more inclined to hold discussions with the opposition or business leaders who have been at odds with the government for years.¶ Last year, he held informal talks with the U.S. State Department after years of bilateral tensions, although that back channel was cut last month when his government took offense at U.S. criticism of democratic standards in Venezuela.¶ A more diplomatic approach may lead to restlessness among ideological stalwarts, including armed groups in the slums who vow to carry on Chavez's legacy and see confrontation as the cornerstone of his "21st century socialism."¶ "Maduro has to stay true to Chavez's spirit, or we are lost," said lawyer and government supporter Jean-Carlos Mendoza, 32, pondering the future during a recent visit to Chavez's coffin.
|
Ellsworth 4-8 (Brian Ellsworth, Reuters, “Analysis: Venezuela's Maduro faces tricky post-Chavez panorama,” Reuters, Mon Apr 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-venezuela-election-maduro-idUSBRE9370PZ20130408)
|
Maduro may struggle to advance Chavez's socialist policies if he wins Venezuela's election on Sunday lacking both his predecessor's iron grip on a disparate ruling coalition and the robust state finances that cemented his rule. Maduro will inherit government finances strained by heavy spending during Chavez's 2012 re-election campaign and nagging shortages of basic consumer goods the former bus driver and union organizer also have trouble controlling "Chavismo," the struggle for leadership is starting to heat up Maduro is unlikely to maintain Chavez's torrid pace of nationalizations, his regular confrontations with private enterprise, or the diplomatic run-ins with the United States and its allies. Maduro hold discussions with the opposition or business leaders who have been at odds with the government for years. he held informal talks with the U.S. State Department A more diplomatic approach may lead to restlessness among ideological stalwarts who see confrontation as the cornerstone of his "21st century socialism."
|
Economic and political divisions forces Maduro to be moderate – no impact
| 3,882 | 73 | 1,034 | 615 | 12 | 154 | 0.019512 | 0.250407 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,529 |
¶ Two months into his administration, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is giving signs of pursuing a much more moderate course for Venezuelan policies than that of the late and former President Hugo Chávez, said Bank of America Merrill Lynch in a report.¶ ¶ "These signs are particularly evident in economic and foreign policy, although they are also beginning to emerge in the domestic policy arena," said BofA Merrill Lynch.¶ ¶ Greater policy moderation reduces policy uncertainty and implies a greater degree of security of property rights, including those of bondholders, the US investment bank noted.¶ ¶ "In the meantime, the government has continued to implement a drastic macroeconomic adjustment program through spending and import cuts. It has also begun to reduce subsidized loans to other countries. These decisions significantly strengthen the country's capacity to service debt obligations," the report reads.¶ ¶ The investment bank also states that economic policy appears to be firmly under the control of pragmatist finance minister Nelson Merentes, who has made a point of frequently meeting with private sector representatives and international investors. ¶ ¶ Economic policies in Venezuela are far from optimal, but at least there is a strong indication that the government "cares about its relationship with the private sector, in sharp contrast to the generalized perception during the Chávez years."¶ ¶ BofA Merrill Lynch said that the key risk to its more upbeat take on Venezuela comes from the possibility of lower than expected oil revenues caused either by falling prices, declining production, or both. ¶ ¶ In contrast to this positive view, ratings agency S&P came out earlier this month downgrading Venezuela's sovereign credit rating to B from B+ (and maintained a negative outlook) as greater political uncertainty is threatening the implementation of economic policies at a time of economic stress for the country.
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Rindebro 6-20 (Ulric Rindebro, reporter, BN Americas, “Venezuela's Maduro showing signs of more moderate course,” June 20, 2013, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/banking/venezuelas-maduro-showing-signs-of-more-moderate-course)
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Maduro is giving signs of pursuing a much more moderate course for Venezuelan policies These signs are particularly evident in economic and foreign policy they also emerge in the domestic policy arena Greater policy moderation reduces policy uncertainty and implies a greater degree of security of property rights, including those of bondholders the government has continued to implement a drastic macroeconomic adjustment program through spending and import cuts. It has also begun to reduce subsidized loans to other countries. economic policy appears to be firmly under the control of pragmatist finance minister Nelson Merentes,
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He’s already showing signs of moderation – especially in foreign policy
| 1,950 | 71 | 632 | 302 | 11 | 94 | 0.036424 | 0.311258 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,530 |
¶ False anti-Iranian accusations persist. They're longstanding. Claims about alleged nuclear bomb development don't wash. Nor do well publicized terror attack charges. ¶ ¶ The Islamic Republic's maliciously vilified. False accusations follow earlier ones. A disturbing pattern repeats. Iran's sovereignty is challenged. Its independence is threatened. ¶ ¶ Washington wants pro-Western stooges everywhere. It wants rival states eliminated. It wants unchallenged global dominance. Everything's fair game to achieve it. Duplicitous misinformation proliferates. ¶ ¶ Argentinian officials falsely charged former Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah in connection with the 1992 Israeli Buenos Aires embassy bombing. It killed 29 civilians and wounded 242 others. ¶ ¶ In 1999, its authorities issued an arrest warrant. It cited this attack and the 1994 AMIA (Argentine Israelite Mutual Association) Buenos Aires bombing. It killed 85 and injured hundreds. Argentina has Latin America's largest Jewish population. It numbers around 200,000. ¶ ¶ On May 29, the Times of Israel headlined "Argentinian prosecutor alleges extensive Iranian terror activity in South America." ¶ ¶ Alberto Nisman's 502 page indictment falsely linked Iran to the 1994 incident. It did so duplicitously. More on that below. ¶ ¶ Nisman named former Iranian cultural attache Mohsen Rabbani. He was Tehran's alleged Latin American clandestine activities coordinator. ¶ ¶ He fabricated Iran's so-called "dual use of diplomatic offices, cultural or charity associations and even mosques, as coverage to hide illegal activities." ¶ ¶ He claimed the 1994 incident wasn't "an isolated event." It's "part of a bigger image, dominated by the strong and aggressive Iranian infiltration in the region in which Rabbani did not limit himself to Argentina." ¶ ¶ (B)ased on the gathered evidence, his activities (extended) to Guyana and to several South American countries." ¶ ¶ "Based on countless reports, evidence, testimonies, court and investigative records related to other countries of the region, North America and Europe - including rulings of foreign courts against the Iranian regime - (his activities supposedly) proved the identical decision-making mechanism, planning and execution of terrorist attacks verified in different countries, which were judicially attributed to Iranian intelligence agents." ¶ ¶ Latin American countries named include “Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname." ¶ ¶ Nisman accused Tehran's Argentinian embassy and several Iranian "front companies" of providing means and cover for individuals involved in the 1994 attack. ¶ ¶ He alleged so-called "documents signed by top authorities in Iran" prove his accusations. ¶ ¶ "I have the certainty that this is irrefutable proof," he claimed. "Any prosecutor who sits in my office will reach the same conclusions because evidence leads to that. Iran is a terrorist state that backs them." ¶ ¶ He asked Interpol to "take further measures in order to detain all the defendants in the AMIA case with international arrest warrants." ¶ ¶ The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) vehemently denied Nisman's accusations. It said Tehran has no involvement in Latin American terrorism. It has intention to commit it. No reason to do so exists. ¶ ¶ "(D)ue to the prosecutor's background and Zionist character, we won't consider his statements important," IRNA stressed. ¶ ¶ Cui bono matters most. Nisman left unaddressed an Iranian motive or interest in Latin American terrorism. What possible purpose could it serve? ¶ ¶ Iran’s got everything to lose and nothing to gain. Israel and America benefit hugely. They do so by claiming Iran's link to incidents bearing their fingerprints globally. They do it on others fabricated out of whole cloth. ¶ ¶ Wall Street Journal columnist Mary O'Grady notoriously reinvents Latin American history. She does so her way. Doing it turns truth on its head. It doesn't wash with reality. She's been exposed, debunked, and disgraced numerous times. ¶ ¶ Her columns repeat lies, damn lies, and vilification of Washington's enemies. She fronts for wealth and power. She does so disgracefully. She's paid to do so. ¶ ¶ She never had credibility. She doesn't now. She substitutes her version of history for reality. It reads like bad fiction. ¶ ¶ On June 2, she headlined "Uncovering Iran's Latin Networks." She cited Nisman's report. She claimed Tehran "sow(s) revolution all over the world, and Latin America is a key target." ¶ ¶ She called his misinformation "sophisticated (proof of) Iranian terrorismâ¤|.run(ning) from the Caribbean to the Southern Cone." ¶ ¶ She cited Nisman's outlandish claim of an alleged foiled 2007 Iranian plot to blow up New York's JFK Airport. He called it similar to the 1994 Argentinian incident. ¶ ¶ So-called evidence is easy to concoct. Washington and complicit allies do it repeatedly. Some do under pressure. All do shamelessly. ¶ ¶ According to O'Grady: ¶ ¶ "The model is not complicated. True believers are placed in legal structures, like embassies, cultural centers, mosques and religious schools, where they carry out official duties but also radicalize converts, collect funds, pass secret communications and otherwise lay revolutionary groundwork." ¶ ¶ Mosques are "dual" purpose, she claims. They serve as "intelligence station(s)." She calls Brazil's border with Paraguay and Argentina "a famous hideout for Hezbollah." ¶ ¶ Her claims lack credibility. They're void of corroborating evidence. She can't include what doesn't exist. She tries anyway. She misses the mark every time. Baseless claims don't wash. ¶ ¶ On August 20, 2012, Judicial Watch headlined "State Dept.: No Middle Eastern Terrorists in Latin America," saying: ¶ ¶ "Months after the world’s largest Spanish news network revealed that Middle Eastern terrorists infiltrated Latin America to plan an attack against the United States, the Obama Administration has determined that the groups don't seem to have a presence in the region though there is growing concern." ¶ ¶ A "lengthy State Department report on terrorism contradicts" alarming claims otherwise. So-called Middle East terrorist groups infiltrating Latin America don't exist. ¶ ¶ Fabricated plots suggested Latin America-based Middle East groups planned White House, FBI, Pentagon, and US nuclear plant attacks. ¶ ¶ Supposed Iranian-linked Hezbollah and Al Qaeda "operational cells" don't exist. Nor do fake money laundering schemes. ¶ ¶ The State Department said "no known international terrorist organization has an operational presence in Mexico." A fabricated Univision expose claimed otherwise. ¶ ¶ Washington said "no terrorist group targeted US citizens in or from Mexican territory. (N)o evidence of ties between Mexican criminal organizations and terrorist groups" exist. ¶ ¶ On May 30, 2013, the State Department again debunked claims about an Iranian-linked Hezbollah/Al Qaeda Latin American terrorist network. "(N)o known operational cells" exist. None do now. None did earlier. ¶ ¶ At the same time, the report acknowledges Iranian President Ahmadinejad's visits to Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela. "The United States continues to monitor such initiatives," it said. ¶ ¶ This report followed Nisman's outlandish claims. He cited nonexistent terrorist cells. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said agency Country Reports are "pretty extensive." She had nothing further to add. ¶ ¶ It bears repeating. False accusations against Iran persist. Washington initiates many. The State Department's latest report wrongfully accuse Iran of "attacks or attempted attacks in India, Thailand, Georgia and Kenya." ¶ ¶ It claimed "Iran provided financial, material, and logistical support for terrorist and militant groups in the Middle East and Central Asia." ¶ ¶ It said "Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and militant groups to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and stir up instability in the Middle East." ¶ ¶ "The IRGC-QF is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad." ¶ ¶ Iran was wrongfully accused of a fabricated US Saudi ambassador assassination plot. It's falsely called the world's leading state sponsor of terror. ¶ ¶ Accusations persist. They don't pass the smell test. They stop short of linking Iran to Latin American terrorism. If Washington saw a connection, headline reports would follow. None did post-Nisman. Official silence further debunks his claims.
|
Lendman 6-26 (Stephen Lendman, author and Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG), host of Progressive Radio News Hour radio program, “State Department Debunks Iranian Latin American Terrorism Links,” article, Rense, June 26, 2013, http://rense.com/general96/statedept.html)
|
False anti-Iranian accusations persist The Islamic Republic News Agency vehemently denied Nisman's accusations Tehran has no involvement in Latin American terrorism. It has intention to commit it. No reason to do so exists. Iran’s got everything to lose and nothing to gain. columns repeat lies and vilification of Washington's enemies So-called evidence is easy to concoct. Washington and complicit allies do it repeatedly Accusations persist. They don't pass the smell test Official silence further debunks his claims
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No Hezbollah attack – your evidence is flawed
| 8,569 | 45 | 521 | 1,305 | 8 | 77 | 0.00613 | 0.059004 |
Credibility Disadvantages - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors.html5
|
Northwestern (NHSI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,531 |
Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.
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Brookes, senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage foundation, 09 (Peter, Keep the Embargo, O, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o, MWH)
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Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The people enjoy no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then?
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Lifting the embargo won’t normalize relations; instead, it will legitimize Castro’s regime, perpetuate human rights abuses, and provide the Cuban government with the resources it needs to counterbalance the United States.
| 1,690 | 221 | 1,283 | 277 | 31 | 208 | 0.111913 | 0.750903 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,532 |
The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.¶ Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. ¶ Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.
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Rubin, writer for the Washington Post, 11 (Jennifer, Obama’s Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html, MWH)
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The administration’s conduct is galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.¶ Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies despots’ behavior has worsened There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. ¶ the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.
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Relaxing sanctions on Cuba will kill US credibility
| 1,426 | 51 | 919 | 221 | 8 | 138 | 0.036199 | 0.624434 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,533 |
Cuba's leaders do not want to normalise ties with the US because then they would lose their excuse for the state of the country, says Hillary Clinton.¶ Cuba's response to recent US efforts to improve relations had revealed "an intransigent, entrenched regime" in Havana, said the US secretary of state. ¶ The Cuban authorities have long blamed a 48-year US trade embargo for holding back the country's development. ¶ The US says the embargo will remain until Cuba improves human rights. ¶ Relations between Washington and the communist government in Havana have soured in recent months after early expectations of an improvement under the Obama administration. ¶ The BBC's Michael Voss in Havana says initial hopes of improved relations are receding with both sides resorting to much stronger and less diplomatic language. ¶ 'Very sad'¶ Mrs Clinton said the response of Cuban President Raul Castro and his brother, ex-leader Fidel Castro, to US efforts to improve ties proved they had no interest in political reform or ending the sanctions.
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CNN, 10 (Hillary Clinton scorns 'entrenched' Cuba, CNN, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8612765.stm, MWH)
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Cuba's leaders do not want to normalise ties with the US because then they would lose their excuse for the state of the country, says Clinton Cuba's response to recent US efforts to improve relations revealed "an intransigent, entrenched regime" Relations have soured in recent months both sides resorting to much stronger and less diplomatic language. ¶ the response of Raul and Fidel Castro proved they had no interest in political reform or ending the sanctions.
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Cuba doesn’t want to improve relations with the US – scapegoating Americans is key to Cuban leaders’ credibility
| 1,041 | 112 | 465 | 169 | 18 | 76 | 0.106509 | 0.449704 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,534 |
Several former Castro’s government officials such as Cuba’s former Ambassador to the United Nations, Alcibiades Hidalgo and ex diplomat Juan Antonio Blanco, who worked in the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, have explained how Cuban leaders need enmity with the United States to derive their internal legitimacy and protect their authoritarian privileges. According to these former officials, every time there was a chance of lifting the embargo, Fidel Castro did something to keep it: Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977), and the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996.
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Lopez-Levy, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate at the University of Denver, 11 (Arturo, Appease Cuba? What Would Winston Churchill Say? The Havana Note, http://thehavananote.com/node/845, MWH)
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former Castro’s government officials such as Cuba’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and ex diplomat explained how Cuban leaders need enmity with the United States to derive their internal legitimacy and protect their authoritarian privileges. every time there was a chance of lifting the embargo, Fidel Castro did something to keep it
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Cuban leaders will block relations with the US – they need enmity in order to protect their authoritarian power
| 597 | 111 | 342 | 93 | 19 | 53 | 0.204301 | 0.569892 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,535 |
Those views are an exaggeration of Cuba’s policy towards the United States but I don’t dismiss their evidences. For some in the Cuban leadership, “anti-imperialism”, manifested at its worst as “anti-Americanism”, is central to their identity. Cuban nationalists have a long list of historic complaints and grievances against U.S. interventionism, from the exclusion of the Paris Treaty in 1898 and the Platt Amendment in 1902 to the Helms-Burton Act in 1996.¶ Fidel Castro’s opposition to U.S. policies over the world is documented and consistent. The Cuban “historicos”, the generation who fought in the revolution, don’t secretly aspire to be United States’ allies or to relations between Cuba and the United States of the cordial kind Russia and Finland have. It is logical, they know only one way to govern, the “under siege” one. A rapprochement with the United States would unleash unpredictable pressures for reform and public deliberation, with more transparency and opportunities for those who think differently. Such a situation would undoubtedly dilute their power.
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Lopez-Levy, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate at the University of Denver, 11 (Arturo, Appease Cuba? What Would Winston Churchill Say? The Havana Note, http://thehavananote.com/node/845, MWH)
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For Cuban leadership, “anti-imperialism”, manifested as “anti-Americanism”, is central to their identity. Cuban nationalists have a long list of historic complaints and grievances against U.S. interventionism, from the exclusion of the Paris Treaty in 1898 and the Platt Amendment in 1902 to the Helms-Burton Act in 1996.¶ Castro’s opposition to U.S. policies over the world is documented and consistent. historicos know only one way to govern, the “under siege” one. A rapprochement with the United States would unleash unpredictable pressures for reform and public deliberation, with more transparency and opportunities for those who think differently. Such a situation would undoubtedly dilute their power.
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Cuban leaders will block rapprochement with the US – it would dilute their authoritarian power
| 1,076 | 94 | 709 | 166 | 15 | 103 | 0.090361 | 0.620482 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,536 |
What’s the best way to mark the fifth annual Cuba Solidarity Day? If we want to help the long-suffering people of Fidel Castro’s island “paradise,” the answer should be obvious: Shine a light on the repression and tyranny that makes daily life there such a grinding ordeal. Show unflinching support for dissidents and advocates of non-violent change on the island.¶ That’s what the George W. Bush administration did on the first Cuba Solidarity Day, May 20, 2008. Worldwide efforts focused on political prisoners and the demands for progress and democratic change. That first Solidarity Day attempted to look below the decks of the Cuban ship, boring down to the unrest and unhappiness on the galley-level.¶ But there’s another school of thought on how best to mark this day — one that encourages “engagement” and leans more on diplomacy than accountability.¶ Today, thanks to the Obama administration, as well as left-leaning think tanks in Washington and New York, an effort is underway to steer an opposite course — one that moves, incredibly enough, closer to cooperation with the Castro regime. Tossed overboard are demands for human rights, freedom and dignity for Cubans. In their place: the siren song of tourism partnerships and exchanges of academics and musicians.¶ A fresh wave of Cubans is disembarking on and around May 20 to participate in Cuba’s latest charm offensive. The capstone visit for this round features Mariela Castro Espín, daughter of Raul Castro and an activist for gay and lesbian rights, at the Latin American Studies Association in San Francisco. She will be received with acclaim as a voice of progressive tolerance on issues of individual sexual preference.¶ The objective of these latest Cuban visitors — salaried employees and privileged members of the regime — is to convince ordinary Americans that Cuba is already on a course to better days. We’re to believe that major economic change is underway, and that small portions of “democratic space,” as the Obama administration fondly refers to it, are being carved out.¶ The ultimate goal of spokespersons such as Mariela Castro is relatively simple: Win the coveted U.S. imprimatur of acceptance for Cuban-style, post-Castro socialism, and smooth the way for full diplomatic recognition. The eventual goal, of course, is to bring down the 1996 Helms-Burton Act and with it the trade embargo. That way, the fabled Castro Revolution may continue on a course of channeled change, with a succession of next-generation party apparatchiks, bureaucrats and military leaders fully in control in the wheelhouse.¶ Yet, as the Bush administration knew, and the Obama administration seems to forget, authentic change in Cuba requires far more than institutional tinkering and piecemeal economic reform or the creation of manufactured “democratic space.” It means taking these five fundamental steps toward authentic political reform:¶ ◾Recognition of the right to independent political parties to exist legally and operate freely.¶ ◾Free and fair elections.¶ ◾Genuine freedom of expression, including unfiltered access to the Internet.¶ ◾Freedom of association for civil society, private enterprise and organized labor.¶ Nothing more — and nothing less — will do.
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Walser, Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, 12 (Ray, How To Achieve Real Political Reform in Cuba, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/05/how-to-achieve-real-political-reform-in-cuba, MWH)
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If we want to help the long-suffering people of Castro’s island “paradise,” the answer should be obvious: Shine a light on the repression and tyranny that makes daily life there such a grinding ordeal. Show unflinching support for dissidents and advocates of non-violent change on the island.¶ That’s what the Bush administration did Worldwide efforts focused on political prisoners and the demands for progress and democratic change. Obama is underway to steer an opposite course — one that moves closer to cooperation with the Castro regime. Tossed overboard are demands for human rights, freedom and dignity for Cubans. We’re to believe that major economic change is underway, and that small portions of “democratic space,” are being carved out.¶ The ultimate goal of spokespersons such as Castro is relatively simple: Win the coveted U.S. imprimatur of acceptance for Cuban-style, post-Castro socialism, and smooth the way for full diplomatic recognition. The eventual goal is to bring down the trade embargo That way the fabled Castro Revolution may continue on a course of channeled change, with a succession of next-generation party apparatchiks, bureaucrats and military leaders fully in control in the wheelhouse.¶ authentic change in Cuba requires far more than institutional tinkering and piecemeal economic reform or the creation of manufactured “democratic space.” It means taking these five fundamental steps toward authentic political reform:¶ ◾Recognition of the right to independent political parties to exist legally and operate freely.¶ ◾Free and fair elections.¶ ◾Genuine freedom of expression, including unfiltered access to the Internet.¶ ◾Freedom of association for civil society, private enterprise and organized labor.¶ Nothing more — and nothing less — will do.
|
Lifting the embargo ignores human rights abuses and legitimizes Castro’s regime
| 3,238 | 79 | 1,787 | 508 | 11 | 269 | 0.021654 | 0.529528 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,537 |
Lacey’s post-embargo Cuba sure sounds wonderful, but it forgets about the actions that must first be taken by Cuba. While engagement by the United States was useful, the Soviet Union and China did not open thanks to American diplomacy alone. Actions taken by those countries’ respective leadership were key. Gorbachev engaged in a policy of glasnost (“openness”) that played an invaluable role in the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened his country to investment and the start of private competition (with countries like Singapore as a model). There’s little sign of such a shift in Cuba. While Cuban President Raul Castro has made signs of being willing to talk to the United States, those moves have been interfered with by Raul’s brother Fidel.¶ A freer Cuba would be beneficial to everyone. It is important, however, to remember that this is a transformation that can only happen through a change in Cuba’s policies, toward a more pluralist, democratic political system and more open economy. It is not a transformation that can happen simply through a change in our policies toward Cuba
|
Powell, writer for the Heritage Foundation, 10 (Michael Orion, Cuba: Change is Not One-Sided, The Foundry, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/03/cuba-change-is-not-one-sided/, MWH)
|
post-embargo Cuba sounds wonderful, but it forgets about the actions that must first be taken by Cuba. While engagement by the United States was useful, the Soviet Union and China did not open thanks to American diplomacy alone. Actions taken by those countries’ respective leadership were key. Gorbachev engaged in a policy of glasnost that played an invaluable role in the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened his country to investment and the start of private competition There’s little sign of such a shift in Cuba. While Raul Castro has made signs of being willing to talk to the United States, those moves have been interfered with by Raul’s brother Fidel.¶ transformation that can only happen through a change in Cuba’s policies, toward a more pluralist, democratic political system and more open economy. It is not a transformation that can happen simply through a change in our policies toward Cuba
|
US unilateral action fails; it must be reciprocated by Cuba
| 1,125 | 59 | 940 | 184 | 10 | 154 | 0.054348 | 0.836957 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,538 |
The repression and violence experienced by the Ladies in White is, unfortunately, not unusual. Just this week, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation announced that a record 786 political arrests occurred in Cuba last month. While many are of a short-term nature, they are designed to promote fear and intimidation. These arrests brought the 2011 total to 4,123, compared with 2,074 in 2010.¶ Yet all too often the media and Obama Administration overlook this continuing wave of repression in Cuba. This inaction, at least on the part of the Administration, is a manifestation of Obama’s flawed foreign policy of engaging with U.S. adversaries such as Iran, Venezuela and Cuba.
|
Walser, Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, and Zuckerman, Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 12 (Ray, veteran Foreign Service officer, Jessica, “Ladies in White” and Obama’s Failed Policy of Cuban Appeasement, Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/2012/01/13/ladies-in-white-and-obama%E2%80%99s-failed-policy-of-cuban-appeasement/, MWH)
|
repression and violence is not unusual. the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation announced that a record 786 political arrests occurred in Cuba last month they are designed to promote fear and intimidation. These arrests brought the 2011 total to 4,123, compared with 2,074 in 2010.¶ all too often the media and Obama Administration overlook this continuing wave of repression in Cuba. This inaction is a manifestation of Obama’s flawed foreign policy of engaging with U.S. adversaries such as Iran, Venezuela and Cuba.
|
The plan’s policy of economic engagement ignores brutal political oppression
| 703 | 76 | 543 | 112 | 10 | 85 | 0.089286 | 0.758929 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,539 |
•Lifting the embargo will strengthen Castro's government ¶ There's no private sector in Cuba; its economy is predominantly state-owned, and trading with it inevitably strengthens the state. The government in Havana has been reeling since the collapse of its Soviet patron, but lifting the embargo would ease its financial crisis and therefore strengthen its hand. ¶ •Cuba's trade with other Western countries hasn't eased repression ¶ Cuba has been trading normally with most of Latin America and Europe for more than a decade now, and Castro has shown no sign of reforming his system or ending repression. The idea that trade promotes human rights is a self-serving myth promoted by corporate America, and there's little reason to believe that an end to the embargo would automatically improve the political situation in Cuba. ¶ •Easing the embargo before Castro agrees to change sends the wrong signal ¶ Castro continues to defy international standards on democracy and human rights, and lifting the embargo now would be to reward that defiance. His regime rejected even the reformist communism of Gorbachev in the '80s, but even though it has struggled to survive economically in the '90s, it has steadfastly maintained its hard line. Democracy should be the condition for lifting the embargo.
|
Karon, senior editor at TIME, 10 (Tony, Do We Really Need an Embargo Against Cuba?, Time, http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,48773,00.html#ixzz2Y3Bxkpzu, MWH)
|
Lifting the embargo will strengthen Castro's government There's no private sector in Cuba; its economy is state-owned trading with it inevitably strengthens the state government in Havana has been reeling since the collapse of its Soviet patron, but lifting the embargo would therefore strengthen its hand •Cuba's trade with other Western countries hasn't eased repression ¶ Castro has shown no sign of reforming his system or ending repression The idea that trade promotes human rights is a self-serving myth Easing the embargo before Castro agrees to change sends the wrong signal ¶ Castro continues to defy international standards on democracy and human rights, and lifting the embargo now would be to reward that defiance. it has steadfastly maintained its hard line.
|
Removing the embargo will only strengthen Castro and re-entrench repression
| 1,296 | 75 | 771 | 208 | 10 | 121 | 0.048077 | 0.581731 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,540 |
Unfortunately, embargo supporters never let reality get in the way of their arguments. In 1994, John Sweeney of the Heritage Foundation declared that “the embargo remains the only effective instrument available to the U.S. government in trying to force the economic and democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over three decades. Maintaining the embargo will help end the Castro regime more quickly.” The latter’s collapse, he wrote, is more likely in the near term than ever before.¶ Almost two decades later, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, retains faith in the embargo: “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered.” One of the best definitions of insanity is continuing to do the same thing while expecting to achieve different results.¶ The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.
|
Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 12 (Doug, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, Time to End the Cuban Embargo, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-pointless-cuba-embargo-7834?page=1, MWH)
|
embargo supporters never let reality get in the way of their arguments Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, retains faith in the embargo sanctions on the regime must remain in place and should be strengthened, The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.
|
Cuban Americans hate the plan
| 1,084 | 29 | 454 | 168 | 5 | 67 | 0.029762 | 0.39881 |
Cuba Embargo Negative - GMU 2013.html5
|
Unknown
|
Case Negatives
|
2013
|
1,541 |
Is Mexico finally on the verge of a historic reform push? Expectations are on the rise, and for good reason. In office just over six months, President Enrique Peña Nieto has taken steps that suggest he is serious about pushing through policy changes meant to, among other things, improve the quality of an education system that produces students who score lower than their counterparts in all other OECD countries in reading, math, and science, and to open the country's lucrative telecommunications sector, which could lower prices for millions of Mexican consumers. The government is also pushing for a state and local fiscal responsibility law intended to prevent governors and local authorities from taking on too much debt. Peña Nieto's financial reform could also help promote public access to credit. According to data from the World Bank, credit as a percentage of GDP remains at about 26 percent (in 2011), much lower than in Latin American peers like Brazil (61 percent) and Chile (71 percent).
|
Hernandez, School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, 6/20/13 — [Maria Jose, Associate, Latin America at Eurasia Group, Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs Master in Public Administration, International Finance and Economic Policy, 2013,( “Politics and Oil: Mexico's Road to Reform”, 6-20-13, Available Online at http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/20/politics_and_oil_mexicos_road_to_reform, Accessed on 6/27/13][SP]
|
Is Mexico finally on the verge of a historic reform push? Expectations are on the rise, and for good reason. Nieto has taken steps that suggest he is serious about pushing through policy changes meant to, among other things, improve the quality of an education system and to open the country's lucrative telecommunications sector The government is also pushing to prevent governors and local authorities from taking on too much debt promote public access to credit
|
There are two different scenarios in this file
| 1,004 | 46 | 464 | 164 | 8 | 76 | 0.04878 | 0.463415 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,542 |
The story of how Mexico reached this crisis point is by now well known. Underinvestment, complacency and poor management of the sector, combined with a refusal on the part of the political elite to embrace the prospect of private or foreign investment in PEMEX has meant that the country has failed to develop other oil fields and is unable to reach the vast majority of its remaining reserves in the deep waters of the Gulf. And this, of course, is only one of a multitude of problems facing the country at the present time. Public insecurity, unacceptable levels of poverty, a lack of infrastructure, low competitiveness and failing fiscal policies are the order of the day in Mexico, and the crisis in oil production only serves to compound these problems.¶ What is less discussed is that the crisis caused by the fall in oil production in Mexico has consequences that go far beyond PEMEX and the Mexican government. The fall in oil production is accelerating, which means that Mexico will become a net importer of oil earlier than most people had predicted. This has far-reaching consequences for PEMEX’s financial health and for government revenues, but also for the Mexican economy and jobs. Mexico is more likely to need to borrow from global financial markets, is more likely to produce ever more migrants who leave the country to seek out opportunities in the United States, and young men in particular who face a pessimistic economic future are ever more likely to turn to the narcotics industry as an alternative.¶ These problems will impact upon the United States. First the dependable source of oil that has been Mexico since the 1970s will no longer be there. Luckily other countries in the hemisphere (namely Canada and Brazil) are ready to replace Mexican barrels with their own. Other problems will prove more intractable and pose longer term challenges to the US. The failure on the part of the Mexican economy to produce jobs and the consequent rise in migration and the drugs trade will have immediate and long-lasting effects on the US. It is time therefore to stop seeing the problems in Mexican oil as only Mexican in nature; and common solutions must be sought to assuage the symptoms that arise. ¶ Now more than ever it is imperative that Mexico’s development is seen as a North American rather than a Mexican challenge. The hundreds of millions of dollars that are being spent on the Merida Initiative are but only part of the solution. Greater spending on infrastructure, on the agricultural sector, on alternative, renewable sources of energy and on improving Mexico’s overall competitiveness will benefit not only Mexico, but also the United States at the local, state and national levels. Border states are anxious to see a reduction in violence that increasingly spills over to their side of the Rio Bravo, California desperately needs new sources of renewable energy that can readily be found (given the right level of investment) in Baja California, and across the US there is a desire to see less illegal immigration. An even more important factor to consider is the interdependence of the US economy with Mexico. Economic losses in Mexico mean losses for American investors; the failure of Mexican firms means interruptions in the production chains that form the heart of NAFTA; and political and economic insecurity in Mexico impacts negatively on US economic growth.
|
Wood, Mexico Institute Director at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 9 (Duncan Wood, Office of the William E. Simon Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Cantarell, Mexico's Economy and Interdependence,” November 30th, 2009. http://csis.org/blog/cantarell-mexicos-economy-and-interdependence)
|
Underinvestment, complacency and poor management of the sector, combined with a refusal on the part of the political elite to embrace the prospect of private or foreign investment in PEMEX has meant that the country has failed to develop other oil fields and is unable to reach the vast majority of its remaining reserves in the deep waters of the Gulf Public insecurity, unacceptable levels of poverty, a lack of infrastructure, low competitiveness and failing fiscal policies are the order of the day in Mexico, and the crisis in oil production only serves to compound these problems.¶ the crisis caused by the fall in oil production has consequences that go far beyond PEMEX and the Mexican government The fall in oil production is accelerating, which means that Mexico will become a net importer of oil earlier than most people had predicted. This has far-reaching consequences for PEMEX’s financial health and for government revenues, but also for the Mexican economy and jobs. Mexico is more likely to need to borrow from global financial markets, is more likely to produce ever more migrants who leave the country to seek out opportunities in the United States, young men who face a pessimistic economic future are ever more likely to turn to the narcotics industry The failure on the part of the Mexican economy to produce jobs and the consequent rise in migration and the drugs trade will have immediate and long-lasting effects on the US. it is imperative that Mexico’s development is seen as a North American rather than a Mexican challenge Border states are anxious to see a reduction in violence that increasingly spills over An even more important factor to consider is the interdependence of the US economy with Mexico. Economic losses in Mexico mean losses for American investors; the failure of Mexican firms means interruptions in the production chains that form the heart of NAFTA; and political and economic insecurity in Mexico impacts negatively on US economic growth
|
Energy reforms are key to reverse declining production that kills the US economy, destabilizes Mexico and spills over regionally
| 3,403 | 128 | 1,990 | 568 | 19 | 328 | 0.033451 | 0.577465 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,543 |
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
|
Rochlin, Okanagan political science professor, 94, (James Rochlin, ““Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America,” p. 130-131)
|
the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war.
|
Regional instability goes nuclear
| 1,560 | 33 | 668 | 239 | 4 | 103 | 0.016736 | 0.430962 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,544 |
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
|
Royal, Director Cooperative Threat Reduction DOD, 10’ (Jedediah, Director Cooperative Threat Reduction DOD, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises” in ‘Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives’ ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
|
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power if the expectations of future trade decline particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources the likelihood for conflict increases as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level Hess find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict particularly during periods of economic downturn The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism ). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict
|
Economic decline causes war – studies prove
| 4,444 | 43 | 2,024 | 651 | 7 | 301 | 0.010753 | 0.462366 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,545 |
Enrique Peña Nieto, the Mexican president, vowed to press ahead with what he claimed would be a “transformational” reform of Pemex, the state-owned oil monopoly, a controversial move widely expected to unleash billions of dollars of foreign investment.
|
Rathbone, Financial Times Latin American editor, 6/17/13 — [John Paul Rathbone, Financial Time's Latin American editor, worked as an economist and a journalist at the World Bank, graduate of Oxford and Columbia Universities, 2013 (“Peña Nieto pledges transformational reform of Pemex,” The Financial Times, Global Economy, 6-17-13, Available Online at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e4d99f60-d767-11e2-8279-00144feab7de.html#axzz2XY74rQ8A, accessed on June 28, 2013)][SP]
|
Nieto vowed to press ahead with what he claimed would be a “transformational” reform of Pemex a controversial move
|
Energy reform will pass only with strong Nieto support
| 252 | 54 | 114 | 38 | 9 | 19 | 0.236842 | 0.5 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,546 |
MEXICO CITY -- In an important test of President Enrique Peña Nieto’s sway over resistant factions of his party, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party has changed its bylaws to clear the way for major reform of the gigantic national oil company.
|
Wilkinson, Mexico City bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, 6/26/13 [Tracy, March 04, 2013, LA Times, “Mexico president wins key party vote on reform of national oil company”, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/04/world/la-fg-wn-mexico-pri-oil-pemex-20130304, accessed: 6/26/13, ML]
|
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party has changed its bylaws to clear the way for major reform of the gigantic national oil company.
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PRI support boosts prospects for passage
| 252 | 40 | 139 | 41 | 6 | 22 | 0.146341 | 0.536585 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,547 |
Pena Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, will not have a majority in either the lower house of Congress or the Senate, the latest projections show, meaning he will have to negotiate with opposition parties on reforms.
|
Reuters 12 (Noe Torres and Jean Arce, 7/6/12, Reuters, “Mexico's Pena Nieto 'likely' to win tax reform by end-2013,” http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/06/uk-mexico-reforms-idUKBRE8650PL20120706?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews, Accessed 6/30/13, JC)
|
Nieto's PRI, will not have a majority in Congress meaning he will have to negotiate with opposition parties on reforms.
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Nieto can pass fiscal reform—needed to jump-start economy
| 232 | 57 | 119 | 37 | 8 | 20 | 0.216216 | 0.540541 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,548 |
Mexico's main opposition parties said on Tuesday they would resume talks on sweeping reforms with the government, lifting a cloud over a cross-party pact that is the axis of President Enrique Pena Nieto's economic agenda.
|
Reuters 5/7/13 (Alexandra Alper and Dave Graham, 5/7/13, Reuters, “Mexico opposition revives economic reform pact,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-mexico-reforms-idUSBRE94612K20130507?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563, Accessed 6/30/13, JC)
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Mexico's main opposition parties said they would resume talks on sweeping reforms with lifting a cloud over a cross-party pact that is the axis of Nieto's economic agenda.
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Economic reform will pass now—opposition parties agreed to preserve the Pact for Mexico
| 221 | 87 | 171 | 35 | 13 | 28 | 0.371429 | 0.8 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,549 |
He explained that over the coming months, the authorities will also promote other major structural reforms in financial issues, to ensure higher level of credit to small and medium enterprises; energy reform to increase production capacity and power generation in our country, and a tax reform to expand the capacity of the Mexican state precisely to raise the standard of living among Mexicans, and especially, to increase productivity and competitiveness in relation to the rest of the world.
The Mexican president pointed out that today’s climate of pluralism and democracy in Mexico, "Has enabled the agreement between the government and the various political forces in the country to sign a Pact for Mexico as we have called it, which means an agreement to promote reforms and structural changes that will speed up the country’s growth and development."
He declared that in an increasingly interconnected world, integration between blocs of nations is essential to building a promising future for the world. "With unity and responsibility we can meet the challenges but, above all, take advantage of opportunities that arise in our time, in the 21st century."
|
DiploNews 4/7/13 (4/7/13, DiploNews, “Our goal is to unlock Mexico's economic potential, says President Nieto,” http://www.diplonews.com/feeds/free/7_April_2013_200.php, Accessed 7/1/13, JC)
|
over the coming months, the authorities will also promote tax reform to raise the standard of living and increase productivity and competitiveness
The Mexican president pointed out that today’s climate of pluralism and democracy in Mexico, "Has enabled the agreement between the government and the various political forces in the country to sign a Pact for Mexico which means an agreement to promote reforms and structural changes that will speed up the country’s growth and development."
With unity we can meet challenges but take advantage of opportunities
|
Tax reforms will pass now—democratic politics
| 1,164 | 45 | 560 | 185 | 6 | 87 | 0.032432 | 0.47027 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,550 |
The private sector really wants deepwater reform that would allow private companies to work alongside PEMEX, but this would require a change in Mexico's Constitution. With between 30 to 50 billion barrels of reserves left, deepwater is the real prize, Wood noted.
|
Boman, Senior Editor at Rigzone.com, 13 [Karen May 27, 2013, “Will The Promise of Mexican Energy Reform Be Realized?”, http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/126669/Will_The_Promise_of_Mexican_Energy_Reform_Be_Realized/?all=HG2, accessed: 6/26/13, ML]
|
The private sector really wants deepwater reform that would allow private companies to work alongside PEMEX, but this would require a change in Mexico's Constitution.
|
Partial reform will pass – won’t trigger the link
| 263 | 49 | 166 | 42 | 9 | 25 | 0.214286 | 0.595238 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,551 |
For Peña Nieto, who began his six-year term in December, opening up the energy industry is the most ambitious task on a hefty to-do list — which includes fixing the education system, telecommunications and tax collection, areas viewed as major hurdles to Mexico’s development into a more modern, democratic, middle-class society.
|
Washington Post 5/7/13 (Nick Miroff and William Booth, 5/7/13, Washington Post, “To power Mexico forward, Peña Nieto looks to energy reform,”http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/to-power-mexico-forward-pena-nieto-looks-to-energy-reform/2013/05/07/0bbaf11a-a93c-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.html?wprss=rss_world_twpstaffonly&Post+generic=%3Ftid%3Dsm_twitter_washingtonpost, Accessed 6/30/13, JC)
|
For Nieto opening up the energy industry is the most ambitious task on a hefty to-do list
|
Nieto is only engaging in smaller reforms—focus on modernization over privatization
| 329 | 83 | 89 | 51 | 11 | 17 | 0.215686 | 0.333333 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
|
Gonzaga (GDI)
|
Disadvantages
|
2013
|
1,552 |
While fiscal reforms have broad-based support, energy reforms promise a much livelier debate. Duncan Wood, the director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, called energy reform the "mother of all reforms" because of its enormous potential for job creation and economic growth. Partly because of its importance, the opening of Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Mexico's state owned hydrocarbons company, to private investment is a polarizing issue.
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Siskind, Research analyst, 13 [Cory, 6/25/13, “Mexico Plays the Waiting Game on Big Reforms” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cory-siskind/mexico-plays-the-waiting-_b_3493542.html 6/27/13 EYS
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energy reforms promise a much livelier debate. Wood, the director of the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center called energy reform the "mother of all reforms" because of its enormous potential for job creation and economic growth. the opening of PEMEX to private investment is a polarizing issue.
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Only the plan triggers the link – the tone set in the special session determines the rest of the agenda
| 487 | 103 | 297 | 71 | 20 | 48 | 0.28169 | 0.676056 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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1,553 |
President Enrique Pena Nieto's pledge to allow more private capital into Pemex, a symbol of Mexican self-sufficiency, is one of the most contentious issues on his legislative agenda, even though he has yet to reveal many details of his plan.
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Graham, staff writer at Reuters, 6/25/13 [Dave, June 25, “Mexico's main leftist party proposes path to oil reform”, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/mexico-pemex-idUSL2N0F124F20130626, accessed: 6/26/13, ML]
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Nieto's pledge to allow more private capital into Pemex is one of the most contentious issues on his legislative agenda
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The aff triggers constitutional reform which sparks massive backlash
| 241 | 68 | 119 | 40 | 9 | 20 | 0.225 | 0.5 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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“This administration is now faced with the opportunity to either fully reform the sector by amending the constitution or, like previous administrations, make incremental changes,” Negroponte told The Financialist.
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The Financialist 4/12/13 (Mark Pabst, 4/12/13, The Financialist, “Saving Mexico’s Golden Goose,”http://www.thefinancialist.com/saving-mexicos-golden-goose-pemex-mexico-oil/, Accessed 7/1/13, JC)
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This administration is faced with the opportunity to either fully reform the sector by amending the constitution or make incremental changes
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Nieto will push for gradual changes—doesn’t require constitutional changes
| 213 | 74 | 140 | 29 | 9 | 21 | 0.310345 | 0.724138 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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The second challenge is reviving a sluggish economy. Peña Nieto is proposing an ambitious energy reform that will attract more foreign direct investment (FDI), but will not run afoul of Mexico’s constitutional prohibition against selling the nation’s natural resources to foreigners. Peña Nieto has set an ambitious goal of achieving a 6 percent annual growth rate by the conclusion of his term in 2018, and he is rightfully convinced that such growth and the resulting job creation is the only way to reduce poverty in a sustainable manner.
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America’s Quarterly 12 ( Rafael Fernandez de Castro and Michael Layton, 11/30/12, America’s Quarterly, “An Opportunity for Mexico’s New President, Enrique Peña Nieto,” http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/opportunity-mexico%E2%80%99s-new-president-enrique-pe%C3%B1a-nieto, Accessed 6/30/13, JC)
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Nieto is proposing an ambitious energy reform that will attract more foreign direct investment but will not run afoul of Mexico’s constitutional prohibition against selling the nation’s natural resources to foreigners Nieto has set an ambitious goal of achieving a 6 percent annual growth rate by the conclusion of his term in 2018
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Constitutional reform isn’t needed—Nieto can get foreign direct investment on energy
| 541 | 84 | 331 | 88 | 11 | 53 | 0.125 | 0.602273 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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Discussions among policy makers are still in preliminary stages, with a proposal likely months away. One idea under discussion is to follow a model used elsewhere, in which the state arranges with private companies to extract the oil and pays them market prices minus hefty royalties that reflect the country's continued ownership of the asset, several people with knowledge of the talks said.
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Iliff & Montes, The Wall Street Journal, Correspondents 3-19-13 [Laurence Iliff, Juan Montes, 3-19-13, The Wall Street Journal, “Oil Industry Is Wary as Mexico Considers Opening Its Waters” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324323904578366502344906718.html, accessed 7-01-13 AMS]
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the state arranges with private companies to extract the oil and pays them market prices minus hefty royalties that reflect the country's continued ownership of the asset
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Constitution change required for joint ventures
| 393 | 48 | 170 | 63 | 6 | 27 | 0.095238 | 0.428571 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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During the era of the pre-democratic PRI in Mexico there existed a long history of national political pacts. Those pacts typically were between the PRI dominated executive branch and the two most influential actors, labor unions and business organizations. In the 1990s, at the highpoint of the democratic transition, the PRI for the first time in its history lost its ability to ensure a two-thirds vote in the legislative branch, preventing it from accomplishing constitutional changes. Consequently, the PRI began negotiating with the opposition; in exchange for support on some legislative initiatives, it agreed to electoral legislation which paved the way for the 2000 electoral victory of PAN.
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Camp, Claremont McKenna College professor and Mexico Institute advisor, 12 (Roderick Ai, 12/2/12, “Pacto Por Mexico: The Expert Take,” http://mexicoinstitute.wordpress.com/2012/12/12/an-experts-take-pacto-de-mexico-op-ed/, Accessed 6/27/13, JC)
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During the era of the pre-democratic PRI there existed a long history of national political pacts pacts typically were between the PRI dominated executive branch and the two most influential actors the PRI for the first time in its history lost its ability to ensure a two-thirds vote preventing it from accomplishing constitutional changes the PRI began negotiating with the opposition; in exchange for support on some legislative initiatives, it agreed to electoral legislation
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Pact of Mexico is key to fiscal reform
| 700 | 38 | 479 | 108 | 8 | 74 | 0.074074 | 0.685185 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Thus far we can identify two central themes to the Mexican government’s strategy that stand out above all the rest. The first of these is coordination. The government has identified that one of the major failings of the Calderon administration was its failure to properly and adequately coordinate the actions of the diverse security agencies in Mexico. That is why, upon taking office, President Peña Nieto took the immediate step of centralizing security decision-making power into the Secretaria de Gobernacion(Interior Ministry), under the leadership of Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, bringing the office of Public Security under his purview. But the coordinating tendency is not limited to structural changes in the administration. Much higher levels of coordination between all government ministries, and between the Federal and State governments has emerged as a central feature of this government. The coordinating theme is to be seen most clearly in the operation of the Pacto por Mexico, a coordinating mechanism
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Wood, Mexico Institute, 13 (Dr. Duncan Wood, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Security Cooperation in Mexico: Examining the Next Steps in the U.S.-Mexico Security Relationship” http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wood_Testimony.pdf accessed 6-25-13 KR)
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The government has identified that one of the major failings of the Calderon administration was its failure to properly and adequately coordinate the actions of the diverse security agencies in Mexico. That is why, upon taking office, President Peña Nieto took the immediate step of centralizing security decision-making power into the Secretaria de Gobernacion(Interior Ministry), under the leadership of Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, bringing the office of Public Security under his purview Much higher levels of coordination between all government ministries, and between the Federal and State governments has emerged as a central feature of this government. The coordinating theme is to be seen most clearly in the operation of the Pacto por Mexico, a coordinating mechanism
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Pacto por Mexico is coordinated now, ability to pass 34 proposals prove
| 1,018 | 71 | 775 | 156 | 12 | 117 | 0.076923 | 0.75 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Mexico's main opposition conservatives are on track to retain the key electoral bastion of Baja California next month, according to a poll released on Friday, in a vote that could strengthen a fragile cross-party alliance built by President Enrique Pena Nieto to re-energize the economy.
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Reuters 6/28/13 (Miguel Gutierrez, 6/28/13, Reuters, “In key Mexican state, opposition leads in poll for July vote,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/28/mexico-election-idUSL2N0F410D20130628, Accessed 7/1/13, JC)
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Mexico's main opposition conservatives are on track to retain the key electoral bastion of Baja California in a vote that could strengthen a fragile cross-party alliance built by Nieto to re-energize the economy.
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the election stabilizes the pact by strengthening the PRI’s allies in the PAN
| 287 | 77 | 212 | 45 | 13 | 33 | 0.288889 | 0.733333 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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With respect to energy and tax reform, the PRI National Assembly has already approved Peña Nieto’s proposals. Tax reforms include implementing VATs on food and medicine, in order to acquire the “necessary funds to pay for infrastructure and social development programmes.” [17] Energy reform, on the other hand, primarily pertains to opening up Pemex—Mexico’s state-owned oil company—to private investment, which according to the president “will be an engine for investment and development.” [18] PAN and PRD spokesmen Luis Alberto Villarreal and Silvano Aureoles, respectively, rejected the idea that the Pacto por México was in jeopardy as a result of these proposals. [19] Both sides have yet to take a clear position on these issues, although it appears as though they are willing to discuss them in greater detail in order to make the necessary changes. It’s important to highlight, however, that some in the PRD are not on board with Peña Nieto’s proposals. The PRD has been highly fragmented, and political leaders within the party, such as Carlos Reyes Gamiz, have never fully agreed with the reforms as outlined in the Pacto por México. In regards to Peña Nieto’s most recent tax and energy proposals, Gamiz stated that pact is almost fully broken. [20]
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Bolton, Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Fellow, 13[Gene, MARCH 12, 2013 “Off and Running — Peña Nieto’s Domestic Agenda” http://www.coha.org/21851/ 6/27/13 EYS]
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With respect to energy and tax reform, the PRI National Assembly has already approved Peña Nieto’s proposals. Tax reforms include implementing VATs on food and medicine, in order to acquire the “necessary funds to pay for infrastructure and social development programmes. ] Energy reform, on the other hand, primarily pertains to opening up Pemex to private investment, which according to the president “will be an engine for investment and development.” PAN and PRD have yet to take a clear position on these issues, although it appears as though they are willing to discuss them in greater detail in order to make the necessary changes however, some in the PRD are not on board with Peña Nieto’s proposals. The PRD has been highly fragmented, and political leaders within the party, such as Carlos Reyes Gamiz, have never fully agreed with the reforms Gamiz stated that pact is almost fully broken. [20]
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Reaching across the aisle is key to keeping the Pact together – it’s already on the brink
| 1,262 | 89 | 905 | 204 | 17 | 150 | 0.083333 | 0.735294 |
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Divisions within Mexico's main conservative opposition party have erupted into a bitter public dispute that threatens to undermine the reform agenda of President Enrique Pena Nieto.
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Reuters 5/20/13 (Dave Graham and Miguel Gutierrez, 5/20/13, “Mexican opposition dispute goes public, threatening reforms,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-mexico-reforms-idUSBRE94J0M820130520, Accessed 6/27/13, JC)
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Divisions within Mexico's main conservative opposition party have erupted into a bitter public dispute that threatens to undermine the reform agenda of Nieto.
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Pact of Mexico fragile—a cause for opposition could collapse the reform agenda
| 181 | 78 | 158 | 26 | 12 | 23 | 0.461538 | 0.884615 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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Fixing the company, Petroleos de Mexico, has become a top priority for Mexico's new president, Enrique Peña Nieto. With an overhaul plan expected by late summer, U.S. and other global energy companies are waiting to see whether Mexico will once more give outsiders a crack at the country's hydrocarbon treasures, including the massive, virtually untapped beds of shale gas south of the Texas border.
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Miroff, Washington Post correspondent, and Booth, Mexico bureau chief, 13 [Nick and William, 5/7/13, “Peña Nieto looks to energy reform to power Mexico forward”, Washington Post, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Pena-Nieto-looks-to-energy-reform-to-power-Mexico-forward_Tuesday-May-07-2013, accessed:7/1/13, ML]
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Fixing Petroleos de Mexico has become a top priority U.S. and other global energy companies are waiting to see whether Mexico will once more give outsiders a crack at the country's hydrocarbon treasures
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Reform’s key to more gas exports
| 399 | 32 | 202 | 64 | 6 | 33 | 0.09375 | 0.515625 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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This week, President Obama is off to Mexico and Costa Rica for a three-day trip starting Thursday. A White House statement said that the trip is ”is an important opportunity to reinforce the deep cultural, familial and economic ties that so many Americans share with Mexico and Central America.” Obama plans to meet with Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto to discuss economic and trade issues. His last visit to Mexico was in June, for the G-20 summit in Los Cabos.
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Reyes, NBC, 4-29-13 (Raul, “Opinion: President Obama has the chance to improve US/Mexico relations,” http://nbclatino.com/2013/04/29/opinion-president-obama-has-the-chance-to-improve-usmexico-relations/, accessed- 6-30-13, RRR)
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This week Obama is off to Mexico for a three-day trip A White House statement said that the trip is ”is an important opportunity to reinforce the deep tie that so many Americans share with Mexico Obama plans to meet with Nieto to discuss economic and trade issues.
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Foreign investment in the energy sector is key to solve the drug war
| 468 | 69 | 264 | 80 | 13 | 48 | 0.1625 | 0.6 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Mexican central bank Governor Agustin Carstens said that the benefits of a fiscal overhaul raising taxes, as Mexico’s incoming president is expected to propose, would outweigh any short-term inflation increase.
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Cattan & Martin, reporter for Bloomberg News, 12 [Nacha and Eric, 11/2/12, “Tax Revamp Under Pena Nieto Outweighs CPI Impact, Carstens Says”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-06/tax-revamp-under-pena-nieto-outweighs-cpi-impact-carstens-says.html, accessed:6/30/13, ML]
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the benefits of a fiscal overhaul raising taxes, as Mexico’s incoming president is expected to propose, would outweigh any short-term inflation
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Tax reform key to the economy
| 210 | 30 | 143 | 30 | 6 | 21 | 0.2 | 0.7 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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2013
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All year long, thousands of foreign investors have nervously watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets as the Clinton administration and congressional leaders debated the pros and cons of bailing out a battered currency. With the exception of 1982 - when Mexico defaulted on its foreign debt and a handful of giant New York banks worried they would lose billions of dollars in loans - few people abroad ever cared about a weak peso. But now it’s different, experts say. This time, the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. “It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy,” said economist Victor Lopez Villafane of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. “I hate to say it, but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse” not seen since the Great Depression, said Dr. Lopez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican economy and the economies of some Asian and Latin American countries. “That’s why it’s in the best interests of the United States and the industrialized world to help Mexico weather its economic crisis,” he said. The crisis began last December when the Mexican government devalued the currency. Last March, after weeks of debate, President Clinton, the International Monetary Fund and a handful of other countries and international agencies put together a $ 53 billion rescue package for Mexico. But despite the help - $ 20 billion in guarantee loans from the United States - Mexico’s financial markets have been volatile for most of the year. The peso is now trading at about 7.70 to the dollar, after falling to an all-time low of 8.30 to the dollar Nov. 9. The road has been bumpy, and that has made many - particularly U.S. investors - nervous. No country understands better the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the United States, said Jorge Gonzalez Davila, an economist at Trinity University in San Antonio. “Despite the rhetoric that you hear in Washington, I think that most people agree - even those who oppose any aid to Mexico - that when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold,” Mr. Gonzalez said. “That’s why nowadays any talk of aid to Mexico or trade with Mexico gets a lot of attention,” he said. Most economists, analysts and business leaders on both sides of the border agree that the biggest impact abroad of a prolonged Mexican fiscal crisis may be on the U.S. economy, especially in Texas and in cities bordering Mexico.
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Rangel fellow at the Monterrey Bureau 95 (Enrique Rangel, “Pressure on the Peso,” November 28th, 1995, from The Dallas Morning News, lexis)
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foreign investors have nervously watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets few people abroad ever cared about a weak peso. But now it’s different the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse That’s why it’s in the best interests of the United States and the industrialized world to help Mexico weather its economic crisis,” No country understands better the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the United States, Despite the rhetoric that you hear in Washington, I think that most people agree - even those who oppose any aid to Mexico - that when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold, That’s why nowadays any talk of aid to Mexico or trade with Mexico gets a lot of attention,
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Mexican economic crisis tanks the global economy
| 2,783 | 48 | 1,183 | 468 | 7 | 199 | 0.014957 | 0.425214 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico. As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence. Even if the Mexican government eventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of human rights. A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a “perfect storm” south of the border. If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond. In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico. There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency. In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole. Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States. To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive. It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome. Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.
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Barnes, Institute for Public Policy Rice University, 11 – (4/29/11, Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf)
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a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence. period of feeble economic growth could create a “perfect storm” south of the border. If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.
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Mexican economic collapse causes instability
| 1,492 | 44 | 381 | 241 | 5 | 60 | 0.020747 | 0.248963 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.
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Zhang, Carnegie Endowment Researcher, and Shi, Columbia University, 11’ (Yuhan, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin, Columbia University, consultant for the Eurasia Group and World Bank, January 22, "America's Decline: A Harbinger of Conflict and Rivalry", http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)jn
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no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. wars may be harder to avoid As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders major powers would compete for supremacy A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge
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U.S. Heg key to promote peace and prevent power wars
| 3,524 | 52 | 1,020 | 543 | 10 | 158 | 0.018416 | 0.290976 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Economists reckon the changes – from tougher competition policy to opening up the country’s almost hermetic energy sector – could boost growth to 6 per cent a year.
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Rathbone, FT's Latin American editor, 13 [John Paul, Financial Times, 3/20/13, “Mexico’s reform plan lifts hopes for greater prosperity”, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a959b3fe-8a4f-11e2-bf79-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Xl84isWW, accessed: 6/30/13, ML]
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Economists reckon the changes could boost growth to 6 per cent a year.
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Nieto’s economic reforms are key to growth
| 164 | 43 | 70 | 28 | 7 | 13 | 0.25 | 0.464286 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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1,569 |
Nonetheless, hopes that Mr Peña Nieto and his centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will push them through are higher than they have been for a quarter century.
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Rathborne, Financial Times, 3-20-13 (John-Paul, Financial Times, Mexico’s reform plan lifts hopes for greater prosperity, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a959b3fe-8a4f-11e2-bf79-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XizM05rl, Accessed 7-1-13, RRR)
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hopes that Nieto and PRI will push them through are higher than they have been for a quarter century.
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The Pact for Mexico is key to keep Mexico from becoming a failed state
| 171 | 70 | 101 | 27 | 14 | 19 | 0.518519 | 0.703704 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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2013
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The dependence on oil revenues is regularly cited as an obstacle to Mexico's efforts to improve its credit rating. The fact that no party has had a majority in Congress for 15 years has stood in the way of a far-reaching tax reform.¶ Pena Nieto's planned tax reform is tricky because it could involve applying value added tax (VAT) to food and medicine for the first time. That could risk opposition inside the PRI since it would hit the poor, who make up roughly half of Mexico's population.
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Chicago Tribune 12 (Dave Graham and Ana Isabel Martinez, “UPDATE 2-INTERVIEW-Mexican president confident of key reforms in 2013,” Chicago Tribune sourced from Reuters, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-11/news/sns-rt-mexico-penanieto-update-2-pix-tvl1e8nb0dm-20121210_1_pena-nieto-mexican-president-enrique-reforms, Accessed 7/1/13, JC)
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The fact that no party has had a majority in Congress for 15 years has stood in the way of a far-reaching tax reform Nieto's planned tax reform is tricky because it could involve applying value added tax to food and medicine That could risk opposition inside the PRI since it would hit the poor, who make up half of Mexico's population.
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Tax reforms won’t pass—PRI will oppose because they target key voters
| 492 | 69 | 336 | 88 | 11 | 62 | 0.125 | 0.704545 |
Mexican Politics Disadvantage - Gonzaga 2013.html5
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Disadvantages
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2013
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Mexico, Jun 21 (Prensa Latina) Federal District Head of Government Miguel Angel Mancera called backward movement the decision to privatize Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and reiterated his opposition to change the article 27 of the Constitution, the newspaper La Jornada said today.
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Prensa Latina 13 [June 21, “Privatizing PEMEX Called Backward Step”, http://www.plenglish.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1537331&Itemid=1, accessed: 6/26/13, ML]
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Mancera called backward movement the decision to privatize PEMEX and reiterated his opposition to change the article 27 of the Constitution
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Mexico would never change their constitution and private companies could never meet their demands
| 279 | 97 | 139 | 41 | 14 | 21 | 0.341463 | 0.512195 |
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Organized by the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution, or PRD, the rally took place on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the nationalization of the country's oil industry, the historical pivot that gave birth to state oil monopoly Pemex.
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Garcia, Reuters Reporter, 13 [David Alire, studied at Harvard University, March 17, “Mexico's leftist opposition rallies against energy reforms”, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/mexico-energy-reform-idUSL1N0CA02Q20130318, accessed:6/27/13, ML]
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Organized by the the PRD the rally took place on the 75th anniversary of the nationalization
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PRD opposes reform – means it won’t pass
| 244 | 40 | 92 | 41 | 8 | 16 | 0.195122 | 0.390244 |
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Peña Nieto says his administration will send the energy bill to Congress by September, when regular sessions resume. He’s relying on the Pact for Mexico, an alliance of the country’s top three political parties, which have vowed to work together to achieve major reforms. Peña Nieto’s own party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), doesn’t have enough votes on its own for a constitutional amendment.
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Bloomberg Businessweek 6/20/13 (Eric Martin, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, and Helder Marinho; “Mexico's President Pushes Reforms for State Oil Company Pemex,” http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-20/mexicos-president-pushes-reforms-for-state-oil-company-pemex, Accessed 6/27/13, JC)
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Nieto relying on the Pact for Mexico, an alliance of the country’s top three political parties, which have vowed to work together to achieve major reforms. the PRI), doesn’t have enough votes on its own for a constitutional amendment.
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Collapse of Pact of Mexico inevitable—electoral reform, corruption, and investor confidence cause breakdown
| 409 | 108 | 234 | 64 | 13 | 39 | 0.203125 | 0.609375 |
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Now the president is setting his sights on another major goal: An overhaul of the energy sector and state-run Petróleos Mexicanos, one of the world's biggest oil firms, whose output is slipping. He proposes to change the law to attract foreign investors—an about-face for a country that once nationalized its oil and barred foreign participation by constitutional amendment.
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WSJ 3/12/13 (Nicholas Casey, 3/12/13, Wall Street Journal, “Mexico Leader's Next Push Is to Tackle Energy,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323826704578356641370976554.html, Accessed 7/1/13, JC)
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the president is setting his sights on An overhaul of the energy sector He proposes to attract foreign investors by constitutional amendment.
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Nieto will push for constitutional amendment in the status quo—proves aff doesn’t trigger the link
| 374 | 98 | 141 | 58 | 15 | 22 | 0.258621 | 0.37931 |
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Jesus Zambrano, chairman of the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), said there could be no talks on these reforms until the government had taken clear steps to punish those responsible for a vote-buying scandal in the Gulf state of Veracruz that was exposed this month.
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Graham, Senior Correspondent at Reuters, and Martinez, Reuters reporter, 13 [Dave and Ana Isabel, April 30, “No talks on key Mexico reforms until spat resolved: opposition”, Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-mexico-reforms-opposition-idUSBRE93T15L20130430, accessed: 6/27/13, ML]
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Zambrano chairman of the PRD said there could be no talks on these reforms until the government had taken clear steps to punish those responsible for a vote-buying scandal in Veracruz
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Veracruz corruption incident triggers the DA
| 286 | 44 | 183 | 47 | 6 | 31 | 0.12766 | 0.659574 |
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Energy: The Mexican constitution reserves ownership of petroleum and other hydrocarbon reserves for the Mexican state. The energy reform package approved by the Mexican Congress in October 2008 made some progress but did not address this prohibition, and oil and gas exploration and production efforts remain under the sole purview of Pemex, Mexico's petroleum parastatal. President Pena Nieto plans to introduce a comprehensive energy reform to address these shortcomings. Many analysts believe the energy reform proposals outlined in the Pact will require constitutional amendments. While Pemex had previously contracted with foreign companies to perform specific tasks such as drilling wells, platform construction or equipment maintenance on a fee-for-service basis, the 2008 reform allowed some private participation in exploration and production of oil fields through so-called “integrated service contracts” (ISCs). In 2011, Pemex successfully completed its first bidding process for three integrated contracts for mature oil fields in Southwest Mexico. In 2012, Pemex announced its second round of ISCs. The list of companies included major oil corporations such as Chevron, Schlumberger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes. The third round of integrated service contracts is now in process, which will include the Chicontepec field. For most of the 20th century, Mexico figured among the world’s largest oil producers and has been a major exporter for much of that time. Currently, however, Mexico is facing the prospect of becoming a net importer of petroleum within a decade, according to the Energy Information Agency (EIA).
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Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 13 [February 2013, “2013 Investment Climate Statement – Mexico” http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204693.htm, accessed, 7-01-13 AMS]
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The Mexican constitution reserves ownership of petroleum and other hydrocarbon reserves for the Mexican state. While Pemex had previously contracted with foreign companies to perform specific tasks such as drilling wells, platform construction or equipment maintenance on a fee-for-service basis, the 2008 reform allowed some private participation in exploration and production of oil fields through so-called “integrated service contracts In 2011, Pemex successfully completed its first bidding process for three integrated contracts for mature oil fields in Southwest Mexico In 2012, Pemex announced its second round The list of companies included major oil corporations such as Chevron, Schlumberger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes.
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Empirically denied – Integrated service contracts avoids constitution change
| 1,630 | 76 | 733 | 240 | 9 | 102 | 0.0375 | 0.425 |
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But plenty more skirmishes await as the youthful Pena Nieto, 46, faces a showdown with traditionalists in his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), commonly dubbed "dinosaurs."
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Graham, Reuters Mexico, 12 [Dave, 10/2/12 “Mexican labor reform signals battles ahead for Pena Nieto” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/02/us-mexico-penanieto-idUSBRE89112B20121002, date accessed 6/27/13 IGM]
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Nieto faces a showdown with traditionalists in his Institutional Revolutionary Party
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Nieto push isn’t key – legislative compromises
| 179 | 46 | 84 | 25 | 7 | 11 | 0.28 | 0.44 |
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The 2012 presidential race generated a surprising amount of anti-PRI sentiment, particularly among young people. Although leftist leader Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) is commonly blamed for having ignited this strong sentiment, it cannot be denied that there already was a latent mistrust of the PRI among key sectors of the general population. The recent radicalization of the #YoSoy132 student movement as well as other nonconformist groups could take on bigger dimensions next year as the PRI attempts to pass politically delicate reforms. These groups are poised to join Lopez Obrador in his attempt to block key structural reforms such as energy liberalization and tax reform.
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Schtulmann, International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, 12 [Alejandro, 12/10/13, “Mexico: Five Key Political Risks in 2013” http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/12/mexico-five-key-political-risks-in-2013/#sthash.wqHRDjWo.dpuf date accessed 6/27/13 IGM]
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The 2012 presidential race generated a surprising amount of anti-PRI sentiment groups are poised to block key structural reforms such as energy liberalization and tax reform.
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Nieto push can’t overcome opposition – riots prove
| 686 | 50 | 174 | 106 | 8 | 26 | 0.075472 | 0.245283 |
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Gonzaga (GDI)
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Peña Nieto’s ascension represents a return of Mexico’s infamous Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the presidency. The PRI, which held a monopoly on presidential power from 1929–2000, faces a significant challenge in proving to the public that it is not longer the party of repressive governance and corruption. Inaugural party planners are also likely reticent to go the way of galas and grandstands because they are acutely aware that Peña Nieto’s win in July was hardly a landside victory. Mexico’s President-elect had the dubious honor of winning the presidency with an estimated 37% of the vote, with ballots divided among three fairly unpopular candidates. His win has since been tarnished by allegations of fraud and heavily contested by political rivals and student activists alike. However, and most importantly, the current transition in politics remains eclipsed by public concern for the drug war, which is viewed to be outside the control of any administration, regardless of political affiliation.
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Bove-LaMonica, US department of State, 12 (Daniella, 11/25/12, “Mexico Presidential Inaguration: New President Takes Office In Shadow of Drug War” http://www.policymic.com/articles/19923/mexico-presidential-inaguration-new-president-takes-office-in-shadow-of-drug-war, date accessed 6/27/13 IGM]
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The PRI faces a significant challenge in proving to the public that it is not longer the party of repressive governance and corruption Mexico’s President-elect had the dubious honor of winning the presidency with ballots divided among three fairly unpopular candidates. His win has since been tarnished by allegations of fraud and heavily contested by political rivals and student activists alike
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Fraud allegations make Nieto’s push ineffective
| 1,019 | 47 | 396 | 157 | 6 | 61 | 0.038217 | 0.388535 |
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After returning Mexico's former ruling party to power, Peña Nieto won international acclaim in his first five months by taking on some of the country's most powerful people. He jailed the head of the far-larger national teacher's union when she threatened to fight school reform. Then his push to open the telecommunications business provoked a multi-billion-dollar drop in the stock of the market-dominating phone companies owned by the world's richest man.
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Fox News 4/14/13 (Fox Latino, 4/14/13 “Mexico's Enrique Peña Nieto Faces Backlash Over Education Reform” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/04/14/mexico-enrique-pena-nieto-faces-backlash-over-education-reform/, date accessed 6/27/13 IGM]
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Nieto He jailed the head of the far-larger national teacher's union when she threatened to fight school reform Then his push to open the telecommunications business provoked a multi-billion-dollar drop in the stock of the market
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Nieto push causes backlash – telecoms and education prove
| 458 | 57 | 228 | 71 | 9 | 36 | 0.126761 | 0.507042 |
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Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.
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Ikenberry, professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton, 2011 (G. John, “A World of our Making” http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all)
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the character of liberal international order itself with or without American hegemonic leadership reinforces continuity rule-based order generates expanding realms of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy the current liberal international order does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance
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American leadership isn’t key—the international order is self-sustaining even if the U.S. declines
| 1,327 | 98 | 586 | 186 | 13 | 76 | 0.069892 | 0.408602 |
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The Attorney General’s Taxpayer Defense office (Prodecon) advised that out of 183 countries, Mexico takes seventh place overall in the amount of taxes that its citizens are expected to pay, and yet paradoxically, finds itself in 107th place in terms of the public’s ability to actually make these tax payments.
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Avilés, Staff writer at La jornada, 6/27/13 [Karina, La Jornada – Mexican news source, 6/27/13, “If Mexico's Fiscal Impunity Continues, "No Amount of Budget Reform Will Fix It", http://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2013/06/if-mexicos-fiscal-impunity-continues-no.html, accessed: 7/1/13, ML]
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Prodecon advised that out of 183 countries, Mexico takes seventh place overall in the amount of taxes that its citizens are expected to pay, and yet finds itself in 107th place in terms of the public’s ability to make these
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Tax reform will fail – fiscal impunity
| 310 | 38 | 223 | 50 | 7 | 40 | 0.14 | 0.8 |
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The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a stud yunder- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ,there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodesof economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).
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Miller, Professor of Administration at the University of Ottawa, 2000 (Morris, , Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000, ingenta connect)
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. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis According to a stud yunder- taken by Pei and Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ,there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodesof economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes an outbreak of violence
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Decline doesn’t cause war
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Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity.
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Chernus 1—Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder [“Fighting Terror in The National Insecurity State,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm]
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this newest war is sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity
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The affirmative represents an inherently unstable world needing innovative solutions to constant problems, which entrenches insecurity logic. The impact is a circular apocalyptic impulse that makes violence inevitable
| 619 | 217 | 370 | 113 | 28 | 63 | 0.247788 | 0.557522 |
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Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact reproduce a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the legitimating moral gloss of the ‘force for good’ rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and sparking long-term trends of rising crime rates, property destruction, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while providing profits for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the active defence of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions and processes of global governance does not work for billions of people or for planetary ecological systems. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed. 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a growing consensus that long-term stability, particularly the reduction of violent conflict, will require far greater political, economic and environmental equity on a global scale, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and transform the rules-based system into a more equitable form. A growing literature now argues that prevailing western approaches to understanding, managing and ameliorating global insecurity and its violent symptoms are inadequate and unsustainable. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate significant negative feedback, or ‘blowback’, from unintended outcomes that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘inevitably leads to a loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process with no end in sight. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generating new and potentially more dangerous risks deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatres of conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the erosion of civil liberties and the securitization of daily life. There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could generate more, and potentially more lethal, risks than it resolves or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, wholly counterproductive. 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.
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Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]
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the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for military operations of choice that are presented as essential to security of citizens but in fact reproduce a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. Afghanistan reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the legitimating moral gloss of the ‘force for good’ rhetoric. the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies the exercise of military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and sparking long-term trends of rising crime rates, property destruction, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while providing profits for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the active defence of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions and processes of global governance does not work for billions of people or for planetary ecological systems. the global political and economic structures and systems that keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed. there is a growing consensus that long-term stability, particularly the reduction of violent conflict, will require far greater political, economic and environmental equity on a global scale An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and transform the rules-based system into a more equitable form prevailing western approaches to understanding, managing and ameliorating global insecurity and its violent symptoms are inadequate and unsustainable. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate significant negative feedback, or ‘blowback’, from unintended outcomes that create more risk. the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘inevitably leads to a loss of control’. The danger is that risk management becomes a cyclical process with no end in sight. a ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generating new and potentially more dangerous risks deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. This risk is not limited to distant theatres of conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the erosion of civil liberties and the securitization of daily life. war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could generate more, and potentially more lethal, risks than it resolves or contains absolute security cannot be achieved the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, wholly counterproductive.
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This fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail and result in more violence.
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Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation.
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Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]
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Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques
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Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a critical approach to security. This is crucial to open space for emancipatory perspectives—our critique is mutually exclusive with the affirmative.
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Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectively of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.
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Crawford 2 [Neta Crawford, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Political Science at Boston University, Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002, p. 19-21]
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Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless actors, agree on what they are arguing about resolution of meta-arguments- regarding prescriptive norms); the way we know the world, ontology and epistemology); and the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics More common are meta-arguments over representations about how we out to understand a particular situation. “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. Defining and controlling representations and images affect whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case actors frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense Imitating not the effectively of events but their logical structure and meaning Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is reframed. Representation becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway
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Representations come before the policy effects of the plan—separating discursive and non-discursive practices is impossible. The representations used are vital to testing the truth claims of the affirmative. Even if fiat exists and policy is important, we could concede that because representations outweigh—they shape policy outcomes and ignoring them would prevent finding the best policy option.
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The existence of nuclear weapons has presented us with a requirement for 100 percent reliability that is found nowhere else in human affairs. Human civilization cannot survive even one global nuclear war. In this sense our endeavor to achieve lasting peace and common security must succeed. One might think that with this unprecedented challenge before us, there would be no effort spared in pursuit of the goal; that both governments and individual citizens would be unrelenting and single-minded in our common hour of need. Yet such is not the case. Our "national security" policies are confused and most certainly do not provide a feeling of security. Our stance toward peace is ambivalent and indecisive; in some circles the word "peace" has taken on connotations of weakness or of empathy with the Soviets. Much of the public seems disinterested, apathetic, and resigned or feels powerless to take effective action. Few people feel capable of thinking clearly about the issue; few have confidence in the ability of their leaders to guide them wisely toward a peaceful future. It is this situation that is addressed by this book. We who are alive today, and whose future world is so at risk, typically do not think clearly about peace. Even the definition of the word is not thought through when we speak or write about peace. That is why this book is written as a primer. It is sophisticated, but simple. The conviction that permeates the book is that peace and the general security of all are attainable goals. But to achieve them will require a whole system change: the combined efforts of vast numbers of people around the globe thinking clearly about the issues and committing themselves to achieving those critically important goals. Paradoxically, the need for a whole-system change does not necessarily make the goal appear less achievable—whole-system change has happened before and could happen again but rather indicates the kinds of actions that are likely to be effective. A brief summary will adequately serve to remind us of what is almost obvious: Peace is a whole-system issue. The production of weaponry was once carried on almost exclusively by governments for their own use; commerce in weapons between nations was considered highly unethical. The manufacture and sale of weapons now represents a significant segment of the U.S. economy, and the economic repercussions of a serious cutback in military production could be severe, at least temporarily. The continuing military buildup has a momentum all its own. Part of that momentum is the psychological inertia of conventional ways of thinking about international conflict. In the United States, the immediate point of conflict appears to center around the fear of communism and involves not just the NATO countries versus the Warsaw Pact countries; the rest of the world is part of the conflict as well. And the fear is not only that territory may be taken by force but also that noncapitalist ideas may gain hold in other parts of the world. (The wisest response to that threat would seem to be to make sure that the free enterprise system works so well for everybody that alternative systems have no appeal. Unfortunately, when we are fearful we do not always take the wisest course.) There is an implicit assumption in most discussions of peace that the Soviet Union is the "enemy" of permanent concern. But North-South tensions are likely to long outlast that particular temporary conflict. The rich capitalist countries require ever-increasing consumption for the well being of their economies, yet the planet would be hard-pressed to accommodate all five or six billion people in mass-consumption societies. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a state of peace on the planet when the vast majority of people remain in a condition of relative privation while the minority strives to increase consumption to maintain flourishing economies. This issue of the relationship between the consuming minority in the rich nations and the far-poorer vast majority of the Earth’s population is likely to remain long after the Soviet Union and the United States have learned to coexist. These connections among the various pieces of the world’s complex macro problem become fairly obvious when we turn our attention to them. But we often overlook how completely our predicament is a direct consequence of a way of thinking that emerged in Western Europe only a few centuries ago. To quote Roger Walsh: Moreover, for the first time in millions of years of human evolution, all the major threats to our survival are human-caused. Problems such as nuclear weapons, pollution, and ecological imbalance stem directly from our own behavior and can therefore Preface xi be traced to psychological origins. This means that the current threats to human survival and well-being are actually symptoms, symptoms of our individual and shared mind-set.’ The problems, in other words, are not only connected, but have a common source in the underlying Western perspectives and tacit assumptions that have shaped not only science and technology, but practically all aspects of modern society. An analogy will help make the point. It is well known that many illnesses are related to an underlying condition of stress, which has among its effects the impairment of the body’s immune system. When these diseases (such as peptic ulcers, allergies, and cardiovascular disease) are considered as isolated problems, the attempts to heal often fail—or result in another symptom popping up somewhere else. The reason is that the underlying cause has not been dealt with. It might seem that dealing with the whole collection of possible illnesses and their underlying cause all at once would necessarily be far more complex than approaching one of them alone. But this is not so. Changing the attitudinal approach to life and eliminating stress is in principle quite simple. (It may appear hard because of the psychological resistance to deep inner change.) Treating the whole-system problem of stress is more successful than direct attacks on the separate medical problems. The analogy suggests that the nuclear weapons threat, global environmental problems, world poverty and hunger, and an assortment of other modern dilemmas relate to an underlying mind-set in such a way that none of them are solvable without a change in that mind-set. Yet with that change and the associated whole-system change they all become solvable. The analogy fits in one more way as well. Just as the executive with heart trouble may be more accepting of a diagnosis that leads to bypass surgery than of one that requires a change in his or her fundamental attitudes, so many people today will seek for a resolution of the peace issue almost anywhere except in a fundamental change of mind. But is whole-system change a plausible scenario? There are two points to be made. First, there is precedent: Whole-system change has happened before in history. Second, forces that might bring this change about are increasingly in evidence. Within the context of Western civilization alone there have been at least two whole-system changes: the end of the Greco-Roman world and the transition from the Middle Ages, through the Renaissance and Reformation periods, into the modern age. It might seem rash indeed to predict a similarly profound revolutionary transfiguration of society. Yet a substantial and growing number of writers and thinkers do predict it, and there are some signs that make such a scenario not so unreasonable an expectation. Having lived over forty years with nuclear weapons, we are increasingly aware of the awfulness of our situation. Slowly but surely people are building up opposition to continuing the same perilous trends. The facts of those trends are familiar but still staggering. The total number of nuclear weapons in the world is around 50,000, with a total explosive power about two million times that of the Hiroshima bomb and a total tonnage 7,000 times that of all the bombs dropped during World War II. The explosion of even one of these weapons would be likely to release radioactive fallout that would dwarf the impact of Chernobyl to insignificance. Global nuclear war would result in devastation and suffering on a scale totally unknown in human history. The biological consequences, immediate and long-range, have been estimated and would be severe. Even if nuclear weapons were never again to be exploded, the radioactive waste already generated by their manufacture remains as an unsolved problem. Thousands of tons of radioactive waste products contain substances that are likely to remain toxic for centuries; no way is known to render the waste harmless, and no leak-proof storage has been devised. Economically, the arms race is a drain on all nations, most especially on the two superpowers and many of the Third World countries. Global military expenditures currently run around a trillion dollars a year, which is nearly three billion dollars a day. A small fraction of this expenditure could provide the whole world with adequate nutrition and sanitary water supply, public health measures to reduce disease, and housing and education. Worldwide, military expenditures account for around 6 percent of the gross economic product. For the United States the figure is about 7 percent, for the Soviet Union around 14 percent, and for some of the Third World countries it is well above 20 percent. In some Third World countries more is being spent on armaments than on health care, education, and welfare all together. In addition to the tragic waste of resources and human effort, uncountable human deaths are resulting from malnutrition and disease, partly from the lack of preventive measures. Untold human misery in poverty-stricken countries directly results from the diversion of attention to arms. Faced with such evidence of the effects of military buildup, people are beginning to see the need for change. Chapter 5 discusses further reasons why it may not be implausible to suppose that another fundamental change is now in the offing. As awareness of the frightening dimensions of the nuclear dilemma has grown, people have banded together in a variety of peace organizations—and hoped that their efforts toward a nuclear freeze, or a peace academy, or a test ban treaty, might be successful. In recent years leaders in these peace-related movements have found common cause with leaders of other groups—ecological and environmental movements, "Green politics," women’s movements, human rights organizations, and so on. And all of them have become more sophisticated in their understanding of how deep are the roots of the problems they are attempting to ameliorate. At the same time a new vision has been forming: a vision of a world with nuclear disarmament and global security, appreciation of the diversity of Earth’s many cultures, wholesome relationships between humans and the planet, elimination of subtle and not-so-subtle oppression of minorities and women, fundamental rights that are guaranteed by universal agreement—a vision of a world at peace. If the forces with this vision continue to grow, they could bring about the sort of whole-system change spoken of earlier. This possibility is not without hazards. People can be very fearful of change, and their reactionary responses can also bring on social disruption and human misery. Thus there are two compelling reasons for thinking about peace in a lucid and fundamental way: (1) to be more effective in working toward peace; (2) to better understand the kind of societal trauma that we may experience during the transition period that probably lies ahead. This short book aspires to be of assistance in that task of learning to think about peace rationally, penetratingly, but still with passion. In past conflicts we have been able to convince ourselves that if we could once vanquish the German "Huns"—or the Axis Powers, or "Red China," or the Soviets—then peace would be assured. But this logic is not as satisfying now as it was in our more naive years. We suspect that the solution to the problem is more complex than subduing some particular "enemy." The solution also involves more than choosing the right arms control policies or the right alternative security strategies or than adopting the latest conflict resolution techniques. Yet peace and common security, for all the world and for generations to come, is a conceivable goal—and therefore an achievable goal. To achieve it we will need a lot of clear thinking about the problem; we hope this book will contribute to that. And as the book points out, the first step in achieving this goal, as with any other goal, is to believe it can be done.
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Smoke and Harman 87 [Richard Smoke BA Harvard magna cum laude, PhD MIT, Professor at Brown, Winner Bancroft Prize in History, and Willis Harman M.S. in Physics and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University, Paths To Peace, 1987, Entire Preface]
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nuclear weapons presented a requirement for 100 percent reliability our endeavor to achieve lasting peace must succeed One might think there would be no effort spared such is not the case "national security" policies are confused and do not provide security. Our stance toward peace is ambivalent "peace" has taken on connotations of weakness the public disinterested, apathetic powerless Few feel capable of thinking clearly about the issue; do not think clearly about peace Even the definition peace and security are attainable But will require a whole system change the need for a system change does not make the goal less achievable system change has happened before and could happen again . The production of weaponry was once exclusively by governments military buildup has a momentum all its own Part of that momentum is the psychological inertia of conventional ways of thinking about international conflict the immediate point of conflict when fearful we do not take the wisest course There is an implicit assumption in discussions of peace the "enemy But North-South tensions are likely to long outlast particular conflict capitalist countries require ever-increasing consumption it is hard to imagine a state of peace when the majority remain in privation connections among the various pieces of the world’s complex macro problem become obvious when we turn our attention to them. But we often overlook how completely our predicament is a direct consequence of a way of thinking all the major threats to our survival are human-caused nuclear weapons, pollution ecological imbalance stem directly from our own behavior and can therefore be traced to psychological origins. threats to survival are actually symptoms of our individual and shared mind-set problems, are not only connected, but have a common source in the Western perspectives and tacit assumptions that have shaped all aspects of modern society many illnesses are related to an underlying condition of stress, When these diseases are considered as isolated problems, the attempts to heal often fail—or result in another symptom popping up The reason is that the underlying cause has not been dealt with. It might seem dealing with the whole collection of illnesses and their underlying cause would be far more complex But this is not so. Changing the attitudinal approach to life is simple. (It may appear hard because of the psychological resistance to deep inner change. Treating the whole-system is more successful than direct attacks on the separate problems. the nuclear weapons threat, global environmental problems, world poverty and hunger, and an assortment of other dilemmas relate to an underlying mind-set in such a way that none of them are solvable without a change in that mind-set. Yet with that change they all become solvable Just as the executive with heart trouble may be more accepting of a diagnosis that leads to bypass surgery than of one that requires a change in fundamental attitudes people today will seek for a resolution of the peace issue almost anywhere except in a fundamental change of mind But is whole-system change plausible there is precedent system change has happened in history forces that might bring this change about are increasingly in evidence. Having lived years with nuclear weapons, we are aware of the awfulness of our situation . Even if never again exploded, the radioactive waste remains an unsolved problem Economically, the arms race is a drain on all nations A small fraction of this expenditure could provide the whole world with adequate nutrition and sanitary water supply, public health measures to reduce disease, and housing and education more is being spent on armaments than on health care, education, and welfare all together , uncountable human deaths are resulting from malnutrition and disease, partly from the lack of preventive measures. Untold human misery in poverty-stricken countries directly results from the diversion of attention to arms a new vision has been forming: a vision of a world with nuclear disarmament and global security, appreciation of the diversity of Earth’s many cultures, wholesome relationships between humans and the planet, elimination of subtle and not-so-subtle oppression of minorities and women, fundamental rights that are guaranteed by universal agreement—a vision of a world at peace. . In past conflicts we have been able to convince ourselves that if we could once vanquish the German "Huns"—or the Axis Powers peace would be assured. But this logic is not as satisfying now as it was in our more naive years. the solution to the problem is more complex than subduing some particular "enemy." The solution also involves more than choosing the right arms control policies or the right alternative security strategies or than adopting the latest conflict resolution techniques common security is a conceivable goal—and an achievable goal the first step in achieving this goal is to believe it can be done
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Traditional conflict management fails through symptom focus. Failure to explore the psychological roots of enemy creation makes the 1AC harms suspect.
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The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes.
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Ahmed 11—Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [“The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
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The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating g h g emissions resulting in warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on food production, as well as on economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes
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The critique is prior. Global instability, resource depletion, and environmental crises are all a product of a flawed epistemic approach to IR—investigating the aff’s approach is prior to solvency.
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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.
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Ahmed 11—Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [“The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
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By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts
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Failure to critically interrogate the aff’s assumptions reifies the existing system—that undercuts their ability to form coherent policy responses and results in externalization of violence.
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One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13
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Biswas 7—Shampa Biswas, Politics at Whitman [“Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125]
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a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent The academy has become a particularly embattled site with the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ what has made possible the encroachment of such statist agendas has been a larger history of professionalisation’ Reid has critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’
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Supremacy of policy-making crowds out critical questioning—causes serial policy failure
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Having conceded where Nye has a point, let’s now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate ‘relevance’ that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and general social progress (and, quite probably, to those scholars’ research communities and their students). As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is [end page 127] more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large research grants which advance one’s institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scholar incapable of attracting research funding—a nowadays a standard criteria for academic employment and promotion.
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Jones 9—Lee Jones, Lecturer in International Politics in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London, former Rose Research Fellow in International Relations at Lady Margaret Hall at Oxford University, holds an MPhil and DPhil from Oxford University, [“International Relations Scholarship and the Tyranny of Policy Relevance,” Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Volume 1, Issue 1, http://criticalglobalisation.com/Issue%201/125_131_JCGS1_JONES_TYRANNYPOLICYRELEVANCE.pdf, p. 127-130]
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His assumption that the academic needs to be policy-relevant can be a very pernicious assumption it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is more or less coercive
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Reject their interpretation—calls for ‘policy relevance’ only entrench dominant systems of thought—this tunnel vision prevents true education—their interpretation is tainted by the hegemonic discourse reason why all their claims are suspect.
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Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as ‘allies’, ‘rivals’, or simply ‘insignificant’, thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states’ domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as ‘unstable*, ‘prosperous’, or ‘ethnically divided’. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things ‘seen’ by and significant for an actor while making other things ‘unseen’ and ‘insignificant’.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor’s and group of actors’ cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of ‘freedom fighters’, such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a ‘terrorist network’, such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum, the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the ‘other’ delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this ‘other’.
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Jourde 6 [Cedric Jourde, Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal, Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin, p. 182-3]
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Relations between states are constructed upon representations Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things ‘seen’ by and significant for an actor while making other things ‘unseen’ and ‘insignificant’ they are founded on each actor’s cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable , making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable identifying how a state represents another state helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the ‘other’ delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this ‘other’
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Representations come first, that’s Crawford—
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It follows that any meaningful discussion of agency must perforce be a discussion of representation. The representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency. While this study suggests that "race" historically has been a central marker of identity, it also suggests that identity construction takes place along several dimensions. Racial categories often have worked together with gendered categories as well as with analogies to parent/child oppositions and animal metaphors. Each of these dimensions has varying significance at different times and enables a wide variety of practices. In examining the construction of racialized identities, it is not enough to suggest that social identities are constructed on the basis of shared understandings within a community: shared understandings regarding institutional rules, social norms, and self- expectations of individuals in that community. It is not enough to examine the shared social criteria by which one identity is distinguished from another. Two additional elements must be considered: power and truth. "Race" has not just been about certain rules and resources facilitating the agency of some social groups and denying or placing severe limitations on the agency of other social groups. Though it has been about these things, this is only one aspect of what "race" has historically been about. "Race" has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as "true" and accurate representations of "reality." Racist discourses highlight, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge. A theory of agency in international relations, if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. This realization in turn implies a reconceptualization of power and how it works that transcends those present in existing theories of international relations. The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This Is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as -uncivilized" or "unfit for self-governinent is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, be.cause the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary, mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus the white malt at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: i. The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional -man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior re-presentations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (x8z: 14). Diffcrance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity of names that are in-scribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modem man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside * system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid4. Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign sub- stitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: iSo). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social political, and economic power arc inextricably linked, This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon chose who toil in the construction of structures of meaning.. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to -get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered -indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.
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Doty 96—Roxanne Doty, Poli Sci @ ASU [Imperial Encounters p. 168-171]
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any meaningful discussion of agency must be a discussion of representation representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency race" historically has been a central marker of identity Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as "true representations of "reality Racist discourses highlight the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge A theory of agency in i r if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior re-presentations The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modem man, the U S the West, real states) has never been absolutely present This generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances the construction of meaning and the construction of social political, and economic power arc inextricably linked This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon chose who toil in the construction of structures of meaning This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that i r pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations
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The dominant colonial representations that structure the aff’s understanding of international security are a prior ethical issue.
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However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames.10
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Reus-Smit 12—Christian Reus-Smit, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Italy [“International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies, June 2012, vol. 40 no. 3, pg. 525-540]
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the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from theorising rests more on assertion than weighty evidence we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. there is now a wealth of research that shows policy communities are not open epistemic realms awaiting well-communicated knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames
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Owen is wrong; we’ll straight turn his argument. Focus on theory doesn’t kill policy relevance. In fact, theoretical inquiry is a pre-requisite to policy relevant research—asking epistemological questions is key to avoid policy failure.
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It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate. Having specified these dangers, however, I want to turn to a confusion within much of IR that has, I will argue, acted to encourage this philosophical turn and so increase its exposure to these risks. As a preface to this task, though, it is useful to sketch out two main lines of debate within the IR theory wars; these are not the only lines of debate, but they are important ones.
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Owen 2 [David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage]
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I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science I want to turn to a confusion within much of IR that has, I will argue, acted to encourage this philosophical turn and so increase its exposure to these risks
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Owen concludes inevitable confusion in IR causes his ‘vicious cycle,’ not our critical interrogation
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Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn.
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Owen 2 [David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3, Sage]
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Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions
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Owen concludes epistemology and ontology are ‘policy relevant’
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The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g.. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic forms of this type of intellectual practice is the central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154)This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s points if intelligence if we recognize his concerns to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident as one believed to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposting of the question ‘ who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.
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Owen 94—David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton [Maturity and Modernity, pg. 209-210]
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The ‘universal’ intellectual maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ the partial character of criticism is not an ethos of fatal resignation but a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’ criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present ’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves
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Owen concedes empistemological inquiry is a pre-requisite to policy analysis—you are a specific intellectual challenging the crude assumptions of the 1AC’s discourse.
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Granted that the objectification and definition of a given phenomenon is open to a variety of normative and political considerations, it becomes interesting to explore how scientific knowledge constitutes a symbolic resource used by politically motivated actors. In order to justify and legitimize certain courses of action, and to render these possible and effective, scientific knowledge forms an important component both for efforts of persuading and mobilizing different groups, and for formulating and establishing policy practices. This can he grasped through the concept of poli1y stories. A policy story can be defined as follows: A set of factual, causal claims, normative principles and a desired objective, all of which are constructed as a more or less coherent argument a story which points to a problem to be addressed and the desirability and adequacy of adopting a specific policy approach to resolve it.
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Sending 4—Ole, Research Fellow @ Norweigan Inst. of Int’l Affairs [Global Institutions & Development eds. Morten Boas and Desmond McNeil p. 58-59]
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In order to justify certain courses of action knowledge forms an important component for formulating policy practices A set of factual, causal claims, normative principles and a desired objective, all of which are construct a story
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We should be analyzing the relationship between the plan and the advantages, not just the plan alone. Policy stories, like the 1ac institutionalize a particular understanding of both problems and solutions. Their advantage choices crowd out different policy practices and concepts.
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